The Many Faces of Europeanization : JCMS 2002 Volume 40. Number 5. Pp. 921-52
The Many Faces of Europeanization : JCMS 2002 Volume 40. Number 5. Pp. 921-52
The Many Faces of Europeanization : JCMS 2002 Volume 40. Number 5. Pp. 921-52
921–52
JOHAN P. OLSEN
Arena, University of Oslo
Abstract
Is ‘Europeanization’ as disappointing a term as it is fashionable? Should it be aban-
doned, or is it useful for understanding European transformations? Five uses are
discussed and it is argued that research need not be hampered by competing defini-
tions as long as their meaning, the phenomena in focus, the simplifying assumption
used, the models of change and the theoretical challenges involved, are clarified and
kept separate. The research challenge is one of model building, not one of inventing
definitions. While it is premature to abandon the term, its usefulness may be more
limited than its widespread use could indicate. Europeanization may be less useful as
an explanatory concept than as an attention-directing device and a starting point for
further exploration.
* Warm thanks to Ulf I. Sverdrup for his co-operation during the first part of this project and to Svein S.
Andersen, Peggy S. Brønn, Simon Bulmer, James Caporaso, Jeffrey T. Checkel, Dag Harald Claes, Jon
Erik Dølvik, Morten Egeberg, Beate Kohler-Koch, Ragnar Lie, James G. March, Gary Marks, John
Peterson, Claudio Radaelli, Helene Sjursen, Trygve Ugland, Helen Wallace, Wolfgang Wessels and two
anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
922 JOHAN P. OLSEN
1 Search in various databases revealed few occurrences of the term prior to the 1980s. Since then
‘Europeanization’ has become increasingly popular, and from the end of the 1990s the term has been
widely used.
2 A focus on institutions does not imply a lack of interest in how studies of policy-making and
implementation, and political identities may help us understand Europeanization. Limited space, time,
energy and competence are the reasons for not giving these aspects the attention they deserve in this article.
For the same reasons and with the same regrets, the sub-national level and variations across European sub-
regions (Morlino, 2000; Goetz, 2002), are not dealt with. In general, the aspiration is not to take stock of
the literature on Europeanization (for a state-of-the-art article, see Bulmer and Lequesne, 2001).
3 At the current stage of Europeanization studies it may be useful to keep definitions parsimonious. That
is, we should not read too much into definitions. For instance, we should not define Europeanization as
an ‘incremental process’ (Ladrech, 1994, yet in Ladrech 2001 this element of the definition is left out). In
this article it is assumed that the exact nature of the processes of change and their end results should be
determined by empirical studies rather than by definition.
5 An institution is viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate
behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such rules are embedded in structures of
meaning and schemes of interpretation, as well as resources and the principles of their allocation (March
and Olsen, 1998, p. 948). Here it is not possible to discuss alternative institutional approaches to European
dynamics (Schneider and Aspinwall, 2001; Stone Sweet et al., 2001).
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tance of geographical space has changed with the growth of functional net-
works with no centre of final authority and power (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz,
1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). Therefore, an adequate understanding
of the ongoing transformations requires attention to other European trans-
national institutions, regimes and organizations as well as non-Member States.
Still, the European Union has been most successful in terms of institutional-
izing a system of governance that includes a large, and increasing, part of the
continent. The EU is currently the core political project in Europe and the
example most often analysed in the literature. The Union will also be the
main frame of reference for this article.
For the European Union and its forerunners, enlargement has been a re-
current process. The Union has turned out to be attractive for most European
states and the list of applicant countries is long. How, then, can we account
for the dynamics of expansion? More specifically, why have the Member
States accepted new members (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2001;
Sjursen, 2001b)?
Consider rule-following. Here, change is normatively driven. Action is
obligatory, derived through a process of the interpretation of an identity, codes
of conduct and the obligations and rights flowing from them in different situ-
ations (March and Olsen, 1989). Change may be seen as quasi-mechanical,
that is, as following from the routine application of stable criteria for entry
and the execution of standard operating procedures to pre-specified situa-
tions. If an applicant country meets the criteria of membership, it is admitted.
If not, then the door is closed. In less automatic situations the underlying
process may be one of arguing and persuading. Actors appeal to a shared
collective identity and its implications. They evoke common standards of truth
and morals, and change follows as normative or factual beliefs change.
