Philosophy of Sport

Plato did more than hang out in Athens’ gymnasia, he actually set up a
philosophical school in one. How education in Plato’s Academy differed from traditional
Greek gymnasia is the subject of Chapter 5. In the utopian vision of Republic, Plato used
athletics as part of the guardians’ education explicitly for the purpose of selecting and
developing souls capable of forgoing personal pleasures, studying philosophy and,
eventually, becoming leaders (Reid 2007). He seems to have believed that athletics can
promote arete, which he describes as harmony among the intellectual, spirited and
appetitive parts of the soul, because sport requires the intellect to apprehend the rules of
the game and then to recruit the spirit and appetite to its cause. Plato’s real-life
gymnasium, however, did not exist in the utopian kallipolis but rather in democratic
Athens. An aristocrat by heritage, Plato was critical of democracy, but he did believe that
arete was a matter of training rather than birth, and that training citizens for virtue is the
best way to ensure good democratic government. The methods used to cultivate arete in
Plato’s Academy probably reflected the customary values of the gymnasium: military
preparedness, athletic beauty (kalokagathia), even erotic partnerships.
The Academy no doubt remained a place for gymnastic training under Plato, but the
focus of kalokagathia (being beautiful and good) shifted from the body to the soul.
Military training, too, probably focused on cultivating virtues such as courage and wisdom
rather than mere weapons skills. And educational pederasty was exchanged for chaste
partnerships that directed erotic desire away from the body and towards ideals such as
wisdom. Plato’s emphasis on the soul also prompted the inclusion of females, both in the
utopian Republic and the real-world Academy. It is likely, of course, that Plato added
philosophical dialogue and maybe even lectures to the existing gymnastic curriculum at
the academy. But it is unlikely that he reduced or eliminated the gymnastic training and athletic games traditionally associated with that place. Sport is made educational by its
ends, not simply its practice, and Plato adapted sport quite explicitly to the end of arete.

under Stoicism and in the context of contemporary Roman values, gladiators were
capable of transcending their base social status and exercising the virtue associated
with Olympic-style athletes. Gladiatorial combat, however, should not be esteemed
as a good athletic contest because it purposely undermines competitorsʼ autonomy
and dignity. Unlike Greek athletics, which were designed to cultivate virtue, the
munera demanded Stoic wisdom to navigate their fl aws. Even as we admiringly call
some modern athletes “gladiators,” we should do what we can to prevent modern
sports from resembling the brutal munera. Gladiatorsʼ virtue may shine through
their predicament, but it does not justify that predicament.

What does Philostratus' Gymnasticus have to offer modern students and scholars of sport?  To find out, we need a reading that considers historical context, Hellenic paideia, and the relationship between nature and culture.  To understand Philostratus’ Gymnasticus, we must get beyond surface appearances and attune ourselves to the symbols and meanings that underpin Greek athletics.  If we do this, we will learn that gymnastics is not just a form of healthy recreation, but a meaningful activity that demands education and develops a kind of ethical aesthetic.  We will discover that, beyond technical expertise, wisdom is needed to make the most of our experience with sport.  And, most of all, we will come to understand that those who practice and appreciate athletics constitute a community with a particular identity informed by a glorious history.

The emphasis placed on sports in modern culture makes it easy for us to forget that they are intrinsically meaningless. The goal, touchdown, or world record that inspires and amazes us does not have anything like the social value of a new cancer treatment or peace agreement. Even its pure entertainment value seems to stem from something more than putting a ball into a net or riding a bike up a mountain. We invent sports, and we attribute meaning to them. In ancient Greece, the motivation
for doing this was spiritual—it was a religious attempt to cultivate arete, the perfection that the deities represented; perhaps it was even a way to make their presence felt on earth. I argue that the value of sports today—even their economic value—depends ultimately on that ancient spiritual connection. If we can see sports again as a kind of spiritual striving, if we can revive their ancient connection to aret, to such eternally
valuable virtues as eusebeia, andreia, sophrosyne, dikaiosyn, and sophia, I think we can revive their social value today. So many athletes strive to win an Olympic medal, to make it to the Olympic Games, or just to have the physique of an Olympic pentathlete. Very few will achieve those things, but all of us can benefit from striving to achieve the greatest athletic prize of all: the virtuous soul of an Olympian.

