Emotivism

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct Charles L. Stevenson’s metaethical view. Since his metaethical view is a form of emotivism, I will start by explaining what the core claims of emotivism are. I will then explore and comment on the specific claims of Stevenson’s proposal. Last, I will offer an overview of the objections that have traditionally been raised against emotivism.

This paper examines some ethical models or principles that ought to guide how accountability can be instituted and assessed. It is a philosophical probe into the rationale and moral foundations of accountability. We shall examine such models as teleology, utility, egoism, hedonism, emotivism and conclude with imperativism. Each of these moral principles makes some claim to human accountability and responsibility in deciding if our actions are right or wrong. In a critical manner we shall assess their claims. We hope to arrive at a strong ground to base our ethical duties in reference to accountability. This will be seen to lie predominantly in favour of teleology and imperativism. How these can be the foundational ground for proper accountability will conclude the essay.

I reconstruct a plot in the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon ethical discussion. I discuss first the reasons why in the first half of the twentieth  century the claim of a neutral character of metaethics vis-a-vis normative ethics was generally accepted; then I discuss the reasons for a U-turn that took place in 1958, which brought back to the forefront two traditional schools of normative ethics, Kantian and Utilitarian, and the reasons for criticism from the new school of virtue ethics. I end by claiming that intuitionism and Kantian ethics will still be on the agenda for some time.

1. Fog on the Channell
2. 1903-1949: when people believed that philosophy needed to be depurated from cant 2.1. Cognitivism and non-cognitivismo 2.2. The naturalistic fallacy  2.3  Hume’ss law 2.4 Hume’s fork 2.5 Intuitionism, naturalism, emotivism
3. 1949-1958: when ethics was depurated from the ‘third person’
3.1 Hampshire’s diagnosis  3.2. Criticism to the The naturalistic fallacy  3.3. Criticism to Hume’s law
4. 1958-1980:  Kantian elements
4.1 The Kantian element in the good reasons approach: Kurt Baier  4.2. The Kantian element in pragmatism: Clarence Lewis  4.3. The Kantian element in utilitarianism: Harrod, Hare, Brandt  4.4. The Kantian element in post-intuitionism
5. 1971-2002: Kantian normative ethics
5.1 Reasons for the normative-ethics revival5.2 Gewirth  5.3 Donagan  5.4 Nagel  5.5 Kantian constructivism 5.6 Kantian contractualism
6. The recent Kant and Aristotle rediscovery and the forthcoming Price and Whewell rehabilitation
7. Provisional concluding remarks: analytic philosophy from Hume to Kant

El que roba lo interpreta como un bien y la víctima lo interpreta como un mal. El robo como mal no existe. Los líderes de la ciencia y la tecnología El conocimiento es tecnológico y la única finalidad es ganar dinero. Al cual la ciencia se vuelve pragmática. Giovanni Sartori explica cómo la televisión e Internet tienen una nefasta y nociva colaboración en la formación del hombre de la anomia, es decir, del hombre sin respeto por las reglas. La televisión en vez de construir y formar, lo que hace es manipular y disfrazar la realidad donde prima lo ridículo y exagerado.  Distanciamiento de la cultura: Tv, supermercados, discoteca, cine. Moda.  Pérdida de la identidad propia: comparación con lo extranjero. Puede producir discriminación y desprecio por lo nuestro (cholo, serrano…)  Rural (comunidad) vs. Urbano (individualismo).  Polifacéticos (diferentes comportamientos e identidades). La Cultura del Individualismo y de la Vulgaridad en la época actual La sociedad del individualismo La sociedad amoral La malignizaciòn de lo bueno El emotivismo Los líderes de la sociedad y la opinión publica El periodismo y los medios audiovisuales La influencia del neoliberalismo en la juventud limeña Lo que caracteriza a la vulgaridad actual es, el sentimiento de igualación. Javier Gomà Lipovetsky La gente ya no está dispuesta a hacer un esfuerzo por alcanzar ideales y defender valores morales.  La búsqueda de errores,  Describir la oscuridad de la vida,  Halagar el sinsentido,  Declarar sospechoso o a anular todo bien que aparece. No hay que distinguir entre acontecimientos malos y buenos. Según Nietzsche En una sociedad donde se considera que la razón no puede y no debe dictar normas éticas, el emotivismo reemplaza los valores. Los líderes del estado Los líderes culturales La crisis y pérdida de valores son principalmente, generados por el líder. Los líderes culturales como los cantantes y las celebridades de Hollywood tienen una influencia negativa sobre los espectadores.

