USAARl '/ J-e

SCI SUPPORT CENTER

p.o. BOX 620577
FORT RUCKER, AL 36362-D57

I
,
UNITED
MG William J. Maddox Jr.
COMMANDER
U. S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER
A major activity of the
U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
COL Norman W. Paulson
COMMANDER
U. S. ARMY AGENCY FOR AVIATION SAFETY
A major activity of the
Inspector General and Auditor General
of the U. S. Army
Richard K. Tierney
EDITOR
U. S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ABOUT THE COVER
An Army C H-21 Shawnee heli-
copter takes off from the flight-
deck of the U SS Core tied to a
dock in Saigon, in December
1961. This marked the entry of
U.S. Army cargo helicopters in-
to the Republic of Vietnam con-
flict. The cover is a line con-
version photograph
ARMY AVIATION
'1GESJ
JUNE 1976 VOLUME22 NUMBER6
Professionalism In Army Aviation And
Budgetary Constraints, BG Charles E. Canedy 1
The Army Aviation Story, Part X: The Early 1960s,
MAJ David H. Price 4
In Extremis, LTC Dick A. Roach 6
Guns A Go-Go, LCDR Donald A. Mohr 8
How's Your Learning Center, William D. Dantzler 14
Don't Melt The Battery, Walter B. Orr 20
Cupid The Killer, CPT John B. Huffman 21
FLIP Realignment In The Pacific .................. 22
Views From Readers ................ , ........... 23
New Aviation Testing Concept, MAJ David M. Mabardy 24
Medical Aspects of Survival-Part II,
LTC D. H. Karney, M.D. and Patsy Thompson 28
Why Pilots Make Errors, William C. McDaniel 32
Realistic Training At Any Price?, Arnold R. Lambert 35
Who Killed George?, David G. Holmes 37
Briefs That Teach ............................... 38
Bird Strike Avoidance-What's Been Done?
CPT Don A. Mynard 40
Aviation Safety Officers Course .............. 43
Pearl ..................................... 44
Unit-Level Life Support Section, CW2 Craig C. Laing 45
USAASO Sez .................................. 48
Aviation Safety, Who Is Responsible?,
BG Charles E. Canedy Inside Back Cover
Th. mi lon of the u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST i. to provide information of an op.rational
or functional nature conc.rning .af.ty and aircraft accid.nt pr.v.ntion, training, maint.nanc.,
op.ration., r arch and d.v.lopm.nt, aviation m.dicin. and oth.r r.lat.d data.
Th. DIGEST i. an official D.partm.nt of the Army p.riodicol publi.h.d monthly und.r the
.up.rvi.ion of the Commanding G.n.ral, U.S. Army Aviation C.nt.r. Vi.w xpr d h.r.in
are not n.c arily tho of the D.partment of the Armynor theU.S. Army Aviation C.nt.r.
Photo. are U.S. Army unl oth.rwis p.cified. Mat.rial may b. r.print.d provid.d cr.dit i.
giv.n to the DIGEST and to the author, unl oth.rwi indicated.
Articl , photo., and it.m. of int.r t on Army aviation are invit.d. Dir.ct communication i.
authoriz.d to: Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Dig t, Fort Ruck.r, AL 36362.
Thi. publication has b n approved by Th. Adjutant G.n.ral, H.adquart.rs, D.partm.nt 0
the Army, 23 D.c.mb.r 1975, in accordance with AR 3101.
Active Army unit. r.c.ive distribution under the pinpoint distribution .yst.m a. outlined in
AR 3101. Compl.t. DA Form 125 ~ n nd dir.ctly to CDR, AG Publication. Cent.r, 2800 Ea.t
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r.vi d DA Form 125.
National Guard and Army Re.erv. units und.r pinpoint di.tributiori 01.0 .hould .ubmit DA
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g.n.ral.
Tho.. not .ligibl. for official di.tribution or who d ir. p.rsonal copi of the DIGEST co
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Wa.hington, D.C. 20402. Annual .ub.cription rat or. $15.70 dom tic and $19.65 ov.,..a
Professionalism
Army Aviation
And i - - - - ~
D
URING
the week
of 15 March the
Aviation Division, ODC-
SOPS, HQDA, reviewed the
final draft of AR 95-1, "Army
Aviation/General Provisions and
Flight Regulations." Representatives
of FORSCOM, TRADOC, DAR-
COM and USAATCA-ASO attend-
ed with each having substantive
changes which they wanted consid-
ered. Throughout the review of the
draft regulation, dialogue at the con-
ference table reflected the growing
and awesome sophistication in the
systems which we now have or
which will be coming into our in-
ventory in the near future.
Sophistication in our systems,
however, has a very human aspect
in that it equates directly to in-
creased demands placed on our
aviators and shows that now, more
than ever before, we must truly rely
JUNE 1976
Budgetary
Constraints
Brigadier General Charles E. Canedy
Deputy Director of Operati ons and Army Aviati on Officer
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
Washington, DC
on "professionalism," both collec-
tively and as individuals, if we are
to succeed in accomplishing our
mission on tomorrow's battlefield.
Professionalism, as we tradition-
ally use it in Army aviation circles,
deals most often with our operation
of aircraft-how we fly, how we con-
duct our maintenance, or how, for
example, we program our missions.
It implies a wealth of complexities
dealing with the operational aspects
of aircraft. We have all heard a
great deal about professionalism at
unit level. We've heard it in speeches
or in articles published in this or
other aviation magazines. It's come
to us in the field by message traffic,
regulations, letters of instruction
and a myriad of other techniques of
communication. As a field com-
mander I have personally addressed
this subject an infinite number of
times.
I would like this one time,
however, to put on my Department
of the Army hat and look at
professionalism in a light which
focuses on a problem very near and
dear to all our hearts-aviation
training and dollars. I want for
once to describe professionalism
and aviation training in the context
of dollars so that you in the field
can have some appreciation for why
you can train, or why at other times
you may not be able to train.
Training dollars for Army
operations are no different from
dollars with which you and I in-
dividually cope in our private lives.
Training dollars (in the same light
as we spend our paycheck) must be
viewed in the perspective of
priorities. You have to understand
the complexities involved in deter-
mining where training dollars really
are spent. Let me briefly attempt to
do this.
The allocation of funds, not to be
overly simplistic, is the driving fac-
tor in how much our aircraft fly,
and in turn how much training our
pilots get. Dollars really do buy the
J P4 which fuels our birds and the
spare parts which keep them
operational. Each year the budget
cycle begins with the submission by
the major commands of what is
known as their CBE. This estimate
in part identifies to DA what the
operational costs are estimated to
be by the major command to
operate and train during the up-
coming fiscal year. Now it's impor-
tant to note that the major com-
mand determined its budget es-
timate based on a composite of the
submissions of the dollar re-
quirements from each of its subor-
dinate commands or installations.
This CBE is then submitted to
Department of the Army. DA in
turn provides program budget
policy guidance to the major com-
mand. The net result of this and
subsequent similar interchanges is
the ultimate appropriation of funds
as part of the overall defense budget
to the MACOM commander for
his use in operating his entire com-
mand for the coming year.
N ow let's turn back to aviation
training. When we talk aviation
training dollars, we talk essentially
about the Army flying hour
program. The flying hour program
is developed by subordinate com-
mands for inclusion in the major
command's command budget es-
timate and final submission. The
flying hours are translated by the
major command into hard dollar
requirements and consolidated with
funds required in each of the other
areas requiring training. For exam-
ple, tank or artillery unit training
dollars are added to aviation re-
quirements to justify O&M funds.
That, in fact, is the last time that
dollars dedicated to aviation or
other types of training are
specifically identified as such in the
budget request's climb to DA level.
When dollars are finally provided
the major commander by DA, that
portion of the funding required to
support Army aviation activities is
part of O&M funds, and as such,
may be reprogramed to higher
priority requirements. It then
becomes the responsibility of the
major commander to break out his
total appropriated funding to sub-
ordinate commands or in-
stallations. Subordinate com-
manders then determine how those
dollars will be used within their
respective commands. Subordinate
2
GLOSSARY
ARTEP
CBE
DARCOM
Army Training and Evaluation Program
command budget estimate
U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness
Command
DOD
FO
Department of Defense
forward observer
FORSCOM
HQDA
JP4
U.S. Army Forces Command
Headquarters, Department of the Army
jet engine fuel
MACOM
O&M
ODCSOPS
TRADOC
USAATCA-ASO
major Army command
operation and maintenance
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
U.S. Army Air Traffic Control Activity-
Aeronautical Services Office
commanders, too, have reprogram-
ing authority.
Each commander and major sub-
ordinate commander then must
establish his own priorities on
where in overall operations and
maintenance his dollars are direct-
ed. Some commanders may need
more than they expected to run
commissaries. Others may require
buildings repaired. You must ap-
preciate, however, that the (real
world) determination that is made
by a commander where to spend his
money is a function of the emphasis
placed on types of training by his
own subordinate commanders and
staffs, coupled with his prudent
judgment. It becomes imperative in
this light, if we are to maximize
aviation training, that we strongly,
from the bottom up, learn to ex-
press the essentiality of placing
dollars where we as aviators know
they must be placed. That, of
course, is in the flying hour
program.
Another part of the equation
which you should understand is that
the flying hour program, while it is
a specific portion of the budget,
cannot now be and is not "fenced"
by DA or even by major com-
manders. The guidance which we
would perhaps parochially like to
have, which in fact would constitute
"fencing of appropriations," would
usurp the commander's perrogative
to determine how he should allocate
and manage his dollars. This then
places a great portion of the burden
of responsibility for gaining the
necessary dollar support on unit
commanders at all levels, and very
much on staff aviation officers. Let
me address this point briefly, for
it's one in which I'm particularly in-
terested.
Years ago it was generally
known that the position of staff
aviation officer was anything but
the most demanding or challenging
assignment. Those were the L-19
(later designated 0-1)/ artillery /FO
days. Today, as has become
generally very apparent, we find
that we cannot afford to have other
than the highest quality officer fill-
ing aviation staff positions at any
command level. Failure to possess
the expertise to advise commanders
properly can have devastating
effects on our program.
It becomes incumbent then upon
commanders, aviation officers,
every Army aviator and all our
noncommissioned officers to ar-
ticulate the essential concept which
states that if Army aviation is to
meet its mission it
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
must train. We must all be able to
express clearly the fact that we
already are down to "bare bones"
in hours allocated for aviation
training. We must further be able to
point out the very important aspect
that there are two critical elements
in determining what constitutes
subordinate command flying hour
program requirements-training
and operational requirements.
We know, due to Congressional,
DOD and Army budget constraints,
that we have reduced aviation train-
ing to that point which, if we were
to reduce any further , could very
well adversely impact on our com-
bat readiness. It is important to
know that training and operations
are the key elements in developing
flying hours. It is essential, and a
big aspect of professionalism, that
we be able to define, no matter
what level we' re at, what con-
stitutes our true training and
operat ional requirements. The
TRADOC commander, in conjunc-
tion with the commander, Aviation
Center, is going to great lengths to
develop AR TEPs for each type of
our aviation units. This will provide
the structural framework upon
which we can develop our aviation
training programs. But this is me:;o e-
ly guidance. The truly professional
Army aviator will pass beyond
what is provided as guidance and
assess the unique or particular
training needs of his aviators, his
unit and his installation to deter-
mine the needs of his total flying
hour program.
We no longer can afford to look
strictly at the operational needs of
the units we support to submit our
dollar requirements for aviation
resources at any given installation.
Frankly, those days are gone
forever. We must distinguish
between training and operations
and prudently determine what are
our traini ng and operational needs.
Based on these summed re-
quirements, we can then forward to
respective major commands the
dollar requests to support a viable
and effective flying hour program.
JUNE 1976
The key to this determination is a
sound knowledge of all aspects of
aviation activities which must
receive attention if your unit is to
remain combat ready. This base of
knowledge, this scope of expertise,
is the framework upon which each
unit must build its training
program. The handling of this
matter successfully is the function
of a professional. He has an in-
terest, a constant interest without
constraints, in his unit, its training
and in Army aviation. He can and
must articulate what the training
needs of his aviators or aviation
unit are. The key point of which we
all must be aware lies in under-
standing that the advice we give to
commanders may alter their
priorities in dollar allocations im-
mediately and continue to provide
the essential future funds to buy the
fuel to operate our aircraft. Sell
your program. It's solid and defen-
sible!
The final point of which you
should be aware is that the alloca-
tion of "flying hours" in reality is
quite different from the allocation
of dollars. While DA approves the
number of "hours" flown by every
individttal command, it cannot
assign or provide the physical
dollars to meet those specific re-
quirements. This is a function of the
major subordinate unit/installation
commander. It's a thorny issue, but
it brings to reality the fact that the
ground commander is normally the
key individual in the Army struc-
ture who determines how many
dollars are allocated for buying fuel
to keep aircraft flying and our
pilots trained. His decisions are
predicted on the total number of
dollars given him in any fiscal year
and upon his estimate of how much
it will cost to operate and maintain
his entire command, to include his
aviation assets.
This brings me to the second part
of this aspect of professionalism,
again tied to dollar constraints and
what we must be prepared to do
with the knowledge we discussed
earlier. We no longer have the lux-
ury of flying for flying's sake. Com-
manders and staff aviation officers,
perhaps even more than you in the
field, are daily faced with criticism
directed at use of Army aircraft.
Professionalism, therefore, becomes
the key to determining when our
aircraft are launched, for what mis-
sions, the blade time required to
perform those missions and what
other activities can be conducted
in conjunction with those missions.
We are today looking at a very
tightly constrained Army wide
operating budget. The implementa-
tion of training and operational
directives demands the utmost in
professional scrutiny in dealing
with aviation operational matters.
I t becomes the burden of the
aviator, as a professional, to
manage the aviation program at
even the lowest levels, i.e., right
there in the cockpit. We must be
sure we are getting our money's
worth in aviation training. One
hour's training for one hour's flying.
Simulators, now coming into the
inventory, also can provide a great
deal of training at reduced cost.
Finally, as we observe Army
aviation's 34th birthday this month,
I want to point out that no
regulations can be written to create
instant aviation experience. Army
aviation's 34 years of experience is
a function of time and training. Ex-
perience is the key element in the
development of professionalism in
each of us. It's through experience
that we learn to appreciate the need
for professionalism. This ex-
perience is the determining factor in
the developmental process leading
to sound judgment. Just as no
regulation can be written to create
experience, no legislation can be set
forth creating judgment. In all
aspects, however, professionalism
remains the common denominator.
In these times of limited dollars,
professionalism, the common
denominator, the constant in the
aviator performance equation,
assures our being able to train to
win that all important "first battle
of the next war!"
3
June 1976 is extra special to the Army aviation community. The
U.S. Army-on 14 June-completes 200 years of service to the
nation; Army aviation observes its 34th birthday on 6 June; and in
just a few weeks-on the 4th of July-the United States of America
celebrates its Bicentennial. The DIGEST begins commemorating
all three of these significant anniversaries this month with the first
of three new chapters to The Army Aviation Story. The first nine
chapters were carried between June 1962 and February 1963.
Chapters X, XI and XII will cover the Vietnam years
Gl'l,e Jlrmy A\liati()I' St()ry
GPart X:
Major David H. Price
T
HE U.S. ARMY' s airmobile concept began,
not out of any predisposition toward counter-
guerrilla war, but out of the requirement to provide
enhanced tactical mobility to the foot soldier. The
threat considered most likely and most dangerous
4
in the early 1960s was the conventional battlefield,
with either or both sides possessing nuclear weapons.
Yet, it was in a counter-guerrilla war in the Republic
of Vietnam that helicopter airmobility proved itself.
Trouble was brewing in Vietnam in 1961. At the
direction of President John F. Kennedy, General
Maxwell D. Taylor made a visit to that beleaguered
nation to assess the situation. One critical problem
was the lack of mobility of the South Vietnamese
forces. On General Taylor'S recommendation, Army
helicopters were dispatched to Vietnam in late 1961.
In December 1961 the first Army aviation uni ts
arrived in Vietnam. They were the 57th and 8th
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Transportation Companies (Light Helicopter). Each
consisted of 20 CH-21 helicopters.
1
The old "Flying
Banana" was hardly suited for the rigors of combat in
the mountains, jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam,
but, as had become their habit, Army aviators made
the most of what they had.
One of the first major tasks was to train the Viet-
namese soldiers to get in and out of helicopters quick-
ly and safely. Then, the Vietnamese Army (ARVN)
officers had to be educated on the capabilities of the
helicopter so that airmobility could be integrated into
their schemes of maneuver. This period of training,
advice and assistance was arduous indeed, but by late
1964 the A R VN and its U.S. advisors were conduct-
i ng battalion-size airmobile operations against the
Vietcong.
Organic Army aviation was not featured in Viet-
nam prior to mid-1965. Instead, the helicopter com-
panies were based around the countryside in key
locations, and normally operated in a geographic area

delineated by province boundaries. The helicopters
were under the control of the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV), and were parceled out
to the A R VN units that requested their services.
M ore often than not , the early years found
American helicopter commanders left out of the plan-
ning for air assaults. Command and control was a real
problem until the helicopter units could establish
effective liaison with the AR VN commanders and
their American advisors. As time went on, coopera-
tion grew between the lifters and the lifted, and solid
relationships were molded between allies-relation-
ships that would last until the American effort was
ended.
The "Flying Banana" was replaced by the powerful,
agile, turbine-powered UH-l Huey in 1964. By
September of that year 250 Hueys were operating in
Vietnam. The workhorse of the Vietnam war had
Continued on page 26
Illustrations by
SSG Mike Turr and
SP5 Margaret Deely
6
LTC Dick A. Roach
Deputy Director
Public Affairs Office
U.S. Army
Military District of Washington
Continued on page 17
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
..... ,j . , - ~
~ - .
--
~ ..
----- ~ . - --J
"
......... ,,- ....
~ . . . . . --_._- . - : : ~
~ . ~ - -.".,..,. "
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---
-
8
LCDR Donald A. Mohr
Search and Rescue Office
Naval Air Station
Corpus Christi, TX
Gu s
A GO-GO
M
ARGINAL WEATHER with 200-foot ceil-
ings had persisted in the Republic of Vietnam
(R VN) since the early part of February, hampering
fixed wing airstrikes in support of the Battle of Hue.
