Infrared Systems For Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?

Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?
by George B. Hept, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
January 2002 Occasional aper !o. 2" Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology Air 'ar College Air Uni(ersity )a*+ell Air Force Base, Alaba,a
Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?
George B. Hept January 2002
%&e Occasional apers series +as establis&e$ by t&e Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology as a #oru, #or researc& on topics t&at re#lect long-ter, strategic t&in.ing about tec&nology an$ its i,plications #or U.S. national security. Copies o# !o. 2" in t&is series are a(ailable #ro, t&e Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology, Air 'ar College, /20 C&ennault Circle, )a*+ell AFB, )ontgo,ery, Alaba,a /"112. %&e #a* nu,ber is 2//34 50/-"1067 p&one 2//34 50/-"3"082560. Occasional aper !o. 2" Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology Air 'ar College Air Uni(ersity )a*+ell Air Force Base, Alaba,a /"112
Contents
age 9isclai,er:::::::::::::::::::::::.::i re#ace..::::::::::::::::::::::..:::iii ;. ;ntro$uction:::::::::::::::::::::::.1 ;;. <lectro,agnetic Spectru, an$ )ilitary Operations...::..:::.:./ ;;;. Operational ;,plications o# ;n#rare$ Syste,s:::...::::..:1/ ;=. Current %ec&nologies an$ %actical A(iation::::.:::::.1> =. Concept o# !atural <(olution::::::..:::::::::20 =;. Conclusions::::::::::::::...:::::::..25 !otes::::::::::::::::::::::::::../1
Disclaimer
%&e (ie+s e*presse$ in t&is publication are t&ose o# t&e aut&or an$ $o not re#lect t&e o##icial policy or position o# t&e 9epart,ent o# 9e#ense, t&e Unite$ States Go(ern,ent, or t&e Air Uni(ersity Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology.
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Preface
%&e concept o# using natural e(olution to un$erstan$ #or &o+ ,o$ern organi?ations a$apt to a c&aotic, rapi$ly c&anging +orl$ situation is currently popular in t&e business +orl$. %&is stu$y e*a,ines +&et&er t&e c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent ,o$el is pertinent to t&e U.S. ,ilitary@s ability to a$apt to pre(ailing national security con$itions in t&e t+enty-#irst century. ;n particular, it e*a,ines t&e e(olutionary $e(elop,ent o# in#rare$ 2;A4 syste,s #or tactical a(iation to un$erstan$ &o+ t&e natural e(olution ,o$el can be applie$ to t&e $e(elop,ent o# ,ilitary syste,s, an$ &o+ t&at co,pares +it& t&e ,ore tra$itional $e(elop,ent o# ra$ar syste,s. %&e central argu,ent in t&is stu$y is t&at t&e c&aotic e(olution o# ;A syste,s &as success#ully in#luence$ t&e current state o# air operations, an$ #urt&er t&at t&e natural e(olutionary $e(elop,ent ,o$el o##ers ,any use#ul analogies #or &o+ ;A syste,s +ere $e(elope$ an$ e,ploye$. Un$erstan$ing t&is analogy an$ its li,its ,ay &elp to create ,ore #le*ible $e(elop,ent syste,s t&at can better able to a$apt to uncertain security con$itions. Finally, t&is stu$y e*a,ines &o+ e(olutionary $e(elop,ent ,ig&t be applie$ to t&e Ae(olution in )ilitary A##airs. ; +oul$ li.e to ac.no+le$ge ,y a$(isors in t&e Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology, 9r. Grant Ha,,on$ an$ Colonel 2ret.4 %e$ Hailes #or gi(ing ,e t&e ti,e an$ opportunity to t&in. about t&is proble,. ; +oul$ also li.e to t&an. Lieutenant Colonel Bet& Baspar an$ Lieutenant Colonel Jo&n Brun$er,an #or t&eir intellectual support an$ encourage,ent. %&at being sai$, t&e aut&or alone is responsible #or t&e contents o# t&is stu$y.
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Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1
I. Introduction
<(olutionary $e(elop,ent is base$ on using continuous e*peri,entation an$ a$aptation in c&anging circu,stances to re+ar$ success, +&ile allo+ing, but e(entually eli,inating, #ailure. Since t&is approac& is agile, #le*ible, Cuic. reacting, an$ t&ri(es on c&ange, it contrasts +it& strategic planning in +&ic& syste,s are $e(elope$ in a planne$ an$ or$erly #as&ion to ,eet #uture reCuire,ents. A planne$ syste, is rigi$, slo+ to react, an$ resists or ignores c&ange, +&ic& contrasts +it& &o+ t&e ,ilitary tra$itionally $e(elops +eapon syste,s. One +or$ t&at $istinguis&es bet+een e(olutionary an$ planne$ $e(elop,ent is Dc&aos.E C&aos, li.e ris., is una(oi$able, an$ &ence s&oul$ be ,anage$ rat&er t&an a(oi$e$. ;n$ee$, a certain $egree o# c&aos is $esirable because it generates t&e necessary set o# a$aptations an$ i$eas t&at can e(entually be Dselecte$E #or e(olutionary i,pro(e,ent. %&e 9ar+inian concept o# Dsur(i(al o# t&e #ittestE can be applie$ to i$eas, syste,s, an$ organi?ations t&at see. to ,aintain a co,petiti(e a$(antage.1 A si,ple e*a,ple t&at illustrates t&is line o# t&in.ing is ;B)@s #ailure to anticipate t&e s+itc& #ro, ,ain#ra,e co,puters an$ re,ote ter,inals to s,aller, stan$-alone, personal co,puters, +&ic& o#ten is cite$ as an e*a,ple o# poor strategic planning. ;n ter,s o# an e(olutionary para$ig,, t&e argu,ent is t&at it +as so impossible #or ;B) to logically $e$uce suc& a ra$ical $e(elop,ent t&at no strategic plan coul$ &a(e succee$e$. ;nstea$ o# #ocusing on poor planning, an i,portant conclusion #or ;B) is to $e(elop an organi?ation t&at is su##iciently c&aotic to $e(elop all rele(ant #iel$s, +&ile a$apting Cuic.ly +&en t&e D#ittestE syste,s sur(i(e. Since c&aos is not usually associate$ +it& ;B)@s culture in t&e 1560@s, its #ailure is not surprising #ro, an e(olutionary stan$point. ;# +e substitute t&e 9epart,ent o# 9e#ense 29o94 #or ;B) an$ t&e #all o# t&e Berlin 'all #or t&e co,puter re(olution, a si,ilar story e,erges #or national security. %&e argu,ent is t&at t&e ra$ical s&i#t to an in#or,ationbase$ society ,ig&t pro(i$e a better gui$e #or ,ilitary ,o$erni?ation. %&e t+o ter,s critical to t&is paper are Dc&aoticE an$ De(olutionary.E C&aotic $oes not i,ply total unpre$ictability or Da state o# utter con#usion,E but s&oul$ be t&oug&t o# in ter,s o# t&e ne+ science o# c&aos t&eory in +&ic& or$er an$ stability can be $eri(e$ #ro, in&erently unpre$ictable states. For t&e purposes o# t&is stu$y, it is use#ul to t&in. o# c&aotic as Dunplanne$E or Dot&er t&an planne$.E At t&e sa,e ti,e,
e(olutionary $e(elop,ent $oes not necessarily i,ply a Dprocess o# gra$ual an$ relati(ely peace#ul a$(ance,E but is t&e a$aptation o# syste,s to a c&anging en(iron,ent by an unbiase$ selection process t&at re+ar$s success. ;t can lea$ to ra$ical, as +ell as gra$ual, s&i#ts in a syste,. %o un$erstan$ t&e potential o# c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent, t&is stu$y consi$ers t&e &istorical e*a,ple o# ,ilitary syste,s +&ose $e(elop,ent e*&ibite$ c&aotic e(olutionary traits, speci#ically t&e $e(elop,ent o# in#rare$ syste,s #or tactical a(iation, +&ic& pro(i$es a use#ul e*a,ple #or se(eral reasons. First, t&e $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s procee$e$ in a relati(ely unplanne$ ,anner an$ e*&ibite$ ,any c&aotic an$ e(olutionary aspects. Secon$, ;A syste,s are rele(ant to current U.S. Air Force 2USAF4 operations. %&ir$, ;A syste,s can be e*a,ine$ in ter,s o# co,bat, +&ic& is t&e ulti,ate test o# ,ilitary syste,s. Fourt&, an$ per&aps ,ost i,portantly, t&e e(olutionary $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s can be co,pare$ +it& t&e ,ore tra$itional $e(elop,ent o# ra$ar syste,s, +&ic& also e*ploit t&e electro,agnetic spectru, #or ,any o# t&e sa,e ,ilitary tas.s. %&is stu$y e*a,ines t&ree cases o# c&aotic ;A syste,s $e(elop,ent t&roug& t&eir $e(elop,ent, procure,ent, an$ e,ploy,ent across t&e spectru, o# tactical a(iation -- air-to-air, air-to-groun$, an$ sur#ace-to-air. %&e operational i,plications o# ;A syste,s #or tactical a(iation +ill also be a$$resse$. %&e lessons learne$ #ro, e*a,ining t&ese cases an$ t&eir operational i,plications o##er i,portant insig&ts #or current air operations an$ #uture $e(elop,ent e##orts. A later section o# t&is stu$y $iscusses &o+ t&e concept o# c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent ,ig&t apply to t&e in#or,ation-base$ Ae(olution in )ilitary A##airs 2A)A4. 'it& t&is approac&, t&e rea$er can un$erstan$ &o+ current ;A an$ ra$ar syste,s as +ell as sensor tec&nology syste,s ,ig&t be $e(elope$ in t&e #uture.
II. Electromagnetic Spectrum and Military Applications

