Assessing The State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation: Cordula Reimann
Assessing The State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation: Cordula Reimann
Assessing The State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation: Cordula Reimann
in Conflict Transformation
Cordula Reimann
http://www.berghof-handbook.net
1
1. Introduction 2
2. Research Agenda / Research Questions 3
Sources and Nature of Conflict
Third-party Characteristics
Third-party Strategies
3. Different Approaches to Conflict Management 7
The Case of Conflict Settlement
The Case of Conflict Resolution
The Case of Conflict Transformation
4. Role of Theory and Research Methods Employed 14
5. Ongoing Questions and Challenges 19
6. Reference and Further Reading 20
Cordula Reimann
1. Introduction
The following analysis aims to provide some direction through the jungle of conceptual
and definitional imprecision that is prevalent in the overall field of conflict management and conflict
transformation. At best, the following description suggests one possible, and hence tentative,
interpretation of what may be regarded as the state-of-the-art. In any case, the author‘s comments
remain more indicative than comprehensive.
The guiding question in this analysis is how to map out conceptually and theoretically the
fields of conflict management and conflict transformation. This question will be discussed in the
context of the conflict management field with reference to three possible approaches: conflict
settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation (see Figure 1).
Before venturing any further in the task, it is necessary to make some introductory
remarks. First, despite, or perhaps even due to, its innate multidisciplinary nature, the overall field
of conflict management is fraught with conceptual and definitional imprecision. In most of the
academic literature, the terms conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation
are often used loosely and interchangeably, in many cases referring to the same strategies. Similarly, 2
one may also come across the term mediation to cover all different forms of third-party intervention.
In short „non-uniform terminology“ (Ropers 1997; p5) is now more the norm than the exception in
the overall field: this definitional imprecision of core concepts continually increases as more actors
become involved.
The term conflict management is itself rather unfortunate, as it may well include
approaches such as conflict transformation that go far beyond the ‚logic of management‘. However,
in the lack of a better alternative, I will accept the use of conflict management as an umbrella term,
while cautioning against its definitional and conceptual pitfalls.
Second, most recognised scholars bring to the field of conflict management expertise
drawn both from academia and from actual conflict management practice. As a consequence, most
defy easy classification and their work does not fall exclusively into one category.
Third, despite the complexity of the different approaches, the research community of
conflict management has done little in the last thirty years to attempt state-of-the-art reviews or even
to stress the interdisciplinary nature of the field by providing usable introductory textbooks (one of
the few exceptions may be Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999).
Fourth, the research on individual and group conflict management, like community
mediation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR), has had a major impact on conflict management
in international relations. Moreover, given the quality of most current violent, protracted conflicts,
it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish conflict management in internal domestic conflict
and external international conflict. These conflicts are protracted to the extent that the crisis usually
patterns itself around the social and political make-up of different groups, drawing its characteristics
from their language, religion, clan affiliation, political and social identity and structure. Thus, to
some extent the following analysis of protracted conflicts in the international arena may also hold
true for inter-group conflict management carried out at other social levels.
To give the following analysis a useful framework, I will first focus on the research agenda
and research questions, and then move forward to review the role of theory and research methods.
measures, such as power-mediation, sanctions, peace-enforcement and arbitration. (See Ron Fisher‘s
article on the website version of this volume, for a good discussion of the changing nature of
peacekeeping, as well as that of Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse in this volume).
In contrast to Track I, Track II refers to all non-official and non-coercive activities,
illustrated by facilitation or consultation (occasionally, one comes across the more general term
mediation in reference either to facilitation or to consultation). Generally, these are conducted in the
form of problem-solving workshops or round table discussions.
This distinction between Tracks I and II further suggests that there will be striking
differences in strategies employed. Although, the strategies are different in emphasis, it seems clear
that in most third-party interventions Track I and II strategies go hand in hand and, in many instances,
will be purposely combined. In practice, conflict settlement measures, such as mediation by Track I
actors, may actually be mirrored with conflict resolution strategies, such as the facilitation/
consultation by Track II actors. The crucial point is that some features of both Tracks may not only
complement one another, but also overlap in both theory and practice. A good example of this is the
conflict management effort in Northern Ireland during the early 1990s: David Bloomfield (1997) has
illustrated just how far conflict settlement efforts on Track I, by the British Secretary of State of Northern
Ireland, overlapped with the Track II conflict resolution work of the Community Relations Council.
