Private equity and venture capital

La üfinicilm legal de socitdad gestora de tntidtuks de capital-riesgo atendiendo a lo.s e/.emenJIJS esenciales integrantes de su rigimen. 2.1.1. El carácter de sociedad anónima especial. 2.2.2. El objeto social principal. 2.2.3. La actividad co~plementaria de las sociedades gestoras .de ent;idades de ca-pi~go. 2.2. La cqnjigumci6n. di Ja ~ de entidades tú capitaJ-ri&go como una activüúul ~ a 711plación y. su.pruisión. 2.3. Definieiim pnrp'IÚlsta de sociedad gmt1m de entitlad& de ~• 3. LA NATUIW..EZA Y LOS REQUISITOS ESPECÍFICOS DE LAS SOCIEDADES GESTORAS DE ENTI-DADES DE WJT.AL.JUESGO. 3.1. lA natumlc:4 tú las socit:tltJtús pstqras de entil.ladts de ~ y sus m¡uisilos de const1tuci6n. 3.1.1. Sociedades anónimas especiales por razón de su o~eto y de sus requisitos constitutivos. Su condición de sociedades reguladas, sometidas al •régimen e~ mún,. de la Ley 25/2005 y al de la •Dittctiva 2011/61/UE GFIA. ~tU!. Su naturaleza de entidades financieras. 3.2. Etttid6des ron ~en su naturalca a las s«iNlttda grstortu. de emitltJdes de ctJf'ital-rilsgo, que ptMiden tklarrolúw func'tlmA ~ tú biD&.• 3.2.1. Las sociedades gestoras de instituciones de inversión colectiva. 3.2.2. Las entidades facultadas para la •gestión de carteras de inversión»: las sociedades de valores, las agencias de valores, las sociedades gestoras de carteras y las entidades de crédito. 3.3. La.s ~u~ a~ 4. ASPECTOS DETI:RMI-NANTES DEL NUCO EN EL QUE DESARROllAN SUS FUNCIONES LAS SO-CIE.DADES GESfORAS DE ENTIDADES DE CAPffAL.~. 4.1. Las socie-.dad&t ~de~ tk ~. amtnl gravitotoriodá ~del ~ 4.2. La obligtiQ6n 1M vdar pur el intms u los ~ y los (l«<iDnilúu, l»>III•~ ~ dM ~ 4e sus jtmQones. 4.3. La mlfdod frtn* • lDs fKJfflidfMs ' .. ~.por los ;tnjvit;jgs OtJtuados •actividades complementarias• de las entidades de capital-riesgo, se dispone que, •(e)n el caso de los fondos de capital-riesgo, las actividades anteriores serán realizadas por las sociedades gestoras• y " (e) n el caso de las sociedades de capital-riesgo, podrán ser realizadas por ellas mismas o bit!n, en su caso, por sw sociedades gestoras•. Vid. Romúcuu. AKTIGAS, F., •Artículo 2 Concepto y artículo 3 Actividades complementarias», en IGLESIAS

This paper provides an overview of the literature on private equity and leveraged buyouts, focusing on global evidence related to both governance and returns to private equity and leveraged buyouts. We distinguish between financial and real returns to this activity, where the latter refers to productivity and broader performance measures. We also outline a research agenda on this topic.

This paper considers the structure, governance and performance of a unique class of mutual funds that receives capital only from individuals, and reinvests this contributed capital in private companies, as opposed to traditional mutual funds that invest in publicly traded companies. We consider the particular class of mutual funds known as Canadian Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds (LSIFs). We point out that similar funds have been introduced in the UK; as well, it has been argued that the Canadian LSIF structure should be introduced in the US. In contrast to expectations, we show that LSIFs have artificially low betas (the average beta is 0.38), returns that have significantly underperformed industry benchmarks (including risk-free 30-day T-bills), average MERs greater than 4%, and have collectively accumulated $CAN 8 billion ($US 5 billion) over 1992-2002. We show that these incongruous data are directly attributable to the LSIF statutory structure. LSIF legislation mandates episodic valuations that determine share prices, an 8-year investor lock-in period, and onerous constraints on capital reinvestment. LSIFs also afford to their investors tax-generated returns in excess of 100%. The unique LSIF structure provides generalizable insights into the relation between organizational governance and performance, and the unsuitability of mutual fund structures for private equity investment.

