Papal Diplomacy

La corte papale dell'età di Leone XII Genga, castello 1 -30 agosto 2015 Mostra a cura di Ilaria Fiumi Sermattei e Roberto Regoli nell'ambito di un programma espositivo ideato da Valerio Barberis Strutture espositive Lexsys (Light and EXhibition SYStem)

This volume, entitled The Baroque Papacy (1600–1700), originally contains the material of the early modern European history seminar held by the author at the Péter Pázmány Catholic University. In the Foreword, the author provides a brief review of the paradigm of confessionalisation. The Introduction (I) summarises the impressive achievements of the reform papacy, the main characteristics of the less dynamic baroque papacy and the gradual change in the relationship of the papal Curia with nation states. The first large chapter (II) examines the role played by the Apostolic See in the European political stage. The focus is on the accelerating loss of pontifical power under Pope Urban V III and on the temporary reversal of this trend due to the organization of the Holy League by Pope Innocent XI, which liberated Hungary from 150 years of Turkish rule.Next, the author analyses the social, economic and financial structures of the State of the Church (III). A separate subchapter deals with the college of cardinals, the pope’s court and Roman society, as well as the the papal financial system and its institutions, the sources, types, sums and the balance of revenues and expenditures. Key processes are best modelled by the rise and fall of papal nepotism (IV). The portrayal of the changes in social and economic structures is followed by a presentation of the Curia’s pioneering decision-making system (V), which, however, became increasingly complicated and, at the end of the 17th century, underwent comprehensive reforms. In the course of this is chapter, the author discusses dicasteriums, which originate in the Middle Ages, but focuses on the expanding network of congregations, their operation, structure and competence, and finally examines the network of nunciatures and especially the development of the pontifical State Secretariate. The aim of these three chapters (III–V) is not only to understand the shifts in pontifical policy in the Early Modern Era, but also to shed light on the changes of Roman church administration and church policy as well as the changing relationship between Rome and local church organisations. The last large chapter (VI) contains a summary of the latter two, including precedent cases, key ordinances, legal frameworks, a summary of the technical and organisational problems of maintaining contacts with Rome and finally an analysis of Spanish, French and German church relations as a sample. In the end, the book contains an Outlook on the 18th century, an Appendix with the archontology of popes and chief curial magistrates.

The volume that was prepared in international cooperation redeems an old debt of international and Hungarian historiography. The tumultuous embassage of Péter Pázmány in 1632 was not only an important phase of Hungarian history, especially that of the history of church and diplomacy, but it was also a highlighted event of the history of the papacy and the Thirty Years’ War, whose outbreak was 400 years ago. Georg Lutz, who is an expert of this period, urged the thorough and modern elaboration of the embassage decades ago. The research has relied upon the documents of Pázmány’s embassage published in the 19th and 20th century (especially the documents written by Pázmány and partly the ones addressed to him); on the correspondence of the papal Secretariat of State and the nunciature of Vienna published by Rotraud Becker in 2013 (NBDIV/5; Nuntiatur des Ciriaco Rocci. Ausserordentliche Nuntiatur des Girolamo Grimaldi, 1631–1633); on the verbals of the Secretariat of State published in this volume (about the papal audiences, the negotiations of Pázmány with Secretary of State Azzolini); on the discorsos and on the supplemental documents exploited in the Primatial Archives of Esztergom. The volume is in English, Chapter I–II can also be read in Hungarian; the sources were written in Italian as well as in Latin, of which usage is helped by their abstracts written in English and Hungarian. The English parts were translated by Ágnes Gátas-Palotai; while Rotraud Becker’s chapter (Chapter I) written in German was translated by András Forgó into Hungarian.

THE MAIN RESULTS IN POINTS:

I. Based on the correspondence of the papal Secretariat of State and the nunciature of Vienna.

1) Not only did Urban VIII and his surroundings find the Roman embassage of the archbishop of Esztergom “undesirable”, but explicitly as a threat. They regarded it as part of the Spanish conduct led by Cardinal Gaspare Borgia, Spanish envoy, against the seemingly neutral but Francophile papal policy. 2) As the Roman relations to the Habsburg courts had to remain correct, they did not pay much attention to the fact that there was a royal order behind Borgia and Pázmány’s conduct; they regarded them as personal enemies. 3) The Hungarian cardinal was secretly watched, his commission was made impossible by the Curia right from the beginning. They did not focus on the imperial requests and their dismissal, but on ceremonial problems, especially on the acknowledgement of the Hungarian cardinal’s title as an imperial legate. 4) The cornered Pázmány was accused of practicing pretence in the papal court and they created such negative atmosphere concerning Pázmány’s defensive letter, Intermittere non possum – whose contemporary copies can be found in every significant European manuscript collection – that he was compared to the hated Borgia and the Curia was considered the attacked party. 5) The conflict of the cardinalate and the legatine commission was mainly stressed in relation to Borgia, the Spanish envoy. Although the cardinals could continue doing the duty of an envoy in the papal court, the number of the appointment of the non-Italian cardinals (cardinali nazionali) significantly reduced after the “riot” of Borgia and Pázmány. 6) Based on the reports of the nuncios about the scandalous Pázmány-affair one can state that there the already weak confidence in the pope’s kindness and the Curia’s explanations has further fallen. As a consequence, the authority and influence of the nuncios of Vienna was also violated in the court of Vienna. 7) Vienna could not be convinced even by the zeal of the Curia; namely, it tried to spread the Roman version of the events by giving particular orders to the nunciature, according to which Pázmány’s improper behaviour was to be blamed for the Curia’s rightful accusations. It is contradicted not only by the cardinal’s reports but also by others’ accounts. 8) The archbishop of Esztergom could not be discredited and destabilised in the imperial court; moreover, it was being seriously considered to send him back to the Eternal City; though, the ardent opposition of the papal diplomacy hindered it in the end. 9) The diplomatic conflict between the Hungarian head of church and the pope created tension also in the relations of the Hungarian church and the Holy See of Rome for decades.

II. Based on the verbals of the Secretariat of State that are being published and on the analyses

While reading the sources published in this volume, the historical atmosphere comes to life. The papal audiences given during the Hungarian cardinal’s embassage and the negotiations with Azzolini could be experienced in real time even at the distance of 400 years. Thanks to the sources of the Vatican, special prospects of the historical recognition have opened up to the readers.
1) Pázmány’s “change of loyalty” can be detected. In his summarising report of late May, Péter Pázmány finally shared the details of the papal audience of 6 April, 1632 with the imperial Secret Council, despite Urban VIII’s canonical ban and his former vow. The primate of Hungary had to choose between his loyalty as a cardinal and as a member of the Secret Council. The choice was made after a long inner and external struggle only at the very end of his embassage in Rome, in the second half of May 1632. From this time on the archbishop of Esztergom became the rigorous enemy of the Barberini-House, one of the “buzzards” of the court of Vienna in the Italian and papal policy. Not only did the Barberinis regard him as an enemy, but the feeling was mutual. 2) From the verbals of the negotiations with Secretary of State Azzolini it is clear that Pázmány himself suggested and requested many times that they should grant financial aid sooner, in one lamp sum, from the instalments of the Italian tithes. The finally granted 130,000 imperial talers was the biggest lamp sum ever that an imperial envoy could obtain from Urban VIII – despite Roman political interests – during the Thirty Years’ War for the purposes of the Catholic League. 3) An important result of our verbal-analysis is that we could learn that, although being in a more disadvantageous tactical situation, the Hungarian prelate – who was actually choleric – also masterly employed the tools of diplomatic pretence like that of the curial prelates. However, it should be noted that the tone and content of his reports written to Vienna and of his negotiations only differed a couple of weeks later, while it can be detected in the correspondence of the Secretariat of State right from the beginning. 4) For the Hungarian as well as international historiography, the purpura is a crucial element of Pázmány’s historical identity. He himself did not attribute much significance to his title of cardinal (in his opinion “his red hat served nothing else but to hang it above his grave”), which offers an insight into his personality and his monastic soul. 5) It is important for the result of the research that the Congregazione dello Stato occurs in the files; moreover, one can study the daily routine of the papal decision making and the preparatory work of the Secretariat of State. Lorenzo Azzolini was the actual head of the papal foreign policy; he was still an official, though, his activity and influence was an important step towards the establishment of the cardinal secretary of state’s position. 6) The Hungarian primate’s conduct in Rome exceeded the relations of the emperor and the pope by far and functioned on the highest level of European diplomacy. Not only did he secretly negotiate with Borgia, but the Spanish and the Austrian-Habsburg envoy mutually acted in front of the Roman diplomacy. Instead of the “Borgia-crisis”, one can and should speak about the “Borgia-Pázmány-crisis” in relation to the most dramatic events of the Roman diplomacy during the Thirty Years’ War. 7)
Pázmány’s hint given to Azzolini on 12 April, namely that he would move to Rome for several years to serve the Church, shows that the plan of his permanent Roman imperial embassage and his cardinal protectorate did not occur during his mission in 1632, as it has been believed, but on the contrary: his commission was the first (and last) episode of a long-established plan of a Roman diplomatic role. 8) During the embassage, the Hungarian primate’s attempt to involve the pope in an anti-Swedish league was a complete and clear failure. However, Urban VIII’s Francophile policy should not solely be blamed for this fiasco and should not only be analysed in the context of Rome and Vienna’s relations. The text that Pázmány brought to Rome was unacceptable not only for the papal court but also for the court of Madrid due to its phrases on the Low Countries. Therefore, the archbishop of Esztergom had to represent such a program that hadn’t been supported by the Spanish monarchy in its written form. The league between the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs was finally realized in 1634. 9) The last and most sensational result of our research: Pázmány intended to publish the most important documents of his embassage in Rome. Pázmány crossed out the addresses and cadences and added titles, sometimes even comments. A fair copy was also made of the labelled text-versions. Pázmány edited the most important documents of his embassage; he compiled the documents that depicted the empire’s situation the best, and then he contrasted them with the documents of the abortive and diversionary debate over his title as a legate. Finally, the manuscript was not edited and was placed in the primatial archives. Such an antipapal publication would not have achieved its goal that the archbishop of Esztergom understood after all.