Conflict settlement should not be understood as a necessary pre-condition for conflict
resolution. Experience has shown, for example, that, if negotiations on Track I become embroiled in
a deadlock, unofficial and informal fora in the form of facilitation and problem-solving workshops
(Track II) may not only be initiated or continued, but also helpful in producing a breakthrough.
This can be illustrated by the back-channel, conflict resolution process in Norway that
eventually led to a framework for conflict settlement and subsequently a negotiated agreement
between the Israeli government and the PLO in 1993 (see Lederach 1997, pp32-34; Corbin 1994). In 5
this process, a Norwegian scholar and his wife hosted and facilitated these secret talks in 1992
between Israeli and Palestinian officials, each of whom enjoyed top-level access while maintaining
their independence. The attainment of a reasonably cooperative relationship between these two
adversarial parties, before the actual start of the formal negotiations, proved to be not only crucial to
the success of the negotiation process itself, but also clearly illustrated the rather limited potential of
conflict settlement strategies such as power mediation/bargaining, when they are attempted in
isolation. The underlying assumption lurking behind this analysis is that very few conflict management
strategies will be fully effective by an exclusive reliance on either a Track I or Track II framework.
Since the early 1990s an appropriate analytical focus on inter-relatedness and
interdependence has emerged and is now occupying the middle ground in this field. By the mid-
1990s it has been possible to see a shift in the literature that stresses an integrative and complementary
approach to conflict management. It emphasises further the need to combine conflict settlement
strategies, such as mediation and negotiation, with conflict resolution strategies, such as facilitation/
consultation (some good examples of this can be found in the work of Glasl 1982; Fisher and
Keashley 1991; Prein 1994).
These complementary and integrative approaches not only shed a different light on the
dichotomy between Track I and Track II strategies, but also provide orientation and new insights into
the various complexities of contemporary violent conflict situations and peacebuilding activities. It
is crucial to make a more conscious combination of different actors with conflict management
activities and strategies. These must be properly matched with the political and social priorities,
which will arise at the different stages of conflict escalation and de-escalation.
According to the most popular and widely discussed ‚contingency model‘ put forward by
Fisher and Keashley (1991), the greater the level of conflict escalation, the more directive the
intervention must be in order to be effective. These models have two implications: first, that some
peacebuilding activities will be more critical at some stages rather than at others; and second, that
practitioners may need to return to an earlier stage of conflict management strategies as they gauge
the progress of their peacebuilding activities. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the
different contingency models in depth, or even to review the critiques of the common assumption of
homogeneity between parties or of the rigid chronological phases of conflict escalation (for a more
in-depth discussion, see Webb, Koutrakou and Walters 1996, pp171-189).
The key point to be raised from these complementary and integrative approaches is that
the synthesis of different models and concepts, in the light of complex conflict interests and needs,
can bring great value and insight to analysis. Indeed, some scholar/practitioners have taken the
complementary and integrative approaches a step further by introducing the concept of further
tracks, which has now been dubbed the ‚multi-track approach‘. The most recent conceptual
development is the creation of an addition specific track – Track III. This is taken to refer to all
process and structure oriented initiatives undertaken by actors involved in grassroots training,
capacity building and empowerment, trauma work, human rights and development work and
humanitarian assistance (Günter Baechler‘s article, in this volume, offers a particularly insightful
discussion of structure oriented initiatives, such as state reform). In the past, the simple distinction
between Tracks I and II has failed to adequately capture the richness of peacebuilding activities and
efforts typical of Track III and, as a result, all that did not fall into this dichotomy was excluded.
From private
individuals, academics, From local grassroots
professionals, ‚civil organisations to local
Political and military
mediation‘, and international
leaders as mediators
actors involved ‚citizens diplomacy‘ development agencies,
and/or representatives
to international and human rights
of conflict parties
local non-governmental organisations and
organisations involved humanitarian assistance
in conflict resolution
Outcome-oriented: Process-oriented:
Process- and/or
Non-official and
From official and structure-oriented:
coercive measures like non-coercive measures
sanctions, arbitration, Capacity building,
mainly facilitation,
strategies taken power mediation to non- consultation in the form trauma work,
coercive measures like grassroots training,
of problem-solving
facilitation, negotiation, workshops and round development and
mediation, fact-finding human rights work
tables
missions and
‚good offices‘
the same time, maintaining some sense of how to uphold social order and continuity, is likely to lead
to anarchy.