This chapter considers the relationship between the U.S. federal income tax system and innovation, using the sharing economy as a focal point for analysis. It makes two main points. First, the tax system is currently a questionable tool for encouraging innovation. Regulators are understandably concerned that taxpayers will use tax incentive provisions in unanticipated ways, and thus are inclined to tightly limit such provisions’ scope. This reduces incentive provisions’ net benefit to taxpayers, and can even cause such provisions to miss their marks entirely. Moreover, small and new companies are key drivers of innovation, and evidence suggests that they are relatively unresponsive to tax incentives.

Second, innovation can help improve the tax system. To fix a problem, one must first identify it; innovation provides opportunities to see where tax law is achieving its goals and where it is falling short. The sharing economy experience suggests some strengths, such as the tax system’s definition of income, as well as weaknesses, such as the dividing line between independent contractors and employees.

This paper provides an overview of the literature on private equity and leveraged buyouts, focusing on global evidence related to both governance and returns to private equity and leveraged buyouts. We distinguish between financial and real returns to this activity, where the latter refers to productivity and broader performance measures. We also outline a research agenda on this topic.

Despite the scientific evidence on the positive effect of venture capital (VC) on portfolio firm performance, such evidence badly pulls up alongside the non-negligible number of entrepreneurial firms that receive an offer by a VC fund and choose to refuse it. We investigate the microeconomic determinants behind the missed realizations of VC investor-investee dyads by focusing on the Italian VC market, that represents an ideal test bed for our identification strategy. We investigate firm characteristics that lead entrepreneurs to refuse VC, which motivations are behind this choice and which is the impact on firm growth.

Using a sample of European venture capital investments, I study the relation between venture capital (VC) contracts and exits. The data indicate that ex ante, stronger VC control rights increase the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will exit by an acquisition, rather than through a write-off or an IPO. My findings are robust to controls for a variety of factors, including endogeneity and cases in which the VC preplans the exit at the time of time of contract choice. My findings are consistent with control-based theories of financial contracting, such as Aghion and Bolton (1992).

A wide range of definitions exists of what constitutes value creation and -generation in private equity buyouts. At the core of the problem is that our understanding of the diverse set of levers, drivers and mechanisms by which financial value is generated has been inconsistent and incomplete. This paper attempts to address extant deficiencies in the literature by proposing a novel and cohesive conceptual model of value generation that connects various strands of research in the field.

In the government’s quest to find a solution to this problem, it established the Venture Capital Trust Fund in the year 2004 through an act of parliament, Act 680. The research attempts to provide an assessment of the Venture capital Trust Fund from 2006-2011. Thus, the objective of the research is to give an assessment of the fund in terms of growth, strategies adopted by the fund managers, success chalked and the challenges faced by the fund. The research involved data gathering from the Venture Capital Trust Fund (VCTF), the Venture Capital Finance Companies (VCFCs) and the Venture Capital Small and Medium Enterprises (VC SMEs). The data collection methods used was; direct observation, face-to-face interview, document survey and the administration of questionnaires. The Microsoft Excel software was used in the analysis of the data gathered. The analysis showed that, the venture capital trust fund performed arguably well in terms of growth within the period under review. It had a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 13.73% and an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of Gh₵ 6,156,231 in terms of quantum. In percentage terms, its internal rate of return was 28.13%. The research also found out that, one of the major challenges facing the Venture Capital Trust Fund was the lack of permanent source of funding. Other challenges included the general lack of understanding of the operations of the fund and the concentration of most of the fund’s activities in the Greater Accra. In terms of successes chalked, the VCTF was able to leverage its initial seed money of Gh₵ 22.4 million to create a pool of Gh₵ 83 million made available for SMEs and an estimated 1,400 jobs was created in one of its Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) program, Sorghum production. The research concluded that, for Ghana’s Venture Capital industry and the Venture Capital Trust Fund in particular perform better as the ones seen in developed world; there must a conscious effort by all stakeholders to find solutions to the challenges facing it.