Until '';;, &u,ans #oug&t un$er (isual con$itions because t&e only portion o# t&e electro,agnetic spectru, in +&ic& &u,ans coul$ DseeE +as t&e e*tre,ely s,all part to +&ic& t&e &u,an eyeball is sensiti(e. '&ile optical $e(ices 2binoculars, optical sig&ts, etc:4 greatly i,pro(e$ &u,an (ision, #ig&ting +as go(erne$ by li,itations associate$ +it& t&e &u,an eyeball. As a result, sol$iers an$ air,en #oug&t at relati(ely close range7 rarely #oug&t at nig&t7 +ere se(erely li,ite$ by s,o.e, ot&er obscurants, an$ +eat&er7 an$ +ere easily $ecei(e$ by ca,ou#lage an$ conceal,ent.
adar
Ho+e(er, t&e a$(ent o# ra$ar greatly e*pan$e$ t&e ,ilitary@s ability to DseeE an$ #ig&t, an$ $ra,atically a##ecte$ air operations. ;n 1530, pri,iti(e ra$ar syste,s &a$ a $ecisi(e e##ect on t&e Battle o# Britain because it e*ten$e$ t&e Aoyal Air Force@s 2AAF4 ability to DseeE across t&e <nglis& C&annel.2 Gi(en t&e necessities o# +ar, ra$ar ,a$e great stri$es in $e(elop,ent as syste,s beca,e su##iciently s,all an$ rugge$ to #it on large aircra#t, +&ic& allo+e$ AAF bo,bers to Di,ageE t&e groun$ #or DaccurateE nig&t bo,bing 2or at least as accurate as conte,porary A,erican $aylig&t bo,bers4./ By t&e en$ o# t&e +ar, t&e Ger,ans &a$ $e(elope$ ra$ar syste,s #or use on #ig&ter aircra#t t&at li,ite$ t&e nig&tti,e sanctuary #or bo,bers.3 Since A,erica entere$ t&e +ar later, it lagge$ be&in$ in ra$ar $e(elop,ent. A year a#ter t&e Battle o# Britain, a $e(elop,ental US ra$ar syste, Dsa+E t&e Japanese attac. on earl Harbor +&ile t&e aircra#t +ere still +ell out to sea, but t&is in#or,ation +as not acte$ upon because t&e ra$ar +as still in $e(elop,ental testing.0 Ho+e(er, t&e Unite$ States e(entually e,brace$ t&e ne+ tec&nology, as A,erican bo,bers use$ ra$ar to DseeE t&roug& t&e s,o.e an$ &a?e o# t&e Au&r in$ustrial area an$ t&e usually clou$y <uropean +eat&er. %&e Unite$ States also $e(elope$ ra$ar-eCuippe$ nig&t #ig&ters #or use in t&e aci#ic t&eater 2 -"1 Blac.
'i$o+s4." %&is tec&nology also &elpe$ turn t&e ti$e against t&e U-boats in t&e Battle o# t&e Atlantic.> %actical a(iation +as not t&e only +arti,e bene#iciary o# ra$ar. A$,iral !i,it? in t&e aci#ic %&eater o# '';; consi$ere$ ra$ar to be as re(olutionary as t&e stea, engine.6 %&e +arti,e success o# ra$ar ensure$ t&at t&is tec&nology +oul$ be &ea(ily e*ploite$ a#ter t&e +ar. )ilitary reCuire,ents #or ,a.ing ra$ar units lig&ter +it& better resolution an$ lo+er po+er consu,ption, an$ #or speci#ic purposes suc& as +eat&er $etection continue$ to increase. %&e story o# ra$ar-base$ syste,s since '';; &as been c&aracteri?e$ by tec&nology pull, +&ic& signi#ies t&at ,ilitary reCuire,ents spur t&e $e(elop,ent o# tec&nology. Ho+e(er, $espite t&e tre,en$ous a$(antages o##ere$ by t&is ne+ tec&nology #or ,ilitary operations, ra$ar &a$ so,e serious liabilities an$ li,itations in co,parison +it& &u,an (ision. %&ese inclu$e$ lo+ resolution, large si?e an$ po+er reCuire,ents, an$ ra$ar@s non-intuiti(e nature. %&e ,ost glaring $i##erence +as t&e Dacti(eE nature o# ra$ar syste,s an$ t&eir subseCuent susceptibility to counter,easures. ;t is #or t&is reason t&at t&e tec&nological co,,unity turne$ to t&e $e(elop,ent o# ot&er capabilities, o# +&ic& in#rare$ tec&nologies are a critical e*a,ple.
Infrared Spectrum
%&e in#rare$ portion o# t&e electro,agnetic spectru, o##ers ,any o# t&e bene#its associate$ +it& ra$ar but +it&out its li,itations. Since t&e in#rare$ spectru, is Fust outsi$e t&e (isible spectru,, t&e concept #or $esign an$ t&e i,agery pro$uce$ by in#rare$ syste,s is relati(ely straig&t#or+ar$. %&e syste,s si,ulate &u,an (ision to pro$uce i,agery t&at Dloo.sE li.e a (isual picture. %&e $i##erence bet+een ra$ar an$ in#rare$ syste,s at t&e en$ o# '';; +as t&at ra$ar +as ,a.ing substantial contributions to t&e +ar e##ort, +&ile t&e bene#its o# in#rare$ syste,s +ere still largely t&eoretical. %&e only +arti,e in#rare$ syste, in t&e Allie$ in(entory in '';; +as a sniper scope, +&ic& +as e,ploye$ at ;+o Ji,a an$ allo+e$ nig&tti,e targeting at a range o# >0 yar$s.5 %&e Ger,ans use$ ;A searc&lig&ts an$ si,ple ;A (ision $e(ices to con$uct ar,or attac.s at nig&t, but t&ese e*peri,ents +ere largely unsuccess#ul.10 %&ere#ore, +&ile ra$ar pro(i$e$ Dpulle$E ,ilitary AG9, ;A syste,s largely relie$ on tec&nology pus&,
+&ic& largely e*plains $i##erences in t&e patterns o# $e(eloping ra$ar an$ ;A syste,s. %&roug&out t&e Col$ 'ar, ra$ar syste,s $o,inate$ tactical a(iation applications. %&e prospect o# +ar +it& t&e So(iet Union $ecisi(ely in#luence$ t&e $e(elop,ent o# ra$ar syste,s an$ tec&nologies. Operationally, t&e Unite$ States e,p&asi?e$ t&e $e(elop,ent o# #ig&ter aircra#t t&at coul$ $estroy So(iet bo,bers at long range +it& ra$ar ,issiles, an$ lo+ #lying attac. aircra#t t&at use$ terrain-#ollo+ing ra$ar to a(oi$ t&e ra$ars o# t&e So(iet integrate$ air $e#ense syste, 2;A9S4. Ho+e(er, t&ere +ere ,any opportunities #or t&e 9o9 to pursue c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent in t&ree areas o# tactical a(iationH air-to-air, airto-groun$, an$ sur#ace-to-air. As a result, ;A syste,s ,a$e inroa$s as bot& as a co,pli,ent to an$ co,petitor +it& ra$ar syste,s.
Military Applications
Air-to-Air: Sidewinder ;n t&e 15"0@s, t&e F-3 &anto, +as t&e USAF@s pri,ary #ig&ter an$ +as ar,e$ +it& t&e A;)-> Sparro+ ra$argui$e$ ,issile. %&e Sparro+ &a$ been un$er $e(elop,ent #or ,ore t&an a $eca$e, an$ +as a large, e*pensi(e, long-range, all-+eat&er ,issile t&at ga(e t&e &anto, a ,ar.e$ a$(antage in t&e air-to-air co,bat against So(iet bo,bers.11 !ot surprisingly, +&en t&e USAF #oun$ itsel# #ig&ting t&e =ietna, 'ar, t&e ene,y $i$ not #ly in ba$ +eat&er. At t&e sa,e ti,e, restricti(e rules o# engage,ent, +&ic& +ere establis&e$ a#ter t&e t&ir$ Sparro+ $estroye$ an A,erican aircra#t, negate$ its range a$(antage.12 A#ter t&at #rien$ly #ire inci$ent, t&e pilots &a$ to establis& positi(e i$enti#ication (isually be#ore #iring, an$ once insi$e (isual range, t&e ene,y@s s,all, ,aneu(erable #ig&ters &a$ t&e a$(antage. Since t&e &anto, #ig&ter $i$ not &a(e an internal gun, it relie$ on t&e Sparro+@s ra$ar gui$ance, +&ic& +as poorly suite$ to close-in, (isual aerial co,bat. %&e Sparro+ $i$ not &a(e its o+n ra$ar trans,itter, but instea$ relie$ on t&e aircra#t@s ra$ar to gui$e it to t&e target. Bno+n as se,i-acti(e ra$ar &o,ing, t&is reCuires t&e attac.ing aircra#t to .eep its nose 2ra$o,e4 pointe$ in t&e $irection o# t&e opposing #ig&ter.1/ Gi(en t&e &ig& closing spee$s o# ,o$ern #ig&ter aircra#t, ene,y #ig&ters o#ten coul$ #ire t&eir o+n s&ort-range +eapons +&ile t&e Sparro+ +as in #lig&t. ;n e(olutionary ter,s, t&e USAF &a$ an un#ille$ nic&e t&at +as #ille$ by t&e ;A-gui$e$ Si$e+in$er ,issile. Aat&er t&an being a pro$uct o#
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation!
t&e stan$ar$ ,ilitary researc& an$ $e(elop,ent process, a s,all tea, at t&e !a(al 'eapons Center at C&ina La.e pursue$ a te*tboo. case o# c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent to create t&e prototype #or t&e Si$e+in$er, +&ic& it $i$ +it&out o##icial support an$ in opposition to o##icial gui$ance.13 %&e tea, at C&ina La.e $e(elope$ an in#rare$-gui$e$ D#ire-an$-#orgetE ,issile, in +&ic& t&e pilot use$ t&e ,issile@s ;A see.er to Dloc. onE to t&e target. '&en #ire$, t&e ,issile +oul$ gui$e on t&e in#rare$ e,issions o# t&e target aircra#t@s Fet engines, +&ic& reCuire$ no #urt&er action #ro, t&e pilot +&o coul$ loo. #or anot&er target or e(a$e ene,y counter-action. <(en a#ter t&e !a(y a$opte$ t&e Si$e+in$er in t&e ,i$-1500@s, t&e USAF ignore$ t&e ;A ,issile because Air Force reCuire,ents clearly speci#ie$ an Dall +eat&er capability,E +&ic& t&e Si$e+in$er $i$ not possess.10 Ho+e(er, t&e Si$e+in$er +as e(entually a$opte$ by USAF an$ pro(e$ to be e*tre,ely e##ecti(e. For e*a,ple, in Operation Aolling %&un$er 215"0-"64, Sparro+ ,issiles accounte$ #or t+enty-se(en air-toair .ills, +&ile t&e Si$e+in$er accounte$ #or t+enty-nine .ills. ;n Operation Linebac.er 215>1->/4, Sparro+s accounte$ #or t+enty-nine airto-air .ills +&ile t&e Si$e+in$er accounte$ #or #i#ty-t+o .ills.1" %&us, t&e Si$e+in$er ,issile consistently &a$ t+ice t&e .ill ratio o# aircra#t .ills per ,issile launc&e$ in co,parison +it& t&e Sparro+ ,issile $uring t&e =ietna, 'ar.1> Furt&er,ore, t&e Si$e+in$er +as consi$erably c&eaper t&an t&e Sparro+, an$ it is esti,ate$ t&at its $e(elop,ent costs +ere onetent& t&at o# t&e Sparro+ ,issile.16 Air-to-Air: A"#AA" and AI"-$% %&e A)AAA) 2A$(ance$ )e$iu, Aange Air-Air )issile4 +as $e(elope$ in a tra$itional progra, to replace t&e Sparro+ ,issile, but t&e progra, +as plague$ by $elays an$ cost o(erruns.15 Ho+e(er, t&e A)AAA) is a success story +&ose relati(ely s,all D#ire-an$-#orgetE ra$ar ,issile is gui$e$ to+ar$ ene,y aircra#t in t&ree stages. '&ile on t&e aircra#t, t&e ,issile recei(es target in#or,ation #ro, t&e aircra#t@s ra$ar syste,, +&ic& pre$icts +&ere t&e ene,y aircra#t is going an$ t&en #ires t&e A)AAA) to+ar$ t&at spot. %&en, t&e A)AAA) #lies to t&at spot using internal inertial gui$ance syste,s, an$ +&en it reac&es t&e target area t&e A)AAA) uses its internal ra$ar to get a #inal #i* on t&e target #or ter,inal gui$ance.20 '&ile t&e ,issile &as a long range, it uses its internal ra$ar #or a s&ort ti,e, +&ic& ,eans t&at t&e ra$ar can be s,all, lo+ po+er, an$ (ulnerable to Fa,,ing #or only a s&ort ti,e. By ,erging t&e t+o $i##erent sensing ,ec&anis,s o# inertial na(igation an$ ra$ar, A)AAA) $esigners
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation&
o(erca,e ,any o# t&e li,itations associate$ +it& ra$ar gui$e$ ,issiles. By t&is stan$ar$, A)AAA) represents a re(olutionary a$(ance,ent in air-to-air +eapons. %&e Si$e+in$er, gi(en its success in t&e =ietna, 'ar, also beca,e part o# t&e tra$itional USAF acCuisition syste,, but continue$ on an e(olutionary $e(elop,ent pat&. Se(eral generations o# Si$e+in$er ,issiles too. a$(antage o# ,ore reliable an$ sensiti(e ;A $etectors until t&e A;)-5L see.er, +&ic& +as so sensiti(e t&at it coul$ DseeE t&e &eat pro$uce$ by s.in #riction on t&e #ront o# t&e aircra#t an$ t&e plu,e trailing be&in$. !o longer ,ust a pilot ,aneu(er to t&e rear o# an ene,y aircra#t to point Si$e+in$er ,issiles at t&e &ot engine e*&aust. As an Dall aspectE ,issile, li.e t&e ra$ar gui$e$ Sparro+ an$ A)AAA), t&e all-aspect Si$e+in$er +as an e*traor$inarily let&al +eapon. 9uring t&e Fal.lan$s con#lict, t&e A;)-5L trans#or,e$ t&e air-to-groun$ Britis& Harriers into potent #leet $e#ense interceptors, as seen by t&e $estruction o# eig&teen Argentine planes +it& only t+enty-si* ,issiles #or a se(enty-#i(e percent success rate.21 Air-to-'ro(nd: %ow Altit(de )avi*ation and Tar*etin* Infrared for )i*+t ,%A)TI#)- ;n (ie+ o# t&e success o# s,art bo,bs in t&e later stages o# t&e =ietna, 'ar, t&e USAF began to $e(elop a +i$e range o# Ds,arterE ,unitions. %&e )a(eric. ;,aging ;n#rare$ ,issile, +&ic& +as a natural upgra$e #ro, t&e %=-gui$e$ )a(eric., +as able to DseeE at nig&t an$ t&roug& s,o.e. %&e proble, +it& )a(eric. ,issiles +as t&at t&ey reCuire$ signi#icant attention #ro, t&e +eapons o##icer +&o &a$ to select an$ loc.-on to targets. As t&e USAF ,o(e$ a+ay #ro, t&e F-3 #ig&ter an$ #ille$ its in(entory +it& single seat A-10 an$ F-1" aircra#t, t&e +eapons o##icer beca,e a rare bree$. %&ere#ore, t&e story o# t&e )a(eric. ;A ,issile is really t&e story o# t&e syste, t&at +as suppose$ to ,a.e it usable in co,bat #or t&e post-=ietna, USAF, +&ic& beca,e LA!%;A!. %&e LA!%;A! syste, consiste$ o# t+o po$s t&at coul$ be retro#itte$ onto e*isting aircra#t #or a nig&t attac. capability against ar,or, +&ic& +as critical to $e#en$ing against a 'arsa+ act attac. t&roug& t&e Ful$a Gap in 'est Ger,any. LA!%;A! +as $esigne$ to enable F-1" an$ A-10 pilots to searc& #or an$ engage tan.s at nig&t. '&ile one po$ pro(i$e$ a laser range #in$er an$ )a(eric. ,issile targeting syste,, t&e ot&er po$ pro(i$e$ nig&t na(igation capability, +&ic& consiste$ o# an in#rare$ picture $isplaye$ on a +i$e-angle &ea$-up $isplay t&at t&e pilot (ie+e$ t&roug& t&e $isplay to DseeE t&e outsi$e +orl$. ;n t&e ,i$-60@s, t&e #irst LA!%;A! #lig&t si,ulator #or t&e F-1" $e(elope$ at t&e Air
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation.
Force Hu,an Aesources Lab at 'illia,s AFB, Ari?ona, +as a state-o#t&e-art si,ulator +it& a #ully #unctional coc.pit t&at use$ ra$ar i,agery an$ si,ulate$ LA!%;A! in#rare$ i,agery.22 '&en F-1" pilots use$ t&e si,ulator, t&ey +ere less ent&usiastic t&an t&e $e(elop,ent tea,. %&ey in#or,e$ t&e $e(elopers t&at #lying #ro, t&e ;A i,age +as li.e Dloo.ing t&roug& a so$a stra+,E +&ile being color-blin$ an$ lac.ing $ept& perception. Ho+e(er, t&ey +ere suppose$ to use t&is syste, +&ile #lying at &ig& spee$ near t&e groun$ +&ile na(igating, a(oi$ing t&e terrain, scanning #or t&reats, an$ engaging targets. LA!%;A! +as a tec&nological ,ar(el but +as li,ite$ by a #la+e$ operational concept.2/ Alt&oug& LA!%;A! +as an initial #ailure, it e(entually beca,e success#ul +&en it +as a$apte$ #or t&e con(ersion o# t&e F-10 #ig&ter aircra#t in t&e late 1560@s. '&en t&e F-10 +as being $esigne$ in t&e 15>0@s, it +as $esigne$ to be a DpureE air superiority #ig&ter. Ho+e(er, a later ,o$el o# t&e F-10, t&e F-10< Stri.e <agle, is t&e USAF@s pre,ier attac. aircra#t. %&e .eys to its Dre(olutionaryE c&ange in ,ission +ere a$$ing a secon$ seat, re#ining its ra$ar, an$ a$$ing LA!%;A! po$s, +&ic& +oul$ allo+ t+o a(iators to na(igate, a(oi$ terrain, scan #or t&reats, an$ engage targets. %&is Dc&aoticE ,erger o# t&e F-10 air#ra,e an$ LA!%;A! po$s create$ a signi#icant operational success in t&e 1550@s. S(rface-to-Air: Stin*er ;n 9ece,ber 15>5, +&en t&e So(iet Union stage$ a ,ilitary coup $@etat in A#g&anistan, it began a nine-year con#lict bet+een t&e So(iet ,ilitary an$ t&e )usli, #ree$o, #ig&ters, .no+n as )uFa&i$een. %&e So(iet ,ilitary an$ its a$(ance$ tec&nology #oug&t pri,arily against s,all ban$s o# poorly ar,e$ guerrilla #ig&ters. !e(ert&eless, re,iniscent in ,any +ays o# A,erica@s =ietna, e*perience, t&e So(iets su##ere$ a se(ere strategic $e#eat.23 )uc& o# t&e cre$it #or t&e So(iets@ $e#eat goes to t&e intro$uction o# t&e Stinger ,issile into t&at con#lict. %&e Stinger is a s,all ;A ,issile t&at +as $e(elope$ an$ procure$ #or t&e U.S. Ar,y to gi(e in#antry,en a portable air $e#ense capability, +&ic& is a sur#ace-to-air ,issile eCui(alent o# t&e Si$e+in$er. ;t +as so e##ecti(e t&at t&e Central ;ntelligence Agency initially a$(ise$ against supplying Stingers to t&e )uFa&i$een.20 Ho+e(er, a#ter C;A-supplie$ So(iet Strella an$ Britis& Blo+pipe ,issiles #aile$ to signi#icantly curb t&e use o# So(iet airpo+er, A,erica supplie$ Stingers to t&e guerrillas, +&ic& i,,e$iately a##ecte$ t&e con#lict.2" So(iet losses o# aircra#t, especially &elicopters, rose s&arply, an$ e(entually reac&e$ 2,000. So(iet #ig&ter
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation$
aircra#t +ere #orce$ to con$uct &ig&-altitu$e operations, +&ic& se(erely li,ite$ t&eir e##ecti(eness. '&en t&e So(iets +ere #orce$ to se(erely restrict all air operations, it se(erely a##ecte$ t&eir ,ilitary capabilities.2> %&us, t&e relati(ely c&eap an$ si,ple Stinger, +&en use$ in its Dc&aoticE role as a guerrilla +eapon, &a$ signi#icant conseCuences #or U.S. ,ilitary capabilities. %&e Stinger@s unplanne$ success is only part o# its c&aotic story because its secon$- an$ t&ir$-or$er c&aotic e##ects continue to &aunt t&e Unite$ States. For e*a,ple, t&e %aliban, successors to t&e )uFa&i$een o# A#g&anistan, are in po+er partly because o# A,erican inter(ention, an$ no+ s&elter Usa,a-bin-La$en, A,erica@s ,ost +ante$ terrorist.26 C&ina &as increase$ its ,ilitary capability by copying Stinger tec&nology supplie$ by a.istan, +&ic& &elpe$ to s&ip Stingers to t&e )uFa&i$een. As partial repay,ent, a.istan got a$(ance$ ,issile an$ nuclear tec&nology #ro, C&ina an$, in turn, proli#erate$ t&at tec&nology to !ort& Borea to up$ate t&e SCU9 ,issiles t&at t&reaten A,erican troops. %&e uninten$e$ conseCuence o# supplying Stinger ,issiles to t&e A#g&an rebels is a per#ect e*a,ple o# t&e e##ects associate$ +it& c&aos t&eory.25 S(rface-to-Air: /om 0ipp(r 1ar ;n t&e 15>/ Io, Bippur 'ar, sur#ace-to-air engage,ents +ere critical to t&e outco,e o# t&e air +ar. !one o# t&e Arab sur#ace-to-air ,issile syste,s +ere particularly e##ecti(e. Aoug&ly 2,000-/,000 ra$ar-gui$e$ ,issiles +ere launc&e$ but $estroye$ only #orty ;sraeli aircra#t./0 A$$itionally t&ey launc&e$ ,ore t&an 0,000 SA-> Strella@s +&ic& $estroye$ only t&irty aircra#t./1 Ho+e(er, t&ese SA)s +ere e##ecti(e because t&e ;sraeliJs +ere #orce$ to s&i#t t&eir groun$ attac. ,issions #ro, t&e planne$ role o# supporting t&e ar,y to counter-SA) ,issions./2 '&ile t&ey e(entually $estroye$ ,any SA) ,issiles, t&e c&aotic $i(ersion o# e##ort nearly cost ;srael t&e +ar.// '&ile t&e ;sraeli #orces &a$ $ealt success#ully +it& <gyptian ra$ar ,issiles in pre(ious s.ir,is&es o(er t&e Sue? Canal in pre(ious years, in t&e Io, Bippur 'ar a 'estern air #orce #ace$ a D,assi(e, integrate$ SA) an$ anti-aircra#t gun air $e#ense net+or.E #or t&e #irst ti,e./3 %&e tactics an$ training t&at &a$ +or.e$ #or ;srael in t&e past +ere no longer e##ecti(e against t&is ne+ t&reat, particularly, t&e tactic o# using lo+-le(el #lig&ts to a(oi$ or brea. ra$ar contact./0 Gi(en t&e nee$ to press t&eir groun$ attac.s early +&ile t&e ;sraeli Ar,y ,obili?e$, t&ere +as no ti,e #or t&e ;sraeli Air Force 2;AF4 to a$apt. Ho+e(er, a rapi$ resupply e##ort by t&e A,ericans, inclu$ing so,e o# t&e latest electronic counter,easures, &elpe$ t&e ;AF reco(er./" !e(ert&eless, only t&e
$isruption o# t&e air $e#ense net+or. by t&e a$(ance o# t&e groun$ #orces later in t&e +ar, #inally allo+e$ t&e ;AF to operate t&e +ay it &a$ inten$e$./>
Post!Cold "ar Implications

