Government v. Springer

9/20/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 050
[No. 26979. April 1, 1927]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

plaintiff, vs. MILTON E. SPRINGER, DALMACIO
COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO, defendants.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GOVERNMENT OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; DIVISION OF POWERS.—The
powers entrusted by the Congress of the United States to
the Government of the Philippine Islands are distributed
among three coordinate departments, the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial.
2. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—No department of the Government of the

Philippine Islands may legally exercise any of the powers
conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the others.
3. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—It is beyond the power of any branch of the

Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its
functions in any other way than that prescribed by the
Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the
Organic Law.
4. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The chief exponent of autonomy in

domestic affairs in the Government of the Philippine
Islands is the Philippine Legislature. The Governor-
General on the other hand is the head of the Government
and symbolizes American sovereignty. Under such a
political system, lines of demarcation between the
legislative and the executive departments are difficult to
fix, and attempted encroachments of one on the other may
260
260 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer
be expected. It is, however, the duty of the Supreme Court,

as the guardian of the constitution, to enforce
fundamental principles.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d4f4bfce16688cc9a003600fb002c009e/p/ARY226/?username=Guest 1/85
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE POWER.—The Organic Act

vests "the supreme executive power" in the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands. The Governor-General
since the approval of the last Organic Act has no
prerogative powers.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Congress of the United States

clearly intended that the Governor-General's power should
be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress
never intended that the Governor-General should be
saddled with the responsibility of administering the
government and of executing the laws but shorn of the
power to do so.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The Organic Act

grants general legislative power except as otherwise
provided therein to the Philippine Legislature. The
legislative power of the Philippine Government is granted
in general terms subject to specific limitations.
8. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Legislative power is the authority,

under the constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Legislature cannot lawfully exercise
powers which are in their nature essentially executive or
judicial. The Legislature cannot make a law and then take
part in its execution or construction. (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 126-131, 157-162.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE.—The

authorities on the question, Where does the power to
appoint to public office reside?, reviewed and certain
principles deduced therefrom. The particular wording of
the constitution involved, and its correct interpretation
predetermines the result. The selection of persons to
perform the functions of government is primarily a
prerogative of the people. The appointment of public
officials is generally looked upon as properly an executive
function. Appointments may be made by the Legislature
or the courts, but when so made should be taken as an
incident to the discharge of functions properly within their
respective spheres.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE IN THE

PHILIPPINES.—The right to appoint to office has been
confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by the
Government of the United States to the executive branch
of the government which it has set up in the Philippines.
Under a system' of government of delegated powers, under
which delegation legislative power vests in the
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VOL. 50, APRIL 1 1927 261
Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the

Governor-General, and under which delegation a general
power of appointment resides in the Governor-General
and a specified power of appointment resides in the
Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or
indirectly perform functions of an executive nature
through the designation of its presiding officers as
majority members of a body which has executive
functions.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Legislature may add to, but
may not diminish, the power of appointment of the
Governor-General.
12. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The exceptions made in favor of

the Legislature as to appointments to office strengthen
rather than weaken the grant to the executive. The
expression of one thing in the constitution is necessarily
the exclusion of things not expressed.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Appointment to office in the

Philippines is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion
.
14. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Myers vs. United States
([1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160) followed.
15. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PUBLIC OFFICERS.—

Membership in the voting committee created for the
National Coal Company is an office or executive function.
16. ID.; ID. ; ID.; CORPORATIONS.—The incorporation of the

National Coal Company has not served to disconnect the
company or the stock which the Government owns in it
from the Government and executive control.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Legislature is empowered to create

and control private corporations.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The National Coal Company is a private

corporation.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—By becoming a stockholder in the

National Coal Company, the Government divested itself of
its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions
of the corporation.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The National Coal Company remains an

agency or instrumentality of government.
21. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The Government, like any other

stockholder, is justified in intervening in the transactions
in the corporation, and in protecting its property rights in
the corporation.
22. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The duty of caring for government

property is neither judicial nor legislative in character but
is executive.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF PARTIAL INVALIDITY.—The

striking out may not necessarily be by erasing words, but
it may be by
262
disregarding the unconstutional provision and reading the

statute as if that provision was not there.
24. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIFICATION BY CONGRESS.—A

territorial statute invalid when enacted is not validated by
the failure of. the Congress expressly to disapprove it.
25. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICERS.—Although there may

be a de facto officer in a de jure office, there cannot be a de
facto officer in a de facto office.
26. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOTING COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL

COAL COMPANY.— So much of section 4 of Act No. 2705,
as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to
vest the voting power of the government stock in the
National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is
unconstitutional and void.
27. EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; "QUO

WARRANTO."—In quo warranto proceedings, the f ailure
of the defendant to prove his title does not establish that
of the plaintiff. The inquiry may go in quo warranto
proceedings to the extent of determining the validity of an
Act authorizing offices.
Per JOHNSON, J., concurring:
28. "Quo WARRANTO;" RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS TO ACT

AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DlRECTORS OF
THE NATIONAL COAL COMPANY.— Upon the facts of
record and the law applicable thereto, it is held, that
Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario
are unlawfully and illegally holding and exercising the
position of members of the Board of Directors of the
National Coal Company, and should be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom; that Romarico Agcaoili, H.
L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo have been duly and
legally elected as members of the Board of Directors of the
National Coal Company, and judgment is rendered that
they be inducted into said position, to take charge thereof
and to perform the duties incumbent upon them as
members of said Board.
29. POWERS OF THE LEGISLATURE; RlGHT OF THE

LAGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
TO EXECUTE OR TO ASSIST IN THE EXECUTION OF
ITS LAWS.—In the governments organized and
established under the American flag the powers thereof
are divided into three separate and distinct departments
—executive, legislative, and judicial, each acting in its
own field, under its own authority and general powers of
government. Under the form of Government established in
the Philippine Islands one of said departments of the
Government has no power or authority
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Government of the Philippine Islands vs, Springer
to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are

performed within the discretion of the other department.
It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government
to make such laws and regulations as will effectually
conserve the peace and good order and protect the lives
and the property of the citizens. The different

departments of the government are coordinate, coequal
and each functions independently of the other, except as
their duties under the law permit them to intervene in
another department. The separate and distinct powers of
the different departments of the government are 1:0
distributed among the legislative, executive and judicial
branches, in which the powers of the government are
arranged, that it can never be in danger of degenerating
into a monarchy or any other despotic form of government
as long as there shall remain any virtue in the body of the
people. The separation of the different departments is the
system of checks and balances which makes the
governments under the American flag governments of
laws and net of men. It is a fundamental rule of
constitutional law that no department of government has
power to perform nor to assist in performing the functions
of another. The Government of the Philippine Islands, like
the Government of the United States, is based upon the
fundamental principle of the separation of the executive,
legislative, and judicial powers, subject only to such
exceptions as are permitted by law. The duties of each
department are well defined and limited to certain fields
of governmental operation. Each department exercises
functions as independent of each other as the Federal or
state governments of the United States. It -was not
intended by the framers of the theory of the Government
of the Philippine Islands, that the duties which had been
assigned to the executive department should be performed
by the legislative department, nor that the duties which
had been assigned to each of them should be performed by
the judicial department.
The executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the
Philippine Government are distributed, respectively,
among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches,
severally exercising functions and powers conferred on
them by law. It is beyond the power of any branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its
functions in any other way than that prescribed. by the
Organic Law or by local laws which conf orm to the
Organic Law. Any Act of the Philippine Legislature which
does not, by its nature, pertain to the law-making
functions and does not fall within any of the express
exceptions established by the Organic Act, is ultra, vires
and therefore
264
null and void. A legislature is a legislature and nothing

more. The power of the legislative department is to enact
laws, while it is the duty of the Governor-General to see
that the laws of the Philippines are faithfully executed.
30. POWERS OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE, GRANTED

BY THE PHILIPPINE CHARTER.—The Philippine
Legislature was given general legislative power under the
Organic Act or charter. While it possesses general
legislative power all of its laws must be reported to the
Congress of the United States, which reserves the power
and authority to annul the same. Some of its laws,
however, must also be referred to the President of the
United States for approval. None of the Acts of the
Philippine Legislature are final until they are either
expressly or tacitly approved by either the Congress or the
President.
31. POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE; ITS

AUTHORITY IS PURELY A DELEGATED AUTHORITY.
—The only authority possessed by the Philippine
Legislature is a delegated authority. The only power or
authority to adopt laws is granted by the Congress of the
United States in the Organic Law. The approval by the
President or Congress of an Act of the Philippine
Legislature does not render such an Act legal, if, in fact.
the same is beyond the powers of the legislature or
contrary to the fundamental law of the land. If the
provisions of the Act extend beyond the powers of the
legislature, it cannot be contended that the same is a valid
and legal Act even though the same has been expressly or
tacitly approved by the President or Congress, unless the
same can be considered an Act of Congress, and then only,
when the same is within the powers and authority of
Congress. Such Act of the Philippine Legislature, even
with such approval, can be no more valid and legal than if
the Congress of the United States itself had adopted a law
which was beyond its power. The legality of such Act,
notwithstanding the approval, may be decided in a proper
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether its
provisions are beyond the powers of the legislative
department of the Government. There is nothing in the
Organic Act of the Philippine Islands which authorizes the
legislative department to participate in the execution of its
laws.
32. PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE ; POWERS OF, TO

APPOINT COMMITTEES TO MAKE INVESTIGATIONS
IN ORDER TO ENACT LAWS.—In addition to the power
to enact laws, the Philippine Legislature has the inherent
power on its own account, or through committees
appointed by it, to inquire into the general condition of the
Gov
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VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 265
ernment, the administration of governmental affairs and

the general welfare of the people, to obtain information to
aid it in adopting laws. When such investigation is
terminated and laws are adopted, then the authority of
the legislature is ended and the execution of such laws is
turned over to the executive department of the
Government.
33. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT,

POWERS OF.—Under the Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands the supreme executive power is vested in an
executive officer whose official title is the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands. The phrase "supreme
executive power" was used by the Congress of the United
States after a careful consideration of its meaning. It was
not a haphazard use of the phrase. The Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands is held responsible for the
faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands.
There is nothing in any of the provisions of the Organic
Law or charter which authorizes or permits the "supreme
executive power" to divide its responsibility for the faithful
execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands with any
other department, legislative or judicial, or with any of the
bureaus of the Government. All executive functions of the
Philippine Government are expressly under the direction
and control of the Governor-General. Outside of the
provisions f or the internal regulation and control of the
affairs of the legislature and its right to take part in the
confirmation of certain appointees by the Governor-
General, there is not a syllable, a word, a phrase, a line
nor a paragraph in the Organic Law which permits the
legislature to participate in the execution of its laws. The
idea of an apportionment of the powers of Government
and of their separation into the three departments is not a
modern invention of political science. No government has

been organized by the Congress of the United States
which did not provide for the separation of the three great
powers of government and their apportionment to distinct
and independent departments of government. It is the
part of wisdom that the President of the United States
and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should
not admit of any encroachment on their powers. The
execution of the laws adopted is finally left in the hands of
the executive department of the Government.
34. FORMS OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAVE EXISTED IN

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SINCE AMERICAN
OCCUPATION.—Since the 13th day of August, 1898,
there have existed in the Philippines five different forms
of government. In each of them there existed the ex
266
ecutive, legislative, and judicial powers, fully established

and recognized by the only authority for the existence of
said Government—the Government of the United States.
35. DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL WHEN HE is

ADVISED BY HIS LEGAL DEPARTMENT THAT AN
ACT OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE is ILLEGAL.
—It is the sworn duty of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands to execute the laws. That duty,
however, does not require him to execute an illegal Act of
the legislature. When he is advised by his legal
department that a certain Act or any part thereof is illegal
and void he may disregard it or formulate an issue upon
the alleged illegality and have that question presented to
the courts for solution. In so doing he is acting within his
powers. To disregard an illegal and void Act of the
legislature is neither tyranny nor a violation of his sworn
duty. It would be a violation of his sworn duty to enforce
or permit the enforcement of an illegal Act.
36. RlGHT OF DlFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF THE

GOVERNMENT, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, TO
CONSTRUE THEIR POWERS.—Every department of
Government invested with constitutional or charter
powers must, in many instances, be the judge of their
powers, or they could not act. Such interpretation is not

exclusive. The parties aggrieved may resort to the courts
for a judicial interpretation.
37. POWERS AND RlGHTS OF THE GOVERNOR-

GENERAL TO PROTECT THE PROPERTY OF THE
GOVERNMENT.—It is the duty of the Governor-General,
as the supreme executive power, to protect the property of
the Government. If he, by negligence or inattention to that
responsibility, permits the property of the Government to
be wasted, destroyed, or lost, he subjects himself to the
danger of impeachment. His responsibility is then one of
great seriousness. He should not supinely disregard it.
38. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE BY THE LEGISLATIVE

DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT FURNISHES
NO ABSOLUTE PROOF OF ITS POWER.— The fact that
Acts of the Legislature have been passed sub silentio is no
proof that said Acts are within the powers of the
Legislature to adopt. The fact that a law has been passed
sub silentio does not create a conclusive presumption that
it was in fact adopted within the powers of the legislative
department of the Government.
39. LEGALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF ACT No. 2706, AS

AMENDED BY ACT No. 2822, CREATING THE
"VOTING COMMITTEE."—The Organic Law or charter of
the Philippine Islands provides "that no bill (public or
private) which may be enacted into law shall
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VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 267
embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be

expressed in the title of the bill." That provision of the
Organic Law is found in many of the states of the Union.
The courts have uniformly held that such a provision is
mandatory, and that any provision in a law, contrary to
that provision of the Organic Law, is null and void. The
purpose of said provision of the Organic Law is to prevent
surprise and fraud on the legislature. The evil which said
provision was intended to avoid was the blending in one
and the same statute of such things as were diverse in
their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor
of all the advocates of each, thus securing the passage of
several measures, no one of which could have succeeded

on its own merits. Another purpose of said provision was
to prevent hodge podge or log rolling legislation, to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in Acts of which the titles gave no information
and which thereby might be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted, and to fairly apprise the peoples
of the objects of legislation that are being considered, in
order that they may have an opportunity of being heard
thereon by objection or otherwise if they shall so desire.
Acts Nos. 2706 and 2822, in their provision permitting the
legislative department of the Government, through a
committee, to participate in the execution of the laws,
without the same having been indicated in the title of said
Acts, is null and void as to that particular provision, and
the Governor-General, by virtue of said illegality, was
justified in disregarding it.
40. THE "VOTING COMMITTEE" AS PUBLIC OFFICERS.—

Considering that the National Coal Company is a private
corporation, that the Government of the Philippine
Islands is a stockholder and thereby stands in the same
relation with said company as any other stockholder, there
is some question whether the members of the "Voting -
Committee" are public officers or not. By becoming a
stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
Government divested itself, so far' as concerns the
transaction of that Company, of its sovereign character
and takes that of a private citizen. As a stockholder of the
corporation the Government exercises none of its powers
as a sovereign. It acts merely as a corporator and exercises
no other powers in the management of the affairs of the
corporation than those expressly given by the
incorporating Act. With reference to the question whether
the members of said Committee are public officers or not,
it may be said that a careful analysis of the authorities
upon that question shows a very wide divergence
268
of opinions. It is doubtful whether the Legislature

intended to make the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives public officers of
the Government. It is sufficient, in our opinion, to hold,
that whatever the character of the President and the

Speaker may be, the Legislature had no authority to adopt
the Acts in question and then, through its officers, attempt
to participate in their execution.
41. RlGHT OF THE COURTS TO DECIDE THE QUESTION

RELATING TO THE DlFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF
THE GOVERNMENT.—The courts will hesitate to
intervene for the purpose of passing upon the respective
powers of the different departments of the Government,
and will not do so until that question is squarely and fairly
presented. In exercising the high authority conferred upon
the courts to pronounce valid or invalid a statute, they are
only the administrators of the public will as expressed in
the fundamental law of the land. If an Act of the
Legislature is to be held illegal it is not because the judges
have any control over the legislative or executive powers,
but because the Act is forbidden by the fundamental law
of the land and because the will of the authors of the
Organic Law is paramount and must be obeyed, even by
the legislative and executive departments of the
Government. In pronouncing a statute illegal the courts
are merely interpreting the meaning, force and application
of the fundamental law of the state.
42. SOLICITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