This book examines the relationship between athletics and philosophy in ancient Greece and
Rome with special emphasis on changing ideas about the connection between athleticism and
virtue. Its aim is to enable a foundational understanding of ancient sport and philosophy that
makes a sincere dialogue with modern practices both possible and fruitful. The book begins by
observing that the link between athleticism and virtue is older than sport, reaching back to the
athletic feats of kings and pharaohs in early Egypt and Mesopotamia. It then traces the role of
athletics and the Olympic Games in transforming of the idea of aristocracy as something acquired
by birth to something that can be trained. The idea of training virtue through the techniques and
practice of athletics is examined in relation to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Then Roman
spectacles such as chariot racing and gladiator games are studied in light of the philosophy of
Lucretius, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. The concluding chapter connects the book’s ancient
observations with contemporary sports issues such as the use of athletes as role models, the
relationship between money and corruption, the relative worth of participation and spectatorship,
and the role of females in sport. The author argues that there is a strong link between sport and
philosophy in the ancient world, calling them offspring of common parents: concern about virtue
and the spirit of free enquiry. In order to preserve this connection between enquiry, virtue, and
sport, she concludes, we must understand its ancient origins.

This book examines the relationship between athletics and philosophy in ancient Greece and Rome focused on the connection between athleticism and virtue. It begins by observing that the link between athleticism and virtue is older than sport, reaching back to the athletic feats of kings and pharaohs in early Egypt and Mesopotamia. It then traces the role of athletics and the Olympic Games in transforming the idea of aristocracy as something acquired by birth to something that can be trained. This idea of training virtue through the techniques and practice of athletics is examined in relation to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Then Roman spectacles such as chariot racing and gladiator games are studied in light of the philosophy of Lucretius, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. The concluding chapter connects the book’s ancient observations with contemporary issues such as the use of athletes as role models, the relationship between money and corruption, the relative worth of participation and spectatorship, and the role of females in sport.

The author argues that there is a strong link between sport and philosophy in the ancient world, calling them offspring of common parents: concern about virtue and the spirit of free enquiry.

The reassuring belief that “sport builds character” is firmly entrenched in
popular opinion despite repeated examples of athlete misbehavior and widespread
disagreement over just what character is and how it can be measured. Scholarly
claims that sport can and should be a form of moral education are usually greeted
with skepticism by philosophers and physical educators alike. Such proposals have a
long and venerable pedigree, however, one that might originate with a foundational
document of western philosophy: Plato’s Republic. In our modern quest to understand
how sport might contribute to moral education, of children in particular, and
to design and implement athletic programs that do in fact “build character,” it seems
worthwhile to look back at what Plato thought on the subject. In Plato’s Republic
sport serves the educational objectives of personal virtue, intellectual achievement,
and political harmony. But to understand and perhaps apply Plato’s insight today,
we must revisit our conceptual dichotomies of mind versus body, academics versus
athletics, and individual versus community. Plato’s historical reality and his ideal
city might seem impossibly distant from today’s concerns. But understanding the
contrasts as well as the similarities might enlighten our efforts to fulfill the hollow
promise that sport may function as moral education.

In the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sport (McNamee, Morgan, 2015) for the first time Bioethics of Sport (BeS) was included, and therefore officially acknowledged, as a separate field within the philosophy of Sport. Starting from that fact, I will raise three issues. Firstly, I will propose the definition for the (new) sub-discipline, briefly present its short history, and indicate the connection to the Bioethics as such. Secondly, I will point out the BeS thematic scope in the past and present, and show how and why it is too narrow, insufficient and not comprehensive enough. In that regard, relying on Fritz Jahr's understanding of Bioethics, I will propose the widening of the current scope, and demonstrate that many of the topics were already present in the discourse of the philosophy of sport just were not recognised and considered as bioethical. Thirdly, I will emphasise the issue of the distinction between ethics and Bioethics of Sport within the philosophy of Sport. Finally, I will consider some prospects regarding the future of the bioethics of sport.