At t&e beginning o# t&e 1550@s, national security un$er+ent #un$a,ental c&anges as t&e Unite$ States #ace$ t&e Dpost Col$ 'arE +orl$. %&e USAF soon #ace$ t&e c&allenges o# a ,ore c&aotic +orl$, +&ic& a##ecte$ tactical a(iation on se(eral le(els. Air-to-Air %&ere +as little reason to $oubt USAF capabilities in t&e air-to-air arena. %&e USAF still use$ t&e Sparro+, but t&e A)AAA) pro,ise$ to be #ar ,ore e##ecti(e, an$ t&ere +as an upgra$e$ an$ $e,onstrably ,ore let&al Si$e+in$er./6 ;n a$$ition, t&e ;sraeli Air Force &a$ $e,onstrate$ t&e superiority o# 'estern pilots an$ aircra#t against So(iet pro*ies in nu,erous con#licts. ;n t&e aerial battles o# t&e 15>0@s an$ 1560@s, t&e Unite$ States $e(elope$ air-to-air ,issile syste,s 2an$ ;sraeli (ariants4 t&at turne$ ;sraeli air superiority into air $o,inance./5 'it& si,ilar training, aircra#t, an$ e(en better ,issile syste,s, t&ere +as no reason to $oubt t&at t&e USAF +oul$ $o,inate air-to-air co,bat. %&e 15>/ Io, Bippur 'ar sa+ ,ore air-to-air co,bat t&an in any pre(ious Arab-;sraeli +ar, +&ic& ;srael &a$ $o,inate$ because o# its superior pilots an$ ,issiles.30 ;srael $o+ne$ 2>> Arab aircra#t +&ile only losing si* in aerial co,bat. Aoug&ly si*ty-#i(e percent o# t&ese .ills +ere attributable to ;A-gui$e$ ,issiles 2Si$e+in$ers an$ ;sraeli (ariants4, +&ile Sparro+ ,issiles accounte$ #or only #i(e percent.31 ;n t&e 1562 Lebanon con#lict, t&e ;sraeli Air Force 2;AF4 use$ bot& ;A an$ ra$ar ,issiles e(en ,ore e##ecti(ely against t&e Syrian Air Force. ;n t&at con#lict, Sparro+ ,issiles +ere not particularly e##ecti(e but ser(e$ t&e tactical purpose o# brea.ing up Syrian #or,ations. %&e all-aspect Si$e+in$er ga(e a ,aFor Cualitati(e a$(antage to t&e ;AF an$ accounte$ #or ,ost o# t&e .ills.32 As t&e operational concept gre+ to inclu$e airborne +arning an$ control plat#or,s suc& as (ariants o# t&e US !a(y@s Ha+.eye, balance in t&e air s&i#te$ #ro, being ,erely one-si$e$ to t&at o# total $o,inance. %&is +as $e,onstrate$ by t&e ;AF@s eig&ty-#i(e to ?ero aerial (ictory ,argin o(er Syria.3/ <(entually, t&e Syrian Air Force belie(e$ t&at ,issions against t&e ;AF +ere suici$al, an$ so,e Syrian pilots eFecte$ at
t&e #irst signal #ro, ra$ar +arning recei(ers.33 %&e air-to-air Dtur.ey s&ootE +as spectacular an$ con#ir,e$ ;sraeli ,astery in air-to-air co,bat t&at &a$ been $e,onstrate$ in pre(ious +ars. %&e ;AF use$ t&e Si$e+in$er +it& great success, an$ use$ t&eir +arti,e e*perience to ,o$i#y t&e ,issile. '&en ;srael #irst use$ t&e Si$e+in$er ,issile, t&e pri,ary ene,y aircra#t o#ten encountere$ +as t&e )iG-2/ Flogger, +&ic& e(en by So(iet stan$ar$s is a robust, stur$y airplane. ;srael learne$ t&at t&e Si$e+in$ers +ere so accurate t&at t&ey o#ten #le+ into t&e tailpipes o# t&e Flogger Fet engines, +&ic& $estroye$ t&e engine but containe$ t&e blast o# t&e Si$e+in$er@s s,all +ar&ea$. %&e pilot o#ten baile$ out o# t&e Flogger to return an$ #ig&t anot&er $ay. Since t&e pilot is an integral part o# t&e #ig&ter syste,, an$ s.ille$ pilots +ere at a pre,iu,, allo+ing t&e ,ost critical part o# t&e #ig&ter syste, escape #ro, air-to-air engage,ents +as ine##ecti(e. %&ere#ore, ;srael put a larger +ar&ea$ in t&e Si$e+in$er ,issile an$ rena,e$ it t&e yt&on, an$ +&en t&e yt&on &it a )iG-2/, it $estroye$ t&e entire aircra#t.30 Air-to-'ro(nd )ost air-to-groun$ $e(elop,ent e##orts $uring t&e Col$ 'ar #ocuse$ on attac. aircra#t t&at +ere $esigne$ to penetrate So(iet ra$ar syste,s. %&e B-1 bo,ber +as $esigne$ to go un$er ra$ar co(erage, +&ile t&e F-11> stealt& #ig&ter +as $esigne$ to be Din(isibleE to ene,y ra$ar.3" Ho+e(er, t&ere +ere reasons to $oubt t&e (alue o# t&is &ig& tec&nology approac&. For e*a,ple, t&e B-1 bo,ber +as .no+n as a D&anger CueenE because o# its serious ,aintenance proble,s an$ insu##icient electronic counter,easures.3> Furt&er,ore, t&e F-11> bo,bing o# an unoccupie$ #iel$ $uring Operation Just Cause in ana,a in 1565 +as a less t&an auspicious co,bat $ebut.36 By t&e early 1550@s, t&ere +ere serious $oubts about USAF in(est,ents in t&e &ig&-tec&nology attac. aircra#t t&at +ere pri,arily $esigne$ to penetrate t&e no+-$e#unct So(iet air $e#enses.35 S(rface-to-Air %&e ability o# t&e USAF to operate in a sur#ace-toair t&reat en(iron,ent +as (ie+e$ +it& cautious opti,is,. ;n t&e Be..a =alley in 1562, ;srael $e,onstrate$ t&at a ra$ar-base$ integrate$ air $e#ense syste,, +&ic& &a$ generate$ so ,any proble,s $uring t&e Io, Bippur 'ar, coul$ be $e#eate$. Furt&er,ore, ol$er generation ;A ,issiles $i$ not pose a signi#icant t&reat because $ecoys coul$ #ool t&ese ,issiles.00 But t&e single e*perience in t&e Be..a =alley coul$ not easily be e*trapolate$ to all o# t&e situations t&at t&e USAF ,ig&t con#ront. %&e entire engage,ent o(er t&e Be..a =alley +as o(er so Cuic.ly an$ apparently e##ortlessly t&at it +as ,ore o# a lesson in ;sraeli ,ilitary s.ills
an$ Syrian inco,petence t&an a true test o# air $e#enses.01 ;n a$$ition, ;srael +as inti,ately #a,iliar +it& t&e co,bat area an$ t&eir opponent, an$ &a$ practice$ against Syrian air $e#enses #or nearly a year in t&e !ege( $esert.02 Suc& a situation +as &ig&ly unli.ely #or U.S. #orces #acing a c&aotic +orl$ +&ere t&reats ,ig&t arise any+&ere an$ anyti,e. %o #urt&er co,plicate ,atters, t&e A#g&anistan con#lict &a$ $e,onstrate$ t&at ,o$ern ;A ,issiles coul$ be e*tre,ely e##ecti(e e(en +&en use$ in s,all nu,bers in a pri,iti(e air $e#ense syste,. Alt&oug& t&e USAF &a$ $e(elope$ plat#or,s t&at coul$ sur(i(e t&e SA) t&reat, t&e issue re,aine$ in $oubt as A,erica &ea$e$ into its #irst post-Col$ 'ar con#lict. S(rface to Air: )ear 3efeat Sp(rs Adaptation and 4vol(tion %&e reCuire,ent #or close air support pre(ente$ t&e ;AF #ro, e*peri,enting an$ a$apting $uring t&e Io, Bippur 'ar. 9uring t&e ne*t ,aFor con#lict bet+een t&e ;AF an$ Arab SA)s o(er t&e Be..a =alley in Lebanon in 1562, Syrian #orces e,ploye$ nearly t&e sa,e ,i*ture o# air $e#ense assets t&at &a$ been so success#ul in 15>/, notably ra$ar-gui$e$ SA-2, SA-/, an$ SA-" long-range ,issiles integrate$ +it& SA-> in#rare$ ,issiles, an$ nu,erous types o# anti-aircra#t 2AA4 guns. Ho+e(er, t&e ;AF +as prepare$ t&is ti,e.0/ %&e ;sraeli@s nulli#ie$ t&e &eat-see.ing Strellas +it& #lares an$ t&er,al balloons, an$ lost only one aircra#t to SA>s $espite ,any lo+ le(el attac.s.03 %&eir ability to $o,inate ra$argui$e$ ,issiles +as e(en ,ore spectacular -- t&e ;AF $estroye$ se(enteen o# nineteen Syrian SA-" sites an$ se(eral SA-2 an$ SA-/ sites in less t&an t+enty ,inutes o# acti(e co,bat.00 Alt&oug& ;srael &as use$ security an$ $eliberate ,isin#or,ation to protect its ra$ar SA)-$e#eating secrets, t&e basis o# its success is +ell .no+n. %&e ;sraeli@s &a$ superior pre-attac. intelligence on t&e location an$ e,ission c&aracteristics o# t&e Syrian SA)s. %&ey began t&e attac. +it& re,otely pilote$ (e&icles, so,e +it& sensors to pinpoint t&e ,issile sites, so,e as $ecoys to entice t&e ra$ars to e,it, an$ so,e +it& let&al +ar&ea$s to &o,e-in on ra$ar e,issions. Once t&e sites +ere locate$, a +ell-coor$inate$ attac. plan +as e*ecute$ +it& t&e &elp o# Ha+.eye airborne +arning an$ control aircra#t. %&e attac. aircra#t +ere +ell protecte$ +it& t&e latest counter,easures, inclu$ing support #ro, large $e$icate$ 2Boeing >0> (ariant4 electronic counter,easures aircra#t. <(en so,e sur#ace-to-sur#ace ,issiles an$ artillery s&ells +ere specially $esigne$ to attac. air $e#ense ra$ars.0" !o ;sraeli aircra#t +ere lost, an$ #ro, t&e start o# t&e con#lict, t&e Syrian air $e#ense syste, +as e##ecti(ely $estroye$.
III. #perational Implications of Infrared Systems

