Foreign Affairs 2018 03-04

HOW WASHINGTON GOT CHINA WRONG
MARCH/APRIL 2018
MARCH/APRIL 2018 • VOLUME 97 • NUMBER 2 •
Letting Go
Trump, America,
and the World
LETTING GO
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Volume 97, Number 2
LETTING GO
Trump’s Lucky Year 2
Why the Chaos Can’t Last
Eliot A. Cohen
The World After Trump 10

How the System Can Endure
Jake Sullivan
The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony 20

Trump’s Surprising Grand Strategy
Barry R. Posen
The Post-American World Economy 28

Globalization in the Trump Era
Adam S. Posen
Giving Up the High Ground 39

C OV E R: PÂT É
America’s Retreat on Human Rights

Sarah Margon
March/April 2018
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ESSAYS
Just and Unjust Leaks 48
When to Spill Secrets
Michael Walzer
The China Reckoning 60

How Beijing Defied American Expectations
Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner
Life in China’s Asia 71

What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like
Jennifer Lind
Green Giant 83
Renewable Energy and Chinese Power
Amy Myers Jaffe
How to Crack Down on Tax Havens 94

Start With the Banks
Nicholas Shaxson
Iran Among the Ruins 108

Tehran’s Advantage in a Turbulent Middle East
Vali Nasr
The President and the Bomb 119

Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process
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ON FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM
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March/April 2018
Mugabe’s Misrule 129
And How It Will Hold Zimbabwe Back
Martin Meredith
The Clash of Exceptionalisms 139

A New Fight Over an Old Idea
Charles A. Kupchan
REVIEWS & RESPONSES

Stranger in Strange Lands 150
Joseph Conrad and the Dawn of Globalization
Adam Hochschild
Still Crazy After All These Years 156

America’s Long History of Political Delusion
James A. Morone
Future Fights 162

Planning for the Next War
Stephen Peter Rosen
Recent Books 168
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CONTRIBUTORS
In 2011, JAKE SULLIVAN became the youngest-ever director
of policy planning at the U.S. State Department. The
next year, the Obama administration sent him to Oman
for the first of many top-secret meetings that would lay
the foundation for the Iran nuclear deal. A former
adviser to both Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden, Sullivan
is now a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace and a visiting lecturer at Yale. In “The World
After Trump” (page 10), he argues that the liberal
international order is more resilient than it appears.
In 1998, after graduating from college, SARAH MARGON

moved to Budapest, where she worked with refugees
from the war in Kosovo. She went on to work at the Open
Society Institute, Oxfam America, and the Center for
American Progress and served as a foreign policy adviser to
Democratic Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin. Margon
is currently the Washington director for Human Rights
Watch. In “Giving Up the High Ground” (page 39), she
argues that the Trump administration is accelerating a
global decline in the respect for human rights.
One of the United States’ preeminent political philosophers,

MICHAEL WALZER has focused his work on the importance
of social context for conceptions of justice and the practical
implications of moral philosophy. His 1977 book, Just
and Unjust Wars, examined the moral basis for war and
the ethical limitations that apply to those who wage it.
A professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study,
Walzer explores the distinctions between the right and
the wrong kinds of whistle-blowing in “Just and Unjust
Leaks” (page 48).
ADAM HOCHSCHILD has spent his career in search of

instances when, as he once put it, “people felt a moral
imperative to confront evil.” He has written about South
African race relations, survivors of the Soviet gulag,
British antislavery activists, conscientious objectors to
World War I, and Americans who volunteered to fight
in the Spanish Civil War. His 1998 book, King Leopold’s
Ghost, which detailed Belgian colonialism in the Congo,
won the Mark Lynton History Prize. In “Stranger in
Strange Lands” (page 150), Hochschild examines the
life and work of Joseph Conrad.
LETTING GO
N
obody really knew what to Jake Sullivan examines the surprising
expect when Donald Trump resilience of the liberal international order,
became U.S. president. Would which has managed to take a licking and
he disrupt the status quo or maintain it? keep on ticking—so far. Other countries
Blow himself up or escape unscathed? appreciate what the United States created,
One year in, the answer is yes. even if Washington doesn’t.
If you squint, U.S. foreign policy Barry Posen suggests that consciously
during the Trump era can seem almost or not, the Trump administration is
normal. But the closer you look, the more following a new grand strategy, one of
you see it being hollowed out, with the illiberal hegemony. It has “pared or
forms and structures still in place but the abandoned many of the pillars of liberal
substance and purpose draining away. internationalism” but “still seeks to retain
The best analogy might be to health the United States’ superior economic and
care—something else the administration military capability and role as security
came in hell-bent on overhauling, only arbiter for most regions of the world.”
to find it more difficult than expected. Adam Posen sees the global economy
In foreign policy, too, the Trump adminis- moving forward calmly and steadily, with
tration came to power promising a revolu- broad-based growth finally kicking in.
tion. But the White House has failed to But here, too, problems have been
kill the existing approach outright and has deferred, and a prolonged abdication of
grudgingly contented itself with hopes U.S. leadership will cause real trouble.
that it will die of neglect anyway. And Sarah Margon traces the decline
In the board game Diplomacy, the of human rights as a concern in this
rules state that “if a player leaves the White House, as even the pretense of
game, or otherwise fails to submit orders,” caring about other countries’ misbehav-
the player’s country is deemed to be ior has been dropped and the president
in “civil disorder.” The country’s pieces embraces a new crop of friendly tyrants.
stand in place, defend themselves if Trying to rule the world by dominance
attacked, and let the game proceed rather than persuasion has not worked
around them. That’s basically what’s well in the past, and there is little doubt
happening with the United States now. that if tried again, it will fail again. The
Confronted with this unprecedented rules of Diplomacy note that civil disor-
situation, Eliot Cohen concedes that to der does not have to be permanent: “A
date, the administration’s foreign policy player who temporarily fails to submit
might be considered “a highly erratic, orders may, of course, resume play if
obnoxious version of the Republican he returns to the game and still has some
normal.” But he argues that this is units left.” What the world will look
because the bill for the administra- like when that eventually happens is
tion’s unconventional behavior has not anybody’s guess.
yet arrived. —Gideon Rose, Editor
The Trump administration
ostentatiously walked away from
the maintenance of world order
as an animating principle of U.S.
foreign policy.
—Eliot Cohen
Trump’s Lucky Year The Post-American World Economy

Eliot A. Cohen 2 Adam S. Posen 28
The World After Trump Giving Up the High Ground

Jake Sullivan 10 Sarah Margon 39
The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony

PÂT É
Barry R. Posen 20
Being in office has done little to
Trump’s moderate Trump’s belligerent rhetoric,
LETTING GO
improve his commitment to facts, or

Lucky Year alter his views on trade and interna-
tional agreements. Over the course of
2017, he insulted foreign leaders on
Why the Chaos Can’t Last Twitter, openly undermined his secre-
tary of state, and attacked the FBI and
Eliot A. Cohen the CIA. He continued to praise dicta-
tors, such as Egyptian President Abdel
W
hen Donald Trump became Fattah el-Sisi and Philippine President
president of the United States, Rodrigo Duterte, and refused to men-
many wondered just how tion Article 5 of the North Atlantic
abnormal his administration, and partic- Treaty—which enshrines the idea that
ularly his foreign policy, would be. After an attack against one NATO member is
all, as a candidate, Trump had evinced a an attack against all—when visiting
partiality for foreign strongmen, derided NATO headquarters in Brussels. His
U.S. allies as a gang of freeloaders, pro- subordinates gamely echoed the promise
posed banning Muslims from entering of “America first,” assuring both the
the United States, sneered at Mexicans, public and themselves that Trump’s use
and denounced free-trade agreements of that phrase had nothing to do with
such as the North American Free Trade Charles Lindbergh’s isolationist and
Agreement and the nascent Trans-Pacific anti-Semitic America First Committee,
Partnership, while demonstrating little founded in 1940.
understanding of most other dimen- Still, the world did not blow up.
sions of international politics. Scores World War III did not break out. A case
of former senior Republican foreign can be made that all things considered,
policy officials, myself included, repu- Trump has ended up being a highly
diated his candidacy on the grounds of erratic, obnoxious version of the Repub-
both his character and his bent toward lican normal. He has been strong on
populist isolationism. His inaugural defense (he increased the Pentagon’s
address confirmed fears that he viewed budget, although not as significantly
the world in darkly narrow, zero-sum as it had hoped), willing to use force
terms. “We’ve made other countries rich (he launched cruise missiles at Syria
while the wealth, strength, and confidence as punishment for its use of chemical
of our country has dissipated over the weapons), and committed to allies (enthu-
horizon,” he said. He went on: “From this siastically in the case of Israel and Japan,
day forward, it’s going to be only America grudgingly in the case of the Europeans).
first. America first.” Although he has been more of an eco-
nomic nationalist than some might like,
ELIOT A. COHEN is Robert E. Osgood the thinking goes that he remains within
Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins the bounds of GOP tradition.
University and the author of The Big Stick: The
Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Yet this reassuringly non-apocalyptic
Military Force. foreign policy was a product of good
2 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Trump’s Lucky Year
Adult supervision? Trump with Mattis and Kelly at the White House, October 2017
fortune, not restraint, and of the resis- postwar governmental consensus on
tance of subordinates rather than the U.S. foreign policy. To be sure, in its
boss’ growth. Trump was remarkably pronouncements, the Trump adminis-
lucky in 2017. He did not experience tration ostentatiously walked away from
any external shocks and paid no visible the promotion of human rights and the
price for alienating the United States’ maintenance of world order as animating
friends. But at the same time, no part principles of U.S. foreign policy. Speak-
of the world is conspicuously better off ing at the UN, Trump himself identified
for his efforts. Instead, the preexisting the sovereignty, security, and prosperity
fissures in the international system are of the American people as his sole objec-
either the same or getting worse; no tives. But congressional mandates and
U.S. adversary is noticeably weaker, and the sheer inertia of previous policies got in
some are getting stronger; and the the way of “America first.” And so human
president’s behavior has devalued the rights violators were still sanctioned, the
currency of the United States’ reputa- United States agreed to ship antitank
tion and credibility. Sooner or later, his missiles to Ukraine, and relations with
luck will run out. And when it does, the Mexico were uneasily patched up. The
Y U R I G R I PAS / R E U T E R S
true costs of the Trump presidency will executive branch predominates in foreign
become clear. policy, but Congress set limits, particu-
larly with regard to Russia, and the courts
IT COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE had their say, blocking Trump’s attempt
In some ways, 2017 demonstrated the to rewrite U.S. immigration law by
sheer difficulty of reversing the massive executive fiat.
March/April 2018 3
Eliot A. Cohen
In addition to the intrinsic limits on of his directives has practically invited

presidential power, there was the resis- passive resistance, such as when the
tance of what some of Trump’s support- service chiefs and his own secretary of
ers darkly call “the deep state.” This is a defense politely ignored his tweet about
misnomer: there is no U.S. equivalent banning transgender individuals from
of what the Turkish military was 30 years serving in the military. Trump has expe-
ago, or what the Pakistani military and rienced the very limitations on his power
intelligence service remain today. The that President Harry Truman anticipated
United States does not even have what for his successor, Dwight Eisenhower:
the British historian Ronald Robinson “He’ll sit here, and he’ll say, ‘Do this!
termed “the official mind,” the suffocat- Do that!’ And nothing will happen. . . .
ing convictions of a mandarin class of He’ll find it very frustrating.”
career professionals. But there is no Some have put their faith in the
doubt that career diplomats, intelligence administration’s “grownups”—Secretary
officials, civil servants, and military of State Rex Tillerson and the three
leaders share a deeply rooted consensus generals, John Kelly (White House chief
about U.S. foreign policy and security. of staff), James Mattis (secretary of
And this consensus unquestionably defense), and H. R. McMaster (national
diverges from Trump’s worldview in security adviser). These officials, the
its support for free trade, U.S. alliances argument goes, have placed their guiding
(particularly NATO), and the U.S.-led and restraining hands on the shoulders
global order. Many of Trump’s senior of the impulsive and poorly read com-
political appointees do not share his mander in chief. This argument has some
worldview. Moreover, the Trump admin- merit. After all, Mattis genially talked
istration has been one of the slowest on Trump out of advocating torture by
record to fill positions—candidates for suggesting that he always got more out
less than 40 percent of the key roles of prisoners by offering them beer and
had been confirmed by the end of 2017. cigarettes—a mild but effective fib, given
(Trump had roughly 300 officials con- that generals do not usually interrogate
firmed by the end of his first year in office, jihadists. When the memoirs are finally
whereas, for example, U.S. President written, we may learn of more disasters
George W. Bush had nearly 500.) As a averted in this way. Of the grownups,
result, there has been plenty of room Tillerson is the least important, his
for officials to continue the policies they background as the reclusive CEO of
prefer rather than pursue those that might ExxonMobil having turned out to be poor
please the president. preparation for leading the State Depart-
The internal feuding and incompe- ment and explaining U.S. foreign policy
tence of some of Trump’s staff have made to the American people. He also appears
the machinery of government even less to have the least influence with Trump.
responsive to the White House. Trump The benign junta, as it were, of Kelly,
may have succeeded in real estate and Mattis, and McMaster is a different
entertainment, but he has no experience matter: closer to the president and more
in bending vast and complex organiza- visibly respected by him. But there are
tions to his will. The informal nature important differences among them.
McMaster has been the most visibly at A YEAR OF TRUMP

odds with the president when it comes to For the Trump administration, 2017 was a
Russia, but he also most overtly endorses year of adjusting, however haphazardly,
Trump’s view of international politics as to a world that many inside and outside
a jungle. Kelly is clearly more sympathetic the president’s camp consider increas-
to Trump’s views on immigration, the ingly dangerous. There was no major
press, and congressional oversight than crisis along the lines of the Bay of Pigs
the others. And Mattis shoulders a unique or 9/11, but enough disturbing events
burden: running the largest organiza- are in train.
tion in the United States, which limits the Throughout Trump’s first year in office,
time he can spend reining in his errant North Korea continued developing nuclear
boss. Furthermore, because Mattis under- weapons and the intercontinental ballistic
stands that he is the main barrier between missiles it would need to carry them to
Trump and a truly catastrophic military the United States. Fiery rhetoric on both
decision, he will likely hold his dissents sides (including Trump’s threats of “fire
in reserve. In other words, the generals and fury”) and heightened sanctions on
may not always be inclined to curb Trump’s Pyongyang did not bring the confrontation
worst instincts, for in some cases, they any closer to resolution. And through its
share them, albeit to a milder degree. rhetoric and continued military buildup,
And being human, they, too, can be including in the South China Sea, China
distracted, exhausted, and outmaneu- made clear that it would not act as the
vered. They form at best a partial, and United States’ sheriff in East Asia. Mean-
not necessarily a permanent, brake. while, McMaster’s insistence on the
What is not known is what will denuclearization of North Korea and
happen if and when the president decides his repeated talk of “preventive war”
on a course of action that his advisers made peaceful and honorable accommo-
deem deeply dangerous but nonethe- dation seem further off than ever. In
less legal. With over a century of drilled the coming year, the United States will
obedience to the commander in chief face a choice: either war (by accident or
under their collective belt, the generals plan) aimed at disarming or even over-
might not be willing to subvert decisions throwing the North Korean regime or a
with which they disagree, as other wily humiliating abandonment of the reddest
political appointees have done in the of redlines.
past (the most important case being As the year unfolded, it became
James Schlesinger’s quiet maneuvering increasingly apparent just how actively
as secretary of defense to ensure that Russia had intervened in the 2016 U.S.
U.S. President Richard Nixon could not presidential election. Allegations about
make any wild moves without his author- the Trump team’s possible connections
ization). Nor is it clear how many of the to Moscow dominated the news, as federal
grownups will stay beyond two years. prosecutors doggedly pursued senior
McMaster and Tillerson could conceivably campaign officials and even secured a
exit before the end of 2018, and their plea bargain from Trump’s dismissed
replacements would probably be even less national security adviser, Michael Flynn.
likely to resist the president’s impulses. Meanwhile, the president remained
March/April 2018 5
Eliot A. Cohen
remarkably cordial toward Russian as a tool of geopolitics are accelerating.

President Vladimir Putin and apparently China’s rise is, if anything, more disturb-
ordered no retaliation for Moscow’s ing than it was a year ago.
astonishing effort to disrupt U.S. politics In the ongoing war against jihadists,
and discredit the United States’ demo- the Trump administration scored a major
cratic processes. Ultimately, Congress and success by completing the campaign to
the State Department overrode the White help Iraq eliminate the physical footprint
House to impose more sanctions on of the Islamic State, or ISIS. Although
Russia. But the situation remains unstable: Trump was quick to take credit—and
the antitank missiles that the United States his administration did indeed increase
sent to Ukraine will surely kill Russians, resources and lift restrictions on U.S.
and Putin is unlikely to react well to that. military commanders—at most his
And a Europe increasingly preoccupied administration expanded and acceler-
with its own populist and secessionist ated an effort launched by the Obama
movements presents more opportunities administration. At the end of the year,
for Russian subversion. ISIS no longer held territory in Iraq, but
In April, Trump hosted Chinese this did not destroy the group any more
President Xi Jinping at his Florida than killing Osama bin Laden finished
resort, Mar-a-Lago, and in November, off al Qaeda. The contest with jihadists
Xi reciprocated in Beijing. The state will go on well after the Trump presi-
visits were successful in the sense of dency, and the administration has not
being cordial and theatrical, but Trump’s articulated a clear strategy for success.
National Security Strategy, released in Meanwhile, vast swaths of Mosul, Iraq’s
December, still identifies China as one second-largest city, lie in ruins. Shiite
of the United States’ major competitors, militias are operating there and in other
and the president continued complain- predominantly Sunni regions of the coun-
ing about China’s trade surpluses and try. And in October, the Iraqi government
failure to rein in North Korea. The admin- seized the contested governorate of
istration’s consistent support for Japan, Kirkuk, a move that shocked and angered
including its decision to increase sales of the United States’ Kurdish allies.
advanced weaponry to Tokyo, is unlikely Next door in Syria, the regime of
to warm the relationship with China. Nor Bashar al-Assad has won its war for
is its standoff with North Korea: Beijing’s survival thanks to assistance from Iran,
apprehension about what might happen Hezbollah, and Russia, while U.S.-backed
on the Korean Peninsula, reflected in rebels found themselves isolated and
Chinese military aircraft patrolling close outgunned. Israel now faces an embold-
to South Korea and the quiet preparation ened Hezbollah and the possibility of a
of refugee camps near the North Korean more permanent Iranian military pres-
border, suggests that a U.S.–North Korean ence in Syria. Trump did improve rela-
conflict could expand into something tions with Egypt, but, reflecting Russia’s
much larger. In the meantime, China’s new assertiveness in the Middle East,
steady acquisition of military power, its the Egyptian government is now buying
menacing posture toward Taiwan, and Russian military hardware and allowing
its use of economic aid and investment Russian military aircraft to deploy from
Egypt. For that matter, the Israeli prime trading order than China. And Trump’s
minister spent more time in Moscow than approach to trade will likely alienate
he did in Washington in 2017. Trump old friends, such as Canada, and critical
inherited these predicaments from his allies, such as South Korea.
predecessor, but he did not, and perhaps Elsewhere, crises percolated, most
could not, turn them around. notably in Venezuela, as a state of over
In the Persian Gulf, Trump more 30 million people continued its decline
firmly aligned the United States with into chaos. But in Latin America (with
Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states the exception of Mexico), as in other
and against Iran. He signaled his desire parts of the world, there was not so much
to walk away from the Iran nuclear deal friction as absence: the United States
and showed little interest in the ferocious was simply not playing much of a role
proxy war that the Arab states are waging one way or another. And throughout
in Yemen against Iran. The administra- his first year, Trump acquired a global
tion appears to be placing its bets on the reputation for being unreliable, tem-
new Saudi crown prince, Mohammed peramental, and deceitful. According to
bin Salman, an ambiguous figure who the Pew Research Center, 93 percent of
is promising to open opportunities for Swedes polled said they had confidence
women and modernize his society while in U.S. President Barack Obama, but
aggressively confronting Iran and shaking only ten percent said they felt the same
down wealthy members and associates of about Trump. Of course, this may say
the royal family. The administration has more about Sweden than the United
been noticeably silent about such excesses, States, but in Canada, Germany, and
as well as about the de facto Saudi kidnap- the United Kingdom, the numbers were
ping of the Lebanese prime minister almost as bad. And foreign officials have
in November. begun talking openly about how, in the
On trade, shortly after taking office, words of Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s
Trump decisively dropped the Trans- minister of foreign affairs, “our friend
Pacific Partnership. (Large international and ally has come to question the very
economic arrangements led by China worth of its mantle of global leader-
took its place.) More consequentially, he ship.” The costs of such a deterioration
began renegotiating the North American in U.S. standing are long term. They
Free Trade Agreement, which he had may not be visible yet, but they will
repeatedly threatened to abandon alto- come into the open in a moment of
gether. Even though Trump promised acute stress.
to replace multilateral trade agreements Meanwhile, the Trump administra-
with bilateral ones, he has failed to follow tion has not solved any of the problems
through. Indeed, he denounced the it inherited, nor does it appear to have
free-trade agreement with South Korea any solutions in view. After denouncing
even as the United States prepared to excessive involvement abroad, it increased,
potentially wage war alongside that not decreased, the deployment of forces
country. Taken together, these actions to active war zones. In Afghanistan, for
made the United States appear less example, Trump raised the number of U.S.
committed to an open international troops with no clear objective beyond
March/April 2018 7
Eliot A. Cohen
persistence. Other moves were dramatic another, this crisis will come to a head
but essentially meaningless. The admin- by the beginning of 2019. It may end
istration’s unilateral recognition of with a body blow to U.S. prestige and
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital was bemoaned reputation, as Washington accepts what
by foreign policy experts, but there is it has declared to be an unacceptable
no evidence that Abu Dhabi, Cairo, or danger. Or it could devolve into a war
Riyadh cared much about it. At most, that kills hundreds of thousands, even
it was a minor pinprick to an Israeli- millions, of people.
Palestinian peace process that had flat- Conflict with Russia has also become
lined years before. more likely. The curious tension between
the president’s sympathetic rhetoric and
TROUBLE AHEAD his administration’s more hostile actions
If Trump’s first year was unnerving but has increased the risk that a contemptu-
largely uneventful, there is reason to ous and irritated Russia will poke back in
think his second will be considerably eastern Europe. The Kremlin’s anxieties
more difficult. Not only are foreign policy about legitimacy in the midst of economic
challenges beginning to pile up; a year stagnation exacerbate the situation. At
of the Trump administration has left the same time, the United States could
the United States in a worse position find itself in fights with Iran and in a
to handle them. more adverse relationship with China.
The conflict with North Korea is The combination of these and other
moving toward some kind of climax. It tensions, and not just each individually,
is entirely plausible that Kim Jong Un, constitutes a second source of worry.
the country’s supreme leader, will order If any conflict goes hot, Washington’s
the test of a nuclear-armed ballistic antagonists in other realms will exploit
missile in 2018. In response, the United the opening. U.S. President Franklin
States might shoot down a test missile, Roosevelt could conceive and execute
even if it is unarmed. Such a move, or strategy against Japan and Germany
some minor incident in territorial waters simultaneously, but Trump is no Roo-
or along the demilitarized zone, could sevelt, and the polarized United States of
degenerate into a devastating war. One 2018 is not the unified United States of
hundred years after the end of World 1942. “One war at a time,” as President
War I, it is wise to remember that small Abraham Lincoln supposedly cautioned
violent events can trigger much, much William Seward, his pugnacious secretary
larger ones. The United States, having of state, who was keen for a fight with
declared that it will not accept a nuclear- the United Kingdom. A United States
armed North Korea, might very well use preoccupied with combat on, say, the
force to make its word good. The public Korean Peninsula would probably be less
statements of Trump and McMaster do aggressive in containing Russia in Europe.
not indicate any interest in a strategy of And if foreign leaders know one thing
containment and pressure over the long about the Trump administration, it is that
term. Even the more cautious Mattis it seems uniquely incapable of focusing.
has spoken of “storm clouds” gathering The final source of instability for U.S.
over the Korean Peninsula. One way or foreign policy in 2018 will be domestic.
Elections in November may cost the have much of a backup bench. And
Republicans control of one or both perhaps worst of all, he thinks he knows
houses of Congress. There are also likely what he is doing. He does not seem to
to be major developments in the inves- realize that he has not faced any tests
tigations led by former FBI Director comparable to the 9/11 attacks or the
Robert Mueller, now the special counsel 2008 recession, and there is no reason
looking into Russia’s interference in the to believe that he has developed the
2016 election and any possible links knowledge or judgment to handle such
between the Trump campaign and a challenge when it does arise. What
Russia. These could be indictments of he attributes to genius, most observers
senior figures in the administration or correctly attribute to luck. And there
Mueller’s firing by Trump. Watergate is a good chance that 2018 will be the
took over two years from the break-in year his luck runs out.∂
to President Richard Nixon’s resignation.
There may be no crime here and no
resignation or impeachment, but the
rhythm feels similar. Moreover, these
elections and investigations are taking
place against the backdrop of a polar-
ized and angry electorate. The resulting
turmoil will affect the conduct of foreign
policy by giving antagonistic powers
openings to take advantage of a country
consumed with domestic scandals or by
tempting a desperate president to look
elsewhere for glory or distraction. Nixon
launched a celebratory tour of the Middle
East in June 1974, shortly before the
House Judiciary Committee recom-
mended his impeachment to the full
House. Trump, who is, if nothing else,
a masterly reality television showman,
might choose to divert attention in a
more dramatic fashion.
Trump appears to believe that he
achieved great things during his first
year in office and that his critics have
been proved both vicious and wrong. In
fact, he has demoralized the institutions
of the U.S. government on which he
depends. He has disappointed anyone,
at home or abroad, who expected him
to mature. He is exhausting his first
group of appointees, and he does not
March/April 2018 9
order or a period with no real order at all.
The World But the existing order is more resilient
LETTING GO
than this assessment suggests. There is no

After Trump doubt that Trump represents a meaning-
ful threat to the health of both American
How the System Can Endure democracy and the international system.
And there is a nonnegligible risk that he
could drag the country into a constitu-
Jake Sullivan tional crisis, or the world into a crippling
trade war or even an all-out nuclear war.
Yet despite these risks, rumors of the
T
he warnings started long before international order’s demise have been
Donald Trump was even a presi- greatly exaggerated. The system is built
dential candidate. For at least a to last through significant shifts in global
decade, a growing chorus of foreign policy politics and economics and strong enough
experts had been pointing to signs that to survive a term of President Trump.
the international order was coming apart. This more optimistic view is offered
Authoritarian powers were flouting not as comfort but as a call to action.
long-accepted rules. Failed states were The present moment demands resolve
radiating threats. Economies were being and affirmative thinking from the foreign
disrupted by technology and globalization; policy community about how to sustain
political systems, by populism. Mean- and reinforce the international order, not
while, the gap in power and influence just lamentations about Trump’s destruc-
between the United States—the leader tiveness or resignation about the order’s
and guarantor of the existing order—and fate. No one knows for certain how things
the rest of the world was closing. will turn out. But fatalism will become a
Then came Trump’s election. To those self-fulfilling prophecy.
already issuing such warnings, it sounded The order can endure only if its
the death knell of the world as it was. Even defenders step up. It may be durable,
many of those who had previously resisted but it also needs an update to account
pessimism suddenly came to agree. As they for new realities and new challenges.
saw it, the U.S.-led order—the post– Between fatalism and complacency lies
World War II system of norms, institu- urgency. Champions of the order must
tions, and partnerships that has helped start working now to protect its key
manage disputes, mobilize action, and elements, to build a new consensus at
govern international conduct—was ending home and abroad about needed adjust-
for good. And what came next, they ments, and to set the stage for a better
argued, would be either an entirely new approach, before it’s too late.
JAKE SULLIVAN is a Senior Fellow at the A RESILIENT ORDER

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In a world where the major trends seem to
He served in the Obama administration as spell chaos, it is fair to place the burden of
Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Depart-
ment of State and as National Security Adviser proof on those who claim that the current
to the Vice President. order can continue. Yet well before
The World After Trump
Missing link: Trump at an ASEAN summit in the Philippines, December 2017
Trump, it had already demonstrated its Some context is important. The U.S.-
capacity to adapt to changes in the nature led order was built at a unique moment,
and distribution of power. Three basic at the end of World War II. Europe’s
factors account for such resilience—and and Asia’s erstwhile great powers were
demonstrate why the emphasis now reduced to rubble, and a combination of
should be on protecting and improving dominance abroad and shared economic
the order rather than planning for the prosperity at home allowed the United
aftermath of its demise. States to serve as the architect and
First, most of the world remains invest- guarantor of a new order fashioned in its
ed in major aspects of the order and still own image. It had not just the material
counts on the United States to operate at power to shape rules and drive outcomes
its center. The passing of U.S. dominance but also a model many other countries
need not mean the end of U.S. leadership. wanted to emulate. It used the opportu-
That is, the United States may not be nity to build an order that benefited itself
able to direct outcomes from a position of as well as others, with clear advantages
preeminent economic, political, and for populations at home and abroad. As
J O NAT HA N E R N ST / R E U T E R S
military influence, but it can still mobi- the international relations scholar G. John
lize cooperation on shared challenges and Ikenberry has put it in this magazine,
shape consensus on key rules. In the years the resulting system was “hard to over-
ahead, although Washington will not be turn and easy to join.” The end of the
the only destination for countries seeking Cold War and the fall of the Soviet
capital, resources, or influence, it will Union served to reinforce and extend
remain the most important agenda-setter. American preeminence.
March/April 2018 11
Jake Sullivan
This precise state of affairs was never and their continued participation sends a
going to last forever. Other powers would similar message. For example, leaders
eventually rise, and the basic bargain of the major emerging powers eagerly
would one day need to be revisited. That accepted U.S. President Barack Obama’s
day has arrived, and the question now is, invitation to join the first Nuclear Secu-
do other countries want a fundamentally rity Summit, in 2010; less eagerly but still
different bargain or simply some adjust- willingly, they joined the global sanctions
ments? A comprehensive 2016 RAND regime against Iran’s nuclear program.
analysis found that few powers display an Richard Fontaine and Daniel Kliman of
appetite for dismantling the international the Center for a New American Security
order or transforming it into something quote a Brazilian official who captured a
unrecognizable. And while Trump’s broader sentiment among emerging
election has forced countries to contem- powers: “Brazil wants to expand its room
plate a world without a central role for in the house, not tear the house down.”
the United States, many still view the And indeed, Brazil has taken on a leading
president as an aberration and not a new role in defending important aspects of
American normal, especially given that the the order, such as the multistakeholder
United States has bounced back before. system for Internet governance. Emerging
Even China has concluded that it powers’ quest for a greater voice in regional
largely benefits from the order’s contin- and global institutions is not a repudiation
ued operation. Around the time of of the order but evidence that they see
Trump’s inauguration, breathless reports increasing their participation as preferable
interpreted Chinese President Xi Jinping’s to going a different way.
comments on an open international
economy and climate change as indica- FROM DOMINANCE TO LEADERSHIP
tors that China planned to somehow take The second factor accounting for the
over for the United States. But what Xi order’s resilience is that the United States
was really signaling was that China does has managed the transition from domi-
not want near-term radical change in the nance to leadership more effectively than
global system, even as it seeks to gain most appreciate. Over the past decade,
more influence by taking advantage of U.S. diplomacy has facilitated a shift
the vacuum left by Trump. And to the from formal, legal, top-down institutions
extent that Beijing has set out to con- to more practical, functional, and regional
struct its own parallel institutions, approaches to managing transnational
particularly when it comes to trade and issues—“coalitions of the willing” (in the
investment, thus far these institutions real, non-Iraq-war sense of the term). This
largely supplement the existing order shift has not only expanded the prospects
rather than threatening to supplant it. for shared problem solving; it has also
Other emerging powers chafe at certain made the rules-based order less rigid,
features of the order, and some seek a more and therefore more lasting.
prominent place in institutions such as Consider climate change. Formal legal
the UN Security Council. Yet rhetorical structures, such as the Kyoto Protocol,
flourishes aside, they, like China, talk in which failed largely because the United
terms of reform rather than replacement— States refused to participate and emerging
powers were exempt, have given way to less party to some of these platforms, but it
formal structures, such as the Paris climate has helped promote them with technical
accord. Unlike Kyoto, Paris achieved broad- and diplomatic support. Viewed from this
based participation because its substantive perspective, Beijing’s establishment of the
commitments are voluntary and states Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is
have flexibility in how to meet them. It largely in line with the “variable geometry”
can survive a temporary U.S. withdrawal that the United States has encouraged.
because other countries had already (Washington erred in resisting the AIIB
factored their targets into their national rather than working to shape its standards.)
energy plans and because the United States And on global health, the World Health
can meet or exceed its own targets even Organization has recognized the need for
without the help of Washington (points more flexible arrangements to deal with
Brian Deese, a former climate adviser to major health crises, including public-
Obama, has made in this magazine). private partnerships, such as the Global
On nuclear proliferation, formal Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review Malaria and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
conferences have not advanced the ball on Meanwhile, various emerging regional
new legal norms. But during the negotia- and subregional arrangements are playing
tions that led to the Iran nuclear deal, the larger roles in local problem solving.
P5+1 (the five permanent members of One could add other examples to the
the UN Security Council plus Germany) list, but the point is this: the overall trend
joined together to develop a rules-based toward practicality and flexibility, encour-
plan to address a major global prolifera- aged by the United States, has generated
tion problem. The resulting agreement, more resilience in the rules-based order.
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, For one thing, more practical and flexible
involved practical commitments from the approaches are better suited to handle
negotiating parties but also incorporated the diffuse and complex nature of trans-
key international institutions—the Inter- national challenges today. For another, the
national Atomic Energy Agency and the rest of the world can continue to partici-
Security Council—for oversight and pate even when the United States pulls
enforcement. And although Trump may back. The new structures are designed to
eventually withdraw from the agreement, extract greater participation and contribu-
the broad participation and buy-in that it tions from a greater number of actors in a
achieved, and the fact that it is working greater number of places—even when the
as intended, have thus far constrained most important of those actors temporarily
him from doing so, despite his claim that relinquishes its leadership role.
it is “the worst deal ever.” There is a concern about whether
On trade and economics, although this trend will water down rules. But the
universal rule-making in the World Trade record so far suggests this is not the case.
Organization has stalled, “plurilateral” For example, the 11 nations currently
and regional initiatives of various shapes pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership
and sizes have proliferated, from the East without U.S. participation might produce
African Community to Latin America’s a trade agreement with weaker labor or
Pacific Alliance. The United States is not environmental provisions than those in
March/April 2018 13
Jake Sullivan
the U.S.-brokered version, which the overwhelmingly approved new sanctions,

Trump administration withdrew from tying Trump’s hands. (The administration
last year. But those provisions would still subsequently surprised most observers
represent an improvement over existing by announcing that it would provide
rules, and a new baseline against which lethal assistance to Ukraine, a move
future rules would be measured. Nor is pushed by top members of Trump’s
this broader trend mutually exclusive national security team.)
with action in the UN system. The rise of Perhaps most important, Trump has
informal mechanisms of cooperation has found that whatever his contempt for
not detracted from basic global standard- the rules-based order, he needs it. Here
setting on issues such as civil aviation. he follows a line of American politicians
To the contrary, the informal and the who have chafed at perceived limits on
formal can be mutually reinforcing. U.S. freedom of action but ultimately
Progress conceived in smaller formats recognized that the order protects and
outside the UN system can help catalyze advances U.S. interests. To counter
universal action. North Korea, he needs both strong
Asian alliances and a working relation-
BINDING TRUMP ship with Beijing (contrary to every-
Finally, although Trump has created a thing he said during the campaign). To
temporary vacuum of global leadership defeat the Islamic State (also known as
and keeps raising questions about his ISIS), he needs the allies and partners
basic fitness for office, he has thus far that made up the coalition, built during
been unable to do the level of systemic the Obama administration, that helped
damage in foreign affairs that he threat- eject ISIS from Mosul and Raqqa. Trump
ened on the campaign trail. He has— has therefore been forced to embrace
again, thus far—been constrained by elements of the order he would
Congress, by his own national security rather dismiss.
team, and by reality. Trump’s own lack of focus has
Consider the U.S. alliance system, a helped. The international relations
central feature of the U.S.-led order. expert Thomas Wright is correct to
Trump continues to deride U.S. allies warn that “since World War II, the
as free riders. But Washington’s policy foreign policy of every administration
toward its alliances in both Europe and has been defined by the character and
Asia has been marked more by continuity opinions of its president,” not anybody
than change. Trump’s advisers have helped else. And Trump’s worst impulses may
ensure that, as have outside advocacy and yet win out, with disastrous conse-
congressional oversight. And European quences. But unlike his predecessors,
leaders have sought to sustain the alliance, Trump has displayed relatively little
despite their misgivings about Trump, by interest in translating his impulses into
working around him. Similarly, whatever consistent policy actions. That can
the administration’s desire to ease pressure potentially allow the system around
on Russia for violations of Ukraine’s him, including voices outside govern-
territorial integrity—a foundational norm ment, to play a more powerful con-
of the rules-based order—Congress straining role than usual.
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ORDER BEGINS AT HOME National Endowment for Democracy

The system’s resilience should not be the calls the “sharp power” of authoritarian
end to a comforting story; it should be states, a mix of strategies to undermine
the starting point of a badly needed effort political pluralism and open elections.
to reinforce and update the international Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
order and address the real threats to its interference in the U.S. presidential
long-term viability. That must begin with election likely helped secure Trump’s
the most serious challenge today: growing victory, and in the years ahead, Russian
disillusionment with some of its core “active measures” and Chinese influence
assumptions. This disillusionment has operations will continue seeking to desta-
been stoked by forces of nativism and bilize democratic systems.
illiberalism, but it is rooted in the lived And when it comes to the interaction
experience of many who have seen few between economic and political reform, the
promised benefits flow to them. Chinese Communist Party has been trying
The United States built the order to prove—including to receptive audiences
on three foundational propositions: in developing-world governments—that
that economic openness and integra- economic openness is perfectly compatible
tion lead to greater and more widely with a closed political system. Unlike the
shared prosperity; that political open- Soviet Union, which relatively few aspired
ness, democratization, and the protec- to emulate, China offers what many
tion of human rights lead to stronger, see as an attractive alternative. Xi has
more just societies and more effective described his country’s model as a “new
international cooperation; and that option for other countries.” Audiences
economic and political openness are in Africa and Asia, and even some in
mutually reinforcing. All three propo- Europe, are paying attention.
sitions are now contested. These trends preceded Trump, and
As the political scientists Jeff Colgan they are now being compounded by new
and Robert Keohane have argued in these threats to democracy, including a whole-
pages, the link between globalization and sale assault on the very idea of truth. But
shared prosperity is no longer clear. The they are not irreversible. The year 1989
current international economic system is did not bring the end of history in one
“rigged,” in their telling, and a new set direction; neither did 2016 in the other.
of rules is needed to better advance the The liberal part of the rules-based
interests of middle classes around the international order has always been
world. Meanwhile, a growing reaction imperfect and will remain so. As Ikenberry
in the West treats global integration as has pointed out, the current order is
a threat to national identity and eco- actually a blend of the traditional West-
nomic vitality. phalian system (founded on state sover-
On the merits of the open political eignty) and a more liberal variant that
model, democracy is now on the emerged first with British hegemony in
defensive—from within, thanks to self- the nineteenth century and then deepened
inflicted wounds and the gathering under U.S. leadership in the twentieth.
strength of populist political parties, This combination has always involved an
and from without, thanks to what the uneasy balance between sovereignty and
March/April 2018 15
Jake Sullivan
noninterference, on the one hand, and TROUBLE FROM WITHOUT

universal values and multilateral coopera- Along with weaknesses within the
tion, on the other. A shift in emphasis West, the order is facing challenges
toward the former does not spell the from without, starting with renewed
end of the entire order. great-power competition. Indeed, the
Moreover, the developments of the Trump administration’s National Security
past two years—Brexit, Trump’s elec- Strategy explicitly makes competition—
tion, the rise of right-wing parties in in opposition to order—an organizing
Europe, foreign interference in demo- principle. It taunts previous administra-
cratic politics—have served as a wake-up tions for seeing great powers as “benign
call. There are new and urgent conversa- actors and trustworthy partners” and
tions in Western democracies not just assuming that “competition would give
about how to resist pressure from abroad way to peaceful cooperation.” But the
but also about how to address social and Trump team is wrong to frame this as an
economic dislocations at home and the either-or proposition. As a prescriptive
distributional consequences of global- matter, abandoning the postwar order is a
ization and automation. Whether this strange concession for a status quo power
brings about a genuine recovery of to make, since the order’s existence is a
strength for liberal democracy over major competitive advantage. Defending
time remains to be seen. But there are it, and mobilizing its assets, is essential
promising signs. Trump’s excesses have for contending with Russia and China.
generated energetic efforts to push back And as a predictive matter, it is by no
against them. In Europe, the EU has means inevitable that great-power
proved more cohesive, and its economic competition will upend the order in
foundation stronger, than most antici- the foreseeable future. To understand
pated, and although populist movements why this is the case, it’s necessary to
continue to make some progress, they distinguish between the two primary
have also met considerable resistance (as great-power competitors.
the French far-right candidate Marine Russia under Putin does want to
Le Pen discovered). Democratic nations undermine U.S. leadership, as well as
have not lost the wherewithal to manage the cohesion of Washington’s democratic
and alleviate the strains of authoritar- allies. But so far, the Kremlin has proved
ian populism. If the West can succeed to be more of a spoiler than an existential
in restoring some of the appeal of the threat. Yes, Putin brazenly violated
democratic model, the weaknesses and Ukraine’s territorial integrity, but he
contradictions in the authoritarian was met with a common transatlantic
model—which, after all, rests on the response that kept him from pulling Kiev
systematic suppression of basic human back into Moscow’s orbit, as well as with
freedoms and is usually accompanied new NATO forward deployments to resist
by debilitating corruption—will come further Russian aggression. Yes, Putin’s
back into sharper focus. In this regard, intervention in Syria assisted Syrian
the major disconnect between Beijing’s President Bashar al-Assad’s butchery
outward projection of confidence and on an industrial scale and gave Russia a
its deep insecurity at home is telling. brokering role there, but that has not
translated into a broader role as security damental global challenge—especially if

manager for the region, and it likely Beijing succeeds in building a sphere of
never will. And on the global level, Russia influence in East Asia. That China aims
simply does not have the power to deci- to change the balance of power in Asia,
sively shift the course of international reducing the United States’ role and
trade and investment regimes or scuttle increasing its own, is evident in its
multilateral efforts to deal with such military buildup, its activities in the
challenges as climate change. That will South China Sea, its coercive economic
be increasingly true going forward, given diplomacy, and the expansion of its
Russia’s fragile economy and unfavorable influence through such efforts as the
demographic trends. The United States Belt and Road Initiative. And the
has to avoid the trap of underestimating Trump administration is helping in this
Putin, but also the temptation to over- cause, by neglecting Asian security and
estimate him. economic institutions.
China is a different story. It has far But the United States and its partners
greater capacity to upend the global have plenty of cards to play. The demand
order—but will be cautious in attempt- for an enduring U.S. presence in Asia,
ing to do so in the near term. For all of from key treaty allies and others resis-
Xi’s rhetoric, China cannot be expected tant to Chinese hegemony, will likely
to replace the United States at the block any aspirations Beijing has for an
center of a newly constituted order. As Asian Monroe Doctrine, or anything
the China scholar David Shambaugh close to it. Even in areas where China
has noted, Beijing remains a “partial has made significant strides, such as the
power.” Its basic global strategy has South China Sea, the United States and
been to act, to borrow a phrase from the its partners still have the capacity to
former U.S. official Robert Zoellick, as protect regional prerogatives and global
amended by Hillary Clinton as secretary norms such as freedom of navigation and
of state, as a “selective stakeholder,” unimpeded lawful commerce. Ultimately,
picking and choosing which responsi- a return to an effective Asia strategy,
bilities to take on based on a narrow anchored in Washington’s historical
cost-benefit analysis. This strategy alliances and contemporary partner-
proceeds from the assumption that the ships, could sustain the U.S. role in
United States will remain the burden Asia and manage regional competition
bearer of last resort. while promoting global cooperation
China will clearly seek greater with Beijing.
influence in the operation and evolution Finally, the paroxysms of violence
of the order. Other emerging powers across the arc of instability from North
will, too. That will require adjustments Africa to South Asia have led some
by both the United States and emerg- observers to conclude that disorder in
ing powers, but not something funda- the Middle East could threaten the entire
mentally new. global order. But Middle Eastern instabil-
That still leaves the question of whether ity has been a feature, not a bug, of the
China’s competitive posture in its region system since the fall of the Ottoman
will over time translate into a more fun- Empire after World War I. In just one
March/April 2018 17
Jake Sullivan
30-year stretch—the period from the A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

early 1970s to the first decade of this None of this is an argument for compla-
century—the region saw the Yom Kippur cency. In Washington, checking Trump’s
War, the Lebanese civil war, the Iranian destructive instincts requires constant
Revolution, the dawn of the modern age work, which will only get harder as he
of terrorism with the siege of Mecca, looks more often to the global stage to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the score points. And the internal constraints
Iran-Iraq War, the first Lebanon war, often come down to a few individuals
two Palestinian intifadas, the Persian who could easily be replaced by less
Gulf War, the war in Iraq, and a Yemeni responsible voices. Internationally, the
civil war. difficulties are accelerating, not abating,
Today, it is true that the combination among them the technology-driven
of weak state structures, violent ideolo- challenge to state supremacy itself. The
gies, and Iranian-Saudi competition has resilience of the rules-based order offers
transformed a number of local conflicts just a window of opportunity to get things
into a regional crisis. In addition to the right. It will eventually close.
horrific human toll, this has had the Many of the most crucial steps require
spillover effects of sending refugees that the United States get its own house
flowing to Europe and inspiring jihadist in order, which would create more fertile
attacks across the West. At the same time, ground for consensus building on national
the United States is no longer as willing security. But there is also a clear task for
or able to play the external role it played foreign policy leaders, in both parties: to
before, for reasons relating to both the strengthen and adapt the postwar interna-
supply side (reduced U.S. willingness tional order so that it responds to current
to invest resources, especially troops) needs and reflects new realities but still
and the demand side (reduced regional secures a central U.S. role. That will
enthusiasm for U.S. involvement). Yet require new ideas and productive advo-
the roiling waters of the Middle East cacy to ensure that globalization delivers
have not swamped the whole system. more widely shared prosperity. It will
U.S.-led efforts against ISIS have rolled require effectively managing strategic
back the biggest threat to the interna- competition with Russia and China by
tional community, the existence of a protecting U.S. prerogatives without
terrorist state in the heart of the Mid- descending into all-consuming rivalry
dle East. Europe is learning to manage or outright conflict. And it will require
the refugee crisis. And despite Tehran’s convincing governments and citizens
advances on several fronts, the basic around the world that in spite of the
power politics of the region tilt toward current president, a strong majority of
the eventual emergence of an uneasy, Americans remain committed to working
sometimes messy balance between Iran closely with other nations to secure
and its proxies on one side and a Saudi- shared interests through common action
led Sunni bloc on the other. Effective and rules.
statecraft can help manage, contain, A temporary American absence is
and reduce regional instability survivable; sustained American absence
over time. is not. In the long run, the international
order will still need leadership, even in two terms of Trump might not be 1x
the best-developed areas of international versus 2x, but more like 1x versus 10x.
cooperation. Who is going to make sure For one thing, Obama needed two terms
that countries increase their emissions to get to the ideas he campaigned on in
reductions under the Paris accord when 2008, and if the same proves true for
the next round of pledges comes in 2023? Trump, his second term could be cataclys-
Who is going to pull the world powers mic. For another, his reelection would
together to execute a follow-on agree- confirm that Trumpism is in fact the
ment to the Iran nuclear deal? American new normal in the United States, not an
leadership is even more critical in emerg- aberration, causing other countries to take
ing areas where the rules have not yet been more decisive steps to rearrange their
developed or where previous solutions no relationships and commitments. It would
longer work. How will updated trade and be an especially severe blow to the long-
investment arrangements account for the term health of U.S. alliances; many of
endurance of state-managed economies, the United States’ friends would more
the changing nature of work, and rising seriously contemplate following through
income inequality? What should be done on German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
to counter trends in state fragility that comment about going their own way.
could lead to even more profound migra- On the other hand, the election of a new
tion flows in the future? What new president in 2020 would say something
norms will govern cyberspace and quite different—and allow the United
artificial intelligence? States to resume its leadership role.
The world cannot count on undiffer- The U.S. foreign policy community
entiated collective action. Nor can it should prepare for this world after
count on China, which has neither the Trump. It is tempting to conclude that
instincts nor the inclination to take on all hope is lost. That conclusion, however,
such a role in the foreseeable future. The is not only unproductive; it is also wrong.
United States is the only country with the In every dimension—from technology
sufficient reach and resolve, and some- to security, development to diplomacy,
thing else as well: a historical willingness economic dynamism to human capital—
to trade short-term benefits for long-term the United States’ advantages are still
influence. It has been uniquely prepared significant. The opportunity remains
to accept a leadership role of an interna- to reconstitute the old consensus on
tional order in which it feels as though new terms.∂
the maxim from Thucydides’ famous
Melian Dialogue is often inverted: the
strong suffer what they must and the
weak do what they can.
All of this underscores the United
States’ window of opportunity. Taking
advantage of this window does require
getting past the current presidency, which
is why Trump must not be handed another
term. The difference between one and
March/April 2018 19
complaints about allies and skepticism
The Rise of of unfettered trade to claim that the
LETTING GO
administration has effectively withdrawn