It can be seen that the received analysis concerning the actors and strategies distinguishes
between, not only Track I, II and IIl actors and their distinctive qualities, but also similar strategies.
In addition, the underlying interpretations of success imply very different assumed evaluation
criteria and raises the question of just when are we justified in deeming the different conflict
management approaches successful?
In the end, the analysis of the three approaches turns out to be less straightforward and a
rather tricky task. This results from the assumptions about these issues that are held by most scholars
in the field, though more implicit than explicit, and particularly in terms of the underlying theory
they employ.
and participation, and then use them to redefine both interests and positions.
While Burton does not spell out under what conditions all needs might be satisfied at the
same time, he does urge practitioners to deepen and broaden the analysis of conflict to better clarify
both needs and relations. Two consequences emerge from this kind of analysis. First, a broadened
analysis of the conflict, with its emphasis on needs, will call for strategies that go far beyond the
outcome oriented conflict settlement strategies with their focus on negotiable interests. This has
resulted from needs and fears being – contrary to interests – non-negotiable, but on the other hand
it is possible to deal with each parties needs and fears in a synergetic way. Burton, among others,
has proposed more process oriented and relationship oriented strategies, approaches that are non-
coercive and unofficial (Track II) activities such as facilitation or consultation in the form of
controlled communication, problem-solving workshops or round-tables. Facilitation and consultation,
pursued in this way, constitutes an effective third party attempt to facilitate creative problem solving
through direct communication and in-depth conflict analysis.
Second, the deepening of conflict analysis and the widening of strategies will also
require that a greater number of actors become involved in the process. These can be drawn from
the civil society groups, from academic institutions and from all forms of civil mediation or
citizen diplomacy groups, including local and international conflict resolution NGOs operating at
Track II level.
While most of the strategies, such as a series of problem-solving workshops, take the form
of medium-term involvement, the very process of sustaining and developing a dialogue should be
best understood as short-term involvement. In fact, a deeper common interest and shared needs
through increased cooperation and improved communication between parties may constitute a form
of successful outcome of conflict management. Along the lines of Burton‘s human needs approach,
any form of successful outcome must be based on the minimum requirement of the satisfaction of 10
the needs of both parties.
First, building on Burton‘s notion of needs satisfaction, any successful conflict transformation
strategy must include Track III actors in the peacebuilding process, as they deal with those most
affected by the effects of violent conflict (see Lederach 1995 and 1997). The lack of fulfilment of
their basic needs gives rise to deep-rooted violence and hatred in the first instance.
Second, the inclusion of Track III actors and strategies is a far cry from the ‚logic of
management‘ predominant in the conflict settlement approach. In fact, Track III strategies such as
capacity building and empowerment workshops reflect the ‚logic of (local) empowerment‘.
Moreover, bottom-up Track III strategies aim to support or even generate local struggles for social
justice and hence for radical, structural change.
The underlying assumption is that the potential for peacebuilding already exists in the
particular region or community and is rooted in its traditional culture. Conflict management
techniques thus cannot, and should not, be simply transferred across cultures with little or no
understanding of the cultural knowledge and resources at work in the particular conflict setting
(Lederach 1995). To build on local struggles means to be aware of the pre-existing traditional ways
in which that society handles conflict. A good example of this is the system of the elders in Somalia,
who, as clan members, can exert their traditional authority to coerce the conflict parties into settling
a conflict and accepting an agreement.
Track III activities are, in general, best situated and understood in the context of the
theoretical framework of non-violent action put forward by Sharp (1973), Gandhi (1938 and 1950)
and King (1963). While these three activists/scholars were influenced by very different religious
convictions and ideologies, they all shared a notion of conflict as a non-violent struggle for social
justice. „Non-violent action brings tensions and contradictions to the surface that already exist but
are denied and covered up.“ (McCarthy and Sharp 1997, xvi). It is primarily through the employment
of „constructive non-violent tension“ (Ibid.) in the form of people‘s power that latent conflict 11
becomes manifest. Thus, socially or politically deprived groups can mobilise in this way to free
themselves from the constraints of exploitative and suppressive relationships. Such people‘s power
can manifest itself in different forms of non-violent struggle, ranging from demonstrations, strikes
and non-cooperation to (economic) boycotts.