As A,erica prepare$ to #ig&t ;raC in t&e ersian Gul# 'ar, ,any co,,entators loo.e$ #or lessons learne$ t&at ,ig&t apply to t&e upco,ing +ar. ;n &in$sig&t, it is Cuite clear t&at t&e ;sraeli e*periences o# using 'estern aircra#t, pilots, an$ ,issiles pro(i$e$ signi#icant tests #or t&e co,bat ,et&o$s an$ results t&at pre(aile$ $uring t&e Gul# 'ar. ;n t&e air ca,paigns o(er Serbia an$ Boso(o in t&e late 1550@s, t&e relations&ip bet+een ra$ar an$ ;A syste,s an$ air operations &as #un$a,entally c&ange$ &o+ t&e USAF operates.
Air!to!Air
;n neit&er 9esert Stor, nor Allie$ Force $i$ ene,y air #orces, $espite being eCuippe$ +it& #airly ,o$ern #ig&ters, seriously c&allenge coalition air #orces. ;raC atte,pte$ se(eral interceptor sorties $uring t&e opening $ays o# 9esert Stor,, but reac&e$ t&e sa,e conclusion as &a$ t&e Syrians o(er t&e Be..a =alley t&at #lying against 'estern air #orces +oul$ be suici$al. Coalition #orces s&ot $o+n 31 ;raCi aircra#t, 23 +it& Sparro+s an$ 12 +it& Si$e+in$ers.0> An ;raCi )iG-20 ,ay &a(e score$ a single aerial .ill Fust be#ore it +as s&ot $o+n.06 ;n a sign o# &o+ co,pletely t&e coalition #orces $o,inate$ t&e aerial battles, ;raCi aircra#t +ere not sa#e e(en after t&ey retreate$ into &ar$ene$ s&elters, because coalition aircra#t syste,atically $estroye$ t&e s&elters an$ anyt&ing insi$e t&ose s&elters.05 %&e ;raCi@s +ere #orce$ into t&e truly $esperate act o# running t&e gauntlet o# coalition co,bat air patrols in or$er to escape to ;ran, a country +it& +&ic& t&ey +ere still tec&nically at +ar."0 O(er Boso(o an$ Serbia, t&e story +as ,uc& t&e sa,e. '&ile t&e ene,y air #orces &a$ capable aircra#t, suc& as t&e )iG-25, !A%O #orces +ere (astly superior. %&e sa,e co,bination o# superior aircra#t, pilots, ,issile syste,s, an$ situational a+areness t&at &a$ ser(e$ t&e ;sraeli Air Force pro$uce$ one-si$e$ aerial battles. As +it& t&e ;sraeli e*perience, t&e principal lessons #ro, t&e air-to-air contests o# t&e 1550@s +as t&at t&e 'est is totally $o,inant.
Air!to!$round
5peration 3esert Storm 6 T+e I# 1ar Historians &a(e clai,e$ ,any D#irstsE #or t&e ersian Gul# 'arH t&e #irst ;n#o 'ar, t&e #irst A)A +ar, an$ t&e #irst success#ul air +ar. ;n any case, 9esert Stor, +as t&e #irst +ar in +&ic& ;A syste,s playe$ a $o,inant role. %&e nig&tly ne+s (i$eo t&at s&o+e$ t&e e##ecti(eness o# precision-gui$e$ +eaponry nearly al+ays in(ol(e$ ;A syste,s. An$ F-10< Stri.e <agles eCuippe$ +it& LA!%;A! po$s +ere (ery e##ecti(e, +&ic& le$ to rus&ing ,ore LA!%;A! syste,s into t&e t&eater."1 %&e Dc&aoticE use o# ;A syste,s increase$ t&roug&out t&e +ar. %&e s,all, lo+ resolution i,age #ro, )a(eric. ,issile see.ers, +&ic& +ere $esigne$ +it& su##icient resolution to (eri#y a target, +ere use$ instea$ by A-10 pilots as D,ini-LA!%;A!sE to searc& #or targets in t&e $esert."2 F-111 pilots use$ t&eir =ietna, 'ar (intage a(e %ac. po$s to attac. tan.s because tan. ar,or staye$ +ar,, an$ t&ere#ore &ig&ly (isible to e(en lo+-resolution ;A syste,s, long a#ter t&e $esert san$ coole$."/ %&e F-11> stealt& #ig&ter, t&e ,ost ,o$ern stri.e aircra#t o# t&e +ar, &a$ no ra$ar at all. Follo+ing t&e $ictu, t&at a stealt&y aircra#t s&oul$ not e,it, t&e F-11> relie$ on ;A syste,s #or na(igation an$ targeting."3 9uring 9esert Stor,, ;A syste,s $e,onstrate$ t&at t&ese &a$ e(ol(e$ to t&e point o# being critical to t&e USAF $o,ination o# t&e battle#iel$."0 0osovo -- T+e '7S 1ar A+ay #ro, t&e $esert, t&e +eat&er li,itations associate$ +it& ;A syste,s +ere e(en ,ore critical. An i,portant syste, $uring t&e Boso(o con#lict +as t&e B-2 bo,ber an$ t&e Joint 9irect Attac. )unition 2J9A)4, +&ic& is gui$e$ by an inertial na(igation syste, t&at uses t&e Global ositioning Syste, 2G S4. G S +as una##ecte$ by +eat&er, +&ic& ,eant t&at t&e B-2 +as one o# t&e #e+ syste,s t&at coul$ bo,b t&roug& t&e o(ercast +eat&er +&ic& c&aracteri?e$ t&e #irst #e+ +ee.s o# t&e air ca,paign."" %&e initial $e(elop,ent o# a satellite-base$ na(igation syste, +as as co,ple* as t&at #or t&e Si$e+in$er ,issile."> '&ile t&e B-2 bo,ber +as $esigne$ to $rop nuclear bo,bs on ,obile So(iet ballistic ,issile launc&ers $uring a nuclear +ar, t&e B-2 bo,ber +as &ig&ly e##ecti(e against stationary targets, suc& as bri$ges an$ air#iel$s, $uring a s,all-
scale con#lict. Alt&oug& not part o# t&e $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s, t&e syste,s use$ to bo,b Serbia pro(i$e #urt&er e(i$ence o# Dc&aoticE e(olutionary $e(elop,ent. 0osovo 6 4vol(tion of Tomcat 8i*+ter %&e U.S. !a(y@s F-13 %o,cat aircra#t un$er+ent a ra$ical c&ange bet+een 9esert Stor, an$ Allie$ Force. %&e %o,cat sy,boli?es t&e ra$ar-base$ #ig&ter aircra#t. ;t uses a large ra$ar to support t&e A;)-03 &oeni* ,issile. %&e &oeni* gre+ #ro, t&e sa,e ra$ar-#ocuse$ planning, as $i$ t&e Sparro+ ,issile."6 ;ts large ra$ar, couple$ +it& its &ig&ly capable #ire control syste,, gi(es t&e F-13 an e*tre,ely long range."5 9esigne$ to .noc. $o+n So(iet bo,bers an$ cruise ,issiles at long range, t&e F-13 +as on its +ay to e*tinction +&en t&e Col$ 'ar en$e$. ;n its ti,e an$ role in #leet $e#ense, t&e %o,cat +as &ig&ly capable, but $uring t&e Gul# 'ar, t&e rules o# engage,ent $i$ not allo+ t&e e*tre,ely long-range ,issile engage,ents in +&ic& t&e co,bination o# &oeni* ,issiles an$ %o,cat aircra#t speciali?e$.>0 %&e proble, +as t&at t&e %o,cat +as a superb aircra#t t&at lac.e$ a role in t&e post Col$ 'ar +orl$. Ho+e(er, t&e %o,cat sur(i(e$ because U.S. !a(y lac.e$ a precision gui$e$ capability $uring 9esert Stor,. By ,erging t&e %o,cat an$ its &ea(y +eapons loa$ +it& LA!%;A! po$s, t&e !a(y +as able to create DStri.ecatsE relati(ely Cuic.ly an$ ine*pensi(ely.>1 =irtually +it&out precision capability in t&e early 1550s, U.S. !a(y aircra#t e##ecti(ely participate$ in Operation Allie$ Force using al,ost e*clusi(ely precision +eapons.
Surface!to!Air
Air 3ominance ;t is $i##icult to co,pare t&e Gul# 'ar an$ t&e Boso(o con#lict +it& t&e USAF@s pre(ious e*periences in t&e =ietna, 'ar. Kuantitati(e nu,bers or percentages o# .ills are not rele(ant because o# t&e $isparate nature o# t&ese air +ars.>2 A ,ore rele(ant co,parison +oul$ be Cualitati(e. Aa$ar ,issiles pose$ a constant $anger o(er !ort& =ietna,, an$ ;A ,issiles +ere a t&reat to lo+ #lying, slo+ aircra#t, especially &elicopters, in Sout& =ietna,. Ho+e(er, in t&e ersian Gul# 'ar t&e ;raCi air $e#ense syste, +as e##ecti(ely $estroye$ in t&e opening ,inutes o# con#lict. %&is +as acco,plis&e$ t&roug& t&e use o# superior intelligence, ra$ar-baiting $ecoys, electronic counter,easures,
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1!
+ell-coor$inate$ co,,an$ an$ control, anti-ra$iation ,issiles, an$ con(entional attac.s +it& special operations #orces an$ Apac&e &elicopters. %&e si,ultaneous attac. against t&e entire air $e#ense syste, pro$uce$ Cuic., o(er+&el,ing (ictory.>/ A#ter t&e #irst #e+ $ays o# suppressing ;raCi air $e#enses, t&ere +as (irtually no ra$ar ,issile t&reat.>3 Ho+e(er, t&e in#rare$ ,issile t&reat $uring t&e ersian Gul# 'ar +as ,uc& *reater t&an $uring t&e =ietna, or ;sraeli con#licts an$ it persiste$ t&roug&out t&e +ar because t&e Allie$ air #orces $i$ not &a(e a +ay to suppress or $estroy passi(e ;A syste,s. %&e Allie$ #orces, li.e t&e So(iets in A#g&anistan, c&ose t&e tactic o# re,aining at ,e$iu,-to-&ig& altitu$es to a(oi$ t&e ;A t&reat.>0 ;n t&e $eca$e since t&e ersian Gul# 'ar, Allie$ aircra#t en#orcing no-#ly ?ones continue to attac. ra$ar ,issile sites +it& (irtual i,punity +&ile staying abo(e t&e ;A ,issile t&reat. ;n Boso(o, t&e tren$ o# a lo+er air $e#ense t&reat continue$. %&e truly a,a?ing statistic o# no Allie$ aircre+ an$ only t+o aircra#t lost to ene,y air $e#enses $uring a se(enty-nine $ay air ca,paign spea.s #or itsel#. Ho+e(er, once again Allie$ aircre+s +ere #orce$ to con$uct operations at altitu$es abo(e t&e ;A t&reat, +&ic& in practical ter,s ,eant t&at ,e$iu, altitu$e attac.s against tactical targets in Boso(o +ere routinely critici?e$ #or t&eir ine##ecti(eness.>" As in t&e A#g&anistan con#lict, relati(ely si,ple an$ c&eap ;A ,issiles seriously ero$e$ t&e e##ecti(eness o# a ,o$ern air #orce. Apac+e 9elicopters %&e Apac&e #iasco, .no+n as %as. Force Ha+., represents t&e ,ost glaring e*a,ple o# $octrinal ,is,atc& $uring Operation Allie$ Force. Since lo+, slo+-#lying aircra#t cannot sur(i(e in t&e #ace o# lo+ altitu$e, ;A ,issiles, t&e Ar,y belie(e$ t&at t&e only +ay to suppress passi(e ;A syste,s $uring Apac&e operations +as to blan.et t&e area +it& s&rapnel in or$er to .ill or $a,age any Dso#tE targets. %o acco,plis& t&is, t&e Ar,y $eploye$ t&e )ultiple Launc& Aoc.et Syste, +it& %as. Force Ha+. because a#ter a $e(astating roc.et artillery stri.e, t&e Apac&es +oul$ be able to sa#ely #ly in an$ $estroy re,aining &ar$ targets.>> '&ile t&is approac& is consistent +it& $octrine, blan.eting a large area +it& s&rapnel is i,practical $uring &u,anitarian operations, suc& as Boso(o. Furt&er, t&is $e#ie$ t&e con(entional +is$o, t&at t&e Ar,y ,ust ,a.e its &elicopter $eploy,ent lig&ter an$ leaner so t&at it can incorporate Apac&e stri.e #orces into air ca,paigns. %&us, t&e $ecision to bring Apac&e &elicopters into an air ca,paign t&at +oul$ operate in t&e presence o# unsuppresse$ lo+-le(el ;A t&reats ,isse$ ,any o# t&e lessons learne$ $uring recent con#licts.
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1&
I%. Current Tec&nologies and Tactical Aviation
Air!to!Air
%&e ,ost telling statistic about USAF air-to-air $o,inance is t&at a 'estern pilote$ F-10 or F-1" aircra#t &as never been s&ot $o+n in air-toair co,bat.>6 )uc& o# t&e cre$it belongs +it& t&e $e(elop,ent o# superior air-to-air ,issiles gui$e$ by ra$ar an$ ;A sensors. %&e A)AAA), #irst use$ in t&e ersian Gul# 'ar, re,ains a state-o#-t&e-art ra$ar-gui$e$ ,issile. 9espite ,inor i,pro(e,ents in let&ality, range, an$ electronic counter-counter,easures, it is not clear t&at a DbetterE ra$ar-gui$e$ ,issile is necessary, as s&o+n by t&e continue$ success o# t&e A)AAA) in +ar. %&e all-aspect Si$e+in$er &as been eCually success#ul. %&e progra, to replace t&e Si$e+in$er +it& an ASAAA) 2A$(ance$ S+ortAange Air-Air )issile4 or A;)-5L &as not pro$uce$ any signi#icant i,pro(e,ents.>5 !onet&eless, t&e ASAAA) ,issile +ill go t&roug& one ,ore e(olutionary i,pro(e,ent, +&ic& +ill be base$ on t&e t&reat pose$ by t&e )iG-25 aircra#t an$ its AA-11 Arc&er ,issile.60 As t&e So(iet Union #ell be&in$ t&e 'est in t&e #iel$s o# electronics an$ co,putational po+er, t&eir ability to #iel$ a$(ance$ ra$ar syste,s $ecline$. As a result, t&e So(iets increasingly relie$ on ,ore reliable, easier to $esign, co,putationally si,pler, an$ toug&er-to-Fa, ;A syste,s, +&ic& surprise$ 'estern intelligence agencies. For e*a,ple, +&en t&e )iG-25 Fulcru, aircra#t +as #iel$e$ in t&e 1560s, its ra$ar syste, an$ associate$ ,issile +ere i,pressi(e by So(iet stan$ar$s but at least a generation be&in$ 'estern syste,s. Ho+e(er, it also &a$ a bu,p on t&e nose, +&ic& +as not an electronic +ar#are antenna as #irst suspecte$, but an ;n#rare$ Searc& an$ %rac. Syste, 2;AS%4, +&ic& +as t&e #irst to be #iel$e$ in an operational #ig&ter.61 Once ,erge$ +it& a laser range #in$er, t&e ;A syste, coul$ $etect aircra#t and pro(i$e targeting $ata at longer ranges +it&out alerting t&e target aircra#t t&at it &a$ been $etecte$. <(en i# a target aircra#t suspecte$ it +as being trac.e$, t&ere is no practical +ay to DFa,E t&is ;A syste,. %&e )iG-25@s ;A syste, +as integrate$ +it& t&e i,pro(e$ ;A ,issile, .no+n as t&e AA-11 Arc&er, +&ic& not only &a$ t&e all-aspect #eature o# t&e latest Si$e+in$ers, but it also &a$ Do##-boresig&tE capability M ,eaning t&at t&e ,issile coul$ Dloo.E
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1.
to its le#t an$ rig&t to DseeE target aircra#t. %&us, t&e pilot coul$ #ire a ,issile +it&out pointing t&e aircra#t nose at t&e target aircra#t, as Si$e+in$er eCuippe$ pilots ,ust $o. %&is e*pan$s t&e #iring en(elope #or t&e ,issile, sa(es precious secon$s in a $og#ig&t, an$ co,pli,ents t&e ,aneu(erability o# a #ig&ter because it is ,uc& easier to ,aneu(er t&e #ig&ter into a #iring position. ;n a$$ition, Aussian pilots &a$ a &el,et,ounte$ t&er,al sig&t +&ic& per,itte$ t&e, to ai, t&e ,issile ,erely by loo.ing at t&e targete$ aircra#t, in e##ect gi(ing t&e, an ;A D&ea$s-up $isplayE +&ere(er t&ey loo.e$, not Fust on t&e #ront o# t&e instru,ent panel, as in 'estern coc.pits. %&e $etails o# t&is syste, $i$ not #ully e,erge until t&e <ast Ger,an )iG-25@s beca,e part o# t&e uni#ie$ Ger,any@s Lu#t+a##e. Once t&ey $i$, it +as clear t&at an ;A-eCuippe$ )iG-25, #lo+n by a s.ille$ pilot, &a$ an a$(antage, an$ t&e AA-11 Arc&er ,issile seriously c&allenges t&e tec&nological pri,acy o# t&e Si$e+in$er.62 '&ile it is not clear t&at t&e Arc&er represents a s&ort#all in our air superiority capabilities, t&e USAF is ,o(ing to close t&e ;A ,issile gap. Until t&en, t&e USAF a$(antage in pilot training, situational a+areness syste,s, an$ long-range ,issiles ,a.e t&e prospect o# an e(enly balance$ close-in $og#ig&t &ig&ly unli.ely.6/ Ho+e(er, t&e USAF acCuisition syste, &as been energi?e$ to con$uct a signi#icant $e(elop,ent progra, to $e(elop a U.S. eCui(alent to t&e Arc&er.63 9espite t&e $e(elop,ent o# its &ig&ly capable ,issiles, t&e USAF &as accepte$ engineering co,ple*ity an$ $esign tra$eo##s to ensure t&e basic 20,, cannon +ill still re,ain integral to #uture #ig&ter aircra#t. %&is $ecision is base$ on =ietna,-era lessons learne$ in t&e F-3 co,,unity, yet t&ese lessons ,ay not be rele(ant. %&e F-3 #unctione$ as a $og#ig&ter because t&e USAF lac.e$ t&e situational a+areness in t&e 15"0s to &an$le long-range ,issile engage,ents an$ because o# t&e serious tactical li,itations +it& se,i-acti(e ra$ar &o,ing. Ho+e(er, t&e F-22 aircra#t &as none o# t&ese li,itations. ;t +ill carry A)AAA) ,issiles, +&ic& are a true D#ire-an$-#orgetE long-range ra$ar ,issile, as +ell as a$(ance$ Si$e+in$ers t&at +ill allo+ s&ort range .ills +it&out t&e tra$itional nee$ to #ly $irectly to+ar$ t&e ene,y aircra#t. ;n a$$ition, t&e USAF &as largely sol(e$ t&e ;$enti#ication Frien$-or-Foe 2;FF4 proble, t&at &in$ere$ ,issile engage,ents $uring t&e =ietna, 'ar.60 ;n t&e 15"0@s, t&e #ailure to $esign t&e F-3 aircra#t to $og#ig&t +it& t&e )iG-21 in t&e )iG@s operational en(elope +as a serious o(ersig&t. Ho+e(er, $esigning t&e F-22 to $og#ig&t against t&e )iG-21 in t&e )iG@s operational en(elope coul$ be a serious ,ista.e.
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1$
Air!to!$round
Since 1550, ;A syste,s &elpe$ t&e USAF signi#icantly i,pro(e t&e ability to $eli(er precision +eapons an$ con$uct aroun$-t&e-cloc. operations. ;n Allie$ Force, U.S. #orces i,pro(e$ t&eir per#or,ance by $e,onstrating unparallele$ all-+eat&er per#or,ance an$ nearly total precision.6" %o$ay, nu,erous precision stan$o## +eapons are in a$(ance$ $e(elop,ent stages an$ +ill enter t&e USAF in(entory in t&e near #uture #urt&er en&ancing per#or,ance.6> Syste,s t&at can selecti(ely engage ,ultiple targets, suc& as t&e Lo+ Cost Autono,ous Stri.e Syste, 2LOCASS4 an$ t&e Sensor-Fu?e$ 'eapon, are only slig&tly #urt&er be&in$ in $e(elop,ent. %&ree tec&nological $e(elop,ents are ,a.ing t&ese +eapons #easible no+. 'it& costs $ri(en lo+er by t&e ci(ilian sector, ;A sensors an$ G S recei(ers are no+ su##iciently ine*pensi(e so t&at t&ese can be put on e*pen$able ,unitions, not Fust $eli(ery plat#or,s. Furt&er,ore, t&e ,icroprocessor re(olution &as i,pro(e$ t&e DbrainsE o# ,unitions, +&ic& &as i,portant e##ects #or t&e ne+ generation o# DbrilliantE ,unitions. '&ile eac& tec&nological $e(elop,ent is po+er#ul, ,erging t&ese t&ree tec&nologies is pro$ucing a tec&nological brea.t&roug&.
Surface!to!Air
%&ere are $i##erences bet+een t&e e##ecti(eness o# ra$ar an$ ;A ,issiles in $enying U.S. aircra#t t&e use o# airspace to prosecute ,issions. Aa$ar ,issiles &a(e been unsuccess#ul against USAF aircra#t +&ile ;A ,issiles &a(e been spectacularly s(ccessf(l. ;n t&e Gul# 'ar, t&e no-#ly ?one o(er ;raCi, an$ in t&e air o(er Boso(o an$ Serbia, t&e airspace belo+ 10,000 #eet &as been (irtually o##-li,its to Allie$ aircra#t gi(en t&e t&reat pose$ by ;A ,issiles. Furt&er, USAF aircra#t &a(e a li,ite$ ability to re$uce t&eir signature against ;A ,issiles an$ (irtually no +ay to locate or suppress t&ese passi(e syste,s. %&e $angers associate$ +it& lo+ altitu$e operations +ere $e,onstrate$ by t&e loss o# ,ore t&an one $o?en lo+ #lying un,anne$ aerial (e&icles $uring Operation Allie$ Force.66 %&e USAF &as success#ully use$ Fa,,ing, stealt& aircra#t, special operations
rai$s 2t&e a(e Lo+-le$ Apac&e attac. on early +arning ra$ars in t&e Gul# 'ar4, an$ in#or,ation +ar#are to co,bat ra$ar ,issiles.65 %&e i,plication is t&at t&e USAF &as (irtually conCuere$ t&e ra$ar t&reat, +&ile t&e ;A t&reat in t&e lo+-le(el en(iron,ent re,ains a proble,.50 Operation Allie$ Force s&o+s t&e result o# t&e USAF@s pulling tec&nology to $e(elop a$(ance$ ra$ar syste,s an$ counter,easures in contrast +it& incorporating an$ countering ;A syste,s at +&ate(er pace t&e tec&nology e(ol(es. ;# t&en Allie$ Force is t&e nor, #or #uture air ca,paigns, t&is poses serious $octrinal, training, an$ acCuisition issues #or t&e USAF. For no+, t&e USAF operates its aircra#t abo(e 10,000 #eet to a(oi$ t&e ;A t&reat. %&is raises se(eral $i##icult c&oices. ;# t&e li,it o# 10,000 #eet beco,es a per,anent tactic, t&en t&e lo+-le(el #lying an$ $og#ig&ting s.ills, +&ic& +ere t&e &all,ar.s o# Col$ 'ar #ig&ter pilots, are irrele(ant.51 Future aggressors ,ay t&en notice t&at s&orter-range ;A syste,s +ere (irtually unc&allenge$ by coalition aircra#t. ;# regional po+ers in(est t&eir li,ite$ resources in ;A syste,s, t&e 10,000-#oot li,it coul$ constrain USAF operations, inclu$ing UA= sensor plat#or,s. By relying on ca,ou#lage, conceal,ent, $eception, an$ &u,anitarian concerns an$ placing ,ilitary ,ateriel in close pro*i,ity to sensiti(e sites, a potential aggressor coul$ potentially s&iel$ its #orces #ro, USAF long-range +eaponry. '&en co,bine$ +it& t&e ability to Fa, or spoo# so,e o# t&e USAF@s precision gui$e$ +eaponry, +e ,ig&t see t&e $e(elop,ent o# an uneasy stan$o## in +&ic& USAF aircra#t +ere sa#e abo(e 10,000 #eet but unable to e##ecti(ely stri.e ene,y #orces. %&e current U.S. ,ilitary strategy, +&ic& relies &ea(ily on airpo+er, +oul$ be un$er,ine$. An$ i# t&e USAF is un+illing to be banis&e$ #ro, lo+-le(el operations, it ,ust re-e(aluate its approac& to ;A syste,s. Since t&e current tren$ to+ar$ less e*pensi(e sensors an$ s,arter ,icroprocessors strongly #a(ors t&e ,issile $e(elopers, t&ere is no straig&t#or+ar$ solution to suppressing or $estroying passi(e syste,s. Catc&ing up to an$ staying a&ea$ o# t&e ;A ,issile t&reat +oul$ reCuire a progra, +it& t&e resources an$ priority o# a tra$itional planne$ progra, an$ t&e #le*ibility an$ a$aptability o# a c&aotic e(olutionary progra,. %&e air,en t&at le$ Allie$ Forces belie(e t&at #uture generations o# ra$ar ,issiles an$ interceptor aircra#t +ill pose a serious c&allenge to t&e ability o# t&e USAF to ,aintain air $o,inance.52 reli,inary lessons learne$ #ro, Boso(o inclu$e t&e nee$ #or larger nu,bers o# ,ore capable Fa,,ing aircra#t, suppression aircra#t, an$ procure,ent o# t&e F-22.5/ ;n
a$$ition, t&e one co,bat ,ission t&at air,en are +illing to relegate to Dun,anne$E aircra#t is t&e suppression an$ $estruction o# ene,y ra$ar air $e#enses. As a result o# t&ese operational reCuire,ents, t&e USAF +ill be better able to ,eet #uture ra$ar t&reats.53 But +&at i# t&e ra$ar ,issile t&reat $oes not ,ateriali?eN Certainly, any regional po+er ,ay &a(e learne$ a $i##erent lesson t&an t&e nee$ to buy a$(ance$ long-range air $e#ense syste,s. ;nterceptor aircra#t an$ a$(ance$ ra$ar SA)s are e*pensi(e syste,s t&at reCuire signi#icant training an$ ,aintenance support. ;n Operation Allie$ Force, stealt&y aircra#t &a$ to plan ,issions in conFunction +it& electronic support aircra#t, but ra$ar gui$e$ ,issile syste,s &a$ little e##ect on t&e air ca,paign an$ ,any +ere e(entually $estroye$.50 8(t(re 3evelopments -- "illimeter 1ave %&e ,illi,eter +a(e 2))'4 portion o# t&e spectru, lies bet+een in#rare$ an$ ra$ar #reCuencies8+a(elengt&s 2appro*i,ately 10 M 100 GH?4. %&e ,illi,eter +a(e spectru,, as t&e crosso(er point bet+een ra$ar an$ ;A syste,s, represents t&e last untappe$ region o# t&e spectru, #or sensor $e(elopers to e*ploit #or tactical a(iation. Fortunately, ))' syste,s o##er great pro,ise because t&ese coul$ co,bine t&e bene#its o# ;A syste,s an$ ra$ar syste,s +&ile ,ini,i?ing t&eir correspon$ing li,itations. '&ile ))' syste,s can be $e(elope$ bot& as ;A an$ as ra$ar syste,s, so,e inno(ati(e ))' syste, concepts can co,bine t&e ele,ents o# i,aging 2;A4 an$ processe$ 2ra$ar4 syste,s.
Summary
One lesson learne$ #ro, t&e $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s is t&at t&e e(olution in ,ilitary a##airs is in progress, as seen by t&e +ay in +&ic& t&e ,ilitary is e*ploiting ;A syste,s, but t&ere is no reason to belie(e t&at t&is state o# a##airs is uniCue to ;A syste, $e(elop,ent. Once t&e concept o# c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent is un$erstoo$, ,any e*a,ples o# suc& $e(elop,ent in ,ilitary syste,s $e(elop,ent can be recogni?e$. %&e ne*t section $iscusses &o+ t&ese $e(elop,ents co,pare +it& t&e concept o# natural e(olution.
%. Concept of 'atural Evolution

