4 Efficient Process Tracing: Analyzing The Causal Mechanisms of European Integration

4 Efficient process tracing
Analyzing the causal mechanisms

of European integration
Frank Schimmelfennig
Introduction
Why a separate chapter on the European Union (EU) in a volume on process

tracing? Is there anything distinct about the analysis of European politics
that would merit a special treatment? In general, the answer is no. The
methodological challenges of studying the EU are pretty much the same as
in other areas of research (although, see Lyall, this volume, Chapter 7, on
process tracing and civil war), and EU scholars have used the same toolboxes
as those working on other polities. There is one major field of inquiry,
however, in which process tracing has taken pride of place for both empirical
and theoretical reasons: the study of European integration.
The study of European integration is about the development of the EU: the
transfer of tasks from the state to the European level of governance, the growth
of EU competences, and the expansion of membership. By contrast, the study
of EU politics and policies deals with elections, legislation, compliance, and
other topics that are well established in the analysis of other political systems.
Standard methods of quantitative or comparative analysis are commonly used
in these areas.
The study of European integration, however, starts from the premise that
the EU is a rare or extreme phenomenon. According to a much criticized
but also very durable assumption of EU research, the EU is a polity sui
generis, “less” than a state but “more” than an international organization
(Wallace 1983). Even if one treats the EU more generally as an instance
of regional integration or multi-level governance, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that the combination of deep supranational centralization and
An earlier version was presented at the workshop on “Process Tracing in the Social Sciences,” Georgetown
University, March 2012. I thank the editors, Alan Jacobs, and the other the participants of the workshop, as
well as Andrew Moravcsik and Craig Parsons for helpful comments.
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99 Efficient process tracing: European integration
broad functional scope – the EU covers all policy areas and some of them are
exclusive competences of the Union – makes it an outlier in the population of
international organizations. As a consequence, most students of European
integration prefer focusing on within-case analysis rather than comparing
the development of the EU to that of other organizations and polities.
In addition, European integration is generally studied as a series or sequence
of individual big decisions: for instance, to establish the common market or
monetary union, to expand to Eastern Europe and start accession negotiations
with Turkey, to empower the European Parliament, or to conclude separate
treaties on free travel (Schengen) and fiscal stability outside the Community
framework. In the first decades of European integration, such big decisions were
arguably too rare, too causally heterogeneous, or too dependent on each other,
to qualify for comparative analysis.
Even though these obstacles do not necessarily hold any more, there are
also theoretical reasons for process tracing. Many of the theoretical con-
troversies in the study of European integration have to do with motivation
and process. Take the traditional theoretical debate between intergovern-
mentalism and neofunctionalism (or supranationalism). Both schools of
thought broadly agree that governments negotiate and decide on integration
in order to cope with international interdependence. They disagree, how-
ever, regarding the sources of interdependence, the nature and sources of
government preferences, the relevant actors in negotiations, and the ways in
which decisions are reached.
Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1998) claims that inter-
dependence is exogenous (to the integration process); government prefer-
ences are conditioned by the interests of powerful domestic interest groups;
negotiations are intergovernmental; and outcomes are determined by the
relative bargaining power of governments. By contrast, supranationalists
(Pierson 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997) argue that interdependence
is endogenous, i.e. generated by the “spill-over” of previous integration
decisions; government preferences are reshaped and constrained by such
spill-overs in addition to transnational interest groups and supranational
institutions; and both negotiations and their outcomes are influenced
by supranational actors such as the Commission. The more recent arrival
of constructivism added more variation to this debate. According to con-
structivism, ideas matter for how governments deal with interdependence;
government preferences are constituted by identities; and negotiations and
their outcomes are constrained by European norms (Schimmelfennig 2012).
Finally, on a more methodological note, studies of European integration are
100 Frank Schimmelfennig
often outcome-centric and focus on examining cases of successful integra-

tion. In other words, they select cases on the dependent variable. This case
selection procedure is useless for establishing sufficient conditions in
comparative analysis (King et al. 1994; Geddes 2003).
Theory-testing analyses of European integration thus cannot rely on
studying covariation between independent variables (for example, interde-
pendence and convergence of government preferences) that do not vary
sufficiently across theories and a dependent variable (integration) that does
not vary sufficiently across cases. For theoretical reasons, such analyses
would most probably run into problems of over-determination or equifin-
ality. For methodological reasons, they would be unable to draw valid causal
inferences. Rather, theory-testing requires examining how factors such as
interdependence and government preferences are produced and in which
causal order they affect the outcomes. In other words, theory-testing
analyses of European integration require process tracing for both theoretical
and methodological reasons.
It is therefore small wonder that many influential studies of European
integration follow a process-tracing design – implicitly or explicitly. This meth-
odological choice cuts across theoretical positions. Andrew Moravcsik’s Choice
for Europe “is a series of structured narratives” of the EU’s grand bargains
designed to test observable “process-level” implications of competing theories
of preference formation, bargaining, and institutional choice (1998: 2, 79). The
critics of liberal intergovernmentalism have objected to Moravcsik’s selection of
units of analysis and cases or his interpretation of data, but not the design
as such. Paul Pierson illustrates his historical-institutionalist, process-level
explanation of the “path to European integration” with a case study of
European social policy (1996). Craig Parsons traces the process of how a specific
set of ideas on the construction of European regional organization prevailed
over its competitors in the French political elite and was subsequently
institutionalized (2003). Adrienne Héritier (2007) examines institutional
development in the EU on the basis of process implications of several theories
of institutional change. This list could easily be extended.
In this chapter, I draw on several of these studies in addition to an
example of my own work to illustrate how process tracing is done in the
study of European integration. Before doing so, however, I make an
argument in favor of “efficient” process tracing. The core point of efficient
process tracing is that it maximizes analytical leverage in relation to the
invested resources. It starts from a causal relationship provisionally
established through correlation, comparative, or congruence analysis and
from a causal mechanism that is specified ex ante; it selects cases that

promise external validity in addition to the internal validity established by
process tracing; and it confines itself to analyzing those process links that
are crucial for an explanation and for discriminating between alternative
explanations. As a result, efficient process tracing is designed to avoid three
major problems of the method: the potential waste of resources, the
temptation of storytelling, and the lack of generalizability. In elaborating
on the concept of “efficient process-tracing,” I focus on deductive, theory-
testing process tracing in contrast to the inductive, theory-building type
(this volume, Chapter 1, pp. 7–8; see also Beach and Pedersen 2013a);
I also emphasize design issues over the actual conduct of process tracing,
which is an important complement to the “best practices” articulated in
Chapter 1.
I then assess key process-tracing studies of European integration.
Andrew Moravcsik’s Choice for Europe (1998) and Paul Pierson’s
“Path to European Integration” (1996) represent the intergovernmental-
ist–supranationalist debate, while A Certain Idea of Europe by Craig
Parsons (2003) and my analysis of enlargement in The EU, NATO, and
the Integration of Europe (2003) are two ideational accounts. These are all
examples of efficient process tracing, but the criteria established earlier in
the chapter also provide grounds for partial criticism. In the concluding
section, I summarize the insights gained from the comparison of these
studies and discuss the prerequisites, trade-offs, and limitations of efficient
process tracing.
Efficient process tracing
Challenges of process tracing