Only helicopters were flying and their operations
were conducted in the dead-man'szone at such low
altitudes they were constantly exposed to enemy
small arms fire.
In an occasional break in the weather on 22
February 1968 two armed ACH-47 Chinooks from
the 228th Assault Helicopter Battalion (Air Cavalry)
joined numerous other helicopter gunships to provide
needed gunfire support near the Citadel. Historians
would later laud these efforts which significantly con-
tributed to the victory in the bitter house-to-house
fighting during the 1968 Tet Offensive.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
ACH-47 number 64-13149 located at the
Army Development and Readiness Command's
Ammunition Center, Savannah, IL, where it is
employed as a training aid for civHian careerists
During one exchange of gunfire in the firefight,
heavy and sustained enemy ground fire struck of
the supporting ACH-47 gunships. In the cockpit,
numerous caution panel light segments illuminated
signifying systems failures as the stricken
broke off the engagement, seeking a secure area for
landing. The wingman, Go-Go 9, continued to rake
enemy positions with suppressive fire as Go-Go 4 ex-
ecuted an emergency landing precariously close to the
walled city.
The crippled Chinook' s position was clearly visible
from the city and drew intense enemy fire. Moments
later 9, piloted by Major Alan B. Matthews,
touched down near the disabled craft, effecting a
rescue of the seven-man crew. The men clambered
aboard as Captain (then WOl) Gary Daniel and waist
gunners continued firing the 40 mm grenade launcher
and 50 caliber machineguns, reducing the level of in-
coming fire.
Go-Go 9 lifted off without incident and was in the
process of initiating measures to secure the area
around the downed Chinook while still en route to
Cam p Evans. Troops requested to support the extrac-
tion attempt were later cancelled when word was
received that Go-Go 4 had sustained a direct hit from
enemy mortar fire and was completely destroyed.
Attrition of CH-47 serial number 64-13154 -
better known to the aircrew as "Birth Control" -
JUNE 1976
would mean a good deal more than the loss of any
other valuable Chinook! For, without an escort or
"Yingman for mutual support, Go-Go 9's career as a
gunship abo had been terminated as surely as if it had
shot down by enemy fire. The loss of the third
gunship woUld toll the death knell to the Guns A Go-
Go e'valuation and the 1 April 1968 demise of the 1st
A viatio'n Detachment of the 228th Assault Helicopter
Battalion. No evidence could be found to substantiate
further single ACH-47 gunship operations - or
others in conjunction with either UH-IB/Cs (Hueys)
or AH-1Gs (HueyCobras). Sijch an association might
well have been as effective and lethal as the later
adopted I-fuey /Loach (light observation helicppter)
!'pink teams."
Ironically, the elimination of those standard
Chinook systems which contributeq to a more
desirable gunship, and the armor added to improve
survivability, precluded 149's return to the' fold of the
more conventiol1allogistic Chinooks. Overweight and
for this mission, Go-Go 9 (known as Easy
Money) was subsequently transferred to the 1st Avia-
tion Brigade and flown to the Army maintenance
facilities at Vung Tau where she served out the
remainder of hyr Vietnam t()ur with the 17th Aviation
Group (Combat) as an AAMTAP (Army Aircraft
Mobile Technical Assistance Program) aircrew
trainer for prospective;! crewchiefs. It was while serving
9
in this capacity that the aircraft was reduced to a mere
skeleton or hulk due to component and systems
removal& (cannibalism). With the graveyard looming
as an imminent possibility, aid came froin an unex-
pected quarter.
Interested individuals who recognized the historical
value of this craft intervened to restore and refurbish
149 and arranged for transportation stateside. This
was accomplished about the time the Refresher Train-
ing School at Phu Loi was closed in April 1972. The
helicopter was never flown while it was waiting to be
transported back to the V.S. The reworked aircraft
was then donated to the V.S. Army Aviation Museum
at Fort Rucker.
One now expect serial number 64-13149 to
finally grace a deserved place of honor at the Army
Aviation Museum, resplendent in paint with stub
wings bristling 20 mm cannon; rockets; and the M-5
grenade launcher under Unfortunately, not
yet! No pristine paint 149 today along with the
Easy Money name given in combat and which had
adorned her side. Instead the helicopter is located at
the Army Development and Readi!1ess Command's
Ammunition Center, Savannah, IL, where it is
employed as a training aid for civilian careerists
assigned to worldwide ammunition activities. The
aircraft is used to teach typical helicopter loading/
unloading and cargo tiedown procedures. The Ammu-
nition Center also is responsible for formulation
of ammunition and nuclear handling procedures.
The inception of the combat experiment and evalua-
tion known as Guns A Go-Go had its beginnings as a
February 1964 Army battlefield requirement for
employment of a heavily armed helicopter. The main
emphasis was expected to focus on increased
and higher weapons payload; two major limiting fac-
tors affecting employment of the current UH-l B
gunships. The Huey was not designed for the armed
configuration, and as armament was increased to the
helicopter's maximum gross weight, airspeeds were
limited to 80 knots. This speed proved unsatisfactory
since the escorting gunships could not overtake an air-
mobile force.
Several alternative helicopter models such as the
Sikorsky S-61 Sea King and Kaman VH-2A Sea
Sprite, along with existing helicopters in the Army in-
ventory, were examined by the Bush Board* as possi-
ble candidates for this escort mission. Current produc-
tion lines, existing IQgistic support and spare parts
commonality may have been factors which tipped the
scales in favor of the CH-47. By June 1965 the Army
authorized production of four armed ACH-47
prototype configurations. The first of these, serial
number 64-13145 (Boeing production number B-I17)
was accepted for the Army by the Navy Plant
Representative as a standard CH-47A on 7 July 1965.
After weapons systems and armor installations were
completed the first flight of the series was ac-
complished on 10 November 1965.
Later in November, 64-13145 was publicly dis-
played at Boeing's Center Two facilities located at
Philadelphia International Airport, PA. This rollout
almost coincided with the secret debut of a Bell
Helicopter Company funded prototype Model 209.
This HueyCobra (which became the AH-l and com-
monly called the Cobra) would revolutionize armed
helicopter gunship tactics and configurations in the
* A Department of the Army board convened to evaluate possible
replacements for the UH-I Huey gunshiI?s.
Number 145 newfrom the factory
10 V.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Number 145 being readied for tests
following 2 years. During the succeeding months three
more armed Chinooks would be delivered: these being
serial numbers 64-13149, 64-13151 and 64-13154.
The most conspicuous difference between these
ACH-47 helicopters and the standard CH-47 A logis-
tics support configured version was the rotatable M-5
nose pod and two fuselage pylons. These were 21/2
feet wide hardpoints located on both sides of the
helicopter near station 242, just outboard of the front
wheels. To provide a fire support capability provisions
existed for installation of a 20 mm cannon, along with
an XM-I0 bomb rack for the 19 shot XM-158 2.75
inch rocket pod on each side. Five fuselage stations
also were provided with flexible mounts for either 7.62
mm or 50 caliber machineguns - two along the sides
and one on the rear loading ramp. This rear position
provided a clear field of fire to engage targets after the
helicopter had passed over them. This was a unique
advantage among gunships and allowed pilots con-
siderably more latitude in attacking fortified
positions.
A cardinal rule of gunship tactics is to never overfly
a target area due to the vulnerability of the helicopter
after its guns no longer keep the enemy down. Dual
side and rear firing weapons permitted the Chinook to
write its own rules. The armed Chinook also boasted
Number 145 undergoing jettison tests
more than 11/2 tons of expendable munitions aboard.
The heavier 50 caliber machineguns normally used
on the ACH-47 nearly doubled the engagement
range of the 7.62 mm machineguns then being used by
UH-Is in Vietnam.
Many standard CH-47 items which were not essen-
tial for the fire support mission were not installed.
These included the cargo hook, winch, heater, cargo
door, auxiliary loading ramps, sound-proofing and all
but five troop seats. Estimates of 2,000 pounds of steel
armor plate were added to protect crewmembers and
vital components. To enhance the survivability of the
helicopter, a combat interphone system, fuel fire sup-
pression, crossfeed shutoff valves and ballistic armor
plate capable of withstanding the impact of 50 caliber
ammunition were installed. Pilot and copilot seat and
torso armor protection, known as the iron maiden
(derived from an early torture device of the same
Number 145 on display
name), also were provided. The normal combat prac-
tice of locating flack jackets in the chin bubble was
employed.
Army test and evaluation boards from Ft. Rucker
operated the first helicopter at Aberdeen, MD, for
weapons capability, testing until March 1966. Follow-
ing unit training at Fort Benning, GA, three of the
craft were assigned transportation to R VN for combat
evaluation. These helicopters arrived and commenced
combat theater operations in June 1966 under the
Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) supervi-
sion. The initial testing was performed by the 53rd
Aviation Detachment Field Evaluation (Provisional)
operating under the 10th Aviation Group (see" Armed
Chinooks," July 1966 and "Armed CH-47A
11
Number 145, shown flying with a friend, was deployed
to RVN as a replacement
Helicopter Employment," August 1966 DIGEST).
These experiments earned high praises for the concept
and caused officers to compare the Guns A Go-Go
with the Air Force's lethal C-47, dubbed Puff the
Magic Dragon.
Following completion of the ACTIV tests the
ACH-47s were assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile) which had introduced the Chinook in its
standard logistics configuration to Vietnam
operations in October 1965. Normal employment of the
Chinook at this time was as a prime artillery mover.
With a 7,000-pound payload, the Chinook could
relocate a complete 105 howitzer, crew and net full of
ammunition in nearly inaccessible areas. General
John J. Tolson, in his monograph "Airmobility 1961-
1971," praised the Chinook in this way: "If the Huey
helicopter became the cornerstone of airmobility, then
the Chinook must be considered one of the principle
building blocks."
12
The ingenuity and courage of all CH-47 air-
crewmembers are indeed worthy of note. While two
aircraft of the Guns delivered over eight tons of ord-
nance in the Song Re Valley on 9 August 1967, other
Chinooks were dropping napalm and riot agents from
the rear loading ramp. This ramp, which could be
lowered in flight, provided a nearly perfect delivery
method. While this mode of operation normally was
employed only when tactical air was unavailable, the
availability of the helicopters to do this mission
facilitated considerable erpployment. A single CH-47
could delivery 2 '12 tons of napalm. During Operation
Pershing more than 29,000 pounds of riot agent was
delivered in this manner by the 1st Cavalry.
The installed armor on the Guns effectively pro-
tected all but one of the aircraft from loss; the actual
reason for the loss of 154 was never fully disclosed. A
taxi accident was to claim the first of the ACH-47s in
V ietnam on 5 August 1966. This occurred in the II I
Corps Area, prior to 1 st Cavalry assignment. Subse-
quent to this accident the fourth ACH-47 aircraft
(serial number 64-13145), located at Edwards AFB,
CA, for performance and flight quality testing, was
deployed to RVN as a replacement. This aircraft is
unceremoniously credited with its own destruction
when it was lost on 5 May 1967. Due to failure of the
retention of the M-24A 20 mm cannon on a gun-run, a
round was fired into the rotor system, striking a rotor
blade and destroying the craft. The last two examples
survived until 22 February 1968 when 154 was lost.
Yet, loss is a strong word only if it is not balanced
against what was gained for this price.
Guns A Go-Go, in its combat evaluation as an in-
terim helicopter gunship, exhibited numerous
Number 145 was destroyed when one of its 20 mm guns
was accidently fired into its rotor system
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Guns A Go-Go blazed a high trail of glory
strengths and a few weaknesses, some of which were
subsequently solved in the AH-IG. It must be
remembered the AH-IG was also only an interim
gunship; the ill-fated AH-56 Cheyenne, cancelled after
prototype testing, was to be the ultimate gunship.
The speed, endurance and firepower of the ACH-47
immediately solved the requirements necessary for es-
corts of the airmobile force. Although the ACH-47
had to reduce forward speed when operating at max
gross weights, it still could escort CH-47 formations
since the latter seldom transited at V ne' Its endurance
equalled or exceeded UH-l fuel reserves, even when
the Guns were "armed to the teeth." With nearly 11j2
tons of expendable ordnance onboard, targets could
be engaged on a more liberal and continuous basis
than when each round had to be rationed for a spe-
cific purpose. This sustained fire support and long
onstation time in the combat zone earned considerable
praise. The Guns excelled in landing zone prepara-
tion, r.oad reconnaissance, interdiction, escort and
in direct support of the infantry.
The ACH-47s prototyped the forward cabin and
rear ramp machinegun installations later adopted on
the logistic model CH-47s as the M-24 and M-41 ar-
mament systems. With a full 360 degrees of fire
capability, the aircrew could effectively engage and
observe the aircraft being fired upon from all quarters.
A serious shortcoming of the later AH-IG Cobra was
a lack of knowing when the aircraft was under fire un-
til actually being hit. Introduction of the SA-7 Strella
missile later in 1972 forced AH-IG gunship pilots to
keep their heads on a swivel.
The installed forward firing 20 mm cannon arma-
ment gave these helicopters the first opportunity to
engage troop concentrations armed with 50 caliber
weapons or larger, rather than being forced to
withdraw and/or await tactical airstrikes. The in-
creased target accuracy and engagement range of the
20 mm also enhanced survivability. The area fire
effectiveness of the 2.75 inch rockets, identical to
JUNE 1976
those carried by the UH-l, needs no further accolades.
Additional target area suppression fire existed in the
M-5 grenade launcher controlled by the copilot.
Basically Guns A Go-Go carried the combination of
weapons systems any three single UH-Is might
employ and the capability to continue the barrage
twice as long. A pair of armed Chinooks were indeed a
formidable adversary.
Today various positions prevail concerning the ideal
size, agility and speed requirements for gunships. Cer-
tainly the effectiveness of this experiment must be
assessed, recognizing the excessive size and some
limitations in maneuverability. Significantly, initial
requirements recognized the Chinook would have lit-
tle to no agility advantage over the UH-l, but it would
excel with a distinct firepower advantage. The Guns
also operated with the earlier lower powered Lycom-
ing T55-L7, 2,650 shaft horsepower (shp) engines, and
not the present L-IIAs which power the Super C
model Chinooks and are rated at 3,750 shp each.
Perhaps the ultimate tribute to The Guns can best
be summed up in the words of their Vietnam com-
mander, Major General Tolson, who said this about
the Guns A Go-Go:
Though anything but graceful, it had a
tremendous effect on the friendly troops
which constantly asked for its support.
From an infantryman's viewpoint, when
the "Go-Go Bird" came the enemy dis-
appeared.
Whenever an Army can field equipment the enemy
is reluctant to engage and can do so much to improve
morale and assist the fighting man on the ground,
they're on the right track!
The Guns A Go-Go blazed a high trail to glory in
their short combat evaluation. The fact that the
Department of the Army elected to discontinue the
armed Chinook concept in no way diminishes the out-
standing combat record of these craft and the heroic
deeds of the pilots and aircrew who flew them.

13
B
y NOW YOU should have a
. learning center. Of course,
being in a progressive professional
aviation unit means you have initi-
ated your learning center already.
Did I hear you say you're going to
wait until the TEC (Training Ex-
tension Course) program provides
you with the equipment for a learn-
ing center? Well, maybe so, but
you're going to have a long wait.
Why wait? Stay with me a few
minutes and I will tell you how to
start your own learning center.
Drawing on experience gained at
the U. S. Army Aviation Center's
Aviation Learning Center at Fort
Rucket:lc ... people
who need . The
A had been
iIi 4% years on 10
Septem;g.er ..... W? t.he lOO,OOOth
student came' through>In 1971, an
average of 34 students per day used
14
William D. Dantzler
Former Chief
Aviation Learning Center
U.S. Army Aviation Center
the facility and in the first half
of 1975, 109 students per day came
to study.
'Overall, an average of 71.6
students have used the Aviation
Learning Center each day.
HStudents" includes everyone who
came to study.
First let's discuss the concept of
the learning center. There are
several types and definition(of the
term "learning center. ;' Any;.;:l:ar!i:;: .
ing center should be structuredt,()
provide individualized, Ie,!'
services to the host populatioh
facility should be
the students need it, but the prime
time a learning center is opened is
1900 to 2100 hours, or off-duty
hours.
A variety of media ranging from
computer assisted instruction to
flash cards should be provided the
students. Reliability oftheinforma-
tion presented tends .. lo build the
student's confidertce j e facility.
Fifty students may rbe studying
40 different lessons in the privacy
afforded by carrels and headsets at
one time, which reduces greatly the
need for instructors.
Facilities: What do you need in
the way of location, space and
equipment?
The ideal location is a place
where the intended users will see it
arid have convenient access during
()ff-dllty hours. You may consider
working with one or more
I1'(;!ighboring units to set up a learn-
ing center.
Your learning center will need
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
1. Students' working in individual study
carrels
2. Individual carrels afford privacy
3. Student performing preflight check
4. Student preparing for an examination
5. Video tape player and TV monitor
6. Tape provides instruction as student
views slide
normal creature comforts such as
IlO-volt AC current, .... heating and
air-conditioning. Good Hghting is a
must, even where audiovisuals are
in use. Students often will want to
take notes or refer to a publication
as they view an audiovisual
program.
A learning center can be installed
in an office building, a barracks, a
hangar or a truck. Initially man-
0
O
I
-
0
JUNE 1976
power may be a problem. If so, you
should consider installing your
learning center where it is near
someone who is .. on duty, like a
charge of quarters, dispatcher or
staff duty NCO. Starting your
learning center with a request for
one competent individual to
operate it may dash your hopes
against the hard boulders of per-
sonnel shortages, so use someone
who already is on duty but not fully
occupied.
Carpeting is a necessity in a
learning center. It will keep down
the noise and will appeal to
students. Ceiling soundproofing is
not absolutely necessary but it will
provide added benefits in keeping
down the noise level.
What about carrels? The word
carrel is a Latin )Yord meaning ~
0
Figure 1
Carrel Configuration
0
0
0 0
study position." Each chair and
place to work at a table can be a
carrel, but carrels should be de-
signed to provide privacy for each
student. Carrels may be built in
several configurations such as
shown in figure 1.
