Revised Recommendations for

Reducing the Risk of Human

Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission
by Blood and Blood Products
_________________________________________________

Draft Guidance for Industry

This guidance document is for comment purposes only.

Submit one set of either electronic or written comments on this draft guidance by the date
provided in the Federal Register notice announcing the availability of the draft guidance.
Submit electronic comments to http://www.regulations.gov. Submit written comments to the
Division of Dockets Management (HFA-305), Food and Drug Administration, 5630 Fishers
Lane, Rm. 1061, Rockville, MD 20852. You should identify all comments with the docket
number listed in the notice of availability that publishes in the Federal Register.
Additional copies of this guidance are available from the Office of Communication, Outreach
and Development (OCOD), 10903 New Hampshire Ave., Rm. 3128, Silver Spring, MD 209930002, or by calling 1-800-835-4709 or 240-402-7800, or email ocod@fda.hhs.gov, or from the
Internet at
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guida
nces/default.htm.
For questions on the content of this guidance, contact OCOD at the phone numbers or email
address listed above.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Food and Drug Administration
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
May 2015

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Table of Contents
I.

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1

II.

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 1
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

III.

History of Efforts to Reduce HIV Transmission by Blood Products ............... 2

Current Risk of HIV Infection Associated with Specific Behaviors ................ 3
Recent Data Relevant to the Deferral for MSM ................................................ 4
Considerations of the BOTS Working Group .................................................... 6
Outcome of HHS and FDA Advisory Committee Meetings.............................. 7
Status of Other Deferral Categories .................................................................... 8

RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................. 9
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Donor Education Material and Donor History Questionnaire ......................... 9

Donor Deferral .................................................................................................... 11
Donor Requalification ........................................................................................ 12
Product Retrieval and Quarantine; Notification of Consignees of Blood and
Blood Components .............................................................................................. 13
Product Disposition and Labeling ..................................................................... 14
Biological Product Deviation Reporting ........................................................... 16
Testing Requirements and Considerations....................................................... 17

IV.

IMPLEMENTATION .................................................................................................... 17

V.

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 19

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Revised Recommendations for Reducing the Risk of Human

Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission by
Blood and Blood Products
Draft Guidance for Industry
This draft guidance, when finalized, will represent the Food and Drug Administrations (FDAs
or Agencys) current thinking on this topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any
person and does not operate to bind FDA or the public. You can use an alternative approach if
the approach satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations. If you want to
discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff responsible for implementing this
guidance using the contact information on the title page of this guidance.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This guidance document provides you, blood establishments that collect blood or blood
components, including Source Plasma, with FDAs revised donor deferral recommendations for
individuals with increased risk for transmitting human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection.
We (FDA) are also recommending that you make corresponding revisions to your donor
education materials, donor history questionnaires and accompanying materials, along with
revisions to your donor requalification and product management procedures. This guidance also
incorporates certain other recommendations related to donor education materials and testing
contained in the memorandum to blood establishments entitled, Revised Recommendations for
the Prevention of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Transmission by Blood and Blood
Products, dated April 23, 1992 (1992 blood memo) (Ref. 1). When finalized, it will supersede
that 1992 blood memo. The recommendations contained in this guidance apply to the collection
of blood and blood components, including Source Plasma.
FDAs guidance documents, including this guidance, do not establish legally enforceable
responsibilities. Instead, guidances describe the FDAs current thinking on a topic and should be
viewed only as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited.
The use of the word should in FDAs guidances means that something is suggested or
recommended, but not required.

II.

BACKGROUND

The emergence of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the early 1980s and the
recognition that it could be transmitted by blood and blood products had profound effects on the
United States (U.S.) blood system (Refs. 2, 3, 4). Although initially identified in men who have
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sex with men (MSM) and associated with male-to-male sexual contact, AIDS was soon noted to
be potentially transmitted by transfusion of blood components, and by infusion of clotting factor
concentrates in individuals with hemophilia (Refs. 5, 6). Subsequently, AIDS was also found to
be associated with heterosexual transmission through commercial sex work and with intravenous
drug use (Refs. 7, 8). In 1983, AIDS was reported to be associated with the virus now known as
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The historical understanding of HIV transmission at this
point in 1983 informed the first blood donor deferral policy, which at the time was seeking to
reduce the transmission of HIV through blood product transfusion.
A.