Viewed this way, protracted violent conflicts turn out to be primarily the result of unequal
and suppressive social and political structures. Dealing effectively with them, therefore, will call for
the empowerment and recognition of marginalised groups in the form of non-violent struggle. Only
in this way will it be possible to deal with issues of immediate concern at the local level, or to put
the appropriate pressure on Track I (and Track II actors), to end the violence and enter into good-
faith negotiations.
An illustrative example can be found again in the Somalia context during the early
1990s (Lederach 1997, pp52-53). The bottom-up approaches commenced with a series of
discussions and agreements on how to end the war, conducted within local peace conferences that
brought the various sub-clans together. These conferences took care to invite legitimated
representatives who could properly advocate each clan‘s fears and concerns, and, thus, put centre-
stage issues of immediate concern at local levels. As these local conferences approached
agreements, a similar decision-making process was then repeated at higher levels involving an
ever-wider range of clans.
Whereas Track I and Track II actors in the conflict settlement and conflict resolution
approaches tended to view (and render) the civilian population and grassroots levels as passive,
Track III strategies put them centre-stage. Thus, conflict transformation will not be primarily the
result of third-party intervention as it was under conflict resolution or conflict settlement.
It is clear that neither Track I nor Track II approaches (nor even both together) can provide
a complete and satisfactory understanding of the complex nature and dynamism of peacebuilding
activities called for in the context of contemporary violent conflicts. Not only does this point to the
necessity for the inclusion of Track III strategies in the peacebuilding process, but also it implies that
practitioners will need to link activities on all three tracks if they are to build domestic peace
constituencies or strategic alliances between the different local, national and international actors.
This in turn suggests that all three track strategies are best understood when they are
integrative and complementary, and, given what was said earlier, it seems safe to say that all three
of these forms of conflict intervention have their proper place in the life-cycle of a conflict. Thus,
Track II and III activities may complement Track I activities, although they must not be regarded as
a substitute or even a panacea for apparently failed Track I strategies. Here, one might turn again to
the example of the Norwegian couple who hosted and facilitated the peace talks between Israelis and
Palestinians; while their work effectively laid the ground for formal negotiations, it did not at any
point obviate the need for a negotiated settlement on substantive issues (see Lederach 1997, p34).
By the same token, Track I activities and strategies may not be well equipped to take on
the lofty goals of long-term reconciliation and social justice. While Track III activities may foster
these broader objectives, they will in the end remain ineffective, if not doomed to failure, unless they
are complemented by structural changes on the Track I level such as the embodiment of models of
minority rights and power-sharing and autonomy models across ethnic boundaries in legal and
governance structures.
The underlying assumption is that any exclusive reliance on one practical or theoretical
approach to conflict management will fail to deal effectively with the complexity and contradictions
of causes and consequences evident in most protracted conflicts. The logical extension of this point
might be an effort to integrate and synthesise Track I, II and III activities not only on the practical, 12
but also on the theoretical level. In the past, most conflict management scholars have been reluctant
to synthesise different theoretical approaches such as game theory, human needs theory and non-
violent theory (and if they did, they certainly were not explicit about it).
There are several conceivable reasons as to why this has not occurred. First, conflict
settlement, with its focus on the logic of management, may be viewed as too strongly associated with
the now widely discredited realist power politics paradigm. Especially in the early work conducted
in the field of conflict management, scholars tended to focus more on identifying differences than
discovering similarities between schools of thought, as the discussion about the competing merits of
conflict settlement and conflict resolution approaches amply illustrates. In general, the field has for
a long time been marked by a well-entrenched dichotomous way of thinking: the objectivist in
opposition to subjectivist understanding of conflict, and conflict settlement compared to conflict
resolution strategies.
As shown above, those scholars focusing on conflict resolution and working, for example,
with problem-solving workshops have tended to make use of very different analytical frameworks
(such as needs and fears mapping) than have conflict settlement scholars, with their focus on
interests and rational choice models of behaviour (see Clements 1998, p136). A final and more
general reason for the persistent divergence between the approaches may be that some scholars have
based their work on implicit rather than explicit assumptions, thus failing to verbalise the theoretical
underpinnings of their argumentation.