The process of decision making is predictable and irrational according to Daniel Ariely and other economic behaviorists, historians, and philosophers such as Daniel Kahneman or Yuval Noah Harari. Decisions made anteriorly can be, but don't have to be, present in the actions of a person. Stories and shared belief in myths, especially those that arise from a system of human norms and values and are based on a belief in a " supernatural " order (religion) are important. Because of this, mass cooperation amongst strangers is possible.

Recent empirical research seems to show that emotions play a substantial role in moral judgment. Perhaps the most important line of support for this claim focuses on disgust. A number of philosophers and scientists argue that there is adequate evidence showing that disgust significantly influences various moral judgments. And this has been used to support or undermine a range of philosophical theories, such as sentimentalism and deontology. I argue that the existing evidence does not support such arguments. At best it suggests something rather different: that moral judgment can have a minor emotive function, in addition to a substantially descriptive one.

This book hopes to explain the reasons behind the creation of violent ideologies as alternative modes of governance given perceived injustice. Emotion and sentimental attachment form an important part of developing one’s politics and preferences. Politics and thus shaped by an emotional reaction to an existing structure of knowledge which then constructs human behavior. In this sense, politics is far from objective, rational process of the mind. The purpose of any political ideology, whether Democracy, Fascism (and its varieties), or Communism, is to escape human suffering by combining ideas, emotion, and people to produce fundamental societal change. Ideologies must possess these three variables to attain the necessary power to succeed as a political force. Power gives the ideology the structural ability to transform society, trapping the once free individual into the ideology. The theory also explains democracy’s success and the failure of Communism and the Fascism.

""In his « little Treatise in English» on Human nature (1640), and, later, in Leviathan (1647 – 1650), Thomas Hobbes examines and redefines the passions. Basing his argument upon the concept of motion, he conceives them as thoughts: passions are nothing but perceptions, which transit through the brain, and then move towards the heart. There they cause various sensations of pleasure or pain, by helping or hindering « vital motion ».
Anger, Hobbes claims, is a break-through in front of a sudden opposition, not the response to an outrage, as the Ancients had erroneously claimed. « Courage, in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a stricter and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end. Anger (or sudden courage) is nothing but the appetite or desire of overcoming present opposition. It hath been commonly defined to be grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted by the often experience we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us. » (Leviathan, I, 6, 1-2.  Cf. Human Nature, VII, 1-2).
The definition of 'orge', as the grief for an undeserved slight, joined to the wish to retaliate, comes from Aristotle’s 'Rhetoric', a text Hobbes not only knew, but also translated. Anger was, for Aristotle, the political passion par excellence. It is because we are insulted that we revolt, and that our revolt is justified. It is in anger that we commit tyrannicide. Be it a tumultuous explosion or a long lasting grudge, ire is by definition the reasoned answer of a social actor, who suffers in his body as well as in the social image that he has  created for herself, and on behalf of justice: one does not recognize this person for that which he wishes to be considered. The gender mark is intended, given the heroic context. This criticism might appear to be just a minor detail, confined to Hobbes’ typology of the passions.  But since the new description of anger disconnects the emotion from any justification (thus from justice), refuting Aristotle was crucial for the consistency of Hobbes’ theory of the state. Leviathan must have zero tolerance for any form of social violence, from sedition (his sickness) to civil war (his death). Therefore the celebration of the noble killing of a king (conveniently labeled “tyrant”), has no place in modern politics. Those who come to treat a sovereign as an obstacle in their way understand nothing of the nature of the state, which is artificial and vulnerable, always threatened by a return to the state of nature.
    Furthermore, to object to Aristotle on anger was consistent with Hobbes’ profound weariness with classical political theory. One of the most insidious causes of the dangerous misunderstanding of the state, Hobbes argues, was ideological. People learned to cultivate dissent and glamorize discontent from subversive, poisonous political theories: those of the Ancients. « From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books and discourses of Policy, make it lawful and laudable, for any man so to do ; provided, before he do it, he call him tyrant. For they say not regicide, that is, killing a king, but tyrannicide, that is, killing of a tyrant is lawful » ('De Corpore Politico', XXVII,  10).  No learning of a language, Hobbes dryly comments, has ever been paid with so much blood, as that of Greek and Latin (Ibidem, 150).
In the transition from a theory of man as a political animal, naturally inclined to sociability (Aristotle), to a vision of human nature, made up of movement and competition, Hobbes rethought the anthropological underpinnings of politics. This required the simplification of the passions, and the rejection of that interlacing of rights, habits and body, which framed the complexity of the emotions in the classical past. The demystification of anger was critical.
 