History of Efforts to Reduce HIV Transmission by Blood Products

Beginning in 1983, the FDA issued recommendations for providing donors with
educational material on risk factors for AIDS and for deferring donors with such risk
factors in an effort to prevent transmission of AIDS (later understood to be caused by
HIV) by blood and blood products (Refs. 2, 9, 10, 11). Providing donor education
material and asking at-risk donors not to donate was demonstrated to have a significant
impact on preventing HIV transmission prior to the availability of testing (Ref. 12).
However, thousands of recipients of blood and blood components for transfusion and
recipients of plasma-derived clotting factors became infected with HIV before the
causative virus was identified and the first screening tests for HIV were approved in 1985
(Refs. 2, 4, 10).
Since September 1985, FDA has recommended that blood establishments indefinitely
defer male donors who have had sex with another male, even one time, since 1977, due to
the strong clustering of AIDS illness in the MSM community and the subsequent
discovery of high rates of HIV infection in that population (Ref. 13). On April 23, 1992,
FDA issued the 1992 blood memo, which contains the current recommendations
regarding the deferral for MSM as well as the deferral recommendations for other
persons with behaviors associated with high rates of HIV exposure, namely commercial
sex workers, intravenous drug users, and certain individuals with other risk factors.
The use of donor education material, specific deferral questions, and advances in HIV
donor testing (e.g., HIV antibody assays, p24 antigen assays, and nucleic acid tests
(NAT)) have reduced the risk of HIV transmission from blood transfusion from about 1
in 2500 units prior to HIV testing to a current estimated residual risk of about 1 in 1.47
million transfusions (Refs. 14, 15). The development of pathogen inactivation
procedures for products manufactured from pooled plasma in the 1980s improved the
safety of these products by inactivating lipid-enveloped viruses. No transmissions of
HIV, hepatitis B virus (HBV), or hepatitis C virus (HCV) have been documented through
U.S.-licensed plasma derived products in the past two decades (Ref. 16).
Relating in large part to the development of more sensitive HIV testing methodologies,
there have been calls in the social and scientific literature to revisit the blood donor
deferral policies that were established about three decades ago, in particular, with regard
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to the deferral of MSM. During the period from 1997 to 2010, FDA held a number of
public meetings, including workshops and Blood Product Advisory Committee (BPAC)
meetings to further review evidence and to discuss its blood donor deferral policies to
help prevent the transmission of HIV (Refs. 17, 18, 19, 20). In June 2010, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) brought the issue of deferral of men
who have had sex with another man, even one time, since 1977, for public discussion at a
meeting of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability (the Committee).
The Committee heard presentations of currently available scientific data as well as
comments from the public. The Committee recommended to the HHS Secretary that the
current MSM deferral policy, while suboptimal, should be retained pending the
completion of targeted research studies that might support a safe alternative policy (Ref.
21).
Based on these recommendations, in September 2010, an Interagency Blood, Organ &
Tissue Safety Working Group on MSM (BOTS Working Group), consisting of
representatives from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), National Institutes of Health (NIH),
HHS Office of Civil Rights, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (OASH), and
FDA, was charged by the Assistant Secretary for Health with exploring the feasibility of
a data and science-driven policy change. Subsequently, the BOTS Working Group
designed and implemented one operational assessment and three research studies to gain
more information to help inform a potential policy change. In addition, it considered the
possibility of conducting a pilot study to assess the effect of a policy change. However,
following review of comments received in response to a Federal Register notice titled,
Request for Information (RFI) on Design of a Pilot Operational Study To Assess
Alternative Blood Donor Deferral Criteria for Men Who Have Had Sex With Other Men
(MSM) (77 FR 14801, March 13, 2012) (Ref. 22), requesting comment on potential
pilot study designs, as well as further considerations regarding the significant statistical,
financial and logistical challenges in implementing such a study, the BOTS Working
Group decided that such a pilot study examining the potential effects of a policy change
would not be feasible. Instead, the BOTS Working Group determined that resources at
HHS could be used in more efficient ways to carefully review the studies that had been
initiated (results of which are summarized in section II.C. below), to complete its review
of the blood donation deferral criteria, and to establish a blood safety monitoring system.
B.

Current Risk of HIV Infection Associated with Specific Behaviors

Recent data indicate that commercial sex work (CSW) and injection drug use (IDU) are
behaviors that continue to place individuals both at a relatively high risk of HIV infection
and at a relatively high risk of window period transmission of HIV (Ref. 23) and few data
are available on the HIV risk in individuals who have discontinued CSW and IDU (Ref.
24). Deferral policies for CSW and IDU are also based on risks for transfusion
transmitted infectious diseases, in addition to HIV, that are associated with these
behaviors (Ref. 25).
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Together, these findings continue to support an indefinite deferral of individuals currently

or previously involved in CSW and IDU behaviors. Therefore, absent additional data, we
have not proposed a change to current deferral policies for CSW or IDU.
Although MSM represent a small percentage of the U.S. male population (approximately
7% of men report that they have ever participated in MSM activity and approximately 4%
of men report that they engaged in MSM activity in the last 5 years 1) (Ref. 26), they
comprise a large proportion of adults in the United States with existing and newly
diagnosed HIV infections. Among persons living with HIV in 2011, CDC estimates that
57% were MSM (including MSM who were also IDU) (Ref. 27). MSM remain at
increased risk of HIV infection. In 2010, male-to-male sexual contact accounted for 63%
of newly diagnosed HIV infections among adults, and 78% of newly diagnosed HIV
infections in men, indicating that male-to-male sexual contact remains associated with
high risk of HIV exposure (Ref. 28).
C.

Recent Data Relevant to the Deferral for MSM

The following results became available by mid-2014, from the operational assessment
and all three of the research studies recommended by the BOTS Working Group.
1. Operational Assessment
The operational assessment examined quarantine release errors. Such errors
occur when a blood establishment accidentally releases a unit of blood that should
not have been released due to issues with donor qualification or testing. It
became clear at an FDA workshop held in September 2011 that HIV risk from
quarantine release errors has been minimized effectively by increased use of
computerized inventory management, with a remaining small risk of human
errors. Following the workshop, a White Paper was produced by AABB on this
topic which describes a number of measures that could be taken to characterize
and prevent such errors (Ref. 29). Quarantine release errors currently appear to
contribute minimally to the risk of HIV transmission through the blood supply
(Ref. 30).
2. Donor History Questionnaire Study
The Donor History Questionnaire (DHQ) Study involved cognitive interviews
with potential donors. After receiving donor education materials, the potential
donors completed the donor history questionnaire, and were then interviewed
regarding their responses (Ref. 31). The key result of this study, which was
1

Purcell et al., have reported that the estimation of the MSM population as a percent of all males over 13 years
differ by recall period: Past 1 year = 2.9%; past 5 years = 3.9%; and ever = 6.9%.