If one is to consider conflict transformation as a conceptual and practical extension and a
useful combination of the pre-existing models, it would make good sense to have some type of
synthesis of game theory, rational choice, human needs theory and non-violence action. An
illustrative example can be found in the problem-solving workshops, which were inspired by
different sources of non-violent action, such as those of Gandhi, King and Sharp, that all stressed the
need for respect for the adversary and the search for mutually beneficial outcomes (Mitchell 1981,
pp71-86). Mutually beneficial outcomes are, in turn, one of the core concepts and aims of most game
theory approaches.
In short, if complementarity is the key and if it is to be taken at face value, it must be
theoretical in nature and bring about an effective cross-fertilisation or strategic marriage between
game theory, human needs theory and non-violent action. While synthesising the different
understandings based on conflict theory, human needs and non-violent action, a conflict transformation
strategy must begin from a three-fold understanding of the nature of conflict.
Not only does this school of thought view conflict first and foremost as an element of
political control and a catalyst for social change, but also as a natural expression of non-violent
struggle for social justice. Conflict transformation, thus, takes up a dual understanding of conflict as
an agent of both social control and change (Clements 1998, p138).
Moreover, conflict transformation does not stop here. It also fundamentally redefines the
dichotomy between conflict resolution and conflict settlement. By placing its primary emphasis on
the question of social justice, the conflict transformation approach rejects the traditional aim of
conflict management to restore the status quo ante and, instead, elaborates on the notion of conflict
as a positive agent for social change.
Conflict transformation is an open-ended, long-term, multi-track and dynamic process,
which significantly widens the scope of actors involved. It effectively combines Track I, II and III
activities along the continuum of short-, middle-, and long-term involvement. It is thus likely to
engage a wide variety of actors, including: official, military and political leaders (Track I); informal
conflict resolution experts, INGOs and NGOs working in conflict resolution (Track II); grassroots, 13
indigenous NGOs providing development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (Track III). An
approach, which is applied so widely, can and should no longer be reduced to a label of ‚peacebuilding
from below‘. This three-fold understanding of conflict also suggests a corresponding triple
interpretation of success; it can be outcome, process, and/or change oriented.
As far as outcomes are concerned, conflict transformation aims to achieve a settlement of
substantive issues raised by the needs and fears of the conflict parties. This has two elements: first,
a process orientation approach emphasising the need to change mutually negative conflict attitudes
and values among parties in order to increase cooperation and communication between them;
second, a change oriented approach stressing the political imperative to create a new infrastructure
for empowerment and recognition of underprivileged groups, thus fostering and enabling social
justice. In short, the satisfaction of basic needs on the personal and relational levels will not be
sufficient. Rather, practitioners must work to achieve equal access to resources and assemble the
infrastructure that will make it possible to address structural inequalities with the aim of longer-term
social reconstruction and reconciliation.
To define a successful outcome is more difficult under the conflict transformation
approach than it was in the simpler cases of conflict settlement and resolution. For peace is now
defined in positive terms. Forms of negative peace must be transcended as the diverse forms of
structural and cultural violence are successively addressed. This will require, for many contem-
porary protracted conflicts, nothing less than a root-and-branch transformation of social relation-
ships and social structures.
intervening variables, such as third-party characteristics, resources and strategies, such as coercion,
expertise and reward (see Bercovitch 1992, pp10-21). If theory is understood in this way, one can
then identify at least four different ways in which the field of conflict management can approach the
„theory-research-practice loop“ (Fisher 1997b, p263).
Some analysts, such as Stedman (1991), Bercovitch and Rubin (1992), Rubin (1981),
Princen (1992), Zartman (1985) and Jabri (1990) have offered comparative, descriptive and empirical
case study documentation of either conflict management practice which have been perceived as
failed or successful (see also most issues of The Negotiation Journal and International Negotiation).
Systematic theory-driven comparative case studies seem to be more the exception than the norm.
On other occasions scholars, such as Bercovitch and Wells (1993) and Nicholson (1992),
aim to discover and develop regularities and correlation or even causal explanations about what
constitutes effective conflict management. They inductively construct theories, making use of
quantitative methods in order to test and frame hypotheses about, for example, the contextual
variables of mediation. These might be concerned with the nature of the parties or the identity and
rank of mediators. Research of this type will take the form of large-scale systematic studies on
effective conflict management, such as can be found in Bercovitch, or constitute more experimental
and laboratory-based approaches to third party intervention as attempted by Rubin (1980). The
large-scale systematic studies are followed particularly closely for the policy-relevant findings that
they can generate for political decision-makers (Bercovitch 1997).
