Turkish Foreign Policy Syria

2010年末に始まった「アラブの春」をきっかけに、トルコの中東における存在感は高まった。リベラルな外交政策の展望、経済統合のプロジェクト、ソフトパワーの手段の活用などが要因として絡み合っていた。しかしながら「アラブの春」以降、トルコの中東への関与は数々の難題に直面している。

この10年間、トルコの外交政策は中東の根底にある危険と不安定化の循環の影響にさらされている。トルコは今、深い構造転換のさなかにある中東からの余波に対処し続けている。中東はその地殻変動のような構造的変化により、地方・地域・世界レベルの数多の主体が関与する多面的な紛争によって不安定化するまでに至っている。不安定化と紛争の波がもたらしている難題に対処する手段も能力も、国際社会は十分に持っていないことが明らかになった。そして中東域内の諸主体は、それぞれが個々に地域の不安定化による最も直接的かつ劇的な影響を被っている。

トルコは2015年以降、強圧的な姿勢に物を言わせようとしてきた。その目的は、国境を越える派兵によって中東から受ける脅威を除去することだ。トルコはシリア領内で4つの軍事作戦を展開するとともに、イラク領内にも地上部隊を派遣して拠点を確保し、武装組織「クルド労働者党（PKK）」の拠点への攻撃を続けている。シリア、イラク領内での軍事的プレゼンスを長期的に維持する方針を固めたトルコ政府は、リビアに加え最近では東地中海など、中東の他の紛争地帯に対しても同様の軍事的アプローチを重視している。

このようなトルコの対中東政策の転換を分析するために、本稿は以下6つの節に分けて論を進めていく。まず最初に「アラブの春」が2つの段階で進展したことを示す。第2に、トルコの対中東政策が、いかなる文脈で展開してきたかを示すために、中東の変容の様々な側面に焦点を合わせる。次に、「アラブの春」以前のトルコの対中東政策がリベラルなものに転換していたことを改めて振り返る。第4および第5節では、「アラブの春」の2つの段階のそれぞれにおけるトルコの政策を分析する。第6節では、越境軍事行動に頼る傾向を強めるなど、トルコの外交政策における現実主義の高まりに焦点を合わせる。そして最後に、今後のトルコの外交政策の方向性を総合的に評価する。

I. PROSPECTS FOR PEACE OR WAR II. MAJOR TRENDS IN FORCE STRENGTH III. COMPARATIVE LAND FORCE STRENGTH: ACTIVE VERSUS MOBILIZED STRENGTH IV. COMPARATIVE AIR STRENGTH: QUALITY OVER QUANTITY V. COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTH: PERIPHERAL MISSIONS VI. TOTAL RESOURCES: RECAPITALIZATION, FORCE MODERNIZATION, AND IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS VII. THE MILITARY FORCES OF ISRAEL VIII. THE MILITARY FORCES OF SYRIA IX. WAR ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS X. CONTINUING EXTERNAL ASYMMETRIC WARS SOURCES AND METHODS OTHER BOOKS BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

تسعى الأطراف الدولية المتدخلة في الأزمة السورية إلى إطالة أمد الصراع التركي-الكردي في سوريا لاستنزاف القدرات العسكرية التركية، وتحجيم النفوذ التركي في سوريا، بهدف استبعاد أنقرة من معادلات تقاسم مناطق النفوذ بعد نهاية الصراع. وفي المقابل، تسعى تركيا لإيجاد موطئ قدم لقواتها في سوريا، وانتزاع الهيمنة على المناطق الحدودية الفاصلة بين تركيا وسوريا من وحدات حماية الشعب الكردية، بالإضافة إلى تأسيس مسارات مستديمة للإمداد العسكري لدعم الفصائل السورية الموالية لها.
وفي هذا الإطار، يتناول هذا التحليل تقييم أبعاد التدخل التركي الذي دخل في أسبوعه الرابع، ويتناول الأهداف التركية من وراء هذه العملية، وأبرز تداعياتها السياسية، والعوامل المؤثرة على مستقبلها.