Illiberal Hegemony from the world and even adopted a grand
strategy of restraint. Some have gone so
far as to apply to Trump the most feared
Trump’s Surprising epithet in the U.S. foreign policy estab-
Grand Strategy lishment: “isolationist.”
In fact, Trump is anything but.
Barry R. Posen Although he has indeed laced his speeches
with skepticism about Washington’s
O
n the campaign trail, Donald global role, worries that Trump is an
Trump vowed to put an end isolationist are out of place against the
to nation building abroad and backdrop of the administration’s accel-
mocked U.S. allies as free riders. “‘America erating drumbeat for war with North
first’ will be the major and overriding Korea, its growing confrontation with
theme of my administration,” he declared Iran, and its uptick in combat operations
in a foreign policy speech in April 2016, worldwide. Indeed, across the portfolio
echoing the language of pre–World of hard power, the Trump administra-
War II isolationists. “The countries we tion’s policies seem, if anything, more
are defending must pay for the cost of ambitious than those of Barack Obama.
this defense, and if not, the U.S. must Yet Trump has deviated from tradi-
be prepared to let these countries defend tional U.S. grand strategy in one impor-
themselves,” he said—an apparent refer- tant respect. Since at least the end of the
ence to his earlier suggestion that U.S. Cold War, Democratic and Republican
allies without nuclear weapons be allowed administrations alike have pursued a
to acquire them. grand strategy that scholars have called
Such statements, coupled with his “liberal hegemony.” It was hegemonic
mistrust of free trade and the treaties and in that the United States aimed to be
institutions that facilitate it, prompted the most powerful state in the world by
worries from across the political spectrum a wide margin, and it was liberal in that
that under Trump, the United States the United States sought to transform
would turn inward and abandon the the international system into a rules-
leadership role it has played since the based order regulated by multilateral
end of World War II. “The US is, for institutions and transform other states
now, out of the world order business,” into market-oriented democracies freely
the columnist Robert Kagan wrote days trading with one another. Breaking with
after the election. Since Trump took office, his predecessors, Trump has taken much
his critics have appeared to feel vindicated. of the “liberal” out of “liberal hegemony.”
They have seized on his continued He still seeks to retain the United States’
superior economic and military capability
BARRY R. POSEN is Ford International and role as security arbiter for most
Professor of Political Science and Director of the
Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts regions of the world, but he has chosen
Institute of Technology. to forgo the export of democracy and
No retreat: U.S. marines in Afghanistan, July 2017
abstain from many multilateral trade pursued ongoing wars against the Taliban
agreements. In other words, Trump has in Afghanistan and the Islamic State
ushered in an entirely new U.S. grand (or ISIS) in Iraq and Syria with more
strategy: illiberal hegemony. resources and more violence than its
predecessors. It has also announced plans
NO DOVE to invest even more money in the Depart-
Grand strategy is a slippery concept, ment of Defense, the budget of which
and for those attempting to divine the still outstrips that of all of the United
Trump administration’s, its National States’ competitors’ militaries combined.
Security Strategy—a word salad of a When it comes to alliances, it may at
document—yields little insight. The first glance seem as if Trump has devi-
better way to understand Trump’s ap- ated from tradition. As a candidate, he
proach to the world is to look at a year’s regularly complained about the failure
worth of actual policies. For all the talk of U.S. allies, especially those in NATO,
of avoiding foreign adventurism and to share the burden of collective defense.
entanglements, in practice, his adminis- However uninformed these objections
tration has remained committed to were, they were entirely fair; for two
OMAR SO BHANI / REUTE RS
geopolitical competition with the world’s decades, the defense contributions of

greatest military powers and to the the European states in NATO have fallen
formal and informal alliances it inherited. short of the alliance’s own guidelines.
It has threatened new wars to hinder Alliance partisans on both sides of the
the emergence of new nuclear weapons Atlantic find complaints about burden
states, as did its predecessors; it has sharing irksome not only because they
March/April 2018 21
Barry R. Posen
ring true but also because they secretly planned to spend $10 billion on the ERI,
find them unimportant. The actual and in its budget for the 2018 fiscal year,
production of combat power pales in the Trump administration increased the
comparison to the political goal of gluing funding by nearly $1.5 billion. Meanwhile,
the United States to Europe, no matter all the planned new exercises and deploy-
what. Thus the handwringing when ments in eastern Europe are proceeding
Trump attended the May 2017 NATO apace. The U.S. military commitment to
summit and pointedly failed to mention NATO remains strong, and the allies are
Article 5, the treaty’s mutual-defense adding just enough new money to their
provision, an omission that suggested own defense plans to placate the president.
that the United States might not remain In other words, it’s business as usual.
the final arbiter of all strategic disputes In Asia, the United States appears,
across Europe. if anything, to be more militarily active
But Trump backtracked within weeks, than it was during the Obama adminis-
and all the while, the United States has tration, which announced a “pivot” to
continued to go about its ally-reassurance the region. Trump’s main preoccupation
business as if nothing has changed. Few is with the maturation of North Korea’s
Americans have heard of the European nuclear weapons program—a focus at
Reassurance Initiative. One would be odds with his campaign musings about
forgiven for thinking that the nearly independent nuclear forces for Japan
100,000 U.S. troops that remained and South Korea. In an effort to freeze
deployed in Europe after the end of the and ultimately reverse North Korea’s
Cold War would have provided enough program, he has threatened the use of
reassurance, but after the Russian invasion military force, saying last September, for
of Ukraine in 2014, the allies clamored for example, “The United States has great
still more reassurance, and so was born strength and patience, but if it is forced
this new initiative. The ERI is funded not to defend itself or its allies, we will have
in the regular U.S. defense budget but no choice but to totally destroy North
in the Overseas Contingency Operations Korea.” Although it is difficult to tell if
appropriation—the “spend whatever it Pyongyang takes such threats seriously,
takes without much oversight” fund Washington’s foreign policy elite certainly
originally approved by Congress for the does, and many fear that war by accident
global war on terrorism. The ERI has or design is now much more likely. The
paid for increased U.S. military exercises Pentagon has backed up these threats with
in eastern Europe, improved military more frequent military maneuvers, includ-
infrastructure across that region, outright ing sending long-range strategic bombers
gifts of equipment to Ukraine, and new on sorties over the Korean Peninsula. At
stockpiles of U.S. equipment in Europe the same time, the administration has
adequate to equip a U.S. armored division tried to put economic pressure on North
in case of emergency. At the end of 2017, Korea, attempting to convince China to
Washington announced that for the first cut off the flow of critical materials to the
time, it would sell particularly lethal country, especially oil.
antitank guided missiles to Ukraine. So Across the Pacific, the U.S. Navy
far, the U.S. government has spent or continues to sustain a frenetic pace of
operations—about 160 bilateral and
multilateral exercises per year. In July,
Tug
the United States conducted the annual
Malabar exercise with India and Japan,
bringing together aircraft carriers from
all three countries for the first time.
In November, it assembled an unusual
flotilla of three aircraft carriers off the NEGOTIATING SECURITY
Korean Peninsula during Trump’s visit
to Asia. Beginning in May 2017, the navy
increased the frequency of its freedom-
of-navigation operations, or FONOPs, in of
which its ships patrol parts of the South
China Sea claimed by China. So busy
IN EURASIA
is the U.S. Navy, in fact, that in 2017
War
alone, its Seventh Fleet, based in Japan,
experienced an unprecedented four
ship collisions, one grounding, and
one airplane crash.
During his trip to Asia in November,
Trump dutifully renewed U.S. security
Fen Osler Hampson and Mikhail Troitskiy
commitments, and Prime Minister Shinzo Editors
Abe of Japan seems to have decided to
allow no daylight between him and the
president, including on North Korea.
Given Trump’s litany of complaints about As tensions rise in the
the unfairness of U.S. trade relationships Great Game writ large in Eurasia, and
in Asia and his effective ceding of the as narratives polarize irreconcilably,
some hysterically so, Tug of War offers
economic ground rules to China, one
a timely, coherent set of dispassionate,
might be surprised that U.S. allies in well-informed essays which together
the region are hugging this president so shed valuable light on the complex
closely. But free security provided by a circumstances, record and prospects of
military superpower is a difficult thing negotiated solutions — and the many
to replace, and managing relations with deep pitfalls in their paths.
one that sees the world in more zero-sum — Christopher Westdal,
economic terms than usual is a small Former Canadian Ambassador
price to pay. to Russia and Ukraine
The Trump administration has CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen’s
increased its military activities across University Press (mqup.ca) and can be found in better
bookstores and through online book retailers.
the Middle East, too, in ways that should
please the critics who lambasted Obama
for his arm’s-length approach to the region.
Trump wasted no time demonstrating
his intent to reverse the mistakes of the
23
Barry R. Posen
past. In April 2017, in response to scenes, the Trump administration seems

evidence that the Syrian government to have been at least as supportive of
had used chemical weapons, the U.S. the Saudi intervention in Yemen as was
Navy launched 59 cruise missiles at its predecessor. The Obama adminis-
the air base where the attack originated. tration lent its support to the Saudis
Ironically, Trump was punishing Syria in order to buy their cooperation on
for violating a redline that Obama had the Iran deal, and given that Trump
drawn and a chemical weapons disarma- despises that agreement, his backing
ment agreement that Obama had struck of the Saudis can be understood only as
with Syria, both of which Trump pillo- an anti-Iran effort. Barring a war with
ried his predecessor for having done. North Korea—and the vortex of policy
Nevertheless, the point was made: there’s attention and military resources that
a new sheriff in town. conflict would create—it seems likely
The Trump administration has also that more confrontation with Iran is in
accelerated the war against ISIS. This the United States’ future.
Pentagon does not like to share informa- The Trump administration’s defense
tion about its activities, but according to budget also suggests a continued commit-
its own figures, it appears that the United ment to the idea of the United States as
States sent more troops into Iraq and the world’s policeman. Trump ran for
Syria, and dropped more bombs on those office on the proposition that, as he put it
countries, in 2017 than in 2016. In Afghan- on Twitter, “I will make our Military so
istan, Trump, despite having mused big, powerful & strong that no one will
about the mistakes of nation building mess with us.” Once in office, he rolled
during the campaign, has indulged the out a defense budget that comes in at
inexplicable compulsion of U.S. military roughly 20 percent more than the 2017
leaders (“my generals,” in his words) to one; about half the increase was requested
not only remain in the country but also by the administration, and the other half
escalate the war. Thousands of additional was added by Congress. (The fate of this
U.S. troops have been sent to the country, budget is unclear: under the Budget
and U.S. air strikes there have increased Control Act, these increases require the
to a level not seen since 2012. support of the Democrats, which the
Finally, the administration has sig- Republicans will need to buy with in-
naled that it plans to confront Iran more creased spending on domestic programs.)
aggressively across the Middle East. To take but one small example of its appe-
Trump himself opposed the 2015 nuclear tite for new spending, the administration
deal with Iran, and his advisers appear has ramped up the acquisition of precision-
eager to push back against the country, as guided munitions by more than 40 percent
well. In December, for example, Nikki from 2016, a move that is consistent with
Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, the president’s oft-stated intention to wage
stood in front of debris from what she current military campaigns more inten-
claimed was an Iranian missile and sively (as well as with an expectation of
alleged that Tehran was arming rebels in imminent future wars).
Yemen, where Iran and Saudi Arabia Trump also remains committed to the
are engaged in a proxy war. Behind the trillion-dollar nuclear modernization
program begun by the Obama adminis- the cause. If realized, these goals would
tration. This program renews every leg do more than legitimate the project of a
of the nuclear triad—missiles, bombers, U.S.-led liberal world order; they would
and submarines. It is based on the Cold produce a world so consonant with U.S.
War–era assumption that in order to values and interests that the United States
credibly deter attacks against allies, U.S. would not even need to work that hard
nuclear forces must have the ability to to ensure its security.
limit the damage of a full-scale nuclear Trump has abandoned this well-worn
attack, meaning the United States needs path. He has denigrated international
to be able to shoot first and destroy an economic institutions, such as the World
adversary’s entire nuclear arsenal before Trade Organization, which make nice
its missiles launch. Although efforts at scapegoats for the disruptive economic
damage limitation are seductive, against changes that have energized his political
peer nuclear powers, they are futile, since base. He has abandoned the Paris climate
only a few of an enemy’s nuclear weapons agreement, partly because he says it
need to survive in order to do egregious disadvantages the United States econom-
damage to the United States in retalia- ically. Not confident that Washington
tion. In the best case, the modernization can sufficiently dominate international
program is merely a waste of money, institutions to ensure its interests, the
since all it does is compel U.S. competi- president has withdrawn from the
tors to modernize their own forces to Trans-Pacific Partnership, launched a
ensure their ability to retaliate; in the combative renegotiation of the North
worst case, it causes adversaries to develop American Free Trade Agreement, and
itchy trigger fingers themselves, raising let the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
the risk that a crisis will escalate to nuclear ment Partnership wither on the vine.
war. If Trump were truly committed to In lieu of such agreements, Trump has
America first, he would think a bit harder declared a preference for bilateral trade
about the costs and risks of this strategy. arrangements, which he contends are
easier to audit and enforce.
PRIMACY WITHOUT A PURPOSE Pointing out that recent U.S. efforts
Hegemony is always difficult to achieve, to build democracy abroad have been
because most states jealously guard their costly and unsuccessful, Trump has also
sovereignty and resist being told what to jettisoned democracy promotion as a
do. But since the end of the Cold War, foreign policy goal, aside from some
the U.S. foreign policy elite has reached stray tweets in support of anti-regime
the consensus that liberal hegemony is protesters in Iran. So far as one can tell,
different. This type of dominance, they he cares not one whit about the liberal
argue, is, with the right combination of transformation of other societies. In
hard and soft power, both achievable and Afghanistan, for example, his strategy
sustainable. International security and counts not on perfecting the Afghan
economic institutions, free trade, human government but on bludgeoning the
rights, and the spread of democracy are Taliban into negotiating (leaving vague
not only values in their own right, the what exactly the Taliban would negotiate).
logic goes; they also serve to lure others to More generally, Trump has often praised
March/April 2018 25
Barry R. Posen
foreign dictators, from Vladimir Putin and Iraq. Within NATO, a supposed
of Russia to Rodrigo Duterte of the guardian of democracy, Hungary, Poland,
Philippines. His plans for more restric- and Turkey are turning increasingly
tive immigration and refugee policies, authoritarian. The European Union, the
motivated in part by fears about terror- principal liberal institutional progeny
ism, have skated uncomfortably close to of the U.S. victory in the Cold War, has
outright bigotry. His grand strategy is suffered the loss of the United Kingdom,
primacy without a purpose. and other member states flaunt its rules,
Such lack of concern for the kinder, as Poland has done regarding its standards
gentler part of the American hegemonic on the independence of the judiciary. A
project infuriates its latter-day defenders. new wave of identity politics—nationalist,
Commenting on the absence of liberal sectarian, racist, or otherwise—has swept
elements in Trump’s National Security not only the developing world but also
Strategy, Susan Rice, who was national the developed world, including the United
security adviser in the Obama adminis- States. Internationally and domestically,
tration, wrote in December, “These liberal hegemony has failed to deliver.
omissions undercut global perceptions
of American leadership; worse, they WHAT RESTRAINT LOOKS LIKE
hinder our ability to rally the world to None of this should be taken as an
our cause when we blithely dismiss endorsement of Trump’s national security
the aspirations of others.” policy. The administration is overcommit-
But whether that view is correct or ted militarily; it is cavalier about the threat
not should be a matter of debate, not a of force; it has no strategic priorities
matter of faith. States have long sought to whatsoever; it has no actual plan to ensure
legitimate their foreign policies, because more equitable burden sharing among
even grudging cooperation from others U.S. allies; under the guise of counter-
is less costly than mild resistance. But in terrorism, it intends to remain deeply
the case of the United States, the liberal involved militarily in the internal affairs
gloss does not appear to have made hegem- of other countries; and it is dropping too
ony all that easy to achieve or sustain. For many bombs, in too many places, on too
nearly 30 years, the United States tested many people. These errors will likely
the hypothesis that the liberal character produce the same pattern of poor results
of its hegemonic project made it uniquely at home and abroad that the United States
achievable. The results suggest that the has experienced since the end of the
experiment failed. Cold War.
Neither China nor Russia has become If Trump really wanted to follow
a democracy, nor do they show any sign through on some of his campaign musings,
of moving in that direction. Both are he would pursue a much more focused
building the military power necessary engagement with the world’s security
to compete with the United States, and problems. A grand strategy of restraint,
both have neglected to sign up for the as I and other scholars have called this
U.S.-led liberal world order. At great cost, approach, starts from the premise that the
Washington has failed to build stable United States is a very secure country and
democratic governments in Afghanistan asks what few things could jeopardize that
security. It then recommends narrow politics, especially nationalism, and

policies to address those potential threats. therefore do not expect other peoples to
In practice, restraint would mean welcome U.S. efforts to transform their
pursuing a cautious balance-of-power societies, especially at gunpoint. Thus,
strategy in Asia to ensure that China other than those activities that aim to
does not find a way to dominate the preserve the United States’ command
region—retaining command of the sea of the sea, restraint’s advocates find
to keep China from coercing its neigh- little merit in Trump’s foreign policy;
bors or preventing Washington from it is decidedly unrestrained.
reinforcing them, while acknowledging During the campaign, Trump tore
China’s fears and, instead of surround- into the United States’ post–Cold War
ing it with U.S. forces, getting U.S. grand strategy. “As time went on, our
allies to do more for their own defense. foreign policy began to make less and
It would mean sharing best practices less sense,” he said. “Logic was replaced
with other nuclear powers across the with foolishness and arrogance, which
globe to prevent their nuclear weapons led to one foreign policy disaster after
from falling into the hands of nonstate another.” Many thought such criticisms
actors. And it would mean cooperating might herald a new period of retrench-
with other countries, especially in the ment. Although the Trump administra-
intelligence realm, to limit the ability of tion has pared or abandoned many of
nihilistic terrorists to carry out spectac- the pillars of liberal internationalism,
ular acts of destruction. The United States its security policy has remained consis-
still faces all these threats, only with the tently hegemonic. Whether illiberal
added complication of doing so in a world hegemony will prove any more or any
in which its relative power position has less sustainable than its liberal cousin
slipped. Thus, it is essential that U.S. remains an open question. The foreign
allies, especially rich ones such as those policy establishment continues to avoid
in Europe, share more of the burden, so the main question: Is U.S. hegemony
that the United States can focus its own of any kind sustainable, and if not, what
power on the main threats. For example, policy should replace it? Trump turns
the Europeans should build most of the out to be as good at avoiding that
military power to deter Russia, so that the question as those he has condemned.∂
United States can better concentrate its
resources to sustain command of the global
commons—the sea, the air, and space.
Those who subscribe to restraint also
believe that military power is expensive
to maintain, more expensive to use, and
generally delivers only crude results; thus,
it should be used sparingly. They tend
to favor free trade but reject the notion
that U.S. trade would suffer mightily if
the U.S. military were less active. They
take seriously the problem of identity
March/April 2018 27
damage has already begun to show. His
The Post-American administration has hobbled the World
LETTING GO
Trade Organization, encouraged China

World Economy and other autocratic regimes to lean on
their smaller neighbors for economic
loyalty, undercut agreements on tax
Globalization in the evasion and climate change, and pushed
Trump Era even major U.S. allies to negotiate free-
trade and cross-border investment deals
Adam S. Posen without the United States.
If the United States continues its
retreat from economic leadership, it will
I
n the aftermath of World War II, impose serious pain on the rest of the
the United States set about building world—and on itself. Unless the Trump
a global, rules-based economic order. administration chooses to launch a full-
At the heart of that order, it put the blown trade war, the consequences will
liberal values of free trade and the rule not come immediately. But a sustained
of law. Over the next seven decades, the U.S. withdrawal will inevitably make
order, backed by U.S. power and bol- economic growth slower and less certain.
stered by its growing legitimacy among The resulting disorder will make the
other countries, prevented most economic economic well-being of people around
disputes from escalating into mutually the world more vulnerable to political
destructive trade wars, let alone military predation and conflict than it has been
conflict. That allowed even the smallest in decades.
and poorest countries to develop their
social and economic potential without WELCOME TO THE CLUB
having to worry about predation by One of the great lessons of economic
stronger neighbors. By taking much of history is that bullying is bad for pros-
the fear out of the global economy, the perity. Good institutions—the rule of
U.S.-led order allowed market decisions law, clear property rights, stable means
to be driven by business, not bullying. of exchange, efficient tax collection,
Today, that order is under threat. the provision of public goods, checks
U.S. President Donald Trump has rejected on official corruption—are the funda-
the idea that the world’s economies all mental prerequisites for sustained
benefit when they play by the rules. economic growth. The benefits of such
Instead, he has decided that putting institutions should not be oversold.
“America first” means withdrawing They do not lead inexorably to prosper-
from supposedly bad deals, on which he ity or democratic freedom. But without
believes the system is based. So far, them, long-term saving and investment,
Trump has failed to follow through on which form the backbone of growth,
his most destructive ideas. But the cannot be maintained.
The U.S.-led postwar order extended
ADAM S. POSEN is President of the Peterson
Institute for International Economics. Follow these kinds of institutions to the interna-
him on Twitter @AdamPosen. tional economic sphere, at least in part.
The Post-American World Economy
The best way to think about the rules- or economic depression, both of which
based order is as a club that promotes can spread if the entire community does
a common set of beliefs to which its not work together to fix problems, even if
members adhere: the ability to export they initially affect only one member. The
to, import from, and invest in markets liquidity provided by the U.S. Federal
around the world should not be deter- Reserve in emergencies is essential to
mined by military power or alliance such financial firefighting.
structures; other countries’ economic The club analogy is not perfect.
growth should be welcomed, not treated Although the members are nation-states,
as a threat; property rights should be underlying each state are millions of
secure from invasion, expropriation, or people, households, and businesses.
theft; and technical knowledge should These, not the states’ rulers, are the
flow freely, subject to the enforcement ultimate beneficiaries of the global
of patents and trademarks. Together, economic order. That is what gives
these values provide the basis for sustained the liberal order its ethical weight.
investment and business relationships,
as well as household income growth. LEADING FROM THE MIDDLE
The club offers some shared facilities, All these attributes are in large part
for which dues are collected. These start the result of U.S. leadership. But if
with the institutions founded at the the United States chairs the club, that
Bretton Woods Conference in 1944— does not mean it can issue commands
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or demand loyalty. Washington cannot
the World Bank, and what became the force a state to become a member; it
World Trade Organization (WTO)—but can only make membership more
go far beyond them. The order maintains attractive than remaining outside the
common systems for settling transac- club. Nor can it easily restrict what a
tions, converting currencies, invoicing member government does within its
in widely accepted units, and applying own country or in areas outside of the
tariffs and customs rules. It also estab- order’s agreed values, short of issuing a
lishes forums where experts can meet credible threat to kick that country out
to discuss specialized topics and groups of the system. But if such threats come
that set international standards, such too often or seem too arbitrary, then
as ICANN (the Internet Corporation for other members will fear for their own
Assigned Names and Numbers). Criti- status and band together to resist U.S.
cally, the club’s facilities now include pressure. Finally, the United States
frameworks for settling international can collect club dues only to the
commercial disputes. degree that members think that mem-
The club includes some mutual insur- bership is worth it and that others are
ance against both man-made and natural paying roughly their fair share.
disasters. In part, this takes the form of This reality contradicts the wide-
development assistance and emergency spread but misguided belief that the
aid, which flow disproportionately to United States provides global public
poorer members. But it also involves goods while others free-ride, let alone
cooperation in the face of financial crises Trump’s view that the global system
March/April 2018 29
Adam S. Posen
has played American voters for fools. the rules, the system itself will be imper-
In reality, the United States supplies iled. The United States has to want to
by itself only two essential aspects of lead, and the other members have to want
the economic order. First, Washington it to do so.
extends an umbrella of security guaran- Thus, U.S. leadership is not the
tees and nuclear deterrence over U.S. inevitable result of the relative size of
allies. Second, the U.S. military ensures the U.S. economy and the U.S. military.
free navigation of the seas and airspace Over the last 70 years, it has persisted
for commerce, subject to some interna- even as the share of the world economy
tional rules that are largely set by the made up by the U.S. economy has shrunk
United States. Both of these are classic from 50 percent to 25 percent. Policy-
public goods in that one actor, the United makers should not fear that China or
States, provides them, and can do so the EU will replace Washington as the
essentially on its own, and every country global economic leader as their econo-
benefits, whether or not it contributes. mies surpass that of the United States.
In fact, when it comes to the rest of So long as the U.S. economy remains
the order’s institutions and benefits, very large (which it will) and at the
the United States has often been the technological frontier (which it probably
one free-riding in recent years. It has will), and the United States maintains
frequently failed to pay its dues to inter- its commitment to globally attractive
national organizations on time, as others values, the country will be capable of
do. It has spent a far smaller share of its remaining the leader.
GDP on aid than other wealthy countries. It is a tribute to the appeal of the liberal
It has failed to respond adequately to rules-based order—and to Washington’s
climate change, even as other countries ability to position itself as at least better
have begun to shift toward greener than the alternative—that U.S. leader-
growth. It has behaved irresponsibly ship has retained such indulgent support.
by excessively deregulating its financial
system and its mortgage market, despite DO THEY REALLY MEAN IT?
pressuring other countries to curtail their Washington’s retreat will not immediately
own growth for the sake of stability. send the world into recession. Unless
This reality is the opposite of the the Trump administration decides to
concern voiced by Trump’s “America mount an actual trade war with China or
first” slogan. The United States has been Mexico, it may not even do any obvious
given a pass on many responsibilities harm over the next year or two. This is
precisely because it leads the system partly because even major economic
and other countries want it to keep policies take time to affect economies
doing so. as a whole. It is also because the global
So far, the benefits of U.S. leader- economy is in the midst of an extremely
ship have been large enough that other broad and balanced recovery. That breadth
countries are willing to ignore a certain makes the current expansion the most
amount of hypocrisy. But at some point, resilient of any since at least the 1980s.
if the United States goes from occasional All the engines of the world economy
free-riding to ostentatiously violating are running well, mostly without
Enjoy it while it lasts: at the New York Stock Exchange, December 2017
overreliance on debt in either the private Some skepticism over the Trump
or the public sector. administration’s course is justified, since
Other countries are also mostly taking past administrations have rarely followed
a wait-and-see approach to Trump’s any stated strategy consistently. What is
threats to the global economic system. more, even if the document does reflect
The administration’s National Security Trump’s intentions, a number of factors—
Strategy, which was released in Decem- the midterm elections later this year,
ber, challenges almost all the fundamen- unexpected developments from the
tal aspects of the United States’ global ongoing investigations into possible
role and the values that the country has coordination between the Trump cam-
professed for the last 70 years. It breaks paign and the Russian government,
down the wall between economics and pushback from Congress, even reasoned
national security and explicitly commits persuasion by the president’s economic
the U.S. government to bilateral bully- advisers and world leaders—could stop
ing instead of enforcing and obeying the the administration from following this
rules. Advancing what it calls “principled mistaken path.
A N D R E W K E L LY / R E U T E R S
realism,” the strategy promises to “inte- If that strategy really does guide
grate all elements of America’s national U.S. policy, however, then it will do
power—political, economic, and military.” serious harm. The United States would
The United States will “pursue bilateral restrict access to its market in a variety
trade agreements” rather than broad ones, of arbitrary ways, by blocking foreign
a recipe for economic coercion rather investment, withdrawing from trade
than cooperation. agreements, imposing “buy American”
March/April 2018 31
Adam S. Posen
restrictions on government purchases, especially its unfettered speculative

and politicizing financial supervision flows and unchecked accumulation of
and access to international payments private wealth. In many countries, this
systems. Inevitably, given greater politi- backlash has led to greater tolerance for
cal discretion over the economy, some state-owned enterprises (reinforced by
U.S. politicians will demand payments, China’s example of state-led growth),
perhaps even bribes, from companies the protection of special interests from
for proceeding with normal commercial trade competition, and the promotion
transactions. All but the last already occur of companies with their headquarters in
to some limited degree, but successive their home country as national champi-
U.S. administrations since World War II ons. All of these can have positive effects
have pushed against these tendencies in moderation, but the current trend is
at home and abroad. Reversing that likely to go too far without the restraint
approach would hurt the United States’ that comes when the United States
economic productivity and its citizens’ enforces the rules. Even under the
purchasing power. At least as important, Obama administration, the United
it wouldn’t stop there. Adopting such States was slow to put new issues, such
policies would encourage autocrats to as women’s empowerment, refugee
follow suit and even democratic allies resettlement, Internet privacy, and
to retaliate in kind. environmental concerns, on the interna-
Finally, the extent of the damage will tional agenda. Yet the best way to deal
depend on how willing and able other with these issues would be to bring other
governments are to uphold the values countries’ concerns about the United
and structures of the current system: States’ errors to a discussion at the G-20.
China and the EU, primarily, but also For other countries to give up on U.S.
other major economies that have long leadership, let alone for the United
supported the rules-based order, such States itself to abandon the system,
as Australia, Canada, Japan, and Mex- would only worsen these problems.
ico. In all likelihood, there will be no The most immediate response to
immediate disaster, because the system the Trump administration’s retreat has
offers benefits to members who volun- come on trade. The prospect of the
tarily comply with its rules. Even without United States’ withdrawal from the
the United States, almost all the other global trading system has spurred
members of the order still publicly several large economies to conclude
subscribe to its stated values: open bilateral or regional trade agreements.
markets, equal treatment of all mem- In the past year, the EU has all but
bers for economic purposes, and the concluded substantive trade deals with
peaceful settlement of disputes. Canada, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam,
Some of the shift away from U.S. and it has accelerated negotiations
economic leadership predates the Trump with Mexico and the South American
administration. Since the global financial trading bloc Mercosur. With surprising
crisis, widespread disdain has emerged speed, the 11 nations remaining in the
for the excesses of turbocharged Anglo- Trans-Pacific Partnership after the
American financialized capitalism, United States withdrew in early 2017
have moved forward with much of the regimes will be vulnerable to future
agreement, with Australia and Japan economic shocks. In the event of a
taking the lead. Regional trade talks major downturn, large countries will
in Asia and Africa involving China and likely fail to act together if the United
negotiations among Latin American States does not contribute. The system
countries have also gained pace; although is not designed to withstand a full-on
these types of negotiations tend to result assault by Washington. If Trump wants
in lower-quality agreements that would to tear down the order, it will be difficult
allow only limited liberalization and for other countries to limit the damage.
resolve few regulatory issues, they will
divert trade from elsewhere, including BEGGAR-THY-NEIGHBOR
the United States. Left-wing critics of the U.S.-led liberal
The Trump administration has begun economic order often argue that the
attacking international institutions from system encourages countries to race to
NATO to the UN. By blocking the appoint- the bottom, exploiting poorer popula-
ment of new trade-dispute judges to sit tions along the way. This criticism has
on the WTO’s seven-member appellate particular merit when it comes to envi-
body, the administration is preventing ronmental protections and labor rights,
the WTO from functioning normally. Here, areas in which the United States does
the rest of the world has been slower not do enough domestically and so lowers
to respond. A few world leaders, such global standards. But until recently, a
as Argentine President Mauricio Macri, combination of peer pressure and formal
who defended the WTO at the organiza- agreements encouraged by the United
tion’s biennial meeting in December, States had increasingly limited the extent
have spoken out. Canada has filed a to which countries undercut one another.
WTO case against the many unilateral Over the last decade, international efforts,
trade measures the Trump administra- led in part by the Obama administration
tion is pursuing, which may set a prec- working through the G-20, had begun
edent for action by other countries. But to rein in two of the most pernicious
most have remained silent, possibly beggar-thy-neighbor policies, currency
because they do not wish to provoke manipulation and the creation of
Trump into directly withdrawing from tax havens.
or further attacking the organization. If the U.S. government walks away
Some nontrade aspects of the liberal from its leadership role, this picture will
rules-based order can continue to func- change dramatically. Today, tax competi-
tion in the absence of U.S. leadership. tion largely takes the form of constructive
Most institutions and forums will not pressure to bring rates and coverage some-
work as well, or as consistently, or as what in line with those of comparable
adaptably, but they will persist. The economies. The United States, along
systems that allow international financial with some other countries, is disadvan-
cooperation have been largely spared taged under the current system, but
from attack so far, in part because of the only international cooperation has a
Federal Reserve’s legal independence. hope of plugging the holes rather than
Yet without U.S. leadership, even these just driving every country’s revenues
March/April 2018 33
Adam S. Posen
down. If the United States tries unilater- politicized. Whether a developing

ally to use its tax code to attract corporate country gets access to financing might
headquarters away from other countries, come to depend on whether it sits inside
the incentives to race to the bottom by a major country’s sphere of influence
allowing tax evasion will strengthen. The and is willing to accept (or unable to
tax bill signed by Trump in December resist) political domination by that
has many complex provisions, but overall, country. The IMF and the World Bank
it appears to privilege domestic pro- will remain, but without backing from
duction in a way likely to both reduce rich countries, they will likely not be
economic efficiency and promote tax able to counterbalance this kind of polit-
conflict internationally. icization in large parts of the world.
More broadly, either opportunistic To avoid facing such political pres-
multinational companies will pit coun- sures, many emerging-market countries
tries against one another as governments will make renewed attempts to hedge
compete to attract jobs or countries will against situations in which they need
designate national champions that will assistance by keeping larger currency
demand protection and subsidies. Either reserves, even if that comes at the cost
way, companies’ shareholders will cap- of domestic investment. They will also
ture more of national incomes, shifting try to secure patrons who will promise
resources away from individual taxpayers them relatively unconditional assistance
and workers and shrinking governments’ when it is needed. With those promises
abilities to deal with social issues and in hand, countries will have less need of
invest in long-term projects. Beggar-thy- help from international institutions and
neighbor policies will beggar everyone. thus will be more willing to keep inter-
Another goal of the postwar liberal national monitors out of their decisions.
order was to give the governments of This combination will make financial
developing countries a voice. Global crises more frequent and, by interfering
governance has never been truly equal; with international cleanup efforts, more
the United States and other major coun- likely to do lasting political and eco-
tries have always played a dominant role. nomic damage. The division between
And deadlock often stymies institutions middle-income countries and countries
in which all member countries have an that remain poor will grow even starker
equal vote, such as at the WTO. But the as inconsistencies in the system will
IMF, the World Bank, and other multi- hurt the poorest and smallest countries
lateral development institutions have the most.
generally applied consistent criteria across
countries when apportioning lending THE POST-REALITY ECONOMY
and aid, authorized by their collective Less obvious but no less destructive
membership. effects of the U.S. withdrawal from
In contrast, in a world in which economic leadership will come on the
national security links and bilateral macroeconomic side. These have begun
relationships displace general rules with recent efforts to compromise
and multilateral institutions, aid and economic statistics. The United States
crisis financing will grow increasingly has always taken pride in the fact that it
relies on independent agencies to
report data about its economy. That
has allowed it to press other countries
to disclose information properly and
promptly, given rise to a set of defini-
tions and techniques to help them do
Global
so, and created the basis for formal
agreements on economic surveillance
Environmental
among technocrats. Objective, standard-
ized economic data allow policymakers
Politics
Kate O’Neill and Stacy D. VanDeveer, Editors
to adjust their policies based on more
than gut feelings or salesmanship. The
Global Environmental Politics
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and the IMF, with (GEP) examines the relationships
strong support from the United States, between global political forces
help develop and maintain this statistical and environmental change.
regime; their regular reports on mem- More timely now than ever.
ber countries’ policies and performance Subscribe today.
give voters and investors independent
expert assessments to consider.
Yet over the past year, British and mitpressjournals.org/gep
U.S. politicians have begun to dispar-
age their own technocrats’ findings.
In London, government ministers have
dismissed official agencies’ skeptical
analyses of Brexit, and in Washington,
Republican members of Congress have
rejected legally required assessments of
legislation by the Congressional Budget
Office and the Joint Committee on
Taxation. In some cases, they have
even attempted to prevent analyses and
data from being released to the public.
Politicians will always present numbers
in a rosy light and push back against
criticism, often with some justification.
But when they demand loyalty over
objectivity and suppress findings they
do not like, they legitimate tactics that
were once the preserve of autocrats.
Other self-interested politicians will
follow this lead. It is impossible to put a
number on the damage this could do by
allowing wrong-headed policies, distorting
GLEP FA jan 2018.indd 1 35

1/5/2018 10:17:24 AM
Adam S. Posen
and deterring investment by raising retirement incomes. Emerging econo-

uncertainty, and reducing the ability mies need investment from wealthier
of publics to hold their governments countries to build roads, bridges, and
accountable. hospitals; develop Internet and other
As the United States turns away communications networks; and train
from the liberal rules-based order and doctors, teachers, and other profes-
economic decisions grow more inter- sionals. But if politicians and national
twined with political power, uncertainty security threats interfere with invest-
will rise and returns on investment will ment between countries or among
fall. Governments will work to trap different sectors of the economy, that
investment at home, either to create win-win exchange will become more
domestic jobs or to fund a corrupt tenuous, leaving both retirees and
political system. Those efforts will workers around the world worse off.
always come at an economic cost. If
they did not, governments would not TRADE ON
have to prevent money from flowing The international free-trade regime
abroad. Policies that restrict foreigners’ forms the most visible—and the most
ability to invest in a particular country reviled—aspect of the postwar eco-
are more of a mixed bag. Limits on nomic order. But it is here that U.S.
some kinds of foreign investment can withdrawal might actually do the least
help prevent destabilizing surges of harm. The United States is more
capital into and out of economies. But dispensable to the rules-based trading
such policies can easily go too far since regime than it is in other economic
foreign direct investment brings a wide spheres, and the other major trading
range of benefits for advanced and countries are responding to U.S.
developing economies alike. withdrawal by deepening their own
If governments begin to restrict trade agreements. International trade
capital flows, investors will find it has persisted throughout recorded
harder to diversify their investments human history, even when some global
across the global economy. That will economies have left the system (as
expose households and businesses to China did from the mid-fifteenth
greater losses from volatility within century to the mid-eighteenth century,
their particular country or region. Laws Japan did from the mid-seventeenth
that make it more difficult for house- century to the mid-nineteenth century,
holds to get their savings into or out and the Soviet Union did throughout
of an economy will reduce the level of its existence). Trade can be limited,
investment and shift it toward more but never completely squelched.
liquid assets, such as cash and govern- U.S. withdrawal will still hurt.
ment bonds. Worthwhile business Countries have already begun to shift
ventures will struggle to raise capital. their trade flows, supply chains, and
Wealthy but aging societies in Europe, business relations away from the U.S.
North America, and Northeast Asia market. This process will only accelerate
need to invest in growing emerging- as the United States retreats. Although
market countries to sustain their the U.S. economy’s sheer size will make
it impossible for other countries to will be tempted to sell out its values for
completely divert trade around it, economic gain. It may restrict the spread
that size will also worsen the global of biotechnologies and agricultural inno-
economic losses from the United vations, as many EU countries have an
States’ withdrawal. anti-science opposition to them; attempt
If the United States entirely aban- to split up the Internet in order to advan-
dons the global free-trade system, the tage European companies in search,
result will be a massive reduction in shopping, and social networking; and
the size of global markets. That would acquiesce to demands from Beijing to
leave consumers with less variety and transfer militarily useful technology or
worse quality in the products they buy, recognize its territorial claims in return
leave companies less able to take advan- for preferential access to Chinese mar-
tage of economies of scale, and leave kets. The United States has sometimes
countries more likely to diverge from failed to stand on principle on these mat-
the common technologies and stan- ters, but U.S. leadership with European
dards that make modern life possible. support remains the only way to make
Global competition would wither. The any progress on such issues. Otherwise,
United States itself would suffer as the incentives for each major economy
companies pursued opportunities in will be to pander and compromise.
places where new trade deals expanded
markets and the politics were more THE HOUSE THAT WE BUILT
favorable. Among the biggest losers The United States has at times failed
would be Americans themselves, as they to live up to its ideals as the leader of the
would soon pay more than they do now liberal economic system. That failure has
for almost everything and miss out on grown more frequent since 9/11, as many
the new jobs and growth that would Americans have felt threatened by the
otherwise have come from the rise of growth of terrorism and the economic
developing economies. rise of China. That trend also reflects a
As the leader of the global economic recurrent nativism in the U.S. electorate
order, the United States has, albeit insuf- and Congress that predates—and contrib-
ficiently, pushed to enshrine tougher uted to—Trump’s election. The United
standards for anticorruption, environ- States has played too dominant a role in
mental protection, and human rights some areas of global economic discussion
in major trade deals such as the Trans- and been reluctant to allow other countries
Pacific Partnership. There is still room to help set the agenda, partly in an effort
for improvement, but trade deals without to pander to domestic nationalists by
the United States, especially those that maintaining the symbolism of dominance.
include China but not the EU, will likely But far worse than a lackluster leader is
score far worse on all these counts. Even one that abandons its role altogether or
the EU may compromise more readily even works actively to subvert the system’s
than before when it becomes the leading values. A return to bullying would only
high-income economy in the global harm economic growth.
trading system. Without the United The United States’ motivation for
States to counterbalance it, Brussels building the postwar economic system
March/April 2018 37
Adam S. Posen
was as much preventing conflict as little better. This miracle took place
promoting growth. In setting out the without conquest or even much conflict,
rules by which all members would and with greater protections for private
conduct business, the architects of the property and human rights than ever
system hoped to separate economic before. The liberal order constructed
from military competition. U.S. with- and led by the United States made such
drawal need not result in economic or progress possible by giving countries,
physical wars, but it will raise the risk businesses, and individuals the opportunity
of stumbling into conflict by accident. to build their economic lives without fear
Without agreed-on rules, even minor of a foreign power taking away what
economic disputes have the potential they had made. That U.S. leadership
to set off escalating counterattacks. If has not, as some have charged, hurt the
the norm of separation between economic United States. The country’s rampant
and military confrontations breaks down, inequality and wage stagnation are
economic frictions, such as Chinese theft largely the result of domestic political
of intellectual property or restrictions choices and failures. A world in which
on trade with a nuclear Iran or North the United States ceases to lead—or,
Korea, could turn into outright conflict. worse still, attacks—the system it built
It is plausible that as the United will be poorer, nastier, less fair, and
States retreats and thereby weakens more dangerous for everyone.∂
its economy, the Trump administration
will blame the economic damage not on
its own actions but on foreign govern-
ments, creating a self-perpetuating
cycle of anger. When other major
countries step forward to preserve the
open economic order, or defend them-
selves against U.S. economic aggression,
Washington may interpret that as an
attack on U.S. primacy. The Trump
administration might even misinterpret
the current forbearance by China or
the EU as a sign of weakness and an
invitation to escalate confrontations.
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Korea, Vietnam, and the countries of the
former Soviet Union, economic growth has
brought hundreds of millions of people
out of what amounted to subsistence or
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drugs” has taken the lives of over 12,000
Giving Up the Filipinos. Trump praised Duterte for
LETTING GO
doing an “unbelievable job on the drug
High Ground problem.” When they met in Manila in
November, Trump laughed heartily after
Duterte cut off questions from reporters
America’s Retreat on and called them “spies”—this in a country
Human Rights where journalists and activists sometimes
end up dead. Before heading to China,
Sarah Margon Trump congratulated President Xi Jinping,
who had just further cemented his
repressive rule at a Communist Party
N
o U.S. president has spoken congress, for his “great political victory.”
about human rights the way All U.S. presidents have, to varying
Donald Trump has. During the degrees, downplayed or even overlooked
campaign, he praised Saddam Hussein concerns about human rights in order to
for his approach to counterterrorism in get things done with unsavory foreign
Iraq: “He killed terrorists. He did that partners. But none has seemed so eager
so good. They didn’t read them the rights. as Trump to align with autocrats as a
They didn’t talk. They were a terrorist. matter of course. The harm goes beyond
It was over.” He promised to loosen the mere words. In country after country,
restrictions on interrogating terrorism the Trump administration is gutting
suspects: “I would bring back a hell of a U.S. support for human rights, the rule
lot worse than waterboarding.” He went of law, and good governance, damaging
out of his way to compliment Russian the overarching credibility of the United
President Vladimir Putin’s abusive rule: States. Within the United States’ borders,
“In terms of leadership, he is getting an meanwhile, the Trump administration
A.” And in a television interview shortly has unleashed an assault on nondiscrim-
after his inauguration, when asked why ination and equal justice.
he respected Putin—“a killer,” in the Even before Trump was elected,
interviewer’s words—Trump responded, human rights were under attack across
“We’ve got a lot of killers. What, do the globe. With crisis, conflict, and
you think our country’s so innocent?” instability gripping much of the world,
As president, he has kept at it. Last repressive leaders from Ethiopia to
April, he chose to congratulate Turkish Russia to Thailand have used these
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for developments to justify tightening their
winning a disputed referendum that hold on power—cracking down harder
expanded his authoritarian rule. In a call on dissent while rejecting the rule of
that same month, he spoke to Philippine law and flouting international norms.
President Rodrigo Duterte, whose bloody Now, with Trump in office, there’s little
campaign under the guise of a “war on reason to believe that such initiatives will
be met with much criticism or conse-
SARAH MARGON is Washington Director of
Human Rights Watch. Follow her on Twitter quences from the United States. Indeed,
@sarahmargon. the Trump administration’s chaotic and
March/April 2018 39
Sarah Margon
virtually values-free approach to foreign the global human rights framework.