Scholars such as Fisher and Ury (1981) and Burton, especially in his earlier work (1969),
are less empirical in nature, taking instead a rather descriptive, sometimes anecdotal and prescriptive
form. This approach is one of inductive theorising: most of its adherents present „…a number of
processes which are dependent upon the idiosyncratic expertise of the individual practitioner“
(Scimecca, op. cit., p214). Most of these will turn out to rely on rather static models that are „… 15
inductive descriptions of core components of practice, with some prescriptive guidelines for
interventions“ (Fisher 1997). The most predominant example may be the work of the Harvard
Negotiation project.
Kleiboer points to the fine line between empirical evidence and conjecture in the field of
conflict management when she stresses that most “… research is represented as evidence but turns
out to be based primarily on usually un-stated conjectures, opinions and ad hoc observations“
(Kleiboer 1996, p376). In fact, many of the findings of Fisher and Ury (1981), Ury (1991) and
Burton (1987) come in the form of manuals, handbooks or ‚cookbooks‘ offering rules or instructions
for successful conflict management exercises (see Mitchell 1993).
There seems to be some confusion as to whether, for example, the exercises of problem-
solving workshops, introduced by Burton and others, are meant as opportunities for inductive
theorising about ideas and hypotheses on conflict and conflict resolution processes (see, for instance,
Fisher 1997b, p256; Hill 1982) or whether they are instead the result of deductive theorising – i.e.
generalising about conflict and conflict resolution and thus drawing on a more generic theory of
human needs (see, for instance, Featherstone 1991). Perhaps this lack of clarity, or even evidence of
contradiction, inherent in much of the conflict management literature, could be traced to the general
ambiguity and definitional imprecision that can be found in Burton‘s work, or at least on
generalisations resulting from selective reading of his rather elusive work.
Yet a study of different forms of problem-solving workshop exercises, as proposed by
Burton (1969), (1972) and Fisher (1983), reveals a more general but equally serious problem: most
research on these workshops seems to deduct and induct hypotheses simultaneously. This is not
particularly surprising when one considers that the initial enthusiasm for problem-solving workshops
as opportunities for theory generation among some scholars never actually led to a systematic testing
of theories (see also Mitchell 1993, pp89-90).
Still others take a rather different route to inductive theorising in conflict management and
transformation: other scholars have been heavily influenced by ‚grounded theory‘ (see, for instance,
Weiss 1999) and by anthropology and ethnography (see, for example, Wolfe and Honggang 1996).
The primary focus of this kind of qualitative research is an attempt to derive research questions from
data and to test these during field-work before refining and reviewing them at the end of the data
collection phase.
Different as these approaches may be methodologically, it seems fair to say that they are
all underpinned by some notion of research which is objective and free of value judgements, and
assume that objective knowledge of the real world out there is possible, whether or not such
knowledge is grounded in subjective experience. Along the way, such scientific, objective findings
not only sharpen the contrast with value judgements, which are considered highly subjective, but are
also usually given epistemological priority.
Only a few scholars, such as Curle and others working with grounded wider social theory,
question this approach, subscribing instead to Galtung‘s definition of „objectivity as an inter-
subjective dialogue based on explicit premises i.e. values…“ (Galtung 1996, p16; emphasis added).
They will insist that the primary analytical focus of conflict management research must be on
empirical evidence, without explicitly considering that theoretical notions already inform the practice
of conflict management itself. Thus, most of the past research in the field of conflict management,
especially in the Anglo-American research community, has largely focused on a detached analysis of
third-party strategies and behaviour and of the nature of conflicts.
Consequently, it was possible in the past to focus on the apparent reality of conflict
management practice without acknowledging just how far that practice was already informed by 16
highly normative, but as yet unquestioned, assumptions. These concerned, for example, the
legitimacy, power and neutrality of the third party, the nature of universal and generic human needs,
the unequal distribution of power between the parties, and the success and impartiality of the conflict
management process.
When theory is viewed as an empirical tool, most theoretical or conceptual approaches to
conflict management turn out to be problem-solving approaches: they work within a given dominant
framework of institutions and social relations. By definition, the problem-solving approach, „…takes
the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into
which they are organised, as the given framework for action“ (Cox 1981, p129). It should be noted
that this is a very different type of problem-solving approach than that implicit in Burton‘s problem-
solving workshop mechanism.