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highly consistent for both individuals who only have sex with partners of the
opposite sex and MSM, was that individuals respond to questions posed by the
questionnaire as if they were answering the more general and subjective question
in the self-assessed context of is my blood safe, rather than providing an answer
to the literal questions as asked. In addition, the study found that potential donors
might have benefited from shorter donor education materials and the ability to
answer I dont know to questions that currently accept only yes or no
responses.
3. Retrovirus Epidemiology Donor Study-II (REDS II) Transfusion-Transmitted
Retrovirus and Hepatitis Virus Rates and Risk Factors Study
The REDS-II Transfusion-Transmitted Retrovirus and Hepatitis Virus Rates and
Risk Factors Study 2011-2013 was a pilot blood donor surveillance study that
evaluated four viral markers (HBV, HCV, human T cell lymphotrophic virus
(HTLV), and HIV) in just over 50% of the nations blood supply (Ref. 32). It
also determined behavioral risk factors that were associated with donations of
blood that tested positive for one of these viruses compared with control
donations. In addition to demonstrating the feasibility of conducting such a
surveillance program, there were several key findings. These included the finding
that for each of these viral infections, the primary behavioral risk factors were
consistent with the known epidemiology for each infection in the United States
and validated the current blood donor deferral criteria. Sex with an HIV-positive
partner and a history of male-to-male sexual contact remained the two leading
independent risk factors for HIV infection in blood donors as originally observed
in CDC-funded studies from the early 1990s. Sex with an HIV-positive partner
was associated with a 132-fold increase in risk (multivariate adjusted odds ratio)
for being HIV-positive, and a history of male-to-male sexual contact was
associated with a 62-fold increase in risk. By comparison, the increase in risk for
a history of multiple sexual partners of the opposite sex in the last year was 2.3fold.
4. Recipient Epidemiology and Donor Evaluation Study-III (REDS-III) Blood
Donation Rules Opinion Study (BloodDROPS)
BloodDROPS examined the opinions of MSM regarding the blood donor deferral
policy (Ref. 33) through web-based surveys of the MSM community and noncompliant MSM who donated blood. A key finding of particular note was that
MSM, who comprise approximately 7% (Ref. 26) of the U.S. male population
represent an estimated 2.6% of male blood donors. Although the data were
determined by different methodologies, they suggest an increase in the proportion
of blood donors reporting MSM behavior from 0.7% in 1993 and 1.7% in 1998.
The qualitative responses by both donating and non-donating groups of MSM
revealed that these individuals view the current policy as discriminatory and
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stigmatizing, and that some individuals knowingly donate despite the deferral.
When asked about shortening the deferral period, since last male-to-male sexual
contact, the most common response was that one year was acceptable as a
compromise, especially if shorter periods might be considered after confirming
the safety of the new policy. The web-based community survey revealed that
approximately 90% of MSM think the MSM blood donation deferral should
change, and 59% of MSM reported they would comply with a change to a oneyear deferral. Of the 83 blood donors who reported male-to-male sexual contact,
50.6% reported that they would adhere to a one-year deferral and 18.4% reported
dont know. Among the subset of the 30 MSM blood donors who had reported
male-to-male sexual contact in the past year, 19 (62%) reported that they would
adhere to a future one-year deferral and 3 (10%) indicated that they dont know
if they would adhere to a one-year deferral (Ref. 32).
The prevalence of HIV infection in male blood donors who reported that they
were MSM was determined to be 0.25%, which is much lower than the estimated
11-12% HIV prevalence in the population of individuals reporting regular MSM
behavior (Ref. 33). This indicates that considerable self-selection likely took
place in individuals who presented to donate.
5. Supportive Data on Australian MSM Policy Change
Some epidemiologic data are available from countries that have changed their
deferral policy for MSM (Refs. 34, 35). The most robust data measuring the
impact of these policy changes are available from Australia (Ref. 36). Australia
also has a voluntary blood donor system and has a similar percentage of men
reporting male-to-male sexual contact at some time during their lives (5%
compared with 7% in the United States (Ref. 26). During the five years before
and five years after a change from a lifetime deferral to a one-year deferral in
Australia, there was no change in risk to the blood supply, defined by the number
of HIV positive donations per year and the proportion of HIV-positive donors
with male-to-male sex as a risk factor. In addition, the compliance rate with the
one-year MSM deferral among male donors in Australia following the policy
change was >99.7% (Ref. 37). Of note, unlike in the U.S., donors in Australia
must sign a declaration in the presence of blood center staff that they understand
that there are penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for providing false or
misleading information.
D.

Considerations of the BOTS Working Group

Over the course of its deliberations, the BOTS Working Group reviewed and discussed
several different options for the MSM policy:
no change,
change to a five-year deferral,
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change to a one-year deferral,

change to a deferral less than one year,
pre-testing of potential donors, and
deferral based upon individual risk assessment.

