10 1 1 401 1713 PDF
10 1 1 401 1713 PDF
10 1 1 401 1713 PDF
Pantone 330
Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language
Key Ideas in Linguistics and the
Philosophy of Language
Edited by
Siobhan Chapman and Christopher Routledge
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
vi
Preface
The ideas described in this book have been developed in linguistics and the
philosophy of language, as well as in some related disciplines such as mathe-
matics, logic and psychology. They necessarily represent only a very small pro-
portion of the long tradition of the serious study of language; we have chosen
them because of their impact on current work in linguistics and the philosophy
of language. These two disciplines are subdivided into many different branches.
Linguistics, for example, includes work undertaken in semantics, pragmatics,
phonology, syntax, sociolinguistics and many other fields. In general we have
not treated these individual fields as key ideas in their own right. You will not,
for instance, find an entry here on Pragmatics, but you will find topics from
the field of pragmatics discussed under entries such as Implicature, Relevance
Theory and Speech Act Theory. The names of different branches of linguis-
tics and the philosophy of language do, however, appear in the index. Similarly,
we have avoided allocating entries to descriptive categories such as adjective,
phrase or conjunction.
The entries are arranged in simple alphabetical order, and aim to elucidate
each key idea, offering a succinct definition followed by a more discursive
account of the development of the idea and of its impact and current relevance.
The book can therefore be used as a stand-alone reference work. However, it is
also designed to be used in conjunction with our Key Thinkers in Linguistics
and the Philosophy of Language (2005). The coverage of these two volumes is
similar: broadly, the study of language in the Western tradition from antiquity
to the present-day, with an emphasis on work that has been influential on lin-
guistics and the philosophy of language as they are practised in the early part
of the twenty-first century. However, the two are complementary in that they
arrange and present the material in different ways. Key Thinkers considers dif-
ferent ways of thinking about language in the context of the work of the
particular figures with which they are most closely associated, drawing out con-
tinuities and developments of thought in their particular historical and social
context. Key Ideas focuses on the development of specific ways of thinking,
sometimes across many decades or centuries, considering the influences on
these ways of thinking, the relationships between them, and their overall
significance.
Each entry is cross-referenced both internally within this book and externally
to Key Thinkers. The internal cross-references (See also) draw attention to
other key ideas that are relevant to the particular entry. These may be ideas that
are concerned with similar or related issues (such as the reference from Deduc-
tion/Induction to Empiricism/Rationalism); ideas that form a specific topic
within a more general approach (such as the reference from Speech Act Theory
vii
PREFACE
viii
Acknowledgements
A book of this kind depends on the cooperation and goodwill of a large number
of people and it has been a privilege to work with all of them. We would like
to take this opportunity to thank all of our contributors to this book and its
companion volume Key Thinkers in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Lan-
guage (2005) for their diligence and professionalism. Two individuals deserve
special mention. We would like to thank Sarah Edwards and her team at Edin-
burgh University Press for their enduring enthusiasm and support over the
course of two lengthy book projects. Jeremy Kaye, whose father Alan S. Kaye
was working on entries for this book when he died in May 2007, generously
gave his time searching for material that Alan was preparing for us and deliv-
ered the one entry his father had managed to complete before becoming too ill
to continue. Alan was passionately committed to the study of language and a
valuable contributor to these books. We dedicate this volume to his memory.
ix
Notes on Contributors
x
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
xi
ACCEPTABILITY/ by a native speaker. A grammatical
string is not necessarily meaningful, as
GRAMMATICALITY exemplified by Chomskys famous sen-
tence Colorless green ideas sleep furi-
Acceptability is the extent to which a ously. However, it is assumed that
sentence allowed by the rules to be even nonsensical grammatical sen-
grammatical is considered permissible tences can easily be pronounced with a
by speakers and hearer; grammatical- natural intonation and that speakers
ity is the extent to which a string of are able to recall them more easily than
language conforms with a set of given ungrammatical sentences. Speakers
rules. It is assumed that a native also supposedly have intuitions about
speakers grammar generates gram- grammaticality (or grammaticalness;
matical strings and that the speaker these two terms appear to be inter-
has the ability to judge a certain string changeable), determined by their com-
to be either acceptable or not in her petence (in other words, knowledge of
language. In practice, the two notions a language).
are frequently confounded and speak- Acceptability, on the other hand, is
ers are typically asked to give their related to speakers performance,
grammaticality judgements instead that is the actual use of her language
of acceptability judgements. in concrete situations. As stressed by
Chomsky, acceptability should not
See also: Innateness; Mentalism;
be confused with grammaticality:
Transformational-Generative
while an acceptable sentence must
Grammar
be grammatical, not just any gram-
Key Thinkers: Chomsky, Noam
matical sentence is necessarily accept-
In prescriptive grammar books able. For a sentence to be judged
employed in language teaching, a acceptable, it must also appear natu-
string is considered to be grammatical ral and appropriate in a given con-
if it conforms with a set of prescribed text, be easily understood and,
norms. These norms are usually based possibly, be to a certain extent con-
on conventionalised rules that form a ventionalised.
part of a higher/literary register for a Both grammaticality and accept-
given language. For some languages, ability are considered to be gradient
these norms are defined and periodi- properties by Chomsky and in the lin-
cally updated by an appointed body of guistic literature they are typically
experts whose rulings are occasionally expressed with a combination of ?
questioned by the frustrated members and * for grammaticality a sen-
of the public. tence marked with ** being strongly
In theoretical linguistics it has ungrammatical, a sentence marked
become customary to utilise the term with a ?* being questionable, and so
grammaticality in line with Noam on and # for acceptability.
Chomskys generative approach. In It has been observed that although
generative grammar, a string is gram- speakers may have intuitions about
matical or well formed if it could be grammaticality, they cannot be
generated by a grammar internalised expected to translate their intuitions
1
ADEQUACY
2
but also structural descriptions of AMBIGUITY/
those strings. For instance, one gram-
mar might generate a structural VAGUENESS
description of the phrase The old
man in which there are only three Ambiguity and vagueness are related
constituents: the, old and man, in but distinct concepts. Ambiguity, the
a flat linear string. Another grammar property of having more than one lin-
could generate a structural descrip- guistically encoded meaning, is an
tion in which there are two interme- important notion in several areas of
diate constituents: the and old linguistics (including syntax, seman-
man. The two grammars differ in the tics and pragmatics) as well as in phi-
structural descriptions they generate. losophy of language. Vagueness, the
In Aspects of the Theory of Syntax property of having no uniquely deter-
(1965), Chomsky argued that a gen- minable value or interpretation, has
erative grammar is justified to the been discussed by philosophers since
extent that the structural descriptions ancient times and is still a focus of
it generates correspond to the intu- attention for philosophers, semanti-
itive grammaticality judgements of cists and pragmatists.
the native speaker. He also sug-
See also: Connotation/Denotation;
gested that linguists should seek
Conventional Meaning;
explanatory adequacy: they should
Nonnatural Meaning; Implicature;
go further than descriptive adequacy,
Indeterminacy; Logic; Logical
devising generative grammars which
Form; Sense/Reference; Signs and
were embedded within a general
Semiotics
theory of human language. The
Key Thinkers: Frege, Gottlob;
theory in question was Chomskys
Grice, H. P.; Peirce, C. S.; Quine,
universal grammar*.
W. V. O.; Russell, Bertrand;
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Primary sources
Ambiguity is the property of having
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic Structures.
more than one linguistically encoded
The Hague: Mouton.
meaning. Lexical ambiguity is a prop-
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the
erty of words (or lexemes) and
Theory of Syntax. Cambridge MA: MIT
syntactic ambiguity is a property of
Press.
phrases, clauses or sentences.
The English noun seal is an
Further reading ambiguous lexical item referring,
Sampson, G. (1979). What was trans- among other things, to a particular
formational grammar? Lingua 48: kind of sea creature or a device for
35578. making sure an opening is fully
Smith, N. (2004). Chomsky: Ideas and closed. The sentence Ive brought the
Ideals. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- seal is ambiguous because of the pres-
sity Press. ence of this lexical item.
A syntactically (or structurally)
Philip Carr ambiguous expression is one which
3
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
can be associated with more than one heap or painful are inherently vague
syntactic structure. For example, one since there is no way to say for certain
reading of the expression grey seals how much of a particular substance
and walruses refers to seals which are we need to create a heap nor exactly
grey and to walruses which are grey, how much discomfort is required for
while on another reading it refers to an experience to be painful.
seals which are grey and to walruses
regardless of colour. Each of these Primary sources
options is associated with a different Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness.
structure which can be represented by London: Routledge.
bracketing:
Further reading
(a) [grey] [seals and walruses] Atlas, J. (1989). Philosophy Without Ambi-
(b) [grey seals] and [walruses] guity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hurford, J. R., B. Heasley, and M. B.
A full understanding of human lan- Smith (2007). Semantics: A Course-
guage requires an account of knowl- book. Second edition. Cambridge:
edge about the ambiguity of linguistic Cambridge University Press.
expressions, the processes by which Saeed, J. (2003). Semantics. Second edi-
we understand utterances containing tion. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
them and what happens when we fail
to disambiguate them. Billy Clark
Vagueness is the related but distinct
property of failing to determine a
unique value or interpretation. Vague-
ness can be understood as a very gen- ANALYTIC
eral, and fairly informal, notion or as
a more systematically understood
PHILOSOPHY
property of concepts, propositions or
utterances. Informally, all linguistic Analytic, or analytical, philosophy
expressions are vague since they have can be any of many things. The term
more than one possible interpretation. is used to describe philosophy that
The expression He has brought the proceeds via analysis, broadly by
seal, for example, could have several seeking to understand the composi-
interpretations depending on who is tion of its subject matter (or concepts
understood as the referent of he, of that subject matter) out of simple
which sense of seal is intended and (or simpler) components. In a promi-
what is the referent of the seal. In nent but secondary sense, analytic
most contexts, this kind of vagueness philosophy applies to most philoso-
is relatively easily resolved and a phy carried out in the mainstream of
unique interpretation can be deter- Anglo-American university philoso-
mined. On the more systematic sense, phy departments together with philos-
vagueness is understood as the prop- ophy that bears a suitable family
erty of not having a uniquely deter- resemblance to it: work within the
minable meaning. Concepts such as so-called analytic tradition.
4
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
5
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
philosophy was due mainly to the 1905). A very similar logic was devel-
work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand oped in the medieval period, but the
Russell. discovery of quantificational logic in
In the very late nineteenth century, its modern form is usually attributed
Moore began a revolt against German to Gottlob Frege (1879) and (inde-
idealism. There were four main areas pendently) Peirce (1885). This logic
of dissent. First, Moore felt that Ideal- enables the systematic treatment of
ism according to which mind and the inferential behaviour of a very
world are interdependent was an large range of the statements that can
erroneous metaphysical view and be made in natural language (and so
that, where possible, there should be a the thoughts expressible by the use of
return to realism, according to which those statements) as well as the sharp
there is an external world that is con- statement of complex positions and
stituted independently of operations arguments. Of special importance
of mind (except, of course, where the was Russells treatment of definite
external world contains individual descriptions* in sentences of the form
minds). Second, Moore felt that grand The F is G. Using the example The
system building should be suppressed present King of France is bald, Rus-
in favour of careful attention to detail sell represented sentences of that form
and rigorous argumentation. Third, as conjoining three claims:
he objected to what he saw as unnec-
essary obfuscation in the writings of (1) There is at least one F (there is at
German idealists. He felt that philo- least one present King of France).
sophical theories and arguments for (2) There is at most one F (there is at
those theories should be open to most one present King of France).
objective assessment and so should be (3) Whatever is F is G (what/who is the
stated as clearly and sharply as possi- present King of France is bald).
ble. In Moores view, work in the sci-
ences at the time offered better models In modern logical notation, the analy-
of philosophical methodology and sis becomes:
this belief also motivated the fourth
source of his dissent, his negative reac- (4) (x) [Fx & (y) (Fy x = y) & Gy].
tion to the Idealist suppression of the
method of analysis. Calling for a By systematising a statements inferen-
return to the method, Moore wrote tial (or, more broadly, logical) behav-
that a thing becomes intelligible first iour, the representation of the
when it is analysed into its constituent statement in a favoured logical system
concepts (Moore 1899: 182). shows the (or, perhaps, a) logical
Inspired by Moore and enamoured form* of the statement. Russells
in particular with the science of math- treatment provided a model on which
ematics, Russell began systematically a definite description that fails to
to develop the programme of analysis. apply to exactly one individual may
He was helped by his discovery (or be meaningful, and so provided a
rediscovery) of modern quantifica- potential solution to old problems
tional logic (see, in particular, Russell about the functioning of talk that
6
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
7
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
8
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
verified or falsified: that is, the Circles undermine a distinction between the
version of the distinction between analysis of statements and the empiri-
statements that are analytic and those cal assessment of those statements.
that are synthetic. Quine therefore And the rejection of determinate
took the range of statements that are translation appears to undermine the
up for scientific assessment to include assumption that there is such a thing
statements in logic and mathematics. as the analysis of a statement.
He took our total theory of the world The main effects of Quines work
to form an interconnected web of have involved the further broadening
statements that can only be assessed of the analytic horizon. Many con-
as a whole on the basis of the range of temporary analytic philosophers who
predictions it makes about the course are influenced by Quines rejection of
of experience. Quines work involved an analytic-synthetic distinction allow
in particular a rejection of the goal of their work to be shaped by the find-
atomist analysis that formed the impe- ings of empirical science. Similarly,
tus for the earliest work in modern many contemporary analytic philoso-
analytic philosophy. phers allow that philosophy even
Quines rejection of the existence of when approached from the armchair
a category of analytic truths went can be a source of discovery about the
hand in hand with a general rejection world. Thus the culmination, through
of the philosophical utility of appeals Quine, of the Vienna Circles anti-
to unreconstructed notions of linguis- metaphysical empiricism has led to
tic meaning. In particular, Quine the reinstatement of metaphysics as a
argued for the indeterminacy* of legitimate area of cognitive inquiry.
translation, the claim that for any Finally, many contemporary philoso-
translation from one language into phers have followed Quine in relegat-
another (including translation from a ing the study of meaning from its
language into itself), there will be central place in the analytic philoso-
other translations that have equally phers armoury, and have sought a
good empirical credentials. Famously more direct approach to answering
he argued that evidence that an philosophical questions.
expression is to be translated by the The postwar period of intense focus
English expression rabbit can be upon language and linguistic meaning
equally good evidence that the expres- coincided with Freges work becoming
sion is to be translated by the English widely available in translation and led
expression un-detached part of a to a re-evaluation of his place in the
rabbit (Quine 1960: 179). When development of analytic philosophy.
conjoined with Quines rejection of a In particular, Michael Dummett
principled distinction between ana- (1993) has claimed that it is criterial
lytic and synthetic statements, accept- of modern analytic philosophy that it
ance of Quines views has seemed to approaches the study of thought
many to undermine the possibility of through a study of the way language is
a philosophy based upon methods of used to express thought and that,
analysis. The rejection of an analytic- from that perspective, Frege should be
synthetic* distinction appears to assigned priority over Russell as its
9
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
10
ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC
11
ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC
12
ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC
sentences to their confirmation condi- know. One motive for this concep-
tions, plus those that enable this link tion of their role is that philosophers
to be derived. It is up to us to identify realise they are not scientists. What
those links. No one ever claimed this they provide must therefore comple-
would be easy. Quines final objection ment rather than compete with scien-
to this faith has, rightly or wrongly, tific knowledge. Another is immodest:
probably been the most influential. He they aim to understand the world at an
observes that evidence for or against a a priori level, that is, at a level imper-
particular clause in some scientific vious to the contingency of experience.
theory can, in principle, come from If Quine is right, this model of phi-
anywhere. Evidence for a particular losophy may be in trouble. According
claim in syntax, for example, may pre- to him, there are no analytic truths in
suppose a particular morphology; evi- any interesting sense. Some support-
dence for this morphology may ers of the model insist they are not
depend in turn on an analogy with a interested in the analysis of scientific
theory of colour vision tied to specific concepts. But they need to defend an
assumptions about photons; and so interest in the analyses they offer.
on. Given this evidential holism, stat- After all, folk ways of thinking are
ing the confirmation conditions for often inferior to scientific ones. Good
higher-level theoretical claims would analyses of concepts such as causa-
require making impossibly detailed tion or knowledge, if Quine is right,
and disjunctive reference to all of sci- may be susceptible to improvement as
ence. Developing and applying a science develops. Advances in the cog-
language that would allow these state- nitive sciences, for example, have
ments to be formulated, if possible at shaped our understanding of what
all, would be no easier than doing sci- knowledge is. Whereas Knowledge
ence as it is done already. must be conscious to the knower
Interest in and scepticism towards would once have been regarded as
the analytic/synthetic distinction thus analytic; it is now commonly regarded
grew out of a concern for how scien- as not even true, let alone analytically
tific methodology might be optimised. true. Disputes over the status of ana-
But the distinction is also central to a lytic truths have, then, broadened out
popular conception of what sets phi- into a split between those who see the
losophy apart from other disciplines philosophy of x and the science of x as
and also to an approach to semantics distinct in both subject matter and
conceived as a part of psychology. methodology, and those who see only
Many philosophers follow Socrates continuity.
in conceiving of their role as being to A very different approach to ana-
analyse concepts. There are more or lytic truth emerges from within lin-
less sophisticated implementations of guistics itself. It may be that to call a
this thought, but a typical illustration sentence analytically true is merely to
is the giving of necessary and sufficient give voice to an accidental feature of
conditions that approximately match, our language faculty. Certain appar-
or perhaps improve on, those for ently analytic entailments, such as
the proper application of the word that killing requires causing to die,
13
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
14
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
15
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
16
BEHAVIOURISM
17
BEHAVIOURISM
18
BEHAVIOURISM
19
BEHAVIOURISM
claimed that human behaviour and early 1960s, it still survives in some
more specifically language are infinitely applied settings (for instance in the
more complex than the types of animal treatment of autism) and in certain
behaviour Skinner had previously stud- strands of animal learning theory. The
ied, and thus principles of animal study of the mind/brain and their role
behaviour cannot be applied to verbal in explaining behaviour are now at
behaviour. He showed that many of the the forefront of scientific investiga-
concepts Skinner used, such as stimu- tion, but the legacy of behaviourism
lus, response, and reinforcement, were has not disappeared completely:
hopelessly vague and had no explana- behaviourism, for instance, shares
tory value in accounting for linguistic with contemporary connectionist
knowledge. He argued that Skinners approaches to psychology and lan-
account is also a poor model of lan- guage the emphasis on associative
guage acquisition, since it fails to learning and on the role of experience
account for the speed, efficiency and on learning.
uniformity with which children acquire
language. According to Chomsky, the Primary sources
basic facts of language acquisition Bloomfield, L. (1933). Language. New
point to the existence of an innate pre- York: Henry Holt.
disposition to acquire language. This Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of Verbal
review, along with work carried out Behavior. Language 31: 2658.
in computer science, was instrumental MacCorquodale, K. (1970). On Chom-
in the demise of behaviourism and in skys Review of Skinners Verbal Behav-
effecting the move from studying ior. Journal of the Experimental
behaviour to studying mental processes Analysis of Behavior 13: 8399.
using a computer metaphor (the cogni- Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind.
tive revolution). London: Hutchinson.
A direct response to Chomskys crit- Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal Behavior.
icisms never came from Skinner him- New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
self. Kenneth MacCorquodale, one of Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the
Skinners former students, published a Behaviourist Views it. Psychological
response (1970) more than ten years Review 20: 15877.
after the review appeared, in which he
showed that Chomsky had misunder- Further reading
stood several of the points Skinner was Baum, W. M. (2003). Understanding
making and that a lot of Chomskys Behaviorism: Science, Behavior, and
criticisms were not actually criticisms Culture. New York: Harper Collins.
of Skinners work but of other behav- Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human
iourist work popular at the time. This Behavior. New York: Macmillan.
response, however, had a very limited Skinner, B. F. (1986). The Evolution of
impact, partly because a paradigm shift Verbal Behavior. Journal of the
had already taken place and behav- Experimental Analysis of Behavior 45:
iourism had given way to cognitivism*. 11522.
Although behaviourism ceased to
be in the mainstream of science in the Stavroula-Thaleia Kousta
20
COGNITIVISM significant role to metaphoricity and
iconicity.
The centrality of meaning in cogni-
Cognitivism can be defined as the tive grammar is one of the main
belief that cognition mediates percep- aspects of the generative semantics
tion, unlike in behaviourism. In this heritage in cognitive linguistics.
broad sense, cognitivism is synony- Meaning in CL is taken to be funda-
mous with mentalism*. But while mental and directly mapped onto
mentalism has found expression in phonological structures. This entails
generative grammar, cognitive linguis- the rejection of modularity (the belief
tics was initiated as an alternative to that there exist encapsulated modules
the generative-transformational para- that process phonological or morpho-
digm, with significant influences from logical information without reference
the generative semantics* approach, to other levels of language) and the
Gestalt psychology and the psychol- adoption of an encyclopedic model of
ogy of prototypes. Its main earliest the lexicon, that is a belief that all
proponents were Ronald Langacker, sorts of encyclopedic information
George Lakoff and Len Talmy in the about lexical items are part and parcel
early 1980s, but the approach soon of their meaning and correspondingly
gathered a broad following in Europe no systematic distinction can be
and the United States. drawn between lexical (word-related)
and encyclopedic knowledge (knowl-
See also: Generative Semantics;
edge about the world). Typically, lexi-
Mentalism; Metaphor; Prototype;
cal knowledge is organised in frames,
Transformational-Generative
organised complexes of information
Grammar,
relating to a given concept.
Key Thinkers: Sapir, Edward;
The centrality of meaning is not
Whorf, Benjamin Lee
merely axiomatic, but informs the
The basic organisations of cognitive entire CL edifice. CL focuses both
linguistics (CL) are semantic-phono- on lexical meaning and on grammati-
logical mappings and in this respect cal meaning. Generative grammar
CL is like all semiotic approaches to ignored the lexicon, seen as a reposi-
communication. The significant differ- tory of exceptions, and assumed that
ence is that CL is squarely focused on grammar was a formal structure, that
meaning and rejects any non-semantic is one without meaning. Conversely,
component to the grammar (for exam- grammatical structure, according to
ple, empty categories). Other charac- CL, is the result of a process of
teristics that distinguish CL from other schematisation, that is abstraction of
non-cognitive approaches to grammar constructional meaning. So, in effect,
are prototypicality, schematicity, and CL claims that all language is mean-
perspectivism, as well as more gener- ing, including grammar, and that
ally, the rejection of modularity and grammatical meaning is very abstract
consequently the adoption of an ency- schematic meaning. Relatedly, CL is
clopedic semantics, and the belief that also very keen on constructional
cognition is embodied and affords a meaning, that is the fact that some
21
COGNITIVISM
22
COGNITIVISM
23
phenomena and sociolinguistic varia- COMPOSITIONALITY
tion at large.
24
CONNOTATION/DENOTATION
25
CONTINUITY
26
CONTINUITY
27
CONVENTIONAL MEANING
human language as a unique adapta- the sounds and the meaning thereby
tion, just as an elephants trunk is expressed. The stored meaning of
unique, does not preclude evolutionary expressions in the lexicon is an exam-
continuity. Advances in genetics may in ple of conventional meaning. Conven-
the end show how humans came to tional meaning must be learnt, as it
have language when other animals do cannot be inferred based on principles
not. But in the mean time it is not of rationality. The distinction between
unreasonable to assume that, as Pinker conventional meaning (what an ex-
says, There were plenty of organisms pression means) and speakers mean-
with intermediate language abilities, ing (what a speaker means by using a
but they are all dead (1994: 346). particular expression) is sometimes
used to draw the line between seman-
Primary sources tics and pragmatics.
Aitchison, Jean (1989). The Language
See also: Nonnatural Meaning;
Instinct: An Introduction to Psycholin-
Signs and Semiotics
guistics. London: Unwin Hyman.
Key Thinkers: Aristotle; Grice, H.
Sebeok, T. (ed.) (1968). Animal Commu-
P.; Lewis, David; Plato; Saussure,
nication: Techniques and Study Results
Ferdinand de; Strawson, P. F.
of Research. Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press. The question of whether the origin of
Pinker, Steven (1994). The Language linguistic meaning lies with natural
Instinct: The New Science of Language necessity or human convention is
and Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin. raised in Platos Cratylus, where
Socrates expresses the view that lin-
Further reading guistic meaning is a matter of habit, a
Uriagereka, Juan. The Evolution of Lan- view echoed in Aristotles De Inter-
guage, in Seed (http://seedmagazine. pretatione. In contemporary linguis-
com), 25 September 2007. http://seed- tics the conventionality of linguistic
magazine.com/news/2007/09/the_evolu meaning is acknowledged in Ferdi-
tion_of_language.php?page=1 (accessed nand de Saussures arbitrary associa-
on 30 January 2008). tion of signifier and signified, which
engenders the possibility for this asso-
Christopher Routledge ciation to shift and change across lan-
guages and over time.
More recently, H. P. Grice explained
linguistic meaning as a type of non-
CONVENTIONAL natural meaning*. Contrary to other
types of signs which are symptomatic
MEANING of particular states of affairs and thus
express natural meaning, the meaning
The fact that a sequence of sounds of a linguistic sign is dependent on
expresses a certain meaning in virtue how speakers use it to bring about par-
of a tacit agreement among speakers ticular effects in an audience. Such use
at a certain time and place, rather than is in turn more or less constrained by
because of any necessary link between the customary use of the sign by
28
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
29
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
proposed in the mid-1960s, during the connection has been established. This
heyday of the Chomskyan paradigm, opening is followed by making an iden-
which regarded talk as being unfit as tification and exchanging greetings.
a source of linguistic data because it is This pattern recurred in the major-
riddled with irregularities and flaws. ity of the telephone calls analysed
However, Sacks and his collaborators, by Schegloff. However, variations
Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, occurred as a result of a number of
proved that conversation is an orderly, reasons, including the setting of the
collaborative activity characterised by call. If the call is made to a workplace,
consistent principles that define what for instance, the answerer would start
linguistic forms interlocutors use to by giving the name of the organisation
open and close their contributions, and not the personal name. Although
how they repair and rephrase their face-to-face conversations are charac-
talk, and when they take the floor terised by similar features, there are a
during the course of a conversation. In few differences. These result from the
addition to these, CA also investigates fact that interlocutors can see each
the role of proxemics, or inter-per- other, which would influence the iden-
sonal distance and body language, in tification part of the opening sequence.
communication. The principles of CA Members of a speech community
have significant implications for a also need to be aware of the way in
number of disciplines that include lin- which conversations are closed, or
guistics, social psychology and com- concluded. Since talk in social interac-
munication, to name a few. It is tions is a collaborative process, it is
therefore useful to summarise some of important to ensure that a conversa-
the areas in which CA has proved tion is not ended in an abrupt manner
useful or enlightening. that would deprive any of the partici-
Since CA investigates the sequential pants of the right to contribute. It has
nature of conversation, analysts have been observed that participants use
studied the systematically recurring lin- certain expressions that signal the end
guistic units that open these conversa- of the conversation, the most common
tions. The majority of these studies among which is goodbye or one of
have focused on telephone conversa- its synonyms. However, a closing
tions because of the limitations result- sequence cannot just be introduced at
ing from the absence of physical clues any juncture of the conversation to
such as body language, facial expres- signal its conclusion. Before terminat-
sions and eye gaze. Schegloff has inves- ing a verbal interaction, a pre-closing
tigated opening sequences in telephone sequence alerting the participants to
conversations (1979, 1986) and con- the nearness of the conversation end
cluded that they are characterised by a has to be introduced. This is meant to
predictable sequence in which the ensure participants are given the
answerer of the telephone call speaks opportunity to make whatever contri-
first, saying hello. Since making a butions they deem necessary. Sche-
call is considered to be a summons gloff and Sacks define a pre-closing
that requires a response, the answerer sequence as a turn after the pro-
is expected to acknowledge that a duction of which every participant
30
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
31
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
32
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
only two people are involved, over- have received specific attention from
laps are rare. On the other hand, if a conversation analysts. First, a story
large number of people are involved in requires a fairly extended turn, which
the discussion of a heated topic, over- may disrupt the orderly turn-taking
laps are likely to occur at a high rate. mechanism of conversation; and,
Unlike written language, in the pro- second, in order to maintain coher-
duction of which a significant amount ence and topic continuity, a story has
of time is spent on composition and to be introduced at the right juncture
revision, spoken language is planned in the conversational interaction. Jef-
in the here-and-now. Consequently, ferson (1978) proposes two factors
conversations are marked by repair, that trigger narratives. The first is
a process whereby utterances are mod- when a conversation topic reminds a
ified. Liddicoat states that although speaker of the events of a certain expe-
repair may target a perceived mistake, rience. When that happens, she or he
people often use repair when they fail may elect to relate the story; however,
to retrieve a specific item from their the conversation participants have to
lexicon, or mental dictionary, in a be alerted by such expressions like by
timely manner (2007: 171). Schegloff the way, or incidentally. According
et al. (1977) have proposed a taxon- to Jefferson, these serve as disjuncts
omy for the classification of repairs marking topic transition and provid-
that occur in conversation. Their ing some kind of a justification for the
categorisation takes into account who narrative. Researchers have also
initiates the repair and who makes asserted the interactive characteristics
it. This yields four types which are: of story-telling. Contrary to common
(1) self-initiated self-repair, which belief, a story is not a monologue that
denotes deficiencies detected and is delivered by a single speaker. Not
resolved by the speaker; (2) self-initi- only do participants comment on and
ated other-repair, which refers to defi- evaluate the narrative after its deliv-
ciencies detected by the speaker, but ery, they also frequently ask questions
repaired by another; (3) other-initiated about and make remarks on the story
self-repair, denoting irregularities while it is being told. Upon the com-
pointed out by an interlocutor, but pletion of the narrative, receivers are
repaired by the speaker; and (4) other- expected to make some kind of a
initiated other-repair, referring to response. That response may be an
repairs detected and repaired by some- evaluation of the story, a comment on
one other than the speaker. Typically, its plot, or an expression of empathy.
Schegloff et al. argue, repairs involving If silence follows the end of a story,
grammatical mistakes are initiated by that would be regarded as an act of
the speaker, whereas repairs of hearing non-compliance.
problems are other-initiated. Citing a Deborah Schiffrin has proposed
variety of examples, the researchers a model for the analysis and inter-
indicate the different junctures of the pretation of spoken English that
conversation at which repair occurs. focuses on what she calls local coher-
Because of their unique characteris- ence, or coherence between adjacent
tics as a specific genre of talk, stories units in discourse. This, she believes,
33
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
34
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
time and place. Since the anonymity of Practices, and Applications. Malden,
the participants should be maintained, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
pseudonyms are usually used. A major Jefferson, G. (1978). Sequential Aspects
issue regarding transcriptions is word of Storytelling. In J. Schenkein (ed.),
representation. Using the conven- Studies in the Organization of Conver-
tional orthography has the advantage sational Interaction. New York: Aca-
that it is a system known to the whole demic. 21948.
literate society. However, since con- Liddicoat, Anthony (2007). An Introduc-
ventional orthography is based on a tion to Conversation Analysis. London:
standard variety of the language, some Continuum.
scholars, for example Duranti (1997), OGrady, William, John Archibald, Mark
argue that using it would undermine Aronoff and J. Rees-Miller (2005).
the neutrality and objectivity of the Contemporary Linguistics: An Intro-
transcription. In addition to the con- duction. Fifth edition. Boston, MA:
versation, non-linguistic sounds such Bedford/St Martins.
as laughter and back channelling Sacks, H., E. Schegloff and G. Jefferson
forms have to be included. The tran- (1974). A simplest systematics for
scription system also needs to indicate the organisation of turn-taking for
pauses within a contributors turn. conversation. Language Vol. 50:
Moreover, a pause between speakers 696735.
turns is also significant because its Schegloff, E. A. (1979). Identification and
absence is an indication of overlapped recognition in telephone conversation
conversation, which is significant to openings. In G. Psathas (ed.), Everyday
the turn-taking mechanism. Supraseg- Language: Studies in Ethnomethodol-
mental features such as stress and ogy. New York: Irvington. 2378.
intonation have to be transcribed Schegloff, E. A. (1986). The routine
because of their interactional signifi- as achievement. Human Studies Vol. 9:
cance. In addition to these features, 23, 11151.
the transcription should account for Schegloff, E. and H. Sacks (1973).
overlaps, body language and back- Opening up closings. Semiotica Vol. 7:
ground noise. Liddicoat asserts that 289327.
transcripts should be continuously Schegloff, E., G. Jefferson and H. Sacks
updated, adding that a transcript is (1977). The preference for self-correc-
not an objective account and that it tion in the organization of repair in con-
will always be a selective representa- versation. Language Vol. 53: 36182.
tion of the data itself (2007: 50). Con- Schiffrin, Deborah (1987). Discourse
versation analysis is an important tool Markers. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
for understanding language in use, but versity Press.
its usefulness to other disciplines, such
as anthropology and sociology, is also Further reading
very significant. Brown, Gillian, and George Yule (1983).
Discourse Analysis. Cambridge: Cam-
Primary sources bridge University Press.
Hutchby, Ian, and Robin Wooffitt (1998). Cook, Guy (1989). Discourse. Oxford:
Conversation Analysis: Principles, Oxford University Press.
35
CORPORA
36
CORPORA
same content, this is known as a par- Times. A more modern version of the
allel corpus. Existing corpora, avail- corpus is the Associated Press World
able through a number of sources, Stream English, published in 1998
including the popular Linguistic Data and containing approximately 143
Consortium (LDC), may be available million words. It combines the North
for a fee or free of charge. American News Text Corpus with
Among the first widely-available English-language text written in all
corpora are those in the the Brown parts of the world, usually not in
corpus, named for Brown University, American English. This corpus is
where it was created in the early marked up in Standard Generalised
1960s. First published as the Standard Markup Language (SGML) to make
Corpus of Present-Day American analysis easier.
