ECHR

In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on a number of cases dealing with the issue of abortion, providing a sufficient corpus of jurisprudence which may be analysed in a consistent manner. A number of analysts, on both sides of the abortion debate, are not satisfied with this case-law. This article aims not to discuss each ruling of the Court case by case, but to try to find, in an objective and systematic manner, the coherency of the jurisprudence of the Court, and in doing so, to present a reasoned legal account of abortion under the Convention.

This article analyses the scope of the human rights of refugees in the ECHR looking at the latest trends in the jurisprudence developed by the Court and which are relevant to the protection of refugees. In doing so, it concentrates on the determination of those rights by the Court, leaving aside issues of access to those rights by refugees.  Its focus is primarily on the latest interpretation by the Court of Article 3 (prohibition against ill-treatment), Article 6 (right to a fair and public hearing), Article 8 (protection of family and private life), Article 13 (effective remedy), Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), and Article 1 of Protocol 7 (procedural safeguards against expulsion).  This analysis forms the core of the article with a first section on the protection of refugees against expulsion and a second section on the protection of the basic rights of refugees who are present in the territory of a Contracting State. Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the limits and opportunities of the ECHR for the protection of refugees in Europe.

Il volume analizza l'ambito di applicazione e il rilievo, per il diritto amministrativo sostanziale e processuale, dell'art. 6 CEDU in tema di "equo processo" . Si dà conto di come tale disposizione sia direttamente applicabile alla gran parte dei procedimenti amministrativi sanzionatori o comunque incisivi delle posizioni soggettive individuali, nonché, in via correttiva ed ex post, alla successiva fase giurisdizionale di impugnazione dei relativi provvedimenti. Si delineano poi i principali e conseguenti effetti di adattamento e di necessaria trasformazione dell'ordinamento nazionale che da tale quadro derivano (in particolare, sul piano dell'incremento delle garanzia procedimentali, e del più penetrante sindacato sulle valutazioni tecniche complesse e sulla discrezionalità amministrativa)

İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi içtihatlarındaki takdir marjı doktrininin Türkiye Anayasa Mahkemesi tarafından da kullanılmaya başlandığı gözlemlenmektedir. Anayasa Mahkemesi, İHAM'ın Sözleşme'ye taraf devletlerin takdir marjı içinde gördüğü konularda aynı takdir marjını yasama organına bırakma eğilimindedir.

Opinion 2/13, by which the CJEU declared incompatible with the EU treaties the long-negotiated draft agreement on EU accession to the ECHR, came as a shock to many observers. Yet, the relation between the ECJ and the ECtHR has a glorious past, and can continue to have a bright future. While the dust kicked up by Opinion 2/13 settles, the article takes a step back and puts the
ruling of the CJEU in a wider context. It recalls the long-standing historical relations between the CJEU and the ECtHR, and discusses the possible scenarios that may open up in the future. In particular, it claims that, even in the aftermath of Opinion 2/13, a virtuous competition between the CJEU and the ECtHR can have beneficial effect for the protection of fundamental rights, as
evidenced by the case of judicial review of targeted UN sanctions. At a time of increasing frustration and preoccupation on the relation between the CJEU and the ECtHR, the article strikes a
note of optimism, suggesting that the interaction between the two European supranational courts can still play a positive role for fundamental rights in Europe.

Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires that the state not only abstains from inflicting death, but also protects life. Nonetheless, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights seems to be progressively outlining a right to assisted suicide, which would fall in the scope of the right to private life. In this order, the court modifies the ground of dignity: it is no more inherent to human nature, but linked to each individual's perception of dignity. Finally, this case law raises questions relating to the role of the court.

Dopo avere dato conto di come il tema delle sanzioni amministrative sia stato sottoposto, negli ultimi anni, a una profonda revisione critica, soprattutto in ragione dell'influenza crescente esercitata dalla giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo, il lavoro si sofferma sul principio di tassatività-determinatezza delle sanzioni amministrative quale riconosciuto a livello costituzionale interno e mostra che interessanti sviluppi derivano oggi dall'art. 7 della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo (CEDU), nell'interpretazione offertane dalla giurisprudenza di Strasburgo

The EU citizenship is unique animal parasitizing on the national citizenship. Yet it has nearly gained self-standing status through the jurisprudence of the CJEU. However, the fact that the EU citizenship has been incrementally carved out on the case-by-case basis is responsible for its patchwork character which causes serious problems. Firstly, Member States have little understanding for the concept of the EU citizenship extended by the judge-made law since it has compromised their sovereignty in such areas as social and immigration policy. Secondly, reverse discrimination, pervading malaise of the EU citizenship, presents a situation where the static EU citizens are discriminated against dynamic one´s and even against Third Country Nationals. Hence the EU citizenship is perceived as a concept benefitting only small minority to the detriment of majority which is the reason why the EU citizenship failed to attain broad allegiance. Unpopular among Member States, lacking the support of ordinary citizens, the EU citizenship needs impetus in order to imbue the EU integration with legitimacy, instead of becoming reason of its erosion.

