Is/ought Problem

In his book The Ethical Project, Philip Kitcher (2011) offers a naturalistic account of Ethics, which he dubs Pragmatic Naturalism. Based in evidence from primatology, archeology and anthropology, and some speculation from evolutionary biology, his account is intended to be normative and not merely descriptive, therefore it has to fulfill a challenge posed by Hume (1978) that any normative naturalistic account of ethics has to fulfill: how to bridge the is-ought gap, i.e. how can a prescription of an ethical practice be made from purely descriptive premises. The purpose of this paper is to explore the details of how this challenge could be met using the framework of pragmatic naturalism. My answer will be that pragmatic naturalism is able to give a logically valid argument from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ using descriptive claims and conceptual truths as premises. Its normative force is not delivered as an absolute authority—as some moral realists would like—but that is not a problem for pragmatic naturalism, since it does not have that aim.

Die systematische Diskussion um die Gültigkeit der These von der Unableitbarkeit eines Sollens aus einem Sein ist bis auf den heutigen Tag nicht abgeklungen.  Für unser Thema ist von Bedeutung, daß Befürworter wie Kritiker der sogenannten Sein/Sollen-Kluft immer wieder darauf hingewiesen haben, daß David Hume das historische Verdienst zukommt, als erster die metaethische These von der Unüberbrückbarkeit der Kluft zwischen ethischen Normen und Tatsachen formuliert zu haben.  - In der vorliegenden Magisterarbeit aus dem Jahre 1989, die an der Philipps-Universität Marburg entstanden ist, wird unter Rückgriff auf die zeitgenössischen Debatten, an denen sich Hume beteiligte und zu denen er Stellung bezog, versucht, eine überzeugende Interpretation in Auseinandersetzung mit der modernen Literatur zu entwickeln.

Bu araştırma, ilk defa David Hume'un tartışmaya açtığı problem olarak bilinen 'Olgu-Değer Problemi' veya diğer bir ifadesiyle 'Olan-Olması Gereken Problemi'nin tarihsel ve kavramsal incelemesini içerir. Bu bağlamda, ilk bölümde 'olgu-değer ayrımı' isimlendirmesiyle ahlâk felsefesine kavramsal olarak tartışmaya açan David Hume'un ahlâk felsefesi ve olgu-değer problemini tartıştığı pasaja yer verildi. Yine bu bölüm içerisinde, Hume'a hiç atıf yapmadan olgu-değer ayrımına benzer bir şekilde iyi kavramını inceleyen George Edward Moore'un ahlâk felsefesinde, olan-olması gereken ayrımının ne şekilde ele alındığı incelendi. İkinci bölüm, olgu-değer probleminin çağdaş ahlâk felsefesinde nasıl ele alındığına ayrılmıştır. Hume'dan tevarüs eden bu problemin, çağdaş ahlâk filozoflarının yoğun ve ciddi olarak gündemlerinde olduğu görülmektedir. Bu minvalde, öne çıkan bazı filozofların olgu-değer problemine ilişkin metinleri incelendi. Son bölümde ise, çağdaş ahlâk felsefesinin önemli isimlerinden Alasdair MacIntyre mezkûr problem etrafında incelenecektir. Bu bağlamda, öncelikle MacIntyre'ın ahlâk anlayışına, erdem ahlâkına, giriş yapıldıktan sonra MacIntyre'ın olgu-değer problemine olan yaklaşımı, gerek kitapları gerekse probleme ilişkin yazmış olduğu makalesi üzerinden takip edilecektir. Bu bölümün son kısmında ise, bu problem etrafında MacIntyre'a yöneltilen değerlendirmelere, eleştirilere yer verildi.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