Just as in nature, +&ere natural selection &as pro$uce$ co,ple* an$ (arie$ li#e #or,s #or ,any speciali?e$ nic&es7 in ,ilitary a##airs, t&e #orces o# co,bat selection &a(e pro$uce$ ;A syste,s t&at per#or, &ig&ly speciali?e$ #unctions in all #acets o# tactical a(iation. %&e c&aotic $e(elop,ent an$ use o# ;A gui$e$ air-to-air ,issiles, ;A targeting syste,s, an$ ;A SA)s &a(e pro#oun$ly in#luence$ all areas o# aerial co,bat. A less ob(ious, but per&aps ,ore i,portant, si,ilarity is t&at e(olutionary $e(elop,ent can pro$uce Dre(olutionaryE i,pro(e,ents in capability.5" %&e gra$ual incorporation o# a$(ance$ sensor tec&nology into t&e Si$e+in$er ,issile le$ to increases in capability once t&e see.er &ea$ +as su##iciently sensiti(e to (ie+ aircra#t #ro, all aspects. %&is is a classic #eature o# c&aotic syste,s, in +&ic& s,all c&anges can &a(e large longter, conseCuences.5> ;t is also si,ilar to e(ents in +it& nature t&at lea$ to Dre(olutionaryE c&anges. %&e $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s &as contribute$ to a ra$ical c&ange in tactical a(iation operations because it alters &o+ USAF aircra#t #ly an$ #ig&t. USAF aircra#t no longer #ly at lo+ le(el to a(oi$ ra$ar, but no+ operate as &ig&-altitu$e stan$o## s&ooters so t&at t&ey can a(oi$ ;A ,issiles, +&ic& is a ra$ically $i##erent ,et&o$ o# acco,plis&ing USAF attac. ,issions. LA!%;A! &as also c&ange$ USAF co,bat operations. '&ile it initially #aile$ in its planne$ role o# enabling aircra#t to attac. s,all, &ig& (alue targets, it e(entually succee$e$ a#ter t&e USAF $e(elope$ a t+o seat attac. aircra#t, t&e F-10< Stri.e <agle, an$ t&e !a(y con(erte$ t&e F-13 %o,cat. Furt&er, LA!%;A! ,ay no+ beco,e success#ul in single seat aircra#t because ,ilitary operations &a(e s&i#te$ a+ay #ro, lo+-le(el #lig&ts, +&ic& +i$ens LA!%;A!@s #iel$ o# (ie+. Anot&er si,ilarity +it& nature is t&at e(olutionary $e(elop,ent is o#ten con(ergent. For e*a,ple, in t&e case o# ,issile syste,s, t&e ra$ar ,issile beca,e D#ire an$ #orgetE +it& t&e intro$uction o# A)AAA), +&ile t&e ;A Si$e+in$er beca,e all aspect D#ire an$ #orgetE +it& t&e intro$uction o# t&e DLE ,o$el. Aa$ar $e(elopers soug&t s&orter +a(elengt&s #or greater resolution, +&ile ;A syste,s use$ longer +a(elengt&s to increase t&e ability to penetrate obscurants. %&e result is t&at bot& are con(erging on ,illi,eter +a(elengt&s. %&e concept o# (estigial co,ponents is anot&er use#ul ele,ent o# t&e natural e(olution analogy. Just as &u,ans &a(e outgro+n t&e nee$ #or
t&eir appen$i*, #ig&ters &a(e outgro+n t&e nee$ #or t&e gun. ;n air-to-air co,bat, an a$(ance$ o##-boresig&t ;A ,issile can #unction as a $og#ig&ting ,issile in t&e unli.ely e(ent t&at USAF #ig&ters are #orce$ to engage in close co,bat. 9espite t&is, t&e F-22 +ill incorporate a 20,, cannon, li.ely to be useless in ,o$ern air operations. Anot&er parallel +it& nature is t&e $i##iculties associate$ +it& i$enti#ying t&e e(olutionary +inners in t&e long ter,. %&e big, po+er#ul ra$ar SA)s o# t&e =ietna, era are no+ (ulnerable to USAF aircra#t, +&ile t&e s,aller, &ig&ly ,obile Strella@s represent a signi#icant t&reat. C&anges in t&e en(iron,ent ,a.e e(en s&ort ter, pre$ictions ris.y. For e*a,ple, t&e ;sraeli Air Force &a$ $o,inate$ t&e )i$east s.ies until all t&e air $e#ense syste,s, +&ic& t&e ;AF &a$ al+ays $e#eate$ separately, +ere integrate$ into a single syste, $uring t&e Io, Bippur 'ar. Finally, +&ile t&e Unite$ States &as no ob(ious peer co,petitor, co,petition in nature is t&e ,ain #orce be&in$ e(olutionary $e(elope,ent. ;srael@s ability to turnaroun$ #ro, near $e#eat $uring t&e Io, Bippur 'ar to co,plete $o,ination o# t&e air $uring engage,ents in t&e Be..a =alley is a classic e*a,ple.
()n!'atural* Evolution
9espite t&e (alue o# t&e natural e(olution analogy, t&is construct +ill #ail un$er certain circu,stances because t&ere are ,any cases in +&ic& syste, $e(elop,ent base$ on tec&nological e(olution $oes not #ollo+ t&e analogy o# natural e(olution. First, unli.e nature, syste, $e(elop,ent $oes not $epen$ on ran$o, c&ange. Alt&oug& t&is stu$y stresses t&e c&aotic nature o# t&e $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s, t&is s&oul$ not be con#use$ +it& t&e ran$o, ,utations in nature t&at $ri(e e(olution. Unplanne$ or Dot&er t&an planne$E $e(elop,ent successes still $epen$ on in$i(i$uals or organi?ations to sol(e a proble, or recogni?e a solution t&at ot&ers &a$ not seen or $i$ not reali?e. %&is is c&aotic, but not ran$o,. Since syste,s $e(elop,ent $oes not occur o(er ,illions o# years an$ in(ol(e billions o# subFects, t&is is a crucial $i##erence. '&ile syste, $e(elop,ent is rational at so,e le(el, syste,s e(ol(e in $istinctly $i##erent +ays. ;n nature, ran$o, c&ange generates success t&at lea$s to e(olution. ;t is a +ell-establis&e$ ,ilitary ,a*i,
t&at $e#eat, not success, $ri(es c&ange, because t&ose +&o lose see. to ,a.e c&anges t&at ,ay be success#ul. %&e ,ost notable &istorical e*a,ple is t&e e,brace o# t&e ''; $e#ensi(e ,entality by t&e (ictorious Frenc&, +&ile t&e $e#eate$ Ger,ans $e(elope$ t&e ra$ically $i##erent blit?.rieg o##ensi(e. Si,ilarly, ;srael@s near-loss in t&e Io, Bippur 'ar le$ to ne+ priorities an$ inno(ati(e tactics, +&ile Syria@s integrate$ air $e#enses re,aine$ relati(ely unc&ange$. On a s,aller scale, t&e U.S. !a(y@s li,ite$ role in t&e ersian Gul# 'ar spurre$ inno(ati(e solutions, suc& as ra$ically c&anging t&e role o# t&e F-13 %o,cat in or$er to Cuic.ly an$ cost-e##ecti(ely prepare #or #uture air operations. Since A,erica is t&e biggest +inner o# t&e last $eca$e an$ Aussia is t&e ,ost conspicuous loser, t&e un-natural aspect o# losers e(ol(ing an$ +inners stagnating raises pro#oun$ly i,portant Cuestions #or t&e U.S. ,ilitary. Anot&er i,portant $i##erence is t&at natural e(olution ten$s to close out co,petition in nature as nic&es are #ille$, but #or $e(elop,ent base$ on tec&nological e(olution, t&e situation is e*actly re(erse$. So,eti,es t&e .no+le$ge t&at a tec&nology is possible gi(es t&e a$(ersary an incenti(e, +&ic& e*plains in part +&y t&e USAF protecte$ stealt& tec&nology #or so long. ;n ot&er cases, t&e ne+ tec&nological $e(elop,ent is sol$ or gi(en a+ay an$, as in t&e case o# t&e Stinger ,issile, ,ay en$ up in an uninten$e$ #as&ion in un#rien$ly &an$s. An$, o# course, espionage can so,eti,es allo+ a ,ilitary co,petitor to catc& up tec&nologically, as see in t&e case o# ;A gui$e$ ,issiles +&en t&e So(iets $e(elope$ t&eir Atoll ,issile $irectly #ro, stolen blueprints o# t&e Si$e+in$er.56 '&ile t&e U.S. ,ilitary &as ,aintaine$ a signi#icant lea$ in i,portant tec&nologies, ci(ilian researc& an$ $e(elop,ent e##orts increasingly set t&e pace #or tec&nological $e(elop,ent.55 ;# co,,ercial #ir,s are t&e #irst to $e(elop ne+ tec&nologies an$ are not encu,bere$ by a slo+ procure,ent syste,, t&ese organi?ations ,ig&t be able to a$apt to ne+ tec&nologies at a (ery rapi$ pace. For e*a,ple, t&e $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s ,ay alrea$y be $o,inate$ by co,,ercial organi?ations, particularly in t&e area o# e*ploiting c&arge$ couple$ $e(ices 2CC94 an$ uncoole$ t&er,al $etectors. %&ese t+o tec&nologies +ill allo+ nearly any ,ilitary #orce to #iel$ t&e types o# ;A syste,s t&at &a(e been $o,inate$ by t&e U.S. ,ilitary. ;n t&at case, special operations #orces, +&ose tactical a$(antage &as long reste$ on nig&t (ision $e(ices, ,ay no longer Do+n t&e nig&t.E
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2!
'&ile t&e Dun-naturalE aspect o# syste,s $e(elop,ent is t&at it coul$ occur by ,erger, c&aotic syste, e(olution by ,erger is a recurring t&e,e. %&ere are ,any e*a,ples. A)AAA) ,a$e ra$ar gui$e$ ,issiles &ig&ly success#ul because it co,bine$ ra$ar an$ inertial sensors. %&e Harrier an$ t&e %o,cat e(ol(e$ into entirely $i##erent nic&es +&en ,erge$ +it& t&e all-aspect Si$e+in$er an$ LA!%;A!, respecti(ely. <gypt@s integration o# ra$ar an$ ;A SA)s an$ AA artillery in t&e Io, Bippur 'ar +as a success#ul ,erger on a ,assi(e scale. Brilliant ,unitions are an e,erging success no+ t&at ;A sensors can be ,erge$ +it& inertial sensors an$ c&eap ,icroprocessors. otentially, ;A ,issile $e(elopers ,ay soon per#or, a si,ilar e(olution by ,erger.100 Anot&er i,portant $i##erence is t&at nature stops at Dgoo$ enoug&,E but syste,s $e(elop,ent base$ on tec&nological e(olution &as no natural en$. Bureaucracies #ocuse$ on syste,s $e(elop,ent create t&e pressure #or continuous i,pro(e,ent #or ,any reasons, inclu$ing inertia +&ic& $ri(es syste,s $e(elop,ent past Dgoo$ enoug&.E %&is is probably t&e case +&ere t&e USAF is $e(eloping an ;A ,issile syste, in reaction to t&e So(iet Arc&er ,issile +&ic& cannot be Fusti#ie$ base$ on t&e t&reat it poses to t&e USAF@s $o,inance in t&e air-to-air roll. %&e #inal $i##erence in syste,s $e(elop,ent e(olution is t&at it can be t&e pro$uct o# planning. Since it +oul$ be i,practical to allo+ unplanne$ $e(elop,ent to beco,e t&e nor,, logic an$ analysis are &elp#ul #or #ocusing t&e e(olution o# tec&nological syste,s. Generally, t&e less ob(ious t&e solution, t&e ,ore (arie$ t&e e*peri,entation an$ t&e ,ore #le*ible an$ a$aptable t&e organi?ation ,ust be. %&e e(olution o# t&e ;sraeli yt&on #ro, t&e Si$e+in$er is an e*a,ple o# a practical an$ e##icient solution to a straig&t#or+ar$ proble,.
Implications for t&e evolution in Military Affairs + MA,