For the most part, the size of the
carrels is up to you. But the height
of the work surface should be 28 in-
ches from the floor . The width and
d ~ p t ~ . of carrels can vary provided
yOli.'bonsider the fact that yo'u need
ad.eqllate space for audiovisual
equipment and the student's notes
or publications. Unless you can
acquire special lens for short dis-
tances for your audiovisual equip-
ment, you also must ensure that
you have adequate projection that
reflects an image large enough to
read. If not you may need ill0re diS'-
0 0
.-
15
tance the projector and the The U.S. has stand-
screen. . ardized certaifl ' types of audio-
Equipptent: The type .of (!quip- visual equipment to ensure ' relia-
mentyou ,will bility and capaqility. buy
mine th'e le&sorl ;. materifll that you a standardized item we know.that it
can . ..PrQgramed texts will purposes ahd hold
and they up for a reas()nable ' time.
only requjre yeS th'em Earphones should be used on
anq a place for to sit and each pjece of to provide
work. . privacy , to the student and 'fo'
SpunQand slide ,lessons can be down the noise level in the room.
acquired your sl,lpporting We have actually had 50 students
Training Aids S(!rvice ,Office studying 40 different It?ssons the
(T ASO), so a 35 mm projector and Aviation Learnil1g Center and the
an auqio-cassette tape recorder only nOIse was the elicking of pro-
be your basic audiovisual they slides. The
system. Personally owned equip- eonibination ' of acoustical ceilings,
ment Gould be ' to ge(your floors, earphones and
' learning moving. Btter .carrels :that reduce the vision all
audiovfsuiH equipment can ' be combjne to provide the student with
after' the idea takes root. .freeoom from distractions.
You need type of Beyond, audiovisuals you may
equipment to show motion. The find' that you have equipment in
most available you will your unit that coulq be used in a
find these days is 19 mm motion center for real hands-on
ni'cture projectors. Try to a later training. Each Soldier could be
m'odel because "the older machines allowed to bring his weapon (with
requjreconslderable" expertise to certain precautions) or a piece of
load and unloap. machines equipment, such as a VRC-12 type'
that 'someorie ' bt! qldio, could be installed and rigged
to load and uploa<;l the projector for to operate normally. The ultimate
the stutiel1t, however. in hands-on tra
ini
I1g would. be a
' . If YQucan arrange it, bypass the helicopter cockpit trainer, a flight
16nim movie projectors and go simulator o' r. a tank rl.!nup
. directly to video-cassette television simulator.
sY-stems . This requires a television
There are many other trainers
' receiver, just like the' one your now available. The place to look for
dayroom or home. It also
them is the basic combat training-
Y-ideo-cassette player which is fairly units; Eaqvanced indiviqual training
about $1,000 per unit. '
Howev'er, ,if you ' have TV 'capabili- units; . .., and other military occupa-
ty, all 16 mm films, can be copied on (MOS) producing
video-cassettes. Any 'student can recent graduates about
operate a video-cassette player. the training they used. The
major cost of these' trainers is the
M any TV lessons now are pro-
duced in cplor. This is ' appealing to 'research and development. Often
the student, but more important, copies can be procured through
the color is to portray cer- your T ASO at rdatively low cost.
tain If you can ac- Lesson Materials: Much could be
quire written about how to acquire lesson
you <;oLor receiver. materials. However, there
Tbere .. ar '" . tain principles which can bef!pplied
systems iay-u' to any situation. Using them, f!loHg'
mentioned are, efoundation for f! with ingenuity, will provide you
TASO with equal or better lesson material
rs y{)urifavisor. 'He has the costs for than other learning centers have to'-
and the lesson qay.
16
First, the lesson fill a
genuine learning need. If filling out
DA Form 2408-3 is 'a problem in
your unit, a lesson will be used
often if This lesson need '
not be elaborate and could well be
in a programed text for-
mat.
Sometimes we find that students,
or users, want variety in their train-
ing, or they learn b.etter from hear-
ing rather than reading. The princi-
still .holds that it must fiiI a
genuine learning need.
Second, ' the lesson must be
technically reliable. The . student
will lose interest if he finds that' the
procedure or technique taught in a
lesson is not correct.Whenypu
consider lessons on
procedure, you also should consider
tpe of correcting minor
errors or revising the lesson to com-
ply with approved changes in

One method of assuring technical
is to have local official
experts review lessons. They will
approve them or show you where
they are wrong. When lessons have
min<;)r errors they should be cor-
rected. As a minimum a notation
should qe attached to the outside of
the lesson stating the jnaccuracy .
Third, the lesson must be as
realistic as it can be made. Consider
a lesson on tactical radio com-
Message formats in
prin ting . or a series of slides may
help but the be&t way .to learn how
to speak qistinct}y..,is it done
properly and perfect.
For that a cassette tape recorder is
all that is needed.
Most military posts now
learning centers, learning labs or
some form of individualized in-
struction available to military' per-
sonnel. The nee9 for learning
centers , is most pressing in tactical
units where motivated Soldiers are
willing to spend their time and ef-
forts preparing for professional tests,
field training ' exercises or' schools.
Successful Soldiers will make a suc-
everybody wants
that. . 1(
U.S. ARMY A VIA TIO:N DIGEST
In .. elDis
Continued from page 6
the speed and agility of these hard-hitting
airmobile troops.
Kirk felt the wind freshen and the Tass
lurched at the top of a puffy cloud. She was
flying smoothly enough now but, even so, the
shifting upper air had pulled her down too
close to the grey overcast. The character of
the challenge was changing and Kirk knew
that before it was all over his real adversary
might well be nature instead of man. He had
battled natural elements many times before
as an aviator and always had emerged the
victor-but he was running silent now and
with much of his aircraft damaged by
shrapnel, he was in extremis . . . a situation
that called for a rare brand of human in-
novation.
Kirk was in the first class to train in the
Tass and when the swords began to rattle his
outfit had been the first to see duty with the
Bosphorus Task Force. Yes-and the first
piiot to make 16 intercontinental flights
across the Bosphorus on his first day of com-
bat . And now he was the first aviator to sur-
vive a mi ssile ambush in the finger ridges of
the Alps. The road to this first was littered
with the dead.
Again he scanned his console but the in-
struments yielded no clues as to his position.
He examined the clouds more closely now,
but they remained ominously puffy and grey.
Not a hint of land or thinness in the cloud
deck below to suggest even the possibility of
a safe descent. It was as if he were sailing
along in uncharted waters, an odyssey on an
unknown sea. That's not what he was trained
for-to fly half-crippled in the unknown.
And, this trip was predesti.ned to end in no
more than 40 minutes. At that time the fuel
supply would be exhausted. How far was he
from friendl y airspace? How many miles
was he away from home? He recalled that it
had been more than 18 months since he said
goodbye to Carolyn and the children.
Kirk was oddly hungry and his body ached
from the flesh wounds. He attempted once
again to make some logic out of the sloppy
movement of his gyro compass. He imagin-
ed that it might eventually tell him what he
needed to compute his approximate loca-
tion. If he could only fix his position above
the clouds he would be willing to try a TLS
(tactical landing system) letdown-a hover
down, minimum forward airspeed to a skids
down landing-just as in training when the
hours of practice seemed insufferably long
and tedious. Drowsiness, hustled along by
battle fatigue, was beginning to set in.
The sudden slap of turbulence shook him
out of the hypnotic doldrums and Kirk
mused at recalling the sign back at the train-
ing base which read, "To sleep in a chair,
you have nothing to lose, but to sleep in the '
cockpit is a permanent snooze." To sleep
now would be certain disaster, and Kirk
JUNE 1976
stretched his arms and legs and loosened his
body armor to lessen the danger of muscle
cramps. He checked a small wound on his
left arm. The arm stretch had pulled on the
cut and it was bleeding slightly. He
retightened his body armor and sub-
consciously rechecked the engine suppressor
circuit switch.
He was startled by the sudden activation
of the engine suppressors. He had checked
the switch and circuit breaker at least a
dozen times since departing the valley. With
suppressors operating, he rationalized that
he could stop worrying so much about the
threat of missiles and concentrate more on
the mechanics of getting home safely. The
mere thought of safe sanctuary back at the
home base suddenl y filled him with hope and
the adrenalin began to flow. Fate owed him
a favor, and he had a gutsy feeling that the
payoff was just around the corner.
The fuel gauge showed about 37 minutes
of fuel remaining. From the corner of his eye
he noticed that his copilot had shifted in his
seat, and it was good to know he was still
alive, even if completely out of the action.
So, patiently, Kirk settled back and searched
for an answer to his dilemma.
H is helmet crackled, "Captain." Kirk
looked around toward the middle seat where
his crewchief had managed to prop himself
up. He face was grey with stress, and his skin
was mangled and blotchy. He was leaning
shaki ly against the gun mount trying to
steady himself, and gave in momentarily to
several spasmodic heaves. He was affec-
tionately known as "Crapper" after the
commotion he precipitated during a one-
shot inspection of the temporary latrine one
day. The base development officer had
claimed that there was no sanitary way to
dispose of the human wastes from the deep
pit below the uriit's two-holer. Crapper had
argued that the unit had most assuredly
found a proper and acceptable solution long
before the inspection and offered to
demonstrate the procedure to the inspector.
Unfortunately, the inspector accepted the
offer whereupon trapper dumped some
MOGAS through one of the open seats,
threw in a lighted match, and proceeded to
blow the crapper-some say-about 40 feet
the air!
"Where ya' hit, Crapper?"
"In my right side, sir, and I think my right
leg above the knee. I can't feel anything
below the knee. Sir . . . "
"Yes, Crapper?"
"What about Mr. Parker?"
"I don't know, Crapper. He took some
hits . .. he's out ... probably shock, I just
don't know. Look, Crapper.;. I know
you're hurt which puts you in a very ex-
clusive club, but the worst is
behind ... You'll make it, you can believe
that . . . "
"Yeh, I know, Captain, I'm not going to
cave in . .. I'll make it ... I mean, who
else'd patch up this tin Lizzie!"
Crapper retched and slumped back across
the seat. Some minutes passed and Kirk
tried to make himself more comfortable. His
body armor had shifted against his pistol,
pushing the muzzle end against the flesh
wound in his right thigh. He figured if he
could raise the seat an inch or two and get
the gun clear of the wound it would ease the
pain in his leg. Kirk lowered himself painful-
ly toward the latch but it was out of reach.
He tried shifting toward the left side and
oddly enough the hurt left him momentarily.
lucky to be alive, he thought, luckier
17
for sure than Brownie, Cretlo and Pointer,
his platoon leaders who went down in the
wak"e of the missile barrage ... if not
luckier, at least more conscientious. You
worked at those mission profiles until they
were second nature; no horsing around with
hot-rod techniques; you just flew mission
tasks the way they were laid out in the book.
Maybe you're alive right now because of
that . And yet, it's hard to believe that other
ways would be so unforgiving . ..
"I'll take it for a while, if you'd like." It
was Mr. Parker! He was sitting straight in
his seat as though he'd just gotten the word
to crank up. "What's the course?"
"Just hold what we've got. The gyro
tumbled coming out of the valley .. . and the
mag compass took a direct hit ... so we've
got no directional reference and the cloud
layer below is solid as far as you can see.
Main hydraulics are gone and generators are
out. I've got no idea where we are ... but
nobody's bothering us, so we're that much to
the good. You might say that we know two
things for sure. That is, the engine's running
for now, but in 20 to 25 minutes it's gonna
stop ... wherever we are. At any rate, let's
continue straight ahead. The gyro is sloppy
and nondirection ai, but at least it gives us a
heading reference."
There was no tactical or emergency
maneuver that Kirk could remember that
called for a helicopter to continue flying
along an unknown course until the fl!el was
exhausted. The more he thought about the
situation the more sarcastic his thoughts
became. He could feel himself becoming em-
bittered by the seemingly hapless predica-
ment. He figured on a more optimistic note
that if circumstances had been just slightly
different he would be safely back at the
home base by now .. . wounds
patched . .. and a craw full of hot food, not
soaring above the clouds with crippled men
in a crippled war machine!
Kirk tholJght back about the men he'd lost
on the slopes of the Alpine Valley that morn-
ing. He knew they always had been afraid of
him, and that most had hated him. He had
always insisted on an impeccable perfor-
mance. Flying had to be done by the book.
And yet, he didn't believe as others did in the
authoritarian approach. He insisted that it
was a coward's way of getting a good perfor-
mance out of an aviator. He well
remembered what a contact flight instructor
once told him when he was having dif-
ficulties with a particular upper-air
maneuver. Keep all your mistakes within
manageable limits. and always want to do
your best . .. then work your butt off to see
that you do. The philosophy was intriguing
and had stuck with Kirk more or less as a
credo for dealing with his fellow airmen.
That his troops could hate him was incom-
prehensible to Kirk. It was not normal, for it
was he who commanded them throughout
their many victories; it was he who planned
18
the missions, controlled the formations and,
until today, had led them safely into combat
without a single loss. That kind of a record
should command respect, admiration and
professional gratitude. But for some reason
not easily understood, it hadn't. And
today ... today's catastrophe had been a
gross miscalculation by the high muckety-
muck planners and Kirk felt no need to
rationalize his guilt in the slaughter.
Of course, any mission in the Alps these
days would be undertaken with considerable
apprehension. The Alpine Passes have been
regarded strategically as prized highways of
conquerors and that's where the action was
today. Because of the bad weather, the valley
had been much too confining and the plan of
maneuver had made the cardinal mistake of
assuming that the enemy was stupid.
The missiles had swarmed at them from
the walls of the valley. The launchers were
well disguised along the slopes, and the
sudden departure of the missiles from the
hillsides turned the valley into a sea of
richocheting red flashes . Kirk calculated
that his flight had been painted on no less
than 30 scopes, and every missile had taken
advantag.e 0 f the flight's vulnerability.
Kirk's assault flights had never before run
up against more than two launchers at a time
and chaffing had, for the most part, been
highly effective. But today the valley was a
very carefully contrived and concealed trap.
Parker spoke haltingly. "I know this is
gonna' sound basic, captain, but if we could
just get a north-south bearing we would at
least know whether it' s hot or friendly down
there."
To hear Parker speak in fundamentals
was somehow reassuring to Kirk that he was
no longer alone to solve the problem, and the
simple assessment of their tragic situation
made it seem like they were on a routine
cross-cou ntry flight back home.
"We're really lost, aren't we, captain?"
Kirk studied the map as if looking for a
telltale clue ... mountain contours, stream-
beds, the very depths of small lakes and
probable compass courses between promi-
nent terrain features. He wondered about the
many thousands of times a map of this sort
had been used by others who knew exactly
where they were. For them it was an easy
matter to decide how to get where they were
going and how to get back. A simple cross-
check of instruments would provide
everything necessary for a safe flight.
Kirk was numb ... he would very shortly
make a judgment in which once again lives,
including his own, might be claimed as the
price of a slight miscalculation. In the air, he
was leader, and the master of ship and crew.
These were dizzy, heavy thoughts constantly
preying on his mind, never to be forgotten, a
good way to keep alive when others die.
Kirk took a canteen from the side of his
seat, drank a little and offered it to Mr.
Parker.
"We've got to try now, captain. It's the
only chance we've got. I mean . .. if we
don't like the way it goes the first time we'll
still have enough fuel to give it another try.
If we wait ... it's a one shot probability.
Besides, even if we get down safely through
the overcast early and we don' t like what we
see we can still make our way to some other
area ... "
Kirk glanced at Parker who looked more
dead than alive, his eyes puffy and red with
fatigue.
"You're right, Bill, we really don't have
any choice .. . read me the emergency des-
cent checks."
As Mr. Parker read the items aloud, Kirk
performed the checks. He noted that rotor
rpm (revolutions per minute) was holding
steady at 100 percent and the Tass was
beginning to decelerate to 90 knots in
response to the repositioning of the cyclic.
Shoulder harnesses were locked and wheel
brakes were released. It seemed terribly
foreboding to Kirk that the critical systems
which were provided by the Tass' engineers
for just such occasions were either battle
damaged or not available because of the
electrical power loss.
The fifth item on the list was the survival
kit located in a rear compartment. It was a
crewchief check, and since Crapper was out,
Mr. Parker commented that what was need-
ed more than a ground survival kit right at
the moment was a good "air" survival kit.
Mr. Parker's words seemed to hang
frozen in the air. Both he and Kirk realized
at the same moment the true significance of
what had been said.
"My gawd," exclaimed Kirk, "the com-
pass! The compass in the survival kit!"
Mr. Parker moved quickly to release his
harness and to slip out from behind the ar-
mor screen which blocked his way to the mid
compartment. He stepped gingerly over the
aft section on the center console and for a
moment he was looking down at the limp
form of Crapper lying across the crewseat.
He didn't appear to Mr. Parker to be
breathing.
Mr. Parker worked his way through the
center area to the rear of the compartment
and released the webbing which restrained
the kit in its compartment. He worked at the
Velcro fasteners and paused to study the
diagramatic listi ng of the contents. The com-
pass was located in a small webbed pouch on
the side of the kit and in seconds Mr. Parker
was edging back into his seat with his
precious cargo. The compass was lusterless
and somber in appearance, but a most
beautiful sight to behold. It took less than 2
minutes to retrieve the compass and to affix
it with survival tape to the center console
where both he and Kirk could observe the
needle's oscillations.
The compass could not have told a more
beautiful story. From the last known posi-
tion, Kirk calculated that he had now been
u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
flying for roughly 35 minutes in a south-
southeasterly direction. Discounting liberal-
ly for the "unknown" unknowns, his com-
putations fixed his position somewhere over
ground that was flat and friendly, quite
possibly near a forward base used by his bat-
talion.
"I think Crapper is dead, sir," Parker said
aloud. "He didn't appear to be breathing."
Kirk had been so terribly tired. He had
resisted the temptation to sleep even if only
for a few minutes. He had slept only a few
hours in the last several days and most of
that was done in the cramped confines of the
Tass. He forced his hand to unfasten his ar-
mored vest and lift out a package of ration
wafers. He bit on the nourishment and look-
ed ponderously at the compass on the con-
sole. Once the needle had stabilized he had
set his panel gyro which had now been
holding reasonably steady for several
minutes. Things were looking up for certain,
but a glance outside at the dull greyish, bot-
tomless clouds below told Kirk that in spite
of his dramatically improved situation,
nothing had really changed with regard to
his descent through the overcast.
"Break ahead!" cried Bill.