As a within-case method focusing on the causal mechanism linking factors or
conditions to outcomes, process tracing occupies a unique position among
observational research designs. Other single-case designs such as the
“congruence method” (George and Bennett 2005: 181–204), which relies on
the consistency between the theoretically expected and the observed outcome,
are fraught with problems of causal interpretation such as omitted-variable
bias or equifinality. Comparative or large-n analysis gives us more confidence
in the relationship between “independent” and “dependent variables,” but
does not provide information on the causal mechanism linking the two. By
analyzing process-level evidence on causal mechanisms, process tracing can

claim, in principle, to increase the internal validity of causal inferences
dramatically and thereby strengthen our causal interpretations of both single
case studies and studies based on covariation (see also Lyall, Chapter 7;
Dunning, Chapter 8 – both this volume). Yet these unique and useful features
of process tracing also produce severe challenges. I will focus on four core
problems: the resource problem; the measure-of-fit problem; the storytelling
problem; and the problem of generalization.
Resource
It is generally agreed that process tracing can “require enormous amounts of
information” (George and Bennett 2005: 223). To some extent, the process-
tracing best practices proposed in Chapter 1 are general standards of good
scientific practice: the search for alternative explanations, the consideration of
potential bias in sources, and the gathering of diverse evidence. In addition,
any research design needs to make a decision on how far “down” and “back”
the researcher wants to go in the search for “the cause.”
In process tracing, however, the per-unit (case) investment of time and
resources is likely to be much higher than in comparative analyses. This has
mainly to do with design: whereas comparative analysis may work with a
few data-set observations per case measuring the independent variables
and the dependent variable, the sequence of causal-process observations in
process-tracing analysis can become very long. This is especially true if
process taking is of the “soaking and poking” kind requiring immersion in
the details of a case (Chapter 1, p. 18) or if researchers heed the warning by
George and Bennett that process tracing “provides a strong basis for causal
inference only if it can establish an uninterrupted causal path” (George and
Bennett 2005: 222). Because we never really know whether we have soaked
and poked enough, and any causal path can always be more fine-grained
and extended into history, process tracers are at risk of ending up in an
“infinite regress.” Moreover, process tracing analyses cannot use the stan-
dardized, computer-based data-processing techniques on offer for com-
parative analysis.1 Finally, process tracing analyses generally take up much
more space – again on a per-case basis – for presenting findings than
comparative analyses.
1
A partial exception would be the application of agent-based modeling to process-tracing accounts, as
discussed by Checkel, this volume, Chapter 3.
Measures of fit
How do we know that the process-tracing evidence is good enough to accept
or discard a hypothesis? Statistical analyses work with levels of significance for
individual factors or measures of fit for entire models. Qualitative comparative
analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987) tests for necessity and sufficiency of conditions,
and uses consistency and coverage to assess the fit of causal configurations.
Both designs benefit from analyzing a data set with clearly delineated and
(ideally) independent units of analysis and a defined number of observations.
Such formal measures of significance and fit do not seem to exist in process
tracing. In part, this has to do with “the non-comparability of adjacent pieces
of evidence” in process tracing (Gerring 2007a: 178; Beach and Pedersen
2013a: 72–76). The units of process tracing, the individual steps in a causal
path or the elements of a causal sequence, are neither independent nor
comparable. Moreover, Gerring claims that the elements of the causal
process chosen by the researcher, and how many of them, can be arbitrary
(Gerring 2007a: 179). It is also difficult to say what qualifies as an “uninter-
rupted” causal path in George and Bennett’s criterion for causal inference.
Finally, whereas Bayes’s Theorem provides a general standard for evaluating
process-level evidence, its application to process tracing remains informal and
less quantifiable than the measures of fit for QCA with which process-tracing
shares the non-frequentist mode of inference (Bennett 2008: 708–709;
Bennett, this volume, Appendix).
Storytelling
Because the standards for selecting causal-process observations and making
valid inferences are relatively open and malleable in process tracing, it is
relatively easy to select, arrange, and present the material more or less con-
sciously in a way that appears plausible to the reader (see also the discussion in
Dunning, this volume, Chapter 8). We may extend Popper’s classical critique
of empiricism by saying that humans have an innate propensity not only for
seeing patterns and regularities (Popper 1963: 62), but also for constructing
and telling coherent stories.
Generalization
Whereas process tracing maximizes the internal validity of causal inferences,
it does not generate any external validity per se. In all fairness, process
tracing is not meant to produce external validity, and other methods suffer
from the same trade-off between internal and external validity. However, in
combination with the high costs of process tracing for producing a highly
valid explanation of a single event of the past, the uncertainty about general-
izability can be discouraging (see also Checkel and Bennett, this volume,
Chapter 10).
The ten criteria of good process tracing proposed by Bennett and Checkel
go a long way in acknowledging these challenges and devising ways to bound
them (Chapter 1, pp. 20–22). “Efficient process tracing” builds on these
criteria, in particular on the Bayesian intuition guiding process-tracing
inferences, but seeks to increase the efficiency of theory-testing process-
tracing designs.
Efficient solutions
I suggest that process tracing deals best with these challenges and is used most
efficiently if it is complementary to the analysis of congruence or covariation;
if it is used on cases that promise a maximum of external validity; if the causal
mechanism is specified ex ante; and if the process links to be examined are
carefully selected to provide for crucial, competitive theory tests.
Complementarity
First, process tracing is best used to complement analyses of congruence
(for single cases) and comparative analyses (for two or more cases). The
high investment in process tracing is most efficient if we have an “initial
suspicion” that the causal mechanism has actually been at work and
effective. For a single case, preliminary evidence is given if the values for
the outcome and the explanatory factor(s) match the hypothetical expecta-
tion (congruence). Statistically significant and substantively relevant
correlations serve as a useful starting point in quantitative studies. In
QCA, conditional configurations with high consistency and substantial
coverage are worth exploring further. Process tracing then serves the
purpose of checking the causal mechanism that is supposed to link the
factors or configurations with the outcome. Sometimes, it may also be
interesting to find out why a condition that is present and that we assumed
to be causally relevant did not produce the outcome – but even for process
tracing of a deviant case, we need first to establish the relationship between
cause and effect to know that it is deviant.
Case selection
If process tracing follows a single-case congruence analysis or explores a
deviant case, case selection is not an issue. If it is designed to probe further
into the causal validity of small-n or large-n correlations, however, the
researcher needs to decide which case or cases to select for process tracing –
assuming that it is so resource-intensive that it can only be conducted for
one or two cases. This selection should again be based on considerations of
efficiency: to maximize external validity while checking internal validity.
Gerring and Seawright suggest selecting a typical case, which represents a
cross-case relationship well, to explore causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007a:
93; Seawright and Gerring 2008: 299). If there is time for two process tracing
analyses, the study of diverse cases that illuminate the full range of variation
in the population is also advisable in order to see how the causal mechanism
plays out for different starting conditions (Gerring 2007a: 97–99; Seawright
and Gerring 2008: 300–301). Both typical and diverse case-study types
maximize external validity on the basis of the assumption that the findings
of process tracing in the selected case(s) are representative for the entire
population.
Alternatively, the process tracing analysis of a crucial case also pro-
mises to be efficient. When dealing with positive outcomes, the best case
is a hard or least-likely case. Based on theoretical expectations, the
researchers choose a case in which the presumed cause is only weakly
present, whereas presumed counteracting factors are strong. If process
tracing shows that the causal process triggered by the presumed cause
produces the positive outcome nevertheless, there is good reason
to conclude that this is even more likely in cases in which the
causal condition is more strongly present and counteracting factors are
weaker.
Ex-ante specification of the causal mechanism