A large portion o# t&e U.S. $e#ense establis&,ent@s ,o$erni?ation progra, #ocuses on i,ple,enting +&at is calle$ t&e in#or,ation-base$ A)A. %&e 2000 !ational Security Strategy notes t&at, D<*ploiting t&e re(olution in ,ilitary a##airs is #un$a,ental i# U.S. #orces are to retain t&eir $o,inance in an uncertain +orl$.E %&is is to be ac&ie(e$ by, Da care#ully planne$ an$ #ocuse$ ,o$erni?ation progra,.E101 '&ile t&e concept o# a Dplanne$ re(olutionE see,s contra$ictory, t&e 9o9
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2&
pre#erence #or planne$ $e(elop,ent is li.ely to gui$e t&e A)A. ;,portantly, t&ere are se(eral lessons #ro, t&e c&aotic $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s #or tactical a(iation t&at are applicable to t&is tec&nological re(olution. First, since c&aotic e(olution +or.s, a planne$ re(olution is not necessary because t&e use o# constant e*peri,entation an$ i,pro(e,ent can result in re(olutionary i,pro(e,ents in capabilities an$ syste,s. Secon$, c&aotic e(olutionary Dre(olutionsE ,ay be &ar$ to recogni?e, as seen by t&e #act t&at t&e USAF still struggles +it& t&e i,plications o# t&e ne+ ,o$e o# ,e$iu, altitu$e, beyon$-(isual-range air +ar#are t&at #irst appeare$ o(er t&e Be..a =alley al,ost 20 years ago. Since t&is ,o$e o# air +ar#are $epen$s &ig&ly on co,,an$, control, co,,unications, co,puters an$ intelligence 2C3;4, ,issiles, aircra#t, an$ pilots, t&e in#or,ation-base$ A)A ,ay alrea$y &a(e arri(e$ #or tactical a(iation. At t&e sa,e ti,e, c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent &appens in an unpre$ictable #as&ion. Since unplanne$ successes +ill un$oubte$ly a##ect t&e A)A, t&e 9epart,ento# 9e#ense ,ust continue to e*peri,ent to preser(e t&e ,ost capable tec&nologies an$ capabilities. %&e .ey is to ,anage c&aotic $e(elop,ent rat&er t&an a(oi$ it. One i,plication is t&at syste, $e(elopers s&oul$ be+are o# (estigial co,ponents. For e*a,ple, t&e U.S. Ar,y@s atte,pt to $igiti?e t&e in$i(i$ual sol$ier &as reac&e$ t&e point +&ere consi$erable +eig&t &as been a$$e$ to t&e sol$ier@s e*isting loa$.102 ;# t&e A)A +ill ,a.e U.S. ,ilitary #orces ,ore capable, +e ,ust consi$er &o+ to ,a.e t&ose tec&nologies practical in operational as +ell as $e(elop,ental ter,s. A critical Cuestion #or t&e A)A is t&e point at +&ic& t&e &u,an in a co,bat plat#or, is t&e eCui(alent o# pro(i$ing use#ul #unctions but in(ol(ing $isproportionate ris.. A critical lesson #ro, t&e c&aotic $e(elop,ent o# ;A syste,s is t&at e(olution by ,erger is consistently success#ul. Since an in#or,ationbase$ A)A is &ig&ly $epen$ent on a$(ance$ tec&nologies in t&e #iel$s o# so#t+are an$ &ar$+are $e(elop,ent, t&e proponents o# an in#or,ationbase$ A)A s&oul$ be a+are o# t&e $angers associate$ +it& in-bree$ing an$ tunnel (ision. ;t is possible t&at i# t&e A)A $e(ol(e$ into in#or,ation e*perts +&o $esign co,ple* in#or,ation syste,s t&at are part o# increasingly co,ple* in#or,ation net+or.s t&at e*ist in isolation, it coul$ ,iss t&e ,ulti-$isciplinary successes t&at pro$uce re(olutionary capabilities.
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2.
A #urt&er lesson #ro, t&is analysis is t&at losers inno(ate an$ co,petition $ri(es e(olution. A,erica alrea$y $o,inates t&e ,ilitary application o# in#or,ation syste,s because +e &a(e no peer co,petitor an$ o#ten engage in ar,s race +it& oursel(es. <(en our allies belie(e t&at +e are e(ol(ing too Cuic.ly on t&e in#or,ation #ront.10/ One lesson #ro, nature is t&at co,petition is necessary #or c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent. '&ile Fointness &as &a$ positi(e e##ects on U.S. ,ilitary capabilities, inter-ser(ice ri(alry &as pro(en use#ul. )any obser(ers belie(e t&at a single Ser(ice coul$ be a #or,ula #or stagnation in t&e $e(elop,ent o# ne+ syste,s. %&is is an i,portant consi$eration bot& as in#or,ation operations ,igrate to t&e Space Co,,an$ an$ t&ere are pressures to create a separate Foint space ser(ice. Finally, an i,portant lesson is t&at tec&nological e(olution is easier #or successi(e generations o# $e(elopers, especially #or in#or,ation syste,s gi(en t&e rise o# t&e internet an$ globali?ation. %&e corollary about t&e ascen$ancy o# ci(ilian tec&nologies in lea$ing e$ge ;A syste,s is e(en ,ore applicable to in#or,ation syste,s. As t&e +orl$@s lea$ing in#or,ation-base$ society, it is not possible to turn bac. or slo+ $o+n t&e pace o# t&e in#or,ation re(olution in t&e society an$ t&e ,ilitary. Ho+e(er, t&e U.S. $epen$ence on in#or,ation syste,s also ,a.es t&e U.S. econo,y an$ ,ilitary ,ost (ulnerable to ne+ #or,s o# +ar#are. One ris. is t&at in#or,ation +ar#are ,ay be enable$ by ci(ilian $e(elopers an$ be e,ploye$ on #un$ing an$ ti,e sc&e$ules t&at are inconsistent +it& 9o9@s $e(elop,ent syste,.
Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2$
%I. Conclusions
'&ile or$erly planne$ $e(elop,ent is t&e pre#erre$ ,et&o$ #or 9o9 an$ t&ere#ore recei(es ,ost o# t&e resources, $eliberate planning also +or.s. Un$er t&e 9o9@s &ig&ly structure$ planning an$ bu$geting syste,, t&e U.S. ,ilitary &as been eCuippe$ +it& t&e #inest ,ilitary &ar$+are in t&e +orl$, inclu$ing suc& &ig&ly success#ul e*a,ples as t&e ra$ar syste,s in tactical a(iation an$ t&e electronic counter,easures t&at $e#eat ene,y ra$ar syste,s. '&ile bot& are pro$ucts o# t&e tra$itional syste,, t&is ,ilitary ,ateriel &as been $e(elope$ at great cost. )any ac.no+le$ge t&at t&e tra$itional $e(elop,ent cycle is too lengt&y to support t&e ,o$ern ,ilitary. As $e,onstrate$ by t&e in#rare$ syste,s e*a,ine$ in t&is stu$y, c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent regularly occurs in 9o9, &as pro$uce$ ,any co,bat successes, an$ ,ay be c&eaper an$ ,ore responsi(e in a rapi$ly c&anging tec&nological en(iron,ent. %&e proble,, &o+e(er, is t&at t&is type o# $e(elop,ent is e*ploite$ on an a$ &oc basis t&at co,petes +it& establis&e$ plans, as seen in t&e $e(elop,ent o# t&e Si$e+in$er ,issile. %&e Unite$ States s&oul$ s&i#t ,ore to+ar$ t&e c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent ,o$el t&at is beginning to play a $o,inant role in t&e business +orl$. Un#ortunately, un$er t&e current bu$get syste,, suc& a s&i#t +ill be e*tre,ely $i##icult #or 9o9 to acco,plis&. %&e ne*t generation 2Super Hornet, F-22 Aaptor, an$ Joint Stri.e Fig&ter4 are alrea$y planne$ an$ ,ay e*cee$ bu$get proFections. Gi(en t&is, t&ere +ill be #e+ resources to spen$ on inno(ati(e #or,s o# $e(elop,ent. %&e .ey Cuestion is &o+ to $e(elop a culture an$ organi?ation t&at ta.es a$(antage o# c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent. %&e ,ost i,portant step is #or 9o9 to stop treating Dc&aoticE $e(elop,ent as an aberration. %&is reCuires t&at unplanne$ or Dot&er t&an planne$E successes not be consi$ere$ #ailures. At a ti,e +&en t&e ris.s o# #aile$ e*peri,ents are lo+, e(olutionary $e(elop,ent s&oul$ be e,brace$ so t&at t&e #orces o# inno(ation, creati(ity, an$ Dout-o#-t&e-bo*E t&in.ing are nurture$ rat&er t&an tolerate$. Ho+e(er, a$$ing c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent into t&e current bu$get syste,, +&ic& calls #or long-range planning, +ill be $i##icult because it raises Cuestions about 9o9@s syste, #or planning, progra,,ing, an$ bu$geting as it relates to e*peri,entation an$ a$aptation.
Fortunately, t&ere is no lac. o# a$(ice. Stu$ies #ro, t&e business +orl$ are #ull o# a$(ice on &o+ to structure organi?ations in c&aotic ti,es. %&e original ,anage,ent guru, %o, eters, suggests t&at organi?ations can Dt&ri(e on c&aos.E103 Speci#ic a$(ice #or t&e ,ilitary is also a(ailable.100 %&ere are +ays in +&ic& t&e Joint Forces Co,,an$ can accelerate t&e pace o# Foint e*peri,entation, an$ t&e establis&,ent o# a center #or e*peri,entation is an e(olutionary step #or+ar$ t&at nee$s to be (igorously pursue$ +it&in t&e $e#ense establis&,ent.10" %&e U.S. Special Operations Co,,an$ 2USSOCO)4 #orces are a use#ul e*a,ple. '&ile our Special Operations Forces 2SOF4 are so s,all an$ speciali?e$ t&at it is $i##icult to $ra+ broa$ conclusions about its acti(ities, t&ese #orces &a(e e,brace$ in#rare$ syste,s ,ore #ully t&an con(entional a(iators, an$ t&us &a(e ta.en a$(antage o# c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent. ;,portantly, e(olution by ,erger is a constant t&e,e in special operations, as seen in t&e ,erging o# cargo aircra#t, ;A sensors, an$ Ar,y artillery into special operations #orces SOF #i*e$-+ing guns&ips. %&e ability to react Cuic.ly to un#ille$ ,ilitary nic&es is c&aracteristic o# SOF, +&ic& is consistent +it& t&e ,ission o# using guns&ips to counter lo+ tec&nology transportation ,et&o$s t&at +ere relati(ely i,,une to con(entional USAF attac. ,et&o$s. '&ile &ar$ly a per#ect ,o$el #or $e(elop,ent, procure,ent, or e,ploy,ent, SOF pro(i$e i,portant lessons #or &o+ to incorporate c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent ,ore #or,ally into t&e 9o9 acCuisition process. Finally, +&ile t&is stu$y &as #ocuse$ on t&e $e(elop,ent o# syste,s an$ tec&nologies, a legiti,ate criticis, is t&at it &as #ocuse$ on ,ateriel rat&er t&an t&e organi?ational an$ $octrinal issues t&at constitute t&e ot&er t+o legs o# t&e tria$ #or a true Dre(olution in ,ilitary a##airs.E Ho+e(er, it is i,portant to un$erstan$ t&at t&e business co,,unity argues t&at t&e concept o# c&aotic e(olutionary $e(elop,ent can be applie$ to organi?ation an$ ,et&o$ology Fust as rea$ily as it to syste,s $e(elop,ent.10> By i,plication, t&e o(erall concept o# applying c&aotic, e(olutionary $e(elop,ent is essential i# t&e U.S. ,ilitary is to continue to $e(elop t&e tec&nologies an$ capabilities t&at allo+ it to ,aintain tec&nological superiority
Center for Strategy and Tec&nology