Part of the research challenge is to account for why some identities and
obligations are activated and others are not. For example, criteria of access to
the EU may be liberal-democratic, implying that the Union will admit coun-
tries that reliably adhere to some universal and impartial criteria in their do-
mestic and international conduct (Schimmelfennig, 2001). Criteria may be
institution-specific and related to the principles on which an institution is
founded, such as the Copenhagen declaration of 1993. Or they may take the
form of a moral imperative based on a general sense of ‘kinship-based’ duty,
that is, belonging to a specific political community (Sjursen, 2001b). This
way of reasoning is illustrated when actors argue that there is an historic op-
portunity to ‘reunify Europe’ after decades of artificial separation (Notre Eu-
rope, 2001). Furthermore, interpretations of obligations may also be history-
specific. For example, Sedelmeier argues that, during the cold war, EU policy-
makers constructed a specific role which implied a responsibility for the EU
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towards the central and eastern European countries (the CEECs). Such com-
mitments were unevenly distributed across policy-makers, yet they had im-
portant impacts on the enlargement process (Sedelmeier, 2001).
It is commonplace to observe that the EU agreed to enlargement with no
precise calculation of the consequences, including the costs and changes re-
quired for Member States. There was no guarantee that the benefits for each
Member State would outweigh their costs. In brief, enlargement cannot be
seen purely as the result of a strategic choice where Member States are maxi-
mizing their expected utility. However, it is also commonplace to observe
that participants in the enlargement process are concerned with costs and ben-
efits, and that they bargain in the defence of self-interest and economic and
security gains.
What, then, are the mechanisms through which identities and norms have
an impact? Do actors use identities and norms genuinely or instrumentally?
Schimmelfennig (2001) argues primarily within a logic of self-interested cal-
culation rather than a logic of appropriateness. The enlargement process is
characterized by strategic use of norm-based arguments and appeals to demo-
cratic identities and values. Member States have been rhetorically entrapped
and have to support enlargement in order to save their reputation as Commu-
nity members. Strategic behaviour is constrained by the constitutive ideas of
the Community and the actors’ prior identification with the Union. In com-
parison, Sedelmeier (2001, p. 184) is more open to whether identities and
norms are used genuinely or instrumentally. He observes that there are simul-
taneous processes of enactment and definition of the EU’s identity. Finally,
Sjursen emphasizes the genuine role of internalized norms. Norms constitute
the identity of actors and do not only regulate their behaviour. Decisions are
made as actors reason together and assess the moral validity of arguments
(Sjursen, 2001b).
Many EU documents portray enlargement as consistent with liberal-demo-
cratic principles and Community values as well as the interests of existing
members and applicant countries (Commission, 2001b). Scholars aspiring to
theorize about Europeanization cannot assume such harmony. It is important
to understand the relations and possible tensions between a logic of appropri-
ateness and norm-driven behaviour and a logic of calculation and expected
utility under varying circumstances. Actors often follow rules. Yet they are
also often aware of the consequences of rule-driven behaviour. And some-
times they may not be willing to accept the consequences of following rules.
In some situations one identity and norm-set may be dominant and provide
clear normative imperatives. In other situations there may be many compet-
ing identities, giving vague guides for action. Likewise, interests and means-
end understandings may be either clear or obscure. One possibility is that a
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THE MANY FACES OF EUROPEANIZATION 929
clear logic of action will dominate a less clear logic. Another alternative is
that learning over time will produce rules and norm-driven action, while highly
unfavourable consequences will make existing rules suspect and activate a
logic of calculation (March and Olsen, 1998). A third possibility is that differ-
ent logics are relevant for different issues. For example, enlargement may be
decided through application of basic norms, while the distribution of the costs
of enlargement may be decided through self-interested calculation and bar-
gaining.
8 Mény et al. (1996); Hanf and Soetendorp (1998); Börzel and Risse (2000); Maurer et al. (2000); Sverdrup
(2000); Börzel (2001); Andersen and Eliassen (2001, p. 233); Bulmer and Burch (2001); Bulmer and
Lequesne (2001); Cowles et al. (2001); Goetz and Hix (2001); Knill (2001); Ladrech (2001); Radaelli
(2000).
pean states.9 No new harmonized and unified model of dealing with Union
matters has emerged. EU arrangements are compatible with the maintenance
of distinct national institutional arrangements and there is even reconfirma-
tion and restoration of established national structures and practices. In sum,
structural diversity persists among the core domestic structures of govern-
ance in spite of increasing contact and competition between national models.