As a safeguard against storytelling, process tracing should be based on causal
mechanisms that are derived ex ante from theories and follow a basic analy-
tical template (see also Jacobs, this volume, Chapter 2). Such causal mechan-
isms tell us what to look for in a causal process rather than inducing us to
make up a “just so” story of our own. “Coleman’s bathtub” (Coleman 1986) or
similar standards for a fully specified causal mechanism in the analytic social
sciences (for example, Hedström and Swedberg 1998) provide a useful

template.2 They usually stipulate:
1. who the relevant actors are;
2. how their beliefs and preferences are formed (macro-micro link or
situational mechanism);
3. how they choose their actions (micro-micro link or action formation
mechanism); and
4. how the individual actions of multiple actors are aggregated to produce the
collective outcome (micro-macro link or transformational mechanism).
In addition, Gerring claims that “process tracing is convincing insofar as the
multiple links in a causal chain can be formalized, that is, diagrammed in an
explicit way” (Gerring 2007a: 181; see also Waldner, this volume, Chapter 5).
I concur with his advice that “the formal diagram is a useful heuristic,
forcing the author to make a precise and explicit statement of her argument”
(Gerring 2007a: 182).
Selection of theories and causal-process observations

Embedding a process-tracing analysis in competitive theory testing provides a
further safeguard against the “infinite regress” and “storytelling” problems,
and it helps to allocate research investments efficiently. Usually, there are a
manageable number of theories or causal mechanisms that are relevant for the
case at hand and compatible with the initial finding of congruence or correla-
tion. In other words, process tracing can be limited to probing into and
discriminating between alternative explanations that attribute the outcome
to the condition (independent variable), but different causal mechanisms.
Once theories are selected, we can further focus on those links of the causal
mechanism that are crucial for each theory and for discriminating between rival
theories. This matches Gerring’s advice to focus our attention “on those links in
the causal chain that are (a) weakest (that is, most contested between theories)
and (b) most crucial for the overall argument” (Gerring 2007a: 184), and it is in
line with Bayesian reasoning (Bennett, this volume, Appendix). If two theories
agree that only states are relevant actors, we can focus on states for the process-
tracing analysis and do not need to probe into the potential role of other actors.
If two theories agree that states are rational, we can skip examining evidence on
2
“Coleman’s bathtub” or “boat” refers to the way in which James Coleman’s scheme of macro-micro-
macro linkages is usually drawn.
their decision-making process and focus on the preferences or constraints on

which the theories may differ. In other words, theory helps us target decisive –
and, if possible, “doubly decisive” – tests right from the start rather than
investing time and other resources in tests that will give us less information.
By the same token, competitive theory testing gives us a clearer idea of the
data requirements. It focuses our attention on those episodes that offer the
possibility to discriminate between competing theories and to collect the data
that are needed for this purpose. It helps us distinguish between irrelevant
data and relevant data. Rather than wasting resources and space on a full,
uninterrupted narrative from cause to outcome, we can focus on a small
number of crucial steps in the process that are worth exploring.
Which process links should we examine and which ones are dispensable?
Process tracing starts from the assumption of a temporal and analytical
sequence, in which later stages in the process are dependent on earlier stages.
For this reason, we start with the first link in the causal process which is
(a) a crucial or the crucial process element for at least one of the competing
theories and (b) for which we have competing hypotheses and observable
implications of the candidate theory and at least one alternative theory. In
other words, there is no need to examine process links which are marginal or
secondary for the theories involved or on which the competing theories agree.
Under the same assumption of temporal and analytical sequence, any theory
that is decisively disconfirmed in the empirical analysis of the first link is
eliminated and does not need to be considered further at later stages. The
process of selecting and testing additional links is reiterated until a single
theory or explanation is left.
This means that if we have only two competing causal mechanisms and the
first link provides for a doubly decisive test that confirms one theory and
disconfirms the other, process tracing could stop in principle after the first
iteration. There are, however, three considerations for pursuing process tracing
further. First, subsequent stages in the causal process may be at least partly
independent from earlier processes. Transformational mechanisms are, for
instance, often independent of preference formation mechanisms. This is a
core insight of the theory of collective action and other social theories explaining
unintended consequences. Second, the crucial process element for a theory may
only come after it would have been eliminated on a less important link. Unless
the later link was strongly causally dependent on the earlier link, it would thus be
“fair” to keep the theory in the race until its most important process implications
have been tested. Finally, the evidence may not be sufficiently strong to discard
one theory and confirm the other. In this case, further testing is also necessary.
Table 4.1 “Good/best-practice” and “efficient” process tracing compared
Good/best-practice process tracing Efficient process tracing
1. Cast the net widely for alternative explanations Yes, but focus on those that are compatible with
findings from analysis of congruence or correlation
2. Be equally tough on the alternative Yes, but eliminate them if their core causal-process
explanations expectations are disconfirmed
4. Take into account whether the case is most Yes, but also select representative or crucial cases in
or least likely for alternative explanations order to maximize external validity
5. Make a justifiable decision on when to start Yes, but let this decision be guided by the relevant
theories and standard analytical templates
6. Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant Yes, but limit yourself to the evidence that is needed to
evidence discriminate between competing theories
7. Combine process tracing with case Yes, but start with comparison to establish correlation
comparisons and select the best case for process tracing
8. Be open to inductive insights Yes, if theoretically specified causal mechanisms fail to
explain the case
Table 4.1 illustrates how “efficient process tracing” builds on and further
develops most of the process-tracing “best practices” advanced in Chapter 1.
Efficient process tracing strongly concurs with the advice to specify testable
process-tracing expectations deductively (criterion 9), and it agrees with the
caveats that process tracers need to consider biases in the evidentiary sources
(criterion 3) and take into account that process tracing may be inconclusive in
the end (criterion 10). For the other criteria, it puts the emphasis on efficiency-
enhancing deduction, selection, and generalizability. Deduction helps us make
a justifiable decision on when to start and how to specify causal mechanisms
(criterion 5); it helps us design more decisive and focused tests (criteria 2 and
6); and it limits the relevance of inductive insights to instances of general
theory failure (criterion 8). Selection of theories based on prior evidence
derived from congruence or correlation limits the number of explanations
to be considered (criteria 1 and 7); and selection of cases based on representa-
tiveness increases external validity and generalizability (criterion 4).
Process tracing in studies of European integration
In this main part of the chapter, I present and discuss examples from the
literature on European integration. As already mentioned in the introduction,
many if not most studies of integration use process tracing as their main
method or as an important part of the analysis. I reconstruct how they

design process tracing and how efficient the designs are in light of the above
considerations. In contrast, I will not discuss how they actually conduct
process tracing, that is, what data they use, how they analyze them, and how
they draw substantive conclusions from them.
I start with two contributions to the debate of the 1990s between inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism (or neofunctionalism): Andrew
Moravcsik’s Choice for Europe and Paul Pierson’s “Path to European
Integration.” I then move on to the more recent debate between ideational
(or constructivist) and rational–institutionalist approaches and present two
studies that seek to demonstrate the relevance of ideas through process
tracing: Craig Parsons’s Certain Idea of Europe and my own book, The EU,
NATO, and the Integration of Europe.
Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe

Andrew Moravcsik’s Choice for Europe (1998) starts from the major theories
that claim to explain the history-making decisions in European integration:
neofunctionalism, federalism, realism, and his own liberal intergovernment-
alism. He develops a parsimonious “rationalist framework” of the stages of
negotiation in international cooperation. Moravcsik uses this framework
to model the causal mechanisms proposed by the various theories in a
commensurable way and to establish at which junctures in the causal process
their propositions differ (see Table 4.2). In each case, these propositions
Table 4.2 Process-tracing framework of The Choice for Europe
National
Stages of preference
negotiation formation Interstate bargaining Institutional choice
Alternative Economic vs. Asymmetrical Federalist ideology vs. centralized

independent geopolitical interdependence vs. technocratic management vs.
variables interests supranational credible commitments
entrepreneurship?
↓ ↓ ↓
Observed Underlying Agreements on substance → Choice to delegate or pool
outcomes national decision-making in international
preferences institutions
→
Source: Simplified reproduction from Moravcsik 1998: 24.
are translated into different observable implications and confronted with

historical evidence. Although Moravcsik does not use the term “process
tracing,” his methodological principles match the method well:
In each case, a consistent set of competing hypotheses is derived from general
theories; the decision is disaggregated to generate sufficient observations to test
those hypotheses; and, wherever possible, potentially controversial attributes
of motive or strategy are backed by “hard” primary sources (direct evidence of
decision-making) rather than “soft” or secondary sources.
Moravcsik is also aware of the advantages and disadvantages of process

tracing: “Adherence to these three methodological principles has disadvan-
tages – it accounts for the length of the book, as well as its continuous
alternation between narrative and analysis – but the aim is to facilitate more
reliable causal inference” (Moravcsik 1998: 10).
In more detail, the rationalist framework of the stages of negotiation in
international cooperation and integration is an actor-centered framework
providing the micro foundations for integration outcomes at the macro level
(ibid.: 24). It is thus in line with the methodologically individualist recipes
for constructing causal mechanisms in the social sciences. The first stage is
about national preference formation (macro-micro) followed by interstate
bargaining and institutional choice (micro-macro) with bounded rationality
providing the (unobserved and untested) micro-micro link. At the stage of
national preference formation, Moravcsik distinguishes between economic
and geopolitical interests. At the stage of interstate bargaining, agreements
could be explained either on the basis of asymmetrical interdependence or
supranational entrepreneurship. Finally, institutional choice may be the result
of federalist ideology, centralized technocratic management, or the need for
credible commitment. Economic interests, asymmetrical interdependence,
and the search for credible commitments constitute the main elements of
the liberal-intergovernmentalist mechanism of integration.
Moravcsik disaggregates each of the three stages into further process-level
indicators. For the preference formation stage, for instance, he checks whether
variation in interests is across issues (evidence for liberal intergovernmentalism)
or across countries (evidence for geopolitical ideas and interests); when shifts in
preferences occurred; how consistent EC policy was with other policies; who the
key actors and coalitions were; and which interests or concerns were prioritized
in domestic deliberations. Some of the indicators are based on characteristic
patterns of cross-case variation; others correspond more closely to the idea that
causal factors (such as interests) leave “traces,” for example, in the temporal
sequence of events or discourses. But Moravcsik’s selection is typical for the

eclectic use of different kinds of “non-comparable” (Gerring) pieces of evidence
in process tracing.
In general, Moravcsik’s three-stage rationalist framework of the stages of
negotiation is not a straightjacket for comparative theory testing and does not
do injustice to the competitors of liberal intergovernmentalism. All theories
under scrutiny are actor-centered and rationalist theories. All of them make
assumptions about preferences and negotiations. In addition, the omission of
the micro-micro link of “rational choice” from process tracing is perfectly
justified. If all theories share this assumption, there is no analytical leverage to
be gained from examining it empirically.
Liberal intergovernmentalism does not compete with each theory at each
stage of the process. For instance, neofunctionalism also assumes economic
interests; hard intergovernmental bargaining and asymmetrical interdepen-
dence are in line with realism. To overcome theoretical indeterminacy and to
demonstrate that the liberal-intergovernmentalist explanation is better than
the alternatives, it would therefore not have been sufficient to just focus on a
single stage of the process. In other words, national preference formation and
interstate bargaining each provide a “smoking-gun” test for liberal inter-
governmentalism. Taken together, they qualify as a “doubly decisive test”
because they not only demonstrate sufficiency, but also “shrink the hoop”
until none of the competitors fits through it (Chapter 1; Bennett, this volume,
Appendix; see also Mahoney 2012).
Does this mean that, from the point of view of efficient process tracing, the
final stage – institutional choice – would have been dispensable? This depends
on the two considerations explicated in the previous section. First, is institu-
tional choice the crucial process element for any of the theories involved?
Institutional choice as such is an important but secondary concern for liberal
intergovernmentalism; the emphasis is clearly on preference formation and
interstate bargaining. It is certainly not crucial for realism (which does not
even feature as one of the alternative explanations here). As I will argue in a
moment, it is also not the defining process feature for neofunctionalism. One
may argue, however, that institutional choice is the key feature of federalism.
In general, federalist theory (in European integration) is poorly specified. Yet,
it has always put a clear emphasis on the “form” of integration. Whereas
functionalism argued that “form follows function,” federalism stipulated that
“function follows form.” In this perspective, examining the choice of institu-
tional form is crucial for eliminating federalism as a competitor and should be
part of an efficient process-tracing analysis.
Second, however, is institutional choice an independent stage of the causal

process? In Moravcsik’s process-tracing framework, the first stage is national
preference formation. Since the analysis shows that national preferences are
indeed predominantly economic and only to a minor extent motivated by
geopolitical concerns or federalist ideology, realism and federalism are “out.”
If, as rationalist institutionalism assumes, institutional choice is functional
and depends on the interests of the participating actors, it is hard to see how
institutional choice should have been motivated by federalist or anti-federalist
ideology or how it should have led to federal (state-like, democratic) European
institutions as a result of economic preferences and intergovernmental bar-
gaining. In this perspective, the study of institutional choice would indeed
have been dispensable for efficiency reasons. If federalism is disconfirmed by
an analysis of preference formation and if institutional choice is largely
dependent on preferences, federalism could hardly have been supported by
an analysis of institutional choice.
There is, however, one omission in the framework that stacks the deck
unfairly in favor of liberal intergovernmentalism and to the disadvantage of
neofunctionalism: the feedback link between integration outcomes and
preferences. This is not just one additional part of the causal process on
which liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism disagree. The feed-
back loop is central to a fully specified causal mechanism in the social sciences;
and it is the essential element of the neofunctionalist causal mechanism of
integration.
Neofunctionalism is a historical–institutionalist and dynamic theory. It does
not dispute that the initial steps of integration match liberal intergovernmen-
talist assumptions about the centrality of exogenous state preferences and
intergovernmental bargaining power. It stipulates, however, that once suprana-
tional organizations and rules are in place, integration produces unanticipated,
unintended, and often undesired consequences and escapes the control of the
states. For instance, integration may create additional transnational interactions
that create demand for more integration. Supranational organizations use the
regime rules and the competences they have been given by the states not only to
stabilize cooperation, but also to further develop the rules and expand their own
powers. The externalities of integration in one policy create demand for inte-
gration in functionally adjacent policy areas. As a result, the integration out-
come modifies the material and institutional constraints under which the states
operate and likely also affects societal and governmental interests. Moravcsik’s
framework, however, does not include the feedback process and thus does not
allow us to study whether or not national preferences become endogenous.
Finally, Moravcsik achieves external validity not by carefully selecting

typical, diverse, or hard cases of integration, but by doing a series of process-
tracing analyses for all major treaty revisions in European integration up to
the time of writing. The result is a book of 500 pages. This is hardly efficient,
but is justifiable given the problems of heterogeneity, time dependence, and
small-n for a comparative analysis of integration decisions from the 1950s to
the early 1990s. It would also have been difficult to find an uncontroversial
hard case for confirming liberal intergovernmentalism vis-à-vis all competing
explanations. In summary, Moravcsik’s Choice for Europe is an excellent
example of efficient process tracing – with the exception of being “too
efficient” regarding the omission of the feedback link from the causal process.
Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration”