Kirk's eyes darted out of the cockpit to
the cloud deck ahead and fell squarely on a
small break in the overcast that he judged to
be less than 5 kilometers at his one o'clock
position. He began to clear the loose items
away from his lap and console, trying not to
notice his heart pounding and a noticeably
drier throat.
He altered course for a straight shot at the
hole which he calculated to be only minutes
away and instructed Mr. Parker to prepare
for descent. The hole itself which was now
only about a kilometer ahead appeared
treacherously small and wispy and Kirk
momentarily studied the swatches of mist
foaming at its edge. He signaled Mr. Parker
to continue the descent checks.
There was no warning except for the slight
yaw of the nose followed by a gentle tug at
the controls. Kirk saw that Mr. Parker was
greatly alarmed and followed his finger to
the "engine fail" light on the annunciator
panel. Kirk reacted instinctively, slapping
the "battery power" switch into the
emergency mode. His eyes darted over the
engine instruments noting the torque split
and, at the same moment, catching the
warning tone in his headset. The rapid
decrease in engine rpm and drop in EGT
(exhaust-gas temperature) confirmed his
deepest suspicions and he reacted instinctive-
ly. As his hand started down with the collec-
tive, his eyes darted out beyond the nose of
the ship. The hole was still about 300 meters
ahead. He heard M r. Parker gasp as the
Tass flattened against the cloud tops and
began to slip into the enveloping mist.
The sudden entry into autorotation jarred
several of the large packets from the survival
kit which Mr. Parker had left hanging, but
JUNE 1976
open, in the rear. The sharp clatter of them
slamming against the compartment floor
assaulted what little calm remained in the
forward cockpit. As the sink speed increased
the ship appeared to be hurling out of con-
trol through the swirling froth.
"Quick! Emergency descent checks!"
shouted Kirk.
Mr. Parker could see that Kirk had
shifted to the left side of his seat and was
applying great restraining pressure to keep
the cyclic from nosing the ship over. Rotor
speed continued to hold slightly high but
steady. As indicated by the centripeter the
ship was in an exaggerated flat turn to the
right. Kirk signaled Mr. Parker for help in
repositioning the directional pedals and the
two exerted all their strength as the main
blades began to adjust toward a cen-
trosymmetric plane.
Painfully Kirk jammed his foot hard
against the left antitorque pedal and almost
instantaneously the centripeter began to
show a decrease in turn velocity.
"Continue the checks," shouted Kirk, as
the nose began to pivot back to the left. Kirk
could sense from the ship's motion pattern
that the descent path had carried them into
shifting currents and the winds had begun to
swirl heavy rain through the damaged areas
into the crew compartment. The centripeter
now oscillated left and right as Kirk fought
to control the wild turns. The Tass had slow-
ed so that the main rotors were now carrying
the full load and Mr. Parker was gamely
performing the few remaining descent
checks.
Heavy air currents seized the Tass and she
fishtailed violently from side to side. Kirk
thought that he' d lost her, but she fluttered
forward like a halfback shaking tacklers, the
blades flexed and once again gripped the
wind.
Rainwash surged through the opened
doors of the troop compartment and as Mr.
Parker turned to complete the last of his
checks, passengers and cargo secured, he
saw to his dismay that Crapper's body was
gone.
The ship lurched forward and began to
rock wildly and Kirk strained with Mr.
Parker calling out his best interpretations of
the centripeter's movements. The clouds
continued to churn around them, and yet
Kirk sensed that the cover was thinning out
. . . then he saw the first gap, followed by
other scattered cracks in the cloud cover.
"Check for a landing area, Bill, we're
breaking through!" Kirk' s voice was filled
with excitement and confidence. They had
defied obstacle after obstacle and now as he
fought to keep the Tass level, he himself
couldn't help but wonder how they had
managed to survive so long.
Gravity sucked them away from the tur-
bulent overcast into smoother air below.
Kirk estimated that they had 1,000 to 1,500
feet of altitude remaining.
"To the right ... two o'clock ... open
patch," shouted M r. Parker.
The nose of the Tass turned right a few
degrees following Mr. Parker's hand signal.
Kirk caught sight of the small clearing and
noted that the wind favored a straight ahead
approach into an area which was rather
broad on the approach side but narrowed
somewhat ominously at the far side. No
matter, this was sanctuary . .. refuge for a
wounded bird ... thank God for small
favors. Kirk slowed the Tass and the trees
raced past on left and right.
"Easy, Tass baby," Kirk's muscles
knotted against the strain, but touchdown
was smooth and the Tass rolled several
meters through tall grass to a safe halt, and
the silence beyond.
19
I
N THE PAST there have been
several T -42 aircraft
mium battery failures because of sus-
pected overch ng (thermal runa-
way). A recent0modification called
nickel cadmium battery charging
rent detector system was devel-
.oped to warn the operator of a bat-
tery overcharge condition. Because
it is a new system pub-
lished in the T -42 Air,craft Oper-
ator's Manual (dash 10), many
" aircraft pilots are not aware
of what it accomplishes and what
they, the pilots, can do with the
system. The monitoring system is
designed to inform ,of a
battery 'wcharge
damage .rt)1e battery. ' .
The nitor illuminates the
yellow ,ning light anytime the
battery' charge current excee&!s' nor-
mal input (7 amperes). Foil . ga
battery engine start, the
light may about sec-
onds after sm cties
"position. The
extinguish within.
o 5 minute , dicating that the
ttery is approaching a full charge
The dine will increase' if the batter
20
A'ircraft Maintenance Instr-actor
Maintenance Training Division
Department of Academic Training
U.S. Army Aviation Cent-er
tate of charge; the
batterY4elll ature is very low; or
if the battery previously has been
discharged at a very low rate (i.
battery operation of radios ' or
craft lights forprQhmged period
he warnin ighl,. .a1so may it,:
minate ort . periods after '
nffing gear alidlor flap operation.
Action the pilot should take on U-
warning light
depends on conditions.
Following a b&.:ttery engine start
the warning light normally il-
luminates for a short period of time,
relative to the aQiount qf
usage. The light should
within 5 minutes ;under most con-
Failure to ,do. so indicates a
lIy dischargecl battery and the
ing check should be ac-
co ished at 90-secondintervals.
1. Throttle set-
per minute (rpm).
2. ' One alternator
3. After ammeter
stabUiz,es,, 'W momentarily turn the
battery switch off and note change
in ammeter indication. A continued
decrease in charge .0
consecu tive 90-second y
checks indic.ates a saUsf ", Y
battery ch', '"Battery
condition unsatisfactory if "the
light remalnsilluminated anClt1!e
barge current fails to decrease
between checks.
If the warni
luminate during
indicates that c
may cause a battery , thermal
runaway. If this occurs the battery
switch should be'turned off and turn-
ed back on for 'landing gear and
flap extension.
During engine shutDown if the
warning light illuminates, conduct
two consecutive checks at
90-second intervals as described
above. IT the battery charge current
has not decreased after two checks,
record on DA Form 2408-13.
The nickel cadmium battery
charge current detector system, if
used properly, can definitely extend
the life of the battery installed in the
T-42 aircraft. The alternators in-
stalled on the T -42 aircraft engines
are not initially self-exciting. They
lI1.ust be excited by a source of elec-
trical power such as the aircraft
battery. Once they are excited and
are operating, they can excite them- "
selves and each other.
The alternators
line when subjeet -to
loads when the bat
the off position or
has failed. When this! .ppens there
will not be any electrical power on
the aircraft. A paltot the modi-
fication was installing a separate
emergency exci.tation system. ', This
included a miniature sealed battery
powerpack and an excitation posi-
ti9n in the alternators' switches. To
"' c'itite' tbe alternators with the
excitation system, place
er of the alternators' switches
. mentarily up from the "on" posi-
tion. This action completes an elec-
;t rical circuit from the sealed battery
powerpack to -cite the alternators.
- The accompanying photo is one
cell from a damaged battery.!fhe
cause of damage was a thermal
runaway battery. Rapid
charging and
bined to the extent that ,caused the
electrolyte to boil Row out
through the fill,t:"vAtt . A
properly used battery charging
current detector, systelJ)
this type damage to the battef y' in-
stalled in the T -42 aircraft.
,
JUNEJ976



Captain John B. Huffman
131st Aviation Battalion
Mississippi Army National Guard
T
WO PHRASES THAT have
been widely circulated through-
out the military establishment in all
corners of the globe are "Dear John"
and "Jody." If a fellow aviator
received a "Dear John," we sym-
pathized with his misery and sug-
gested, in our consolation, that
"Jody" must have been a father-
less child. In our thoughts, we've
passed off the occurrance with noth-
ing more than a touch of humor
and the promise to ourselves that it
won't happen to us. Enter reality!
Squadron has just passed down a
contact fire support mission to
troop operations. It's your mission
as team lead in a low bird with
CW2 Jones covering high with his
armed snake. You could be happier
over operations choice of a wing
man for you. Jones has been down
in the dumps since mailcall last
week and recently his aim hasn't
been what it should be. This mis-
sion has to go and go quickly and
since Jones is the only one in the
weapons platoon that hasn't flown
today he'll have to do.
You brief Jones, get your crew
together and ' crank. After'!. short
flight, you make contact WIth the
enemy and begin to do your thing.
The radio is alive with the excited
voices of the ensuing battle and you
can' t get the air to tell 'ole Jones
to get his sweet bippey on down in
position and give you some support.
" ... Why isn't he in position? .. .
Taking fire!! ... Taking fire! .. .
Damn it Jones, shoot!
"I'm hit!. .. Mayday! Mayday!"
Where was Jones as your aircraft
and crew went down in a fiery
crunch?
Mr. Jones was where many of us
have been or could be at some time
in the future. He was preoccupied
with the apathy that displaces
emotional well-being after he
21
endured the emotional shock of a
.. Dear John."
Just exactly what percentage of
all aviation accidents are pilot
error? We've all read the statistics
and realize it's a large percentage
indeed. How many of these ac-
cidents that were classified as "pilot
error" were in fact emotionally in-
stigated either through the loss of a
loved one or as a result of heart-
break within a relationship?
The statistics will never reveal
the true percentage because the
dead hold their secrets and the
wives and lovers of these aviators
and crewmen will never come
forward and say, "Yes, I left him
and caused him to take his mind off
his work."
I can't pretend to be a practicing
psychologist, but I do know what
I've witnessed in my own ex-
perience. I've climbed into the
cockpit, taken the controls, and
flown when I should have voluntari-
ly grounded myself until a par-
ticular period of emotional stress
had passed. I've seen an experi-
enced, seasoned pilot take a civilian
helicopter (OH-13S) through a
cloud deck 3,000 feet thick and stay
I FR (instrument flight rules) for 30
minutes in an aircraft that was
barely equipped for VFR (visual
flight rules) flight. Why did he do
it? It was his decision but could the
fact that he had just lost his fiancee
have influenced his thinking? I
think it definitely could have
because I know how I felt; I saw the
way the OH-13 pilot ignored all
good sense; and I helped in the
recovery of the bodies of Jones and
his crew. How could these instances
have been prevented along with the
many like them that have been
covered with the entry "pilot error"
on the accident forms?
Field Manual (FM) 10 1-5 on
staff procedures says that the com-
mander is responsible for
everything that his unit does or
doesn't do. Does that make him
responsible for Jones? Yes, in a
sense, if he was aware and did
nothing or if he had dictated to his
men that mission comes before all
else-including good sense.
The real world tells us that the
commander cannot be everywhere
nor can he know everything about
everyone in his command. Where
then does the responsibility lie for
detecting these emotional disorders-
and dealing with them in a rational
manner? This is one monkey that
should-and can-rest firmly on
the backs of each of us without
shame. As professional aviators, we
should be able to detect this kind of
instability and remove ourselves
from the cockpit long before we en-
danger everyone in the aircraft.
Most of us can do this for ourselves
but we must be prepared to do it for
others by encouraging them to
ground themselves. Or we should
notify the right person to make sure
that they stay sidelined until they
recover. Each of us must feel that
absti nence, at a rough time in our
lives, is a responsible course of ac-
tion and should be respected rather
than ridiculed or criticized.
I ask every aviator and crewman
to reflect on the words I've written
and ask themselves if these truths
couldn't apply to their own lives. If
we can keep the arrows that pierce
a broken heart in their quill and
removed from the cockpit, Cupid
will never be the Killer.
FLIP REALIGNMENT IN THE PACIFIC
On 15 July 1976, the Pacific and South Asia (PSA)
and the Australia, New Zealand and Antarctica
(ANZA) FLIP (flight information pUblication) Enroute
and Terminal publications will be combined into a
single package. The title of the new publication will be,
the same as Area Planning Three-Pacific, Australia
and Antarctica (P AA). The new P AA FLIPs also will
be published on an expanded cycle.
The PSA and ANZA Supplements will be combined
into a single P AA Supplement. The Enroute Chart
coverage will remain the same, but the current ANZA
Charts 1-9 will become P AA Charts 11-19,. The charts
and supplement will be published every 16 weeks with a
Military Aviation Notice (MAN) issued at the interven-
22
ing 8-week midpoint.
The Instrument Approach Procedures (lAPs) will be
combined into three high/low combination volumes.
These volumes will also contain the Standard Instru-
ment Departures (SIDs) plus any existing expanded
airfield diagrams and Standard Terminal Arrival
Routes (STARs). The radar minima for the airfields
will be removed from the supplement to the front of
these volumes. The lAP volumes will be published every
24 weeks.
The bound MAN s will be published at each of the 8-
week intervals between cycles with the second MAN
being cumulative. ,
U.S. ARMY A VIA TION DIG EST
JEWS
ROM
EADERS
Sir:
Your November issue had a letter from
Tom O. Mathews who stated that LTC
Patrick H. Brady was the only dustoff pilot
to receive the Medal of Honor.
There have been two dustoff pilots to
receive the Medal of Honor. The other
recipient was CW4 Michael J. Novosel for
actions on 2 October 1969 while performing
a mission under the cal1 sign of "Dustoff
88." CW4 Novosel is currently an instructor
at the Warrant Officer Career Col1ege, Fort
Rucker, AL.
CPT David L. Conner
Academic Instructor
Warrant Officer Career Col1ege
Fort Rucker
You are correct, See "Honor Times 29" in
the January 1974 DIGEST for the story
about CW4 Novosel and "Out Of The Valley
Of Death" in the May 1970 DIGEST for the
article about Major Brady.
Sir:
I have enclosed the attached for possible
publication in the A VIA TION DIGEST.
WOC Wayne P. Johnson
61st WOC Company
Fort Rucker
ROTOR IN THE GREEN
A t times. in sunlit solitude of drifting clouds
As turning on the wind I flew
Climbing to gaze down upon a broken wind-
swept shroud
Hovering there as I looked down. motionless
it seemed
A bove the spinning Earth I've untold
passed
JUNE 1976
There joined with fleeting speed. as if in
distant dream
My agile craft on high once more
With Rotor in the green.
Sir:
The China-Burma-India Hump piiots As-
sociation will hold its 31st annual reunion
at the Ramada I nn, Monroe, LA 5 through 8
August 1976. For further information con-
tact:
CBI Hump Pilots Assoc. Headquarters
917 Pine Boulevard
Poplar Bluff, MO 63901
Phone: (314) 785-2420
Jan Thies
Executive Secretary
The advanced attack helicopter (AAH)
prototype acceptance ceremony was held
on the 16th of this month at the U.S.
Army Engineering Flight Activity located
at Edwards AFB, CA. Two prototype
aircraft were accepted from each of the
prime contractors-Jlell Helicopter Tett-
ron and Hughes Helicopters. The l\AHs
will be undergoing operational
which will lead to selection of the win-
ning contractor.
Sir:
I am inclosing the following "words most
hate to hear" which 1 felt you might
share with your readers:
When you're a new guy, an old guy says,
"Did you ever see anyone do this with a
UH-1?"
At 5,000 feet on the second leg of a cross-
country flight, "Did you check the fuel
cap after that last stop?"
With a 1: 1 vibration, "No, 1 didn't
preflight the head, I thought you did."
"Do you smell wires burning?"
With the master caution light on, "What's
supposed to be where the 'spare light' is?"
While riding front seat in a cobra at night
you hear the backseater say, "oh no!"
Flying NOE, "WOW, Did you see that
wire we just flew under?"
Flying formation your wingman says,
"Hey, Lead, Your EGT looks higher than
mine."
When you call Branch, "No, you can't go
to Hawaii or the Canal Zone, we have
already cut your orders for Korea!"
On short GCA final at night in a rain-
storm, your copilot says, "Hey man,
listen to the groovy sound on the NAY."
In an inadvertent I FR when your only
map is a V FR sectional, you hear" Army
2,3,4 radar contact lost."
"The CO wants to see you as soon as you
land!"
CW2 James E. Nunn
Sir:
The United States Army Warrant Of-
ficers Association (USA WOA) will host its
fourth annual meeting of the members at the
Bordeaux Motor Inn, Fayetteville, NC, dur-
ing the period 7 through 9 July 1976. All
warrant officers, active duty, reserve,
National Guard and retired are invited to at-
tend. For more information, please contact
USA WOA, P.O. Box 3765, Washington,
DC 20007.
CW4 Don Hess, USA Retired
Executive Secretary
Continued on page 48
23
F
OLLOWING ABOUT 2 years
of study, a Joint TRADOC/
DARCOM Special Study Group rec-
ommended that a sepanit(! agency
for TRADOC operational testing
and another for DARCOM develop-
mental testing be collocated at the
U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft.
Rucker. DA approved the provi-
sional implementation on 17 Febru-
. ary 1976 of this concept recom-
mertded by the Study Group. Oper-
ational testing is to begin 1 July
1976. Developmental is be-
ing performed by the U.S. Army
Aircraft Development Test Activity,
which formerly was DARCOM's
and TECOM's U.S. Army Aviation
Test Board.
Collocation of separate opera-
tiortal and developmental testing
organizations represents a new and
unique approach to the "how" prob-
lem for accomplishing testing re-
quired in the research, devdopment
and acquisition of aviation materiel
systems.
The two new test agencies con-
sist of personriel and equipment
authorizations of the previous
TECOM Aviation Test Board. ,
The TRADOC operational test
organization is commanded by
COL Robert A. Bonifacio. It has
been assigned the iltle of U. S.