policy is bolstering this global deteriora- Under Trump, the United States has
tion while corroding the institutions and walked away from (or threatened to
alliances needed to reverse it. walk away from) a number of vital global
commitments, institutions, and initia-
WRONG ON RIGHTS tives that would provide an opportunity
The first year of Trump’s presidency was to share the burden of combating global
marked by a frenzy of activity on domestic challenges while respecting rights. The
issues. His administration instituted harsh administration has threatened to with-
new immigration rules that are ripping draw from the UN Human Rights Council,
apart families and communities. Between largely because the Palestinian territories
late January and early September 2017, the (and therefore Israel) are a permanent
total number of immigrants arrested item on its agenda. It’s true that the
inside the country (versus at the border) council has flaws, but it has also success-
increased by 43 percent compared with fully documented and exposed many
the number arrested during the equiva- human rights issues of concern to U.S.
lent time period under President Barack law and policymakers. Walking away
Obama in 2016. These are people who would not only weaken the council but
have been uprooted from communities also limit the available avenues for
where they have families and deep ties. Washington to promote human rights.
The president has also issued a series of From the UN’s negotiations on the
travel bans, all of which use classic scape- compact for global migration to the
goating tactics and bigotry to incite fears Paris agreement on climate change,
about Muslims and refugee-resettlement the Trump administration has repeat-
programs. Although the courts blocked edly suggested multilateral institutions
the original and most draconian versions are of no use to the United States, even
of this ban, in late 2017, they did allow a though the country was instrumental
revised version to proceed. in creating the UN, as well as many of
The president has empowered bigots the norms and laws that guide thinking
by making racially charged statements, about human rights today.
including referring to white supremacists When it comes to human rights,
marching in Charlottesville, Virginia, as symbolism matters, and under this
“very fine people.” He has sought to end administration, human rights activists
what he calls the “very dangerous anti- have been made to feel as though they
police atmosphere in America,” which is aren’t important. The president and his
a direct rebuke to activists calling for racial top national security officials have met
justice in policing. He has also gravely with very few frontline activists and have
harmed women’s rights by attacking held very few meetings with civil society
reproductive choice, halting an equal- before or during overseas trips—a practice
pay measure, and weakening protec- that previous presidents often used so as
tions against gender-based violence on to hear directly from ordinary citizens
college campuses. about the challenges they were facing.
On foreign policy, meanwhile, the Words matter, too, and Trump’s
administration has dismissed or damaged fulsome praise of strongmen, many of
Giving Up the High Ground
Roughed up: police detaining a demonstrator during a protest in Ankara, February 2017
whom he has hosted at the White House Watch’s Middle East advisory commit-
with great fanfare and little condemna- tee), has written, “It was no coincidence
tion, has been taken by many as permis- that days later, Bahraini police used the
sion for brutality. Last April, he con- deadliest force we have seen in decades,
gratulated Egyptian President Abdel killing five protesters.”
Fattah el-Sisi, a military dictator who Similarly, politicians looking to
has overseen a vicious crackdown on discredit the free press have latched on
government critics, for doing “a fantastic to the term “fake news,” one of Trump’s
job.” The next month, counter to a prom- favorite phrases. In Syria, President
ise made to the White House, Sisi signed Bashar al-Assad rejected an Amnesty
a draconian law regulating civil society. International report documenting the
Perhaps he was emboldened by Trump’s brutal killing of 13,000 military prisoners,
comment in Saudi Arabia a week earlier: saying, “You can forge anything these
“We are not here to lecture—we are not days. We are living in a fake-news era.”
here to tell other people how to live.” In Myanmar, where security forces have
On that same visit to Saudi Arabia, undertaken a campaign of ethnic cleansing
Trump told Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, against Rohingya Muslims, a government
U M I T B E K TAS / R E U T E R S
the king of Bahrain, “There won’t be official went so far as to say, “There is no
strain with this administration,” which such thing as Rohingya. It is fake news.”
the Bahraini regime evidently viewed The term has become a catch phrase
as a green light to intensify repression. for government officials in China, the
As Nabeel Rajab, an imprisoned Bahraini Philippines, Russia, and Venezuela who
activist (and member of Human Rights wish to shield themselves from scrutiny
March/April 2018 41
Sarah Margon
and create a climate of fear that vilifies expanded the scope of funds affected by
dissenting voices. Indeed, according to this restriction, raising the amount of aid
the Committee to Protect Journalists, at stake from $600 million to $9 billion.
which has been keeping a database of The United States is by far the
imprisoned journalists since the early world’s largest health donor, so the rule
1990s, the number of people charged will inflict untold harm on women, girls,
with reporting “false news” rose to a and their families. It will likely hinder
record high in 2017. hard-fought progress on health care
in poor and middle-income countries,
THE WAR ON WOMEN particularly those that rely heavily on
Perhaps it should not be surprising U.S. resources. Affected health programs
that a man who was caught on tape may have to cut not only their family-
bragging about sexual assault has put in planning offerings but also services linked
place policies that set back the rights to child health, including vaccinations
of women and girls around the world. and the prevention and treatment of
But the swiftness of the rollback has been HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.
startling. In keeping with Republican As research by Human Rights Watch
tradition, the Trump administration has in Africa has found, the new rule already
cut off U.S. funding for the UN Popu- means fewer health services of all types,
lation Fund, which provides lifesaving not just the loss of safe abortion care.
maternal care for women, falsely claim- To take one example, Family Health
ing that it promotes forced abortions. Options Kenya, an organization set to
And the reversal of so many domestic lose U.S. funds, has curtailed outreach
policies in support of gender equality services such as family planning, cervi-
no doubt undermines U.S. credibility cal cancer testing, and HIV testing for
overseas when it comes to empowering impoverished communities, and it has
women and girls. already closed one clinic. Organizations
But perhaps the greatest threat to in Kenya that have no choice but to
women will come from Trump’s expan- agree to the new restrictions because
sion of the so-called Mexico City policy, they depend on these funds worry that
also known as “the global gag rule,” a more women will die from unsafe
long-standing policy of Republican abortions, a leading cause of maternal
administrations that imposes conditions mortality in the country. In Uganda,
on health-care organizations receiving the policy presents a difficult choice
U.S. aid. To keep their U.S. funding, for organizations with multiple public
these organizations must certify that health campaigns: Should they keep
they are not using their other funds to the funds and focus just on fighting
provide abortions (except in cases of HIV/AIDS, or should they reject the
rape, incest, or to save a woman’s life) funds and work to end injuries and
and that they are not offering informa- deaths from back-alley abortions?
tion about or referrals for abortions or Trump’s policy is not only an assault
advocating them. Otherwise, they lose on women’s health; it is also likely to be
all their U.S. funding. In one of his first self-defeating. A 2011 Stanford Univer-
acts as president, Trump dramatically sity study found that when a more
limited version of the Mexico City would prioritize economic interests

policy was last in place, during the over values.
George W. Bush administration, sub- In the fight against the Islamic State,
Saharan Africa actually saw abortions or ISIS, the Trump administration has
increase. This happened particularly demonstrated a noted antipathy toward
in parts of the continent that had few the laws of war. As a candidate, Trump
health-care options and relied heavily promised to “bomb the shit out of” ISIS,
on U.S. funds. Although the researchers and as president, he has lessened the
could not conclusively explain this uptick, White House’s oversight of air strikes in
their leading interpretation was that Iraq and Syria while giving commanders
an overall decline in family-planning in the field more control, even as they
resources led to more unplanned preg- shifted to more intense urban warfare.
nancies and more abortions. It stands to In recent years, the Department of
reason that an expanded version of the Defense has sought to make the details
policy will lead to even more preventable of its campaign against ISIS somewhat
maternal deaths, due to an increase in more transparent. The Pentagon regularly
both unplanned pregnancies and unsafe publishes information on its website
abortions—to say nothing of its effect about war costs, and even posts videos
on efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, of air strikes. It also publishes a monthly
and child malnutrition. report examining civilian casualties.
But over the last year, human rights
ON THE WARPATH groups, the UN, and journalists have
Because the United States is the world’s found growing evidence that a dramati-
preeminent military power, its use of cally higher number of civilians are being
force is watched closely, especially killed by U.S. forces or U.S.-led coali-
when the White House has unequivo- tion forces in Iraq and Syria (as well
cally pushed for a greater reliance on as Afghanistan) than what is officially
hard power. Indeed, the Trump admin- reported. In some cases, these investi-
istration has increased defense spending gations have found serious violations of
while reducing foreign aid. It has reversed the laws of armed conflict. An exhaustive
a policy to phase out the use of cluster inquiry by The New York Times Magazine
bombs, a particularly indiscriminate concluded that the campaign against
explosive. It has signed secret changes ISIS may be the least transparent war
that undo the Obama administration’s in recent U.S. history. The magazine
more restrictive policies regarding the reported that one civilian is killed for
use of drone strikes and commando every five coalition air strikes—more
raids, a shift that will inevitably lead than 31 times the rate the coalition
to less transparency and accountability has acknowledged.
and more civilian deaths. It has also Parts of this strategic shift began
accelerated arms sales, including to during the Obama administration. In
governments with poor track records December 2016, the Pentagon removed
on human rights, and has signaled its the requirement for a “strike cell” in
intention to loosen restrictions on arms Baghdad, which had served as a collection
exports—a shortsighted move that point for information about planned
March/April 2018 43
Sarah Margon
targets for air strikes in Iraq—an extra promote human rights, there was always
check to avoid civilian casualties. But a common understanding that doing so
the Trump administration exacerbated was a key part of what defined the United
the problem by speeding up the tempo States—and what Americans believed was
of operations without doing enough to the right thing for their government to do.
mitigate civilian harm. The Pentagon Not so under Trump. Although some
also failed to consistently ensure that lower-level U.S. officials appear commit-
there had been adequate checks on ted to keeping human rights a priority,
intelligence collection before approving others have concluded that this may be
an air strike, and it has used munitions impossible. In November, for example,
and firepower generally not considered Elizabeth Shackelford, a U.S. Foreign
appropriate for urban warfare. Investi- Service officer who most recently served
gations to assess allegations of civilian in Kenya, resigned from the State Depart-
harm in the aftermath of a lethal strike ment in protest, writing, “Our govern-
have become deeply inadequate, hampered ment has failed to demonstrate a com-
in part by the lack of a clear process for mitment to promoting and defending
gathering information from those closest human rights and democracy.” No one
to the ground, such as local activists, who is actually running U.S. foreign
emergency responders, and nongovern- policy seems to believe that the advance-
mental organizations. ment of fundamental rights should be
one of its central pillars.
SAVING THE SYSTEM Given the United States’ historically
Human rights concerns have always spotty record on promoting human rights,
competed with national security con- there are those who think that other
siderations. For too long, Washington governments can pick up the slack. But
has adopted policies in the name of in reality, the loss of the United States
protecting national security that come as a champion, however inconsistent
at the expense of human rights, forget- its support can be, is likely to further
ting the long-term costs of doing so. encourage governments to treat their
The Obama administration’s arms sales citizens poorly, confident that no mean-
to Saudi Arabia, despite the Saudi-led ingful rebuke will follow. It is also likely
coalition’s unlawful air strikes against to create a leadership vacuum, and the
civilians in Yemen, is a prime example countries that aim to fill it—such as
of the harm this approach can do, with China, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela—will
thousands of civilians killed and anti- no doubt seek to spread their no-strings-
American sentiment on the rise in the attached approach to global affairs.
country. Another is the CIA’s secret So what is to be done? Realistically,
post-9/11 torture and rendition pro- the next few years are likely to be hard
gram, which the Bush administration on human rights. But despite the absence
launched in violation of international of U.S. leadership, there have been
obligations and U.S. law and which has some bright spots, with rights-minded
undermined Washington’s credibility countries stepping up. At the UN Human
on human rights. But even as the United Rights Council, for example, the Nether-
States struggled with how and when to lands managed to overcome opposition
from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Uzbekistan—for corruption and

Emirates, and the United States to human rights abuses.
launch an independent investigation But these efforts can only go so far.
into the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen. Petition gathering by like-minded
Similarly, Iceland took the lead in draft- countries is less effective without the
ing and collecting support from 38 other most powerful country on earth. State
countries for a joint statement at the and local governments can only do so
council condemning Duterte’s bloody much to work around the federal govern-
“war on drugs.” As long as Trump is in ment. And although Congress controls
power, such ad hoc coalitions of like- the power of the purse, it has far less
minded countries will need to become influence on foreign policy than the
the norm. executive branch. And all the while, the
There is also much that other parts White House’s attacks on immigrants,
of the U.S. government can do to protect health care, minority communities, and
human rights. Just as some cities and the justice system will continue to dimin-
states have decided to comply with the ish American credibility on human rights
Paris climate agreement despite the overseas. Simply put, unless it changes
federal government’s withdrawal, they course dramatically, the Trump adminis-
can also find ways to protect immigrants tration—and the president himself—
caught up in the Trump administra- will remain one of the greatest threats
tion’s dragnet and keep families and to human rights in decades.∂
communities intact.
Congress, for its part, has already
resisted a number of presidential initia-
tives in the interest of human rights. In
May, a bipartisan group of 15 senators
sent Trump a letter urging him to “ensure
that America remains a leader in advo-
cating for democracy and human rights.”
Congressional committees are using
aid allocations and authorization bills to
push back against the executive branch.
Individual members of Congress are
drafting legislation, holding hearings, and
meeting with foreign officials to stand
up for human rights in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Russia,
and elsewhere. In December, the
Treasury Department, under pressure
from Congress, imposed sanctions on
13 individuals—from Belgium, China,
the Dominican Republic, Gambia,
Guatemala, Israel, Myanmar, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Sudan, and
March/April 2018 45
A GLOBAL CAMPAIGN
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Violence Law in 2016. But they needed hard data to implement it.
The Asia Foundation and SynTao surveyed hundreds of employees and
employers across all industries to uncover the real costs of domestic
violence and how its impact extends from the victim’s personal life to
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ESSAYS
If American citizens are good

democrats, they will always be
suspicious of government officials.
But they ought to be suspicious
of whistleblowers, too.
—Michael Walzer
Just and Unjust Leaks Iran Among the Ruins

Michael Walzer 48 Vali Nasr 108
The China Reckoning The President and the Bomb

Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner 60 Richard K. Betts and Matthew C.
Waxman 119
RAFAEL MARCHANT E / REUT E RS
Life in China’s Asia

Jennifer Lind 71 Mugabe’s Misrule
Martin Meredith 129
Green Giant
Amy Myers Jaffe 83 The Clash of Exceptionalisms
Charles A. Kupchan 139
How to Crack Down on Tax Havens
Nicholas Shaxson 94
Just and Unjust Leaks
When to Spill Secrets
Michael Walzer
A
ll governments, all political parties, and all politicians keep
secrets and tell lies. Some lie more than others, and those
differences are important, but the practice is general. And
some lies and secrets may be justified, whereas others may not. Citizens,
therefore, need to know the difference between just and unjust secrets
and between just and unjust deception before they can decide when it
may be justifiable for someone to reveal the secrets or expose the
lies—when leaking confidential information, releasing classified doc-
uments, or blowing the whistle on misconduct may be in the public
interest or, better, in the interest of democratic government.
Revealing official secrets and lies involves a form of moral risk-
taking: whistleblowers may act out of a sense of duty or conscience,
but the morality of their actions can be judged only by their fellow
citizens, and only after the fact. This is often a difficult judgment to
make—and has probably become more difficult in the Trump era.
LIES AND DAMNED LIES

A quick word about language: “leaker” and “whistleblower” are over-
lapping terms, but they aren’t synonyms. A leaker, in this context,
anonymously reveals information that might embarrass officials or open
up the government’s internal workings to unwanted public scrutiny. In
Washington, good reporters cultivate sources inside every presidential
administration and every Congress and hope for leaks. A whistleblower
reveals what she believes to be immoral or illegal official conduct to her
bureaucratic superiors or to the public. Certain sorts of whistle-blowing,
relating chiefly to mismanagement and corruption, are protected by law;
leakers are not protected, nor are whistleblowers who reveal state secrets.
MICHAEL WALZER is Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study.
Before considering the sorts of official deception where the stakes

are high and the whistleblower’s decisions and the public’s judgment
of them are especially difficult, it’s important to look at the way secrets
and lies affect everyday politics, where the dilemmas are simple—and,
most of the time, not much is at stake. Consider the many politically
engaged men and women who insist that they are not running for of-
fice even while they are secretly raising money and recruiting help for
a campaign. They don’t want assaults on their records to begin before
they have developed the resources they will need to counterattack.
Citizens expect deception of this sort and commonly see through it:
the practice is tolerable even if it is not fully justifiable.
But what about a candidate who tries to conceal political positions
she has held in the past or who lies about her policy commitments for
the future? Someone inside the candidate’s campaign who exposes such
lies is disloyal, but the disclosure is certainly not unjust. The leaker is
a good citizen even though she may not be a desirable colleague in a
conventional political enterprise.
Now imagine a politician who is particularly ruthless: she wins the
election and then uses the power of the government to destroy records
of her previous actions, removing documents from archives and
threatening people who know too much. Anyone breaking the silence or
leaking the documents would be a public hero—and a welcome colleague
to the vast majority of citizens who are sure that they would never
destroy records or threaten anyone. Self-aggrandizing deception and
ruthless attempts to cover it up invite moral exposure.
But now consider a politician who shouts lies at election rallies and
solicits money from unsavory characters in order to defeat a particularly
awful opponent—a neo-Nazi, for example, who threatens to dismantle
the institutions of democratic government. Here is a politician with
dirty hands. She has gotten her hands dirty for a good cause—but the
good cause doesn’t wash them clean. She is a lying and possibly corrupt
politician. Still, I wouldn’t defend someone inside her campaign who
exposed the lies or revealed the source of the campaign funds and
claimed something like a Kantian categorical imperative. “I had to do
it,” the leaker might say. “No, you didn’t,” I would respond. Lying to
one’s fellow citizens and seeking funds that the candidate doesn’t dare
talk about are certainly practices that should not be generalized. If all
candidates acted in that way (and far too many do), democracy itself
would be at risk. But if democratic institutions were already at risk,
March/April 2018 49
Michael Walzer
most citizens would want to make an exception for a politician they

were sure would defend those institutions—even if she did not adhere
to democratic norms while seeking office.
THE SECRET SHARER

Government secrets and deceptions are equally common but often
harder to judge than the secrets and deceptions of individual candidates
or elected officials. A relatively easy case can help establish some of
the contours. It was militarily necessary and therefore justified for
the U.S. government to keep the date of the 1944 D-Day invasion
secret from the Germans and, in order to ensure secrecy, to withhold
the information from almost everyone else, too. Governments justi-
fiably conceal such information from anyone who does not need to
know it. Similarly, Washington’s and London’s efforts to deceive the
Germans about the location of the invasion were also justified, as
were all the lies that officials told as part of those efforts. Providing
that information to the press would not have been a good thing to
do; in fact, someone who revealed it would probably have been
charged with treason.
But contemporary U.S. military operations often do invite whistle-
blowing—as in cases in which the people being kept in the dark are
not U.S. enemies, who know a good deal about what’s going on
since their operatives or soldiers are already engaged with American
ones. Rather, it’s the American people who don’t know. Think of
drone attacks or special operations that the public has never been told
about, in places that most Americans have never heard of; recent
U.S. military activities in Niger offer a good example. Soldiers die,
and officials struggle to explain the mission—and, with even greater
difficulty, the reasons for concealing it in the first place. In the
wake of such incidents, it’s plausible to argue that the truth should
have been revealed earlier on by someone with inside knowledge.
The whistleblower in this case would be a good citizen, one might
argue, because the use of force abroad should always be the subject
of democratic debate. Still, such a disclosure might not be justified
if the operation was defensible—necessary for national security, for
example, or intended to help people in desperate trouble—and if
blowing the whistle would shut down any prospect of success. A
disclosure might also be unjustified if it put the lives of U.S. operatives
or armed forces at risk. Government officials usually claim that both
the operation and U.S. personnel have been endangered. The case
at hand, they regularly insist, is just like D-Day.
But U.S. leaders often choose secrecy for a very different reason:
they fear that an operation would not survive public scrutiny or a
democratic decision-making process. Or an operation has been debated
and democratically approved but has taken on a different character in
the field. Mission creep is common and
often results in an entirely new mission,
different from the one that citizens
U.S. leaders often choose
debated and Congress voted on. The secrecy out of fear that an
new mission may be strategically and operation would not
morally justifiable, but the democratic survive a democratic
process has been cut short or avoided
altogether. If the operation is kept secret, decision-making process.
however, Americans don’t know that it
hasn’t been democratically authorized; they don’t know that it is going
on at all. And obviously, they can’t weigh official justifications, since
they have never heard a government official justify the operation.
By contrast, a potential whistleblower knows that the operation is
going on and that it hasn’t been democratically authorized. But who is
she to judge its strategic or moral value? In recent years, many govern-
ment whistleblowers have been very young people—members, perhaps,
of a generation of “digital natives,” who believe that everything should
be revealed. But government employees and contractors take oaths or
sign agreements that commit them to obey secrecy rules; their superiors
and fellow workers trust them to protect the confidentiality of their
common enterprise, whatever it is.
If the enterprise is clearly illegal or monstrously immoral, a govern-
ment employee or contractor should certainly break that promise,
violate the trust of her coworkers, and blow the whistle. Officials or
operatives engaged in illegal or immoral activities don’t deserve her
protection. This argument is similar to one often made in the case of
humanitarian intervention: if a massacre is going on, anyone who can
stop it should stop it, regardless of the costs imposed on the killers. If
the U.S. government is engaged in an illegal and immoral operation,
anyone who can stop it should.
Consider a rough analogy. U.S. soldiers are required by international
law and by the Uniform Code of Military Justice to refuse to obey
illegal commands—and they should assume that monstrously immoral
March/April 2018 51
Michael Walzer
commands are always illegal. Discipline and obedience are more crucial
to a military than they are to a civilian bureaucracy, and yet soldiers
are commanded to disobey illegal orders even on the battlefield. Citizens
might excuse a soldier who obeyed an illegal order under coercion or
who evaded rather than defied the order—as did the U.S. soldiers at
the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam who shot into the air, deliberately
missing the civilians they had been ordered to kill. There are civilian
equivalents of this kind of evasion, such as slowing down the work
required to prepare for an operation or doing the work so badly that
the operation has to be postponed or canceled. Whistle-blowing, by
contrast, is closer to deliberate disobedience on the battlefield.
There is a difference between the two contexts, however: a soldier
often has to decide whether to obey in an instant; a whistleblower has
more time. Bureaucracies move slowly, so a whistleblower, thinking
about a clearly illegal or immoral operation, can appeal to her superiors
to stop the operation. She can deliberate at length about the costs of
what she is preparing to do. She can talk to coworkers whom she
trusts (although there probably won’t be any). Publicly blowing the
whistle may mean losing her job and perhaps going to prison. Yet
assuming she has exhausted the options for internal dissent, this is her
obligation. And if she blows the whistle, her fellow citizens should
recognize the value of what she has done, after the fact.
But what if the operation isn’t clearly illegal or morally mon-
strous? What if there are arguments to support it, and the would-be
whistleblower has heard them, even though her fellow citizens
haven’t? How can she claim the right to judge the official account of
what’s going on and the justifications of her coworkers and superiors,
many of whom have more experience than she has? Such a situation
is very different from the case of a soldier on the battlefield, who
can see pretty clearly the meaning of what she is being ordered to
do—who might even look into the eyes of the innocent civilians she
has been told to kill.
Whistle-blowing generally involves decision-making under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Americans elect officials and ask them (and their
appointees) to make decisions under those conditions. These officials
may not be any more qualified than ordinary citizens, but they have
been given and they have accepted a charge and the responsibilities
that go with it—which include, crucially, the obligation to worry
about the consequences of their decisions. Officials have at their
disposal a multitude of researchers, analysts, and advisers, who pre-

sumably reduce the uncertainty and help with the worrying. By con-
trast, a whistleblower is usually alone; her uncertainties are private,
and the public cannot know how much she worries. Indeed, one of
the things the public should be concerned about is how well a whistle-
blower understands the uncertainties. Is she a good worrier? It can
be dangerous when whistleblowers make their decisions on the basis
of some ideological fixation or long-standing prejudice. That’s a
danger for officials, too—but they are being watched by coworkers
(and, to an extent, by Congress and the media), whereas whistle-
blowers act in the shadows.
March/April 2018 53
Michael Walzer
A WHISTLE IN THE DARK

Does it make a difference if whistleblowers are (or claim to be) con-
scientious? “Conscience” originally meant what the word suggests:
“co-knowledge,” shared, as the early Protestants said, between a man
and “his God.” But in the case of a whistleblower, the knowledge is
uncertain and limited to the individual: good enough, perhaps, to
justify someone’s refusal to serve in the military, but not good enough
to justify decisions that affect large numbers of other people. I am
sure that many whistleblowers have consciences, but they have to
defend their actions in other terms.
If American citizens are good democrats, they will always be suspi-
cious of government officials, and that will make them receptive to
the information that whistleblowers provide. But they ought to be
suspicious of whistleblowers, too. Citizens may not need to know
the information that a whistleblower provides—indeed, the whistle-
blower might be acting for profit or publicity and not out of a desire
for more democratic decision-making or a concern for law and morality.
Sometimes, however, whistle-blowing opens a debate that should
have started long before and exposes government activities that many
citizens strongly oppose.
Imagine a military or intelligence operation that originally made
a lot of sense and that the government has successfully defended to
the public but that has expanded in ways that U.S. citizens didn’t
anticipate and haven’t been told about. The operation now requires
a degree of force far greater than officials had originally planned for,
and its geographic range has expanded. The potential whistleblower
knows what is going on, and she knows that there hasn’t been any-
thing resembling a democratic decision. Is that enough knowledge
to justify revealing details about the operation to the media? Probably
not: she has to make some judgment about the character of the
expanded operation, and she has to consider the possible consequences
of her revelations—and she is, remember, no better a judge than
anyone else.
Arguably, the goal of empowering citizens by supplying them with
crucial but secret information justifies whistle-blowing—as long as
there are good reasons to believe that secrecy isn’t a legitimate
requirement of the mission and as long as the revelation results in no
negative consequences for U.S. personnel in the field. Those two
qualifications, however, will probably mean that whistle-blowing can-
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not be justified in many cases. But now imagine that the expanded
operation involves terrible brutality or potential danger to civilians
abroad or in the United States. And the whistleblower believes that
ordinary Americans would recognize the brutality or the danger, and
so she isn’t merely acting on her own judgment: she is assuming that
most of her fellow citizens would judge the situation in the same
way—and giving them the chance to do so.
This is the best way to think about whistle-blowing: it involves a
kind of moral risk-taking, and it can be justified only after the fact, if
other citizens recognize its morality. Of course, its morality will always
be contested, with government officials arguing that an important mis-
sion has been undercut and that agents
in the field have been endangered. This
might be true, or it might be a lie, which
Soldiers are obligated to
would justify further whistle-blowing. disobey illegal orders; civil
The whistleblower herself is counting servants are not obligated
on her fellow citizens to defend her to blow the whistle when
judgment—to affirm it, in fact, and say,
“Yes, this is an operation that we should they see wrongdoing.
have been told about, and it is one that
we would have rejected.” If most of her fellow citizens agree—or, rather,
most of those who are paying attention, since majority rule would not
work here—then exposing the operation was likely justified.
The case is the same if U.S. citizens are both the objects of the
operation and the ones from whom it is being concealed. The best-
known contemporary American whistleblower, the former National
Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, revealed the large-
scale surveillance of Americans by their own government. He bet that
most of his fellow citizens would not think that the danger they faced
was great enough to warrant such a massive invasion of their privacy.
With some difficulty, I can imagine circumstances in which large-
scale secret surveillance by an otherwise democratic state might be
justifiable or at least defensible. But what Snowden revealed was an
operation that could not be justified by any actually existing danger;
this was something that American citizens needed to know about.
Unfortunately, however, Snowden revealed much more than what
Americans needed to know—and not only to his fellow citizens: in
addition to sharing secrets about the surveillance of American citi-
zens with journalists from The Washington Post and The Guardian, he
March/April 2018 55
Michael Walzer
provided the South China Morning Post with information about U.S.
intelligence operations against non-American targets in mainland
China. That disclosure put Americans at risk, and Snowden had no
reason to believe that what the United States was doing in China was
either illegal or immoral—or anything other than routine.
Judgments in cases like this one will obviously be shaped by political
views, but not, one hopes, by partisan loyalties. Many liberals and
Democrats, along with some conservatives and a few Republicans,
condemned the domestic surveillance that Snowden revealed and
defended his decision to do so. The first year of the Trump adminis-
tration, however, has seen many leaks that have derived from and
invited partisanship. Consider the leaked details of the president’s
May 2017 conversation with Russian officials in the Oval Office, after
he had fired FBI Director James Comey, who had been investigating
whether Donald Trump’s election campaign had coordinated with the
Kremlin. “I just fired the head of the FBI. He was crazy, a real nut job,”
Trump said, according to a source quoted by The New York Times. “I
faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off.” The Washington
Post reported that during the same meeting, Trump shared highly
classified information with the Russians that “jeopardized a critical
source of intelligence on the Islamic State.” The leakers to the Times
and the Post certainly meant to raise questions about the president’s
competence on foreign policy. Americans who already doubted Trump’s
abilities welcomed the leak. The president’s supporters obviously
did not.
There is no way to make an objective judgment here—not, at least,
about the leakers. But the journalists who reported this and many
other leaks, and who worked hard to make sure of their accuracy, were
doing their job and ought to be commended. They did not confront a
moral dilemma. Leaks of this sort are grist for the mill of a free press.
BUREAUCRATIC OUTLAWS
As for whistle-blowing, as opposed to leaking, a truly detached and
fully informed observer would probably be able to make an objective
judgment about any particular revelation. But that sort of judgment
isn’t likely in the fraught world of politics and government—although
a consensus might take shape, slowly, over time, as in the case of the
Pentagon Papers: it seems likely that most Americans have come to
believe that the military analyst Daniel Ellsberg did the right thing
in sharing the documents with the press. Whistleblowers such as

Ellsberg appeal to their fellow citizens, and there really isn’t any further
appeal to make. If the citizens don’t agree among themselves about
the justifiability of the disclosure, there can be no definitive verdict.
But suppose that most Americans recognize the brutality or the
danger that has driven the whistleblower to act. Her action was justified,
but she has violated the commitments she made when she took her
job, and she may have broken the law.
When soldiers disobey an illegal order, Democracies live
they are in fact obeying the official
army code. But there is no official code uneasily with secrecy,
that orders civil servants to refuse to and governments
keep secrets about an illegal or immoral keep too many secrets.
operation. Soldiers are obligated to dis-
obey; civil servants are not obligated to
blow the whistle. They are, however, protected from official retaliation
and punishment by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 if they
reveal a range of illegal government actions: gross mismanagement,
the waste of public funds, or policies that pose a substantial and
specific danger to public health and safety.
If whistleblowers are fired or demoted for revelations such as those,
they can file an appeal to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board.
These appeals are most often denied—but not always. In 2003, Robert
MacLean, an employee of the Transportation Security Administration,
told an MSNBC reporter that in an effort to reduce spending on hotels,
the TSA would be removing air marshals from many long-distance
flights. He was subsequently fired. After appealing the decision—first
to the MSPB, then to a federal appeals court—he was finally reinstated
in 2013. The Supreme Court upheld that decision in 2015. It was a
rare judicial victory for whistle-blowing.
But blowing the whistle on government action abroad or on security-
related surveillance at home isn’t protected by the Whistleblower
Protection Act. And revealing classified information is not legal even
if public health and safety are at issue. If a whistleblower reveals secrets
that the government doesn’t believe should be revealed, she has broken
the law, regardless of her intentions or public sentiment about her
actions. She is a disobedient civil servant, a bureaucratic outlaw.
Citizens might well consider her action a form of civil disobedience.
But an act must meet certain conditions for that term to apply. First,
March/April 2018 57
Michael Walzer
the whistleblower must have tried to convince a superior that the

government’s operation was illegal or immoral. Before going outside
the government, she must have done the best she could inside, among
her coworkers. Second, she must act in person and in public, without
any attempt to hide who she is—even though this means that she
won’t see any more secrets. Many leaks can come from a single concealed
leaker, but whistle-blowing is almost certainly a one-time act. If
internal dissent doesn’t work, then going public is a kind of principled
resignation. Third, the whistleblower must take responsibility for the
revelation she has made; she must not hand secret documents to agents
about whose subsequent behavior she can’t be reasonably confident.
She has a purpose for blowing the whistle, and she has to do her best
to make sure that her purpose, and no other, is served. Snowden ini-
tially chose The Guardian, The Washington Post, and The New York
Times (among other media outlets) as venues for his leaked secrets,
and this seems the right kind of choice since these are newspapers
whose publishers have had, along with a desire to sell papers, a long-
standing commitment to democratic government. But Snowden
showed less careful judgment in choosing to share information with
the South China Morning Post, an organization that he had no reason
to believe was committed to democratic decision-making in the
United States.
A similarly flawed judgment also affected the case of another well-
known American whistleblower, Chelsea Manning, who in 2010
provided a massive trove of classified diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks.
In contrast to newspapers with long records of public service, Wiki-
Leaks is the wrong kind of intermediary between a whistleblower and
the American people. Its directors may or may not have democratic
commitments, but they also have narrowly partisan and personal aims,
about which the public has learned a great deal in recent years.
TOUGH CALLS
A civil whistleblower is making the same appeal to her fellow citizens
that civil rights activists in the 1960s made—in similar defiance of the
law and with a similar willingness to accept legal punishment. Whistle-
blowers can and probably should be punished for revealing state
secrets, even if the secrecy is unjust. Judges and juries should try to
make the whistleblower’s punishment fit her crime, and her crime
must be weighed against the government’s subversion of the democratic
process and the illegality and immorality of the revealed operation:

the more significant the subversion and the greater the brutality or
danger, the milder the sentence should be.
There must be some punishment for people who break secrecy
laws, to serve justice when someone blows the whistle recklessly and
to deter others from doing so. The fear of punishment focuses the
mind and forces a potential whistleblower to think hard about what
she is doing. Citizens should respect a whistleblower’s willingness to
pay the price of her disobedience, and at the same time, they should
make their own judgments about whether what she did was right or
wrong. Her action may require a complicated verdict: for example,
perhaps she was right to open the democratic debate but wrong in her
assumption of what the outcome of the debate should be. In any case,
the public owes her a reflective response—not knee-jerk hostility or
knee-jerk support.
Democracies live uneasily with secrecy, and governments keep too
many secrets. Greater transparency in government decision-making
would certainly be a good thing, but it has to be fought for democrati-
cally, through the conventional politics of parties and movements.
Whistle-blowing probably does not lead to greater transparency; in
the long run, it may only ensure that governments bury their secrets
more deeply and watch their employees more closely. Still, so long as
there are secrets, whistle-blowing will remain a necessary activity.
Whistleblowers have a role to play in a democratic political universe.
But it is an unofficial role, and one must recognize both its possible
value and its possible dangers.∂
March/April 2018 59
The China Reckoning
How Beijing Defied American Expectations
T
he United States has always had an outsize sense of its ability
to determine China’s course. Again and again, its ambitions
have come up short. After World War II, George Marshall,
the U.S. special envoy to China, hoped to broker a peace between the
Nationalists and Communists in the Chinese Civil War. During the
Korean War, the Truman administration thought it could dissuade
Mao Zedong’s troops from crossing the Yalu River. The Johnson admin-
istration believed Beijing would ultimately circumscribe its involve-
ment in Vietnam. In each instance, Chinese realities upset American
expectations.
With U.S. President Richard Nixon’s opening to China, Washington
made its biggest and most optimistic bet yet. Both Nixon and Henry
Kissinger, his national security adviser, assumed that rapprochement
would drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow and, in time, alter
China’s conception of its own interests as it drew closer to the United
States. In the fall of 1967, Nixon wrote in this magazine, “The world
cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that
we can influence events, should be to induce change.” Ever since, the
assumption that deepening commercial, diplomatic, and cultural ties
would transform China’s internal development and external behavior
has been a bedrock of U.S. strategy. Even those in U.S. policy circles
who were skeptical of China’s intentions still shared the underlying
belief that U.S. power and hegemony could readily mold China to the
United States’ liking.
KURT M. CAMPBELL is Chairman of the Asia Group and was U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013.
ELY RATNER is Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations and was Deputy National Security Adviser to U.S. Vice President Joe
Biden from 2015 to 2017.
The China Reckoning
The era of good feelings: Xi and Obama in California, June 2013

Nearly half a century since Nixon’s first steps toward rapproche-
ment, the record is increasingly clear that Washington once again put
too much faith in its power to shape China’s trajectory. All sides of the
policy debate erred: free traders and financiers who foresaw inevitable
and increasing openness in China, integrationists who argued that
Beijing’s ambitions would be tamed by greater interaction with the
international community, and hawks who believed that China’s power
would be abated by perpetual American primacy.
Neither carrots nor sticks have swayed China as predicted. Diplomatic
and commercial engagement have not brought political and economic
openness. Neither U.S. military power nor regional balancing has
stopped Beijing from seeking to displace core components of the
U.S.-led system. And the liberal international order has failed to
lure or bind China as powerfully as expected. China has instead pur-
sued its own course, belying a range of American expectations in
KEVIN LAMARQU E / REUT E RS
the process.
That reality warrants a clear-eyed rethinking of the United States’
approach to China. There are plenty of risks that come with such a
reassessment; defenders of the current framework will warn against
destabilizing the bilateral relationship or inviting a new Cold War.
But building a stronger and more sustainable approach to, and rela-
March/April 2018 61
tionship with, Beijing requires honesty about how many fundamental

assumptions have turned out wrong. Across the ideological spectrum,
we in the U.S. foreign policy community have remained deeply in-
vested in expectations about China—about its approach to economics,
domestic politics, security, and global order—even as evidence against
them has accumulated. The policies built on such expectations have
failed to change China in the ways we intended or hoped.
THE POWER OF THE MARKET

Greater commercial interaction with China was supposed to bring
gradual but steady liberalization of the Chinese economy. U.S. President
George H. W. Bush’s 1990 National Security Strategy described
enhanced ties with the world as “crucial to China’s prospects for
regaining the path of economic reform.” This argument predominated
for decades. It drove U.S. decisions to grant China most-favored-
nation trading status in the 1990s, to support its accession to the
World Trade Organization in 2001, to establish a high-level economic
dialogue in 2006, and to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty under
U.S. President Barack Obama.
Trade in goods between the United States and China exploded from
less than $8 billion in 1986 to over $578 billion in 2016: more than
a 30-fold increase, adjusting for inflation. Since the early years of
this century, however, China’s economic liberalization has stalled.
Contrary to Western expectations, Beijing has doubled down on its
state capitalist model even as it has gotten richer. Rather than becoming
a force for greater openness, consistent growth has served to legitimize
the Chinese Communist Party and its state-led economic model.
U.S. officials believed that debt, inefficiency, and the demands of
a more advanced economy would necessitate further reforms. And
Chinese officials recognized the problems with their approach; in 2007,
Premier Wen Jiabao called the Chinese economy “unstable, unbalanced,
uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” But rather than opening the country
up to greater competition, the Chinese Communist Party, intent on main-
taining control of the economy, is instead consolidating state-owned
enterprises and pursuing industrial policies (notably its “Made in
China 2025” plan) that aim to promote national technology champi-
ons in critical sectors, including aerospace, biomedicine, and robotics.
And despite repeated promises, Beijing has resisted pressure from
Washington and elsewhere to level the playing field for foreign
The China Reckoning
companies. It has restricted market access and forced non-Chinese

firms to sign on to joint ventures and share technology, while funneling
investment and subsidies to state-backed domestic players.
Until recently, U.S. policymakers and executives mostly acquiesced
to such discrimination; the potential commercial benefits were so
large that they considered it unwise to upend the relationship with
protectionism or sanctions. Instead, they fought tooth and nail for
small, incremental concessions. But now, what were once seen as
merely the short-term frustrations of doing business with China
have come to seem more harmful and permanent. The American
Chamber of Commerce reported last year that eight in ten U.S.
companies felt less welcome in China than in years prior, and more
than 60 percent had little or no confidence that China would open its
markets further over the next three years. Cooperative and voluntary
mechanisms to pry open China’s economy have by and large failed,
including the Trump administration’s newly launched Comprehensive
Economic Dialogue.
THE IMPERATIVE OF LIBERALIZATION

Growth was supposed to bring not just further economic opening
but also political liberalization. Development would spark a virtuous
cycle, the thinking went, with a burgeoning Chinese middle class
demanding new rights and pragmatic officials embracing legal reforms
that would be necessary for further progress. This evolution seemed
especially certain after the collapse of the Soviet Union and demo-
cratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan. “No nation on Earth
has discovered a way to import the world’s goods and services while
stopping foreign ideas at the border,” George H. W. Bush proclaimed.
U.S. policy aimed to facilitate this process by sharing technol-
ogy, furthering trade and investment, promoting people-to-people
exchanges, and admitting hundreds of thousands of Chinese students
to American universities.
The crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square
in 1989 dimmed hopes for the emergence of electoral democracy in
China. Yet many experts and policymakers in the United States still
expected the Chinese government to permit greater press freedoms
and allow for a stronger civil society, while gradually embracing more
political competition both within the Communist Party and at local
levels. They believed that the information technology revolution of
March/April 2018 63
the 1990s would encourage such trends by further exposing Chinese

citizens to the world and enhancing the economic incentives for open-
ness. As U.S. President Bill Clinton put it, “Without the full freedom
to think, question, to create, China will be at a distinct disadvantage,
competing with fully open societies in the information age where
the greatest source of national wealth is what resides in the human
mind.” Leaders in Beijing would come to realize that only by granting
individual freedoms could China thrive in a high-tech future.
But the fear that greater openness would threaten both domestic
stability and the regime’s survival drove China’s leaders to look for an
alternative approach. They took both
the shock of Tiananmen Square and
Events of the last decade the dissolution of the Soviet Union
have dashed even modest as evidence of the dangers of democ-
hopes for China’s political ratization and political competition.
liberalization. So rather than embracing positive
cycles of openness, Beijing responded
to the forces of globalization by put-
ting up walls and tightening state control, constricting, rather than
reinforcing, the free flow of people, ideas, and commerce. Additional
stresses on the regime in this century—including an economic slow-
down, endemic corruption in the government and the military, and
ominous examples of popular uprisings elsewhere in the world—have
spurred more authoritarianism, not less.
Indeed, events of the last decade have dashed even modest hopes
for political liberalization. In 2013, an internal Communist Party
memo known as Document No. 9 explicitly warned against “Western
constitutional democracy” and other “universal values” as stalking-
horses meant to weaken, destabilize, and even break up China. This
guidance demonstrated the widening gap between U.S. and Chinese
expectations for the country’s political future. As Orville Schell, a
leading American expert on China, put it: “China is sliding ineluctably
backward into a political climate more reminiscent of Mao Zedong in
the 1970s than Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.” Today, an ongoing crack-
down on journalists, religious leaders, academics, social activists, and
human rights lawyers shows no sign of abating—more than 300 law-
yers, legal assistants, and activists were detained in 2015 alone.
Rather than devolving power to the Chinese people, as many in the
West predicted, communications technologies have strengthened the
The China Reckoning
hand of the state, helping China’s authorities control information

flows and monitor citizens’ behavior. Censorship, detentions, and a
new cybersecurity law that grants broad government control over the
Internet in China have stymied political activity inside China’s “Great
Firewall.” China’s twenty-first-century authoritarianism now includes
plans to launch a “social credit system,” fusing big data and artificial
intelligence to reward and punish Chinese citizens on the basis of
their political, commercial, social, and online activity. Facial recogni-
tion software, combined with the ubiquity of surveillance cameras
across China, has even made it possible for the state to physically
locate people within minutes.
THE DETERRENT OF PRIMACY

A combination of U.S. diplomacy and U.S. military power—carrots
and sticks—was supposed to persuade Beijing that it was neither
possible nor necessary to challenge the U.S.-led security order in Asia.
Washington “strongly promot[ed] China’s participation in regional
security mechanisms to reassure its neighbors and assuage its own
security concerns,” as the Clinton administration’s 1995 National
Security Strategy put it, buttressed by military-to-military relations
and other confidence-building measures. These modes of engagement
were coupled with a “hedge”—enhanced U.S. military power in the
region, supported by capable allies and partners. The effect, the think-
ing went, would be to allay military competition in Asia and further
limit China’s desire to alter the regional order. Beijing would settle for
military sufficiency, building armed forces for narrow regional contin-
gencies while devoting most of its resources to domestic needs.
The logic was not simply that China would be focused on its self-
described “strategic window of opportunity” for development at home,
with plenty of economic and social challenges occupying the attention
of China’s senior leaders. American policymakers and academics also
assumed that China had learned a valuable lesson from the Soviet
Union about the crippling costs of getting into an arms race with the
United States. Washington could thus not only deter Chinese aggres-
sion but also—to use the Pentagon’s term of art—“dissuade” China from
even trying to compete. Zalmay Khalilzad, an official in the Reagan
and both Bush administrations, argued that a dominant United States
could “convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be
difficult to prepare and extremely risky to pursue.” Moreover, it was
March/April 2018 65
unclear whether China could challenge U.S. primacy even if it wanted

to. Into the late 1990s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was
considered decades behind the United States’ military and those of
its allies.
Against this backdrop, U.S. officials took considerable care not to
stumble into a confrontation with China. The political scientist Joseph
Nye explained the thinking when he led the Pentagon’s Asia office
during the Clinton administration: “If we
China has set out to build treated China as an enemy, we were
guaranteeing an enemy in the future. If
its own set of regional and we treated China as a friend, we could
international institutions. not guarantee friendship, but we could
at least keep open the possibility of more
benign outcomes.” Soon-to-be Secretary
of State Colin Powell told Congress at his confirmation hearing in
January 2001, “China is not an enemy, and our challenge is to keep it
that way.”
Even as it began investing more of its newfound wealth in military
power, the Chinese government sought to put Washington at ease,
signaling continued adherence to the cautious, moderate foreign
policy path set out by Deng. In 2005, the senior Communist Party
official Zheng Bijian wrote in this magazine that China would never
seek regional hegemony and remained committed to “a peaceful rise.”
In 2011, after a lively debate among China’s leaders about whether it
was time to shift gears, State Councilor Dai Bingguo assured the world
that “peaceful development is a strategic choice China has made.”
Starting in 2002, the U.S. Defense Department had been producing
a congressionally mandated annual report on China’s military, but
the consensus among senior U.S. officials was that China remained a
distant and manageable challenge.
That view, however, underestimated just how simultaneously insecure
and ambitious China’s leadership really was. For Beijing, the United
States’ alliances and military presence in Asia posed unacceptable
threats to China’s interests in Taiwan, on the Korean Peninsula, and
in the East China and South China Seas. In the words of the Peking
University professor Wang Jisi, “It is strongly believed in China
that . . . Washington will attempt to prevent the emerging powers,
in particular China, from achieving their goals and enhancing their
stature.” So China started to chip away at the U.S.-led security order
The China Reckoning
in Asia, developing the capabilities to deny the U.S. military access

to the region and driving wedges between Washington and its allies.
Ultimately, neither U.S. military power nor American diplomatic
engagement has dissuaded China from trying to build a world-class
military of its own. High-tech displays of American power in Iraq
and elsewhere only accelerated efforts to modernize the PLA. Chinese
President Xi Jinping has launched military reforms that will make
Chinese forces more lethal and more capable of projecting military
power well beyond China’s shores. With its third aircraft carrier report-
edly under construction, advanced new military installations in the
South China Sea, and its first overseas military base in Djibouti,
China is on the path to becoming a military peer the likes of which the
United States has not seen since the Soviet Union. China’s leaders no
longer repeat Deng’s dictum that, to thrive, China will “hide [its]
capabilities and bide [its] time.” Xi declared in October 2017 that
“the Chinese nation has gone from standing up, to becoming rich, to
becoming strong.”
THE CONSTRAINTS OF ORDER