La CEDH construit progressivement un droit conventionnel au suicide assisté qui découle d’une vision du suicide comme expression de l’autonomie individuelle. Ainsi, ce « droit » ne trouve pas sa cause dans la souffrance, mais dans la liberté, rendant incohérent le fait de le réserver aux personnes grabataires. La seule responsabilité de l’Etat serait d’éviter les abus en veillant à la qualité de la volonté de mort. La Cour transcrit ainsi l’individualisme et le matérialiste contemporains, révolutionnant un fondement de la Convention: la dignité humaine ne serait plus inhérente, mais relative et réflexive, absorbée dans la liberté individuelle.

Civil forfeiture is playing an increasingly prominent role in the fight against organised crime. While this tool is attractive to law enforcement agencies, it does give rise to concerns under Art 6 of the ECHR. Such proceedings ought to attract the full range of enhanced procedural protections inherent in the criminal process. Even if the Strasbourg Court decides otherwise, there is an argument that the presumption of innocence ought to apply where civil forfeiture proceedings are instituted against a person subsequent to that person being acquitted in criminal proceedings. The Strasbourg jurisprudence, though, is permeated by confusion and inconsistency, which does not inspire confidence that the rights of the individual will be protected. The final section of this paper, then, considers whether civil forfeiture represents a proportionate response in the fight against organised crime. Ultimately, though, given lack of information on such crime, we cannot provide an answer either way – what can be said, though, is that civil forfeiture has had a significant impact on the rights of the individual.

Dopo avere dato conto della evoluzione subita dal principio di precauzione a livello internazionale, europeo e nazionale, il lavoro si sofferma sul tema dell'allentamento del principio di legalità-prevedibilità dell'azione amministrativa che si può verificare quando siano adottate misure cautelative per gestire il rischio nelle situazioni di incertezza. Inoltre, viene esaminata criticamente la tendenza espansiva del principio di precauzione che, nella legislazione nazionale, dovrebbe oramai vincolare non solo la pubblica amministrazione, ma pure i soggetti privati.

Le sujet de ce travail est la relation entre l’art. 17 (interdiction de l’abus de droit) et la liberté d’expression dans la jurisprudence de la Cour. L’ancienne Commission européenne des droits de l’homme et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ont interprété cette interdiction de l’abus de droit article au fil des années en l’utilisant notamment comme outil pour dénier la protection de l’art. 10 CEDH garantissant la liberté d’expression ou pour faciliter sa restriction au regard de l’art. 10 §2. Le but de ce travail sera d’analyser cette jurisprudence et d’en cerner les enjeux.
Après une première partie consacrée à l’importance de la liberté d’expression, aux restrictions « classiques » à celle-ci basées sur l’art. 10 §2 et au cas particulier de l’art. 17, suivront trois parties portant sur les différents cas de figure dans lesquels l’art. 17 trouve à s’appliquer pour restreindre la liberté d’expression. La première sera consacrée au traitement des affaires concernant la démocratie mise en danger par des partis anti-démocratiques ou par le discours d’incitation à la violence, la deuxième à celui des affaires concernant du discours de haine et la dernière au traitement du discours négationniste.
Tout au long de ces développements, la question sera celle de savoir dans quelle mesure l’art. 17 est un outil approprié pour restreindre comparativement à l’art. 10 §2 CEDH.

"This article addresses the role of strategic litigation of the right to legal capacity of people with disabilities. It places legal capacity within an international human rights law framework and sets out how it is particularly resonant in the context of disability where its withdrawal leads to arbitrary removal of rights such as the right to property, healthcare decision-making, working and voting. The article examines art.12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), a treaty which, at the time of writing, has been signed by all 27 Member States of the European Union and ratified by 18. In addition, the EU has acceded to the Convention, the CRPD being the first UN human rights treaty that has provided this opportunity.The author provides a review of European jurisprudence in the area of legal capacity and suggests that litigation can play a valuable role in highlighting the wrongs in guardianship systems, and opening
up areas for advocacy and law reform."

Information bibliographique de la Deutsche Nationalbibliothek La Deutsche Nationalbibliothek a répertorié cette publication dans la Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; les données bibliographiques détaillées peuvent être consultées sur Internet à l'adresse http://dnb.d-nb.de.