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The philosophical work of Iris Murdoch, although not so extensive, cannot be easily grasped through usual classifications. Here we suggest approaching it from the perspective of Moore’s thesis on the indefinable nature of good that she endorsed after having re-examined it. This comparison with Moore, however, is part of a more general and deeper investigation on the platonic Idea of the Good itself. Thus, after having analyzed how Murdoch understood and assessed the transition from Moore’s conception to the contemporary framework shared by emotivism and R. Hare’s prescriptivism, we clarify the idea of the sovereignty of good by emphasizing the following three aspects: the link between the realm of good and the authority of truth; the unifying power of the idea of good, in regard to reality as we experience it in our lives; lastly, the way in which this idea enables us to transcend the limits of our inherited theoretical horizons, thus revealing the true nature of human freedom

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Questa tesi è costruita su un confronto fra due filosofi morali contemporanei: lo scozzese A. MacIntyre e l’americano W. K. Frankena. L’opportunità per tale confronto è fornita dalla recensione, intitolata MacIntyre and Modern Morality, che Frankena dedicò a Dopo la Virtù, l’opera di filosofia morale più nota del pensatore scozzese. I primi due capitoli del presente lavoro sono dedicati all’esposizione delle tesi contenute in Dopo la Virtù. Il primo espone le tesi critiche nei confronti della modernità contenute nella prima parte dell’opera, il secondo la particolare proposta etica positiva dello scozzese, contenuta nella seconda. Il terzo e ultimo capitolo è dedicato all’esposizione delle critiche contenute nella recensione di Frankena, con particolare riguardo a quelle concernenti la trattazione dell’emotivismo. Tutte queste analisi sono volte all’individuazione del punto di dissenso teoretico fondamentale fra i due autori: la definizione di “emotivismo”. Il problema è di notevole importanza, poiché dalla confutazione della teoria emotivista dipende la legittimità di tutta l’opera di MacIntyre, e può essere così formulato: la definizione di “emotivismo” che MacIntyre adotta in Dopo la Virtù è corretta? Obiettivo della mia tesi è un’esposizione dei termini di questo problema, che non può prescindere dall’analisi delle opere in questione.

This thesis is based on a critical comparison between two contemporary philosophers: A. MacIntyre and W. K. Frankena. The opportunity for such a work is offered by a review, entitled MacIntyre and Modern Morality, in which Frankena deals with the most important MacIntyre’s work in moral philosophy: After Virtue. The first chapter of this work is concerned with the exposition of the first, critical part of After Virtue; the second chapter is about the particular form of virtue ethics that characterizes MacIntyre’s thought. The third and last chapter is focused on Frankena’s critics to After Virtue, and most of it is deals with the treatment of emotivism. All these analysis converge in the exposition of the main disagreement between the two philosophers: the definition of “emotivism”. Since MacIntyre’s work depends on the confutation of emotivism, the question is important, and can be thus formulated: is the definition of “emotivism” that MacIntyre adopts in After Virtue correct? Aim of this work is to expose, as clearly as possible, this question’s terms.