Established national patterns are resistant to, but also flexible enough to cope
with, changes at the European level.10
While European developments have been presented as an important rea-
son for administrative reforms (Raadschelders and Toonen, 1992, p. 16), and
as creating a need for improved domestic co-ordination (Kassim, 2000, p.
236), governments and administrative systems have differentially adapted to
European pressures on their own terms. That is, adaptation has reflected insti-
tutional resources and traditions, the pre-existing balance of domestic institu-
tional structures, and also ‘the broader matrices of values which define the
nature of appropriate political forms in the case of each national polity’
(Harmsen, 1999, p. 81).11 Likewise, a study of ten smaller west European
states – both Member and non-Member States – concluded that adaptations to
the EU were influenced by existing institutional arrangements and traditions
(Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998).
Europeanization as domestic impacts is not limited to structural and policy
changes. European values and policy paradigms are also to some (varying)
degree internalized at the domestic level, shaping discourses and identities
(Dyson, 2000 a ,b; Checkel, 2001). Europeanization of foreign policy has
produced shared norms and rules that are gradually accumulated, rather than
being a process where interests have been fixed (Sjursen, 2001a, pp. 199–
200). Likewise, common concepts of appropriate fiscal behaviour, taxation
and ‘sound’ money and finance have developed at the elite level (Radaelli,
1997; Dyson, 2000a; Sbragia, 2001, p. 80).
9 Kaelble (1989), studying primarily social institutions, concluded that there had been considerable
convergence in Europe in the period 1880–1980. Gary Marks (personal communication) holds that, at the
level of subnational regionalization, there has been both convergence and divergence. Where there has
been change over the past several decades, it has been towards strengthening regions. Yet the extent of
variation in the strength of regions is still at least as great as in 1950 or 1960. Countries have similar slopes,
but the slopes tend to diverge over time. As a result, the direction of change is convergent, but the outcome
is greater divergence.
10 Page and Wouters (1995); Wessels and Rometsch (1996); Christensen (1996); Egeberg and Trondal
(1999); Harmsen (1999); Bomberg and Peterson (2000); Kassim et al. (2000); Maurer et al. (2000);
Radaelli (2000); Sverdrup (2000); Bulmer and Burch (2001); Cowles and Risse (2001); Goetz (2001);
Jacobsson et al. (2001); Ladrech (2001); Trondal (2001); Wessels et al. (2001); Ugland (2002).
11 Harmsen observed that the Netherlands was more occupied with the perceived threat to the autonomy
of civil society, and the balance between state and society, than the sovereignty of the state. In contrast,
France was more interested in buffering the state against EU norms (Harmsen, 1999, p. 105; see also
Kassim et al., 2000; Wallace, 2000, pp. 369–70).
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pendent source of change. European-level changes are just one among sev-
eral drivers of domestic change.
Furthermore, a development towards, for instance, autonomous central
banks (Cowles and Risse, 2001, pp. 232–3) and a shared concept of ‘appro-
priate fiscal behavior’ (Sbragia, 2001, p. 80) are not solely European phe-
nomena. Typically, transnational professions such as economists spread pre-
dominant ideas globally. Likewise, the high intensity of competitive selec-
tion in the telecommunications sector is to a considerable extent a result of
strong global pressure (Schneider, 2001, p. 78; Levi-Faur, 2002). Changes in
educational policy have been understood in terms of changes in (economic)
factors outside the range of the EU (Beukel, 2001, p. 139). There are interest-
ing attempts to separate effects of Europeanization and globalization (Verdier
and Breen, 2001). Still, a major challenge is to trace changes at the domestic
level back to European-level institutions, policies or events. In practice it has
turned out to be difficult to isolate European effects (Radaelli, 1997, p. 572,
2000; Bulmer and Burch, 2001, p. 76; Levi-Faur, 2002) and to disentangle
‘net-effects’ of European arrangements from global, national and sub-national
sources of change.