Pour la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, comme dans la plupart des droits nationaux, l’avortement relève d’une logique de tolérance. Cette tolérance est fondée sur la pétition de principe qu’il serait juridiquement et scientifiquement impossible, mais en fait surtout non souhaitable, de savoir si l’enfant à naître est une personne. Cette tolérance est accordée dans l’ordre interne via la technique de la marge d’appréciation nationale, mais elle n’a pas d’effet quant à la substance du droit à la vie dans l’ordre proprement conventionnel. La Cour a toujours refusé d’exclure explicitement l’enfant à naître du champ d’application de la Convention et de juger que cet enfant à naître n’est pas une personne. Tant qu’il en sera ainsi, il sera impossible de prétendre à l’existence d’un droit à l’avortement au titre de la Convention, et tout avortement pratiqué devrait être justifié par des droits et intérêts garantis par la Convention et proportionnés aux « autres droits et libertés concurrents, y compris ceux de l'enfant à naître ».

This brief legal note argues and demonstrates how the Italy-Libya engagement in 2017 to stem the migrant flows to the EU falls in a grey zone between the legal and the illegal. By explaining the different approaches that have been adopted by the two countries, the note argues that they are – to a certain extent – acting in a legal area on which there is not much judicial precedent. However, the evolutionary interpretation and application of the relevant legal doctrine leads to the conclusion that Italy can be considered complicit in the Libyan wrongful acts, despite the lack of a directly applicable legal rule or a clear-cut precedent on the extraterritorial application of the ECHR to an EU Member State’s acts of facilitation of internationally wrongful acts committed by another state. Despite these acts can be generally defined as “contactless”,1 they nevertheless can create international responsibility

The article examines the ECtHR's attitude towards end-of-life issues. It argues that the Court's tendency to limit its review to a procedural dimension is balanced by the importance attributed to 'personal autonomy', and that the limits imposed by most Member States to euthanasia and assistance in suicide are not coherent with the rising European consensus on this value.

"Friendly settlement procedure allows termination of the applications, which are received by supranational human rights monitoring mechanisms without a final decision on alleged violations. In the first chapter, the typology of friendly settlements and the differences from similar procedures will be examined. After analyzing the friendly settlement procedures under various human rights conventions beside ECHR in the second chapter, the friendly settlement procedure and the unilateral declarations under ECHR will be explained in the third chapter. In the final chapter, suggestions will be made through evaluating the opinions regarding friendly settlement and unilateral declarations proposed in the doctrine.
Keywords: Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, Friendly Settlement Procedure, Unilateral Declarations."

Dostane çözüm yolu, ulusalüstü insan hakları denetim organlarına yapılan başvuruların ihlal olup olmadığına ilişkin nihai bir karar verilmeksizin sona ermesini sağlamaktadır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde dostane çözüm yolunun türleri ve benzer kurumlardan farkları incelenecek, ikinci bölümünde ise AİHS dışındaki ulusalüstü insan hakları belgeleri çerçevesinde dostane çözüm yolunun uygulanması ele alınacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde AİHS’nin yürürlüğe girmesinden bugüne kadar dostane çözüm yolunun uygulanması anlatılarak dostane çözüm girişimlerinin başarısız olması halinde başvurulan tek taraflı bildirim sonucu davaların kayıttan düşürülmesi usulü incelenecektir. Son bölümde ise dostane çözüm ve tek taraflı bildirimlere yönelik doktrinde belirtilen görüşler değerlendirilmek suretiyle önerilerde bulunulacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan Hakları, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi, Dostane Çözüm Yolu, Tek Taraflı Bildirimler.

Opinion 2/13, by which the CJEU declared incompatible with the EU treaties the long-negotiated draft agreement on EU accession to the ECHR, came as a shock to many observers. Yet, the relation between the ECJ and the ECtHR has a glorious past, and can continue to have a bright future. While the dust kicked up by Opinion 2/13 settles, the article takes a step back and puts the ruling of the CJEU in a wider context. It recalls the long-standing historical relations between the CJEU and the ECtHR, and discusses the possible scenarios that may open up in the future. In particular, it claims that, even in the aftermath of Opinion 2/13, a virtuous competition between the CJEU and the ECtHR can have beneficial effect for the protection of fundamental rights, as evidenced by the case of judicial review of targeted UN sanctions. At a time of increasing frustration and preoccupation on the relation between the CJEU and the ECtHR, the article strikes a note of optimism , suggesting that the interaction between the two European supranational courts can still play a positive role for fundamental rights in Europe.

This study revisits the place of the Holocaust and the French revolutionary tradition in the birth of international human rights law, with particular reference to the genesis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It argues against conceptualizing the drafting of the UDHR as an exceptional moment of Holocaust remembrance in the immediate aftermath of the war, positing instead that the framers’ silence on the Jewish identity of the victims of Nazi genocidal acts functioned as an instrument of consensus politics. The article also examines how figures on the French far right practiced their own form of consensus politics by recasting their counterrevolutionary corporatist agenda in the idiom of human rights, all the while championing the civil liberties of those accused of collaboration with the Axis enemy.