Резюме. Проследявайки тенденциите във визуалните изкуства в Германия, Франция и Италия в периода 1918 – 1936 г. и поставяйки ги на философски анализ, можем да разберем по какъв начин тялото на спортиста се естетизира и се превръща в машина за печелене на символен капитал за тоталитарните режими. Този период е и свидетелство за възхода и установяването на пропа-гандата. Тази тенденция се оказва стабилна и доминантна десетилетия по-къс-но, когато визуалните изкуства продължават с пропагандна цел да представят образите на спортистите-машини. В периода между двете световни войни в хуманитарните науки се забеляз-ва един стремеж да се обясни каква грешка в прогреса довежда до най-уни-щожителната до този момент Първа световната война. Освалд Шпенглер в " Залезът на Запада " (1918) вижда проблема в културата, която, превърнала се в цивилизация, вече няма своята живителна сила. Нидерландският филолог и философ Йохан Хьойзинха в " Homo Ludens " (1938) вижда проблема в стана-лата прекалено сериозна игра, в абсолютизирането на победата и желанието за трупане на материални блага, в изкривената житейска философия, която вижда смисъла в надмощието над другите, а не във взаимната игра. Появява се психоанализата на Зигмунд Фройд и Карл Г. Юнг и всички търсят отговор на въпроса защо прогресът доведе до това динамитът да се използва за убий-ства, а не за строенето на тунели, какво накара хората на Модерността да се впуснат в най-кървавите и варварски войни в историята на човечеството. Вероятен отговор на въпроса може би трябва да се потърси в отношението към човека, в естетизирането на телесността в този период и във възприятие-то на героичното. Акцентът на тази статия е върху естетизирането на тялото на спортиста като пример за това как тялото започва да има амбивалентна функция (Grigorov, 2015). Двойствената му функционалност е резултат от

The Body-machine from Michael Phelps to Oscar Pistorius discusses in retrospection the utilitarian view about the body that should be productive. From a utilitarian perspective, the body is not personal belonging but is separated from the human and transformed into a working machine. This view about the body raises many ethical problems especially for people that are not so productive such as handicapped people. Evidence for this can be found in professional sport. This process is essential for athletes. In the early 20 th century the athlete's body-machine was produced for the needs of professional sport. Those new athletic body-machines have become very important because they produced symbolic capital for their countries. The products, achievements, and especially the Olympic medals of athletes fulfill the nationalist agenda which, in Europe, was especially influential in that period. Athletes' achievements from international sport competitions produce symbolic capital in a similar way to archeological artifacts or the works of " national " writers. The gold medal and the world record can stimulate national dignity and consolidate people from a certain community. Top athletes are very famous and can become decision makers. However, very often this symbolic capital serves the purposes of state propaganda. Such examples are provided in this paper. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the inhumane practice of using athletes as gold producing machines rather than letting them develop fully their human potential.

Een interessant aspect aan sport is dat het de mens toont in beweging. Waar beweging bij veel andere activiteiten slechts begeleidend lijkt te zijn, zet sport het lichamelijke, plotselinge en onvoorspelbare van beweging in de schijnwerpers. Sport laat zien hoe onze gedachten en gevoelens ontstaan vanuit ons bewegende lichaam. Hoe we ons voelen en hoe we waarnemen hangt nauw samen met hoe we bewegen.

Applying Bernard Suits’ conceptual definition of game-playing, and his outline of a conceptual definition of sport, I ask and answer the following question: can hunting be a sport? An affirmative answer is substantiated via the following logic. Premise one, all sports are games. Premise two, a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. Premise three, fair-chase hunters voluntarily accept unnecessary obstacles. Conclusion one: fair-chase hunting is a game. Premise four, a sport can be defined as a game that requires the exercise of physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability. Premise five, some fair-chase hunts require physical skill, have a wide following, and have institutional stability. Conclusion two, fair-chase hunting that requires physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability is a sport. After substantiating each premise and conclusion I consider and refute several important objections. Primarily, 1) that hunting lacks constitutive rules and 2) that hunting lacks volitional engagement and thus cannot be a game or sport

Given Bernard Suits’ stature in the philosophy of sport, his take on strategic fouling, surprisingly, hasn’t been given much attention in the literature. Rather than relying on a purely empirical or ‘ethos’ approach to justify the Strategic Foul he provides a mixed justification. Suits’ account combines a priori and a posteriori elements. He introduces a third kind of rule, which appears to be unlike rules of skill or constitutive rules, into his conceptual scheme. Suits claims that it is sometimes tactically correct to break such a rule in order to gain an advantage. I will argue that the a priori element in his justification of strategic fouling is unconvincing because there is nothing special about ‘third type’ rule-violations, which incur a ‘fixed penalty’. Furthermore, the a posteriori element ultimately reduces to a rule of skill, and it is doubtful whether it has sufficient normative force to warrant breaking a rule. But, most importantly, the a posteriori element degrades the power of the a priori element.