UNITED STATES AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES FOR
THE WELFARE AND WELL BEING OF THE
INHABITANTS.—No Government past or present, has
more carefully and watchfully guarded and protected, by
law, the individual rights of life and property of the
citizens of the Philippine Islands than the Government of
the United States and its representatives. Each of the
three departments of the Government has had separate
and distinct functions to perform in this great labor. The
history of the Philippine Islands, covering a period of more
than a quarter of a century, discloses the fact that each
department has performed its part well. No one
department of the Government can or ever has claimed,
within its discretionary and legal powers, a greater zeal
than the others in its desire to promote the welfare of the
individual citizen. They are all joined together in their
respective spheres and departments, harmoniously
working to maintain good government, peace, and order to
the end that the rights of each citizen in his life and
property be equally protected. No one department can
claim that it has a monopoly
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VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 269
of these benign purposes of the Government. Each

department has an exclusive field, under the law, within
which it can perform its part, within certain discretionary
limits. No other department can claim a right to enter
these discretionary and legal limits and assume to act
there. No presumption of an abuse of these discretionary
powers by one department will be considered, permitted or
entertained by another. Such conduct on the part of one
department, instead of tending to conserve good
government and the rights of the people, would directly
tend to destroy the confidence of the people in the
Government and to undermine the very foundations of the
Government itself.
43. CONSTITUTIONAL LlMITATIONS UPON

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; IT IS LlMITED BY THE
FOUR WALLS OF CONSTITUTIONAL OR CHARTER
PROVISIONS.—Some one has said that the powers of the
legislative department of the Government, like the
boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the
departments of the same are limited and confined within
the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are expressly
given and such other powers as are necessarily implied
from the given powers. The constitution is the shore of
legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which they cannot leap.
44. LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE; HOW

SHOULD BE ENTITLED.—One of the subsections of the
Jones Law provides "That no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." That
provision of the law is mandatory. When the body of an
Act contains important matters to which no reference is
made in the title of the same, such matters cannot have
force of law. Considering that the Legislature of the
Philippine Islands exercises a delegated authority only,
there is no law justifying the Legislature of the Philippine
Islands to enact laws "by the authority of the same." The
enacting clause should be "By Authority of the United

States" be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature. (Act
No. 2667.)
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Quo warranto.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
270

Attorney-General Jaranilla, F. C. Fisher, and Hugh C.

Smith for plaintiff.
Jose Abad Santos; Ross, Lawrence & Selph; Paredes,
Buencamino & Yulo; Araneta & Zaragoza; Charles E.
Tenney; Camus, Delgado & Recto and Mariano H. de Joya
for defendants.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the

name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against
three directors of the National Coal Company who were
elected to their positions by the legislative members of the
committee created by Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822. The
purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part
of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act
No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all such
stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the
GovernorGeneral, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives."
The material facts are averred in the complaint of the
plaintiff and admitted in the demurrer of the defendants.
The National Coal Company is a corporation organized
and existing by virtue of Act No. 2705 of the Philippine
Legislature as amended by Act No. 2822, and of the
Corporation Law. By the terms of the charter of the
corporation, the Governor-General was directed to
subscribe on behalf of the Government of the Philippine
Islands for at least fifty-one per cent of the capital of the
corporation. The Government eventually became the owner
of more than ninety-nine per cent of the thirty thousand
outstanding shares of stock of the National Coal Company.
Only nineteen shares stand in the names of private
individuals.
On November 9,1926, the Governor-General

promulgated Executive Order No. 37. Reference was made
therein to opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the
United States
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VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 271

Army and of the Acting Attorney-General of the United

States wherein it was held that the provisions of the
statutes passed by the Philippine Legislature creating a
voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the
duties and powers thereof with respect to certain
corporations in which the Philippine Government is the
owner of stock, are nullities. Announcement was made that
on account of the invalidity of the portions of the Acts
creating the voting committee or board of control, the
Governor-General would, thereafter, exercise exclusively
the duties and powers theretofore assumed by the voting
committee or board of control. Notice of the contents of this
executive order was given to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (24 Off.
Gaz., 2419.)
A special meeting of the stockholders of the National
Coal Company was called for December 6,1926, at 3 o'clock
in the afternoon, for the purpose of electing directors and
the transaction of such other business as might properly
come before the meeting. Prior thereto, on November 29,
1926, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives as members of the voting
committee, requested the Governor-General to convene the
committee at 2.30 p. m., on December 6, 1926, to decide
upon the manner in which the stock held by the
Government in the National Coal Company should be
voted. The Governor-General acknowledged receipt of this
communication but declined to participate in the proposed
meeting. The President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives did in fact meet at the time
and place specified in their letter to the Governor-General.
It was then and there resolved by them that at the special
meeting of the stockholders, the votes represented by the
stock of the Government in the National Coal Company,
should be cast in favor of five specified persons for directors
of the company.
272

On December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the

special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal
Company was held in accordance with the call. The
Governor-General, through his representative, asserted the
sole power to vote the stock of the Government. The
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives attended the meeting and filed with the
secretary of the company a certified copy of the minutes of
the meeting of the committee held at the office of the
company a half hour before. The Governor-General,
through his representative, thereupon objected to the
asserted powers of the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the latter
likewise objected to the assertion of the Governor-General.
The chair recognized the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives in their capacity
as majority members of the voting committee as the
persons lawf ully entitled to represent and vote the
Government stock. To this the representative of the
GovernorGeneral made protest and demanded that it be
entered of record in the minutes. The vote cast by the
Representatives was in favor of Alberto Barretto, Milton E.
Springer, Dalmacio Costas, Anselmo Hilario, and Frank B.
Ingersoll. The Governor-General, through his
representative, alleging representation of the Government
stock, cast his vote in favor of Alberto Barretto, Romarico
Agcaoili, Frank B. Ingersoll, H. L. Heath, and Salvador
Lagdameo. The chair declared the ballot cast by the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House as
electing the names therein indicated, directors of the
National Coal Company.
Immediately after the stockholders' meeting, the
persons declared by the chairman to have been elected, met
and undertook to organize the board of directors of the
National Coal Company by the election of officers. All the
directors for whom the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of
273
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 273

the House of Representatives voted and who were declared

elected at the meeting of the stockholders participated in
this meeting. Included among them, were the three def
endants, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and
Anselmo Hilario.
The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic
Law, particularly in the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of
August 29,1916, and in statutes enacted under authority of
that Act, and in decisions interpretative of it.
The Government of the Philippine Islands is an agency
of the Congress of the United States. The powers which the
Congress, the principal, has seen fit to entrust to the
Philippine Government, the agent, are distributed among
three coordinate departments, the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial. It is true that the Organic Act
contains no general distributing clause. But the principle is
clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly
incorporated in our Administrative Code. It has time and
again been approvingly enforced by this court.
No department of the Government of the Philippine
Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred by
the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again it is true
that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition.
But it is fairly implied by the division of the Government
into three departments. The effect is the same whether the
prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly been
announced by this court that each of the branches of the
Government is in the main independent of the others. The
doctrine is too firmly imbedded in Philippine institutions to
be debatable. (Administrative Code, sec. 17; Barcelon vs.
Baker and Thompson [1905], 5 Phil., 87; U. S. vs. Bull
[1910], 15 Phil., 7; Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros [1910], 16 Phil., 366;
Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield [1910], 16 Phil.,
534; Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338;
Concepcion vs. Pa-
274

redes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho [1922], 43

Phil., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612; Alejandrino
vs. Quezon [1924], 46 Phil., 83.)
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government
of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions In any
other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by
local laws which conform to the Organic Law. The

Governor-General must find his powers and duties in the
fundamental law. An Act of the Philippine Legislature
must comply with the grant from Congress. The
jurisdiction of this court and other courts is derived f rom
the constitutional provisions.
These canons of political science have more than
ordinary significance in the Philippines. To the
Government of the Philippine Islands has been delegated a
large degree of .autonomy, and the chief exponent of that
autonomy in domestic affairs is the Philippine Legislature.
The Governor-General on the other hand is the head of the
Government and symbolizes American sovereignty. That
under such a political system, lines of demarcation between
the legislative and the executive departments are difficult
to fix, and that attempted encroachments of one on the
other may occur, should not dissuade the Supreme Court,
as the guardian of the constitution, from enforcing
fundamental principles.
The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. In addition
to specified functions, he is given "general supervision and
control of all the departments and bureaus of the
government of the Philippine Islands as far as is not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." He is also
made "responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of
the Philippine Islands and of the United States operative
within the Philippine Islands." The authority of the
GovernorGeneral is made secure by the important proviso
"that all executive functions of Government must be
directly under
275
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 275

the Governor-General or within one of the executive

departments under the supervision and control of the
GovernorGeneral." (Organic Act, secs. 21, 22.) By the
Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as Chief
Executive of the Islands, is charged with the executive
control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in
person or through the Secretaries of Departments, or other
proper agency, according to law." (Sec. 58.)
The Organic Act grants general legislative power except
as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature.
(Organic Act, secs. 8, 12.) Even before the approval of the
existing Organic Act, it was held that the Philippine

Legislature has practically the same powers in the
Philippine Islands within the sphere in which it may
operate as the Congress of. the United States. (Chanco vs.
Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329.) The rule judicially stated is
now that an Act of the Philippine Legislature which has
not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid, unless
the subject-matter has been covered by Congressional
legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of
the Organic Law. The legislative power of the Philippine
Government is granted in general terms subject to specific
limitations. (Gaspar vs. Molina [1905], 5 Phil., 197; U.S. vs.
Bull, supra; In re Guariña [1913], 24 Phil., 37; U. S. vs.
Limsiongco [1920], 41 Phil., 94; Concepcion vs. Paredes,
supra.)
An independent judiciary completes the governmental
system. The judicial power is conferred on the Supreme
Court, Courts of First Instance, and inferior courts.
(Organic Act, sec. 26.)
It is axiomatic that the Philippine Legislature was
provided to make the law, the office of the Governor-
General to execute the law, and the judiciary to construe
the law. What is a legislative, an executive, or a judicial
act, as distinguished one from the other, is not always easy
to ascertain. A precise classification is difficult. Negatively
276

speaking, it has been well said that "The legislature has no

authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has
no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary
has no power to make or execute the law." (U. S. vs. Ang
Tang Ho, supra.)
It is legislative power which has been vested in the
Philippine Legislature. What is legislative power? Judge
Cooley says he understands it "to be the authority, under
the constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them." Those matters which the constitution specifically
confides to the executive "the legislature cannot directly or
indirectly take from his control." (Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 126-131, 157-162.) President
Wilson in his authoritative work, "The State," page 487,
emphasizes by italics that legislatures "are law making
bodies acting within the gifts of charters, and are by these
charters in most cases very strictly circumscribed in their
action." If this is true, the converse that legislative power is

not executive or judicial or governmental power needs no
demonstration. The Legislature cannot lawfully exercise
powers which are in their nature essentially executive or
judicial. The Legislature cannot make a law and then take
part in its execution or construction. So the Philippine
Legislature is not a partaker in either executive or judicial
power, except as the Philippine Senate participates in the
executive power through having the right to confirm or
reject nominations made by the Governor-General, and
except as the Legislature participates in the judicial power
through being made the sole judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of its elective members and through
having the right to try its own members for disorderly
behavior. The Philippine. Legislature may nevertheless
exercise such auxiliary powers as are necessary and
appropriate to its independence and to make its express
powers effective. (McGrain vs. Daugherty [1927], 273 U. S.,
135; 71 Law. ed., 580.)
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VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 277

When one enters on a study of the abstract question,

Where does the power to appoint to public office reside?,
one is nearly buried in a mass of conflicting authority. Yet
we have been at pains to review all of the cases cited by
counsel and others which have not been cited. Shaking
ourselves loose from the encumbering details of the
decisions, we discern through them a few elemental truths
which distinguish certain cases from others and which
point the way for us in the Philippines.
The first principle which is noticed is that the particular
wording of the constitution involved, and its correct
interpretation predetermines the result. Does the
constitution deny the legislative body the right of
exercising the appointing power. The legislature may not
do so. (State vs. Kennon [1857], 7 O. St., 547; Clark vs.
Stanley [1872], 66 N. C., 28.) Does the constitution confer
upon the governor the power to appoint certain officers and
upon the legislature the power to prescribe the manner of
appointment. The authorities are in conflict as to whether
the legislature may itself make the appointment. Does the
constitution merely contain the usual clause distributing
the powers of government and no clause regulating
appointments. The weight of judicial opinion seems to be
that the power of appointing to office is not exclusively an

executive function and that the legislature may not only
create offices but may also fill them itself, but with a
vigorous opposition in most respectable quarters. (Contrast
Pratt vs. Breckinridge [1901], 112 Ky., 1, and State vs.
Washburn [1901], 167 Mo., 680, with People vs. Freeman
[1889], 80 Cal., 233, and Richardson vs. Young [1909], 122
Tenn., 471.)
The second thought running through the decisions is
that in the state governments, the selection of persons to
perform the functions of government is primarily a
prerogative of the people. The general power to appoint
officers is not inherent in any branch of the government.
The
278

people may exercise their political rights directly or by

delegation. Should the people grant the exclusive right of
appointment to the governor, he possesses that right; but if
they should otherwise dispose of it, it must be performed as
the sovereign has indicated. Inasmuch, however, as the
legislative body is the repository of plenary power, except
as otherwise restricted, and the chief executive of the State
is not, legislative bodies usually possess wide latitude in
the premises. But this situation does not obtain in the
Philippines where the people are not sovereign, and where
constitutional rights do not flow from them but are granted
by delegation from Congress.
It may finally be inferred from the books that the
appointment of public officials is generally looked upon as
properly an executive function. The power of appointment
can hardly be considered a legislative power. .
Appointments may be made by the Legislature or the
courts, but when so made should be taken as an incident to
the discharge of f unctions properly within their respective
spheres. (State vs. Brill [1907], 100 Minn., 499; Stockman
vs. Leddy [1912], 55 Colo., 24; Spartanburg County vs.
Miller [1924], 132 S. E., 673; Mechem on Public Officers,
secs. 103-108; Mechem, The Power 'to Appoint to Office; Its
Location and Limits, 1 Mich. Law Rev. [1903], 531.)
From the viewpoint of one outside looking in, it would
seem that the State legislatures have all too often been
permitted to emasculate the powers properly belonging to
the executive department, and that the governor of the
State has been placed with. the responsibility of

administering the government without the means of doing
so. The operations of the executive department have been
fundamentally varied by the legislative department. The
legislature has absorbed strength, the executive has lost it.
This tendency has rather been tolerated than acquiesced
in. The executive should be clothed with sufficient power to
administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have
complete control of the instrumentalities through whom
279
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 279

his responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by

Hamilton, that "A feeble executive implies a feeble
execution of the government. A feeble execution is but
another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill
executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice
a bad government." The mistakes of State governments
need not be repeated here.
The history of the power of appointment ;and the stand
taken by the judiciary on the question in the State of
Kentucky is of more than ordinary interest. Kentucky was
permitted to become an independent State by Virginia. The
clause in the Kentucky constitution separating and
guarding the powers of government came from the pen of
the author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas
Jefferson. He it was who, in a letter to Samuel Kercheval,
dated July 16, 1816, said: "Nomination to office is an
executive function. To give it to the legislature, as we do in
Virginia, is a violation of the principle of the separation of
powers. It swerves the members from correctness by
temptation to intrigue for office for themselves, and to a
corrupt barter for votes, and destroys responsibility by
dividing it among a multitude." Possibly inspired to such
action by the authorship of the portion of the State
constitution which was under consideration, in the early
days of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Mr. Chief Justice
Robertson in the case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth ([1830],
3 J. J. Marshall, 401) announced that "Appointments to
office are intrinsically executive," but that it might be
performed by a judicial officer when the duties of the office
pertains strictly to the court. This opinion was shaken in
the case of Sinking Fund Commissioners vs. George
([1898], 104 Ky., 260) only to be afterwards reaffirmed in
Pratt vs. Breckinridge ([1901], 112 Ky., 1), and in Sibert vs.
Garrett ([1922], 246 S. W., 455). In the decision in the

latter case, one of the most recent on the subject, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky after reviewing the authorities
refused to be frightened by the bugaboo that numerically
280

a greater number of courts take a contrary view. It said:

"We are convinced that they by doing so are inviting
destruction of the constitutional barriers separating the
departments of government, and that our interpretation is
much the sounder one and is essential to the future
preservation of our constitutional form of government as
originally intended by the forefathers who conceived it. * *
* Such power (of appointment) on the part of the
Legislature, if a full exercise of it should be persisted in,
would enable it to gradually absorb to itself the patronage
and control of the greater part of the functioning agencies
of the state and county governments, and, thus endowed, it
would be little short of a legislative oligarchy."
It is of importance, therefore, not to be confused by State
decisions, and invariably to return to the exact provisions
of the Philippine Organic Law. It is the intention of the
authors of that Law which should be searched out and
effectuated.
The right to appoint to office has been confided, with
certain well defined exceptions, by the Government of the
United States to the executive branch of the government
which it has set up in the Philippines. Let the Organic Law
speak upon this proposition.
The original government inaugurated in the Philippines
after American occupation was military in nature, and
exercised all the powers of government, -including, of
course, the right to select officers. The original civil
authority with administrative functions established here
was the second Philippine Commission. President
McKinley, in his Instructions to the Commission of April 7,
1900, ever since considered as the initial step taken to
introduce a constitutional government, provided that until
further action should be taken by Congress or otherwise,
"The Commission will also have power * * * to appoint to
office such officers under the judicial, educational, and
civil-service systems, and in the municipal and
departmental governments, as shall be provided for." When
the first Civil Governor was
281
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 281

appointed on June 21, 1901, the President again took

account of the power of appointment in the following
language: "The power to appoint civil officers, heretofore
vested in the Philippine Commission, or in the Military
Governor, will be exercised by the Civil Governor with the
advice and consent of the Commission." The Congress when
it came to make legislative provision for the administration
of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands,
in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Bill,
"approved, ratified, and confirmed," the action of the
President in creating the Philippine Commission in the
manner and form set forth in the Instructions of the
President, and in creating the office of Civil Governor and
authorizing said Civil Governor to exercise the powers of
government to the extent and in the manner set forth in
the executive order dated June 21, 1901. (Philippine Bill,
sec. 1.) Congress in the same law provided that the Islands
"shall continue to be governed as thereby and herein
provided." (See Opinion of Attorney-General Araneta on the
power of the Governor-General to appoint and remove civil
officers, 3 Op. Atty.-Gen., 563.)
Thus stood the right to appoint to office for fourteen
years.
The Organic Act of August 29, 1916, included what
follows on the subject of appointments. The
GovernorGeneral "shall, unless otherwise herein provided,
appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate,
such officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-
General, or such as he is authorized by this Act to appoint,
or whom he may hereafter be authorized by law to
appoint." (Organic Act, sec. 21.) The exception to the
general grant is that the Philippine Legislature "shall
provide for the appointment and removal of the heads of
the executive departments by the Governor-General."
(Organic Act, sec. 22.) Each House of the Philippine
Legislature may also elect a presiding officer, a clerk, a
sergeant at arms, and such other officers and assistants as
may be 'required.
282
(Organic Act, sec. 18.) The Philippine Legislature is

authorized to choose two Resident Commissioners to the
United States. (Organic Act, sec. 20.) The prohibition on
the local Legislature, which has been thought of as
referring to the Resident Commissioners, is that "No
Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which
he may have been elected, be eligible to any office the
election to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall be
appointed to any office of trust or profit which shall have
been created or the emoluments of which shall have been
increased during such term." (Organic Act, sec. 18.)
The Administrative Code provides the following: "In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the
GovernorGeneral shall have such specific powers and
duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law
and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth,"
including the special powers and duties "(a) To nominate
and appoint officials, conformably to law, to positions in the
service of the Government of the Philippine Islands. (b) To
remove officials from office conformably to law and to
declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials.
For disloyalty to the Government of the United States, the
Governor-General may at any time remove a person from
any position of trust or authority under the Government of
the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The
Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by the
Governor-General. (Sec. 66.)
It will be noticed that the Governor-General, in addition
to being empowered to appoint the officers authorized by
the Organic Act and officers whom thereafter he might be
authorized to appoint, was to continue to possess the power
to appoint such officers as could be appointed by him when
the Organic Act was approved. The careful phraseology of
the law and the connection provided by the word "now"
with prior Organic laws is noteworthy. It would not be at
all illogical to apply the same rule to the Governor-General
in his relations with the Legislature
283
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 283

which the judiciary uniformly applies to the courts in their

relations with the Legislature, which is, that the
Legislature may add to, but may not diminish, the
jurisdiction of the courts—The Legislature may add to, but

may not diminish, the power of the Governor-General.
(Organic Act, sec. 26; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil.,
44; In re Guariña, supra; U. S. vs. Limsiongco, supra,.)
It will also not escape attention that the only reference
made to appointments by the Legislature relates to the
selection of Secretaries of Departments, of officers and
employees for the Legislature, and of Resident
Commissioners, from which it would naturally be inferred
that no other officers and employees may be chosen by it.
The exceptions made in favor of the Legislature strengthen
rather than weaken the grant to the executive. The specific
mention of the authority of the Legislature to name certain
officers is indicative of a purpose to limit the legislative
authority in the matter of selecting officers. The expression
of one thing in a constitution is necessarily the exclusion of
things not expressed. Had it been intended to give to the
Philippine Legislature the power to name individuals to fill
the offices which it has created, the grant would have been
included among the legislative powers and not among the
executive powers. The administrative control of the
Government of the Philippine Islands by the Governor-
General to whom is confided the responsibility of executing
the laws excludes the idea of legislative control of
administration.
Possibly, the situation may better be visualized by
approaching the question by a process of elimination. Is the
power of appointment judicial? No one so contends. Is the
power of appointment legislative? Not so if the intention of
the Organic Law be carried out and if the Legislature be
confined to its law-making function. Is the power of
appointment executive? It is.
The exact question of where the power of appointment to
office is lodged has never heretofore arisen in this juris-
284

diction. But a decision of this court and a controlling

decision of the United States Supreme Court are in point.
In Concepcion vs. Paredes, supra, this court had before
it a law which attempted to require a drawing of lots for
judicial positions in derogation of executive power. The case
was exhaustively argued and after prolonged consideration,
the questioned -portion of the law was held invalid as in.
violation of the provisions of the Organic Act. Following the
lead of Kentucky, it was announced that "Appointment to

office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise
of discretion."
In the case of Myers vs. United States ([1926], 272 U. S.,
52; 71 Law. ed., 160), the United States Supreme Court
had presented the question whether, under the
Constitution, the President has the exclusive power of
removing executive officers of the United States whom he
has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The answer was that he has. The decision is
epochal. The Chief Justice quoted from. Madison the
following:
" 'lf there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in
any free Constitution more sacred than another, it is that
which separates the legislative, executive and judicial
powers. If there is any point in which the separation of the
legislative and executive powers ought to be maintained
with great caution, it is that which relates to officers and
offices.
" 'The powers relative to offices are partly legislative and
partly executive. The legislature creates the office, defines
the powers, limits its duration and annexes a
compensation. This done, the legislative power ceases.
They ought to have nothing to do with designating the man
to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an executive
nature. Although it be qualified in the Constitution, I
would not extend or strain that qualification beyond the
limits precisely fixed for it. We ought always to consider
the Constitution with an eye to the principles upon which it
was founded. In this point of view, we shall readily
conclude that if the legislature determines the powers, the
honors,
285
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 285

and emoluments of an office, we should be insecure if they

were to designate the officer also. The nature of things
restrains and confines the legislative and executive
authorities in this respect; and hence it. is that the
Constitution stipulates for the independence of each branch
of the Government/ " (1 Annals of Congress, 581, 582. Also
see Madison in The Federalist, Nos. 47, 76.)
The distinguished Chief Justice said:
"* * * The Constitution was so framed as to vest in the
Congress all legislative powers therein granted, to vest in
the President the executive power, and to vest in one

Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress might
establish, the judicial power. From this division on
principle, the reasonable construction of the Constitution
must be that the branches should be kept separate in all
cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the
Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more
than it affirmatively requires. Madison, 1 Annals of
Congress, 497.
* * * * * * *
"The vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But
the President alone and unaided could not execute the
laws. He must execute them by the assistance of
subordinates. This view has since been repeatedly affirmed
by this court. * * * As he is charged specifically to take care
that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable
implication, even in the absence of express words, was that
as part of his executive power he should select those who
were to act for him under his direction in the execution of
the laws. The further implication must be, 'in the absence
of any express limitation respecting removals, that as his
selection of administrative officers is essential to the
execution of the laws by him, so must be his power of
removing those for whom he cannot continue to be
responsible. (Fisher Ames, 1 Annals of Congress, 474.) It
was urged that the natural meaning of the term 'executive
286

power' granted the President included the appointment and

removal of executive subordinates. If such appointments
and removals were not an exercise of the executive power,
what were they? They certainly were not the exercise of
legislative or judicial power in government as usually
understood.
"It is quite true that in state and colonial governments at
the time of the Constitutional Convention, power to make
appointments and removals had sometimes been lodged in
the legislatures or in the courts, but such a disposition of it
was really vesting part of the executive power in another
branch of the government.
* * * * * *
*
"We come now to a period in the history of the

Government when both Houses of Congress attempted to
reverse this constitutional construction and to subject the
power of removing executive officers appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate to the control of the
Senate, indeed finally to the assumed power in Congress to
place the removal of such officers anywhere in the
Government.
* * * * * *
*
"The extreme provisions of all this legislation were a full
justification for the considerations so strongly advanced by
Mr. Madison and his associates in the First Congress, for
insisting that the power of removal of executive officers by
the President alone was essential in the division of powers
between the executive and the legislative bodies. It
exhibited in a clear degree the paralysis to which a
partisan Senate and Congress could subject the executive
arm and destroy the principle of executive responsibility,
and separation of the powers sought for by the framers of
our Government, if the President had no power of removal
save by consent of the Senate. It was an attempt to
redistribute the powers and minimize those of the
President.
* * * * * *
*
"For the reasons given, we must therefore hold that the
provision of the law of 1876 by which the unrestricted
287
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 287

power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to the

President is in violation of the Constitution and invalid."
Membership in the Committee created by Acts Nos.
2705 and 2822 is an office. No attempt will be made to
accomplish the impossible, which is to formulate an exact
judicial definition of the term "office." The point is that the
positions in question constitute an "office," whether within
the meaning of that word as used in the Code of Civil
Procedure under the topic "Usurpation of Office," and in
the jurisprudence of Ohio from which these portions of the
Code were taken; whether within the local definitions of
"office" found in the Administrative Code and the Penal
Code; or whether within the constitutional definitions
approved by the United States Supreme Court. (Code of
Civil Procedure, secs. 197 et seq., 519; Act No. 136, sec. 17;
State vs. Kennon, supra, cited approvingly in Sheboygan
Co. vs. Parker [1865], 3 Wall., 93; Administrative Code, sec.
2; Penal Code, arts. 264, 401.) Paraphrasing the United
States Supreme Court in a late decision, there is not
lacking the essential elements of a public station,
permanent in character, created by law, whose incidents
and duties were prescribed by law. (Metcalf & Eddy vs.
Mitchell [1926], 269 U. S., 514; U. S. vs. Maurice [1823], 2
Brock., 96; U. S. vs. Hartwel [1867], 6 Wall., 385.) The
Legislature did more than add incidental or occasional
duties to existing executive offices for two of the members
of the voting committee are representatives of the
legislative branch. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
has held that the Act of the General Assembly giving to the
Representatives the power to appoint proxies and directors
in all corporations in which the State has an interest,
creates a public office and fills the same by appointment of
the Legislature. (Clark vs. Stanley [1872], 66 N. C., 28;
Howerton vs. Tate [1873], 68 N. C., 498; Shoemaker vs.
U.S. [1892], 147 U. S., 282; Advisory Opinion to Governor
[1905], 49 Fla., 269; Mechem on Public Officers, Ch. I.)
288

To tell the truth, it is possible that the earnestness of

counsel has just led us to decide too much. Not for a
moment should there be dismissed from our minds the
unusual and potently effective proviso of section 22 of the
Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government
must be directly under the Governor-General or within one
of the executive departments under the supervision and
control of the Governor-General." At the very least, the
performance of duties appurtenant to membership in the
voting committee is an executive function of the
Government, which the Organic Act requires must be
subject to the unhampered control of the Governor-General.
The administrative domination of a governmentally
organized and controlled corporation is clearly not a duty
germane to the law-making power.
The incorporation of the National Coal Company has not
served to disconnect the Company or the stock which the
Government owns in it from the Government and executive
control. The Philippine Legislature is empowered to create
and control private corporations. (Martinez vs. La

Asociacion de Señoras Damas del Santo Asilo de Ponce
[1909], 213 U. S., 20.) The National Coal Company is a
private corporation. (National Coal Company vs. Collector
of Internal Revenue [1924], 46 Phil., 583.) By becoming a
stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far
as respects the transactions of the corporation. (Bank of the
U. S. vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia [1824], 9 Wheat., 904.)
Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued
without its consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the
National Coal Company remains an agency or
instrumentality of government. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
in speaking of the Bank of the United States said, "It was
not created for its own sake, or for private purposes. It has
never been supposed that Congress could create such a
corporation." (Osborn vs. Bank of the U. S. [1824] J 9
Wheat., 738; National Bank vs. Commonwealth [1869], 9
289
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 289

Wall., 353; Railroad Co. vs. Peniston [1873], 18 Wall, 5;

Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. vs. U: S. [1918], 250 U.
S., 123.) Of the National Coal Company, it has been said by
Mr. Justice Johnson as the organ of the court in National
Coal Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, supra,
that "The Government of the Philippine Islands is made
the majority stockholder, evidently in order to insure
proper governmental supervision and control, and thus to
place the Government in a position to render all possible
encouragement, assistance and help in the prosecution and
furtherance of the company's business." The analogy is
closer in the companion National Bank case, No. 27225.
It further is incontrovertible that the Government, like
any other stockholder, is justified in intervening in the
transactions in the corporation, and in protecting its
property rights in the corporation. Public funds were
appropriated to create the National Coal Company. Those
funds were used to purchase stock. The voting of the
government stock is the prerogative of the stockholder, not
the prerogative of the corporation. It is a transaction in,
but not of, the corporation. The stock is property. The
Government, the owner of the majority stock in the
company, naturally dominates the management of its
property. The Government may enforce its policies and
secure relief in and through the corporation and as a

stockholder.
The situation will be better understood if it be recalled
that, in addition to the National Coal Company (Acts Nos.
2705 and 2822), the Philippine Legislature has created the
Philippine National Bank (Acts Nos. 2612, 2747, 2938, and
3174), the National Petroleum Company (Act No. 2814),
the National Development Company (Act No. 2849), the
National Cement Company (Act No. 2855), and the
National Iron Company (Act No. 2862). The aggregate
authorized capital stock of these companies is P54,500,000.
The Legislature has in each of these instances directed that
a majority of the shares of stock shall be purchased for the
Government, and has appropriated money for this purpose.
290