The case of Lautsi v. Italy, better known as the “Crucifix Case,” is a particularly significant case. Its significance is not only political and legal, but also religious. Never before in the history of the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe has a case raised so much public attention and debate. The debate regarding the legitimacy of the symbol of Christ’s presence in Italian schools is emblematic of the cultural crisis in Western Europe regarding religion. Twenty-one State parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, in an unprecedented move, joined Italy to reassert the legitimacy of the public display of Christian symbols in European society. The Court finally recognized, in substance, that in countries of Christian tradition, Christianity enjoys a special social legitimacy that distinguishes it from other philosophical and religious belief systems. In other words, because Italy is a country of Christian tradition, Christian symbols may legitimately enjoy greater visibility in Italian society than other religious or ideological symbols.

La Corte Interamericana de los Derechos Humanos (en lo adelante ‘Corte IDH’), contrario a su homóloga europea, no ha admitido categóricamente el margen de apreciación en su jurisprudencia. No obstante, contrario a su homóloga europea, ha admitido un deber general de los Estados partes de la Convención Americana sobre Derecho Humanos (en lo adelante ‘CADH’) realizar un juicio de compatibilidad entre actos o normas jurídicas respecto a la Convención. Como existe la obligación primaria de tutelar los derechos protegidos por la CADH, es inevitable la existencia del margen de apreciación a cargo de los Estados, en un determinado sentido, para hacer efectivas sus obligaciones, a propósito de los artículos 1.1 y 2.1 del citado convenio. Pero esto tiene implicaciones respecto a la determinación del contenido de los derechos, ante la inexistencia de una teoría o una concepción sobre los derechos en la CADH.

L’articolo mostra come la pretesa a ottenere un’abitazione sociale si venga sempre più a configurare, grazie all’influenza dell’ordinamento europeo, come un diritto umano avente un ben definito e non comprimibile contenuto sostanziale.
In conseguenza di ciò, l’ordinamento interno è oggi chiamato a individuare effettivi strumenti di tutela che consentano di rendere giustiziabile tale posizione individuale. La questione riveste una rilevanza particolare in ragione dell’ampio coinvolgimento di soggetti privati nel momento dell’attuazione degli interventi edilizi e in quello, successivo, della assegnazione degli alloggi sociali. Se infatti è pacifico il diritto di azione del cittadino nei confronti delle decisioni dell’amministrazione incidenti sui suoi interessi pretensivi, molto più complessa è la definizione degli ambiti di tutela nei confronti di scelte sì di interesse generale, ma compiute da soggetti privati finanziati in tutto o in parte tramite risorse pubbliche.
Il tema del social housing costituisce dunque l’occasione per una più generale riflessione sugli strumenti di tutela del cittadino nei confronti delle scelte di amministrazione di beni scarsi delegate dal pubblico al privato.

El en presente artículo, ejemplificando en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos humanos, se analiza el efecto de fertilización jurisprudencial cruzada (jurisprudential cross-fertilization) entre el Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos y el Derecho penal internacional, tanto cuando éste es aplicado por los tribunales internos, como cuando lo es por los tribunales internacionales, denunciando simultáneamente el frecuente uso defectuoso de la jurisprudencia ajena. Para ello además se resumen las principales aportaciones del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos al Derecho penal internacional, comentando simultáneamente las similitudes y las diferencias que presenta con la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.

Human rights problems exist all over Europe. Although the European Court of Human Rights is competent to deal with individual complaints about such problems, the Court is much criticised. Moreover, there may be little political will or capacity to tackle the structural problems which have caused such complaints to be made. At the same time, the judgments of the Court can be shown to have great impact on national case-law, legislation and policy. Paradoxically, thus, the Court's case-law has an important transformative power, as is further explained in this essay.

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) explicitly embeds the concept of reasonable accommodation within the principle of non-discrimination. Article 2 of the CRPD unambiguously recognizes that reasonable accommodation is vital in enabling persons with disabilities to enjoy and exercise their rights on an equal basis with others. This article argues that in the ten years since its entry into force, the CRPD has stimulated a process of cross-fertilization. In particular, it contends that the CRPD has played a crucial role in the advancement of disability equality, and in the recognition of reasonable accommodation as a gateway to the equal enjoyment of all human rights within the European human rights system. By adopting a legal perspective and a traditional doctrinal approach, this article focuses on relevant Euro-pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. It shows the gradual adoption by the ECtHR of the concept of reasonable accommodation as an essential element to remove specific barriers or disadvantages to which a particular disabled individual would otherwise be subject. The primary emphasis of this short article is on the ECtHR case law and on the extent to which it has translated the CRPD and the work of the CRPD Committee into the European human rights system.