12 See, however, Strang (1991). Of course, a successful diffusion of European forms of organization and
governance, such as the territorial state, has, over time, made Europe less unique.
14 Please note that I talk about co-evolving institutions and not institutional co-evolution. The latter
concept, as used in biology and evolutionary economics, opens a theoretical can of worms, i.e. the
relationship between institutional change, development and evolution. Institutional development implies
that change has a direction, that there are consistent and durable changes in political institutions and the
institutional balance (Orren and Skowronek, 2001). Institutional evolution in addition suggests that
change tends to improve the adaptive value of institutions, in terms of performance and survival. Processes
of development and evolution should, however, be documented empirically rather than assumed in models
of European institutional dynamics.
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On the one hand, it has been observed that change is not unilateral. Glo-
bal, European, national and sub-national processes interact in intricate ways.
Typically, there is no single dominant and deterministic causal relation. Causal
chains are often indirect, long and complex. Effects are difficult to identify
and disentangle. Interactive processes of feedback, mutual influence and ad-
aptation are producing interpenetration between levels of governance and in-
stitutions (Héritier et al., 1996, p. 1; Rometsch and Wessels, 1996; Kassim,
2000, p. 257; Laffan et al., 2000, pp. 84, 85; Wallace, 2000, p. 370; Bulmer
and Burch, 2001, p. 178; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2001; Ladrech 2001, p. 4).
On the other hand, the observed complexity is often bracketed. For example,
Risse et al. (2001, p. 12) write: ‘although the causality between Europeaniza-
tion and domestic structure runs in both directions, we have chosen to empha-
size the downward causation from Europeanization to domestic structure’.
The dilemma is obvious. A focus on uni-causal relations and the language and
logic of fixed dependent and independent variables, can become a straitjacket
preventing an adequate theoretical and empirical analysis of European dy-
namics of change. However, no coherent empirical research programme is
possible if everything is seen as endogenous and in flux.
Current European developments may illustrate an elementary property of
human beings, that they are capable of producing more complex behaviour
and institutions than they are capable of understanding (Lave and March,
1975, p. 6). A world where many actors are adapting to each other simultane-
ously and therefore changing the context in which other actors are adapting,
is a world that is difficult to predict, understand and control by any single
actor or group of actors. It is difficult both to infer the proper lessons of expe-
riences and to know what action to take (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999, p. 8).
Political leaders facing a situation where institutions evolve and unfold
through an unguided process with weak elements of shared understanding
and control may trust processes of natural selection, for instance through com-
petitive markets. Then the task of prospective leaders is to establish simple
rules of fair competition and to harness complexity by protecting variation,
exploration and innovation. A complementary position is to try to make insti-
tutional change a more guided process by improving the elements of shared
understanding and co-ordination and reducing complexity. Examples would
be institutional actors monitoring each other, exchanging information, intro-
ducing arrangements of consultation before decisions are made, developing
shared statistics and accounts, making explicit efforts to reduce incom-
patibilities and redundancies, and deliberately to develop networks of contact
and interaction, joint projects and common rules and institutions. An increas-
ing institution and regime density at both European and global levels sug-
gests that both competitive markets and reforms aiming at more deliberate
co-ordination are parts of a changing world order.
For students of institutional dynamics, Europeanization as unification
makes it necessary to rethink what are fruitful research strategies. In simple
models of institutional change, action is often assumed to be a response to a
fixed environment, i.e. the environment is not affected by institutional action.
The assumption is convenient, but often inconsistent with institutional reali-
ties (March, 1981). Assuming that institutions create their environments in
part – that they are part of an ecology of interaction, control, co-operation and
competition, with organized units responding to each other – complicates the
model-building task considerably.
One strategy is to design research projects aiming to specify the scope
conditions for specific processes of change, i.e. under what conditions each
process is likely to be most significant for understanding European transfor-
mation. Another research strategy – and an even more challenging one – is to
focus on how institutional transformation may be understood as an ecology
of mutual adaptation and co-evolving institutions, including a (varying) number
of interacting processes of change. Empirically, the latter research strategy
implies studying how non-European, European-level, national and sub-na-
tional institutions and actors may change at the same time and in association
with one another, as they try to find a place within a complex multi-layer and
multi-centred system.
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