On first entering Syria, the observant traveler will probably be startled to go through passport control and notice a military map of Syria on the wall, for this map contains several anomalies. It shows the Golan Heights under Syrian control, though they have been occupied by Israel since 1967. Syria's boundaries with Lebanon and Jordan appear not as international borders but as something called "regional" borders. Israel does not even exist; instead, there is a state called Palestine. And Palestine is separated from Syria by a line designated a "temporary" border. Finally, the province of Hatay, a part of Turkey since 1939, appears to be included in Syria; only on close inspection can one see the "temporary" border between it and Syria...

Little about Syria’s natural endowments would lead an analyst to
predict that it would have such a central role in Middle Eastern
affairs. By most indicators of strategic importance—including size,
internal cohesiveness, and wealth—Syria would seem destined to be no
more than a minor player, relatively easy for greater powers inside and outside the region to marginalize and ignore.

Despite these apparent manifestations of insignificance, vulnerability,
and weakness, Syria has long been an important consideration in U.S. foreign policy toward the greater Middle East. Understanding this paradox is essential to understanding the challenges that Syria poses for U.S. policymakers. To that end, this chapter offers an overview of Syria’s strategic place in the greater Middle East as well as an overview of the principal analytic questions surrounding Bashar al-Asad’s presidency.

This thesis aims to analyze both the evolution of Turkish-Syrian relations during the period of the AKP governments and the emergence of the Syrian revolt in March 2011. With the popular revolts in many Arab countries starting in December 2010, Turkey’s general foreign policy vision, which had already undergone considerable changes from the traditional foreign policy of Turkey under the rule of the AKP government, was deeply affected by the Arab revolts. With the newly-emerged political and social conjuncture in the Middle East and due to the lack of foresight for any kind of a regime change or the collapse of secular and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, the vision of zero-problem policy with neighbors did not easily adopt to the radical changes in the region. Nonetheless, the AKP government expected that the Assad regime would remain in power for only a few weeks, since the ruling elite in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were toppled in a short time. Afterwards, she provided unilateral support to the Syrian
v
National Council, which was later replaced by the Syrian National Coalition and the Free Syrian Army by legitimizing her policy through humanitarian reasons. This thesis argues that the confrontation between the Sunni and Shia political entities, due to the rising sectarianism in the Middle East during the Arab revolts, led to the alienation of Turkey to her neighbors and therefore, Turkey’s zero-problem policy with Syria failed.

Turkey’s response to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq’s independence referendum took most observers by surprise. The prevailing assumption was that, despite its vocal objections, Turkey would eventually just accommodate the results of the referendum because years of engagement and a KRG-centred Iraq policy had created multi-faceted interdependencies, which would be hard to overturn. However, rhetoric dictated policy. In a counter-intuitive move, Turkey realigned its partnerships to chart a new policy which involved greater coordination with the central government of Iraq. This reaction is best understood through a study of contextual variables at regional, domestic and leadership levels which have led to major changes in Turkey’s regional policies.

Ortadoğu’da Arap isyanları olarak adlandırılan 2011’deki protesto dalgası sonrası gelişen iç çatışmalar bölgede kaba güç olarak tabir edilen askeri güç kullanımını öne çıkarmaktadır. Türkiye de bölgesinde önemli bir aktör olarak özellikle 24 Ağustos 2016’da başlattığı Fırat Kalkanı Harekatı ile askeri güç kullanarak hem kendi güvenliğini koruma hem de Suriye iç savaşında bir sınır komşusu olarak oynadığı rolün ağırlığını
arttırmak üzere hamleler yapmıştır. Türkiye 20 Ocak 1018’de de “terörle mücadele” ve “hudut bölgesi güvenliği” kapsamında Suriye’nin Afrin vilayetinde de bir askeri harekat düzenlemiştir. Türkiye’nin hukuksal zeminini “meşru müdafaa” üzerine oturttuğu bu harekat Suriye iç savaşındaki dengeleri de etkileyen önemli bir adım olmuştur. Bu
çalışmada Zeytin Dalı Harekatı’nın nasıl bir konjonktürde gerçekleştirildiği ve Suriye iç savaşına olası etkileri değerlendirilmektedir

ABSTRACT
When do states use force? What are the legitimate reasons for it? These are the basic questions of international relations and are still subject of debate. The main reason of this discussion is that use of force is a radical tool of foreign policy and it changes balance of power deeply. Especially in the Middle East region, following the uprisings in 2011, use of hard power has become a common exercise. Turkey as an important player in the region has used force in Syria by launching Euphrates Shield Operation starting on 24 August 2016 to protect its borders and to increase its role in the civil war. Once again on January 20th, 2018 Turkey initiated another military operation under the brand of “Olive Branch” "to fight against terrorism” and “to protect its border area” near in Afrin province of Syria. The consequences of this operation are beyond that reasoning and will have impact on Syrian civil war. In this article the international conjuncture of this operation enabling Turkey to act militarily and its consequences have been analyzed.

