Hundred Years War

Where did Henry V get his reputation as a paragon of justice? It is mainly conveyed to us by French chroniclers, and it is therefore necessary to investigate its origins in the French kingdom. This study focuses on Henry’s administration of justice at the surrender of the town and the Market of Meaux. The stout resistance of the besieged was punished harshly. It was a robust response to an obvious breach of the tacit code of honour. The heroic conduct of the defenders, especially the Bâtard de Vaurus, is a later historiographical construction. Uniquely, Henry V ordered the trial and execution of four ‘hardened criminals’. This sent a strong signal to the king’s enemies that was meant to leave a lasting impression. No one should defy his authority as heir to the throne of France. And no one, not even a nobleman, could terrorise the population with impunity.

Co-authored with Anne Curry, Peter Hoskins and Thom Richardson

The Battle of Agincourt on October, 25, 1415, remains one of the most glorious victories in British history, with a legacy that endures today. A pivotal moment in the Hundred Years War between France and England, it reinvigoratead the English campaign in France and bolstered the English crown's hereditary claims to French land. Published to mark the 600th anniversary of this famous victory, The Agincourt Companion tells a wider story about warfare in the middle ages. Delving into the development and advances in weaponry, armour and tactics during this period and the impact this had on the battlefield, this is a richly detailed look at the world of medieval warfare.

There was nothing second-rate about the English way of war in the Late Middle Ages, argues Tobias Capwell, Curator of Arms and Armour at London’s Wallace Collection, in a major new study published late last year. The early 15th-century English warrior was at the forefront of military innovation. And the key to success was combined-arms tactics.

Through the review of chronicles, and the study of late medieval landscape, we present the results of a small research, which is based on the reconstruction of a historical and geographical framework within which to frame this episode of the Hundred Years War. Our goal is to  some light to about the previous eight months, when John of Lancaster and his army were settled in Galicia, how raised the occupation, what was their itinerary, and which events unwrapped before the settlement of the Duke in Ourense and join their armies with of João of Avis ones, to undertake together the company to conquer Castille.

A través de la revisión de las crónicas, y el estudio del paisaje bajomedieval, exponemos los resultados de una pequeña investigación tomando como base la reconstrucción de un marco histórico y geográfico en el que encuadrar este episodio de la Guerra de los Cien Años. Nuestro objetivo es arrojar algo de luz a los, alrededor de ocho meses que, Juan de Lancaster y su ejército estuvieron asentados en Galicia, de qué manera plantearon la ocupación, cuál fue su itinerario y cómo se desenvolvieron los acontecimientos antes del asentamiento del Duque en Ourense y de la unión de sus ejércitos con los de Juan de Avis, para acometer juntos la empresa de conquistar Castilla.

The article analyses one of the episodes of the Hundred Years War, the Treaty of Amiens — an alliance made by the duke of Bedford, English regent of France, with the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany in an attempt to consolidate his position in the struggle against Charles VII. The treaty is often considered of little value due to a combination of factors: 1) its ‘personal’ rather than «inter-state» character; 2) subsequent defection of Brittany to the Dauphinist cause; 3) supposedly insignificant obligations of mutual military assistance. A closer look at the context in which the Treaty was concluded and implemented may reveal a different picture. The Treaty put a line under the crisis of succession triggered by the deaths in 1422 of Henry V and Charles VI: Bedford was acknowledged as regent of France for Henry VI, and took upon himself the obligations Henry V had had towards the duke of Burgundy by their agreement of December 1419. This may suggest that the Lancastrian regime in France had a dual nature based on the Treaty of Troyes (1420) with Charles VI as well as on «personal» treaties with the duke of Burgundy (and in 1423 of Brittany). The military component of the Treaty is found non-negligible if compared with the contemporary practice based on the documentary evidence. Finally, in spite of Breton defection it may be shown that in Anglo-Burgundian relations the Treaty remained observed up to the early 1430s.

Originally published in the Journal of The Scottish Local History Forum this article draws attention to two significant, but little-known events when Scotland was seen as a key player in European politics. The 1434 French embassy mission to fetch the Scots Princess Margaret, aged ten, for marriage to the twelve-year old Dauphin Louis, showed their ambassador, Scotsman Hugh Kennedy, draw on his clan and political connections to bring about a successful conclusion.

The shuttle diplomacy of the French 'King of Arms', Gilbert Chauveau (Montjoie) is understandably less well documented due to the delicate nature of his discussions with the kings of France, England, Scotland and Denmark. His appearance at a small, sequestered Cluniac monastery in south-west Scotland would been facilitated by the clan descendants of Hugh Kennedy. It would have been the perfect venue well away from the eyes of the curious in the political hotbed of Scotland's parliament and royal palaces.

Although much has been written on the efforts of the Lancastrian regime to impose its power in France in the aftermath of the Treaty of Troyes (1420), the role played by English military forces  and  administrators  in  some  regions,  such  as  Champagne,  remains  very  obscure.  The  article examines the case of the most remote outposts of Lancastrian power in France, the gar-risons of Montigny-le-Roi and Nogent-le-Roi in the region of Bassigny in the east of Cham-pagne (now in the Département de la Haute-Marne). These garrisons have been portrayed as troublesome to both friend and foe as well as a means of putting political pressure on the duke of Burgundy. However, a study of the report on the garrisons’ abuses in the 1423–1426 and re-lated documents reveals their Anglo-French composition and provides evidence of the efforts of the Lancastrian government to impose control over the garrisons. The same report along with financial sources concerning the garrisons’ effectives makes it possible to reconsider the scale of English participation in the battle of Bulgnéville (1431). Finally, the evidence for the 1430s suggests that after the loss of most important cities of Champagne to the Dauphinists in 1429 the garrisons in Bassigny remained in close contact with the Burgundians and were engaged in a number of joint operations up until the Treaty of Arras (1435) and Franco-Bur-gundian reconciliation. Thus the article provides a more complex and dynamic picture of the history  of  the  two  garrisons  and  their  role  in  Anglo-Burgundian  relations  within  changing  political and military contexts

Bordeaux à la fin du Moyen Âge, une puissance militaire.

Composition et organisation de ses forces armées.

Cet article a pour but d’interroger le qualificatif de « puissance militaire » appliqué à une ville durant

la guerre de Cent Ans.  Il pose aussi la question de la pertinence du concept de « milices » appliqué

uniformément aux forces municipales.

Du début du XVe siècle à la fin des années 1440, Bordeaux est au cœur du conflit déjà ancien qui

oppose le roi de France au roi d’Angleterre, également duc d’Aquitaine. Ce dernier en délègue le

gouvernement à un représentant ordinaire, le sénéchal d’Aquitaine, ou extraordinaire, le lieutenant

du roi-duc. Le sénéchal est un officier expérimenté dans l’art de la guerre, mais son poids politique

est limité par la maigreur de sa retenue. Le lieutenant du roi-duc est envoyé en Aquitaine lorsque la

situation militaire est critique mais son bref séjour ne permet pas de pérenniser d’éventuels succès

voire aggrave la situation. Les lacunes des officiers ducaux se trouvent contrebalancées par une

politique vigoureuse des jurats de Bordeaux, qui se perçoivent à la tête d’une « quasi » cité-Etat.

L’oligarchie bourgeoise s’immisce dans la conduite de la guerre parce qu’elle est incontournable. Les

jurats sont dans une position de force face aux requêtes du sénéchal et en profitent pour aussi

s’imposer dans la diplomatie. Ils payent aussi de leur personne et le roi-duc lui-même, conscient de

ses propres faiblesses dans le duché, les y encourage.

Pour mener cette politique guerrière, la Jurade commande une véritable armée composée

d’hommes d’armes, de gens de trait, de fantassins, mais aussi d’auxiliaires, artillerie et logistique

fluviale incluses. Les combattants proviennent en majorité de la communauté, même les hommes

d’armes puisque la bourgeoisie a l’obligation de posséder l’armement idoine.

L’autre grande force de Bordeaux est d’arriver à rallier les différentes forces vives du duché. Elle est à

la tête d’une ligue de ville fondée en 1379, dans une relation de marraine à filleule qui se traduit par

une alliance défensive et offensive orchestrée par les jurats. Cette ligue forme l’ossature d’un bassin

défensif qui protège la capitale des velléités des Français.  Il se caractérise par une périphérie de

places tenues par des routiers anglo-gascons qui échangent avec les jurats afin de négocier trêves et

solutions de repli. Vient ensuite le bassin à proprement parler, basé sur un maillage plus ou moins

dense allant des Landes au Médoc en passant par l’Entre-deux-Mers et une partie de la rive nord de

la Dordogne et de l’estuaire de la Gironde. Le cœur du dispositif s’appuie sur les villes qui servent de

bases d’appuis pour projeter des opérations via la maîtrise des deux axes majeurs que forment la

Garonne et la Dordogne. Le bassin a un point faible structurel au niveau des Landes qui sont difficiles

à défendre à cause de la nature de l’espace. La noblesse, qui forme une autre composante du pays,

est présente dans les sources. Elle trouve en Bordeaux une entité capable de pallier aux absences du

roi-duc. Les nobles savent qu’ils peuvent être gagés, protégés et inclus dans les trêves par les jurats,

qui reçoivent en échange des hommes d’armes et capitaines expérimentés pour les opérations

militaires. Cependant, la noblesse a fort à faire avec ses propres conflits, en particulier lors de la

période troublée de l’alliance d’Henri IV avec les Armagnacs. Elle mène aussi son propre conflit dans

une guerre qui nourrit la guerre.

