Durkheim and Society as a Moral Entity:

A Brief Synopsis and Critique

Andrew Oberg
I. Introduction
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) lived and died during turbulent times not only for his
native France but also for all of Europe. During his youth France suffered a crushing
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, with it the passing of the Second
Empire, the birth of the Third Republic, and the short-lived and much discussed
Paris Commune, while at the time of his death Europe was embroiled in the first
World War with Russia having passed through two distinct revolutions in a single
year. It is not surprising then, as one of the founding fathers of the discipline of
sociology, that Durkheim was greatly concerned with the questions of social
structure and morality. His views on the societal origin of morality, however, have
been as controversial as they have been influential, and thus the present paper will
seek to elucidate those views through an examination of modern academic research
done on both Durkheims earlier works and his latter. The structure of Durkheims
society as a moral entity will be discussed, followed by a look at the place Durkheim
gave the individual in society, and finally some criticisms of Durkheims views will be
offered. Writing nearly a century before the present though he did, there is perhaps
something of Durkheim that we can apply to our own times of questioning amidst
rapid change.
II. Society as a moral entity
One of the most striking features of Durkheims conception of society is the collective
effervescence that forms its group mind. He attributed to society a will of its own, an
ability to think, feel, wish, and act in its own right.1 Society is thus self-aware, and
endowed with a higher consciousness than individuals as it is composed of the
1 Whitney Pope, Durkheim as a Functionalist, The Sociological Quarterly, 16:3 (1975),
361-379.

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collective consciousnesses of all individuals within it,2 arising out of those members
collective effervescence. This idea is closely linked to Durkheims notion of homo

duplex, that all of us are internally divided between egoistic impulses and our ability
to go beyond ourselves into a realm of conceptual thought and moral activity held in
common by a society.3 This collective mind then functions by protecting individuals,
when interacting with one another, from the disturbance of their sensory perceptions,
allowing them to substitute the world around them for a more moral one, a medium
that also acts as the basis for the social structuring of emotions.4 Thus, the moral
force that society exerts does in fact come from the separately existing entity society
itself, but that entity can be understood as being generated by its members. In this
way, Durkheims view of society as a moral power can be understood to mean
morality developing as a social phenomenon rather than society developing as a
moral one.5 This entity of society, once created, could however also cease to be
should the idea of society disappear from its members minds, being rooted in their
collective effervescence as it is.6 Durkheim saw the increasing division of labor as
one such potential weakening agent of collective sentiments, the substitute social
cohesive he suggested will be discussed below. This may all strike the reader as
being quite strange and esoteric, and so a helpful analogy may perhaps be taken
here from Hindu theology. Vedantic philosophy, rooted in the Upanishads, and
especially that of the Advaitan school, teaches that the ultimate reality of the entire
universe is one supreme consciousness, that all is connected into this one reality,
that it supports all, flows through all, and yet is beyond all.7 Taking this concept and
localizing it, as well as allowing it to be self-generated rather than pre-existent, we
have an idea of how Durkheim saw society as something other than its members and
yet created by its members; something very much along the lines of the whole is
2

ibid.

Chris Shilling and Philip A. Mellor, Durkheim, Morality and Modernity: Collective
Effervescence, Homo Duplex and the Sources of Moral Action, The British Journal of Sociology,
49:2 (1998), 193-209 (p. 196).
3

4
5

ibid.

T. M. S. Evens, Two Concepts of Society as a Moral System: Evans-Pritchards Heterodoxy,

Man, 17:2 (1982), 205-218.

6 Shilling and Mellor, op. cit.
7 Upanishads, trans. by F Max-Mller, rev. and intro. by Suren Navlakha (Hertfordshire:

Wordsworth Editions, 2000).

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Durkheim and Society as a Moral Entity: A Brief Synopsis and Critique

greater than the sum of its parts.

This entity of society (or, perhaps more fitting to the view heretofore discussed,
Society) exerts a tremendous moral force over its members and to a large, even total,
degree dictates their behavior. When born, each person faces the society where they
live as an objective reality with a moral quality that is beyond any one individuals
control.8 A person does not choose to believe in certain things or act in certain ways;
he or she learns them through the process of socialization.9 The objective nature of
Durkheims society is quite important in that it not only dictates norms (or social
facts, that is, collectively held standards of behavior,10 also seen as endowed with a
coercive power over individuals11) but obliges each person to experience reality in
certain ways and not in others, it causes each separate individual to view him or
herself as a cultural object,12 and therefore composes both ones view of the outside
world and ones sense of identity and place in that world. Society has both a physical
and moral force that it uses to control its members, making them feel, think, and act,
as society, in its higher wisdom, deems necessary to achieve the equilibrium that is
its goal.13 Society can thus regenerate itself throughout the gradual process of
inevitable change that occurs within all human groupings, whether coming from
advances in technology or adjustments to a changing environment, by continually
exerting moral force and behavioral control over each of the members composing
that society. In summation, according to Durkheim, society is a separate entity
created by its members, an entity that is both above and beyond them and entirely
moral; the moral force it exerts, moreover controls and assimilates to individual
consciousness to such an extent that flouting it is for the most part unthinkable, and
its status as moral constraint may even go unnoticed.14
8 Richard A. Hilbert, Anomie and the Moral Regulation of Reality: The Durkheimian
Tradition in Modern Relief, Sociological Theory, 4:1 (1986), 1-19.
9 Pip Jones, Liz Bradbury, and Shaun Le Boutillier, Introducing Social Theory, 2nd edn
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
10 ibid., see also Shilling and Mellor, op. cit.
11 Murray Knuttila, Introducing Sociology: A Critical Approach, 3rd edn (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
12 Hilbert, op. cit.
13 Pope, op. cit.
14 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: The Free Press, 1938) p. 55,

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III. The individual in society

As controlling and pervasive as Durkheims concept of society is, there is still a place
for the individual within it. In fact, Durkheim saw the individual becoming more
and more central as society developed within modern cultures from an increasing
division of labor. While social cohesiveness was achieved in pre-modern societies due
to mechanical solidarity, the solidarity that comes about more or less automatically
from the similarity of peoples lives and limited number of available roles, modern
societies are held together by organic solidarity, that which comes from the
interdependence resulting from each person having a very specialized and limited
role within society.15 To Durkheim, in addition to bringing about organic solidarity,
such specific roles also play a large part in giving meaning and purpose to life,
arguing that our work makes sense only because it serves something other than
ourselves. The individual is not an end sufficient unto himself.16 Ones occupational
function was so important to Durkheim that he suggested occupational groups could
succeed the family in its economic and moral functions, giving a sense of security,
place, and belonging to each individual.17 Through the organic solidarity that is
built in such a way, and reflecting its developing pluralistic nature, society becomes
bound together increasingly by the beliefs and values that its members share rather
than a set of common behavioral patterns, and in modernity the core of those beliefs
and values is individualism. To modern people, the individual is sacred and
individualism is our public religion.18 That individualism should take on such
importance to each of us is explained by Durkheim in that since there are fewer
common ideas and fewer common perspectives in modern societies, the authority of
such institutions as the state or religious orders weakens, forcing society to rely
more on its individual members.19 Furthermore, although this is not explicitly
stated, as the entity of society directly influences how its members think in
in Hilbert, op. cit., p. 2.
15 Jones et al., op. cit.
16 Emile Durkheim, The Conjugal Family, in On Institutional Analysis, trans., ed., and intro.
by Mark Traugott (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1978 [1892]), pp.
229-239 (p. 236).
17 ibid. The same point is repeated in Shilling and Mellor, op. cit.
18 Steven Seidman, Contested Knowledge, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 1998),
p. 61.
19

ibid.

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Durkheim and Society as a Moral Entity: A Brief Synopsis and Critique

Durkheims system, it could very well cause each member to consider individualism
as an important value to hold. Thus, organic solidarity is created through general
norms and values stemming from individualism, such as justice and equality, and
not through society dictating specific behaviors outright.20 In fact, the rights and
dignity that society accords the individual comes to be, in Durkheims thought, the
most significant value consensus in advanced societies.21 In his later writings, this
point came to be the knot holding together public morality in the entity that is
society, its moral foundation being one of interdependence and acceptance of
individual differences.22
Moreover, it must be remembered that in Durkheims view of society each individual
contributes to generating the higher and all-encompassing entity of society itself,
making each member a necessary part of the whole. Through his notion of homo

duplex Durkheim proposed the method by which such a transcendent being could
come into existence, via the collective consciousness generated by individuals
interacting within groups. Considered from a long-term perspective, and Durkheim
did take such an evolutionary approach to social questions,23 how such interactions
could contribute over time to the birth of a society is rather plain to see. Additionally,
morality for Durkheim had a strong social character, so that an action is considered
moral if and only if it is directed towards an impersonal or social end; morality
begins and ends with life in the group.24 This view also helps explain the terrible
weight Durkheims concept of anomie would place on an individual, as the
disconnect an anomically afflicted person felt from the society all around them would
be alienating and emotionally exhausting. Hilbert makes the comparison here
between a person alone in a foreign country experiencing anomie from his or her
culture shock, from not being able to relate in any way to their external reality, as
opposed to the experience of that same reality that the natives of the country have,

Charles E. Marske, Durkheims Cult of the Individual and the Moral Reconstitution of
Society, Sociological Theory, 5:1 (1987), 1-14.

20
21
22
23
24

ibid.
ibid.

Seidman, op. cit.

Evens, op. cit.

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which of course would not be anomic in the least.25 It should be noted, however, that
Hilbert was writing in general terms here, as Durkheims anomie could afflict a
person in their own birth society; occurrences of such were considered by Durkheim
to be a potential cause of suicide and he further saw anomie increasing with the
advancing of the division of labor, a cause of some concern in his analysis of modern
societies.26
IV. Problems with Durkheims views
To my mind, there are a number of serious problems with Durkheims views on
society as a moral entity, and with how society comes to be structured. First and
foremost, despite the goal Durkheim had of approaching the study of societies from a
scientific methodology built upon a firm empirical basis,27 he does not seem to have
based much of his theoretical analysis on case studies of any specific and naturally
occurring societies.28 His analysis rather remains almost always in the abstract, and
he was never able to show empirically how such institutions that he deemed
necessary came into existence (other than to state that necessity explains existence,
creating a classificatory scheme he could not convincingly validate).29 Furthermore,
although his view of society existing as a separate entity created and nourished by
the contributions of each member in a collective effervescence was based on
observations of collective behavior, it is difficult to see such evidence as having
enough strength to warrant the conclusion drawn. Durkheims view of society may
not necessarily be a priori in that he does allow for it to gradually form via group
interactions building up over long periods of time (think here of small bands of
hunter-gatherers gradually joining (whether forced together through conquest or by
consensus) to become a tribe, and then tribes of similar customs and languages
gradually joining to become a nation, creating their society bit by bit as they go
along), but it is still metaphysical in nature and seems to me a long way from being
scientifically sound. Additionally, such an entity is given the somewhat disturbing
25
26
27
28
29

Hilbert, op. cit.

ibid.

Jones et al., op. cit.

Marske, op. cit.
Pope, op. cit.

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Durkheim and Society as a Moral Entity: A Brief Synopsis and Critique

power of total moral control over the individuals whose consciousnesses mystically
combine to form it. That society influences the way we behave is unquestionable, but
to state that flouting [societys control] is for the most part unthinkable 30 is
granting a far stronger capacity than I, at least, am comfortable in assigning to it.
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, Durkheims work almost entirely avoids
discussing the conflicts that occur between groups within societies. The axis of
opposition that Durkheim uses is one of social-individual, with deviations being
termed nonsocial and pathological.31 Social location, differing interests, and that
some members of a society may use their positions of institutional advantage to help
themselves and their friends at the expense of other members of society, all get short
shrift from Durkheim.32 This despite increasing foci on social justice and the need to
equalize the conditions of competition within society that are marks of his later
works.33 Durkheim may have been merely trying not to be Marx by donning such
rosy-colored glasses, but the end result is that he comes across as very strongly
justifying the status quo, to the point that in his view whatever social structure,
arrangements, and institutions any given society has are the natural outcomes of
the necessary functions they serve.34 Such a stance can logically only lead to a docile
acceptance of whatever one may feel to be wrong with ones society. I cannot help but
think that that would stand in strong contrast to the republican ideals Durkheim
hoped to uphold,35 yet that nevertheless seems to be the position he took.
V. Conclusion
Emile Durkheim was one of the most important social thinkers of his time, and his
legacy within the field of sociology is not in question. His work helped to secure that
discipline as an independent area of scientific study and paved the way for
generations of sociologists to come. His concerns with morality, social cohesion, and

30
31
32
33
34
35

Durkheim, in Hilbert, op. cit., p. 2.

Pope, op. cit.

ibid.

Marske, op. cit.

Jones et al., op. cit.
Seidman, op. cit.

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smoothly functioning social institutions were valid and important not only for his
own time and place. However, in an examination of his views on society as a moral
entity, the place of individuals within society, and some of the problems associated
with those views, significant flaws have been revealed in his overall theoretical
system. While his analysis of the outcomes that an increasing division of labor (with
the resultant shifting of societal mores towards a strongly favorable view of
individualism and individual rights and dignity) has brought to modern societies
may be sound, as well as his ideas of society forming out of group interactions and
carrying with it a moral influence that is exerted on the members of that society, his
notion of a self-existent and morally controlling entity that exists as society appears
to be very much in error. Moreover, Durkheims failure to address the very real and
significant social and economic distress that certain groups within society face at the
hands of other groups in society must be seen as a grave omission. The world may
have much to thank Durkheim for, particularly his emphases on social morality and
group cohesion, but on the whole his work did not point the way forwards for the
people of his own time, and nor does it do so for ours.

Bibliography
Durkheim, Emile, The Conjugal Family, in On Institutional Analysis, trans., ed.,
and intro. by Mark Traugott (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1978 [1892]), 229-239
Evens, T. M. S., Two Concepts of Society as a Moral System: Evans-Pritchards
Heterodoxy, Man, 17:2 (1982), 205-218
Hilbert, Richard A., Anomie and the Moral Regulation of Reality: The Durkheimian
Tradition in Modern Relief, Sociological Theory, 4:1 (1986), 1-19
Jones, Pip, Liz Bradbury, and Shaun Le Boutillier, Introducing Social Theory, 2nd
edn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011)

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Durkheim and Society as a Moral Entity: A Brief Synopsis and Critique

Knuttila, Murray, Introducing Sociology: A Critical Approach, 3rd edn (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005)
Marske, Charles E., Durkheims Cult of the Individual and the Moral
Reconstitution of Society, Sociological Theory, 5:1 (1987), 1-14
Pope, Whitney, Durkheim as a Functionalist, The Sociological Quarterly, 16:3
(1975), 361-379
Seidman, Steven, Contested Knowledge, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd.,
1998)
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Effervescence, Homo Duplex and the Sources of Moral Action, The British Journal
of Sociology, 49:2 (1998), 193-209
Upanishads, trans. by F Max-Mller, rev. and intro. by Suren Navlakha
(Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2000)

177