Army Aviation Test Board, which
is. the same name by which
TECOM's previous agency was
known. The new Aviation Test
Board is authorized 88 per-
sonnel-52 military and 36
Civilians. It is functionally orga-
nized as shown iri figure 1.
The DARCOM aviation
developmental test organization is
commanded by COL Robert S.
Kellar. It . IS now designated the
U.S. Army Aircraft Developrrient
Test Activity. There are 221 per-
sonnel authorized-126 military
and 95 civilians. It is organized as
depicted in figure 2.
In reachirig their findings, mem-
bers of the Study Group were con-
cerned primarily with irhplemerit-
ing the AMARC recommendations
24
New Aviation l
and the latest testing procedures
contained in ARs 70-10 and 71-3
for separate operational and
developmental testing. Two basic
organizational alternatives were ex-
amined at great length by the Study
Group for achieving this purpose.
The first alternative envisioned
the location of the operational test
organization at the Army Aviation
Center with the developmental test
activity located at Yuma Proving
Ground, AZ.
The second alternative con-
sidered collocation of operational
and developmental test agencies at
the Army Aviation Center. MG
William J. Maddox Jr., com-
mander, U. S. Army Aviation
Center, was instrumental in the for-
mulation and adoption of this in-
nov ati ve concept for aviation
materiel system testing.
The primary considerations that
led to the development of this
testing concept, its recommenda-
tion to DA and finally to DA ap-
proval were reql,lirements for:
Effective test management of
aviation materiel systems
Reducing time required for
research, development, test and
evaluation of aviation materiel
systems
Conserving resources and funds
Th,e collocation concept for avia-
tion operational and developmental
testing will provide the most ideal
basis for cost effective test integra-
tion envisioned tn testing
publications. Aviation combat and
development actIons,
their universal nature, span the
major commands of both,
TRADOC and DARCOM. Thus
test management of the various
aviation new development systems
will be facilitated by the focalizing
of test requirements through the
collocated test organizations.
Operational and develop,mental
test time, resources, and fund I
Major David M. Mabardy, Infantr]
GlI
AMARC U. S. Mater if
Acquisition Review
Committee
DA Department of the Ar m
DARCOM U. S. Army Mater i,
Development and
Comma n
DT Developmental testi r1
Figure 1
c
Admin
&
Mgt Division
I
Aircraft
Test
Division
Armament
Test
Division
c
U.S. Army
Aircraft Development
Test Activity
I I
Administrative
Plans
and
Services
MethodoiOSj
Division Division
savings will be achieved through
close, continuous test coordination
and integration; "piggy-backing"
of flying hours and test projects on
a single testbed aircraft; sharing of
test data and instrumentation; and
.j
I
1
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
'sting Concept
hief, Administration and Management Division
U.S. Army Aviation Test Board
IRY
)"r
lAM
Fort Rucker
Operational testing
Reliability,
and maintainability
r
ECOM
rRADOC
U.S. Army Test and
Evaluation Command
U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command


LJ
U.S. Army
Aviation Test Board
Test Concept
And
Methodology
Division
I
Ground
Support
Test
Division
I
Test
Instrumentation
And
Support
Division
fer I Figure 2
f--- Headquarters
Detachment
Test
Support
Division
I
Materiel
Test
Division
through the joint use of test support
facilities. The uniqueness of the
collocation concept for aviation
operational and developmental
testing, and its potential for
savings, prompted DA to direct
that the first year of testing under
this concept (commencing 1 July
1976) be evaluated for its cost effec-
tiveness.
Under this concept the mission of
the Aviation Test Board is to con-
duct operational tests and evalua-
tions, concept evaluations and other
tests for the research, development,
and acquisition of aviation materiel
systems, subsystems and ancillary
equipment. In performing this mis-
sion, the Aviation Test Board will
serve as the aviation combat devel-
oper's operational test organization
representing the troop user. Testing
will be conducted to estimate a
prospective system's military utili-
ty; operational effectiveness; oper-
ational suitability (including com-
patibility, interoperability, RAM,
logistic supportability, operational
man (soldier)-machine interface, and
training requirements; and the need
for any modifications. In addition,
the OT provides information on or-
ganization, personnel requirements,
doctrine and tactics. It also may
provide data to support or verify
operating instructions, publications
and handbooks.
The OT will be accomplished by
operational and support personnel
of the type and qualifications of
those who are expected to use and
maintain the system when
deployed. It will be conducted in as
realistic an operational environ-
ment as possible. Normally the OT
will be accomplished within con-
trolled field exercises and, to the
maximum extent possible, use TOE
troop units and maintenance sup-
port personnel in tactical scenarios.
The mission of the Aircraft
Development Test Activity is to
monitor, conduct, evaluate and
report on government and contrac-
tor tests of the single integrated
development test cycle concept for
aircraft; aircraft components; and
aircraft related support equipment
in support of the materiel developer.
Developmeht testing is con-
d ucted to demonstrate that the
engi neeri ng design and develop-
ment process is complete; that the
design risks have been minimized;
that the system will meet
specifications; and to estimate the
system's military utility when it is
introduced. Developmental testing
is accomplished in factory,
laboratory and proving-ground en-
vironments and includes engineer-
ing design testing and human fac-
tors testing to demonstrate a
satisfactory technical man
(soldier)-machine interface-using
qualified and experienced
operators, crews and maintenance
support personnel.
The physical collocation of
operational and developmental
testing activities at Fort Rucker
will complement and enhance the
Army Aviation Center Team
research and development efforts
for providing future training,
operational concepts and equip-
ment for an ever increasing
technologicai sophistication of the
battlefield environment. It will
enable the conduct of better and
more economical testing in greater
harmony with the overall goals of
the Army.
The collocation of these activities
will provide a focal point for avia-
tion test management; provide for
effective testing feedback; decrease
manpower and cost requirements;
and at the same time provide the
necessary separation and in-
dependence of operational and
developmental testing.
With the addition of an
operational and developmental
testing capabiiity, the Aviation
Center Team represents the Army's
centralized source of aviation ex-
pertise. As such, it is a vital in-
gredient in the mix of technology
and operational requirements
necessary for research, develop-
ment, test and evaluation leading to
the acquisition of Army aviation
materiel systems of the future.
daz ,
JUNE 1976 25
Gl'he J1rmy Aviation Story
Continued from page 5
arrived. With its speed, survivability, carrying capaci-
ty and ease of maintenance, the Huey was particularly
suited to the ta5k and to the environment.
Two other Army aircraft, fixed wing, made
widespread reputations in the early years. The OV-l
Mohawk was dispatched to Vietnam in 1962. The
Mohawk's mission was reconnaissance and sur-
veillance. Visual and photographic reconnaissance by
these twin-turbine airplanes produced a wealth of in-
telligence for supported units. Ground advisors had
great praise for the Mohawk's performance. Mohawk
aircraft were used throughout the Vietnam War, and
improved models are in the Army inventory today.
The CV -2 Caribou twin-engine transport airplane
preceded the helicopter into the war. The first Caribou
The CH-21 "Flying Bananas" were the first Army cargo
helicopters to arrive in Vietnam
landed in Saigon in August 1961. Two years later
there were two Caribou companies incountry (a total
of 32 airplanes). During the early years, Army pilots
flew highly dangerous missions into short, unim-
proved airstrips in support of far-flung Green Beret
outposts. By 1964 the Caribou had been thorollghly
integrated into the daily operational planning of the
ARVN.
The Caribou was successful for several reasons: It
was tough and afforded a high availability rate. Also,
the Caribou filled the gap between the Army's larger
helicopters and the U.S. Air Force C-123 Provider,
which weighed almost twice as much as the Caribou.
Further, the system which allocated Caribou support
was flexible and responsive to allow maximum
productive use of the aircraft. (In April 1966 the
Caribou was transferred to the U.S. Air Force. The
26
The "Flying Banana" was replaced by the powerful, agile
turbine-powered UH-1
Army was assured, as part of this transaction, that the
Air Force would relinquish all claims for helicopters
and followon rotary wing aircraft which are designed
and operated for intratheater movement, fire support,
supply and resupply of Army forces .)
By the end of 1964 the Army had more than 400 air-
craft and 3,700 aviation personnel in Vietnam. Com-
mand relationships with the AR VN were well es-
tablished. The formerly separate helicopter companies
were being integrated into battalions whose internal
staffs could make full use of the critically inadequate
flight hours available to support the war effort.
Meanwhile, defense strategists in the United States
were thinking in terms of the nuclear battlefield.
Mobility is of essence when units and people are
spread thin, as one might expect on such a battlefield.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara viewed
Army plans for growth in the airmobile concept as
The CV-2 Caribou was one of the aircraft used by the
11th Air Assault Division
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
conservative. McNamara was a genuine advocate of
enhancing tactical mobility for ground forces, and he
saw the helicopter as a possible solution. Army avia-
tion enthusiasts were delighted.
In order to decide how best to use the airmobile
concept in varying intensities of conflict, The Tactical
Mobility Requirements Board, composed of Army of-
ficers, was appointed and subsequently directed to
conduct a series of tests. The board, convened in 1962
and headed by General Hamilton H. Howze, soon
Major David H. Price is a rated
aviator. He has been a fire
team leader, a gunnery in-
structor, aeroscout platoon
leader and commander of an
aviation company. He is an
instructor of military history at
the Air Force Academy
became better known as The Howze Board.
2
It was blown downforests or rubbled cities), strike an enemy,
given authority to do whatever was necessary to ob- then disperse again."
tain meaningful results. The tests were exhaustive and Lieutenant General C.W.G. Rich, the overall test
elaborate. Results indicated that Army aircraft would director, recommended the retention of an air assault
enhance combat effectiveness in both conventional division in the regular Army force structure. In sup-
and counter-guerrilla actions, and that Army combat porting this recommendation, General Rich .said:
tasks could be accomplished faster and by a smaller "The significant question is not whether we can alford
commitment in manpower. such organizations, but whether this nation, with its
, One of The Howze Board pro- r , . rapidly expanding population and
posals was the formation of an . ever-increasing GNP (gross national
air assault division which could product] can afford NOT to have
move one-third of its infantry at them. The tested organizations are
one time. The result was the II th prototypes, in being, of the most
Air Assault Division (Test), or- versatile forces that we can add
ganized on 15 February 1963 under to the United States A rmy. The
the command of Major General movement capability of all divi-
Harry W. O. Kinnard. More than sions, including the 11 th Air Assault
400 aircraft and thousands of avia- Division has been enhanced by Air
tion personnel were assembled at Force aircraft; however, the inte-
Fort Benning, GA. ) The mission gration of A rmy aircraft into these
was to test the airmobile concept, tested units has provided the crucial
amounting to an expansion and ex- maneuver capability of light mobile
tension of the findings of The Howze forces to close with and destroy
Board. the enemy. In combination with in-
The tests were exciting, elaborate lantry divisions and other standard
and exhaustive; on one occasion A rmy organizations, airmobile units
more than 35,000 personnel par- General Hamilton H. Howze offer a balance of mobility and an
ticipated. A fter the final test, Ajr Assault II, General increased A rmy combat readiness on a theater scale
Kinnard forwarded his report on the airmobile that is applicable to the entire spectrum of warfare."
division's capabilities and potential. It read in part: The Howze Board, which spawned the lith Air
" ... Beyond what I believe to be its capabilities to Assault Division (T), truly ranks as a major bench-
perform roles normal to other divisions, I am even more mark in the history of Army aviation. It paved
impressed by what I feel as its ability to perform in the way for the expansion of a new type of Army -
unique ways beyond the abilities of other divisions. For A Flying Army.
example, in a low scale war, I believe it can exert con- Next month: Part XI, The Mid-1960s
trol over a much wider area and with much more For additional information see previous issues of the
speed and flexibility and with much less concern for DIGEST:
the problems of interdicted ground communications 1 "A Page In History," May 1963, page 16 and
or of difficult terrain. In higher scales of war, I see in "Army Aviation Milestones," June 1966, Outside
this division an unparalleled reserve or screening force Back Cover.
capable of operating over very large frontages. By 2 "Industry and Air Assault," February 1964, page 3
properly picking times, places, and methods, I believe and "Army Aviation Hall of Fame (General
it can also operate with devastating effect against the Howze)," May 1975, page 5.
rear of the enemy. Faced with threat or use of nuclear 3 "Divarty Fullback," July 1965, page I; "Hawk
weapons, I believe it can widely disperse and yet, when Star," September 1964, page 27 and "The Aviation
required, quickly mass (even over irradiated ground, Group," December 1965, page 2.
JUNE 1976 27
MEDICAL ASPECTS
OF SURVIVAL
Part II-Medical Problems in a Prolonged Survival Situation
Lieutenant Colonel David H ..
Medical DIvIsion
and UaAAAVa
Patsy Thompson
Publications and Graphics Division, U.S. Army .Agency for Aviation Safety
"Medical Aspects of Survival, Part I," in last month's
DIGEST, discussed lifesaving emergency medical aid. Part
II focuses on medical problems associated with heat, cold and
snakebite injuries in a prolonged survival situation.
H
EAT INJURIES. Prevention
is the best treatment of heat
injuries. This is especially true in a
survival situation where incapacita-
tion due to heat injury may result
in death. General preventive meas-
ures are good physical conditioning
and acclimatization to a desert or
jungle environment prior to being
exposed to a possible survival situ-
ation. Measures which should be
taken during a survival situation
are performance of activities, such
as looking for food, during the
cooler or nighttime hours; protec-
tion from the sun and heat, such
as makeshift shelters, and loosen-
ing clothing especially at the neck,
wrists and lower legs to allow cir-
culation of air; and replacement
of body salt and water lost through
sweating. A person may lose 6 to 13
quarts of water daily, depending on
temperature, humidity and physical
activity. If these measures are
applied, they will protect you from
the following heat injuries.
Heat exhaustion results from a
combination of water and salt loss
due to physical exertion and/or a
hot environment. Excessive
sweating, weakness, vertigo, diz-
ziness, headache, nausea and mus-
cle cramps may precede collapse.
The victim is listless and apprehen-
sive, and his skin is usually pale,
cool and clammy. This is a revers-
ible physiological disturbance and
recovery is usually rapid with water
and salt replacement. However,
failure to stop all physical exertion
and administer salt and water when
it occurs may lead to the more
serious condition of heat stroke. A
victim of heat exhaustion should be
JUNE 1976
placed in a cool environment and
his clothing should be loosened. He
should be given plenty of cool (not
cold) water mixed with one or two
salt tablets per quart or canteen of
water. Unless impregnated salt
tablets are available, salt tablets
should always be dissolved in water
before administering as taking the
tablets whole may cause nausea.
Other mixtures of salt tablets or
table salt are contained in table 1.
Heat cramps are painful contrac-
tions of abdominal or skeleton
muscles associated with exertion in
a hot environment. The cause is the
same as for heat ex-
haustion-depletion of body water
and salt through perspiration
without replacement. They may
progress to the point that the victim
may be prostrate with legs drawn
up or thrashing about, grimacing
and occasionally crying out from
the excruciating pain. Treatment
for heat cramps is the same as that
for heat exhaustion.
Heat stroke, commonly called
sunstroke, may be rapidly fatal. It
is a life or death emergency.
Prolonged strenuous exercise com-
bined with exposure to excessively
high temperatures associated with a
high relative humidity and/or the
direct rays of the sun may lead to
heat stroke. There is a breakdown
of the sweating mechanism and the
skin becomes hot and dry.
However, when unconsciousness
first occurs, the skin may still be
moist. Heat stroke is usually
preceded by high fever, mental con-
fusion, headache, dizziness, nausea
and vomiting, which progress to un-
consciousness and coma. Con-
vulsions may occur. The pulse is
rapid and weak. Proper treatment
is to rapidly reduce the body
temperature to a safe range (102
degrees F. or lower); otherwise,
irreversible braIn damage may oc-
cur. Ideally, immersion of the vic-
tim in an ice bath or in water as
cold as . possible is the most ef-
ficient method of cooling. If this is
not possible, the victim should be
placed in the shade, his clothing re-
moved and his entire body wet by
pouring cold water on him. He
should be cooled further by con-
tinuously fanning his wet body. He
should be transported to the nearest
medical facility at once! If con-
scious, he should be given cool, salt
water as prescribed for heat exhaus-
tion..
Sunburn is caused by overex-
posure of the skin to the sun' s ul-
traviolet radiation. In the event of
sunburn, a soothing lotion should
be applied to the affected area.
However, severe cases are disabling
and can lead to other forms of heat
illness. Sunburn can be prevented
by limited exposure to the sun and
by use of shelter, clothing and
sunscreen lotions.
Cold Injuriel. As in the case of
heat injury, cold injury is better
prevented than treated, since tissue
damage may be irreversible. Some
good measures for preventing cold
injuries are to avoid wind and
moisture as much as possible,
loosen clothing and foot-gear to im-
prove circulation, and keep feet and
socks dry and feet and toes exer-
cised to maintain adequate circula-
tion.
Smoking, alcohol and the use of
29
MEDICAL ASPECTS
medications, salves or ointments
are prohibited if the person is suf-
fering from cold injury. Nicotine
causes vasoconstriction and may
further decrease the blood supply to
the injured tissue. On the other
hand, alcohol increases peripheral
blood flow, causing further loss of
body heat. However, hot liquids are
encouraged, if available, and mild
stimulants such as tea and coffee
are useful, especially if the patient
is generally cold. Also, surprisingly
enough, a person may become
dehydrated in cold areas just as
readily as in hot desert areas, so he
should consume at least 2 quarts of
water daily. Above all, make sure
you are in good physical condi tion
and properly clothed and equipped
with survival gear when flight over
a cold environment is anticipated.
Freezing temperatures are not
necessary to sustain cold injuries, as
significant injuries can occur when
the temperature falls below 10
degrees C. (50 degrees F.). The in-
jury potential of cold cannot be
evaluated by ambient temperature
alone, as both wind and moisture
play an important role in its effect.
Wind markedly increases the effect
of low temperatures in removing
heat from exposed or inadequately
protected skin and, as windspeed
increases, loss of body heat in-
creases. Moisture also creates a
problem as cold injuries can occur
at tem peratures even higher than 10
degrees C. (50 degrees F.) when
body parts, particularly the feet,
hands and face, are exposed to wet
clothing for an extended length of
time. Injuries caused by cold, windy
and wet conditions are hypother-
mia, frostbite and frostnip, and
trench and immersion foot. Secon-
dary dangers are snow blindness
and sunburn.