NATURALIZM "Etyka jest pochodzenia naturalnego", "dobro i powinność są czymś naturalnym"tak mogłyby brzmieć najogólniejsze i zarazem najbardziej intuicyjne odpowiedzi osoby niewyszkolonej specjalnie filozoficznie na pytanie o to, czym może być naturalizm etyczny. W rzeczy samej, odpowiedzi te stanowią punkt wyjścia dociekań ściśle filozoficznych: teza bazowa naturalisty etycznego brzmi bowiem mniej więcej właśnie w ten sposób: "Naturalizm etyczny jest stanowiskiem mówiącym, że to, co etyczne, jest naturalne" 1 . Piszę «mniej więcej», bo jeśli naturalizmu nie traktujemy -jak to zwykle ma miejsce -jako terminu, który "nosi znaczenie wypisane na swoim czole" 2 , to zasadniczo każdy z elementów wchodzących w skład tej quasi-definicji wymaga odpowiedniego sprecyzowania czy krytyki, żeby w ogóle dało się tu mówić o definicji. Jak można się domyślać, obiektem szczególnej uwagi musi być to, co naturalne. W niniejszym rozdziale postaram się, po uprzednim wyróżnieniu najważniejszych płaszczyzn refleksji naturalistycznej, omówić metaetycznie istotne dystynkcje i płaszczyzny rozważań, które pomogą objaśnić akceptowalne pojęcie naturalizmu etycznego. Zanim przedsięwzięcie to zostanie zainaugurowane, warto jednak dokonać pewnego rozróżnienia. W literaturze poświęconej naturalizmowi w etyce spotkać można dwa różne określenia, które odsyłają do rozważanego zagadnienia: naturalizm etyczny i etyka naturalistyczna. Druga z tych nazw jest genetycznie pierwotna: w dyskursie metaetycznym zadomowiła się dzięki -tyleż wpływowej, co często krytykowanej -znanej pracy George'a E. Moore'a, Principia Ethica 3 . Drugi termin został wprowadzony do etyki głównie za sprawą recepcji dzieła Moore'a 4 . Moore pisał: 1 Moore, Principia Ethica, dz. cyt., rozdział II. 4 Określenie to pojawiło się w artykule C.L. Stevensona, poźniej -w najbardziej znanej książce Richarda Brandta, a także u E.M. Adamsa. Zob. C.L. Stevenson, Moore's Argument against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism, w: The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, ed. P. Schilpp, Evanston, Northwestern UP 1942, s. 71-90; R.B. Brandt, Etyka…, dz. cyt., (rozdz. VII); E.M. Adams, Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press 1960, passim.

When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something.  Could the reasons for OBJECTIVELY outweigh the reasons against, in the sense that someone who thought otherwise would simply be wrong?  (This is not the same question as that of whether any of the competing reasons could be objectively valid in itself.)  Three seemingly relevant kinds of ethical theory are examined: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and moral absolutism.  It is suggested that the proponents of these have all so far failed to show that they can give compelling objective reasons for acting on certain reasons rather than others.  We so far lack any conception of what sort of second-order considerations could adjudicate between competing reasons.  This is not so much an ‘error theory’ in J. L. Mackie’s sense as an admission of ignorance.

In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one can say in explanation of one's own actions suffers from a severe limitation: one can shed little light on the question why one acted on one's reasons for an action rather than on one's reasons against that action. In this paper I want to explore this suggestion further. One of my tasks will be to distinguish my question from three standard philosophical questions that have tended to overshadow it: the question of freewill and determinism; that of the relation between fact and value; and that of the possibility of weakness of will. On these I shall, on the whole, maintain a studied agnosticism.

According to Democritus’ anthropogeny is a microcosmic consequence within the process of cosmogony. However, the case of man is a peculiarity: man, this atom complex, is well aware of himself, yet is not aware of what he must do. Man does not naturally do that which promotes the harmonious ordering of his atoms. We must create a second nature. Now it becomes possible for us to be as we must be according to our first nature. Democritus is the is first thinker who explains to us what our nature is and who, from our being, derives an ought: he who wishes to do the right thing for both himself and others finds himself subject to the ought requirement to do that which brings the most calm to the atoms. This is a direct connection between being and ought, an extravagant mechanical existentialism.

Mackie’s claim that in general courage benefits its possessor seems inconsistent with his ‘error theory’ of value.  But how plausible is it in itself?  I suggest that his arguments for the claim fail in the same way as the arguments of those who more explicitly embrace ‘virtue ethics’ fail.  We do not know any way of objectively weighing risks against other considerations, of deciding whether something is ‘worth the risk’.  Since I have no PROOF that there could not be a way, I prefer to speak of ‘ignorance’ rather than ‘error’ here.

I argue that Mackie's thesis about courage and self-interest is neither consistent with his 'error theory' of value nor convincing in itself.  The question of the objectivity of value needs to be distinguished from that of whether one value can objectively outweigh or outrank another.  This is so even when the only values under consideration are self-interested ones.