At the end of World War II, the United States built institutions and
rules that helped structure global politics and the regional dynamics
in Asia. Widely accepted norms, such as the freedom of commerce
and navigation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and international
cooperation on global challenges, superseded nineteenth-century
spheres of influence. As a leading beneficiary of this liberal interna-
tional order, the thinking went, Beijing would have a considerable
stake in the order’s preservation and come to see its continuation as
essential to China’s own progress. U.S. policy aimed to encourage
Beijing’s involvement by welcoming China into leading institutions
and working with it on global governance and regional security.
As China joined multilateral institutions, U.S. policymakers hoped
that it would learn to play by the rules and soon begin to contribute
to their upkeep. In the George W. Bush administration, Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick memorably called on Beijing to
become “a responsible stakeholder” in the international system. From
Washington’s perspective, with greater power came greater obligation,
especially since China had profited so handsomely from the system.
As Obama emphasized, “We expect China to help uphold the very
rules that have made them successful.”
March/April 2018 67
In certain venues, China appeared to be steadily, if unevenly, taking

on this responsibility. It joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
organization in 1991, acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
in 1992, joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and took part
in major diplomatic efforts, including the six-party talks and the
P5+1 negotiations to deal with nuclear weapons programs in North
Korea and Iran, respectively. It also became a major contributor to
UN counterpiracy and peacekeeping operations.
Yet Beijing remained threatened by other central elements of the
U.S.-led order—and has increasingly sought to displace them. That
has been especially true of what it sees as uninvited violations of
national sovereignty by the United States and its partners, whether
in the form of economic sanctions or military action. Liberal norms
regarding the international community’s right or responsibility to
intervene to protect people from human rights violations, for example,
have run headlong into China’s paramount priority of defending its
authoritarian system from foreign interference. With a few notable
exceptions, China has been busy watering down multilateral sanctions,
shielding regimes from Western opprobrium, and making common
cause with Russia to block the UN Security Council from authorizing
interventionist actions. A number of nondemocratic governments—
in Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere—have benefited
from such obstruction.
China has also set out to build its own set of regional and interna-
tional institutions—with the United States on the outside looking
in—rather than deepening its commitment to the existing ones. It has
launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Devel-
opment Bank (along with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa), and,
most notably, the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s grandiose vision for
building land and maritime routes to connect China to much of the
world. These institutions and programs have given China agenda-
setting and convening power of its own, while often departing from
the standards and values upheld by existing international institutions.
Beijing explicitly differentiates its approach to development by noting
that, unlike the United States and European powers, it does not
demand that countries accept governance reforms as a condition of
receiving aid.
In its own region, meanwhile, Beijing has set out to change the
security balance, incrementally altering the status quo with steps just
The China Reckoning
small enough to avoid provoking a military response from the United

States. In the South China Sea, one of the world’s most important
waterways, China has deftly used coast guard vessels, legal warfare,
and economic coercion to advance its sovereignty claims. In some
cases, it has simply seized contested territory or militarized artificial
islands. While Beijing has occasionally shown restraint and tactical
caution, the overall approach indicates its desire to create a modern
maritime sphere of influence.
In the summer of 2016, China ignored a landmark ruling by a tribu-
nal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which held that
China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea were illegal under
international law. U.S. officials wrongly assumed that some combination
of pressure, shame, and its own desire for a rules-based maritime order
would cause Beijing, over time, to accept the judgment. Instead,
China has rejected it outright. Speaking to a security forum in Aspen,
Colorado, a year after the ruling, in July 2017, a senior analyst from the
CIA concluded that the experience had taught China’s leaders “that
they can defy international law and get away with it.” Countries in the
region, swayed by both their economic dependence on China and
growing concerns about the United States’ commitment to Asia, have
failed to push back against Chinese assertiveness as much as U.S.
policymakers expected they would.
TAKING STOCK
As the assumptions driving U.S. China policy have started to look
increasingly tenuous, and the gap between American expectations
and Chinese realities has grown, Washington has been largely focused
elsewhere. Since 2001, the fight against jihadist terrorism has con-
sumed the U.S. national security apparatus, diverting attention
from the changes in Asia at exactly the time China was making
enormous military, diplomatic, and commercial strides. U.S. Presi-
dent George W. Bush initially referred to China as a “strategic
competitor”; in the wake of the September 11 attacks, however, his
2002 National Security Strategy declared, “The world’s great powers
find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of ter-
rorist violence and chaos.” During the Obama administration, there
was an effort to “pivot,” or “rebalance,” strategic attention to Asia. But
at the end of Obama’s time in office, budgets and personnel remained
focused on other regions—there were, for example, three times as
March/April 2018 69
many National Security Council staffers working on the Middle

East as on all of East and Southeast Asia.
This strategic distraction has given China the opportunity to press
its advantages, further motivated by the increasingly prominent view
in China that the United States (along with the West more broadly)
is in inexorable and rapid decline. Chinese officials see a United States
that has been hobbled for years by the global financial crisis, its
costly war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and deepening dysfunction
in Washington. Xi has called on China to become “a global leader
in terms of comprehensive national strength and international influ-
ence” by midcentury. He touts China’s development model as a “new
option for other countries.”
Washington now faces its most dynamic and formidable competi-
tor in modern history. Getting this challenge right will require doing
away with the hopeful thinking that has long characterized the
United States’ approach to China. The Trump administration’s first
National Security Strategy took a step in the right direction by inter-
rogating past assumptions in U.S. strategy. But many of Donald
Trump’s policies—a narrow focus on bilateral trade deficits, the
abandonment of multilateral trade deals, the questioning of the value
of alliances, and the downgrading of human rights and diplomacy—
have put Washington at risk of adopting an approach that is confron-
tational without being competitive; Beijing, meanwhile, has managed
to be increasingly competitive without being confrontational.
The starting point for a better approach is a new degree of humility
about the United States’ ability to change China. Neither seeking
to isolate and weaken it nor trying to transform it for the better
should be the lodestar of U.S. strategy in Asia. Washington should
instead focus more on its own power and behavior, and the power and
behavior of its allies and partners. Basing policy on a more realistic
set of assumptions about China would better advance U.S. interests
and put the bilateral relationship on a more sustainable footing.
Getting there will take work, but the first step is relatively straight-
forward: acknowledging just how much our policy has fallen short
of our aspirations.∂
What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like
Jennifer Lind
F
or now, the United States remains the dominant power in East
Asia, but China is quickly closing the gap. Although an economic
crisis or domestic political turmoil could derail China’s rise, if
current trends continue, China will before long supplant the United
States as the region’s economic, military, and political hegemon.
As that day approaches, U.S. allies and partners in the region, such
as Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, will start to face
some difficult questions. Namely, should they step up their individual
defense efforts and increase their cooperation with other countries in
the region, or can they safely decide to accept Chinese dominance,
looking to Beijing as they have looked to Washington for the past
half century?
It may be tempting to believe that China will be a relatively benign
regional hegemon. Economic interdependence, one argument goes,
should restrain Chinese aggression: because the legitimacy of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rests on economic growth, which
depends on trade, Beijing would maintain peaceful relations with
its neighbors. Moreover, China claims to be a different sort of great
power. Chinese officials and scholars regularly decry interventionism
and reject the notion of “spheres of influence” as a Cold War relic.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that his country has “never
engaged in colonialism or aggression” thanks to its “peace-loving
cultural tradition.” In this view, life in China’s Asia would not be so
different from what it is today.
But this is not how regional hegemons behave. Great powers
typically dominate their regions in their quest for security. They
develop and wield tremendous economic power. They build massive
JENNIFER LIND is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Follow her
on Twitter @profLind.
March/April 2018 71
Jennifer Lind
militaries, expel external rivals, and use regional institutions and cul-
tural programs to entrench their influence. Because hegemons fear
that neighboring countries will allow external rivals to establish a mil-
itary foothold, they develop a profound interest in the domestic
politics of their neighborhood, and even seek to spread their culture
to draw other countries closer.
China is already following the strategies of previous regional hege-
mons. It is using economic coercion to bend other countries to its will.
It is building up its military to ward off challengers. It is intervening
in other countries’ domestic politics to get friendlier policies. And it
is investing massively in educational and cultural programs to enhance
its soft power. As Chinese power and ambition grow, such efforts will
only increase. China’s neighbors must start debating how comfortable
they are with this future, and what costs they are willing to pay to
shape or forestall it.
ECONOMIC CENTRALITY
Over the past few decades, China has become the number one trading
partner and principal export destination for most countries in East
Asia. Beijing has struck a number of regional economic deals, including
free-trade agreements with Australia, Singapore, South Korea, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and others. Through such
arrangements, which exclude the United States, Beijing seeks to
create a Chinese-dominated East Asian community. Beijing is also
building an institutional infrastructure to increase its influence at the
expense of U.S.-led institutions, such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and Japanese-led ones, such as the
Asian Development Bank. In 2014, China, along with Brazil, Russia,
and India, set up the $100 billion New Development Bank, which is
headquartered in Shanghai. In 2015, China founded the $100 billion
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which 80 countries have now
joined. Furthermore, Xi’s much-heralded Belt and Road initiative will
promote Chinese trade and financial cooperation throughout the
region and provide massive Chinese investment in regional infrastruc-
ture and natural resources. The China Development Bank has already
committed $250 billion in loans to the project.
Such policies mimic the economic strategies of previous regional
hegemons. China was the predominant economic and military power
in East Asia until the nineteenth century. It granted or withheld trade
Changing of the guard: Chinese naval officers in Shanghai, December 2013

privileges according to an elaborate system of tribute, in which other
countries had to send diplomatic missions, bestow gifts, and kowtow
to the Chinese emperor. The Chinese then determined the prices and
quantities of all goods traded. Imperial China consolidated its economic
power by investing in agriculture and railroads, extracting minerals, and
encouraging close commercial integration throughout the region.
In Latin America, the United States followed the same playbook to
establish itself as the region’s central economic player. In the nineteenth
century, American firms flocked to the region in search of fruit, minerals,
sugar, and tobacco. The U.S. company United Fruit managed to gain
control of the entire fruit export trade in Central America. Finance was
another powerful tool; as the Uruguayan journalist Eduardo Galeano
has argued, a U.S. “banking invasion” diverted local capital to U.S.
firms. Washington encouraged American banks to assume the debts of
European creditors to minimize the influence of European rivals. For
CAR L O S BAR R IA / R E U T E R S
almost 100 years, Washington used diplomacy to advance its economic

interests through initiatives promoting U.S. regional trade and invest-
ment, such as the Big Brother policy in the 1880s, “dollar diplomacy”
in the early 1900s, and the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s.
The United States also built a regional institutional architecture to
advance its agenda. In 1948, it created the Organization of American
March/April 2018 73
Jennifer Lind
States (headquartered in Washington, D.C.) to promote regional security

and cooperation. American influence ensured that the OAS remained
silent on, or even legitimized, various U.S. military and political inter-
ventions in Latin America. Other development institutions, including
the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Export-Import
Bank of the United States, also advanced U.S. interests. Through “tied
aid,” such organizations required sponsored projects to hire U.S. vendors.
The IMF, as Galeano has argued, was “born in the United States, head-
quartered in the United States, and at the service of the United States.”
Another regional hegemon, Japan, pursued similar strategies in its
empire that dominated the region in the early twentieth century. Vowing
to eject the Western colonial powers, Tokyo declared itself the head
of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” To feed its industrial
economy and military, Tokyo extracted raw materials from countries
it conquered. To promote Japan’s centrality, and to prevent economic
activities by rival countries, it reformed
Economic dominance lets and managed local economies in a
regional network, standardizing the
regional hegemons use region’s currency in a “yen bloc” and
economic coercion to dispatching Japanese banks through-
advance their agendas. out the area so that they controlled
the majority of the region’s bank
deposits. Tokyo also created the
Southern Development Bank, which provided financial services
and printed currency in occupied territories.
Similarly, in Eastern Europe after World War II, the Soviet Union
relied on economic and financial statecraft to dominate the region.
Moscow blocked all trade with Western Europe and forbade Eastern
European states from accepting aid under the 1948 Marshall Plan.
Instead, it created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to
manage and integrate the regional economy. Soviet investment, trade
agreements, and trade credits made Eastern European countries
economically dependent on Moscow, both as their primary export
market and as their supplier of raw materials and energy. And by sell-
ing raw materials at below-market prices, Moscow encouraged local
political leaders to become dependent on its subsidies.
Economic dominance lets regional hegemons use economic coercion
to advance their agendas. In Latin America, the United States has
long sought to coerce countries through sanctions. In addition to the

long-standing (and failed) U.S. embargo of Cuba, Washington used
financial pressure to weaken President Salvador Allende in Chile in
the 1970s and embargoed Nicaragua to undermine the Sandinista
government in 1985. Similarly, in Eastern Europe, Moscow sought
to control independent-minded leaders, imposing sanctions against
Yugoslavia in 1948, Albania in 1961, and Romania in 1964.
Beijing has already begun to employ such economic coercion. In
2017, China punished South Korea and the Japanese–South Korean
business conglomerate Lotte for cooperating with the U.S.-built
THAAD missile defense program. (Lotte had sold the land on which
THAAD was deployed to the South Korean government.) Beijing banned
Chinese tour groups from visiting South Korea, Chinese regulators
closed 80 percent of Lotte supermarkets and other Korean-owned
businesses (ostensibly for fire-code violations), and state-run media
urged boycotts of Korean products. Beijing has also used economic
coercion against Japan (banning the export of Chinese rare-earth
metals to the country after a 2009 ship collision) and Norway
(embargoing Norwegian fish exports after the Chinese dissident Liu
Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010). And in 2016, when Mongo-
lia hosted the Dalai Lama, Beijing imposed extra fees on commodities
moving through the country and froze all diplomatic activity—including
negotiations about a $4 billion Chinese loan. “We hope that Mongolia
has taken this lesson to heart,” the Chinese foreign ministry said in
a statement. Apparently it has: the Mongolian government has an-
nounced that the spiritual leader will not be invited back.
Such coercion will be less necessary in the future as leaders pre-
emptively adjust their policies with Beijing in mind. Consider the
Philippines: in the past, the country has stood up to China—for
example, filing a complaint about Chinese territorial assertiveness
with an international tribunal at The Hague in 2013. But more recently,
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who has received $24 billion
in investment pledges from Beijing, has warmed relations with China
and distanced his country from the United States.
THE PURSUIT OF MILITARY HEGEMONY

Following the example of previous hegemons, China is also expanding
its regional military reach. Since the 1990s, Chinese military spending
has soared, and the CCP is modernizing weaponry and reforming its
March/April 2018 75
Jennifer Lind
military organizations and doctrine. The People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) has adopted the doctrine of “anti-access, area denial” to push the
U.S. military away from its shores and airspace. China has also built
the region’s largest coast guard and controls a vast militia of civilian
fishing vessels. In 2017, the PLA opened its first overseas military base
in Djibouti; it will likely build more bases along the African east coast
and the Indian Ocean in coming years. Meanwhile, in the South
China Sea, China has built six large islands that house air force bases,
missile shelters, and radar and communications facilities. Already,
the U.S. military finds itself constrained by the expanding bubble of
Chinese air defenses, by China’s growing ability to find and strike
U.S. naval vessels, and by an increased missile threat to U.S. air bases
and ports.
Beijing is using these capabilities to more forcefully assert its
territorial claims. By transiting disputed waters and massing ships
there, Beijing is pressuring Japan militarily over a cluster of small
islands called the Diaoyu by China and the Senkaku by Japan. Else-
where, to deny access to disputed areas, the PLA swarms fishing and
coast guard vessels, and fires water cannons at other countries’ ships.
Last summer, after asserting ownership of an oil-rich area in Vietnam’s
exclusive economic zone, Beijing threatened to use military force if
Vietnam did not stop drilling. Vietnam stopped drilling.
Contemporary China’s quest for regional military dominance
follows the behavior of previous regional hegemons, including China
itself. As the historian Peter Perdue has argued, modern China is a
product of invasions that subdued all of modern Xinjiang and Mon-
golia, and reached Tibet, as well. Chinese dynasties, he has written,
“never shrank from the use of force,” including the “righteous ex-
termination” of rival states and rebels. Throughout Asia, Chinese
military garrisons subdued invaders and pirates.
Subsequent hegemons dominated their regions through military
force, too. Starting in the late nineteenth century, the United States
began to build what would become the Western Hemisphere’s preemi-
nent military. In that period, the United States acquired territory
through numerous wars against Mexico and Spain. Over the next few
decades (often to advance the United States’ commercial interests),
U.S. forces invaded Latin American countries more than 20 times,
most often the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
During the Cold War, the United States repeatedly used military
force to counter leftist movements in Latin America: it blockaded

Cuba in 1962, sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965, mined
Nicaraguan harbors in the 1980s, and invaded Grenada in 1983 and
Panama in 1989.
Japan also built and maintained its empire through military force. Its
nineteenth-century military modernization yielded stunning victories
over China and Russia. Through these and other military campaigns,
Japan seized territories such as Korea and Taiwan and wrested colonial
possessions from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The Japanese military then administered the empire, fighting
counterinsurgencies and suppressing independence movements.
In Europe after World War II, the Soviet Union dominated its
sphere of influence with the region’s most powerful army. It stationed
troops in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. To
shape the region to its liking, the Kremlin was willing to use force. It
dispatched Soviet troops to quell uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
These hegemons did not tolerate the presence of rival great powers
in their regions. Likewise, China today is chafing against the U.S.
presence in Asia and actively working to undermine it. Chinese officials
and defense white papers criticize U.S. alliances as outdated and desta-
bilizing. Xi himself, calling for a new “Asian security architecture,”
has argued that these relationships fail to address the region’s complex
security needs. Meanwhile, by cultivating close ties with Seoul and
encouraging the Philippines’ tilt toward China, Beijing has sought to
draw U.S allies away.
NOSY NEIGHBOR
Beijing is also interfering in the domestic politics of other countries.
Citing China specifically, Canadian intelligence officials have warned
of foreign agents who might be serving as provincial cabinet ministers
and government employees. And in 2016, a scandal erupted in Australia
after it was revealed that Sam Dastyari, a senator who had defended
Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, had financial ties to a
Chinese firm, prompting new laws banning foreign political donations.
Historically, regional hegemons have intervened extensively in
domestic politics to support friendly governments and undermine
parties and leaders perceived as hostile. Within China’s tribute system,
the emperor delegated the administration of subservient states to
March/April 2018 77
Jennifer Lind
local leaders, an approach known as “using barbarians to govern bar-

barians.” But local independence went only so far. As the sixteenth-
century statesman Chang Chu-cheng said of such vassals, “Just like
dogs, if they wag their tails, bones will be thrown to them; if they
bark wildly, they will be beaten with sticks; after the beating, if they
submit again, bones will be thrown to them again; after the bones,
if they bark again, then more beating.”
Japan similarly intervened in domestic politics during its imperial
heyday. In the Philippines, for example, it abolished all political
parties except for the pro-Japanese one. Elsewhere, it delegated con-
trol to friendly local leaders and police, and trained such leaders at
institutes in Japan. If officials in China, Korea, and Manchuria did not
cooperate, Tokyo relied on a Japanese paramilitary organization that
intimidated, blackmailed, and assassinated local leaders.
For its part, the United States meddled in Latin American politics
countless times. Through the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine, Washington claimed the right to intervene in its neighbors’
affairs. It relied on covert and overt, violent and nonviolent methods
to support anticommunist leaders and to undermine or depose leftist
ones. The U.S. diplomat Robert Olds explained the approach in blunt
terms in 1927: “Central America has always understood that govern-
ments which we recognize and support stay in power, while those
which we do not recognize and support fall.” During the Cold War,
the U.S. military and the CIA funded, armed, and trained anticom-
munist forces throughout Latin America at institutions such as the
U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama. U.S.-trained forces
sought to depose leftist governments in Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua. Washington also supported coups in Guatemala in
1954 and Chile in 1973.
Moscow was similarly busy in Eastern Europe. After World War
II, the Soviet Union installed communist parties in its neighbors’
governments, in which advancement depended on loyalty to Moscow.
Under Stalin, Soviet secret police harassed, tortured, and murdered
opposition leaders. After Stalin, the Soviets relied on subtler tac-
tics, such as bringing foreign elites to train in communist party
schools and to build networks with Soviet and regional politicians.
Through the Brezhnev Doctrine, Moscow claimed the authority to
intervene in its neighbors’ politics in order to defend socialism from
hostile forces.
PLAYING HARDBALL FOR SOFT POWER

China today is seeking to increase its influence in East Asia and
beyond through extensive educational and cultural activities. The
media is central to this effort. The state-run media organizations
Xinhua and the China Global Television Network have bureaus all
over the world. Hollywood studios regularly seek Chinese funding
for their projects, as well as distribution rights in China’s vast mar-
ket. Wary of offending the CCP, studios have started preemptively
censoring their content. Censorship has also begun to infect the
publishing industry. To gain access to China’s vast market, publishers
are increasingly required to censor books and articles containing
specific words or phrases (for example, “Taiwan,” “Tibet,” and “Cultural
Revolution”). Prominent publishing houses, including Springer
Nature—the world’s largest academic book publisher—have succumbed
to Beijing’s demands and are increasingly self-censoring.
Beijing also promotes Chinese influence in education. China has
become the world’s third most popular destination for foreign
study, welcoming more than 440,000 students from over 200 coun-
tries in 2016. Many students receive support from the Chinese gov-
ernment. Overseas, in 142 countries, Beijing has created more than
500 Confucius Institutes to promote Chinese language and culture.
A study by the U.S.-based National Association of Scholars argues
that Confucius Institutes are decidedly nontransparent about their
connections to the CCP. Their teachers must observe CCP restrictions
on free speech and are pressured to “avoid sensitive topics,” such as
human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan.
The CCP also infiltrates college campuses abroad. Beijing enlists
members of the 60-million-strong Chinese diaspora: at universities
around the world, Chinese Students and Scholars Associations dem-
onstrate in support of visiting Chinese leaders and protest the Dalai
Lama and other speakers the CCP deems hostile. Beijing also monitors
and silences Chinese critics abroad by mobilizing harassment on so-
cial media and by threatening their families back home. In Australia,
concerns about Chinese interference and espionage at universities led
intelligence officials to issue warnings about an “insidious threat”
from foreign governments seeking to shape local public opinion.
Past regional hegemons similarly promoted their influence through
culture and education, and by co-opting leaders of civil society. As the
China expert Suisheng Zhao writes, “Chinese culture was seen as a
March/April 2018 79
Jennifer Lind
great lasting power to bridge periods of disunity and to infuse new

governments . . . with values supportive of the traditional Chinese
order.” China spread its language, literature, Confucian philosophy,
and bureaucratic traditions to Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and other coun-
tries. Chinese emperors also followed the advice of one minister in
the Han dynasty who proposed subduing barbarians with “five baits”:
silk clothing and carriages, sumptuous food, entertainments and female
attendants, mansions with slaves, and imperial favors such as banquets
and awards.
U.S. hegemony in Latin America also relied heavily on soft power. In
1953, the U.S. government created the U.S. Information Agency, which,
according to President Dwight Eisenhower, would show countries that
U.S. objectives “are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate
aspirations for freedom, progress, and
peace.” U.S. TV stations started Latin
Past regional hegemons American channels that broadcast
promoted their influence American films and programs. The
through culture and U.S. government built news agencies
education. and radio stations and infiltrated or
intimidated opposition media outlets.
In Chile and the Dominican Repub-
lic, for example, the CIA and the USIA engaged in an intense propaganda
effort against undesirable political candidates, spreading misinfor-
mation and silencing opposition media.
Likewise, imperial Japan created the East Asia Development
League to shape regional perceptions and guide the activities of
Japanese people living in the empire. Tokyo controlled civil society
by creating and infiltrating organizations such as youth groups,
martial arts clubs, student unions, secret societies, and religious
organizations. Its Greater East Asia Cultural Policy sought to erad-
icate Western culture. For example, Tokyo banned Coca-Cola on
the grounds that it had been invented “to bring the people under
the soul- and mind-shattering influence of the insidious drug, and
so to make them more apt for Anglo-American exploitation.” Tokyo
prohibited the use of European languages and established Japanese
as the area’s official language, dispatching hundreds of teachers
throughout Asia. Japan transmitted its culture through radio programs,
newspapers, and comic books, as did cultural institutes that spon-
sored exhibitions, lectures, and films.
The Soviet Union secured its influence in Eastern Europe through

extensive cultural activities. As the writer Anne Applebaum details in
her book Iron Curtain, Soviet-backed communist parties took over
radio stations and newspapers and intimidated or shut down indepen-
dent media. The Soviets created influential youth organizations
and co-opted writers, artists, and other intellectual leaders by offer-
ing well-paid jobs, lavish houses with servants, and free education
for their children.
Moscow also created a vast organization known as VOKS (a Russian
acronym for All-Union Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign
Countries) to disseminate Soviet ideas and culture and bring Western
intellectuals under communist influence. VOKS brought thousands of
visitors to the Soviet Union and sponsored scientific research, film-
making, athletics, ballet, music, and publishing. It also spent lavishly
at international fairs and expositions—such as the Brussels World’s
Fair of 1958—to showcase Soviet technology and culture.
CONTEMPLATING LIFE IN CHINA’S ASIA

When examining China’s current behavior in the context of previous
regional hegemonies, some common themes stand out. First, economic
interdependence has a dark side. Although interdependence raises the
cost of conflict, it also creates leverage. China’s centrality in regional
trade and finance increases its coercive power, which Beijing has
already begun to exercise. Second, history shows that regional hege-
mons meddle extensively in their neighbors’ domestic politics. Indeed,
Beijing has already begun to reverse its much-touted policy of non-
intervention. As China grows stronger, its neighbors can expect Beijing
to increasingly interfere in their domestic politics.
East Asian countries need to decide whether this is something they
are willing to accept. In particular, Japan, the only country with the
potential power to balance China, faces an important choice. Since
World War II, Japan has adhered to a highly restrained national secu-
rity policy, spending just one percent of its GDP on defense. For obvious
historical reasons, the Japanese people are suspicious of military state-
craft, and they worry about a lagging economy and the expense of
caring for an aging population. They may decide to continue devoting
their wealth to butter rather than guns.
This would be a perfectly valid choice, but before making it, the
Japanese people should contemplate their life in China’s Asia. Beijing
March/April 2018 81
Jennifer Lind
and Tokyo are already embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute over

the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. To gain control of the islands, weaken
the U.S.-Japanese relationship, and advance other interests, Beijing
can be expected to use greater military and economic coercion and
to meddle in Japanese politics. Beyond a hegemon’s normal reasons
to intervene, China harbors deep historical resentment toward Japan.
Imagine if the United States had actually hated Cuba.
If Japan decided that Chinese hegemony would be unacceptable, its
national security policy would need to change. The United States’
global interests and commitments allow Washington to devote only
some of its resources to Asia. It would not have the capability, let
alone the will, to balance Beijing alone. Japan would need to become
more like West Germany: a U.S. ally that, although outgunned and
directly threatened by a hostile great power, mobilized substantial
military might and was a true partner with the United States in securing
its national defense.
Tokyo and Washington could use diplomacy to offer countries an
alternative to Chinese regional dominance. To do so, they should
look to a core group of maritime countries with similar values and
overlapping interests—namely, Australia, India, New Zealand, and
the Philippines. Other potentially interested actors, such as Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, should be welcomed, too. But
the first step on this path is a Japanese—and broader East Asian—
debate about the prospect of living in China’s Asia.∂
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READY FOR THE FUTURE

By Yoshimasa Hayashi, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
A
s Japan deals with an ageing population and finds itself in the midst of a fourth industrial
revolution, the country’s universities, as core stakeholders in fostering human resources and
driving innovation, are asked to play important roles in strengthening our society.
To face the challenges of universities towards more lation is resulting in a combining all these attri-
the future, the Japanese internationalization, shortage of workers. butes and deal with a re-
government formulated through the Top Global Japan, nevertheless, duction of jobs with these
the Japan Revitalization University Project. has developed effective demographic changes.
Strategy in 2013, Anybody can learn more technologies. We are a On behalf of the govern-
launched the Top Global about this program from: stable society with a well- ment, I invite research-
University Project, and set https://tgu.mext.go.jp/ organized government. I ers and students from
to double the numbers of en/index.html. am convinced that Japan around the world to
both inbound and out- The government is also has the capability to become to Japan and learn
bound student exchang- encouraging Japanese come a leading problem- in a cutting-edge envi-
es. students to study abroad solving nation by skillfully ronment. n
through government
scholarships and a public- Kobe: Crossroads of Industry and Culture
private study abroad ini-
“E
ver since our port began vative companies to this bustling
tiative called “Tobitate!” operating 150 years ago, seaside metropolis.
or “Young Ambassador Kobe has Amid so much
Program.” been very much optimism about
open to the world. the future, Kobe
To support some na- The city, in terms has intensified its
tional universities in their of industry, has de- efforts to develop
efforts to raise the qual- veloped over the clean energy.
ity of their educational years to the times In December,
and research activities and the needs of its the city conduct-
people,” Mayor Kizo ed the world’s
to world-class standards, Hisamoto said. first test to sup-
MEXT established the I n the past ply energy from
Designated National few years, Kobe Kobe Mayor Kizo Hisamoto hydrogen power.
Yoshimasa Hayashi, Minister
of Education, Culture, Sports,
University system. In has been home It has also col-
to Japan’s largest Biomedical laborated with the government
Science and Technology 2017, Tohoku University, Innovation Cluster, which hosts of Aberdeen in Scotland to de-
University of Tokyo and more than 340 companies on velop a marine industry cluster.
Based on this long-term Kyoto University were the Port Island, joining heavy indus- “We’ve made the most of
strategy, the Ministry first schools to receive tries manufacturing as major pil- international knowledge to
of Education, Culture, this DNU status. lars of the city’s economy. develop Kobe into a thriving,
This growth would not have multi-faceted city. Looking to the
Spor ts, Science and A successful society been possible if it weren’t for the future, we intend to continue
Technology (MEXT) has must be both stable and highly skilled and talented work- this pioneering spirit,” Hisamoto
provided financial sup- be receptive to new ideas ers who live in Kobe. said.
port to improve the study so that advanced technol- The mayor is now focused on www.city.kobe.lg.jp/foreign/
efforts to attract new and inno- english/index.html
environment at univer- ogy, such as AI and ro-
sities in order to attract botics, can be applied in
more international stu- daily life. Advancements
dents, among others. The in technology will further
ministry has also support- change labor markets. In
ed the efforts of Japanese Japan, a shrinking popu-
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Japanese SMEs look further afield

JAPAN
U
ntil recently, small through clients here aged them from ex- players and demand
Japanese compa- in Japan,” President panding overseas and sharply declined. Many
nies were viewed Kensaku Kashiwagi said. promoting the “Made in companies decided to
as businesses that pre- However, Shimizu Japan” brand. open in other Asian mar-
fer to transact only with Densetsu Kogyo “The strength of small kets. That is why we now
other Japanese com- President Hiroyuk i companies lies in being have a branch office in
panies. Many of them Shimizu was steadfast in able to quickly adapt Singapore and a plant in
expanded their interna- maintaining his compa- and deliver customer re- Malaysia,” says President
tional presence mainly ny’s international opera- quests. Customers keep Norio Okubo.
to support long-running tions following a slump demanding for better, so “It is not very easy to
relationships with their in the demand for coat- we keep innovating for do business overseas.
loyal customers. ing technology in the the better,” Shimizu ex- To ensure international
As continuing global- automotive and medical plained. growth, companies need
ization makes the busi- equipment sectors. “In Japan, there is a to modernize products
ness landscape increas- “When our U.S. sub- philosophy called ma- and processes. But Japan
ingly competitive, many sidiary faced some chal- gokoro, which means will remain important
of these Japanese SMEs lenges in the past, most sincerity or devotion. It because we still lead in
have had to accept the of the executives wanted is the ultimate made- technological innovation
need to expand overseas to close it down. But I in-Japan asset. And and high-quality manu-
if they are to survive and believed in the market we’ve made it a point to facturing,” Okubo added.
grow sustainably. and decided to run the center our operations Meanwhile, President
Showa Denki, a man- operations myself un- around this philosophy,” Masayoshi Funahashi
ufacturer of wind ma- til it became profitable,” Kashiwagi said. of Shachihata, a leading
chines such as electric Shimizu recalled. With the compelling maker of writing instru-
blowers and fans, is an “Now, after our cus- need for Japanese comments and stampers,
example of how these tomers in the U.S. expe- panies to find stronger attributes the compa-
SMEs are seeing their rience our service, they and more sustainable ny’s success to its abil-
global potential. tell their Japanese coun- growth prospects, pack- ity to design pens, mark-
“I started our over- terparts to reach out aging products maker ers and stampers that
seas business in 2010 to us in Japan for their Ohishi Sangyo has iden- address and adapt to the
by myself, after finding coating needs,” Shimizu tified Southeast Asia as ever-changing consum-
out through internal re- added. its most promising mar- er taste.
search that 38% of our For Shimizu and ket. “Using skills we have
products ended up be- Kashiwagi, leading an “In the last 20 years, cultivated, we have de-
ing exported overseas SME has not discour- Japan lost a lot of big veloped our latest ma-
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chine, the QuiX, where

you can easily customize
your stamps,” Funahashi
JAPAN
said.
“The domestic market
is diminishing and com-
petition grows more
stiff. That is why I expect
more potential from our
international operations.
In fact, we mostly offer
our latest markers to the
international markets
first,” Funahashi said.
Helping out small
companies that want a
bigger global presence
but don’t have the re-
sources, trading compa-
Shachihata’s Headquarters in Nagoya
ny Yashima Sangyo has
acted as a major connec- Japanese companies to Aso in April 2017,” neurs turn their ideas
tor between Japanese introduce themselves ACCJ Representative into reality.
and foreign businesses. to foreign markets, and Christopher LaFleur said. “We are making Kobe
“Our company aims help raise the profile of “Its focus on setting into a city where start-
to introduce Japanese Japanese quality in man- high trade and invest- ups can thrive. Kobe has
quality products to the ufacturing,” he added. ment standards and re- developed into a thriv-
global market, and vice Some local govern- ducing market barriers ing, multi-faceted city
versa. We aim to be a ment units and non- aligns with the need we and we, with the rest
partner in global ex- profit organizations, see on both sides, and of Japan, will continue
pansion for companies such as the American we hope the positive that pioneering spirit for
worldwide,” President Chamber of Commerce agenda will continue,” he years to come,” Mayor
Masatoshi Takamuku in Japan and the City of also said. Kizo Hisamoto said.
said. Kobe, have joined the ef- Already known as one Recently, Kobe col-
“Many SMEs have the forts to promote bilateral of Japan’s most dynam- laborated with US-based
right products with the trade and cooperation. ic cities and the base seed investment fund
perfect quality, but find “With this, we ap- of many major global 500 Startups in an ac-
global expansion to be plaud the launch of the companies, Kobe has in- celerator program. It
challenging. My dream U.S.-Japan Economic tensified efforts to spur was the first such col-
is to have an exhibition Dialogue by Vice further growth through laborative program with
for the ‘Made in Japan’ President Pence and programs aimed specifi- a Silicon Valley venture
brand as a means for Deputy Prime Minister cally at helping entrepre- capital fund in Japan.
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Abenomics at work
JAPAN
in manufacturing
A
s the world ea- one of the companies well positioned to ex- been in the business
gerly awaits in charge of eliminat- pand further globally. for 80 years. We are a
the 2020 Tokyo ing utility poles on the It eyes China and the supplier of Japanese
Olympics, which got streets, and installing US as its next big mar- wood for the Tokyo
the unflagging sup- underground wires and kets. Stadium and it is excit-
port of Prime Minister cables. We are proud to Although nearly all ing to be part of the
Shinzo Abe, construc- contribute to the prep- its business is domes- Tokyo 2020 infrastruc-
tion materials develop- aration of Japan’s land- tic, construction mature because it will
er Kanaflex, like many scape for the influx of terials wholesaler JK surely have an impact
other Japanese compa- tourists for Tokyo 2020,” Holdings values its role on people from all over
nies, works in the back- President Shigek i in the construction of the world,” President
ground to prepare for Kanao said. the Olympic Stadium, Keiichiro Aoki said.
the influx of thousands Given its impres- always the centerpiece However, Aok i is
of tourists from across sive track record and venue of the Summer studying the feasibil-
Japan and the rest of unique products, Games. ity of setting up opera-
the world. Kanaflex has done well “Ninety percent tions outside Japan for
“ We were selected in the United States of our business is in its housing materials
by the National Diet as for over 30 years and is Japan but we have segment.
As the third “ar-

row” of the economic
stimulus plan dubbed
JAPAN
Abenomics, the eco-
nomic empowerment
of women has become
more visible in recent
years, with very im-
pressive results.
“I just became CEO
two years ago. Before
that, for over five years,
our financial condition
was not good,” recalled
Akiko Mitani, the CEO
of Nikko Company,
which makes ceramic The government’s economic stimulus plan dubbed Abenomics has remained effective in providing
Japanese companies the much needed shot in the arm.
goods and wastewater
treatment systems. by the government as empowerment among my,” Watanabe said.
To t u r n t h i n g s one of Japan’s Top 100 women in the work- To complement
around for the Global Niche compa- force. While there is that objective, she es-
110-year-old company, nies, an achievement still a long way to go tablished the group
Mitani encouraged her that has given much for us here in Japan, Monozukuri-Nadeshiko
employees to under- pride to President there is no denying the for female CEOs within
stand the company’s Hiroki Watanabe. importance of wom- the manufacturing in-
importance to the lives “I want to cultivate en’s role in the econo- dustry.
of all Japanese. That
shift in mindset led to
increased productivity
and profitability.
For the next five
years, Mitani plans to
lead the company in
growing its business
around the world.
“We have been ex-
porting our products
for over 50 years. While
we will continue to
focus on our biggest
markets, such as the
US and Middle East,
I see great potential
in Southeast Asia as
our comprehensive
business field as well,”
Mitani explained.
For Fuji Denshi, a
unique manufacturer
of induction heating
machines, tapping the
talent of its female
workforce has also
yielded positive results.
In fact, it was named
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Local impact, global outlook

JAPAN
I
n recent years,
Japanese universi-
ties have focused on
two main objectives:
contributing to the lo-
cal community and
globalizing its instruc-
tion.
In Nagano Prefecture,
Shinshu University
has topped the Nikkei
Global ranking several
times in terms of local
contributors.
“Everyone is working
together to revitalize
the economy. There is
true synergy between A view of Toyo Eiwa University’s campus in Yokohama
the government, the universities,” President the expertise from university develops a
private sector and the Kunihiro Hamada different fields to de- full English-only cur-
said. velop new industries riculum to increase its
The national univer- that will help the lo- pool of international
sity established five cal community in the students and partners.
research institutes for next years,” Hamada “We also send stu-
the fields of biomedi- also said. dents abroad to see
cal, carbon, mountain, In Yokohama, Toyo different cultures,” said
and energy & environ- Eiwa University aims President Akufumi
mental sciences, as to further incorpo- Ikeda, who believes
well as fiber technol- rate diversity and that this exposure is
ogy. open-mindedness especially important
“We have already re- among its students. to its students be-
organized our faculties Globalization is the cause it also allows
as we aim to combine ongoing focus, as the them to understand
their own heritage
and share it with peo-
ple around the world.
“With our students
being all female and
Japan encouraging
women to play bigger
roles in the economy,
making our students
venture out into the
world is our way of
making an impact on
the country,” Ikeda
said.
Green Giant
Renewable Energy and Chinese Power
Amy Myers Jaffe
I
n 1997, in need of increasing oil and gas imports to fuel its accel-
erating economy, China launched a new energy policy. Intent
on replicating Washington’s close relationships with large oil-
producing countries, its diplomats toured oil-state capitals, offering
investment and arms in exchange for guaranteed supplies. Of partic-
ular interest were governments that had been ostracized by Western
powers—an opening, Beijing believed, that would allow it to level the
energy playing field with the United States and have the added benefit
of fueling conflicts that would distract the U.S. military just as it was
trying to refocus on Asia.
Yet many of China’s forays turned out badly. New partners defaulted
on loans and failed to deliver the promised oil. The practice of
investing in dangerous places where others would not put the lives
of Chinese workers at risk. At home, several leaders of large energy
corporations have been purged in so-called anticorruption drives.
Meanwhile, the United States has enjoyed a domestic energy boom
that is rapidly turning it into a major exporter of oil and natural
gas and cushioning its economy against oil-price shocks. Beijing has
begun to worry that, given the United States’ decreasing reliance on
supplies from the Persian Gulf, Washington might intervene more
slowly to quell disturbances in the Middle East that threaten to disrupt
the flow of oil.
Accordingly, since assuming office in 2012, Chinese President
Xi Jinping has turned to a new strategy: a pivot to renewable energy.
China already dominates the global solar-panel market, but now it is
AMY MYERS JAFFE is David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environ-
ment and Director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
March/April 2018 83
Amy Myers Jaffe
expanding its support for oil-saving technologies, funding the devel-

opment and production of everything from batteries to electric cars.
The goal is not just to reduce China’s dependence on foreign oil and
gas but also to avoid putting the country at an economic disadvantage
relative to the United States, which will see its own growth boosted
by its exports of oil and gas to China. China’s aims are also strategic.
By taking the lead in green energy, Beijing hopes to make itself an
energy exporter to rival the United States, offering other countries
the opportunity to reduce their purchases of foreign oil and gas—and
cut their carbon emissions in the process.
If Beijing’s new energy strategy succeeds, it will help both the global
fight against climate change and China’s ambition to replace the United
States as the most important player in many regional alliances and
trading relationships. That ambition has been bolstered by the Trump
administration’s backward-looking approach to energy policy: its focus
on coal, oil, and natural gas; its abandonment of the international
organizations that shape global energy markets; and its rejection of
the Paris climate accord. Such moves are helping pave the way for
China to become the renewable energy superpower of the future.
Washington needs to respond before it is too late.
OIL SHOCK
Beginning in the first decade of this century, breakneck economic
growth in China created a need for foreign oil and gas, driving China’s
transformation from a regional power to a global one. Hampered by
competition for resources from large Western oil companies, Beijing
focused on so-called rogue states, where, because of Western sanctions,
those rival companies could not invest. It first targeted Iran, Iraq, and
Sudan, then Russia and Venezuela.
The results have been less than stellar. In Iran, Western and
then UN sanctions hindered Chinese efforts for several years by
limiting the amount of money Chinese firms could spend in Iran.
And even since the Iran nuclear deal relaxed sanctions, other
problems have cropped up. In early 2016, for example, two Chinese
national oil companies, Sinopec and the China National Petroleum
Corporation, finally managed to get production moving at two
fields in Iran’s Khuzestan Province, but they now have to worry
about Saudi-backed Arab separatists, who have recently bombed
oil facilities there.
Green Giant
China has encountered similar problems in Iraq, where a lack of

security has plagued oil projects. And in the more secure Kurdish
region, estimates of oil reserves have been reduced by half since initial
surveys. Together with low oil prices, that means that Sinopec is unlikely
to make a profit on its investments there. Chinese exploration for
natural gas in Saudi Arabia has also come up dry.
In Africa, Chinese projects have fared little better. Prolonged civil
wars in Sudan and South Sudan have severely restricted the amount
of oil that Chinese firms operating there
can extract. Beijing has faced interna-
tional condemnation for its support of
China’s increasing
the Sudanese government, which has dependence on foreign oil
been sanctioned by the United States has made its leaders uneasy.
for war crimes. And attacks on Chinese
oil workers in Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, and South Sudan have
forced the Chinese government to evacuate its personnel and have led
to political criticism at home.
China has struggled even in relatively stable places. Last Sep-
tember, a Chinese conglomerate invested $9 billion in the Russian
state-controlled oil giant Rosneft in return for a 14 percent owner-
ship stake. But Rosneft is saddled with nearly $50 billion in debt
and has undertaken a program of ambitious international spending
driven less by a coherent profit strategy than by Russia’s strategic
interests. This decision, on top of the uncertainty caused by U.S.
sanctions on Russia, led Rosneft’s share price to decline by 23 percent
during 2017, which translates into a multibillion-dollar loss for the
Chinese conglomerate.
The story is similar in Venezuela. From 2007 to 2014, Chinese
firms provided around $60 billion in oil-backed loans to Caracas. But
Venezuelan crude oil exports to China reached just 450,000 barrels
a day in 2017, only half the volume the Chinese had anticipated.
One of the largest lenders, the China Development Bank, currently
receives barely enough oil and refined oil products from Venezuela
to cover the interest payments on its loans.
All told, China’s $160 billion in spending on oil and gas assets has
bought it less energy that it might have expected. Its foreign oil re-
sources are projected to produce roughly two million barrels a day by
2028. By comparison, just over a decade ago, Saudi Arabia spent $14
billion to add two million barrels a day of new production. China’s
March/April 2018 85
Amy Myers Jaffe
oil imports pale in comparison with the United States’ domestic oil
production, which stood at 9.8 million barrels a day at the end of 2017
and could reach over 20 million barrels a day in the next decade. More-
over, China’s own oil production, currently 3.9 million barrels a day, is
falling fast due to mismanagement, depleted fields, and low prices.
China currently imports around 70 percent of the oil it uses. By 2030,
that figure is expected to reach 80 percent.
Meanwhile, the United States will likely become a net exporter of
oil and natural gas by the 2030s, if not sooner. When it does, other
energy producers will lose their long-standing leverage over U.S.
policy. (In 1973, for example, OPEC placed an embargo on oil exports
to countries, including the United States, that had supported Israel
during the Yom Kippur War.) And the U.S. economy, which boasts
hundreds of thousands of new oil and gas jobs, will be better shielded
than China’s economy from a sudden drop in the global oil supply.
China’s increasing dependence on foreign oil has made its leaders
uneasy. Its 12th five-year energy plan, which ended in 2015, noted “a
profound adjustment in energy supply patterns” resulting from the de-
velopment of new oil and gas sources in Canada and the United States.
It characterized China’s energy security situation as “grim,” in contrast
to that of the United States. Such trends have also changed Beijing’s
calculus in the Middle East. Although Washington is still saddled with
the responsibility of protecting the region’s oil flows, an oil cutoff caused
by conflict there would now do more damage to China’s economy than
to that of the United States. Beijing has to take account of the growing
risk that Washington will abdicate its protector role in the region or, at
the least, force China and other countries to foot more of the bill.
THE BIG GREEN BANG