The principal management theoretical lenses for examining leveraged buyouts have been the agency theory and information asymmetries. Occasionally a wider number of theories and concepts have been invoked, such as the parenting advantage, the resource-based view, and the market for corporate control. This paper reviews the fundamental literature connected with the theories and examines the applicability to the leveraged buyouts carried out by private equity firms.

This report is a follow-up study building on the previous Kukula Capital baseline study which was prepared in September 2019 for the Zambian National Advisory Board for Impact Investment (NABII).
This report addresses and analyses both the Private Asset Impact Funds (PAIFs), that is non-Development Finance Institutions (non-DFIs) self-identifying as impact investors albeit not necessarily in full accordance with the official definition of impact investment, and the DFIs.
❖ Study coverage: The study compiles data on 23 asset managers of which the headquarters of 4 are located in Zambia and the rest are located in 12 other countries. In terms of assets under management (AUM), the study survey covers 5 DFIs and another 18 non-DFIs which all
together are deploying capital into (impact) enterprises across the following 7 impact sectors: Financial Services; Renewable Energy; Real Estate; Agriculture; Food and Agro-Processing; Waste Management and Tourism.
❖ Market size: The study aggregates a total of USD 85.17 Mn of assets into 28 impact enterprises, which were split between DFIs: $47.17 Mn in AUM; Private Equity: $36.17 Mn in AUM; High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs): $1.40 Mn in AUM and Crowdfunding: $0.43 Mn in AUM.
❖ When looking exclusively at DFIs’ 13 Impact Deals Flow into projects in the period 2019-2020 the total amount $706 Mn in AUM is invested by 8 different Multilateral and Bilateral DFIs.
The study brings the most comprehensive data set to date on this investment fund universe focusing on Zambia exclusively during the period 2019-2020 by providing a clear picture state of the size of the
impact investment market in Zambia. The study does this by:
i. Mapping all known 23 impact investors including by highlighting which Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) they all focus on and investment products they use;
ii. Estimating the Market size (i.e., the total value of impact investments) including highlighting the methodology used and assumptions made;
iii. Identifying existing and potential trends in the Zambian impact investing market and showing developments from the baseline period 2015-2018 to the follow-up up period from 2019-2020;
iv. Investigating the fund management landscape in Zambia and describing the impact measurement and management tools which these impact investors are using;
v. Identifying AUM by sector, instrument and organisation type;
vi. Investigating the investment performance and the risks of various instruments;
vii. Mapping the (impact) enterprises who received impact capital from both the 18 non-DFIs and 5 DFIs, and counting the actual number of transactions from 2019-2020;
viii. Finally, by identifying some of the major challenges the impact investors are confronted with and proposing what could be done to ensure that the opportunities associated with growing of the impact investment market size in Zambia eventually materialize within the newly Elected Zambian Government’s forthcoming 8th National Development Plan (2022-2026).

This article examines how private equity returns in Asia are related to levels of legal protection and corruption. We utilize a unique data set comprising over 750 returns to private equity transactions across 20 developing and developed countries in Asia. The data indicate that legal protections are an important determinant of private equity returns in Asia, but also that private equity managers are able to mitigate the potential for corruption. The quality of legal system (including legal protections) is positively related to returns. Inefficient legal protections negatively impact transaction structures and economic certainty when exiting investments. We also find that private equity managers, irrespective of the quality of legal system they are operating within, can mitigate the potential impact of corruption. Private equity returns are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption, controlling for legal systems. This finding is consistent with the view that private equity managers bring about organizational change to alleviate the costs of corruption. Our findings are robust to inclusion of controls for Hofstede cultural variables, economic conditions, and transaction specific characteristics, as well as consideration of econometric sample selection methods for unexited investments.