There have likewise been authorized corporations for the

promotion of the merchant marine (Act No. 2754). The
stock of the Manila Railroad Company has been purchased
for the Government. (Acts Nos. 2574, 2752, and 2923.) All
these are conspicuous instances of a paternally inclined
government investing large sums in business enterprises
which after acquisition or organization have vitally
concerned the Government. In all of the companies
mentioned, the stock is to be voted by a committee or board
of control, consisting of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The power of the majority stockholders to
vote the government stock in the corporation carries with it
the right, under our Corporation Law, to elect all the
directors, to remove any or all of them, and to dissolve the
corporation by voluntary proceedings. (Corporation Law,
secs. 31, 34, 62.) In the case of the Philippine National
Bank, the law explicitly enumerates various functions of
the bank which may not be performed without the express
approval of the Board of Control. (Act No. 2938.)
Very important property rights are involved in the
transactions in the governmentally directed corporations.
Just as surely as the duty. of caring for government
property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it
as surely executive. Yet a majority of the voting committee
or board of control is made up of the presiding officers of
the two houses of the Legislature and they are in a position
to dictate action to the directors and subordinate personnel

of these corporations.
Based on all the foregoing considerations, we deduce
that the power of appointment in the Philippines
appertains, with minor exceptions, to the executive
department; that membership in the voting committee in
question is an office or executive function; that the
National Coal Company and similar corporations are
instrumentalities of the government; that the duty to look
after government agencies and government property
belongs to the executive depart-
291
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 291

ment; and that the placing of members of the Philippine

Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an
invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of
the Executive Department. Under a system of government
of delegated powers, under which delegation legislative
power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive
power vests in the Governor-General, and under which
delegation a general power of appointment resides in the
Governor-General and a specified power of appointment
resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot
directly or indirectly perform functions of an executive
nature through the designation of its presiding officers as
majority members of a body which has executive functions.
That is the meaning we gather from the tri-partite theory
of the division of powers. That is the purport of the
provisions of the Organic Law. That has been the decided
trend of persuasive judicial opinion.
The intimation contained in the conclusions just reached
does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff will be
privileged to substitute the directors designated by the
Governor-General for those designated by the two
presiding officers in the Legislature. The burden has
heretofore been on the defendants. From this point, it will
be on the plaintiff. It is well established in quo warranto
proceedings that the failure of the defendant to prove his
title does not establish that of the plaintiff. (People vs.
Thacher [1874], 10 N. Y., 525.)
The answer to the problem comes from two directions.
The Acting Attorney-General of the United States finds the
solution in the supreme executive power entrusted to the
Governor-General, while counsel for the plaintiff advance
the rule of statutory construction pertaining to partial

invalidity. We are frank to say that we experience difficulty
in following the lead of the law officer of the Government of
the United States. The GovernorGeneral since the approval
of the last Organic Act has had no prerogative powers, His
powers are so clearly and dis-
292

tinctly stated that there ought to be no doubt as to what

they are. Like the Legislature and the judiciary, like the
most inconspicuous employee, the Governor-General must
find warrant for his every act in the law. At this stage of
political development in the Philippines, no vague
residuum of power should be left to lurk in any of the
provisions of the Organic Law.
Counsel for the plaintiff rely on a decision of this court
(U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759) as best
expressing the local rule regarding statutes void in part.
Counsel for the defendants cite an earlier case (Barrameda
vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44). As the principle announced in
the last cited case is the more comprehensive and is much
fairer to the defendants, we give it preference. It was there
announced:
"Where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion,
if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume
that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they
had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the
other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated
without causing results affecting the main purpose of the
Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the
Legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a
statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose
whatever, and what remains must express the legislative
will independently of the void part, since the court has no
power to legislate."
Omitting reference to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives in section 4 of
Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, it
would then read: 'The voting power of all such stock
293
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 293

owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall

be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor-General." Would the court be justified in so
enforcing the law without itself intruding on the legislative
field?
The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen, is
authorized to create corporations and offices. The
Legislature has lawfully provided for a National Coal
Company and a committee to vote the government stock in
that company, but has unlawfully provided for two of its
members to sit in the committee. Would this court be doing
violence to the legislative will if the voting power be
continued solely in the hands of the Governor-General until
different action is taken by the Legislature? We conclude
that we would not; for the reason that the primordial
purpose of the Legislature was "to promote the business of
developing coal deposits * * * and of mining * * * and
selling the coal contained in said deposits." (Act No. 2705,
sec. 2; Act No. 2822, sec. 1.) The incidental purpose of the
Legislature was to provide a method to vote the stock
owned by the Government in the National Coal Company.
In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "The
striking out is not necessarily by erasing words, but it may
be by disregarding the unconstitutional provision and
reading the statute as if that provision was not there."
(Railroad Companies vs. Schutte [1880], 103 U. S., 118;
State vs. Westerfield [1897], 23 Nev., 468; State vs.
Washburn, supra; State vs. Wright [1913], 251 Mo., 325;
State vs. Clausen [1919], 107 Wash., 667; 1 Lewis
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Second ed. Ch. IX.)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Clayton vs. People ([1890], 132 U. S., 632) is particularly
applicable on account of relating to the validity of an Act
passed by a territorial legislature, the question of partial
invalidity, and the contention likewise here made, that
since the law in question had been on the statute books for
a number of years, it must be considered as having been
im-
294
pliedly ratified by the Congress. An Act of the Legislature

of Utah of 1878 had declared that the auditor and the
treasurer shall be elected by the voters of the territory. In a
decision handed down in 1886, the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Utah held the Act void because in conflict with
the organic act creating the territory, which provided that
the governor, with the consent of the legislative council,
shall appoint such officers. It further held that a territorial
statute invalid when enacted is not validated by the failure
of the Congress expressly to disapprove it. (People vs.
Clayton [1886], 4 Utah, 421.) The United States Supreme
Court on appeal affirmed the judgment. It said:
"It can hardly be admitted as a general proposition that
under the power of Congress reserved in the Organic Acts
of the Territories to annul the Acts of their Legislatures the
absence of any action by Congress is to be construed to be a
recognition of the power of the Legislature to pass laws in
conflict with the Act of Congress under which they were
created. * * * We do not think that the acquiescence of the
people, or of the Legislature of Utah, or of any of its
officers, in the mode for appointing the auditor of public
accounts, is sufficient to do away with the clear
requirements of the Organic Act on that subject. It is also,
we think, very clear that only that part of the Statute of
Utah which is contrary to the Organic Act, namely, that
relating to the mode of appointment of the officer, is
invalid; that so much of it as creates the office of auditor of
public accounts and treasurer of the Territory is valid; and
that it can successfully and appropriately be carried into
effect by an appointment made by the governor and the
Council of the Territory, as required in the Act of
Congress."
On the assumption, however, that -the entire provision
authorizing the voting committee be considered as wiped
out, yet we think it would still devolve on the
GovernorGeneral to protect the public interests and public
property.
295
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 295

He is made responsible for the execution of the laws, and

he would be unfaithful to that trust if, through inaction,
instrumentalities of government should fail to function and

government property should be permitted to be dissipated.
Counsel for the defendants have injected the argument
into the discussion that, as the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives are at least de
facto officers, their right to act as members of the voting
committee cannot be collaterally attacked, and that the
defendants in this suit are the de jure members of the
board of directors of the National Coal Company.
Contentions such as these are out of harmony with the
avowed purpose to avoid technical obstruction, and to
secure a definite expression of opinion on the main issue.
However, it remains to be said that this is a direct
proceeding to test the right of the defendants to the offices
to which they consider themselves entitled. The inquiry
then may go, as is proper in quo warranto proceedings, to
the extent of determining the validity of the act authorizing
the offices. The f allacy of the argument relating to the de
facto doctrine is that, although there may be a de facto
officer in a de jure office, there cannot be a de facto officer
in a de facto office. There is no such thing as a de facto
office under an unconstitutional law. (Norton vs. Shelby
County [1886], 118 U. S., 425.)
Before terminating, a few general observations may be
appropriate. The case has been carefully prepared and
elaborately argued. All parties appear to desire to have the
matter at issue definitely determined. We have endeavored
to accommodate them. But in such a bitterly fought
contest, the ingenuity of counsel presses collateral points
upon us which the court need not resolve. We thus find it
unnecessary to express any opinion on the propriety or
legality of Executive Order No. 37, on that portion of
section 18 of the Organic Act which disqualifies Senators or
Representatives for election or appointment to office, and
296

on other subsidiary matters. Need it be added that the

court is solely concerned with arriving at a correct decision
on a purely legal question.
Every other consideration to one side, this remains
certain—The Congress of the United States clearly
intended that the Governor-General's power should be
commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never
intended that the Governor-General should be saddled with
the responsibility of administering the government and of

executing the laws but shorn of the power to do so. The
interests of the Philippines will be best served by strict
adherence to the basic principles of constitutional
government.
We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of
section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act
No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the
government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. It results,
therefore, in the demurrer being overruled, and as it would
be impracticable for the defendants to answer, judgment
shall be rendered ousting and excluding them from the
offices of directors of the National Coal Company. So
ordered, without costs.
Street, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, J., concurring:
Under the admitted facts the writ of quo warranto prayed

for should be granted. Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio
Costas, and Anselmo Hilario are unlawfully and illegally
holding and exercising the position of members of the
Board of Directors of the National Coal Company and
should be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom; that
Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo
have been duly and legally elected as members of the Board
of Directors of the National Coal Company, and judgment
is rendered that they be inducted into said ,position to take
charge thereof and to perform the duties incumbent upon
them as members of said Board of Directors.
297
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 297

The principal questions involved in this action are:
(a) May the Legislative Department of the Government

of the Philippine Islands adopt a law and provide
that some of its members shall take part in its
execution?
(b) Was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
authorized, under the law, to promulgate Executive
Order No. 37? and,
Were the respondents legally elected as members of

(c) the Board of Directors of the National Coal
Company?
Inasmuch as these questions involve respective powers of

two great departments of the Government, they should be
seriously considered by this court and not to be lightly
resolved on.
These questions were presented to the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands for solution in an original action,
praying for the issuance of the extraordinary legal writ of
quo warranto. In relation with the questions involved, the
specific and definite purpose of the action is (a) to inquire
into the right of the respondents, Milton E. Springer,
Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario to act as members of
the Board of Directors of the National Coal Company, a
private corporation created by special charter by an Act of
the Philippine Legislature; and (b) to have inducted into
office, in their place and stead, said Romarico Agcaoili, H.
L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo.
To the petition presented by the Government of the
Philippine Islands (ex rel. Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath,
and Salvador Lagdameo) the respondents demurred. The
facts are therefore admitted. A question of law only is
presented for solution.
THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE ACTION IS BASED
The facts upon which the petition is based are few, clear,
and well defined. There is no dispute upon the facts. They
are briefly: That the National Coal Company is a private
corporation created by Act No. 2705 (vol. 12, Public Laws,
p. 216, March 10, 1917) as amended by Act No.
298

2822 (vol. 14, Public Laws, p. 202, March 5, 1919). Act No.
2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, constitutes the charter
of said company. Said Acts are not public laws. They are
private Acts of the Philippine Legislature. They provide
that said company shall be subject to the provisions of the
Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of said charter, and shall
have the general powers mentioned in said Act (Act No.
1459) and such other powers as may be necessary to enable
it to prosecute the business of developing coal deposits in

the Philippine Islands, and mining, extracting,
transporting, and selling the coal contained in said
deposits. Said charter provided that the capital of said
company shall be P3,000,000, divided into 30,000 shares of
stock with a par value of P100 per share.
Said charter further provided that the Governor-General
on behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
shall subscribe for 51 per centum of said capital stock, and
that the "voting power of all such stock owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives." At the time of the adoption of
said charter the Philippine Legislature appropriated the
sum of P1,530,000 for investment in the stock of said
company to be acquired by the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
The National Coal Company was organized in
accordance with the provisions of its charter. A Board of
Directors was elected from time to time. Its business was
carried on by said Board of Directors. Finally a legal
question arose concerning the right of the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
act with the Governor-General in voting the stock of said
company. That question was referred to the Judge
Advocate General of the United States Army as well as to
the AttorneyGeneral of the United States. Upon full
consideration of
299
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 299

the question, the Judge Advocate General and the

Attorney-General reached the conclusion that the
Representatives were without authority in law to take part
in the voting of the stock owned by the Government, for the
reason that the particular provision of the charter granting
or creating said power as illegal and void, and that the
participation of the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives in voting said
stock was an illegal encroachment upon the powers of the
Executive Department of the Government. Upon receiving
said opinions, the Governor-General evidently for the
purpose of avoiding criticism that he was permitting an
illegal and void law to be enforced and, if possible,

impeachment proceedings for a failure or refusal on his
part to comply with the law of the land, issued an executive
order, known as Executive Order No. 37. Executive Order
No. 37 provides:
"Whereas it is held in an opinion of the Judge Advocate
General of the United States Army, confirmed by an
opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States,
received at the Office of the Executive, November seventh,
nineteen hundred and twenty-six, that the provisions of the
statutes passed by the Philippine Legislature creating a
'Board of Control' or 'Committee' and enumerating the
duties and powers thereof, with respect to certain
corporations in which the Insular Government is the owner
of stock, are nullities; that the remaining portions of said
statutes are valid; that the duties imposed by said statutes
upon said Board or Committee are executive in their
nature, and subject to the provisions of the Organic Act
relating to the executive functions; that said executive
duties and powers may be performed as in other cases not
specifically provided for by law.
"Now, therefore, acting under authority of said opinions,
the duties and powers heretofore exercised by said 'Board
of Control' or 'Committee' shall, from and after this date,
300

be exercised solely by the Governor-General pursuant to

the executive power vested in him by the Organic Act."
Notice of said Executive Order was duly and timely
given by the Governor-General to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The Governor-General further notified the President and
Speaker that "he would thereafter exercise exclusively the
duties and powers" with respect to the voting of the stock
held by the Government of the Philippine Islands in the
National Coal Company.
At the time of the issuance of said Executive Order No.
37 or thereabouts the Government of the Philippine Islands
was the registered owner of about 29,975 shares out of the
total of 30,000 shares of said company. The President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
protested against the alleged assumed authority on the
part of the Governor-General to vote said government stock
and insisted upon their right to participate in the voting of

the same.
Later, and without going into great detail, a meeting of
the stockholders was called for the purpose of electing
members of the Board of Directors of said company. In
accordance with the preannounced intention, the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives attended the meeting of the stockholders
of the company and then and there asserted their right, as
a majority of the "Voting Committee," to vote the stock of
the Government. Against the objections and protest of the
Governor-General they were permitted by the Chairman of
the meeting to vote all of the stock held by the Government
of the Philippine Islands. They deposited a ballot
purporting to be signed by them on behalf of the said
"Voting Committee" for the election as Directors of Alberto
Barretto, Frank B. Ingersoll, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio
Costas, and Anselmo Hilario. Notwithstanding the
objection and protest of the Governor-General to the
acceptance of said
301
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 301

ballot, the Chairman permitted it to be deposited in favor

of the persons for whom it was cast. At the same meeting of
the stockholders and at the same time the Governor-
General, insisting upon his sole right to vote the stock
owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands, cast
his ballot representing all of the stock of the Government,
in favor of Alberto Barretto, Frank B. Ingersoll, Romarico
Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo, which
ballot was rejected by the Chairman and the same was not
allowed to be deposited.
Against the ruling of the Chairman, permitting the
ballot of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to be deposited on behalf of the
said "Voting Committee" a protest of the Governor-General
was duly and timely presented. Notwithstanding said
protest on the part of the Governor-General, that the
Representatives had no authority to vote the stock of the
Government nor to participate in the voting of the same,
the Chairman declared that Alberto Barretto, Frank B.
Ingersoll, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and
Anselmo Hilario had each received a majority of the votes
cast and that said persons had been duly elected as

members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal
Company.
It will be noted that both the Governor-General, and the
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of
Representatives voted for the election of Alberto Barretto,
and Frank B. Ingersoll. There is no objection in this record
to the right of said persons to act as members of the Board
of Directors. The contention of the Government is, that
Romarico Agcaoili, H, L. Heath and Salvador Lagdameo
had been duly and legally elected as members of the Board
of Directors by the vote of the Governor-General, and that
Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario
had not been duly and legally elected as members of the
Board of Directors by the vote of the President of the Sen-
302

ate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and

that they should be ousted and altogether excluded from
their office.
Considering the foregoing facts we have the question
squarely presented, whether the persons elected by the
Governor-General in voting the stock owned by the
Government had been duly and legally elected directors of
said company, or whether the persons elected by the
Representatives were legally elected as such Directors.
It can scarcely be contended that the President .of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
when the Governor-General is present at a meeting of the
stockholders of said company, have a right to vote all of the
stock of said company, to the entire exclusion of the
Governor-General. There is nothing in the law which
indicates the manner in which the stock owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands may be voted when a
difference of opinion exists among the members of the
"Voting Committee" as to how the same shall be voted.
Without discussing the method of voting the stock when
there is a difference of opinion in the "Voting Committee"
as to how it shall be voted, we pass to the question,
whether or not the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, as members of the
Legislative Department of the Government, have any right
whatever to participate in the voting of the stock belonging

to the Government of the Philippine Islands.
THE RIGHT OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF

THE GOVERN
MENT TO EXECUTE OR TO ASSIST IN THE
EXECUTION OF
ITS LAWS.
The Legislative Department of the Government adopted

the law creating the charter of the National Coal Company.
The Legislative Department of the Government provided a
method, in said charter, by which it, through the President
303
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 303

of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, should assist in the execution of said law.
It has been stated so frequently by eminent statesmen
and jurists, that it scarcely needs the citation of authorities
to support the doctrine, that wherever the American flag
flies as an emblem of Government, the powers of that
Government are divided into three distinct and separate
departments—Executive, Legislative and Judicial—each
acting in its own field, under its own authority and general
powers of the government. While the line of demarcation,
by division, is easily discerned, it is at times difficult to
follow in actual cases. There is a constant overlapping of
the different departments of the government which cannot
be avoided, and yet such overlapping generally results in
the greater stability and permanency of the government. It
is also a statement, based upon political science, that
scarcely needs repetition, that one department overreaches
its powers whenever it steps across the line of demarcation
and attempts to f unction within the field of another
department of government under the American flag. Under
the form of government established in the Philippine
Islands, one department of the government has no power or
authority to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are
performed within the discretion of the other department. It
is the general duty of the legislative branch of the
government to make such laws and regulations as will
effectually conserve the peace and good order and protect
the lives and the property of the citizens of the state. It is
the duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he
deems wise and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such

laws. Every delay and hindrance and obstacle which
prevents a strict enforcement of laws necessarily tends to
jeopardize public interest and the safety of the whole
people. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87.)
The different departments of the government are
coordinate, coequal and each functions independently,
uncontrolled and uncontrollable by the other. To that
statement, however, there exist exceptions. For example,
the
304

executive department of the government may annul and set

aside acts of the legislative department of the government
under its power of veto. So may the legislative department
of the government annul and set aside actions of the
executive department of the government by repealing or
amending laws. So likewise the judicial department of the
government may annul and set aside acts of the legislative
department of the government when such acts are contrary
to the f undamental laws of the state or beyond the powers
of the legislative department. But in every case, where one
department, as above indicated, to any extent attempts to
control ;the effects of acts of the other department or
departments, it is acting under its own powers and within
its own department.
The Constitution of the United States as well as the
Constitution of each of the states of the Union provide that
the government shall be divided into three departments:
executive, legislative, and judicial. George Washington,
who was the President of the Constitutional Convention
which adopted the United States Constitution, in a letter
written to his friend Lafayette in 1788, referring to the
complete separation of the powers of the government, said:
"These powers are so distributed among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, in which the powers of the
government are arranged that it can never be in danger of
degenerating into a monarchy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy,
or any other despotic form of government as long as there
shall remain any virtue in the body of the people."
Mr. Thomas Jefferson, who has, been quoted on
questions relating to the meaning, force and application of
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States
perhaps more than any other one person, said: "The great
principle established by the Constitution of the United

States which was never before fully established, was the
separation of the delegated power into the hands of the
executive, the legislative department, and the judiciary.
This is our sys-
305
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 305

tem of check and balances which makes ours a 'government

of laws and not of men.' " On another occasion Mr. Thomas
Jefferson said, in discussing the necessity of limiting the
power of government: "When it comes to a question of
power—trust no man, bind him down from mischief, by the
strong chains of the Constitution."
By the well known distribution of the powers of
government among the executive, legislative, and judicial
departments by the constitution, there was provided that
marvelous scheme of check and balances which has been
the wonder and admiration of the statesmen, diplomats,
and jurists in every part of the civilized world.
The balance of the powers of government provided for in
the constitution as well as in the charter of the Philippine
Government was not the result of chance. The various
parts did not fall into place merely through the vicissitudes
of circumstance. They were devised by careful foresight;
each in a measure dependent upon the others and not
possessed of so much independence as to give freedom and
courage in the exercise of their functions. Each was to move
within its respective spheres as the bodies of the celestial
system march along the pathways of the heaven. It is a
fundamental rule of constitutional law that no department
of government has power to perform nor to assist in
performing the functions of another.
The executive department is limited to the execution. of
valid laws adopted by the legislative department of the
government. The legislative department is limited to the
enactment of laws and to the, investigation of facts
necessary for wise legislation. The judicial department of
the government is limited to the administration of justice
and the interpretation of laws. In case of differences
between the executive and legislative departments as to
their respective powers, it has long since been conceded
that the Supreme Court shall act as an umpire. Marbury
vs. Madison [1803], 1 Cranch' [U. S.], 137; Rice vs. Austin,
306

19 Minn., 74; Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard [U. S.], 44;

Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat. [U. S.], 19.)
No government, past or present, has more carefully and
watchfully guarded and protected, by law, the individual
rights of life and property of its citizens than the
governments under the American flag. Each of the three
departments of the government has had separate and
distinct functions to perform in this great labor. The
history of the United States, covering nearly a century and
a half, discloses the fact that each department has
performed its part well. No one department of the
government can or ever has claimed, within its.
discretionary power, a greater zeal than the others in its
desire to promote the welfare Of the individual citizens,
entities or corporations. They are all joined together in
their respective spheres, harmoniously working to
maintain good government, peace and order, to the end
that the rights of each citizen be equally protected. No one
department can claim that it has a monopoly of these
benign purposes of the government. Each department has
an exclusive field within which it can .perform its part
within certain legal and discretionary limits. No other
department can claim a right to enter these legal and
discretionary limits and assume to act there. No
presumption of an abuse of these legal and discretionary
powers by one department will be considered or
entertained by another. Generally such conduct on the part
of one department, instead of tending to conserve the
highest interest of the government and its citizens and the
rights of the people, would directly tend to destroy the
confidence of the people in the government and to
undermine the very foundations of the government itself.
(Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87, 115; Forbes
vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534.)
The Government of the Philippine Islands, like the
Government of the United States, is based upon the
fundamental principle of the separation of the executive,
307
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 307

legislative, and judicial powers. Subject only to the

exceptions especially established by the organic act, neither
of the great departments of the government may validly
exercise any of the powers conferred upon either of the
others. In the case of Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil., 612) it
Was said: "The duties of each department are well defined
and limited to certain fields of governmental operation."
Each department exercises functions as independent of
each other as the Federal or state governments of the
Union. It was not intended by the framers of the theory of
our government that the duties which had been assigned to
the executive should be performed by the legislative, nor
that the duties which had been assigned to each of them
should be performed and directed by the judicial
department. (Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 700, 718;
Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U. S., 361; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)
No well organized government or business even can be
well managed if one department can enter upon the field of
another and attempt to administer or interfere in the
administration of the other. (Abueva vs. Wood, supra;
Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil.,. 87; U. S. vs.
Bull, 15 Phil., 7, 27.)
In the case of Kilbourne vs. Thompson (103 U. S., 168) it
was said: "It is also essential to the successful working of
this system, that the persons entrusted with power in any
one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach
upon the powers confided to the others, but that each shall
by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the
powers appropriate to its own department and no other."
Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1917 (Act No.
2711) provides: "The executive, legislative, and judicial
powers of the Philippine Government are distributed,
respectively, among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, severally exercising the functions and powers
conferred on them by law."
308

Each department .of the government has an exclusive field

within which it can perform its part within certain
discretionary limits. No other department can claim a right
to enter these discretionary limits and assume to act there.
(Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, supra; U. S, vs. Bull,
supra; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil.,
534; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil, 322; Severino vs.
Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental

Negros, 16 Phil., 366; Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil.,
338.)
In the case of United States vs. Ang Tang Ho (43 Phil.,
1) this court said that the legislature has no authority to
execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority
to make or construe the law. Subject to the constitution
only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the judiciary only to say when an
act of the legislature is or is not constitutional. It is beyond
the power of any branch of the Government of the
Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other
way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local
laws which conform to the Organic Law. (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 96.)
It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature
to enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish
the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the Chief
Executive. (Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil., 599.)
From all of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable.
that if any given act of the Philippine Legislature does not,
by its nature, pertain to the law-making function, but is
either executive or judicial in character, and does not fall
within any of the express exceptions established by the
Organic Act, such an act is ultra vires and therefore null
and void. (See, for a discussion of the powers of the
executive department of the Government, the opinion by
the late Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano in the case of In
re Patterson, 1 Phil., 93.)
309
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 309

POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF

GOVERNMENTS
UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG
Some one has said that the powers of the legislative

department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments,
however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments of the
same are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only
exercise such powers as are expressly given and such other
powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers.
The constitution is the shore of legislative authority

against which the waves of legislative enactment may
dash, but over which they cannot leap.
Mr. Justice Cooley, one of the greatest expounders of
constitutional law, said: "The legislative power, we
understand, to be the authority, under the constitution, to
make laws and to alter and repeal them."
Mr. Biddel, an eminent lawyer, said: "The legislature
has no other duty nor power than to make laws. After a law
has been enacted, that department has no further power
over the subject except to amend or repeal it. It can neither
adjudge the law nor execute it. All power of that
department is ended."
Mr. James Wilson, who was a member of the convention
which adopted the Constitution of the United States, and
later one of the first members of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and one of the very ablest of the members of
that great body, in discussing the question of the powers of
the legislative department of the government, said, quoting
from an able English statesman: "England can never be
ruined but by a Parliament (legislative department), which
demonstrates the danger of allowing to the legislative
department any other (power) than strictly legislative
powers."
310

Even the Justices of the Supreme Court joined in a letter

addressed to President Washington upon the general
subject of the separation of the departments of government,
and insisted upon a scrupulous and undeviated
maintenance of the separation of the departments.
Mr. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander
Hamilton, who were among the great expounders of the
Constitution, wrote earnestly upon the question of the
separation of the departments of government, and, with
many others, united in protesting against tolerating the
claim of the legislative department to exercise any other
than purely legislative power.
It has been said in many of the leading cases decided by
the highest courts of record that "the power of the
legislature is the power to legislate only and to make such
investigations as are necessary for that purpose."
Under a constitutional form of government it is believed
that all will agree that the concentration of power in the
legislative department of government or in any one of the

other departments will inevitably result in despotism.
Mr. Bryce, who for many years was a close student of
the system of government under the American flag, said:
"A legislature is a legislature and nothing more." Mr.
Woodrow Wilson, in discussing the powers of the executive
and legislative departments of government, said: "The
power of the legislative department is to enact laws, while
it is the duty of the President to see that the laws of
Congress are faithfully executed."
A careful reading of the debates, in the Constitutional
Convention, by the greatest statesmen and diplomats at
that time shows clearly that one of their greatest concerns
was the limitation upon the powers of the executive and
legislative departments. A reading of the Constitution itself
adopted after a long discussion shows clearly that its
members intended to expressly limit the powers of said
departments. In the enumeration of the powers of the
311
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 311

Government of the .Philippine Islands vs. Springer
three departments the phrase that each "shall" or "shall

not" do a particular thing is frequently found. No general
unlimited power is found. Experience had shown that there
was need of curbing the legislative body in order to prevent
a violation of the citizens' right of liberty and property. The
members of the Constitutional Convention made an effort
to strike at the very root of the evils which the people of the
state had suffered by the madness of a sovereign legislative
body.
James Madison, a member of the Convention, and later
President of the United States, said: "Experience had
proved a tendency in our governments (state governments)
to throw all power into the legislative vortex. The
executives of the states are, in general, little more than
ciphers; the legislature, omnipotent. If no effectual check be
devised in restraining the instability and encroachments of
the latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be
inevitable."
Gouverneur Morris, one of the great statesmen of his
time, said that "he concurred in thinking the public liberty
in greater danger from legislative usurpation than from
any other source." (July 21, 1787.)
James Madison, in September, 1787, in speaking of the
encroachments of the legislative department, said: "The
experience of the states had demonstrated that their

checks are insufficient. The legislative department is
everywhere extending the spheres of its activity and
draining all power into its impetuous vortex. I have
appealed to experience for the truth of what I advance on
this subject."
Mr. James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional
Convention and one of the first members of the Supreme
Court of the United States, said on the 16th day of June,
1787: "If the legislative authority be not restrained there
can be neither liberty nor stability."
The great statesmen who were among the members of
the Constitutional Convention were as solicitous about the
312

Government the Philippine Islands vs. Springer
limitations of the executive department of the government,

as they were concerning the limitations of the legislative
department. They were exceedingly cautious in defining
the powers of each of said departments, and so f ar as their
knowledge and experience aided them their work was
complete.
POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE,

GRANTED BY THE
PHILIPPINE CHARTER
Turning to the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,

commonly known as the "Jones Law," for the purpose of
ascertaining what power or authority to legislate was
granted to the Philippine Legislature, we find that, while
the legislature was given "general legislative power" (secs.
1, 8, 12), "all laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature
shall be reported to the Congress of the United States,
which reserves the power and authority to annul the
same." Not only must all laws enacted by the Philippine
Legislature be reported to Congress for approval but
certain laws, in addition to the requirement that they must
be submitted to Congress, must be submitted to the
President of the United States for approval (secs. 9, 10, and
19). In other words, no act of the Philippine Legislature can
have the force and effect of a law until it has been either
expressly or tacitly approved either by the Congress of the
United States or by the President. Neither will it be
contended that the express or tacit approval by the
Congress of the United States or by the President, of a law

otherwise illegal and void, will render such law valid if, in
fact, it was adopted without power or authority.
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

LEGISLATURE TO ENACT
LAW IS WHOLLY A DELEGATED AUHORITY
The only legislative authority possessed by the Philippine

Legislature is a delegated authority. The only power
313
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 313

or authority to legislate is granted by the Congress of the

United States by the charter (Jones Law; Act of July 2,
1902). To ascertain the power of the Philippine Legislature,
therefore, an examination of its charter must be made.
It is argued that when either the President or the
Congress of the United States gives express or tacit
approval to an Act of the Philippine Legislature, that such
an act thereby becomes a valid subsisting law. That
argument is tenable, except when such act is beyond the
powers granted to the Legislature. The approval by the
President or Congress of an act of the Philippine
Legislature does not render such an act legal if, in fact, the
same is beyond the powers of the Legislature or contrary to
the fundamental law of the land. If the provisions of the act
extend beyond the powers of the Legislature, then certainly
it cannot be contended that the same is a valid and legal
act even though the same has been expressly or tacitly
approved by the President or Congress, unless the same
can be considered an act of the Congress of the United
States and then only, when the same is within the power
and authority of Congress. Such act of the Philippine
Legislature, even with such approval, can be no more valid
and legal than if the Congress of the United States itself
had adopted a law which was beyond its power. The
legality of such act, notwithstanding the approval, may be
decided in a proper proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether its provisions are beyond the powers
of the legislative department of the government.
The general legislative powers granted to the Philippine
Legislature are found in sections 6, 7, 8, and 12 of the Act
of August 29, 1916, and those provisions of the Act of July
2, 1902, which have not been repealed. Section 6 provides
that the laws now in f orce in the Philippines shall continue

in force, except as altered, amended or mod-
314

ified herein, until altered, amended or repealed by the

legislative authority herein provided by the Act of
Congress.
Section 7 provides that the legislative authority herein
provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this
Act, by due enactment, to amend, alter, modify or repeal
any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act, as
it may from time to time see fit.
Section 8 provides that general legislative power, except
as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted to the
Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act. Section 12,
among other things, provides that general legislative power
in the Philippines, except as herein otherwise provided,
shall be vested in the Legislature, which shall consist of
two houses, one the Senate and the other, the House of
Representatives, and the two houses shall be designated
"the Philippine Legislature."
From a reading of said sections 6, 7, 8, and 12 we have
some difficulty in determining why it was necessary to
repeat practically the same idea concerning the legislative
authority in said sections. The provisions of sections 6, 7,
and 12 add nothing to the provisions of section 8 which
granted general legislative power to the Philippine
Legislature.
We have read said Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
in vain, to find the slightest reference to the power of the
Philippine Legislature to participate in the slightest
degree, by legislation or otherwise, in the execution of its
laws even after they have been approved expressly or
tacitly by the President or Congress, unless such power is
found in that provision of the law, and then only in the
Philippine Senate, which gives that branch of the
Legislature the right to participate, with its advice and
consent, in the appointment of certain officers of the
Government But even that provision can scarcely be
construed to mean that the Senate can participate in the
execution of the laws.
315
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 315