The “Pázmány-Borgia-affair” is a turning point in the history of the papacy. The termination of the papacy’s role among the great powers sealed in the Peace of Westphalia can be dated back to this time.

Gli archivi della Santa Sede e il regno d’Ungheria (secc. 15–20). In memoriam di Lajos Pásztor, a cura di GAETANO PLATANIA–MATTEO SANFILIPPO–PÉTER TUSOR, Budapest–Roma 2008. pp. xviii + 322 and 16 suppl. (4 maps, 12 pictures). With the University „Tuscia” of Viterbo.
"The Archives of the Holy See and the Kingdom of Hungary (15–20 centuries)". Studies in English, Italian and German. Some of the authors: Alexander Koller, Silvano Giordano, Andreas Gottsmann,Silvano Giordano, Christine Maria Grafinger, Elisabeth Zingerle, Kornél Szovák, Enikő Csukovits, Tamás Véghseő.

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Gli archivi della Santa Sede e il regno d’Ungheria (secc. 15–20). In memoriam di Lajos Pásztor (CVH I/4), a cura di GAETANO PLATANIA–MATTEO SANFILIPPO–PÉTER TUSOR, Budapest–Roma 2008. xviii + 322 p. és 16 melléklet (4 térkép, 12 kép). A viterbói egyetemmel (Università della Tuscia) közös kiadás.

A képekkel, térképekkel gazdagon illusztrált kötet a nemzetközi vatikáni kutatások neves, külföldi és hazai szakembereinek tanulmányait közli, melyek témája a legkülönfélébb aspektusok bemutatása Magyarország és a pápaság közös történetéből. A tanulmányok alapjául a Római Magyar Akadémia, a Viterbói Egyetem és a PPKE Egyháztörténeti Kutatócsoport által 2007. június 12-én Rómában közösen rendezett, a kötettel azonos című nemzetközi konferencia előadásai szolgálnak.

Az olasz, angol és német nyelvű írások szerzői között találjuk többek között a viterbói egyetem bölcsészkari dékánját, a római német történeti intézet igazgatóhelyettesét, a vatikáni apostoli könyvtár főkönyvtárosát, a római osztrák történeti intézet munkatársát, a bécsi, spalatói egyetem egy-egy professzorát, a grazi egyetem doktoranduszát.

A most kiadásra kerülő okmánytár Magyarország és a Szentszék több mint ezer évre visszanyúló kapcsolatának egy speciális területét, a pápaság tizenöt éves háborúban vállalt szerepének egy szeletét dolgozza fel. Az iratok Gianfrancesco Aldobrandini generális válogatott levelezését tartalmazzák. A pápa unokaöccse három ízben (1595, 1597, 1601) vezette őszentsége hadseregét a magyarországi hadszíntérre, amelynek a működéséhez egyaránt fűződnek sikerek és kudarcok.