English by Henry Kucera and Nelson Newswire data is also used in the
Francis, it contains 500 written texts Wall Street Journal (WSJ) corpus,
and totals more than one million which exists in several forms. An early
words of running text, averaging over version of it, called CSR-I, contains
2,000 words per text. Although it has Wall Street Journal news articles read
seen a number of proofreadings and aloud in the early 1990s as part of
revisions since its creation, the Brown an effort to support research on
corpus remains an admirable repre- large-vocabulary Continuous Speech
sentation of 1961 written American Recognition (CSR) systems. This was
English, spanning a wide range of soon revised as CSR-II, containing
styles and varieties of prose, including 78,000 utterances, or seventy-three
both informative and imaginative hours of speech. There are also writ-
prose, such as text from newspapers, ten text variations of Wall Street Jour-
novels, non-fiction and academic pub- nal data, containing thirty million
lications. Kucera and Francis con- words parsed in a treebank-style (cap-
ducted a thorough analysis of the turing syntactic structure) with part of
corpus, a landmark in modern corpus speech tagging.
linguistics. Another version of the Combining both written and spoken
Brown corpus now exists with tagging text from a wide range of British Eng-
for parts of speech. lish sources, the British National
Another important corpus includes Corpus (BNC) contains 100 million
texts published by the Associated words and has been updated several
Press (AP), aptly known as the North times since its birth in 1991. Its mas-
American News Text Corpus, or more sive size is roughly equivalent to 1,000
simply the AP corpus. There are actu- average paperback books. The written
ally multiple versions of this corpus. A portion of the BNC corpus represents
1987 version of it contains fifteen mil- 90 per cent of the total and contains
lion words, and a 1988 version con- text from British newspapers, periodi-
tains thirty-six million. The content cals, journals, non-fiction and fiction
came from North American authors, books, letters and essays. The remain-
writing news stories in American Eng- ing 10 per cent consists of spoken
lish for the Los Angeles Times, the utterances by British English speakers
Washington Post and the New York in the form of informal conversation,
37
CORPORA
38
CORPORA
39
CORPORA
speech corpora data as well as testing of the language used by the popula-
systems against an existing corpora of tion of interest. When selecting a
natural, unscripted speech. It may corpus or collecting data to build a
even play a role in assembling a con- new corpus, a linguist must identify
trolled language to be used for a what type of text a corpus must reflect
speech recognition system, identifying as well as whether the results of work
the words and phrase structures that with the corpus will transfer to the
regular people may use when interact- domain of interest. That is, a corpus
ing with the system. Machine transla- serves as a powerful tool for linguists,
tion (MT) technology also uses but it cannot wholly substitute for the
corpora for example-based systems real world. In general, the larger a
working on the assumption that trans- corpus, the more useful it is and the
lation involves finding or recalling more likely it is to capture actual lin-
analogous examples of words and guistic use. Yet even the largest corpus
phrases. Corpus-based approaches to available is only as useful as the extent
MT may be trained using a subset of to which it reflects the target domain
texts within a particular corpus and and offers a usable format for analy-
then tested against other texts within sis. In addition to size, the breadth of
that same corpus. Finally, corpora are a corpus also affects its usefulness and
also useful for exploring and inter- applicability for meaningful research.
preting historical documents. For A valuable corpus for a linguist study-
example, researchers working on ing general language use, for example,
deciphering an ancient text could use should contain a variety of text
a corpus of texts from the same his- sources, such as newspapers, text-
torical period and geographical loca- books, popular writing, fictions and
tion to find clues to better understand technical material. Another potential
the text they are studying. drawback specific to speech corpora is
A key criticism of corpus analysis is that they lack linguistic cues that are
that it supports statistical methods otherwise available in a text corpus.
that disregard our knowledge of lan- Speech corpora include both frag-
guage. Within NLP, systems fall along mented, incomplete words and filled
a spectrum, with purely rule-based pauses, such as uh and um. While
approaches at one end and corpus- these elements reflect how people
based (statistical) approaches at the actually speak, which is crucial for
other. Evaluations of competing NLP speech recognition systems, they
systems show that hybrid systems, understandably make it harder to
incorporating a combination of lan- work with the data.
guage rules and statistical methods, The concept of a corpus presents
consistently outperform systems that an interesting circular relationship
use only one of the two methodolo- between linguistics and society in gen-
gies. Even when a corpus-based (or eral. A corpus captures a subset of
hybrid) approach is undisputed, a par- real-world language data, while lin-
ticular corpus itself might not fit the guists use this data in a format that
task. A corpus fails its job when it is enables them to study it, to analyse its
not an accurate representative sample contents, and to develop and support
40
CORPORA
41
CORRESPONDENCE THEORY
Edwards, Jane (1993). Survey of elec- phy, and its contemporary version is
tronic corpora and related resources for mostly influenced by G. E. Moore,
language researchers. In J. Edwards Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgen-
and M. Lampert (eds), Talking Data: stein and Alfred Tarski. For many
Transcription and Coding in Discourse people outside philosophy, including
Research. Hillside, NJ: Lawrence Erl- linguists and lay-persons, the cor-
baum Associates. respondence solution seems intu-
Morley, Barry (2006). WebCorp: a tool for itively correct: in our daily lives we
online linguistic information retrieval have to assume that there is a relation
and analysis. In A. Renouf and A. Kehoe between what people say and the
(eds), The Changing Face of Corpus Lin- things they talk about. But whether
guistics. Amsterdam: Rodopi. what they say is true or false, we need
the concept of truth because without
Jennifer A. Baldwin it we would not be able to describe
what happens in the world.
One modern way of formulating the
correspondence theory solution is to
CORRESPONDENCE say that a sentence (a proposition) is
true iff (if and only if) it corresponds to
THEORY some fact, or iff it corresponds to some
state of affairs. It is not hard to see the
A theory that tries to solve the prob- problem: in order to appreciate the
lem of what constitutes truth as a notion of correspondence one has to
property of sentences by claiming that grasp the notions of sentence, fact
there is a relation of correspondence and state of affairs respectively. Intu-
between the meaning of true sentences itively we would say that the truth of a
and the way the world is at a certain sentence has to do with the meaning of
place and time. the sentence, and this may be differen-
tiated from the state of affairs, which
See also: Language of Thought;
seems to be what is out there, in
Logic; Sense/Reference; Truth
reality. But can sentence meaning be
Theories; Truth Value
separated from fact? Some sentences
Key Thinkers: Aristotle; Kant,
for example, Open the window
Immanuel; Moore, G. E.; Russell,
do not express facts, but in general
Bertrand; Tarski, Alfred;
sentences are interpreted as expressing
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
facts of some kind. So, if a sentence
Correspondence theory is the most meaning conveys true information,
prominent of several theories trying to what is the difference between the
solve the problem of what truth is. It meaning of a sentence and the facts
originates in Greek philosophy, specif- that it conveys? In other words, if sen-
ically in the work of Aristotle, and tence meaning and fact are the same
appears in the medieval period in thing, how can they not correspond?
the work of Thomas Aquinas and Dictionary definitions on the notion
William of Ockham. It was later a of truth usually take up the nature of
principle in Immanuel Kants philoso- the relation between language and
42
CREATIVITY
43
DECONSTRUCTION
44
DECONSTRUCTION
The very mention of the word decon- There is a grain of truth in the
struction causes jitters among many claim that deconstruction engages in
academic philosophers and calls forth textual analysis. But it is important to
derision from others. It is probably add that, as Derrida himself once
true to say that no other term in phi- remarked, there is nothing outside the
losophy has recently been the target of text. What Derrida was trying to press
such tireless tirade and misrepresenta- home in his trademark claim was that,
tion. In common parlance, it is often contrary to conventional thinking on
erroneously and dismissively used as the matter, the reading of a text does
though it were just a fancy word for not consist in pitting the text against
destruction thus proving the old something that is essentially of some
adage that one can give a dog a bad other order say, ideas or intentions
name and hang it. When Jacques Der- in the mind of the speaker/writer or a
rida first employed the word, scarcely putative reality out there. Instead, a
could he have imagined that it would reading of the text is an extension of
soon be at the epicentre of so much that very text. That is to say, no text
controversy and acrimony. From the comes out unaffected by its successive
1960s on, when Derrida took the readings. Each new reading of the text
world of philosophy by storm, decon- adds something to that text and is
struction became a catchword among fully incorporated into the texts
academics across a wide spectrum of meaning so that the meaning of the
disciplines, and his influence is felt in text to the extent there is such a
areas as diverse as literary criticism, thing may be described as that which
linguistics, sociology, and even such is constantly undergoing change,
unlikely disciplines as economics and despite the illusory sensation that it is
law. the self-same object that one is dealing
Both Derrida and the movement he with on successive occasions.
started have understandably been the So what on earth does Derrida
target of scathing criticism, especially mean by deconstruction and exactly
from those scholars who, speaking how does it work? It has been
on behalf of the philosophical estab- remarked that it is easier to define
lishment, rightly sensed a potential deconstruction by saying what it is
threat to the way they went about not, rather than what it is. In a famous
their routine business. However, to text called Letter to a Japanese
call the approach sceptical or down- Friend, Derrida wrote that decon-
right nihilistic, or to characterise it as struction is neither an analysis, nor a
just plain philosophical dilettantism, critique and, furthermore, it is not a
as some critics have done, is to dismiss method and cannot be transformed
it without a fair hearing. To regard into one. In fact, as it turns out, the
deconstruction as a form of textual very quest for definitions is antitheti-
analysis is to give it a left-handed com- cal to the spirit of deconstruction.
pliment and, in effect to relegate it to This is so because the idea that mean-
the realm of literary criticism ings can be captured and encapsulated
another way of saying it is anything in neat definitions is the very hallmark
but philosophical. of philosophy in its traditional sense.
45
DECONSTRUCTION
Recall, for instance, Socratess irritat- ness of the reader to tease it out of spe-
ing habit of asking his interlocutors to cific texts.
provide him with a definition of, say, The process of unravelling a texts
piety (as repeatedly shown in Platos putative meaning begins the moment
Dialogues). Therefore, to the extent one notices that the dichotomies that
that deconstruction seeks to, as it a texts author posits in order to con-
were, call the bluff of philosophy in struct his arguments are actually rela-
respect of its time-honoured preten- tions of hierarchies, often ingeniously
sions, it is only to be expected that it camouflaged in order to be presented
should stubbornly resist every attempt as symmetric. In other words, it is
to enclose it in a neat definition. invariably the case that, in a dichoto-
The idea that one can define ones mous pair, one side is privileged to the
terms once and for all rests on the detriment of the other. In his book Of
assumption that there are such things Grammatology (1967) Derrida illus-
as meanings that can remain stable trated this by showing how one of the
over a period of time and which could founding dichotomies of linguistics
be captured and imprisoned in the namely, the one that opposes meaning
form of rigorous definitions. Well, and the linguistic object (say, the
among other things, deconstruction text)is itself the result of a textual
is, as we have seen, concerned with prestidigitation at the hands of Ferdi-
reminding us that there are no such nand de Saussure, the disciplines
stable meanings to begin with, and so founding father, who postulated it.
the quest for definitions is a wild goose Initially presented as a symmetric pair,
chase. Rather, the meaning of a given the distinction between signified and
text is precisely what is iterable a signifier reveals itself, upon closer
neologism coined by Derrida, meaning inspection, to be an hierarchical one.
that which comes out different every This is because the very stability of
time one repeats it, as bizarre as this that sign relation (the sign being, for
might indeed appear at first blush. It is, Saussure, a relation of bond between
to use another of Derridas coinages, a signifier and a signified) is predi-
determined by diffrance, an amalgam cated upon there being one side of the
of deferral and difference. relation (namely, the signified) not
Derrida maintained throughout dependent on the other and thus capa-
that deconstruction is a form of close ble of standing alone unlike the sig-
reading, where all that one needs to nifier whose contribution to the sign
mobilise is the texts own internal relation is always that of pointing to
logic. In other words, texts decon- the other, namely the signified, con-
struct themselves as it were when sub- ceived of as auto-sufficient in that it
jected to relentless close reading. All is the meaning, period.
that a reader needs to do is to press Derrida extended his deconstructive
ahead with its own internal logic. analysis to other prized dichotomies of
That logic, Derrida insisted, is built structural linguistics such as speech
around the notion of logocentrism, versus writing. He argued that the lin-
the belief that there are stable mean- guists preference for speech to the
ings out there and that it is the busi- detriment of writing (the wandering
46
DEDUCTION/INDUCTION
47
DEDUCTION/INDUCTION
48
DEDUCTION/INDUCTION
49
DEDUCTION/INDUCTION
50
DEDUCTION/INDUCTION
51
DEDUCTION/INDUCTION
52
DEDUCTION/INDUCTION
53
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
54
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
presence of the definite description that where necessary the messy and
ensures that the logical form of the imperfect constructions of natural
sentence is a complex set of proposi- language must be translated into log-
tions that concern existence and ically correct form before they can
uniqueness as well as baldness. The provide suitable subject matter for
logical form of the present king of philosophical analysis. This has been
France is bald could be paraphrased the cause of a number of responses to
as there is an entity x such that x is the Russell. Perhaps the most significant
present king of France, no entity that of these has been that put forward by
is not equivalent to x is the present Peter Strawson in his 1950 article
king of France, and x is bald, or more On referring. Coming from a back-
informally there is one, and only one, ground in ordinary language philoso-
king of France, and he is bald. phy* (OLP), Strawson criticises
This analysis allowed Russell to Russell for being obsessed with logic
explain his conviction that the sen- and mathematics, at the expense of
tence is false. The simple proposition attending to the realities of natural
that a present king of France exists is language. Russell was overlooking
false. This is sufficient to make the important facts about the ways in
logical form* of the sentence, which is which speakers actually use expres-
a coordination of this and two other sions containing definite descriptions;
propositions, false also. The analysis as Strawson puts it, mentioning, or
also allowed Russell to maintain a referring, is not something an
classical bivalent logic* for language. expression does; it is something that
If the present king of France is bald someone can use an expression to do
is false, then logic dictates that the (1950: 326).
present king of France is not bald Strawson claims that someone
must be true. This is indeed the case if encountering an utterance of the
the negation is read as having scope present king of France is bald would
over the whole of the logical form: as not be likely to reply thats false, as
Russell paraphrases it, the negative Russells account would seem to pre-
sentence can be read as it is false that dict. Rather they would be stuck for a
there is an entity which is now king of response of any kind, feeling that
France and is bald. The negative sen- there was something badly wrong
tence is ambiguous, however. On with this statement; the question of
another reading it can be interpreted whether it is true or false would just
as there is an entity which is now king not arise. For Strawson, the proposi-
of France and is not bald, and on this tion that there exists a present king of
reading it is as false as its positive France is not part of the logical form
equivalent. of the statement, but is a presupposi-
Russells theory is very much a tion* attached to its use. It is neces-
product of his analytic approach to sary for this presupposition to be
philosophy. It draws attention to what fulfilled for the sentence to be either
he sees as a discrepancy between the true or false. Hence both the present
grammatical form of a sentence and king of France is bald and the pres-
its logical form. The implication is ent king of France is not bald must be
55
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
56
DESCRIPTIVISM
57
(CRITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
58
(CRITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
59
(CRITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
60
(CRITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
61
(CRITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
62
(CRITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
certainly losing overall coherence tity and norms (that is, discourse does
through the proliferation of often- not simply reflect existing external
conflicting methodologies and facts, it plays a central role in con-
assumptions about language, society structing the world as we see it). How-
and the main goals of the analysis, but ever, CDA goes further in focusing
at the same time it was gaining especially on the role of discourse in
strength through the sheer range of constructing and reproducing social
topics that could be covered and inequalities as embodied, for exam-
through the increasing sophistication ple, in racial and sexual discrimina-
of the analytical methods on offer. A tion. Certain forms of discourse are
sense of the diversity can be gained by available to those with power, while
inspecting the spectrum of areas cov- other forms of discourse construct the
ered in surveys of discourse analysis users as (relatively) powerless. To take
such as those edited by van Dijk a simple example, each time someone
(1985) and by Schiffrin et al. (2003). fills in a tax return, providing the
The diversity can also be seen by information required in the format
comparing publications such as (to specified, they are accepting and
take just two examples fairly ran- thereby reaffirming the authority of
domly) Georgakopoulou and Goutsos the institution controlling their behav-
(1997), which keeps to a firmly text- iour. This seems completely natural,
linguistic approach and highlights and most people do not take a resist-
especially the linguistic and organisa- ant attitude, whatever their feelings
tional differences between narrative about paying tax. The discourse
and non-narrative discourse, and embodied in tax forms and the like
Wetherell et al. (2001), a reader has become so naturalised that we no
designed to introduce discourse analy- longer notice the implications, in
sis to students of the social sciences terms of reinforcing the unequal dis-
and oriented strongly towards ethno- tribution of power, of doing as we are
graphic and socio-cultural issues. The told that is, of playing our assigned
discipline is also served by an increas- roles in a discourse event. The set of
ingly wide selection of journals naturalised assumptions about the
including Discourse Studies, Dis- state of things with which language
course and Society, Text & Talk and users work, and which are reflected in
others. the language they use, are seen as
One of the more recent manifesta- making up the users ideology. The
tions of discourse analysis that is more inequality is built into ones ide-
worth special mention has been in the ology that is, the less obvious it is
form of critical discourse analysis the more difficult it is to resist or even
(CDA), as developed by scholars to question. CDA practitioners set
such as Norman Fairclough (1995), themselves the task of using various
Teun van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. This forms of analysis to bring to light the
starts from the basic constructionist ideological assumptions underlying
assumption in most discourse analysis any discourse, particularly those
that discourse inherently functions to which embody dominant forces in the
construct and reproduce social iden- society.
63
(CRITICAL) DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
64
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
Beyond the Clause. London and New developed these ideas to propose what
York: Continuum. became, through further reworking
Mitchell, T. F. (1957). The language of by Noam Chomsky and Morris Halle,
buying and selling in Cyrenaica. Hes- the standard model.
peris 44: 3171. Although the notions were implicit in
earlier phonetic description, Nikolai
Geoff Thompson Trubetzkoy (1939) focused attention
on phonologys subsegmental level.
Trubetzkoy described oppositions be-
tween phonemes, invoking the idea that
DISTINCTIVE phonemes are characterised by the
contrasts they exhibit in languages.
FEATURES American structuralists also spoke of
phonemes features, principally to op-
The smallest units of linguistic struc- pose the distinctive and non-distinctive
ture, from which larger units are built, properties of languages indivisible
sometimes seen as the attributes by phonemes. Jakobson revised these
which phonemes* can differ. The idea largely language-specific notions and
is fundamental in phonology, where sought a small language-universal set of
many generalisations are standardly features, which exist independently of
stated in terms of features. the segments that they compose.
Trubetzkoy focused on distinctive
See also: Generative Phonology;
oppositions those which signal
Phoneme; Optimality Theory
phonological contrast. These could be
Key Thinkers: Chomsky, Noam;
privative (a marked property is either
Jakobson, Roman; Trubetzkoy,
present or absent), equipollent (both
N. S.
members are of equal status) or grad-
One of the few areas of phonological ual (with several gradations of one
consensus is that segments are com- property). All Jakobsons features were
posed of features. Features play cru- arguably equipollent, with two values,
cial phonological roles, being used (1) each characterising a definite property
to express how segments contrast (for example, tense/lax, nasal/oral).
with each other and (2) what groups Jakobsons work (some collaborative,
of segments (natural classes) for- clearly expressed in Jakobson, Fant
mally have in common, (3) to model and Halle 1952) based features prima-
what changes in phonological pro- rily on segments acoustic properties.
cesses in generative phonology*, and Chomsky and Halle (1968) redefined
(4) in the formulation of constraints in features using principally articulatory
optimality theory*. The Prague Lin- definitions, and used them in phono-
guistic Circle provided the first logical rules, setting the scene for
detailed expression of the ideas standard generative phonology. They
behind feature theory, and relevant reinforced features binary nature,
ideas occur in American structuralist using plus and minus values (for exam-
work. Roman Jakobson, seen as the ple, [+back], [nasal]) in underlying
father of distinctive feature theory, representations and virtually all rules.
65
EMIC/ETIC
66
EMPIRICISM/RATIONALISM
of another. To the extent that they are Psychology. Amsterdam: Swets &
relevant to the latter, these units con- Zeitlinger. 5563.
stitute part of an etic inventory that is
no longer internal to any single lan- Marina Terkourafi
guage. The International Phonetic
Alphabet is an example of such an
inventory, while the phonologies of
individual languages correspond to EMPIRICISM/
the emic systems from which the
former is abstracted.
RATIONALISM
An inventory of etic units is created
by the analyst prior to the analysis of Put simply, empiricism is the view that
the particular language to which it is all knowledge derives from experi-
applied. Etic units correspond to raw ence; rationalism is a contrasting view
observational data, often measurable in which knowledge comes from rea-
by instrumental means. Since they soning. In epistemology, the branch of
do not combine into a system of philosophy concerning theories of
meaningful contrasts, they are pre- knowledge, empiricism and rational-
structural. Conversely, emic units result ism are types of position that have
when the raw data are interpreted by been taken about the sources of
natives, though they are not necessarily knowledge, in particular in discus-
consciously known (named) by them. sions about what is required for a
They are thus structural and valid for state to count as knowledge. In psy-
only one language. Combining emic chology and its philosophy, empiri-
and etic perspectives yields a kind of cism and rationalism concern the
tri-dimensional understanding of sources of psychological states and
human behaviour instead of a flat capacities that may include, but are
etic one (Pike 1954: 12). not confined to, states of knowledge.
See also: Analytic/Synthetic;
Primary sources
Behaviourism;
Pike, Kenneth (1954). Language in Rela-
Deduction/Induction; Holism;
tion to a Unified Theory of the Structure
Innateness; Linguistic Relativity;
of Human Behaviour. Glendale, CA:
Logical Positivism; Mentalism;
Summer Institute of Linguistics.
Universal Grammar
Key Thinkers: Berkeley, George;
Further reading
Chomsky, Noam; Descartes, Ren;
Headland, Thomas, Kenneth Pike and
Frege, Gottlob; Hume, David;
Marvin Harris (eds) (1990). Emics and
Locke, John
Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate.
Frontiers of Anthropology. Vol. 7. In a general sense, a position is a
London: Sage. form of empiricism insofar as it holds
Jahoda, Gustav (1977). In pursuit of the that knowledge (or other psychologi-
emic-etic distinction: can we ever cal states and capacities, indicated
capture it?. In Y. H. Poortinga (ed.), henceforth: (etc.)) about some partic-
Basic Problems in Cross-Cultural ular subject matter, S, derives from
67
EMPIRICISM/RATIONALISM
68
EMPIRICISM/RATIONALISM
rational insight) and deductive rea- its lack of specificity. First, articulating
soning, rather than by experience of the precise content of a form of
that subject matter; (2) knowledge of empiricism is dependent upon further
a particular subject matter is innate specification of the notion of experi-
(very roughly, determined by nature ence employed in the approximate
rather than, for example, by the par- account. For instance, one form of
ticular course of experience); and (3) empiricism holds that knowledge
the concepts or ideas that constitute (etc.) about a particular subject matter
our abilities to think about a particu- derives solely from sense experience of
lar subject matter are innate. Ratio- that subject matter visual, auditory
nalists about knowledge (etc.) about a or tactile experience and not from
particular subject matter characteristi- other forms of experience introspec-
cally endorse at least one of (1)(3) tive experience or religious revelation.
with respect to that subject matter. Further specification of that form of
Empiricists about knowledge (etc.) of empiricism would be dependent upon
a particular subject matter character- further specification of the boundaries
istically reject (1)(3) with respect to of sensory experience. Correlatively,
that subject matter. Since epistemolog- articulating the precise content of a
ical forms of empiricism and rational- form of rationalism is dependent upon
ism concern the justification or further specification of the extent of
warrant required for a state to count reason or our rational nature(s).
as knowledge, and not the sources of Whether a particular form of ration-
psychological states and capacities in alism is in dispute with a particular
general, it is possible to adopt psycho- form of empiricism depends upon the
logical forms of each type of position details of such further specification. In
without also adopting epistemological particular, it depends upon whether
forms. For instance, one might hold the type(s) of experience to which
that a particular belief is innate and appeal is made in characterising
so be a psychological rationalist with the particular form of empiricism
respect to the belief and also hold includes, or excludes, the outputs of
that in order to be justified or war- the type(s) of reason, or our rational
ranted the innate belief must be sup- nature(s) to which appeal is made in
plied with experiential support and characterising the particular form of
so be an epistemological empiricist rationalism.
with respect to the belief. Alterna- Second, someone who holds that
tively, one might hold that a particular there are sources of knowledge in
belief is only acquired on the basis of addition to experience and reason, or
experience, but that the justification our rational nature(s), might reject
or warrant for the belief derives from empiricism (or rationalism) about a
reason. In that case, one would be a subject matter without endorsing
psychological empiricist and an epis- rationalism (or empiricism) about that
temological rationalist. subject matter. For instance, that
Two points are worth noting about person might hold that knowledge
the approximate account of the two about some subject matters depends
types of position, both pertaining to upon aspects of our non-rational
69
EMPIRICISM/RATIONALISM
70
EMPIRICISM/RATIONALISM
71
EMPIRICISM/RATIONALISM
bland claim that we are predisposed rationalism. That should not be sur-
to acquire language. And because he prising now that we have recognised
provides an account according to the variety of possible rationalist posi-
which our initial state of knowledge is tions. But some of the apparent differ-
shaped by experience in the course of ences are especially striking and have
normal development, his account been taken by some thinkers to under-
avoids falsification by the fact that mine Chomskys classification as a
small children and subjects of abnor- rationalist, or the bearing of his work
mal development lack ordinary on the standing of more traditional
knowledge of language. forms of rationalism.
However, important questions First, although Chomsky talks of
remain concerning the precise content knowledge of language, it is not clear
of the claim that a basic component of that he thinks of this knowledge as the
human linguistic capacity or state is sort of propositional knowledge
innate. And the fact that many theo- knowledge that such-and-such that
rists who align themselves with either is of concern to epistemologists. Some
empiricism or rationalism including philosophers have thought that the
Chomsky agree that both innate knowledge is really knowledge-how
and experiential factors play a role in that is, practical knowledge like
shaping knowledge of language knowledge how to ride a bicycle.
tends to undermine the utility of their Although Chomsky rejects that inter-
classification as empiricists or ratio- pretation, it remains an open question
nalists. Second, empiricists have whether he is right to do so. And
attempted to provide accounts of lan- Chomsky admits other reasons for
guage acquisition that make more lim- thinking that the sort of knowledge
ited appeals to innate psychological in question differs from the sort
states and capacities. Some empiricist that concerns epistemologists. For
approaches agree with the rationalist instance, he does not think that
assessment of what the child acquires knowledge of language is justified or
and attempt to provide accounts of warranted and he does not think that
how the child might acquire it more or we are typically conscious of possess-
less solely on the basis of experience. ing it; he thinks of it as tacit knowl-
Other empiricist approaches involve edge. Moreover, some of these reasons
an attempt to show that the child might also be grounds for thinking
acquires less than the rationalist has that knowledge of language is not
claimed, so that the task of accounting really a psychological state, so under-
for their acquisition is made easier for mining Chomskys classification even
the empiricist. Thus far, no empiricist as a psychological rationalist.
account has been provided that has Second, Chomsky does not think
anything approaching the depth, that knowledge of language is knowl-
detail and coverage of rationalist edge about a mind-independent sub-
accounts. ject matter. Rather, on Chomskys
Chomskys form of rationalism view, facts about an individuals
appears to differ in certain respects language are constituted by facts
from some more traditional forms of about the individuals psychology, in
72
EMPIRICISM/RATIONALISM
73
FEMINISM
Ed. and trans. E. Curley. Princeton, NJ: were silenced and interrupted by men.
Princeton University Press. Another influential study of the area is
Stich, S. (ed.) (1975). Innate Ideas. Pamelas Fishmans 1978 analysis of
Berkeley, CA: California University the home conversations of American
Press. couples: she found that women did a
lot of the interactional shitwork as
Guy Longworth she termed it that is mundane but
sustains relationships, in the same
way that they do other mundane work
that sustains the family, such as house-
work.
Some of the researchers of the time
FEMINISM did not only argue that male domi-
nance led to gender differences in
Feminism is a hotly contested term speech but to female deficiencies. The
but it can broadly be described as a deficit approach as an extension of
range of social movements and theo- the dominance approach was carried
ries that have discrimination on the over from an earlier period where men
basis of gender as their key concern. were seen as default human beings
Feminist linguistics explores the inter- and everything that deviates from the
relationship between language and male norm was seen as deficient. Thus
gender. speaking like a woman was not only
seen as feminine but, at the same time,
See also: Conversation Analysis;
as deviating from normal that is
Deconstruction; (Critical)
male speech. It is one of the lasting
Discourse Analysis; Political
achievements of this early work to
Correctness; Poststructuralism
identify the double bind in which
Key Thinkers: Cameron, Deborah;
women as speakers found themselves:
Tannen, Deborah
if they talked like a lady, they were
Feminist linguistics, or language and considered less than a full human
gender as the field is more widely being; if they talked like a man, they
known, emerged in the context of were considered insufficiently femi-
the second feminist movement of the nine.
1960s and 1970s. Linguists of the By the 1980s the political climate
time who were also feminists started had changed and while the students of
to ask what part language played in these pioneers were still interested in
the widespread discrimination against researching the way men and women
women. This early work found a focal spoke differently, they were no longer
point in Robin Lakoffs 1975 book ready to see those differences as an
Language and Womans Place. The expression of female subjugation and
author argued that men and women male dominance. Feminism had
spoke differently and that those dif- turned into a social movement that
ferences were evidence of male domi- was more focused on celebrating
nation: women were described as less female difference. Consequently the
confident speakers, for instance, who dominance and deficit approaches
74
FEMINISM
of the 1960s and 1970s started to be evidence that women talked more than
replaced by the difference approach. men and equally solid evidence that
The key exponent of this approach men talked more than women. At the
is best-selling linguist Deborah same time, the universalist underpin-
Tannen. In books such as Thats Not nings of the feminist movement started
What I Mean (1986) and You Just to be questioned by women of colour,
Dont Understand! (1990), she argues the queer movement and others who
that communication between men and did not see themselves represented
women could best be understood in the stereotypical straight white
through applying the framework of middle-class USAmerican woman
intercultural communication for who seemed to have been taken to rep-
example, the way people who grew up resent the prototypical female experi-
in different parts of the world may ence up until then. Both the
sometimes create communication dif- dominance approach and the differ-
ficulties but men and women, she ence approach came in for substantial
argues, have communication difficul- criticism on a number of grounds, par-
ties because they operate with differ- ticularly for treating men and
ent values. Men are apparently driven women as homogeneous categories;
by competition and women by coop- for a lack of attention to context; for
eration. These different values are an unsophisticated understanding of
expressed in different communicative power relations; and for insensitivity
styles, which lead to misunderstand- to ethnic, racial, social, cultural and
ings and fights between the sexes. linguistic diversity.
Representatives of the difference As a result, poststructuralist
approach were keen to stress that approaches to language and gender
while men and women had different started to emerge. Deborah
communicative styles, these were Camerons book Feminism and Lin-
equally valid. guistic Theory (1985) is often consid-
By the late 1980s language and ered a foundational text for this new
gender had changed from an almost approach. Poststructuralism* does
esoteric interest of some female lin- not start from the assumption that
guists to become a thriving research men and women speak differently it
field which was institutionally based in does not even start from the assump-
university departments and curricula. tion that men and women naturally
However, this high level of research exist as meaningful categories. Rather
activity also had a surprising side- it is language that calls the (gendered)
effect that led to a complete conceptual identity of speakers into existence.
rethinking of the field: as more and Gender is thus no longer treated as a
more researchers tested the various given but the linguistic concern is now
claims about female and male speech with the way in which gendered sub-
empirically, differences no longer jectivities are constituted in language.
appeared as clear-cut as they had Once the question how do men and
seemed to exponents of both the dom- women talk differently? had become
inance and the difference approach. obsolete, feminist linguistics was in a
For instance, there was empirical position to focus on new questions.
75
FEMINISM
76
GENERATIVE PHONOLOGY
Second Language Learning, and and only the surface forms of a natu-
Gender. Berlin and New York: Mouton ral language, focusing on its speech
de Gruyter. sounds. As with any such set of rules,
the measure of its success was the ade-
Ingrid Piller quacy* with which it was consistent
with underlying linguistic knowledge,
known as universal grammar*.
Chomsky and Halles book The
GENERATIVE Sound Pattern of English (1968),
known as SPE, is widely regarded as
PHONOLOGY the defining text of generative phono-
logy. In it they attempted to specify the
A branch of generative grammar that phonological rules underlying the
aims to establish a set of rules, princi- speech sounds of native English
ples or constraints capable of produc- speakers. SPE established the standard
ing the surface phonetic forms of a framework for this type of theory.
language and of modelling the inter- That framework is as follows: that
nalised linguistic knowledge of the there are abstract rules determining
native speaker. Generative phonology the actual acoustic output of speech;
was a central idea in linguistic that the rules apply sequentially to
research throughout the 1960s and produce a series of derivations result-
although it has undergone reforms ing in an abstract representation of the
and changes in subsequent decades, it phonetic representation; that the
continues to be the dominant frame- phonetics consists of a series of
work for many developments in segments that could be exhaustively
phonological theory. defined in terms of sets of binary
features; that the rules are strictly
See also: Adequacy; Distinctive
ordered.
Features; Optimality Theory;
By the 1970s SPE had become a
Transformational-Generative
benchmark against which most other
Grammar; Universal Grammar
work in phonology was measured.
Key Thinkers: Bloomfield, Leonard;
But critics began to find problems
Chomsky, Noam; Jakobson,
with some of its basic assumptions.
Roman; Trubetzkoy, N. S.
For instance, SPEs focus on abstract
Generative phonology originated with rules, rather than detailed phonetic
the work of Noam Chomsky and analysis, and the formal complexity of
Morris Halle at the Massachusetts many of its proposals, became stum-
Institute of Technology (MIT) in the bling blocks for many linguists. These
late 1950s. It built on N. S. Trubet- criticisms led to developments such
zkoys idea of phonemic oppositions as Natural Generative Phonology,
and Roman Jakobsons later work on which attempted to establish rules
distinctive features*. More specifi- that were more psychologically plau-
cally it drew on the general aspiration sible than the abstractions of SPE.
of generative grammar to stipulate a Later work on optimality theory* did
set of rules capable of producing all away with rigid sequential derivation
77
GENERATIVE SEMANTICS
in favour of an algorithm for selecting half of the 1960s and the 1970s. It
surface forms from a set of possible opposed the approach dubbed inter-
alternatives. pretive semantics favoured by Noam
In the twenty-first century, phonol- Chomsky and others. Among its major
ogy might appear to have moved some proponents were George and Robin
way from the rigid model imposed in Lakoff, Paul Postal, John (Haj) Ross,
SPE. Nevertheless the formal and and James McCawley. Generative
principled approach of generative semantics is credited for bringing atten-
phonology and the wider generative tion to meaning in linguistics and for
project remains an important founda- ushering in interest in pragmatics, cog-
tion for much work in the field. nitive linguistics and some aspects of
sociolinguistics.
Primary sources
See also: Cognitivism; Prototype;
Chomsky, Noam (1964). Current Issues in
Transformational-Generative
Linguistic Theory. The Hague: Mouton.
Grammar
Chomsky, Noam and Morris Halle
Key Thinkers: Austin, J. L.;
(1968). The Sound Pattern of English.
Chomsky, Noam; Grice, H. P.;
New York: Harper and Row.