Paul Pierson focuses precisely on the gap in Moravcsik’s process-tracing
framework. He criticizes the “snapshot” view of European integration that
omits the consequences of integration decisions for member-state control.
Whereas he concedes that “at any given point in time, the key propositions of
intergovernmentalist theory are likely to hold” (Pierson 1996: 126 [emphasis
in original]), the theory seriously underestimates “the lags between decisions
and long-term consequences, as well as the constraints that emerge from
societal adaptations and shifts in policy preferences that occur during the
interim” (ibid.).
Based on historical–institutionalist assumptions that elaborate on and
partly contradict those of Moravcsik’s functional theory of institutions,
Pierson develops a causal mechanism for the “missing link” in Moravcsik’s
framework. In a first step, he argues that member states are likely to lose
control of the institutions they created owing to the partial autonomy of
EC institutions, the restricted time horizons of political decision-makers,
unanticipated consequences such as overload and spill-over resulting from
high issue density, and unexpected shifts in government preferences. In a
second step, he claims that member states are unable to reassert control
because of supranational actors’ resistance, institutional barriers to reform
(such as veto powers or high voting thresholds), or sunk costs that raise the
price of exit to the point that exit threats by member states lose credibility.
Pierson then combines these elements of the causal mechanism in an arrow
diagram (see Figure 4.1) that illustrates the feedback link between “institutional
and policy outcomes” at T0 (as explained by liberal intergovernmentalism)
and the member-state preferences, bargaining power, and power of other actors
MEMBER STATE MEMBER STATE

MEMBER STATE
BARGAINING PREFERENCES
PREFERENCES SHIFTS IN
POWER
DOMESTIC
CONDITIONS
MICRO-LEVEL
ADAPTATIONS
(“Sunk Costs”) INSTITUTIONAL
INTERSTATE AND POLICY
BARGAINING MEMBER STATE OUTCOMES
BARGAINING
ACCUMULATED POWER
POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
HEAVILY
DISCOUNTED
INSTITUTIONAL OR UNINTENDED
AND POLICY EFFECTS POWER OF
OUTCOMES OTHER ACTORS
(e.g. European
Court)
TIME: T0 T1 T2
Figure 4.1 The causal mechanism in “The Path to European Integration”

Source: Reproduction from Pierson 1996: 149
that shape institutional and policy outcomes at T2. At T1 “micro-level adapta-

tions (‘sunk costs’),” “accumulated policy constraints,” “heavily discounted or
unintended effects” as well as “shifts in domestic conditions” modify member-
state preferences, constrain or rebalance member-state bargaining power,
and/or increase the power of other actors, thereby producing outcomes that
would not have occurred in the absence of the institutional effects that liberal
intergovernmentalism does not include. In a final step, Pierson briefly analyzes
three cases in the area of social policy to illustrate these institutional effects (for
a more extensive analysis of EC social policy, see Leibfried and Pierson 1995).
Pierson’s article is again an excellent example of an efficient process-tracing
design. First, it demonstrates how theories can and need to be elaborated for the
process tracing of causal mechanisms (Chapter 1, p. 30; Jacobs, this volume,
Chapter 2). Pierson explicates process-level arguments that are merely implicit
and underdeveloped in the original formulation of neofunctionalism. In
addition, he provides micro foundations for the various spill-over effects
theorized by neofunctionalism. Finally, he combines the elements of the causal
mechanism in a process model that is represented as an arrow diagram.
Second, Pierson picks a hard case for neofunctionalism to build external

validity for his analysis. According to Pierson: “Social policy is widely con-
sidered to be an area where member-state control remains unchallenged”
(Pierson 1996: 148). He goes on to argue that the “need for action at
the European level has not been self-evident” (ibid.), presumably because
issue-specific international interdependence was low. In addition, “member
states have been quite sensitive to intrusions on a core area of national
sovereignty” (ibid.), and earlier attempts by the Commission to strengthen
the social dimension of European integration have not been met with success.
In a typical justification for a hard-case design, he concludes that “even in this
area – where an intergovernmentalist account seems highly plausible – a
historical institutionalist perspective casts the development of European
policy in quite a different light” (Pierson 1996: 150). By extension, we can
infer that if the mechanism proposed by historical institutionalism works
effectively under these unfavorable circumstances, it is likely to be even
more powerful in “easier” policy fields.
This is not to say that the process-tracing design could not be improved.
Although it is clear that the process-tracing case study is placed in a compe-
titive setting between historical institutionalism and intergovernmentalism,
the alternative expectations of liberal intergovernmentalism for the feedback
link are not explicitly formulated. For one, it is sometimes not sufficiently clear
how compatible and incompatible elements of the historical–institutionalist
mechanism are with liberal intergovernmentalism. For instance, shifts in
domestic conditions, one element in Pierson’s account, would fit a liberal-
intergovernmentalist account as well and thus do not help to discriminate
between the two theories. The question is rather whether such shifts could
have been anticipated at the time of the negotiations, but were discarded in
favor of short-term gains and at the price of long-term losses. This is, indeed,
Pierson’s argument in the case of British Prime Minister Major’s refusal to
sign a Social Protocol at Maastricht (Pierson 1996: 155).
In addition, the crucial element in the feedback mechanism for the theory
competition is not that institutions develop in ways that governments did not
fully foresee at the time of their making – remember that Moravcsik starts
from the assumption of bounded rationality, and elaborating incomplete
contracts and dealing with uncertainty are the major reasons for creating
supranational organizations. The core issue is whether governments are able
to correct institutional developments that run counter to their own prefer-
ences. Efficient process tracing would thus focus less on the link between T0
and T1 and more on the link between T1 and T2. It would need to show that
member-state preferences at T2 were based not on exogenous domestic or

international situations (such as changes in the domestic power of interest
groups or changes in international interdependence), but on endogenous
institutional effects of European integration. In case member-state preferences
did not differ from T0, the analysis would have to show that even powerful
governments tried in vain to rein in supranational organizations or change
European rules because of resistance, institutional barriers, or weak credibility
of exit threats.
The case studies in Pierson’s article either do not engage in such focused
process-level competitive tests (as in the case of workplace health and safety)
or provide less than conclusive results (as in the case of gender policy). Finally,
the Social Protocol was still too recent at the time of writing to observe longer-
term institutional effects. However, Pierson correctly predicted that the next
Labour Government would sign the protocol and thus constrain British social
policy more than if Major had negotiated and signed a watered-down version
in Maastricht.
In all fairness, it also needs to be mentioned that Pierson’s 1996 article was
mainly meant to set the agenda for and design a competitive process-tracing
analysis rather than conducting it at the necessary level of detail (Pierson 1996:
158). He admits to “daunting” challenges “for those wishing to advance a
historical institutionalist account” (ibid.: 157), such as “to trace the motivations
of political actors in order to separate the intended from the unintended” or
“determining the impact of sunk costs on current decision-making” (ibid.: 158).
Pierson is also keenly aware of the fundamental trade-off involved in process
tracing: “The evidentiary requirements encourage a focus on detailed analyses
of particular cases, rendering investigations vulnerable to the critique that the
cases examined are unrepresentative” (ibid.). This statement again points to the
need to design process-tracing analyses efficiently in terms of both internal and
external validity. By choosing hard cases from the area of social policy, Pierson
did much to strengthen the potential generalizability of his results. In contrast,
the specification of competitive observable implications for the crucial process
elements was still underdeveloped in the 1996 article.
Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe

Craig Parsons shares the interest of all integration theories in explaining the
EU as “the major exception in the thinly institutionalized world of interna-
tional politics” (Parsons 2003: 1). In contrast to liberal intergovernmentalism,
however, he claims that a “set of ideas” rather than structural economic
incentives was responsible for this development; and while he agrees

with historical institutionalists about the centrality of path-dependent insti-
tutionalization, he puts the emphasis on the “institutionalization of ideas,”
“effectively defining the interests even of actors who long advocated other
ideas” (ibid.: 2), rather than on institutional constraints on governments’
material interests and cost–benefit calculations.
Parsons’s book is a study of French policy-making on European integra-
tion from 1947 to 1997. He subdivides this period into five steps of integra-
tion from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to Maastricht,
but also analyzes two instances of failure: the European Defence Community
of the early 1950s and the “empty chair crisis” of 1965 and 1966. The
temporal scope of the book is thus similar to Moravcsik’s Choice of
Europe, except that he focuses on France (rather than France, Germany,
and the UK, as Moravcsik does).
According to Parsons, the selection of France is justified because France was
the pivotal country for supranational integration in Europe: “The victory of
the community project was not determined solely in France, but the key battle
of European ideas occurred here.” In addition, he classifies France as a hard
case for his ideational account and an easy case for its competitors. Parsons
claims to tell “the story of how the state that invented the state, famous for its
jealous defense of autonomy, with a deep bias toward dirigiste economic
policies, delegated unprecedented amounts of sovereignty to a neoliberal
and monetarist framework” (Parsons 2003: 33). From the point of view of
efficient process tracing, France is thus a good choice.
More than Moravcsik or Pierson, Parsons refers directly to process tracing –
probably because the term had become more familiar to integration scholars
in the meantime. For instance, he laments that other work has claimed the
causal impact of ideas “without tracing the process by which certain ideas
become embedded as constitutive norms or identities” and vows “to focus on
this link” (Parsons 2003: 6).
Parsons does not develop the same kind of semi-formalized and graphically
illustrated process model as Moravcsik and Pierson, but a causal mechanism
starting with preferences, moving on to collective interaction, and ending with
feedback can easily be reconstructed from the theoretical chapter of his book.
In addition, the ideational argument is contrasted with and tested against
structural alternatives (realism, liberalism, and functional institutionalism)
and institutionalism (neofunctionalism).
The first stage is preferences. Parsons argues that initial preferences on
integration are ideational rather than structural. Conflict takes place between
traditionalists, confederalists, and advocates of supranational community rather

than between parties, bureaucracies, or economic groups. Correspondingly, the
first step of process tracing is to determine whether or not preferences on
integration are cross-cutting groups based on structural interests and positions.
In addition, Parsons looks for persisting debate along ideational lines. “As long
as current patterns of mobilization do not trace to current objective conditions
(and do trace to differences in rhetoric), we have evidence that ideational factors
are currently influencing action” (Parsons 2003: 14).
The second, transformational stage analyzes how individual preferences of
policymakers are transformed into French governmental policy. After all,
“variation in individuals’ ideas does not mean ideas matter in government
strategies” (Parsons 2003: 14). Parsons’s argument in this part of the causal
process is not “inherently ideational.” Rather, leaders that have been (s)elected
on the basis of other cleavages use the discretionary space they have on the
integration issue to pursue their supranational ideas. It is therefore historically
contingent and not part of an ideational, structural, or institutional mechanism
whether leaders with supranational ideas or leaders with traditionalist or
confederal ideas come to power. Parsons makes an interesting and non-trivial
point which completes the narrative sequence from individual preferences to
government policy. Yet, the function of analyzing this stage of the process is
unclear: because it does not directly test ideational effects against its alternatives,
efficient process tracing could have done without the analysis of this stage.
Moreover, a second part of the transformational mechanism is missing in
Parsons’s argument: the micro-macro link from individual state preferences
to European integration outcomes, which features prominently in
Moravcsik’s account of intergovernmental bargaining, is dealt with only in
passing. Parsons claims that “without the community ideas of French leaders,
today’s Europe would look much like the rest of modern international
politics” (Parsons 2003: 27). Whereas all other governments would have
been willing to settle for less ambitious institutional solutions, “French insis-
tence on the community model repeatedly decided the outcome” (ibid.: 2).
Yet, this is not a mechanism-based argument. It is not clear how France has
been able to impose its community ideas on its partners. Was it bargaining
power, as structuralists would claim, or was it persuasion or social influence as
an ideational account would have to show? If institutional feedback is the
missing link in liberal intergovernmentalism, intergovernmental negotiations
are the missing link in Parsons’s “certain idea of Europe.”
In contrast, Parsons returns to the competitive testing of causal mechan-
isms at the final stage: the institutional feedback. From an efficiency point of
view, we can ask again whether the analysis of this link is necessary. First, is
this link the crucial one for any of the competing theories? Second, is it
conceivable that structuralism or institutionalism explains the feedback
stage if the study shows that the French debate on European integration
does not follow structural lines (and that government leaders pursue
European policy independent of structural cleavages)? Both questions can
be answered in the affirmative. First, as I have argued in my criticism of
Moravcsik, the institutional feedback is central for neofunctionalism. Second,
Parsons argues that even if structural factors were indeterminate at the
beginning, structural signals may “have clarified over time” and shape
preferences at subsequent stages of the integration process (Parsons 2003: 15).
Were it correct, we would expect that the earlier dissidents’ adjustments traced to
identifiable structural shifts (economic, geopolitical, or electoral); that French groups
or parties displayed greater internal agreement before deciding on later institutional
steps (the imperatives forward now being clear); and that dissidents pointed to
exogenous pressures to justify their alignment. (Parsons 2003: 16)
This is a clear process-tracing agenda. Against structuralism, Parsons claims

that:
broader elite agreement on European strategies arose in discrete steps that followed
institutional initiatives by pro-community leaders, not clear structural shifts. Only
after advocates of that agenda successfully asserted it in a new European deal did
proponents of other views reluctantly adjust their strategies to a revised institutional
status quo. In so doing, they consistently referred to pressures from the new
institutions themselves. In a short period of time after each deal, they changed
their strategies and rhetoric to present the institutional steps they had opposed as
“in French interests.” (Parsons 2003: 16)
At the theoretical level, Parsons also distinguishes ideational and rational–
institutionalist mechanisms of institutional feedback in terms of conversion
versus constraint logics. In the end, however, he does not really engage in
competitive process tracing for the reason that both logics would be hard
to distinguish empirically (ibid.: 18). That means, however, that Parsons’s
criticism of neofunctionalism ultimately rests on the rejection of interest-
based integration preferences rather than on the core claim of Pierson and
others that integrated institutions affect policymakers’ preferences and
behavior through rational adaptation and constraints.
As a final consideration, could Parsons have worked with fewer cases to
make his point? First, the argument about the institutional construction of
interests requires a longitudinal analysis. Second, it is most effective if it
includes a period in which anti-supranationalist leaders made French policy.