Диссертация на соискание ученой степени канд. юрид. наук.

Посвящена исследованию онтологии и прикладного механизма взаимодействия Европейского Суда по правам человека и национальных судебных юрисдикций при осуществлении правосудия по гражданским делам.
Предпринята попытка осмыслить правовую природу деятельности ЕСПЧ и юридическую силу его постановлений в контексте гармонизации цивилистического процесса. С привлечением широкого круга литературных и правоприменительных источников, в том числе на иностранных языках, материалов судебной практики как в России, так и за рубежом, исследуются вопросы о роли и месте ЕКПЧ в системе источников гражданского процессуального права; о понятии и сущности доктрины свободы усмотрения (margin of appreciation doctrine) и ее эволюции.

For members of ethno-cultural minorities, the right of political participation means more than the right to seek to influence the outcome of a process designed to aggregate individual preferences to find a decision acceptable to a majority of citizens. Effective participation of national minorities in public life requires specific arrangements to "facilitate the inclusion of minorities within the State and enable minorities to maintain their own identity and characteristics, thereby promoting the good governance and integrity of the State." 1 After an overview of the different approaches toward minorities and their political representation (which obviously determine the legal solutions adopted and consequently the judicial attitude), the paper deals with more specific rules on the political representation of minorities (such as participation at central, regional and local government level, special electoral rules, non-territorial arrangements, veto rights, consultative bodies, etc.) and their judicial interpretation in comparative analysis. In conclusion, the paper argues that the concrete recognition of effective rights of political participation by the courts depends on the set of values forming the basis of the constitutions. Any technical instruments for the implementation and guarantee of these rights can only be based on the political recognition of the representation and participation of minorities as a constitutionally legitimate aim (and value).

The 2020 pandemic caused by Sars-Cov-2 (hereinafter, the coronavirus pandemic), has triggered an array of legal responses across Council of Europe States. Many measures taken by states to slow the spread of the virus by ‘flattening the curve’ and enforce social distancing are similar across states. That stated, one key fault-line opening up is on the question of whether to derogate from the ECHR under Article 15.  The purpose of this  article is to demonstrate why Article 15 ECHR should be used to accommodate what has become known as ‘lockdown’ powers necessary to confront the coronavirus pandemic. This is the closest we shall get to an ‘ideal state of emergency’—the very situation it was designed for.  In contrast, far from protecting human rights, failure to use Article 15 ECHR risks normalising exceptional powers and permanently recalibrating human rights protections downwards.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. – 2.1. Il contesto istituzionale. – 2.2. La “base normativa” e la sua evoluzione. – 2.3.1. La composizione della Corte. – 2.3.2. (segue:) Un confronto critico con le Corti nazionali. – 2.4. Le funzioni e le modalità operative. – 2.5. Il parametro. – 2.6. L’ oggetto. – 2.7. La dottrina del margine di apprezzamento e i rapporti con le Corti nazionali – 2.8.1. I problemi posti dall’allargamento ad est del Consiglio d’Europa. – 2.8.2. (segue:) Le risposte della Corte europea. – 2.9.1. L’amplificazione dell’effetto diretto della giurisprudenza di Strasburgo… – 2.9.2. …e dell’effetto indiretto delle decisioni della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. – 2.10. Il problema del superamento del giudicato nazionale. – 2.11. Il protocollo n. 12 sull’eguaglianza e le sue possibili ripercussioni. – 2.12. Le innovazioni previste dal protocollo n. 14. – 3. La Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. – 3.1. La base normativa: aspetti strutturali e operativi. – 3.2. Le funzioni. – 3.3.1. Il parametro: l’elaborazione della Corte in tema di “principi generali” e diritti fondamentali. – 3.3.2. (segue:) La Carta dei diritti e le sue potenzialità in riferimento al ruolo “costituzionale” della Corte di giustizia (e… dei giudici comuni?). – 3.4.1. L’oggetto: il sindacato (diretto) sugli atti comunitari… – 3.4.2. …e il sindacato (essenzialmente indiretto) sugli atti nazionali (…nell’ambito d’applicazione del diritto dell’Unione). – 3.5. Gli effetti delle decisioni. – 3.6. La prima prudenza post Maastricht. - 3.7. Tendenze recenti: le reazioni della Corte di giustizia ai nuovi problemi posti dall’allargamento ad est dell’Unione. – 4. Gli scenari futuri: in particolare, la prospettiva dell’adesione dell’Unione alla CEDU. –5. Conclusioni generali.

Birinci bölümde öncelikle çevre hakkı teriminin anlaşılması amacıyla bu hakkın tanımı, hukuki niteliği ve kapsamı hakkında açıklamalar yapılacak, daha sonra bu hakkın uluslararası ve ulusal düzlemdeki önemli kaynaklarına değinilecektir. Son olarak ise bu hakkın önemli ilkelerinden bahsedilecektir. İkinci bölümde ilk olarak AİHM’nin çevresel davalara koruma sağlarken özellikle dayandığı yorum yöntemleri ve doktrinlere değinilecektir. Üçüncü bölümde kabul edilebilirlik koşulları bakımından çevresel davalarda özellik gösteren birtakım hususlara yer verilecektir. Devamı bölümde ise çevresel davalarda AİHM’nin koruma kapsamını sınırlandıran bir etmen olarak ulusal takdir marjı doktrinine değinilecektir. Beşinci bölüm, AİHM’nin çevresel davalardaki yaklaşımını, çevre hakkına koruma sağlayan Sözleşme veya Ek Protokollerinde düzenlenmiş her bir hak bağlamında ele alacaktır. Son bölümde ise çevresel davalarda söz konusu olan usuli güvenceler, spesifik olarak çevresel davalara ait güvenceler ve genel olarak var olan güvenceler olarak ikili bir ayrımla incelenecektir.

This chapter traces how Winston Churchill in tandem with a number of British and continental conservatives sought to promote postwar reconciliation with Germany by means of championing a European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It traces how Churchill fashioned a basis for reconciliation by imagining a "European family" that needed to be created – or in his words, recreated – on the basis of a new European human rights system for reconciliation to be achieved.  This initiative was backward-looking as well as forward-looking. Churchill and his allies in the European unity movements invoked the language of human rights in order to recall a lost European civilization anchored in common Christian and humanist values.

L’Autore, premessi alcuni richiami alla pratica della tortura così come inflitta e disciplinata in differenti epoche storiche, dedica attenzione ad alcune vicende giudiziarie dell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra, esemplari nell’evidenziare un’inaccettabile lacuna normativa in più occasioni lamentata dalla giurisprudenza nazionale e sovranazionale. Serie perplessità vengono inoltre espresse quanto agli oscillanti orientamenti della Corte di Strasburgo in merito alla violazione dell’art. 3 C.E.D.U., permanendo rilevanti riserve quanto all’individuazione di un chiaro discrimine fra “tortura” e “trattamenti inumani e degradanti”.
Infine, particolare considerazione è riservata ad un’attenta analisi del nuovo delitto di tortura a partire dai relativi lavori preparatori, valutato globalmente tanto alla luce dei profili ritenuti apprezzabili quanto di quelli innegabilmente critici: primo fra tutti, la speciale esimente disciplinata all’art. 613-bis, comma 3 c.p., la quale rischia di compromettere radicalmente l’operatività della nuova disposizione.

As the title suggests, the paper begins with an historical overview of the theory and practice of torture, spanning from roman to contemporary law, with special focus given to notable cases decided by the Italian courts during the second half of the past century, which highlighted an unacceptable lack of regulation in Italian criminal law. Further attention is then paid to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, its contradictory stances on the construction of Article 3 E.C.H.R. and the notions of “torture” and “inhuman or degrading treatment” contained therein. A careful analysis of Article 613-bis (introduced in 2017) of the Italian Penal Code follows, providing a detailed illustration of the preparatory works and an overall assessment of both positive and negative aspects of the new provision, notably the special exemption stated in the third paragraph, which poses a serious threat to its effectiveness.​

Over the past few years, states have been entering into international agreements that increasingly displace their non-refoulement obligations. Non-refoulement is a legal norm that protects vulnerable people from being expelled and returned to a state where they might face serious mistreatement. This rule has been a cornerstone of the law on international migration and forced movement for a considerable period, even being viewed as a human right by some. However, recently states have begun entering into international agreements and treaties that overcome the non-refoulement obligation through a number of arrangements. This study will proceed by looking at three forms of contracting out of non-refoulement: agreements that establish facts, agreements that establish jurisdiction or agreements creating competing norms. This article seeks to draw attention to these effects, criticize them and emphasize that we should not lose sight of the need to protect vulnerable people from expulsion to situations of serious mistreatment.

On 14 July 2015 the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) passed a very alarming ruling No. 21-P whereby all lower courts shall stop the proceedings on any case submitted for their consideration and refer to the RCC in order to review the constitutionality of legislation in which the ECtHR has found flaws. Should the RCC come to a conclusion that the Strasbourg decision is incompatible with the Constitution, it is not to be implemented. Later in 2015 a Federal Constitutional Law was adopted solidifying the right of the RCC to rule, essentially, on the constitutionality of a Strasbourg judgment (No. 7-FKZ of 14 December 2015).

If not a sign of a change in the general political attitude towards the implementation of decisions of the Strasbourg Court, this ruling at least brought forward the debate about international obligations and state sovereignty. The RCC reasoned that:

‘the participation of the Russian Federation in any international treaty does not mean giving up national sovereignty. Neither the ECHR, nor the legal positions of the ECtHR based on it, can cancel the priority of the Constitution. Their practical implementation in the Russian legal system is only possible through recognition of the supremacy of the Constitution’s legal force.’

Importantly, the RCC classified their reserved position as the ‘right to object’ which, in view of the Court can only be used ‘in the most exceptional cases for the sake of making a contribution to the balanced formation of the European Court of Human Rights.’

This paper argues that the ‘right to object’ is not a revolutionary invention of the RCC. It is used in one form or another by the Constitutional Courts of Austria, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Essentially, there are reasons to agree with the RCC that ‘the interaction of European and constitutional legal orders is impossible in conditions of subordination, because only dialogue between different legal systems is the basis of a proper balance.’

En el momento actual, la intensidad del impacto del derecho de la Unión en la determinación del estatuto jurídico de todas las personas que se encuentran físicamente en el territorio de la Unión -o de sus Estados miembros 1 -es notable. Junto a la existencia de la ciudadanía de la Unión europea se desarrolla en estos momentos una incipiente política de extranjería europea a través de la reinaugurada política común de * Recibido: 6/6/2011. Aceptado: 14/6/2011.! 1 La referencia -generalizada en documentos políticos e institucionales-al territorio de la Unión , o al territorio de la Comunidad , sigue siendo jurídicamente incorrecto. Sobre esta cuestión, Del Valle Gálvez, A., Inmigración, extranjería y fronteras en la Unión Europea: cinco problemas conceptuales en Forner Delaygua, J. J. (Ed.), Fronteras exteriores de la UE e inmigración a España: Relaciones internacionales y derecho. Cuadernos 33 de la Escuela Diplomática, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2007, pp. 43-80, p. 50. A este respecto, resulta significativa la precisión ofrecida por el Artículo 77 del Tratado sobre el Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea -inexistente hasta el momento-que pretende aferrarse a una concepción clásica de territorio estatal al señalar que el presente artículo no afectará a la competencia de los Estados miembros respecto de la delimitación geográfica de sus fronteras, de conformidad con el Derecho internacional . Sin embargo, progresivamente emerge una concepción independiente de la Unión, que ha desembocado en el empleo en los Tratados del término alternativo espacio , de forma que, al igual que la ciudadanía de la Unión se ha erigido en categoría jurídica independiente entre la ciudadanía y la extranjería, el territorio de la Unión emerge como una tercera categoría que se diferencia del territorio nacional y del territorio extranjero. Las consecuencias jurídicas de este desarrollo permanecen, no obstante, inciertas. Véase, Bast, J., Transnationale Verwaltung des Europäischen Migrationsraums , Der Staat, 46 1, pp. 1-32, p. 4. Sin duda, el asunto Ruiz Zambrano constituye un paso al frente en esta dirección. El TJUE se refiere expresamente al territorio de la Unión en el punto 44 de su Sentencia. ! RGDE 24 (2011) Iustel ! 2 inmigración 2 . En el marco de este contexto, surgen dos tensiones que son

The article aims at placing the ECtHR's Menarini ruling in the broader context of the ECtHR jurisprudence. In addition, the article discusses the ECHR standards that dictate the required intensity of judicial control over the inspections run by competition authorities. The ECtHR judgement in Delta Pekarny of 2014 serves as a primary point of reference. Finally, the article discusses the challenges arising from ECHR framework judgments for the enforcement system of EU and Polish competition law.

Surrogacy is a widespread practice for childless parents. Surrogacy laws vary widely from State to State. Some States require genetic parents to obtain a jurisdictional order to have their names on the original birth certificate, without the name of the surrogate mother. Other States allow to put the name of the intended parents on the birth certificate. In Italy and in other countries (e.g. France, Spain) all forms of surrogacy are forbidden, whether it be traditional or gestational, commercial or altruistic. Stepping back from three recent judgments issued by the European Court of Human Rights (Mennesson v. France, n. 65942/11, and Labassee v. France, n. 65941/11, 26.6.2014, Paradiso e Campanelli v. Italie, n. 25358/12, 27.1.2015), in the cases where national rules forbid the transcription of birth certificates for public policy reasons, specifically the prohibition of surrogacy, this Article aims at an analysis of the subject, dealing with the contrast between public policy on the one side and the fundamental right to identity as stated by art. 8 ECHR, on the other. The ECtHR affirms, in some way, that subverting the effectiveness of the prohibition of surrogacy may be justified by the best interest of the child.  Anyway it is debatable if this fundamental principle ought to be read as an exception to the public policy clause or as a basic value of this.