Searle, John
Halle, Morris (1962). Phonology in Gen-
erative Grammar. Word 18, 5472. Chomskys standard theory (1965)
Prince, Alan and Paul Smolensky postulates the presence of formal rules
(1993/2004). Optimality Theory: Con- which generate syntactic sentence
straint Interaction in Grammar. Rutgers skeletons which are then filled by lex-
University and University of Colorado ical insertion rules to create deep
at Boulder. Oxford: Blackwell. structures. These are then turned by
transformations into questions, pas-
Further reading sives and so on. According to Chom-
Carr, Philip (1993). Phonology. Hound- sky, transformations do not affect
mills: Macmillan Press. meaning. Chomsky and many of his
Kenstowicz, M. and C. Kisseberth (1986). collaborators took the position that
Generative Phonology: Description and lexical semantics had to take place
Theory. New York: Academic Press. after deep structures had been
generated, relegating the role of lexi-
Christopher Routledge and Siobhan cal semantics to the interpretation of
Chapman structures that had already been gen-
erated, just like phonology (hence the
name given to this position: interpre-
tive semantics). The generative
GENERATIVE semanticists took a different position,
that lexical insertion had to happen
SEMANTICS both in the deep structure and after
some transformations, but most
An approach to the treatment of seman- significantly that transformations
tics within transformational-generative affected meaning, hence the name
grammar* popular between the second generative semantics.
78
GLOSSEMATICS
The debate between the two camps the study of meaning and its relations
was fierce and highly technical, to social interaction.
revolving, for example, on the correct
decomposition of the verb kill in Primary sources
cause to become not alive. The Harris, Randy Allen (1993). The Linguis-
details are beyond an introductory tics Wars. New York and Oxford:
account (but see Harris 1993) but the Oxford University Press.
result of the controversy was that the
generative semanticists, while essen- Further reading
tially correct, did not present a cohe- Chomsky, Noam (1965). Aspects of the
sive research programme and moved Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA:
on to other fields, including gender MIT Press.
research (Robin Lakoff), pragmatics Rosch, Eleanor (1975). Cognitive repre-
(Georgia Green), cognitive linguistics sentations of semantic categories. Jour-
(George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker), nal of Experimental Psychology: General
or developed other theories of syntax 104: 192233.
(Paul Postal, James McCawley). Ross, John Robert (Haj) (1973). Nouni-
In general, generative semantics is ness. In Paul Kiparsky, John Robert
to be credited with the attention to Ross, James D. McCawley and Osamu
meaning that characterised the fields Fujimura (eds), Three Dimensions of
of pragmatics and cognitive linguistics Linguistic Theory. Tokyo: TEC Corpo-
in the last quarter of the twentieth ration. 137257.
century and the first decade of the Zadeh L. A. (1965). Fuzzy sets. Informa-
twenty-first. In particular, generative tion and Control 8: 33853.
semantics interest in broad data,
often resulting in odd, whimsical or Salvatore Attardo
arcane examples, led to an interest in
notions that defied the rigid categori-
sation of transformational grammar,
such as Rosss squish, Lotfi Zadehs
GLOSSEMATICS
fuzzy logic, and Eleanor Roschs
prototypicality, which are at the core A structuralist approach to the study
of cognitive linguistics. Generative of language that attempts to establish
semantics was also instrumental in a formal and abstract theory of lan-
bringing J. L. Austins, H. P. Grices guage equivalent to the exactness of
and John Searles ideas to the fore- theories in the natural sciences by set-
front of linguistic theory and con- ting up a formal system of description
tributing significantly to the creation based on a elementary unit called a
of the discipline of pragmatics. glosseme. The theory was developed
Generative semantics can then in the 1930s by the Danish scholar
be seen as the precursor of many of Louis Hjelmslev in collaboration with
the most significant contemporary Hans Jrgen Uldall and is the most
approaches to the study of linguistic prestigious outcome of the works of
meaning and as having brought about the Copenhagen Linguistic Circle.
a significant shift in paradigm toward Any list of linguistic theories mentions
79
GLOSSEMATICS
glossematics, but apart from accounts stance, which may best be understood
of the phonematic systems of some as unformed matter.
dialects, the theory has not been The most fundamental work in
adopted by many linguists. glossematics was written in Danish
(Omkring sprogteoriens grundlggelse
See also: Logical Positivism;
(English translation: Prolegomena to a
Phoneme; Signs and Semiotics;
Theory of Language (1953)) and it is
Structuralism
significant that in Paul L. Garvins
Key Thinkers: Hjelmslev, Louis;
review of the translation by Francis J.
Greimas, Algirdas; Jakobson,
Whitfield, he says that The Prolegom-
Roman; Saussure, Ferdinand de
ena are probably among the most
The point of departure in glossematics unreadable books in linguistics. Partly
consists in a few axiomatic claims: lan- due to this and partly due to the fact
guage is one of the semiotic systems that, apart from writings in Danish, the
employed by humans to think and bulk of Hjelmslevs works was written
communicate, the linguistic system is in French, the details of the theory are a
an immanent, self-contained, structure challenge for the non-initiated, and
that should be described without although the intellectual achievements
any metaphysical or psychological of glossematics are widely acknowl-
claims, and the formal system of edged, the approach has had little
glossematics is the adequate tool for impact on empirical studies. Its most
that. The theory is a hierarchically- prominent status is as an inspiration for
ordered set of terms conceiving func- linguists and as a beacon of scholarly
tion (in a non-mathematical sense) as rigour.
the key-concept on which the other
terms are elaborated. Basically it
Primary sources
denotes dependence relations between
Garvin, Paul L. (1954). Review of Prole-
other entities, called functives.
gomena to a Theory of Language.
According to the intrinsic logic of
American Anthropologist, vol. 56, no.
glossematics, it presents a complicated
5, part 1: 9256.
nomenclature of functions and func-
Hjelmslev, Louis (1943). Omkring sprogte-
tives, the most important of which are
oriens grundlggelse. Copenhagen: Uni-
the terms constant, a functive whose
versity of Copenhagen. Reprinted
presence is a necessary condition for
Akademisk Forlag 1966. Trans. Francis
the presence of another functive, and
J. Whitfield (1953), Prolegomena to a
variable which is a not necessary
Theory of Language. Baltimore: Waverly
condition. The apparatus is utilised on
Press.
both sides of the linguistics sign,
Hjelmslev, Louis (1975). Rsum of a
expression and content, implying
Theory of Language. Copenhagen:
that minimal units of the same nature,
Nordisk Sprog-og Kulturforlag.
glossemes, can be found both in the
expression form and the content
form. Form as a concept should Further reading
be conceived of as a synonym for Hjelmslev, Louis (1928). Principes de
structure, and it is opposed to sub- grammaire gnrale. Copenhagen: Hst
80
HOLISM
and Sn. Reprinted Copenhagen: and long, the second of which itself
Munksgaard, 1968. depends for its meaning on space,
Hjelmslev, Louis (1932). Etudes baltiques. and so on until the meanings of all
Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard. words are seen to belong to an inter-
Hjelmslev, Louis and Hans Jrgen Uldall connected web. The mentalist form
(1957). Outline of Glossematics. Copen- holds that the content of concepts
hagen: Nordisk Sprog-og Kulturforlag. (the components of propositions*)
depends on that of all other concepts
Hans Gtzsche in the thinkers repertoire. The pros
and cons of semantic holism are usu-
ally unaffected by which form it takes.
A words meaning is, after all, given
HOLISM by the concept it expresses. Early dis-
cussions of holism tended to be
Holism about meaning, or semantic framed linguistically. Latterly it has
holism, is the idea that there are no been framed in terms of the content of
independent units of meaning smaller the language of thought*.
than the entire representational Most arguments for semantic
system, that is, the language. While holism have a two-premise pattern.
some have happily embraced semantic The first premise is that some property
holism, others have claimed that its other than meaning is holistic. The
allegedly unpalatable consequences second is that semantic facts are
undermine otherwise seemingly grounded in this other property.
attractive theories in the philosophy Meaning therefore inherits the holism
of language or psychology. of the other property. The three
instances of this form of argument
See also: Analytic/Synthetic;
presented below centre on evidence,
Descriptivism; Indeterminacy
on translation, and on psychological
Key Thinkers: Dummett, Michael;
explanation respectively.
Fodor, Jerry; Quine, W. V. O.
Holism about evidence (confirma-
Holism has several different mean- tion holism) is the thesis that whether
ings, according to what is being said some empirical discovery confirms a
to be holistic (as opposed to atom- given proposition depends on the con-
istic). Some other forms of holism firmation status of a good number of
will be mentioned here, but the focus other propositions, and ultimately of
is on semantic holism, which is a every other proposition. Science stands
pivotal idea in the philosophy of or falls as a whole, since it consists of
language. mutually supporting theses, not eviden-
Semantic holism itself has both a tially isolated ones. If we accept this,
linguistic and a mentalistic guise. The and also hold (more contentiously) that
linguistic form holds that what one the meaning of a sentence is consti-
word in a language means depends on tuted by its confirmation conditions,
what all the other words mean. For semantic holism results. Tying meaning
example, perhaps giraffe depends for to confirmation conditions can have
its meaning on the meaning of neck different motives. Logical positivists,
81
HOLISM
for example, wished to streamline sci- waiting in the cupboard, and so on.
ence by making this link. Others think Ultimately, it seems, an agents acts
that if a sentence is independent in prin- emerge out of a whole sea of rationally
ciple to confirmation or disconfirma- coherent propositional attitudes* and
tion, then it would never be rationally related mental states. According to
assertible and its meaning could never cognitive holists, this deeper truth is
be learnt. disguised by the way we highlight just
Translation holism is the thesis that one propositional attitude in our ordi-
how we translate one word can nary explanatory practices. To get
depend on how we translate any other from this alleged truth to semantic
word in the same language. Consider holism (of the mentalistic kind in this
how we might complete the transla- case) we must make a further assump-
tion from Old English of the following tion: that a mental states content is
Saxon law: grounded in the states explanatory
potential. Since this potential is holis-
(1) No man shall kill hwyer except in tic, mental content is holistic.
the presence of two or three wit- Having sketched three popular
nesses; and then he shall keep his arguments for semantic holism, let us
skin for four days. turn to objections, not to the argu-
ments, but to semantic holism itself. If
Clearly we need to know something successful, these objections can tell us
about what skinned creature it might more about meaning than that it is
have been impermissible (in the culture non-holistic. They also show that, for
of the utterer) to kill save in the pres- each of the three arguments just con-
ence of witnesses. But we know that sidered, either the underlying prop-
this is what we need to figure out only erty is not holistic after all, or that
because we have already translated the meaning is not constituted out of con-
other words in the sentence. Semantic firmation conditions, translatability
holism follows if we add the further or other such aspects.
assumption that the meaning of a word One common objection to semantic
is constituted by its translatability. This holism is that to understand any word
further claim is not entirely implausi- or concept one would have to instan-
ble. After all, communicability is a fun- taneously understand every word in
damental aspect of word meaning, and the language, or every concept in an
depends on our translating (or inter- entire repertoire. Even if this is not
preting) one anothers words. impossible, it certainly seems not to be
Holism about psychological expla- how we do achieve semantic compe-
nation (cognitive holism) is best tence. One response is to insist that
approached by example. Suppose we children acquire concepts one by one,
explain why someone walked towards but these morph, becoming gradually
their kitchen by saying that they distinct and more sophisticated con-
desired food. This only explains their cepts, reflecting the beliefs they
behaviour if we assume they think that acquire on the way to adulthood. A
there is food in their kitchen, that its more radical strategy is to accept that
door is not locked, that no assassin lies we do indeed acquire concepts en
82
HOLISM
masse, but to express this more plau- istic alternatives. These latter usually
sibly as the view that we become identify the meaning of a word or
proper subjects for the attribution of mental representation with a causal
propositional attitudes in a kind of relation of some kind. It has proven
Gestalt event. immensely difficult to get straight on
A different objection centres on the what kind of causal relation could
commitment of holists to a fine- work. The debate here often collapses
grained conception of meaning. The into that between descriptivist theo-
nature of a persons concept is read off ries of reference (popular with holists)
from the sum of beliefs that person and direct theories of reference (popu-
has involving that concept, since a lar with atomists).
belief is just a linking of one concept Even so, it is a simplification to treat
to other concepts. A change in belief the debate as a choice between seman-
could change the concepts identity. tic holism and semantic atomism.
Ultimately, a single discrepancy in There is an intermediate position
beliefs held would mean that two semantic molecularism and a hybrid
people had no concepts in common. position, either of which may evade
This is, to say the least, counterintu- the difficulties faced by the purer
itive: we could neither understand, views. In semantic molecularism a
learn from, nor disagree with one word or concepts meaning is from its
another, or with our previous selves connection to some proper subset of
after we have changed our minds, for the other words or concepts in the lan-
that matter. Semantic holists try to guage or conceptual system, rather
reply by saying that while, strictly than being either independent from all
speaking, we have no concepts in these connections or dependent on all
common, our concepts are similar of them. The difficulty here, as critics
enough to allow understanding, learn- have pointed out, is how to distin-
ing, disagreement and so on. guish between ancillary connections
Finally, some commentators think and constitutive connections.
that holism is incompatible with com- The hybrid position involves adopt-
positionality. The meaning of a phrase ing an atomistic theory for some pur-
like pet fish ought to be a function of poses and a holistic theory for others.
the meanings of pet and fish. But if For example, two factor theories of
semantic holism is correct, the meaning mental content say that, for purposes
of pet fish ought to be associated with of cognitive explanation, a holistic
that of golden, even though there is account is better, while an atomistic
nothing in the meaning of either pet or theory is better suited to the purpose
fish to predict this association. A pos- of understanding the conditions under
sible response, here, is to insist that which a belief is true. Each hybrid
semantic holism applies only to simple theory needs to be evaluated on its
phrases or concepts; the meaning of merits, but a general problem attaches
complex phrases or concepts is deter- to the strategy: how to fuse the two
mined by compositionality*. elements of the theory.
Semantic holists respond in kind by Holism about meaning is distinct
pointing out problems with the atom- from other forms of holism but it is
83
common to argue for semantic holism IDEATIONAL
from holism of these other kinds by
making a constitutive assumption THEORIES
about semantic facts. Equally, the
alleged incoherence of semantic Ideationalists hold that the meaning
holism has led others to go in the other of words is inherited from the mean-
direction and reject these constitutive ing of mental entities (ideas or con-
assumptions. Nevertheless, arguments cepts) rather than the other way
about holism touch on many other around. Two classic statements of
areas of the study of meaning. ideationalism have had an enduring
influence, the first by John Locke and
Primary sources the second by H. P. Grice.
Block, N. (1986). Advertisement for a
See also: Nonnatural Meaning;
semantics for psychology. In P. A.
Private Language
French (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philos-
Key Thinkers: Grice, H. P.; Locke,
ophy, vol. X. Minneapolis: University of
John; Putnam, Hilary;
Minnesota Press. 61578.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Davidson, D. (1975). Thought and talk.
In S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Lan- Locke sought to answer the question:
guage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [How can] the thoughts of mens
Devitt, M. (1996). Coming to Our Senses. minds be conveyed from one to
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. another? (1706/1997: III.1.2). Having
Dummett, M. (1976). What is a Theory a thought, according to him, was a
of Meaning? In G. Evans and J. matter of having ideas roughly, per-
Mcdowell (eds), Truth and Meaning: ceptual and abstract concepts in ones
Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Claren- mind. The existence and content of an
don Press. 67137. idea was supposed to be private, that
Dummett, M. (1991). The Logical Basis of is, directly accessible only to its posses-
Metaphysics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard sor. Language allows this privacy to be
University Press. overcome so that knowledge can be
Fodor, J. (1981). The present status of the pooled. Words stand as marks for the
innateness controversy. In J. Fodor, ideas within [the speakers] own mind,
Representations. Brighton: Harvester. whereby they might be made known to
Fodor, J. and E. Lepore (1991). Holism: A others. That is to say, spoken words
Shoppers Guide. Cambridge, MA: have a proxy content that is inherited
Blackwell. from the speakers ideas and, with
Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. luck, appropriately decoded by the
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. hearer.
Locke treated the principle of
Further reading ideationalism as obvious, and focused
Fodor, J. A. and E. Lepore (1993). Holism: instead on confusions that arise when
A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: we ignore how imperfect a vehicle for
Rodopi. ideas language can be. The first influ-
ential criticism of ideationalism did
Alex Barber not emerge until two centuries later
84
IDEATIONAL THEORIES
85
IMPLICATURE weakest of the Achaeans was it that
had smitten [Hector] has been usually
taken to convey, when uttered by the
When a sincere performance of a author of The Iliad (15.1) about Ajas,
speech act takes place in a certain con- that Ajas was rather the strongest of
text of utterance, what is conveyed by the Achaeans. The usage of such
the performance, under the circum- expressions of understatement was
stances, beyond what is then being lit- marked in early rhetorical studies as
erally said by it, is an implicature of it. litotes (Hoffmann 1987), but the
theoretical problem of delineation and
See also: Nonnatural Meaning;
problem of derivation of what is con-
Relevance Theory
veyed but not said remained open
Key Thinkers: Grice, H. P.
until the second half of the twentieth
I meant what I said, and I said what I century.
meant, said an elephant called It was the philosopher H. P. Grice
Horton in Horton Hatches the Egg, a who made the first crucial contribu-
book for children by an author and tions to a theory of implicature that
illustrator called Theodore Seuss purports to delineate whatever is con-
Geisel, otherwise known as Dr Seuss. veyed beyond what is said when a cer-
What Horton said about himself tain speech act is sincerely performed
makes sense, because what Horton in a certain context of utterance and
meant is not necessarily what Horton to show how to derive what is con-
said. Generally speaking, when a veyed but not said from the speech act
person performs a speech act in some and its context of utterance. Grices
context of utterance, a full report of major ideas were made public during
what the person did under the cir- the 1960s, first in a 1961 paper on the
cumstances will have to include an causal theory of perception, and then
answer to the question, What was in the 1967 Harvard University
conveyed by the utterance made by William James lectures, parts of which
the speaker under the circumstances? were distributed and published in
It is a major insight into the nature of various forms, and then in a revised
language use that the required report version. They appeared in full in
is dividable into two separate parts: Grice (1989), which includes also
one, reporting what was said, and an related Prolegomena and Retrospec-
additional one, reporting what was tive epilogue.
conveyed beyond what was said. Grices theory is about contexts of
Interesting examples abound of utterance that involve a speaker, a
speech acts that convey more than speech act, which includes a sentence
what they say, but much less so sys- or other expressions, and a hearer.
tematic depictions of what is con- Such a context of utterance is one
veyed but not said by a certain speech in which the speaker performs a
act in a certain context of utterance speech act intending to have some
and systematic understanding of how communicative effect on the hearer.
a speech act conveys what it does not Grices theory introduces two major
say. The Homeric expression not the ideas about communicative, conver-
86
IMPLICATURE
87
IMPLICATURE
88
IMPLICATURE
Quantity maxim 2, we draw the con- not all of my colleagues read fiction.
versational implicature that the Such a conversational implicature is
speaker believes that, for the sake of called generalised.
the present conversation, it is sufficient
to point out the fact that he had seen Conversational implicatures versus
the movie, conveying but not admit- conventional implicatures
ting that the speaker had not read the An implicature in general is what is
book. conveyed by a performance of a speech
The distinction between conversa- act beyond what is said when the
tional implicature by simple derivation speech act is performed. According to
from the norms and conversational Grices theory, it is possible to convey
implicature by what Grice called dra- by a performance of a speech act what
matic derivation from the norms will is beyond what is said independently
have to be manifest in each attempted of the norms of conversation which
improvements on Grices theory. produce conversational implicature.
There is a class of implicatures Grice
Particularised conversational called conventional implicatures,
implicatures versus generalised which do not rest on the norms of con-
conversational implicatures versation but rather on conventions
Our discussion of the conversational that govern the use of certain expres-
implicatures that can be drawn from a sions. Consider an ordinary use of
speech act of saying I saw the movie but, such as What they did was
applied to the particular context of legally permissible, but ethically
utterance, in which that speech act wrong. On the level of what is said,
served as a response to a particular one may replace but with and with-
question about the speaker, Have you out changing the propositional signifi-
read the present top best-selling cance of the assertion and its truth-
book?. We can easily imagine con- value. However, the use of but con-
texts of utterance in which the same veys that there is some significant con-
speech act appears, even in reference trast between the two parts of the
to the same movie, made by the same assertion. The significance of the con-
speaker, where none of the above- trast varies, but not its conveyed
mentioned conversational implica- appearance.
tures can be drawn. Hence, those Grice himself thought the nature of
conversational implicatures are called conventional implicatures should be
particularised ones. better explained before any free use
However, not all conversational of it, for explanatory purposes. Some
implicatures are particularised. If a scholars have tried to reduce all con-
speaker uses the expression most in ventional implicatures to other phe-
an ordinary speech act, a conversa- nomena of language use, such as
tional implicature is going to be usu- conversational implicature, presuppo-
ally drawn in terms of not all. Thus, sition* or what is said. Related theo-
for example, an ordinary usage of retical debates are still ongoing.
Most of my colleagues read fiction Grices theory lends itself to three
would conversationally implicate that types of study, related to the following
89
IMPLICATURE
theoretical problems. First, what is the able from (R) without any resort to
nature of the norms and what justifies (CP).
each of the maxims? Second, do To move to our second question,
speakers usually observe the norms of several types of empirical studies of
conversation? Third, what alternative Grices theory should be mentioned.
theories of language use would serve One type includes surveys of linguistic
as improvements upon Grices theory, behaviour that result in apparent
explaining the facts better and more counter-examples, such as people
broadly? regularly making vague comments
The first attempt to show the foun- or references in conversation. Such
dation of Grices system of norms, dis- examples can, however, be shown to
regarding debatable details, was be compatible with and even
Kasher (1976), further developed in explained by Grices theory, where the
what appears as an appendix in at least cost part of (R) involves yet
Kasher (ed.) (1998). The major idea of another parameter, such as commit-
the explanation is that speech activity ment or guilt on grounds of being
is ideally rational, that is, it acts shown to be mistaken, which should
according to the Rationality Principle: be minimised.
Empirical studies of other types are
(R) Given a desired end, one is to related to different theoretical ways of
choose that action which most effec- explaining data about what is con-
tively, and at least cost, attains that end, veyed but not said (Bezuidenhout and
everything else being equal. Morris, in Noveck and Sperber 2006),
to the psychological processes of com-
When the best means at ones disposal puting conversational implicatures
are the verbal ones, then one follows (Chierchia et al., in Noveck and Sper-
(R) by performing a certain speech ber 2006), to the operation of impli-
act. It is not difficult to explain the cature production devices in the brain
most effectively requirement of (R) (Kasher et al. 1999), and to child
when a desired end is given, but it is acquisition of such devices (Noveck,
much more difficult to elucidate the in Noveck and Sperber 2006). Such
at least cost requirement. A simple studies are related to the issue of mod-
reading of Grices norms shows what ularity (in the sense of Fodor 1983),
he took to be some of the costs, such where much remains to be studied.
as verbal effort, related to number of Finally, let us consider three theo-
words uttered and the time it takes to ries of implicature that have been
voice them and similar attributes of developed in the footsteps of Grices
speech. Other at least cost parame- theory. The first two have been labeled
ters include inaccuracies (avoided by neo-Gricean. All of them have fun-
expressions of the Henry James style) damental principles of the above-
and hurt feelings (avoided by using mentioned form most effectively and
politeness manifestations). Kasher at least cost.
(1976) includes arguments against Laurence Horn suggested (see Horn
(CP) and arguments that show that 1984 and 2004) a replacement of
supermaxims and maxims are deriv- Grices maxims by two principles:
90
IMPLICATURE
91
INDETERMINACY
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson (1987). ings of expressions and utterances
Relevance: Communication and Cogni- precisely because there are no mean-
tion. Oxford: Blackwell. ings about which to be definite. Mean-
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber (2004). ing does not exist as an autonomous
Relevance theory. In Laurence R. entity but only in observable behav-
Horn and Gregory Ward (eds), The iours within a language community.
Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Writers starting from quite diverse
Blackwell. 60732. sets of initial assumptions have found
themselves advocating this sceptical
Further reading and, to many thinkers, counterintu-
Carston, Robyn (2004). Relevance theory itive thesis.
and the saying/implicating distinction.
See also: Behaviourism; Holism
In Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward
Key Thinkers: Kripke, Saul;
(eds), The Handbook of Pragmatics
Quine, W. V. O.; Wittgenstein,
Oxford: Blackwell. 63356.
Ludwig
Davis, Wayne A. (1998). Implicature:
Intention, Convention, and Principle in Indeterminacy in linguistics is most
the Failure of Gricean Theory. Cam- commonly associated with W. V. O.
bridge: Cambridge University Press. Quines 1960 discussion of translation.
Gazdar, Gerald (1979). Pragmatics: Impli- Quine alleged that translation is inde-
cature, Presupposition and Logical terminate because words themselves
Form. London: Academic Press. do not have meaning; all that linguists
Grandy, Richard E. and Richard Warner can do is observe patterns of behaviour
(eds) (1986). Philosophical Grounds of in relation to particular language use.
Rationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Quines meaning scepticism finds an
(See, in particular, Paul Grice: a view of echo in a puzzle raised by Saul Kripke.
his work by the editors and the reply by Kripkes puzzle purports to show that
Grice.) we do not follow any determinate
Kasher, Asa (ed.) (1998). Pragmatics: Crit- meaning-rule in applying a word in
ical Concepts. Six volumes. London: novel circumstances.
Routledge. (See in particular vol. IV In his 1960 discussion Quine is not
which includes seventeen classical offering practical advice but scrutinis-
papers on implicature.) ing the notion of meaning. For this
reason he asks us to imagine we are
Asa Kasher what he calls radical translators,
developing a translation manual in
other words, a recipe for going from
sentences in some entirely unfamiliar
INDETERMINACY language to sentences of our own lan-
guage. To develop this manual we
Indeterminacy in a linguistic context may use only a narrow range of clues.
has various interpretations, but in In particular we may not rely on the
most senses it is taken to refer to the two languages having a common
idea that linguists cannot make defi- origin and we certainly may not use a
nite pronouncements about the mean- dictionary. The only evidence we may
92
INDETERMINACY
use is behavioural: dispositions on the part of the same whole as rather than
part of native speakers to assent or is the same as; the alternative manual
dissent in varying circumstances to would then correctly predict assent.
utterances of sentences of their lan- Quine is confident that, after comple-
guage. Quine limits himself to this evi- mentary juggling of different clauses,
dence on the grounds that sentence alternative but equivalent translation
meanings, in so far as there are such manuals will always be available.
things (and he ends up doubting there Translation, he insists, is a matter of
are), must be constituted by trans- fitting a complete manual to all the
latability on these terms. Allowing sentences of the other language (see
other evidence would be presupposing holism*); Quine treats as myth the
rather than coming to understand the view that successful translating is a
nature of a sentences meaning. Inde- matter of revealing the one true mean-
terminacy of translation is the thesis ing of individual words and sentences.
that, in the context of radical transla- Some critics have argued that it will
tion, there will always be at least two always be possible to isolate at most
acceptable but incompatible transla- one translation scheme compatible
tion manuals available. with assent/dissent patterns. There is
Quine gives an example. Suppose certainly more room for manoeuvre
that, as a rabbit scurries by, a native with Quines Gavagai example than
speaker utters the one-word sentence, he initially realised. In 1970 Quine
Gavagai. You guess it means Lo, a expressed regret at the focus on this
rabbit. Tests on future occasions particular example. He tried to show,
using assent and dissent to this same quite generally, how his controversial
sentence bear out your hypothesis. indeterminacy thesis follows from a
Before adopting this as the correct widely accepted underdetermination
translation, however, you must rule thesis. According to this, empirical
out alternatives. But this cannot be evidence rarely forces any particular
done. For example, why not take scientific theory upon us. His infer-
Gavagai to mean Lo, undetached ence from underdetermination of
part of a rabbit? In those few contexts theory to indeterminacy of translation
where the difference between this and has failed to convince the majority of
your translation shows up, Quine commentators. Other critics have
holds that it will be possible to tweak questioned whether indeterminacy of
other parts of the manual to accom- translation, even if correct, generates
modate the discrepancy. Imagine you trouble for the notion of meaning.
point to one part of a rabbit, then Most target the behaviourism* built
another part of the same rabbit, and into his statement of the evidence
solicit assent or dissent from This gav- available to a radical translator.
agai is the same as that gavagai or Kripkes 1982 indeterminacy puzzle
rather, Shiz gavagai sumo shaz gava- is inspired by his reading of Wittgen-
gai, as it may be. Native-speaker steins Philosophical Investigations
assent here will not automatically rule (1953). To set up the puzzle, Kripke
out the alternative translation manual. uses, for illustrative purposes, the
We could take sumo to translate as is expression + ; or, in spoken English,
93
INDETERMINACY
added to. Suppose you are asked present question is 125 rather than
What is 68 + 57? Suppose further that five. This is bad enough. But the
this is a question you have never before sceptic also denies the possibility of
had occasion to address (there will knowing whether you meant plus by
always be some such question). You +in the past, and so mean plus now.
answer with confidence: 125. You are It is not a matter of ignorance as to
assuming that the expression + refers which you mean: there is simply no
here to what it has always referred fact of the matter as to which you
to, namely, the plus-function. But a meant in the past, or which you mean
sceptic challenges you: How do you now.
know that + has always referred to The puzzle can be generalised in
the plus function? Perhaps it has various ways. First, it extends to
always referred to the quus (pro- expressions other than +. Suppose
nounced qwus) function, shown in you ask yourself, right now, Is this a
Figure 1. book I am reading? Your answer
depends on what you mean by
book. Perhaps book refers now, as
5 if x = 68 and y = 57 in the past, to quooks, defined in
x quus y = Figure 2.
x plus y otherwise The conclusion we are invited to
accept is that whenever we come to
Figure 1 apply a familiar word in a novel con-
text, there is nothing in virtue of
which our application is correct or
The only way you could ascertain incorrect, since nothing in previous
which of the two functions + referred uses determines that the word
to earlier is to apply the expression in means one thing rather than another.
the context of figuring out the sum of Moreover, since every context of a
fifty-seven and sixty-eight. But by word being used was novel once, the
hypothesis you could not have done puzzle applies to every use of any
this. word. Finally, the puzzle is not just
Kripkes imagined sceptic has thus about communication. It applies even
far claimed to establish only that you when we silently ask ourselves a
do not at present know whether ear- question, so it is a puzzle about
lier uses of + referred to plus rather thought itself, not just about the
than quus; and hence that you do not exchange of thoughts through spoken
know if the correct answer to the language.
false otherwise.
Figure 2
94
INDETERMINACY
95
INNATENESS (information about grammatical sen-
tences), yet they successfully acquire
language.
The claim that some aspects of lin- From this basis one has to conclude
guistic competence are genetically that humans are genetically hard-
specified rather than learnt through wired for language: children are born
experience. This claim has been driv- equipped with a universal grammar*
ing research in generative linguistics (Chomsky 1981), containing informa-
and language acquisition since the late tion about linguistic universals
1950s. enabling them to form hypotheses
about the structure of the language
See also:
they are learning. The proposed exis-
Acceptability/Grammaticality;
tence of a critical period for language
Continuity; Mentalism;
(typical language acquisition is not
Transformational-Generative
possible after a certain age) and stud-
Grammar; Universal Grammar
ies of deaf children who sponta-
Key Thinkers: Chomsky, Noam;
neously develop sign language have
Descartes, Ren; Plato
been used as further evidence in sup-
Noam Chomsky has proposed that port of linguistic nativism.
humans possess domain- and species- Opponents of the Chomskyan view
specific knowledge of the structure of claim that the richness of the data
possible languages, which enables available to children is vastly underes-
human young to acquire language timated; the stimulus argument fails
with speed, efficiency and uniformity. only given the generative definition of
This view can be traced back to Carte- what language is. One of the strongest
sian cognitivism and Platonic philoso- challenges to nativism comes from
phy. Opponents claim that language Connectionist psychology (Elman et
acquisition is innately constrained but al. 1996) where artificial neural net-
only by mechanisms that underlie gen- works have been trained to reproduce
eral cognitive ability. In other words, linguistic behaviours such as recursion,
it is currently uncontroversial that previously thought to be possible only
language acquisition is innately con- through innate pre-programming.
strained; what is the object of heated Research on innateness has spurred
debate is exactly what is innate. research with animals and in genetics.
The argument that has most force- In 2001 Cecilia Lai and colleagues sug-
fully been used in support of the lin- gested that a mutation in the FOXP2
guistic innateness position is that the gene is causally involved in language
stimulus argument, in which children disorders. Despite widespread enthusi-
learn language by experience, is seri- asm in the popular press about the lan-
ously flawed (Chomsky 1980: 34). guage gene, the exact role of FOXP2
For example, since language is a com- in relation to language development is
plex system, it could only be acquired far from clear.
through experience if negative evi- Although the innateness question
dence was available. Children only is still unresolved, interdisciplinary
ever have access to positive evidence research that straddles the gap
96
INTEGRATIONISM
97
INTEGRATIONISM
98
INTEGRATIONISM
the final arbiter they are the result ers (as represented by the linguist
of general problem-solving abilities him/herself), and around this is a
applied (unconsciously and instanta- periphery of variation in forms,
neously, because of years of practice) including the usages of individuals or
to seeing what function utterances groups (such as dialects), which have
need to serve in context in order to be an uncertain relationship to the code
an appropriate contribution to the but which can be left to sociolinguists
communicative event. Signs are inher- and other scholars with fringe inter-
ently indeterminate, and are only ests to deal with. Integrationists
rendered determinate (to whatever would see this as merely ducking the
degree is judged necessary by the inter- issue (and, in the process, taking an
actants) in particular contexts. Taking sweepingly arrogant view of society).
this to the next level, segregationist For them, language is in a state of con-
approaches are underpinned by the stant flux, geographically and histori-
view that a language is a fixed code, so cally but also moment-by-moment as
that sentences can be deemed unequiv- speakers negotiate and create mean-
ocally to be grammatical (part of the ing in context; and generalisations
code) or ungrammatical (not part of about the characteristics of a particu-
the code). However, for the integra- lar language will necessarily exclude
tionist this is an equally untenable dis- the variability that is fundamental to
tortion: this could only be true of a the way that language operates.
grammar held in the mind of the ideal A charge that has been levelled
speaker-hearer in a homogeneous against integrationism is that its
speech community an imaginary robust attacks on mainstream linguis-
entity that does not, and cannot, exist. tics have not been balanced by any
The third point of contention clear programme or methodology to
involves a claim which seems counter- replace current practices. Michael
intuitive, but which follows logically Toolan counters this by arguing that
from the points above: language such a complaint reflects a way of
exists but languages do not. Speakers thinking deeply committed to the pre-
do, of course, find it useful to refer vailing post-Saussurean cognitivist-
to languages such as English and mechanistic paradigm and that the
French, but the integrationist sees that term integrational linguistics names a
as a convenient fiction which is unnec- principle rather than a method (1996:
essary and misleading as a basis for 23). He notes that much of the work
linguistics. A language implies deter- in ethnography, conversation analy-
minate signs and a fixed code which sis* and discourse analysis is in prac-
are, at least potentially, shared by all tice congruent with integrationism,
speakers of that language. But who and the way forward will probably
decides which parts of English involve adapting methods from those
belong to the code and which do not? approaches. A more theoretical
Some linguists would attempt to get counter-attack from a segregationist
round this question by arguing that position (though they would reject the
there is a fixed core that is recognised label) can be found in Borsley and
and accepted by all (educated) speak- Newmeyer (1997) who insist that
99
INTENTIONALITY
mainstream linguistics does not in fact Muddle: Roy Harris and Generative
work with a telementation model. Grammar. In G. Wolf and N. Love (eds),
This paper, and the response in Toolan Linguistics Inside Out. Amsterdam.