This new reality has prompted China to ramp up its investment in
renewable energy and low-carbon technologies. It is not only looking
for domestic energy security but also banking on green energy
products as major industrial exports that will compete with Russian
and U.S. oil and gas. China aims to make itself the center of the clean
energy universe, selling its goods and services to help other countries
avoid the environmental mistakes it now admits were part of its recent
economic growth.
There is a precedent for this approach. Beginning around ten years
ago, a booming solar power industry in Germany helped China’s nascent
Green Giant
solar-panel manufacturing sector get off the ground. The Chinese

government plans to repeat that success on a grander scale. It hopes
that demand for clean energy technology from countries looking to
reduce their carbon emissions will create jobs for Chinese workers
and strong relationships between foreign capitals and Beijing, much
as oil sales linked the Soviet Union and
the Middle East after World War II.
That means that, in the future, when the
China’s bet on
United States tries to sell its liquefied renewable energy is
natural gas to countries in Asia and designed to improve
Europe, it may find itself competing its national security.
not so much with Russian gas as with
Chinese solar panels and batteries.
According to the International Energy Agency, the Chinese public
and private sectors will invest more than $6 trillion in low-carbon
power generation and other clean energy technologies by 2040. The
Chinese renewable energy sector already boasts 125 gigawatts of
installed solar power, over twice the figures for the United States
(47 gigawatts) and Germany (40 gigawatts). Chinese firms now have
the capacity to manufacture 51 gigawatts’ worth of photovoltaic solar
panels every year, more than double total global production in 2010.
The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the Chinese govern-
ment has provided as much as $47 billion in direct funding, loans, tax
credits, and other incentives to solar-panel manufacturers since 2008.
Over the last decade, Chinese exports have contributed to an 80 per-
cent drop in global solar-panel prices. Future Chinese investment in
battery technology is likely to have a similar effect on battery prices.
Overall, China currently generates 24 percent of its power from
renewable sources; the United States generates 15 percent.
China is also betting big on electric vehicles, heavily subsidizing
their development and production. In 2015, Chinese public subsidies
for electric vehicles totaled more than ten times the amount provided
by the U.S. government. Over 100 Chinese companies currently make
electric cars and buses. The Chinese car manufacturer BYD is now the
largest producer of electric vehicles in the world, with another six
Chinese firms also ranking in the top 20. In 2015, China surpassed the
United States in annual and cumulative electric car sales. There are
over one million electric cars on Chinese roads today, almost double
the number in the United States. By 2020, China aims to have five
March/April 2018 87
Amy Myers Jaffe
million in operation. China could eventually boast as many as 100 mil-

lion electric vehicles. In September, Chinese officials confirmed that
the government is developing a timetable to end the use of gas-powered
cars in China, in line with other countries, such as France and the
United Kingdom, that are aiming to eliminate them by 2040.
Beijing is also working to dominate the financing of green energy.
In late December, it announced that it intends to create the world’s
largest carbon market, in which firms trade credits for the right to emit
greenhouse gases. China already buys more “green bonds”—which fund
projects designed to prevent climate change or mitigate its effects—than
any other country and is actively promoting so-called green finance
within its financial sector by encouraging its major banks, including
the People’s Bank of China, to accelerate the issuance of green bonds
and other kinds of credits for clean energy. The Chinese government
has started to promote cooperation on green finance between Chinese
and foreign businesses through bilateral efforts, such as the UK-China
Economic and Financial Dialogue. It is also playing up its environ-
mental standards to attract multinational lenders to pay for its ambitious
$1.4 trillion Belt and Road Initiative, an infrastructure program designed
to expand Beijing’s influence in Asia.
China’s bet on renewable energy and electric transport is also
designed to improve its national security. Chinese analysts have long
decried the risks of shipping oil through sea-lanes that are dominated
by the U.S. military and increasingly threatened by the growing
navies of regional powers such as India and Japan. Replacing foreign
oil with domestic sources of renewable energy would remove this
problem. Meanwhile, flexible energy microgrids (which generate and
distribute power in self-contained grids that can detach from centralized
systems during a crisis) and multifuel transportation systems (which
move away from sole reliance on oil-based gasoline and diesel) will
help China withstand cyberattacks and limit the effects of natural
disasters and wars. Advanced clean energy technologies will also likely
fuel autonomous weapons, such as drones, artificial intelligence, and
satellite-based equipment that can disable U.S. satellites and global
positioning systems, all of which China is trying to master.
FALLOUT
China’s energy pivot promises to reshape the international order. Its
most direct impact will be on the global response to climate change.
Green Giant
Here comes the sun: solar panels in Zhejiang Province, China, December 2014
Just as China’s big move into solar-panel manufacturing brought down
the costs of that technology, so the prices of batteries, electric cars, and
carbon capture and storage will likely collapse as China invests.
The energy pivot is also already changing how China deals with the
rest of the world. It is courting countries in Europe, Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia with the promise of cheap loans, upgraded energy and
transport infrastructure, and freedom from energy shortages and energy-
related pollution. Russia’s history of heavy-handed threats to cut off
supplies of oil and gas to its neighbors has made Beijing’s job all the
easier. Helping countries generate clean, abundant energy will allow
China to compete more aggressively with the United States by under-
cutting Washington’s ability to use its new oil and gas exports to forge
CHINA STRING E R N ETWO RK / REUTE RS
closer relations with other countries. Chinese officials have even argued
that by assisting countries in developing green business models and
providing access to reliable energy and modern infrastructure to poorer
countries, China can help redress inequality among nations and create
more consistent global economic growth, lowering the risks of terrorism
and conflict.
Not all the effects of China’s move into clean energy are likely to
prove so benign. If China comes to depend largely on domestic energy,
it will become less willing to offer preferential loans to failing oil states.
March/April 2018 89
Amy Myers Jaffe
That could prove disastrous for some countries, especially if China’s

renewable energy technology exports also eliminate a significant pro-
portion of the world’s demand for oil and gas. This story has already
played out in Venezuela. In 2016, China refused to extend new loans
to Caracas, cutting off Venezuela’s most important remaining finan-
cial lifeline and pushing the country deeper into debt, poverty, and
political breakdown. As China sells more and more renewable energy
technology and electric vehicles at home and abroad, other oil states,
such as Angola, Nigeria, and Russia, could experience similar fates.
Even countries in the Persian Gulf could suffer if they do not reform
their economies. The result could well be more dangerous failed
states with disenfranchised populations.
AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGE

China’s new energy strategy raises serious questions for U.S. energy
and climate policy. The Trump administration argues that the United
States can maintain U.S. energy dominance by selling its vast sup-
plies of oil and natural gas to the rest of the world, as long as domestic
producers are unfettered by excessive government regulation. But the
success of that vision will rely on international energy and carbon
rules. If the United States abdicates its global role, those might be set
by other countries.
Although President Donald Trump has announced that the United
States will withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, the country
cannot formally do so until 2020. That means that the United States
still holds leadership positions in the bodies that will play a large part
in determining global energy-market regulations, energy- and carbon-
pricing policies, and possibly even which fuels—coal, oil, gas, nuclear,
or renewables—will be favored globally. But if the United States
leaves those groups, they may well design a global energy architec-
ture that favors China’s interests. That could allow China to sell its
energy technology products abroad free of tariffs, while fees on carbon
emissions would hamper U.S. oil and gas exports. It could also make
Chinese, rather than U.S., requirements for energy-product labeling
and efficiency and for zero-emission vehicles the global standards.
And if Chinese financial institutions help set the rules and standards
for green financing, they could stack the deck in their own favor,
hurting U.S. banks in what is set to become a multitrillion-dollar
industry in the coming decades.
Green Giant
To keep the United States’ options open, the Trump administration

needs to find a creative way to meet the country’s original pledge in the
Paris agreement to reduce its emissions by roughly 27 percent from
2005 levels by 2025. There is still time to do so. A majority of U.S.
states and major cities will continue to implement the initiatives they
set out in alignment with the Clean Power Plan, an Obama-era policy
designed to get states to cut their carbon emissions, which the Trump
administration rescinded in October. U.S. car and truck manufacturers
and ride-sharing companies are engaging China to sell their products
and services to Chinese consumers. By recommitting to the Paris
agreement, even with a less ambitious strategy, the Trump administra-
tion would avoid needlessly antagonizing countries that care about the
accord and maintain U.S. influence in global rule-making on energy.
The United States should also work both inside and outside the
framework of the Paris agreement to create trade rules and carbon-
market systems that would favor U.S. oil and natural gas exports in
the immediate term and lay the groundwork to promote U.S. clean
technology companies in the long run. A good model exists in the
agreement finalized in November among Alaska, Sinopec, the Bank
of China, and China’s sovereign wealth fund, which will result in a
Chinese investment of up to $43 billion to develop natural gas re-
serves in northern Alaska. Natural gas could replace coal in countries
such as China and India, reducing carbon dioxide emissions. And
tying China to U.S. resource extraction would help cement U.S.-
Chinese energy cooperation and ensure that the United States’ en-
ergy exports will remain competitive with those of other countries
trying to sell oil and gas to China.
So far, the Trump administration has shown little sign that it has
a real vision for sustaining U.S. energy dominance. It seems inclined
to expand rules set by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States in order to safeguard U.S. advantages in artificial in-
telligence and other digital technologies important to protecting
U.S. energy infrastructure. That could be worthwhile, but the ad-
ministration will need a much broader vision, one that goes beyond
a proposed small tariff on imported solar panels and looks at the rest
of the U.S. clean technology complex, which includes new batteries,
energy-saving digital products, and alternative-fuel vehicles.
The administration has begun the process of rewriting the Clean
Power Plan. It has suggested improving the efficiency of power plants by
March/April 2018 91
Amy Myers Jaffe
reducing leaks and using new digital technologies to improve control

systems. But that will not be enough. It also needs to devise policies to
help innovation and promote the adoption of technologies that can rival
Chinese products, such as smart meters and solar panels or wind turbines
with connected batteries to store the energy generated. New regulations
on the power generation industry should reward states, counties, and
cities that want to shift to clean energy and issue green bonds.
Rick Perry, the secretary of energy, has argued that natural gas and
renewable sources of energy are less reliable than fossil fuels or nuclear
power and so the administration should subsidize coal and nuclear
power in key markets to prevent interruptions in supply. But this argu-
ment fails to realize that new technologies can create a flexible, responsive
grid capable of bouncing back quickly in the aftermath of sudden surges
in demand, natural disasters, or cyberattacks.
The administration should also think creatively about how to best
tap the United States’ increasing surplus of cheap natural gas to lower
the country’s emissions and meet its pledge under the Paris agreement.
Washington should consider supporting new uses for natural gas, such
as to power long-distance trucks or to make hydrogen fuel for other
vehicles. Doing so while minimizing emissions will require enforcing
rules governing the leakage of methane from oil and gas production,
transport, and disposal. Those rules have bipartisan support in Congress
as well as support from many industry players. But the Department of
the Interior has delayed their implementation and even suggested that
it is considering scrapping them altogether.
There is some good news. The Republican tax reform bill signed by
Trump in December left federal support for renewable energy and cred-
its for electric cars intact (an earlier version of the bill had eliminated
them). But these programs don’t do enough to meet the challenge of
China’s massive public investments.
Washington should embrace additional policies to promote private-
sector investment in clean technology, such as allowing renewable
energy investors to form master limited partnerships (MLPs), a type
of publicly traded entity that avoids double taxation for its shareholders.
Currently, MLPs are restricted to companies that extract or process
natural resources or lease real estate. The tax bill slashed the tax rate
for MLPs, making them even more attractive, but failed to extend the
structure to renewable energy production, even though a bipartisan
congressional group proposed doing just that last October.
Green Giant
The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris accord will likely be
accompanied by lackluster U.S. participation in Mission Innovation,
a global initiative involving the European Union and 22 major
countries, including China and the United States, to accelerate the
transition to clean energy by doubling the public R & D budgets of
the participating countries. Failing to take part would be a mistake.
China is building an energy system that will help its economy and
allow its military to better withstand cyberattacks and natural disas-
ters. The United States should do the same. That means developing
and installing new technologies, such as smart grids, solar panels,
and wind turbines, at U.S. military bases to reduce the damage from
potential interruptions in power supplies or attacks on power sources.
During the Cold War, the United States realized the likely eco-
nomic and military consequences of losing the space race, and it
rose to the task. Meeting the challenge of China’s pivot to renewable
energy will be no different. The United States risks frittering away
its dominance of the global energy market. But with strong leader-
ship and a long-term commitment, it can secure its energy future
for decades to come.∂
March/April 2018 93
How to Crack Down on
Tax Havens
Start With the Banks
Nicholas Shaxson
O
n October 17, 2008, during the throes of the global financial
crisis, officials from the U.S. Department of Justice summoned
Swiss banking regulators and executives from UBS, Switzerland’s
largest bank, to a closed-door meeting in New York to discuss the
bank’s role in helping American clients evade taxes. It was a sensitive
moment: the Swiss government had bailed out UBS the previous day.
The bank’s game plan was simple, a company insider later told Reuters:
“Admit guilt, settle the case quickly, and move on.”
But the Swiss were in for a nasty surprise. Four months earlier, U.S.
authorities had imprisoned Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS wealth
manager who had begun to spill the institution’s secrets. Cooperating
with U.S. investigators, Birkenfeld described a culture of deception at
the bank, which circumvented many countries’ laws and the bank’s own
regulations, making use of encrypted computers and offshore shell
companies and trusts. (Birkenfeld also claimed to have relied on less
sophisticated methods, such as hiding diamonds in a toothpaste tube to
smuggle them across borders.) Birkenfeld claimed that UBS, seeking to
make inroads with “high net worth individuals”—Silicon Valley entrepre-
neurs, Russian oligarchs, Saudi princes, Chinese industrial magnates—
sponsored events popular with global economic elites, such as the
America’s Cup yacht race and the Art Basel festival in Miami. In his
confessional book, Lucifer’s Banker, he describes organizing what he touts
as the largest-ever exhibit of Rodin sculptures. “I can’t even remember
how many of those art lovers ended up in our vaults,” Birkenfeld writes.
NICHOLAS SHAXSON is a writer on the staff of the Tax Justice Network and the author of
Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens. Follow him
on Twitter @nickshaxson.
According to Birkenfeld, other UBS bankers also used such events

to introduce themselves to ultrarich attendees and pitch their bank as
a safe harbor where vast quantities of wealth could reside, out of the
reach of pesky tax collectors. The Department of Justice estimated
that in 2004 alone, Swiss bankers visited the United States 3,800 times
to find and retain clients. The investigation found that UBS had helped
U.S. clients hide up to $20 billion.
But U.S. clients accounted for less than two percent of the assets of
the bank’s wealth-management division, which was handling around
$1.3 trillion globally by the time the financial crisis hit in 2007. Secrecy
was a global game for Swiss banks, and the playing field extended far
beyond Switzerland and the United States. One former Swiss banker
told me that she would regularly travel to Latin America for work and
would always arrive with butterflies in her stomach, uncomfortable
with the deceptions she had to carry out. On the immigration form,
she would write that she was traveling for pleasure, “though my suitcase
would be full of business suits and portfolio evaluations.” She would
remove client names and numbers from documents so that if the
authorities found them, they wouldn’t be able to connect the dots
between assets and depositors. She attended polo matches, operas,
and champagne dinners, earning the trust of potential customers.
“That is where it happens,” she said—meaning the establishment of a
mutually beneficial relationship in which her bank would help wealthy
elites hide their often ill-gotten gains in exchange for hefty wealth-
management fees. “I felt like I was prostituting myself,” she said.
UBS was a major player, but just one part of a vast system of off-
shore tax havens that still thrives. Havens facilitate tax evasion,
undermine the rule of law, and abet organized crime. They contribute
to the economic inequality that has sapped people’s faith in democracy
and fueled populist backlashes. They corrupt market economies by
favoring large multinationals over smaller local companies for reasons
that have nothing to do with productivity, entrepreneurship, or gen-
uine wealth creation. They have supercharged the profits of sys-
temically important global banks, helping make such institutions
“too big to fail” and “too big to jail.” They help wealthy elites in
poor countries loot their treasuries and stash the spoils elsewhere,
generating illicit cross-border financial flows of around $1 trillion
each year, according to the Washington, D.C.–based research firm
Global Financial Integrity.
March/April 2018 95
Nicholas Shaxson
Before the global financial crisis, few officials in the developed world
made much noise about tax havens. But their existence was hardly a
secret, and many major financial firms involved in the offshore system
employed former officials as executives or lobbyists. At the time that
UBS was under investigation, its vice chair of investment banking was
Phil Gramm, a former Republican senator from Texas who had served
as the chair of the Senate Banking Committee. (I sent Gramm an e-mail
asking him what he knew about UBS’ activities in this area at that time;
a representative said he was not available to comment.)
Whatever political cover the bank may have believed it enjoyed, the
Department of Justice officials told the Swiss that if they wanted to
avoid criminal charges of defrauding the United States, they would
need to supply the names of U.S. tax evaders who held assets at UBS.
For the Swiss, this represented an excru-
Havens undermine the rule ciating choice between violating the
official policy of banking secrecy that
of law, abet organized their country had upheld for more than
crime, corrupt market seven decades and risking a criminal in-
economies, and sap people’s dictment that could conceivably destroy
UBS. Ultimately, in February 2009, the
faith in democracy. Swiss government gave its blessing to
a settlement in which UBS admitted
defrauding the United States and paid a fine of $780 million. Crucially,
Switzerland also agreed to implement emergency laws to bypass Swiss
courts and allow UBS to deliver the names of 280 high-level U.S.
tax evaders.
But the Department of Justice wasn’t done: it immediately hit UBS
with a new fraud charge. The bank eventually coughed up 4,450 names.
The Department of Justice widened the net to include other Swiss
banks, and to date, more than 55,000 U.S. taxpayers have voluntarily
come forward with information about their Swiss deposits. By January
2016, U.S. authorities had recovered some $8 billion from these banks’
clients in back taxes, interest, and penalties, plus $1.4 billion in penalties
paid by the banks themselves. More is likely to have been recovered
since then.
The episode marked a powerful victory in the fight against tax havens
and provided crucial lessons in how to crack down on them, a task that
has taken on renewed urgency in recent years. Last November, the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, in partnership
with 95 news organizations all over the world, published the “Paradise
Papers” reports, the result of a giant data leak from the Bermuda-
based offices of an offshore law firm, Appleby, which shed light on
how the ultrarich avoid taxes and escape other laws and rules. This
was a sequel to the ICIJ’s 2016 “Panama Papers” reports, which revealed
the secrets of another company that specialized in hiding assets, the
Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, and exposed a sordid world of
criminality and creative tax shenanigans—alongside plenty of perfectly
legal behavior. And in 2014, the ICIJ published the “LuxLeaks” papers,
another huge data leak, which revealed how the accounting firm PwC
helped its clients lawfully avoid paying taxes by using Luxembourg as
a platform for exploiting loopholes in other countries’ tax codes.
These revelations have turned a harsh spotlight on the questionable
financial practices of prominent multinationals such as Disney; the
commodity trading giant Glencore and its rival, Koch Industries;
celebrities such as Harvey Weinstein and Shakira; criminals connected
to the notorious Mexican drug lord Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán; and
political figures as varied as U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross,
Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Queen Elizabeth II. What
these investigations have shown is that tax havens aren’t an exotic side-
show to the world economy: they lie close to its heart.
Outrage over tax havens has never been more widespread and
deep-seated than it is today. But addressing the harm they cause will
not be easy; tax havens enjoy the protection of powerful forces, and
the reforms that would be required to rein them in are fairly radical.
Successfully tackling the problem will require mobilizing public anger
against rigged systems that disadvantage ordinary people.
TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN

There is no generally agreed-on definition of “tax haven,” but its
meaning can be boiled down to two ideas: elsewhere and escape. Very
wealthy people put their money or assets elsewhere—in places usually
referred to as “offshore”—to escape the rules at home that they don’t like.
Those rules may be tax laws, disclosure requirements, criminal statutes,
or financial regulations. In exchange, the private-sector enablers of
the system earn hefty fees from their clients, and haven governments
profit from taxes, which they typically levy not on the capital nominally
flowing through these places but on the incomes or consumption of
the local resident professionals who handle that capital.
March/April 2018 97
Nicholas Shaxson
A commonly cited estimate of the total amount of wealth held off-

shore, calculated by the economist Gabriel Zucman, is $8.7 trillion—a
figure equal to around ten percent of global GDP. Zucman arrived at
that figure using a novel method: tracking mismatches between cross-
border assets and liabilities in countries’ balance-of-payments records.
He has said that the $8.7 trillion figure probably does not fully reflect
the volume of hidden assets, because it
excludes nonfinancial assets owned off-
Havens exist in almost shore, such as art, or racehorses, or real
every region of the world, estate. But in e-mail exchanges with me,
with each providing a he agreed there were further assets his
different mix of offshore data miss. His method doesn’t account
for some fairly common tax-evasion tools,
services. such as certain insurance products de-
signed to hide assets, or for situations
in which recorded assets and liabilities technically reside in the same
jurisdiction but are nevertheless “offshore” because the owner is else-
where. (One example: U.S. securities held by a custodian bank in the
United States but owned by a Brazilian.) Also, although banks don’t
mind revealing aggregate figures of their assets and liabilities, which
form the basis of Zucman’s numbers, tax or criminal authorities seek
client-level data, which banks are far more reluctant to hand over. It’s
safe to assume that if authorities could see that information, they
would discover many more hidden assets.
Using a model that is more inclusive than Zucman’s, the economist
James Henry has estimated that tax havens hold between $24 tril-
lion and $36 trillion. Even that estimate represents only the stock
of individual wealth held offshore and does not fully take into
account the assets that corporations park outside their home coun-
tries. (Corporate and individual wealth overlap, of course, since
individuals hold corporate assets, but the two forms of wealth are
taxed differently.) U.S. Fortune 500 corporations alone hold around
$2.6 trillion offshore. The UN Conference on Trade and Development
has estimated that developing countries lose out on somewhere
between $70 billion and $120 billion in annual tax revenue due to
multinationals artificially shifting profits to tax havens. And rich
countries are hardly immune: according to a 2014 U.S. Senate report,
the United States loses around $150 billion in tax revenue each year
owing to offshore tax schemes.
The global offshore system is constantly evolving. Havens exist in

almost every region of the world, with each providing a different mix
of offshore services. In Asia, Hong Kong serves as China’s offshore
gateway to the world—a low-tax platform for capital to flow in and
out of China, often with minimal scrutiny. Singapore, meanwhile,
acts as a haven of choice for wealthy elites from Australia, Indonesia,
and Malaysia. In Europe, Switzerland is not the only player. A U.S.
Senate investigation published in 2013, for example, showed how
Apple had routed some $74 billion through Ireland in the preceding
four years, escaping almost all taxes on its profits earned outside the
United States. Meanwhile, Luxembourg provides exotic tax-avoidance
products, such as shell companies, alongside more mainstream tax-
escape facilities. And the Netherlands acts as an offshore stepping-
stone for investment funds shifting capital between different countries
stripping out taxes along the way.
Then there is the massive British network, which resembles a spider
web, with the City of London in the middle, surrounded by an array
of British territories and dependencies: the British Virgin Islands, Ber-
muda, Gibraltar, the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of
Man. The British Virgin Islands specialize in secretive shell companies
and trusts. Bermuda is a big player in offshore “captive insurance,”
wherein a multinational owns a company ostensibly for insurance pur-
poses but typically with the real goal of cutting its tax bill. Gibraltar is
a favored destination for dodgy money from the former Soviet Union,
and the Cayman Islands and Jersey cater to the tax-avoidance needs of
investors in hedge funds and private equity firms, among others. Such
places enjoy some level of autonomy from the United Kingdom, but
London ultimately calls the shots and guarantees their legal systems.
Another crucial tax haven is the United States. Delaware, Nevada,
Wyoming, and other states encourage people to set up shell companies,
which allow their owners to hide behind walls of secrecy so thick that
foreign crime fighters cannot penetrate them—and neither, usually, can
the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Justice. Much of
U.S. President Donald Trump’s wealth is reportedly held by Delaware
companies, which would make it easier for him to hide conflicts of inter-
est. The amount of assets held in shell companies based in the United
States can only be guessed at; it is likely in the trillions.
The U.S. federal government, for its part, turns a blind eye to this
state-level phenomenon and even provides another layer of financial
March/April 2018 99
Nicholas Shaxson
secrecy for foreigners. Federal enforcement efforts focus on finding

U.S. tax cheats in overseas havens. Under the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA), Washington requires foreign financial insti-
tutions to disclose their American clients’ financial information to the
U.S. Treasury and imposes a 30 percent withholding tax on certain
payments to foreign financial institutions that don’t comply. But
Washington is stingy when it comes to sharing information in the other
direction, often refusing to reveal data on the assets that foreigners
hold in the United States to law enforcement authorities elsewhere.
As a result, the United States hosts large amounts of criminal and
foreign “dark money,” some of which finds its way into the political
system via campaign spending. In 2011, the Florida Bankers Association
estimated that hundreds of billions of dollars had come to the United
States in pursuit of this secrecy. The sums are larger now.
Notice that nearly all the places mentioned above are either rich
countries or satellites of rich countries. Tax havens need to persuade
asset holders that they are safe, reliable, and trustworthy. Nobody wants
to hide assets in a banana republic.
There are havens in less wealthy coun-
tries and places without rich-country
protectors—the Bahamas, Belize,
Mauritius, and the Seychelles, for
example—but they cannot offer
mainstream ultrarich depositors
the same level of protection as
the big players, and so those
places tend to go down mar-
ket, attracting more illicit money.
All tax havens share an impor-
tant feature: they are “captured
states,” in which powerful global
forces prevent local democratic institu-
tions from interfering in the elaborate game of offshore finance. This
is especially true of smaller tax havens, such as Jersey or Vanuatu,
where local legislators are often ordinary folks—former
fishermen or hoteliers, for example—who lack the skills,
knowledge, or confidence they would need to push back
against the flood of money, influence, and financial
expertise that suffuses the offshore system and that has
drowned entire societies. Locals often fear that chal-
lenging offshore players will lead the rich to take their
money elsewhere. Haven residents who dare criticize
the offshore sector are routinely ostracized as traitors and
even frozen out of employment. And if offshore players
don’t get the laws they want, they have been known to
turn to bribery, which can be especially effective in small
jurisdictions. As a result of all of this, local authorities
often serve as rubber stamps for laws and regulations
proposed by offshore private-sector actors.
Most tax havens attract little genuine foreign invest-
ment as a result of their offshore strategies. What they
generally get instead is “hot money”—rootless capital that
flits from place to place in search of the most welcoming
home. The constant fear in havens that such assets will
flee creates a race to the bottom, as authorities strain to
make themselves ever more accommodating. In March
March/April 2018 101

Nicholas Shaxson
2009, in the depths of a global financial crisis that was brought on

in large part by lax regulation, Robert Kirkby, then the technical
director of Jersey Finance, the official lobbying body for Jersey’s
financial sector, proudly described this dynamic. Explaining how
Jersey dealt with private-sector demands to loosen regulations related
to the risky securitization of various kinds of assets, he told me, “You
can lobby onshore, but there are lots of stakeholders, you have to get
past them all, and it takes a long time.” In Jersey, he boasted, “we can
change our company laws and our regulations so much faster.” That may
sound like a form of free-market efficiency—but those stakeholders
and onshore rules that such places bypass represent the lifeblood of
the rule of law and accountability.
“A LOT OF THIS STUFF IS LEGAL”

It’s fair to ask why tax havens persist and why they have so many defend-
ers if they are so clearly deleterious. Offshore advocates make a number
of arguments. But none survives scrutiny.
Officials in tax havens point out that those places are sovereign nations
(or autonomous territories) with every right to set their own tax laws.
That’s true. But by the same logic, countries harmed by havens have
every right to take strong countermeasures against them. Officials in
havens also note that people have a right to privacy and need relief
from unjust laws. But the people who use tax havens are overwhelmingly
rich and powerful. Providing them with special forms of protection
and immunity from fiscal and legal obligations while leaving everyone
else to shoulder the responsibilities and burdens of society creates one
rule for the 0.1 percent and another rule for everyone else.
Defenders of offshoring also correctly argue that the practice is not
always illegal and arguably benefits ordinary investors alongside the
ultrarich. Most large private pension and equity funds touch the offshore
system in some way. So do “tax efficient” corporate cash management
operations, which circulate capital around a multinational’s many global
subsidiaries, and “tax neutral” investing platforms, which host pools
of capital from various different places and then spread it out around
the world, seeking out the highest after-tax returns. If such assets
were taxed in havens, too, it would be unfair “double taxation.” In this
sense, defenders argue, havens serve as frictionless, efficient financial
conduits, removing obstacles from the path of capital as it flows in
pursuit of investment opportunities around the globe.
Yet this isn’t the full story. For one thing, the facilities that prevent
“double taxation” are the same ones that allow accounting tricks to
produce “double nontaxation,” in which no taxes are paid anywhere.
What is more, a lot of common tax avoidance that gets labeled “legal”
actually is not: often, it’s not clear whether a particular offshore strategy
or structure is lawful until it has been tested in court. Law firms that set
up shell companies for their clients may not be breaking any laws them-
selves, but many of their clients are. More broadly, what is legal isn’t
necessarily legitimate. As U.S. President Barack Obama said in 2016,
in reaction to the Panama Papers revelations: “The problem is that a
lot of this stuff is legal, not illegal.”
Tax havens are a pure distillation of all that is wrong with financial
globalization: they encourage capital to move across borders, but in
the wrong directions. Many developing countries have found that
when they open up to global finance, investment doesn’t flow in to
their capital-starved economies—instead, after being looted by elites,
money flows out, into tax havens. Indeed, this represents one of the
main reasons why financial globalization has failed to improve the lot
of many poor countries.
TO CATCH A TAX CHEAT

No magic bullet can solve this vast political and economic conundrum.
Any serious effort to do so would run headlong into some of the
world’s most powerful interests. So fairly radical solutions are required—
as is constant vigilance, since the officials, bankers, accountants, and
lawyers who prop up the offshore system will always seek new ways to
subvert the rules.
One tactic that some economists (and many lobbyists) advocate
would be sure to fail: trying to reduce the incentive for major companies
and rich people to park their money offshore by lowering corporate and
income tax rates. For one thing, as rich countries have steadily lowered
their corporate tax rates since the 1970s, corporate investment has stag-
nated and tax avoidance has skyrocketed. Major firms now sit on huge
piles of uninvested cash—Apple alone had nearly $300 billion at last
count. Cutting corporate taxes would simply add to such piles. The
same applies to lowering taxes for superwealthy individuals. There is
little point in trying to “compete” with tax havens. After all, why would
corporations or rich people pay a bit less when they can pay a whole lot
less, or even nothing, by going offshore?

Nicholas Shaxson
What lower taxes might attract, however, is more hot money,

which brings few benefits to economies but is associated with a raft
of costs: financial instability; asset bubbles; increased economic,
political, and geographic inequality (which saps long-term growth);
and the potential, especially in smaller open economies, for “Dutch
disease,” in which financial inflows push up real exchange rates and
damage productive parts of an economy.
If governments want to cut havens out of the game, they will have to
take far more drastic steps. By late 2017, U.S. taxes on the estimated
$2.6 trillion in profits held overseas by Fortune 500 companies were
supposedly being “deferred” until such time as the companies decided
to “repatriate” them. As Kimberly Clausing, Reuven Avi-Yonah, and
other tax experts have recommended, the United States should simply
eliminate such deferrals and tax accumulated offshore earnings directly,
with exemptions for taxes already paid in other countries. According to
the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, such an approach to
taxing multinationals could raise up to $750 billion for the U.S. Treasury.
But the tax bill Trump signed into law last year went in precisely the
opposite direction, levying a one-time tax on accumulated offshore
earnings at a hugely reduced rate of between eight and 15.5 percent
and exempting future foreign profits from tax—thus increasing the
incentive for multinationals to keep relying on tax havens.
Advocates for the tax bill cheered in January when Apple announced
that it would make a $38 billion tax payment on the cash that it held
overseas and would spend $30 billion in capital expenditures over the
next five years. Other technology companies will likely follow suit.
But Apple’s announcement did not say that the investments had any-
thing to do with the tax reforms. Moreover, the reforms will yield less
than half of the revenue the United States could have raised by simply
taxing Apple’s roughly $246 billion in offshore profits at the full cor-
porate rate and then continuing to tax them every year. Instead, Wash-
ington will get a relatively modest short-term payment and next to
nothing in the future.
An even more far-reaching solution is called “formulary apportion-
ment” and would divide a multinational’s total global income between
individual countries according to a formula based on the company’s sales,
assets, and payroll in each country where it operates. After the income
was so divided, each country could tax its share at whatever rate it
liked. Countries could adopt this measure unilaterally, calculating
and then taxing their share of a multinational’s income, but inter-

national coordination would help iron out complexities. Many U.S.
states and Canadian provinces already use a version of this model.
It’s not without its drawbacks, but it could make a huge difference
if properly implemented.
Other solutions are already being tested. In 2014, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development set up a useful (although
imperfect) global information-sharing scheme called the Common
Reporting Standard, in which participating countries automatically
share financial information about one another’s taxpayers. The CRS is
technically similar to the FATCA in the United States but with a big
difference: unlike FATCA, the CRS doesn’t impose a hefty 30 percent tax
on payments to financial institutions that don’t comply with it. Most
large countries and even most large tax havens have agreed to partici-
pate in the CRS, with one glaring exception: the United States. Wash-
ington claims that it does participate, in effect, since the CRS is similar
to FATCA—but this ignores the fact that although FATCA involves vague
promises to share information with other countries, it actually offers
other countries very little. To give the CRS teeth, the EU—the largest
non-U.S. entity represented by the OECD—should impose its own
30 percent tax on payments to financial institutions that don’t comply
with the CRS. This would target U.S. banks, which would likely pres-
sure Washington to provide the necessary information.
On the level of U.S. states, the activist Ralph Nader and others
have long argued that letting individual states incorporate companies
has resulted in a race to lower standards, as states turn themselves into
permissive corporate havens in order to attract businesses and maxi-
mize incorporation fees. Nader has argued for a federal law that would
create “a modern federal chartering agency with comprehensive author-
ity.” Limiting corporate chartering to the federal level, Nader contends,
would “put an end to the wheeling and dealing that corporations use
against state governments.”
Another tactic would be to require all countries and territories to
establish standardized central registers that would record who owns
the various assets they hold—and, ideally, publish that information.
The United Kingdom has the power to impose such a rule on every
node in its spider web of tax havens, and the EU could force all its
member states to do the same thing. Large, powerful countries could also
blacklist tax havens that refused to take this step by imposing sanctions

Nicholas Shaxson
ranging from blocking foreign aid to cutting off recalcitrant govern-

ments or financial institutions from international payment systems.
(The trouble with blacklists, however, is that the big players usually have
the political muscle to lobby their way off the lists, leaving behind only
the minnows.)
Alongside these measures, the UBS case illustrates an immensely
powerful principle for those seeking to tackle tax havens. For decades,
countries had tried and failed to crack open Switzerland’s famed
banking secrecy. The fight launched by U.S. law enforcement against
the bank didn’t exactly pit the United States against Switzerland: rather,
it was chiefly a contest between the rule of law, on the one hand, and
wealthy tax evaders and other criminals, on the other. Switzerland
was merely the main battlefield. U.S. authorities did not threaten the
country’s government, at least not directly.
If authorities in one country go after another country, then elected
officials and the public in the target country might rally against foreign
“bullies.” That is what happened in 2008, when Peer Steinbrück, then
the German finance minister, publicly threatened to “take a whip” to
Switzerland, albeit without providing detailed proposals. In the wake
of a furious response from the Swiss public, the Germans backed off.
In tackling tax havens, private companies often make much better
targets than governments. Banks can be regulated and penalized. So
can the so-called Big Four accounting firms: Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and
PwC, which are as responsible as any other group for putting together
the nuts and bolts of the offshore system. Little focuses the minds of
bankers and accountants like the threat of jail or the loss of a license
to operate in a big economy.
TRUMP TIME?
Fatalists argue that crackdowns on tax havens are pointless, like squeezing
a balloon: its shape changes, they argue, but its volume stays the same.
That is false. Crackdowns are more like squeezing a sponge: yes, there
is some displacement, but also a reduction in volume.
The real problem with crackdowns is usually that governments lack
the political will to carry them out. In the United States, it seems
unlikely that this will change much in the Trump era. But Trump
could, in theory, revive his now tattered populist image and drive up
his flagging approval ratings by announcing a crackdown on tax
havens. He has, in fact, already expressed interest in doing so. When
I interviewed him by telephone in 2016 for an article I was writing for

Vanity Fair, he told me that, if elected, he would “fix” tax havens and
address the issue of banking secrecy. “I fully understand the tax-haven
situation, and much of it will be ended,” he said. “It is very easy to end
it.” But when I asked him how, he cut short the interview.
Whether or not Trump acts, it seems likely that the offshore system
will come under ever-stronger attack, as public fury rises about in-
equality and as large multinationals and private elites remain untaxed,
unaccountable, and out of touch. Until recently, few people paid
attention to tax havens, and those who did considered them to be
colorful sideshows to the global economy: the province of a few Mafiosi,
drug runners, tax-cheating celebrities, and European aristocrats. But
the Panama and Paradise Papers helped expose the truth: the offshore
system is a cancer on the global economy. Tax havens are formidable
bastions of wealth and power, but because they hurt nearly everyone,
the campaign against them could conceivably draw together a vast
array of allies. Mafia bosses and drug runners use tax havens, so law
enforcement and tough-on-crime politicians should want to shut them
down. Every major private-sector financial institution uses tax havens
and is significantly implicated in the offshore system, so campaigners
against the outsize influence of Wall Street should be laser-focused on
the problem. U.S. banks go offshore to escape rules they don’t like,
accelerating their path toward too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-jail status. So
policymakers worried about financial stability should pay more atten-
tion to the role of tax havens. Politicians use tax havens to hide bribes and
bypass disclosure laws, which means that anticorruption campaigners
ought to join the fray. Dictators and their cronies in poor countries
use havens to stash their looted treasure, so international development
organizations should contribute more to fighting the offshore system.
The list of potential partners in the fight against the offshore system
is long, and could grow longer. It is a cause that could attract voters on
the right worried about crime and the corruption of markets and voters
on the left worried about inequality and growing corporate power.
Politicians of all stripes would be wise to get ahead of the story.∂

Iran Among the Ruins
Tehran’s Advantage in a Turbulent
Middle East
Vali Nasr
O
ver the last seven years, social upheavals and civil wars have
torn apart the political order that had defined the Middle
East ever since World War I. Once solid autocracies have
fallen by the wayside, their state institutions battered and broken, and
their national borders compromised. Syria and Yemen have descended
into bloody civil wars worsened by foreign military interventions. A
terrorist group, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), seized vast areas
of Iraq and Syria before being pushed back by an international coalition
led by the United States.
In the eyes of the Trump administration, and those of a range of
other observers and officials in Washington and the region, there is
one overriding culprit behind the chaos: Iran. They point out that the
country has funded terrorist groups, propped up Syrian dictator
Bashar al-Assad, and aided the anti-Saudi Houthi rebels in Yemen.
U.S. President Donald Trump has branded Iran “the world’s leading
state sponsor of terrorism,” with a “sinister vision of the future,” and
dismissed the nuclear agreement reached by it, the United States,
and five other world powers in 2015 as “the worst deal ever” (and refused
to certify that Iran is complying with its terms). U.S. Secretary of
Defense James Mattis has described Iran as “the single most enduring
threat to stability and peace in the Middle East.” And Saudi Foreign
Minister Adel al-Jubeir has charged that “Iran is on a rampage.”
Washington seems to believe that rolling back Iranian influence
would restore order to the Middle East. But that expectation rests on
a faulty understanding of what caused it to break down in the first
place. Iran did not cause the collapse, and containing Iran will not
VALI NASR is Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University.
bring back stability. There is no question that many aspects of Iran’s

behavior pose serious challenges to the United States. Nor is there
any doubt that Iran has benefited from the collapse of the old order in
the Arab world, which used to contain it. Yet its foreign policy is far
more pragmatic than many in the West comprehend. As Iran’s will-
ingness to engage with the United States over its nuclear program
showed, it is driven by hardheaded calculations of national interest,
not a desire to spread its Islamic Revolution abroad. The Middle East
will regain stability only if the United States does more to manage con-
flict and restore balance there. That will require a nuanced approach,
including working with Iran, not reflexively confronting it.
MORE NORMAL THAN YOU THINK

Too often, politicians and analysts in the West reduce Tehran’s interests
and ambitions to revolutionary fervor. Iran, the charge goes, is more
interested in being a cause than a country. In fact, although Tehran
certainly has its dyed-in-the-wool hard-liners, it also has many prag-
matic, even moderate, politicians who are keen to engage with the
West. In domestic politics, the two camps are locked in a long-running
tug of war. But when it comes to foreign policy, there is a growing
consensus around the imperatives of nationalism and national security.
It was this consensus that led Iran to sign and then implement the
nuclear deal.
Some observers see Iran today, with its use of militias and insurgents
abroad, as the United States saw the Soviet Union or China at the
height of its revolutionary fervor—as a power intent on using asym-
metric means to upset the existing order and sow chaos. Iran’s goal is
to “expand its malign influence,” Mattis said at his confirmation hear-
ing, “to remake the region in its image.” But Iran is closer to modern
Russia and China than to their revolutionary predecessors. Like them,
it is a revisionist power, not a revolutionary one. It opposes a regional
order designed to exclude it. Iran’s methods often defy international
norms, but the national interests they serve, even when at odds with
those of the United States, are not uncommon. Iran’s view of the
world is shaped less by the likes of Lenin and Mao than by those of
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. And it is driven less by revolutionary
zeal than by nationalism.
What characterizes Iran’s current outlook harks back not just to the
Iranian Revolution in 1979 but also to the Pahlavi dynasty, which ruled

Vali Nasr
the country for the five decades leading up to the revolution. Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, the last shah, envisioned Iran dominating the Middle
East, with the help of a nuclear capability, a superior military, and
exclusive control over the Persian Gulf. For a time, the Islamic Repub-
lic eschewed such nationalism in favor
of more ideologically driven aspirations.
Iran worries that it is But nationalism has, over the last de-
outgunned by its cade and a half, been on the rise. Today,
traditional rivals. Iran’s leaders interlace their expressions
of fidelity to Islamic ideals with long-
standing nationalist myths. Like Rus-
sia and China, Iran has vivid memories of its imperial past and the
aspirations of great-power status that come with them. And like those
two countries, Iran sees a U.S.-led regional order as a roadblock in
the way of its ambitions.
Such nationalist ambitions come alongside more acute national
security concerns. The Israeli and U.S. militaries pose clear and pres-
ent dangers to Iran. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq put
hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops on Iran’s borders and convinced
Tehran that it would be foolish for it to think that Iranian forces could
thwart the U.S. military on the battlefield. But the U.S. occupation of
Iraq showed that, once the initial invasion was over, Shiite militias
and Sunni insurgents would do just that, persuading the United States
to withdraw. The use of those militants, who relied on training and
weapons provided by Iran to kill and injure thousands of U.S. soldiers
during the Iraq war, also helps explain the Trump administration’s
antipathy toward Iran.
Iran sees threats from the Arab world, as well. From 1958, when
a revolution overthrew the Iraqi monarchy, to 2003, Iraq posed an
ongoing threat to Iran. The memory of the eight-year Iran-Iraq
War in the 1980s shapes Iran’s outlook on the Arab world. Many
senior Iranian leaders are veterans of that war, during which Iraq
annexed Iranian territory, used chemical weapons against Iranian
troops, and terrorized Iranian cities with missile attacks. And since
2003, brewing Kurdish separatism in Iraq and Syria and growing
Shiite-Sunni tensions across the region have reinforced the percep-
tion that the Arab world endangers Iran’s security.
Iran also worries that it is outgunned by its traditional rivals. In 2016,
according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Iran
Hired guns: a Hezbollah fighter on the Lebanese-Syrian border, July 2017

spent three percent of its GDP on its military, less than the propor-
tions spent by Saudi Arabia (ten percent), Israel (six percent), Iraq
(five percent), and Jordan (four percent), putting Iran in eighth
place in the Middle East in terms of defense spending as a percent-
age of GDP. Iran’s spending lags in absolute terms, as well. In 2016,
for example, Saudi Arabia spent $63.7 billion on defense, five times
Iran’s $12.7 billion.
To compensate for this handicap, Iran has adopted a strategy of
“forward defense.” This involves supporting friendly militias and
insurgent groups across the Middle East, including Hamas and
Hezbollah, both of which threaten Israel’s borders. Iran’s most vaunted
military unit is the Quds Force, the part of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) charged with training and equipping such
proxies. Hezbollah has proved a particularly effective ally, as it has
achieved the only instances of Arab military success against Israel. In
ALI HASHISHO / REUTE RS
2000, it forced Israeli troops to withdraw from southern Lebanon,

and in 2006, it blunted Israel’s offensive there.
A similar logic underlies Iran’s long-range missile program (and,
before the 2015 agreement, its nuclear efforts). Tehran has intended
for these programs to serve as a protective umbrella over its other forces,
a strategy successfully employed by Pakistan against India. Iran has

Vali Nasr
agreed to freeze its nuclear program; the idea now is that, with a fully
developed missile program, even a significantly more powerful country
could not attack Iran or its proxies without facing devastating retaliation.
SURROUNDED BY CHAOS
If Iran’s behavior appears more threatening today than it once did,
that is not because Iran is more intent on confronting its rivals and
sowing disorder than before but because of the drastic changes the
Middle East has experienced over the last decade and a half. Gone is
the Arab order on which Washington relied for decades to manage
regional affairs and limit Iran’s room for maneuver. A chain of events,
starting with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, culminated in the
implosion of the Arab world, as social unrest toppled rulers, broke
down state institutions, and triggered ethnic and sectarian strife that
in some cases escalated into full-fledged civil war.
In many ways, the instability has enhanced Iran’s relative power and
influence throughout the region; with so many other power centers
weakened, Tehran looms larger than before. In Iraq, working through
an array of Kurdish and Shiite political forces, Iran shapes alliances,
forges governments, settles disputes, and decides policies. As a result,
Iraq is influenced more deeply by Iran than by any other country,
including the United States. In Syria, Iran has combined Hezbollah
fighters with Shiite volunteers from across the Middle East to make an
effective military force, which it has used to wage war on the opposition.
As Assad has gained the upper hand in the civil war, Iran’s influence
in Damascus has surged. And in Yemen, with very little investment,
Iran has managed to bog Saudi Arabia and its allies down in a costly
war, diverting Saudi resources away from Iraq and Syria.
But the instability has also produced new threats. Arab public opin-
ion is highly critical of Iran’s support for the Assad regime in Syria.
According to a Zogby poll published in 2012, soon after Iran entered
the Syrian conflict, the country’s favorable rating in the Arab world
plummeted to 25 percent, down from a high of 75 percent in 2006. And
the meteoric rise of ISIS, which is virulently anti-Shiite and anti-
Iranian, brought into sharp relief Sunni resistance to Iranian influence.
Yet ISIS’ fate has also confirmed the effectiveness of forward defense
in Tehran’s eyes. Without Iran’s military reach and the strength of its
network of allies and clients in Iraq and Syria, ISIS would have quickly
swept through Damascus, Baghdad, and Erbil (the capital of Iraqi
Kurdistan), before reaching Iran’s own borders. Although Iran’s rivals

see the strategy of supporting nonstate military groups as an effort to
export the revolution, the calculation behind it is utterly conventional:
the more menacing the Arab world looks, the more determined Iran
is to stay involved there.
The new regional context has also heightened the risk of direct
conflict between Iran and the United States or its Arab allies. But
here, too, Iran’s leaders sense that they have the advantage. Iran has
come out of the fight against ISIS stronger than before. The IRGC
has trained and organized Iraqi Shiites
who confronted ISIS in Iraq, Shiite vol-
unteers who traveled from as far away
With so many other power
as Afghanistan to fight in Syria, and centers weakened, Tehran
Houthi forces battling the pro-Saudi looms larger than before.
government in Yemen. Together with
Hezbollah, these Shiite groups form a
force to be reckoned with. After the fighting ends, they will continue
to shape their home countries as they enter local politics, entrenching
Iran’s influence in the Arab world. As a result, Sunni Arab states will
no longer be able to manage the region on their own.
Over the past year, escalating tensions with Saudi Arabia, the
Trump administration’s saber rattling against Iran, and the admin-
istration’s ban on travel from several Muslim-majority countries,
including Iran, have touched off a nationalist reaction. The defiance
toward the United States is matched by worry about the growing threat
from the reinvigorated U.S.-Saudi relationship. Tensions between Iran
and Saudi Arabia have been on the rise since the signing of the
nuclear deal, but since the Trump administration took office, they have
taken an ominous turn. In May 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman, Saudi Arabia’s first deputy prime minister and minister of
defense, warned that the battle for influence over the Middle East
ought to take place “inside Iran.”
Iran is also no longer immune to the kinds of terrorist attacks that
have hit Arab and Western capitals. Last June, ISIS gunmen and suicide
bombers attacked the Iranian parliament building and the mausoleum
of Iran’s first supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, killing 18 people.
The sense of danger from the threats swirling around the country has
led many Iranians to accept the logic of forward defense. During the
early years of the Syrian civil war, Iran’s rulers went to great lengths

Vali Nasr
to downplay Iranian involvement and hid Iranian casualties. Now,

they publicly celebrate them as martyrs.
During antigovernment protests in late December and early January,
some marchers shouted slogans questioning Iran’s involvement in
Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories. Forward defense, the
demonstrators claimed, channeled scarce resources to distant con-
flicts, away from pressing needs at home. The protests suggested that
nationalism is tempered by its economic cost. But despite the public
criticism, Iran is not about to collapse under the pressure of imperial
overreach. Iranians are skeptical of their government’s regional ambi-
tions, but they do not doubt the imperative of defense. They worry
about the threat posed by Sunni extremists to sacred Shiite cities in
Iraq and Syria, and even more so to Iran itself. In any case, Iran’s rulers
are not moved by the criticism. Many of them saw foreign hands behind
the protests. They are convinced that rather than retreat, Iran must
show strength by protecting its turf in the Middle East.
FROM NEGOTIATION TO CONFRONTATION

The Obama administration responded to the disintegrating order in
the Middle East by distancing the United States from the region’s
unending instability. In a clear break with past U.S. policy, it refused
to intervene in Syria’s civil war and moved beyond the old strategy of
containment to forge a nuclear deal with Iran. That deal angered the
Arab world and aggravated regional tensions, but it also reduced
the threat that would have continued to tether the United States to
the Middle East just when it was trying to break free.
The success of the nuclear deal suggested that the United States
might reimagine its relationship with Iran. Arab allies concluded
that Washington would no longer be committed to containing the
country and worried that it would turn away from them. Tehran
agreed. With the Arab world in free fall, it reasoned, a containment
strategy against Iran was unsustainable, and the nuclear deal would
make it unnecessary.
But despite these expectations, the United States did not fundamen-
tally change its approach to the region. The Obama administration
sought to assuage Arab angst by signing large arms deals with Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Those in Tehran who had supported the nuclear deal were disappointed:
Iran had given up an important asset only to see the conventional
military gap with its regional rivals widen. In 2015, Saudi Arabia and
its allies for the first time proved willing to use that military superiority,
with devastating effect, in Yemen—a signal that was not lost on Iran.
Tehran responded by doubling down on its missile program.
The Trump administration has reversed course on the nuclear deal
and is pivoting back to the old U.S.-Arab alliance system, with Saudi
Arabia as its anchor. The deal may limp along, but the opening that it
presented Iran and the United States has closed. A return to contain-
ment will be difficult, however. Two important building blocks are
missing: Iraq and Syria are weak and broken, unable to control their
own territories and ruled by governments that are closer to Iran than
to the United States’ Arab allies. The two countries cover most of the
Levant and for several decades had imposed order on its competing
sects, ethnicities, and tribes. Since World War I, along with Egypt
and Saudi Arabia, they had served as pillars of the Arab order. After
1958, Iraq, in particular, acted as both a shield against Iranian influence
and a spear in Iran’s side.
Ultimately, the United States’ position in the Middle East reflects
its broader retreat from global leadership. The United States lacks
the capacity to roll back Iranian gains and fill the vacuum that doing
so would leave behind. The shortcomings of U.S. policy were on full
display during last year’s referendum on independence held by Iraqi
Kurdistan. Although Washington called on the Kurds not to hold the
vote, it could not stop them, and after they voted for independence,
it played little role in managing the ensuing crisis. Instead, Iran defused
the standoff, which threatened to escalate into open conflict between
Baghdad and Erbil. Tehran compelled Kurdish leaders to back away
from independence, surrender control over the contested city of
Kirkuk, and even submit to a change in leadership in the Kurdistan
Regional Government.
Nor can the United States’ principal Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, pick
up the slack. It has successfully rallied Sunni Arab public opinion in
opposition to Iran’s meddling in Syria and the rest of the Arab world.
And between 2013 and 2016, it, along with Qatar and Turkey, put Iran
and its clients on their heels in Syria by supporting various anti-Assad
opposition groups. But then the Saudi effort fell short. Saudi Arabia
quarreled with Qatar and Turkey, and the Assad regime survived the
Sunni-led opposition. And in Yemen, the Houthis have stood their
ground in the face of the vast military muscle of the Saudi-led coalition.