It seems clear that the problem-solving approach fails to critically reflect upon the underlying
frameworks it assumes, especially those of social order and status quo, of gender, or to question its
assumptions about universality and objectivity. This may explain why most of the existing problem-
solving conceptual and explanatory frameworks operate within implicit and tacit agreement about the
concepts of social justice and, therefore, of negative and positive peace (see William Zartman et al.
1996, pp79-98). While Bush and Folger concentrate their analysis on domestic conflict resolution, and
here particularly on the development of ADR in the US, they also offer some provocative questions for
further discussions about the assessment of conflict management success (see Bush and Folger 1994).
Some scholars and practitioners may deem certain conflict management efforts to be effective without
properly defining what effective actually means. Is, for example, the overall reduction of hostility and
of violence or the establishment of a cease-fire a form of effective conflict management?
What is notably missing from most conflict management research efforts is any type of
explicit normative theoretical grounding, which would be essential for the proper understanding and
evaluation of conflict management success (see also Kleiboer 1996, p377; Kleiboer 1998). Thus,
Rasmussen, Rouhana and Rothman have stressed that most evaluation is either conducted poorly or
even completely omitted, principally because „the theoretical grounds on which an intervention has
been built have not been clarified“ (Folger 1999). We should dare to rock the boat of conflict
management. After all, just what are these sacrosanct and unspoken values which inform all analysis
but which are never spelled out or questioned?
A good example of such a sacrosanct value might be found in the issue of gender. What
is our largely implicit image of the individual in the field of conflict management? Do we view
him/her as rational but also empathetic and cooperative, as gender-neutral? Apart from anything
else, conflict management scholars may well be criticised for portraying the theory and practice of
conflict management as a gender-neutral enterprise; their working assumption has always been that
conflict management has no perceptible effect on the relative positions or roles of women and men
in society during times of war and peace.
Especially the concerns of women and ‚devalued men‘ (those who are coloured, non-
Westernised, working-class, or gay), their social interests, ideas and experience, have been simply
left behind by the analysis and management of protracted conflicts (see Reimann 2001). A cursory
glance at the conflict management literature will quickly show that conflict management on the
conceptual and especially more practical level remains a man‘s world; in contrast to those involved
in work on domestic and local conflicts, most of the practitioners and academics involved in conflict
management in the international arena are still men.
Feminists can argue that this field of conflict management actually perpetuates, and
indirectly enforces, the exclusionist power structures and hierarchies found in most patriarchal 17
societies. Clearly, most third-party interventions tend to reduce or suppress social conflicts such as
those arising from gender inequality. One might well ask from this perspective: is there a wolf in
sheep‘s clothing? Does conflict management change the symbols but at the same time continue to
subscribe to the ‚old‘ invisible principles and practices of patriarchy in the ‚new‘ post-settlement
social order? Thus, conflict management remains mired in the logic and practices of management
and, as such, neglects the underlying power arrangements of conflict management initiatives such
as gender inequality.
This leads directly to the larger questions: if conflict management is not gender-neutral,
just what is its hidden understanding of the public and private spheres in conflict management
approaches? What does it mean to be an embodied, gendered mediator or conflict management
scholar; that is, how does the practice of conflict management define a man or a woman?
Alternatively, what is the underlying understanding of masculinity and femininity in conflict
management theory and practice?
The analysis shows that most conflict management approaches work from a fairly static
and simplistic notion of identity. Despite Burton, Azar and others considering the identity group as
the most relevant unit of analysis in the study of protracted or intractable social conflicts, their work
falls short of and fails to account adequately for the rich and varied ways in which identities both
shift and are constructed. It is paramount to understand that notions of masculinity and femininity,
and their connections with violence or peace in most conflicts, are fluid, requiring continual
redefining and careful handling.
These questions serve to highlight that it is largely the unspoken and hidden values of
scholar/practitioners, which serve to define success in conflict management. Viewed this way, the
concept of, for example, an effective outcome of conflict management comes to look more like a
highly subjective value construction than an objective description. To label a conflict management
effort as a success is, in itself, to make a value judgment.