Although not making a change would maintain the current level of safety of the blood
supply, as noted above, there is evidence that the deferral policy is becoming less
effective over time. In addition, the policy is perceived by some as discriminatory. The
data that a five-year deferral would be safer than a one-year deferral are not compelling.
However, some have argued that a five-year deferral would, in theory, add a safeguard by
allowing time for intervention against an emerging infectious disease that might spread
rapidly among MSM and be transmitted through blood transfusion. Sufficient data are
not available to assess the effectiveness of selecting MSM with low HIV risk based on
deferral times of less than one year since last exposure. The individual risk-based options
were not determined to be viable options for a policy change at this time for a number of
reasons: pretesting would be logistically challenging, and would likely also be viewed as
discriminatory by some individuals, and individual risk assessment by trained medical
professionals would be very difficult to validate and implement in our current blood
donor system due to resource constraints. Additionally, the available epidemiologic data
in the published literature do not support the concept that MSM who report mutual
monogamy with a partner or who report routine use of safe sex practices are at low risk
for HIV. Specifically, the rate of partner infidelity in ostensibly monogamous
heterosexual couples and same-sex male couples is estimated to be about 25%, and
condom use is associated with a 1 to 2% failure rate per episode of anal intercourse (Refs.
38, 39, 40, 41). In addition, the prevalence of HIV infection is significantly higher in
MSM with multiple male partners compared with individuals who have only multiple
opposite sex partners (Ref. 28).
Change to a one-year deferral is also supported by other evidence, including the
experience in countries that have already changed their policies to a one-year deferral
(Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Hungary, Japan, Sweden and United Kingdom). In
addition, this change would potentially better harmonize the deferral for MSM with the
one-year deferral in place for both men and women who engage in certain other sexual
behaviors associated with an increased risk of HIV exposure (e.g., sex with an HIVpositive partner, sex with a commercial sex worker). Thus, following careful review, the
BOTS Working Group was supportive of a policy change to a one-year deferral for
MSM.
E.

Outcome of HHS and FDA Advisory Committee Meetings

Following deliberation of the BOTS Working Group, two advisory committee meetings
were held. The HHS Advisory Committee on Blood and Tissue Safety and Availability
(ACBTSA) met on November 13, 2014, to review the MSM deferral policy (Ref. 33).
The scientific information described in sections II.C. and D. was presented to the
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ACBTSA members along with the BOTS Working Group recommendation.
Additionally, the meeting included an open public hearing session. The Committee voted
16 to 2 to recommend a policy change to a one-year MSM deferral. It also recommended
that this change be accompanied by establishment of a robust system to monitor the
safety of the blood supply and a communication plan on the policy change targeted to all
stakeholders.
Subsequently, on December 2, 2014, the FDA BPAC met to consider measurement of
HIV incidence in blood donors as an additional method to assess transfusion risk, and the
potential value of laboratory tests to detect recently acquired HIV infections in
seropositive donors as part of a Transfusion Transmissible Infections Monitoring System
(TTIMS) (Ref. 42). An open public hearing was also held. At that meeting, FDA noted
that it intended to establish a general program to monitor the safety of the blood supply in
collaboration with the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI), which could
monitor for a number of different transfusion-transmitted viral infections. FDA also
noted that it intended to engage in public discussions of issues such as enhancements to
education about the donation of safe blood and further evaluation of the effectiveness of
the blood donor history questionnaire. In their comments, some BPAC committee
members indicated support for a change in MSM deferral policy to one year, and most
members noted that they considered concomitant establishment of a blood donor
monitoring program a prerequisite for any policy change. On the topic of testing for
recency of HIV infection, several BPAC committee members commented that tests
looking at how recently HIV infection had been (recency tests 2) could potentially be very
useful additions to the established measures of incidence for monitoring the safety of the
blood supply.
F.

Status of Other Deferral Categories

In addition to the behavioral deferrals noted for MSM, CSW and IDU, the 1992 blood
memo addressed several other deferrals that had been recommended in order to reduce
the risk of HIV transmission through the blood supply (Ref. 1). For most of these
deferrals, directly applicable data are not available at this time to support a change in the
existing deferral policies. In the case of the deferral for persons with hemophilia or
related clotting disorders who have received clotting factor concentrates, the rationale for
deferral has changed from prevention of HIV transmission to that of ensuring that donors
are not harmed by the use of large bore needles used during the donation process. While
2

HIV recency tests typically involve detailed assessment of the strength and characteristics of antibody profiles that
develop and change over time in response to HIV infection. Thus, it appears to be technically feasible that a
serologically-based HIV recency test, once validated in a blood donor setting, could reflect a high likelihood that an
HIV infection occurred within a certain interval of time (e.g., in the past six months). While such tests are not yet
FDA-approved for this purpose, this additional measure of new HIV infection may increase the statistical power to
assess whether HIV incidence in the blood donor pool changed significantly after a change in the deferral
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21 CFR 640.3(c)(3) currently requires deferral for receipt of any derivative of human
blood which the FDA has advised is a possible source of viral hepatitis, given the
enhanced safety measures now used in the manufacture of clotting factor concentrates
(Ref. 16), FDA does not consider the receipt of FDA-licensed clotting factor concentrates
to be a risk factor for hepatitis. Further, FDA has not recommended a deferral for the
receipt of other FDA-licensed plasma-derivatives because of HIV or hepatitis risk 3, and
we intend to consider revisions to the current regulations.

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following sections summarize the revised recommendations related to blood donor deferral
and requalification related to reducing the risk of HIV transmission by blood and blood products.
Given the passage of time, and in order to simplify practical application of these criteria for
donors and blood collection establishments, reference to since 1977 present currently for some
criteria has been dropped as the period of time during which individuals are assessed to be at risk
of transmitting HIV.
A.

Donor Education Material and Donor History Questionnaire

1. We recommend that donors be provided donor education material before each
donation explaining the risk of HIV transmission by blood and blood
products, certain behaviors associated with the risk of HIV infection, and the
signs and symptoms associated with HIV infection, so that donors can selfdefer. The donor education material should be presented to donors in a
manner they will understand, which may include oral, written, or multimedia
formats. The donor education material should instruct the donor not to donate
when a risk factor for HIV infection or signs or symptoms of HIV infection
are present. The donor education material should indicate that individuals
who have engaged in any activity or who have any risk factor that would
result in a deferral (see section III.B. of this guidance) should not donate
blood or blood components.
2. We recommend that blood collection establishments update their donor
education material, DHQ, including full-length and abbreviated DHQs, and
accompanying materials (e.g., flow charts) and processes to incorporate the
recommendations provided in this guidance.
3. We recommend that the updated DHQ include the following elements to
assess donors for risk:

Consistent with the donor history questionnaires and accompanying materials prepared by AABB and Plasma
Protein Therapeutics Association (PPTA) and found acceptable by FDA, a voluntary donor deferral exists for the
receipt of Hepatitis B Immune Globulin because the donor had been recently exposed to hepatitis B virus.

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i.

A history ever of a positive 4 test for HIV,

ii.

A history ever of exchanging sex 5 for money or drugs,

iii.

A history ever of non-prescription injection drug use 6,

iv.

A history in the past 12 months of sex with a person with a positive

test for HIV, a history of exchanging sex for money or drugs, or a
history of non-prescription injection drug use,

v.

A history in the past 12 months of receiving a transfusion of Whole

Blood or blood components such as packed red blood cells, platelets,
or plasma,

vi.

A history in the past 12 months of contact with blood of another

individual through percutaneous inoculation such as a needle stick or
through contact with a donors open wound or mucous membranes,

vii.

A history in the past 12 months of a tattoo, ear or body piercing,

viii.

A history in the past 12 months of syphilis or gonorrhea, or treatment

for syphilis or gonorrhea,

ix.

For male donors: a history in the past 12 months of sex with another
man,

x.

For female donors: a history in the past 12 months of sex with a man
who has had sex with another man.

Note: In the context of the donor history questionnaire, male or female gender is
taken to be self-identified and self-reported. In instances where a donor has
asserted a change in gender identification, medical directors may exercise
discretion with regard to donor eligibility.

In this context, positive includes positive test results on an HIV diagnostic assay and repeatedly reactive or
reactive results on antibody or NAT blood donor screening assays, respectively.
5
Throughout this guidance the term sex refers to having anal, oral, or vaginal sex, regardless of whether or not a
condom or other protection is used.
6
Non-prescription injection drug use includes not only the injection of non-prescription drugs, but also includes the
improper injection of legally-prescribed drugs, such as injecting a prescription drug intended for oral administration
or injecting a prescription drug that was prescribed for another individual.

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B.

Donor Deferral

We recommend that you defer as follows:

1. Defer indefinitely an individual who has ever had a positive test for HIV.
2. Defer indefinitely an individual who has ever exchanged sex for money or
drugs.
3. Defer indefinitely an individual who has ever engaged in non-prescription
injection drug use.
4. Defer for 12 months from the most recent contact any individual who has a
history of sex with a person who: has ever had a positive test for HIV, ever
exchanged sex for money or drugs, or ever engaged in non-prescription
injection drug use.
5. Defer for 12 months from the most recent transfusion any individual who has
a history of receiving a transfusion of Whole Blood or blood components.
6. Defer for 12 months from the most recent exposure, any individual who has a
history of contact with blood of another individual through percutaneous
inoculation such as a needle stick or through contact with a donors open
wound or mucous membranes.
7. Defer for 12 months from the most recent tattoo, ear or body piercing, an
individual who has a history of tattoo, ear or body piercing. However,
individuals who have undergone tattooing within 12 months of donation are
eligible to donate if the tattoo was applied by a state regulated entity with
sterile needles and non-reused ink. Individuals who have undergone ear or
body piercing within 12 months of donation are eligible to donate if the
piercing was done using single-use equipment.
8. Defer for 12 months after completion of treatment, an individual with a
history of syphilis or gonorrhea, or an individual with a history of diagnosis or
treatment for syphilis or gonorrhea in the past 12 months.
9. Defer for 12 months from the most recent contact, a man who has had sex
with another man during the past 12 months.
10. Defer for 12 months from the most recent contact, a female who has had sex
during the past 12 months with a man who has had sex with another man.
We recommend that you defer indefinitely an individual with hemophilia or related
clotting factor deficiencies requiring treatment with clotting factor concentrates for
reasons of donor safety, rather than based upon the risk of HIV infection.

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Note: Additional recommendations for donor deferral to reduce the risk of HIV
transmission by blood and blood products have been established in other FDA guidance
documents, including:

Guidance for Industry: Recommendations for Screening, Testing, and

Management of Blood Donors and Blood and Blood Components Based on
Screening Tests for Syphilis, dated September 2014;

Guidance for Industry - Recommendations for Management of Donors at

Increased Risk for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) Group O
Infection, dated August 2009; and,

Memorandum to All Registered Blood Establishments - Recommendations

for the Deferral of Current and Recent Inmates of Correctional Institutions as
Donors of Whole Blood, Blood Components, Source Leukocytes, and Source
Plasma, dated June 8, 1995.

Note: Collections from donors at risk of HIV infection must be approved by CBER
consistent with the Guideline for Collection of Blood or Blood Products from Donors
with Positive Tests for Infectious Disease Markers (High Risk Donors), dated
September 1989.
C.

Donor Requalification
1. Donors deferred because of a history of sex during the past 12 months with
any of the following individuals: a person who has a positive test for HIV; a
person with a history of exchanging sex for money or drugs; or a person with
a history of non-prescription injection drug use, may be eligible to donate
provided that 12 months since the last contact have passed and they meet all
other donor eligibility criteria.
2. Donors deferred because of a history of receiving a transfusion of Whole
Blood or blood components such as packed red blood cells, platelets, or
plasma during the past 12 months may be eligible to donate if 12 months have
passed since their last transfusion and they meet all other donor eligibility
criteria.
3. Donors deferred because of a history of contact with blood of another
individual through percutaneous inoculation such as a needle stick or through
contact with a donors open wound or mucous membranes during the past 12
months may be eligible to donate if 12 months have passed since their last
exposure and they meet all other donor eligibility criteria.
4. Donors deferred because of a history of tattoo, ear or body piercing in the past
12 months may be eligible to donate if 12 months have passed since their last
tattoo, ear or body piercing and they meet all other donor eligibility criteria.
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5. Donors deferred because of a history of syphilis or gonorrhea, or treatment for
syphilis or gonorrhea in the past 12 months may be eligible to donate if 12
months have passed since diagnosis and completion of treatment and they
meet all other donor eligibility criteria.
6. Male donors previously deferred because of a history of sex with another man,
even one time, since 1977, may be eligible to donate provided that they have
not had sex with another man during the past 12 months and they meet all
other donor eligibility criteria
7. Male donors deferred because of a history of sex with another man in the past
12 months may be eligible to donate provided they have not had sex with
another man during the past 12 months and they meet all other donor
eligibility criteria.
8. Female donors deferred because of a history of sex in the past 12 months with
a man who has had sex with another man may be eligible to donate provided
that during the past 12 months they have not had sex with a man who has had
sex with another man and they meet all other donor eligibility criteria.
D.
Product Retrieval and Quarantine; Notification of Consignees of Blood and
Blood Components
If you collected blood or blood components from a donor who tests reactive for HIV on
that donation, or when you are made aware of other reliable test results or information
indicating evidence of HIV infection, you must follow the HIV lookback requirements
in 21 CFR 610.46.
In addition, we recommend that you take the following actions if you determine that
blood or blood components have been collected from a donor who should have been
deferred according to the recommendations in section III.B. 2-10 of this guidance, for
reasons other than a positive HIV test result.
1. If you collected blood or blood components from a donor who should have
been deferred according to the recommendations in section III.B. of this
guidance, we recommend that you quarantine and destroy any undistributed
in-date blood or blood components collected from that donor.
2. If you distributed blood or blood components collected from a donor who
should have been deferred according to the recommendations in section III.B.
of this guidance, we recommend that you notify consignees of all blood and
blood components. We recommend that the consignee retrieve and quarantine
the in-date blood and blood components collected from that donor. We do not
recommend retrieval and quarantine of plasma pooled for further

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manufacturing into products that are manufactured under processes that
include validated viral clearance steps, which have been shown to be robust in
the clearance of lipid-enveloped viruses.
E.

Product Disposition and Labeling

1. We recommend that you destroy or re-label blood or blood components that
were collected from a donor who should have been deferred based on risk
factors for HIV infection in accordance with the recommendations in section
III.B. of this guidance. If you re-label the blood or blood components as
described in this section, they may be released for research or for manufacture
into noninjectable products or in vitro diagnostic reagents when no other
suitable sources are available.
a. You must use the following statement to prominently re-label the blood or
blood components originally collected for transfusion in accordance with
21 CFR 606.121(f):
NOT FOR TRANSFUSION: Collected From a Donor Determined
To Be At Risk For Infection With HIV
In addition, you should include one of the following cautionary label
statements, as applicable:
Caution: For Laboratory Research Only
or
Caution: For Further Manufacturing into In Vitro Diagnostic
Reagents For Which There Are No Alternative Sources
or
Caution: For Use in Manufacturing Noninjectable Products Only
And, for recovered plasma 7:
Not for Use in Products Subject to License Under Section 351 of the
Public Health Service Act

See FDA Compliance Policy Guide Sec 230.100 for the definition of recovered plasma.
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073861.htm

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b. You should use the following statements to prominently re-label the unpooled blood or blood components originally collected or intended for
further manufacture:
Collected from a Donor Determined to be at Risk for Infection with
HIV
And
Caution: For Laboratory Research Only
or
Caution: For Further Manufacturing into In Vitro Diagnostic
Reagents For Which There Are No Alternative Sources
or
Caution: For Use in Manufacturing Noninjectable Products Only
And, for recovered plasma:
Not for Use in Products Subject to License Under Section 351 of the
Public Health Service Act
2. You must destroy or re-label blood or blood components, including Source
Plasma, collected from a donor who currently tests reactive for HIV or
collected from a donor deferred for reactive HIV testing (21 CFR 610.40(h)).
If you re-label the blood or blood components, including Source Plasma, in
accordance with 21 CFR 610.40(h) and 606.121, the blood or blood
components may be released for research or for manufacture into
noninjectable products or in vitro diagnostic reagents when no other suitable
sources are available. You must label the reactive unit with the
BIOHAZARD legend (21 CFR 610.40(h)(2)(ii)(B)), and:
a. You must use the following statement to prominently re-label the blood or
blood components originally collected for transfusion
(21 CFR 606.121(f)):
NOT FOR TRANSFUSION: Collected From a Donor Determined
To Be Reactive for HIV
In addition, you should use one of the following cautionary label
statements, as applicable:
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Caution: For Laboratory Research Only

or
Caution: For Further Manufacturing into In Vitro Diagnostic
Reagents For Which There Are No Alternative Sources
or
Caution: For Further Manufacturing Use as a Component of a
Medical Device For Which There Are No Alternative Sources
b. You must use the following statement to prominently re-label the unpooled blood or blood components, including Source Plasma, originally
collected or intended for further manufacture
(21 CFR 610.40(h)(2)(ii)(C)):
Collected from a Donor Determined to be Reactive for Infection with
HIV
In addition, you should use one of the following cautionary label statements,
as applicable:
Caution: For Laboratory Research Only
or
Caution: For Further Manufacturing into In Vitro Diagnostic
Reagents For Which There Are No Alternative Sources
or
Caution: For Further Manufacturing Use as a Component of a
Medical Device For Which There Are No Alternative Sources
F.

Biological Product Deviation Reporting

If you have distributed blood or blood components for transfusion or for further
manufacturing, collected from a donor who should have been deferred according to
section III.B. of this guidance, you should report a biological product deviation as soon as
possible, but you must report within 45 calendar days from the date you acquire the
information reasonably suggesting that a reportable event has occurred
(21 CFR 606.171).
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G.

Testing Requirements and Considerations

Section 610.40(a) (21 CFR 610.40(a)) requires establishments that collect blood or blood
components to test each donation intended for use in preparing a product, for evidence of
infection due to HIV type 1 (HIV-1) and HIV type 2 (HIV-2). In addition,
21 CFR 610.40(b) requires you to use one or more approved screening test as necessary
to reduce adequately and appropriately the risk of transmission of HIV-1 and HIV-2.
FDA has considered the use of approved donor screening tests for antibodies to both
HIV-1 and HIV-2 as necessary to reduce adequately and appropriately the risk of
transmission of HIV. In addition, FDA recommendations on the use of approved HIV-1
nucleic acid donor screening tests to meet the requirements under 21 CFR 610.40(b) are
found in, Guidance for Industry: Use of Nucleic Acid Tests on Pooled and Individual
Samples from Donors of Whole Blood and Blood Components (including Source Plasma
and Source Leukocytes) to Adequately and Appropriately Reduce the Risk of
Transmission of HIV-1 and HCV, dated October 2004.
You must defer a donor who tests reactive by a donor-screening test for HIV-1 or HIV-2
(21 CFR 610.41), you must perform a supplemental (additional, more specific) test on
donations that test reactive on a screening test (21 CFR 610.40(e)), and you must make
reasonable attempts to notify a donor who has been deferred based on the results of tests
for communicable diseases (21 CFR 630.6). Where appropriate, donors who are deferred
because of reactive test results should be provided information about the need for medical
follow-up and counseling.
Current FDA recommendations are found in Guidance for Industry: Nucleic Acid
Testing (NAT) for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) and Hepatitis C
Virus (HCV): Testing, Product Disposition, and Donor Deferral and Reentry, dated May
2010. In addition, for the purpose of donor counseling, if a donation tests repeatedly
reactive for antibodies to HIV-1/HIV-2 or for HIV-2 on an approved donor screening
test, but HIV-1 positivity is not confirmed on an approved supplemental test, further
testing may be performed using licensed or approved tests to diagnose HIV-2 infection
and clarify the donors infection status.

IV.

IMPLEMENTATION

You may implement the recommendations once you have revised your donor education material,
DHQ, including full-length and abbreviated DHQs, and accompanying materials to reflect the
new donor deferral recommendations. Licensed blood establishments must report the indicated
revisions to FDA in the following manner (21 CFR 601.12):

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1. Revision of your donor education materials, DHQ and accompanying materials must
be submitted to FDA as a prior approval supplement (PAS) under 21 CFR 601.12(b).
Revision of a previously FDA accepted DHQ and accompanying materials must be
reported as a major change if you are revising the FDA accepted DHQ and
accompanying materials to implement these new recommendations. Report such a
change to FDA as a prior approval supplement (PAS) under 21 CFR 601.12(b).
2. If the current version of the donor educational materials, DHQ and accompanying
materials prepared by the AABB Donor History Task Force or PPTA are revised to
contain the recommendations in this guidance and are found acceptable by FDA, we
would consider the implementation of the donor education materials, DHQ and
accompanying materials to be minor changes, if implemented without modification
and in their entirety as a complete process for administering questions to donors.
Report such a change to FDA in your annual report under 21 CFR 601.12(d), noting
the date the process was implemented.

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V.