Thus, an analysis spanning the time period from the 1950s via the “Gaullist”
1960s to the relaunch of supranationalism in the internal market program was
necessary. Only the analysis of monetary policy in addition to single-market
policies may have been redundant.
In summary, Craig Parsons’s study is highly efficiently designed to demon-
strate the ideational formation of integration preferences against materialist,
structuralist accounts of “objective” preferences. By contrast, the transforma-
tion and feedback stages contribute less to confirming an ideational explana-
tion of integration and defending it against alternative explanations. For these
stages of the process, the process-tracing design would have benefited from an
additional process link to be studied (transformation of French preferences to
European outcomes) and from the specification of observable implications
discriminating between conversion and constraints as institutional feedback
mechanisms.
Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe

My book on “rules and rhetoric” in the enlargement of the EU and NATO
(Schimmelfennig 2003) deals with an aspect of integration that had long been
neglected by the literature. Whereas integration theory has almost exclusively
been concerned with “vertical integration,” the transfer of powers from the
nation-state to an international organization, integration also has a “horizon-
tal” dimension, the expansion of integrated rules and institutions to additional
states and territories. Concerning this horizontal dimension, integration the-
ory asks why and under which conditions non-member countries seek to join
an international organization and member countries agree to admit a new
member state.
In terms of theory, the book is similar to that of Parsons (2003) in that it
puts forward an ideational explanation of integration. In particular, it claims
that rationalist institutionalism can only partly explain the Eastern enlarge-
ment of the EU (and NATO). The book starts with a congruence analysis of
Eastern enlargement, which shows that rationalist institutionalism accounts
for the interest of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to join the
EU, but not for the interest of the member states to admit them. The CEECs
were highly dependent on trade with and investments from the EU and were
poorer than the member states. They therefore stood to gain from full access
to the internal market, subsidies from the EU budget, and decision-making
power in the integrated institutions. The member states, however, had few
incentives to admit the CEECs. First, the CEECs’ economic and trade
relevance for most member states was low. Second, the prospect of their
accession raised concerns about trade and budget competition. Third, massive
enlargement dilutes the old members’ voting power. Finally, the CEECs
depended much more on the EU than the other way around and did not
have the bargaining power to put pressure on the EU to admit them.
In contrast, a second congruence analysis based on sociological or con-
structivist institutionalism shows a strong fit of explanatory conditions and
outcome. Starting from the assumption that the EU is a community of liberal
European states, the sociological or constructivist hypothesis posits that all
liberal European states are entitled to membership in the EU if they so desire.
This holds even if their admission produces net costs for the organization or
individual old member states. In cases of conflict between material (economic)
interests and liberal community norms, the norm of liberal membership
overrides the economic interests and the superior bargaining power of
member states. The analysis shows that the EU invited those ex-communist
countries to accession negotiations that had consolidated liberal democracy;
in addition, those that had become consolidated democracies earlier were in
general also invited to membership talks earlier. In a next step, the book
reports a large-n event-history analysis of enlargement decisions in three
major Western European international organizations: the EU, NATO, and
the Council of Europe. This analysis confirms democracy in European non-
member countries as the most relevant factor of enlargement. In summary,
the study establishes a robust correlation between liberal democracy and
EU enlargement, which serves as a starting point for the exploration of the
causal mechanism linking community norms with enlargement decisions.
The need for process tracing arises from the fact that various modes of action
are theoretically compatible with the covariation between community norms
and enlargement decisions: habitual, normative, communicative, and rhetorical
action. I suggest that the causal mechanism of social action can be conceived as a
sequence of four stages or links (Schimmelfennig 2003: 157–159). The first is
cognitions, that is, the set of beliefs or ideas actors hold about the world and the
actors’ ways of thinking and making decisions. The second level is the goals
actors set for themselves and seek to attain through their actions. The third is
the individual behavior actors choose in light of their goals and cognitions.
Finally, two or more individual behaviors form an interaction that brings about
a collective outcome. Social norms can become influential at each of these stages
or levels. The earlier in the process they do, the deeper the institutional impact
on social action. Each of the four modes of action is based on the assumption
Table 4.3 Modes of action in The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe
Norm impact on
Logic of action Cognitions Goals Behavior Outcome
Habitual X X X X
Normative X X X
Communicative X X
Rhetorical X
Rational
Source: Slightly modified reproduction from Schimmelfennig 2003: 158.
that rules have an impact on decision-making at different stages in the process

of social action (Table 4.3).
The stages of rule impact match the major links in the “bathtub” template of
analytic social science. The habitual mode of action is the most structuralist
one and leaves the least room for individual agency. According to this mode,
rules have the deepest possible impact because they already shape social action
at the level of cognitions. Normative action leaves more room for agency. It
conceives the goals of the actors as norm-based. But they are a result of
reflective and purposive choice, not of habit. Communicative action does
not postulate norm-based goals and preferences, but norm-based behavior.
It assumes that actors with conflicting preferences enter into a discourse about
legitimate political ends and means in which they argue according to norma-
tive standards of true reasoning and rational argument. Unlike communica-
tive action, rhetorical action starts from the assumption that both the
preferences and the behavior of the actors are determined by individual and
instrumental choices. According to this mode of action, social norms will,
however, affect the process of interaction and, as a consequence, the collective
outcome. Rational action is the null hypothesis. It excludes the impact of
norms at any stage of the causal mechanism. It was already disconfirmed by
the congruence analysis and therefore did not need to be included in the
process tracing. Note that whereas Moravcsik’s process-tracing analysis does
not deal with the modes of action because all theories in his set of competitors
are rationalist theories, the micro-micro link is of key interest here.
While it is difficult to test the dispositional features and cognitive mechan-
isms assumed by the modes of action directly, they leave characteristic traces
in verbal and non-verbal behaviors. To facilitate comparison and competitive
evaluation, the observable implications that I specify for each process
hypothesis refer to a common set of phenomena: (1) the CEECs’ enlargement

preferences; (2) the member states’ enlargement preferences; (3) the initial
reaction of the organizations to the CEECs’ bid for membership; (4) the
decision-making process within the organizations; and (5) the effects of
enlargement on later enlargement rounds. I further refer to several features
of efficient process tracing:
Finally, note that, even though process analysis results in a more narrative form of
presentation than the correlational outcome analysis of NATO and EU enlargement, I
do not provide a full chronological account of the enlargement decision-making
processes that one would expect in a historiographical perspective. Rather, I present
“analytical episodes” focused on examining the empirical implications of the process
hypotheses under scrutiny. These episodes sometimes violate the chronological order
and regularly neglect those aspects of the enlargement process that are not relevant for
hypothesis-testing. (Schimmelfennig 2003: 159)
I then formulate five expectations (relating to the five types of observable