In the Christian religious tradition, theological virtues of faith, hope and love have a central role. Along with the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance they present the whole of the good human life. While cardinal virtues can be cultivated by human will, faith, hope and love are given by God and therefore open 'natural' human life on Earth toward transcendent spiritual realities. Human beings as bio-psycho-social and spiritual beings incorporate theological virtues in all the activities of their life. In sport, faith, hope and love have an important, though often neglected, role. On a practical level faith can be recognized in any relation between athlete and coach. To trust one's coach, without any guarantee that the outcome of prescribed workouts will lead to the desired results, needs strong faith, trust and confidence. Moreover, faith is the virtue that makes sport so attractive also for spectators even to the point of being a 'secular' religion for the masses. Hope is the virtue of 'not yet' or of something 'being on its way'. For most athletes, daily workouts are not a goal, but just the means to that end. Any reason for doing sports needs a hope behind it in order to move or will oneself to action. Along with hope, understood as a golden mean, we find despair on the one hand and 'false hope' on the other. Both are corruptions of hope seen daily in the world of sport. To manage hope in sport practices correctly offers a path to success in sport at all levels. Love is at the apex of the theological virtues. There are many formulations of love both in ancient Greek and Roman times: eros, agape, caritas, amor. Each has its special characteristic meaning also in sport. In sport we can see laughter and tears because any love is connected with highest human joy and deepest depression. Yet, in summation, it is argued that love in sport must be understood as the binding force and source of cooperation and fulfilled life for any athlete qua human being.

Feelings play a crucial role in sports, just as in any other arenas of human experience. However, one may encounter certain feelings in the sporting field more than others such as envy, pride, arrogance (or hubris), ambition, anger, sadness, despair, fear, anxiety, and euphoria (and zealotry on the part of fans, if this is a feeling). It is necessary for athletes and the sporting community to harbor feelings in their proper dose or in their proper context in order to sustain the spirit of sporting. Yes, sport does have a cathartic role in the lives of the sporting community, but if the euphoria as part of catharsis is excessive, it turns into zealotry, which, in my view, goes against the spirit of sport. What is crucial is to understand the role of feelings in sports.

In this paper, I will examine the works of several philosophers such as Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Aristotle uses the concept of ‘catharsis’ in order to explain a phenomenon that happens during the experience of drama. Since then catharsis has been broadly applied and can also be applied to sports. Whether as players or as spectators, sport has cathartic effects. Although Aristotle focuses on the discharge of two emotions, namely pity and fear, it can be used for a variety of emotions. How can we channel our violent urges and our fears? The former issue takes us to Nietzsche and how he sees the necessity for externalizing our destructive urges, which he sees in in the Olympic culture of competition. On the other hand, Kierkegaard and Heidegger address the subject of fear, as they discuss its debilitating impact on our potentiality and how, not fear, but anxiety can push us further and higher. Furthermore, Hume brings up the concept of ‘moral sentiment’ in his discussion of morality and highlights the quality of emotions as the underlying aspect of our moral make-up and action. His critique of rational paradigms in morality would resonate with Nietzsche, but in this paper I will focus on the quality of sentiments both in Hume and Nietzsche. Finally, Spinoza speaks of ‘affects’ and, like Hume, of passions. Every action has an impact on something else. Actions are always driven by motives and feelings, even if we are not aware of them. It would be for the good of the sporting community to work on these passions and affects.

The question of emotions and emotional intelligence has been the subject of psychology to a large extent; however, there are many ideas to be found in philosophers. What I chose is only a small part of philosophical reflections on human emotions with the hope of starting a bigger investigation, as I engage with recent scholarly work on this subject by Stephen Mumford, Mikko Salmela, Jeffrey P. Fry, and others. Philosophy of sport and the sporting community can benefit from these reflections so that we can seek and find higher realms in the spirit of sporting.

This paper led me to the book on the same subject.

I begin this review with a brief overview of the book itself, followed by a discussion of its pedagogical usefulness as a text in Philosophy of Sport and Philosophy of Religion courses. I then move on to discuss a few points in the book that I take to be especially interesting and/or problematic from a philosophical point of view.

Somaesthetics – an inquiry into the qualitative dimensions of our sensually embodied engagements – affords one of the most refined, revealing, and rigorous ways to conduct appreciative and profitable exploration of sport. The chapter delves into several fundamental concepts in Shusterman’s oeuvre with cross-sectional relevance for sport and somaesthetics: constraint, enhancement, self-knowledge, instrumentality, and self-realization. Section one presents a brief overview of extant scholarship at the intersection of both, sport and somaesthetics. Then, section two discourses on games and sport as springs for constrained endeavors that enrich our vital landscape. Section three discusses human enhancement in sport in relation to the somaesthetic transformative agenda. In section four, self-knowledge, central to both sport and somaesthetics, takes center stage. Section five then examines instrumentality, meaning, and “selfless” flourishing. A pithy conclusion highlights key ideas.