This book is an introduction in a double sense. It is intended to introduce beginners in philosophy to the idea of philosophical nonsense and the problems it raises. But it is also addressed to professional philosophers, most of whom seem virtually unaware of the issue.

Certain philosophers, here called ‘nonsensicalists’, believe that much philosophy (philosophical questions as well as assertions) is simply nonsense in the strict sense of being meaningless. They proceed as though it were an established fact that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and the notion were quite unproblematic. By contrast, many other philosophers proceed as though either they had never heard of it or it were quite obvious that there is no such thing.

There can be little doubt that what the nonsensicalists are saying is of great importance – if they are right. But there are at least eight questions that must be addressed before anyone is in a position to start hunting down philosophical nonsense and they have all been woefully neglected.

The idea of philosophical nonsense goes back to Thomas Hobbes at least and yet its history remains largely unresearched.

In view of the neglect of the problems raised by the notion of philosophical nonsense, even by professional philosophers, it is not unduly optimistic to suggest that it is a topic to which relative newcomers to the subject might make a contribution.

Ludwig Wittgenstein thought that good philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that bad philosophy has put there and must make movements as complicated as the knots it unties. Is the notion of philosophical nonsense an essential aid to this – as Wittgenstein himself thought – or just another knot?

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The purpose of this paper is to outline the meta-ethical system that most aligns with normative Sunni Islāmic theology and to present contending systems in order to articulate why they are not consistent with mainstream Sunni theology. The primary argument is that such a meta-ethical system does in fact exist and is largely congruent with a contemporary paradigm known as “divine command theory.” The way this is established is by looking at different meta-ethical categorizations and determining what elements are or are not reconcilable with Sunni theology. The noteworthy systems that are not reconcilable — namely emotivism, moral
objectivism, and evolutionary ethics — are examined separately to facilitate a defense of divine command theory in relation to them. The significance of this project is due to the fact that a modern and comprehensive account of divine command theory from a strictly Islāmic worldview is yet to be developed, and this paper lays the groundwork for such an account.

Zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts geschah in der Philosophie etwas grundlegend Neues: Junge Philosophen wandten sich von der Metaphysik ab. Die Philosophie, so eine damals revolutionäre These Alfred Ayers in seinem Werk „Language, Truth and Logic“ aus dem Jahr 1936, müsse von der Metaphysik unterschieden werden. Leider war Ayers Theorie noch nicht ausgereift, auch wenn sie die wichtige Basis für die Abkehr der Philosophie von der Religion einleitete.

Im vorliegenden Paper soll Alfred Ayers emotivistische Theorie mit der emotivistischen Theorie Charles Stevensons aus dessen 1944 veröffentlichtem Werk „Ethics and Language“ verglichen werden. Dabei soll bewiesen werden, dass Stevensons emotivistische Theorie dem Ayerschen Emotivismus  überlegen ist.

Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one's theory of semantics determines what one's theory of justification must be is mistaken.

The aim of this essay is to show that moral judgments are produced both by emotions and rational principles. First of all, I will point out some of the answers that have been given in modern and contemporary philosophy to the question concerning to the cause of moral judgments. Secondly, from researches that are being developed in contemporary moral psychology, I will give reasons that explain why such question must be re-formulated. Finally, I will propose a new method of investigation that allows solving the question exposed in the first part. This method follows the line of the studies in moral psychology. From this point of view, it is suggested that moral judgments are produced both by rational principles and emotions. This implies that emotivism and rationalism give an incomplete answer to the question concerning the causes of moral judgments.

.Taking as my starting-point Cora Diamond’s paper ‘What nonsense might be’, I extend her ‘austere’ conception of nonsense to encompass the talking of nonsense.  We need to focus on the utterer as well as the utterance.  This brings out how difficult it is going to be to DIAGNOSE the talking of (philosophical) nonsense, without falling into the ‘sense that is senseless’ trap (PI, I, 500).  It is not clear to what extent Diamond sees the problem here.  I suggest that if there is a way round the difficulty, it will involve adopting a therapeutic approach.

