Resident Training and The Medical Emergency Team: Geoffrey K. Lighthall
Resident Training and The Medical Emergency Team: Geoffrey K. Lighthall
Resident Training and The Medical Emergency Team: Geoffrey K. Lighthall
Introduction
Periodic re-examination of health care delivery systems have led to reforms
aimed at improving the welfare and safety of patients. Medical Emergency
Teams (METs) have emerged at the same time as resident work-hour
restrictions have come into effect, public awareness of medical error has
increased, and new models of residency program accreditation have
been proposed (1,2). While well intentioned, the noted reforms and
improvements in health care have not emerged as a coherent and user-
friendly package. Concerns over medication error, for example, have led to
directives for computer entry of drug orders, but this is not always com-
patible with a desire to maximize time at the bedside in the face of work-
hour limitations. Likewise, the implementation of protocols and pathways
that have provided higher quality of care may pose a threat to the concept
of applying and individualizing basic and clinical science at the bedside.And
while resident work-hour restrictions have been promulgated as a measure
to improve patient safety, compliance with these new rules means even
greater reliance on shift care or cross-coverage schemes, where there is
greater likelihood that physicians will be responsible for patients with
whom they have little familiarity.While numerous challenges abound in res-
ident education, the question here is whether the implementation of a
Medical Emergency Team (MET)—a classically patient-centered interven-
tion—interferes with medical education, or whether there are ways in which
medical education can be enhanced through the existence and operation of
a MET.
217
218 G.K. Lighthall
intensive care unit (ICU). The studies were notable for demonstrating great
variations in quality of care, and in particular, the widespread finding of care
that was inadequate.
Studies evaluating patterns of ward care prior to ICU admission show a
general lack of time urgency in evaluating and treating patients with abnor-
mal vital signs and other forms of deterioration (3–5). Patients initially
admitted to hospital wards (as opposed to ICU) had up to a 4-fold increase
risk of mortality, suggesting that the nature of the care was a more sig-
nificant determinant of the ultimate clinical trajectory than the admitting
diagnosis (4). Both deterioration in the admitting condition and the
development of new problems were key risks for a worse outcome.
In a study done by McQuillan et al., patients considered to have “sub-
optimal” care had twice the ICU mortality rate of the other groups (6).
Areas considered problematic were: timing of admission (late), and man-
agement of oxygen therapy, airway, breathing, circulation, and monitoring.
Reasons underlying the suboptimal care were “failure of organization, lack
of knowledge, failure to appreciate clinical urgency, lack of experience, lack
of supervision, and failure to seek advice.” Our own experience in examin-
ing the dynamic decision making of house staff in a fully simulated ICU
revealed similar deficiencies, including non-adherence to established
protocols (7).
Two different studies of antecedents to cardiac arrest demonstrated that
75% to 85% of the affected patients had some form of deterioration in the
hours prior to the cardiac arrest (3,8). Nearly one-third of such abnormal-
ities persisted for greater than 24 hours prior to cardiac arrest, with a pop-
ulation mean of 6.5 hours (3). In one series, the majority (76%) of the
disease processes eventually progressing to cardiac arrest were not consid-
ered intrinsically, rapidly fatal (8). In another series, over half of the cardiac
arrests presented ample warning of decompensation: the majority of pa-
tients had uncorrected hypotension, and half of these had systolic blood
pressures less than 80 mmHg for more than 24 hours (9). Other patients in
this series had severe but correctable abnormalities such as hypokalemia,
hypoglycemia, and hypoxemia. This collective experience suggests that
quality of care, more so than the disease, may be responsible for the poor
immediate survival of these patients. Inattention to or unawareness of a
developing serious condition causes the additional problem of hasty deci-
sion making at the time of cardiac arrest. Once a cardiac arrest has
occurred, the clinician’s hand is forced, and ICU admission becomes
mandatory for surviving patients in the absence of a do-not-resuscitate
order.
Problems with establishing proper care were found to exist at multiple
levels: nurses were not calling physicians for patients with abnormal vital
signs or changes in sensorium; physicians did not fully evaluate these abnor-
malities when they were contacted; ICU consultants were not called in rou-
tinely, and senior level or consulting ICU caregivers did not obtain routine
20. Resident Training and the Medical Emergency Team 219
studies, such as blood gasses, hematocrit and electrolyte studies, that would
have defined the patient’s problem. In cases when laboratory studies
were done, they were not always interpreted correctly, and when they were,
therapy was not always initiated (5). All of the aforementioned studies were
conducted in academic centers where junior team members are tradition-
ally called to evaluate a patient and there is a varying degree of engage-
ment by more senior staff members. Loss of valuable time in patient
evaluation and stabilization may have been further compounded by attend-
ing staff that lack knowledge of seriously ill patients and their problems,
and who lacked the skills to direct an appropriate resuscitation (6,10).
Further, teaching hospitals have also increased their reliance on cross-
coverage schemes, which also have been associated with a higher incidence
of potentially preventable adverse events (11).
The overall goals are: (1) perform a quick analysis of vital signs, ventilatory,
and oxygen delivery status to assess the severity of acute and chronic con-
ditions, (2) make timely decisions about triage, goals of care, or need for
the involvement of other services (surgery, cardiac catheterization labora-
tories, etc.), and (3) rapidly stabilize respiratory and cardiovascular status
prior to ICU transfer if needed. Moreover, the approach needs to be pre-
dictable and systematic.
This design reflects a desire to use the minimum number of people to
accomplish all tasks related to the team goals: patient examination and his-
torical investigation, invasive procedures including mechanical ventilation,
analysis of laboratory values and clinical course, communication with con-
sultants, and ongoing monitoring of patient and care plans until transfer to
220 G.K. Lighthall
unstable patients is a test of their mettle, and that to solicit outside help is
a sign of weakness. In many instances, the team’s attending physician is
never called to help with evaluation. Even when an one is summoned, they
may not have the best understanding of how to prioritize diagnostic and
stabilization efforts and organize and lead a multidisciplinary team, or
possess the technical skills and knowledge required by the situation.
Medical training is structured around the concept of gradually increas-
ing responsibility and decreasing supervision, and a belief in learning from
mistakes. Given this, it is reasonable to consider whether a team-oriented
approach to unstable patients undermines medical education by depriving
residents of the ability to make and learn from their medical decisions. An
argument could be made that there is little to be gained from allowing mis-
takes to occur (21). Observational studies in the intensive care unit as well
as in a simulated environment have demonstrated that physicians make
errors without even realizing that they occur (7,22); in the case of real
patients, it is difficult to imagine how any educational benefit could result
from such mistakes if the physician is unaware of them. When errors are
detected, there is great variability among individuals, departments, and
specialties in acknowledging errors and their sources. In one study on self-
reported errors—despite 90% being associated with serious outcomes—
only 54% of the house officers discussed their mistakes with an attending
physician (23). In a more recent study of morbidity and mortality confer-
ences in internal medical departments, cases containing errors were pre-
sented in less than half of the conferences, and were addressed as errors in
only one-half of the applicable instances (24). By the authors’ estimation,
a substantive discussion of error would occur in the studied department’s
morbidity and mortality conferences only 7 times a year.
If one of the prime modalities of resident training is learning from mis-
takes, additional thought should be directed toward maximizing the yield
of this process. Simulation training may be a superior alternative to prac-
ticing on patients—especially for development of crisis management skills
(25–28). Simulation training for individuals and teams provides greater
exposure to situations that generate errors, and allows residents to acknowl-
edge errors immediately after they occur and to discuss them with peers
and senior staff in a constructive, non-punitive environment (7,29). The use
of simulation training as part of MET development will be discussed in
greater detail below. To summarize here, the MET is not likely to interfere
with the assimilation of knowledge and experience in residency training.
There is good evidence that allowing too much independence in critical sit-
uations may create errors and hazards that are not known, caught, or dis-
cussed in a manner that maximizes the educational yield of each mistake.
Resident participation in a MET rearranges resident responsibilities in a
way that maximizes patient safety and survival, and may in part replace the
ethically untenable system of “learning from mistakes” with one that does
things the right way.
224 G.K. Lighthall
Procedures
Depending on design, a MET may differ from the current mode of ward care
by having attending physicians or fellows involved early on in an evaluation
and resuscitation. At first glance, this “top-heavy” approach may seem to
deprive residents of valuable experience in performing procedures and eval-
uating bedside and laboratory data. Personal experience as a triage attend-
ing suggests that the opposite is true: when working with medical or surgical
house staff to evaluate and stabilize patients in their care, the primary teams
are typically pushed toward doing more—whether it is obtaining arterial
blood gas studies, placing arterial or central venous catheters, or making
changes in ventilatory or fluid therapy. Residents are actually encouraged to
look deeper into the patient’s problems and to understand more.
Not all critical care attending physicians are likely to participate in a
MET; rather there is likely to be a self-selection bias toward those with a
more hands-on approach to patient care. Having the MET led by a critical
care-based faculty member or fellow is likely to bring to the bedside
someone who is comfortable supervising and performing procedures, and
who has the skills to back up the care by the primary team. To give a con-
crete example, our proposal for a MET includes a technology bundle that
features a portable blood gas/chemistry analyzer, a portable monitor that
can display invasive pressures and exhaled CO2, and a portable ultrasound
machine for analysis of cardiac structure and function. Thus, while the
overall mode of care may be different for a ward emergency, the MET
brings with it new and perhaps more advanced opportunities for patient
evaluation and skill development.
Another example is central lines. Many of our residents on the ICU rota-
tion complain that they get little experience placing central lines because
the majority of patients have them placed in the operating room. However,
these residents, hungry for experience, rarely place central lines on patients
in the emergency room or in the intermediate care unit—even when indi-
cated for safety reasons (for example, vasopressor administration) or by
clinical evidence (for example, as a guide for fluid therapy in early sepsis)
(30). With the loosening of critical care boundaries that would be seen with
a MET, residents will learn more about different invasive procedures, their
indication, and the interpretation of their data. Although unproven, we feel
that based on this understanding, residents will actually perform more pro-
cedures than at present.
A Win-Win Situation
Many of the changes in health care delivery associated with METs are likely
to facilitate the development and assessment of competencies now required
by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME)
20. Resident Training and the Medical Emergency Team 225
• Patient care
• Medical knowledge
• Practice-based learning and improvement
• Interpersonal and communication skills
• Professionalism
• System-based practice
of future errors (29). Residents exposed to such a culture of safety may let
this philosophy shape behavior and improve patient care in other settings.
In brief, the role of the resident is likely to change with the inception of
a Medical Emergency Team. Despite what some may perceive as a loss of
autonomy or independence with the change, a more favorable structure for
patient care could be the product. Table 20.2 summarizes some differences
one would likely see.
distribution, are probably best applied to real emergencies if they have been
practiced at an earlier time. Medical simulation has been used to teach crisis
management skills in a number of acute care professions, including critical
care, and is a natural fit for MET training (7,30,34). As a training modality,
human patient simulation guarantees the resident exposure to the desired
case mix, and at no risk to the patient. Ideally, the MET will have periodic
practice sessions to maintain competency, refine methods, and to in-
corporate new members. Scoring systems that rate individual performances
in the management of specific patient emergencies have been developed
and used in simulated patient scenarios, and may be applicable to the
training and evaluation of MET teams as a whole (34,35).
As an operating principle, the MET should practice evidence-based med-
icine. Simulation training provides an opportunity for team members to
discuss new diagnostic modalities and therapies and to rapidly incorporate
them into team operations. There is certainly a basis for resident attendance
and involvement in such activities, and this alone can provide some direct
training experience in crisis management as well as engender some consis-
tency in the evaluation of patients in uncontrolled settings.
The use of vasoactive and analgesic medicines in medical emergencies is
vastly different from that in other settings, including advanced cardiac life
support emergencies; our own work in ICU crisis simulation suggests that
this remains an esoteric body of knowledge and a frequent source of error
(7). A simulated environment is especially valuable in learning the use and
pitfalls of these medicines for different types of patients and in dynamic
situations. Most residencies lack direct skill development in crisis manage-
ment, so, insofar as a MET can increase exposure to and assimilation of
such skills, it should be regarded as another plus for the training of medical
residents.
Summary
The need to train and develop house staff for independent practice may
conflict with the needs of patients who require rapid stabilization. Finding
a healthy balance between the 2, where the patient receives the best care
possible, is a challenge to those in academic medicine. Increasingly, data
suggests that the traditional models of resident training have in part failed
to place the patient first. The contributors to this text believe that the imple-
mentation of Medical Emergency Teams will offset some of these short-
comings in care and improve the public accountability of medical
education. The MET can also offer opportunities for the development of
competencies in patient care for both trainees and established physicians.
Likewise, the MET can provide an educational structure from which house
staff can learn a great deal more about interdisciplinary teamwork, patient
safety, and the responsiveness of health care to patient needs.
230 G.K. Lighthall
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