Korean reunification

Former South Korean President Park Geun Hye popularized the term 'tongildaebakron' which may be translated as 'reunification bonanza'. This was based on the idea that reunification of the two Koreas would lead to an economic windfall. This is highly unlikely scenario after roughly 70 years of division and the impasse over the North's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. However, this paper argues for another economic case to provide motivation for South Koreans aim for the more modest goal of rapprochement instead of reunification. First, and most simply, the South Korean expenditure on its military could be reduced. Something that most would agree would be a simply drop in the percentage of the GDP spent on defense. However, this paper also argues that, if measured by percentage of the labour force dedicated to the defense of South Korea (currently 2.3% versus the world average of 0.8%) could stand to make a significant economic gain by shifting from a conscription based military, that trains the numbers necessary to deter North Korea, to a professional army, that handles the basic defense needs of South Korea in the region. By using world bank indicators historically and comparing the difference between South Korean military troop numbers as a percentage of the workforce and the global average of troops as percentage of the workforce over time, this research then uses World Health Organization methodology for calculating economic impacts of the cost of workforce absence due to illness in a country to show that not being at peace with North Korea has been and will continue to be a massive economic drain on South Korea.

This  paper seeks  to  explore the  question  of the possible role  of Japan in Korean unification.  What do the Japanese think about Korea and Korean unification,  why  do  they  think  that  way,  and  how  might  it  affect  their security  decision
-making  in  the  future?    I  have  examined  the  question
from  a  historical  and  cultural  viewpoint,  as  well  as  a political  one.    We will  see  that  the  Japanese  experience  with  Korea  has  certain  recurring themes throughout history, and that the themes build upon one another to produce a unique Japanese view of Korea.  Taking this into account, the
salient  characteristic  of  Japan’s  policy  toward  Korean unification  is pragmatism.    Japan  prizes  stability  on  the  peninsula  and  fears  the possibility  of  a  potentially  hostile,  possibly  nuclear-armed,  united country  across  the  Korea  Strait.    At  the  same  time,  the  inflammatory behavior of North Korea and the prospect of a united, democratic Korean
state  make  a  change  in  the  status  quo  seem  attractive.    However,  such change  would  be  unattractively unpredictable  and  ruinously  expensive.  Faced with these conflicting feelings, Japan hedges.  The least bad policy
option  for  Japan  to  pursue  is  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  while endeavoring to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and  missile programs as best it can.  A divided Korea breaks the Korean “dagger aimed at the heart of Japan” at the hilt.

North Korea Webinar by Universal Peace Federation (UPF) on 25th June 2022.

Presentation by Felix Abt on

1. Sanctions, impact and lifting them
2. The role of South Korean, Chinese and other foreign companies in the North
3. A post-reunification scenario

Can political violence of national division and war be overcome through family bonds and reunion? This paper addresses this question through an examination of two Korean siblings-a North Korean sister and a South Korean brother separated in the aftermath of the Korean War, 1950-1953. Over half a century later, the sister escaped North Korea wishing to contact and reunite with her long-lost brother, and asked for my help. In my efforts to make their reunion possible, I encountered thorny issues about desire, separation, and kinship. I argue that the affective glow of national reunification and reconciliation symbolized by inter-Korean family reunions obscure the deeper impediments to overcoming war's legacies and its enduring violence.

This qualitative study addresses the deficit in current Korean government policy in integrating young North Korean defectors and demonstrates the catalysts and inhibitors of young North Koreans integrating to South Korean society. It does so through secondary source, narrative analysis and by examining young North Korean defectors’ responses in primary interviews in other studies on life in South Korea. The responses were coded by theme and organized into three categories of concern for young defectors based on their responses: culture and language, power, and income and housing. The results informed recommendations understood through Ager and Strang’s domains of integration and are based on current practices in aiding displaced people employed by states and intergovernmental actors. These recommendations were addressed to the Korean government. The goal of this research is to improve the lives of young North Korean people in South Korea by questioning current local integration approaches which do not incorporate Forced Migration thought in their implementation.

La péninsule Coréenne est aujourd’hui divisée en deux : La Corée du Nord et la Corée du Sud.
Mais comment en sommes-nous arrivé-là ?
Quelle est la situation actuelle au sein de ces deux pays ? Après plus de 60 ans, qu’est-ce qui les sépare ou bien les rapproche encore ? A travers mon expérience dans les deux Corées, je pourrais donner des exemples précis et un point de vue à la fois extérieur et intérieur sur ce conflit fratricide. 
A quoi doit-on s’attendre pour les prochaines années ? Une réunification est-elle possible ?

Статья описывает проблему объединения Корейского полуострова при этом охватывает современную историю вопроса с 2011 г., когда к власти в КНДР пришел Ким Чен Ын. На сегодняшний день основными целями администрации Корейской рабочей партии является формирование ядерного арсенала КНДР, в следствие чего КНДР преднамеренно вступает в конфронтацию с остальным миром, включая своего давнего союзника – Китай. Также в статье рассмотрены основные принципы подходов в отношении КНДР со стороны 2 из 3 основных игроков в регионе – Китай и США. В связи с тем, что Российская Федерация на сегодняшний день ведет сдержанную политику на Корейском полуострове, автором было принято решение не рассматривать политику РФ в вопросе объединения Корейского полуострова. Правление Ким Чен Ына отмечено продолжением разработок ракетного и ядерного оружия, проведением экономических реформ, ухудшением отношений с Южной Кореей и странами Запада. Его испытания ядерного оружия и баллистических ракет заставили администрацию США всерьез воспринять Северную Корею в качестве страны, обладающей ядерным оружием, и активизировать действия по усилению давления на КНДР через мировые сообщества, а также принудить КНДР к отказу от реализации ядерной программы путем запугиваний через устные угрозы и проведение совместных учений в регионе со странами-союзниками. Даже терпеливый Китай, который по возможности всегда отказывался участвовать в принятии различного рода санкций к КНДР вынужден посылать сигналы в адрес Северной Кореи о том, что их «ядерные игры» начинают переходить границы.