Les sources nous mettent en présence d’un unicum dans l’espace méridional français, avec une ville

qui se trouve être une véritable puissance militaire. Elle est à la tête, non pas d’une simple « milice »

communale, mais d’une véritable armée, tel un prince ou un grand baron. La défaite de 1453 brise ce

modèle original de rapport de force lorsque Charles VII essaye d’y substituer celui de « bonne ville ».

[Now available through open access from Speculum: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0038713415002316]

Among those witnesses of John Gower's works that are known to have been produced during his lifetime, the Trentham manuscript (London, British Library, Additional MS 59495) stands out for its remarkable design as a seemingly planned trilingual collection. The manuscript, usually dated to the first year of Henry IV's reign, exclusively contains Gower's poetry—showcasing his virtuosity in English, French, and Latin. A number of its poems are either addressed to or invoke Henry, yet nothing is known about the history of this manuscript before the seventeenth century. As a result, scholarship on the Trentham manuscript (henceforth Trentham) tends to foreground the question whether this compilation was ever presented to Henry. I will adduce fresh evidence to establish the early provenance of Trentham and show that the manuscript remained in Southwark until the middle of the sixteenth century. Second, I will offer a new context for the composition of Trentham by reading the collection against the background of Anglo-French relations during the first months of Henry's rule. Finally, I will argue for Gower's personal involvement in and continued ownership of this manuscript.

Sebastian Sobecki (2015). Ecce patet tensus: The Trentham Manuscript, In Praise of Peace, and John Gower's Autograph Hand. Speculum, 90, pp 925-959. doi: 10.1017/S0038713415002316.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0038713415002316

What do we really know about the 1/3 gros au lion, or tiers de gros, of Flanders, said to have been struck for Louis of Nevers (1322-1346) or Louis of Male (1346-1384)?
To date, not a single author has managed to correctly and accurately describe the fractional leeuwengroot coins of 14th century Flanders.
This paper is an attempt to rectify that situation.

Apart for a few episodes such as the battle of Cravant (1423), the defence of Paris (1429) and especially the capture of Joan of Arc at the siege of Compiègne (1430), the military aspect of Anglo-Burgundian alliance in 1420-1435 war is little known to general audience. This stage of the Hundred Years War is presented largely as a series of English successes in the 1420s followed by the defeats and setbacks after 1429. The present study aims to uncover this largely ignored aspect of one of the most dramatic stages of the Hundred Years War, which at a certain point brought the English to the walls of Orléans – an undoubted peak of their centuries-long efforts to subdue the French kingdom.
For the aims of research, the course of the Hundred Years War in the 1420s-early 1430s has to be considered not in the terms of the English fighting against the French but as a struggle of two alternative claims to the French throne, both of them relying on certain support among the French population. One of these suggested that the French crown remained with the Valois dynasty represented by Charles VII, the other tried to introduce the Dual Monarchy of England and France under the governance of the House of Lancaster, as formalised by the Treaty of Troyes (21 May 1420). The role of Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, the most high-ranking French partisan of the Dual monarchy, as the pillar of the Lancastrian power in France becomes the subject of study. This raises the question of the system of obligations between the duke and the Lancastrian government, the modes of its practical exploitation and the significance of the duke’s contribution to the Lancastrian war efforts.
With this in mind, this study provides a chronological reconstruction of Anglo-Burgundian military cooperation in its development by placing it in a wider military and diplomatic context. Having assembled the evidence on the
practice of military assistance it proceeds to discussing the most widely employed models of cooperation and interaction between the allies eventually leading to a certain reconsideration of the whole nature of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance. The research reveals the scale and continuity of the alliance which retained its importance from December 1419 to September 1435, the significance of the allies’ efforts in supporting each other and variety of its models and, finally, the crucial influence of the military power or weakness factor on the diplomacy and politics in France.

Bordeaux im Spatmittelalter, eine Militarmacht : Die Zusammensetzung und Organisation seiner Streitkrafte. In den Studien zum Hundertjahrigen Krieg kommt die spatmittelalterliche Stadt nur selten als Militarmacht vor. Dennoch spiegelt sich in den Aufzeichnungen der Jurade aus Bordeaux eine Stadt, die fur den Krieg gerustet ist und deren Aufgebot dem eines Prinzen in nichts nachsteht. Die Jurats machten aus der Region rings um Bordeaux einen stark verteidigten Platz, der den franzosischen Truppen Paroli bieten konnte. Sie schafften es auch, den ortlichen Adel auf ihre Seite zu bringen.

This detailed, lavishly illustrated book chronicles the armour worn by English men-at-arms during the later phases of the Hundred Years War, as they fought through the great victories and humiliating defeats in France that would ultimately lead them into the Wars of the Roses.