Vali Nasr
Iran still worries about Saudi Arabia’s newfound assertiveness.

Prince Mohammed is waging war in Yemen and isolating Qatar, and
he even attempted to strong-arm Lebanon’s prime minister, Saad
Hariri, into resigning in November. Breaking with his predecessors,
he has also shown a willingness to play
a role in Iraq, where he is wooing Iraqi
A consensus has emerged Shiite politicians, including the maver-
in Tehran around closer ties ick militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr.
with Russia. Yet Saudi Arabia will have a hard time
continuing this aggressive strategy. The
crown prince has to manage a tricky
succession from his father, King Salman, and pull off an ambitious
program of social and economic reforms, all while confronting Iran.
Nor does Iran feel as isolated as Washington and its allies would
like. Last June, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab states to impose a
diplomatic and economic boycott on Qatar, punishing it for cozying
up to Iran and for supporting terrorist groups and the Sunni Islamist
organization the Muslim Brotherhood. But the effort to isolate Qatar
has only pushed it closer to Iran, providing Tehran with a beachhead
on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf.
Saudi Arabia’s move also damaged relations with Turkey. Ankara’s
ruling Justice and Development Party has ties to the Muslim Brother-
hood, and the country has its own aspiration to lead the Sunni world.
The U.S.-Saudi vision of regional order does not reflect Turkey’s
interests and ambitions. All of this has accelerated Turkey’s pivot
toward Iran and Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has
found ways around his disagreements with Tehran and Moscow to
forge a partnership with the two in order to shape events in Syria. This
new axis was on full display last November, when Erdogan joined
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani in Sochi to decide Syria’s fate. The rise in tensions between
Iran and the United States is happening in the context of Russia’s entry
into the Middle East, which began in earnest in 2015, when Russia
intervened in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the Assad regime. U.S.
officials have steadfastly downplayed Moscow’s interest in Syria and
dismissed the idea that Russia will gain influence by extending its
reach into the region. But Russia has emerged as the main arbiter of
Syria’s fate, and as its role has grown beyond Syria, it has become the
only power broker in the Middle East that everyone talks to.
Russia could not have made these gains without Iran. Iranian ground
presence gave Russia its victory in Syria. And in Afghanistan, Central
Asia, and the Caucasus, Iran and Russia have worked together closely to
counter U.S. influence. The two countries see themselves as great powers
at odds with U.S. alliances built to contain them. Russia understands
Iran’s value to its broader ambitions. Iran sits at an important geographic
location and is an energy-rich country of 80 million people, with a net-
work of allies and clients that spans the Middle East—all outside the
United States’ sphere of influence. That makes Iran a prize for Putin,
who is eager to push back against the United States wherever he can.
By working together in the Syrian civil war, the Iranian and Russian
militaries and intelligence communities have built deep ties with one
another, which will help Iran withstand future U.S. coercion. Over
the past year, as the United States has backed away from the nuclear
deal and put increased pressure on Iran, a consensus has emerged in
Tehran around closer ties with Russia. Iran is looking to increase
trade with Russia and buy sophisticated weaponry from it to counter
rising military spending within the Saudi-led bloc. It may even sign
a defense pact with Russia, which would include close military and
intelligence cooperation and Russian access to Iranian military bases,
something Iran has resisted in the past. In the end, U.S. policy may
end up empowering Russia without diminishing Iran’s influence.
TIME TO TALK
Based as it is on a warped understanding of the causes of the disorder
in the Middle East, the Trump administration’s Iran policy is caught
in a self-defeating spiral. The assumption that the United States and
its Arab partners will be able to contain Iran quickly and painlessly,
and that doing so will bring stability to the region, is dangerously
wrong. Right now, the United States does not have enough troops in
the Middle East to affect developments in Iraq or Syria, let alone
suppress Iran. Committing the necessary military resources would force
Trump to go back on his disavowal of costly military adventures. And
those resources would have to come at the expense of other pressing
issues, such as managing North Korea and deterring China and
Russia. Nor should Washington put its hopes in its regional allies.
They are not able to expel Iran from the Arab world, nor would they
be able to replace its influence if they did. Any regional conflagration
would inevitably compel the United States to intervene.

Vali Nasr
Even if the United States did muster the necessary resources to

contain Iran, doing so would not bring stability. Iran is an indispens-
able component of any sustainable order in the Middle East. Military
confrontation would only encourage Tehran to invest even more in
forward defense, leading to more Iranian meddling and more insta-
bility. Stable states, such as Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates, could stumble, and weak ones, such Iraq and Lebanon,
could descend into the kind of lawlessness and violence that have
characterized Libya and Yemen in recent years. On top of that, the
United States would have to contend with humanitarian crises and
terrorist groups that would pick up where ISIS left off.
Rather than conceive of a regional order designed to contain Iran,
the United States should promote a vision for the Middle East that
includes Iran. It should convince Tehran that it would be better off
working with Washington and its allies than investing its hopes in a
Russian-backed regional order.
To achieve that, the United States would have to rely more on
diplomacy and less on force. Washington should find ways to reduce
tensions by engaging Iran directly, picking up where the nuclear deal
left off. It should also encourage Iran and Saudi Arabia to cooperate
to resolve regional crises, starting with those in Syria and Yemen.
Given the trust Saudi Arabia now places in the Trump adminis-
tration, the United States should do what the Obama administration
failed to: lead an international diplomatic effort to broker a regional
deal that would end conflicts and create a framework for peace and
stability. This task should not be left to Russia. Such an effort would
be difficult, especially since Washington has thrown away any dip-
lomatic capital generated by the nuclear deal. But the alternative—
escalating confrontation—would only drive the Middle East deeper
into disarray.∂
SPONSORED REPORT
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A BRIGHT ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

By H.E. Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
S
ince June 2017, the Government of Qatar has accelerated its plans to move from a hydrocarbon
to a diversified, knowledge-based economy. In line with Qatar National Vision 2030, our
roadmap launched in 2009 to achieve sustainable economic growth, we have strengthened
international relationships with trade partners, opened new trade routes, increased our international
investments and created new incentives for local and foreign businesses.
The catalyst for this rules that allow visa-free does not and will not use
transformation has been entry to citizens of over 80 economic tools to harm
the illegal blockade im- countries. trading partners, nor do
posed on us by our neigh- As a testament to our we leverage business
bors. The blockade has commitment to economic deals for political gain.
inspired national pride development, we are Ultimately, we are com-
and patriotism in Qatar building strategic partner- mitted to creating a dy-
and given us the chance ships with international namic and more diversi-
to tell the world who we investors as we look for- fied economy in which
are, what we stand for and ward to foreign invest- the private sector plays
what we believe in. ment in Qatar, as well as a prominent role. This
While the blockading opportunities to bolster has been boosted by
countries attempted to foreign economies. the opening of our new
use economic means to H.E. Mohammed Bin The United States and Hamad Port, south of the
curtail our sovereignty Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Deputy the United Kingdom re- capital Doha, which now
through closing borders, Prime Minister and Minister of main key partners for in- handles 27 percent of
Foreign Affairs
splitting up families, and ternational investment trade in the region.
attempting to harm our In recent months, we and collaboration. Qatar Since its opening last
currency, we have re- have made it easier for has invested $27 bil- September, we have es-
mained committed to foreign investors to gain lion in the US with nearly tablished new shipping
keeping business and a foothold in the Qatari $10 billion more slated routes to Oman, Kuwait,
politics separate. Put sim- market by removing bar- for projects in the years Turkey, Pakistan, and India.
ply, we will never stoop to riers to investment and ahead. Qatari investment The illegal actions
their level and put our re- providing greater in- in the UK has amounted of our neighbors have
gion’s citizens at risk. centives through our to £40 billion, and we an- served as an impetus for
The fundamentals of our Investment Free Zones, nounced in March that we us to accelerate our eco-
economy remain strong including those located will invest an additional nomic plans and renew
and we have not scaled at Hamad International £5 billion in the next three our commitment to diver-
back our domestic or in- Airport. to five years. sification and sustained
ternational trade or made We have also fast- Since the start of the growth.
changes to our long-term tracked major labor re- blockade, we have con- We fully expect to see
investment strategy. Our forms in partnership with tinued to honor all of our a strong return of the
assets and foreign invest- the International Labor business agreements and Qatari economy this year
ments comprise more Organization and opened we have not missed or and growth over the
than 250 percent of our the door for expatriates to delayed a single shipment years to come and we
GDP and we remain the gain permanent residency of energy to our regional will continue to build
world’s largest exporter of in Qatar, a first for the re- and international partners strategic par tnerships
LNG, GTL and the second gion. This is in addition to that rely on Qatar for their with our friends around
largest producer of helium. the introduction of new sources of energy. Qatar the world. n
PONSORED R
REPORT
EPORT
Educating Media Professionals and Old School, New School

Engaging Thought Leadership in the
W
idely known as an oil-rich state, Qatar has built a reputa-
QATAR
Middle East tion over the years as a more diversified economy with a
By Everette E. Dennis, Dean globalized outlook on development. Apart from the usual
and CEO of Northwestern petrochemical players, the country boasts large local flagships as
University in Qatar well as new contributors to its nation-building project.
Established in 1964, Qatar Insurance Company (QIC) is the
N
orthwestern University largest insurance company in the MENA region by Gross Written
in Qatar (NU-Q) began Premium and market capitalization. Group President and CEO
its tenth year of op- Khalifa Abdulla Turki Al-Subaey wants the company to become
erations in the fall of 2017, fully among the world’s top 50 insurance companies by 2030.
ensconced in a new 515,000 Dennis delivers keynote address at “We are a Qatar-based composite insurer with an underwrit-
square foot building, hailed as OSCE conference in Vienna. ing footprint across the Middle East and the rest of the world. The
one of the world’s largest and group is the leading insurance group in the region in terms of total
most advanced communication and media centers where en- assets, gross written premi-
gaged innovation in teaching, research and thought leadership ums and net income,” said Al-
continues apace. Subaey.
Designed by architect Antoine Predock, the building features the
With 73 percent of its gross
infrastructure of a television network and a Hollywood studio with
a robotic newsroom, massive video installations, a state of the art written premium generated
cinema, black box theater and the largest sound stage in the region from outside of the Middle
along with classrooms, auditorium, executive education center and East, QIC’s strategy is under-
even a digital museum, called the Media Majlis at NU-Q, which will pinned by continued global
open in September 2018. expansion and diversification.
A diverse, cosmopolitan student body from Qatar and 40 other “QIC’s international busi-
countries comes to NU-Q to study media industries and technology ness is a critical element of
as well as journalism and strategic communication imbedded in a the group’s overall insurance
liberal arts context. Graduates work in media industries, business, and reinsurance operations.
government, and other fields. Thirty-four percent of the first four We have grown in recent years
graduating classes have matriculated for advanced study to the both organically and through
world’s top graduate schools, such as Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard acquisition, and we will con-
and London School of Economics. tinue to do so,” said Al-Subaey.
The resident faculty is made up of media professionals, renowned While QIC is primarily non- Qatar Insurance Company (QIC)
scholars, and others including award-winning documentary and life insurance and reinsurance President and CEO Khalifa
narrative filmmakers. The curriculum, modeled on and validated group, the group is looking to Abdulla Al-Subaey
by Northwestern’s home campus, has also developed specialties in expand into life and medical
Middle East Studies, Media and Politics, Strategic Communication,
insurance and is open to partnerships with global players to gain
and other specialties.
NU-Q is dedicated to the advancement of freedom of expression access to new distribution platforms and geographic markets.
and independent media through its current undergraduate instruc- “We are focusing on the Asia-Pacific markets. We already have
tion with degrees granted by Northwestern’s home campus in the operations in Shanghai and Singapore through leading specialist
United States. insurance and reinsurance group Antares, which we acquired in
NU-Q also has a signature institutional research project, Media 2014 and we want to expand our presence beyond,” explained Al-
Use in the Middle East, now in its fifth year, the only longitudinal Subaey.
study of its kind in the world, and a partner in the World Internet In the next two years, Al-Subaey plans to implement structural
Project. Along with the course Media Industries in the Middle East, changes and adopt new technology to improve customer service.
NU-Q maintains an interactive website where these massive data “During the past half century, QIC has served as a trusted insur-
sets are available to scholars, media professionals, and the public. ance partner to businesses and individuals both locally and region-
(www.mideastmedia.org) ally. Now, it is spreading its wings globally beyond the regions,”
Northwestern University in Qatar carries out its work sensitive shared Al Subaey.
to local culture and traditions and fully conscious of the tensions Focused on communication and journalism and embedded in
separating tradition and modernity, while building connections to the liberal arts, Northwestern University in Qatar (NU-Q) has attract-
the realities of a digital and global society. Being at the epicenter ed around 300 students coming from 40 different countries, half of
of geopolitics and higher education has yielded great benefits for them Qatari nationals.
individuals, institutions, and society itself. n “We have a uniquely diverse student body, which creates a glob-
al environment for our students. In a country with little tradition
for journalism and media education, we have seen interest in our
programs grow over several years. Due to a recent diplomatic crisis,
our students have a front row seat to a situation that is multifaceted
and has many causes, all with a central communication and media
component,” said NU-Q Dean and CEO Everette Dennis.
Following the diplomatic embargo declared by some of its
neighbors in June 2017, Qatar, with its population of 2.6 million,
has displayed extraordinary agility and resilience in negotiating the
challenges posed by the crisis.
“We have various print and digital media outlets, television and
radio outlets and a booming film industry. So we have a ‘media city’
in Qatar and NU-Q is well positioned to provide talent for that in-
dustry. Our graduates are being employed to help tell the story of
Qatar’s evolution and change,” explained Dennis. n
QATAR
The President and
the Bomb
Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process
I
n November 2017, for the first time in 41 years, the U.S. Congress
held a hearing to consider changes to the president’s authority to
launch nuclear weapons. Although Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee,
the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, insisted
that the hearing was “not specific to anybody,” Democrats used the
opportunity to air concerns that President Donald Trump might
stumble into nuclear war. After all, he had threatened to unleash “fire
and fury” on North Korea, and he subsequently boasted in a tweet
about the size of the figurative “nuclear button” on his desk in the
Oval Office. General C. Robert Kehler—a former head of U.S. Strategic
Command, the main organization responsible for fighting a nuclear
war—tried to calm senators’ fears about an irresponsible president
starting such a war on a whim. He described how the existing process
for authorizing the launch of nuclear weapons would “enable the pres-
ident to consult with his senior advisers” and reminded the senators
that officers in the chain of command are duty-bound to refuse an
illegal order.
What Kehler could not assure the senators, however, was that the
process that enabled the president to seek the concurrence of the
secretary of defense or senior officers actually required him to do
so, or even required that he consult with advisers. Nor could he assure
them that officers receiving a launch order would dare to assert
their own judgment over his about its legality, or that the president
RICHARD K. BETTS is Director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at
Columbia University and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
MATTHEW C. WAXMAN is Liviu Librescu Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and
an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

would listen to them if they did. When asked by Senator Ben Cardin,
a Democrat from Maryland, whether the president could ignore a
military lawyer’s advice that an order to launch a nuclear attack was
illegal, Kehler said that would present “a very interesting constitutional
situation.” He continued: “I would say, ‘I have a question about this,
and I’m not ready to proceed.’” Pressed by Cardin about what would
happen next, Kehler responded, “Well, I don’t know.” The implication
was worrisome: although common sense and careful official planning
dictate a process to prevent an imprudent and impulsive president
from starting a nuclear war, there is nothing stopping a determined
president from overriding it.
Details of the current nuclear launch process are classified, but in
general, they are designed to ensure that the president can quickly
order a launch. That’s why wherever the president goes, he is accom-
panied by a military officer carrying the “football,” a briefcase contain-
ing strike options and codes used for communicating with the chain of
command and confirming that an order is authentic. Once an order is
issued, it reaches officers manning the missile silos, bombers, and sub-
marines responsible for carrying out an attack. Before issuing the order,
however, the president is expected to confer in person or over a secure
line with senior military and civilian advisers. But that is merely assumed.
The secretary of defense has no formal role in the authorization, and
the president can bypass him if he wishes.
That needs to change: any presidential order to launch nuclear
weapons that is not in response to an enemy nuclear attack should
require the concurrence of the secretary of defense and the attorney
general. This reform is not aimed at a particular president; it addresses
a problem that could arise in any administration. Moreover, adding
these checks would not only limit the commander in chief’s power
but also buttress it, protecting the launch process from interference
by unauthorized parties.
CONSTRAINING AND CONFIRMING

There are two sets of scenarios in which a U.S. president might order
a nuclear strike. The first is relatively straightforward and uncontro-
versial: launching a retaliatory attack after or during an enemy nuclear
attack. In that case, given the need to respond quickly, the commander
in chief’s power should remain unhampered. The concern arises when
considering the other set of scenarios: the first use of nuclear weapons,
The President and the Bomb
Hail Mary: carrying the “nuclear football” in Washington, D.C., February 2017
either as an initial knockout blow or during the course of a conventional
war. What if the commander in chief ordered such an attack without
sufficient cause, consultation, or legal justification?
Starting a nuclear war is the most momentous national security
decision imaginable. Some observers have called for a ban on nuclear
first use altogether, and the Obama administration considered declaring
a no-first-use policy near the end of its second term. But for better or
worse, U.S. and NATO strategic doctrine has always rested on this option
(originally, to counter the Soviets’ perceived superiority in conventional
forces), and there is no consensus for taking it off the table.
In the event that the president wanted to be the first in a conflict to
use nuclear weapons, two procedural problems could arise: insufficient
deliberation and insubordination. On the one hand, the president
might order a launch without adequate consideration or without con-
sulting responsible advisers, and the military chain of command might
KEVIN LAMARQU E / REUT E RS
simply comply. On the other hand, he might order a launch and officers
might refuse to comply, either doubting the order’s authenticity or
resisting it on moral or other grounds. Either possibility is dangerous.
The first risks unnecessary and catastrophic escalation. The second
may seem less dangerous—to some it may even seem desirable—but
a refusal by uniformed officers to comply would deeply damage the

hallowed norms of civilian control of the military. Currently, if the

president orders a launch, there are technical means to ensure the
authenticity of the order, but the system is not designed to deal with
an order that appears to be irrational. Relying on ad hoc disobedience
of orders of questionable legality is not the right solution to this prob-
lem, since it is both unreliable and fraught with bad constitutional
and policy implications.
A third and very different problem—the possibility of unauthorized
parties tampering with the system to inject a false launch order or
block a legitimate one—has received less attention. Such a problem
is unlikely. The U.S. nuclear command-and-control system has been
carefully designed with redundant bul-
warks against imaginable accidents—
It is time to add new but so have nuclear power plants, and
checks to the process for still there were unanticipated disasters
nuclear first use. at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and
Fukushima, all of which would pale in
comparison to a single mistaken use of nuclear weapons. When it comes
to nuclear weapons, even extremely low odds of a mistake should be
reduced in any reasonable way possible. Whether an unauthorized
launch stemmed from an unhinged military aide in charge of the
football, unforeseen technical glitches that accidentally mimicked a
presidential order, malicious hackers who managed to penetrate the
command-and-control system, or malfunctioning sensors that generated
false warnings of an attack, a requirement that officials in addition to
the president sign off on a nuclear launch would serve as a valuable
safeguard. It would make it harder for a wayward president, a provoca-
teur, or a malfunction to start a nuclear conflagration, while preserving
the president’s option to fire nuclear weapons first when sensible officials
consider it necessary.
Given the deficiencies in the existing process, it is time to add new
checks for nuclear first use: certification from the secretary of defense
that a given order is valid (meaning definitely from the commander in
chief) and from the attorney general that it is legal (that is, within the
president’s authority and proper legal bounds). Requiring written confir-
mation from the secretary of defense that the president has, in fact,
commanded a launch would supplement the existing technical means
for ensuring an order’s authenticity. More important, it would guarantee
the secretary’s involvement in the decision-making. Requiring written
confirmation from the attorney general that an order is legal—or,

alternatively, that there has been a meaningful review of the order’s
legality—would further widen the circle of cabinet-level discussion.
For both officials, provisions would need to be made for alternates to
perform their roles when needed.
These proposed requirements could be implemented either by the
executive branch, through an executive order, or by the legislative
branch, through a new law. The executive-branch route would be
more politically and legally palatable to those who oppose legislative
restrictions on presidential decision-making or fear that it would lead
to further congressional meddling. True, executive orders can be waived
by the president, but once it was institutionalized in two cabinet
departments, it would be difficult to undo this requirement quickly
and without raising major alarms internally.
Codifying these requirements instead through legislation would
have virtues and risks. For one thing, statutory requirements would
give commanders below an irrational president greater confidence to
resist an unjustified launch order. There is, however, a danger that
even if such a statute were not watered down during the legislative
process, the executive branch might label it unconstitutional and
announce that it would refuse to be bound by it, at least in certain
circumstances. The legal issues raised by such a law are unlikely to
ever be resolved by the courts, which have tended to punt on tough
questions about war powers and leave them to the other branches.
That said, the executive branch often adopts practices mandated by
Congress even without conceding its legal position. (For example,
presidents regularly submit notifications to Congress about the use of
U.S. forces, as required by the 1973 War Powers Resolution, even
when questioning the constitutionality or applicability of the law.) If
Congress did pass reforms to the nuclear launch process, it should
be prepared to exercise firm oversight and, if necessary, use its other
powers, such as threatening to withhold certain funding, to ensure that
the executive branch followed through.
Adding new certifications to the launch process should appeal to a
broad range of opinions—both of those who want to move toward a
ban on first use and of those who are worried about the credibility of
U.S. nuclear deterrence, including whether the command-and-control
system will function as intended in crises. The fact that the safeguards
would both constrain and empower the president as commander in

chief should increase the odds of a viable political coalition for reform.
Still, the proposal would no doubt be controversial. But the most likely
criticisms do not hold up.
IS THIS REALLY A PROBLEM?

The first criticism of additional checks is that they represent a solution
to a problem that does not exist. Granted, the image of a president
simply pushing a button to launch hundreds of missiles at a moment’s
notice, unchallenged, is naive. And although the details of command
and control are classified, some of the most informed critics of reform
insist that consultation and concurrence are solidly built into the stan-
dard operating procedure. As a practical matter, however, senior officials
might not be immediately available when called on to confer with the
president, a problem that has come up in past exercises and false-
warning incidents. More to the point, the president can change or
revoke the procedural plans that his subordinates have designed,
reject the counsel of top advisers, or issue orders directly to officers in
the chain of command—who in some circumstances could be no more
senior than a colonel.
Officers are bound to disobey orders that are obviously illegal, but
when the legality of a command seems uncertain, they are not expected
to resist. Officers might be especially inclined to defer to the commander
in chief in a crisis or even merely in a situation of increased tension,
when an order for action, however unwise it may sound, would not
seem to be a completely nonsensical bolt from the blue. (The current
strain with North Korea represents just such a situation.) If the presi-
dent said that the United States needed to launch an anticipatory first
strike to prevent an enemy attack that could kill many Americans,
there is no guarantee that officers of any rank would assert that their
interpretation of the law should take precedence over his. Besides,
those who count on officers in the chain of command to resist illegal
nuclear orders rarely consider what that would mean the day after, for
presidential authority over the military or for the credibility of the
nuclear deterrent.
If a four-star general who headed U.S. Strategic Command does
not know what would happen if the president insisted on a suspect
order, as Kehler admitted, then there certainly is a problem. And some
of the most knowledgeable civilian experts on command-and-control
procedures—such as Bruce Blair, a scholar at Princeton (and former
missile launch control officer in the U.S. Air Force), and Scott Sagan,
a political scientist at Stanford—are firmly convinced that the current
system is inadequate. The current reliance on the president’s optional
consultation with top advisers is only a speed bump in slowing a pre-
cipitous launch authorization. What’s needed is a circuit breaker.
Lengthening the time in which an irrational launch order could be
held up, as required certification by the secretary of defense and the
attorney general would do, would buy time for the most extreme
solution, if it appeared necessary: the as-yet-untested process, author-
ized by the 25th Amendment, by which cabinet officers can legally
remove a president who has gone off the deep end.
What about the opposite problem—that unauthorized parties
could manage to block the legitimate use of nuclear forces? It’s hard
to know how significant that risk is. But even if the current system
is immune to such interference—and to the similar danger of an
unforeseen malfunction—there is no guarantee that it will remain so,
especially in the age of rapidly evolving technology and burgeoning
failures in cybersecurity. The record in military history of disastrous
surprises that had been considered impossible before the fact does
not inspire confidence.
TYING THE PRESIDENT’S HANDS?

A second line of criticism contends that these reforms would danger-
ously tie the president’s hands. Skeptics fear that even a short lag
in the process could give an enemy an advantage, whether during a
tense standoff or in the course of a conventional conflict. It’s impor-
tant to remember, however, that the measures would apply only to first
use, meaning that there is no risk that a president would be unable
to retaliate quickly against an enemy nuclear attack in progress.
That said, the one situation in which additional steps in the process
could present a problem would be if a president felt it necessary to
launch a preemptive nuclear strike—that is, one intended to interdict
an imminent attack by an enemy making immediate preparations
for nuclear war. It’s important to distinguish this from a preventive
war, one waged in anticipation of a possible enemy attack sometime
in the future. Preventive wars are almost never a good idea, given
the uncertainty about whether the threat will ever come to pass, and
because they are usually seen by the rest of the world as aggression,
not defense. A nuclear one started by the United States, inflicting

epochal devastation without immediate provocation, would brand the

country as an international outlaw.
A preemptive attack, in contrast, could be more legitimate, since if
an enemy attack really was about to begin, a U.S. first strike might
block the damage it could inflict. Preemption is still very risky, how-
ever, since it may be impossible in the heat of a crisis to determine
whether the enemy’s war preparations are intended for offense or
defense. Figuring out which mistake is the greater risk—launching
an unnecessary attack or falling victim to aggression—has long been
a central strategic dilemma for decision-makers.
During the Cold War, the United States handled the dilemma by
constructing a nuclear force capable of surviving a first strike and firing
back effectively, creating a sense of certain retaliation, which would make
Moscow refrain from initiating a nuclear attack under any circumstances,
since it knew that doing so would be suicidal. Thus, there would be no
need for preemption, even in a crisis. No strategy is foolproof,
but such deterrence should still work today, even against a reckless
adversary such as the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who, for
all his bluster, still wants to stay in power (and alive).
If U.S. intelligence did report a major increase in the readiness of
North Korean forces, the argument for a preemptive strike would grow
stronger, but should not override the reasons for nuclear restraint.
Rather, policymakers should make an effort to maximize the capabili-
ties for preemption with conventional forces. Doing so may require
technical and operational innovations, along with the deployment
of additional forces near the scene in peacetime, and it would raise
the risk of failing to destroy 100 percent of the enemy’s arsenal. But
the alternative risk—starting an unnecessary nuclear war—is worse.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The third likely criticism would come from those who believe that
limiting the president’s nuclear authority—if done through legislation—
would violate the Constitution. Imposing conditions on his authority
to direct military officials and exercise tactical and operational control
over U.S. forces, the argument runs, would encroach on his executive
powers, including as commander in chief.
But the proposed requirements are justifiably within Congress’
authority. The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war
and regulate the military, provisions that arguably include the power
to place limits on when the president may resort to nuclear first use.
New requirements would also raise separate concerns about encum-
bering the president’s direct command of military forces or intruding
on his power to determine how to conduct military operations, but
Congress may arguably legislate measures such as these to ensure
that the president’s commands are lawfully and properly carried out,
without taking military options completely off the table. In the past,
the enormous stakes of nuclear decision-making were used to justify
expanded presidential powers, but today, the better argument is that
the special challenges of nuclear decisions justify giving Congress
some authority to regulate them.
To be clear, this proposal leaves open many constitutional and
legal questions. Under what circumstances may a president resort to
a nuclear first strike without explicit authorization from Congress?
What international law applies to a proposed strike, and how should
it be interpreted in the context at hand? But the aim right now
should not be to answer such questions definitively; rather, it should
be to ensure that before a nuclear attack is launched, the answers
are carefully considered, formalized, and communicated reliably
down the chain of command. Instead of settling the thorny ques-
tions in advance, they would be left for the attorney general to answer
when certifying the legality or legal review of a given proposed attack.
Moreover, merely institutionalizing this process of requiring the
attorney general’s official opinion would allow time for reconsidera-
tion. And in the event that the attorney general refused to certify that
a strike was legal, the process would give the chain of command the
confidence needed to resist an irrational president who wished to start
a nuclear war without reasonable grounds. In other words, it would put
insubordination on firmer legal footing, should it come to that.
THE BALANCE OF RISKS

Requiring additional checks for the first use of nuclear weapons would
serve as a hedge against a low-probability, high-consequence event: an
impetuous commander in chief lurching into catastrophe. At the same
time, it would help guard against interference by hostile parties seeking
to sabotage the chain of command, and it would improve decision-
making and implementation in the very unlikely event that a nuclear
first strike were truly necessary. Political and legal opposition to this
proposal will inevitably be strong. Much of that will concern the

question of the extent of the president’s war powers, but merely

adding a delay to the process for first use does not require resolving
this long-standing constitutional debate. If only by ensuring and
formalizing deliberation, these reforms would buy time for respon-
sible officials to take action. And although critics will inevitably
point to the political, strategic, and legal risks of this proposal, the
problem of an inadvertent nuclear war has no risk-free solution.
Adding new steps to the authorization process would balance these
risks better than the current system does.
Questions about how and when to use nuclear weapons may seem
like an academic relic of the Cold War era, a time when they consumed
defense planners. Indeed, after the Soviet Union collapsed, such ques-
tions faded away as smaller security problems took center stage.
But now, as tensions grow with the established nuclear powers of
China and Russia and with the new nuclear power of North Korea
and the potential one of Iran, such debates have returned to the fore.
As the United States adapts its nuclear strategy to the twenty-first
century, it should adapt its nuclear decision-making procedures, too.
The founders put a high premium on checks and balances out of a
healthy appreciation for the limits of any individual’s virtue or wisdom.
There is every reason to apply this logic to the process of starting a
nuclear war—the ultimate presidential power.∂
Mugabe’s Misrule
And How It Will Hold Zimbabwe Back
Martin Meredith
I
n a radio broadcast that Robert Mugabe made from exile in 1976,
during the guerrilla war he was leading to overthrow white-
minority rule in Rhodesia, he set out his views about the kind of
electoral democracy he intended to establish once he had gained
control of Zimbabwe, as the new state was to be named. “Our votes
must go together with our guns,” he said. “After all, any vote we shall
have shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces
the vote should remain its security officer—its guarantor. The people’s
votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins.”
As Zimbabwe’s leader for 37 years, Mugabe never deviated from
this attachment to brute force. Whatever challenge his regime faced, he
was always prepared to overcome it by resorting to the gun. So proud
was he of his record that he once boasted that in addition to his seven
university degrees, he had acquired “many degrees in violence.”
What propelled Mugabe to use violence so readily was his obsession
with power. Power for Mugabe was not a means to an end but the end
itself. His overriding ambition was to gain total control, and he pursued
that objective with relentless single-mindedness, crushing opponents
and critics who stood in his way, sanctioning murder, torture, and
lawlessness of every kind. “I will never, never, never, never surrender,”
he said after unleashing a campaign of terror to win an election held
in 2008. “Zimbabwe is mine.”
To sustain himself in power, Mugabe came to rely on a cabal of army
generals, police chiefs, senior civil servants, and political cronies will-
ing to do his bidding. In return, he gave them license to amass huge
personal wealth, derived mainly from bribes and the looting of state
assets. As the bedrock of the Mugabe state, they became accustomed
MARTIN MEREDITH is a journalist, historian, and biographer. He is the author of The Fate
of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence.

Martin Meredith
to using methods of violence and intimidation as a matter of routine,

able to act with impunity.
Ensconced in the presidential residence in Harare, the capital, Mugabe
intended to rule for life. At the age of 93, although prone to falling
asleep in meetings and afflicted by memory lapses, he still clung to
power with the same determination and ruthlessness that had marked
his political career from the start.
In his dotage, however, he succumbed to the blandishments of
his 52-year-old wife, Grace, an avaricious and menacing figure with
ambitions to establish herself at the head of a Mugabe dynasty. During
a vicious struggle over the succession, Mugabe was persuaded in
November 2017 to dismiss Grace’s main rival, Vice President Emmerson
Mnangagwa, his chief enforcer and a key player in the security estab-
lishment. Fearing that their own positions were under threat, the
generals who had underwritten Mugabe’s rule for so long decided
to stage a palace coup, placing him under house arrest. For six days,
Mugabe tried to hold on to the trappings of office, but after losing the
support of his party, he accepted a lavish retirement package and
agreed to resign, paving the way for Mnangagwa to take control.
Mugabe may have gone, but the Mugabe state lives on. The apparatus
of vote rigging and repression is still in place. The plight of Zimbabwe,
moreover, remains pitiful, a once prosperous country not only reduced
to economic ruin but also trapped in a culture of corruption and violence
that Mugabe fostered since gaining power in 1980 and that is now
deeply embedded among the ruling elite. There is little hope of much
change for the better.
FROM TEACHER TO REVOLUTIONARY

Before he entered politics, Mugabe seemed set on an illustrious career
as a teacher. Like many other independence leaders in Africa, he was a
product of the mission-school system. As a pupil at Kutama Mission
School in rural Rhodesia, then a British colony, he devoted much of his
time to studying, encouraged by Jesuit teachers who recognized his in-
tellectual ability and his aptitude for self-discipline. His Jesuit upbring-
ing instilled in him a self-confidence that he never lost. Yet he was also
secretive and solitary, preferring books to sports or other school activi-
ties. “His books were his only friends,” his brother Donato once recalled.
Mugabe left Kutama in 1945 with a teaching diploma and took up
a series of teaching posts. After winning a scholarship to study in
Mugabe’s Misrule
No country for old man: Mugabe and his wife, November 2017
South Africa, he returned to Rhodesia in 1952 more politically aware
of the injustices of white rule, but he still preferred to continue his
studies rather than engage in political activity. To his political friends
in the 1950s, he remained an aloof and austere figure, a supporter
of the African nationalist cause but one who kept his distance. In
1958, with three academic degrees to his credit, he took up a post
at a teacher-training institute in newly independent Ghana. As the
first black African colony to gain independence, Ghana was brimming
with optimism and ambition at the time. Its leader, Kwame Nkrumah,
harbored grand plans for a new socialist order and was keen to support
the liberation of the rest of Africa from European rule. Mugabe reveled
in this environment but nevertheless remained committed to his work
P H I L I M O N B U L AWAY O / R E U T E R S
as a teacher.
The pivotal moment came in 1960, when he returned to Rhodesia
for a brief visit, fully expecting to go back to Ghana, but found himself
caught up in nationalist agitation against white rule. Galvanized into
action by street protests, he abruptly resigned from his teaching post
and threw himself into the nationalist fray with the same dedication
he had hitherto devoted to education.

Martin Meredith
Mugabe was among the first nationalists to advocate armed struggle,

convinced that nothing else would overcome white intransigence. But
he was simultaneously helping organize attacks against black political
opponents. When the nationalist movement split in 1963, setting off
internecine warfare between two rival factions, ZANU (the Zimbabwe
African National Union) and ZAPU (the Zimbabwe African People’s
Union), Mugabe played a prominent role in orchestrating violence
carried out by ZANU’s youth group against ZAPU. ZAPU was politically
aligned with the Soviet Union and tended to focus on the urban
proletariat, whereas ZANU supported Mao Zedong’s China and was
agrarian in outlook.
Gang violence between the two factions eventually gave Rhodesia’s
white rulers sufficient pretext to arrest nationalist leaders and crush
the nationalist movement in 1964 in the name of law and order. When
a guerrilla war against white rule broke out in 1972, ZANU and ZAPU
fought separately in different parts of Rhodesia. Meanwhile, many of
the personal hatreds and antagonisms engendered in the nationalist
movement in the 1960s continued to fester and came to the fore after
independence in 1980, with disastrous consequences.
Like Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Mugabe endured long years
of imprisonment. And like him, he suffered the anguish of losing a son
and was refused permission to attend the funeral. But whereas Mandela
used his prison term to open a dialogue with South Africa’s white rulers
in order to defeat apartheid, Mugabe emerged from 11 years in prison
bent on revolution. In 1975, he escaped into exile in neighboring Mo-
zambique, intent on taking control of ZANU’s war effort, determined to
overthrow white society by force and replace it with a one-party Marxist
regime. In 1979, after seven years of civil war in which at least 30,000
people had died, a negotiated settlement under British auspices was within
reach, but Mugabe still hankered for military victory—“the ultimate
joy,” as he described it at the time. Only an ultimatum from African
presidents who had until now backed him forced him to compromise,
accepting a cease-fire and a British-run transition to independence. “As
I signed the document, I was not a happy man at all,” he recalled.
THE DICTATOR
After winning a majority in Zimbabwe’s inaugural elections in February
1980, Mugabe became prime minister of a coalition government amid
a rising sense of optimism. He made strenuous efforts to achieve a good
Mugabe’s Misrule
working relationship with his former white adversaries, pledging to

strive for reconciliation and racial harmony. Instead of the angry
Marxist ogre that the white minority had been led to expect, he
impressed them as a model of moderation. Even the recalcitrant white
leader Ian Smith, who had previously denounced Mugabe as “the
apostle of Satan,” found him “sober and responsible.”
On the international stage, Zimbabwe was accorded star status. In
the first year of independence, Zimbabwe was awarded more than
$1 billion in aid, enabling Mugabe to em-
bark on ambitious health and education
programs. The white population, too,
Within weeks of taking
benefited from the growing prosperity. office, Mugabe decided to
Mugabe paid particular attention to settle some old scores, not
the concerns of white farmers—the against former white
backbone of the agricultural economy—
reassuring them with large increases in adversaries but against
commodity prices. “Good old Bob!” they black opponents.
cheered. “We are the darling of the
world,” Mugabe told a meeting of white farmers, “and since we are on
honeymoon and honeymoons don’t always last long, we ought to take
advantage of it!”
Zimbabwe’s honeymoon was indeed brief. Within weeks of taking
office, Mugabe decided to settle some old scores, not against former
white adversaries but against black opponents. Although Mugabe’s
party, ZANU-PF (the additional two letters stand for “Patriotic
Front”), had won the February 1980 elections with a substantial ma-
jority, the outcome left his ZAPU rivals with a stronghold in Matabele-
land, a region that makes up the western half of the country. Mugabe
made clear his intention of provoking a showdown, licensing his
closest colleagues to speak out about the need to “crush” ZAPU. In
October 1980, he secretly arranged for North Koreans to train a special
military brigade as a strike force. It was given the name Gukurahundi,
after a Shona word meaning “the rain that blows away the chaff before
the spring rains.”
In 1983, using “dissident” activity in Matabeleland as a pretext, Mugabe
unleashed the Gukurahundi on a campaign of mass murder, torture,
arson, rape, and beatings directed mainly against the civilian population
there. One of the key figures in the campaign was Mnangagwa, then the
minister of state security, who described the “dissidents” as “cockroaches”

Martin Meredith
that needed to be eliminated. Over a four-year period, an estimated

20,000 civilians were killed. ZAPU eventually capitulated and agreed
to disband.
Having demolished his ZAPU rivals and established a de facto one-
party state, Mugabe went on to accumulate huge personal power, giving
himself the right to hold office as president for an unlimited number of
terms. He based his regime on a vast system of patronage, controlling
appointments to all senior posts in the civil service, the defense forces,
the police, and parastatal organizations. One by one, all these institu-
tions—and, eventually, the judiciary—were subordinated to his will.
His secret police harassed, intimidated, and murdered his opponents.
As a reward for their loyalty, Mugabe allowed the new elite to engage
in a scramble for property, farms, businesses, and contracts. “I am rich
because I belong to ZANU-PF,” boasted one of his cronies, the multimil-
lionaire businessman Philip Chiyangwa, in the press. “If you want to be
rich, you must join ZANU-PF.” The scramble became ever more frenetic,
spawning corruption on a massive scale. One after another, state corpo-
rations—the national oil company, the national electric company, the
national telecommunications company—were plundered. Fraud, theft,
and embezzlement in government departments became endemic. In the
most notorious case, a state fund set up to provide compensation for
those who had suffered during the liberation war was looted so thor-
oughly by Mugabe’s colleagues that nothing was left for genuine vic-
tims. A land redistribution program financed by the British government
was halted when it was discovered that Mugabe had been handing out
farms intended for peasant resettlement to ministers and officials.
By the mid-1990s, Mugabe had become an irascible dictator, brooking
no opposition, contemptuous of the law and human rights, and indif-
ferent to the incompetence and corruption around him. Whatever good
intentions he had started out with had long since evaporated. Surrounded
by sycophants, he had become increasingly detached from reality, living
in heavily fortified residences and venturing out only with retinues of
armed bodyguards and in large motorcades. He spent much of his time
abroad, enjoying the role of revolutionary hero.
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

Ordinary people suffered the brunt of government mismanagement.
By 2000, Zimbabweans were generally poorer than they had been at
independence; average wages were lower; unemployment had tripled;
Mugabe’s Misrule
and life expectancy was falling. More than two-thirds of the population
lived in abject poverty. Veterans of the liberation war held particular
grievances over government neglect and Mugabe’s failure to deliver
on promises of land reform.
Popular opposition to Mugabe’s regime spread to many parts of the
country. Aiming to challenge ZANU-PF in parliamentary elections in
2000, a coalition of labor unions, lawyers, journalists, and church
groups launched a new party, the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC), and mobilized support to oppose Mugabe’s plans to extend his
powers even further in a referendum over a proposed new constitution.
White activists played a significant role in the “no” campaign. White
farmers, in particular, were alarmed by Mugabe’s proposal to allow the
government to seize land without compensation.
The result was a stunning defeat for Mugabe: 55 percent voted against
the proposed constitution. Shaken to the core, the ruling elite suddenly
saw their grip on power slipping and, with it, all the wealth, salaries,
perks, contracts, commissions, and scams they had enjoyed for 20 years.
Mugabe attributed his defeat principally to the whites.
In a carefully coordinated operation, starting ten days after the refer-
endum result was announced, Mugabe launched a campaign of terror
against white farmers and hundreds of thousands of black farm workers
whom he accused of supporting the opposition. Gangs armed with
axes and machetes invaded white-owned farms across the country.
Government and army trucks were used to transport them to the farms
and keep them supplied with rations. They were called “war veterans,”
but the majority were too young to have participated in the war 20 years
earlier. Large numbers were unemployed youths paid a daily allowance.
They assaulted farmers and their families, threatened to kill them, and
forced many to flee their homes. They stole tractors, slaughtered cattle,
destroyed crops, and polluted water supplies. The police refused to
take action. Black farm workers and their families were subjected
to mass beatings and taken away en masse to “reeducation centers.”
Mugabe fanned the flames, describing white farmers as “enemies,” and
as the election approached, his target became the MDC and opposition
of any kind. “The MDC will never form the government of this country,
never ever, not in my lifetime or even after I die,” he declared. Violence
and intimidation erupted across the country. One MDC candidate, Bless-
ing Chebundo, who was running for Mnangagwa’s seat in Parliament,
endured several murder attempts. On his way to work, Chebundo was

Martin Meredith
surrounded by a gang of ZANU-PF thugs who poured gasoline on him

and tried to set him on fire, but failed because in the scuffle, their
matches had been doused in gasoline. Even though he was forced to
remain in hiding throughout the campaign, he nevertheless managed
to inflict on Mnangagwa a humiliating defeat.
After months of systematic intimidation, ZANU-PF scraped through
with a narrow victory. But there was to be no respite from Mugabe’s
tyranny. He pursued his vendetta against
At one point, Zimbabwe’s white farmers relentlessly, seizing cattle
ranches, dairy farms, tobacco estates,
inflation rate reached and safari properties. When the Supreme
500 billion percent. Court declared his actions illegal, Mugabe
swiftly removed independent judges and
replaced them with loyalists. A chaotic land grab ensued as Mugabe’s
cronies, party officials, and army and police commanders scrambled to
snap up choice properties. Among the beneficiaries were his wife,
Grace, and his brother-in-law.
The farm seizures spelled the end of commercial agriculture as a
major industry. The impact on food supplies was calamitous. To survive,
Zimbabwe became increasingly dependent on food imports and foreign
food aid. Over a five-year period from 1999 to 2004, the economy
shrank by one-third, precipitating a mass exodus. It was not only
whites who fled abroad but also a large part of the black middle class—
doctors, nurses, teachers, and other professionals who saw no future
for themselves in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.
The same pattern of violence, intimidation, and vote rigging prevailed
from one election to the next. In 2005, Mugabe targeted the mass of dis-
affected Zimbabweans living in slums and shantytowns on the fringes of
urban centers, strongholds of the MDC. In a campaign called Operation
Murambatsvina, using a Shona word meaning “drive out the rubbish,”
police squads bulldozed and sledgehammered one community after an-
other. According to a UN investigation, some 700,000 people lost their
homes, their source of livelihood, or both. Mugabe claimed that the aim
of the campaign was merely slum clearance. But his real purpose was to
make clear the fate of anyone who voted against him.
In the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008, the
MDC’s leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, became a direct victim of Mugabe’s
tactics. When Tsvangirai arrived at a police station to investigate reports
that supporters held there had been beaten, he, too, was seized, held
Mugabe’s Misrule
down, and beaten so badly that doctors thought his skull had been
fractured. “I told the police, ‘Beat him a lot,’” Mugabe subsequently
said at a gathering of African presidents. “He asked for it.”
Despite the fearful consequences, MDC supporters continued to defy
Mugabe’s regime. The 2008 parliamentary elections gave opposition
parties, led by the MDC, a clear majority. The simultaneous presidential
election also gave Tsvangirai a narrow lead over Mugabe, but election
officials, after weeks of prevarication, manipulated the figures to ensure
that a second round of voting was needed.
The campaign of terror that Mugabe unleashed to win the second
round was more intense than any previous election episode. In a
military-style operation, youth militias, police agents, army personnel,
and party thugs moved into opposition areas, setting up torture camps
and indoctrination centers. The campaign was officially called
Operation Mavhoterapapi?—“Operation Whom Did You Vote For?”
Among the people, it was known simply as chidudu—“the fear.”
Villagers were beaten en masse and told to vote for Mugabe next time
or they would be killed. Scores of MDC organizers were abducted and
murdered; hundreds were tortured. Some 200,000 people were forced
to flee their homes. Mugabe vowed that he would “go to war” to prevent
an MDC victory. “We are not going to give up our country because of
a mere x,” he said. “How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?” Five
days before the voting was due to start, Tsvangirai withdrew.
A fractious coalition government was eventually formed, but Mugabe
refused to implement any major reform that would restore a semblance
of democracy, leaving Tsvangirai and the MDC humiliated and discredited
by the time of the next election, in 2013. The economy, meanwhile,
continued its downward slide. At one point, inflation reached 500 billion
percent, according to calculations by the International Monetary
Fund, rendering the currency worthless.
MUGABEISM AFTER MUGABE

The damage inflicted on Zimbabwe by Mugabe’s 37-year rule is immense.
Mugabe vitiated the courts, trampled on property rights, rigged elec-
tions, hamstrung the independent press, and left Zimbabwe bankrupt
and impoverished. One-quarter of Zimbabweans live abroad in order
to survive; four million depend on food aid; vast numbers of children
are stunted by malnutrition; life expectancy, at 60 years, ranks among
the lowest in the world.