A brief conspectus of my views on Hume, Is and Ought, omitting most  of the complications required to answer Arthur Prior (and saying nothing about Gerhard Schurz whose ideas would be a little too complicated to explain to the  intended audience). Suitable for first or second year undergraduates or intelligent laypeople with some knowledge of  philosophy but not much of formal logic.

David Hume was an early exponent of attending to the language we use to speak about objects of aesthetic and artistic interest. His remarks on this topic were largely negative and designed to warn us against being misled by such discourse. Nearly two centuries later, logical empiricists found inspiration in Hume in setting out constraints on "cognitively" meaningful language, as well as in suggesting ways in which our utterances may have "emotive" rather than cognitive meaning. As logical empiricism waned, Anglophone philosophers looked to ordinary language to illuminate our concepts of artistic and aesthetic phenomena as revealed by the "language games" in which they figure. This approach included studying the role of evaluations ('x is bombastic', 'y' is eloquent) in describing works of art, the conditions under which aesthetic descriptions ('x' is elegant, 'y' is serene) are justified, the sensitivity of such descriptions to the contexts in which they are used, as well as the character of disagreements about the quality of works of art and objects of aesthetic interest more generally. Current research sees a productive cross-fertilization between the fields of aesthetics and philosophy of language as scholars aim to understand how we communicate our interpretation and evaluation of works of art, artifacts, and aspects of our natural environment.

Herewith my notes to the second section of Russell on Ethics (9780 words) exploring Russell’s contributions to what we nowadays call Meta-Ethics. These deal with:
1) Russell’s admiring but critical response to Moore’s Principia Ethica. Russell  distinguished between  the Open Question Argument proper and what I call the Argument from Advocacy or later, following Russell himself, ‘the Barren Tautology Argument’ (See above, ‘Desiring to Desire’).  He also challenged Moore’ analytic consequentialism with an argument usually attributed to Ross  (though Moore later said print that it was Russell had who convinced him that he was wrong).
2) Russell’s pioneering versions of emotivism and the error theory.  In the case of emotivism, his theory is my view markedly superior to those of his better known successors, Stevenson and Ayer. His version of the error theory is undermined by his own semantic commitments, specifically his belief in what he calls the Fundamental Principle. 
3) Russell’s neo-Humean wobble from Human Society in Ethics and Politics.

Alasdair MacIntyre as a Critic of the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Morality (II): The History of the Corruption of the Modern Ethics

In the famous “disquieting suggestion” Alasdair MacIntyre has written a hypothetical state of modern ethics as a set of mutually antagonistic, chaotic, irrational and ultimately arbitrary positions. The late work of this extremely popular contemporary Scottish philosopher (although for many decades living in the United States), sometimes referred to “an interminably long history of ethics”, is devoted to mainly two purposes: to prove the arguments put forward in the “disquieting suggestion” and to overcome this crisis. This series of two articles is devoted to the presentation of the first, negative aim of MacIntyre.

MacIntyre summarizes the main reasons of the contemporary crisis into the three slogans: incommensurability of terms and languages, the conceptual incommensurability of the rival arguments, and the ostensible impersonal, objective rationality. These three elements are characteristic of all modern ethical theories realizing “the enlightenment project of justifying morality.” As the example, MacIntyre has shown two post-Enlightenment ethical traditions: liberal individualism (negating the social dimension of the person and the communal base of practical rationality) and emotivism, which is based on the negation of rational discourse, leading to persuasion and propaganda in the moral sphere.

A discussion of Eugenio Lecaldano, “Saggi di storia e teoria dell’etica”.I criticize three key-ideas in Lecaldano's proposal of new sentimentalims, namely (i) the very definition of  sentimentalism, which falls short of providing a metaethics alternative to 'rationalist' metaethics making room for emotions; (ii) the very idea of secular ethics, which fails to characterize a family of ethical theories alternative to those the author clasiifies as religious kinds of ethics, (iii) the characterization of  deontological etics, which apperas to be more a strawman than a model of ethical theory corresponding faithful enough to doctrines actually argued by Kant and other so-called deontologists.