Hasta la fecha ningún autor se había interesado en estudiar la posible incidencia del régimen jurídico de los grupos de socie- dades en las operaciones de capital-riesgo. Siendo el objeto principal de la actividad de capital-riesgo la toma temporal de participaciones en empresas es común que las entidades de capital-riesgo acaben adquiriendo el control de una o varias so- ciedades. Interesará resolver los posibles problemas que pueda plantear esa relación de dependencia sobre todo para exami- nar si se podría producir una comunicación de responsabilidad de las sociedades filiales a la sociedad matriz a través de la aplicación de la doctrina del levantamiento del velo societario.

We document that the choice between disintermediated individual angel investments and intermediated private equity and venture capital investments depends on legal, economic, and cultural differences. We find evidence of this using PitchBook's comprehensive data on more than 5,000 angel and 80,000 private equity and venture capital investments in 96 countries from 1977 to 2012. The data further indicate that investee firms funded by angels are less likely to successfully exit through either an IPO or an acquisition. These findings are robust to propensity score matching methods, as well as to clustering standard errors and excluding U.S. observations, among other approaches.

In Canada, Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) have become the dominant source of venture capital. There is reason for concern over this development, because evidence suggests LSVCCs are inefficient investment vehicles, charging high fees and yielding disappointing results: very
few funds generate positive returns. Moreover, government tax subsidies to LSVCCs may crowd out private venture investment.
Accordingly, Canadian policymakers should investigate other ways to facilitate entrepreneurial investment.

This paperaims to explore different return driversfor private equity investments that are not directly linkedto the investee company’s fundamentalsby examining macroeconomic-, industry-, and deal-level dataas well as thevariance in their impact onthe performance spectrum. This study will use acomprehensivedataset that is collected from AfricInvestcovering 242 dealsin 194 companies, operatingin 24 African countries,across 14 funds,closed between 1995 and2020.This paper shows that exit routes, co-investments, and cash-out structures have a positive impact on returns,while debtusage, GPexperience,ticket size, and ownership stakehave a limited role in driving returns. In terms of external factors, GDP growth has a positive impact on returns that is most significant on the lowerperformancequantiles, while business environment variables arefound tohave limited impact. The effect of sector on returns has also been found to be significant, furtherreinforcingthe importance of sector allocation as a performance driver in private equity.

ABSTRACT We examine the impact of international venture capital investors on private firm success spanning 69 countries over the years 1995-2010. The data examined indicate that, relative to deals in which the investor base is purely domestic, private firms that have an international venture capital syndicate have a higher probability of exiting via IPO and higher IPO proceeds, as well as higher total deal M&amp;amp;A values. These relationships, however, depend on the level of internationalization and hence imply a tradeoff between the strategic benefits associated with international investors and the costs associated with geographic, cultural and legal differences across countries.