[See video here: https://miroslavimbrisevic.wordpress.com/talks/]

The TV series ‘Cobra Kai’ brings up some interesting philosophical and practical questions about the teaching of martial arts (MA). I will reflect on these questions and try to come up with some answers. We are presented with two styles of teaching. One is hard and aggressive (Johnny Lawrence from Cobra Kai), the other soft and empathic (Daniel LaRusso from Miyagi Do).
The Karate competition invites the following questions: Is it ok to fight dirty, if this gives you victory? Can you use the rules strategically? Can you break the rules to gain an advantage? Isn’t it a hollow victory when you target a pre-existing injury of your opponent deliberately? In a good competition you bring out the best in each other. ‘You want to beat your opponent when s/he is at her/his strongest.’ This reflects the tension in MA teaching whenever there is a sports side (competition). Winning at all cost will be in conflict with MA values: winning honourably, exhibiting indomitable spirit, etc.

This paper examines the notion of fouls in sports. In the first part of the paper we examine some actual distinctions and classifications between different kinds of fouls. In the second part we examine the significance, validity and justification of these classifications from a normative perspective.

Adapting Bernard Suits' account of game-play, we can show that, in games, competition can be converted into cooperation. Suits says that to play a game is to voluntarily take up unnecessary obstacles for the sake of overcoming them. Thus, in games, we can become each others' desired obstacles. Others in the philosophy of sport have argued for such cooperation, but typically but the weight of conversion on player consent or player intention. I argue for a more distributed model of conversion, in which player consent, proper match-ups of player temperament and skill, features of game-design, and psychological fit of players with game design all contribute to the conversion process. As a result, conversion isn't guaranteed, even when all players have consented. Finally, I use the conversion model to argue against the popular view in philosophy of sports that the purpose of sport is the display or development of excellence; instead, the social function of converting competition into cooperation is just as plausible an account of the purpose of sport.

Our research work has fixed as objective, to apprehend the report of mental preparation for athletic performance from a study of a population of Algerian athletes. Sports performance defined by Platonov, V.N (1984.) as being " the maximum possibilities of an individual in a discipline at a given moment in its development" involves several other determinants. And this definition has the interest to introduce "the concept of threshold or level of performance", which are quantifiable, as defined by time, distance, power. In contrast, the physical appearance which is much easier to quantify and evaluate, it seemed more that random to define this 'process' that unites a sports result in the specific field of the individual mind. And for this, we are interested in our study, this pane, in the matter of the psychological variables that differentiate individuals between them and to, "everything that distinguishes the champions of other normal individuals: differential psychology.'' Durand, M. (1987). And we asked why mental preparation is so important in the realization of the sports performance? What are its methods, how to determine its effectiveness? The intervention of the psychologist through a descriptive language full observation taken upstream, and has designed to try to understand that which is expressed, by his actions, emotions and attitudes in a stressful environment and in its "moments of great solitude." In other words, we are trying to assign to this mental factor 'discriminating quality' so coveted by the athlete and his coach.

"The sport of golf has grown tremendously in the past three decades. It is now the leading sport in the world in terms of total economic expenditure, yet surprising little on golf has
appeared in the academic sports studies literature. In particular, the impact of golf on the environment has been virtually absent from discussion. Golf takes place in the outdoors, yet golf course development and maintenance has involved many aspects that are deleterious to the environment. This article charts the impact of golf on the environment from an international perspective, particularly noting emerging differences in first and developing world countries."