Hypothermia is a condition
caused by exposure of the entire
30
TABLE 1
Salt
4 ten-grain salt tablets-dissolved in
1 level mess kit spoons-dissolved in
Diluting Water
2 quart canteen.
S-gallon can.
Lyster bag. 9 level mess kit spoons-dissolved in
1 level canteen cup-dissolved in 2S0-gal water trailer.
body to cold, with a subsequent
lowering of body temperature. It
can result from even a short immer-
sion in cold water or by prolonged
exposure to low air temperature.
The treatment is to warm the entire
body. The preferred method of
treatment is to immerse the victim
in a warm, not hot, water bath. If
this is not possible, then dress him
warmly and have him drink hot liq-
uids to warm the inside of the body.
If in a field situation, a fire and
sleeping bag may do the trick.
Frostbite (tissue injury) or frost-
nip (superficial frostbite of the skin)
is a constant danger to anyone ex-
posed to below freezing
temperatures. It produces no par-
ticular pain during its onset and
may not be noticed by the victim,
though it is usually preceded by
numbness, tingling, stinging, aching
or stiffness. Body parts most easily
frostbitten are the cheeks, nose,
ears, chin, forehead, wrists, hands
and feet. The affected area is pale
or a whitish color. Any body area
which stings, tingles or aches
should be inspected for normal
coloring so that measures can be
taken to prevent injury to the deep
body tissues. The buddy system
works great here for inspecting
hard-to-see areas. Make frequent
checks even if there are no symptoms.
Frostbite may cause blistering and
peeling just as in sunburn, but do
not break or open the blisters. And
do not warm or rewarm frostbitten
parts by massage, exposure to open
fire, cold water soaks, or rubbing
with snow, as this may cause
further damage. If the part has
been numb for only a short time,
the frostbite probably involves only
the skin (frostnip); otherwise it
should be assumed to be deep.
To treat frostnip, warm the
affected area with another part of
your body, such as placing hands in
armpits. If frostbite is suspected,
get to a medical facility as soon as
possible. Protect the injured area
from further cold injury by blankets
or any available clothing which is
not constricting. If a lower extremi-
ty is involved, the person should be
treated as a litter patient with the
part level or slightly elevated. In
unusual circumstances where travel
on foot is the only means of evacua-
tion for frostbite of the feet, thaw-
ing of the injured part is not in-
dicated until the patient reaches an
aid station and medical help.
Trench foot results from fairly
long exposure of the feet to wet
conditions, generally at
temperatures from approximately
freezing to 50 degrees F. The
possibility of developing trench foot
is even greater when the feet are in-
active. Trench foot can be serious,
as it can lead to loss of toes or parts
of the feet. A symptom of trench
foot is usually numbness but there
may be a tingling or aching sensa-
tion or cramping pain. If exposure
of the feet has been prolonged and
severe, the feet may swell so tightly
that pressure causes clots in the
blood vessels and cuts off circula-
tion. In the case of trench foot, the
victim's feet should be dried
thoroughly and he should be treated
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
as a litter patient and taken to a
medical facility immediately.
Immersion foot is similar to
trench foot, but it is caused by im-
mersion of the feet in water or con-
stant wetness of feet for a prolong-
ed period (usually in excess of 12
hours). It will develop more rapidly
when the temperature IS below 50
degrees F., but can occur when the
feet are exposed to warm water for
more than 24 hours. The soles of
the feet become wrinkled and white
and standing or walking becomes
extremely painful. Other portions
of the body may become similarly
affected when exposed to water for
long periods. Treatment is the same
as that for trench foot injury.
Snow blindness is the effect
which glare from an icefield or
snowfield has on the eyes. It may
occur under hazy, cloudy con-
ditions as well as in bright sunlight.
It can be recognized in its eady
stage by a scratchy feeling in the
eyes when the eyelids are closed. If
this occurs, the eyes should be
covered with a dark cloth to shut
out all light and the victim should
be taken to a medical facility at
once.
Sunburn is also possible in cold
areas so the same preventive
measures as mentioned prevIously
should be taken.
Snakebite. The most important"
point to keep in mind about
snakebite is that, although serious,
snakebite poisoning is usually
neither fatal nor . permanently dis-
abling. For example, "one study in
Malaysia of 824 poisonous
snakebites demonstrated that 53
percent of those persons bitten
developed no symptoms, 10 percent
had severe symptoms and only 1
percent were fatal. The factors
militating for worst prognoses were
large snake, small person and bites
about the head."
JUNE 1976
There are two basic types of
snake venom; one type destroys the
blood cells while the other attacks
the nervous system. Depending on
the type and amount of venom in-
jected, one may have severe pain in
the local site within a few minutes,
rapid swelling and discoloration of
skin with formation of blistei'.s, and
continued oozing of blood and
tissue fluids from the puncture site.
General body effects may include
circulatory collapse, clammy skin,
fast heartbeat, intense thirst, severe
headache, dizziness, blurred vision,
muscle spasms, vomiting of blood,
fever, respiratory failure and con-
vulsions. Maximum venom effects
usuaily occur in 24 to 36 hours. If
fang marks are absent and there is
no significant pain, swelling or
numbness at the bite site or tingling
of the scalp, lips or tongue within
20 minutes, one may assume that
the snake was probably non-
poisonous. However, chances
should not be taken and all
snakebites should be treated as
poisonous. The objective of treat-
ment is to slow the absorption of
the venom so that it can be detox-
ified by the natural defensive
mechanisms of the body.
N onmedically trained personnel
should use the following procedures
for first-aid treatment.
Remain calm, but act swiftly.
Within practical limits, immo-
bilize the affected part in a posi-
tion below the level of the heart.
Place an improvised lightly
constricting band (a shoestring or
bootlace may be used) 2 to 4 inches
closer to the heart than the site of
the bite and reapply this constric-
ting band ahead of the swelling if it
progresses up the arm or leg. The
band'should be placed tightly
enough to halt the flow of blood in
the superficial vessels but not tight-
ly enough to stop the pulse. One
should be able to insert a finger
between the band and the limb. All
rings, watches and bracelets should
be removed from the limb at the
time the band is applied.
Kill the snake without damag-
ing the head, if possible, and save
the entire snake for positive identi-
fication later.
Reassure the victim, but do not
give him any alcohol or medication.
Alcohol speeds up metabolism and
absorption whereas medication
such as morphine may cause
respiratory failure should the snake
venom be the type which attacks
the nervous system.
Transport the victim and the
dead snake to a medical facility as
soon as possible.
Unless you are medically trained
and less than 30 minutes have
elapsed since the bite, do not cut
into the bite site as the absorption
of venom will be enhanced froin a
larger wound. This will cause more
tissue damage and also, there will
be a greater chance of subsequent
infection reSUlting in permanent
disability. Overzealous treatment
for snakebite in the field could easi-
ly do more harm than good and
result in disability or even death.

31
Fourth in a series oi four articles on
WhY pilotS Dllke errors
I
N PREVIOUS articles, we've talked about behav-
ior, what affects behavior, learning, and how be-
havior can be changed. In this last article, let's begin
to bring it all together ih a little tighter ball. By now
you may have inferred that by introducing reinforce-
ment and punishment (presenting or removing things
the person likes or dislikes) we have changed the en-
vironment. If you have, go around the board once,
collect $200 and move to the head of the class. You
are absolutely right. Let's spend a little more time
with the environment.
Changing the Environment
It doesn't take a mental giant to realize doctors
don't learn brain surgery in steel mills. You must
32
artange the environment so that you can get a person
to make a desired behavior. A surgeon will nbt learn
to make incisions when stoking a blast furnace. Pilots
will have a difficult time learning to fly if ali they are
given are mot'orcylces. We could wait for a long time
for a certain behavibr to occur unless we prepare the
environment ' so that certain behavior will happen.
Once that behavior occurs, we reinforce it. Many
behaviors will disappear if this reinforcement is not
made.
Several interesting studies have been conducted on
radar operators. Watching a radar scope is not all
kicks and tricks. In fact, it gets flat boring. That little
sweep of light goes round and round for hours and
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
William C. McDaniel r.:i. 2\
Directorate for Technical Research and Applications
U.S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety UBAAAVB
hours. It may be weeks and weeks or months and
months before the bad guys ever show up on the screen
as a targef That little radar operator could grow a
long grey beard just waiting on the chance to jump up
and shout, "There he is, yipee, there he is." How do
you keep him on the ball? Simple, just throw a fake
target on the scope ever so often. Now the behavior
can occur anq be reinforced. This technique has im-
proved uperator perfoqnance tremendously.
What about aviation? We have much the same
problem on a preflight inspection. Some little obscure
items on the checklist are almost always okay. The
aviator may go through of preflight inspec-
tions and never get the opportunity to say, "Aha, look
at that." The boss never gets the chance to say, "Good
eyes, superaviator." Eventually, the aviator stops in-
specting (he may look in the general direction).
USAAA VS has just got another candidate for a
statistic. "Inattention," "failure to follow accepted
procedures" -you can just see the accident report
now. Pilot error? Hogwash, he behaved just exactly as
he had learned. The farsighted commanders might use
the false alarm procedure that has worked so well for
radar operators. "Planting" a little discrepancy here
and there at different times will produce the" Aha, I
found it" behavior. Reinforcement for that behavior
given from time to time will maintain the behavior.
We've talked about people behaving in a certain
manner in a similar environment. There is another
to this coin. In "unusual" or "unfamiliar" en-
vironments, behavior is unpredictable. A person may
make all kinds of bizarre responses in an unfamiliar
situation. He may scream, cry, shout, freeze, fig4t or
faint. Ask an IP what a student pilot when he
first begins to control an aircraft. I think the IP will
verify this little factual tidbit becomes increasingly im-
portant in emergency situations. We attempt to train
for emergencies as ' realistically as possible. Unfor-
tunately, the gap between the training environment
and an actual emergency environment is often too
wide for some individuals. They cannot relate one with
the other. They fail to generalize. Those of
times a pilot trains for engine failure with those nice
available stagefields and cool IPs to bail him out in
case of trouble are far removed ' from his present, ac-
tual, terrible predicament. There he is at 5,000
feet-no mamma, no papa, no per diem-out of fuel,
out of luck, out of ideas and now things are really get-
ting bad. ' The Army furnished him dash lOs. What
does he do? Eat the cQvers?
What can be done? Hopefully we trainers get him
into a familiar environment. Remember Jhe instruc-
tions of that cool IP? "Begin your crosscheck, roll off
JUNE 1976
the throttle, now down on collective pitch, trim it up
just a little, you're looking good. Watch your air-
speed." With just a little prompting, recall may give
him enough familiarity with the environment. He'll
begin making the responses he's learned to make in
these similar situations.
Modeling is a term used by psychologists to identify
one way the enyironment can be changed to bring
about desired behavior. Army folks are more familiar
with the phrase "lead by example." An ' outhouse by
any other name will still smell the same (forgive me,
Mr. Shakespeare). you want to call it or
whatever turns you on. If you want the troops to look
sharp, leaders should look sharp. If you want pilots to
be professional, more experienced and senior pilots
should set the pace. That's all well and good, as far as
it goes. Modeling or leading by example may certainly
bring about a desired behavior. The unfortunate bot-
tom liny is that it will not maintain the behavior. As
you may have already noticed, modeling does not in-
corporate any reinforcement. Without reinforcement,
you won't have repetitive behavior. Show me a leader
who believes he can be such a shining example to his
troops that he need not set any consequences (rein-
forcement) for their behavior, and I'll show you a
sharp leader with a bunch of sloppy troops.
Up to now, we've talked about arranging the en-
vironment to get a behavior to occur. Sometimes the
behavior we desire is complex. , We could provide an
aircraft and books on how to fly. We could say flying
is a little bit like driving a car. We could even fly the
student around for a couple of years, modeling how to
fly' an aircraft. If we do this over and over, eventually
he may a psychologist, but he'll never amount
to anything useful like an aviator.
Shaping
When a psychologist he is "shaping" behavior,
he really means, 4'1'11 take what I've got and hope for
something next time." In other words, reinforce
a behavior each time the behavior gets a little closer to
the final goal. A shaping reinforces little
steps of progress. Your IP used this technique to teach
you how to fly. He turned you loose on the controls for
the first time. Finally, after an eternity of sheer terror
for both you and the IP, he stopped you with, "Okay,
that wasn't t90 bad; we'll try it again tomorrow."
With a few words of encouragement, he reinforced
your behavior-all of your behavior. This included
profuse sweating, your stiff, unrelaxed posture, blood
circulating in aU the wrong places, trying to move the
control stick to some place 15 feet outside the aircraft,
the difficult breathing t4at was the result of a glob of
something stuck iq close proximity to your Adam's
apple, and a host of other behaviors too numerous to
mention. The important behavior was that you
ly moved the controls.
33
WHY PILOTS .MAKE ERRORS
Over the next days and weeks, all the unwanted
behaviors begin to fade out. The IP does not reinforce
sweating, or lumps in your throat. He is not attending
to these behaviors. Sometimes these behaviors are
there. If they are, they get reinforced. Alot of the time
these behaviors are not there when reinforcement is,
made. But the behavior necessary for flying is con-
sistently reinforced. This behavior is continually being
strengthened, while the nervous behavior, the un-
desirable control movements are being weakened.
You are beginning to learn the correct behavior. You
are learning which behavior results in reinforcement
and the behavior that does not bring reinforce-
ment.
You learned to fly in small steps. You didn't get the
whole thing all at once. If you had trouble with a step,
the IP backed up and worked with you until you could
do it. You were shaped into learning how to fly. The
same applies to aviation safety. A unit safety program
is not completed in an hour, or in a meeting, or sub-
sequent to a published SOP. Safety consists of a mul-
titude of both simple and complex behaviors. Com-
manders are subject to the same behavioral principles
as all us other organisms. Subordinates can shape
their superiors just as effectively as the other way
around. If a cOl1?mander is for a position or
policy on safety, chances are that these positions or
policies will be enforced and augmented with ad-
ditional programs. A simple example might be a
hypothetical briefing. "Sir, since our present FOD
program was started, we have cut our maintenance
problems by 10 percent. As a result, our aircraft
availability for mission accomplishment has increased
considerably." Do you think the commander will cur-
tail that part of the safety program? Heavens, no.
Maintaining Behavior
Once you've got a desired- behavior to occur by
arranging the environment, by shaping and by reinfor-
cing, you can't stop there. You've got to keep this
behavior going. Naturally, you keep it going by rein-
forcement. But how often do you reinforce? You're
going to miss praising a good job now and then. For-
tunately, that's good. Commonsense tells us that if we
want a strong behavior we reinforce it each and every
34
time it occurs. Well, it just turns out that this is one
time commonsense belongs to common people. It's
just not true. We are not reinforced for everything we
do 100 percent of the time. We don't win every game
we play. We don't get awards every time we do
something exceptional. What do we do? We try
harder.
Remember when we talked about extinction? We
said that when reinforcement is not made there is, ini-
tially, an increase in the behavior. I gave a somewhat
exaggerated example of Joe Turkey moving the
toolroom Qut to the next aircraft he worked on. He's
trying harder to get reinforcement. If no reinforce-
ment comes, of course, the behavior will eventually
cease. With the wisdom of Solomon, the intrepid
supervisor will space his reinforcement over a period
of time or after a number of behaviors. He will avoid
reinforcing too much just as surely as he will avoid the
extinction of a behavior. By doing this, the supervisor
will not only maintain a behavior but aho reinforce
"trying harder."
To Sum Up
We've talked about behavior, what causes it, how to
start a behavior, how to cqange behavior and how to
maintain behavior. Certainly this series of articles has
not been designed to make anyone a psychologist (you
have to take a correspondence course for that). Cer-
tainly you will not be able to control all behavior.
There are just a lot of things in the environment, the
physical state of an individual, and the prior learning
of the person that we canQot control. If this series of
articles has succeeded in getting you to think about
behavior and looking for the consequences, it
has achieved a great deal. If, instead of saying a per-
son is "overconfident," you look for the behavior that
has resulted in this label, the articles have done much . .
If you see "overconfidence" as a specific behavior
such as flying IFR when the pilot had no IFR
training-if you see the pilot being reinforced for this
behavior such as his fellow pilots this
superhuman effort with: "You did a great job of
flying" -if you can approach problems' from this
direction, we're a lot closer to getting at this "pilot
error" problem. .
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Arnold R.lambert
t Publications and Graphics Division
UBAAAV. U.S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety
REJ\LISTIC
J\T PRiCe
H
ow IMPORTANT IS realistic training? At
a glance this may seem like a stupid question
because everyone knows there is no substitute for rea-
listic It is necessary in every endeavor, whe-
ther you are trying to become a typist, aviator, surgeon
or anything else. You can study a diagram of a type-
writer keyboard and learn where each letter or symbol
is located but the realistic training comes when you
put your fingers on the keys. An aviator's realistic
training comes when he climbs into the aircraft after
many hours of ground schooling.
At this point let's come to a screeching halt, back up
and take another look at the question. This time let's
put the emphasis on the words, "How important . . . "
To what lengths should we go to obtain realistic
training? What and how much should we be willing to
sacrifice for realistic training? Can we produce a
proficient typist by sacrificing the basics? Certainly
not. Beginners would be lost on an unmarked
keyboard before they got started. Can we put a stu-
dent pilot in an aircraft and tell him to fly without the
benefit of ground training? No again; this would be as
risky as telling an intern to operate on a patient
without first letting him observe and then assist a skill-
ed surgeon. Realistic training is important but the
sacrifices made to achieve it should not endanger lives.
Unfortunately, however, human life is sometimes
endangered (no matter how unintentional) to obtain
realistic training. The following accident is a case in
point.
The aviation unit was participating in a tactical
training mission in support of an infantry unit. At first
light the unit received a troop extraction mission. The
five UH -1 H crews were briefed on the mission by the
pilot of the lead aircraft. After the briefing at the drop
zone the mission was delayed and the five aircraft
returned to the airfield to await further instructions.
About mid afternoon, they took off for the 15-minute
flight to the pickup zone (PZ).
Because of their fuel load and the small PZ, each
aircraft was to land (one at a time) and pick up six
troops. The fuselage of the fifth aircraft in the flight
touched a stump in the PZ but the damage was
JUNE 1976
Approach view of lZ and detail of stump cluster in touchdown area
negligible. The flight proceeded to a prearranged point
and discharged the troops. The return flight to the PZ
was uneventful and because of fuel limitations, the
mission commander instructed the crews to pick up
eight troops each on the second landing.
Landing in the PZ, the lead aircraft settled on a
35
REALISTIC TRAINING
cluster of stumps, the tallest nearly 2 feet high. The
crew was concerned about the size of the PZ and the
crew chief was instructed to clear the tail rotor. It was
necessary to hover to the left center of the PZ and
place the tail rotor to the right to avoid fallen trees and
branches.
The aircraft landed and eight troops boarded.
Checking the controls, the pilot found that the pedals
were binding and suspected hydraulic problems. The
troops were off-loaded and the aircraft was inspected
to determine the cause and damage.
The aircraft was on the stumps, with one tightly
against the fuselage and the other barely touching it.
The crew chopped away a portion of the tallest stump
and after a thorough inspection of the damaged area
and repeated control checks, a decision was made to
fly the aircraft out of the PZ. The unit maintenance
officer was notified and he concurred with the deci-
sion. The crew chief was left in the PZ to act as a
ground guide for the other aircraft to complete the
mission. The aircraft was flown to an open field where
maintenance personnel, including a technical inspec-
tor, evaluated the damage. Temporary repairs were
made and the aircraft was flown back to the airfield.
During the 4-day period, the unit flew more than
200 hours of support for the field training mission. It
was a fast-moving exercise in which aviation assets
were used to the maximum in an effort to obtain
realistic training.
This aviation unit routinely provided regular and
aggressive support of the ground troops. The unit
aviators were overall highly qualified, well trained and
sincerely dedicated to mission accomplishment.
Now let's take a look at the sequence of events and
factors that put these highly qualified aviators on an
accident course. Neither the pilot nor copilot had
eaten properly or had adequate rest during the train-
ing exercise. The pilot either ate C-rations or missed 5
of the last 11 meals before the accident and the copilot
missed 6 of 11. The pilot worked 38 and the copilot
worked 29 of the 48 hours before the accident. The
copilot slept 9 of the 48 hours and the pilot slept 10
hours, but without the benefit of proper personal
equipment. When time permitted, the pilot slept on
the bare ground.
The PZ was originally cleared for a medevac opera-
tion and was not prepared in accordance with TM 5-
330. The cleared area is irregular, approximately 90
feet long by 75 feet wide. It is surrounded by jungle,
approximately 75 to 90 feet high. The surface was un-
even tropical soil, hardened (because of the dry sea-
son), with no significant slope. The PZ had many tree
trunks scattered across it with branches and other
36
debris throughout. The stumps were not cut off at
ground level. The highest stump was approximately 2
feet 2 inches, but in the touchdown area, they averaged
approximately 1 foot 6 inches in height. The PZ
offered minimum blade clearance. Particularly
noteworthy was the fact that there was only one area
where it was possible to land the aircraft. That area
contained stumps and was only 10 feet 3 inches in
width. When landing in the PZ, the aircraft had to
hover straight down and maneuver to the left to set
down. In the touchdown area, the tail rotor was close
to stacked debris and had to be positioned to the right.
Communication also played a part in this accident.
As the aircraft descended into the PZ, the outside
radio toggle switches were shut off (at pilot's request)
because excessive radio traffic was obstructing inter-
communications. Good intercommunications was
considered important because the crew was concerned
about blade strikes.
The ground commander attempted to contact the
aircraft crew by FM radio to warn them about the
stumps. Another aircraft in the flight attempted to
relay the information on the VHF radio. Neither
transmission was acknowledged.
Due to the vertical descent necessary to this PZ, the
crew of the aircraft could not observe or comply with
the hand signals of the ground troops, who were not
positioned properly or current in proper arm and hand
signals.
If the circumstances surrounding this accident had
occurred during an actual tactical situation, it would
be more understandable. But during peacetime, poor
planning, unprofessionalism and disregard for safety
in order to obtain realistic training endangers human
life unnecessarily.
This was a minor accident but it could easily have
been a tragedy. Imagine an aircrew sincerely
dedicated to mission accomplishment, tired from
working long hours with little sleep and a lack of
proper nourishment. Send them into an improperly
prepared and very tight LZ where maximum alertness
and precision control applications are required.
Provide them with unqualified ground guides and turn
off all external communications. They were fortunate
indeed that the accid'ent was minor. Similarly handi-
cap a surgeon and you certainly wouldn't want to be
the patient.
Training missions must be carefully planned and
coordinated, and every individual thoroughly briefed.
These missions must then be carried out with a max-
imum degree of professionalism and careful judgment,
with emphasis and consideration on safety first. Com-
mand supervision can accept no less if accidents are to
be prevented.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

U.AAAV.
David G. Holmes
Directorate for Plans, Operations & Education
U.S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety
Who
Killed
George?
' ,:. '. .
,. , .... .

JUNE 1976
Third in a series of episodes on
George, your unit ASO, who died
from frustration after his training had
taught him the professional approach
to safety
S
UMMER HAD ARRIVED in all its splendor.
Everyone wanted to do more and do it better
simply because the days were longer. The first launch
of the day now got off the ground an hour earlier and
the night flyers had to wait until 2000 to pull pitch.
There was a constant hassle about scheduling night
flying. If the crews reported for duty at 0730 on the
day they were to fly this meant 8 hours of office
work, then a 2-hour delay, then 2 hours of night flight.
If they came in at noon, a half day of productive time
was lost from an already overloaded staff.
Then there were the trips to the beach with the kids
and an occasional 3 o'clock fishing trip and the razor's
edge began to dull.
But these everyday problems faded completely
under the pressure of preparing for the airshow and
demonstration which was held every summer. This
absolutely took priority over all else. Whole platoons
were assembled to set up booths and bleachers, to
make pictures and man the static displays, and
through it all no one had time for George, the aviation
safety officer.
The airshow was a biggie. Practice demonstrations
were flown over and over to get the split-second
timing that only "true professionals" could pull
off. And on the big day, they ,knew for sure IT was
perfect-except for the weather. And that wasn't
really all that bad-ragged with low lying scud
blowing in around 1,300 feet. It wasn't thick and,
by now, everyone was anxious to get on with the
show. All the acts punched through without incident
just as rehearsed-God is a good copilot.
Then it was time for the parachute team-lO,OOO
jumps without a fatality. In they came below the
ragged clouds to be in full sight of the spectators-
I, 2, 3-strato-clouds-a good show-4, 5, 6-six
was a streamer. The crowd thought it was a dummy
drop, landing behind some buildings. They hardly
noticed the abrupt end to the show-I ,200 feet
was just too low. The weather had taken away
the safety margin. Who had decided to go ahead
with the jump with ceilings under 2,000 feet?
Could a "'true professional" have can-
celled the parachute act and didn't? Or did
someone try and get overruled by a "true
professional"?
Either way, George died a little more
that day. ctn ,
37
briefs that teach
38
-. - - ... . ~
-- - - ------.-=
-------= -----=--=--=--=--=--=-= - = = = : ~ /
double confusion
Arriving at their destination, a T-42 pilot and copilot were cleared to land. The pilot verified that
his landing gear was down and locked, then landed on the runway centerline and started his rollout.
During the rollout, as he started to clean up the aircraft by retracting the flaps, he felt the nose gear
give away. He reacted to this by pulling back on the yoke, but then felt -the aircraft dip to the left as
the left main gear gave away, followed by the right main gear. The aircraft then skidded off the runway.
The landing gear was extended on high base leg. The pilot stated that the green light came on,
verifying gear extension, and the copilot confirmed nose gear extension by the floor panel indicator.
FI ap handl e was acti vated.
Touchc:bwn on the runway was normal. On rollout the pilot elected to retract his flaps (which
were not extended) and soon afterward the ai rcraft settl ed to the runway as the landing gear coli apsed. ,
Neither crewmember had looked out to see the flap position markings or to verify the flap position.
The pilot was confused because the flap selector on the T-42 is different from the U-21 which he
also flew. Therefore, he had moved the flap selector from the up position to the neutral detent in
the traffic pattern, but did not actually extend the flaps. The sensations of flap extension felt in the
traffic pattern were caused by gear extension and propellers being placed in full low pitch position.
The gear handle in theT-42 is in the same relative position as the flap handle on the U-21. The
probabl e cause of thi s accident was the inadvertent movement of the landing gear handl e to the
up position.

In another mishap, a T-42 pilot elected to land several hundred feet down the runway. He made a
nonnal touchdown at about 80 knots. After touchdown and during rollout, in an effort to achieve
better braking action, the pilot decided to raise the flaps. He inadvertently grasped and activated
the gear handle control lever. The nose wheel retracted first, then the left main landing gear began
to retract. As the nose gear bent under the fuselage, the propeller struck the runway. The aircraft
skidded more than 3)0 feet and came to rest off the left side of the runway. Sound familiar?
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
nanual revision proposed
During preflight of a TH-55, a student
ilot (SP) removed the antitorque pedal
etaining pins. He intended to fly a series
f traffic pattern circuits while varying
ntitorque pedal adjustment and find a
uitabl e, comfortabl e setti ng. He then
lanned to replace the retaining pins and
ontinue his flight. He received tower
learance and was hovering toward the take-
ff pad when the left anti torque pedal came
ff the pedal arm. The ai rcraft entered a
3st right spin. The SP attempted to regain
ontrol by using the left pedal arm and
)wering the collective pitch, but the
i rcraft crashed.
This accident was caused by the SP
tiling to replace the retaining pins to
ecure the anti torque pedals before flying
Ie aircraft.
The investigation board felt that the
H55A cockpit checklist is not specific
110ugh in regard to pedal adjustment,
articularly security of pins, and recom
ended the primary flight training manual
.r TH-55As be changed as follows:
1 . Section X, page X.1-1 n sert in TH-55A
leck list (secondary prefli ght inspection)
Fter item 3. Untie main rotor, etc.
~ Adjust pedals and secure with
ltaining pins.
2. Section X, page X-6-Change cockpit
leck item 1C to read: Adjust pedal sand
~ u r e with retaining pins.
JUNE 1976
E f ~ ~
USAAAV8
no margin for error
An AH-1G pilot and crew chief flying as observer departed
a field strip and hovered north to select a confined area. A
clearing was located and the pilot hovered to it. After
evaluating the situation, he talked with the observer about
being able to get the ai rcraft into the clearing. The observer
said he thought it would be all right.
The pilot decided that the clearing was large enough and
hovered the aircraft to a point he believed to be the center of
the clearing. He decided to attempt a landing and told the
observer to clear the aircraft on the left side. The observer
turned to the I eft and concentrated primari lyon "the main rotor
tip path plane. The pilot began a hovering descent from an
altitude of approximately 3J feet agl. He slowly lowered the
aircraft and maintained an approximate centered position
within the confined area. About 5 feet agl he told the
observer it was getting tight on the right. The observer said
he had about 5 feet on the I eft. The pi lot hovered I eft and
the main rotor struck the branches of a I arge tree on the I eft
side 29 feet above the ground.
Neither the pi lot nor the observer was aware of the tree
strike. Descent continued to approximately 3 inches agl,
where the main rotor struck and severed a branch on the right
side of the aircraft. Simultaneously, the crew heard a loud
noi se which was the tai I rotor bl ades striking a scrub oak
tree. The gO-degree gearbox and tail rotor assembly then
separated from the aircraft and the aircraft came to rest
upright. There were no injuries.
The area selected for landing was not large enough to
accommodate the aircraft with ~ given margin for error. The
pilot used poor judgment by continuing ttle approach when
there was doubt that the aircraft would clear the trees.
Supervisory error is considered a factor because the
aircraft was allowed to operate in critical conditions (i.e.,
low level flying and confined areas) without a qualified crew.
An unqualified individual (crew chief) was put in a position
to advise the pilot of flight functions because a copilot was
not avai I abl e fo r the fl i ght.
The unit standing operating procedures did not provide
guidance for tactical operations, i.e., low level flight, NOE
flight and confined area operations. .....'
39
large turkey buzzard crashed
through liB-inch Plexiglas windshield
of Navy helicopter and impacted
squarely in pilot's face, knocking
him momentarily unconscious.
(Photos courtesy of APPROACH
magazine)
BIRD
S TR IK E
AVOIDANCE
-WHAT'S
BEEN
DONE?
40
S
INCE JULY 1970, the Army
has had 97 bird strikes at a cost
of $188,707. Fortunately, all but
one of these have been incidents.
The Air Force's experience in bird
strikes is worse. In 1973 alone the
Air Force had 327 bird strikes
which resulted in two fatalities and
a cost of $32,000 per bird strike.
With the advent of terrain flying,
an even greater potential threat of
bird strikes to aircraft and crew
exists. Several organizations are
conducting research on methods to
prevent bird strikes. Birds have a
strong will to survive. Pilots who
have seen birds dive to avoid colli-
sion with their aircraft will vouch
for this. This instinct in birds can
be used to prevent bird strikes.
Lights. Tests conducted at
night, using hand-held and radar-
controlled binoculars or telescopes,
show that most birds react within 1
or 2 seconds when illuminated with
the -beam of a 200-watt incandes-
cent searchlight (beam-width about
5 degrees) aligned with the beam of
the tracking radar. The birds either
(l) turned suddenly and maint(lined
altitude, descended or climbed, (2)
hovered and turned upwind or
made small scale movements, or (3)
made no reaction at all. In more
than 80 percent of the turns, the
birds increased the angle between
their flight path and the beam.
Since the radar and light beam
tracked the birds, they could not ac-
tually escape the beam. The
proportion of birds reacting to the
searchlight was greater at short
ranges, suggesting that the intensity
of the light was important. These
data show that most birds seek to
avoid a light beam, and that
attempted avoidances occur quickly
at substantial distances, at least un-
der these typical conditions.
Since it is clear that birds often,
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
Captain Don A. Mynard
Directorate for Aircraft Accident Analysis & Investigation
U8AAAV8 U.S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety
Model airplane designed to resemble falcon proved effective. All birds tested with
the exception of hawks showed a defense avoidance response to the model.
JUNE 1976
but unfortunately not always, are
successful in their attempts to avoid
collisions with aircraft, it is possible
that some appropri ate kind of light
would significantly increase their
rate of success. Because the air-
speeds of aircraft are much greater
than those of birds, only a very
narrow zone of collision hazard,
centered on the aircraft's flight
path, need be illuminated.
The Campbell Soup Company in
Camden, NJ, uses rotating orange
beacons over each loading dock,
similar to those used on emergency
vehicles. This is the only practical
method they found to keep birds
away from the docks.
Other methods are strobe lights
(also good for preventing midairs
with iron birds) and avoidance of
migration routes.
Wounded bird tapes. Follow-
ing is an extract from a report by
Dick Millson on devices used at
Sikorsky Aircraft to scare birds
away.
The first time the wounded bird
tape was used at Sikorsky there
were about 2,000 seagulls perched
on the hangar roof. The recording
was played into a loudspeaker
aboard an enclosed fire department
utility van. All 2,000 gulls took off
at once and emptied their lower
bowels. It sounded like a heavy
downpour inside the van. Two
pilots walking to their aircraft will
to this day attest to the effec-
tiveness of the tape in scaring
seagulls.
Several bird species will gradual-
ly learn to ignore any formerly
frightening noise or object if ex-
posed to it too often or too long.
When this occurs, several options
can be implemented. Our next op-
tion used blank shotgun shells and
twin fire noise shells. These shells
were used in conjunction with the
playing of the wounded seagull
tape.
41
BIRD STRIKE AVOIDANCE
One may rightfully ask, "What
happens if the gulls become con-
ditioned to having one of their flock
killed?'" The answer is our next
avail able option. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture has registered
a trade product , specifically for the
control of gulls around airports,
which contains the chemical poison
4-aminopyridine as the active in-
gredient. When dispersed in accor-
d a nce with instructions, this
chemical kills only a small number
of birds, achieving its control by
frightening away the remainder of
the flock by distress calls of the few
affected birds.
Federal conservation officials
believe that with proper use this
method of control often is effective
in alleviating gull problems. e s t ~
have shown that flocks frightened
a wa y often avoid the same
locations in the future.
Falcons. The National
Research Council of Canada
observed the behavior of 1,000
ducks that were approached by a
model airplane designed to resem-
ble a falcon. The ducks showed a
definite avoidance response to the
falcon- shaped aircraft and per-
formed a number of avoidance
behaviors.
(1) Flocks of ducks were seen to
turn away from the aircraft or to
land very quickly on the water,
sometimes virtually tumbling from
the sky and at other times
noticeably increasing their rate of
descent to the water.
(2) Ducks feeding in the nearby
field flew to a protective slough
when the aircraft passed over.
(3) Ducks on the slough formed
a compact, milling mass with birds
in the flock constantly trying to
move to the center of the group.
42
This large flock moved to the far
end of the slough which was maybe
one-half mile long and far removed
from where the aircraft was flying.
(4) Other ducks stayed close to
the bank and under overhanging
wild berry bushes. Gulls were also
afraid of the model.
Geese also treated the falcon air-
craft as a potential threat. A pass
by the model at two Canada geese
which were sitting on a log caused
both to move into the water with
one of the geese exhibiting a threat
postu reo In this case the bird
lowered its head and extended its
neck and head towards the aircraft.
A pass towards a flock of seven
white-fronted geese that were about
to pass over the field caused them
to do a quick turn and leave the
area in the direction from which
they had come. Even a large fl ock
of Canada geese showed some
response to the model but they did
not leave the area.
The model also deterred gulls.
The trials were conducted at a time
when small numbers of gulls were
normally flying over the test area.
No gulls were seen flying over the
area while the aircraft was air-
borne; however, during a refueling
stop, a few gulls again passed over
the area.
One major question needs to be
anwered before the effectiveness of
this technique can be totally
evaluated. It needs to be deter-
mined if birds will learn, through
repeated exposure to the model,
that it is different from a real falcon
and not a threat to them. The
falcon-shaped aircraft was found to
be effective at eliciting the same
response from birds as that ob-
tained by a live falcon. All birds
tested, with the exception of hawks,
showed a very definite avoidance
response to the aircraft.
Radar. Radar has become a
valuable tool for studying the
movements of birds in the at-
mosphere. Relatively few radar
technicians and operators realize
the importance of radar for studies
of bird, bat and insect movements
in the atmosphere. Of all the ap-
proaches currently being used to
reduce the hazards that birds pose
to aviation, radar techniques offer
the best promise of definite results.
The distribution of surveillance
radar throughout the country, par-
ticularly in the vicinity of airports,
adds to the feasibility of this ap-
proach.
A final warning. When flocks of
blackbirds or starlings are feeding
or roosting, they will often attack a
hawk, owl , eagle, heron, vulture or
other large birds. This behavior
pattern is carried out by thousands
of birds at a time. The harassed
bird will fly erratically or may fly
several hundred meters, all the
while being surrounded by a tight
flock of thousands of birds. Flocks
of starlings have been known to
mob model airplanes and give
alarm cries at the approach of some
aircraft. It is a distinct possibility
that a flock might mob an aircraft,
thereby increasing the number of
birds that would be struck or in-
gested. It is possible that the shape
or the painting o ~ an aircraft could
influence the reaction of a flock of
birds. A flock intent on mobbing a
hawk would not be as sensitive to
an approaching aircraft.
The bird versus aircraft problem
is far from hopeless. When it comes
to prevention, several methods and
techniques are available. Much can
be done now and the future is look-
ing even better. Identify your
problem, then ,use all available in-
formation in a' plan to reduce the
hazard.
U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST
JUN E 1976
AVIATION SAFETY OFFICERS COURSE
T
HE UNITED STATES Army Agency for Aviation Safety
(USAAAVS) now conducts all formal Army MOS-
awarding aviation safety officer (ASO), flight safety technician
training. This training will replace the ASO Course currently
taught under contract by the University of Southern California.
The decision to transfer the training to USAAAVS considered
both cost savings to the Army and training requirements
based on the identified needs of the ASO for job performance.
\ The course development closely followed TRADOC Regula-
tion 350-100-1, Systems Engineering of Training (Course
Design). Initial input was accomplished through personal inter-
views with ASOs at several major installations, as well as infor-
mation gleaned from questionnaires sent to the major com-
mands. The a-week program of instruction focuses on mishap
prevention. Other subject areas presented in both the
classroom and during practical exercises include Accident
Investigation; Aviation Physiology, Psychology and
Technology; Management, Communications; Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA); and Aviation Law. A practical
exercise on the accident prevention survey will be conducted at
a major installation other than Fort Rucker, which has been ex-
cluded only because of the large exposure it already gets from
other aviation safety training exercises.
The new ASO Course was critiqued by students in an evalua-
tion course completed in May 1976. The 32 commissioned and
warrant officer students attending this course were selected
from 109 nominations received from the major commands. The
class composition included trained ASOs, individuals who have
expressed a desire to serve as ASOs and USAAAVS personnel.
Untrained students who successfully completed this evaluation
course were awarded the appropriate MOS/ AS!.
A DA pamphlet will be published soon outlining course dates
and class sizes for FY 77. Quotas for these courses will be con-
trolled by the Deputy for Professional Development,
MILPERCEN. .-= (
43
Personal Equipment & Rescue/ Survival Lowdown
< 3 ~ ~
UIIAAAVa
If you have a ques tion about
personal equipment or
rescue/s urvi val gear. writ e Pearl.
USAAA VS. ft . Rucker. A L 3636 2
CW2 Craig C. Laing
UNIT-LEVEL LIFE
SUPPORT SECTION
Is your unit having difficulty in main-
taining and repairing life support
equipment? This article tells how one
unit solved the problem.
T
HIS IS EA G LE 246. Request immediate de-
scent to one two thousand, over. "
"Eagle 246, are you experiencing any problems?"
"That' s affirm; my oxygen mask has malfunctioned."
"Eagle 246, you are cleared to one two thousand
feet; report reaching."
" Roger. We are leaving two one thousand; we'll
call reaching twelve."
Early in 1975, a new aviation company was
deployed to the central part of South Korea to con-
ductU-21 high altitude reconnaissance flights. Each
mission required flight above 20,000 feet with only a
pilot and copilot aboard. The crew wore the Army A-
13 oxygen mask with the SPH-4 helmet for as much as
4 hours' duration.
Toward the end of the first month of flying, I was
orbiting at 2 1,000 feet when I heard a slightly garbled
transmission from another pilot at the same altitude.
He was requesting an immediate descent to 12,000
feet because something was wrong with his oxygen
mask. 1 imagined him experiencing some of the same
symptoms I had encountered once on a high altitude
flight in the States-lightheadiness, spots before my
eyes, and worst of all, not being able to move or con-
trol myself as I normally would have.
The following week another pilot's oxygen mask ex-
halation valve malfunctioned. By this time several
pilots were beginning to complain about discomfort
and fatigue associated with the A-I3 mask when used
with the SPH -4 hel met. In fact, they began to question
how much thought our higher command had given to
essential life support equipment, such as masks and
survival vests, and proper fit and comfort of the
helmet.
Like myself, a few of the pilots who had experienced
similar problems in the States before being deployed
JUNE 1976
Harness being sewn to ensure individual optimum fit
to Korea had procured the MBU-5/P Air Force mask
as we believed it was more comfortable and reliable
than the A-13 Army oxygen mask during prolonged
high altitude flights.
As complaints poured in from the pilots wearing the
SPH-4 with the A-13 oxygen mask, the safety officer
and I realized that something had to be done to pre-
vent compromising flight safety. What we needed was
a unit Ii fe support section and a specialist to properly
maintain the pilot' s life support equipment. Great
idea! Only one problem-we had no established
guidelines, Army regulations or experienced personnel
to aid us in setting up such a section. So, we were on
our own.
Fortunately, we heard that the Korean Air Force
across the field used all American-made equipment
and had a good life support shop. A visit to their shop
confirmed this and also provided us with some infor-
mation on how to set up our section. The first thing we
needed was equipment racks for storing the helmets
and masks when not in use. These racks would also
allow for proper drying of the equipment after each
mission. The Koreans accommodated us by making
two storage racks from old waterpipe we informally
procured from the facilities engineers. Within one
week, the pipes were straighten.ed, welded together,
painted and placed in the flight planning room. The
45
UNIT-LEVEL LIFE SUPPORT SECTION
racks were labeled with the aviators' names and they
were advised to store their helmets, masks and sur-
vival vests (which had been requisitioned) next to their
name plates following each mission. This procedure
was fully supported by our commander. However, this
was just the beginning.
We next found ourselves in the helmet repair
business, as maintenance at any level was not
available in Korea and it seemed ridiculous to
purchase a new SPH -4 just because of a cracked visor
or a missing screw. Also, it was a waste of money
when at that particular time the helmet cost $170 as
compared to, for example, the mike boom assembly
which cost only $32. To remedy this situation, we ob-
tained some unserviceable helmets and used their
various parts for repair and replacement. Next, we
found ourselves cleaning visors, changing mike
booms, tightening screws and adjusting the straps on
the helmets to ensure a better fit.
Our next project was to informally procure enough
properly fitted Air orce MBU-5/P oxygen masks for
all our aviators. I pent a lot of time with an Air Force
life support specialist to learn as much as possible
about care and maintenance of the mask and helmet.
Each mask had to be torn down and cleaned with
alcohol and Phisohex every 30 days. This took almost
half my duty time.
At this point, the commander decided we needed a
life support officer. There is no regulation which re-
quires such a position and I was informally assigned as
one of the Army's first life support officers.
The next order of business was to requisition repair
and replacement parts through Army channels to
maintain the masks. Extensive coordination was re-
46
quired before we received these items. Within 2
months after requisition, we had a prescribed loads list
of more than 40 line items.
I was then challenged with writing a unit level life
support SOP. After studying every existing Air Force
Technical Order on life support equipment and con-
ducting personal interviews with Air Force life sup-
port equipment specialists, I came up with a workable
SOP which I was satisfied could be implemented with
the available resources in Korea. This SOP outlined
the responsibilities and duties of the life support of-
ficer, life support technician and flight crewmembers;
the physical layout of the equipment storage racks and
life support room; the maintenance requirements of
and precautions to be taken in the life support room;
and the reference publications to be maintained.
I then drew up plans for a work bench and work
counter /storage area, because by this time our work
area needed expanding. I also installed four wall
lockers to accommodate the growing inventory of
supplies and equipment.
On receipt of the survival vests we had ordered, 3
days were required to assemble the vests and explain
the use of each piece of equipment to all
crewmembers. The survival radio is not a component
of the vest and more orders were initiated. When this
item arrived, test equipment was needed to check the
batteries. We procured two surplus battery test sets
(TS-2530/UR, TM 11-5820-800-12, radio set
AN /PRC-90) from the Air Force which could be used
to test the total charge in milliamps of both the strobe
light (marker distress) and survival radio batteries. In
Flight planning and life support room
addition, we initiated a 30-day inspection period for
all vests, checking and testing each item as necessary
to include a complete operational check of the
AN /PRC-90 survival radio and strobe light. We in-
serted a card in one of the pockets to show the date of
inspection, meter readings of each battery and the in-
spector's initials.
Presently, our Life Support Section is almost com-
plete and our normal routine consists of cleaning
masks monthly, inspecting and repairing helmets, in-
specting survival vest components, presenting classes
on a wide variety of subjects, indoctrinating new
crewmembers on how to use life support equipment
and finalizing the prescribed loads list.
Whenever I recall the problems involved in es-
tablishing this section, I take much pride in realizing
that our unit is one of few which has a life support sec-
tion. In fact, we have a saying in the unit that "when
all else fails, you can depend on our life support
equipment."
Editor's note: In this article, the pilot requested
clearance for descent when he experienced difficulty
with his oxygen mask. However, in accordance with
paragraph 1-4b, section I, chapter 1, AR 95-1, and
paragraph 91 .3b, part 91, Federal A viation Rules,
which provide for deviation from flight regulation dur-
ing an emergency situation, this aviator could have
begun descent immediately and then contacted A TC
to inform them of the emergency. Also, as stated in
paragraph 1-17, AR 95-1, the pilot in command of an
aircraft is the final authority for all aspects oj the
technical operation of his aircraft until the designation
Life support equipment racks
is terminated or the flight plan is closed, whichever is
later.
If your unit is having problems with oxygen system
components and procedures contact Commander,
U.S. A rmy A viation Systems Command, ATTN:
A viation Life Support Manager, P. O. Box 209, St.
Louis , MO 63166, or call AUTOVON 698-
3241/3291. A Iso, it is suggested that you submit
Equipment Improvement Reports using Forms 2407
and 2407-1 in accordance with paragraph 3-16, TM
38-750, dated November 1972, on life support equip-
ment which does not provide adequate protection, per-
form as designed or fulfill your needs, or which
hampers the user when performing his duties.
CW2 Laing touches up paint on helmet, which is part of the
daily inspection
CW2 Laing entered the Army in 1969. Upon com-
pleting fixed wing flight school at Ft. Rucker, AL,
he was assigned to a U.S. Army Security Agency
(USASA) unit in EI Paso, TX. From there he went
to Vietnam. He next attended U-21 IP school at
Rucker and was assigned as an SIP for a USASA
unit at Ft. Bliss, TX. He attended the Rotary Wing
Qualification Course before going to the 146th
USASA Company in Korea. Presently, CW2 Laing
is attending the Warrant Officer Advanced Course
at Rucker before being assigned to the TRADOC
Flight Detachment at Ft. Monroe, VA.
47
..
If.
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;USAASO Sez
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48
Pilots and Controllers - TAKE HEED
T
HE FEDERAL AVIATION Administration (FAA) has noted that there is a continued tendency
toward incidents or near incidents that can be attributed to the lack of proper identification
in air/ground communications.
The FAA realizes that both the controller and the pilot are interested in cutting down on fre-
quency congestion. While this effort is commendable, there are some instances where their combined
efforts can lead each other into a trap.
The controller's handbook has provisions for abbreviated transmissions. In the case of call
signs, however, the controllers may not abbreviate similar sounding identification, the identifi-
cation of an air carrier or other civil aircraft having an FAA authorized call sign. The Airman's Infor-
mation Manual cautions pilots that "abbreviated aircraft identifications are not to be used
except when initiated by the ground station." Still there are incidents traceable to t he misuse
of call signs.
The FAA is not interested in placing the blame for these type incidents on one or the other part of the
controller /pilot team. They are vitally interested in highlighting this problem to both sides and point-
ing out how one can help the other to prevent recurrence.
The most dangerous practice is the acknowledging of a clearance without using an identification.
The simple and single "roger" has often led a controller (who has not checked) to permit
one pilot to execute a clearance that was meant for another.
Another undesirable practice is the shortening of identification to the point where the wrong
person is acknowledging or executing a clearance. This happens particularly when the idenfi-
cation prefix is dropped either by the controller or the pilot.
Two good rules are:
NEVER acknowledge a ground transmission without including the aircraft identification .
Use abbreviated call signs, even though initiated by the ground station, as little as possible.
If any doubt at all exists, use the compl ete identification.
I SEE FLIP CHANGE PAGE 221
V F R Continued from page 23
Sir:
I would like to comment on two ar -
ticles in your A VIA TlON DIGEST:
"The Mark of the Professional" by
LTC Martin Vi ssers, October 1975, and
"Tactical Instrument Flying-Why?" by
CPT Lewis D. Ray, December 1975. I
did enjoy LTC Vi sser's article (it' s
always fun to remini sce) and do agree
with the author th at the instrument ex-
aminer who wi ll not conduct a checkride
in act ual instrument conditions needs a
reorientation in objectives. However, I
cannot agree with the statement , "We
cannot afford to spend time, effort or
money on polishing a skill that we won' t
all use on the batt lefield." I feel CPT
Ray has written an excellent article on
the subject, and probably answers the
questions better than I could. After 6
years of nying in Europe (and a few mor e
in other int eresting fog-bound locations)
I liked CPT Ray's statement , "All Army
aviators oper ating in forward areas in
any helicopter should plan on the
possibi lity of tr ansit ioning from VFR to
IFR ni ght, and back agai n if necessary,
to enhance mi s ion accompli shment and
tacti cal staying power." Beli eve it or not ,
some of us were experimenting with this
concept in Germany in the early sixties.
It can and will work . However it takes
some hard , dedicated training, involving
a time span we may not have available in
the nex t war.
If we limit ourselves to the "VFR
only" crew concept in Europe, on a
typical winter ni ght , we wi ll either lose
the batt le or experience an unacceptable
hi gh aircraft and crew loss rate! I' ll ad-
mit that it is not easy to maint ain
proficiency in all of the required skills,
but it is poss ibl e. In an era of shrinking
budgets, one bright spot on the horizon is
the new family of simulators becoming
available. Many of the e ophi sticated
training devices can be programed to
provide both a NOE and tactical instru-
ment environment in one ni ght phase.
LTC J ohn R. Di ckinson
Ch ief, BAT, TC/ OD
U.S. Army Readiness Group
Schilling Manor
Salina, KS 6740 1

! !
! AVIATION SAFETY i
.. ...
! Who Is Responsible? !
..
.. T HE is unquestionably responsible for everything his unit does or fails :
to do. No one in Army green would question this statement. You can delegate authority
but not responsibility - another true statement. So at first glance it would appear that only
one individual is responsible for aviation safety, right? - wrong! ..
Who are some'of the key members of the aviation safety team? The maintenance officer ..
comes to mind right away for he has the task of producing a respectable OR rate, constantly :-
training new maintenance types and obtaining spare parts in an austere money environment.
We can't overlook the unit safety officer. He is the guy who says you can't do this and you +,
can't do that, and you always wonder how he ever developed such a tainted view of Army avia- ..
tion. We all realize some Qbscure regulation or directiYe requires units to have instructor
pilots (IPs) and standardization programs. Everyone eagerly awaits the opportunity to show :
that fleet-footed; fast-harmed IP what pilot proficiency is aU about on the next
tion checkride. ..
At this point a,few words on standardization seem appropriate. If you ask 10 aviators what :
standardization means in Army aviation, you probably would be- surprised at the different
answers. You might define standardization in flying as performing duties in a uniform manner ..
. 'and being consistent. Of course you must realize that it is possible to be .consistently wrong. , ..
An oversimplistic view of standardization is to ensure crewmembers perform assigned duties ... =
in the proper manner. There is no substitute for a thorough preflight and use of a checklist
(regardless of your experience level). Individual standardization facilitates the exchange of
pilot and copilot duties in the unit and provides a degree of flexibility necessary to provide
timely aviation support. Unit standardization permits employment of Army aviation as a
member of the combined arms team the scale demanded for successful engagement on the .........-
high threat battlefield. Does your unit have an aggressive standardization program? Is the
commander involved and committed to the program? Does he attend stan.. -+'
dardization and safety meetings? ;."
Have we overlooked anyone in the unit who contributes or fails to contribute to aviation
safety? Of course! We haven't talked", about you! YOli are aviation safety. After you strap in
4i
:
and run through the checklist and reach opetilting RPM, the influence of the commander and
everyone else is just that - influence. Only you can enforce safety at this p,oint. How do you
fly safely? You use all your previous experience no matter how vast or shallow; you must :
know your own capabilities and, mote importantly, your own limitations. The most important :.
thing you can do is simply use your head - there is no substitute for good old-fashioned com-
mon sense!
BRIGADIER. GENERAL E. CANEDY
Deputy Director of Operations & Army Aviation Officer
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans
'Yashington, DC
!
:
i
" , " ", :
tttt+tt++++ttt++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
T
HE TRUTH FOUND in these words
spoken by Abigail Adams lives on to
a
day, bearing more significance than ever
before, for action is the chief ingredient
in the recipe for success in any endeavor.
In the area of Army aviation, we long
ago initiated action to enhance safety. Our
present aviation safety program is a result
of this action.
Over the years we have developed and
published rules of flying-procedures, controls,
guidelines, regulations-covering just about every
conceivable situation. These rules, if acted upon,
will prevent accidents. Yet, we see the same types
of accidents these rules were written to prevent
occurring over and over again. This leads us to
believe that too many of our safety programs
get more talk than action.
Before the door to success of our joint
safety effort can be opened, it must first be
unlocked. YOU are the key. We have the '" 5'
program-what we need is action.
Make Aviation Safety
THE SPIRIT OF '76
ABIGAIL ADAMS
""We have too many high sounding
words and too few actions that
correspond with them."
\