Tabla de contenidos

1. Presentación,
Editores

2. Elementos para un enfoque pragmatista de la responsabilidad en la obra de G. H. von Wright,
Matías Parmigiani

3. La filosofía de von Wright y su utilidad en el derecho penal,
María Laura Manrique

4. Norma, acción y deber: el modelo del silogismo práctico,
Juan Pablo Mañalich

5. Variedades de lo bueno en el razonamiento judicial,
Flavia Carbonell Bellolio

6. El problema de la comprensión de la acción valorativa. Emotivismo y filosofía de la mente en von Wright,
Federico José Arena

7. Conflictos prácticos genuinos y racionalidad práctica. Una solución modal,
Pau Luque & Alessandro Torza

8. von Wright y las normas de competencia,
Alejandro Daniel Calzetta

9. Georg Henrik von Wright: esbozo de su vida y su obra,
Daniel González Lagier

Fin dal Secondo Dopoguerra abbiamo assistito a un'espansione progressiva del cognitivismo etico anche all'interno della filosofia analitica del diritto e del positivismo giuridico. altri teorici che aderiscono almeno a una di queste correnti giusfilosofiche, se non a entrambe, hanno manifestato in numerose occasioni la loro assoluta credenza nella possibilità, o nella necessità, di un'etica oggettivamente conoscibile, la loro convinzione che le norme abbiano valori di verità e, talvolta, si sono persino compromessi con la tesi ontologica che postula l'esistenza di autentici fatti morali. * Vorrei ringraziare Mauro Barberis, Damiano Canale e Nicola Muffato per le preziose osservazioni a una versione precedente di questo saggio dedicato a Riccardo Guastini.

¿Qué lógica yace detrás de las cláusulas de moralidad? La respues-
ta es que este tipo prohibitivo no se encuentra alineado con la función principal de lamarca. En términos generales, podemos afirmar que una marca reputada “inmoral” puede resultar distintiva, por lo que este simple reconocimiento obliga a analizar con mayor detenimiento y profundidad el fundamento de las cláusulas de moralidad. Si las razones que sostienen las cláusulas de moralidad no resisten mayor análisis, su aplicación podría complotar contra el funcionamiento del sistema de marcas.
Este trabajo empezará con un repaso del origen y la estructura de las cláusulas de moralidad. En la segunda parte de este artículo, destacaremos las principales incongruencias de la aplicación de las cláusulas de moralidad y brindaremos razones por las cuales deberían inobservarse.

Analytic ethics in the central period – extending from the beginning of the twentieth century to post-World War II linguistic analysis – is too often construed by historians and philosophers alike in monolithic terms as the emotivism of A. J. Ayer. In contrast, we argue that a multiplicity of ethical doctrines were developed by analytic philosophers at this time of which Ayer’s emotivism was just one. Moreover, we maintain that this multiplicity of ethical doctrines was itself the result of a multiplicity of conceptions of analysis and that connecting these two sets of beliefs makes for the best understanding of analytic ethics.