(1998), give a flavour of the debate. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 4264.
It is hard to judge how far the in- Saussure, Ferdinand de (1922/1983).
tegrationist critique has altered the Course in General Linguistics. Second
course of linguistics as its proponents edition. Trans. Roy Harris. London:
would wish. An increasing number Duckworth.
of approaches have independently Toolan, Michael (1998). A few words on
arrived, by different routes, at rather telementation. In R. Harris and G.
similar conclusions, and key aspects of Wolf (eds), Integrational Linguistics.
the integrationist position (such as the Oxford: Pergamon. 6882.
indeterminacy of the sign) have them-
selves become mainstream, though Geoff Thompson
generally under different labels. Inte-
grationism can claim to have con-
tributed to weakening the hegemony
of a particular view of linguistics, but
INTENTIONALITY
there is as yet little sign that it has
brought about its demise. Directedness or aboutness; the prop-
erty of mental states whereby they are
Primary sources about, or directed towards, states of
Davis, Hayley G. and Talbot. J. Taylor affairs in the world, typically
(eds) (1990). Redefining Linguistics. expressed in language through such
London: Routledge. intentional verbs as believe,
Harris, Roy (1981). The Language Myth. desire, know, and intend. Inten-
London: Duckworth. tionality is an important concept in
Harris, Roy (1998). Introduction to Inte- both philosophy of mind and ethical
grational Linguistics. Oxford: Perga- theory as a way of recognising respon-
mon. sibility towards other beings, and in
Harris, Roy and George Wolf (1998). distinguishing humans and other
Integrational Linguistics: A First higher animals from computers.
Reader. Oxford: Pergamon.
See also: Artificial Intelligence;
Toolan, Michael (1996). Total Speech: An
Nonnatural Meaning;
Integrational Linguistic Approach to
Phenomenology; Speech Act
Language. Durham/London: Duke Uni-
Theory
versity Press.
Key Thinkers: Husserl, Edmund;
Wolf, George and Nigel Love (eds) (1997).
Searle, John
Linguistics Inside Out: Roy Harris and
His Critics. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Intentionality is an important concept
John Benjamins. in both continental and analytic phi-
losophy. It was introduced by the
Further reading German philosopher Franz Brentano,
Borsley, Robert and Frederick, J. and developed by his pupil Edmund
Newmeyer (1997). The Language Husserl, for whom it is one of the
100
INTENTIONALITY
101
INTENTIONALITY
102
INTUITION
103
INTUITION
work led to major changes in linguis- consistent intuitions about this and so
tics and in psychology (often referred this constitutes good data about their
to as the Chomskyan revolution) underlying system of linguistic knowl-
and a large amount of work in these edge. A large amount of work in lin-
disciplines is now based on data from guistics and psychology has been
intuitions. based on evidence from intuitions like
Chomskys work changed linguis- this.
tics in several ways. He introduced a From the outset, there was consid-
new way of thinking about what was erable discussion of issues associated
the object of study (mental grammars) with the use of intuitions as data.
and also about the methods to be used Chomsky himself pointed out that not
in studying it. Before Chomskys all intuitions are as clear, or as clearly
work, the most common methods shared, as the intuitions about exam-
used by linguists were discovery pro- ples like (1)(2), and he suggested that
cedures, which were techniques for theories should be based as much as
discovering facts about the language possible on the clearer cases. Other
being studied. Chomsky argued that linguists have questioned the useful-
these techniques must be based on a ness of intuitions at all, arguing that it
number of factors, including intuition, is better to look at naturally-occurring
and also that speakers intuitions pro- data, such as data gathered in a
vide evidence for the existence of an corpus. Chomsky has always rejected
internalised language system which this view, pointing out what he sees as
should be the object of study for lin- serious problems with such naturally-
guistics. He suggested that the best occurring data. One problem is that
method for studying the system was to there is an element of luck in whether
explore the intuitions. One famous a corpus will provide relevant exam-
data set discussed by Chomsky con- ples. Related to this is the fact that a
cerns the examples in (1) and (2): corpus cannot provide negative evi-
dence; it cannot show us what is not
(1) (a) John is easy to please. possible in a language. We cannot, for
(b) It is easy to please John. example, use corpus data to find out
(2) (a) John is eager to please. that sequences like It is eager to
(b) It is eager to please John. please John (with the same reading as
(2a)) or Which student did Sylvia tell
Chomsky pointed out that (2b) is not the teacher who taught to go home
a possible way of expressing the same are not possible in English.
thing as is expressed by (2a) (it is a But the reasons why these are not
possible utterance, of course, but only possible are important if we aim to
if we take it to refer to a particular understand the nature of our language
entity capable of being eager to please system. Another reason is that Chom-
someone). There is no logical reason sky sees the object of study as an
why (2b) could not be a way of saying internalised system, which he origi-
the same thing as (2a) by analogy with nally termed competence (Chomsky
the pattern in (1a) and (1b), but this is 1965) and distinguished from
not possible in English. Speakers have language in actual usage, which he
104
INTUITION
termed performance. A large num- sun and observe directly what is hap-
ber of irrelevant factors affect per- pening there. But we can observe light
formance, for example interruptions, and heat coming from the sun and
reformulations, the physical and make inferences about what must be
mental state of the speaker. Any causing what we observe. Similarly,
corpus shows many examples of we cannot look directly at the compe-
ungrammatical utterances involving tence of speakers but we can make
overlap, false starts, hesitation, repeti- inferences based on their intuitions
tion, reformulation, unfinished utter- about particular examples.
ances and so on. Chomsky argued Birdsong (1989) and Schtze
that what we should do is look for (1996) considered methodological
sophisticated ways of finding data issues with the use of intuitions, and
which reveal facts about the underly- used the term metalinguistic perform-
ing system of competence. The best ance to describe what speakers are
data, he argued, come from the intu- doing when they make these judge-
itions of speakers. ments. This term makes clearer what
What are the intuitions exactly? the judgements are and highlights the
They are often referred to as gram- fact that this approach is using per-
maticality judgements but this is formance data to explore competence.
slightly misleading, particularly if we One major issue which all re-
take seriously the distinction between searchers need to address is that the
grammaticality and acceptability. intuitions of speakers vary. While
Chomsky argues that mental gram- most speakers will agree on (1)(2)
mars are systems of tacit knowledge: above, a large number of examples are
speakers know that (2b) does not judged differently by different speak-
work like (1b) but they cannot explain ers. One source for the variation in
why. There are also a number of well- judgements is that all speakers have
known examples which speakers slightly different language back-
reject but which are nevertheless con- grounds and experiences resulting not
sidered to be grammatical, and vice just in dialectal variation (variation
versa. Strictly speaking, then, speak- based on where the speaker lives or
ers cannot be relied on to make judge- has lived) but also idiolectal varia-
ments about grammaticality but only tion reflecting the speakers individual
about acceptability, that is about linguistic history. While there is sig-
whether particular examples sound nificant agreement about examples
OK or whether they can imagine like (1)(2), there would be variation
hearing or saying them. in responses to (3)(4):
This means that intuitions are quite
far removed from the system of gram- (3) He and Sylvia will go.
mar which is the object of study. (4) All of the staff are pleased to work
Chomsky (1980: 18992) acknowl- here.
edged this remoteness, making an
analogy with the study of thermonu- In fact, Chomsky has suggested that
clear reactions inside the sun. We language is an individual phenome-
cannot set up a laboratory inside the non and that no two individuals
105
LANGUAGE GAMES
share exactly the same language data should be used instead. Others,
(1988: 36). like Schtze, envisage research carry-
Given this variation, linguists need ing on using a range of kinds of
to make idealisations about the lan- data. For methodologically eclectic
guage they are studying. They need linguists, the range of possible
either to abstract away from the vari- sources of data includes elicitation
ation and imagine a group of speakers (engaging speakers in conversations
who do share a language, or to focus which are likely to elicit utterances of
on describing the competence of just the forms being considered), inter-
one speaker. In practice, for many lin- views, questionnaires, experiments
guists, the object of study is their own and corpora.
mental grammar. But even individual
speakers do not always make the same Primary sources
judgements about particular exam- Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the
ples. So linguists need to be careful not Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA:
to accept too readily the judgements MIT Press.
of informants. A number of studies Schtze, C. T. (1996). The Empirical Base
have compared actual recorded usage of Linguistics: Grammaticality Judge-
of speakers with what they report ments and Linguistic Methodology.
about themselves and found signifi- Chicago: Chicago University Press.
cant differences.
Schtze (1996) makes a number of Further reading
suggestions to help address these diffi- Birdsong, D. (1989). Metalinguistic Per-
culties. He suggests that it is legitimate formance and Interlinguistic Compe-
to continue to use intuitions as data tence. New York: Springer-Verlag.
but suggests that certain precautions Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic Structures.
should be followed and that linguists The Hague: Mouton.
should aim to develop other tech- Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and Represen-
niques, in particular experimental tations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
work. As well as a number of specific Chomsky, N. (1988). Language and Prob-
suggestions about materials and the lems of Knowledge: The Managua Lec-
procedure of gathering intuitions, one tures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
of the main precautions urged by
Schtze is that subjects who provide Billy Clark
intuitions should never themselves be
linguists since there is a risk that
their training will interfere with their
judgements.
LANGUAGE GAMES
Chomsky has been resolute in
rejecting alternative kinds of data, The idea that language use can be
suggesting for example that gathering compared to a game, where conver-
corpus data is unlikely to lead to sational participants are the players
significant insights. Other linguists and the goal of their conversation
suggest that intuitions are unreliable can be reached if they perform
and that naturally-occurring corpus certain types of moves within the
106
LANGUAGE GAMES
107
LANGUAGE GAMES
108
LANGUAGE GAMES
the choices of other players, all of metaphor rather than as a vehicle for
whom are trying to maximise precise formalisation.
their payoff. Dekker and Van Rooy
(2000) propose to use Nash Equilib- Primary sources
ria to characterise winning candi- Benz, A., G. Jaeger and R. Van Rooij
dates in two-dimensional optimality (2005). Game Theory and Pragmatics.
theory, an extension of optimality Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
theory* employed on the semantics- Hintikka, J. (1973). Logic, Language
pragmatics interface. Under the Games and Information: Kantian
two-dimensional optimality theoretic Themes in the Philosophy of Logic.
interpretation, a form-meaning pair is Oxford: Clarendon Press.
optimal if it satisfies both the speakers Lewis, D. (1969). Convention. Cam-
and the hearers communicative goals, bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
originally expressed by the Gricean Merin, A. (1994). Algebra of Elementary
maxims and later subsumed under the Social Acts. In Tshatzidis, S. (ed), Foun-
Q- and R-principle (Horn 1984). The dations of Speech Act Theory. London:
principles capture the intuition that Routledge.
the speakers and the hearers attempt Parikh, P. (2001). The Use of Language.
to minimise communicative effort Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
leads to opposing preferences (for the Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical
speaker, to say as little as possible; for Investigations. Trans. G. E. M.
the hearer, to maximise the informa- Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
tion value of the message). If the
speaker acted only on the basis of her Further reading
own preferences, our language would Dekker, P. and R. Van Rooy (2000). Bi-
consist only of expressions involving directional optimality theory: an appli-
low articulatory effort with a high cation of game theory. Journal of
degree of homonymy. A division of the Semantics 17: 21742.
pragmatic labour results in the use of Horn, L. R. (1984). Towards a new tax-
unmarked forms in unmarked situa- onomy for pragmatic inference: Q-
tions and marked forms in marked sit- based and R-based implicatures. In D.
uations. Schiffrin (ed.), Meaning, Form, and Use
Other recent accounts of pragmatic in Context. Washington: Georgetown
phenomena in which the authors University Press. 1142.
make use of game-theoretical results Lorenzen P. (1955). Einfhrung in die
concern indirect speech acts and operative Logik und Mathematik.
underspecification, credibility, ques- Berlin: Springer.
tion-answer pairs and grounding Lorenzen, P. and K. Lorenz (1978). Dialo-
(Benz, Jaeger and van Rooij 2005). gische Logik. Darmstadt: Wis-
The game jargon has also been utilised senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
in computational analyses of dia- Osborne, M. J. and A. Rubinstein (1994).
logue, where dialogue acts are charac- A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge,
terised as moves appropriate for MA: MIT Press.
different game types. Here, the idea of
a language game serves as a loose Marie Nilsenov
109
LANGUAGE OF fore, in which LOTH is an alternative
to the theory of intentionality*.
THOUGHT LOTH is predicated on a number of
theses. The first is so-called represen-
The Language of Thought Hypothesis tational realism, or the holding of a
is the hypothesis that thinking and Representational Theory of Mind
thought are conducted in a mental (RTM). According to this theory,
language (mentalese) that is innate, there is a unique, distinct, dedicated
distinct from all natural languages, psychological relation for each propo-
universal among all thinking beings, sitional attitude, and each thought
and physically realised in the brain. incorporating an attitudinal verb is a
The language of thought is an im- token of this mental type. Thinking is
portant concept in the attempt to thoughts joined up in other words,
find a cognitive and neurological causal sequences of tokenings of this
explanation for language and con- mental representation of the attitude,
sciousness. be it belief, desire, or whatever. It fol-
lows that there is a strong rationalist
See also: Innateness; Intentionality;
bias in LOTH: thinking is defined as
Mentalism; Private Language;
rational thought, the ratiocinative
Propositional Attitudes;
process consisting of thoughts in
Propositions; Universal Grammar
causal sequence.
Key Thinkers: Chomsky, Noam;
The second LOTH thesis is that
Fodor, Jerry
these mental representations belong
The Language of Thought Hypothesis to a representational or symbolic
(LOTH) was first postulated by Jerry system that is itself language-like. This
Fodor in 1975. According to this is the part of the hypothesis that is
hypothesis, thought and thinking are most closely influenced by Noam
done in a mental language, men- Chomsky: roughly speaking, this sym-
talese. It is a bold hypothesis insofar bolic system (often called mentalese)
as this language is held to be innate, corresponds to what Chomsky calls
distinct from all natural languages, competence or deep structure.
and physically realised in the brain. Mentalese has its own grammar, and
LOTH is derived from work on one which is, moreover, universal.
propositional attitudes*, which are LOTH, despite being concerned with
described by sentences of the form propositional attitudes rather than
Mary believes that pigs might fly. propositional content, is thus situated
The general form of such sentences is in the tradition of linguistic thought
S As that P, where S is the subject stretching back to Port-Royal logic*,
who holds the attitude, A is an atti- which sees the purpose of language as
tudinal verb such as believe, desire, being predicative, that is to make
hope, intend and P is any sentence. propositional statements about the
It may be seen that attitudinal verbs world which are demonstrably true or
coincide with what elsewhere in the false. LOTH is incompatible with the
philosophy of mind are called inten- meaning is use tradition of linguistic
tional verbs: there is a sense, there- philosophy promulgated by Ludwig
110
LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
111
LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
112
LANGUE/PAROLE habits of any one member of a given
speech community, Saussure sought to
examine language in general and to
Referring to two aspects of language identify the systems or rules and con-
examined by Ferdinand de Saussure ventions according to which language
at the beginning of the twentieth cen- functions. Saussures views on lan-
tury, langue denotes a system of inter- guage influenced linguistics during the
nalised, shared rules governing a twentieth century, and his imprint can
national languages vocabulary, be found in theoretical works dis-
grammar, and sound system; parole cussing phonetics, phonology, mor-
designates actual oral and written phology, syntax, pragmatics and
communication by a member or mem- especially semantics. Indeed, the dis-
bers of a particular speech commu- tinction between langue and parole
nity. Saussures understanding of the forms an important part of the theo-
nature of language and his belief that retical basis of structuralism*.
scholarship should focus on investi- A popular lecturer at the University
gating the abstract systematic princi- of Geneva, Saussure suggested ideas
ples of language instead of researching and concepts that fascinated his stu-
etymologies and language philosophy dents, yet he did not personally write
led to a revolution in the field of an authoritative guide to his views.
linguistics. Two colleagues of his, Charles Bally
and Albert Sechehaye, collected and
See also: Phoneme; Signs and
edited student notes from three occa-
Semiotics; Structuralism;
sions during 190611 when he deliv-
Transformational-Generative
ered his lectures, publishing the
Grammar
assembled remarks under the title
Key Thinkers: Bakhtin, Mikhail;
Cours de Linguistique Gnrale in
Barthes, Roland; Bloomfield,
1916. In the 1990s newly-edited ver-
Leonard; Boas, Franz; Chomsky,
sions of student notes based on Saus-
Noam; Jakobson, Roman; Pike,
sures lectures, along with translations
Kenneth; Sapir, Edward; Saussure,
into English, appeared. At the begin-
Ferdinand de
ning of the twenty-first century, there
The discussion concerning langue and is still disagreement about a number
parole was first suggested by Ferdi- of Saussures statements, and prob-
nand de Saussure and popularised in lems surrounding the fragmented
his Cours de Linguistique Gnrale nature of some of the student notes
(Course in General Linguistics), a have not been fully resolved.
series of Saussures university lectures Through Cours de Linguistique
collected by his students and published Gnrale, Saussures views concerning
posthumously in 1916. Abandoning language and the study of language
the mindset, goals and objectives of were introduced to scholars through-
historical linguistics, Saussure advo- out the world. Saussure rejected
cated a synchronic examination of lan- the nineteenth-century notion that
guage. Not interested in studying a linguistics should be primarily histor-
particular language or the linguistic ical and comparative, and disagreed
113
LANGUE/PAROLE
114
LANGUE/PAROLE
115
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY
Riedlinger et Charles Patois. French ed. limits of the native speakers language
Eisuke Komatsu. English ed. and trans. are the limits of his/her world. In the-
George Wolf. Oxford: Pergamon. ories of linguistic relativity, the vocab-
Saussure, Ferdinand de (1993). Troisime ulary and linguistic structure of ones
Cours de Linguistique Gnrale (1910 native language limits or influences
1911): daprs les cahiers dmile Con- ones Weltanschauung or world view.
stantin. French ed. Eisuke Komatsu.
See also: Feminism; Political
English ed. and trans. Roy Harris.
Correctness; Structuralism
Oxford: Pergamon.
Key Thinkers: Humboldt, Wilhelm
Saussure, Ferdinand de (1966). Course in
von; Peirce, C. S.; Sapir, Edward;
General Linguistics. Cours de Linguis-
Saussure, Ferdinand de; Whorf,
tique Gnrale. Trans. Wade Baskin.
Benjamin Lee
New York: McGraw-Hill. First French
edition 1916. The idea that the native language
colours the speakers world view has
Further reading been in the forefront of linguistic sci-
Chomsky, Noam (1964). Current Issues in ence since the time of Wilhelm von
Linguistic Theory. The Hague: Humboldt, and has found advocates
Mouton. and critics from various disciplines.
Harris, Roy (1987). Reading Saussure: A The American philosopher Charles
Critical Commentary on the Cours de Sanders Peirce postulated that the
Linguistique Gnrale. London: Duck- symbolic universe could only make
worth. sense through language, which he
Harris, Roy (2004). Saussure and His defined as semiotic, a system of signs.
Interpreters. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Ferdinand de Saussure, in the Cours
University Press. de Linguistique Gnrale, stated that:
Koerner, E. F. K. (1973). Ferdinand de No ideas are established in advance,
Saussure: The Origin and Development and nothing is distinct, before the
of His Linguistic Thought in Western introduction of linguistic structure
Studies of Language. Amsterdam: Ben- (1916: 155). However, the notion of
jamins. linguistic relativity has largely become
Sanders, Carol (ed.) (2004). The Cam- associated with Benjamin Lee Whorf,
bridge Companion to Saussure. Cam- who along with Edward Sapir, his lin-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. guistic mentor at Yale University, used
modern linguistic concepts to advo-
David V. Witkosky cate the position that language limits,
or at least influences, the way a speech
community conceives of its world
view and reality.
LINGUISTIC Part of the groundwork for this
hypothesis was laid by Whorfs work
RELATIVITY as a fire insurance investigator. During
his career, he had the opportunity to
The idea central to the Sapir-Whorf analyse many reports as to why fires
hypothesis, which states that the broke out in factories. He found that
116
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY
workers would use extreme caution esis. When viewed in terms of output,
when around full drums of gasoline. one could counter that a more appro-
Just as one would expect, workers priate label would be the Whorf-
were careful not to smoke around Sapir hypothesis.
full drums. Yet, these same workers A rather interesting development in
when around empty drums of gaso- this debate over giving credit where
line would often toss lit cigarettes credit is due has been the attempt to
nearby. This caused a violent explo- disassociate Sapir from the hypothesis
sion because an empty drum entirely. Desirous of preventing the
(unknown to the smoker) still con- image of the great maestro Sapir from
tained volatile gasoline vapour; an being tarnished by the taint of contro-
empty drum was really much more versy, some, most notably Alfred L.
of a threat than a full one. Using Kroeber, have claimed that Edward
these data, Whorf concluded that the Sapirs views were not really pro-
meanings of certain words had an Whorfian. This viewpoint is not borne
effect on a persons behaviour. out by an examination of Sapirs own
It was the research of both Sapir writings. For example, as one can
and Whorf into the grammatical sys- plainly see in the following passage,
tems of many American Indian lan- there can be no doubt that Sapirs
guages, however, that proved to have position was fundamentally one that
the greatest impact on this hypothesis. equated language with culture and
By predicating their insights into the thinking. In Sapirs words:
interrelationships of language and
culture on what they had learned from Language is a guide to social real-
the structures of these so-called ity . . . it powerfully conditions all our
exotic languages, the basic idea of thinking about social problems and
language shaping the perceptions of processes. Human beings do not live in
its speakers and providing for them a the objective world alone, nor alone in
vehicle so that their experiences and the world of social activity as ordinar-
emotions can be placed in significant ily understood, but are very much at
categories, was given scientific under- the mercy of the particular language
pinnings. Generally, Sapir is credited which has become the medium of
with giving the problem of establish- expression for their society. It is quite
ing the link between language and cul- an illusion to imagine that one adjusts
ture its initial formulation, continuing to reality essentially without the use of
in the tradition of Johann Gottfried language and specific problems of
Herder and Humboldt. Whorf is hon- communication or reflection . . . No
oured as the one who took this idea two languages are ever sufficiently sim-
and developed it into a bona fide ilar to be considered as representing
hypothesis. Hence, the resultant sup- the same social reality . . . We see and
position is commonly given the desig- hear and otherwise experience very
nation the Whorfian hypothesis. largely as we do because the language
Pointing to Sapirs pre-eminent stature habits of our community predispose
as a linguist, some writers prefer the certain choices of interpretation.
appellation the Sapir-Whorf hypoth- (1929: 209)
117
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY
There are really two different yet what I have called the linguistic relativ-
related versions of the Whorfian ity principle, which means, in informal
hypothesis, which is understandable terms, that users of markedly different
when one considers that Whorf did all grammars are pointed by their gram-
of his professional writing in the mars toward different types of observa-
rather short period between 1925 and tions and different evaluations of
1941. His ideas, quite naturally, were externally similar acts of observation,
continuously developing. The strong and hence are not equivalent as
version of the hypothesis, which is observers but must arrive at somewhat
called linguistic determinism, holds different views of the world. (In Carroll
that language determines thinking, or 1956: 221)
as Stuart Chase writes in the foreword
to Whorfs collected works: All Perhaps the most incontrovertible
higher levels of thinking are depend- piece of evidence in favour of linguis-
ent on language (in Carroll 1956: vi). tic relativity comes from the realm of
This position is most difficult to numbers and numerals. There are lan-
defend primarily because translation guages, such as Hottentot, also known
between one language and another is as Nama, which only have words for
possible, and thinking can take place the numerals for one and two and a
without language at all, as evidenced word roughly translatable as many
by fine art. for three or more. A few languages
Mirroring Sapirs thoughts as men- have no numerals whatsoever and
tioned above, Whorf notes in his 1940 their speakers are consequently unable
article Science and Linguistic: to undertake even basic arithmetic.
In Whorfs undated manuscript A
We dissect nature along lines laid down Linguistic Consideration of Thinking
by our native languages . . . We cut in Primitive Communities, it is
nature up, organize it into concepts, shown that the problem of thinking
and ascribe significances as we do, by so-called primitive peoples is
largely because we are parties to an approachable through linguistics (in
agreement to organize it in this way an Carroll 1956: 65). Further, as linguists
agreement that holds throughout our have come to fully appreciate only
speech community and is codified in the fairly recently, Whorf maintained that
patterns of our language. (In Carroll linguistics is essentially the quest of
1956: 213) MEANING (in Carroll 1956: 73).
Example after example is given of
The milder version of the Whorfian things which are relatively easy to say
hypothesis is labelled linguistic rela- in Hopi but awkward or clumsy to say
tivity. This states that our native in such Standard-Average-European
language influences our thoughts or (SAE) languages as English, Spanish
perceptions. In fact, it was Whorf and German. The term SAE was of
who coined the phrase linguistic Whorfs own invention.
relativity. In the article Linguistics In the classic An American Indian
as an Exact Science, Whorf com- Model of the Universe, Whorf argues
mented: that since there is neither an explicit
118
nor an implicit reference to time in the LINGUISTIC
Hopi language and thus no tenses for
its verbs, according to the Hopi view VARIABLE
of the world time disappears and
space is altered (in Carroll 1956: 58). A descriptive unit defined as a cate-
Whorfs basic contention is that Hopi gory of two or more linguistic alter-
metaphysics, which underlies its cog- natives co-varying with one another in
nition, is different from our own. In one of three ways: in a categorical way
other words, the Hopi calibrate the (the variation always occurs given cer-
world differently because their lan- tain circumstances); in a quasi-
guage defines experience differently predictable or probabilistic way (in
for them. line, for example, with another lin-
As more information has surfaced guistic variable or a social variable);
about Hopi, some of Whorfs specific or in an apparently unpredictable,
grammatical points have not with- random way (free variation). The
stood the test of time. Although most central idea is that there are multiple
linguists today dismiss many of ways of saying the same thing,
Whorfs claims, it should be pointed though debate continues as to
out that Whorfs basic idea of linguis- whether two different linguistic struc-
tic relativity that the structure and tures are ever exactly equivalent in
vocabulary of ones mother tongue function and/or meaning, and about
influences ones world view the extent to which individual lan-
although not proven to be correct, guage users are able to exercise con-
also has not been proven to be wrong. scious choice over which alternative
to select from the range available.
Primary sources
See also: Acceptability/
Carroll, John B. (ed.) (1956). Language,
Grammaticality; Conversation
Thought and Reality: Selected Writings
Analysis; Corpora; (Critical)
of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge,
Discourse Analysis; Descriptivism;
MA: MIT Press.
Emic/Etic;
Mandelbaum, David G. (ed.) (1949).
Empiricism/Rationalism; Intuition;
Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in
Speech Act Theory; Type/Token
Language, Culture, and Personality.
Key Thinkers: Cameron, Deborah;
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Halliday, M. A. K.; Pike, Kenneth;
Sapir, Edward (1929). The status of
Labov, William; Milroy, Lesley;
linguistics as a science. Language 5:
Sapir, Edward
20714.
Variables operate at all levels of lin-
Further reading guistic structure. Grammatical vari-
Saussure, Ferdinand de (1916/1966). ables capture some aspect of
Course in General Linguistics (Cours de optionality in the occurrence of mor-
Linguistique Gnrale). Trans. Wade phological or syntactic forms. For
Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill. instance, the use of double modal
constructions like might could (+
Alan S. Kaye main verb) is not obligatory in those
119
LOGIC
120
LOGIC
1 3
All the premises are true. All the premises are true.
The conclusion is true. The conclusion is false.
2 4
Figure 3
121
LOGIC
122
LOGIC
first, then the second; but not the logical and the non-logical vocabu-
second; therefore not the first (see lary of the lexicon. Let us consider a
Kneale and Kneale 1962: 1623). language of propositional logic, called
The first and the second here are PL (after Tomassi 1999). The lexicon
place-markers for complete assert- of PL consists of:
ibles. Assertibles are the meanings of
declarative sentences (see Bobzien i. The sentence letters: P, Q, R,
2003). Stoic logic is a type of proposi- and so on, which symbolise atomic
tional (or sentential) logic. The sentences that is sentences with no
Stoics put what are now called the other sentences as parts.
logical operators of propositional ii. The propositional operators: ~,
logic at the centre of their investiga- &, v, , , at least roughly
tions. Their English equivalents are equivalent to it is not the case
If . . . then . . ., . . . or . . ., . . . and that . . ., . . . and . . ., . . . or . . .,
. . . and It is not the case that. . .. If . . . then . . ., and . . . if and
These operators are used to form only if . . ..
complex statements: that is, state- iii. The parentheses: (and ), used as
ments with other statements as parts. a type of punctuation.
In symbolic logic, artificial, formal
languages are constructed and em- A PL formula is any string of symbols
ployed, in contrast with the mixture of from the lexicon of PL. A well-formed
artificial symbols and natural lan- formula (WFF) of PL is a formula con-
guage used by earlier formal logicians. structed in observance of the follow-
Symbolic logic in this sense developed ing formation rules:
with the work of Gottlob Frege and of
Bertrand Russell and A. N. White- 1. Every sentence letter is a WFF.
head, following earlier nineteenth- 2. Prefixing a WFF with ~ gives a
century innovations. Freges work is WFF.
of unparalleled influence and impor- 3. For any WFFs containing A B, put-
tance. ting them either side of & or v or
Among Freges most valuable con- or and putting parentheses
tributions to logic were the inven- round the resulting formula gives a
tions of modern predicate logic (also WFF.
known as quantificational logic and 4. Nothing else is a WFF.
predicate calculus) and the first
formal system, both originally The propositional operators are the log-
included in his Begriffsschrift (1879). ical vocabulary of PL. In propositional
While Freges notation is obsolete, logic, the quantifiers some, all and
contemporary logic is built upon his no (and equivalent expressions) are
predicate logic and his systematisa- not treated as logical vocabulary. Thus,
tion of the notion of proof. not every valid argument is proposi-
A formal language consists of a lex- tionally valid. For example, the validity
icon (a set of symbols) and a syntax of a valid syllogism, like Argument F
(a set of rules for using the symbols). above, depends on expressions other
Logicians distinguish between the than the propositional operators.
123
LOGIC
124
LOGIC
125
LOGIC
Supplementing the vocabulary and Ernest is brave and Ernest is not brave.
rules of inference of a classical system So Ernest is a mountaineer.
with logical operators standing for
It is necessary that and/or It is pos- The premise here is a contradiction, so
sible that, enables the development it cannot be true. So, we cannot be in
of systems of modal logic. A formal a situation in which the premise is true
system S is said to under-generate and the conclusion false. Thus we have
relative to natural language if there a classically valid argument. Logicians
are valid arguments of natural lan- in the field hold that arguments like
guage that are not S-valid. Modal Reads example show that the classical
logicians hold that, in failing for- account of validity over-generates.
mally to account for the validity of Linguists and philosophers of lan-
such arguments as H, classical logic guage investigate the relationship
under-generates. between logic and natural language,
What is it to revise classical logic asking, for example, about the rela-
and why do so? A system of logic S* tionship between logical and gram-
is a revision of a classical system of matical form and the extent to which
logic S if and only if S* discards one semantic theory for natural language
or more of the inference rules of S. A can be modelled on the formal seman-
formal system is said to over- tics for logic. Logic is also interesting
generate if there are arguments that for linguists because the syntax of a
ought to be considered invalid but formal language is finitely specifiable
which come out as valid within the by reference to a set of recursive for-
system. Some logicians object to the mation rules (for example, the PL
classical account of logical conse- formation rules set out above). An
quence on the basis that it results in analogous set of rules for a natural
over-generation. This objection some- language would be explanatory with
times stems, as in the case of intu- respect to a speakers capacity to form
itionist logic, from rejection of a sentences never previously encoun-
principle of classical semantics (see tered.
the entry on truth value). If there are Analytic philosophy* of language,
classically valid arguments which inaugurated by Frege and Russell, has
ought not to be considered valid at all, logic at its heart, and some of the
then at least one of the inference rules foundational works of modern
of classical logic must be rejected or symbolic logic were its impetus. In lin-
restricted. guistics, formal semanticists and con-
Revisions to classical logic include temporary syntactic theorists use logic
intuitionist, relevant, fuzzy and in their analyses of natural language.
dialethic logics. The relevant logician, A solid grounding in logic goes a long
for example, notes a seemingly odd way for the student of linguistics or
feature of classical validity: that from the philosophy of language.
contradictory premises any conclu-
sion whatever can validly be inferred. Primary sources
Read (1995: 55) gives the following Aristotle. De Interpretatione. Trans. J. L.
example: Ackrill. In Jonathan Barnes (ed.)
126
LOGICAL FORM
(1984), The Complete Works of Aris- why it logically entails other sentences
totle, vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton Uni- that it entails and why it is entailed by
versity Press. 2538. other sentences that logically entail it.
Aristotle. Prior Analytics. Trans. A. J. Questions about logical form are
Jenkinson. In Jonathan Barnes (ed.) important to the characterisation of
(1984), The Complete Works of Aris- logic and to its relationship with nat-
totle, vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton Uni- ural language.
versity Press. 39113.
See also: Definite Descriptions;
Frege, Gottlob. Begriffsschrift (1879/
Logic; Logical Positivism
1967). Trans. Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg.
Key Thinkers: Aristotle; Chomsky,
In Jean van Heijenoort (ed.) (1967),
Noam; Russell, Bertrand
From Frege to Gdel: A Sourcebook in
Modern Mathematical Logic, 1879 Bertrand Russell aimed to put a con-
1931. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- ception of logical form at the centre of
versity Press. 582. the practice of philosophy. Logical
form in this sense is distinct from the
Further reading notion called LF by linguists after
Allwood, Jens, Lars-Gunnar Andersson Noam Chomsky. The investigation of
and sten Dahl (1977). Logic in Lin- logical form begins with the inquiry
guistics. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- into deductive reasoning initiated by
versity Press. ancient logicians. For example, Aris-
Bobzien, Susanne (2003). Stoic logic. In totle noted that any argument that is
Brad Inwood (ed.), Cambridge Com- an instance of the pattern below is
panion to the Stoics. New York: Cam- deductively valid:
bridge University Press. 85123.
Noonan, Harold W. (2001). Frege: A Crit- Some As are Bs.
ical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity. All Bs are Cs.
Kneale, William and Martha Kneale So, some As are Cs.
(1962). The Development of Logic.
Oxford: Clarendon. Statements themselves have logical
Read, Stephen (1995). Thinking about forms: Some philosophers are logi-
Logic. Oxford: Oxford University cians is an instance of the pattern
Press. Some As are Bs.
Tomassi, Paul (1999). Logic. London: With the development of modern
Routledge. symbolic logic*, a view arose that
grammatical form can be misleading
Stephen McLeod as to logical form. For example, on
Russells account, sentences that use
definite descriptions* have logical fea-
tures not evident at the level of surface
LOGICAL FORM syntax. In The present King of France
is bald, none of the words is a logical
On one central conception, the logical operator. Russell claims, however,
form of a sentence consists in those of that the sentence is to be analysed as
its structural features which clarify employing covert logical operators.
127
LOGICAL POSITIVISM
128
LOGICAL POSITIVISM
129
MENTALISM
130
METAPHOR
131
METAPHOR
132
METAPHOR
literary analysis (1999: 120). Chal- nutrient, has been that the target
lenging this among other Western domain food, a physical entity, is
philosophical principles, they assert understood in terms of the source
metaphors form the basis of concep- domain love, a nonphysical entity.
tualisation. Without them, therefore, Such a simplistic view of the relation-
the discussion of science, morality or ship between the source and target
philosophy would not be possible. domains, Kvecses argues, is not
Even a universal concept like time is sufficient to explain the various
metaphorically anchored because it metaphorical expressions based on
is perceived of, and spoken about, the complex relationship between the
metaphorically, not temporally. Citing two domains. He argues that the intri-
examples from English, they discuss a cate mappings between love and
number of expressions related to the nutrient, and our ability to highlight
various aspects of time. Some of different aspects of them enable us to
these are metaphoric expressions that use metaphors like love as food,
indicate the passage of time as the desire for love as hunger, and
approaching, arriving, running consequences of love as effects of
and flying. This metaphorisation of nourishment. These complex map-
time, they believe, is culturally specific pings, Kvecses argues, enable speak-
as reflected in different languages. In ers to highlight specific source-target
English, for instance, we look for- relationships that would make it pos-
ward to future events and regard past sible for them to express subtle mean-
ones as being behind us whereas in ings (2002: 7992).
Aymara, a language spoken in the Since its inception as an independ-
Chilean Andes, the future is behind. ent, vital discipline, metaphor theory
In this culture, the metaphorisation of has seen a number of developments.
future events as being behind indicates One of these is the universality of
the unforeseeable nature of such metaphors and their variation in dif-
events (1999: 141). ferent cultures. Although Lakoff and
Lakoff and Johnsons pioneering Johnson (1999) alluded to this aspect
research on metaphor sparked interest of metaphors, Kvecses (2005) is
in the field and paved the way for a credited with its development. Kvec-
multitude of subsequent publications. ses predicates the potential universal-
Reiterating the basic principles of ity of many conceptual metaphors on
their framework, Kvecses (2002) the similarity of human physiological
argues that the formula proposed to and conceptual experiences. Anger in
explain conceptual metaphors, which humans, for instance, results in many
states that a target domain is under- physiological changes, including an
stood in terms of a source domain, is increase in body temperature and
insufficient. Using expressions such as blood pressure. Kvecses believes this
someone is starved for love or accounts for diverse cultures utilis-
hungry for affection, he argues that ing figures of speech based on the
the traditional explanation of such fig- pressurised container conceptual
ures of speech, which are based on metaphor. English metaphoric expres-
the conceptual metaphor love as a sions like boiling blood, simmering
133
MINIMALISM
134
MINIMALISM
for language optimally satisfies con- approaching the same order of magni-
straints imposed only by the need to tude of complexity as the phenomena
service a sensori-motor interface (PF) themselves. Similar concerns moti-
and a conceptual-intentional interface vated the transition from the Revised
(LF). Extended Standard Theory to Govern-
ment-Binding Theory in the late
See also: Adequacy; Logical Form;
1970s. Additionally, various principles
Transformational-Generative
began to emerge which had a least
Grammar; Universal Grammar
effort flavour, or were computation-
Key Thinkers: Chomsky, Noam
ally more simple: namely local metrics
The Minimalist Program, the succes- for determining the domain of certain
sor framework to Noam Chomskys syntactic effects. As a result of consid-
Government-Binding Theory, was ini- erations such as these, the strong min-
tially articulated in the book of the imalist thesis began to emerge in the
same name (Chomsky 1995) which mid-1990s.
brought together several earlier Not surprisingly, this thesis has far
papers with some new material. It was reaching implications for every aspect
expanded upon principally in Chom- of the computational system, and
sky (2000, 2001, 2004, 2005). The much of the organisation and technol-
leading idea, often called by Chomsky ogy of Government-Binding Theory
the strong minimalist thesis, is that has undergone revision. If PF and LF
language is a perfect solution to the are the only linguistic levels with any
problems imposed by virtual concep- significance (being the only two seem-
tual necessity. In other words, there ingly mandated by virtual conceptual
are certain inescapable constraints on necessity, though see below), then
the computational system of the other linguistic levels, such as D-struc-
human language faculty. If it is to ture and S-structure, must be elimi-
relate sound and meaning, the com- nated. Linguistic principles stated in
putational system must interface with terms of these levels must be reformu-
at least a sensory-motor system (Pho- lated.
netic Form/PF) and a semantic/ Structure-building has also under-
conceptual-intentional system (Logi- gone radical revision, returning to a
cal Form/LF). The strong minimalist version of generalised transforma-
thesis hypothesises that the only con- tions from Chomskys early work in
straints are those imposed by these the 1950s. Rather than building up
interfaces, and that computational syntactic objects in a top-down
system satisfies these constraints in an fashion through recursive phrase-
optimal fashion. structure rules, the so-called Merge
As with previous radical changes in operation builds structure from the
framework developed by Chomsky, bottom up, combining two syntactic
questions of simplicity, and ultimately objects of arbitrary complexity: that
the logical problem of language acqui- is, individual lexical items or larger,
sition, were central. By the early 1990s previously created syntactic objects.
there was within Government-Binding Consistent with the goal of appealing
Theory a sense that explanations were only to virtual conceptually necessary
135
MINIMALISM
136
MINIMALISM
137
MODALITY
138
MODEL-THEORETIC SEMANTICS
139
MODEL-THEORETIC SEMANTICS
140
MODEL-THEORETIC SEMANTICS
141
NAMES
derived from other linguistic levels by (eds), Handbook of Logic and Lan-
transformational operations in the guage. Amsterdam and Cambridge, MA:
syntax, is called logical form* (May Elsevier and MIT Press. 591.
1985). On the other hand, the strict Tarski, A. (1935). The concept of truth in
compositionality constraint between formalized languages. In J. Corcoran
form and meaning built into Mon- (ed.) (1983), Logic, Semantics, Meta-
tagues original theory precludes the mathematics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
need for such an additional level of Publishing. 152278.
syntactic representation.
Model-theoretic semantics can pro- Further reading
vide interpretations for (semantic rep- Bach, Emmon (1989). Informal Lectures
resentations of) linguistic expressions on Formal Semantics. Albany: SUNY
in a way that accurately captures our Press.
pre-theoretical semantic judgements Cann, Ronnie (1993). Formal Semantics:
of such expressions. It is currently the An Introduction. Cambridge: Cam-
focus of a great deal of research in lin- bridge University Press.
guistics, but much of this research also Dowty, David R., R. E. Wall and S. Peters
unifies and expands various other dis- (1981). Introduction to Montague
ciplines, such as philosophy, cognitive Semantics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub-
science, artificial intelligence*, and lishing.
theoretical computer science. Work in Gamut, L. T. F. (1991). Logic, Language
model-theoretic semantics has made and Meaning (Volume 2): Intensional
significant contributions to our under- Logic and Logical Grammar. Chicago:
standing of truth and meaning in nat- University of Chicago Press.
ural languages, for example in areas
Ivn Garca lvarez
as diverse as tense and aspect, gener-
ics, negation, and plurality.
142
NAMES
143
inherent in language but a matter of NONNATURAL
naming practices in context.
There can be no doubt that the rela- MEANING
tionship between a name and its refer-
ent has more psychological reality for A type of meaning, which includes lin-
language users than that pertaining guistic meaning, in which there is no
between any other linguistic signs and necessary link between a sign and
their referents. Modern linguistics and what it represents. In his influential
onomastics, however, have tended to account of nonnatural meaning, H. P.
dismiss this widely held assumption Grice emphasised the importance of a
as primitive or superstitious. This speakers intentions and a hearers
stance has led to an ever-widening recognition of these intentions.
chasm between limited academic
See also: Conventional Meaning;
interest in names and naming and
Implicature; Intentionality; Signs
widespread popular interest. In the
and Semiotics; Use/Mention
philosophy of language, the relation-
Key Thinkers: Grice, H. P.; Peirce,
ship between names and their refer-
C. S.; Saussure, Ferdinand de;
ents remains an enduring focus of
Searle, John; Strawson, P. F.
interest.
The idea that linguistic meaning can
Primary sources be distinguished from natural mean-
Frege, Gottlob (1892). On sense and ing is long standing. It can be traced
meaning. In Peter Geach and Max back to classical philosophy, and in
Black (eds) (1980), Translations from more recent times can be found in
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Peirces account of words as sym-
Frege. Oxford: Blackwell. 5678. First bols and in Saussures discussion of
Edition 1952. the arbitrary nature of the sign. How-
Kripke, Saul (1972). Naming and neces- ever, Grices short article meaning
sity. In D. Davidson and G. Hartman attempted a more precise characteri-
(eds), Semantics of Natural Language. sation.
Dordrecht: Reidel. Grice draws attention to two differ-
Mill, J. S. (1867). A System of Logic. ent ways in which the verb mean is
London: Longman. Chapter 2. used, exemplified by Those spots
Russell, Bertrand (1919). Introduction to mean measles and Those three rings
Mathematical Philosophy. London: on the bell (of the bus) mean that the
George Allen and Unwin. bus is full. The first case involves nat-
Searle, John (1958). Proper names. Mind ural meaning; the spots simply are a
67: 16673. symptom of the disease. In the second
case, there is no necessary connection
Further reading between the three rings and the mean-
Evans, Gareth (1982). The Varieties of ing, but rather someone (the bus con-
Reference. Oxford: Oxford University ductor) meant something by the rings;
Press. we can say that the rings mean The
bus is full. Unlike in the case of natural
Ingrid Piller and Siobhan Chapman meaning, the rings are not a guarantee
144
OPTIMALITY THEORY
of the truth of this statement; the bus Searle, John (1969). Speech Acts. Cam-
conductor may be mistaken or deliber- bridge: Cambridge University Press.
ately trying to deceive. Grice labelled Strawson, P. F. (1964). Intention and con-
this second type of meaning nonnat- vention in speech acts. The Philosophi-
ural meaning, for which he coined the cal Review 73: 43960.
abbreviation meaningnn. Linguistic
meaning is a type of meaningnn. Further reading
For Grice, meaningnn is determined Avramides, Anita (1989). Meaning and
by a speakers intention to communi- Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
cate something, and by a hearers Chapman, Siobhan (2005). Paul Grice:
recognition of that intention. If A is a Philosopher and Linguist. Basingstoke:
speaker and x an utterance, then A Palgrave.
meantnn something by x is roughly
equivalent to A intended the utter- Siobhan Chapman
ance of x to produce some effect in an
audience by means of the recognition
of this intention (1957: 385). Grice
raises but does not fully develop the OPTIMALITY
idea that linguistic meaning (what x
meansnn) may itself be determined by
THEORY
speakers intentions, and hence that
conventional meaning is to be defined A framework in theoretical linguistics
in terms of psychology. He also hints used to formalise analyses in phonol-
that what speakers intend to commu- ogy, and less frequently other areas of
nicate in specific contexts may some- linguistics. Its core is the assumption
times go beyond what their words that linguistic generalisations should
actually meannn. be described using a set of violable
Meaning has largely been constraints on surface representations
favourably received by philosophers which are ranked in terms of their
and linguists alike, although some importance.
have put forward criticisms that sug-
See also: Generative Phonology;
gest flaws in Grices theory (Strawson
Universal Grammar
1964; Searle 1969; Schiffer 1972).
Key Thinkers: Chomsky, Noam
Meaning also introduced Grices
interest in the distinction between Optimality theory (OT) took centre
what our words mean and what we stage in theoretical linguistics during
mean by using our words, which he the 1990s. Its basic tenets were both
explored further in his work on con- familiar and revolutionary and this
versational implicature*. has doubtless contributed to its suc-
cess. It developed ideas long present
Primary sources in linguistics, but gave them new
Grice, Paul (1957). Meaning. The Philo- characteristics, considerably chang-
sophical Review 66: 37788. ing the understanding of the gram-
Schiffer, Stephen (1972). Meaning. mar. Despite some influence from
Oxford: Clarendon Press. neural networks, OT was essentially
145
OPTIMALITY THEORY
146
OPTIMALITY THEORY
bnd !*
bnt *
bn !*
b !**
Table 1
147
OPTIMALITY THEORY
148
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
149
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
even here, one cannot point to any con- arguing that such an approach would
sensus. John Searle, of the University of clarify matters by blocking misuses of
California at Berkeley, probably the language. In other words, most of phi-
most famous of Austins followers, has losophy, on careful inspection, would
categorically denied being a linguistic boil down to straightforward linguistic
philosopher, claiming to be only a analysis.
philosopher of language. J. L. Austin, one of the principal
The term ordinary language phi- exponents of ordinary language phi-
losophy captures an important ele- losophy, used to quip that if one wants
ment that distinguishes the movement to embark on a career in philosophy
from the work of earlier philosophers, one had better equip oneself with a
particularly those inspired by logical good dictionary. His point was that
positivism* or what may contrastively our ordinary, everyday language,
be referred to as ideal language phi- unlike its ideal or formal counterpart,
losophy. Bertrand Russell, for one, was fashioned into its present form by
was openly scornful of ordinary lan- generations of speakers. In that long
guage which he thought was full of process, the language has been
ambiguity* and vagueness and hence invested with most, if not all, of the
inadequate for the philosophers pur- distinctions that its speakers felt nec-
poses. Unlike many of their con- essary. Not that the ordinary language
temporaries and predecessors who cannot be improved or further dis-
believed in first positing a logically tinctions introduced into it to suit
perfect language and then lamenting fresh needs. Ordinary language may
how our ordinary, everyday language not provide us with the last word on
pales in comparison with it, ordinary philosophical problems, but it should
language philosophers insisted on certainly be the starting point of all
examining ordinary, everyday lan- philosophical inquiry.
guage at its face value. The philosophical importance of
In stark contrast with the apologists conferring pride of place upon ordi-
of ideal language, Wittgenstein argued nary language can hardly be overesti-
in his Philosophical Investigations mated. In a way it debunked the very
(1953) that ordinary language was per- enterprise of philosophy or at least a
fectly in order as it stood, and that traditional way of going about doing
many of the puzzles that professional philosophy. The image of the proto-
philosophers and linguists encountered typical philosopher is best captured by
and sought to resolve were actually the the famous statue called The Thinker
result of an inadequate understanding by the French sculptor Auguste Rodin.
of the subtleties of ordinary, everyday Lost in meditation, the philosopher is
language. In his essay Systematically completely out of touch with the
Misleading Expressions, Ryle (1932) work-a-day world. Introspection is his
made a strong case for a careful analy- preferred modus operandi and soli-
sis of ordinary language expressions as tude his self-imposed ambience. This is
a way of doing philosophy, or rather, perfectly in tune with philosophys
as a way of dissolving many of the proverbial disdain for language in the
problems that crop up in philosophy, everyday sense of the word. Gottfried
150
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
Wilhelm Leibniz, the German philo- the hilt. True to the austere tradition of
sopher, is famously said to have sober empiricism, the hallmark of
exclaimed that if God Almighty were British thought, he preferred to start
one day to descend upon the earth, He his philosophical inquiry with the tan-
would certainly address us ordinary gibles to start from the concrete
mortals in the language of mathemat- (words) and work his way towards the
ics it was inconceivable for the general or the abstract, rather than the
philosopher that an all-perfect God other way around. And he was in no
would have recourse to any language hurry to finish that job. He believed
other than the all-perfect language of that philosophy demanded a great deal
mathematics. of painstaking spadework. He once
Traditionally, philosophy is con- said that the sentence Neither a be-all
cerned with conceptual analysis. It is nor an end-all be could make an excel-
not primarily concerned with words. lent motto for philosophy.
Words are believed to embody con- Another essay by Austin, A Plea for
cepts at best. For the most part, tradi- Excuses, is widely regarded as a
tional philosophers distrusted words, prime example of OLP at work. By
judging them misleading representa- carefully teasing out the different uses
tions of the concepts behind them. of the word excuse (which excul-
Recall the Socratic practice, illus- pates the doer of an action), Austin
trated in several of Platos Dialogues, distinguishes it from justification
of insisting that his interlocutor pro- (which, by contrast, absolves, as it
vide a definition of, say, piety, instead were, the action itself of any imputa-
of pointing to examples of pious per- tion of wrong-doing). This essay also
sons. The moral is that true under- highlights what may be seen as yet
standing comes from pure conceptual another hallmark of OLP deflecting
analysis which is what a definition is the focus from the naming of an act
all about. In Socrates view, examples (along with the hypostatisation that it
give the false impression that one has invariably involves) to the more mun-
got to grips with the concepts behind dane doing of the act or, simply put,
them. the action itself. This idea found its
Austins attitude to this time- full expression in How to Do Things
honoured practice among philoso- with Words (1962a), undoubtedly
phers was eloquently expressed in a Austins most famous work. Before
paper entitled Are there any a priori proceeding any further, it is important
concepts?, originally presented in to comment on the title of the book,
1939 before the Aristotelian Society. In originally presented as a series of
it Austin surprised his audience by twelve lectures presented at the Uni-
arguing that he had no idea of what versity of Harvard in 1955 under the
that question meant because he did not title Words and Deeds and published
know what concepts were to begin posthumously. It has been suggested
with. So the question of concepts being that Austin chose that title somewhat
a priori or a posteriori simply did not lightheartedly after Dale Carnegies
arise. On this question and on many bestselling How to Win Friends and
others, Austin was an Aristotelian to Influence People. In fact, many an
151
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
Austin reader has a rather difficult expected answer would have it, a
time coming to terms with what is best barn. Austin thus challenges what
described as his blithe irreverence for may be described as a mainstay of Pla-
the sober, lofty style that one typically tonic realism, namely, the idea that
associates with philosophy, and his epistemology can only play second
use of a thoroughly colloquial style. fiddle to ontology or, to put it more
But it is important to realise that simply, what there is can by no means
Austin is making an important philo- be affected by what one comes to
sophical point here (Rajagopalan know about it.
2000a). The performative view of language
In How to Do Things with Words thus has important things to say in
Austin argued that a sentence such as respect of what has, from time imme-
The cat is on the mat, which has long morial, been the philosophers Holy
been seen as a declarative (or, consta- Grail: the concept of truth. P. F. Straw-
tive as he calls it) and hence capable son advanced what is referred to as
of being judged true or false, is actu- the performative theory of truth
ally a performative* which cannot according to which truth is not some-
be judged true or false but only happy thing to be approached solely with the
or otherwise, depending on the cir- tools of the trade available in philoso-
cumstances in which it is uttered or phy in its conventional sense, but
performed. Thus was launched the something invariably mediated by
idea that speaking a language is per- language. Truth claims, in other
forming a series of acts. This seminal words, take precedence over truth
idea has inspired a number of scholars ipsis. To call something true is to per-
from a number of diverse disciplines form the speech act of endorsing it or
including linguistics, psychology, giving it ones stamp of approval.
anthropology, sociology, and even Historians of philosophy often treat
such unlikely fields as economics. OLP as a chapter in the unfinished
A discussion of Austins legacy book of analytic philosophy but the
would be incomplete without a men- point is debatable. Both the later
tion of his book Sense and Sensibilia Wittgenstein and Austin produced
(1962b) (the echo of Jane Austens cel- immense challenges to what was the
ebrated novel is unmistakable here). established dogma in philosophy. Per-
Austin takes on the fashionable haps the best proof of the radical
approach to the analysis of perception nature of their philosophical positions
in terms of sense data* and proceeds is the publication in 1959 of a book by
to deconstruct the so-called argument Ernest Gellner entitled Words and
from illusion. For instance, he says, Things: An Examination of, and an
the right answer to the question as to Attack on, Linguistic Philosophy.
what it is that you actually see, posed The book even carried a laudatory
apropos of a church camouflaged so preface by Bertrand Russell in which
as to look like a barn, is precisely what he lamented that his former pupil
that description says, namely, a Wittgenstein seemed to have taken a
church camouflaged so as to look like holiday from serious intellectual activ-
a barn and not, as the traditionally ity, meaning thereby that he considered
152
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
153
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
154
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922/1961). Trac-
tatus Logico-Philosophicus. London:
PERFORMATIVE
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/1968). Philo- A description of utterances, sentences
sophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil and speech acts the use of which is
Blackwell. meant to create facts in addition to the
fact of one of them having been used.
Further reading Often, the appearance of hereby
Butler, Judith (1997). Excitable Speech: A marks the performative nature of the
Politics of the Performative. New York: expression, as in Master Little John is
Routledge. hereby created Sheriff of Nottingham
Hacking, Ian (1975). Why Does Language (Robin Hood).
Matter to Philosophy? Cambridge:
See also: Speech Act Theory
Cambridge University Press.
Key Thinkers: Austin, J. L.; Searle,
Lakoff, George (1987). Women, Fire and
John
Dangerous Things: What Categories
Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: Uni- For a long period, philosophers of lan-
versity of Chicago Press. guage and logicians of natural lan-
McCloskey, Deirdre (1985). The Applied guage were interested in sentences the
Theory of Price. Second edition. New utterance of which in appropriate
York: Macmillan. contexts expresses propositions that
Rajagopalan, Kanavillil (2000a). Austins are either true or false, for example,
humorous style of philosophical dis- Shakespeare is the author of Romeo
course in light of Schrempps interpreta- and Juliet or All ravens are white. It
tion of Orings incongruity theory of was always clear that not all sentences
humor. Humor: An International Jour- are of that type, for example English
nal of Humor Research 13 (3): 287311. sentences in the interrogative or the
Rajagopalan, Kanavillil (2000b). On imperative. It was J. L. Austin (1961)
Searle [on Austin] on language. who drew attention to sentences of a
Language and Communication 20 (4): seemingly different type that are quite
34791. commonly used, the performatives.
Rajagopalan, Kanavillil (2004a). John The leading intuition underlying
Langshaw Austin. In Philipp Strazny the distinction between propositional
(ed.) (2004), Encyclopedia of Linguistics. utterances and performative ones is
New York: Fitzroy Dearborn. 98100. that in the former case the story of
Rajagopalan, Kanavillil (2004b). John the utterance, as commonly intended,
Searle. In Philipp Strazny (ed.) (2004), conveyed and understood, is that of
Encyclopedia of Linguistics. New York: presenting a given fact about the state
Fitzroy Dearborn. 9368. of affairs, while in the latter case the
Rosch, Eleanor and Barbara B. Lloyd (eds) story involves some additional ele-
(1978). Cognition and Categorization. ment that creates a new fact. Thus sin-
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum cerely saying The door is open is
Associates. describing what the speaker takes
to be a fact about the door, under
Kanavillil Rajagopalan the circumstances of utterance, while
155
PHONEME
156
POLITENESS
157
POLITENESS
with several studies focusing on the endearment terms and in-group lan-
realisation of politeness in different guage), and negative face satisfied
cultures. through avoidance of contact (as sig-
nalled through for example, ques-
See also: Implicature; Speech Act
tioning and hedging). These two
Theory; Conversation Analysis
aspects of face allow for a four-way
Key Thinkers: Grice, H. P.; Searle,
classification of speech acts into acts
John
that inherently threaten the speakers
The importance of politeness as a or the hearers positive or negative
factor motivating particular turns of face. Prior to performing an act x that
phrase was acknowledged early on by inherently threatens face, known as a
linguists such as Charles Bally and face threatening act or FTA, the
Otto Jespersen. Later, it was also speaker assesses the weightiness of
acknowledged by H. P. Grice (1967) the threat using the formula
and John Searle (1975), who associ- Wx=D(S,H)+P(H,S)+Rx. In this for-
ated it with departures from rational mula, D(S,H) stands for the distance
efficiency and with indirectness, between the speaker and the hearer, a
respectively. However, it was not until symmetric measure of familiarity or
the 1970s with Robin Lakoffs work similarity between them; P(H,S) is the
on the rules of politeness (1973) and, power of the hearer over the speaker,
most notably, the publication of Pene- an asymmetric measure of the amount
lope Brown and Stephen Levinsons of control the hearer can exercise over
essay Politeness: Universals in Lan- the speaker; and Rx is the ranking, or
guage Usage (1978) that the inte- seriousness, of the imposition entailed
gration of politeness into existing by x in the culture in question. The
theoretical frameworks became a seri- sum of these three sociological values
ous theoretical concern. A major con- guides the speakers choice among five
tribution of Brown and Levinson lay strategies for the realisation of FTAs,
in proposing the notion of face, ranging from Bald on record (Wx is
inspired by Ervine Goffmans work on negligible), to Dont do the FTA (Wx
ritual aspects of everyday exchanges, is very high) (see Figure 4). The bulk
as the unifying principle underlying of Brown and Levinsons essay is ded-
the expression of politeness through icated to cataloguing the linguistic
language. expressions that may realise the first
Brown and Levinson distinguish four strategies (since the last one
two aspects of face: positive face results in silence), which they illus-
refers to the desire to be liked and trate with examples from English,
approved of, while negative face cor- Tamil (a Dravidian language) and
responds to the wish for privacy and Tzeltal (a Mayan language).
freedom from imposition. The two It is hard to overestimate the impact
aspects of face may thus be viewed as of Brown and Levinsons model to
pulling in opposite directions, with field of politeness studies. Integrat-
positive face promoting sociability ing politeness with anthropological
and contact with others (as signalled, notions such as face, as well as the the-
for example, through, the use of oretical frameworks of implicature*
158
POLITENESS
Lesser
Greater
Figure 4 Strategies for performing FTAs (Brown and Levinson 1987: 60)
and Speech Act Theory*, their work and surrounding social conventions
has been instrumental in shaping our (an aspect of discernment) with con-
thinking about how human dyadic comitant over-emphasising of individ-
relationships are reflected in, and con- ual rationality (also termed volition);
stituted through, language. Moreover, and the universal applicability of their
their comprehensive analysis of field- claims.
work data has inspired a multitude of More recently, and in tandem with
articles and books exploring politeness the challenging of Gricean and Sear-
phenomena in a variety of languages lean accounts of meaning as not
and cultures, often using the data col- flexible enough to account for the
lection method of Discourse Comple- ongoing co-construction of meaning
tion Tests (DCTs). Nevertheless, these by participants in interaction, a new
works have also produced criticisms set of concerns focusing on social
and refinements of Brown and Levin- theoretic aspects of politeness and
sons model. Some of the most impor- favouring a more holistic approach to
tant ones concern the definition of face politeness phenomena have emerged.
and prioritising of negative over posi- Responding to a paradigm shift
tive aspects; their focus on face threat- within politeness studies, recent stud-
ening acts to the exclusion of face ies distinguish between first-order
enhancing/boosting acts; the defini- politeness (Politeness1), correspon-
tions and adequacy of the three socio- ding to participants own definitions
logical variables and their assumed and perceptions of politeness in inter-
independence; the association of action, and second-order politeness
politeness with degree of indirectness; (Politeness2), corresponding to the
the nature and content of politeness technical definition of politeness
implicatures; the (inscrutable) role of by researchers, building on, for exam-
silence in their model; the little atten- ple, anthropological notions such
tion paid to the role of the audience as face. Although researchers do not
159
POLITENESS
necessarily agree on which of the two this debate. In other words, the fre-
should be the focus of scholarly quent, contextually-conditioned asso-
analysis, the distinction between ciation of a particular perlocutionary
Politeness1 and Politeness2 has sev- effect with a particular expression in
eral important consequences, includ- corpus data, if such association can be
ing the possibility of finer gradation established, provides an empirically
between behaviour that is merely ade- verifiable baseline as to what consti-
quate (now termed politic), and tutes the unmarked case, and an
behaviour that goes beyond that (now analyst-independent vantage point
termed polite), with behaviour that from which to locate and analyse var-
is inappropriate falling at either end ious cases as marked.
of a continuum that ranges from Politeness is neither inherent in lin-
over-polite to impolite. In this way, guistic forms in isolation from their
the question of the scope of a theory context of utterance (it is not a matter
of politeness is also raised, with impo- of structure), nor does it reside
liteness/rudeness increasingly attract- (wholly) in the speakers intention,
ing scholarly attention. independently of its recognition by the
At the level of methodology, the hearer (it is not a matter of agency).
focus has shifted from isolated utter- Rather, politeness may be viewed as
ances to longer chunks of discourse, the mutual constitution of face by par-
which are often analysed using con- ticipants in an exchange, which is
versation-analytic tools. Rather than greatly facilitated by their partaking
aiming at providing an inventory of of similar societal norms what may
devices, either lexical or structural, by be described in terms drawing on
which politeness is expressed, as Bourdieu as their having developed
in earlier studies, emphasis is now homologous habitus. Approaches to
placed on the utterance situation as a politeness have thus increasingly
whole, including the addressees turned to social-theoretic notions,
reception of the speakers utterance, such as habitus and communities of
prosodic aspects, and any paralinguis- practice, to analyse the contribution
tic cues available. The use of recorded of language in constructing, maintain-
conversational data is paramount in ing and endangering good social rela-
this respect. Further to the qualitative tionships.
analysis of these data, the value of
their quantitative analysis is also Primary sources
increasingly acknowledged. Such Brown, Penelope and Stephen Levinson
quantitative analysis presupposes the (1978). Politeness: universals in lan-
availability of large conversational guage usage. In Goody, E. (ed.), Ques-
corpora*, in which regularities of tions and Politeness: Strategies in Social
usage (or norms) may be investigated. Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge
While the existence of such norms, University Press. 56324. Reprinted as
and hence their value as analytic tools, Brown, Penelope and Stephen Levinson,
have been brought into question, (1987) Politeness: Some Universals in
quantitative analysis of conversa- Language Usage. Cambridge: Cam-
tional corpora may hold the key to bridge University Press.
160
Lakoff, Robin (1973). The logic of polite-
ness; or minding your ps and qs. In
POLITICAL
Papers from the Ninth Regional CORRECTNESS
Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Soci-
ety. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Soci- In its most general sense the term
ety. 292305. political correctness refers to an indi-
Leech, Geoffrey (1983). Principles of viduals or groups conscious avoid-
Pragmatics. London: Longman. ance of linguistic terms associated
principally with race, ethnicity,
Further reading nationality, gender, religious belief
Bousfield, Derek and Miriam Locher (eds) system and sexual orientation that are
(2007). Impoliteness in Language. perceived to be pejorative or at any
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. rate to have the potential to cause
Eelen, Gino (2001). A Critique of Polite- offence to others. A more specialised
ness Theories. Manchester: St Jerome. sense refers to an uncritical adherence
Grice, Herbert Paul (1967). Logic and to and advocacy of a particular polit-
conversation. William James Lectures, ical credo, such as Marxism.
Harvard University typescript. In P. Cole
See also: Conversation Analysis;
and J. Morgan (eds) (1975), Syntax and
(Critical) Discourse Analysis;
Semantics. Vol. III: Speech Acts. New
Feminism; Metaphor; Names;
York: Academic Press. 4158. Reprinted
Politeness
in Grice, H. P. (1989), Studies in the Way
Key Thinkers: Cameron, Deborah;
of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Milroy, Lesley; Tannen, Deborah;
University Press. 2240.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee
Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Catherine (2005).
La Politesse dans le discours en interac- The term political correctness origi-
tion. In C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni. Le Dis- nated on American campuses among
cours en Interaction. Paris: Colin. New Left activists in the 1960s and
187284. 1970s, when it was used primarily in
Searle, John (1975). Indirect speech acts. connection with feminist criticisms of
In P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), syntax perceived sexism in language. Nowa-
and Semantics. Vol. III: Speech Acts. days the term is used mainly by critics
New York: Academic Press. 5982. of proposed linguistic and social
Terkourafi, Marina (2005). Beyond the reforms and is therefore almost exclu-
micro-level in politeness research, Jour- sively pejorative. Opponents of politi-
nal of Politeness Research Vol. 1:2, cal correctness claim that is is overly
23762. concerned with trivial linguistic pre-
Watts, Richard (2003). Politeness. Cam- scriptivism. Those on the other side of
bridge: Cambridge University Press. the debate draw on a form of weak
Watts, Richard, Sachiko Ide and Konrad Whorfianism to claim that language
Ehlich (eds) (2005). Politeness in Lan- influences perception, therefore that
guage. Second edition. Berlin: Mouton linguistic change is a necessary pre-
de Gruyter. cursor to changing social attitudes.
While practically all language users
Marina Terkourafi observe the conventions prohibiting
161
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
the public use of taboo forms, the forms of legislation seeking to pro-
degree of sanction attached to individ- scribe the public use of offensive lan-
ual words or phrases in the social guage. Since 2000 extensions to
domains mentioned above is highly existing linguistic legislation have
fluid, such that terms considered been made in the United Kingdom, for
acceptable at a particular place or time example, ostensibly in the interests of
may quickly become stigmatised if protecting religious minorities from
they are considered insufficiently persecution in the aftermath of the
politically correct or PC by one or events of 11 September 2001. The
more politically or economically influ- Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006
ential groups. Awareness of the often specifies that it will be an offence to
serious consequences of deliberately incite (or stir up) hatred against a
or accidentally flouting the conven- person on the grounds of his or her
tions of politically correct language religion, by prohibiting threatening
have strongly influenced linguistic words and the display of any written
habits at almost all levels of society in material which is threatening if the
English-speaking countries, perhaps intention by so doing is to stir up reli-
most particularly in the United States, gious hatred.
where a high degree of sensitivity to Resistance to the introduction of
certain terms perceived to betray racist such measures takes several forms.
attitudes has resulted in the sacking of Key among these are the holding up of
several high-profile public figures. For PC language to public ridicule, for
example, the use of the word coon by example James Finn Garners series of
American radio talk-show host Dave politically correct stories, and the
Lenihan in an item about US Secretary appropriation (and thereby subver-
of State Condoleezza Rice broadcast sion) of non-PC terms such as
in 2006 was apparently accidental (he queen and nigger by the gay and the
claims to have intended to say coup), black communities, respectively.
while the previous year Las Vegas TV
weatherman Rob Blairs alleged use of Primary works
the same form, supposedly substituted Cameron, Deborah (1995). Verbal
for King in the phrase Martin Luther Hygiene. London: Routledge.
King Junior Day, could plausibly Dunant, Sarah (1995). The War of the
have resulted from an anticipatory Words: The Political Correctness
speech error. Both Lenihan and Blair Debate. London: Virago.
were nonetheless dismissed from their
posts almost immediately. In 1999 Further reading
vociferous objections to the contextu- Fairclough, Norman (2003). Political cor-
ally valid use in a private meeting of rectness: the politics of culture and lan-
the word niggardly by David guage. Discourse and Society Vol. 14:1,
Howard, an aide to the mayor 1728.
of Washington DC, led to Howards Holborow, Marnie (1999). The Politics of
resignation. English. London: Sage.
Political correctness is tightly
bound to censorship, and to other Dominic Watt
162
PORT-ROYAL LOGIC modifications from the scholastic
studies. Propositions* are understood
to be complexes formed by acts of will
Colloquial name for La Logique ou (judgement) that combine a subject
lArt de Penser (Logic or the Art of idea with a predicate idea, with the
Thinking) written by Antoine Arnauld verb carrying affirmative force; a neg-
and Pierre Nicole but published ative judgement is the converse, where
anonymously in 1662 (the fifth edi- the predicate is separated from the
tion was published in 1683). The subject. The Logic falls prey here to
Logic elaborated a traditional syllo- not being able to distinguish a propo-
gistic logic wedded to a Cartesian sition from an attitude towards it. The
epistemology and metaphysics. The reasoning, however, brings into relief
work also contains many insights in the unity problem that was to bedevil
natural language syntax that were not Bertrand Russell.
surpassed until the work of Noam The Logic also distinguishes
Chomsky in the mid-twentieth cen- between explicating and determining
tury. subordinate propositions (relative
clauses). For example, The invisible
See also: Analytic/Synthetic;
God created the visible universe can
Empiricism/Rationalism; Logic;
be analysed as The God who is invis-
Propositional Attitudes;
ible created the universe which is visi-
Transformational-Generative
ble, where the first relative clause
Grammar
explicates its subject, and the second
Key Thinkers: Aristotle; Arnauld,
further determines its subject. This
Antoine; Chomsky, Noam;
development was perhaps the first
Descartes, Ren; Frege, Gottlob;
formal account of the analytic/syn-
Russell, Bertrand
thetic* distinction.
With its companion, Grammaire The Logic fell into neglect after the
Gnrale et Raisonne de Port-Royal rise of modern function-argument
(published by Arnauld and Claude logic and the prevailing behav-
Lancelot in 1660), the Logic seeks iourism* empiricism* in the first part
to show that the new Cartesian of the twentieth century. In the mid-
philosophy of ideas provides a gen- 1960s, however, Chomsky argued
eral account of judgement and rea- that the Port-Royal approach was the
soning and a sound basis for a high point of a Cartesian first cogni-
demarcation of good and bad tive revolution, in its search for
arguments. It further provides many underlying mental structures behind
detailed analyses of how linguistic the surface of language. Although
surface forms systematically mis- Chomskys historical remarks have
match the complex combination of been broadly misconstrued, they did
ideas they express. stimulate fresh interest in Port-Royal
Following Aristotle, the Logic and both the Logic and Grammar are
categorises judgements in terms of now recognised as the forerunners of
quantity and quality, and adopts much that is characteristic in modern
the standard syllogistic forms with linguistic analysis.
163
POSSIBLE WORD SEMANTICS
164
POSSIBLE WORLD SEMANTICS
the way the world may look depend- world what then is the meaning of a
ing on the choices made by John; in the false sentence? Can a lack of corre-
history of the universe it may seem spondence be the meaning of a sen-
insignificant what John chose to do, tence? Possible world semantics may
but in the context of what linguistic not have a clear answer to this.
expressions and especially sen- Another problem is the question
tences mean, it may be crucial. about the relation between words and
Taking (1) as an ordinary life utter- the world, in that we may ask: what
ance, it is expected to have an inherent world? It seems evident that we can
meaning more or less evident to the talk directly about things in our envi-
interlocutors engaged in a conversa- ronment because we can observe them
tion, and in modern philosophical while talking. In general we also feel
semantics this is supposed to be estab- fairly sure that our environment is rel-
lished by its truth value, that is, atively stable: for instance, that when
whether it is true or false according to we get up in the morning, our home
its truth conditions. This in turn is the will look the way it looked when we
way the world looks like in the cir- went to bed. We may realise that the
cumstances surrounding Johns buying building may have burned down over
a car or not. night, but only as a hypothetical pos-
So far one might accept the claim sibility. Philosophers have spent much
that the meaning of sentences has to time debating the fact that we think
do with the relation between the we know, and can talk about, things
words uttered and the world, but we do not observe while talking, and
there are two problems here. One is basically we cannot be totally sure
that it may not be evident how the that we do know. The fact that we
meaning of sentences is identical with nevertheless maintain that we actually
the question of whether they are true do know is based on our experience
or false. Intuitively one may think that and the belief that our experience is
in order to decide the truth value (rel- reliable. Therefore one of our linguis-
ative to a specific state of affairs) of a tic skills affiliated with our mental
sentence, one has to understand it, faculty and our memory is the abil-
and to understand it is to know its ity of displacement, namely that we
meaning. But, it is claimed, to know can talk about things that are not
its meaning is to know its truth value present, or even things we have never
based on its truth conditions, which it experienced anything about, like
follows is the same thing as its mean- Napoleon, the far side of the moon or
ing. There seems to be a kind of circu- Jack the Ripper. This, too, is one of the
larity predicament as an immanent issues for possible world semantics. In
part of truth-value semantics, and this the special and technical framework
is one of the problems possible world of formal logic, possible world seman-
semantics tries to solve. A further tics will also comprise a kind of modal
complication is the following ques- logic, the modality* of which is so-
tion: if meaning is truth conditions called alethic modality, which deals
that is, there is a kind of correspon- with propositions expressing what is
dence between a sentence and the possible versus what is necessary.
165
POSSIBLE WORLD SEMANTICS
166
POSSIBLE WORLD SEMANTICS
but the trouble with such sentences is (12) if the Big Bang initiated the
the fact that their truth value is not universe [antecedent] then it will
given by the meanings (reference of expand forever [consequent]
the subject and extension of the
predicate) of their parts, as is the and adding the alethic expression it is
case with the previously mentioned possible that as a prefix. This can be
subject-predicate sentences. Hence formalised, first, as
(7) and (8) cannot be used as truth-
functional conjuncts in the same way. (13) p q
This other kind of logic may be
expressed in a formal and symbolised where p is the antecedent and q the
language (so-called alethic formal consequent in (12) and, second, as
logic) using special logical operators.
Thus in (9) (14) ( p q) = it is possible that (12).
167
POSSIBLE WORLD SEMANTICS
168
POSSIBLE WORLD SEMANTICS
169
POSTSTRUCTURALISM entities themselves are not positively
defined, but identified at best as mere
place-holders. This has the conse-
Poststructuralism is an outgrowth of quence that all structures are by defi-
structuralism* It is a method of analy- nition hermetically closed unto
sis which had a tremendous impact in themselves. It is only on this condition
the last decades of the twentieth cen- that a structure can be regarded as
tury on work done in the fields of lin- composed of pure negativities. To put
guistics, anthropology, psychology, it differently, the structurality of a
literary criticism and elsewhere. given structure is conditional upon the
Arguably, it remains a potent force to entire space having been taken up by
reckon with in the early twenty-first binary relations: the forceful removal
century, though it has been at the of any entity will automatically trigger
centre of intense and often acrimo- a rearrangement of the remaining
nious debates. entities. This in turn means that all
structures are fully integrated, each
See also: Signs and Semiotics;
with respect to itself, and autonomous
Structuralism; Deconstruction
with respect to other structures.
Key Thinkers: Bourdieu, Pierre;
Structuralism was a huge success as
Derrida, Jacques; Lacan, Jacques;
an idea in the early decades of the
Saussure, Ferdinand de
twentieth century and it held sway
Like so many other terms that take the over several academic disciplines well
prefix post-, poststructuralism is a into the second half of that century. It
complex notion. Part of the difficulty revolutionised linguistics and set it
in getting to grips with the term has to apart from philology and historical
do with just how one is supposed to linguistics, which dominated the disci-
view its relation to structuralism. In pline in the nineteenth century. In fact
one sense, the term does imply that it the neat separation between syn-
regards structuralism as a thing of the chrony and diachrony that Ferdinand
past (as in post-World War Two de Saussure advocated was but a
period). But equally it also captures straightforward consequence of the
the idea that it is an offshoot of struc- requirement that a structure, in order
turalism or, alternatively, it is a move- to function the way it was required to,
ment that draws its strength from the had to be closed unto itself. But it soon
legacy of structuralism (as in post- became clear that this was at odds
graduate student). with the further requirement that a
In other words, to understand what structure also had to be resilient, so as
poststructuralism is about, one needs to permit the rearrangement of its
to have some idea of what constitutes internal units in order to accommo-
structuralism. Structuralism is a mode date eventual structural changes.
of inquiry which looks at the phe- From a structuralist point of view, all
nomena under its scrutiny as made up changes were, so to speak, sudden and
solely of the relations among the enti- cataclysmic and, while keeping the
ties in question, rather than those enti- overall structure intact, would result
ties themselves. In other words, the in an internal rearrangement of the
170
POSTSTRUCTURALISM
171
POSTSTRUCTURALISM
This new subject is one who has been notion of habitus. In Bourdieus
empowered to act on his/her own and view, social agents develop, over a
is endowed with agency. Once the period of time, a feel for the game
presence of an agent who is in a posi- which is a kind of eminently practical
tion to subvert the order of things, and bodily knowledge.
thwarting it from within, is recog- Poststructuralism is closely tied to
nised, it is but a short step to reject the and often confused with postmod-
existence of all pre-ordained, founda- ernism. While the two indeed share
tionalist, essentialist and totalising many common concerns, it is impor-
conceptual schemes. tant to bear in mind that the latter is
Michel Foucault played an impor- concerned to critique, in a way the
tant role in the development of post- former is not, the Enlightenment proj-
structuralism. Having been a die-hard ect and the sheer arrogance of those
structuralist himself, Foucault grew who claimed to be fighting the battle
increasingly discontented with two of of Reason against Irrationality.
structuralisms key assumptions. On Poststructuralism, alongside post-
the one hand, while recognising the modernism, opens up an entirely
pervasiveness of structures in many of new set of possibilities for thinking
human activities, Foucault became about ethical issues. With the meta-
sceptical of the idea that structures narratives of foundationalist, essen-
invariably control and regulate the tialist and totalising discourse
human condition. On the other completely discredited, poststruc-
hand, he also came to recognise the turalism leaves us no option but that
inevitable situatedness of our gaze of regarding the path of ethics as an
and the impossibility of ever attaining exercise in tight-rope walking, with
a transcendental standpoint from no safety net in case a false step is
which to contemplate things. taken. In other words, it foregrounds
Freeing the subject of language the question of personal responsibil-
from the shackles of structurally ity. In the United Kingdom, a special-
imposed subjugation is key to a poli- ist group called Post-Structuralism
tics of identity. But then the escape and Radical Politics has been actively
from the prison-house of structure engaged in promoting discussion on
should not herald a return to liberal the political implications of poststruc-
individualism whereby the individ- turalism in all walks of life.
ual determines his/her own destiny
through the exercise of a series of Primary sources
rational choices. This is the central Belsey, Catherine (2002). Poststructural-
thrust of and moving impulse behind ism: A Very Short Introduction.
the work of Pierre Bourdieu. In his Oxford: Oxford University Press.
book Outline of a Theory of Practice Bourdieu, Pierre (1977). Outline of a
(1977) Bourdieu made a proposal for Theory of Practice. London: Cambridge
avoiding both the Scylla of the total University Press.
subjugation of the subject of language Derrida, Jacques (1966). Structure, sign,
and the Charybdis of navel-gazing and play in the discourse of the human
individualism, by putting forward the sciences. In Jacques Derrida (2001),
172
PRESUPPOSITION
173
PRESUPPOSITION
174
PRESUPPOSITION
175
PRESUPPOSITION
176
PRESUPPOSITION
Apart from these technical and epis- assume, and it may seem a little odd
temological questions, some issues to say that sentences are able to assume
concerning presuppositions are on the something, because a common-sense
borderline between such basically understanding might claim that only
philosophical problems and the daily people can assume. The same question
use of language. Some of them deal may arise when considering the theo-
with the formulaic or grammati- retical idea that a sentence like the
calised expressions associated with king of France is bald presupposes the
specific speech acts: sentence there exists a king of France,
because it would be counter-intuitive
(6) What did Jack the Ripper do? to think otherwise. This has led to the
suggestion that there are, at least, two
In (6) the wh-expression connected types of presupposition: one is a
with the fixed word order (and a cer- semantic notion dealt with in modern
tain prosodic contour) signifies the logic where scholars try to solve the
speech act of a question, and it pre- technical problems of formal lan-
supposes that Jack the Ripper did guages, and another is a pragmatic
something (cf. Lyons 1977: 597). This notion dealing with what people pre-
kind of presupposition is not indiffer- suppose in their discourse interactions.
ent to negation because the sentence: To contemplate this question is like
opening a Pandoras box in linguistics
(7) What did Jack the Ripper not do? and philosophy. As Levinson puts it,
there is more literature on presupposi-
presupposes that there was something tion than on almost any other topic in
that Jack the Ripper did not do. pragmatics (excepting perhaps speech
Another kind of presupposition (cf. acts) (1983: 167).
Lyons 1977: 599) is found in sen- In order to approach the subject we
tences expressing so-called proposi- may take the Italian-soup-in-small-
tional attitudes*, for example, plastic-bags scenario described above
sentences containing expressions like as an example. A main topic here will
think, believe, realise: be what are in general called presup-
position triggers. A presupposition
(8) The police realised that Jack the trigger is one or more words, or
Ripper had killed the woman aspects of surface structure in gen-
eral (Levinson 1983: 179) that gen-
In (8) it is a presupposition of the com- erate a relation of presupposition
pound sentence that Jack the Ripper between what is actually expressed
actually killed the woman and as for and what must be assumed. At face
the historical Jack the Ripper, of value only the word Italian seems to
whom little is known, a sentence like be common to the two utterances
(8) does not seem justified. thereby suggesting there is a connec-
As pointed out by Lyons (1977: tion between them. But this similarity
600), a pre-theoretical notion of pre- may elicit a rather large number of
supposition as a verb presuppose possible scenarios and it is in fact
means almost the same as the word deceptive. My wife and I may have
177
PRESUPPOSITION
any kind of fast food after her Italian be interpreted as a No, we should buy
classes. If, instead of fantasising, we no more soup. But this is, in a narrow
look at the details of what is being sense, not something presupposed. It
said, my utterance was Look, there is may belong to the normal state of
this special Italian soup in small plas- affairs in certain cultures or subcul-
tic bags, and this may be interpreted tures, but none of the words or other
as a man-and-wife convention for the surface aspects can, directly, trigger
speech act of a question: Should we such presuppositions. Only knowledge
buy some? Taken as a question, the about the family and a number of cir-
presupposition is either we buy some cumstantial facts may yield the infor-
or we dont buy some. In this case it mation that this has nothing to do with
is the unspoken but intended question a scenario where, for instance, the stu-
that triggers the presuppositional rela- dents of my wifes language class eat
tion in that the specific clause surface Italian soup every time they meet.
structure of questions the syntactic However, in a broad sense these
inversion and the prosody of ques- inferred assumptions may be called
tions produced by native speakers of presuppositions. Some scholars have
English will come to my wifes mind defended radical theories of pragmatic
when I paraphrase my intended ques- presupposition in which the key con-
tion as the declarative sentence I actu- cepts are appropriateness or felicity
ally utter. If this reading seems fair (Levinson 1983: 204) and mutual
enough, the logical response from my knowledge or common ground,
wife should be an answer implying meaning that a presupposition can be
either that we should or we should not appropriately used if it is assumed in
buy the soup-in-small-plastic-bags, the context that the propositions indi-
and it actually may be so. The sen- cated by the presupposition-triggers
tence My Italian language course has are true (Levinson 193: 205). The con-
no more classes may be paraphrased textual prerequisite is furthermore that
as My Italian course has stopped, this is known by the participants, and
and the verb stop is a so-called consequently what is not mutually
change-of-state verb triggering the known by them will not come up as
necessary presupposition(s) I have presuppositions because they are inap-
attended an Italian language course in propriate. In this framework the chain
the past and now I dont attend it any of inferences assumed in my conversa-
more because there are no more tional transactions with my wife on
classes. Italian soup may well be called pre-
In order to establish a connection suppositions, but one problem is just
between my question Do we buy or the criterion about mutual knowledge.
not buy? and the Italian classes, one When examining actual discourse it is
may speculate what my wifes absence fairly hard to make justified claims
or late home-coming has to do with about what people know as opposed
fast food and one only has to infer that to claims about what they say.
in this family fast food is on the menu At the core of theories on presup-
when the housewife is away or late, positions there are other difficulties,
and that my wifes response may boldly among them the problem of whether
178
PRIVATE LANGUAGE
179
PRIVATE LANGUAGE
Key Thinkers: Ayer, A. J.; Carnap, in approach and associated with John
Rudolf; Chomsky, Noam; Fodor, McDowell, takes the argument to be a
Jerry; Frege, Gottlob; Kant, principled declining of a justification
Immanuel; Kripke, Saul; Russell, of our normative activity, for the
Bertrand; Wittgenstein, Ludwig reason that any non-normative basis,
such as consensus, would never suffice
In the first half of the twentieth cen- to establish the kind of correctness
tury, the received understanding of a involved in meaning.
classical empiricist theory of language Wittgensteins argument has also
was that words are outward signs of surfaced in cognitive science. Jerry
private states (ideas or images). Such a Fodor and Noam Chomsky have
position found its contemporary argued that meaning, linguistic and
advocates in Bertrand Russell, Rudolf non-linguistic, has an empirical basis
Carnap and A. J. Ayer. Arguably fol- in an unconscious system of rules that
lowing Immanuel Kant and Gottlob determine interpretation as opposed
Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein argued to normatively governing it. They
that such an essentially private lan- defend this approach against the pri-
guage was impossible and, therefore, vate language argument by pointing
the empiricist conception of meaning out that the rules at issue are not
is confused. Although the argument essentially private, but simply not
has been interpreted in many different available to first person conscious
ways, its basic structure is as follows. access; ultimately, whether there are
(1) Rule following is constitutive of such rules or not is an empirical issue
competent language use. (2) Rule fol- that cannot be a priori determined.
lowing is a normative activity that is,
there are essential conditions on Primary sources
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophi-
whether one is following the rules cor-
cal Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
rectly or not. (3) If linguistic meaning
Kripke, Saul (1984). Wittgenstein on
is private, then the agent must be fol-
Rules and Private Language. Oxford:
lowing private rules. (4) If the rules
Blackwell.
are private, then there is no difference
McDowell, John (1984). Wittgenstein
between following the rules correctly
on following a rule. Synthese 58 (3):
or not; whatever seems right will be
32564.
right. (5) Therefore, there can be no
Fodor, Jerry (1975). The Language of
such private language.
Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
In general terms there are two
University Press.
schools of thought on the argument.
Chomsky, Noam (1986). Knowledge of
One school, most prominently repre-
Language. Westport: Praeger.
sented by Saul Kripke, views the
argument as an attempt to show Further reading
that linguistic meaning is essentially Miller, Alexander, and Crispin Wright
public, in that only a public check (eds) (2002). Rule-Following and
by other speakers could establish Meaning. London: Acumen.
whether one is following the rules or
not. Another school, more diagnostic John Collins
180
PROPOSITIONAL (2)
a. Jane believes that Fido is barking.
ATTITUDES b. Fido exists.
c. There is something that Jane
A propositional attitude is what some- believes is barking.
one is described as having by a propo-
sitional attitude report: for example, Like other ordinary relational claims,
by an utterance of Jane believes that (1a) has existential import that (2a)
Fido is barking or Henry wishes his and other attitude reports seem to
cat would have kittens. The subtle lack. In particular, (1a) entails both
semantics and pragmatics of proposi- (1b) and (1c) while (2a) apparently
tional attitude reports, as well as the entails neither (2b) nor (2c). After all,
role of propositional attitudes them- Jane could have the belief reported in
selves in language use, have made (2a) even if Fido is a figment of her
them one of the more controversial imagination, contrary to (2b); and in
topics in linguistics. that case, contrary to (2c), nothing
would have the property of being
See also: Compositionality;
believed by Jane to be barking, for if
Definite Descriptions;
there were, that thing would be Fido,
Descriptivism; Intentionality;
and there is no Fido.
Propositions; Sense/Reference
Another difference relates to the
Key Thinkers: Frege, Gottlob;
law of identity. This law, compelling
Kripke, Saul; Quine, W. V. O.;
in the context of ordinary relations, is
Russell, Bertrand
less plausible in the context of attitude
A standard route into the topic of reports. Thus, suppose Fido is Rex.
propositional attitudes begins with This identity and (1a) could not both
the observation that propositional be true without (1d) also being true. In
attitude reports differ from ordinary contrast, the identity and (2a) do not
relational claims. On the face of it, entail (2d). After all, Jane may not
for Jane to believe that Fido is realise that Fido and Rex are one and
barking is for her to bear a two-place the same dog.
relation to the proposition that
Fido is barking just as for her to (1)
stroke Fido is for her to bear a two- a. Jane strokes Fido.
place stroking relation to the dog d. Jane strokes Rex.
Fido. This surface similarity is (2)
deceptive. a. Jane believes that Fido is barking.
One difference can be illustrated by d. Jane believes that Rex is barking.
comparing (1) with (2):
These two distinctive features of
(1) propositional attitude reports
a. Jane strokes Fido. apparent lack of existential import
b. Fido exists. and apparent substitution failure
c. There is something that Jane give rise to a range of semantic puz-
stroked. zles. Any solution to these depends on
181
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
(3) a does not exist, therefore not . . . a The problem is that any compositional
... derivation of (5a) using (5b) seems to
license a parallel derivation of the ille-
For example, if Saladin never existed, gitimate (6a) from (6b). Given that
it follows that Saladin could not have Fido is Rex, (6b) follows from (5b), and
fought Richard the Lionheart. But the the derivation of (6a) from (6b) could
inference appears to fail when (3) is then mimic that of (5a) from (5b). Yet
Fido does not exist, therefore Jane (6a) seems wrong: Janes belief that
does not believe that Fido is barking. Fido is barking is not enough to make
Any theory of negative existentials the sentence Jane believes that Rex is
therefore has an additional burden: to barking true, even if Rex is Fido.
explain exceptions to (3) thrown up
by propositional attitude reports. (6)
The second feature, apparent sub- a. Jane believes that Rex is barking is
stitution failure, threatens the compo- true iff Jane believes that Fido is
sitionality thesis, a cornerstone of barking.
most approaches to formal semantics. b. Rex refers to x iff x is Fido.
In one form, this thesis holds that the
referential or truth conditional prop- Notice that this problem does not
erties of complex expressions are a arise for Rex is a dog, which is true
function of the referential or truth if Fido is a dog and Rex is Fido.
182
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
These puzzles may seem like mere Since the elements of propositions are
technical challenges, but their actual entities, the referents of the
endurance suggests otherwise. What words used, substituting co-referring
follows is a summary of two promi- expressions will alter neither the iden-
nent theories of propositions, stressing tity of the proposition expressed nor,
how each confronts the puzzle of therefore, the truth value of the sen-
apparent substitution failure. Both the- tence. Russellians must explain the
ories treat propositions as structured appearance of substitution failure in
complexes of elements, but they dis- propositional attitude reports with-
agree on the nature of these elements. out granting that this appearance is
Followers of Bertrand Russell genuine.
assume that propositions are struc- Before 1972 the standard way was
tured complexes of real-world Russells own. Ordinary names* like
entities. Sentences map onto the Fido and Rex are not in fact refer-
propositions they express via a map- ring expressions at all, he said. They
ping that takes individual words onto are really disguised definite descrip-
the real-world entities they refer to. tions*, which have an internal struc-
The proposition expressed by a typi- ture of their own but no referents. The
cal utterance of (1a), for example, contrast between (2a) and (2d) does
would be (1e), the first element of not, therefore, constitute a case of
which is a two-place relation, and the changing truth value by substituting
second element of which is an ordered co-referring expressions.
pair consisting of Jane then Fido. In more detail, suppose Fido in
Janes idiolect is a disguised version of
(1) The dog I bought last year and Rex
e. <strokes, <Jane, Fido>> is a disguised version of The dog I ran
over two years ago. In that case, (2a)
Thus (1e), and hence (1a) itself, will be and (2d) would express the distinct
true just so long as the ordered pair propositions (2g) and (2h) respec-
satisfies the two-place relation. More tively (where can be read as roughly
generally, the truth value* of proposi- equivalent to for every, as exists
tions is determined compositionally and as entails; see the entry on
from its components. Logic for a fuller account of these
So (2a) expresses the proposition logical constants).
(2e), which breaks down further into
(2f). The simple proposition Jane pur- (2)
portedly believes is a component of g. <believes, <Jane, x(x is a dog I
the more complex proposition bought & y(y is a dog I bought
expressed by (2a) itself and is repre- x=y) & x is barking) >>
sented in (2f) as <barks, <Fido> . h. <believes, <Jane, x(x is a dog I ran
over & y(y is a dog I ran over
(2) x=y) & x is barking) >>
e. < believes, <Jane, that Fido is bark-
ing>> No actual dog is a component of
f. < believes, <Jane, <barks, <Fido>>> either proposition, so Fido or Rex
183
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
lack a shared referent, or indeed any But Fregeans have a ready explana-
referent. tion for exceptions such as (2a) and
Russells defence of Russellianism (2d): when a word occurs within the
fell out of favour after Saul Kripkes scope of a propositional attitude verb,
1972 criticisms of descriptivism about Fregeans say it refers to its customary
names. More recent Russellians (for sense, not its customary referent.
example, Salmon 1986) have instead Since Fido and Rex have distinct
tried to explain the appearance of sub- customary senses, the propositions
stitution failure as a pragmatic effect. expressed by (2a) and (2d) have dif-
While (1a) and (1d) express the same ferent components even after con-
Russellian proposition at the semantic version into Russellian propositions,
level, the small difference between and hence potentially different truth
them carries pragmatic significance values.
easily mistaken for a semantic differ- The most pressing question
ence. Fregeans must answer is: what is a
The second view of propositions, sense? If a sense is just a disguised
Fregeanism, is similar to Russellian- definite description, anti-descriptivist
ism save that the elements in a propo- objections to Russell carry over. Some
sition are not objects but perspectives take the sense of a word to be the
on, or ways of thinking about, or (to concept it expresses. But concepts are
use Gottlob Freges own terminology) often defined as components of pro-
modes of presentation of, objects. positions, and if the sense of Fido
The mapping from sentences onto the is unpacked merely as that compo-
propositions they express is therefore nent of a proposition which is
a function from a word onto, not an expressed by Fido , Freges solution
object, but a specific mode of presen- seems hollow. More substantial and
tation of an object. Frege calls this controversial theories of concepts are
function the words sense*. Two available, but at the very least
words, such as Fido and Rex (or Fregeans must address profound
George Orwell and Eric Blair), can questions in the philosophy of mind
have a common referent but distinct before they can claim to have solved
senses. For this reason, substituting the substitutivity puzzle.
one of the words for the other within To sum up, propositional attitude
a sentence will change the proposition reports appear to behave differently
expressed. It will not (normally) from sentences devoid of psychologi-
change the truth value, however. The cal attitude verbs. These differences
truth value of Fregean propositions is pose a challenge to semanticists. The
determined in the same way as Rus- compositionality thesis, in particular,
sellian ones, by referents rather than is difficult to defend in this context
modes of presentation; and Fregean without taking potentially controver-
propositions can be converted into sial stands on the nature of proposi-
Russellian propositions by replacing tions, a nature whose investigation
each perspective on an object with the belongs as much to the philosophy of
object itself. Substitution will there- mind as it does to the philosophy of
fore not (normally) affect truth value. language.
184
PROPOSITIONS
185
or expresses a wish. But at the same
time she/he refers to a certain person
PROTOTYPE
called Sam and expresses the predica-
tion smokes habitually with respect Prototype theory explains how people
to that person. In other words, the understand the meaning of a word by
reference and the predication are the reference to the best example of the
same in all four sentences, and thus object indicated by the word. This
the same proposition is made, regard- means that, for example, in identifying
less of their respective illocutionary an object as belonging to the category
acts. This is in opposition to mathe- of furniture, the human mind is geared
matical languages, where every to thinking in terms of chair, that is,
proposition is expressed in the form the prototype member of that cate-
of a statement. gory, rather than with the more mar-
Logical analysis based on proposi- ginal ones such as lamp or stove.
tions has had a major influence on
See also: Ambiguity/Vagueness;
semantic studies of natural languages.
Cognitivism; Intuition; Language
Although the theories are controver-
Games; Language of Thought
sial, they can lead to more advanced
Key Thinkers: Aristotle; Fodor,
studies in semantic linguistics, partic-
Jerry; Whorf, Benjamin Lee;
ularly with respect to sentence mean-
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
ing, and in artificial intelligence.
Every conceivable thing is in principle
Primary sources distinct from every other. In order for
Searle, John R. (1969). Speech Acts: An them to make sense, people group
Essay in the Philosophy of Language. together exemplars of the same kind
Cambridge: Cambridge University into categories. But how precisely the
Press. mind works in this respect is not
Thomason, Richmond H. (ed.) (1974). always clear. In the Aristotelian tradi-
Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of tion, categorisation is explained as the
Richard Montague. New Haven: Yale conjunction of necessary and suffi-
University Press. cient features. Hence a bird has to be
a winged creature as its necessary fea-
Further reading ture and possess a beak as its sufficient
Austin, John L. (1962). How to Do Things feature. All members of a category are
With Words. Oxford: Oxford Univer- thought to have an equal status. Once
sity Press. established, a category will separate
Kneale, William (1972). Propositions and entities that belong to it from those
truth in natural languages Mind 81: that do not. No ambiguity or varia-
22543. tion is allowed.
Tarski, Alfred (1956). Logics, Semantics In the 1970s Eleanor Rosch con-
Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to ducted a number of cognitive psycho-
1938. Trans. J. H. Woodger. Oxford: logical experiments on how people
Clarendon Press. operate with categories and how they
learn about things through them. Not
Jrg Strssler all members of a category turned out
186
PROTOTYPE
187
PROTOTYPE
are not the same as the cognitive about domestic cats and dogs as
representation itself. The difficulty typical pets, allowing for snakes and
comes from the role of prototype caimans as less common pets. But pet
Though intuitively a robin is the pro- fish creates some problems. It does
totypical bird, it cannot be used as a not matter whether the fish in ques-
unique criterion for being a bird. tion, usually a goldfish, is prototypical
Properties of some other birds are also fish or not, and it is not relevant either
taken into consideration. The ques- where in the scale of pets the goldfish
tion is which properties are to be stands. In fact the combination
included and which ones are to be between pet and fish here is no
ignored in other words, how far one longer understood in terms of the
can extend the category. While an prototypes of each category.
ostrich may be quite far removed from Prototypes are a mental construc-
a typical bird, it is still a bird, not a tion that helps us to understand the
birdlike creature the way a bat is. A world. This construction or model is
colour is no longer considered to be built upon an immense storage of
red as it moves towards being orange concepts that can be retrieved to
or purple. But where are the bound- combine with one another in order to
aries of these categories? Such cases form a model to represent reality in
show that there are no clear-cut the mind. One such powerful model
boundaries in other words, cate- is family resemblance, a notion that
gories are inherently fuzzy. goes back to Wittgenstein. This is
Furthermore, many words have dif- exemplified by the use of the word
ferent meanings, evoking different game. Although every game has
sets of membership. The word jail- some similarity with other games,
bird, for example, refers to a criminal there is no single feature that links
who is locked up behind bars like a them all. Instead, there is a compli-
canary and who may be persuaded to cated network of similarities overlap-
sing (confess) in order to get better ping and criss-crossing. There is
treatment. This shows that the word something that makes all members of
bird is associated not with a single a category resemble one another even
category, namely the avian category, if it cannot be said that they share a
but also with other categories, in this common set of properties. What hap-
case prisoner. Polysemy is the basis pens is that each member is linked
for metaphors*. The expression he is to the others by an intermediate
a fox to describe a cunning and sly member with which each is in close
person is an example where the meta- contact and thus shares some proper-
phorical use of the word fox gives it ties. Thus, schematically, it is possible
a new sense. But obviously slyness is that in a category ABC the members
not part of the ordinary sense of the A and C have nothing in common
word fox. and yet both are part of a family
In addition to the problems above, a simply because each is in contact with
combination of categories can pro- member B.
duce a more complex concept without As synthesised by John R. Taylor,
reference to prototypes. People talk the notion of prototype is very influen-
188
PSYCHOANALYSIS
189
PSYCHOANALYSIS
used to treat has shrunk since Freuds and a baseball. The interpreter puts
time, from encompassing psychosis, the two images together to arrive at
aphasia, schizophrenia and what the single word screwball, which as a
Freud and his contemporaries called signifier of Daffys daffiness partakes
hysteria, to being confined to the rel- of the meaning of neither screw nor
atively minor condition of neurosis ball. In order to arrive at this inter-
and associated personality disorders. pretation, the interpreter must per-
Yet psychoanalysis continues to have form a two-stage decoding: first he
currency as a tool of cultural critique. or she must translate each picture into
Freuds claim to importance in lin- a word a movement from symbol
guistics comes primarily through to signification and then translate
Chapter VI of The Interpretation of the individual words into a combina-
Dreams (1899), The Dream-Work. tion that is homophonically, but
According to Freud, the dream- not semantically, related to them a
work (the work in which the uncon- movement from signification to
scious mind of the dreamer engages in meaning. The dreamer, meanwhile,
order to create a dream) consists of has already performed the same
four stages: condensation, displace- sequence of operations as an encoding
ment, figurability and secondary revi- process, this constituting the dream-
sion. Condensation is the process work.
whereby a detailed and seemingly In later works Freud extends the
long dream can take place within a province of psychoanalysis as an inter-
very short amount of real time. pretive technique from dreams to
Displacement is the process of replac- other, more explicitly linguistic phe-
ing material the dreamer wishes to nomena, such as jokes and flashes of
repress by other elements which wit, and ultimately to the discourse of
apparently have a different meaning. the patient more generally. It is
Figurability is the process of turning this fact, that psychoanalysis takes
dream material into pictures most as its working material the discourse
dreams are pictorial, or are a combi- of the patient, that inspires Lacans
nation of pictures and language. And linguisticisation of Freud, famously
finally secondary revision is the claiming that the unconscious is
process of turning the dream into a structured as a language (Lacan 1972:
day-dream, of organising the mate- 188). According to Lacan, Freuds
rial so that it may be remembered as condensation corresponds to Roman
a coherent sequence. Jakobsons concept of metaphor*,
The first three of these processes, displacement corresponds to Jakob-
claims Freud, organise the dream into sons metonymy, while figurability
a series of rebuses. A rebus is a kind of (or transposition) corresponds to the
picture-puzzle, whereby pictures sym- sliding of the signified under the signi-
bolise words in an indirect manner. fier (Lacan 2006: 425).
For example, in a 1940s Warner Bros To take the third of these phenom-
Merrie Melodies cartoon, Daffy Duck ena first, Lacan develops Saussures
is shown with a flag attached to his theory of the sign, as represented in
tail, on which are depicted a screw the Figure 5 (Saussure 1992/1983).
190
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Figure 5
Here, the picture of the tree represents which determines how psychic phe-
the concept (signified) of a tree in the nomena are organised, and hence how
speakers mind, while the word arbor subjects behave: according to this
represents the sound image (signi- example, men and women line up
fier) of that concept. The horizontal before the doors according to the sig-
line shows that signifier and signified nifiers that label them. In other words,
are discrete manifestations, while the sex is determined socially, rather than
oval shows that nevertheless together biologically. Moreover, the bar sepa-
they form a psychological unity. The rating signifier from signified, which
choice of a tree (arbre in French) for was a relatively minor part of Saus-
illustrative purposes is a little joke on sures theory, assumes a major role in
Saussures part, since the relation Lacans: it represents nothing other
between signifier and signified is held than the bar of repression. Thus even
to be arbitrary (arbitraire) and like- in everyday life, signifiers do not sig-
wise the signified is separated from the nify signifieds directly, but rather, they
signifier by a barre (barre being an signify, according to Lacan, other sig-
anagram of arbre). nifiers in the signifying chain that con-
Lacan (2006: 416), meanwhile, stitutes the subjects discourse. It is the
replaces Saussures diagram with the task of analysis to uncover the true
another (see Figure 6). signifieds of these signifiers, which
This both inverts Saussures dia- have been displaced.
gram and reduplicates it. The signifier This theory of linguistic displace-
is shown to have priority for the sub- ment leads to Lacans appropriation of
ject over the signified, by being placed Jakobsons theory of metaphor and
above it. Meanwhile, the two doors metonymy. In a series of papers on
are identical, so that only the signifiers aphasia, Jakobson defines metaphor as
distinguish them. Accordingly, the sig- the selection or substitution of terms
nifier for Lacan has a material reality, one for another, while metonymy is
191
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Figure 6
192
RELEVANCE THEORY
193
RELEVANCE THEORY
194
RELEVANCE THEORY
positive cognitive effects are derivable one that satisfies their expectations of
from the processing of alternative optimal relevance. Notice that the
inputs, the one which is less costly to term interpretive hypotheses as used
process is the more relevant. in the definition above includes not
How much relevance are individu- just the proposition the speaker
als entitled to expect? According to intended to communicate, but also the
relevance theory, maximal relevance is contextual assumptions, implicatures
an unreasonably high expectation in and attitudes intended by the speaker.
communication because, for example, The relevance-theoretic compre-
our interlocutors might be unwilling hension procedure does not guarantee
or unable to produce information that that communication will always be
would yield the most positive cogni- successful, of course. Misunderstand-
tive effects for the least processing ings do occur from time to time.
effort (Higashimori and Wilson Rather, this heuristic offers an account
1996). In light of this, Sperber and of how addressees select the interpre-
Wilson (1995) have argued that while tive hypothesis they are entitled to
cognition tends to be geared to the assume is the one overtly intended by
maximisation of relevance, acts of their interlocutors.
ostensive communication simply Relevance theory rejects the tradi-
create an expectation of optimal rele- tional assumption that every pragmat-
vance. In other words, for any osten- ically determined aspect of utterance
sive stimulus (for example, a verbal interpretation other than reference
utterance) addressees are only entitled assignment and disambiguation must
to expect a degree of relevance that is be an implicature*. Central to this
sufficient to warrant their effort in framework is the claim that the
processing it, and which is also the explicit side of communication should
highest degree of relevance that their also fall under the scope of a theory of
interlocutors are able to achieve given pragmatics (Bach 1994; Carston
their abilities, goals and preferences. 2002, 2004b; Sperber and Wilson
The presumption of optimal rele- 1993, 1995). Thus, according to
vance suggests the following general relevance theory, there are two
comprehension procedure: Check types of communicated assumptions
interpretive hypotheses in order of (conceptual representations of the
accessibility, that is, follow a path of actual world): explicitly communi-
least effort, until an interpretation cated assumptions, or explicatures,
which satisfies the expectation of rele- and implicitly communicated ones
vance is found; then stop (Carston (implicatures). When is an assump-
2002: 45). Every utterance gives rise tion communicated by an utterance
to a number of possible interpretive explicit? Sperber and Wilson (1995:
hypotheses that are compatible with 182) suggest that an explicature is an
the linguistic meaning of the sentence inferential development of the propo-
uttered. According to this general sitional template or logical form*
criterion, addressees follow a path encoded by an utterance. In other
of least effort in considering such words, an explicature involves a com-
hypotheses, stopping once they reach bination of linguistically decoded
195
RELEVANCE THEORY
196
RELEVANCE THEORY
allowed by the speaker, the weaker the spective, using expressions which
communication. The relevance-theo- encode procedures for the identifica-
retic approach to the implicit-explicit tion of intended cognitive effects
distinction has led to a significant would obviously reduce the processing
reassessment of the interface between cost involved in achieving those
semantics and pragmatics: the exis- effects, a result that is in consonance
tence of pragmatic aspects of pro- with the communicative principle of
positional content which do not relevance. For example, Blakemore
correspond to items present in the (2002) links the use of the sentential
syntactic representation, as argued by connective but with the cognitive
relevance theory, strongly suggests effect of contradiction and elimina-
that context-sensitivity at this level is tion. Hence, according to Blakemore,
widespread. the use of but activates an inferential
An important development within process resulting in the contradiction
relevance theory was the recognition, and elimination of an assumption
due to the seminal work of Diane which the speaker has reason to
Blakemore (1987, 2002), that linguis- believe is accessible to the hearer. For
tic meaning can encode constraints on example, an utterance of the sentence
the inferential phase of utterance com- Kim is rich, but unhappy activates an
prehension. Thus, linguistic meaning inferential process whereby the hearer
may affect the inferential processes contradicts and eliminates the accessi-
that characterise utterance compre- ble assumption that wealth leads to
hension in two different ways: while a happiness.
majority of linguistic expressions Research in relevance theory has
encode constituents of conceptual rep- also made an important contribution
resentations, there are also expressions to the study of figurative language.
which encode inferential procedures, Verbal irony, for example, is analysed
which we could think of as instructions in this framework as an echoic use of
to increase the salience of a particular language in which the speaker dissoci-
type of inferential process. ates himself tacitly from an attributed
Blakemore justified the distinction utterance or thought (Wilson 2006;
between conceptual and procedural Wilson and Sperber 1992). For exam-
encoding in both cognitive and com- ple, uttering You really are good at
municative terms. Since, as it is this! after a friend has failed to score
assumed in relevance theory, the inter- an easy goal in a quick counter-attack
pretation of utterances involves carry- can be construed as an instance of
ing out computations over conceptual verbal irony because we are tacitly
representations, it is reasonable to dissociating ourselves from a thought
expect from a cognitive point of view or utterance with a similar content
that languages encode information (such as a reassurance that our friend
about the inferential procedures in is a skilful footballer) which may
which such conceptual representations have been attributed to us had the cir-
enter (and not just the constituents cumstances of the game been differ-
of conceptual representations them- ent. This analysis is a departure from
selves). From a communicative per- more traditional Gricean accounts,
197
RELEVANCE THEORY
198
SENSE DATA
199
SENSE/REFERENCE
Sellars maintains that we form inter- data receive increasing support in lin-
pretations, not mere mental images, guistic circles, where words in lan-
that lack the same properties of those guage trigger direct awareness of
physical objects. internal interpretations, not property-
In support of the sense data theory, bearing sense data.
Hume and Russell use an example of
how a table appears differently to us Primary sources
as we physically move alongside it or Austin, J. L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia.
away from it in order to describe how Oxford: Clarendon Press.
our sensory experience adjusts to per- Berkeley, George (1998). Three Dialogues
spectival variation, or changes in our between Hylas and Philonous. Ed. J.
physical relationship to external Dancy. New York: Oxford University
objects. Because the size and shape of Press.
the physical table do not change, our Hume, David (2000). An Enquiry Con-
perception is our awareness of the cerning Human Understanding: A Crit-
tables corresponding mental image. ical Edition. Ed. T. Beauchamp.
Other arguments supporting sense Oxford: Clarendon Press.
data have to do with perception of Russell, Bertrand (1964). The Problems of
mental images not directly related to Philosophy. New York: Oxford Univer-
physical objects. This includes optical sity Press.
illusions, hallucinations, double
vision and even time delays between Further reading
the existence of a physical object and Firth, Roderick (1965). Sense data and
our perception of it. the percept theory. In R. Swartz (ed.),
More recently, criticisms of the sense Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing. New
data theory have directly refuted its York: Anchor Books. 20470.
supporting arguments. For example, Chrucky, Andrew (1992). The alleged
sense data theorists would argue that if fallacy of the sense datum inference.
thing X were made to look exactly like Eastern Pennsylvania Philosophical
thing Y, what we are directly aware of Association. Bloomsburg University.
in our perception is thing Y. This Huemer, Michael (2004). Sense data.
mental image of thing Y is evidence of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
sense data. Opposing arguments, how- (http://plato.stanford.edu/).
ever, state that this illusion does not
change the fact that we are still looking Jennifer A. Baldwin
at and perceiving properties of a real
(or material) thing X.
Originating from discussions on
human knowledge and understanding,
SENSE/REFERENCE
the sense data theory is an important
component of the philosophy of per- The distinction between sense and ref-
ception. As the debate continues over erence (German Sinn and Bedeu-
whether mental phenomena behind tung) goes back to the German
perception exist as mental images or as logician Gottlob Frege. According to
pure interpretation, critics of sense his understanding, sense and reference
200
SENSE/REFERENCE
201
SENSE/REFERENCE
202
SENSE/REFERENCE
meanings of its constituents. This is This theory of sense and reference can
the principle of compositionality* only be maintained if we assume that
controversially attributed to Frege. in these contexts the expressions do
Hence it should be possible to substi- not have their customary reference. In
tute constituents of the sentence with his essay Sense and Reference, Frege
co-referring constituents without analyses various types of subordinate
affecting the reference of the entire clauses in detail.
sentence. If we substitute the proper name
Leibniz had formulated this regu- Charlotte Bront with her pseudonym
larity as his law of substitution and in Currer Bell in the following true sen-
Freges theory the objective content of tence Dorothy believes that Charlotte
a declarative sentence is called a Bront is the author of Jane Eyre, the
thought (Gedanke) and is under- meaning of the entire sentence is
stood as the sense of a sentence. Sub- changed because the resulting sen-
stitution might change the sense or tence is not necessarily correct:
thought as in the example given Dorothy believes that Currer Bell is
below. the author of Jane Eyre. Dorothy
might not be aware of the fact that
The morning star is a body illuminated Charlotte Bront at that time pub-
by the sun. lished under the assumed masculine
The evening star is a body illuminated name Currer Bell; therefore she might
by the sun. believe that Charlotte Bront is the
author of Jane Eyre and at the same
In contrast what remains the same is time believe that it can not be the case
the truth value of the sentence, which that Currer Bell is the author of Jane
Frege considers the reference. The Eyre, despite the fact that they are
idea of truth values comes from the one and the same person.
discipline of logic or logical semantics. The issue described above is also
It refers to a function which maps sen- known as Freges second puzzle about
tences on to the truth values true or language. How can it be that the prin-
false. Corresponding to what is said ciple of substitution fails in the con-
about proper names, Frege claims that text of propositional attitude* reports
sentences need to have sense but not (or of indirect quotation)? The answer
necessarily reference. This can be is that in these cases we talk about the
shown in the sentence Miss Marple words themselves. Expressions corre-
investigated the assassination in the spondingly do not have their custom-
Orient Express. This sentence is ary reference, but they have their
meaningful but, as it contains the indirect reference, coinciding with
name Miss Marple, a fictional char- what is customarily their sense.
acter whose reference is doubtful, it Frege introduces the term indirect
cannot be said to have a reference, (German ungerade) reference/sense
that is a truth value*. contrary to the customary (gewhn-
The following paragraph highlights lich) reference/sense. This leads to the
several subordinate clauses as exemp- position that under the given circum-
tions from the substitution principle. stances a clauses reference is not a
203
SENSE/REFERENCE
truth value but a thought. Thus we the antecedent clause nor the conse-
can only substitute the subordinate quent clause qualifies to express an
clause with another with the same entire thought. It is their combination
thought (that is, reference) in order to which expresses one single complete
keep the truth value of the complex thought. While several types of subor-
sentence but not necessarily substitute dinate clauses are in a way incom-
another with same truth value. plete, others for example, concessive
The situation is comparable in sen- clauses are complete in this respect.
tences with it seems that and com- The remaining cases of failure of
mand, ask, forbid, or doubt the substitution test are explained
whether, to name a few. In all these with additional subsidiary thoughts
cases the words in the subordinate not explicitly expressed. One example
clause have an indirect reference and given by Frege himself is a causal sub-
this determines that the reference of ordinate clause: Because ice is less
the subordinate clause is not a truth dense than water it floats on water.
value but a thought, a command, a Frege argues that the compound
request, a question and so on. Accord- expresses more than one thought per
ing to Frege, the subordinate clause clause namely three thoughts alto-
following these expressions may also gether:
be understood as proper name of the
thought it represents in the compound 1. Ice is less dense that water.
sentence. 2. If anything is less dense that water,
The discussion about sense and ref- it floats on water.
erence of propositional attitude 3. Ice floats on water.
reports, initialised by Frege, is still
alive. One topic is the question, for The clause because ice is less dense
example, of how nested quotations or than water does not only express the
propositional attitudes leading to a first but also part of the second
hierarchy of senses fit into Freges thought. This overlapping is the
theory. Apart from cases of indirect reason why it is not possible to
reference of words, there are other exchange the subordinate clause given
cases where sense and reference do above by another one with the same
not correspond to thought and truth truth value without doing harm to the
value respectively. In the sentence truth of the entire sentence. It thus
whoever invented the ingenious Miss does not serve to disqualify the theory
Marple was a fanciful person, the of sense and reference of sentences in
grammatical subject whoever has no this view.
independent sense, but only in con- Freges ideas had a significant
nection with the main clause. This impact on the development of modern
accounts for the fact that the sense of semantic theories. The distinction
the subordinate clause is not a com- between sense and reference continues
plete thought. Besides, the reference is to be the subject of research in philos-
not a truth value but the person ophy. Besides the topics already men-
Agatha Christie. A further example is tioned, another issue still discussed in
conditional sentences. Usually neither the literature is the questions raised by
204
SIGNS AND SEMIOTICS
205
SIGNS AND SEMIOTICS
206
SIGNS AND SEMIOTICS
Ribot and Paul Pierre Broca. To the Whitneys claim of the arbitrary
thirty-year shaping of his theory of nature of sign, Saussure contended
sign, Bral included a strong psycho- that the meaning of a sign is not con-
logical value that he drew from the tained within it, but arises in its inter-
studies on the human mind which pretation. This means that meanings
were so pervasively spreading in the do not exist per se but are established
second half of the nineteenth century. by the language users in relation to
He thus attempted to search the cog- the context of use. In other words,
nitive and intellectual features of the the role of the interpreter must be
human mind which regulate the accounted for, either implicitly as in
nature of language. Saussure, or explicitly as in Peirce.
This aspect of Brals semantics is Saussures apparatus was followed
evident in the work of Saussure, who by Hjelmslev (1943) who substituted
aimed to find a bridge between the the terms expression and content to
psychic essence of the concept and the refer to the signifier and signified
concrete reality of the word. He came respectively. He also referred to
up with the idea of sign as an indi- planes of expression and content, each
visible pair consisting of abstract con- having substance and form. Thus
cept and concrete realisation. Until there are four categories which may
one of his 1911 lessons, when he first facilitate analytical distinctions: sub-
used the two terms signifiant and sig- stance of expression, form of expres-
nifi, Saussure generally spoke of sign sion, substance of content, and form
in the same way as was done by his of content.
contemporaries, that is as the phono- In the United States semiotics devel-
logical counterpart of an entity. Later oped in the second half of the nine-
he developed a more refined theory teenth century within the field of
where the sign is conceived of as a philosophy where Charles Peirce
dyadic entity formed by the indivisible claimed that semiosis is an action, or
combination of a signifier (signifiant, influence, which is, or involves, a
the acoustic image) and a signified dynamical operation of three subjects,
(signifi, the mental representation of such as sign, its object, and its
reality). The signifier and the signified interpretant, this tri-relative influence
are intimately linked by an associative not being in any way resolvable into
link whereby each triggers the other. action between pairs (Hartshorne et
Hence they stand in a static dyadic al. 1958: 5.484). Whereas in the Saus-
relationship which goes under the surean theoretical apparatus, the sign
label of signification. With reference is a bipartite entity, Peirce conceived
to language, a linguistic sign is not a of it as a dynamic triadic relation:
link between a thing and a name, but
between a concept and a sound pat- a sign or representamen is something
tern. This means that language is which stands to somebody for some-
mainly symbolic, since the relations thing in some respect or capacity. It
between the sound sequences and addresses somebody, that is, creates in
their meanings are conventional, or the mind of that person an equivalent
arbitrary, and have to be learnt. On sign, or perhaps a more developed sign.
207
SIGNS AND SEMIOTICS
The sign which it creates I call the inter- iourism* and investigated the under-
pretant of the first sign. The sign stands standing of the unitary process of
for something, its object. (Hartshorne semiosis. He proposed to focus on the
et al. 1958: 2.228) relation that the sign can establish
with the other entities in the semiotic
Semiosis is therefore an endless pro- process. Thus the sign-object relation
cess, something that Eco (1976) points to the dimension of semantics;
defined as unlimited semiosis. the sign-sign relation refers to syntax;
In his investigation of the triadic and the sign-interpreter relation refers
nature of sign (Triadism), Peirce to pragmatics. Such a tripartite divi-
claimed that all thought whatsoever sion became normalised in linguistics.
is a sign, and is mostly of the nature Semiotics is a broad discipline which
of language (Hartshorne et al. 1958: deals with any type of signification
5.421). In his triadism, Peirce and communication. It encompasses
analysed the sign in itself, in relation branches like social semiotics, visual
with the object, and in relation with semiotics, zoosemiotics, music semiol-
the interpretant, thus developing a ogy, computational semiotics, and lit-
huge number of categories. As far as erary semiotics, to mention but a few.
language is concerned, the most rele-
vant triad is the one which originates Primary sources
from the relation that a sign estab- Bral, Michel (1897). Essai de sman-
lishes with itself. The sign-to-sign rela- tique. Science des significations. Paris:
tion produces three modes, an icon, Hachette.
an index, and a symbol. The icon is a Eco, Umberto (1976). A Theory of Semi-
mode in which the signifier is per- otics. Bloomington: Indiana University
ceived as imitating the signified, as is Press/London: Macmillan.
the case with onomatopoeia. An index Hartshorne, Charles, Paul Weiss and
is a mode in which the signifier is arbi- Arthur W. Burks (eds) (1958). Collected
trary but connected in some way, Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Eight
physically or causally, to the signified, volumes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
for example in the case of demonstra- University Press.
tive pronouns. A symbol is a mode in Hjelmslev, Louis ([1943]1953). Prolegom-
which the signifier is fundamentally ena to a Theory of Language. Balti-
arbitrary. These three modes give rise more: Indiana University Publications
to three basic principles which are in Anthropology and Linguistics.
fundamental to investigate linguistic Morris, Charles W. (1938/1970). Founda-
phenomena: the principle of indexi- tions of the Theory of Signs. Chicago:
cality, of iconicity, and of symbolicity. Chicago University Press.
Peirces scientific contribution went Saussure, Ferdinand de (1916/1983).
almost unknown during his life- Course in General Linguistics. Trans.
time, and his semiotic approach was Roy Harris. London: Duckworth.
spread by Charles Morris who, draw-
ing largely on the Peircean theoretical Further reading
framework, approached semiotics Chandler, Daniel (2001). Semiotics: The
through the lenses of Meads behav- Basics. London: Routledge.
208
SITUATIONAL SEMANTICS
Eco, Umberto (1984). Semiotics and the called situations and can be indi-
Philosophy of Language. Bloomington: viduated by cognitive agents. Thus,
Indiana University Press. people perceive situations, cause them
Locke, John (1689/1963). Of the division to be brought about, and have all sorts
of the sciences. Book IV, chapter XXI. of attitudes toward them. One fact
An Essay Concerning Human Under- remains: we are at all times in situa-
standing. Ed. Peter N. Nidditch. tions (cf. Norbert Hornstein: Situa-
Oxford: Clarendon. tions people the world. They are dated
and located.).
Annalisa Baicchi While the Barwise-Perry volume
(1983) is exceptional in its pro-
grammatic employment of situations
(applied, among others, to naked-
SITUATIONAL infinitive perception and belief
reports), historically there was always
SEMANTICS some interest in situations. Two note-
worthy albeit cryptic passages in
An information-based approach to Zettel (Wittgenstein 1981: 2, 13)
natural language semantics. Formu- show that Wittgenstein thought that
lated by Jon Barwise and John Perry in situations a person is embedded in are
their influential book Situations and of key value in making their behav-
Attitudes (1983), it is built upon the iour intelligible. Authorities of prag-
notion of a situation a limited part matics like J. L. Austin, H. P. Grice
of the real world that a cognitive agent and Peter Strawson could be regarded
can individuate and has access to. A as friendly to a situational approach,
situation represents a lump of infor- for they try to come to terms with
mation in terms of a collection of the notion of context. And for some,
facts. It is through the actualist ontol- situations are generalised versions
ogy of situations that the meaning of of events as conceived by Donald
natural language utterances can be Davidson and others.
elucidated. A situation is a rich object consist-
ing of individuals enjoying various
See also: Logic; Possible World
properties and standing in a variety of
Semantics
relations. It is a small world. Inci-
Key Thinkers: Austin, J. L.;
dentally, there is a crucial difference
Davidson, Donald; Frege, Gottlob;
between situation-theoretic and
Grice, H. P.; Lewis, David;
mathematical relations. The latter are
Montague, Richard; Strawson, P.
set-theoretic constructs whereas the
F.; Tarski, Alfred; Wittgenstein,
former are relations of the kind recog-
Ludwig
nisable by cognitive agents. A situa-
Situational semantics (situation tion may extend quite far in space and
semantics in the sequel) starts with time. An agent can watch a film about
the hypothesis that what is called the a past assassination, scrutinise the
world is an inconceivably large total- latest videos from the Jupiter mission,
ity. Limited parts of the world are or chat with someone who relates
209
SITUATIONAL SEMANTICS
210
SITUATIONAL SEMANTICS
211
SPEECH ACT THEORY
Devlin, Keith (1991). Logic and Informa- Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975). Truth and
tion. New York: Cambridge University Method. Trans. and ed. Garrett Barden
Press. and John Cumming. New York:
Devlin, Keith (2006). Situation theory Seabury Press.
and situation semantics. In Dov Gawron, Jean Mark and Stanley Peters
Gabbay and John Woods (eds), Hand- (1990). Anaphora and Quantification
book of the History of Logic, vol. 7. in Situation Semantics. Stanford, CA:
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 60164. CSLI Publications.
Seligman, Jerry and Larry Moss (1997). Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of
Situation theory. In van Benthem, Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
Johan and Alice ter Meulen (eds), versity Press.
Handbook of Logic and Language. Strawson, P. F. (1997). Entity and Identity.
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 239309. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1981). Zettel. Ed.
Further reading G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von
Aczel, Peter, David Israel, Yasuhiro Kata- Wright. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe.
giri, and Stanley Peters (eds) (1993). Sit- Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
uation Theory and Its Applications, vol.
3. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. Varol Akman
Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A World of
States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Austin, J. L. (1979). Philosophical Papers. SPEECH ACT
Ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
THEORY
Barwise, Jon, Jean Mark Gawron, Gordon
Plotkin, and Syun Tutiya (eds) (1991). Speech act theory accounts for an act
Situation Theory and Its Applications, that a speaker performs when pro-
vol. 2. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. nouncing an utterance, which thus
Cooper, Robin (1996). The role of situa- serves a function in communication.
tions in generalized quantifiers. In Since speech acts are the tools that
Shalom Lappin (ed.), The Handbook allow us to interact in real-life situa-
of Contemporary Semantic Theory. tions, uttering a speech act requires
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. knowledge not only of the language
6586. but also of its appropriate use within
Cooper, Robin, Kuniaki Mukai, and John a given culture.
Perry (eds) (1990). Situation Theory
and Its Applications, vol. 1. Stanford, See also: Logical Positivism;
CA: CSLI Publications. Ordinary Language Philosophy;
Davidson, Donald (1980). Essays on Performative
Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Key Thinkers: Aristotle; Austin, J.
Press. L; Ayer, A. J.; Grice, H. P.; Husserl,
Dretske, Fred (1981). Knowledge and the Edmund; Kant, Immanuel; Ryle,
Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: Gilbert; Searle, John; Wittgenstein,
MIT Press. Ludwig
212
SPEECH ACT THEORY
Speech act theory was first developed Although he explicitly deems the
by J. L. Austin whose seminal Oxford nature of sentences to be uninteresting
Lectures in 19524 marked an impor- in his inquiry on apophantic logos,
tant development in the philosophy of Aristotle represents the first account
language and linguistics. Austins pro- of language as action.
posal can be viewed as a reaction to Aristotles standpoint influenced
the extreme claims of logical posi- the study of language for centuries
tivists, who argued that the meaning and paved the way for a tradition of
of a sentence is reducible to its research on verifiability, but several
verifiability, that is to an analysis German and British philosophers
which verifies if utterances are true or anticipated a view of language as a
false. Austin contended that most of tool to change a state of affairs. The
our utterances do more than simply issues of language and conversation
making statements: questions and were addressed by Immanuel Kant
orders are not used to state something, who anticipated some concepts like
and many declarative sentences do not context and subjective idealisation,
lend themselves to being analysed in the rules that articulate conversation,
terms of their falsifiability. Instead, and the para-linguistic gestures used
they are instruments that allow speak- in the accomplishment of speech acts.
ers to change the state of affairs. This But it was only at the end of the nine-
is tantamount to saying that we use teenth century that a more elaborate
language mainly as a tool to do things, treatment of language as action was
and we do so by means of performing initiated.
hundreds of ordinary verbal actions of The first, although non-systematic,
different types in daily life, such as study of the action-like character of
make telephone calls, baptise children, language was conducted by Thomas
or fire an employee. Reid, who described different acts
The fact that not all sentences are a that can be performed through lan-
matter of truth verifiability was first guage, and grouped them into two
advanced by Aristotle who, in his De categories: solitary acts like judge-
Interpretatione, argued that: ments, intentions, deliberations and
desiring, which can go unexpressed;
as there are in the mind thoughts which and social operations like command-
do not involve truth or falsity, and also ing, promising or warning, which, by
those which must be either true or false, their very social nature, must be
so it is in speech. [. . .] A sentence is a sig- expressed. Reids contribution to the
nificant portion of speech [. . .] Yet every inception of a speech act theory can be
sentence is not a proposition; only such fully understood if viewed from the
are propositions as have in them either wider perspective of the philosophical
truth or falsity. [. . .] Let us therefore dis- developments of his time.
miss all other types of sentence but the Franz Brentanos distinction
proposition, for this last concerns our between physical and psychological
present inquiry, whereas the investiga- phenomena is particularly relevant in
tion of the others belongs rather to the this respect because it reintroduced to
study of rhetoric or of poetry. (14) philosophy the scholastic concept of
213
SPEECH ACT THEORY
intentionality, which allows for a Marty offered the first account of uses
distinction between mental acts and of language meant to direct others
the external world. As far as speech behaviour, like giving an order,
act theory is concerned, suffice it here requesting, or giving encouragement.
to say that Brentano argued that every Marty stated that sentences may hint
mental, psychological act has a con- at the speakers psychic processes and
tent and is directed at an object (the argued that deliberate speaking is a
intentional object), which means special kind of acting, whose proper
that mental phenomena contain an goal is to call forth certain psychic
object intentionally within themselves phenomena in other beings (1908:
and are thus definable as objectifying 284). Stemming from Brentanos tri-
acts. The Brentanian approach to partite subdivision of mental phenom-
intentionality* allows for a distinc- ena into presentation, judgements,
tion between linguistic expressions and phenomena of love and hate,
describing psychological phenomena Marty discriminated linguistic forms
and linguistic expressions describing into names, statements and emotives
non-psychological phenomena. Fur- (utterances arousing an interest),
thermore, Brentano claimed that which is a model that closely resembles
speaking is itself an activity through Karl Bhlers Sprachtheorie. It is pre-
which we can initiate psychic phe- cisely to Bhler that we owe the
nomena. Edmund Husserl picked up coinage of the label speech act theory.
the importance of what Brentanos He offered the first thorough study of
psychological investigation could the functions of language Darstel-
bring to logic*, in particular the con- lung (representation), Kindgabe (inti-
trast between emotional acts and mation or expression), and Auslsung
objectifying acts. Husserl tackled the (arousal or appeal) thus endowing
issue of human mental activities non-representational sentences with
(acts) and how they constitute the their own status.
object of knowledge through experi- A more complete treatment we find
ence. In his Logical Investigations in the work of Adolf Reinach, who
(1900/1) he developed a theory of offered the first systematic theory of
meaning based on intentionality speech acts. Reinach received a doc-
which, for him, meant that conscious- torate in philosophy from the Univer-
ness entails directedness towards an sity of Munich; his dissertation was
object. It is on the notion of objecti- on the concept of cause in penal law.
fying acts, that is acts of representa- It was within the context of legal lan-
tion, that Husserl shaped his theory of guage that Reinach argued in favour
linguistic meaning, thus emphasising of the relevance of speech acts which
the referential use of language. Collat- he referred to, presumably independ-
erally he treated the non-representa- ently of Reids work, as social
tional uses of language, that is acts acts, that is acts of the mind that are
like asking questions, commanding or performed in the very act of speak-
requesting. ing. Reinach (1913) provided a
Following Brentano and moving detailed taxonomy of social acts as
within the field of psychology, Anton performative* utterances and their
214
SPEECH ACT THEORY
215
SPEECH ACT THEORY
216
SPEECH ACT THEORY
217
SPEECH ACT THEORY
218
STRUCTURALISM
219
STRUCTURALISM
220
STRUCTURALISM
221
STRUCTURALISM
222
STRUCTURALISM
of their language, the so-called Sapir- that goes back to Boas and the (basi-
Whorf hypothesis. cally pragmatic) idea that human
Franz Boas is regarded as the beings communicate in sentences, not
founder of American structuralism. by using words in isolation. The other
An anthropologist untrained in lin- thing is the fact that, contrary to gen-
guistics, he contributed notably to eral opinion, Bloomfield did not
the description of the phonological totally abandon linguistic semantics
and grammatical structures of from his linguistic approach. For
Native American languages. Boas instance, he appeals to a special kind
incremented the prestige of language of meaning:
studies as a part of anthropological
studies, which traditionally included Since our study ordinarily concerns
archaeology and cultural and physical only the distinctive features of form and
anthropology. But he was also an meaning, I shall henceforth usually
advocate of relativism, a view that he omit the qualification linguistic or dis-
passed on to his students and follow- tinctive, and speak simply of forms and
ers, and, in line with this, one of his meanings, ignoring the existence of
main concerns was to promote the non-distinctive features. A form is often
basic methods of fieldwork. If lan- said to express its meaning. (Bloomfield
guages are more or less self-contained 1935: 141)
entities, it sounds reasonable to call
for careful and detailed investigation This is also by necessity consistent
into each particular language in order with his hierarchy of categories which
to offer exhaustive descriptions. And would otherwise have been impracti-
this may be one of the only reasons for cal because the notions meaningful
the predicate structuralism to this and meaningless are necessary theo-
stage of American structuralism: what retical concepts for the distinctions
was accounted for through linguistic between the classes of linguistic units,
fieldwork were the internal structures for instance in the expression the
of particular languages. smallest meaningful unit . . ..
The same characteristic may be But some of Bloomfields followers
attributed to the most prominent in American structuralism took it fur-
American structuralist, Leonard ther away from semantics and linguis-
Bloomfield. In his principal theoretical tic meaning, one of them being Zellig
work, Language (1935), the words Harris, whose principal work actually
structure and structural are not fre- has the word structural in its title.
quently found. The book offers more And these two themes, the meanings
of a methodological account of cate- of the words structuralism, structural
gories and their hierarchies than an and structure, and the question of
all-encompassing and consistent whether semantics can be disposed of,
theory, but there are two features that are being transferred to the modern
are worth mentioning. In opposition worlds most famous linguist, Noam
to European structuralism, Bloomfield Chomsky. It may seem ironical that
and American structuralism empha- Chomskys programmatic work, Syn-
sise sentences as linguistic units, a bias tactic Structures (1957), dealt with
223
STRUCTURALISM
224
SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
225
SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
226
SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
speaker
Deictic: my
interactant speaker-plus
Deictic: our
personal addressee
(possession) Deictic: your
non-interactant
specific
non-selective
Deictic: the
demonstrative non-plural
nominal Deictic:
(proximity)
group this
plural
Deictic:
selective these
near
Deictic:
that
far
Deictic:
those
non-specific
227
SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
228
SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
229
SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
Table 2
Might the man have driven the car too fast perhaps ?
- Actor - Process: Circumstance
material Goal
Table 3
their complement), whereas mental and is theme), which signal that there is
verbal processes can; mental and behav- some kind of specific contextual pres-
ioural processes must normally have sure at work, often associated with a
human sensers/behavers, whereas mate- change of textual frame. For example,
rial processes have no such restriction. in the following extract from a
The third metafunction is the tex- guide to a historical monument, the
tual. This is the part of the grammar choice of themes (underlined) is
which is concerned with how the designed to help the reader to follow
meanings in the clause are organised the text organisation. The marked
to fit in with the co-text of the sur- themes (in italics) signal that the text
rounding messages and with the is moving on to deal with a different
wider context of the utterance. The part of the church, whereas the
textual system that has been most unmarked themes signal that the text
fully explored is that of theme: the is, for the moment, continuing to
theme of a clause is the initial experi- focus on the same part of the church
ential constituent, which has a special introduced in the preceding marked
role in signalling how the current theme.
clause relates to clauses around it.
Very broadly, there is a choice On the northern side of the church
between unmarked themes (where was a porch . . . Further east, on the
theme and subject are the same), west side of the north transept was a
which typically signal continuity of room . . . The east wall of the room was
some kind in the topic, and marked divided into three parts . . . Its use is not
themes (where something other than known for certain, but it may have been
subject, such as an adverbial adjunct, a vestry and sacristy . . .