For the first time, many unknown or rarely published visual and documentary sources have been brought together to reveal the beautiful and intimidating accoutrements of the war-like English.

Employing rich imagery in diverse media, combined with detailed technical and decorative analysis, Armour of the English Knight creates a unique visual journey through the physical world of the late medieval armoured warrior.

Титульный лист и содержание книги.
116 стр.

Первая книга в отечественной историографии, посвященная иностранным наемникам на службе английских королей в период самого продолжительного военно-политического конфликта Позднего Средневековья - во время Столетней войны.
В книге прослеживаются карьеры наемников на основании богатого фактического материала, опубликованных и нерративных источников. Также в книге затронуты различные аспекты военного дела Столетней войны, приводится классификация наемников по происхождению и географии поступления. Впервые исследуется влияние иностранных наемников на английскую тактику.

“¡Oh! Quién tuviera una musa de fuego” que le inspirase los artículos. “Un reino” por despacho, “príncipes” como editores “y monarcas para espectadores de la escena sublime”. Sólo así podríamos presentar, en toda su majestad, al “belicoso Harry (…) con la apostura de Marte”...

The paper looking at one of the later stages of the Hundred Years War aims to explore the relations between the English military forces in France in the 1420s -1430s with their French and Burgundian partisans. A case study under consideration are the two garrisons – those of Nogent-le-Roy and Montigny-le-Roy – on eastern borders of Champagne in the royal bailliage of Chaumont (now the departément of Haute Marne). The English presence in the region established c. 1424-1425 and was maintained for about a decade, until the rupture of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance in 1435. The specifics of these garrisons is their location on the very periphery of the Lancastrian kingdom of France in the region adjacent to the borders of Burgundy, over 250 km away from Paris and some 200 km away from the nearest English garrisons at Meaux, Montereau and Villeneuve-le-Roy (now Villeneuve-sur-Yonne). Their isolation became still more complete when most of the Champagne was lost to the Dauphinists in 1429. These factors must have resulted in little control over these garrisons from the Lancastrian government in Paris and, especially in the 1430s their greater contacts with the Burgundian administration. The paper will make an attempt to place the history of the garrisons of Nogent and Montigny within the greater context of the Anglo-Burgundian relations in the 1420s-1430s by looking at the personalities of the captains and soldiers serving there, their engagement in the Lancastrian and Burgundian military enterprises and their conflicts with local population and nobles.

Le Crotoy, a port town and fortress on the northern bank of the Somme estuary, was captured by the adherents of Henry VI in 1424 and remained under Lancastrian control until 1449. The Dual Monarchy model stipulated that the kingdoms of England and France remained separate in all administrative matters and were only united by the person of the monarch. Le Crotoy, however, shows greater connections with England in the spheres of military administration and finances, represented among other evidence by the presence of the city captains’ accounts in the English Exchequer (TNA, E 101, E 364). The paper aims to specify the borders of Lancastrian England and France in Ponthieu and set up a question of the unique status of Le Crotoy during the Lancastrian period of its history.

When in December 1431 Henry VI was crowned in Paris, Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy and the principal French supporter of the Lancastrian regime, avoided attending the ceremony and in the same month concluded a truce with Charles VII. This is often regarded as evidence of the weakness of Anglo-Burgundian alliance and the duke's desire to extricate himself from of the conflict.
A complex crisis in Anglo-Burgundian relations leading to its final rupture in 1435 is beyond all doubt. However a closer look at the military enterprises of the period from 1431 shows a significant number of joint engagements, including the siege of Lagny-sur-Marne in 1432, campaigns in Picardy in 1433 and 1434 and finally the siege of Saint-Denis in 1435, which was brought to a successful end after the Treaty of Arras of September 1435, marking the final Franco-Burgundian rapprochement and the end of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance.
The paper aims to reconsider the contribution of the Burgundians to the military efforts of Lancastrian regime in France in the last years of the alliance, based on Lancastrian and Burgundian administrative documents. It will also attempt to assess whether the military situation and experiences of joint action between 1432 and 1435 may have made Philip the Good seek reconciliation with Charles VII.

The contemporary chroniclers mention a number of personal conflicts between the English and the Burgundian captains during the period of alliance such as those between Henry V and the Prince of Orange and the seigneur de L’Isle-Adam in 1420, between the earl of Salisbury and the duke of Burgundy in 1424 and eventually between the duke of Bedford and the duke of Burgundy. It has been accepted that the discord between the dukes may have been in place since 1429 eventually ruined their relations in 1433 after Bedford’s second marriage with Jacquetta de Luxembourg.
The paper aims to explore to what degree the Anglo-Burgundian relations and especially their joint efforts against the Dauphinists may have been influenced by such personal outbursts of anger or discord in comparison with the formal declarations of friendship like the Treaty of Amiens (1423), the current military situation and the general framework of the Treaty of Troyes