Martin Meredith
No wonder the downfall of Mugabe brought crowds onto the streets

in celebration. But the sense of euphoria has been replaced by appre-
hension. As a member of Mugabe’s inner circle since independence,
Mnangagwa, now 75 years old, is well known for his ruthlessness. His
involvement in the Gukurahundi atrocities and in ZANU-PF’s habitual
election violence has made him the most feared politician in Zimbabwe.
At his inauguration as president in December 2017, he praised Mugabe
as “a father, a mentor, a comrade-in-arms, and my leader.” He also
approved a lavish retirement package for Mugabe and his wife that in-
cludes bodyguards, housekeepers, gardeners, waiters, cooks, chauffeurs,
diplomatic passports, first-class air flights, and private health insurance.
In recent years, as Mugabe’s deputy, Mnangagwa sought ways
out of Zimbabwe’s economic morass, courting multilateral financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank and proposing reforms to encourage foreign investors to return.
As president, he has promised to compensate white farmers, even
though the treasury is empty. But although he offers a more pragmatic
approach than Mugabe, Mnangagwa has also made clear his deter-
mination that ZANU-PF, and its wealthy elite, will remain in control.
“The dogs may keep on barking, but ZANU-PF will keep on ruling,”
he said after Mugabe’s resignation. To this end, he has appointed to
his cabinet several former generals notorious for their brutality,
including Perence Shiri, former commander of the Gukurahundi,
and Constantino Chiwenga, a former defense forces chief; both
have been heavily involved in orchestrating election violence and
farm seizures.
The key test of Mnangagwa’s intentions will come in the run-up to
the next elections, which are due later this year. He has promised that
the elections will be “free and fair.” Yet ZANU-PF’s government has a
long record of rigging elections. It is practiced not only in controlling
the work of election officials and law enforcement agencies but also in
manipulating a defective electoral roll system that contains millions
of ghost voters. Much will depend on the willingness of Western
governments to insist on credible elections that are strictly monitored
as a condition for helping Zimbabwe emerge from decades of misrule.
Meanwhile, the state Mugabe created lives on. With Mnangagwa and
the generals at the helm, ZANU-PF continues to control every lever of
government. Just as Mugabe envisioned more than four decades ago,
the vote still goes with the gun.∂
The Clash of
Exceptionalisms
A New Fight Over an Old Idea
Charles A. Kupchan
M
any Americans have recoiled at President Donald Trump’s
“America first” foreign policy. Critics charge that his pop-
ulist brand of statecraft undermines the United States’ role
as an exceptional nation destined to bring political and economic
liberty to a waiting world. Trump exhibits isolationist, unilateralist, and
protectionist instincts; indifference to the promotion of democracy; and
animosity toward immigrants. How could Americans elect a president
so at odds with what their country stands for?
Yet “America first” is less out of step with U.S. history than meets
the eye. Trump is not so much abandoning American exceptionalism
as he is tapping into an earlier incarnation of it. Since World War II,
the country’s exceptional mission has centered on the idea of a Pax
Americana upheld through the vigorous export of U.S. power and
values. But before that, American exceptionalism meant insulating
the American experiment from foreign threats, shunning international
entanglements, spreading democracy through example rather than
intrusion, embracing protectionism and fair (not free) trade, and pre-
serving a relatively homogeneous citizenry through racist and anti-
immigrant policies. In short, it was about America first.
That original version of American exceptionalism—call it American
Exceptionalism 1.0—vanished from mainstream politics after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But it retained allure in the heartland
and is today making a comeback across the political spectrum as
Americans have tired of their nation’s role as the global policeman and
grown skeptical of the benefits of globalization and immigration. To
CHARLES A. KUPCHAN is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University
and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Charles A. Kupchan
be sure, as a grand strategy, “America first” is headed for failure. The

United States and the rest of the world have become too interdependent;
solving most international challenges requires collective, not unilateral,
action; and immigration has already ensured that a homogeneous
United States is gone for good.
A brand of exceptionalism dating to the eighteenth century is ill
suited to the twenty-first. Still, the contemporary appeal of “America
first” and the inward turn it marks reveal that the version of excep-
tionalism that has guided U.S. grand strategy since the 1940s is also
past its prime. Trump’s presidency has exposed the need for a new
narrative to steer U.S. foreign policy. The nation’s exceptional mission
is far from complete; a world tilting toward illiberalism sorely needs
a counterweight of republican ideals. How the United States redefines
its exceptional calling will determine whether it is up to the task.
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 1.0

From its earliest days, the exceptionalist narrative has set the boundaries
of public discourse and provided a political and ideological foundation
for U.S. grand strategy. The original conception of American excep-
tionalism was based on five national attributes.
The first was geography: protective oceans kept predatory powers
at bay, and ample and fertile land sustained a growing population and
generated wealth, helping the United States become the dominant
power in the Western Hemisphere. But the nation’s geopolitical
ambition would stretch no farther. Exceptional geographic bounty
enabled, even mandated, a grand strategy of isolation from other
quarters. As President George Washington affirmed in his Farewell
Address, the country enjoyed a “detached and distant situation. . . .
Why forgo the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our
own to stand upon foreign ground?” The United States did experiment
with a broader imperialism in 1898, colonizing the Philippines and
taking hold of Hawaii and a number of other Pacific islands, and
it intervened in Europe during World War I. But these episodes
provoked a sharp backlash and consolidated the stubborn isolationism
of the interwar decades.
Second, in part because of its geographic isolation, the United States
enjoyed unparalleled autonomy, both at home and abroad. Although
the founders were keen to expand overseas commerce through trade
deals, they were deeply averse to binding strategic commitments. As
The Clash of Exceptionalisms
Washington said in his Farewell Address, “The great rule of conduct

for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial
relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.”
After reneging in 1793 on the revolution-era alliance with France that
had helped the United States gain independence, the country would
not enter into another alliance until World War II.
Third, Americans embraced a messianic mission: they believed
that their unique experiment in political and economic liberty would
redeem the world. As the pamphleteer
Thomas Paine wrote in Common Sense,
“A situation, similar to the present,
A brand of exceptionalism
hath not happened since the days of dating to the eighteenth
Noah until now. The birthday of a century is ill suited to the
new world is at hand.” But the United twenty-first.
States was not to fulfill this mission
through intervention. When liberal
revolutions unfolded in Europe and Latin America in the early 1800s,
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams asserted that the United States
“goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.” The country
should be “the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all,”
he insisted, but only through “the countenance of her voice, and the
benignant sympathy of her example.”
Fourth, the United States enjoyed unprecedented social equality
and economic mobility. Americans had replaced monarchy and aristoc-
racy with equality of opportunity. Yeoman farmers and small-town
shopkeepers were the foot soldiers of manifest destiny—the notion
that democracy and prosperity would stretch from coast to coast. As
the United States became a leading commercial power, it defended its
emerging industrial base through tariffs and insisted on fair and recip-
rocal trade, not free trade. And when necessary, it was prepared to use
deadly force to defend the commercial rights of its citizens, as made
clear in the Barbary Wars of the early 1800s and in the War of 1812.
Finally, Americans believed their nation had been endowed with
not just exceptional land but also exceptional people: Anglo-Saxons.
Reflecting a view commonplace in the early United States, the
Congregational minister Horace Bushnell declared, “Out of all the
inhabitants of the world, . . . a select stock, . . . the noblest of the
stock, was chosen to people our country.” The racial dimension of
American exceptionalism manifested itself in the campaigns against

Charles A. Kupchan
Native Americans, the enslavement and segregation of African

Americans, and frequent bouts of anti-immigrant sentiment. Through
the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Congress extended the timeline
for immigrants to become U.S. citizens and granted the federal
government the power to imprison or deport those it deemed disloyal.
Restrictions on immigration kicked in during the second half of the
1800s and intensified during the interwar period. And the fear of
diluting the population with “inferior peoples” curbed the country’s
desire to acquire significant territory in the Caribbean and Central
America after the Civil War.

Then came the attack on Pearl Harbor, which, as Arthur Vandenberg, a
Repubican senator and one-time isolationist, wrote in his diary, “ended
isolationism for any realist.” So began the era of American Exception-
alism 2.0. If the United States could no longer shield itself from the
world and share the American experiment by example, it would have
to run the world by more actively projecting its power and values. Ever
since the 1940s, internationalists have enjoyed political dominance,
while isolationists have become political pariahs—“wacko birds,” as
Senator John McCain of Arizona once labeled his fellow Republican
Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky and others who take that stance.
Under American Exceptionalism 2.0, an aversion to foreign entan-
glement gave way to a strategy of global engagement. The Cold War
set the stage for the country’s core alliances in Europe and Asia, as well
as a global network of diplomatic and military outposts. Unilateralism
yielded to multilateralism. In 1919 and 1920, the Senate rejected U.S.
participation in the League of Nations three times; in 1945, it ratified
the UN Charter by a vote of 89 to 2. The United States also assumed
a leading role in the panoply of institutions that have undergirded
the postwar rules-based international order. And it continued to
pursue its messianic mission, but through more intrusive means, from
the successful occupations and transformations of Germany and
Japan after World War II to the ongoing and less successful forays
into Afghanistan and Iraq.
The American dream remained central to this updated version of
exceptionalism, but it was to be fulfilled by the factory worker instead
of the yeoman farmer. The postwar industrial boom generated bipartisan
support for open trade. And especially after the civil rights movement of
True believers: watching a Veterans Day parade in New Hampshire, November 2015
the 1950s and 1960s, postwar American exceptionalism lost its racial
tinge, replaced by a conviction that the melting pot would successfully
integrate a diverse population into one civic nation. Preaching plural-
ism and tolerance became part of spreading the American way.
THE RETURN OF AMERICA FIRST

Postwar presidents through Barack Obama have been staunch
defenders of American Exceptionalism 2.0. “The United States has
been, and will always be, the one indispensable nation in world affairs,”
Obama affirmed in a 2012 commencement speech at the U.S. Air
Force Academy. But just minutes after taking office, Trump promised
something different. “From this moment on,” he proclaimed in his
inaugural address, “it’s going to be America first.”
Because of the America First Committee, which was founded in
1940 to oppose U.S. intervention in World War II, this phrase evokes
anti-Semitism and isolationism. But there is more to Trump’s
BRIAN SNYD E R / REUTE RS
“America first” than its ugly pedigree. Trump’s political success stems
in no small part from his ability to exploit a version of American
exceptionalism that resonates with the nation’s history. As the writer
Walter Russell Mead has argued, populist foreign policy—what
Mead calls a “Jacksonian” approach—has always maintained its
appeal in the heartland, Trump’s electoral base. Whether Trump

Charles A. Kupchan
himself actually believes in the exceptional nature of the American

experiment is unclear (his illiberal instincts and behavior suggest he
may not). Nonetheless, he has proved quite successful at reanimating
core elements of American Exceptionalism 1.0.
Trump has cloaked himself in isolationist garb, repeatedly ques-
tioning the value of core U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia and
promising in a campaign speech outlining his “America first” foreign
policy that the United States will be “getting out of the nation-building
business.” So far, his bark has been worse than his bite, as these pledges
have proved easier said than done. The United States remains the
strategic stabilizer of Europe and Northeast Asia and continues to be
mired in the broader Middle East. And when it comes to Iran and
North Korea, Trump, if anything, errs on the hawkish side.
Still, Trump’s vision is nonetheless isolationist. In his “America
first” campaign speech, he promised to let allies that did not increase
their own military spending “defend themselves.” And he pledged to
bring to an end the era in which “our politicians seem more interested
in defending the borders of foreign countries than their own.”
Trump wants to roll back multilateralism. As a candidate, he vowed
that “we will never enter America into any agreement that reduces
our ability to control our own affairs.” Once in office, he pulled the
United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris climate
agreement, and UNESCO. He refused to certify the nuclear deal with
Iran and continues to take aim at the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the World Trade Organization.
As for the United States’ messianic mission, Trump is disdainful of
the activist brand of democracy promotion embraced under American
Exceptionalism 2.0. As he explained in that same campaign speech, he
sees today’s instability in the Middle East as a direct result of the
“dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies out of countries
that had no experience or interests in becoming a Western democracy.”
But Trump does not stop there; indeed, he forsakes even American
Exceptionalism 1.0, by showing little patience for republican ideals.
He traffics in untruths, denigrates the media, and expresses admiration
for Russian President Vladimir Putin and other autocrats.
According to Trump, the American dream has given way to what he
called “American carnage” in his inaugural address. He claimed that
the wealth of the country’s middle class “has been ripped from their
homes and then redistributed across the entire world.” Taking a page
from American Exceptionalism 1.0, he has promised protectionist

policies to “bring back our jobs . . . bring back our borders . . . bring back
our dreams.”
Trump also wants to return to the more homogeneous America of the
past. Restricting immigration; ending Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, or DACA (the Obama administration’s program that shielded
undocumented immigrants who were brought to the country as children);
insulting Hispanic Americans; sending back Haitians, Salvadorans, and
others displaced by natural disasters; and equivocating on neo-Nazis in
Charlottesville—all these moves are not-so-subtle paeans to the days
when Christians of European extraction dominated the United States.
For Trump, making America great again means making it white again.
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRISIS

“America first” helped Trump win the presidency, but as a guiding
principle for U.S. foreign policy, it is leading the nation astray. As
Trump has already found out, a daunting array of threats makes it
impossible for the United States to return to the era of “entangling
alliances with none,” as Thomas Jefferson put it. The rules-based inter-
national order that the United States erected may limit the country’s
room for maneuver, but dismantling it is a recipe for anarchy. In
today’s globalized economy, protectionism would worsen, not improve,
the plight of the U.S. middle class. And with non-Hispanic whites
projected to fall below 50 percent of the population by the middle of
this century, there is no going back to Anglo-Saxon America.
But the political appeal of “America first” also reveals serious cracks in
American Exceptionalism 2.0, which still dominates the U.S. foreign
policy establishment. Trump’s success stems not just from his skill at
activating traditional elements of American identity but also from his
promises to redress legitimate and widespread discontent. The United
States has overreached abroad; after all, it was Obama, not Trump, who
insisted that “it is time to focus on nation building here at home.” The
middle class is hurting badly: stagnant wages, inequality, and socio-
economic segregation have put the American dream out of reach for
many. And the nation has yet to arrive at an effective and humane
policy for controlling immigration, raising important questions about
whether the melting-pot approach remains viable.
American Exceptionalism 2.0 is also failing to deliver overseas.
With help from the United States, large swaths of Europe, Asia, and

Charles A. Kupchan
the Americas have become democratic, but illiberal alternatives to the

American way are more than holding their own. The collective wealth
of the West has fallen below 50 percent of global GDP, and an ascen-
dant China is challenging the postwar architecture, meaning that
Washington can no longer call the shots in multilateral institutions. It
was easy for the United States to advocate a rules-based international
order when it was the one writing the rules, but that era has come to
an end. Today, U.S. ideals are no longer backed up by U.S. prepon-
derance, making it harder to spread American values.

With American Exceptionalism 2.0 stumbling and Trump’s effort to
revert to the original version not viable, the United States can either
abandon its exceptionalist narrative or craft a new one. The former
option may seem tempting amid the nation’s political and economic
trials, but the costs would be too high. American exceptionalism has
helped the country sustain a domestic consensus behind a grand
strategy aimed at spreading democracy and the rule of law. With
illiberalism on the rise, the globe desperately needs an anchor of
republican ideals—a role that only the United States has the power
and credentials to fill. Failing to uphold rules-based governance would
risk the return of a Hobbesian world, violating not just the United
States’ principles but also its interests. Indeed, it is precisely because
the world is potentially at a historical inflection point that the United
States must reclaim its exceptionalist mantle.
Doing so will require adjustments to all five dimensions of the
exceptionalist narrative. For starters, the United States should find the
prudent middle ground between the isolationism of American
Exceptionalism 1.0 and the overreach that has accompanied Pax
Americana. Some scholars have suggested that the United States
embrace “offshore balancing,” letting other countries take the lead in
keeping the peace in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf,
with Washington intervening only in a strategic emergency. But this
approach goes too far. The United States’ main problem of late has
been shot selection, embroiling itself in unnecessary wars of choice in
the strategic periphery—namely, the Middle East—where offshore
balancing is indeed the right approach. But in the core strategic theaters
of Europe and Asia, a U.S. retreat would only unsettle allies and
embolden adversaries, inviting arms races and intensifying rivalries.
The United States needs to end its days as the global policeman, but it
should remain the arbiter of great-power peace, while emphasizing
diplomatic, rather than military, engagement outside core areas.
The United States must also rebalance its alliances and partnerships.
Trump is not alone in his antipathy to pacts that, as he said, “tie us up.”
Congress has lost its appetite for the treaty-based obligations that laid
the foundation for the postwar order. But the United States cannot
afford to drift back to unilateralism; only collective action can address
many of today’s international challenges, including terrorism, nuclear
proliferation, and climate change. The United States should therefore
view itself as the leader of an international posse, defending rules-based
institutions when possible and put-
ting together “coalitions of the
willing” when only informal coop-
The United States can
eration is available. either abandon its
Although Trump’s diplomacy lacks exceptionalist narrative or
tact, he is right to insist that U.S. craft a new one.
allies shoulder their fair share. The
United States should continue cata-
lyzing international teamwork, but Washington must make clear that
it will ante up only when its partners do. And in areas where the
United States transitions to an offshore-balancing role, it should help
organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, and the African Union become more
capable stewards of their respective regions. Washington should also
encourage emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, and South
Africa to provide the much-needed public goods of humanitarian as-
sistance, peacekeepers, and development aid.
Although the United States’ messianic mission should remain at the
core of its exceptionalist narrative, the country must transition from
crusader back to exemplar. Recent efforts at regime change in the Middle
East, far from clearing the way for democracy, have unleashed violence
and regional instability. Leading by example hardly means giving up on
democracy promotion, but it does entail engaging in a world of political
diversity and respectfully working with regimes of all types. Still,
Americans must always defend universal political and human rights; to
do otherwise would be to abandon the ideals that inform the nation’s
identity. Trump’s failure on this count is not serving to reclaim an earlier
version of American exceptionalism but denigrating it.

Charles A. Kupchan
Domestic renewal is also essential to restoring faith in the American

way both at home and abroad. The United States cannot serve as a
global beacon if its electorate is deeply divided and it cannot provide
opportunity for many of its citizens. Still, if the United States could
recover from the internal discord of the Civil War and the hardship of
the Great Depression, it can surely bounce back from today’s malaise.
Renewing the American dream—a key step toward overcoming political
polarization—requires a realistic plan for restoring upward mobility, not
a false promise to bring back an industrial heyday that is gone for good.
Manufacturing employment has suffered mainly because of automation,
not open trade or immigration. Adjusting the terms of trade can help.
But rebuilding the middle class and restoring economic optimism in
areas hurt by deindustrialization will also require ambitious plans to
better educate and retrain workers, expand broadband Internet access,
and promote growth sectors, including renewable energy, health care,
and data processing.
Finally, a new version of American exceptionalism must embrace the
idea that the United States’ increasingly diverse population will integrate
into an evolving national community imbued with the country’s long-
standing civic values. As sectarian passions cleave the Middle East,
Hindu nationalism unsettles India, and discord over the future of
immigration and multiculturalism test European solidarity, the United
States must demonstrate unity amid diversity. The melting-pot approach
of American Exceptionalism 2.0 is the right one, but sustaining it will
require deliberate measures. Reversing socioeconomic segregation and
immobility will take heavy investment in public schools and community
colleges. Effective border control, a rational approach to legal immi-
gration, and a fair but firm way to deal with undocumented immigrants
would assure Americans that diversity is the product of design, not
disorder. Fluency in English is critical to helping newcomers enter the
mainstream. And national service and other programs that mix young
Americans could encourage social and cultural integration and produce
a stronger sense of community.
If nothing else, the rise of Trump has demonstrated that American
Exceptionalism 2.0 has run its course. But try as he might, Trump will
fail in his bid to respond to today’s challenges by going back to the
past. Looking beyond Trump, the United States will need a new
exceptionalism to guide its grand strategy and renew its unique role
as the world’s anchor of liberal ideals.∂
REVIEWS & RESPONSES
Joseph Conrad lived

in a far wider world
than even the greatest
of his contemporaries.
—Adam Hochschild
BET TMANN / G ET TY IMAG ES
Stranger in Strange Lands Future Fights

Adam Hochschild 150 Stephen Peter Rosen 162
Still Crazy After All These Years Recent Books 168

James A. Morone 156
countries, even the tottering Austro-
Stranger in Hungarian Empire, won enclaves or
concessions in China. Meanwhile, the
Strange Lands United States fought a ruthless war in
the Philippines, killing several hun-
Joseph Conrad and the Dawn dred thousand Filipinos to establish
an American colony.
of Globalization It is startling, however, how seldom
such events appear in the work of the
Adam Hochschild era’s European writers. It would be as
if almost no major nineteenth-century
American novelist dealt with slavery or
no major twentieth-century German
The Dawn Watch: Joseph Conrad in a one wrote about the Holocaust. It’s not
Global World that Europeans were unaware. Hundreds
BY MAYA JASANOF F. Penguin Press, of thousands of them had lived or worked
2017, 400 pp. in the colonies, and the fruits of empire
were everywhere on display: in palatial
I
n the late nineteenth century and mansions and grand monuments built
the first decade of the twentieth, with colonial fortunes, in street names
nothing reshaped the world more such as Rue de Madagascar in Bordeaux
than European imperialism. It redrew the and Khartoum Road in London, in shops
map, enriched Europe, and left millions full of foreign trinkets and spices. In
of Africans and Asians dead. For example, 1897, more than one million visitors
in 1870, some 80 percent of Africa south came to see a world’s fair on the outskirts
of the Sahara was under the control of of Brussels that featured 267 Congolese
indigenous kings, chiefs, or other such men, women, and children, living in
rulers. Within 35 years, virtually the entire huts and paddling canoes around a pond.
continent, only a few patches excepted, There were similar human exhibits at
was made up of European colonies or fairs in the United States.
protectorates. France, Germany, Italy, Writers, however, were largely silent.
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom Mark Twain was a forthright critic of
had all seized pieces of “this magnificent imperial cruelty in the Philippines and
African cake,” in the words of King Africa, but only in some shorter pieces
Leopold II of Belgium—who took an in the last decade and a half of his life.
enormous slice for himself. George Orwell would be profoundly
In Asia in these same years, the British disillusioned by his years as a police
tightened their grip on the Indian sub- officer in British-ruled Burma, but he
continent, the French on Indochina, and did not return from there and begin
the Dutch on what today is Indonesia. writing until 1927; Burmese Days, his
Japan, Russia, and half a dozen European debut novel, appeared in 1934. If turn-
of-the-century writers approached
ADAM HOCHSCHILD is the author of Spain in
Our Hearts: Americans in the Spanish Civil War, imperialism at all, it was usually to
1936–1939. celebrate it, as did John Buchan and
Stranger in Strange Lands
Rudyard Kipling in the United Kingdom writer. Although Conrad “wouldn’t have
and similar literary cheerleaders in known the word ‘globalization,’” Jasanoff
France and Germany. writes, “with his journey from the prov-
The standout exception was Joseph inces of imperial Russia across the high
Conrad. In his novel Nostromo, the seas to the British home counties, he
American mining tycoon Holroyd embodied it.” And despite some racial
declares, “We shall run the world’s stereotypes in his portrayals of Afri-
business whether the world likes it or cans and, to a lesser extent, Asians, he
not.” Conrad’s most searing portrait recognized a multiethnic world: half of
of such business is Heart of Darkness, what he wrote, she points out, is set in
published in 1899. No one who reads Southeast Asia. No other writer of his
that book can ever again imagine the time was dealing so trenchantly with
colonizers of Africa as they liked to encounters between Europeans and the
portray themselves: unselfishly spread- non-European world.
ing Christianity and the benefits of Conrad’s involvement with imperial-
commerce. “To tear treasure out of the ism, political rebels, and the life of the
bowels of the land was their desire,” says sea just when steam was replacing sail
Marlow, Conrad’s narrator and alter ego, made him attuned to dimensions of the
“with no more moral purpose at the back world that remain relevant today. “The
of it than there is in burglars breaking heirs of Conrad’s technologically displaced
into a safe.” The Congo at this time was sailors are to be found in industries
the privately owned colony of Leopold II, disrupted by digitization,” Jasanoff
whose ruthless regime conscripted huge writes. “The analogues to his anarchists
numbers of Congolese as forced laborers— are to be found in Internet chat rooms
to gather ivory, wild rubber, food for the or terrorist cells. The material interests
king’s soldiers, firewood for the steam- he centered in the United States emanate
boats that plied the rivers, and much today as much from China.” Conrad was
more. But the novelist does not imply not a theorist of globalization, even under
that there was anything uniquely Belgian another name, but Jasanoff ’s take on
about this burglary, represented by him is a bracing reminder that in an age
Mr. Kurtz, the rapacious ivory hunter when writers often worked on a geo-
who is the book’s villain. “All Europe graphically limited stage—think of
contributed to the making of Kurtz.” Wessex, for instance, the name Thomas
Conrad lived in a far wider world Hardy gave to the part of England where
than even the greatest of his contem- he set nearly all his novels—Conrad’s
poraries, such as Marcel Proust or James stage spanned the globe. And there are
Joyce, and this is what animates The Dawn still very few major novelists about whom
Watch, the gracefully written new book one could say that today.
about him by the Harvard historian
Maya Jasanoff. Born Jozef Teodor Konrad A LONG WAY FROM HOME
Korzeniowski to Polish parents, he left Conrad’s life, so much of it lived in far
home at age 16 to sail the world on mer- corners of the world, has kept critics
chant ships for two decades, then settled and biographers busy for decades, their
in the United Kingdom and became a task made all the more challenging by

Adam Hochschild
the web of evasions he spun in several you hear, to make you feel . . . before all,
unreliable memoirs of his own. The Dawn to make you see.”
Watch is by no means as comprehensive Exploring Conrad’s world, particu-
a biography as others, particularly the larly the changes in ocean commerce
masterful Joseph Conrad: A Life by that occurred over his lifetime, leads
Zdzislaw Najder (2007); in fact, it’s Jasanoff down some fascinating byways.
not really a full biography so much as The switch from sail to steam meant
a meditation on the novelist’s life and fewer jobs: there weren’t all those sails
several of his major works. Still, the to set and furl, and steamships were
book is a great pleasure to read, for larger and could carry much bigger
Jasanoff is driven to understand the cargoes. Hence it was a tough employ-
world that shaped a writer she loves. To ment market, and Conrad seems to
draw closer to his maritime experience, have spent as much time looking for a
she traveled by container ship from berth as actually serving in one. Once
Hong Kong to England; by a 134-foot, he was able to sign on to a British long-
two-masted sailing vessel from Ireland haul sailing ship as first or second mate,
to Brittany; and by riverboat down a he was likely to find that more than
thousand miles of the Congo River. 40 percent of the crew were foreigners
Yet she mentions these voyages only like him: the wages were lower than
modestly, using them not to boast of many British workers earned onshore,
her enterprise but to evoke Conrad’s but princely to someone from Asia or
life on the water: the remarkable width eastern Europe. (Jasanoff found the
of the Congo River, for instance, or the same thing to be true today for the
rhythm of mariners’ talk when you are Filipino crew of the container ship she
out of sight of land for days at a time traveled on.) And she points out that
and your senses focus on the sea, the even during the long twilight of the
sunrise, the weather. sailing vessel, the cost of coal meant
Jasanoff has also visited many of that transport by sail was still financially
the places where Conrad lived, and competitive on routes of more than
she sketches them with a novelist’s eye: 3,500 miles, which was one reason
“Marseille, city of olive oil, orange Conrad still often worked on such ships,
trees, sweet wine, and sacks of spice, much to the later benefit of his readers.
mouth open to the Mediterranean and
eye cocked toward the Atlantic, city of THE VICTIMS OF EMPIRE
Crusaders, revolutionaries, the Count Nowhere is Conrad’s encounter with
of Monte Cristo.” She brings the same the world outside Europe more power-
skillful pen to people who shaped the fully rendered than in Heart of Darkness,
world Conrad lived in, such as King probably the most widely read, acclaimed,
Leopold II, who, she writes, had “a nose and written about short novel in English.
like a mountain slope and a beard like a The book gains its power from being
waterfall foaming over his chest.” Her closely based on six months Conrad
descriptive powers make for a fitting spent in the Congo in 1890. He had
homage to a writer who said that the signed up for what he expected to be
work of the written word was “to make an adventurous post as a steamboat
captain, but as he trained for the job, he
was horrified by the greed and brutality
he saw, fell ill with dysentery and malaria, Not all readers
and cut short his stay to return to Europe.
Many of the details in Heart of Darkness— are leaders,
the slave laborers in chains, the rotting
bodies of those who had been worked to but all leaders
death—can be found in the diary Conrad
kept during the first weeks of his stay. are readers.
What gave him such a rare ability to - Harry S. Truman
see the arrogance and theft at the heart
of imperialism? And to see that King
Leopold’s much-promoted civilizing
mission was founded on slave labor? Much SIGN UP for the
of it surely had to do with the fact that he Foreign Affairs
himself, as a Pole, knew what it was like Books & Reviews
newsletter
to live in conquered territory. Through-
out the nineteenth century, the land
that is Poland today was divided among
three neighboring empires, Austria-
Hungary, Prussia, and Russia. The last,
where most of Conrad’s family lived,
was the most repressive; when he was
three, Cossacks charged into churches to
break up memorial services for a Polish
nationalist hero. Furthermore, for the
first few years of his life, tens of millions
of peasants in the Russian empire were
the equivalent of slave laborers: serfs.
Conrad’s poet father, Apollo
Korzeniowski, was a Polish nationalist
and an opponent of serfdom, although
both he and his wife came from the class
of country gentry that had sometimes
owned serfs. For his nationalist activities,
Korzeniowski was thrown into a harsh
Warsaw prison and then herded into
exile in northern Russia by the tsar’s
police. His wife and four-year-old son
went with him, and their time in the
frigid climate exacerbated the tuberculosis
that would kill Conrad’s mother when he
was only seven. His father died only a ForeignAffairs.com/newsletters
few years later, and his funeral procession,
153
Adam Hochschild
in Austrian-occupied Krakow, turned into violent revolution falls into the hands
a huge demonstration of Polish nation- of narrow-minded fanatics. . . . The
alism. Small wonder that this boy who noble, humane, and devoted . . . the
grew up among exiled prison veterans, unselfish and the intelligent may begin
talk of serfdom, and the news of relatives a movement—but it passes away from
killed in uprisings was ready to distrust them. They are not the leaders of a
imperial conquerors who claimed they had revolution. They are its victims.”
the right to rule other peoples. In Russia, this turned out to be all
Few Europeans of Conrad’s time too true. But this clumsy novel, with its
were outspokenly hostile to imperialism, wooden dialogue and stick-figure cast,
and virtually all of them were on the would have been a far better one had
left. Paradoxically, however, in everything Conrad demonstrated more empathy
else about his politics, Conrad was deeply for such “noble, humane, and devoted”
conservative. He hated labor unions. characters, no matter how misled they
For all his disgust with Russian and turn out to be. It is just that more
Belgian imperialism, he believed that capacious vision that gives greater
British imperialism was splendid. Heart depth to later novels dealing with the
of Darkness was enthusiastically welcomed Soviet tragedy, such as Boris Pasternak’s
by the largely British “Congo reformers,” Doctor Zhivago and Vasily Grossman’s
who were agitating against King Leopold’s Life and Fate.
forced-labor regime, but Conrad was Conrad brilliantly saw many of the
wary of identifying himself with their injustices of the world as it existed.
movement, even though one of its key But what gave him such a skeptical
figures was the Irishman Roger Casement, view of anyone who aspired to change
with whom he had bonded when they it? Jasanoff suggests that this came
briefly shared a house in the Congo. from “the failure of his father’s political
Conrad had no use for the socialist objectives,” but there is evidence to
idealism in which so many British suggest otherwise. In Conrad’s A
intellectuals—including several close Personal Record, he speaks of his father
friends—had great faith. In his two as “simply a patriot” and not a revo-
most self-consciously political novels, lutionary. And Korzeniowski’s political
The Secret Agent, about anarchists in objectives were achieved during his
London, and Under Western Eyes, about son’s own lifetime, when Poles finally
Russian revolutionaries in St. Petersburg won their own homeland. Such a goal
and Geneva, almost all the characters are is certainly more benign than the
venal or hopelessly naive. Both groups dreams Conrad eviscerates in The
are infiltrated by police informers. Secret Agent and Under Western Eyes:
In one sense, Conrad’s dour vision the anarchist vision of the destruction
served him well. Although Under Western of all governments and the Bolshevik
Eyes was published six years before the one of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Russian Revolution, he virtually predicted Conrad himself advocated Polish nation-
its fate. The novel’s narrator at one point hood and honored the memory of his
says: “In a real revolution the best father; on a visit to Korzeniowski’s
characters do not come to the front. A grave decades after his death, the
Stranger in Strange Lands
novelist surprised his family by archconservatism of his political

kneeling in prayer. views may well have stemmed from
Conrad’s sweeping dismissal of all his mortification over these youthful
radicals and reformers surely came from indiscretions and his desire to prove
elsewhere. In his late teens, when he himself sober and responsible in the
was living in Marseille, he lost all his eyes of his much-loved father figure,
money by investing in the running of Bobrowski.
contraband goods—possibly guns—to In the best of his work, however,
Spain. He received a loan from a friend Conrad rose above the quirks and
and attempted to recover his losses at the torments of his own life. He etched a
casinos but gambled it all away. Deeply deeper picture of the connections
depressed, he fired a pistol into his chest between the world’s North and South
in an attempt at suicide, but, even more and portrayed the corrosive effect of
humiliating, the bullet missed his heart, the lust for riches more powerfully
and he survived. than any other writer of his day—and
Rushing to Marseille to bail him perhaps of our day as well.∂
out of trouble was his uncle, Tadeusz
Bobrowski, his mother’s brother, who
had acted as a guardian since the death
of Conrad’s father. In person and in a
long string of letters over the years,
Bobrowski sternly disapproved of the
young Conrad’s ambitions as impractical
and romantic and kept urging his ward
to do something sensible, such as
returning to Krakow and going into
business. Happily, he did not prevail.
Conrad also suffered a later acute
embarrassment, which Jasanoff men-
tions only in passing. In the 1890s, he
invested and lost almost all his savings,
plus a modest inheritance, in a South
African gold mine. Ironically, the South
African gold rush was a get-rich-quick
bonanza of the type that Conrad had
written about so harshly in Nostromo,
where the rush was for silver, and
Heart of Darkness, where it was for
ivory. More awkward still, these losses
came just as he was getting married
and starting a family. Small wonder
that the plot of one of his best novels,
Lord Jim, revolves around a man trying
to live down an early disgrace. The

announces a “City upon a Hill,” with
Still Crazy After nothing less than the future of all Chris-
tianity at stake. The Puritan ministers
All These Years Increase Mather and his son, Cotton,
hunt witches in Salem Village. Andersen’s
story runs through P. T. Barnum, Henry
America’s Long History of David Thoreau, Walt Disney, Ronald
Political Delusion Reagan, and, finally, Trump himself,
who beats them all by managing an
James A. Morone average of over five untruths a day.
As Andersen shows, fantastical
thinking has always played an outsize
role in American culture. But something
Fantasyland: How America Went seems different today. Running beneath
Haywire; A 500-Year History the parade of con artists and manias that
BY KURT ANDERSEN. Random Andersen deftly catalogs glints some-
House, 2017, 480 pp. thing more dangerous than illusions: a
bitter contest over national identity that
I
n the spring of 2011, Donald Trump political institutions may no longer be
began suggesting that U.S. Presi- able to contain.
dent Barack Obama had not been Americans have wrestled over their
born in the United States. “Why doesn’t national character many times before.
he show his birth certificate?” Trump What has changed? The answer lies in
asked on ABC’s The View. “I would love how the political parties have reorganized
to see it produced,” he told Fox News’ debates over race, immigration, and the
On the Record. “I’m starting to think that American self. For a long time, the party
he was not born here,” he announced system stifled tribal questions; now, it
on NBC’s Today Show. Despite plenty inflames them.
of evidence to the contrary, Trump kept
repeating his nonsense. To this day, polls AMERICAN GODS
show that some 70 percent of registered Fantasyland begins with an inventory of
Republicans doubt Obama’s citizenship. magical thinking. Two-thirds of Ameri-
Welcome to what Kurt Andersen calls cans believe in angels and demons; a
“Fantasyland.” third think climate change is a hoax, that
In his new book, Andersen takes a humans roamed among the dinosaurs, or
dizzy, mordant trip through five centuries that pharmaceutical cartels are hiding
of magical thinking, bringing a novelist’s the cure for cancer. The fantasies don’t
gaze to make-believe Americana. The sit in any one cultural corner, Andersen
“hucksters” and the “suckers” tumble observes. Many of those who believe,
through the pages. John Winthrop against all scientific evidence, that geneti-
cally modified foods are unsafe to eat
JAMES A. MORONE is John Hazen White snicker at those who deny Darwin’s theory
Professor of Public Policy and Professor of
Political Science and Urban Studies at Brown of evolution. And most creationists, in
University. turn, dismiss the Mormon belief that an
Still Crazy After All These Years
The show that never ends: a poster advertising the Barnum & Bailey Circus, 1895
angel revealed the contents of the Book of fractured Americans’ shared understand-
Mormon on golden plates to Joseph Smith. ing of reality.
The leitmotif for Andersen’s tour Today, the mass media overflow
of American chimeras comes from an with malicious fantasies and conspir-
unnamed senior adviser in the George W. acy theories. During the 2016 election,
Bush White House who, speaking claims that Democratic Party officials
with the journalist Ron Suskind in 2002, were implicated in a child sex ring run
mocked the chumps in the “reality-based out of a pizza parlor in Washington, D.C.,
community” clinging to the notion that emerged from a white supremacist
“solutions emerge from your judicious website and quickly went viral. This
study of discernible reality.” Not anymore, kind of fevered public discourse didn’t
boasted the adviser. Now, “we create our just spring up; it was unleashed, in part,
own reality.” by policy decisions. For nearly four
This attitude, as Andersen shows, was decades, starting in 1949, the Federal
nothing new. But two recent shifts in the Communications Commission enforced
TIM E LI F E PICTU RES / G ET TY IMAG ES
social cosmos, he argues, have tipped a policy known as the Fairness Doctrine,
American society into a more intense which required media outlets to pres-
and destabilizing Fantasyland. First, the ent both sides of controversial issues—
1960s culture of “do your own thing, find producing the bland news regime that
your own reality, it’s all relative” liberated many Americans now remember with
everyone to nourish his or her own favorite nostalgia. Then, in 1987, the Reagan
fantasies. Second, a new era of information administration repealed the rule and
and communication threw opinions onto fended off congressional efforts to
the airwaves alongside actual news and reinstate it.