%&e Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology +as establis&e$ at t&e Air 'ar College in 155". ;ts purpose is to engage in long-ter, strategic t&in.ing about tec&nology an$ its i,plications #or U.S. national security. %&e Center #ocuses on e$ucation, researc&, an$ publications t&at support t&e integration o# tec&nology into national strategy an$ policy. ;ts c&arter is to support #aculty an$ stu$ent researc&, publis& researc& t&roug& boo.s, articles, an$ occasional papers, #un$ a regular progra, o# guest spea.ers, &ost con#erences an$ sy,posia on t&ese issues, an$ engage in collaborati(e researc& +it& U.S. an$ international aca$e,ic institutions. As an outsi$e #un$e$ acti(ity, t&e Center enFoys t&e support o# institutions in t&e strategic, scienti#ic, an$ tec&nological +orl$s. An essential part o# t&is progra, is to establis& relations&ips +it& organi?ations in t&e Air Force as +ell as ot&er 9epart,ent o# 9e#ense agencies, an$ i$enti#y potential topics #or researc& proFects. Aesearc& con$ucte$ un$er t&e auspices o# t&e Center is publis&e$ as Occasional papers an$ $isse,inate$ to senior ,ilitary an$ political o##icials, t&in. tan.s, e$ucational institutions, an$ ot&er intereste$ parties. %&roug& t&ese publications, t&e Center &opes to pro,ote t&e integration o# tec&nology an$ strategy in support o# U.S. national security obFecti(es. For #urt&er in#or,ation on t&e Center #or Strategy an$ %ec&nology, please contactH Grant %. Ha,,on$, 9irector %&eo$ore C. Hailes, 9eputy 9irector Jo&n . Geis ;;, 9irector o# Operations Air 'ar College /20 C&ennault Circle )a*+ell Air Force Base, Alaba,a /"112 2//34 50/-"55"82560800>5 29S! 35/-"55"82560800>54 <,ailH Grant.Ha,,on$O,a*+ell.a#.,il %e$.HailesO,a*+ell.a#.,il Jo&n.GeisO,a*+ell.a#.,il
Titles in t&e #ccasional Papers Series