A forráscsoportra régen felfigyelt a hazai és nemzetközi tudományosság, ám néhány úttörő kezdeményezést leszámítva idáig nem történt érdemi kísérlet a levelezés kiadására, és sokat kellett várnunk a források monografikus jellegű feldolgozására is. Ez utóbbin változtatott Giampiero Brunelli 2017-ben megjelent könyve (La santa impresa. Le crociate del papa in Ungheria 1595–1601), amely első áttekintő összefoglalását és értelmezését nyújtja ennek a három hadjáratnak. Ezt a narratívát építi tovább az okmánytár, bőséges magyar nyelvű regeszták segítségével nyitva meg az utat az események további lehetséges értelmezése előtt. A kötet segítségével szinte kitapintható közelségbe kerülnek nemcsak a szentszéki erőfeszítések, hanem a háború fő terhét viselő Habsburg kormányzat háborút illető lépései is, amelynek diplomáciai és katonai jellegű tevékenysége egyúttal más megvilágításba kerül.

Aldobrandini generális levelezéséből kibontakozik egy teljes koraújkori hadsereg mozgósításának, a harctérre történő eljutásának, ellátásának komplex és igen nehéz feladata. Ennek megvalósítása kapcsán ráirányul a figyelem arra, hogy az Egyházi Állam civil hadvezérének a tevékenységét milyen hatékonyan segítették a szintén civil, egyházi méltóságot betöltő pápai hadbiztosok. Az ő tevékenységükről még nem született sem forráspublikáció, sem feldolgozás magyar nyelven. A levelek rávilágítanak azokra a buktatókra, amelyek két nagy ellátó rendszer, a pápai és a Habsburg összehangolásának nehézségéből fakadtak, de arra is, hogy az Apostoli Kamara a császáritól eltérően milyen hatékonyan működött, amikor képes volt arra, hogy kb. 10 ezer embert eljuttasson egy ezer kilométerrel távolabb lévő hadszíntérre, úgy, hogy a seregnek maradjon ideje a hadműveletekre is.

A levelezés alapján végigkísérhetjük a harctérre kiérő pápai katonákat a mustrától kezdve a táborig, majd az Esztergom, Vác, Pápa, illetve Kanizsa alatt vívott harcokat. Sőt az okmánytárba bekerültek azok az 1595 és 1597 közötti hadműveleti szünetben született iratok is, amelyek témája a hadsereg áttelelése, illetve az Erdélybe vonulás voltak. Ezek nem keltették fel eddig a figyelmet, bár az említett narrációnak ugyanúgy a részeit képezik.

VIII. Kelemen megkülönböztetett figyelemmel kísérte az eseményeket, és többször is személyesen avatkozott bele kompetenciájától távol eső stratégiai kérdésekbe, amely persze újfent aláhúzza Clausewitz tételét, hogy a háború a politika, és esetünkben – a hitterjesztés – folytatása fegyveres eszközökkel, illetve, hogy ez a háború személyes ügy volt a számára. De kiderül az is, hogy az Egyházi Állam erején felül vállalt – az utókor által máig kellően értékelt – szerepet a háborúban, és annak finanszírozásában. Rómában pontosan tudták, hogy Európa igazi határai nem a tengeren, ahogy a nyugat-európai történészek tekintélyes rész főleg Braudel nyomán máig hiszi, hanem a magyar királyság romjain keresztül húzódtak és húzódnak máig is.

Az okmánytár lényeges és fontos részét képezi a fizetési és veszteséglistákat tartalmazó Függelék, amely elsősorban persze a tisztikarról nyújt tanulságos képet. A száraz, első ránézésre nem túlságosan izgalmas, sőt érdektelennek tűnő név és számsorok olvasása közben azonban gondoljunk csak arra, hogy itt egy több, mint négyszáz évvel ezelőtti élet eleven szövetének egy darabja szakad ki a hadbiztosok és pápai tisztviselők pennája nyomán. Amelyből egyszerre tárul elénk a hitből, isten akaratából fakadó sztoikus belenyugvás a veszteségek felett, a lelkesedés, a halált megvető bátorság, mert a katonák és tisztjeik komolyan gondolták, hogy ők egy igazságos háborút vívnak. De megelevenedik a harcok hevessége, szinte halljuk a katonák kiabálását és jajgatását, érezzük a lőpor füstjét, a sebesülés bűzét, és a falmászás izzadságát is. Kitapinthatóvá válik az elmúlás ellen feszülő emberi akarat, amely a veszteségeket minimalizálni akarja, és a hadvezér józan számítása, hogy csak ép katonákkal lehet a harcot folytatni. Mindezt nem tudjuk meg a császári hadseregről, mivel a hosszú háború magyarországi szakaszáról ilyen átfogó jellegű, a hadtörténeti szempontokat előtérbe helyező, és egy egész hadsereg működésébe mély betekintést engedő, a háborút mintegy alulnézetből megmutató forráskiadás eddig nem jelent meg. Talán ebben ragadható meg leginkább az okmánytár legfontosabb újdonsága.