Turkey is an important actor of the war in Syria. After the first months of the conflict the Syrian neighbour began supporting the opposition forces in the war and took a very critical approach to Bashar al-Assad's regime, based on the assumption that the Syrian president must definitely resign from the office. It was a substantial change of the Turkish policy towards Syria in comparison to the first decade of the 21 st century. The main goal of this article is an in-depth analysis of Turkey's policy towards the war in Syria in order to identify the reasons for a specific , inflexible Turkish position. The author verifies positively a hypothesis that the Turkish policy towards Syria and the war there is a result of the interplay of many domestic and foreign policy factors in Turkey as well as the regional and international situation. The inflexible Turkish position is in this context a consequence of the more sectarian policy of the AKP government (reflecting the departure from the "strategic depth doctrine ") connected with the ideological factor as well as the negative consequences of the Assad regime's actions for Turkish security and the increasingly complex Kurdish issue.

During the onslaught of the Islamic caliphate on Kobanî, Syria, media outlets across the globe broadcast pictures of brave and often unveiled Kurdish women fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a quintessentially male force of destruction. The images of women fighting Islamist male aggressors aroused outrage, admiration, and pity among observers. But had all Kurdish fighters been male or had women fought for ISIS, viewers might have reacted differently. To examine some of the most widely disseminated gendered pictures and videos of the Syrian uprising in the media, this article draws on Mohja Kahf’s three categories, which typify how Muslim women, Arab women, or both are perceived by the Anglophone reading and viewing public: the first is victims; the second, escapees; and the third, pawns of patriarchy and male power. While this typology helps in examining gendered images of the Syrian uprising, it also obscures the socioeconomic realities on the ground.

Siyaset Psikolojisi, Türkçe olmayan literatürde gerek deneysel gerekse teorik çalışmalarla oldukça zenginleşmiş bir disiplin olmasına karşılık, Türkçe literatürde yeterince yer bulamamış bir alandır. Bu disiplinin katkılarından olan imge ve denge kuramları, sırasıyla kısaca grupların birbirlerine karşı kalıp yargılar geliştirdiklerini ve bireylerin davranışlarının tutum ve duygularıyla uyumlu olmasını istediklerini, aksi halde bir rahatsızlık hissi gelişeceğini ifade eder. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın argümanı, ontolojik güvenlik literatürüyle düşünüldüğünde; devletlerin tıpkı bireyler gibi davranışlarında denge aradıkları, bu davranışların ikili ilişkilerde imgeler etrafında geliştiği ve bunun ontolojik güvenliği sağladığıdır. İkinci argüman ise, değişmesi zor gözüken kalıp yargılar olsa da imgelerin değişebileceği, ancak bu durumda yine ontolojik güvenlik kaygısının devreye girerek, devletlerin kimlik ve anlatılarıyla bu değişimi meşrulaştırdıklarıdır. Bu bakımdan çalışmada, Türkiye’nin Azerbaycan, Yunanistan ve Suriye ilişkileri incelenmiş, birincil kaynaklar olarak ulusal gazete ve internet haber sayfalarındaki söylemler değerlendirilerek bir söylem analizi metodu kullanılmış; bunun yanında literatürden kaynaklara yer verilmiştir. Çalışmanın sonunda iki argümanın da Türkiye örneğinde doğrulandığı, Siyaset Psikolojisi ve ontolojik güvenliğin birlikte düşünülebileceği görülmüştür.

Although Political Psychology is an enriched discipline with reference to either theoretical or experimental non-Turkish studies, it could not have found enough space in Turkish literature. Having been two of the contributions of the discipline, image and balance theories state respectively that the groups develop stereotypes to each other and the individuals seek behaviours to be coherent with their attitudes and emotions otherwise they feel a sense of disturbance. In this context, considering the literature of ontological security, the study claims that the states look for a balance in their behaviours in just the same way as the individuals, these behaviours take a place around images and it provides ontological security. When it comes to the secondary claim, the study propounds that images may change even though they seem to be static, but in this case, ontological security concern steps in and the states legitimise this change by referring to their identities and narratives. In this regard, the study evaluates interrelations of Turkey with Azerbaijan, Greece and Syria. National newspapers and discourses have been used as primary sources and it has been tried to follow the method of discourse analysis. At the end of the work, it is seen that both claims of the study were confirmed regarding the case of Turkey and that both Political Psychology and ontological security share compatible logics.

https://sbfdergi.ankara.edu.tr/dergi/tybook/51/5--Melih-Nadi-Tutan.pdf
https://sbfdergi.ankara.edu.tr/index.php?bil=bil_tyearbook

Turkey's position vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict has been, from the outset, replete with the AKP's ideological vision pertaining to Turkish society and the Middle East. The AKP conceived the Syrian war as a springboard for the realization and consolidation of its new Islamist conception of nationalism. Thus, its involvement in this war has also directly reflected on domestic political and ideological struggles, and, as a result, the Syrian War has been a testing ground for the AKP's Islamist nationalist project. However, AKP's regional ambitions were ultimately scotched by the complicated dynamics of the Syrian conflict and Islamic nationalism as an ideology has reached its limits. This led the AKP to engage in certain discursive maneuvers to alleviate this ideological crisis.

Žádné revoluční spojenectví mezi Ankarou a Moskvou, ohlašované některými komentátory, se nekoná a konat nebude, píše v analýze politolog Emil Aslan. 1 Nedávní nepřátelé na život a na smrt – prezidenti Ruska a Turecka Vladimir Putin a Recep Tayyip Erdogan – se v úterý sešli ve druhém hlavním městě Ruska, Petrohradu, aby " resetovali " vztahy mezi oběma zeměmi. Zapomenuty jsou křivdy nedávné minulosti: " Rána kudlou do zad " ruskému lidu, kterou Turci podle Putinova tvrzení vsadili někdejším přátelům, když jim sestřelili bombardér. Nebo obvinění Ankary obecně a Erdoganovy rodiny zvláště ze spolupráce s Islámským státem při nelegálním tranzitu a prodeji místní ropy. Či tvrzení, že Turecko sponzoruje džihádistické teroristy. Spory vyústily v plošný zákaz dovozu tureckých zemědělských výrobků do Ruska, zavedení vízové povinnosti vůči tureckým občanům, znemožnění charterových letů do tureckých turistických destinací, ve vyhánění tureckých firem i studentů ze země. Nynější obrat je natolik razantní a pro mnohé nečekaný, že se začalo hovořit o rýsovaném spojenectví mezi Ankarou a Moskvou, o postupném odchodu Turecka z NATO do ruské náruče a o nových hrozbách pro Evropu a Západ, které by ze sbratření Putina s Erdoganem plynuly. Turecko a Rusko, dva historičtí rivalové, v současnosti sdílejí řadu významných zájmů zejména v ekonomické oblasti. Obě země hodně stojí o výstavbu plynovodu Turkish Stream – náhradu za South Stream, nerealizovaný kvůli rusko-ukrajinskému konfliktu. " Turecký potok " by měl dodávat zemní plyn zemím jižní a východní Evropy. V době, kdy se ruský rozpočet potýká s významným snížením zisku z prodeje dramaticky zlevněné ropy na světových trzích, by se jednalo o kýžené miliardy dolarů navíc. Ekonomický a politický profit z výstavby plynovodu, který Moskva uložila k ledu po sestřelení bombardéru vloni v listopadu a o kterém Turci a Rusové začali znovu vyjednávat, by měla mít i Ankara. Ta již delší dobu usiluje o transformaci země v eurasijský energetický uzel.

It is argued in this study that Turkey’s ambition to play a key regional role and become a global actor is not novel. There have been at least two similar initiatives in recent history that defended Turkey’s extraordinary strategic potential and aspired to put it into the heart of global politics. What has, however, been indeed novel and has lent credibility to the whole experiment is Turkey’s recent economic dynamism and political reforms. While such a trend is indeed reasonable, Turkey’s claims for a global strategic role and a value-based foreign policy may be already overblown. Turkey is bound to play a key regional role and may indeed become a global actor in the years to come; its capabilities, however, are not infinite, and significant risks may lurk in their overestimation.

First published in the American Chronicle, Buzzle and AfroArticles on 26th September 2007

Republished in the Aramaean portal as per below

http://www.aramaic-dem.org/English/Aram_Naharaim/070926.htm

A while back, the Arameans of the Aram Naharaim Foundation sent a Letter to the Presidents of the United States and France, and the Premier of the United Kingdom with the respect to the critical issue of the Aramaeans of Iraq. The letter focuses on the false identities projected by Western missionaries among the Aramaean Eastern Christians, who have subsequently been partly divided into ‘Assyrians’ and ‘Chaldaeans’, although their real identity is Aramaean. This criminal act of Spiritual Genocide is at the epicenter of all problems pertaining to Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, as it generates the riparian environment on which flows the river of Islamic Extremism.

In fact, all the Muslim populations of the aforementioned countries, as well as the Arabic speaking populations of Turkey and Iran, plus the totality of the populations of Kuwait, Qatar, Emirates and the northern edges of Arabia are not Arabs, but Aramaeans of the Late Antiquity and the Early Christian times who got linguistically arabized because they accepted gradually Islam.

Contrarily, the Ancient Chaldaeans (Kaldu), who lived in Southern Mesopotamia, were just one of the various Aramaean tribes who had settled in Mesopotamia in the beginning of the Neo-Assyrian times ((12th – 11th centuries BCE). Naming some Aramaeans today after a name that refers to a subdivision of the Ancient Aramaeans is an act of absurdity or anti-Aramaean hatred.

Absolutely paranoid is the effort to name other modern Aramaeans as ‘Assyrians’, despite the fact that the Ancient Assyrians left no trace in Mesopotamia, following the extinction of the Assyrian Empire (614 – 604 BCE). This effort is undertaken through vast misinterpretation of sources from the Late Antiquity, and in order to distinguish the Aramaeans, who contrarily to pro-Catholic ‘Chaldaeans’, accepted Protestant missionaries’ preaching and distorted versions of bogus-History.

The shocking fact that linguistically and culturally the modern pseudo-Assyrians have no relations with the Ancient Assyrians makes no sense to these extremists, who by sharing the same area (Northern Mesopotamia, and North-Western Iran) with the Kurds are definitely exposed to Kurdish expansionism.

Adding to this is the incredible paranoia to claim the same past as the Kurds (Assyrian Mesopotamia); only a perverse plan that wants to push these Aramaeans to frontal clash with the Kurds would stipulate such a controversial national name for the Aramaeans.

To παρόν άρθρο δημοσιεύτηκε στα «Χανιώτικα Νέα», την ιστοσελίδα του apopseis.gr και του ΟΔΕΘ. Αναφέρεται στις "διεθνείς σχέσεις" του τουρκοκυπριακού ψευδοκράτους ("ΤΔΒΚ") και τις απόπειρες της Τουρκίας να ενθαρρύνει τη διεθνή αναγνώρισή του ή τις διμερείς σχέσεις του με τρίτα κράτη. Μεταξύ άλλων, γίνεται αναφορά στην αντίδραση της διεθνούς κοινότητας στην ανακήρυξη της "ανεξαρτησίας" του, καθώς και στην πολιτική ανάσχεσης της αναγνώρισης που υιοθέτησαν η Ελλάδα και η Κύπρος.

Why has Turkey not engaged politically with the PYD to transform it, an approach that is hardly alien to it? Why has it insisted on militarizing its Syria policy? It is often argued that Turkey’s military posture is driven by domestic political calculations, chiefly electoral pressures or diversionary concerns. Such factors play a role, yet a closer look into the
domestic context reveals that a more complex set of factors drive its counterterrorism policy.

In Occidente, all'indomani del fallito colpo di Stato orchestrato da alcuni settori delle forze armate nella notte fra il 15 e il 16 luglio 2016, sono molti gli osservatori che si sono domandati quale assetto politico si sarebbe istituzionalizzato in Turchia nell'immediato futuro. Al centro delle questioni vi era la portata delle misure repressive adottate per volontà del presidente della Repubblica, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, e del Governo a guida AK Parti-la formazione politica di cui Erdogan stesso è uno dei fondatori. L'epurazione avviata a livello istituzionale (forze armate, magistratura, sistema educativo e dell'informazione) sarebbe servita davvero a rafforzare la solidità democratica del sistema o, al contrario, avrebbe costituito la precondizione, impraticabile prima del tentato colpo di Stato, per affondarne anche la dimensione politica? Le incertezze che hanno avvolto la politica interna si sono estese anche alla sfera degli affari internazionali, con particolare riguardo alla crisi siriana, alla lotta contro il terrorismo curdo e, più in generale, alla questione curda; e, ancora, al riavvicinamento a Paesi quali Israele e la Russia, con cui negli anni addietro si era verificata una crisi nei rispettivi rapporti bilaterali, all'inasprimento delle relazioni con lo storico partner americano, alla disputa con l'Unione Europea sulla questione dei migranti.

The recent escalation of armed clashes in southeastern Turkey between Turkish security forces and Kurdish militants is indicative of the new, turbulent phase the Kurdish problem has entered. This paper will analyze Turkish foreign policy in Syria with regards to the Kurdish issue; Ankara's efforts to constrain Kurdish activities in Syria will also be examined. Moreover, further analysis will reveal the ways in which the escalation of Turkish military operations against the PKK is connected with Turkish foreign policy in Syria and the potential consequences the creation of a second autonomous Kurdish state in Syria might have for Turkey.

The Coalition of Radical Left (Syriza) was the big winner of the Greek national elections of January 25 [because of a typo the published article wrongly states 15 instead of 25], 2015, as expected. With 36.34% of the votes, Syriza and its leader (now Prime Minister) Alexis Tsipras won 149 seats, two seats shy of absolute majority. New Democracy, of now former Prime Minster Antonis Samaras, came second with 27.86% and 76 seats.

Since the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has always had aspiration to become more integrated to the West as a part of Westernization project and this aspiration was mainly reflected the domestic policies. While keeping the impartiality position in the one hand, domestic dynamics were also to be reflected in the external relations as well. Therefore, during the Republican People’s Party (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) rule (1923-50), external relations were based on staying ally with the Western states while protecting the peace with the neighbor countries including Soviet Union.
This pacifist trend in foreign policy also continued until late 20th century in general terms with the exception of Cyprus events in 1970s, but Cold War period has also increased both cooperation and dependency in Turkish foreign policy to the West. As the effects of the Cold War started to decline and Turkey became more alienated from the West on several issues, so Turkey started to warm its relations with the Muslim countries and organizations throughout 1980s especially during Turgut Ozal years. This expansionist tendency to turn would be interpreted as a result of changes in domestic dynamics especially with the rise of Islamic motives in social, economic, and political spheres.
After AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party) came to power on 2 November 2002, the rise of Islamic motives and tendencies have increased domestically on the one hand as well as relations with the Islamic world, but on the other hand, Erdoğan, the founder of AKP, and other ministers of AKP also reject defining the AKP in religious terms on many occasions saying that “We are not an Islamic party, and we also refuse labels such as Muslim-democrat,”. Instead, he calls the party’s agenda as conservative democracy (Wright, 2011, p. 128). So, would it mean that AKP has islamicized the politics and created a new dynamic for foreign policies of Turkey? Some argue that there has been an axis shift in foreign policy turning from the West to the East while some reject such claims and argue that AKP expanded its axis and policy areas to Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasian region.
In this paper, I will compare both points of view and analyze the main dynamics behind the foreign policy of Turkey since the beginning of the Republic. Then, I will try to locate the role of Islam in AKP’s foreign policy agenda and evaluate the critics and responses to foreign policy of AKP. My main aim is to find out whether the islamization trend in politics under AKP rule is a continuation of conservatism trend in domestic policies which started with Democrat Party in 1950, or a new breakthrough for political Islam in Turkish history.

The advances by Syria’s regime against the opposition-controlled territory in the northwest governorate of Idlib triggered yet another cross-border military operation in the country by Turkey in February. Further escalation was prevented only through a meeting between Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin on March 5 in Moscow. However, the unstable equilibrium in Idlib is more fragile than ever, and Turkey urgently needs to sustain it.

Dedicated to all those who selflessly organised the safe retreat of Kesab Armenians during the events of March 2014, saved them from extermination and heroically protected their right to return to their birthplace
The booklet presents the cultural heritage of Kesab District, Latakia Governorate, Syria, on the basis of the results of field work conducted in 2006, 2008 and 2010. Our studies are also supported by the available records regarding the history, architectural features and lapidary inscriptions of the local monuments.

Operation Olive Branch proved western analysts were wrong When the launch of Operation Olive Branch was announced on January 20 , many experts and analysts had serious doubts about the fate of the operation that aimed to capture Afrin from the PKK's Syrian affiliate, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG). Military gains against Daesh with direct American support led to the YPG's image transforming into the most effective fighting force in Syria. Also, post-coup attempt dismissals in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) raised questions regarding its effectiveness, which came to be doubted by some analysts. But within two months, the TAF and its local ally, the FSA seized Afrin from the YPG with minimal military losses. This sudden TAF-FSA victory in Afrin refuted many a myth regarding Turkey and the YPG. Thus, it is important to identify these misconceptions as myths proven wrong on the battlefield. The first myth that the Afrin operation debunked is the claim that the YPG is the most effective fighting force on the Syrian battlefield. Since the siege of Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) the YPG has been fighting against Daesh in Ayn al-Arab, Tal Abyad, Manbij, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor with US air support , US supplied weapons and funding. The US' direct support has been decisive in these YPG victories over Daesh on many fronts. In addition to the military achievements that took place against Daesh, the discourse that presents the YPG as a " secular and anti-jihadist " fighting force was/is a popular talking point of the Western media. Not only did the media and analysts turn a blind eye to YPG-PKK links, but they also ignored the fact that it was US support for the YPG that was the real defining factor. The heavy losses incurred by the YPG against Daesh in Northern Syria prior to American intervention were forgotten. It was this illusion that led some to expect heavy YPG resistance in Afrin, and even a TAF defeat.

IRAN’S PERSPECTIVES FOR SANCTIONS AND CHEMICAL WEAPON
By Cigdem Yorgancioglu


PREFACE : On the basis of the interview with Foreign Minister of Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif. conducted by Richard Haass (the moderator) for Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) on 17th July 2017 which is a session in which the current developments in the Middle East (including but not limited to Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Kurdish self-determination, Turkey involvement in Syria/Iraq etc.) questioned, evaluated, analyzed and discussed Zarif gave emphasis to several points on the session by replying moderator and participants questions. Meanwhile, Zarif's humorous and confident style of conversation while ridiculing conflicts and inconsistencies against Iran, that popped out during CFR session was significant. Such style remind me Iran Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan statement to US on 19th July 2017 with the following words " Instead of making decisions for other countries, the secretary of defense and the American ruling party better think about their own domestic issues and review the causes of the collapse of its administration in the not too distant future. " Out of the covered subjects on CFR session, two issues, namely new sanctions on Iran and alleged chemical weapons usage in Syria shall be the subject of this article which intended to be reiterated for the prospective articles and essays in the near future. In the meantime sanctions will be more emphasized rather than the reasons of imposing sanctions. The second issue, explicitly chemical weapons will generate a question at the final part of the article from

Egypt plays a crucial role in the formation of Turkish Middle Eastern policy. The importance that Egypt possesses for Turkey ranges from the nations’ shared historical and cultural memory to economic and security concerns. Due to its geographic location, Egypt is a key zone for Turkey, to reach the African and Persian Gulf states’ markets. Egypt also has a huge impact on the development of the sub-geopolitical region around the Nile.

The advances by Syria’s regime against the opposition-controlled territory in the northwest governorate of Idlib triggered yet another cross-border military operation in the country by Turkey in February. Further escalation was prevented only through a meeting between Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin on March 5 in Moscow. However, the unstable equilibrium in Idlib is more fragile than ever, and Turkey urgently needs to sustain it.