REFERENCES

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the Prevention of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Transmission by Blood and Blood
Products, April 23, 1992.
2. Epstein JS, Jaffe HW, Alter HJ, Klein HG, Blood system changes since recognition of
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4. Dubin C, Francis D, Closing the circle: a thirty-year retrospective on the AIDS/blood
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5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Pneumocystis
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6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Possible
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7. Ginzburg HM, Intravenous drug users and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome, Public
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8. Van de Perre P, Clumeck N, Carael M, Nzabihimana E, Robert-Guroff M, De Mol P, Freyens
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9. FDA Memorandum: Recommendations to Decrease the Risk of Transmitting Acquired
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10. Leveton LB, Sox Jr HC, Stoto MA, eds, HIV and the blood supply: an analysis of crisis
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MMWR 1985, 34(35); 547-548.

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14. Ward JW, Grindon AJ, Feorino PM, Schable C, Parvin M, Allen JR, Laboratory and
epidemiologic evaluation of an enzyme immunoassay for antibodies to HTLV-III, JAMA 1986,
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15. Zou S, Stramer SL, Dodd RY, Donor testing and risk: current prevalence, incidence, and
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18. FDA Workshop on Donor Suitability, 1998,
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rences/TranscriptsMinutes/UCM056297.pdf
19. FDA Blood Products Advisory Committee Meeting, September 14, 2000,
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20. FDA Workshop on Behavior-Based Donor Deferral in the NAT Era, 2006,
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ces/transcriptsminutes/ucm054430.pdf
21. HHS Advisory Committee for Blood Safety and Availability Meeting, 2010,
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dations/06112010_recommendations.pdf
22. Federal Register Notice, Request for Information (RFI) on Design of a Pilot Operational
Study To Assess Alternative Blood Donor Deferral Criteria for Men Who Have Had Sex With
Other Men (MSM) (77 FR 14801, March 13, 2012)
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/03/13/2012-6091/request-for-information-rfi-ondesign-of-a-pilot-operational-study-to-assess-alternative-blood-donor
23. Kucirka LM1, Sarathy H, Govindan P, Wolf JH, Ellison TA, Hart LJ, Montgomery RA, Ros
RL, Segev DL, Risk of window period HIV infection in high infectious risk donors: systematic
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24. United Kingdom Scientific, SaBTO Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues
and Organs, Donor Selection Criteria Review, April 2011,
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9.pdf
25. Soriano V, Vispo E, Labarga P, Medrano J, Barreiro P, Viral hepatitis and HIV co-infection,
Antiviral Res 2010, 85:303-315.
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Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

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26. Purcell DW, Johnson CH, Lansky A, Prejean J, Stein R, Denning P, Gaul Z, Weinstock H,
Su J, Crepaz N, Estimating the population size of men who have sex with men in the United
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27. CDC, HIV Surveillance Report, 2012; vol 24. Published November 2014,
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28. CDC, Estimated HIV incidence in the United States, 20072010. HIV Surveillance
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29. AABB on Quarantine Release Errors, White Paper 2013,
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30. FDA workshop on Quarantine Release Errors in Blood Establishments, September 2011,
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263117.htm
31. HHS Advisory Committee on Blood and Tissue Safety and Availability, Results from the
Uniform Donor History Questionnaire, December 2013,
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32. Custer B, Kessler D, Vahidnia F, Leparc G, Krysztof DE, Shaz B, Kamel H, Glynn S, Dodd
RY, Stramer SL; NHLBI Retrovirus Epidemiology Donor Study-II (REDS-II), Risk factors for
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33. Custer B, Sheon N, Siedle-Khan B, Pollack L, Spencer B, Bialkowski W, DAndrea P,
Sullivan M, Glynn S, Williams A, NHLBI Recipient Epidemiology and Donor Evaluation-III
(REDS-III), Noncompliance with the men who have sex with men (MSM) deferral among U.S.
male blood donors, Blood Donation Rules Opinion Study (BloodDROPS), November 13, 2014.
34. Benjamin RJ, et al, Deferral of males who had sex with other males, Vox Sanguinis 2011,
101: 339-367.
35. Offergeld R, et al, Sexual risk behavior and donor deferral in Europe, Vox Sanguinis 2014,
107:420-427.
36. Seed CR, Kiely P, Law M, Keller AJ, No evidence of a significantly increased risk of
transfusion-transmitted human immunodeficiency virus infection in Australia subsequent to
implementing a 12-month deferral for men who have had sex with men, Transfusion 2010,
50:2722-2730.
37. Lucky TTA, Seed CR, Waller D, Lee JF, McDonald A, Wand H, Wroth S, Shuttleworth G,
Keller AJ, Pink J, Wilson DP, Understanding noncompliance with selective donor deferral
criteria for high-risk behaviors in Australian blood donors, Transfusion 2014, 54:1739-1749.
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38. Mark KP, Janssen E, Milhausen RR, Infidelity in heterosexual couples: demographic,
interpersonal, and personality-related predictors of extradyadic sex, Arch Sex Behav 2011,
40:971-982.
39. Stone E, Heagerty P, Vittinghoff E, Douglas JM Jr, Koblin BA, Mayer KH, Celum CL,
Gross M, Woody GE, Marmor M, Seage GR III, Buchbinder SP, Correlates of condom failure in
a sexually active cohort of men who have sex with men, J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr Hum
Retrovirol 1999, 20:495-501.
40. Weller S, Davis-Beaty K, Condom effectiveness in reducing heterosexual HIV transmission.
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2002. (1):CD003255.
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Defic Syndr 2015, 68(3):337-344.
42. FDA Blood Products Advisory Committee Meeting, December 2014 transcript
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOther
Biologics/BloodProductsAdvisoryCommittee/ucm386681.htm

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