It remains to be seen how far the ongoing discussion about Peace and Conflict Impact
Assessment (PCIA) (see contribution of Mark Hoffman in this volume) can offer some remedy in
the form of a conceptual framework for systematically classifying and evaluating the success of
conflict management efforts. Critics may ask whether or not increasingly popular neat and tidy
boxes of success criteria in evaluation forms are in the end little more than mere drops in a theory-
starved ocean.
One might further question the degree to which arbitrarily isolated and, in my view, rather
static conflict indicators can add insights to the overall picture of the unanticipated, highly complex
and dynamic conflict interactions inherent in most inter-group conflicts. How might one, for
example, squeeze the fluid, changing and complex identities and agencies of women to make them
fit into a success or conflict indicator?
Most women are likely to experience intra-state conflicts in a rather ambiguous way.
While some violent conflicts may indeed represent intermediate catalysts for women‘s empowerment,
as women find they can successfully assume roles in the private and public spheres previously
dominated by men. Nevertheless, for them, most conflicts remain above all devastating experiences,
marked by gross atrocities and large-scale human rights violations such as sexual violence, rape
and forced prostitution. Hence, while discussing the management of the process of women‘s
agency in violent conflict, one must perpetually keep in mind the uneasy tension between
vulnerability and victimhood on the one hand, and empowerment and emancipation on the other,
always resisting the impulse to prioritise the one over the other (see Reimann 2001).
More generally, one can even imagine a scenario in which one has classified various and 18
diverse conflict indicators and yet is still unable to find a satisfactory explanation for the dynamics
of the systemic inner-society violence that characterises many contemporary conflicts. What, then,
are the political and ethical implications of PCIA?
It would appear that most PCIAs offer only limited political and ethical guidance on how
to deal with its results. This is hardly surprising, as most of the success or conflict indicators
proposed to date are not situated in the wider theoretical framework of a peaceful and just society.
While it seems clear that PCIA may foster the economic efficiency of development cooperation
projects, it is so far ill equipped to venture into ethical and political waters, by seeking to label
peacebuilding efforts as a success or failure.
Burton was one of the few in the field who dared to take up and discuss in some length
the shortcomings of problem-solving approaches (Burton speaks instead of „puzzle-solving
approaches‘“). According to Burton‘s approach, „…the solution is not the final end-product. It is, in
itself, another set of relationships that contains its own set of problems… [P]roblem-solving
frequently requires a new synthesis of knowledge or techniques and a change in theoretical
structure…[T]he system of interactions is an open one, i.e. the parts are subject not merely to
interaction among themselves (…) but to interaction with a wider environment over which there can
be no control“ (Burton 1979, p5).
This approach has some prima facie purchase on critical theory as an attempt at theoretical-
normative critique. Like Burton, critical theory focuses on challenging and dismantling traditional
forms of problem-solving approaches by questioning „entrenched forms of social life that constrain
freedom“ (Devetak 1996, p148). The starting point here is, as it was for Burton, the problematisation
of the origin of any given framework of institutions and social relations. And, like Burton‘s problem-
solving approach, critical theory aims to then clarify possible ways to bring about social change and,
thus, to transform the dominant social and political system (see Cox 1981, pp129-130).
Another intriguing question is how far Burton‘s problem-solving workshop mirrors
Habermas‘ ‚ideal speech situation‘? According to Habermas‘ ideal speech situation, all participants
have an equal opportunity to participate and raise questions. Finally, similar to Burton, Horkheimer
stresses that knowledge is not simply a reflection of a concrete historical situation, but must be
understood as a social force to generate social change (see Horkheimer 1972, p215).
Yet, Burton‘s anti-positivist line of argumentation somehow clashes with his wider
emphasis on a positivist approach to the scientific study of conflict: most of Burton‘s work reflects
in one way or another his search for a non-ideological model of social order in general and a value-
free concept of objective human needs in particular. In others words, Burton‘s credo to move „from
subjectivity to theory-based objectivity“ (Burton 1993, p57), turns out to be “…inappropriate
because any analysis of the social world will be infused with the values of the analyst. In a world
of competing values, the merits of any particular model, therefore, are not self-evident. No model
is free from ideology. Since John Burton wishes to change the world, he has no alternative but to
make the argument for change in ideological terms. It is counter-productive to dress one‘s values
in natural science garb. A non-ideological model of social order is a chimera which it is a mistake
to claim or pursue“ (Little 1984, p95).
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