230
SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
Table 4
One factor which complicates the used in that way in some texts); it
already complex three-dimensional allows new kinds of meanings to be
picture above is grammatical meta- made. In the headline, radiation is an
phor, which has been identified in instance of metaphor, but it is
SFG as a crucial mechanism by which extremely difficult to unpack it: it has
language can expand the potential become an accepted term for referring
meanings that can be expressed. in a condensed form to a complex phe-
Grammatical metaphor* involves nomenon. Grammatical metaphor is
the use of wordings which do not often ignored in other grammatical
map in a straightforward way onto approaches; but, since SFG is a gram-
the meanings that they express. This mar of discourse, it has a central place
can be seen in the following news- in the model.
paper headline: Rise in radiation SFG is the most fully-developed
exposure leads to warning. A transi- alternative to what was, for much of
tivity analysis of this clause is in Table the twentieth century, the main lin-
4. guistic paradigm, which aimed to split
This captures part of the meaning as the problem of describing language
it is expressed; but it is clearly possible into separate areas such as syntax,
to unpack the clause into more con- semantics, sociolinguistics, and so on.
gruent wordings which reflect more SFG rejects that kind of divide-and-
naturally the events in the world that conquer solution, on the grounds that
are being represented. One possi- language is a resource for social com-
ble wording (some of the missing munication and can only be properly
information is supplied from the news- understood if that whole picture is
paper article itself) would be Because taken into account at all stages of
[= leads to] doctors are exposing [= investigation. Its orientation to lan-
exposure] patients to radiation [= guage in use means that it has
radiation] more often [= rise], been widely adopted in discourse
researchers are warning [= warning] analysis* and corpus linguistics and
that . . .. This is a much less econom- in a range of other areas, most
ical way of representing the meaning, notably education, natural language
but it is also more natural, in that it is generation and language acquisition
easier to process in speech and easier studies.
for a non-specialist to understand.
Grammatical metaphor of this kind is Primary sources
particularly associated with formal Halliday, M. A. K. (1978). Language as
technical writing. It is not just an Social Semiotic: The Social Interpreta-
impressive-sounding way of saying tion of Language and Meaning.
simple things (though it is certainly London: Arnold.
231
Halliday, M. A. K. (1985, second edition TRANSFORMATIONAL-
1994, third edition, with Christian
Matthiessen, 2004). An Introduction GENERATIVE
to Functional Grammar. London: GRAMMAR
Arnold.
Halliday, M. A. K and Ruqaiya Hasan
(1976). Cohesion in English. (English Any formal description of language
Language Series 9). London: Longman. consisting of an algorithm which gen-
Halliday, M. A. K. and Christian M. I. erates sentence structures and of a set
M. Matthiessen (2006). Construing of transformations which modify
Experience Through Meaning: A Lan- them systematically. In particular the
guage-based Approach to Cognition. theory developed by Noam Chomsky,
Second edition. London and New York: whose goal it is to account for the
Continuum. implicit knowledge of language inher-
Halliday, M. A. K. (2002). Collected ent in the human mind by means of a
Works of M. A. K. Halliday. Ed. formalised system of rules. Transfor-
Jonathan Webster. Ten vols. London mational-generative grammar claims
and New York: Continuum. to produce all and only the possible
Martin, J. R. (1992). English Text: System sentences of a language determined by
and Structure. Amsterdam and Philadel- intuition* and the evaluation by com-
phia: John Benjamins. petent native speakers and to account
Matthiessen, Christian M. I. M. (1995). for language acquisition and speakers
Lexicogrammatical Cartography: Eng- knowledge of language.
lish Systems. Tokyo: International Lan-
See also: Acceptability/
guage Sciences Publishers.
Grammaticality; Behaviourism;
Empiricism/Rationalism;
Further reading Innateness; Language of Thought;
Butler, Christopher S. (2003). Structure
Logical Form; Minimalism;
and Function: A Guide to Three Major
Universal Grammar
Structural-Functional Theories. Two
Key Thinkers: Chomsky, Noam;
vols. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Fodor, Jerry; Katz, J. J.; Montague,
Eggins, Suzanne (2004). An Introduction
Richard
to Systemic Functional Linguistics.
Second edition. London: Pinter. Transformational-generative gram-
Matthiessen, Christian M. I. M. (2006). mar has been one of the most influen-
Frequency profiles of some basic gram- tial linguistic theories since the
matical systems: an interim report. In publication of Chomskys (1957) Syn-
Geoff Thompson and Susan Hunston tactic Structures. It is a systematic,
(eds), System and Corpus: Exploring objective, scientific formalisation of
Connections. London: Equinox. 10342 grammar, based on the belief that the
Thompson, Geoff (2004). Introducing structure of language is determined
Functional Grammar. Second edition. by the structure of the human mind,
London: Arnold. that all languages share some
common, universal characteristics
Geoff Thompson and that the species-specific creativ-
232
TRANSFORMATIONAL-GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
ity* of human language that is, the sentences of the language under analy-
capacity of all native speakers to sis (1957: 11). Furthermore such a
produce and understand an infinite theory is to provide a general method
number of sentences that they have for selecting a grammar for each lan-
never heard before must be guage. In order to achieve this aim,
accounted for. Furthermore, such a Chomsky relied heavily on features
theory should also reflect processes of that are important for the success of
language acquisition and language theories in physics, and thus arguably
use. Transformational-generative established linguistics as a science.
grammar has been constantly devel- After rejecting linear finite state
oped into more powerful theories, grammars and after showing the
mainly by Chomsky himself, based on limitations of phrase-structure (PS)
suggestions and criticism from many descriptions, a formalised version
scholars, perhaps the best known of of immediate constituent analysis,
whom are Jerry Fodor, J. J. Katz, and Chomsky developed a grammar with
Richard Montague. Chomskys views a tripartite structure. It consisted of
have always been controversial, but a set of phrase-structure rules, a set
they cannot be ignored. of morphophonemic rules that con-
In Syntactic Structures, the first of vert sequences of morphemes into
Chomskys continually developing sequences of phonemes, and an inter-
models, Chomsky declared that mediate level of transformations mod-
syntax is a completely autonomous ifying the output strings of elements
part of language, independent of generated by the PS-rules into strings
semantics and the phonological that can serve as the input to the mor-
system. Furthermore he proclaimed phophonemic rules. With a generative
that the syntax of a language can be component generating the underlying
formalised in a mathematically pre- structures and a transformational
cise way by means of different rules component modifying them into sur-
operating on different levels. His pro- face structures, this approach was the
gramme was revolutionary in two birth of what was to be known as
ways. First, it was an attempt to for- transformational-generative gram-
malise at least some of the features of mar.
language; and, second, Chomsky dis- The PS-rules given in Chomsky
sociated himself from the prevailing (1957: 111), which generate the
idea that a grammatical description of underlying structures, are the follow-
a language can only be derived from ing (slightly modified): (1) NP
the observation and analysis of actu- VP, (2) VP Verb NP, (3) NP
ally occurring data. For Chomsky {NPsing / NPpl}, (4) NPsing T N, (5)
[s]yntax is the study of the principles NPpl T N + S, (6) T the, (7) N
and processes by which sentences are {man, ball, etc.}, (8) Verb Aux +
constructed in particular languages. V, (9) V {hit, take, walk, read, etc.},
Syntactic investigation of a given lan- (10) Aux C(M) (have + en) (be +
guage has as its goal the construction ing), (11) {will, can, may, shall,
of a grammar that can be viewed as a must}. stands for sentence, NP for
device of some sort for producing the noun phrase, VP for verb phrase,
233
TRANSFORMATIONAL-GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
for zero, T for the definite article, N face structure. In contrast to PS-rules,
for noun, V for verb, S for the plural transformations are not applied to
morpheme, Aux for auxiliaries, M for single elements but to phrase markers,
modals, and C is the element that will the structural description of the
later be interpreted by a transforma- underlying structure generated by the
tional rule as concord; en stands for PS-rules. In other words, a transfor-
the past participle morpheme and ing mational rule takes one structure as its
accounts for the progressive form. input and modifies it into another
Wavy brackets indicate a set of possi- structure.
bilities from which one must be Formally, transformations consist
chosen, and round brackets stand for of two components: the structural
optionality. Thus rule (10) states that description, which serves as the con-
C must be chosen and that we may dition for the transformation to be
choose zero or more of the parenthe- applicable, and the structural change,
sised elements in the given order, which describes the output. As an
resulting in eight different possibilities example of an optional transforma-
to rewrite Aux. tion, consider the structural analysis
Phrase-structure rules are re-write NP Aux V NP. In a formal
rules which formalise immediate con- approach these four elements are
stituent structures of sentences on an numbered linearly from left to right as
abstract level. All the elements to the X1 X2 X3 X4. The structural
right of the arrow are the proper con- change now gives the precise instruc-
stituents of the single element to the tion X1 X2 X3 X4 X4 X2 +
left. In other words, rule (1) formalises be + en X3 by + X1 , that is, in a
the fact that in the sentence The man less formal way, to re-write the input
hit the ball the man and hit the string NP1 Aux V NP2 as NP2
ball are proper constituents of the Aux + be + en V by + NP1. It can
sentence, whereas the man hit is not. easily be seen that this transformation
The output of the PS-rules are kernel turns the underlying structure of an
strings, that is the underlying struc- active sentence such as The man hit
tures of kernel sentences. In order to the ball into the passive The ball was
arrive at the surface structure of the hit by the man.
kernel sentences we have to apply all It must be noted that in the theory
the obligatory transformations which of Syntactic Structures, the PS-rules,
regulate the morphological processes, together with the obligatory transfor-
for example, concord. mations, only generate simple, active,
Transformations were first intro- affirmative, declarative sentences, so-
duced in linguistics by Zellig Harris called kernel sentences, and that all
(1952) as a means to account for other sentences are generated by
the relationship between linguistic applying optional transformations.
expressions at surface structure. In Though it would not be impossible to
Chomskys terminology, transforma- generate all the interrogative, nega-
tions are re-write rules applied on the tive, passive sentences, and so on by a
output of the PS-rules, the underlying set of PS-rules alone, the obvious rela-
structure, in order to arrive at the sur- tionship between, for example, pas-
234
TRANSFORMATIONAL-GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
sive and active sentences would be were responsible for the recursiveness
lost. All transformations are based on of language, another solution to han-
deletion or insertion of elements dling this vital feature of a comprehen-
resulting in substitutions or permuta- sive theory had to be found. So, instead
tions and are either obligatory or of taking two sentence structures and
optional. Whereas the obligatory conjoining them, it was proposed that
transformations account for the by integrating a rule of the type NP +
necessary morphological processes N + (S) the task could be shifted into
needed to arrive at the actual sen- the PS-rules and the generalised trans-
tences, optional transformations such formations could be discarded. Simi-
as negation, passivisation, question larly, instead of having a negative or
formation and so on change the mean- interrogative transformation, inserting
ing by introducing new semantic the necessary element into the respec-
information. Note that sentences such tive affirmative or declarative kernel
as (a) The man didnt hit the ball (b) string, it was suggested that an abstract
The ball was hit by the man (c) Did marker (neg) or (Qu), or both of them,
the man hit the ball? and so on, are is inserted in the underlying structure
not derived from (d) The man hit the as an optional element, yielding the
ball but that the kernel sentence (d) is rule S (Qu) (neg) + NP + VP. If these
generated by means of obligatory markers are chosen in the generative
transformations and sentences (a) to process, the respective obligatory
(c) by optional transformations from transformations are triggered off by
the same underlying kernel string. these markers to produce negative,
Furthermore Chomsky distin- interrogative or negative-interrogative
guishes between singular and gener- sentences.
alised transformations. Singular J. J. Katz and Paul M. Postal sug-
transformations operate on individual gested in their seminal book An
strings of elements, whereas gener- Integrated Theory of Linguistic
alised transformations combine two Descriptions (1964) that the underly-
different strings into one, resulting in ing structure already contained all the
embedding and conjunction and thus necessary elements for the semantic
accounting for the possibility of recur- interpretation of sentences, and that
sive constructions and the infinite transformations only account for the
capacity of the grammar. necessary adjustments in order to
The model proposed in Syntactic arrive at the surface structure and thus
Structures had some major draw- are obligatory. Furthermore as the
backs: the growing complexity of the meaning of the sentences is stated by
transformational component, particu- means of PS-rules, these transforma-
larly with respect to the generalised tions must also be meaning-preserving.
transformations, the covert relation- Based on these suggestions, Chom-
ship between, for instance, affirmative sky proposed in Aspects of the Theory
and negative sentences, and above all of Syntax (1965) a much stronger
the fact that it was a purely syntactic transformational-generative model
theory. than his original one. The base com-
As the generalised transformations ponent of the Aspects Theory still
235
TRANSFORMATIONAL-GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
236
TRANSFORMATIONAL-GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
introduction of marked elements and assignment of abstract Case and its mor-
above all the reduction of the number phological realization. Control theory
of transformations to a single, heavily determines the potential for reference of
constrained move- rule. This devel- the abstract pronominal element PRO.
opment led to the Government and
Binding Theory (GB-Theory) advo- It is the aim of GB-theory to find the
cated in Chomsky (1981). principles and parameters common
In GB-Theory, sentence descriptions to all languages so that the syntax of a
are simultaneously created on the four particular language can be explained
interdependent levels of syntax (or D- along these lines. Evidence and
structure), S-structure, phonetic form counter-evidence from specific lan-
and logical form, each of which is con- guages has led to continual refinement
cerned with specific aspects of the of the theory, so that as much varia-
description of the sentence under con- tion in human language as possible
sideration. It is based on the principles can be accounted for.
and parameters theory, which states In The Minimalist Program (1995),
that there is a finite set of fundamental the latest step in the continuous
principles common to all natural lan- development of transformational-
guages and a finite set of binary generative grammar, Chomsky pro-
parameters that determine the range vided a radically new approach to the
of permissible variability in language, implementation of his underlying
language acquisition and language ideas. The well-established concepts
understanding. A major difference of D-structure and S-structure have
from the Aspects model is the fact that been discarded as well as government,
logical form is now derived from the the central element in GB-theory. Even
S-structure and not from the D- the ubiquitous phrase-structure rules
structure. have been eliminated from the theory
The principles that constrain the to a large degree. The only conceptu-
range of possible sentence structures ally necessary categories left are the
are contained in closely related sub- lexicon and the two levels of phonetic
systems as formulated in Chomsky form and logical form* and it is the
(1981: 56): role of a grammar to map them onto
each other. It is suggested that all the
Binding theory poses locality conditions other categories be dealt with in exter-
on certain processes and related items. nally specified systems outside the
The central notion of government actual grammar. Using conceptions of
theory is the relation between the head economy, assuming that humans use
of a construction and categories as economic a system as possible, it is
dependent on it. -theory is concerned suggested that an optimal solution of
with the assignment of thematic relating phonological form and logi-
roles such as agent-of-action, etc. cal form can be found.
(henceforth: -roles). Binding theory is As suggested by the title of Chom-
concerned with relations of anaphors, skys book, minimalism* has not yet
pronouns, names and variables to possi- been fully developed into a compre-
ble antecedents. Case theory deals with hensive theory, but is a program,
237
TRUTH THEORIES
238
TRUTH THEORIES
most central issues in philosophy the name should avoid. Consider the
and truth theories vary a great deal sentence, I am lying. If one asks
from one another in terms of what whether this sentence is true or false,
they claim as well as what they take one is soon confronted with a para-
for granted, that is, their metaphysi- dox. If it is true, then the speaker is
cal baggage. Philosophers have admitting that he/she is lying or that
always been at pains to define truth what he/she is saying is false. On the
and suggest ways of ascertaining other hand, if it is false, then we have
when something is true and when it is the speakers word that he/she is not
not. lying or that what he/she is saying is
true. So, either way, the question as to
See also: Analytic/Synthetic; the truth or falsity of the sentence I
Correspondence Theory; Definite am lying leads one to an intellectual
Descriptions; Logic; quagmire. There are many variants of
Presupposition; Propositions; the liar paradox that produce similar
Truth Value results. Among these are Epimenides
Key Thinkers: Aristotle; Ayer, A. the Cretan says all Cretans are liars
J.; Davidson, Donald; Frege, (is Epimenides lying or telling the
Gottlob; Kant, Immanuel; Peirce, truth?) or The barber of Seville is one
C. S.; Quine, W. V. O.; Ramsey, F. who, while continuing to live in
P.; Russell, Bertrand; Strawson, P. Seville, decides to shave every man in
F.; Tarski Alfred; Wittgenstein, Seville who does not shave himself
Ludwig (does the barber shave himself?). It is
clear that, irrespective of the defini-
Ever since Pontius Pilate asked the tion of truth one works with, one has
question What is truth? and, as the to make sure that the paradox pro-
saying goes, preferred not to wait for duced in each of these cases must
an answer, the issue has been posed somehow be skirted.
and intensely probed time and time The solutions proposed by phil-
again by philosophers. But truth has osophers for the liar paradox and its
proved to be evasive. Over the cen- variants differ considerably. Some rec-
turies, philosophers have proposed ommend that we regard such sen-
competing theories of truth, but this is tences as meaningless on the grounds
an area of investigation where new that one part of a sentence cannot sen-
problems keep cropping up faster than sibly refer to the sentence as a whole
they are able to tackle them. In philos- and therefore predicate of it that it is
ophy, the predicate true is always in true or false. Others concede that such
contrast with false, unlike popular sentences do make sense (how else do
usage where it is often opposed to fic- we know that they are odd?) but are
titious, fake or spurious. neither true nor false. Others decree
Philosophers have long contended that such sentences are ill-formed
with a mind-boggler referred to gener- because they violate a ban on self-
ically as the liar paradox. The liar reference. Still others decree that all
paradox illustrates an early conun- paradoxical sentences, being outright
drum which any theory of truth worth contradictions, are false and argue
239
TRUTH THEORIES
further that any attempt to derive the cal term proposition*, which they dis-
truth of part of a paradoxical sentence tinguish from a sentence (a syntactic
by logical means is doomed to fail. entity) and a statement (a unit of prag-
Bertrand Russell identified a version matics). Another property of truth is
of the liar paradox in set theory by that a sentence, once true, will always
asking us to imagine a set of sets that be true no matter what the specific cir-
are not members of themselves and cumstances of its utterance, making
wondering, apropos of this larger set, due allowances for such elements as
if it is a member of itself. What Russell tomorrow that, as it were, date the
successfully showed by his discussion sentence. In other words, truth is not
of this antinomy was the importance only a universal but also an eternal
of weeding out the threat of contra- property. Furthermore, it is an inalien-
diction from a mathematically sound able property. With reference to the
theory of truth, or for that matter, any specific example above, it must be
theory whatsoever. pointed out that what is being consid-
Anyone setting out to propose a ered truth-apt is neither the sentence
theory of truth has to sort out a per se nor the proposition expressed
number of initial questions. To begin by it, but a dated instantiation of it,
with, it is important to know what it that is to say, a token of that sentence
is of which we may sensibly predicate as produced on a certain date and at a
truth or, to put it technically, what precise time. This caveat is absolutely
sorts of entities can be said to be truth- necessary because, unless we are fur-
apt. For instance, the sentence It will ther told when/on which day the sen-
rain tomorrow is bound to be either tence was uttered, it would be
true or false we will soon discover impossible to verify its truth, for the
whether it is one or the other simple reason that this can only be
whereas Will it rain tomorrow? or If done retrospectively a day after it is
only it rained tomorrow/Would that it uttered.
rained tomorrow is not considered to The philosophers who broadly sub-
be a candidate for truth ascription. scribe to the view of truth adumbrated
On the other hand, Il pleuvra in the foregoing paragraphs are work-
demain, Vai chover amanh, kal ing within what is referred to as the
pani barsega, which are the French, correspondence theory* of truth. This
Portuguese and Hindi translation- is a way of conceiving of truth that
equivalents of It will rain tomorrow dates back to at least as far back as
respectively, are just as true or false Aristotle, who famously claimed in his
under the same set of circumstances as Metaphysics (1011b25): to say of
the English sentence. This means that what is that it is not, or of what is not
what is true or false is not the sentence that it is, is false, while to say of what
It will rain tomorrow (which, of is that it is, and of what is not that it
course, belongs only to the English is not, is true. Underlying the corre-
language). In other words, truth has spondence theory is the assumption
to do with what a sentence says or that truth is a matter of correspon-
what we may call its meaning. dence between what one says on the
Many philosophers use the techni- one hand and what there is out there
240
TRUTH THEORIES
241
TRUTH THEORIES
242
TRUTH THEORIES
243
TRUTH VALUE
has received the name of the perfor- Russell, Bertrand (1905). On denoting.
mative* theory of truth because it Mind 14: 47944.
draws on J. L. Austins speech act Strawson, Peter. F. (1949). Truth. Analy-
theory* which initially posited an sis: 8397.
important distinction between saying Tarski, Alfred (1933). The concept of truth
and doing. Quine, to whom the dis- in formalized languages. Reprinted in
quotational theory of truth is gener- Alfred Tarski (1956), Logic, Semantics,
ally attributed, interpreted Tarskis Metamathematius. Trans. J. H. Woodger.
semantic theory in the light of Oxfurd: Clarendon Press. 15278.
Ramseys insight and argued that
Tarskis was, at bottom, a deflationary Further reading
theory to the extent that, in Tarskis Alston, William P. (1996). A Realistic
approach, the predicate is true only Conception of Truth. Ithaca, NY: Cor-
made sense in a metalanguage, not in nell University Press.
the object language. Davidson, Donald (1984). Inquiries into
Truth theories, dedicated to answer- Truth and Interpretation. Oxford:
ing the deceptively simple-looking Oxford University Press.
question of what it is to say that a Dummett, Michael (1978). Truth and
sentence, statement or proposition is Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Har-
true, have dominated the work of vard University Press.
some of the most eminent thinkers, and Horwich, Paul (1990). Truth. London:
have touched on many of the major Basil Blackwell.
issues in the philosophy of language. Kirkham, Richard (1992). Theories of
Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cam-
Primary sources bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Aristotle (350 BCE). Metaphysics. Trans. Rescher, Nicholas (1973). The Coherence
W. D. Ross. Available at http://clas- Theory of Truth. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
sics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html versity Press.
(accessed 4 October 2007).
Kanavillil Rajagopalan
Ayer, Alfred J. (1952). Language, Truth and
Logic. New York: Dover Publications.
Frege, Gottlob (1892). On sense and mean-
ing. In Peter Geach and Max Black (eds)
TRUTH VALUE
(1980). Translations from the Philosoph-
ical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: At their simplest, truth values are often
Blackwell. First edition, 1952. 5678. thought to be governed by the princi-
Quine, Willard V. O. (1970). Philosophy ple of bivalence, in which any declara-
of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice tive sentences truth value can be either
Hall. true (when what the sentence states is
Ramsey, Frank P. (1927). Facts and the case) or false (when what the sen-
propositions. Aristotelian Society Sup- tence states is not the case). There is
plementary Volume 7: 15370. debate in logic and the philosophy of
Rorty, Richard (1979). Philosophy and language about the appropriateness of
the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Prince- the principle of bivalence and hence,
ton University Press. about the nature of truth value.
244
TRUTH VALUE
245
TYPE/TOKEN
246
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
This second usage may seem at thought* as having been uttered, and
odds with the first. To obtain two tokened is a useful alternative. To
tokens of the word Alfred in the token a sentence of the language of
second usage of the type/token dis- thought is for that sentence to occur
tinction would require two utterances explicitly in ones brain. Philosophers
of the word. But in the first usage there of mind also make a related distinction
are two tokens of this word in the sen- between types and tokens of actions
tence Alfred Brendel was named after (where only the latter are specific
Alfred the Great, even if that sentence events) and types and tokens of mental
is not uttered even once. state (such as the belief that London is
The relation between the first and in England, which anyone might have,
second usages can be understood if we versus Janes belief that London is in
return to our non-linguistic example. England).
The vehicles in a car park can be typed The type/token distinction admits,
according to manufacturer, to colour, then, of several different manifesta-
to engine size, or to age, and so on. tions in linguistics. Using the label to
Similarly, the utterances produced at a mark the contrast between a sentence
particular party can be typed in differ- and a particular utterance of it may be
ent ways: by the identity of the utterer, slightly out of kilter with other uses
for example, or by loudness, pitch, but it has become dominant and is at
time of occurrence,and so on. But the least comprehensible in context.
most useful way of typing utterances
in linguistics is usually by the expres- Primary sources
sion produced. So dominant is this Peirce, Charles S. (1966). Collected Papers
way of comparing and contrasting of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge,
utterances that it has become normal MA: Harvard University Press.
to talk as though sentences themselves
are the type, while utterances are Further reading
tokens of them. Though this use Wetzel, Linda (2006). Types and Tokens:
is, arguably, erroneous, it is simple An Essay on Universals. Cambridge,
enough to understand what an author MA: MIT Press.
has in mind in writing this way. The
practice has even given rise to talk of a Alex Barber
sentences being tokened, by which is
meant its being uttered. A related
practice is to describe the indexicality
of expressions such as I, now, and UNIVERSAL
so on as token reflexivity, since
indexicals depend for their referential
GRAMMAR
properties on features of the context of
their utterance. In Noam Chomskys theory of human
A further factor driving this second natural language, the genetically
use of token derives from the philos- determined initial state of the lin-
ophy of mind. It makes little sense to guistic competence in the individ-
talk of sentences of the language of ual human mind/brain, which is the
247
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
248
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
249
UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
250
USE/MENTION
251
USE/MENTION
One is that the very label for the con- (7) The final letter in Paris is left
trast is misleading: to mention a word unvoiced by the people who live
often is to use it, albeit to refer to itself. there.
Another is that one can mention a word (8) The people of Paris do not pro-
without actually using it, as with (6): nounce it that way.
(9) Giorgione was so-called because
(6) The five letter word that refers to of his size.
the capital of the largest French-
speaking European country has two The use/mention distinction can be
syllables. difficult for language users to negoti-
ate, yet it is important in discussions
Since such cases do not give rise to of language precisely because it exists
confusion, they are not what people at the interface between expression
would have in mind as typical men- and meaning. The fact that for speak-
tionings, but mentionings they never- ers and hearers the distinction is
theless are. Yet another complication often imperceptible without addi-
is that non-mentioning uses of a word tional communicative actions, includ-
have little in common beyond being ing gestures and intonation, has made
non-mentionings. They are certainly use/mention a central problem in
not all cases of using the word to refer pragmatics as well as in the philoso-
to a standard referent. Think of the phy of language more generally.
or Santa Claus, for example, or
the use of words to refer to a non- Primary sources
standard referent in malapropisms. Frege, Gottlob (1892). On sense and ref-
Anaphora in which one word or erence. In P. Geach and M. Black (eds)
expression is referentially dependent (1980), Translations for the Philosoph-
on another introduces yet more ical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Third
complexity. In (7), the final word is edition. Oxford: Blackwell.
anaphoric to the fifth word, even Quine, W. V. (1956). Quantifiers and
though the fifth word refers to itself propositional attitudes. Journal of Phi-
while the final word refers to a city. losophy 53, 17787.
With the it in (8) the situation is
reversed. Following W.V.O. Quines Further reading
work on propositional attitudes*, Davidson, Donald (1979). Quotation. In
example (9) is still more complex. Donald Davidson (2001), Inquiries into
The so in so-called refers to the Truth and Interpretation. Oxford:
name Giorgione (which means tall Oxford University Press.
George) while his refers to the Ren- Devitt, Michael and Kim Sterelny (1987).
aissance artist himself, making it Language and Reality. Oxford: Black-
unclear whether the name to which well. 345.
both are tied anaphorically should be
in quotation marks or not. Alex Barber
252
Index
253
INDEX
254
INDEX
255
INDEX
Matthiessen, Christian, 226, 228, 229 Peirce, Charles Sanders, 56, 49,
Mead, Margaret, 208 116, 144, 2078, 242, 246
Mendoza, San Francisco Ruiz de, 217 performatives, 152, 154, 1556,
mentalese, 11011 21416
mentalism, 21, 1301 Perry, John, 20910
mention see use/mention phase, 137
merge operation, 135 phenomenology, 101
Merin, Arthur, 108 phoneme, 65, 1567, 220, 222, 224,
metaphor, 16, 213, 43, 49, 109, 233, 246
1314, 188, 190, 1912, 198, 231 phonology, 23, 38, 58, 656, 778,
metonymy, 132, 1902, 217 113, 115, 147, 148, 220, 222,
Mill, J. S., 26, 68, 143, 202 238
minimalism, 1348, 2378 Piaget, Jean, 53
Mitchell, T. F., 60 Pike, Kenneth, 58, 667, 115
modality, 62, 1389, 165, 228 Plato, 5, 7, 28, 46, 96, 143, 151, 192
model theoretic semantics, 13942 politeness, 90, 15761
Montague, Richard, 24, 13940, political correctness, 1612
164, 1856, 211, 233, 236 Popper, Karl, 43, 49, 52
Moon, Rosamund, 131, 134 Port Royal Logic, 110, 1634
Moore, G. E., 6, 7, 10, 42, 88, 199 possible world semantics, 23, 1649,
morphology, 13, 38, 58, 139 176, 202, 211
Morris, Charles, 208 Postal, Paul, 789, 235
postmodernism, 47
names, 256, 54, 1424, 168, 176, poststructuralism, 47, 75, 1703
1834, 2023, 214 pragmatics, 3, 22, 289, 5960, 78,
narrative, 33, 63 79, 91, 109, 113, 157, 177, 181,
natural language processing (NLP), 193, 195, 1979, 208, 217, 228,
15, 3941 236, 252
negative evidence, 96, 104 Prague Linguistics Circle (Prague
Neurath, Otto, 128 School), 65, 115, 221
Nicole, Pierre, 163 preferred/dispreferred responses, 31
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 44 prescriptivism, 1, 57, 154
nonnatural meaning, 29, 1445 presupposition, 55, 89, 1739, 241,
noun phrase, 25, 1367, 176, 2335, 245
250 Prince, Alan, 146
private language, 85, 111, 17980,
Ockham, William of, 26, 42 222
openings and closings, 30 propositional attitudes, 823, 110,
optimality theory, 65, 778, 109, 112, 177, 1815, 204, 252
1459 propositions, 4, 48, 55, 81, 95, 108,
ordinary language philosophy (OLP), 122, 155, 163, 165, 1678, 174,
8, 55, 14955, 215 176, 1823, 184, 1856, 215, 242
orthography, 35, 38 prototype, 21, 79, 1869
psychoanalysis, 171, 18993, 222
Pnini, 120 psychology, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 30,
Panther, Klause, 217 489, 66, 71, 72, 81, 85, 96, 104,
parameters, 50, 108, 211, 237, 250 112, 1301, 145, 152, 157, 170,
parole see langue/parole 187, 206, 214, 238
Pascal, Blaise, 15 Putnam, Hilary, 85
256
INDEX
Quine, W. V. O., 89, 1112, 1314, science, 9, 1214, 18, 20, 43, 47, 52,
19, 25, 923, 95, 129, 2434, 73, 79, 81, 97, 133, 171, 174,
252 206, 221, 233
Searle, John, 1516, 79, 1013,
Ramsey, Frank, 2434 11112, 1435, 150, 1534,
Rask, Rasmus, 57 1556, 158, 185, 202, 21617
rationalism see Sechehaye, Albert, 113
empiricism/rationalism Sellars, Wilfred, 199200
realism, 6, 152, 168, 241, 242 semantics, 1314, 21, 23, 26, 58, 78,
recursion, 2, 96 95, 97, 107, 109, 113, 126, 131,
reference see sense/reference 138, 13942, 1649, 176, 181,
register, 1, 59, 62 182, 185, 1978, 201, 203, 2068,
Reid, Thomas, 213, 214 20912, 220, 222, 224, 227, 231,
Reinach, Adolf, 21415 233, 236, 241, 245
reinforcement, 19, 20, 63 sense data, 199200, 152
relative clause, 2, 163 sense/reference, 2005
relevance theory (RT), 91, 1939 sequence pairs, 31
repair, 30, 32, 33, 34 signs and semiotics, 28, 989,
response see stimulus/response 11415, 116, 1424, 201, 2059,
revised extended standard theory, 215
135, 236 Sinclair, John, 60
Ribot, Thodule-Armand, 2067 situational semantics, 20912
Rorty, Richard, 243 Skinner, B. F., 1920, 130
Rosch, Eleanor, 22, 79, 154, 1867 Smolensky, Paul, 146
Ross, John (Haj), 22, 78, 79 sociolinguistics, 24, 58, 601, 76, 78,
Russell, Bertrand, 67, 9, 10, 15, 42, 97, 99, 120, 157, 231, 238
49, 546, 123, 126, 127, 143, sociology, 35, 45, 59, 114, 152, 158,
150, 1523, 163, 174, 1756, 189, 238
180, 1834, 199200, 215, Socrates, 13, 28, 46, 151
2401 speech act theory, 59, 60, 869, 91,
Ryle, Gilbert, 8, 19, 149, 150, 215 97, 1012, 109, 112, 129, 1523,
155, 1589, 1778, 185, 196,
Sacks, Harvey, 2932 21219, 244
Sadock, Jerrold, 217 Sperber, Dan, 90, 91, 1939
St Anselm, 26 Spinoza, Benedictus de, 70
Sampson, Geoffrey, 52 stimulus/response, 1820, 434,
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 52, 116, 4950, 52, 701, 96, 195, 249
117, 223 Strawson, P. F., 8, 556, 145, 149,
Sapir, Edward, 58, 66, 115, 116, 152, 1746, 202, 209, 243, 245
117, 118, 130 structuralism, 113, 1701, 21925
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 26, 28, 46, Stubbs, Michael, 601
58, 59, 97, 98, 11316, 144, 170, Swales, John, 62
18992, 2057, 219, 2212, 224, synecdoche, 132
226 syntax, 2, 13, 38, 589, 79, 97, 111,
Schegloff, Emanuel, 301, 33 113, 123, 126, 127, 1412, 146,
Schiffer, Stephen, 56, 145 163, 208, 231, 233, 2367, 249
Schiffrin, Deborah, 334, 63 synthetic see analytic/synthetic
Schlick, Moritz, 128 systemic-functional grammar (SFG),
Schtze, C. T., 2, 1056 62, 98, 22532
257
INDEX
258
ERRATUM
The publisher and editors of Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language
wish to apologise for the errors of fact which they mistakenly introduced into the
entry on Innateness in this volume, errors which were neither originated nor seen by
the author. The corrected and author-approved entry is printed here.
Innateness
The claim that some aspects of linguistic competence are genetically specified rather
than learnt through experience. This claim has been driving research in generative
linguistics and language acquisition since the late 1950s.
Primary sources
Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and Representations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chomsky, N. (1981). Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures.
Holland: Foris Publications.
Further Reading
Elman, J. L., E. A. Bates, M. H. Johnson, A. Karmiloff-Smith, D. Parisi and K.
Plunkett (1996). Rethinking Innateness: A connectionist perspective on
development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hauser, M. D., N. Chomsky and W. T. Fitch (2002). The faculty of language: What
is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298, 156979.
Lai, C. S. L., S. E. Fisher, J. A. Hurst, F. Vargha-Khadem and A. P. Monaco (2001).
A forkhead-domain gene is mutated in severe speech and language. Nature
413: 51923.
Stavroula-Thaleia Kousta