CAPITAL-RIESGO. 2.1. La üfinicilm legal de socitdad gestora de tntidtuks de capital-riesgo atendiendo a lo.s e/.emenJIJS esenciales integrantes de su rigimen. 2.1.1. El carácter de sociedad anónima especial. 2.2.2. El objeto social principal. 2.2.3. La actividad co~plementaria de las sociedades gestoras .de ent;idades de ca-pi~go. 2.2. La cqnjigumci6n. di Ja ~ de entidades tú capitaJ-ri&go como una activüúul ~ a 711plación y. su.pruisión. 2.3. Definieiim pnrp'IÚlsta de sociedad gmt1m de entitlad& de ~· 3. LA NATUIW..EZA Y LOS REQUISITOS ESPECÍFICOS DE LAS SOCIEDADES GESTORAS DE ENTI-DADES DE WJT.AL.JUESGO. 3.1. lA natumlc:4 tú las socit:tltJtús pstqras de entil.ladts de ~ y sus m¡uisilos de const1tuci6n. 3.1.1. Sociedades anónimas especiales por razón de su o~eto y de sus requisitos constitutivos. Su condición de sociedades reguladas, sometidas al •régimen e~ mún,. de la Ley 25/2005 y al de la ·Dittctiva 2011/61/UE GFIA. ~tU!. Su naturaleza de entidades financieras. 3.2. Etttid6des ron ~en su naturalca a las s«iNlttda grstortu. de emitltJdes de ctJf'ital-rilsgo, que ptMiden tklarrolúw func'tlmA ~ tú biD&.· 3.2.1. Las sociedades gestoras de instituciones de inversión colectiva. 3.2.2. Las entidades facultadas para la •gestión de carteras de inversión»: las sociedades de valores, las agencias de valores, las sociedades gestoras de carteras y las entidades de crédito. 3.3. La.s ~u~ a~ 4. ASPECTOS DETI:RMI-NANTES DEL NUCO EN EL QUE DESARROllAN SUS FUNCIONES LAS SO-CIE.DADES GESfORAS DE ENTIDADES DE CAPffAL.~. 4.1. Las socie-.dad&t ~de~ tk ~. amtnl gravitotoriodá ~del ~ 4.2. La obligtiQ6n 1M vdar pur el intms u los ~ y los (l«<iDnilúu, l»>III·~ ~ dM ~ 4e sus jtmQones. 4.3. La mlfdod frtn* • lDs fKJfflidfMs ' .. ~.por los ;tnjvit;jgs OtJtuados

ESTE UBRO. 9. Vui. an. 55 del Real Decreto ~tivo.4/200f, de 5 de mann, por el que te aprueba el texto refumlido de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Sodedadet. 10. En tel ámbito europeo, los fondos de fondos suponen un 15,5~ del total del patrimonio invertido en el mercado delcapitakietgo -ár. wMuvtaA (·lttlf¡:/ /ftJC&M~/jtJCts, consultado en fecha !O ma}'O 2012)-.

This study discusses a model of success in venture capital (VC) fundraising. We develop this model based on agency and trust theory. The model is tested against quantitative data collected from 151 limited partners (LP) with headquarters predominantly in North America and Europe. Beyond the well-known criterion of the VC firm's track record, results suggest that trust and perceived controllability shape the investment decisions of those LPs. Moreover, antecedents of these main factors are evaluated. In sum, this study shows how fundraising VC firms can systematically manage the fundraising process.

This paper examines institutional investors' propensity to invest in a relatively unknown asset class of listed private equity. Based on data provided by LPEQ, Preqin and Scorpio Partnership covering 171 institutional investors in Europe in 2008-2010, we find allocations are primarily a function of size, type, location, decision-making authority and liquidity preferences. Investment in listed private equity is more commonly made by institutions that are smaller, private (not public) pension institutions, institutions that have a preference for liquidity, quick access, and administrative and cash flow management simplicity, and institutions that are based in the UK, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands. As well, institutions are less likely to invest in listed private equity when investment decision-making is empowered to an alternative asset class team.

There is a plethora of different studies and researches on women in venture capital, and venture capital­ financed entrepreneurship. Though these studies provide us with valuable observations, not much is known to have been done to change these trends.

The main goal of the study of WomenVC was not to compare women investors against men, but to analyse the data that could help us to understand the performance of women venture capitalists, which has been never done before, as well as suggest possible measures to strengthen their position in industry.

nota redazionale a Trib. Roma 16 febbraio 2022, con il quale, affermata la validità dei patti parasociali di opzione put&call a prezzo predefinito, si è escluso che la cancellazione della società le cui quote sono oggetto dell'opzione faccia venir meno, se assunta successivamente all'accettazione dell'opzione da parte del socio beneficiario, l'obbligo del socio concedente l'opzione di pagare il prezzo prestabilito.