1 #eac+bac: 5perations for Air ;ampai*n 7lannin* and 4<ec(tion Scott ). Britten, Septe,ber 155> 2 %asers in Space: Tec+nolo*ical 5ptions for 4n+ancin* = S "ilitary ;apabilities )ar. <. Aogers, !o(e,ber 155> / )on-%et+al Tec+nolo*ies: Implications for "ilitary Strate*y Josep& Siniscalc&i, )arc& 1556 3 7erils of #easonin* by 9istorical Analo*y: "(nic+> ?ietnam> and t+e American =se of 8orce Since 1$45 Je##rey Aecor$, )arc& 1556 0 %asers and "issile 3efense: )ew ;oncepts for Space-@ased and 'ro(nd@ased %aser 1eapons 'illia, H. ossel, July 1556 " 1eaponiAation of Space: =nderstandin* Strate*ic and Tec+nolo*ical Inevitables %&o,as 9. Bell, January 1555 > %e*al ;onstraints or Information 1arfare )ar. Aussell S&ul,ann, )arc& 1555
6 Serbia and ?ietnam: A 7reliminary ;omparison of = S 3ecisions to =se 8orce Je##rey Aecor$, )ay 1555 5 Airborne and Space-@ased %asers: An Analysis of Tec+nolo*ical and 5perational ;ompatibility Bennet& '. Bar.er, June 1555 10 3irected 4ner*y and 8leet 3efense: Implications for )aval 1arfare 'illia, J. )cCart&y, February 2000 11 9i*+ 7ower "icrowaves: Strate*ic and 5perational Implications for 1arfare <ileen ). 'alling, )arc& 2000 12 #e(sable %a(nc+ ?e+icles and Space 5perations Jo&n <. 'ar$, Jr., )arc& 2000 1/ ;r(ise "issiles and "odern 1ar: Strate*ic and Tec+nolo*ical Implications 9a(i$ J. !ic&olls, )arc& 2000 13 3eeply @(ried 8acilities: Implications for "ilitary 5perations <ric ). Sepp, )arc& 2000 10 Tec+nolo*y and ;ommand: Implications for "ilitary 5perations in t+e Twenty-8irst ;ent(ry 'illia, B. )cClure, July 2000
1" =nmanned Aerial ?e+icles: Implications for "ilitary 5perations 9a(i$ Gla$e, July 2000 1> ;omp(ter )etwor:s and Information 1arfare: Implications for "ilitary 5perations 9a(i$ J. Gruber, July 2000 16 8ailed States and ;as(alty 7+obia: Implications for 8orce Str(ct(re and Tec+nolo*y ;+oices Je##rey Aecor$, 9ece,ber 2000 15 1ar as 1e 0new It: T+e #eal #evol(tion in "ilitary AffairsB=nderstandin* 7aralysis in "ilitary 5perations Jan S. Bree,er, 9ece,ber 2000 20 =sin* %asers in Space: %aser 5rbital 3ebris #emoval and Asteroid 3eflection Jonat&an '. Ca,pbell, 9ece,ber 2000 21 1eapons for Strate*ic 4ffect: 9ow Important is Tec+nolo*yC Collin S. Gray, January 2001 22 = S Army Apac+e 9elicopters and = S Air 8orce 4<peditionary 8orces: Implications for 8(t(re "ilitary 5perations Bra$ )ason, June 2001 2/ T+e 4nd of SecrecyC "ilitary ;ompetitiveness in t+e A*e of Transparency Bet& ). Baspar, August 2001
23 7rompt 'lobal Stri:e T+ro(*+ Space: 1+at "ilitary ?al(eC Larry G. Sills, August 2001 20 7recision 4n*a*ement at t+e Strate*ic %evel of 1ar: '(idin* 7romise or 1is+f(l T+in:in*C %i,ot&y J. Sa.ulic&, 9ece,ber 2001
'otes
Bro+n, S&ona L. an$ <isen&ar$t, Bat&leen )., ;ompetin* on t+e 4d*e: Strate*y as Str(ct(red ;+aos, Har(ar$ Business Sc&ool ress, Ca,bri$ge, )assac&usetts, 1556, p. 23/. Bro+n an$ <isen&ar$t apply e(olutionary an$ c&aos t&eory to business ,o$els. Co,peting Don t&e e$geE ,eans Dt&e unpre$ictable, o#ten uncontrolle$, an$ e(en ine##icient strategy t&at nonet&eless $e#ines best practice in t&e presence o# per(asi(e c&ange.E 2 Beegan, Jo&n, T+e Second 1orld 1ar> =i.ing enguin, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 1550 p. 52. / Bar.er, Aalp&, T+e #A8 at 1ar, %i,e-Li#e Boo.s, Ale*an$ria, =irginia, 1561, p. 132. 3 9el(e, Ben, )i*+tfi*+ter: T+e @attle for t+e )i*+t S:ies> Sterling ublis&ing Co,pany, ;nc., !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 1550, pp. 10>-161. 0 Spector, Aonal$ H., 4a*le A*ainst t+e S(n, =intage Boo.s, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 1560, p. /. " 9el(e, Ben, )i*+tfi*+ter: T+e @attle for t+e )i*+t S:ies> Sterling ublis&ing Co,pany, ;nc., !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 1550, pp. 1"/. > Beegan, Jo&n, T+e Second 1orld 1ar> =i.ing enguin, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 1550 p. 120. 6 )iller, <$+ar$ S., 1ar 7lan 5ran*e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 1551, p. /00. 5 Hu$son, Aic&ar$ 9., Infrared System 4n*ineerin*> Jo&n 'iley G Sons, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 15"5, p. 5 10 'estru,, Aon, Sidewinder: ;reative "issile 3evelopment at ;+ina %a:e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 1555, p. 36. 11 Ibid., p. 3" 12 Ibid., p. 21/. 1/ Gunston, Bill an$ Spic., )i.e, "odern Air ;ombat> Crescent Boo.s, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 156/, p. 31. 13 'estru,, Aon, Sidewinder: ;reative "issile 3evelopment at ;+ina %a:e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 1555, pp. 11/, 115. 10 Ibid., p. 1/" 1" Ibid., p. 210. 1> Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 205. See also, Gunston, Bill, an$ Spic., )i.e, "odern Air ;ombat> Crescent Boo.s, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 156/, p. 166. 15 DA)AAA) )eets Fun$ing,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, !o(e,ber 3, 1560, pp. 20-2". 20 Gunston, Bill, '(ide to t+e 1orldDs Airborne "issiles> Sala,an$er Boo.s, Lt$., Lon$on, Unite$ Bing$o,, 155/, pp. 22-2/. 21 'estru,, Aon, Sidewinder: ;reative "issile 3evelopment at ;+ina %a:e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, p. 216. 22 %&e aut&or, as a proFect engineer, D#le+E about 100 &ours in t&e si,ulator +it& t&e LA!%;A! syste,. 2/ Clar.e, atric. <., DLitening Stri.es,E ;itiAen Airman, February 1555, pp. 12-1/. ;ronically, a LA!%;A!-li.e po$ calle$ L;%<!;!G is a &ig& priority #or t&ese sa,e aircra#t in t&e Air !ational Guar$ an$ Aeser(e. 23 Cor$es,an, Ant&ony H., an$ 'agner, Abra&a, A., T+e %essons of "odern 1ar> ?ol(me III: T+e Af*+an and 8al:lands ;onflicts> 'est(ie+ ress, Boul$er, Colora$o, 1550, p. 3. 20 Ibid., p. 1>3. 2" Ibid. 2> Ibid., pp. 1>"-1>>. %&e Stinger clearly &a$ Da po+er#ul tactical, i# not strategic, i,pact on t&e So(iet $ecision to +it&$ra+ #ro, A#g&anistan.E 26 AFa,i, Foua$, D)r. Bin-La$en@s !eig&bor&oo$,E = S )ews E 1orld #eport, Septe,ber >, 1556, p. 2". AFa,i notes t&at, D;n Osa,a bin La$en, an$ in t&e p&eno,enon o# t&e %aliban, t&e puritanical
?ealots +&o &a(e conCuere$ ,uc& o# A#g&anistan, so,e Arabs sa+ an A,erican instru,ent being turne$ against its creator. ;t +as in t&e last battle o# t&e col$ +ar, t&e $ra+n-out struggle #or A#g&anistan, t&at t&ose ra$icals &a$ been #orge$. %&ey &a$ been gi(en A,erican-,a$e Stinger ,issiles an$ A,erican ,oney an$ succor. 'it& suc& tools &a$ bin La$en an$ &is acolytes t&+arte$ co,,unis,7 no+ t&ey &a(e turne$ on t&e Great Satan. )ost )usli,s s&e$ no tears #or t&e Unite$ States. %&e A,ericans, a#ter all, &a$ so+n t&e +in$ in t&e i,penetrable &ills o# a.istan an$ A#g&anistan7 no+ t&ey are reaping t&e +&irl+in$.E 25 Gleic., Ja,es, ;+aos: "a:in* a )ew Science, enguin Boo.s, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 156>, p. 6. /0 Cor$es,an, Ant&ony H., an$ 'agner, Abra&a, A., T+e %essons of "odern 1ar> ?ol(me I: T+e Arab-Israeli 1ars 1$&3 6 1$.$> 'est(ie+ ress, Boul$er, Colora$o, 1550, p. 60. /1 Ibid., p. 62. /2 Ibid. D<(en t&oug& .ill rates +ere lo+, t&e Arabs +ere please$ at t&e +ay t&eir So(iet SA)s .ept t&e ;AF PsicH ;sraeli Air ForceQ at bay.E // Ibid. D%&e suppression e##ort too. so long t&at ,uc& o# t&e ;AF@s air superiority coul$ not be broug&t to bear PsicH on t&e groun$ battlesQ.E /3 Ibid. /0 Ibid., p. 60 %&e AAA an$ especially RSU-/3 represent $e(iations, +&ic& +ere &ig&ly e##ecti(e in t&e lo+ altitu$e en(iron,ent, especially +&en pilots #lattene$ out #ro, t&e steep $i(es an$ split-S ,aneu(ers t&at t&ey use$ to a(oi$ SA)s. %&e RSU-/3 +as e*pecte$ to be Cuite e##ecti(e in any scenario in +&ic& tactical aircra#t &a$ to attac. ar,or on t&e ,o(e, but t&is scenario ne(er &appene$ a#ter t&e Io, Bippur 'ar. Furt&er,ore, planners ensure$ t&at RSU-/3 +as one o# t&e ,ost &ea(ily countere$ ra$ar syste,s, partly because o# t&eir $e,onstrate$ e##ecti(eness an$ because ,any +ere li.ely capture$ $uring t&e ;sraeli groun$ ca,paign. /" Ibid., p. 60. /> Ibid., p. 63. /6 'estru,, Aon, Sidewinder: ;reative "issile 3evelopment at ;+ina %a:e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 1555, p. 15>. /5 Cor$es,an, Ant&ony H., an$ 'agner, Abra&a, A., T+e %essons of "odern 1ar> ?ol(me I: T+e Arab-Israeli 1ars 1$&3 6 1$.$> 'est(ie+ ress, Boul$er, Colora$o, 1550, p. 60. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 6". 32 Ibid., p.201. 3/ Ibid., pp. 51, 201. 33 Ibid., p.201. 30 Gunston, Bill, '(ide to t+e 1orldDs Airborne "issiles> Sala,an$er Boo.s, Lt$., Lon$on, Unite$ Bing$o,, 155/, p. 32. %&e ;sraeli@s &a$ t&e sa,e e*perience +it& t&e )a(eric. air-to-groun$ ;A ,issile, but ,a$e e*actly t&e opposite ,o$i#ication. %&e )a(eric. +as also (ery accurate, consistently scoring $irect &its on tan.s. Since it is a ,assi(e ,issile t&at &its +it& &ig& (elocity on t&e (ulnerable top ar,or, t&e .inetic energy o# t&e i,pact is su##icient to .ill a tan.. %&e e*plo$ing +ar&ea$ +as super#luous, unless, as t&e ;sraeli@s note$, s&rapnel #ro, t&e tan. .ille$ $is,ounte$ in#antry +&o are in t&e (icinity. %&ere#ore, t&e ;sraeli@s re,o(e$ t&e +ar&ea$ #ro, so,e o# t&eir )a(eric.s in or$er to generate signi#icant +eig&t sa(ings, +&ic& increase$ t&e range an$8or payloa$ o# t&e #ig&ter an$ t&e range o# t&e )a(eric. ,issile. 3" Grant, Aebecca, T+e #adar 'ame> ;A;S ;n$epen$ent Aesearc&, Arlington, =irginiaH 1556, p. 2>. '&ile stealt& aircra#t are not in(isible to ra$ar, t&e goal o# stealt& tec&nology is to $ecrease t&e e##ecti(e $etection an$ trac.ing area o# t&e ra$ar. 3> DUSAF Generals Concur on B-1 Bo,ber Upgra$e,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, !o(e,ber 0, 1552, p. >0.
36
)orrocco Jo&n 9., DF-11>A Fig&ter Use$ in Co,bat #or First %i,e in ana,a,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, January 1, 1550, pp. /2-//. 35 )orrocco Jo&n 9., D!e+ ASOCs Lin. Aegional Airspace,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, )arc& 22, 1555, pp. 0>-06, #or a $iscussion o# proble,s +it& integrating ele,ents o# e*-'arsa+ act integrate$ air $e#ense syste,s into !A%O. 00 Cor$es,an, Ant&ony H., an$ 'agner, Abra&a, A., T+e %essons of "odern 1ar> ?ol(me I: T+e Arab-Israeli 1ars 1$&3 6 1$.$> 'est(ie+ ress, Boul$er, Colora$o, p. 16" 01 Ibid., p. 15/ 02 Ibid., p. 16>. 0/ Ibid., p. 16". DUnli.e 15>/, t&e ;AF ,a$e SA) suppression one o# its ,ost critical obFecti(es o# t&e +ar. ;t +as so success#ul in t&is area t&at it beco,es $i##icult to $iscuss any aspect o# per#or,ance by t&e So(iet SA) syste,s in Syrian an$ LO &an$s.E 03 Ibid., p. 16". 00 Ibid., p. 15/. 0" Ibid., p. 166. 0> Co&en, <liot A., '(lf 1ar Air 7ower S(rvey> ?ol(me 5: A Statistical ;ompendi(m and ;+ronolo*y, U.S. Go(ern,ent rinting O##ice, 'as&ington 9.C., 155/, pp. "0/-"03. 06 Beaney, %&o,as A., an$ Co&en, <liot A., '(lf 1ar Air 7ower S(rvey S(mmary #eport> Air Uni(ersity ress, )a*+ell AFB, Alaba,a, 2000, p. 06. 05 )urray, 'illia,son, Air 1ar in t+e 7ersian '(lf, %&e !autical G A(iation ublis&ing Co,pany o# A,erica, ;nc., Balti,ore, )arylan$, 1550, p. 160. <(entually />0 o# 053 2"/ percent4 o# t&e s&elters +ere $estroye$. "0 Beaney, %&o,as A., an$ Co&en, <liot A., '(lf 1ar Air 7ower S(rvey S(mmary #eport> Air Uni(ersity ress, )a*+ell AFB, Alaba,a, 2000, p. 16. "1 Ibid., p. 201. "2 Al,on$, 9enise L., 3esert Score: = S '(lf 1ar 1eapons, U.S. !a(al ;nstitute, Annapolis, )arylan$ 1551, p. 21. "/ )urray, 'illia,son, Air 1ar in t+e 7ersian '(lf, %&e !autical G A(iation ublis&ing Co,pany o# A,erica, ;nc., Balti,ore, )arylan$, 1550, p. 166. "3 Al,on$, 9enise L., 3esert Score: = S '(lf 1ar 1eapons, U.S. !a(al ;nstitute, Annapolis, )arylan$ 1551, p. 02. "0 Ibid , p. 260. A signi#icant use o# ;A tec&nology $uring Operation 9esert Stor, +as not #or tactical a(iation an$ t&us $i$ not recei(e ,uc& publicity. %&e Dt&er,al sig&tsE t&at +ere e,ploye$ by U.S. ar,or #orces see,e$ +ell suite$ to t&e groun$ battles $uring t&e Gul# 'ar. '&ile bot& si$es@ ar,or #orces &a$ large caliber, &ig& (elocity cannon t&at coul$ engage targets at long ranges, t&e .ey to ,o$ern ar,ore$ con#lict is not t&e range o# t&e gun, but t&e range o# t&e sensors #or $etecting ene,y ar,or. %&e san$ an$ s,o.e on battle#iel$s $uring t&e ersian Gul# 'ar +ere transparent to t&e t&er,al sig&ts o# U.S. Abra, tan.s, Bra$ley #ig&ting (e&icles, an$ Apac&e &elicopters. '&ile U.S. #orces coul$ $estroy ;raCi targets at long range, t&e ;raCi@s +ere re$uce$ to #iring nearly blin$ at t&e occasional ,u??le #las& t&at penetrate$ t&e ot&er+ise opaCue at,osp&ere. "" Scott, 'illia, B., DBa$ 'eat&er !o 9eterrent #or !e+ Long-Aange 'eapons,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, )ay /, 1555, pp. ""-">. "> Aut&or inter(ie+ +it& Lieutenant Colonel Bet& Baspar, USAF, +&o ser(e$ as a progra, ,anager at t&e 9e#ense A$(ance$ Aesearc& roFects Agency 29AA A4. "6 'estru,, Aon, Sidewinder: ;reative "issile 3evelopment at ;+ina %a:e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 1555, pp. 2>, 150. "5 Gunston, Bill, '(ide to t+e 1orldDs Airborne "issiles, Sala,an$er Boo.s, Lt$., Lon$on, Unite$ Bing$o,, 155/, p. 33.
>0
Gor$on, )ic&ael A., an$ %rainor, Bernar$ <., T+e 'eneralDs 1ar> Little, Bro+n, an$ Co,pany, Boston, )assac&usetts, 1550, p. 216. >1 Scott, 'illia, B., DLA!%;A! Gi(es %o,cat !ig&t Attac. Aole,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, June 10, 155", pp. 30-3/. >2 Beaney, %&o,as A., an$ Co&en, <liot A., '(lf 1ar Air 7ower S(rvey S(mmary #eport> Air Uni(ersity ress, )a*+ell AFB, Alaba,a, 2000, p. "1. 9uring t&e ersian Gul# 'ar, ra$ar SA)s accounte$ #or 1" percent o# t&e Allie$ losses, +&ile lo+ altitu$e $e#enses 2;A ,issiles an$ AAA4 accounte$ #or >1 percent. ;n t&e Boso(o con#lict, ra$ar ,issiles accounte$ #or 100 percent o# Allie$ losses. >/ Ibid., p. 230 >3 Ibid., p. 2/0 >0 <(en so, t&e single largest aircre+ loss, an AC-1/0 aircra#t, +as $ue to an ;A ,issile t&at +as able to pic. up t&e contrast o# t&e large aircra#t against t&e ,orning t+ilig&t s.y, +&ic& +as a ti,e o# $ay +&en t&e Guns&ip s&oul$ not &a(e been in t&e area. >" )orrocco, Jo&n 9., DBoso(o Con#lict Hig&lig&ts Li,its o# Airpo+er an$ Capability Gaps,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, )ay 1>, 1555, pp. /1-//. >> )ann, aul, DBoso(o Lessons Calle$ A,biguous,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, June 26, 1555, pp. /2-/". >6 Hallion, Aic&ar$ ., ;ontrol of t+e Air: T+e 4nd(rin* #eF(irement, Air Force )useu,s an$ History rogra,, 'as&ington, 9C 1555, p. "0. For re#erence, F-10 an$ F-1" aircra#t &a(e s&ot $o+n 1/0 ene,y aircra#t. >5 Hug&es, 9a(i$, DLu#t+a##e )iG ilots <##ecti(e +it& Arc&er,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, October 1", 1550, p. /5. 60 Aut&or inter(ie+ +it& AFAL researc&er on o##-boresig&t ,issile an$ ;AS% an$ H)%S. 61 Hug&es, 9a(i$, DLu#t+a##e )iG ilots <##ecti(e +it& Arc&er,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, October 1", 1550, p. /5. 62 Ibid. 6/ Ibid. %&is +as t&e opinion o# t&e USAF general in c&arge o# procure,ent, +&ile t&e )iG-25 +as being e(aluate$. He also note$ t&at t&e USAF alrea$y &as a s&ort range, o##-boresig&t capability in t&e A)AAA). 63 Aut&or inter(ie+ +it& AFAL researc&er on o##-boresig&t ,issile an$ ;AS% an$ H)%S. 60 Beaney, %&o,as A. an$ Co&en, <liot A., '(lf 1ar Air 7ower S(rvey S(mmary #eport> Air Uni(ersity ress, )a*+ell AFB, Alaba,a, 2000, p. 230. 6" %&e #ollo+ing $ata can be use$ to esti,ate t&e accuracy o# ,unitions $roppe$ #ro, aircra#tH 15>2 -- 300 #eet #or con(entional ,unition7 30 #eet #or precision ,unition, but (ery #e+ U.S. aircra#t &a(e t&is capability7 1551-- /0 #eet #or precision ,unition, +it& 10 percent o# t&e #orce &a(ing t&is capability7 1555 -- 10 #eet #or precision ,unitions, +it& 50 percent o# t&e #orce &a(ing t&is capability7 1555 -- 30 #eet #or precision ,unitions +it& all +eat&er capability, but #e+ aircra#t &a(e t&is capability. 6> %irpa., Jo&n A., DBrilliant 'eapons,E Air 8orce "a*aAine, February 1556, pp. 36-0/. 66 Fulg&u,, 9a(i$ A., DBoso(o Con#lict Spurre$ !e+ Airborne %ec&nology Use,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, August 2/, 1555, pp. /0-/1. 65 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Coonts, Step&en, 8li*+t of t+e Intr(der> !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 156", p. /. Coonts note$ t&at an A-" pilot +oul$ penetrate ene,y $e#enses by #lying as lo+ Das &is s.ill an$ ner(es allo+e$, +&ic& +as (ery lo+ in$ee$.E 52 Fulg&u,, 9a(i$ A., DSecurity Lea.s an$ t&e Un.no+n Be$e(ile$ Boso(o Co,,an$ers,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, !o(e,ber 1, 1555, pp. //-/3.
5/
'all, Aobert, DS<A9 Concerns Aaise$ in Boso(o,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, July 2", 1555, p. >0. 53 )ew 1orld ?istas: Air and Space 7ower for t+e 21st ;ent(ry: Attac: ?ol(me> USAF Scienti#ic A$(isory Boar$, 'as&ington, 9.C., 1550, p.11. 50 Fulg&u,, 9a(i$ A., D;,pro(e$ )issiles %rigger Ja,,er !ee$,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, Septe,ber 2>, 1555, p. /2. 5" Goul$, Step&en Jay, T+e 7andaDs T+(mb> '.'. !orton G Co., !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 1560, p. 1>5. 5> Gleic., Ja,es, ;+aos: "a:in* a )ew Science, enguin Boo.s, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 156>, p. 6. 56 'estru,, Aon, Sidewinder: ;reative "issile 3evelopment at ;+ina %a:e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 1555, p. 20". 55 DClinton lans )aFor ;nitiati(e on Scienti#ic Aesearc&,E 1all Street Go(rnal, 9ece,ber /1, 1555, p. A12, +&ic& notes t&at $uring t&e last 0 years, $e#ense AG9 $ecline$ slig&tly, +&ile non-$e#ense AG9 increase$ by 12 percent. 100 ;A sensors &a(e alrea$y incorporate$ ,any #eatures t&at coul$ ,a.e ;A ,issiles e(en ,ore t&reatening. )arginally ,ore t&reatening $ual-ban$ see.er &ea$s are alrea$y being o##ere$ as lo+-tec& retro#it .its #or ol$er Strella@s, but true ,ulti-ban$ see.er &ea$s coul$ be $e(elope$ t&at +oul$ be (ery $i##icult to spoo#. %&e CC9 i,agery, +&ic& is t&e latest in c&eap sensor tec&nology, coul$ easily be applie$ to ,issiles to re$uce t&eir (ulnerability to counter,easures. )ost t&reatening, t&e ,arriage o# c&eap ,ulti-sensor see.ers an$ c&eap ,icroprocessor po+er coul$ pro$uce truly re(olutionary a$(ances in t&e let&ality o# ;A ,issiles. 101 )ational Sec(rity Strate*y 2222, U.S. Go(ern,ent rinting O##ice, 'as&ington, 9.C., 2000, p. 21. 102 Time "a*aAine, January 1, 2000, p. /3. 10/ )orrocco, Jo&n 9., DBoso(o Con#lict Hig&lig&ts Li,its o# Airpo+er an$ Capability Gaps,E Aviation 1ee: and Space Tec+nolo*y, )ay 1>, 1555, pp. /1-// A Dretire$ senior Frenc& na(al a(iatorE suggeste$ t&e US s&oul$ slo+ its $ri(e #or ne+ $igital battle#iel$ en&ance,ents to be ,ore in line +it& its <uropean allies in or$er to sustain co&esion o# t&e transatlantic alliance. 103 eters, %&o,as J., T+rivin* on ;+aos: 9andboo: for a "ana*ement #evol(tion, Al#re$ A. Bnop#, !e+ Ior., !e+ Ior., 156>, p. *ii. 100 'estru,, Aon, Sidewinder: ;reative "issile 3evelopment at ;+ina %a:e, !a(al ;nstitute ress, Annapolis, )arylan$, 1555, p. 1"6. 10" Jo&nstone, )ar. A., Ferran$o, Step&en A. an$ Critc&lo+, Aobert '., DJoint <*peri,entationH a !ecessity #or Future 'ar>E Goint 8orces H(arterly, Autu,n8'inter 1556-55, pp. 10-23. 10> Bro+n, S&ona L., an$ <isen&ar$t, Bat&leen )., ;ompetin* on t+e 4d*e: Strate*y as Str(ct(red ;+aos, Har(ar$ Business Sc&ool ress, Ca,bri$ge, )assac&usetts, 1556, p. 23/.

Infrared Systems For Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?

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Infrared Systems For Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?

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Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?

by George B. Hept, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs?

George B. Hept January 2002

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation3

II. Electromagnetic Spectrum and Military Applications

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation4

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation5

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation!

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation&

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation.

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation$

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation12

Post!Cold "ar Implications

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation11

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation12

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation13

III. #perational Implications of Infrared Systems

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation14

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation15

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1!

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1&

I%. Current Tec&nologies and Tactical Aviation

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1.

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation1$

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation22

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation21

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation22

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation23

%. Concept of 'atural Evolution

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation24

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation25

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2!

Implications for t&e evolution in Military Affairs + MA,

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2&

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2.

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation2$

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation32

Infrared Tactical Systems for Aviation31

Center for Strategy and Tec&nology

Titles in t&e #ccasional Papers Series

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