THE ONLY SOVEREIGN IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IS THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES
The people of the Philippine Islands exercise in all matters

of government a delegated authority. The executive, the
legislative, and the judicial departments of the Government
are merely exercising a delegated authority. These
departments, unlike the departments of Government in the
United States under the Constitution, have received no
authority f rom the people of the Philippine Islands. In the
absence of Congressional authority, these departments
have no authority or power. They are each creatures of the
Congress of the United States. Like all agents, they must
act within the authority given. The title of acts of the
Philippine, Legislature, by which it assumes to enact laws
"by its own authority" is an assumption of authority not
possessed in fact nor in law. It acts by authority of the
Congress of the United States and in the enactment of laws
that authority should be recognized.
RIGHT OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO APPOINT

COMMITTEES
TO MAKE INVESTIGATIONS IN ORDER TO ENACT
WISE LEGIS
LATION.
In addition to the power to enact laws, the Philippine

Legislature has the inherent power on its own account, or
through committees appointed by it, to inquire into the
general condition of the government, the administration of
governmental affairs and the general welfare of the people,
to obtain information to aid it in adopting wise legislation.
When such investigation is terminated and laws are
adopted, then the authority of the legislature is ended and
the execution of such laws is turned over to the Executive
Department of the Government.
THE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE

UNDER THE
CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
From a further examination of the Act of Congress of

August 29, 1916, in relation with the Act of Congress of
316

July 2, 1902, we find a depository of power and authority

created for the express purpose of executing the laws of the
Philippines. Section 21 of said Act (August 29, 1916)
provides "that the supreme executive power shall be vested
in an executive officer whose official title shall be the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands." It occurs to us
that when the Congress of the United States used the
words "supreme executive power" that the phrase was used
after a careful consideration of its meaning. It was not a
haphazard use of the term. The use of that phrase was
carefully considered by the Congress of the United States
when the Jones Bill was under consideration. In addition to
the enumerated powers conferred upon the "supreme
executive power," we find that he is held responsible for the
faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands."
The language of section 22 is "he shall be responsible for
the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands."
There is nothing in any of the provisions of the Jones Law
which authorizes or permits the "supreme executive power"
to divide its responsibility for the faithful execution of the
laws of the Philippine Islands with any other department,
legislative or judicial, or with any of the bureaus of the
Gevernment. All executive functions of the Philippine
Government are expressly under the direction and control
of the Governor-General.
Outside of the provisions for the internal regulation and
control of the affairs of the legislature, its rules and
regulations in its relation with the confirmation of certain
appointees by the Governor-General, there is not a syllable,
a word, a phrase, a line, nor a paragraph in the Jones Law
which permits the legislature to participate in the
execution of its general or special laws.
It is a fundamental maxim of political science,
recognized and carried into effect in the Federal
Constitution and the constitutions of all the states of the
Union, that good government and the protection of rights
require that the
317
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 317

legislative, executive, and the judicial powers should not be

confided to the same person or body, but should be
apportioned to separate and mutually independent
departments of the government. (Black's Constitutional
Law, p. 83.)
The idea of an apportionment of the powers of
government, and of their separation into three coordinate
departments is not a modern invention of political science.
It was suggested by Aristotle in his treatise on "Politics."
and was not unfamiliar to the more advanced of the
medieval jurists. But the importance of this division of
powers, with the principle of classification, were never f
ully apprehended, in theory, until Montesquieu gave to the
world his great work "Spirit of the Laws." Since then his
analysis of the various powers of the state has formed part
of the accepted political doctrine of the civilized world.
All American constitutions, state and Federal, provide
for the separation of the three great powers of government,
and their apportionment 'to distinct and independent
departments of government.
The principle of the separation of the three departments
of the government imposes upon each the limitation that it
must not usurp the powers nor encroach upon the
jurisdiction of either of the others.
The people of the United States ordained in their
constitution that "all legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." The
people also declared that "the executive power shall be
vested in a President" and that "the judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." It is made clear therefore that the
power to legislate is given to the Congress and that the
President and the courts are prohibited from making laws.
The legislature cannot lawfully usurp any of the functions
granted by the Constitution to the executive department.
The true meaning of the constitutional division of govern-
318

mental powers is simply that the whole power of one of the

three departments of government shall not be exercised by
the same hand which possesses the whole power of either of
the other departments.
Mr. Baker, who was Secretary of War of the United

States at the time the Jones Law was adopted, and who
perhaps was more familiar with its meaning and purpose
than any other one person, wrote a letter to
GovernorGeneral Harrison, in which he said in general
terms that "it would seem to be the part of wisdom for the
President and the Governor-General to admit of no
encroachment on those powers placed in their hands."
Energy and constancy in the executive department of
the government is a leading element in the definition of
good government. They are essential to the protection of
the people of the state against foreign attack; they are not
less essential to the steady administration of the law; to the
protection of property against those irregular and high-
handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the
ordinary course of justice and administration of the law; to
the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults
of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. A feeble executive in
the administration of his department implies a feeble
execution of the government. A feeble execution is but
another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill
executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in
practice, a bad government. Delay in the administration of
the laws will lead to injustice, dissensions, turmoils, and
disorder.
While the legislature has authority to adopt laws and
the courts are possessed with power to construe them, yet
finally in its largest sense, the administration of a
government and the execution of the laws so adopted and
construed is finally left in the hands of the executive
department of the government.
319
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 319

FORMS OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAVE EXISTED IN

THE PHIL
IPPINE ISLANDS SINCE AMERICAN OCCUPATION
Since the 13th day of August, 1898, there have existed in

the Philippines several distinct forms of Government.
First. A Military Government.—From the 13th day of
August, 1898, until the 1st day of September, 1900, there
existed a Military Government in the Philippine Islands
under the authority of the President of the United States.
That Government exercised all of the powers of

government, including executive, legislative, and judicial.
Second. Divided Military and Civil Government.—From
the 1st day of September, 1900, to July 4, 1901, the
legislative department of the Government was transferred
from the Military Governor to the United States Philippine
Commission, to be thereafter exercised by said Commission
in the place and stead of the Military Government, under
such rules and regulations as the Secretary of War might
prescribe, until the establishment of the Civil Central
Government for the Islands, or until Congress should
otherwise provide. During that' period the executive
authority was vested in the Military Governor while the
legislative authority was vested in the Philippine
Commission. (See Instructions of the President of the
United States to the United States Philippine Commission,
April 7, 1900.) On the 4th day of July, 1901, the executive
power theretofore possessed by the Military Governor was
transferred to the President of the United States Philippine
Commission.
Third. Civil Government.—From the 4th day of July,
1901, to the 16th day of October, 1907, the executive and
legislative powers of the Philippine Government were
possessed by the United States Philippine Commission.
The President of the Commission not only possessed and
exercised the executive power of the Government but sat as
a member of the United States Philippine Commission as a
member of the legislative department of the Government.
320

Fourth. Legislative Department of the Government Divided

into Two Branches.—On the 16th day of October, 1907, the
Legislative Department of the Government was divided
into two branches—the United States Philippine
Commission, and the Philippine Assembly—which form
continued up to the 16th day of October, 1916. The
Governor-General during that period not only possessed
the executive powers of the Government, but acted as a
member of the branch of the legislative department, known
as the United States Philippine Commission.
Fifth. Legislative Department of the Government
Separated from the Executive Department.—From the 16th
day of October, 1916, until the present time, by virtue of
the provisions of the Jones Law, the executive and
legislative departments of the Government have been

separated, each constituting a separate and distinct
department of government; the first, represented by the
Governor-General and the second, by the Philippine
Legislature.
In each of the separate forms of government above
mentioned there existed the executive, legislative and
judicial powers fully established and recognized by the only
authority for the existence of said Government,—the
Government of the United States.
DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE

PHILIPPINES WHEN
ADVISED OF ILLEGALITY OF A LAW—HE MAY
DISREGARD
IT OR FORMULATE A PROPER ISSUE TO BE
PRESENTED TO
THE COURT CONCERNING ITS LEGALITY.
It is the sworn duty of the Governor-General of the

Philippines to execute the laws. That duty, however, does
not require him to execute an illegal act of the Legislature.
When he is advised by his legal department that a certain
act, or any part thereof, of the Legislature is illegal and
void, he may do one of two things: (a) He may disregard it
and refuse to execute it, or (&) he may formulate an issue
upon the alleged illegality and have that question
presented
321
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 321

to the courts for solution. He is acting within his powers

whichever of these courses he elects to take. To disregard
an illegal and void act of the Legislature is neither tyranny
nor a violation of his sworn duty. It would be a violation of
his sworn duty to enforce or permit the enforcement of an
illegal act.
RIGHT OF DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS TO

CONSTRUE POWERS
GRANTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OR CHARTER
While in many jurisdictions a provision exists by virtue of

which the executive and legislative departments may, in
case of doubt as to their powers, refer the question to the
courts for decision, no such provision exists in the
Philippines. In the absence of such provision it becomes

necessary therefore in the first instance, when a duty is to
be performed, for said departments to pass upon the
question of their power to act. Every department of
government invested with constitutional or charter powers
must, in many instances, be the judge of their powers, or
they could not act. Such interpretation of their powers is
not exclusive. The parties aggrieved may resort to the
courts for a judicial interpretation. (Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 73.)
EXCLUSIVE DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO

PROTECT THE
PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT
It is the duty of the Governor-General, as the supreme

executive power, to protect the property of the Government.
If he, by negligence or inattention to that responsibility,
permits the property of the Government to be wasted,
destroyed or lost, he subjects himself to the danger of
impeachment. His responsibility is then one of great
seriousness. He should not supinely disregard it. While the
legislative department of the Government may adopt laws
for safeguarding and protecting the property, public and
private, it cannot intervene in the enforcement of such law.
The
322

legislative department would thereby be taking part, not

only in the enactment of laws but in the execution of the
same, which is not permitted under the American
Constitution and system of laws.
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE BY LEGISLATIVE

DEPARTMENT FUR
NISHES NO CRITERION AS TO REAL POWERS
In support of the contention that the President of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
under Act No. 2705 as amended by Act No. 2822, have a
right to intervene in the execution of said laws, our
attention is called to many acts of legislative bodies, where
such bodies have not only enacted laws but have made
provisions in the same, by which they have intervened in
their execution. The cited cases support the allegations of
the respondents. Our attention is called especially to Acts

Nos. 69, 1415, 1841, 1849, 1870, 1981, 2023, 2479, 2510,
2598, 2957 and 3208 as well as to many acts of the
legislatures of different states of the Union. It is true that
in each of the various acts cited; of the Philippine
Legislature, a provision is made for the appointment of
certain persons to assist in their execution.
No question has ever been raised concerning the powers
of the Legislature in respect of said acts. The mere fact,
however, that the legality of said acts has never been
questioned and their legality has been passed sub silentio,
does not create a conclusive presumption that they were in
fact adopted within the powers of the legislative
department of the Government. The fact that a statute has
been accepted as valid, and invoked and applied for many
years in cases where its validity was not raised or passed
on, does not prevent a court from later passing on its
validity where the question is properly raised and
presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563,
and cases cited.)
323
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 323

LEGALITY OF THAT PROVISION OF ACT NO. 2705, AS

AMENDED
BY ACT NO. 2822, CREATING THE "VOTING
COMMITTEE"
In addition to the contention that the Legislature, by virtue

of the provisions of Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822, not only
attempted to legislate but to participate in the execution of
its laws, there is still another objection to the legality of
that provision of said acts which creates the "Voting
Committee." One of the inhibitions against the powers of
the Philippine Legislature is found in one of the
subparagraphs of section 3 of the Jones Law. Said
subparagraph provides: "That no bill (public or private)
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title
of the bill." The title of Act No. 2705 reads: "An Act to
create the National Coal Company." The title of Act No.
2822 is: "An Act to amend Certain Sections of Act No. 2705,
Entitled 'An Act to create the National Coal Company.' "
Act No. 2822 does not amend that provision of Act No. 2705
relating to the "Voting Committee." The inhibition,
therefore, of the Jones Law need not be discussed with

reference to the provisions of Act No. 2822.
Many of the states of the Union have adopted similar
constitutional provisions. The purpose of this legislative
restriction and the evils sought to be remedied thereby are
clearly stated by Mr. Sutherland, now an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his valuable
work on Statutory Construction. In section 111 he says
that:
"In the construction and application of this
constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in
view the correction of the mischief against which it was
aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was
common in all legislative bodies where no such restriction
existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters
having no
324

relation to each other, or to the subject specified in the

title, by which measures were often adopted without
attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented
diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the
members of the legislature who favor either in support of
all. These combinations were corruptive of the legislature
and dangerous to the State. Such omnibus bills sometimes
included more than a hundred sections on as many
different subjects, with a title appropriate to the first
section, 'and for other purposes.'
"The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object
intended to be accomplished by the legislation often
resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which
they would not knowingly have approved. And not only
were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that
legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the
closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to
commend them, would have been made odious by popular
discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been
reasonably announced. The constitutional clause under
discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such
corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures by
confining each act to one subject or object; to prevent
surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or
object to be expressed in the title."
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329), the

Supreme Court of Alabama stated the proposition as
follows—citing and quoting from Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, p. 143:
"The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief
proposed to be remedied by this provision are well known.
Legislative assemblies for the dispatch of business often
pass bills by their titles only, without requiring them to be
read. A specious title sometimes covered legislation which,
if its real character had been disclosed, would not have
commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the
325
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 325

legislature is one of the purposes this provision was

intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this
provision, the title of a statute was often no indication of its
subject or contents.
"An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to
correct was the blending in one and the same statute of
such things as were diverse in their nature, and were
connected only to combine in f avor of all the advocates of
each, thus often securing the passage of several measures,
no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits.
Mr. Cooley thus sums up his review of the authorities
defining the objects of this provision: 'lt may, therefore, be
assumed as settled, that the purpose of this provision was:
First, to prevent hodge-podge, or log-rolling legislation;
second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature,
by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no
information, and which might therefore be overlooked and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to f
airly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they
may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition
or otherwise, if they shall so desire.' "
"The practice," says the Supreme Court of Missouri, "of
comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antagonistic
nature, in order to combine in its support members who
were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which
measures could command the requisite majority on its own
merits, was found to be not only a corrupting influence in
the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best interests
of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that
other pernicious practice by which, though dexterous and

unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses
in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles
gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged
them on to their passage. These things
326

led to fraud, surprise, and injury, and it was found

necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a
constitutional provision." (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42
Mo., 578, 590.)
The authorities are to all intents uniform that this
constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 112, states
the rule correctly as follows:
"The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the
evil and mischief which has been pointed out, depends on
judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being
regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to
the validity of legislation. The mischief existed
notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators;
it might be expected to continue notwithstanding that that
obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitu-
tional injunction, if it be construed as addressed exclusively
to them, and only directory. It would, in a general sense, be
a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the
provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded
at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is
clear beyond all question that such was the intention of the
framers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering
of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it
descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential
matters which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure.
The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can
be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be
treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral
obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded."
In the case of Walker vs. State, supra, the court said:
"It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning
which seems to us unanswerable, that this provision of the
constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure,
directory to the general assembly, but that it is mandatory,
327
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 327

and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not

conforming to it."
Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional
Limitations (pp. 179, 180) states that our courts have held,
without exception, that such constitutional provision is
mandatory. (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883.)
Inasmuch as the body of said Act contains a provision to
which no reference is made in the title, in view of the well
established authorities, we are forced to the conclusion
that, that provision creating the "Voting Committee" is
illegal. That illegality, however, is one which may be
separated from the rest of the act without affecting the
legality of the other provisions.
THE "VOTING COMMITTEE" AS PUBLIC OFFICERS OF

THE
GOVERNMENT
It is argued most earnestly by the petitioner, and denied

with equal earnestness by the respondents, that the
Representatives, acting as members of the "Voting
Committee" in participating in voting the stock of the
National Coal Company,' were acting as public officials of
the government and that the legislature is without
authority to appoint public officials for that purpose or to
appoint public officials at all for any purpose. It is admitted
by both parties that the National Coal Company is a
private corporation. It is admitted that the Government of
the Philippine Islands is a stockholder. The law provides
that the Governor-General, the President of the Senate,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives at a
stockholders' meeting shall act as a committee for the
purpose of voting said stock. Does that fact make the
Representatives public officials? In the voting of the stock
do they stand in any different relation to the Government
and the
328

National Coal Company than any other holders of stock?