This article provides an innovative interpretation of the rules of Italian limited responsibility companies (s.r.l.), which takes into account not only and not much the phenome-non of crowdfunding, but also and above all the financing via business angels and venture capital. We therefore advance a proposal for a complete re-reading of the subject as reformed in 2012-2015-2017, aimed wherever possible at making venture capital financing feasible. The proposed construction reflects the original intentions of the legislator, reduces the impact of mandatory rules and is consistent with the deeply felt need to modernise Italian company law.

This paper examines institutional investors' propensity to invest in a relatively unknown asset class of listed private equity. Based on data provided by LPEQ and Preqin covering 100 institutional investors in Europe in 2008, we find allocations are primarily a function of size, type, location, decisionmaking authority and liquidity preferences. Investment in listed private equity is more commonly made by institutions that are smaller, private (not public) pension institutions, institutions that have a preference for liquidity, and institutions that are based in the UK. As well, institutions are more likely to invest in listed private equity when investment decision-making is not empowered to a private equity team, an alternative asset class team, or a board / investment committee, but are more likely when decision-making is delegated to an equities team.

This paper introduces a new dataset from 100 Dutch institutional investors’ domestic and international asset private equity allocations. The data indicate that the perceived comparative dearth of regulations of private equity funds impedes institutional investor participation in private equity funds, particularly in relation to the lack of transparency. The data further indicate that the perceived importance of regulatory harmonization of institutional investors has increased Dutch institutional investor allocations to domestic and international private equity funds, particularly via the harmonization from the International Financial Reporting Standards (regulation of reporting standards and transparency), the Financieel Toetsingkader (regulation of portfolio management standards such as of matching assets and liabilities), and Basel II (regulation of risk management and disclosure standards).

This paper introduces a new dataset from 100 Dutch institutional investors’ domestic and international asset private equity allocations. The data indicate that the perceived comparative dearth of regulations of private equity funds impedes institutional investor participation in private equity funds, particularly in relation to the lack of transparency. The data further indicate that the perceived importance of regulatory harmonization of institutional investors has increased Dutch institutional investor allocations to domestic and international private equity funds, particularly via the harmonization from the International Financial Reporting Standards (regulation of reporting standards and transparency), the Financieel Toetsingkader (regulation of portfolio management standards such as of matching assets and liabilities), and Basel II (regulation of risk management and disclosure standards).

Francisco Gomes (Partner & COO) presents the CardioCare at Brazilian Association of Private Equity and Venture Capital - ABVCAP Latin America - Sao Paulo/Brazil - Março/2012, showing to investors the CardioCare Project with cardiac monitoring system base

Los autores de esta obra confian en que el resultado de su trabajo, volcado en estas páginas, facilite el conocimiento del régimen de las entidades de capi~riesgo y sus sociedades gestoras y contribuya al correcto desarrollo de la operativa en el mercado del capital-riesgo.

We investigate the differences in venture capital (VC) governance of investee firms with Open Business Models (OBMs), specifically Open Source Software (OSS), versus closed business models. Due to OSS’s pronounced complexity and uncertainty, we conjecture that VC-backed OSS firms are more frequently staged and syndicated. We present robust empirical evidence from the US that OSS ventures have more financing rounds and are more likely to be syndicated, and mixed evidence that OSS ventures have a larger number of syndicated investors.

This paper examines institutional investors' propensity to invest in a relatively unknown asset class of listed private equity. Based on data provided by LPEQ, Preqin and Scorpio Partnership covering 171 institutional investors in Europe in 2008-2010, we find allocations are primarily a function of size, type, location, decision-making authority and liquidity preferences. Investment in listed private equity is more commonly made by institutions that are smaller, private (not public) pension institutions, institutions that have a preference for liquidity, quick access, and administrative and cash flow management simplicity, and institutions that are based in the UK, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands. As well, institutions are less likely to invest in listed private equity when investment decision-making is empowered to an alternative asset class team.