In this paper I argue for a prescriptive definition of Olympic sport that hinges on the normative demands of Olympism.  Although the International Olympic Committee sets up specific criteria for the selection of sports to be included in the Olympic Games, they do not stipulate a definition of Olympic sport per-se.  I would like to construct a definition of Olympic sport that begins with Bernard Suits’ basic metaphysical idea, but then incorporates a normative element based on the ideals and objectives of the Games as articulated in the Olympic Charter’s “Fundamental Principles of Olympism.”  If, for example, Olympic sport is supposed to exalt the “joy of effort,” provide educationally good examples, respect “universal fundamental ethical principles,” and promote “a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity,” we need a definition that recognizes that.  Not only would this definition help us to distinguish Olympic sport from non-Olympic sport, it might help us to identify sports rules and performances as more or less ‘Olympic’ depending on how well they exemplify those ideals.  For example, a sport like marathon running exemplifies the “joy of effort” better than a motorized sport like automobile racing does and is therefore more ‘Olympic,’ though both activities have the same basic game structure (that of a race).  Furthermore, sports that provide the opportunity for wide participation and multicultural interaction, such as soccer, may be more ‘Olympic’ than sports like shooting or sailing, which require more sophisticated equipment and infrastructure and involve less personal interaction.  Finally, athletes who display behaviors which detract from Olympic values—such as the badminton players in the London Games who fluffed some early matches—may be failing to play an ‘Olympic’ sport even as they follow all the rules of a game.  Likewise, going above and beyond the rules of sport to promote Olympic ideals—such as the Canadian cross-country ski coach at Sochi who lent an opposing athlete a spare ski—may be recognized as more ‘Olympic’ than behaviors based on strictly competitive logic.  Human beings invented sport and we also control its definition.  I think the Olympic Movement should define Olympic sport in a way that consciously promotes Olympic ideals.

The Olympic Games are a sporting event guided by philosophy. The modern Olympic Charter calls this philosophy “Olympism” and boldly states its goal as nothing less than “the harmonious development of humankind” and the promotion of “a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.” The ideas and ideals behind Olympism, however, are ancient—tracing their roots to archaic and classical Greece, just like the Games do. This collection of essays explores the ancient Hellenic roots of Olympic philosophy and explain their application to modern sport. It examines the philosophical heritage of the Games, the ethics implied by Olympic values of sport, the educational goals of sport, the relations between justice and fair play, the political ideals of peace and world community, and modern challenge of multiculturalism as expressed in the philosophical contrasts between East and West.  To understand the beauty, challenges, politics, and potential of the Olympic Games, we must first understand Olympic philosophy.

Öz Suits, oyun oynamayı, " gereksiz engelleri aşmak için girişilen gönüllü bir çaba " olarak nitelendirir. Bu çerçevede, İnsanın oyun oynamak istediği için –aşılacak– suni engeller yarattığını; bu engelleri aşmak için izin verilen araç, gereç ve yöntemleri sınırlayan ve dolayısıyla engelleri belirleyen kurallara, – sadece o etkinliği mümkün kıldığı için – uyduğunu belirtir. Suits, bu temel oyun oynama (game playing) tanımından hareketle, oyun (game), oyun (play) ve spor (sport) belirlenimleri yapar. Bunun yanında, bir insanın herhangi bir etkinliğe girme amacının iki şekilde olacağını dile getirir: ototelik ya da araçsal. İlki, bir etkinliğin amacının kendisinde olduğunu; ikincisi, başka bir amacın aracı olduğunu ifade eder. Bu bizi, Antikçağ' dan günümüze, Felsefe Tarihinde çokça tartışılan bir ikiliğe götürür: Bir eylem haz (hedone) için mi yoksa mutluluk (eudomania) için mi yapılır? Temelini Mill ve Bentham'ın Yararcı Felsefe anlayışından alan İngiliz ve Amerikan düşünme ve yaşama anlayışına göre; İnsan acıdan kaçar ve hazza yönelir. Böyle bir anlayışla ortaya konan Ütopya düzeni ise insanın herhangi bir yoksunluk duymadığı bir yer olarak ortaya çıkar. Burada Suits, ototelik bir etkinlik olarak oyun oynamayı, Ütopya'nın varoluş ideali olarak çözümler. Buna karşın, gerçek yaşamda, Bir oyun kendisi için yapıldığında, oyuncular oyunla bütünleşerek ve oyundan zevk alarak mücadele ediyorlarsa, iş, aile, toplumsal ilişkiler, sanatsal yönelimler kısacası gerçek dünya yaşantılarının hepsinin üzerinde bir yoğun eylem gerçekleştiriliyorsa ve bu eylemde ne madalya ne onur ödülü vb. gözetilmeden eylemin kendisi amaçsa, aslında bu oyun tıpkı bir Ütopya yaşamı gibidir.

All athletes experience victory and defeat, but how many truly learn from the experience of sport? In ancient Greece, sport was an integral part of education. Today, athletics programs remain in our schools, but we face a growing gap between the modern sports experience and enduring educational values. This book seeks to bridge that gap by advocating a philosophical approach to the sports experience.