Korean Peninsula Issue – Current Situation and Vectors of the Problem Settlement
The article describes the problem of (re)unification of the Korean Peninsula, and covers the modern history of the issue from 2011, when Kim Jong-un took power in North Korea. As of today, the main objectives of the administration of the Korean Workers' Party are the formation of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal, as a result of which the DPRK deliberately enters into confrontation with the rest of the world, including its long-time ally, China. Also in the article are considered the main principles of approaches to the DPRK from 2 of the 3 main players in the region – China and the USA. Considering that the fact that the Russian Federation currently conducts a restrained policy on the Korean Peninsula, the author decided not to consider the policy of the Russian Federation in the matter of unifying the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong-un's administration policy was marked by the continuation of development of missile and nuclear weapons, economic reforms, deterioration of relations with South Korea and (pro)Western countries. His tests of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles forced the US administration to take seriously North Korea as a nuclear-weaponed state and to intensify efforts to increase pressure on the DPRK through the world community, and to force the DPRK to abandon the nuclear program through intimidation through oral threats and conducting joint exercises in the region with allied countries. Even patient China, which whenever possible always refused to participate in the adoption of various sanctions to the DPRK, has to send signals to North Korea that its "nuclear games" are beginning to overstep the bounds of decency.

The two sides of Korea, the last remaining divided country in the world, have each put forward a series of unification formula but there has been no significant progress made in devising mutually acceptable plans for reunification until the June 15 Joint Declaration which acknowledged a common ground in both sides' proposals. To facilitate the process of unification, South Korea has to overhaul its legal norms that have seriously blocked legitimate efforts to build a democratic platform for dialogues and exchanges between the South and the North, all the while easing military confrontations. The most pertinent approach for a unity would be to strive for a negotiated unification in which the two parties with equal rights and duties tolerate each other, and promote coexistence and co-prosperity, without marginalizing either side. The power structure of a unified Korea should be framed in accordance with such a negotiation approach: a federal government mainly in charge of military affairs and foreign policy to overarch two autonomous regional governments in the south and north of Korea, whose governance system shall be of an assembly government coupled with a directorial system and a unicameral federal assembly of equal number of representatives from both sides. A pan-Korean organization for national unification can prepare for parliamentary elections for constitutional assembly and the final draft of the reunification constitution passed by the constitutional assembly shall be approved in two separate referendums in the north and south.

This next discussion will consider differences that impact unification costs—an apparent area of major interest to South Korea in particular. It also will examine factors affecting the relative power of the two sides in each unification effort, as they are markedly different from the German case. It is important to note that external and internal conditions for Korean unification are subject to continuous change and adjustment, which makes comparisons and predictions even more complicated.

In the event of unification or collapse of the North Korean government, the common line among most scholars is that hundreds of thousands of North Koreans will flee southwards in an attempt to join South Korea’s modern society, find new jobs, and escape the last remaining signs of the Kims. But South Korean researcher Song Young Hoon thinks differently, suggesting that in the event of sudden change we can expect many North Koreans to stay put, pointing out that in the event of contemporary global crises, most people survive by staying in their country of origin, rather than fleeing.

The two sides of Korea, the last remaining divided country in the world, have each put forward a series of unification formula but there has been no significant progress made in devising mutually acceptable plans for reunification until the June 15 Joint Declaration which acknowledged a common ground in both sides' proposals. To facilitate the process of unification, South Korea has to overhaul its legal norms that have seriously blocked legitimate efforts to build a democratic platform for dialogues and exchanges between the South and the North, all the while easing military confrontations. The most pertinent approach for a unity would be to strive for a negotiated unification in which the two parties with equal rights and duties tolerate each other, and promote co-existence and co-prosperity, without marginalizing either side.
The power structure of a unified Korea should be framed in accordance with such a negotiation approach: a federal government mainly in charge of military affairs and foreign policy to overarch two autonomous regional governments in the south and north of Korea, whose governance system shall be of an assembly government coupled with a directorial system and a unicameral federal assembly of equal number of representatives from both sides. A pan-Korean organization for national unification can prepare for parliamentary elections for constitutional assembly and the final draft of the reunification constitution passed by the constitutional assembly shall be approved in two separate referendums in the north and south.

Under changing dynamics such as US-China relations, the domestic and foreign policies of South Korea's new government under President Moon Jae-in have shown favor to China and North Korea, which is somewhat contrary to previous administrations that maintained pro-American policies. This situation is very similar to the geopolitical circumstances of the Joseon Dynasty during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries before Korea was occupied by Japan. This article analyzes and compares the geopolitical situations and Korea's domestic and foreign policies of the two periods. By doing so, this article argues that policy makers should be more prudent when deliberating what should be achieved in order to enhance the future of Korea, rather than how to ensure their own personal legacy or ambition for political power.