Are they not governed by the same laws, and by-laws of the
corporation like other stockholders?
Mr. Justice Marshall, in the case of the Bank of the
United States vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia (22 U. S., 904
[Feb. 18, 1824]), in discussing the question of the relation
of the Government to private corporations when it becomes
a stockholder in a private corporation, said, among other
things: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a
government becomes a partner in any trading company, it
divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a
private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company
(or corporation) its privileges and its (sovereign)
prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it
associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to
its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted
* * *. As a member of a corporation, a Government never
exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator,
and exercises no other powers in the management of the
affairs of the corporation, than are expressly given by the
incorporating act. The Government of the Union held
shares in the old Bank of the United States; but the
privileges of the Government were not imparted by that
circumstance to the bank. The State of Georgia, by giving
to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily
strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the
transactions of the bank, and waives all the privileges of
that character."
The doctrine announced by Chief Justice Marshall in
that case has been followed without modification not only
by the courts but by all of the eminent authors who have
written upon that particular question. (Thompson on
Corporations, vol. 1, sec. 167; Bank of Kentucky vs. Wister,
27 U. S., 318, 322; Briscoe vs. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U. S.,
256, 324; Louisville Railway Co. vs. Letson, 43 U. S.,
329
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 329

497, 550; Curran vs. State of Arkansas, 56 U. S., 302;

Veazie Bank vs. Fenno, 75 U. S., 533; Railroad Co. vs.
Commissioners, 103 U. S., 1, 5; Hopkins vs. Clemson
College, 221 U. S., 636, 644; Putnam vs. Ruch, 56 Fed., 416;
Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Henderson, 68 Fed., 591; U. S.
vs. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co., 206 Fed., 964;
Encyclopedia of the U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol. 11, p.

225; Encyclopedia of the U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol. 3,
p. 124; Encyclopedia of the U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol.
4, p. 643.)
The petitioner as well as the respondents cite many
cases in support of their respective contentions. The
petitioner cites the following cases:
Pratt vs. Breckinridge (112 Ky., 1); State vs. Brill (100
Minn., 499); State vs. Denny (118 Ind., 382; 4 L. R. A., 79);
State vs. Washburn (167 Mo., 680); State vs. Stanley (66 N.
C., 60); Welker vs. Bledsoe ("68 N. C., 457); Howerton vs.
Tate (68 N. C., 546); Myers vs. United States (272 U. S., 52;
71 Law. ed., 160) ; Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599).
Cases cited by respondents:
The Smithsonian Institution; Mechem's Public Officers,
sec. 1; Olmstead vs. -Mayor (42 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 481); United
States vs. Germaine (99 U. S., 508); McArthur vs. Nelson
(81 Ky., 67); Congressional Reports, vol. II; State vs.
Kennon (7 Ohio State, 562).
See also:
Walker vs. City of Cincinnati (21 Ohio State, 14; 8 Am.
Rep., 24); State vs. Hocker (39 Fla., 477; 63 Am. St. Rep.,
174); Butler vs. Walker (98 Ala., 358).
After a careful analysis of all of the authorities cited, it
is difficult to conclude just what is the weight of authority,
in view of the decision of Chief Justice Marshall quoted
above. If the Government acts merely as one of the
corporators of the National Coal Company and exercises no
other power in the management of the affairs of the cor-
330

poration than the one expressly given by the Incorporatory

Act, it is difficult to understand how the "Voting
Committee" is acting as a public officer. It was not the
intention of the Legislature to make the President and
Speaker officers of the Government. The Legislature simply
intended to add additional duties to said officers. But after
all, in our opinion, the fact that the Legislature enacted the
law and at the same time provided that, through the
President and Speaker, it (the Legislature) should assist in
the execution of the same, is sufficient to nullify that
provision. It is a matter of no importance in what capacity
they acted. The Legislature had no authority to take part
in the execution of the particular law.
THE RIGHT OF THE COURT TO DECIDE THE

QUESTION, WHAT
ARE THE RESPECTIVE POWERS OF THE DIFFERENT
DE
PARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT.
It is conceded by all of the eminent authorities upon

constitutional law that the courts have authority to finally
determine what are the respective powers of the different
departments of government.
"The question of the validity of every statute is first
determined by the legislative department of the
Government, and the courts will resolve every presumption
in favor of its validity. Courts are not justified in adjudging
a statute invalid in the face of the conclusions of the
legislature, when the question of its validity is at all
doubtful. The courts will assume that the validity of a
statute was fully considered by the legislature when
adopted. Courts will not presume a statute invalid unless it
clearly appears that it falls within some of the inhibitions
of the fundamental laws of the state. The wisdom or
advisability of a particular statute is not a question for the
courts to determine. If a particular statute is within the
constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be
sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of
its enact-
331
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 331

ment. If the statute covers subjects not authorized by the

fundamental laws of the land, or by the constitution, then
the courts are not only authorized but are justified in
pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise
or beneficient such legislation may seem to be. Courts are
not justified in measuring their opinions with the opinion
of the legislative department of the Government, as
expressed in statutes, upon questions of the wisdom, justice
and advisability of a particular law. In exercising the high
authority conferred upon the courts to pronounce valid or
invalid a particular statute, they are only the
administrators of the public will, as expressed in the
fundamental law of the land. If an act of the legislature is
to be held illegal, it is not because the judges have any
control over the legislative power, but because the act is
forbidden by the fundamental law of the land and because
the will of the people, as declared in such fundamental law,

is paramount and must be obeyed, even by the legislature.
In pronouncing a statute illegal, the courts are simply
interpreting the meaning, force, and application of the
fundamental law of the state." (Case vs. Board of Health
and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250, 251.)
The judicial department of the Government may
examine every law enacted by the legislative branch of the
Government when the question is properly presented for
the purpose of ascertaining:
(a) Whether or not such law came within the subject-
matter upon which the legislative branch of the
Government might legislate; and
(b) Whether the provisions of such law were in harmony
with the authority given the legislature.
If the judicial branch of the Government finds (a) that
the legislative or executive branches of the Government
had authority to act upon the particular subject, and (b)
that the particular law contained no provisions in excess of
the powers of such department and the acts of the exe-
332

cutive were within his powers, then that investigation, or

that conclusion, conclusively terminates the investigation
by the judicial department of the Government.
SOLICITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES AND
ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS FOR
THE WELFARE AND WELL BEING OF THE
INHABITANTS.
No Government, past or present, has more carefully and

watchfully guarded and protected, by law, the individual
rights of life and property of the citizens of the Philippine
Islands than the Government of the United States and its
representatives. Each of the three departments of the
Government has had separate and distinct functions to
perform in this great labor. The history of the Philippine
Islands, covering a period of more than a quarter of a
century, discloses the fact that each department has
performed its part well. No one department of the
Government can or ever has claimed, within its
discretionary and legal powers, a greater zeal than the

others in its desire to promote the welfare of the individual
citizen. They are all joined together in their respective
spheres and departments, harmoniously working to
maintain good government, peace, and order to the end
that the rights of each citizen in his life and property be
equally protected. No one department can claim that it has
a monopoly of these benign purposes of the Government.
Each department has an exclusive field, under the law,
within which it can perform its part, within certain
discretionary limits. No other department can claim a right
to enter these discretionary and legal limits and assume to
act there. No presumption of an abuse of these
discretionary powers by one department will be considered,
permitted or entertained by another. Such conduct on the
part of one department, instead of tending to conserve good
government and the rights of the people, would directly
tend to destroy the
333
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 333

confidence of the people in the Government and to

undermine the very foundations of the Government itself.
CONCLUSIONS
For all of the foregoing reasons the petition for the

extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto should be granted,
and that Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and
Anselmo Hilario are each illegally and unlawfully
occupying the position of members of the Board of Directors
of the National Coal Company and should be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom; that Romarico Agcaoili, H.
L. Health, and Salvador Lagdameo have been duly and
legally elected as members of the Board of Directors of the
National Coal Company, and judgment is rendered that
they be immediately inducted into said position, to take
charge thereof and to perform the duties incumbent upon
them as members of the Board of Directors. The demurrer
is overruled. Considering the petition and demurrer in
relation with the stipulated facts, there seems to be no
reason for permitting an answer to be filed. And without
any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
AVANCEÑA, C. J., VlLLAMOR, and VlLLA-REAL, JJ.,

dissenting:
Much to our regret we have to dissent from the majority

whose opinion has always commanded our respect.
In the case of National Coal Company vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue (46 Phil., 583), this court said:
"THE NATIONAL COAL COMPANY, A PRIVATE
CORPORA-TION; SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF
INTERNAL REVENUE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 1496 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.—The
National Coal Company is a private corporation. The fact
that the Government happens to be a stockholder therein
does not make it a public corporation. It is subject to all the
provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as they are not
inconsistent with Act No. 2705. As a private corporation, it
has no greater powers, rights,
334

or privileges than any other corporation which might be

organized for the same purpose under the Corporation
Law. It was not the intention of the Legislature to give it a
preference, or right, or privilege over other legitimate
private corporations in the mining of coal. The law made no
provision for its occupation and operation of coal-bearing
lands, to the exclusion of other persons or corporations,
under proper permission. The National Coal Company
being a private corporation, neither the lessee nor the
owner of the lands upon which it mined coal for the year in
question, is subject to the payment of the internal revenue
duty provided for in section 1496 of the Administrative
Code."
The National Coal Company, having been created and
established by the Philippine Legislature for the purpose of
developing the coal industry in the Philippine Islands, in
harmony with the general plan of the Government to
encourage the development of the natural resources of the
country, what relation does it bear with said Government?
Is it an agency or instrumentality thereof empowered to
perform some government act or function for governmental
purposes?
Agency or instrumentality is defined to be a means by
which a certain act is done (2 C. J., 420; 32 C. J., 947). So
governmental agency or instrumentality may be defined as
a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain

governmental act or function is performed. A governmental
act is a term sometimes used to describe an act done in
pursuance of some duty imposed by the state on a person,
individual or corporate, which duty is one pertaining to the
administration of government and as an absolute
obligation on a person who receives no profit or advantage
peculiar to himself for its execution (28 C. J., 753, n. 1).
Naturally, when a government acts it does so for purposes
of its own. Now, what is the purpose of government? "A
government does not exist in a personal sense, or as an
entity in any primary sense, for the purpose
335
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 335

of acquiring, protecting, and enjoying property. It exists

primarily for the protection of the people in their individual
rights, and it holds property not primarily for the
enjoyment of property accumulations, but as an incident to
the purpose for which it exists—that of serving the people
and protecting them in their rights." (Curley vs. U. S., 130
Fed., 1, 8; 28 C. J., 750.) "The term governmental purposes,
as used in the constitution which provides that public
property taken for public purposes is exempt from taxation,
means, in its most extensive sense, the punish-ment for
crime, for prevention of a wrong, the enforcement of a
private right, or in some manner preventing wrong from
being inflicted upon the public or an individual, or
redressing some grievance, or in some way enforcing a legal
right, or redressing or preventing a public individual
injury. (City of Owensboro vs. Com., 105 Ky., 344; 28 C. J.,
753, n. 8).
In the light of the above definitions, let us inquire what
governmental act or f unction does the National Coal
Company perform, and for what governmental purposes.
As was stated by this court in the above cited case, "As a
private corporation, it has no greater rights, powers, or
privileges than any other corporation which might be
organized for the same purpose under the Corporation
Law. It was not the intention of the legislature to give it a
preference, or right, or privilege over other legitimate
private corporations in the mining of coal. The law made no
provision for its occupation and operation of coal-bearing
lands to the exclusion of other persons or corporations,
under proper permission." It is subject to the payment of
internal revenue tax on its coal output. The Philippine

Government owns nothing in said corporation except the
stock which it has purchased therein. The National Coal
Company cannot perform any governmental act, for it has
not been authorized to do so. The fact that it has been
created and established for the purpose of developing the
coal industry in the Philippine Islands, in harmony with
336

the general plan of the Government to encourage the

development of the natural resources of the country, and
the fact that the Government owns a majority of the stock
thereof, are not alone sufficient to give the National Coal
Company the distinction of being an agency or
instrumentality of said Government, just as the investment
of government money in any other corporation of the same
nature or in a radio corporation to which it has given a
charter for the purpose of encouraging the development of
radio communication in the Islands is not by itself
sufficient to make of such a corporation an agency or
instrumentality of the Government in the political and
administrative sense of the term.
If the National Coal Company is a private corporation,
and is not a government agency or instrumentality, what
standing has the Government in said corporation by virtue
of its ownership of a majority of its stock.
In the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Planters'
Bank of Georgia (6 Law. ed., 244), Chief Justice Marshall
said:
"It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a
government becomes a partner in any trading company, it
divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that
company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a
private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company
its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level
with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the
character which belongs to its. associates, and to the
business which is to be transacted. Thus, many states of
this Union who have an interest in banks, are not suable
even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the
corporation from being sued. The State of Georgia, by
giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued,
voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as
respects the transactions of the bank, and waives all the
privileges of that character. As a member of a corporation,

a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts
merely as a cor-
337
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 337

porator, and exercises no other power in the management

of the affairs of the corporation, than are expressly given by
the incorporating act." (Bank of the United States vs.
Planters' Bank of Georgia [22-25 U. S.], 6 Law. ed., 244.)
In the case of the Bank of Kentucky vs. Wister (7 Law.
ed., 323), the court, after citing the above paragraph,
added:
"To which it may be added, that if a State did exercise
any other power in or over a bank, or impart to it its
sovereign attributes, it would be hardly possible to
distinguish the issue of the paper of such banks from a
direct issue of bills of credit; which violation of the
Constitution, no doubt the State here intended to avoid."
The Government of the Philippine Islands, as a
stockholder, has a right to participate in the election of the
Directors of the National Coal Company by the exercise of
its voting power. In so doing it acts merely as a corporator
with no other power than are expressly granted by the
Corporation Law, and does not exercise its sovereignty. It
cannot impose its sovereign will, but it must act according
to the by-laws of the corporation. The only control it has is
what is given to it by the amount of its stock.
The Government, as stockholder, has a right to appoint
or designate a proxy to vote its stock in the National Coal
Company, and the Philippine Legislature has done this for
it by creating in the same Act a voting committee to be
composed exclusively of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. Now the question arises whether or not
the position of a proxy of the Government in said
corporation is a public office.
"An office is defined by good authority as involving a
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit
338