This contribution scrutinises the main implications of
the introduction by the Court of Justice of an alternative
jurisdiction test in EU citizenship cases. The test is based on
the concept of the intensity of Member State interference with
EU citizenship rights of individuals and does not take the
existence (or not) of any cross-border situation into account.
This signifies a definitive move away from the Internal Market
thinking, establishing EU citizenship as such as an activator
of EU law. It also has significant implications for the division
of powers between the Union and the Member States. It
remains to be seen how frequently the new test will be used
next to the established cross-border situation test. A departure
from the market rationale, although potentially radical, is
to be welcomed, since it reflects the essence of the concept
of citizenship better and offers important opportunities to
improve the legal position of the individual in the context of
the European integration project.

On the 18th of December 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered the historic Opinion 2/13, where it ruled that the draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is not compatible with Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union or with Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) TEU.In terms of practical effects, the Court’s long list of objections to the draft agreement as expressed in Opinion 2/13, blocked, at least temporarily, the road towards the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Furthermore, in symbolic terms, Opinion 2/13 reflected the Court’s fundamental disagreement with the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and the 24 Member States that submitted their observations in the context of the Opinion request, all concluding that “the draft agreement is compatible with the Treaties”. Finally, in terms of internal organization and function, Opinion 2/13 exposed the division between the Court and the Advocate General Kokott, who had concluded in her View that under certain conditions, the draft agreement is compatible with EU law. It is, therefore, evident that there are many aspects of Opinion 2/13 that require thorough analysis and interpretation. The core of this Thesis is an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. Did the Court fully and adequately justify its negative Opinion to the question of the European Commission on the following issue: “is the draft agreement providing for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’) compatible with the Treaties?”?

2. How is the protection of human rights in Europe affected by the Court’s rejection of the accession of the EU to the ECHR and what is the way forward?

Come ormai noto, il processo di attribuzione individuale di eventi lato sensu disastrosi - o, più correttamente, dei loro effetti sulle persone - solleva enormi criticità; d’altra parte, come sottolineato da autorevole dottrina in merito alla vicenda Eternit, tali casi inevitabilmente pongono un problema di giustizia: problema che si sostanzia, appunto, nell’ardua individuazione dei soggetti responsabili e che, assai spesso, prende le mosse da situazioni di errata, intempestiva o mancata attivazione da parte delle competenti autorità (carenze legislative, errori di pianificazione, vuoti di controllo etc.)
Questa negligenza istituzionale, d’altro canto, fa oggi da base ad un modello diverso e relativamente nuovo di responsabilità, che qualifica gli effetti dei disastri come vere e proprie violazioni di diritti umani e che individua quale proprio destinatario lo Stato unitariamente inteso. In ambito CEDU, in particolare, da una decina d’anni a questa parte, s’è assistito al consolidamento della teorica della responsabilità statale in materia di disastri: sullo Stato gravano obblighi positivi di protezione della vita e dell’incolumità, tanto in relazione ad eventi naturali quanto in relazione ad attività artificiali, e il mancato rispetto di tali obblighi legittima i soggetti coinvolti a ‘cercare giustizia’ adendo la Corte europea.
Il presente lavoro si propone di delineare questo nuovo statuto punitivo dello Stato, essenzialmente costruito sugli articoli 2 e 8 della Convenzione. Anche appoggiandosi alla terminologia adoperata in altre aree del diritto, si punta, anzitutto, a dare una definizione quanto più comprensiva di ‘disastro’; quindi, ad esaminare la struttura di questo illecito, azzardando una trasposizione delle tradizionali categorie penalistiche sul piano statale; infine, a valutare aspetti positivi e aspetti critici di questo modello, soffermandosi anche su possibili, nuovi obblighi d'incriminazione.

The Italian lawmakers have recently extended the anti-
Mafia non conviction based confiscation to the persons suspected of belonging to a criminal association aimed to corruption or to the commission of various crimes against public administration. This provision, although apparently in line with the tendency increasingly widespread on a supranational level to use instruments of a broadly preventive character to fight serious crimes, raises some issues, especially in terms of compliance with human rights protection. Indeed, although these measures focus
on property and not on individuals, in many cases they
significantly affect the life and well being of the people involved.
After analysing the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR) case law on administrative measures having criminal nature and on Anti-Mafia non conviction based confiscation, the
article investigates the legitimacy of the extension of this specific form of non-conviction based confiscation to the crimes against public administration.