implications) for each mode of action. The empirical analysis starts with the
candidates’ and the member states’ enlargement preferences and the initial
decision-making process. Because the observations do not meet the
expectations based on the habitual and normative modes of action, these
modes are excluded from further analysis. In contrast, the egoistic state
preferences and the strategic initial reaction of the member states were
compatible with the communicative and rhetorical modes of action. In the
next step, I therefore focus on the further negotiating and decision-making
process of the EU and NATO as well as on subsequent enlargement rounds in
order to discriminate between the two remaining modes. In the end, the
observational implications of “rhetorical action” are shown to be more
consistent with the actual process than those of “communicative action.”
Rhetorical action thus demonstrates how egoistic preferences and strategic
action can still result in norm-conforming outcomes.
Does this design meet the criteria of efficiency set up above? First, the
process tracing is clearly complementary to a set of congruence and compara-
tive analyses that put into question rationalist–institutionalist theories such as
liberal intergovernmentalism and establish a correlation between community
norms and enlargement decisions. It is used to resolve a problem of equifin-
ality: multiple mechanisms through which norms may bring about norm-
conforming behavior (Chapter 1, pp. 19, 21). Second, I contrasted several
causal mechanisms and their observational consequences resulting from
different assumptions about the actors’ modes of action.
But was it necessary to study all five links in order to determine the causal
mechanism linking community norms and enlargement decisions? In hind-
sight, two of them appear redundant. First, since what really matters is the
decision-making of the international organization, the preferences of the appli-
cants do not seem to be relevant. The four modes of social action under study
could have been causally effective regardless of the motivations and goals of the
CEECs. (And, indeed, the analysis of their preferences proved inconclusive.)
Second, the brief analysis of subsequent enlargement rounds was not necessary
either. Even though this analysis provides further evidence for the rhetorical
action hypothesis, the effect of the first round of Eastern enlargement in the EU
or NATO was not crucial for any of the competing hypotheses nor needed to
discriminate between any of them. From the point of view of efficiency, it would
have been enough to study the member states’ enlargement preferences and
initial reactions as well as the subsequent negotiating behavior resulting in the
decision to admit the democratically consolidated CEECs.
Finally, I do not explicitly discuss the generalizability of the findings of the
process-tracing analysis. I chose the case of Eastern enlargement out of
interest in the issue and based on the perception that Eastern enlargement
was a highly relevant event in the history of European integration. Whereas it
is plausible to assume that Eastern enlargement constitutes a hard case for
rationalist institutionalism, it may well constitute an easy case for sociological
institutionalism. The external validity of my 2003 findings is thus uncertain
(see also Checkel, this volume, Chapter 3).
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have made the case for “efficient” process tracing, which
builds on the best practices advanced by Bennett and Checkel in the intro-
ductory chapter. However, I further elaborate on these practices to cope with
four core challenges that hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of process
tracing as an inferential method: the large amount of resources needed; the
absence of formal, quantifiable measures of fit; the temptation of storytelling;
and the limits to generalization.
As a partial remedy to these problems, I proposed making process tracing
complementary to analyses of congruence and correlation; selecting repre-
sentative or crucial cases; specifying causal mechanisms and their observable
implications ex ante and according to basic templates of analytic social
science; and designing process tracing as competitive theory testing with a
focus on the crucial process links on which the theories differ. Following these
recommendations, I suggest, helps us design harder tests, impedes storytell-
ing, reduces the required time and resources for conducting process tracing,
and improves generalizability. It thus makes process tracing both more
rigorous and more efficient.
There are several prerequisites of efficient process tracing. It requires
studies establishing congruence or correlation in our area of interest; theories
with a well-specified causal mechanism; and clear and observable implications
of this causal mechanism. These prerequisites for engaging in efficient process
tracing may not be fulfilled. This does not mean, however, that the researcher
should delve inductively into the case. Often, time and resources are better
spent by doing a comparative analysis that helps us pick a suitable case for
process tracing and by elaborating and operationalizing the causal mechan-
ism. In principle, social scientists have a big toolbox full of the “nuts and bolts”
or “cogs and wheels” (Elster 1989) to construct theoretically plausible and
consistent causal mechanisms deductively.
Efficient process tracing will also be undermined if either the implications
of the theories or the available evidence do not lend themselves to rigorous
tests that allow the researcher to accept and reject theories “beyond reasonable
doubt.” But this applies to research in general. Importantly, because of its
deductive design, efficient process tracing is more likely to alert us to problems
of indeterminacy than the inductive search for causal processes.
At the same time, efficient process tracing does come at a price in that it
passes over several features that researchers may particularly value. First, it
replaces the full narrative from cause to outcome with a few process snapshots.
Second, we may rashly accept an explanation if one theory quickly outper-
forms alternative explanations at an early stage of process-tracing analysis. It
may well be that this explanation would not have performed well at later stages
of the causal process or with regard to process links that were not tested
because they were uncontroversial. Third, by privileging hypothesis testing
over hypothesis generation or the open exploration of explanations, efficient
process tracing discourages or even prevents researchers from discovering
new causal mechanisms or process features. Fourth, efficient process tracing is
mainly designed to bring about scientific development. It is certainly not the
best approach to make process tracing relevant for policy.
As a final thought, we need to bear in mind that efficiency is about designing
process-tracing studies, rather than actually conducting the analysis. In the
end, the quality of the data, their analysis, and their interpretation are decisive
for the conclusions we draw on the basis of efficient process tracing.

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4 Efﬁcient process tracing

Analyzing the causal mechanisms

Why a separate chapter on the European Union (EU) in a volume on process

often outcome-centric and focus on examining cases of successful integra-

from a causal mechanism that is speciﬁed ex ante; it selects cases that

Efﬁcient process tracing

Challenges of process tracing

analyzing process-level evidence on causal mechanisms, process tracing can

Ex-ante speciﬁcation of the causal mechanism

sciences (for example, Hedström and Swedberg 1998) provide a useful

Selection of theories and causal-process observations

their decision-making process and focus on the preferences or constraints on

Table 4.1 “Good/best-practice” and “efﬁcient” process tracing compared

Good/best-practice process tracing Eﬃcient process tracing

Process tracing in studies of European integration

method or as an important part of the analysis. I reconstruct how they

Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe

Table 4.2 Process-tracing framework of The Choice for Europe

Alternative Economic vs. Asymmetrical Federalist ideology vs. centralized

Source: Simpliﬁed reproduction from Moravcsik 1998: 24.

are translated into diﬀerent observable implications and confronted with

Moravcsik is also aware of the advantages and disadvantages of process

sequence of events or discourses. But Moravcsik’s selection is typical for the

Second, however, is institutional choice an independent stage of the causal

Finally, Moravcsik achieves external validity not by carefully selecting

Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration”

MEMBER STATE MEMBER STATE

Figure 4.1 The causal mechanism in “The Path to European Integration”

that shape institutional and policy outcomes at T2. At T1 “micro-level adapta-

Second, Pierson picks a hard case for neofunctionalism to build external

member-state preferences at T2 were based not on exogenous domestic or

Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe

incentives was responsible for this development; and while he agrees

traditionalists, confederalists, and advocates of supranational community rather

This is a clear process-tracing agenda. Against structuralism, Parsons claims

includes a period in which anti-supranationalist leaders made French policy.

Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe

Logic of action Cognitions Goals Behavior Outcome

Source: Slightly modiﬁed reproduction from Schimmelfennig 2003: 158.

that rules have an impact on decision-making at diﬀerent stages in the process

hypothesis refer to a common set of phenomena: (1) the CEECs’ enlargement

I then formulate ﬁve expectations (relating to the ﬁve types of observable

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