of the public, by which it is distinguished from employment

or contract." (Mechem Pub. Off. quoted in Barnhill vs.
Thompson, 122 N. C., 403, 405; 29 S. E., 720.)
The word. "office" mentioned in the constitution means a
position having to do with the general government of the
State (Walker vs. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 145), and the
same meaning must be given to the word "office" mentioned
in the Jones Law, which has the character of a constitution.
Does the committee in voting the stock of the
Government perform any sovereign function of
government?
The Government participates in the management of the
affairs of the National Coal Company every time it
exercises by proxy the right of -Voting in the election of its
directors, and, according to Chief Justice Marshall, in so
doing it acts as a corporator merely and does not exercise
any sovereign power. Its proxy, in performing his duty
exercises no greater power. And it cannot be otherwise, for
we would have the absurd result of an agent exercising a
higher power than that of the principal in the fulfilment of
the latter's mandate. If the voting of the stock of the
Government in the election of the directors of the National
Coal Company is the act, not of the Government in its
sovereign capacity, but of a corporator merely, the
designation of the members of the voting committee by the
Government to vote its stock does not involve a delegation
of a sovereign function of government, for the function
delegated is of a private and not of a public nature.
The case of State vs. Stanley (66 N. C., 59; 8 Am. Rep.,
488), cited in the brief for the plaintiff, wherein it was held
that membership in a committee, composed of the
Representatives of the State of North Carolina, is an office,
is not in point, for said committee was entrusted with the
appointment of directors and proxies in all the corporations
in which the State was a stockholder; while the committee
under consideration has no other power except
339
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 339

to vote the stock of the Government in the National Coal

Company. In that case the committee was an appointer of
directors and proxies; in this case the committee is a mere

proxy.
Is the public directly benefited by the exercise of the
delegated power of voting the stock of the Government by
the committee? When the committee votes the stock of the
Government, as a stockholder, the corporation and its
stockholder alone are directly benefited by the act, and the
public only indirectly by way of an increased material
prosperity. But this is not the kind of benefit that is sought
to be obtained by the creation of a public office. It is the
benefit that is deserved from the protection of life, liberty,
property, and the pursuit of happiness.
The voting of the stock of the Government which is
delegated to the committee, not being a part of the
sovereign functions of the said Government not being
exercised for the direct benefit of the public, membership
therein is not a public office.
Let us now examine into the question whether or not the
designation of the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, as ex-officio members of
said committee, by section 4 of Act No, 2705, as amended
by Act No. 2822, is constitutional, and therefore valid.
If the membership in the voting committee is not a
public office, the designation by the Philippine Legislature
of its own members as members ex-officio thereof is not in
violation of the principle of separation of powers. It will not
be denied that the power of appointment to certain offices
vested in the Governor-General by the Jones Law refers
only to public executive office; that his power of supervision
and control is limited to public executive functions, and
that the responsibility imposed upon him for the faithful
execution of the laws refers only to laws of public nature.
Membership in the voting committee, not being a public
office, the Governor-General has no
340

power to appoint its members; the voting of the stock of the

Government not being a public executive function, he has
no supervision and control over it; and the law creating the
National Coal Company and designating a voting
committee not being a public law, he is not charged with
the responsibility of executing it. Therefore, in creating the
voting committee and designating the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as
ex-officio members thereof the Philippine Legislature did

not encroach upon any of the powers of the
GovernorGeneral.
The contention that the Legislature cannot execute its
own laws, is contrary to the congressional interpretation
expressed on various occasions, specially in the case of "The
Smithsonian Institution." In incorporating it, the Congress
has provided for its management "by a Board of Regents"
named the Regent of the Smithsonian Institution, to be
composed of the Vice-President, the Chief Justice of the
United States, and three members of the Senate and three
members of the House of Representatives; together with six
other persons, other than members of the Congress, two of
whom shall be resident of the City of Washington; and the
other four shall be inhabitants of same State, but no two of
them in the same State" (9 Fed. St. An., sec. 588 [a]). The
members of the Senate were to be appointed by the
President thereof; and the member of the House, by the
Speaker thereof. Granting, for the sake of argument, that
membership in the voting committee is a public office, does
the designation of the President of the Senate and of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio
members of the said committee an encroachment upon the
power of appointment to office vested in the Governor-
General.
No challenge seems to have been made to the power of
the Philippine Legislature to designate the
GovernorGeneral or any other executive officer to serve on
said voting committee or any public office, and a challenge
of
341
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 341

that nature, if made at all, will find no support in the

authorities (12 C. J., 837).
What is vigorously attacked is the power of the
Legislature to designate any of its members to serve on
said voting committee, the contention being that the
exercise of such power is a violation of the principle of
separation of powers and an encroachment upon the power
of appointment to office vested in the Governor-General by
the Jones Law.
"By some authorities the power of appointment to office
is regarded as per se an executive function, which,
therefore, may not be exercised, vested, or controlled by the
legislature except in so far as it is a necessary incident to

the exercise of the legislative power or is vested by the
constitution in the legislature. By the great weight of
authority, however, the power of appointment is held not to
be per se an executive function, and unless the
appointment of particular officers is, by the constitution,
expressly conferred on the executive department or
forbidden to the legislature the latter may, by statute, vest
the power of appointment in its discretion. The ordinary
constitutional distributive clause providing for the com-
plete separation of governmental powers has generally
been held insufficient to vest the appointing power solely in
the executive. Thus a statute conferring on a circuit judge
the power to fill vacancies in a board of park commissioners
is valid. So a board of civil service commissioners may be
appointed by the legislature for the purpose of prescribing
qualifications for officers except such as are otherwise
provided for in the constitution." (12 C. J., 836, par. 319, n.
1.)
"A provision of the constitution precluding the
legislature from electing or appointing officers does not
invalidate an act creating a board or commission of which
certain state officers shall be ex-officio members, nor
prevent the legislature from imposing new functions on
existing officers." (12 C. J., 837, par. 319, n. 5.)
342

"Under the American system of government the chief

executive has no prerogative powers, but is confined to the
exercise of those powers conferred upon him by the
constitution and statutes." (12 C. J., 898, par. 402; State vs.
Bowden, 92 S. C., 393; Richardson vs. Young, 122 Tenn.,
471.)
This must be true of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, when section 21 of the Jones Law says
in part:
"He shall, unless otherwise herein provided, appoint, by
and with the consent of the Philippine Senate, such officers
as may now be appointed by the Governor-General, or such
as he is authorized by this Act to appoint, or whom he may
hereafter be authorized by law to appoint."
The enumeration of the instances in which the
GovernorGeneral may make appointments, implies that he
has not been empowered to make all appointments. The
expression "whom he may hereafter be authorized by the

law to appoint," implies clearly that there may be certain
cases in which he may not be authorized to make
appointments.
It is contended that the legislature may make such
appointments where the source of power is the people or
the constitution made by the people, as the residuum of
power is entrusted in the legislature; but that this may not
be done in the Philippine Islands where the source of power
is the Congress of the United States, and the Philippine
Legislature only acts by delegation of said body. The
Congress of the United States, after enumerating the
powers pertaining to each of the three departments of the
Government and declaring which are the functions of each,
has reserved to itself the power and authority to annul the
laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature, which must be
reported to it (Jones Law, sec. 19). If the Congress of the
United States had intended to limit the powers of the
Philippine Legislature to those enumerated by it in the
Organic Act and to those of purely legislative character,
343
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 343

it would seem that there would have been no necessity for

making such reservation; because all laws passed by the
Philippine Legislature which are within its powers will of
necessity be valid, and all laws in excess of its powers will
be null and void, and the courts will so declare them. It is
only when a residuum of power is left with a legislature
which does not owe its powers to the people or to a
constitution made by the people, as the Philippine
Legislature, that such reservation becomes necessary; for it
may exercise a power which the Congress had not intended
it should exercise, and which the latter may be powerless to
correct, giving room to doubts with no other means of
solving them except by judicial decision, which may be
precisely the contrary of what the Congress may have
intended. If such reservation of power and authority has
any meaning at all, as it must have, it cannot be other than
to avoid doubts and uncertainties as to the authority of the
legislature to enact certain laws, by permitting those
affected by them to determine by the action or inaction of
Congress whether or not such power was one of those
constituting the residuum.
Furthermore, nothing could have prevented the

Congress of the United States from giving to the Philippine
Legislature the power of appointment to an office which
have not previously been vested expressly in the Governor-
General, as nothing had prevented it from placing in the
hands of the Philippine Commission not only executive but
legislative powers as well. If so, there is nothing that can
prevent it from ratifying any law by which executive
officers are created and filled by the legislature with its
own members. Ratification may be made either expressly
or impliedly. Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822,
having been reported to Congress, the failure of the latter
to annul it was equivalent to an implied ratification.
In the case of Fajardo Sugar Co. of Porto Rico vs.
Holcomb, decided on November 23, 1926, the Federal Court
of the First Circuit said:
344

"If, turning from the section specifically dealing with the

powers of the auditor, we look more broadly at the
structure of the Government of Porto Rico provided under
the Organic Act,—we are driven to the same conclusion.
Under that Act, the Governor-General, Attorney-General,
Commissioner of Education, and Auditor are presidential
appointees. The Governor has, in general, the powers of the
Governor of one of our states, and, besides, he is required
annually to make official report of the transactions of the
government of Porto Rico to the executive department of
the United States, to be designated by the President, and
the said annual report shall be transmitted to the
Congress. Moreover, in section 34 (Camp. St., par. 3803 n),
it is provided that if, after veto of the Governor, the
Legislature shall by a two-thirds vote pass an Act over the
veto, the Governor, if he shall not then approve, shall
transmit the proposed Act to the President of the United
States; that 'if the President of the United States approve
the same he shall sign it and it shall become a law. If he
shall not approve same, he shall return it to the Governor
so stating, and it shall not become a law.' It follows that no
Act can become a law without the approval of the Porto
Rican Governor, a presidential appointee, or the President
of the United States. There is also a provision in section 34
that:
" 'All laws enacted by the legislature of Porto Rico shall

be reported to the Congress of the United States * * *
which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul
same.'
"If not thus annulled, within reasonable time, there is a
presumption that they are approved." (Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228
U. S., 549, 558; 33 S. Ct. 585; 57 Law. ed., 960; Porto Rico
vs. American, etc., R. R., 254 F., 369; 165 C. C. A., 589;
Camunas vs. P. R. Ry., etc., Co. [C. C. A.], 272 F., 924, 931,
and cases cited.)
"The result is that all Porto Rican legislation now on the
statute books is—in a very real sense, though indi-
345
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 345

rectly—the output of our Federal Government. Under such

conditions, the court should not lightly assume that the tax
acts of Porto Rico, now contended to be in conflict with
section 20 of the Organic Act, are inconsistent and
therefore invalid. Doubtless the relation of the Organic Act
to the Porto Rican Government is in certain aspects, like
the relation of a state Constitution to a state Legislature."
(Camunas vs. P. R. Ry., etc., Co. [C. C. A.], 272 F., 924,
928.)
"But the analogy is not complete; for, after all, the
Organic Act is nothing but federal legislation, and Porto
Rican legislation, approved expressly or impliedly by
Congress, has exactly the same import"
The only prohibition to the appointment of members of
the Philippine Legislature to executive public offices is that
contained in section 18 of the Jones Law, which says that
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for
which he may have been elected, be eligible to any office
the election to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall
be appointed to any office of trust or profit which shall have
been created or the emoluments of which shall have been
increased during such term." The present Speaker of the
House of Representatives is clearly not within said
prohibition, as Act No. 2705 creating said committee was
enacted in 1917, before his term of office began in 1922; so
the now President of the Senate, for while the said Act was
passed during his term of office, that term had already
expired in 1922, and he is now serving another term
(19221928).
Therefore, the Philippine Legislature may -not only

create the voting committee but designate the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives as ex-officio members of said committee,
always. granting, for the sake of argument, that
membership therein is a public office.
It only remains now for us to dispose of another
question, that of the power of the Governor-General to vote
the stock
346

of the Government alone, granting again, for the sake of

argument, that section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by
Act No. 2822, is unconstitutional in so far as it refers to the
designation of the President if the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of
the voting committee.
"The provision in constitutions as to distribution of
powers, and as to the executive power of the state being
vested in the Governor, is declaratory and does not confer
any specific powers" (12 C. J., 898; Field vs. Peo, 3 111.,
79), The power to vote the stock of the Government is
delegated to a committee to be composed exclusively of the
GovernorGeneral, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the rule is
"Where the power is delegated for a mere private purpose,
all the persons (if more than one), upon whom the
authority is conferred must unite and concur in the
exercise. In case of the delegation of a public authority to
three or more persons, the authority conferred may be
exercised and performed by a majority of the whole
member. If the act to be done by virtue of such public
authority requires the exercise of discretions and judgment,
—in other words, if it is a judicial act,—the persons to
whom the authority is delegated must meet and confer
together, and be present when the act is performed; or at
least a majority must meet, confer, and be present after all
have been notified to attend. Where the act is to be done is
merely ministerial, a majority must concur and unite in the
performance of the act, but they may act separately." (18 C.
J., 472, note 3-a; Perry vs. Tynen, 22 Barb [N. Y., 137,
140].)
Whether we consider the delegation of the power to vote
the stock of the Government as for public or private
purpose, the Governor-General alone cannot exercise it as

the voting requires the exercise of discretion and judgment,
and at least a majority must concur after all have been
notified.
347
VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 347

To recapitulate, we believe that we have demonstrated the

following propositions:
1. That the National Coal Company is not an agency

or instrumentality of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
2. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, as
mere corporator, if it had to vote its own stock
would have to do so in the capacity of a private
citizen, and not in its sovereign capacity.
3. That the voting committee in exercising the power
delegated to it does so in the same capacity as its
principal.
4. That the voting of the stock of the Government is a
private act, and the committee in doing so performs
a private function, and therefore membership
therein is a private and not a public office.
5. That membership in the voting committee being a
private position and not a public office, the
designation by the Philippine Legislature of the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives as exofficio members
thereof was not an encroachment upon the power of
supervision and control over all executive functions
of the Government vested in the Governor-General.
6. That even granting that membership in said
committee is a public office, still the Philippine
Legislature has the power to designate the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives as ex-officio members of
said committee, by virtue of the residuum of power
placed in its hands by the Congress of the United
States.
7. That whether we consider the delegation of the
voting power as for public or private purposes, the
Governor-General alone cannot exercise that power
as it requires discretion and judgment, and at least

a majority must concur.
8. That, finally, the Congress of the United States by
its reserved power and authority to annul any law
of the Philippine Legislature, has by its silence
impliedly ratified Act No. 2705, as amended by Act
No. 2822.
348

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Agoncillo
For the foregoing considerations we are of the opinion that

the demurrer should be sustained and the complaint be
dismissed.
Writ granted.
___________
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9/20/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 050

[No. 26979. April 1, 1927]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GOVERNMENT OF THE

2. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—No department of the Government of the

3. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—It is beyond the power of any branch of the

4. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The chief exponent of autonomy in

260 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer

be expected. It is, however, the duty of the Supreme Court,

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE POWER.—The Organic Act

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Congress of the United States

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The Organic Act

8. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Legislative power is the authority,

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE.—The

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE IN THE

VOL. 50, APRIL 1 1927 261

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer

Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the

12. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The exceptions made in favor of

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Appointment to office in the

15. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PUBLIC OFFICERS.—

16. ID.; ID. ; ID.; CORPORATIONS.—The incorporation of the

17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Legislature is empowered to create

18. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The National Coal Company is a private

19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—By becoming a stockholder in the

20. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The National Coal Company remains an

21. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The Government, like any other

22. ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The duty of caring for government

23. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF PARTIAL INVALIDITY.—The

262 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer

disregarding the unconstutional provision and reading the

24. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIFICATION BY CONGRESS.—A

25. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICERS.—Although there may

26. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOTING COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL

27. EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; "QUO

Per JOHNSON, J., concurring:

28. "Quo WARRANTO;" RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS TO ACT

29. POWERS OF THE LEGISLATURE; RlGHT OF THE

VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 263

Government of the Philippine Islands vs, Springer

to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are

and the property of the citizens. The different

264 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer

null and void. A legislature is a legislature and nothing

30. POWERS OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE, GRANTED

31. POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE; ITS

32. PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE ; POWERS OF, TO

VOL. 50, APRIL 1, 1927 265

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer

ernment, the administration of governmental affairs and

33. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT,

modern invention of political science. No government has

34. FORMS OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAVE EXISTED IN

266 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer