India 2

INDIA'S STRATEGIC THINKING AND ITS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Author(s): A. Z. Hilali
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September/October 2001), pp. 737-764
Published by: University of California Press
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INDIAS STRATEGIC THINKING AND

ITS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
A. Z. Hilali
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War created grave problems for Indias foreign policy. New Delhi no
longer enjoys the protection of the Soviet veto in the U.N. Security Council;
the new Russian state no longer willingly acts as the guardian of Indias interests in international forums; and Moscow is no longer able to provide softcurrency military equipment deals. This dramatic and rapid shift in the strategic realm provides unprecedented opportunities for India to reassess its international orientation and maneuver itself into a dominant regional position,
beyond the narrow geopolitical confines of the old East-West division, so as
to realize fully its economic, cultural, and military potential. Thus, with the
emergence of a unipolar world, India is less idealistic, moralistic, and doctrinaire than it was in the years when Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian foreign policy.
Although fundamentally the character of Indias nonalignment policy has
not changed, pragmatically the countrys policy toward the West is more
open and soft as compared to the Cold War period. New Delhi is beginning
to come to terms with the new realities of a world in which non-alignment
has lost meaning. The main challenges for Indian diplomats and policy makers facing the post-Cold War world with its changing security environment
are the need to (1) build a strong economic base capable of sustaining the
countrys military growth and (2) maintain a higher diplomatic profile.
This article evaluates the circumstances under which Indian elites develop
national security strategy. Little analysis exists that systematically reviews
the interplay of factors formulating Indian strategies and the characteristics of
A. Z. Hilali is Research Scholar in the Center for Security Studies,
Department of Politics, University of Hull, United Kingdom.
Asian Survey, 41:5, pp. 737764. ISSN: 00044687
2001 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California
Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 947041223.
737
738
ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001
New Delhis strategic behavior. Historically, India has not exercised a tradition of independent strategic thinking but rather since Independence has borrowed and adapted different policies in pursuit of its national interests in
foreign policy and defense. In this regard, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi,
and their successors respectively contributed to formulating or articulating
different theories in general terms based on their own perceptions and predilections to various events. Despite economic constraints, India is modernizing its present-day military capabilities, national security apparatus, and
defense systems. In the post-Cold War era, New Delhis acquisitions of advanced conventional weapons, growing nuclear capability, and evolution of
its navy into a blue-water force signal, in the view of some analysts, significant progress in the nations becoming a major military power state.
In this context, New Delhis self-identity and internal ambition to transform itself into a First World power should be examined. This article will
offer a preliminary assessment of Indias strategic orientation in shaping its
security policy and will explore the constraints that formulate hurdles against
the achievement of these aims. In fact, the article will argue that New
Delhis armed forces retain limited capacity to develop an indigenous weapons production capability and are still dependent on external sources and that
India will resolve its structural constraints with difficulty and not achieve
major power status in the world.
Nehruvian Foreign Policy and Indias

Quest for a Global Role
After Independence in 1947, Indias foreign policy was long plagued by the
bitter legacy of partition. The country experienced three wars with Pakistan
(in 1947, 1965, and 1971) and one with China (in 1962) in less than a quarter
century. As foreign minister, Nehru articulated goals of non-alignment and
peaceful coexistence as polestars of Indian policy. He also focused on the
problems of world peace, anti-colonialism, and anti-racism and called for an
end to Cold War conflicts between the superpowers.
Together with Jamal Abdul Nasser and Marshal Josef Tito, Nehru was one
of three leaders who created the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 in
order to make it possible for nations to cooperate with each other and offer a
broad framework for collective dialogue and collective action against the developed countries. Nehrus non-aligned foreign policy was an attractive
model for most developing countries because it was based on the principles
of non-involvement in either of the two alliance systems and an active and
independent participation in world affairs. Furthermore, Nehru saw nonalignment between the superpowers at the time of the Cold War as a vital
precondition to protecting national interest. Thus, his non-alignment strategy
A. Z. HILALI
739
by no means precluded an active stance in Indian self-interest; it became the

dominant ethos of Indias foreign policy in international affairs.
Nehru promoted the idea of non-alignment to prove that India was an independent country and had a right to play an international role. However, the
Sino-Indian war of 1962 was a watershed for Indian defense planners. In the
aftermath, India abandoned its cherished non-alignment policy; cast off the
Menon defense strategy, which had left the Indian army helpless before the
Chinese invasion; and set out a comprehensive program for military modernization with the help of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. New Delhis military
weaknesses had been exposed and in military defeat the countrys international prestige declined. Nehrus foreign policy based on global influence
without military power was shattered and Indias position and influence
among the new non-aligned nations were also affected.1 Nehru categorically
wrote in April 1963 that Indias responses would inevitably be affected by
the policies that others adopted toward it. He argued that protection of the
countrys interest, by force if necessary, was the first charge on its foreign
policy, though to the outside world his rhetoric of peaceful coexistence and
mutual respect caught the headlines.
Since Independence, the Indian leaderships primary objective has been to
enhance and expand Indias military might and still is a main preoccupation.
The newborn Indian military in 1947 inherited the British army structure; it
was not a revolutionary army opposing colonialism. As the founding father
of the modern Indian army, Nehru accepted the military status quo and made
a plan to upgrade the countrys military strength. He also used the military in
the early years of Independence to strengthen Indias position in Kashmir,
Hyderabad, and Goa; later, the 1962 dispute and Indias humiliating defeat in
it confirmed the necessity of maintaining the countrys military organization
and a strong military establishment.
New Delhis security considerations, however, are not confined to its immediate neighbors. They span a wider area, and in this respect Indias primary concern is to insulate the subcontinent from external intrusion.
Insulation would assure New Delhi the regional preeminence that its policy
makers perceive as an essential prerequisite for achieving the major power
status that Indian elites seek for their country. In any case, the countrys
foreign policy guardians also see themselves and India as the successors to
the British Raj and, as such, heir to the former empires historic strategic
concerns of South Asia. Nehru articulated these grand ambitions for a preeminent position in the world clearly, perceiving himself as the leader of a
new Asia and lighting the path for the rest of the world. Indeed, his dream
1. Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., and Stanley A. Kochanek, India: Government and Politics in a
Developing Nation, 5th ed. (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), p. 404.
740
was to transform India into Akhund Bharat (Greater India) to rule over the
world.
Indias expressions of self-perceived greatness have played a major part in
provoking Pakistan into desperate attempts to bolster its own national defense. Since Independence, Indian planners have reflected an enduring preference for bilateral as opposed to multilateral initiatives, at both global and
regional levels. While Europe and Asia have accepted the benefits of multilateralism, India remains chained to the notion that bilateral advantages outweigh any gains that might be derived from dealing with neighbors,
particularly Pakistan, multilaterally. Thus, Indias attitudes toward multilateralism have been characterized as thinking unilaterally, pursuing issues
bilaterally, and posturing multilaterally.2
New Delhis emphasis on bilateralism is rooted in historical developments
that have made it leery of multilateralism. First, with respect to global multilateralism Indias aversion can be traced to its early failure to achieve an
Asian leadership role under the NAM. Foreign policy leaders in India saw
their country as having a natural claim to that leadership, but such ambitions
were countered by China and Pakistan. Second, with respect to regional multilateralism Indias attitude can be traced to its perception of itself as a global
rather than simply a regional power. For New Delhi, regional politics remain
wedded to the notion that India, as a major power, gains more advantage
from its relationship with the world as compared to regions. Third, the countrys uneasiness about multilateral forums can be traced to its experience that
such forums are simply arenas within which regional rivals and global adversaries can criticize Indian policies.3 Thus, a central element to Indian security
culture is the belief that, while other states may resist, India is destined to
play the dominant role in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, it
is one of the core beliefs of the countrys leaders that Indias manifest destiny
is to be not only a regional hegemon but a global power as well. To gain
insight into Indian norms or standards in this light, a review of the Indian
grand strategy is necessary.
Factors Influencing Indias Grand Strategy

In the post-Cold War era, Indian policy makers have sought a more prominent standing in the international community and aim to make their country
one of the great powers of the world. The Indian political elite sees India as a
past and future great powerone destined to play a major role not only on
2. Andrew Latham, Constructing National Security: Culture and Identity in Indian Arms
Control and Disarmament Practice, Contemporary Security Policy 19:1 (April 1998), p. 145.
3. For detailed discussion about Indias aversion to multilateralism, see Arthur Rubinoff, The
Multilateral Imperative in Indias Foreign Policy, Round Table (1991), pp. 31314.
A. Z. HILALI
741
the subcontinent but ultimately in the Indian Ocean and on the world stage as
well. Put simply, New Delhis leaders are frustrated that they cannot articulate the goal better and that their country is not accepted as a peer by the
other great powers.4 Furthermore, they feel that Indias self-conception is of
broad international interest, not just because of its great size, wealth, and
superior logistics systems but also because of its growing military and nuclear capability. All observers agree that Indias future strategic role and
power potential are indeed of both regional and global import.
For India, South Asia is a strategic entity; its outer boundary forms Indias
own natural defense perimeters. As a prominent power there, New Delhi
sees the South Asian region as its sphere of influence. Historically, India has
been independent only for about 50 years, having been ruled for the previous
200 years by the British, who decided defense policy and strategy without
Indian involvement. Principal figures in the Indian nationalist movement
worked hard to create a concept of a modern nation-state. Except for basic
perceptions of threat and hegemonic ambitions, however, a modern tradition
of strategic thinking in India has not resulted. In order to understand the
complexity of Indian coercive diplomacy and the characteristics of its strategic behavior, four vital factors must be recognized.
Geography controls the political environment of a country and may propel
its foreign policy and national interests. The Himalayan mountains to the
north, the Arabian Sea to the west, the Indian Ocean to the south, and the Bay
of Bengal to the east have created a largely enclosed, natural geographical
unit often referred to as the Indian Subcontinent. The mountains and seas
have long been perceived as protective barriers and have given Indias people
a sense of security. Many analysts consider South Asia, stretching from the
Himalayas to the adjoining zones of the Indian Ocean, as Indias natural security zone. Its image as a global colossus is derived in large measure from
its size and location on the globe.
History and culture have equally contributed toward shaping Indian strategic thinking. Historically, India foresees a possible revival of ancient power
as the nation becomes a superpower in its own right. For instance, the affirmation of greatness in Indian civilization and nationalism is connected with
Hindutva (Hinduness), meaning a great Hindu state. However, fear also exists in the minds of the Hindu leadership and it forces them to build up their
military strength for a greater India. The basis of this vision of Indian culture
has thus been defined by the upper-caste Hindu culture of the Hindi belt,
under its concept of Ram Rajya, a term denoting a revivalism that seeks to
bring back the values of the past.
4. George Tanham, Indian Strategic Culture, Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1992), p. 129.
742
Moreover, the caste-dominated and hierarchical nature of Indian society

tends to contribute to a conservative view of life, inherently creating a defensive mentality, and accounts for its traditionally slow pace of social change.
The Indians view of society as a hierarchy also is projected onto their view
of the world. India believes in a hierarchy of nations based on wealth and
power with itself placed in the top ranks of the worlds summit; it is essentially a Brahmin perception of the world.
A third factor that has influenced Indian strategic thinking is the rediscovery of Indian history in the late 19th century. At the time, Indian nationalists searched for examples of Indian unity but found only limited periods of
unification. The period of the empires, particularly during the reign of the
first three Mauryan kings (Chander Gupta, Bindusara, and Asoka), was an era
of Indian unity, strength, and glory. Thus, India sees itself as both an ancient
civilization and a contemporary great power deserving of parity of esteem
with other ancient civilizations and great powers (such as the Peoples Republic of China).
A final factor to consider is the legacy of colonial rule by the British. The
British were the first to think explicitly about the strategic defense of South
Asia as a whole. At first, they developed an offensive defense by attacking
Indias neighbors, Burma and Afghanistan, in order to create buffers between
British India, Russia, and China. The Indian army, largely commanded by
conservative British officers, became a strictly defensive force as Britain was
constrained into a more and more passive posture. Indians were, however,
quite aware of the great British empire and their role in protecting it. Most
Indians felt at Independence that they had inherited the mantle of the British
Raj, with the responsibility not only for the defense of the subcontinent but
also, perhaps, for inserting an even more ambitious role in the Indian Ocean
and abroad.
Current Challenges to Indias

Regional Dominance
The states of South AsiaBangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,
and Sri Lankaface no common threat perception. As a consequence, their
security policies toward each other and great powers outside South Asia are
quite different. This lack of a security consensus has been shaped by competing symbols of group identity among the regions one billion people; disparity in size, population, and wealth between India and its neighbors; and
geographical locations of each of the regions states.
India forms the core country of South Asia. The defense and security factors with which it must cope are extensive. Among the regions nations, India has by far the most advanced industrial and technological base, including
an indigenous armament industry that is the largest among Third World states
A. Z. HILALI
743
in value, volume, diversity of manufacture, and research and development

facilities. Moreover, India has a large public and private basic industrial sector that serves as a foundation for economic development. The country currently retains the worlds 10th largest industrial economy, although per capita
income is low, standing at $245 in 199697 and rising 5% to $280 in
199899. The economy grew 6.8% in 199899, belying fears of a slower
growth because of an industrial slowdown. In the same way, the agriculture
sector grew impressively by 7.6% that fiscal year, while manufacturing recorded a modest growth rate of 3.6%.
After the end of the Cold War, economic liberalization vastly broadened
the scope of the activities of private investors, now free from the fear of
nationalization and protected by the state from foreign competition. The government provided legal protection to investors and took a variety of steps to
encourage foreign investment in India. The primary effect of these policy
changes was to increase the rate of capital formation. For instance, during
199899 India had positive net capital inflows approaching 180 billion rupees. This rise led Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha to predict that India
will receive $10 billion in foreign direct investment each year, more than
triple the annual average of the past decade.5
India was a great ally of the Soviet Union; until the communist empires
end in the early 1990s, its military and economic aid enabled New Delhi to
pursue its vision of itself as a Great Powerthe equal of the other great
powers in the U.N. Security Council; the predominant nation on the Indian
Ocean; and the unchallenged hegemon of South Asia itself. Indias strategic
posture is based on the idea of an offensive defense. It is using all possible
sources to acquire superior weapons to protect the national security. As a
consequence, New Delhis strategic perceptions have also been influenced by
the strategies of the great powers, especially those related to intervention in
the Third World and the employment of military force for the purpose of
coercive diplomacy.6 For this reason, the countrys leaders have felt that India must gain its proper place in the world community.
In the early 1980s, Sen Gupta, a foreign policy analyst who argued that no
South Asian government should ask for extensive military assistance with an
anti-Indian bias, gave the clearest formulation of an Indian Monroe doctrine for the region. The concept of such a doctrine first emerged after the
dismemberment of Pakistan. Indian strategic planners at the time viewed
their country as the undisputed power of the region and Pakistan, in the
5. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), January 20, 2000, p. 36.
6. K. Subrahmanyam, Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, Defence Studies and
Analysis (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1985), p. 7.
744
words of Banerjee, as a fish in Indias troubled waters. 7 Further impetus

for Indias development came from a second incident involving Sri Lankas
1983 ethnic crisis across the Palk Strait from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
At this time, New Delhi declared that if a South Asian country genuinely
needs to deal with a serious internal conflict, it should ask for help from
neighboring countries, including India.8 The rationale of this position was to
become abundantly clear in 1987 when India claimed the right, as the regional policeman, to assist Sri Lanka in place of non-regional powers. Indian officials strongly opposed the foreign powers presence and their
intervention in the domestic affairs of a South Asian nation. Warning neighboring countries that they should avoid enlisting external support in order to
strengthen their position against India, the officials argued that in the case of
intra-regional conflicts Indias neighbors should seek assistance from India.
Chinas Military Buildup and

Indias Current Strategy
Indians regional doctrine was formulated as a reaction to local developments, not as a conceptual precaution outlining a security perspective for the
future. New Delhis regional strategy and policy are clear, that no neighboring state can undertake any action in foreign affairs or its defense policy that
India deems potentially inimical to its security. Further, India will not permit
foreign powers to establish a presence or influence in South Asian states that
India views as unfriendly. New Delhi insists that it is not a threat to its
neighbors, that it does not want to be, and that it cannot be because its neighbors security is a part of its own security.
Nevertheless, India strongly believes that China continues to pose a threat
to its security. This powerful resonance of threat is the essential part of Indias current strategic thinking. In the Ministry of Defenses National Security Report 199697, the Indian government for the first time expressed
explicit concerns over Pakistans and Chinas development of nuclear and
ballistic missile capabilities.
Indian leaders believe that China is a real military threat because it has
continued to occupy 35,000 square miles of Indian territory and the bulk of
its conventional forces remains within what they regard as Indian borders.
Most Indian strategists argue that Beijings vast resources, economic pro7. Sumanta Banerjee, The Politics of Violence in the Indian State and Society, in Internal
Conflicts in South Asia, eds. Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 84.
8. Devin T. Hagerty, Indias Regional Security Doctrine, Asian Survey 31:4 (April 1991), p.
62; Akhtar Majeed, Indian Security Perspectives in the 1990s, ibid., 30:11 (November 1990),
p. 1085; and M. V. Bratersky and S. I. Lunyov, India at the End of the Century: Transformation
into an Asian Regional Power, ibid., 30:10 (October 1990), pp. 92835.
A. Z. HILALI
745
gress, and military strength are factors that cannot be ignored. An Indian
army chief remarked that the lesson learned from the 1962 war was not to
fight the Chinese without nuclear weapons and significant conventional
strength. Thus, the underlying power rivalry between the two Asian giants
and their self-images as natural great powers and centers of civilization and
culture persist and will drive them to support different countries and causes in
their own interests. India will strive to emerge not only as an independent
power center in a multipolar world but as a counterweight to Chinese power
and influence. For this reason, some Indian strategists like Jasjit Singh hold
that the appropriate and logical point of reference to define Indias strategies
would be in relation to Communist China.9
Beijing appears poised to translate its growing economic power into
greater military strength and strategic ambition. Indeed, Chinas ambitions as
a global and regional power as well as a Third World standard-bearer bring it
into competition with Indias. On the other hand, New Delhis military
buildupespecially its naval expansion and development of guided missile
and nuclear capabilitiesowes much to the dynamics of a growing SinoIndian rivalry.
India continues to lag behind as compared to Chinas economic growth and
military buildup; it faces enormous challenges domestically and in its economic sector that the central government is ill-equipped to address. Indian
armed forces lag behind the Chinese military by some decades. China possesses the worlds third largest nuclear arsenal. According to estimates by
Samuel Kim, China also maintains the worlds largest standing military estimated at three million soldiers, sailors, and airmentwice the Indian number.10 Moreover, approximately one million people in the Indian army serve
in the ground forces, where their primary responsibilities are to ensure domestic order and protect bordersnot to project power. Most of the Indian
ground forces are engaged in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam to counter insurgency movements and maintain internal order. Then, too, the experts estimate that only about 35% of these ground forces are even equipped to move
about within India. A still smaller number possesses the trucks, repair facilities, construction and engineering units, and other mobile assets needed to
project power abroad.
Chinas economic power measured in terms of aggregate statistics is impressive as compared to Indias. According to the World Banks purchasing
power parity estimates, China, with a 1994 gross domestic product (GDP) of
just under $3 trillion, has become the second-largest economy (after the U.S.)
9. Jasjit Singh, Indian Security: A Framework for National Strategy, Strategic Analysis
(New Delhi) (November 1987), p. 898.
10. Samuel S. Kim, China as a Great Power, Current History 96:611 (September 1997), pp.
24648.
746
in the world. A Rand study predicted that Chinas GDP will reach $11.3
trillion by the year 2010 as compared to $10.7 trillion for the U.S., $4.5
trillion for Japan, $3.7 trillion for India, and $2.0 trillion for Korea.11 Moreover, whatever the size of its economy and resources, it is clear that Chinas
military power in quantitative and qualitative terms is growing.
One of the most remarkable and potentially dangerous developments in the
post-Cold War era is the rise of Chinese nationalism, particularly because it is
linked with the proposition that military power is the most important component of zonghe guoli (comprehensive national strength). Nationalism with
military overtones is viewed as indispensable in Beijings attempt to regain
its status as a leading world power and defend itself against any threats, actual or imagined, to its territorial sovereignty and integrity. Since the reacquisition of Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese leadership has shown its
determination to control Taiwan and other lost territories, including the disputed McMahon Line or Arunachal Pradesh (90,00 square kms) in the eastern
sector of India. There are reports that the Chinese have constructed a base on
Myanmar territory along the Andaman Sea within striking distance of the
western entrance to the straits.12 Such a development would inevitably result in a further degradation of the already explosive situation in eastern Indiaespecially if one also takes into consideration growing signs of Chinas
determination to expand its military power and assert its presence in Southeast Asia.
Chinese national security doctrine, based on forward projection and fighting low-intensity conflicts on its periphery, will inevitably lead to a further
augmentation of Chinese military presence in the area.13 A recent Chinese
internal document states that the disputed islands in the South China Sea
(south of Chinas Hainan Province), which are subject to conflicting jurisdictional claims, could provide further living space for the Chinese people.14 For
this purpose, Beijing has apparently accelerated the politics behind moving
the Han population into the region to change the demographic balance of the
area. Meanwhile, its naval military doctrine has shifted from the coastal defense of the mainland to active defense of maritime economic and strategic
interests.
Given these circumstances, Indian defense planners argue that without significant military power, India will not be able to successfully project its national identity as a great power or play a more decisive role in world affairs.
11. Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., Long-Term Economic and Military Trends 19942015: The
United States and Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1995), pp. 58.
12. David Shambaugh, In Shanghais Busy Shipyards: A Warning of Chinese Might, International Herald Tribune, January 15, 1993.
13. Ibid.
14. See South China Sea: Treacherous Shoals, FEER, August 13, 1992, pp. 1422.
A. Z. HILALI
747
India proclaims that its economic growth is speeding up and it is committed

in its defense policies to balancing regional and global geopolitics. The
countrys policy makers claim that India is a strong state with an ability to
mobilize its human and material resources in the service of its worldwide and
policy objectives. Thus, India has captured the attention of the Western
world and proven that it can share global responsibilities.
Pakistan as a Counterweight
In the literature of international relations, utilizing a balance-of-power strategy offers three basic benefits to a great power. First, a modest investment of
resources can build viable counterweights to would-be regional hegemons.
Second, a balancing strategy will enjoy the support of most smaller states,
who naturally fear the rise of a preponderant power in their region. Third,
smaller states feel more secure when a balancing strategy is pursued in that
while a great power, after all, may only visit an area briefly and periodically
in support of its immediate interests, a local state is in position to take advantage of the great powers interests in the area. 15 Thus, the idea of a balanceof-power suits smaller or weak states, and they can enter into an alliance or
partnership with a great power to counter a regional hegemon and maintain
local stability, prestige, and military power.
In the Cold War and post-Cold War periods the U.S. has attempted to
pursue this option, particularly in regions where it has short- or long-term
interests. To be sure, the U.S. cannot create a regional counterweight by
itself, but it can support such a player in any region of the world when it
perceives a mutuality of interests there. Smaller states thus can resist regional hegemons and protect their security with the military and economic
assistance of a great power.
India has always deeply resented U.S. and Chinese efforts to make Pakistan a local counterweight and has greatly expanded and modernized its land,
sea, and air forces, and even developed nuclear weapons, in its efforts to
thwart a balancing strategy aimed against its position in South Asia. In fact,
India sees itself as a regional power on a par with China and is determined to
extend its political and military reach beyond South Asia. Some Indian strategists have argued that Indias military expansion is not so much part of a
strategic assessment as a view of Indias proper place in the world. Pakistan
is only one factor in Indias political and military calculations and, at least in
some public declarations, not the most important factor by far.16
15. Graham E. Fuller and John Arquilla, The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers,
Orbis 40:4 (Fall 1996), pp. 61516.
16. Janne E. Nolan, Trapping of Power Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 86.
748
However, Pakistan views Indias aspirations as a direct challenge to its

sovereignty and security. The geography of Pakistan, including a concentration of population centers and major military installations near the Indian
border and a lack of territorial depth, saddle it with intractable disadvantages.
Military planning in Pakistan is almost wholly directed at achieving some
kind of parity with India, since Pakistan is unwilling to accept the role of
being an Indian satellite and sees military developments in India as potential
threats. Thus, the balancing effort has been a direct outcome of Indias military superiority and hegemony. Pakistans defense planners realized their
countrys economic and military weakness and sought external support in
balancing or in order to strengthen its bargaining position vis-`a-vis India.
At the military level, regionally only Pakistan has the means to forge a
credible deterrent to India. Pakistan has already demonstrated its ability to
build short-range ballistic missiles. In February 1998 it successfully tested
two indigenously produced surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs)the Hatf-1
and Hatf-2both with a payload capacity of 500 kgs and ranges of 100 and
300 kms, respectively. An upgraded model, the Hatf-3, has been flight-tested
to 800 kms. Pakistans military has also stored in forward positions some 30
Chinese-made M-11 (DF-11) missiles, with a range of 300 km. Some defense analysts consider that Pakistani Hatf-3 is actually a copy of Chinese M9 (DF-15).17
The sophistication of Pakistans missile hardware has increased dramatically. In April 1998, Pakistan tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) called the Ghauri (also known as the Hatf-5). No single event in the
1990s has had such adverse implications for Indias security as the Pakistani
acquisition of the Ghauri. With its potential range of 1,500 kms, the Ghauri
could strike deep into the Indian heartland. At a stroke, Indias real military
advantage over Pakistanits strategic depthwas nullified. Previously,
Pakistani missile capabilities were such that they could barely reach the outskirts of Indian industrial centers and defense installations. A system with a
range of 372 miles could easily reach the capital and other population centers.
According to Indian defense experts, as part of its strategy to build up
Pakistan as a military counterweight to India China quickly equalized the
Indian technological advances realized with the Prithvi 1 and 11 missiles by
supplying Pakistan with M-11s and M-9scamouflaged as the indigenous
Hatf-2 and -3in 1990, just two years after Indias Prithvi and Agni tests. 18
Some Indian security strategists claim that China has provided Pakistan with
17. See Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, NRDC Nuclear NotebookAfter the Tests:
India and Pakistan Update, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54:5 (SeptemberOctober 1998),
<http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/so98nukenote.html>.
18. Brahma Chellaney, After the Tests: Indias Options, Survival 40:4 (Winter 199899), p.
100.
A. Z. HILALI
749
all of its missiles and nuclear technology, an effort that included the setting
up of the Khushab plutonium-production reactor. For instance, Brahma
Chellaney claims that China transferred (and continues to transfer) nuclearwarhead blueprints to Islamabad and since then Pakistan has attained credible
deterrence and confidence.19
The U.S. has allowed India to counter Chinas nuclear superiority. Similarly, it also did not object to the maintenance of the status quo in the regional
balance of power when the Chinese provided the necessary assistance to Pakistan to counter Indian superiority. For its part, Pakistan is trying to maintain its role in the regional balance of power. For instance, the Pakistani air
force flies the U.S. supplied F-16, the French Mirage III and Mirage V, and a
number of obsolescent aircraft (F-6, F-7, and A-5) provided by China. Meanwhile, the Pakistan navy, partially to offset Indian developments, has grown
quite dramatically in the last few decades with the addition of more U.S.
destroyers and British frigates. It has superiority in submarines over India
and has signed a deal with France to acquire Agnosta-class diesel submarines. According to the deal, one submarine out of the three contracted for by
France will be built in Pakistan.20
Indias Military Strength

India has invested considerable amounts of time and money in building up its
military, consistent with Nehrus notion of self-reliance in the buildup of its
military strength. From the late 1960s onward, India increasingly turned toward the Soviet Union for both weapon imports and technological assistance
to create an indigenous arms industry aimed primarily first at China and then
increasingly at Pakistan. India has one of the largest standing armies in the
world; even excluding a large pool of reserves, it numbers over one million
personnel. While the army continues to take the lions share of the Indian
defense budget, both the air force and the navy have been considerably expanded since the mid-1970s.
Currently, Indian arms expenditures are about two and a half times those of
all of its South Asian neighbors combined. Indian officials claim that this
relatively large defense expenditure is needed because of the regional and
extra-regional threats with which the country must cope. The Indian government has consistently spent over 3.3% of its GDP on increasing its armed
forces. In 199697, the government approved a Rs. 36 billion pay raise for
the armed forces, which helped expand the defense budget to Rs. 356 billion
($9.5 billion). Around 25% of the budget was spent on equipment; Rs. 89
billion ($2.5 billion) was allocated to the capital account for equipment and to
19. Brahma Chellaney, After the Tests, p. 100.
20. The News (Rawalpindi), September 6, 1995.
750
improve infrastructure.21 The 199697 Defense Services estimates allocated

Rs. 111.28 billion ($3.6 billion) for the army, Rs. 36.18 billion ($1.16 billion)
for the air force, and Rs. 13.52 billion ($0.435 billion) for the navy. Capital
outlay for the three services combined was Rs. 68.32 billion ($2.1 billion).22
The current coalition government headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) has increased its defense budget by 28.2%. Military expenditures rose
to $13.5 billion, the highest ever hike in Indian history.23 The government
allocation for ground forces was increased by $543 million to $6.7 billion, for
the air force by $403 million to $1.83 billion, and for the navy by $163 million to $939 million.24 This high growth in military expenditure reflects ambitious plans for modernization and expansion of air, sea, and land forces.
This hike is likely to fuel international concerns over escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. According to Janes Defence Weekly, during the
last decade India imported $12.2 billion worth of defense equipment as part
of a major modernization program.25 The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency published a report in 199798 in which it argued that Indias
military strength had already reached a point where it amounted to 74% of
South Asias total spending on defense. 26 This massive military buildup and
expenditure reflect the Indian thrust to pursue its vision of itself as a great
power. Some analysts have argued that India would be the leading country of
Asia by the end of the century, with significant military strength and economic potential.
Defense Production
In the tradition of its doctrine of self-reliance, India has made a concerted
effort to develop an indigenous arms industry. Indias recent efforts to enhance its vast defense and science and technology infrastructure have come
about through a combination of two mutally consistent policies, namely, the
pursuit of the indigenous production of equipment, including production
under license, and a policy of independent research, pursued through one of
the Third Worlds largest military industrial research complexes.
The defense sector controls over three dozen factories, which produce a
variety of defense-oriented equipment ranging from Russian T-72 and British
Vijayanta tanks to the indigenous Chetak, later renamed the Arjun. After the
21. International Institute for Strategic Studies, ed., The Military Balance 199697 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 147.
22. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ed., SIPRI Yearbook 199697
Armament and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 425.
23. See Dawn, March 1, 2000.
24. Ibid.
25. See Janes Defence Review (November 1999), p. 18.
26. The Muslim (Islamabad), October 5, 1980.
A. Z. HILALI
751
failure of the Arjun tank project, the Indian government signed an agreement
with Russia for 310 T-90 tanks. The $705 million deal includes the outright
purchase of 124 tanks, with the remaining 186 to be partly assembled and
partly produced in India.27 India also has 36 ordnance factories, nine public
sector undertakings, and 34 major research and development (R&D) organizations all owned and run by the Defense Ministry. These defense-related
institutions are responsible for nearly 15% of Indias industrial output and
produce military goods worth 25% of the entire defense budget.28 India is not
only self-sufficient in the production of various small arms and ammunition,
but Indian complexes have designed and built supersonic fighters, frigates,
and light combat, training, and transport aircraft. India has manufactured surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air-to-air missiles. It has also embarked on
the design and manufacture of high-powered radar, super computers, and airborne warnings and control systems aircraft.29
Indian defense planners had expected that the army would also benefit
from the development of an advanced light helicopter (ALH). Indian technicians have achieved adequate expertise in the design and manufacture of armored personnel carriers and all types of infantry and artillery weapons and
ammunitions. India is building T-27 tanks under license from Russia, to
match the 155-mm caliber field howitzers of the Pakistan army, and at the
cost of $1.25 billion it has purchased Bofors 155mm howitzers and BMP-2
infantry combat vehicles.
The world is also witness to the development of Indo-U.S. military technological ties. The pivotal event in that field has been the granting of U.S.
consent to help India develop a light-combat aircraft (LCA) to serve as the
mainstay of the Indian Air Force (IAF). It is important to note here that the
Indian governments usual policy has been to buy technology, not the
weapon itself. This policy has been prompted by the desire to retain independence in this field. However, this has not prevented India from acquiring
Mirage 2000 fighters from France.
Indian defense factories have shown significant achievements in the production of naval warfare equipment, while the navy has gone ahead and obtained Sea Harrier fighter/attack aircraft, ship-based missiles, and aircraft
carriers from Britain and SSK2500-U submarines from Germany. Furthermore, India has been able to develop the German-designed Howaldswerske
type-1500 submarine and Dornier coastal air patrol aircraft; Russian-designed, nuclear-powered submarines and MiG fighter planes; British-de27. See Times of India, October 5, 2000.
28. Jasjit Singh, Trends in Defence Expenditure, Asian Strategic Review 199394 (New
Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1994), p. 51.
29. Amit Gupta, The Indian Arms Industries, Asian Survey 30:9 (September 1990), pp.
84653.
752
signed Leander class frigates; French-designed corvettes; and the GE-LM

2500 marine-adapted gas turbine engine.30
India has undertaken long-term planning in science and technology to promote self-reliance. For this purpose, since 1958 its government has promoted
a policy of independent research under the guidance of the Defense Research
and Development Organization (DRDO). This overarching organization
serves as the focal point for all scientific and technological aspects of national security. Comprising 47 laboratories staffed by over 108,000 scientists, the DRDO provides design and development assistance to the production units. Indian R&D expenditure, at $0.394 billion, ranks after the U.S.
($24.94 billion), France ($3.1 billion), the U.K. ($2.9 billion), and Germany
($0.693 billion).31 The Indian government increased defense R&D expenditure sharply from Rs. 10.8 billion in 1998 to Rs. 23.2 billion in the February
2000 budget.32 This increase in defense spending is a part of the sustained
annual rise, which reached 8% last year, and shows the high priority placed
on the military. The government has increased the funding for military research by 12.5% and for atomic research by 33%, as well as set aside a special allocation of $660 million for naval fleet expansion over and above the
naval budget of $791 million.33 Moreover, with the indigenous share of Indias total procurement of Rs. 70 billion at only Rs. 20 billion, there is talk of
adjusting expenditures such that the amount of spending with domestic suppliers would be raised to 70% by 2005.34
Indias Future Military Plan

In 1975, the Indian government appointed an expert committee consisting of
General K. V. Krishna Rao, M. L. Chibber, and K. Sundarji to develop a 20year prospective plan for the improvement of Indias military capabilities and
potential to develop into a major power.35 The committees recommendations, with a few modifications, were carried out in 1987. The committee
stated that the primary goal of the army was the prevention of war with as
small an investment as possible. It recommended that Indias R&D capability be used to minimize the armys dependency on imports. The experts saw
Pakistan and China as the main threats to Indian security and recommended
that a force structure be developed that would deter both enemies. In operational terms this meant that the Indian army should have a force advantage
30. Time, April 3, 1989, p. 10.
31. Bratersky and Lunyov, India at the End of the Century, p. 938.
32. See Hindu, February 29, 2000.
33. See Dawn, March 4, 1999.
34. Ravi Rikhye, The Militarisation of Mother India (New Delhi: Chanakya, 1990), p. 38.
35. Amit Gupta, Determining Indias Force Structure and Military Doctrine, Asian Survey
25:5 (May 1995), pp. 44748.
A. Z. HILALI
753
over the Pakistani and Chinese sides of two corps (six divisions), which was
considered sufficient to deter any threat. Further, it was suggested that the
number of tank regiments in the army be doubled from 27 to 58 and that two
mechanized infantry divisions be included in the existing force structure.36
The development of a new force structure was also laid down in army chief
of staff General Krishnaswamy Sundarjis 1987 prospective plan, Army
20002010. The plan called for the army to build up from the then-current
force level of 34 divisions to 45, including four tank divisions, eight mechanized infantry divisions, seven reinforced army plains and mountain divisions, and two air assault divisions. Following up on the Sundarji plan, India
is to get the S-300 V theater missile defense (TMD) system. This acquisition
is part of Indias plans to purchase defense hardware and technologies worth
$15 billion from Russia under their new defense agreement. The S-300 V
anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) is an advanced air defense system that,
according to Janes Intelligence Review, is the worlds first operational
ATBM system. It comprises two different missiles, the dedicated anti-missile 9M82 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] code name: 5A-12b
Giant) and the dual-role 9M83 (NATO code name: 5A-12L Gladiator).37
The entire system, which is also mobile, can intercept ballistic missiles with a
range of up to 1,000 kms. India would have no trouble integrating the Russian ATBM system, because Indias entire air defense system is based on
Russian weapons and technology. Samir Sen, a former director of DRDO,
has stated that the value of Indias TMD system is that it will effectively
neutralize Pakistans missile capabilities. 38 Further, under the Indo-Russian
agreement, Russia will also provide T-90 tanks, Su-30 MK fighter planes,
three frigates, one submarine, and upgrades of MiG-21 fighters.39 Indian defense planners have also shown an interest in Israeli technology applicable to
missile defense, particularly the Arrow ATBM and Phalcon airborne early
warning aircraft. According to the Hindustan Times, New Delhi is trying to
acquire Arrow technology from Israel covertly in order to provide the Akash
with an ATBM capability.40
Indian Air Force
The IAF is unchallengeable in the region. It is both larger and more sophisticated than the air forces of Pakistan and China. In personnel strength, it has
almost a 2.5 to 1 advantage over its neighbors. The IAF has a 3-to-1 edge in
ground attack fighter squadrons, a better than 1.8-to-1 advantage in jet com36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Ibid.; and Afzal Mahmood, Mini-Star Wars in South Asia, Dawn, January 26, 1999.
Janes Intelligence Review (May 1997), pp. 913.
See Afzal Mahmood, Mini-Star Wars.
Ibid.
See Hindustan Times, February 13, 1997.
754
bat aircraft, and over 9-to-1 in transport equipment. The period of 198090
was marked by a major military build up and the IAF emerged with one of
the most modern fleets in the Third World, featuring Mirage-2000s; MiG23s, -25s, -27s, and -29s; and the Jaguar ground attack aircraft. It also built
up a strategic transport component with the acquisition of the Russian Il-76.
The IAF consists of five regional air commands, controlling 110,000 personnel and 844 combat aircraft organized into 52 fixed-wing combat squadrons, one helicopter attack squadron, three reconnaissance helicopter
squadrons, 13 fixed-wing transport squadrons, and 11 transport helicopter
squadrons. The IAF basically relies heavily on Soviet built aircraft and domestically produced Ajeets and Maruts. Soviet-made helicopters, such as the
Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-26, are also in extensive use by the Indian army. Furthermore, the IAFs fighter planes are armed with Soviet AA-2 Atoll, AA-7
Apex, R-550 Magic, or Matra Super 530-D air-to-air missiles. For air-tosurface attacks they carry French AM-39 Exocets or Sea Eagles, or Soviet
AS-7 Kerrys, AS-118 ATGWs, or AS-30s. The IAF also controls some 30
battalions of surface-to-air missile launchers, which use Soviet SA-3s and
Divina V7 5SM/VKs. Moreover, 32 of the IAFs 41 combat squadrons are
equipped with Soviet fighters.
By 1986 India was attempting to gain access to Western technology
through various licensing agreements with French, Germany, and U.S. companies. Furthermore, the Indian government established the Aeronautical Development Agency, under the auspices of the DRDO, and the agency has a
number of projects in hand, including the LCA, a pilotless target aircraft, and
the ALH. To be built by Hindustan Aeronautics in Bangalore, the LCA was
designed to be a lightweight, single-seat, single-engine fighter whose primary
role would be air superiority with a secondary ground-attack capability. It
will be equipped with an air-refueling capability enabling it to acquire a
force-multiplier dimension and will be able to deploy a payload of over 4,000
kg configured on seven multipurpose store stations.41 As such, it is the obvious choice as a successor to the MiG-21 variants that the IAF currently employs.
Meanwhile, the Indian government has signed agreement with Russia to
receive 140 Su-30 Matzinger Keegan, Inc. (MKI) multirole fighters42 to
make up for the protracted delay in the ALH project, caused by technical
difficulties. Thus, by the time the ALH is ready for production, the Indian
army may buy only a token number of aircraft because it will already have
spent money on the Su-30 fighters, already has a top-ranking Soviet helicop41. H. P. Mama, Indian Aerospace Programme: Opportunity Knocks, International Defence
Review, no. 10 (1988), p. 1 and 336; LCA to Make Test Flights in 199596, Defence and
Foreign Affairs Weekly, April 915, 1990, p. 1. See also Hindu, January 28, 1993.
42. Times of India, October 5, 2000.
A. Z. HILALI
755
ter in operation, and is also expected to buy anti-tank helicopters from the
West.
Indian Naval Power
The Indian Ocean has gradually emerged as a pivotal region in the economic
and geopolitical configurations of the world politics. In contrast to Indian
designs toward the rest of the world, Indias strategy with respect to the Indian Ocean is relatively clear, pragmatic, and effectively applied. The countrys peninsular geography and island territories give it a natural extension of
land-based cover far out into the ocean and across to the Malacca Strait. As
the power of the Indian navy increases, the planners are seeking to carve out
a large sphere of Indian influence stretching from the Persian Gulf to the
Strait. India can see the Indian Ocean as its third front, after those with Pakistan and China, and a natural area of interest. The Southwest Asia portion of
the Indian Ocean region is of particular concern to India as the source of
much of its oil, job opportunities for Indians, and, in the Persian Gulf, a zone
for much trade. India also feels it must cultivate the Muslim countries of
southwestern Asia in order to limit Pakistans role and influence over them.
India has developed bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Moreover, it is the only country on the Indian Ocean that has a strategic interest in
that body of waters choke points: the Red Sea and the Straits of Hormuz, the
Madagascar region to the east of Africa, and the Malacca Strait in Southeast
Asia. India has claimed that its strategic area includes all reaches of the Indian Ocean to north of the Tropic of Capricorn. Indian naval experts also
argue that the countrys maritime interests and defense require a large and
powerful navy in any case because a great nation should naturally have a
great navy.43
In the late 1980s, the Indian military strategists were alarmed as Chinese
naval vessels made port calls in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Because it would have been difficult for the Chinese vessels to call at Bangladeshi and Pakistani ports in one voyage without stopping at Sri Lanka,
New Delhi coerced Colombo into giving India a veto over the use of its port
facilities.44 Indian naval strategists make no secret of their countrys intention to check Chinese naval developments in the Indian Ocean by controlling
choke points in the Malacca Strait and through the establishment of a permanent naval base in the Andaman Island, thus putting them on the vital trade
routes between Suez and Singapore.45 In Southeast Asia, India has close
43. Tanham, Indian Strategic Culture, p. 139.
44. Sri Lanka provided the port facilities to India under the Gandhi-Jayewardene agreement
of 1987, which denied the Chinese Navy access to Sri Lankan ports.
45. R. P. Khanna and M. Vyas, Indias Navy Comes of Age, Proceedings (monthly, U.S.
Naval Institute) (April 1989), pp. 12022; and G. Jacobs, Chinese Waves in South China Sea
756
political and security ties with Chinas main adversaries, Vietnam and Indonesia, and a shared geopolitical interest in checking the spread of Chinese
influence in the region.
One Indian analyst, Amit Gupta, has argued that [t]he Indian navy is unmatched in the region and is the most balanced naval force in the Indian
Ocean area. It enjoys maritime superiority in that area, with a large submarine fleet, an integral air arm, and a surface fleet of which over half of the
ships are armed with missiles.46 Thus, Indian defense planners justify its
naval buildup in terms of Chinas naval modernization, especially its sealaunched ballistic missile capability and its alleged desire to move into the
Indian Ocean.47
Since the 1980s, India has pressed ahead with an ambitious naval modernization program. By 1994, the navy numbered 47,000 personnel, with another
5,000 in its air arm and 1,000 marines. The fleet comprised more than two
dozen principal surface vessels, including two aircraft carriers, five destroyers, and 21 frigates. India has been building up its navy quite rapidly, and the
development of naval carrier- and land-based aviation, development of the
submarine fleet, and induction of ships for protracted endurance cruises into
the navy suggest broader aims. The navy also has 15 operational submarines.
In February 1988, the Indian flag was hoisted on the nuclear attack submarine
Chakra, leased from the Soviet Union, which was to be used to train Indian
crew. Reports indicated that Russia might sell to India five to seven nuclear
submarines of the Victor-3 and Charley-2 (capable of carrying cruise missiles) classes. Furthermore, following on the success of its indigenously produced frigates India announced in 1989 that it planned to construct its own
nuclear submarine. Subsequently, it was announced in 1993 that India intended to build its own aircraft carrier fleet.
Indias badly needed modernization of its navy is also prompted by the
aging of its fleet. The British-built carrier Vikrant (formerly the HMS Glory)
was commissioned in 1951 and a second, the Viraant (formerly the HMS
Hermes), was received from the British in 1988. Each carried British Sea
Harrier attack planes and Sea King helicopters armed with Sea Eagle antishipping missiles. At the time the Viraant went into operation, Indias naval
authorities were projecting the construction of five more aircraft carriers: two
each for the eastern and western marine zones, i.e., in the eastern and western
parts of the Indian Ocean, with a fifth one to be under repair or reconstrucCausing Ripples in Far-off New Delhi, Armed Forces Journal International (October 1990), pp.
4041.
46. Amit Gupta, Determining Indias Force Structure and Military Doctrine, Asian Survey
35:5 (May 1995), p. 452.
47. J. Mohan Malik, India Copes with the Kremlins Fall, Orbis (Winter 1993), p. 75.
A. Z. HILALI
757
tion.48
India later launched its biggest (6,700 tons) and most powerful homebuilt missile-equipped destroyer in 1998. Called the Delhi-class, this ship is
equipped with 16 SSMs with a range of 100 kms; surface-to-air missiles;
100-mm guns, and a locally developed early warning system. Moreover, the
construction of the Karwar naval base south of Bombay, believed to be the
largest naval facility in Asia between the Middle East and Japan, is already
underway.
The Indians have purchased five Soviet Kashin-class guided-missile destroyers; each is equipped with SA-NI Goa and powerful SS-N-26 Styx antiship missiles, five torpedo tubes, and a single Ka-25 Hormone or Ka-27 Helix ASW helicopter. The fleet is rounded out by a variety of frigates: three
domestically produced Godavari-class patrol frigates, which fire Styx missiles and carry two Sea King helicopters each; six British Leander-class frigates (renamed Nilgiri-class); one ex-British Whitby-class frigate (given the
name Talwar, not to be confused with the Talwar-class frigate) fitted with
Styx missiles and a Chetak helicopter; eight Kamorta-class patrol corvettes
(ex-Soviet Petya-class); indigenous Khukri-class corvettes with Styx missiles; and two British Leopard-class vessels for training.
India has also a respectable submarine fleet, including eight Kilo-class diesel submarines equipped with Soviet-era SS-N-7 missiles, eight older Foxtrot-class subs, and two German-built T-209s. In September 1989, India
launched the Shakli, its first locally produced submarine, which is still in
service. Recently, India has signed a deal with Russia to purchase the aircraft
carrier Admiral Gorshkov; the package includes the lease of four Tu-22 Backfire bombers, a maritime reconnaissance aircraft, five Kamov-31 airborne
early warning helicopters for the navy, and strike aircraft fitted with a 300 km
range air-to-ground missiles. Despite such additions, some Indian defense
experts argue that the countrys naval buildup is still not commensurate with
national requirements in terms meeting those obligations arising out of defending its island territories in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. They
hold that Indias long coastline gives rise to a legitimate demand to build a
powerful navy, which would be the only real force in the blue water area.49
Nuclear Deterrence
Indias development of a nuclear weapons capability dates back to 1948,
when the government established an Atomic Energy Commission whose
mandate was to launch a comprehensive nuclear program. By the time China
conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, India had acquired the capability to
48. M. V. Bratersky and S. I. Lunyov, India at the End of the Century: Transformation into
an Asian Regional Power, Asian Survey 30:10 (October 1990), pp. 93637.
49. Ibid., p. 938.
758
produce weapons-grade plutonium. Reprocessed spent fuel from a test reactor (supplied by Canada and fueled with plutonium donated by the U.S.) provided the plutonium for the nuclear device detonated by India in 1974. By
this time, the country had developed a fairly sophisticated nuclear infrastructure, including reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication facilities, callandria vessels, and even a pilot-scale enrichment plant and reactors. With the tests
successful completion, India became the first Third World country to carry
out a nuclear explosion and the first new entrant into the nuclear club since
China exploded its bomb a decade earlier.
India has a broad-based nuclear program at present, with dozens of research, commercial power, fuel, and reprocessing facilities located across the
country. It has nine commercial reactors in operation and has completed an
additional eight plants. India also has greatly expanded its nuclear weapon
production capabilities, constructing a range of nuclear facilities free from
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or other non-proliferation
controls. New Delhi has a large and growing stockpile of weapons-grade
plutonium not open to international inspection. It also has a fledgling uranium-enrichment project linked to its nuclear-powered submarine programs.
Its fissile-material production complex has been substantially enlarged and
includes a 125-ton-capacity reprocessing plant at Kalpakkam. Moreover, Indias nuclear program is expected to produce thousands of pounds of fissile
material in the next decade.
Indian leaders rationale for the nuclear program included concerns over
the nuclear threat from China, aspirations for regional pre-eminence and international recognition and the desire to maintain a clear edge over Pakistans
growing nuclear potential. Pakistan and several Middle Eastern countries
have an array of missiles and warheads and China is pressing on with its
military modernization. In the post Cold War era, Indias sense of isolation
cut across the entire political spectrum and was compounded by a belief that
India was not accorded the respect due to it because of its civilizational and
cultural qualities, population, and potential. India also claimed that it deserved a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, basing the case upon
its intrinsic importance as accounting for one fifth of the world, plus its
active role in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations, and important role
in U.N.-associated agencies and various arms control and disarmament fora.
Indian policy makers saw nuclear weapons as a passport to the recognition
and prestige India had been seeking.
All over the world, nuclear weapons remain a currency of power and the
threat of their use will be exploited. Consequently, India has no alternative
but to exercise its nuclear option. In the post Cold War era, Indian nuclear
diplomacy was qualitatively different from that practiced during the preceding epoch. Its diplomacy has been nurtured on the doctrine of NAM and
A. Z. HILALI
759
commitment to disarmament. Thus, its pursuit of non-alignment was a balance of power exercise in a bipolar world in which the two nuclear power
blocs could not go to war directly with each other. In the early 1980s, India
was generally believed to have developed nuclear weapons as part of its military forces. Its possession of a growing stockpile of weapons-grade material
gave it the ability to make such devices rapidly.
Indias nuclear program included extensive efforts to enlarge plutonium
production capability through clandestine nuclear trade, the domestic production of materials, and the testing of nuclear capable IRBM. India acquired
technology from British firms to improve its capacity to build nuclear weapons. This technology made possible the development of a heat-resistant material that, if applied to the tips of long-range ballistic missiles, allows them
to carry nuclear warheads to much greater distances. Russia also provided
the technology for cryogenic engines that were to be used in a polar-launch
vehicle and can also be used for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs). There are also reports that India has acquired sophisticated electronic equipment from the British firm GEC Marconi for its nuclear program,
as well as beryllium-based hydrogen bomb technology from a German firm
that would enable India to produce a thermonuclear bomb.
In May 11, 1998, the Indian leadership decided to put an end to ambiguity
regarding its status as a member of the nuclear club. In Operation Shakti-1,
India conducted five nuclear tests at Pokharan in the Rajasthan Desert. These
tests involved a 12-kiloton (KT) fission device, a 43-KT thermonuclear device, a 2-KT low-yield device, a 4045 KT device, and a sub-kiloton device.
All were designed and developed with the technical cooperation of Russia
and Indias Bhabha Atomic Research Center. India has stockpiled enough
fissile material to build more than 100 nuclear weapons. It is also worth
noting that the Indian atomic energy sector has taken on the production of
tritium, an isotope of hydrogen whose main application is in fashioning a
hydrogen bomb. Finally, India possesses fixed-winged aircraft, including the
Anglo-French Jaguar and the Soviet-supplied MiG-23 and MiG-27, that can
be modified to carry nuclear weapons.
Missile Program
In 1980 India became the first developing country and the sixth country in the
worldafter Russia, the U.S., France, Japan, and Chinato put a satellite,
Rohini-I, into orbit using its own launch vehicle. The military significance of
the development of the SLV-3 launch vehicle was immediately underlined by
the countrys top space official, who said the rocket could be converted into a
760
930-mile IRBM.50 Along with Israel, India leads the industrializing world in
manufacturing space-launch vehicles and components.
In the early 1980s, space-related missile efforts were formally integrated
into Indias national defense planning. In 1983 the government established
the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP),which is run
under the auspices of the DRDO and includes plans for a series of missile
systems to be developed in coming years. The IGMDPs founding marked
the governments decision to finally approve military missile development
and a conscious effort was made to extend the fruits of civilian space research
to the missile development program. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, the scientist who
headed the successful SLV-3 project, became the program chief and established close ties between civilian and military research, setting off alarm bells
in Pakistan, China, and the U.S. in the process. According to a recent report,
the DRDO operates more than 45 defense-related plants and research facilities of which 19 are engaged specifically in various aspects of missile design.
Indias ballistic missile program is already in an advanced state of R&D
and perhaps deployment. The country has successfully test-fired the Agni-I,
an IRBM with a range of 2,500 kms (1,550 miles); the Agni-II, a solid-fuel
IRBM with a range of 5,000 km; the Prithvi, a short-range ballistic missile
with a range of 250 kms (155 miles); the Trishul (trident-short range) SAM
with a range of nine kms (5.6 miles); the Akash, a medium-range Sky Patriot
class SAM with a range of 25 kms (16.8 miles); and the Nag (Cobra), an antitank missile.51 While the Agni provides India with the capability to place all
of Pakistan, much of the Indian Ocean, and many cities in southern China
within the range of its missiles, the Trishul and Akashif deployed as
ATBMscould give India the capability of protecting itself from incoming
missiles.
According to a report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile,
Indias IGMDP missile program is in its final stages. However, decisions
regarding future missile development and deployment, especially of ICBMs
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), are still a high priority.
India has developed an assortment of ballistic missiles, running from shortrange to intercontinental-class devices, along with SLBMs and a short-range,
surface ship-launched system.52 It is aggressively seeking technology from
other states, particularly Russia, the U.S., Germany, and other Western European countries, for its missile program. Technology and expertise acquired
50. Nolan, Trapping of Power, p. 41.
51. See Dawn, April 17, 1999, and September 2, 1998. See also Edmond Dantes, Missiles in
Gulf Buoy Indias Development Drive, Defence News, February 25, 1991, p. 1; and FEER, June
8, 1989, p. 21.
52. See Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report (Executive Summary) (Washington: Government Printing Press Office, 1998), p. 15.
A. Z. HILALI
761
from other states, particularly from Russia, are helping India to accelerate the
development and increase the sophistication of its missile systems. Many
Indian nationals are educated and work in the U.S., around Europe, and in
other advanced countries; some of the knowledge they acquired returns to the
Indian missile program. While India continues to benefit from foreign technology and expertise, its programs and industrial base are now sufficiently
advanced that supplier control regimes can affect only the rate of acceleration
in Indias programs.
Economic Impact of Defense Policy

Since the 1960s when India started military modernization, the major portion
of the countrys budget has been allocated to defense. India is the second
most populated country in the world after China. Its gross national product is
limited and per capita income is also less than in the rest of South Asia. Its
seemingly permanent tension and hostility with China and Pakistan will further lead to poverty and backwardness.
Indias defense posture is as unstructured and anarchic as it is profligate.
New Delhi has much less defense capability than it desires and its massive
investment programs suggest. It is more than 60% dependent on the former
Soviet Union for imports and spare parts for the production of a wide range
of ordnance. Increasingly, the major factor affecting Indias various modernization programs is unreliability of delivery. Most of the new weapons have
been imported and produced under license from a considerable array of suppliers. This dependency has been creating a logistical nightmare with respect
to spare parts, maintenance, and training.53
Moreover, in some case there have been production and collaboration difficulties with respect to some of the licensing agreements. For example, the
LCA design assumed the incorporation of the General Electrics F-404 engine produced in the U.S., because the Indian-produced engines could not
meet the IAFs specifications. The plane also included imported radar and
missile guidance systems. Production costs escalated when the air force reduced the size of its order, especially following the MIG-29 deal. By the
time the IAF deployed the LCA, the technology it contained was in some
respects redundant. A similar problem occurred with the domestically produced battle tank, whose India-manufactured engine has so far proved inadequate for the army.
Furthermore, Indo-Pakistan enmity is no longer tied to the geostrategic
concepts of the former superrivals, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Thus, the
previous approach toward international crisis management of the Indo-Pakis53. Chris Smith, Indias Ad Hoc Arsenal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.
14459.
762
tani conflict in which the global partners of the South Asian antagonists restrained the two from open military confrontation, is no longer applicable.
Pakistan has consistently denounced Indias defense spending and the evolution of Indian military doctrine as parts of a plan to undermine Pakistans
sovereignty and undo partition. These denunciations have continued because
of the present and continuing impasse over Kashmir, which remains the most
likely cause of any future conflict between India and Pakistan. The Kashmir
problem has the potential to grow into a bigger confrontation as a reflection
of the global phenomenon of increasing demands by ethnic and national minorities for self-determination and the influence that pressures from such contenders would have on Indian domestic politics. The growing antagonism
between Hindus and Muslims, communal clashes, and ethnic separatism in
India are major reasons for increasing the defense budget. India still views
military might as a more effective security guarantee than diplomacy, a policy that can be seen to have both external and internal dimensions.
For India, the uneasy external relations with Pakistan and China justify an
armament policy aimed at modernization. Furthermore, the end of the Cold
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have encouraged India to revive its
previous security policy of getting itself recognized by the world community
as the preeminent power in the region. Many Indians believe that the present
transformation of the international system is likely to work in its favor. Some
Indian strategists believe that the U.S. may allow India to play a role as a
relatively autonomous regional power in the Pacific Rim and South Asia because, since the Afghanistan crisis, the U.S. has given low priority to the
South Asian region. The U.S. might reduce its military strength in the Pacific
area and delegate partial responsibility to India to control the Indian Ocean.
Indian defense planners are hopeful that the U.S. will also offer India appropriate weapons systems and technological know-how.54 Thus, the trend has
prevailed toward armaments modernization rather than disarmament, and India has sought to purchase as much Western technology as financial constraints permit.55 In this regard, Indias ambitious nuclear and missile
program is obviously aimed at regional predominance. India seeks to rise as
an international actor with the help of military strength and economic power,
the essential status symbols for the countrys foreign and security policy.
Conclusion
The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 together represent one of
the most important events in the post-Cold War era. Both countries have
54. Citha D. Maass and George Bautzmann, Indias Post Cold War Armaments Policy: An
Analysis until 1993, Contemporary South Asia 5:2 (1996), p. 143.
55. See Janes Defence Weekly , May 8, 1993, p. 29.
A. Z. HILALI
763
abandoned ambiguity about their nuclear status and are determined not to roll
back or turn back any more than will the five established nuclear powers
abolish their own nuclear arsenals. Both are nuclear powers in a de facto
sense because the world hegemonic system and established nuclear powers
have hesitated to accept the existence of two new members to the club who
are and will remain outside of the otherwise near-universal, non-proliferation
regime. Thus, under the present circumstances, nuclear India has had difficulty adjusting to the international system because its nuclear status has not
yet been accepted by the big five on the one hand nor is it a non-nuclear
weapons state on the other. Some observers are of the opinion that India is
not clear about its future role and its leadership, diplomats, and industrialists
have yet to evolve a consciousness about their place in a unipolar world.
Indias rise to prominence has not simply been a consequence of the countrys growing strength. The rise has also been spurred by its concurrence
with a broader reordering of the global balance of power. Indeed, India has
emerged as South Asias bully and acquired unprecedented opportunities for
autonomous action in the region and beyond. Most Indians planners are confident that the time has now come for the regions smaller countries to learn
to not only live with Indias aspirations but also cooperate with it on a
subordinate basis. But the cumulative effect of this stance has been to lead
Pakistan to replenish and modernize its own arms and armor to the extent that
it is once again able to challenge India. Further, the conditions prevailing in
South Asia make the risk of actual nuclear war between the emerging nuclear
neighbors uncomfortably high. This risk has been fully acknowledged and
there are countries in the region that wish that the extra-regional powers
would resist or limit the role of India. The U.S. and China are the primary
extraregional actors capable of actively challenging such an emerging hegemony. They could do so by shoring up Pakistani capabilities in the conventional and nuclear fields and have it continue to play the role of balancer
against India. Some observers believe that the U.S. could counter China
through an involvement with India. On the other hand, China has also been
playing a role of regional balancer in South Asia by providing Pakistan with
aid aimed at expanding and modernizing its land, sea, and air power capability.
Thus, at present India can pursue only modest goals. Instead of overestimating its capabilities, New Delhi should realize that the acquisition of nuclear weapons cannot guarantee it an independent role in global politics.
Nuclear capability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for playing such
a part. India wont attain such status until its economic and technological
power are unchallenged. Moreover, an over-ambitious strategy defense can
only injure Indian interests. On the other hand, a strategy that does not seek
764
to deal with the countrys security challenges in a realistic, pragmatic way

also cannot secure Indias future.

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INDIA'S STRATEGIC THINKING AND ITS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

INDIAS STRATEGIC THINKING AND

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

Nehruvian Foreign Policy and Indias

by no means precluded an active stance in Indian self-interest; it became the

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

Factors Influencing Indias Grand Strategy

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

Moreover, the caste-dominated and hierarchical nature of Indian society

Current Challenges to Indias

in value, volume, diversity of manufacture, and research and development

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

words of Banerjee, as a fish in Indias troubled waters. 7 Further impetus

Chinas Military Buildup and

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

India proclaims that its economic growth is speeding up and it is committed

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

However, Pakistan views Indias aspirations as a direct challenge to its

Indias Military Strength

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

improve infrastructure.21 The 199697 Defense Services estimates allocated

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

signed Leander class frigates; French-designed corvettes; and the GE-LM

Indias Future Military Plan

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

Economic Impact of Defense Policy

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 5, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001

to deal with the countrys security challenges in a realistic, pragmatic way

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