European Union Energy Policy

The article analyses the development and outcomes of the EU efforts to form a liberalized internal energy market. Particular attention was paid to multilevel system of governance of the energy market and the balance between network and hierarchical forms of governance. The research concludes that the legislative and regulatory regime is still rather heterogeneous and cannot provide the desirable level of competition. The shortages of energy infrastructure prevent the merger of national energy markets of EU member states. The paper reveals factors that impede further liberalization of the market.

Due to insufficient level of domestic natural gas production, the European Union countries are forced to import this key energy resource from the third countries. This involves political and economic as well as physical risks. In order to ensure energy security, it is necessary to mitigate the threats that in the case of natural gas supplies are primarily related to various types of dependencies. The dependency grows in the situation of low diversification of energy sources and resources suppliers. The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of LNG imports on the European Union’s energy security, which would not be possible without showing the structure of the regional natural gas market. Implications of LNG trade will be shown in comparison with pipeline gas supplies, which are dominant on this market.

Η ενεργειακή φτώχεια αποτέλεσε έναν από τους παράγοντες επιδείνωσης της θέσης των μικρών και πολύ μικρών επιχειρήσεων στην Ελλάδα, σύμφωνα με τα ευρήματα ποιοτικής και ποσοτικής έρευνας που διενεργήθηκε μεταξύ Μαΐου και Αυγούστου 2019. Αιτία της εμφάνισης και της επιδείνωσης της ενεργειακής φτώχειας είναι η άνοδος των τιμών του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος (κατά 28% για τις μεσαίου μεγέθους βιομηχανίες και 177% για τα νοικοκυριά από το 2006 ως το 2017) και η πτώση των εσόδων των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων (ΜμΕ). Ως αποτέλεσμα, το 15% των ΜμΕ έχουν καθυστερημένες οφειλές σε λογαριασμούς ενέργειας (ΔΕΗ, φυσικό αέριο, κ.α.) Παρότι είναι αδύνατο να εξαχθούν αξιόπιστοι μέσοι όροι, εξ αιτίας των μεγάλων αποκλίσεων που προέρχονται από τα διαφορετικά μεγέθη και τις διαφορετικές δραστηριότητες, πολλές ΜμΕ καταβάλλουν ακόμη και το 66% του κέρδους τους για ενεργειακό κόστος (όσες δραστηριοποιούνται πχ στον κλάδο της εστίασης).
Με βάση τις απαντήσεις που έδωσαν 19 επαγγελματίες προερχόμενοι όλοι σχεδόν από διαφορετικούς κλάδους, ακόμη και σήμερα σχεδόν 1 στους 3 επιβαρύνεται με την αποπληρωμή διακανονισμών σε ληξιπρόθεσμα χρέη του παρελθόντος προς ενεργειακές εταιρείες.
Παρά το τέλος της οικονομικής κρίσης και ύφεσης, το σύνολο των ερωτηθέντων (100%) απάντησε ότι συνεχίζει να λειτουργεί υπό το ίδιο καθεστώς περιορισμών στην κάλυψη των ενεργειακών του αναγκών, όπως συνέβαινε και στο αποκορύφωμα της κρίσης, σε βάρος της ποιότητας των παρεχόμενων υπηρεσιών, των όρων ζωής και εργασίας του. Οι περιορισμοί αυτοί αφορούσαν και συνεχίζουν να αφορούν περιορισμένη ή ακόμη και καθόλου χρήση συσκευών κλιματισμού το καλοκαίρι, και θέρμανσης το χειμώνα, θερμοσίφωνα, λαμπτήρων φωτισμού, ενώ εντατικοποιείται η λειτουργία του υπάρχοντος παραγωγικού εξοπλισμού.
Σχεδόν 2 στους 3 συμμετέχοντες προτιμούν ένα σύστημα σταθερών κι εκ των προτέρων γνωστών τιμών για το ηλεκτρικό ρεύμα, απορρίπτοντας το σημερινό απρόβλεπτο καθεστώς συνεχών αυξήσεων. Από τις απαντήσεις των ερωτώμενων αναδεικνύονται τα κόστη που προκαλεί η πολύ κακή κατάσταση του κτιριακού αποθέματος (π.χ. το 69% των κτιρίων δε διαθέτει μόνωση), που επιβαρύνει τους λογαριασμούς της ενέργειας, ενώ το γεγονός ότι η έδρα των 2 σχεδόν από τους 3 επαγγελματίες δεν είναι ιδιόκτητη λειτουργεί αποθαρρυντικά για την ανάληψη του κόστους της ενεργειακής αναβάθμισης.
Συμπερασματικά προκύπτει ότι το ενεργειακό κόστος έχει εξελιχθεί σε μια σοβαρότατη παράμετρο του κόστους λειτουργίας, που ενίοτε υπερβαίνει ακόμη και το εργατικό και σε κάθε περίπτωση έχει οδηγήσει στην άνοδο της ενεργειακής φτώχειας.

Warsaw for the Falling Walls Lab, September 22
Center for Theoretical Physics
Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland

Presentation title: Breaking the wall of Europe
Problem: For centuries, Germany and Russia have been the mortal enemies of Poland. The EU reconciled Poles and Germans. Reconciliation between Poland and Russia is a matter of the future of Europe.
Answer:
Therefore-despite Brexit and migration crisis-the EU should be the federal state, but not United States of Europe, but the Federal State of European Nations (From Lisbon to-sometimes–Vladivostok). Russia - Future of Europe?

Avropa regionu dünyanın iqtisadi mərkəzi hesab edilir və bu mərkəzin enerji təminatı hal hazırda gündəmdə olan məsələlərdən biridir. Xüsusilə XXI əsrdən etibarən Rusiya-Avropa münasibətləri enerji prizmasından əhəmiyyət kəsb edir. Son dönəm dünyada gedən dinamik proseslər dövlətlərin geostrateji imperativ kimi “enerji təhlükəsizliyi” konsepsiyalarının qəbul etməsi enerjinin önəmini ortaya qoyur və bu konsepsiyalar dünyada yeni enerji xəritəsinin yaranmasına gətirib çıxarır. Dünyanın ən çox enerji idxal edən regionu olaraq Avropanın da enerji gələcəyi bu istiqamətdə son dövrlər müzakirə olunan əsas gündəm mövzularından biridir. İqtisadi böhranlar, siyasi münaqişələr, neftin qiymətinin kəskin enməsi, Rusiya ətrafında baş verən proseslər Avropanın enerji təhlükəsizliyinin təmin olunmasına təhlükə yaradır və Avropada enerjinin gələcəyi haqqında müsbət fikirləri sual altına qoyur.
Məqalədə Avropanın enerji siyasəti bir çox statistik məlumatlar əsasında analiz edilir, Rusiyadan asılılığın aradan qaldırılması və ya azaldılması məsələsi, diversifikasiya, yeni mənbələrin mövcudluğu, tranzit bölgələrin təhlükəsizlik meyarları araşdırılır.
Açar sözlər: Avropanın enerji siyasəti, enerji təhlükəsizliyi, diversifikasiya, Avropa İttifaqı, Rusiya, Xəzər regionu, Cənub Qaz Dəhlizi, Türkiyə, Ukrayna, İran.

Resumen:
La Unión Europea ha dado respuesta a la crisis climática, la COVID-19, la erosión de la globalización, y un entorno internacional adverso a través de tres estrategias interrelacionadas: el Pacto Verde Europeo, que define un nuevo modelo de desarrollo económico y social orientado a la descarbonización de la economía y el cumplimiento de las metas climáticas del Acuerdo de París; el programa NextGenerationEU (NGEU), como respuesta contracíclica a la pandemia, y mecanismo financiero para acelerar la triple transición socioeconómica, digital y ecológica de la UE; y la búsqueda de una mayor soberanía o autonomía estratégica. Este trabajo examina NGEU y el Pacto Verde como elementos del relanzamiento del proyecto europeo, y de la respuesta societal de la UE a la crisis de la globalización. También se analiza cómo la invasión rusa en Ucrania ha inducido la convergencia de las metas del Pacto Verde en materia de energía con los imperativos de soberanía energética planteados por la aparición de una "Europa geopolítica".

Abstract:
The European Union has faced the climate crisis, the COVID-19, the erosion of globalization, and an ad- verse international scene, through three interrelated strategies: the European Green Deal, which defines a new model of socioeconomic development, in order to decarbonise the economy and achieve the climate goals of the Paris Agreement; the NextGenerationEU program, which proposes a countercyclical response to the pandemic, and is a financial mechanism to accelerate the EU’s triple transition —digital, ecological and socioeconomic—; and the pursuit of a strengthened sovereignty, or strategic autonomy. This paper examines NGEU and the Green Deal as elements for relaunch the European project, and as a EU’s societal response to the globalization crisis. It also analyzes how the Russian invasion of Ukraine has induced the convergence of the Green Deal’s energy goals with the imperatives of energy sovereignty raised by the Europe’s geopolitical awakening.

In this report Richard Youngs and Shahrazad Far analyze the foreign and security policy implications of the Energy Union. The authors also point out a number of policy recommendations for the forthcoming strategic development of the Energy Union.

There are significant synergies between the Energy Union strategy and the national policy priorities of Eastern Partnership countries. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries will play a crucial role in the functioning of the Energy Union. Their strategic reserves and location along oil and gas supply corridors will be fundamental for the EU to diversify its energy supply sources and routes. Development of energy infrastructure under Project of Common Interest (PCIs) umbrella can benefit not only EU but EaP countries as well.
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The Energy Union Strategy stipulates enhanced energy security in the partner countries along with the European Union, including through support to investment in infrastructure, better regulation, energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy technologies, research innovation and competitiveness and more efficient common crisis management to prevent disruption of energy supply. Adoption of the Energy Union could bring significant economic, political and social benefits to the EaP countries.

The European Union (EU) is struggling to develop a coherent and strategically independent energy policy, the likes of which could spur EU integration and expand its reach to the southeast. The enactment of such a policy would conform with the original objectives of the European Union: to strengthen energy relations, avert war, restore peace, and foster regional cooperation. However, such precepts have recently been challenged by the prevailing risk of instability in eastern Ukraine. In this piece, we will provide the larger context for a “Cool War” between Russia and the West and the energy plan that could better integrate the Balkan states into the EU.

The intricate design of the Energy Union governance is aimed at connecting the EU level and Member States in a flexible way. From this perspective, a priority tool of the Governance Regulation is a system of bilateral relations between the European Commission and each
country to negotiate, monitor and report the ten year National Energy and Climate Plan. This paper suggests that the lack of Commission’s enforcement powers and of a stringent followup process ‘disarms’ any attempt to meet the Energy Union objectives. Achieving such goals
would have required a cooperation mechanism built on a horizontal dialogue between all Member States and the Commission. An alternative to an efficient cooperative form of all Member States is foreseen in the regional cooperation. Since regional cooperation is affirmed as a fundamental source of the EU energy market integration, the paper argues that the governance architecture should have foreseen a European vision to organise the joint work of regional groups instead of leaving the Member States free to decide if and how to cooperate. The analysis points out that the success of the Energy Union is, to a large extent, in the Member States’ hands and relies on their will to comply with the Commission’s soft regulation.

The European Union and the United States have significant commonalities in terms of economic, energy, and climate change goals and renewable energy priorities. This includes responses to economic hardship and linkages to the use of energy and resources. Both regions face similar and significantly challenging barriers to renewable energy market penetration in the areas of cost, investment, and technology. In the past decade both have adopted different but related response actions with track records of success as well as lessons learned. In the future, much greater expansion of renewable energy is needed to meet global climate stabilization goals and domestic energy, and environmental security needs. Solutions within regions to overcome barriers are most likely to be developed and succeed with the support of strong bilateral and multilateral support mechanisms. In particular, renewable energy implementation requires enhanced collaboration at national and subnational levels of government within and between the European Union and the United States. This includes greater thought leadership, peer learning, information exchange, and technical assistance that are proactively deployed at all levels of government and strategically focused through modern mechanisms that enable high-priority, high velocity policy development and implementation.

Liberalization of the European internal market for energy by means of unbundling and third party access alone is not enough to make renewable energy on a par with fossil fuels. To increase the production of renewable energy in its Member States, the EU has in place a set of legal instruments to promote the scale up of renewable energy production through i.e. setting binding targets for renewables and providing a legal framework for support schemes. However, while arguably consistent with EU disciplines pertaining to State aid, EU support schemes can easily fall foul of WTO subsidy disciplines. This article argues that EU and WTO law are disconnected paradigms in this respect: EU legislation by its design at-tempts to legitimize support schemes for renewable energy, not necessarily taking into account their consistency with the WTO ASCM. WTO law, on the other hand, currently provides too little space for subsidies that further legitimate policy goals, such as environmental protection and climate change mitigation.

This article questions the currency of contemporary pipeline politics and diplomacy as applied
in the Eurasian gas system. In doing so, it argues that the mosaic of proposed pipelines—
notably Nord Stream 2, South Stream, and Turkish Stream—is out of tune with the current
traits of global political life, namely geopolitical ruptures, changing market fundamentals, fuel
uncertainty, and the evolving politics and economics of natural gas. This article provides
alternative explanations for the still-central role of pipeline politics and diplomacy in energy
politics and concludes with the policy implications stemming from their alternative reading.

Концепция энергетической безопасности Европейского Cоюза ориентирована на достижение трех целей: безопасной, доступной и устойчивой энергии. В статье утверждается, что такое пони-мание энергетической безопасности является внутренне противоречивым, поскольку реализовать все три приоритета одновременно невозможно. Этот вывод подтверждается анализом коллизий, возникающих при осуществлении большинства направлений энергетической политики ЕС, а также углубленным исследованием отдельных казусов. В частности, обеспечение безопасности поставок практически всегда требует дополнительных затрат, тем самым порождая конфликт с целью минимизировать расходы. Дополнительные рас-ходы могут быть продиктованы более высокой стоимостью энергоресурсов из безопасного источника в сравнении с «опасным», инвестициями в инфраструктуру, политическими издержками и даже затратами на обеспечение «жесткой» безопасности источников поставок. Результатом попы-ток обеспечить дополнительную надежность поставок является избыточная (в рамках рыночной логики) инфраструктура и нерациональная (с экономической точки зрения) структура энергопотребления, повышающая стоимость конечной энергии для потребителя. Энергетическая политика ЕС, декларируя все три цели одновременно, на практике акцентирует то один, то другой элемент «триады», реагируя на актуальные вызовы и адаптируясь к меняющемуся соотношению сил внутри объединения. В статье прослежена эволюция приоритетов и показаны причины этих изменений. Они определяются как внешними причинами, так и динамикой интересов государств-членов ЕС. Колебания между целями энергетической триады, а также необходимость вербально позиционировать все три цели как приоритетные, снижают эффективность и последовательность энергетической политики ЕС.

The concept of energy security of the European Union includes three elements: to provide a secure, affordable and sustainable energy. The article argues that this understanding of energy security is self contradictory, since three above mentioned objectives could not be reached simultaneously. The analysis of the contradictions between particular areas of EU energy policy, as well as some case studies of interfuel competition confirm this conclusion.
For example, security supply usually requires additional expenses, thereby generating a conflict with the objective of minimizing the cost of energy. Additional costs may be associated with a higher cost of energy from a secure source in comparison with the "unsecure" one, the investment in infrastructure, political costs or even the costs of providing hard security in the region of supply. Providing additional security of supply may result in infrastructure excessive under the market logic, and structure of energy mix irrational from an economic point of view. This inevitably would increase energy price for the end consumer.
Therefore, EU energy policy, politically declaring all three objectives simultaneously, in practice emphasizes one or another objective of the triad, reacting to current challenges and adapting to the changing balance of influence within the EU. The article traces the history of changing priorities of EU energy policy and their causes.
Dynamic of EU energy policy priorities is determined by external factors and the changing balance of interests of the EU Member-States. Shifts from one objective to another became more frequent in the last decade in comparison with 1980s-1990s, as the differences in the energy interests within the Union have increased in line with the number of the EU countries The fluctuations between the objectives of the energy triad and the need to follow, at least verbally, all three priorities reduce efficiency and coherence of EU energy policy.

Από τα τέλη του περασμένου αιώνα, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση έχει θέσει ως βασικό στόχο, τη δημιουργία μιας ενιαίας εσωτερικής αγοράς ενέργειας, η οποία θα λειτουργεί με κανόνες πλήρους και ελεύθερου ανταγωνισμού. Από την πρώτη θεσμοθέτηση των ευρωπαϊκών οδηγιών για την απελευθέρωση των αγορών ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας και φυσικού αερίου, έως και σήμερα, τα βήματα που έχουν γίνει δεν φαίνεται να καλύπτουν τους στόχους που είχαν τεθεί. 
Το γεγονός αυτό αποδίδεται κυρίως στην διάρθρωση των περισσότερων ευρωπαϊκών αγορών ενέργειας, οι οποίες χαρακτηρίζονται από συνθήκες μονοπωλίου, με μία μόνο, συνήθως κρατική, εταιρία να έχει το μεγαλύτερο μερίδιο αγοράς, όπως μέχρι πρότινος στην Ελλάδα.
Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, από την μεριά της, έχει να επιδείξει σημαντικές προσπάθειες για την μετεξέλιξη αυτών των ολιγοπωλιακών περιφερειακών αγορών, σε μια ενιαία ευρωπαϊκή αγορά ενέργειας, θεσμοθετώντας πλήθος ρυθμιστικών διατάξεων και κανονισμών.
Καθώς η ενέργεια αποτελεί αναπόσπαστο κομμάτι των σύγχρονων κοινωνιών, με προεκτάσεις στον οικιακό, στον μεταφορικό, στον βιομηχανικό, στον τομέα της εθνικής ασφάλειας, κ.α., η επάρκεια σε ενεργειακές πηγές, αποτελεί βασική επιδίωξη κάθε κράτους. Διεθνείς συνεργασίες, διακρατικές συμφωνίες και ανταλλαγή τεχνογνωσίας είναι μόνο μερικές από τις μεθόδους που χρησιμοποιούν τα κράτη – δρώντες στο ενεργειακό σύστημα, για να διασφαλίσουν τον ενεργειακό εφοδιασμό τους. 
Συνεπώς, η ενεργειακή ασφάλεια έγκειται στην ικανότητα ενός κράτους, να διασφαλίσει τις βασικές ενεργειακές του ανάγκες, κυρίως μέσω της εκμετάλλευσης των εγχώριων πηγών και της πρόσβασης σε εξωτερικές πηγές, με προνομιακούς όρους.
Έτσι ο ασφαλής και απρόσκοπτος εφοδιασμός σε ενέργεια, αποτελεί αντικείμενο διαμαχών και συγκρούσεων στην διεθνή γεωπολιτική σκακιέρα. Η επίτευξη του εξαρτάται από μια σειρά παραμέτρων που σχετίζονται με οικονομικά, πολιτικά, νομικά και τεχνικά ζητήματα. Βασικότεροι παράμετροι αποτελούν, οι τιμές προμήθειας ενέργειας, οι διακρατικές συμφωνίες με κράτη – παραγωγούς, η διαφοροποίηση των πηγών ενέργειας μιας χώρας, οι υποδομές μεταφοράς και αποθήκευσης ενέργειας, η πολιτική σταθερότητα των εμπλεκόμενων χωρών, κ.α.
Η ενεργειακή ασφάλεια ωστόσο, δεν αφορά μόνο τους προμηθευόμενους, αλλά και τους προμηθευτές ενέργειας. Στις περιπτώσεις όπου ένα κράτος - παραγωγός εμπορεύει το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της παραγωγής του, προς ένα κράτος – καταναλωτή, η εξάρτυση του από αυτό, είναι ίση και αντίρροπη προς αυτό. Στην παραπάνω λογική, εξετάζεται η αμφίδρομη ενεργειακή εξάρτηση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης από το φυσικό αέριο της Ρωσίας και οι συνέπειες αυτής, στις μεταξύ τους σχέσεις.

The territory of Europe is foreign dependent in terms of energy, so European countries made policies of allocating energy and providing the security of it. In this essay we will consider the energy policy and the activities to provide security of European Union, within the relationship between the union and the countries which have reserves.

We investigate the impact and the possible consequences of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. We model the European gas network as a cooperative game between regions as players over the pipeline network. Our model offers several novelties compared to earlier cooperative studies. Firstly, we focus on cost saving rather than on the profits of cooperation. Secondly, we introduce liquefied natural gas as a player. Thirdly, we apply an iterative linear program to account for the long term bilateral contracts that still drive the gas market. This modelling technique also allows us to identify individual gas flows. We focus on the change of influence of the players in three different scenarios. We investigate how the power of the agents shift when the Nord Stream pipeline is expanded, when the Ukrainian pipeline is shut down and finally when both of these happen. Our calculations show that when Nord Stream 2 is operational, Russia and Western Europe improve their position compared to the base scenario, while other suppliers, notably Norway, together with Central-Eastern-and Southern Europe suffer losses, especially when the Ukrainian route is dismissed. The results highlight that both the supporters and adversaries of Nord Stream 2 are governed by self-interest and solidarity and trust, the values proclaimed by the EU and the Energy Union, remain but a slogan.

L’objet de ce mémoire de recherche était de comprendre dans quelle mesure les collectivités régionales et locales pouvaient être considérées comme des acteurs à part entière de la politique européenne de développement des énergies renouvelables. Plus précisément, il s’agissait d’étudier dans quelle mesure ces entités infra-étatiques pouvaient, notamment en vertu d’une dynamique partenariale n’accordant de prééminence à aucune des catégories d’acteurs et les intégrant toutes dans le processus décisionnel, intervenir tant au stade de la conception des normes européenne relatives au développement des énergies renouvelables, qu’à l’exécution de ces dernières, au même titre que les Etats et que les Institutions européennes.

This article addresses European energy policy through conventional and transformative sustainability approaches. The reader is guided towards an understanding of different renewable energy options that are available on the policy making table and how the policy choices have been shaped. In arguing that so far, European energy policy has been guided by conventional sustainability framework that focuses on eco-efficiency and 'energy mix', this article proposes greater reliance on circular economy (CE) and Cradle to Cradle (C2C) frameworks. Exploring the current European reliance on biofuels as a source of renewable energy, this article will provide recommendations for transition to transformative energy choices.

Turkey's enhanced geopolitical significance in the post–Cold War era is evident from an examination of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project for natural gas from Turkmenistan. This article looks at Turkmenistan's situation within the Turkey–Russia–Iran triangle, examines the negotiations among different stake-holders with a focus on the first half of calendar year 2000, and contextualizes the analysis in a series of interrelated regional and global contexts including South Asia and Central Asia. It emerges from the analysis, that among Russia, Turkey and Iran, Russia is the agenda-maker in Central Asian diplomacy and Iran is the agenda-taker. This makes Turkey the (potential) agenda-breaker. However, the degree of agenda-bending of which Turkey is capable, will be greatly limited by increased dependence on natural gas from Russia via the Blue Stream project. Ironically, much of this gas will likely be of Turkmenistani origin.

ABSTRACT
European Union’s energy security strategy towards its Eastern European neighbours stems out of direct application of EU procedures, directives and regulations in non-EU states. Economic diplomacy tactics used by the European Union in its Eastern vicinity is a vector of positive social and environmental change, as modification of the energy mix and enhancing energy efficiency measures will contribute to these countries’ successful energy transition and improvement of environmental indicators, and will lower end-user tariffs. In this article, we discuss the pattern observed during the past years in the implementation of provisions included in the Third Energy Package by non-EU contracting parties (specifically, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) to the Energy Community. The impact of functional unbundling of energy operators and liberalization of energy markets in these Eastern Partnership member states is analysed. Russia’s direct implication in internal matters related of the energy sector in these EaP countries is part of a bigger state of play, implemented over the past decades as a tool of geopolitical competition in this region. Overall, predictable business environment combined with harmonised legislation complying with the EU energy acquis ensures energy security and allows for political stabilization, thus tackling the challenges of Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe.

Key words: Economic diplomacy, Energy security, Eastern Partnership, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Third Energy Package, Energy Community

In the sphere of natural gas, Russia and the EU share an interdependent relationship: Russia is the single largest supplier of natural gas to the EU, while the EU is Russia’s largest gas export market. In May 2014, a deal was struck between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation to enable large-scale Russian gas exports to China. What impact could this deal could have on the EU-Russia gas relationship? This article analyses Russia’s existing and proposed gas production and export infrastructure for the delivery of natural gas to Europe and to China, and the extent to which increased gas exports to the East could result in the limitation of Russian gas exports to Europe. It is concluded that, due to its dependence on new gas production in eastern Siberia and the construction of new, purpose-built pipeline infrastructure, the Gazprom-CNPC deal of May 2014 will not have significant impact on Russia’s gas exports from north-western Siberia to the EU. The launch of talks aimed at delivering Russian gas from the Yamal Peninsula to China via the ‘western route’ opens the first possibility for Russia to balance its gas exports between East and West. However, this is unlikely to generate price competition between Europe and China, due to Gazprom’s inability to extract a ‘European’ price for its gas exports to China. This suggests that Gazprom will not re-direct significant volumes away from Europe towards China, but rather will seek additional export volumes.

Since 1991, Central Asia's vast oil and gas deposits have promised economic develop
ment for the impoverished region and have attracted the attention of major powers interested in accessing those resources for themselves. Kazakhstan's vast energy resources drew significant Western attention to Central Asia following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Turkmenistan, the other energy export giant of Central Asia, has yet to live up to its real potential. Uzbekistan's large population accounts for the country's high domestic consumption and lower level of exports, despite its very high production levels. Uzbekistan will likely find its position as a local energy provider to Central Asia constrained in years to come. Turkmenistan remains dependent upon Russia's pipeline system. Despite a relative diversification of foreign trade in some sectors, Kazakhstan has been folded mostly into a sphere of Russian economic influence as well, except for the south of the country. Central Asia's energy trade could still bring prosperity to the region, but its domestic political volatility and complicated regional and global relationships may spoil such efforts.

In October 2014 the European Council agreed to create a “reliable and transparent governance system (…) to ensure that the EU meets its energy policy goals”. With the announcement of the Energy Union Package in February 2015, the Commission initiated a debate on how to make the European energy sector more secure, sustainable and competitive. The keyword now is therefore ‘governance’, the scope of which should not be restricted only to the formalized governance mechanism that the 2030 framework for energy and climate promised, and the Energy Union Package tries to bring to life, but also includes informal cooperation between different levels of the policy-making process, namely European, regional, national and sub-national. The role of these different levels of governance has to be better understood in the context of the political economy of the energy sector and its impact on the European industry.

La investigacion se propone demostrar, mediante un analisis de la interdependencia, que la venta del gas natural es para Rusia una herramienta de presion politica que en mas de una oportunidad ha empleado para persuadir a los paises de la ex-URSS. Pero Rusia solo puede hacer esto cuando los costos economicos sean bajos. Por ejemplo, con respecto a la Union Europea, este pais no podria emplear los cortes de gas para presionar a los gobiernos dado que Rusia depende bastante de los ingresos que le reportan las exportaciones de gas. No obstante, Rusia si ha sido capaz de negociar bilateralmente los acuerdos de gas, con lo cual ha obtenido una cierta ventaja sobre aquellos paises de europa del este que son miembros de la UE y que importan mas de la mitad de su gas de este pais. Sin embargo, dicha estrategia no es sostenible, en tanto que los paises de la UE estan optando por una diversificacion energetica con lo cual van a depender menos de fuentes rusas en el futuro cercano.

This paper is a general overview of the European Union’s foreign policy towards Central Asian (Uzbekistan- Kazakhstan- Tajikistan- Turkmenistan- Kyrgyzstan) countries. This paper contains, after the dissolution of the USSR, how the European Union’s policy dynamics changed in the 1990s and 2000s towards the region. The attitude of the EU toward significant issues such as the 2006 Ukraine natural gas crisis, 9/11 attacks and US intervention in Afghanistan will be analysed. Also, how the EU’s policy implementation channels affected by these events will be included in the analyse.

This lengthy presentation prepared for an executive lecture given in the context of an intensive 1-week compact seminar on the European Union key priorities, addresses the main elements of the EU energy & climate policies in 2018 (Clean Energy Package and the status of the negotiations on each file of this package, main energy & climate elements of the mobility package, EU ETS, LULUCF, Effort Sharing).

The Energy Union does not adequately highlight the importance of the external aspects of EU energy policy, nevertheless, the first ‘State of Energy Union Report’ identifies the Energy Charter as one of the main external policy instrumenta of the EU. The position of the EU, which represents more than half of the Energy Charter constituency, is critical for the future of establishing a legal basis for international flows
of energy materials and products. The EU is also the single largest financial contributor to the UN system. As the 28 Member State block is in the process of upgrading its internal market hardware at the same time, it is important to address common objectives and compatibility of principles of a proposed META, first draft of which was presented by the ECS informally in an Expert Meeting in Beijing in 2015, and the EU internal energy legislation. For this purpose, this paper looks into the existing and expected legislation needed to pursue the Energy Union vision and makes a comparative assessment of provisions that could be included within the scope of the multilateral agreement. This paper argues that there is justification for collaborative efforts to construct and implement the multilateral transit/transport agreement by the UN, EU and ECS institutions and concludes with recommendations to this end.

В статье анализируется Глобальная стратегия внешней политики и политики безопасности Европейского Союза (Стратегия Могерини), обнародованная в июне 2016 г. Внимание сконцентрировано на отражённом в документе понимание энергетической безопасности, на потенциальном влиянии документа на отношения Россия‒ЕС в области энергетики. Стратегия Могерини подтверждает зафиксированную ранее расстановку приоритетов в области энергетической безопасности: прежде всего безопасность поставок, на втором месте дешёвая энергия, а устойчивая энергия отошла на третий план. В русле политической дискуссии последних лет Стратегия трактует надёжность поставок как минимизацию зависимости от России. Евросоюз выступает как game changer, который пытается распространить внутренние правила “рынка покупателя” на систему международных сделок. Попытки России защитить ранее существовавшие нормы “рынка продавца” пока не приносят заметных успехов.

The article analyses the Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union proclaimed in June 2016 (Mogherini Strategy). Analysis is concentrated on understanding of the energy security, reflected in the document, and on potential impact of the document on EU-Russia energy relations. the paper reveals how the Strategy is placing emphases in the EU energy policy and in what way this may affect Russia’s interests. Mogherini Strategy reaffirms previously laid down priorities of the energy security: first and foremost, the security of supplies, the second place goes to the cheap energy, while sustainable energy has re-ceded into the background. Within the framework of recent political discussion, Mogherini Strategy regards security of supplies as a minimization of dependence on Russia. The European Union acts as a game changer, who is trying to extend internal rules of the “consumer market” to the system of international deals. Russia’s attempts to protect the former rules of the “seller market” are not yielding visible success.

The current study attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the European energy policy evolution emphasizing the centrality of energy resources for the entire EU's integration process. The results reveal that for the last decade EU had a rather reactionary behaviour instead of a proactive energy security strategy. EU's dependence on natural gas imports has been the main driver of its energy security strategy and the post gas crisis moments represented the periods when the level of energy insecurity prompted higher levels of solidarity between member states, which in turn allowed for major advancements towards the creation of the current Energy Union.