Не существует никакой другой проверки или обоснования истин помимо наблюдения и научного опыта. Мориц Шлик («Поворот Философии») 1. Альфред Джулис Айер: язык, логика и этика. 1.1. Вена-Лондон-Оксфорд. Альфред Джулис Айер-ведущий представитель английского логического эмпиризма, приобрел мировую известность благодаря своей ранней работе Язык, истина и логика (1936 г.), в которой основополагающие идеи участников Венского кружка (Морица Шлика, Рудольфа Карнапа, Отто Нейрата и др.) сочетались с набирающими популярность и влияние в британских университетах новыми формами лингвистического анализа (теорией дескрипций Бертрана Рассела, концептуальным анализом Джорджа Эдварда Мура и диспозиционным анализом Гилберта Райла). Благодаря своим родителям 1 , Айер получил образование в престижном частном колледже Итона (The King's College of Our Lady of Eton beside Windsor), после окончания которого он поступает в университет Оксфорда, где его философским наставником становится выдающийся британский философ-Гилберт Райл. Именно по его настоянию, Айер отправляется на стажировку в столицу Австрии и посещает регулярные заседания Венского кружка 2. Проведенное в Вене время (1932/1933 гг.) становится определяющим для его философских взглядов. Базовые принципы традиционного эмпиризма Джона Локка, Джорджа Беркли и Дэвида Юма (поиски надежных эмпирических предпосылок знания и апелляция к чувственным данным), которые он прочно усвоил в философской среде Оксфорда, 1 Родители Айера принадлежали к очень состоятельным семьям: отец-Джулис Айер, выходец из швейцарского франкофонного кантона Нёвшатель, работал финансистом в семье Ротшильдов; мать-Рейн Ситроен была племянницей основателя французской автомобильной компании. Подробнее см.:

The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non-cognitivists theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non-cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self-defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. It relies upon a problematic understanding of both emotivism and the deflationary theory of truth.

Spanish translation, introductory study and notes on Charles Leslie Stevenson’s “Persuasive Definitions”. Published in Stevenson, Charles L. “Definiciones persuasivas”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. VIII, n. 1 (2021), pp. 105–125.

[Introductory study published in Oya, Alberto. “Presentación. Las definiciones persuasivas según Charles L. Stevenson”. Quaderns de Filosofia, vol. VIII, n. 1 (2021), pp. 101–104].

Bertrand Russell was a meta-ethical pioneer, the original inventor of both emotivism and the error theory. Why, having abandoned emotivism for the error theory, did he switch back to emotivism in the 1920s? Perhaps he did not relish the thought that as a moralist he was a professional hypocrite. In addition, Russell's version of the error theory suffers from severe defects. He commits the naturalistic fallacy and runs afoul of his own and Moore's arguments against subjectivism. These defects could be repaired, but only by abandoning Russell's semantics.Russell preferred to revert to emotivism.

I. INTRODUCTION 'I do not myself think very well of what I have said on ethics' wrote Russell in extreme old age (DBR, p. 132). And most subsequent philosophers have agreed with him. Either they do not think very well of what he said or they do not think of it at all. Until very recently, Russell hardly rated a mention in most books and bibliographies on 20th Century ethics. His most anthologized paper on the subject is 'The Elements of Ethics' (1910) in which he expounds, not his own ideas, but the ideas of his colleague and sometime friend, G.E.Moore (PE, ch. 1). Even dedicated Russell fans such as John Slater (Bertrand Russell (1994)) and Anthony Grayling (Russell (1996)) are a bit lukewarm about his theoretical ethics, whilst R.M. Sainsbury in his 'Arguments of the Philosophers' book Russell (1979), is positively dismissive: 'I have left aside his work on moral philosophy, on the grounds that in both its main phases, it is too derivative to justify a discussion of it'. In the first phase, represented by 'The Elements of Ethics' (1910), Sainsbury suggests that Russell's ideas were derived from G.E.Moore, and in the second, represented by Human Society in Ethics and Politics, they were 'close to Hume's, with a dash of emotivism'. (Sainsbury (1979), p. x.) In my view this is a consensus of error. In the latter part of this essay I contend: 1) that Russell's 'work in moral philosophy' had at least three, and (depending how you look at it) up to six 'main phases'; 2 2) that in some of those phases, it was not derivative, but on the contrary, highly original; 3) that Russell was a pioneer of two of the chief forms of ethical anti-realism that have dominated debate in this century, emotivism and the error theory (so that if the theory of HSEP was derived from emotivism, it was derived from a family of theories which Russell helped to create); 4) that the revolt against Hegelianism, which led to the birth of Analytic Philosophy, had an ethical dimension to it; and 5) that Russell played an important part in the debates that led up to Moore's Principia Ethica, the book which he summarizes in 'The Elements of Ethics'.