James A. Morone
The change coincided with the right to point to the 1960s. But under-
emergence of transformative media neath the story of a “do your own thing”
technologies. In the late 1980s and early culture lies a deeper tale of how the
1990s, cable channels sprang up on tele- white majority has responded to the twin
vision, serious content moved into the dangers of racial equality and immigrant
newly opened FM radio bands, and a power. Amid the upheaval of the 1960s,
series of provocative talk-show hosts leaders of both parties finally acquiesced
seized the freed-up space on the AM to black demands for racial justice—and
dial. The policy shift and the techno- promptly faced a white backlash. The
logical change combined to produce a Republican Party lurched into a rebellion
fresh kind of content: heated, partisan, against its own elites. Barry Goldwater,
and often fantastical. Rumors sprang the party’s nominee in the 1964 presi-
from the dark corners of the new World dential election, was the first leader of
Wide Web and crept into established that revolution. He preached free-market
broadcast media. Anderson surveys all liberty but remained silent as segregation-
sorts of collateral damage: one quickly ists lined up behind him. At the same
discredited study of 12 people published time, Democrats faced their own racial
by Andrew Wakefield in 1998 led to reckoning as white voters, especially those
dangerous anti-vaccine hysteria and in the South, turned away from the party.
the return of dormant diseases such as The Democratic nominee has lost the
whooping cough. A surge of racial white vote in every presidential election
fantasies convinced millions that anti- after 1964.
white bias was a greater problem than Goldwater’s coalition of small-
anti-black bias and that American government conservatives and segrega-
Muslims were scheming to replace tionists had a long, bipartisan provenance.
U.S. jurisprudence with Islamic law. Back in the antebellum United States,
The new media ecosystem flourished supporters of slavery fiercely resisted
mainly on the right. Although liberals federal projects. If the national govern-
have tried to emulate conservative news ment was powerful enough to build roads
shows, they have never had much success. or mental hospitals, they reasoned, it
As Andersen observes, the 45 million might be powerful enough to meddle
Americans who listen to right-wing with their racial order. In 1842, former
talk radio are older, whiter, and more President John Quincy Adams, then an
conservative than the country as a whole. antislavery representative from Massa-
Above all, they are angry. According to a chusetts, told his constituents that slavery
2015 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, “palsied” the hand of national government
98 percent of those who regularly tune and stood in the way of “the prospective
in are convinced that the country is promotion of the general welfare.”
going in the wrong direction. These clashing attitudes about federal
power were vividly illuminated when
NATION OF IMMIGRANTS the North and the South split in 1861.
The history behind that anger helps With the slave states gone, the Union
explain just how and why the United Congress passed a cascade of previously
States has gone haywire. Anderson is blocked national programs: land-grant
colleges, railroads, a homestead act, from the shadows after all this time was
banking bills, a progressive income tax, an unprecedented intersection of racial
and the first national currency. The politics and immigration.
Confederate constitution, in contrast, Until the 1960s, the political parties
forbade its central government from sorted views on immigration very differ-
engaging in any “internal improvements.” ently from those on race. Before the
Alexander Stephens, the Confederate Civil War, the pro-slavery Democrats
vice president, explained the twin corner- embraced new Americans, hustled them
stones of the fledgling state: slavery for into the franchise, and turned an indulgent
blacks and no national projects under the eye on their cheating at the polls,
guise of interstate commerce. Guarding beating up abolitionists, or sparking
the racial hierarchy meant binding the race riots. Year after year, the Demo-
central government. cratic Party platform denounced aboli-
That pattern persisted long after tionists, welcomed “the oppressed of every
slavery ended. Men and women fighting nation,” and attacked the rival party’s
to preserve segregation in the middle long history of anti-immigrant prejudice.
of the twentieth century learned that On the other side, the same people who
raw racism provoked a national backlash. fought against slavery often despised
Calling for liberty and bashing the gov- immigrants and worked to limit their
ernment, in contrast, brought them allies. political participation. Even Abraham
The leaders of the powerful libertarian Lincoln quietly incorporated nativists
streak that runs through mainstream into the new Republican Party, although
American conservatism, from Goldwater, he refused to make concessions to them.
through Reagan, down to the present, As the historian David Potter wrote, “No
always seem to wink at the bigots. Of event in the history of the Republican
course, many conservatives dispute that party was more crucial or more fortu-
idea; after all, they point out, every nate than this sub rosa union. By it, the
coalition has its lunatic fringe, and the Republican party received a permanent
big-government liberals of the New Deal endowment of nativist support which
were long enmeshed with the segregation- probably elected Lincoln in 1860 and
ists of the “Solid South.” which strengthened the party in every
But with Trump, what seemed fringe election for more than a century to come.”
burst onto center stage, trumpeting racial These twin alliances—Whigs (and, later,
animosity to cheering partisans. Anderson Republicans) joining with slavery’s critics
bluntly sums up the Trump campaign’s and nativists and Democrats siding with
strategy: “Fuck the dog whistles.” You’re segregationists and immigrants—kept the
“living in hell,” Trump told African two issues of slavery and immigration
Americans during the first presidential largely separate.
debate. “You walk down the street, and Once again, the 1960s changed every-
you get shot.” For a time, Trump refused thing. In 1965, Congress passed the Hart-
to denounce the Ku Klux Klan or disavow Celler Act, which opened the door to a
the white supremacist leader David Duke, new wave of immigrants (immigration
who had urged his supporters to vote for to the United States had been radically
Trump. What allowed racism to burst curtailed in the 1920s). The main

James A. Morone
opposition to the act came from segre- Although most Americans expect politics
gationists who feared that, unlike the to turn on differences over public policy,
predominantly European immigrants the two political parties are now config-
of the past, new arrivals to the United ured to bring tribal issues to the surface.
States were more likely to be nonwhite. They repeatedly thrust the same perilous
New tensions arose as the immigrant question into politics: Who counts as a
generation that arrived after the act true American?
swelled into one of the largest in U.S. By underscoring the question of
history. Those tensions were increas- national identity, party conflict now
ingly channeled into party politics as strains the United States’ political institu-
the parties aligned themselves along tions: regular order in Congress, the norms
racial, ethnic, and national-origin lines. that once held the presidency in check,
The Democratic Party championed civil the impartiality of the courts and of the
rights and sponsored open immigration; news media. Everything from the churches
over time, African Americans, Asian to the Boy Scouts has been caught up
Americans, and Spanish speakers drifted in the struggle. Mix this broad conflict
(or were pushed) into its ranks. At the over identity with the United States’
same time, white natives moved deci- long history of fantasy, and the result is
sively to the Republicans. a nation that has, indeed, gone haywire.
Exacerbating matters still further, the
U.S. Census Bureau began to publicize an BAD TRIP
explosive demographic prediction after Andersen ends his book with the wan
the 2000 census: the United States was hope that American fantastical thinking
inexorably becoming a majority-minority has peaked and that the American people
nation. That oversimplified matters will somehow stumble their way to
because the bureau uses a standard “balance and composure.” What are the
reminiscent of the “one-drop rule,” classi- chances of that happening? The racialized
fying people of mixed ethnic heritage as history that runs parallel to the story
minorities. But there is no denying that of Fantasyland offers two very different
the face of the nation is changing. Noth- prospects for the future.
ing symbolized that change more than On the one hand, national institutions
Obama. Nothing gave voice to the are generally resilient, and even in today’s
fretful backlash more than Trump. media landscape, it remains difficult for
The political realignment over race most people—Trump excluded, it seems—
and immigration meant that by the early to simply lie without consequences.
years of this century, for the first time, race Politics may continue to swing wildly
and ethnicity mapped neatly onto party back and forth for some time, but the
identification. Take just one marker of the basic demographic trends that worried
divide: almost 90 percent of Republican Republican leaders after their defeat in
members of the House of Representa- the 2012 presidential election have not
tives are white men; among Democrats, changed. Every year, the United States
the figure is 43 percent. The political grows a little less white; white nationalism
system that once diffused the issue of offers no long-term prospect of political
national identity now exacerbates it. success. Rather, each party will have to
face up to some stubborn realities. In this scenario, the pressure of racial

Republicans will need to finally and and ethnic change could result in the old
forcefully divorce their small-government South’s racial politics going national.
message from implicit (and sometimes Andersen’s history makes it easy to
explicit) appeals to white supremacy. imagine the tall tales that might justify
Democrats will need to earn the allegiance voter suppression, already a finely honed
of their voters by squarely addressing the feature of U.S. politics. Politicians gerry-
issue of economic opportunity rather mander districts, deny suffrage to felons,
than running on antipathy toward the purge voting lists shortly before elections,
Republican Party. impose restrictive registration require-
Of course, on either side, an impas- ments, enact voter ID laws, close polling
sioned base might not permit its party places, and reduce voting times, all of
to make the necessary adjustments. which make it harder for many black,
There is plenty of precedent for that. Hispanic, poor, and young people to
American politics has often operated cast their ballots. Fantasies about mas-
with a dominant majority party and an sive voter fraud could ratchet up the
(often regional) minority one. The party restrictions. Trump’s victory, achieved
that fails to keep up with the times may with almost three million fewer votes
find itself looking like the Democrats after than his opponent got, might mark the
the start of the Civil War (the party beginning of minority rule.
put just two men in the White House Whichever of these visions proves
in 72 years) or the Republicans after the more accurate, American politics is not
start of the Great Depression (just one likely to calm down anytime soon, as the
president in 36 years). nation continues to confront its changing
On the other hand, democracies can identity. Yet there is ultimately some-
break. As the political scientists Robert thing soothing about Andersen’s lively
Mickey, Steven Levitsky, and Lucan history. It is a litany of falsehood, fantasy,
Ahmad Way warned in this magazine and folly. But it is also the tale of a country
last year, it is exceedingly difficult for a that has managed to survive and thrive
large democracy to negotiate a change in for five centuries despite all the lies it
its dominant ethnic group. The United tells itself.∂
States tried to achieve something like
that after the Civil War, during Recon-
struction, when Republicans sought to
impose racial equality on Southern
society. Resurgent white power fended
off the reforms and constructed bluntly
authoritarian regimes that stripped the
vote from almost all black people and
many whites across the Southern states.
By the mid-1930s, for example, Missis-
sippi had over two million citizens, but
only about 6,000 of them cast ballots
in midterm congressional elections.

what they know how to do with no regard
Future Fights for the future. It is not enough to follow
U.S. President Barack Obama’s injunction
“Don’t do stupid shit.” Policymakers must
Planning for the Next War be able to choose among alternative ideas.
In The Future of War, Lawrence
Stephen Peter Rosen Freedman, professor emeritus at King’s
College London (and a member of this
magazine’s panel of regular book review-
The Future of War: A History ers), comprehensively examines how
BY LAWRENCE F REEDMAN. Allen people have done this in the past. But
Lane, 2017, 400 pp. his analysis will disappoint those seeking
practical advice. Although Freedman
offers a useful corrective to current
F
ormer U.S. Secretary of Defense tendencies, he may have overlooked
Robert Gates has been known to some of history’s more useful lessons.
quip that Washington’s predic-
tions about its future wars have been FUTURE WARS: A RETROSPECTIVE
one hundred percent right, zero percent To survey how Americans and Europeans
of the time. In early 1950, officials said have thought about the future of war
that the United States would not fight over the past 150 years, Freedman consults
in Korea. In 1964, U.S. President Lyndon many different sources, discussing fiction
Johnson promised that he would not writers such as Tom Clancy, H. G. Wells,
send American troops to fight wars in and Jules Verne and Vietnam War movies
Asia. Iraq was not on any American’s list such as the John Wayne classic The Green
of enemies in 1990; after all, the United Berets, in addition to the works of political
States had assisted that country in its scientists and military professionals,
war against Iran just a decade before. such as Charles Edward Callwell and
And few people—not even Khalid Sheik B. H. Liddell Hart. He also covers related
Mohammed, one of the architects of topics, such as civilian and military casual-
the 9/11 attacks—anticipated the U.S. ties, failed and fragile states, and the
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. morality of humanitarian intervention,
So why bother thinking about the and provides potted histories of campaigns
future of war at all? The answer, for in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia,
better or worse, is that there is no other which are occasionally interesting even
choice. If bureaucracies do not carefully when not closely related to the subject
consider possible future scenarios, they at hand. This wide scope is commend-
will make choices that merely reflect their able, as no discipline or mode of thought
implicit or explicit assumptions about has a monopoly on insight. But the book’s
what kinds of wars they will fight. Worse breadth may also explain some small
yet, they may simply carry on doing factual errors that detract from its author-
ity. (Small Wars, the classic book by the
STEPHEN PETER ROSEN is Beton Michael
Kaneb Professor of National Security and military strategist Callwell, displays
Military Affairs at Harvard University. considerable respect for insurgents, not
Future Fights
Eye robot: a military robot in London, February 2009

the imperial arrogance asserted by wars would be determined the same way.
Freedman. Robot swarms do not require Even figures such as the Polish banker
central control, as Freedman writes; they Ivan (Jan) Bloch and the British politician
respond to cues from their environment Norman Angell, who saw in the early
and one another. The actor Peter Sellers 1900s that sudden victories were no
said that his character Dr. Strangelove longer possible, predicted short conflicts,
was modeled on the German American assuming that no one would tolerate
engineer Wernher von Braun, not the bloody stalemates. After World War I,
American strategist Herman Kahn, as scholars anticipated the use of poison
Freedman has it.) gas and economic warfare, but not the
In setting up his main argument, adoption of blitzkrieg. The Cold War
Freedman approvingly quotes the politi- nuclear standoff led some to argue that
cal theorist Hannah Arendt: “Predictions nuclear proliferation and deterrence would
of the future are never anything but stabilize the global system, a prediction
projections of present automatic processes whose accuracy scholars are still debating.
and procedures, that is, of occurrences that The collapse of the Soviet Union
L U K E M ACG R E G O R / R E U T E R S
are likely to come to pass if men do not produced the famous “end of history”
act and if nothing unexpected happens.” thesis, which heralded democratic peace
He goes on to survey the long history of and the permanent triumph of Western
this flawed thinking. After the seemingly liberalism. The September 11 attacks led
decisive battles of the Franco-Prussian observers to hypothesize about religious
War and the Russo-Japanese War, theorists wars of terror, neglecting the reemergence
assumed that the outcomes of future of great-power military competitions.

Stephen Peter Rosen
Freedman concludes that although advancement created a revolution that

there will be many efforts to portray the expanded the battlefield and compressed
future of war, “if there is a lesson from the time within which campaigns would
this book it is that while many will deserve occur. With the advent of railroads in
to be taken seriously, they should all be the American Civil War, combat could
treated skeptically.” But perhaps historical cover continent-sized areas in a matter
study can offer more constructive wisdom. of days or weeks, not months or years.
There are some alternative ways to think And later, aviation brought war to
about the subject that have proved useful European cities before the defending
in the past. And examining the successes— armies were defeated.
not just the failures—might help strategists According to the influential American
constructively plan for future wars. strategist Andrew Marshall, an under-
standing of this pattern helped the Soviet
THE EVOLUTION OF WAR Union identify the disruptive potential
If a country cannot say with confidence of digital information technology before
where or with whom it will fight, it still its impact on war was widely recognized,
may be possible to narrow down how it in the wake of the 1990–91 Gulf War.
will fight. There are some constants, The Soviet general staff had famously
but the character of war does change— assessed that the antitank potential of
sometimes quickly, but more usually American precision weapons was equal to
slowly. For example, the political scientist that of tactical nuclear weapons, without
Stephen Biddle has described how the the drawbacks. The recognition that the
increasing lethality of firepower has Soviet military industrial complex was
forced the steady dispersal of troops on unable to compete in the area of digital
the battlefield. This in turn has expanded information processing led the general staff
the battlefield, gradually eliminating what to urge Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
had been rear guards and diminishing the to seek some sort of rapprochement with
time interval between the onset of war the West, which would enable the Soviets
and attacks on the enemy’s heartland. to catch up in an area that was critical to
Identifying these kind of trends has military competition.
historically helped countries prepare for Today, the diffusion of digital military
future wars. During the tsarist era, the technology has given not only the Chinese
Russian military was not in the fore- and the Russians but also the Iranians
front of military modernization. But and their proxy Hezbollah the ability to
perhaps because they led a backward reach out over long distances and strike
institution, Russian military thinkers at targets with precision. This poses a
were uniquely conscious of how others problem for the U.S. military, which
were changing. These Russians (and later will need to figure out how to fight its
Soviets) understood that revolutions in way into areas defended with precision
military affairs would regularly alter the weapons. Freedman neglects the impli-
pace and geographic extent of war. First cations of this diffusion of precision
came railroads and rifles; then internal strike weapons, instead focusing on
combustion engines, radios, and airplanes; robots, drones, cyberwarfare, and
then missiles and nuclear weapons. Each hybrid warfare.
PLANNING FOR THE UNKNOWN
Still, an awareness of general trends in
the character of war does not necessarily
mean that a country will know how to
prepare. For advice on this front, strate-
gists might consult the work of Burton
Klein, who tackled the question of
military procurement during periods of
uncertainty as an analyst at the RAND Franklin Williams
Corporation in the 1950s. Internship
When World War II ended, the United The Council on Foreign Relations is seeking
States did not know who its friends or talented individuals for the Franklin Williams
its enemies would be. The Cold War Internship.
alliance structures had not yet emerged, The Franklin Williams Internship, named after
and there was still hope for cooperative the late Ambassador Franklin H. Williams,
was established for undergraduate and graduate
relations with the Soviet Union. Wash- students who have a serious interest in
ington also did not know what to buy. international relations.
Ballistic missiles had been used in World Ambassador Williams had a long career of
War II, but so had manned bombers and public service, including serving as the
primitive cruise missiles. The United American Ambassador to Ghana, as well as the
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Lincoln
States had already developed atomic
University, one of the country’s historically
bombs, but now scientists suggested that black colleges. He was also a Director of the
superbombs might be possible. Council on Foreign Relations, where he made
After reflecting on the practices of the special efforts to encourage the nomination of
U.S. defense establishment during that black Americans to membership.
period, Klein concluded that flexibility The Council will select one individual each
term (fall, spring, and summer) to work in
should be the principal goal of defense
the Council’s New York City headquarters.
spending during uncertain times. In his The intern will work closely with a Program
eyes, there were two kinds of flexibility. Director or Fellow in either the Studies or
The first could be obtained by investing the Meetings Program and will be involved
in expensive, multipurpose forces that with program coordination, substantive
and business writing, research, and budget
were not optimized for any one mission— management. The selected intern will be
for example, an aircraft carrier task force. required to make a commitment of at least 12
The second kind of flexibility derived hours per week, and will be paid $10 an hour.
from information rather than capabilities. To apply for this internship, please send a
According to Klein, countries could get résumé and cover letter including the se-
mester, days, and times available to work to
ahead of the curve by investigating
the Internship Coordinator in the Human
different technologies and investing in Resources Office at the address listed below.
prototypes of weapons: some might be The Council is an equal opportunity employer.
failures, but others might be war winners. Council on Foreign Relations
Such an approach would show strategists Human Resources Office
many different ways to face many dif- 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065
tel: 212.434 . 9400 fax: 212.434 . 9893
ferent threats and allow them to iron out humanresources@cfr.org http://www.cfr.org
problems in advance.
165
Stephen Peter Rosen
During this period, the United States the use of cavalry and the integration
made prototypes of dozens of missiles of artillery fire and infantry movements.
and airplanes, many of which it did not But Russia was big, and the tsar’s army
buy. The Department of Defense also had many more horses than Napoleon’s.
bought information about large-scale If the war could be extended and pro-
production for military purposes, so that tracted, France would run out of horses.
if and when an enemy emerged, it could And without cavalry, Napoleon would
quickly build the necessary forces. be blind on the battlefield, reducing
Unfortunately, this approach—known his operational superiority.
as “industrial mobilization planning”— Russia in 1812 is not the only case of a
became a lost art in the United States foreseeable war, as the historian Williamson
after the emergence of large arsenals Murray demonstrates in a 2014 book that
of thermonuclear weapons led policy- he co-edited titled Successful Strategies.
makers to believe that it was no longer Murray suggests that strategists can reduce
necessary. the problem of forecasting the character
of a future war by focusing on what can
KNOW THY ENEMY be known with certainty about the enemy.
Freedman is right that it is always diffi- For example, the Union had a demographic
cult to predict the future. But sometimes advantage over the Confederacy. In a war
the problems facing a particular nation of attrition, it would win if the forces of the
can be foreseen. Throughout history, South were constantly engaged—hence
successful preparations for war with a General Ulysses S. Grant’s famous order
known enemy have fallen into roughly to General George Meade: “Wherever
two camps: the Clausewitzian type and Lee goes, there you will go also.”
the Sun-tzu type. The Clausewitzian In some cases, it may be possible to go
approach relies on general information beyond an enemy’s obvious characteristics
about the enemy’s and one’s own capabil- to understand its plans and thwart them
ities. The Sun-tzu approach depends on even before the war begins. As Sun-tzu
a close and detailed study of the enemy. observed, the acme of strategy is to defeat
In his classic book On War, Clausewitz the enemy’s strategy. Of course, such an
gives examples of how the general char- approach requires a detailed understand-
acteristics of belligerents can be used ing of or intelligence about the enemy’s
to identity what he calls the enemy’s plans, which is not always possible. Still,
“centre of gravity.” The magnificent it has been successfully executed in the
2009 book by the historian Dominic recent past. The military analyst Peter
Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, illustrates Swartz has written about how a careful
the Clausewitzian approach in action. reading of Soviet naval doctrine and the
Lieven documents how a simple assess- exploitation of still classified intelligence
ment of geography and national strengths sources showed the U.S. Navy that it
and weaknesses allowed Russian officials had completely misunderstood how the
to successfully prepare for war against an Soviet navy planned to fight a submarine
invading France in 1812. Napoleon was war. A corrected understanding helped
clearly a superior general, and his army the U.S. Navy develop a new strategy.
was superior, as well—particularly in Instead of using U.S. attack submarines
Future Fights
to protect American transatlantic convoys who are able to adapt rapidly to changing
from Soviet submarines, the Americans conditions. Finally, it should revive the
began to use their attack submarines to art of industrial mobilization planning, so
threaten Soviet ballistic missile submarines, that when threats become better defined,
in order to keep the Soviet navy on the the United States can make the best use of
defensive. In the event of war, Washing- its still formidable production capabili-
ton planned to force the Soviet attack ties. And since the industrial age is over,
submarines to stay close to home instead military mobilization will need to involve
of going out to sink American convoys. newly dominant production technologies,
This strategy worked—the threat posed such as chip fabrication and 3-D printing.
by American attack submarines led the Freedman may be right that a fixation
Soviet navy to hold their ballistic missile on the recent past makes mispredicting
submarines close to port, in “bastions,” hard to avoid. But even so, consider-
where they would be protected by Soviet ing history can still help officials use-
attack submarines. fully plan for a wide range of future
contingencies.∂
LOOKING AHEAD
The United States is currently experi-
encing another period of uncertainty.
What is the greatest threat to American
security today? China? Russia? Islamist
extremism? Officials and experts disagree.
Are nuclear weapons obsolete or the
wave of the future? Again, reasonable
experts disagree. But acknowledging the
unknowns does not mean that strategic
policymaking is impossible.
As a practical matter, the United
States should practice the arts of planning
just discussed. If general trends in the
character of war persist, they will greatly
constrain the ability of the United States
to intervene militarily at intercontinental
distances, at least in the way Washington
has become accustomed to doing. As
other states gain the ability to conduct
precision strikes, building up the fixed
logistical bases and resources necessary
for industrial-era war in the theater of
operations will no longer be possible.
The United States should also prior-
itize funding research and development
and focus on building a smaller military
with higher-quality personnel, soldiers

Recent Books of rivals, and self-restraint in the use of
institutional prerogatives.
Political and Legal

Safe Passage: The Transition From British
G. John Ikenberry to American Hegemony
BY KORI SCHAKE. Harvard
University Press, 2017, 400 pp.
How Democracies Die World power transitions are rare but

BY STEVEN LEVITSKY AND DANIEL perilous moments when hegemonic
ZIBLAT T. Crown, 2018, 320 pp. leadership passes hands. From the
ancient struggles between Athens and
S
ince the mid-twentieth century, Sparta to the world wars of the twenti-
most people in Europe and North eth century, these grand shifts have
America have taken for granted often been bloody. The passage of
the stability of their liberal democratic leadership from the United Kingdom
institutions. In the postwar decades, to the United States, however, stands
some democracies did collapse, but they out as unusually peaceful. Although
tended to be weak states in poor countries this story has been told many times,
outside the advanced Western world, Schake provides a fresh and insightful
such as Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, Peru, account that focuses on key moments
and Thailand. Today, as Levitsky and when American and British elites revised
Ziblatt argue in this important study, their judgments about each other and
democracies are dying in slower and more their changing geopolitical fortunes.
subtle ways—and Western democracies, She argues that the transition was peace-
including the United States, are not ful mostly because it unfolded slowly
immune. The risk comes not from power- over a century, during which the
hungry generals or revolutionary parties United States became an empire and
but from elected officials who come to the United Kingdom became a democ-
office—often riding a nationalist, popu- racy. A shared political heritage and
list, anti-elite, anticorruption wave— common liberal democratic values
and proceed to take small steps toward helped an increasingly beleaguered
authoritarianism. The threat is so danger- United Kingdom decide that it could
ous precisely because each step is often cede leadership to the United States
legal. Delivering a powerful wake-up and harness U.S. power to the pursuit
call, Levitsky and Ziblatt see signs of of its own interests. The book is most
erosion in “the soft guardrails” of democ- fascinating in its details, illuminating
racy in the United States. Decades of the myriad struggles between London
extreme polarization have taken their and Washington over the rules and
toll on the respect for constitutional institutions that would form the basis
checks and balances and on traditional for Pax Americana.
American political norms, such as mutual
toleration, acceptance of the legitimacy
Recent Books
The Sovereignty Wars: Reconciling designed to tame state power. In this

America With the World insightful book, Hurd argues that
BY STEWART PATRICK. Brookings international law is actually best under-
Institution Press, 2017, 352 pp. stood as a tool of state power—less an
externally imposed constraint than a
For more than a century, the grand debate resource that governments employ to
over the United States’ global role has authorize and legitimize what they want
tended to pivot on one question: Can to do. He arrives at this contrarian view
Washington best advance its interests and by closely examining the role of inter-
values through international institutions or national law in contemporary disputes
through its own national efforts and ad hoc over war, torture, and drones. In Hurd’s
partnerships? At times, as Patrick illumi- portrait, governments pragmatically—
nates in this cogent and timely book, this and sometimes cynically—interpret
debate has turned into “sovereignty wars,” international law to suit their purposes.
heated controversies over whether the They look for legal arguments that will
United States should accept constraints on justify their actions and create a “vo-
its autonomy and freedom of action. The cabulary of virtue” to describe their
U.S. Senate’s debate over President policies. Governments have steadily
Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations expanded what qualifies as self-defense,
was the first and most dramatic fight of this for example, in order to give themselves
kind. But more recent arguments over the permission to use force. Nevertheless,
North American Free Trade Agreement, Hurd notes, in often small and subtle
the International Criminal Court, the ways, international law also construc-
Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the Paris tively shapes how states think about
agreement on climate change have proved and pursue their interests.
almost as profound and consequential.
Cutting through the hyperbole and
inflamed rhetoric that tends to surround Beyond Gridlock
this subject, Patrick argues that when the BY THOMAS HALE AND DAVID
United States signs a treaty or ties itself to HELD. Polity, 2017, 280 pp.
other countries, it is exercising its sover-
eign authority, not abdicating it. Washing- Conventional wisdom holds that the
ton’s long-term efforts to build and operate Western-centered postwar system of
within a world of rules and institutions have multilateral cooperation is in crisis. In
made it easier, not harder, for the United areas as diverse as security, trade, devel-
States to be the captain of its own future. opment, the environment, and public
health, the challenges of managing
interdependence have multiplied and
How to Do Things With International Law cooperation has receded. In an earlier
BY IAN HURD. Princeton University book, Hale and Held described the
Press, 2017, 200 pp. problem as “gridlock”: a world order
marked by dysfunctional international
Scholars and policymakers have tradition- institutions and countries less willing
ally seen international law as a framework or able to coordinate polices and provide

Recent Books
global public goods. In this new book, father, Corneo, an economist who is
the authors reassess that bleak outlook. keeping the faith, albeit not without
Reporting on research conducted by a reservations. Corneo takes seriously
consortium of experts, the book identifies the many criticisms of capitalism as it is
some areas of effective cooperation, practiced today but insists that detractors
such as the World Trade Organization’s must confront the question of which alter-
dispute-settlement mechanism and the native systems could realistically meet
Chemical Weapons Convention. It also contemporary society’s economic needs.
notes that, as older frameworks weaken, In this sweeping and informative discus-
new types of multilateral cooperation sion of the role of economy in society, he
have emerged. For example, although explores alternative systems, both hypo-
the WTO’s Doha Round of trade talks thetical and real, and finds them all
has stalled, China is building trade and inferior to capitalism. The book then
investment ties across Central Asia and addresses how the modern welfare state
Southeast Asia. The Paris agreement on has tempered capitalism’s worst features
climate change signaled another form but has eroded since the late twentieth
of progress. As Hale and Held see it, century—a development that is respon-
the institutions of global governance sible for much of today’s public disillu-
are inadequate, but small innovations sionment with the free-market system.
and experiments in cooperation—often Corneo considers how the welfare state
pursued regionally, in coalition with might be revived under current condi-
civil society groups, or by transnational tions, which would require new incen-
technical elites—show promise. tives for politicians and civil servants to
construct a sturdier safety net.
Economic, Social, and Capitalism Without Capital: The Rise of

Environmental the Intangible Economy
BY JONATHAN HASKEL AND STIAN
WESTLAKE. Princeton University
Richard N. Cooper Press, 2017, 288 pp.
In the context of business spending,

Is Capitalism Obsolete? A Journey Through “investment” is a word with diverse
Alternative Economic Systems meanings, which often leads to confu-
BY GIACOMO CORNEO. sion. Economists usually use it to refer
TRANSLATED BY DANIEL STEUER. to expenditures on tangible things,
Harvard University Press, 2017, 312 pp. such as buildings and equipment—a
kind of spending that raises future
C
apitalism is increasingly unpop- earnings. The authors of this informa-
ular, especially in Europe. This tive book, by contrast, define it more
intriguing book opens and closes broadly as expenditure today in the
with a spirited dialogue between a young expectation of material rewards in the
woman skeptical of capitalism and her future. Haskel and Westlake note that
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in all rich countries, “intangible low (even negative) interest rates, vast
investment”—spending on things central bank purchases of bonds, and
such as research and development and “forward guidance”—statements that
branding—has been growing relative central banks make to inform the public
to tangible investment. The data are of likely future decisions—made sense
often sketchy, but the authors report to stimulate economic recovery in the
that intangible investment now ex- wake of the crisis. Such steps, which
ceeds the tangible kind in Finland were once unconventional, and are
and Sweden, and does so by even now more common, may become quite
larger margins in the United Kingdom normal in future. This is something
and the United States. The authors of a niche subject, but Ubide’s presen-
explore how the changing nature of tation of these ideas does not rely on
investment will affect companies, overly technical language.
investment analysts, economists, and
governments, and they offer sugges-
tions for all. This is a useful exposition Vaccines: What Everyone Needs to Know
of a number of widely used but poorly BY KRISTEN A. F EEMSTER. Oxford
understood terms and concepts. University Press, 2017, 208 pp.
Life has been made immeasurably

The Paradox of Risk: Leaving the better by the sharp decline in the
Monetary Policy Comfort Zone incidence of infectious diseases, an
BY ÁNG EL U BI D E. Peterson improvement made possible through
Institute for International Economics, inoculations, especially of children,
2017, 170 pp. which protect people from contracting
diseases and have led to the elimination
Many books have been written on the or near elimination of maladies such as
origins, dynamics, and lessons of the smallpox and polio. Yet public wariness
financial crisis and recession of 2007–9. of vaccines persists and has even in
The year 2008 was arguably the worst some cases increased—perhaps, ironically,
financial year since 1931—which was a owing in part to the decline in disease
very bad year indeed. This important incidence produced by vaccines. This
book distinguishes itself by focusing useful, fair-minded, and extremely
on how central banks—specifically, the informative book explains how vaccines
U.S. Federal Reserve, the European are produced and how they work;
Central Bank, the Bank of England, discusses the diverse reasons behind
and the Bank of Japan—took unconven- some parents’ hesitancy to inoculate
tional actions to avert another Great their children; explores the prospect of
Depression. Ubide, an economist with employing vaccines for not only pre-
extensive practical experience in wealth venting but also curing some diseases,
management, discusses misconceptions including AIDS and even some cancers;
about the role of monetary and fiscal and examines the potential for the total
policies in contributing to and helping elimination of particular diseases, such
end the crisis; he argues that extremely as measles.

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Behemoth: A History of the Factory and the Military, Scientific, and

Making of the Modern World
BY JOSHUA B. F REEMAN. Norton, Technological
2018, 448 pp.
Lawrence D. Freedman
This fascinating book is a history of the
large factory’s importance as a symbol
of modernity from early-eighteenth-
century Europe to early-twenty-first- The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a
century Asia. It tells the stories of Nuclear War Planner
companies (mostly private but also BY DANIEL ELLSBERG. Bloomsbury,
some state-owned enterprises), offers 2017, 432 pp.
sociological portraits of factory workers,
B
and considers the portrayal of factories efore he became famous for
in art, literature, and films. The earliest leaking the Pentagon Papers,
large factories were established in Ellsberg was a bright analyst at
England in the 1720s, produced silk the RAND Corporation who worked on
yarn, and employed around 300 people. some of the most perplexing problems
By 1945, Ford’s River Rouge facility in in U.S. national security. This candid
Dearborn, Michigan, employed 85,000 and chilling memoir describes how he
people, who mainly worked on building came to recognize that the U.S. mili-
bombers. Today, some factory complexes tary’s approach to preparing for nuclear
in China employ over 100,000 workers. war was terrifyingly casual. If war came,
Building factories on a large scale has the United States was ready to obliter-
sometimes involved erecting whole cities ate not only the Soviet Union but also
for their employees, which has intro- China, as a matter of course—a plan
duced a myriad of logistical problems; that would have immediately produced
this was often the case in the Soviet 275 million fatalities and then led to
Union. In their heyday, big factories another 50 million, owing to the effects
signaled and celebrated the arrival of of radiation. And those numbers do not
a modern technological age and new even include the lives that would have
opportunities for laborers. Later, they been lost by the United States and its
facilitated the organization of dis- allies. Ellsberg was appalled, but he
satisfied workers. In recent decades, understood the logic of deterrence and
factories have declined in size in Europe the policy challenges that had allowed
and the United States, not least because such an approach to develop. This gives
large and densely concentrated facilities his account credibility and poignancy: at
increase the risk of disruption to value one point, he drafts an alternative
chains owing to human events or war plan that would still have horrific
natural phenomena such as earthquakes consequences—just not as awful as the
and storms. one it would replace. His experiences
have led Ellsberg to argue that how-
ever much he might like to see nuclear
weapons abolished, the first step in
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addressing the danger must be to make The Virtual Weapon and International Order
them harder to use. BY LUCAS KELLO. Yale University
Press, 2017, 336 pp.
The Pentagon’s Wars: The Military’s Digital World War: Islamists, Extremists,
Undeclared War Against America’s Presidents and the Fight for Cyber Supremacy
BY MARK PERRY. Basic Books, BY HAROON K. ULLAH. Yale Univer-
2017, 368 pp. sity Press, 2017, 336 pp.
Ignore the off-putting title and subtitle The debate about how digital commu-
of this book, which suggest that it alleges nications technology is transforming
a militaristic conspiracy against elected conflict takes place on a spectrum: on
leaders. In reality, the book is an enthrall- one end sit those warning of a “cyber–
ing, gossipy account of the interplay Pearl Harbor”; on the other sit a variety
between senior U.S. military and politi- of skeptics who point to the difficulty of
cal leaders since the end of the Cold gaining a lasting political benefit from
War. The events covered in the book are cyberattacks. Kello situates himself
already well known (the U.S.-led wars closer to the first group and argues that
in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq), the emergence of cyberweapons in the
as are the personalities, including gener- twenty-first century has been as revolu-
als such as Wesley Clark, Tommy Franks, tionary in its implications as the intro-
David Petraeus, and Colin Powell. What duction of nuclear weapons was in the
Perry adds are accounts of personal twentieth. Atomic arsenals threatened
rivalries and interservice competition unprecedented mass destruction, but
and details about how Presidents Bill they mostly fit within traditional models
Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack of interstate war. Cyberweapons, on the
Obama looked to the generals to get other hand, do not kill directly but can
the advice they wanted—which was not interfere with systems that do, and they
always the advice they really needed. empower nonstate actors as much as
Clinton’s first term opened with a states. Using familiar examples—the
public spat with Powell over whether Stuxnet virus, which the United States
gay people should be allowed to serve and Israel directed against Iranian nuclear
in the military, yet when it came to enrichment facilities; North Korea’s
the wisdom of a war with Iraq a decade hacking of Sony Pictures; the Russian
later, senior officers kept their misgiv- cyberattack on Estonia in 2007; and
ings to themselves. The book demon- Russian interference in the U.S. presi-
strates that far from forming a cabal dential election in 2016—Kello addresses
against the White House, U.S. military the danger of escalation, the prospects
leaders have often failed to challenge for cyberdefense and cyberdeterrence,
civilian leaders who were making and the problem of crafting legal rem-
poor decisions. edies for malevolent behavior.
Ullah zeroes in on one part of the
virtual battlefield. Drawing on obser-
vations he made while working for the

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U.S. State Department during the more credible strategy that was showing
Obama administration, he presents a results, until it was undermined by
series of case studies from the Muslim Congress, which failed to back the
world. He reveals the sophistication military, and the press, which stoked
and enthusiasm with which Islamists public opposition to the war. In his
have exploited social media to prosely- latest book, Daddis is having none of
tize, nurture new recruits, and spread this. He argues that the changes Abrams
propaganda or news of a coming dem- made were less significant than many
onstration. Violent jihadists also use assumed, and he shows that the narra-
encrypted sites to discuss how to carry tive of military victory snatched away
out acts of terror in the real world. The by Congress and antiwar sentiment
potential for social media to circumvent misses a vital point. The real problem
official censorship, especially in coun- had less to do with U.S. military strat-
tries where Internet access is wide- egy than with the South Vietnamese
spread, means that it can provide a vital government’s failure to develop an
outlet for public frustrations and can authentic national identity that could
be used to support a variety of causes. sustain it through the next stage of
But as Islamist leaders have learned, it what had already been a long civil war.
is difficult to impose message discipline
online; radical groups often wind up
arguing among themselves. The most The United States
powerful lesson Ullah draws—illustrated
best by the example of Egypt in the Walter Russell Mead
years after the revolts of 2011—is that
when it comes to seizing power, as
opposed to merely expressing and
stoking disaffection, the winners tend National Security Strategy of the United
to be strong leaders with a clear pur- States of America
pose and an effective organization. White House, 2017, 68 pp.
T
he 2017 U.S. National Security
Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Strategy attempts to integrate
Years in Vietnam President Donald Trump’s
BY GREGORY A. DADDIS. Oxford aversion to trade agreements with his
University Press, 2017, 320 pp. emphasis on American sovereignty at
the expense of multilateral institutions
In 2014, Daddis, a U.S. Army veteran, and his skepticism about the prospects
published a well-regarded book on for democratization in the developing
General William Westmoreland’s period world with a policy of U.S. global
of command during the Vietnam War, engagement. The authors articulate a
which spanned from 1964 to 1968 and Jacksonian view of world order, in which
ended when he was replaced by General a sovereign United States, secure in its
Creighton Abrams. The conventional military, technological, and economic
wisdom holds that Abrams developed a power, frustrates revisionist great
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powers, maintains a global alliance president in 1896. This was a frustrating

system, and actively counters terrorism time. The Civil War did not end with
and other threats to the homeland. the triumph of democracy and racial
The keys to this strategy are domestic: brotherhood but rather in an ugly and
reviving the economy through tax ultimately losing fight against the forces
cuts and deregulation and promoting of white supremacy. The Industrial
U.S. energy production. U.S. military Revolution left Americans divided by
spending will increase. China, as the class; meanwhile, mass immigration
most important economic and security led to ethnic polarization. It was a time
competitor to the United States, will when U.S. institutions and ideologies
be the central concern of American were unable to cope with the problems
strategy. There are many reasons to the country faced and when populist
be skeptical that this approach can movements surged as governments
succeed—or that Trump will prove failed to meet public needs. The rich
disciplined enough to follow it. But history of those years can be difficult
the political pressures to which it to follow; readers will thank White for
responds are real and won’t go away the clear prose and strong narrative
anytime soon. The post–Cold War drive that makes this complicated story
foreign policy era is over, and as U.S. easier to understand.
policymakers think about what comes
next, they will find that the domestic
political dynamics that helped shape The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs,
this strategy statement will remain Bureaucrats, and Billionaires
relevant even when the Trump admin- BY DENNIS C. JET T. Palgrave
istration comes to an end. Macmillan, 2018, 481 pp.
Despite occasional cries from the

The Republic for Which It Stands: The academy that domestic politics are—or
United States During Reconstruction and should be—irrelevant to foreign policy,
the Gilded Age, 1865–1896 practitioners and policymakers know
BY RICHARD WHITE. Oxford that the two are irrevocably linked. In
University Press, 2017, 968 pp. this book on the politics of the Iran
nuclear deal, Jett takes an interesting,
White’s fascinating and comprehensive if imperfect, look at the domestic actors
book could not be more timely. When that sought to influence U.S. policy
questions of race, economic inequality, before and after the international nego-
and the rise of giant corporate monopo- tiations that led to the deal. Jett, whose
lies and a plutocratic elite dominate belief that no truly rational argument
U.S. politics, it is time to take another can be made against the agreement shines
look at Reconstruction and the Gilded forth on every page, gets at least one
Age, the period of American history important thing right: although some
stretching, roughly, from the assassina- of the most prominent individuals and
tion of President Abraham Lincoln in organizations that opposed the deal
1865 to William McKinley’s election as were Jewish, the U.S. Jewish community

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was deeply divided over Iran policy, the agency, in which flawed planning
with most Jewish Americans siding with can lead to serious mistakes. The Ghosts
President Barack Obama and supporting of Langley is not the last word on the
the agreement. That said, Jett’s inability CIA, but it contains information and
to grasp the salience of the procedural perspectives that those concerned for
and policy arguments that opponents the future of this important institution
of the deal brought forward leads to a would do well to consider.
somewhat one-sided account of a com-
plex debate. At its weakest, the book
reads like a collection of talking points; Western Europe
at its best, it helps readers understand
the complicated links between domestic Andrew Moravcsik
politics and foreign policy that presidents
and diplomats neglect at their peril.
Go, Went, Gone

The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA’s BY JENNY ERPENBECK. New
Heart of Darkness Directions, 2017, 320 pp.
BY JOHN PRADOS . New Press,
T
2017, 320 pp. his brilliantly understated novel
traces with uncommon delicacy
There are few government agencies as and depth the interior transfor-
controversial as the CIA, and few research- mation of a retired German classicist
ers have brought as much passion and named Richard. One day, he stumbles
determination to understanding it as upon a group of unauthorized African
Prados. His story begins with the Office migrants encamped in the center of
of Strategic Services (the precursor to Berlin. First, he sees only the immedi-
the CIA, established during World War II), ate life-and-death challenges they face.
continues through the disastrous As many Germans have done recently,
CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, he helps mobilize churches, organiza-
and gains energy and detail when it arrives tions, and individuals to assist them.
at the Iran-contra scandal of the Reagan Most of the refugees disappear anyway.
years and the George W. Bush adminis- But Richard gets to know the ones that
tration’s use of “enhanced interrogation remain. He witnesses their struggle to
techniques” after the 9/11 attacks. Prados’ retain vivid memories of lost families,
research and unrelenting search for the loves, communities, and cultures—with-
truth are admirable, and his conclusions out which they find it difficult to main-
command respect, if not always assent. tain their dignity. In the end, Richard
He highlights serious problems at the comes to realize that his life, too, is lived
agency but says very little about any on “the surface of the sea,” beneath which
successes it has enjoyed. The secrecy and lie many things “one cannot possibly
isolation of the CIA can lead to excessive endure.” He, too, must cope with trou-
suspicion among outsiders; it can also bling traumas and decide which memories
lead to a hothouse environment inside to foster and which to repress. Erpenbeck
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possesses an uncanny ability to portray mine their electoral success. Meanwhile,

the mundane interactions and routines such tactics tend to degrade solidarity
that compose everyday life, which she in society as a whole—blocking inclu-
elevates into an intimately moving med- sion, fostering anti-Muslim sentiment,
itation on one of the great issues of empowering conservative religious
our times. Her economical prose lends leaders, and undermining the influence
existential significance to the most of Muslim women. In the long term,
commonplace conversations, defined the best way to resolve these dilemmas
less by what they include than by what may be to dilute ethnic enclaves and
they omit. challenge traditional social structures.
Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Civil Service in (Times of)

European Politics Crisis: A Political Sociology of the
BY RAFAELA M. DANCYGIER. Changing Power of Eurocrats
Princeton University Press, 2017, 264 pp. BY DIDIER GEORGAKAKIS. Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017, 329 pp.
The participation of Muslims in
European politics has spawned a Many believe that the civil servants
heated debate often dominated by who manage the EU—labeled “Eurocrats”
anti-immigrant prophets of doom. by critics—are too numerous, unaccount-
Dancygier sheds a cooling light on able, powerful, and pampered. In this
the issue. With a sophisticated analysis book, Georgakakis debunks that myth.
of thousands of elections in Austria, The population of Eurocrats (around
Belgium, Germany, and the United 40,000) is no larger than the number of
Kingdom, she shows that European public servants typically employed by a
political parties have been ruthlessly major European city—and thus only
pragmatic in attracting Muslim votes. five percent of the average per capita
As soon as a pool of Muslim voters number of public employees in the EU
reaches a significant size, parties select member states. In recent years, more-
candidates who can best appeal to over, civil-service reforms have much
them. Yet this poses difficult political diminished the power and perks that
dilemmas. The easiest Muslims for a Eurocrats enjoy. Ironically, the British
party to attract, and those who will government led the effort to impose a
offer the most electoral advantage, distinctively Anglo-Saxon bureaucratic
tend to be those who are geographically model on Eurocrats, only to suffer
concentrated—and thus also the least criticism from Brexiteers who view the
assimilated and most conservative. Brussels bureaucracy as a foreign impo-
Often, the traditional bases of European sition. More broadly, the influence of
parties hold different views on gender, the most independent part of the EU,
religion, and sexuality than the typical the European Commission, has waned
Muslim in such enclaves. So tailoring relative to that of national governments,
messages to new Muslim voters can technocratic bodies, and the elected
fragment parties and ultimately under- European Parliament. No wonder

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Eurocrats today are less idealistic than For those who enjoy long afternoons
they used to be: fewer now believe with friends in a good café, dishing dirt
that they are spearheading a grand, on the rich or famous, this book is a
open-ended experiment in suprana- must-read.
tional governance. Despite its academic
verbosity and occasionally awkward
prose, this book details an important Absolute Power: How the Pope Became the
and overlooked transformation in how Most Influential Man in the World
contemporary Europe is governed. BY PAUL COLLINS . PublicAffairs,
2018, 384 pp.
The Gourmands’ Way: Six Americans in U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese
Paris and the Birth of a New Gastronomy President Xi Jinping, and German
BY JUSTIN SPRING . Farrar, Straus Chancellor Angela Merkel need not
and Giroux, 2017, 448 pp. panic. Collins, a former priest, never
advances the hyperbolic claim in this
Spring recounts the experiences of Julia book’s subtitle. His more modest aim
Child, Alice B. Toklas, and four other is instead to show how popes have
mid-twentieth-century culinary writers consolidated their hold within the
who introduced Americans to fine French Catholic Church itself since the turn
cooking. The book’s aim is neither to of the nineteenth century. In the pro-
illuminate French culinary culture nor cess, he argues, the papacy has sup-
to explain why so many Americans were pressed reformist elements, local par-
receptive to it in the postwar era. It is ishes, and women everywhere. Yet this
rather to examine the six authors’ indi- blinkered vision of the church treats
vidual foibles and the idiosyncratic papal power as resulting entirely from
ways in which they led each one to infallible theological pronouncements
become a gastronomic guru. In doing and the bureaucratic influence of the
so, the book serves heaping portions Roman Curia, the Vatican’s administra-
of snarky gossip, sharp criticism, and tive body. The reader gets little sense
insight into the commercial side of of even the most obvious social and
cookbooks and cuisine. Obsessively cultural trends that surround and
detailed, the book spares no one, and shape any religion. Such developments
its vivid prose keeps the reader going have transformed modern Catholicism
through a seemingly inexhaustible beyond recognition. The declining
catalog of moneygrubbing schemes, number of active Catholics in Europe
lovers’ spats, and personal weaknesses. and North America, for example, has
Intermittently visible behind the left more developing-world believers,
biographical pastiche lies the uniquely who tend to be more conservative, in
romantic atmosphere of Paris, the city control. South America is now home
that attracted all the main characters to more Catholics than any other con-
with its unique mix of deeply rooted tinent, and Catholicism is growing
cultural traditions, tolerance of bohe- most rapidly in sub-Saharan Africa.
mian lifestyles, and class snobbery. For a full understanding of the
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church’s role in the world, readers slights, and his obvious receptivity to
should look elsewhere. personal flattery—all of which help
explain why his efforts often came up
short. Lula’s Brazil sought to punch
Western Hemisphere above its weight. The more recent
near collapse of the country’s political
Richard Feinberg system and economy has at least mo-
mentarily returned Brazil to mere
middle-power status.
In Rethinking Global Democracy in
Acting Globally: Memoirs of Brazil’s Brazil, Fraundorfer finds reasons for
Assertive Foreign Policy hope that multilateral institutions will
BY CELSO AMORIM. Hamilton do a better and more evenhanded job
Books, 2017, 486 pp. at tackling pressing global problems
by sharing power with civil society
Rethinking Global Democracy in Brazil organizations and affected local com-
BY MARKUS F RAUNDORF ER. Row- munities. Fraundorfer closely exam-
man & Littlefield, 2017, 250 pp. ines four recent cases in which such
interactions took place, all involving
D
uring the 2003–10 presidency Brazil: the development of the World
of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Health Organization–backed interna-
the energetic foreign minister tional drug purchase facility called
Amorim traveled widely to expand Unitaid; the promulgation of rights-
Brazil’s global influence. In his highly based doctrines by the UN’s Committee on
intelligent and richly detailed memoir, World Food Security; the establishment
the wily, sharp-tongued diplomat seeks of the eight-nation pro-transparency
to justify his controversial and ill-fated Open Government Partnership; and
attempt to insert Brazil into negotiations the NETmundial global meeting, a
over Iran’s nuclear program and to explain one-off effort to advance ethical
his more sure-footed and well-informed Internet governance. During the reign
but equally unsuccessful effort to secure of Lula’s Workers’ Party, Brazil served
a deal during the World Trade Organi- as a fascinating laboratory for these
zation’s failed Doha Round of trade democracy-expanding innovations.
negotiations. He blames others for Brazilian representatives, including
both outcomes: France, Russia, and the Amorim, possessed the expertise and
United States foiled his Iranian gambit, credibility to play leading roles in all
and protectionist nations (particularly four international exercises. To his credit,
India and the United States) impeded Fraundorfer recognizes that such exper-
the trade accord. Amorim sought to iments are extremely fragile, typically
establish Brazil as a trusted, balanced entail only voluntary commitments,
interlocutor and as a prestigious player produce more doctrinal posturing than
on the world stage. Yet in his caustic policy implementation, and depend on the
asides, Amorim reveals his own skewed goodwill of progressive governments—
sensibilities, his sensitivity to perceived which is currently in short supply.

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Paladares: Recipes From the Private Res- contemporary Cuban interior design what
taurants, Home Kitchens, and Streets of Cuba Paladares does for today’s Cuban cuisine.
BY ANYA VON BREMZEN AND MEGAN Taking readers inside a diverse range of
FAWN SCHLOW. Abrams, 2017, 352 pp. professionally photographed high-end
homes, Mallea perceptively reveals sophis-
Havana Living Today: Cuban Home ticated blends of eclectic prerevolutionary
Style Now architecture, vintage furniture, and
BY HERMES MALLEA. Rizzoli, fixtures accented with contemporary
2017, 224 pp. design concepts and inspired by cutting-
edge Cuban artists. But it’s not just the
Cuba, like its cuisine, is a grand fusion of homes that are revealed; it’s also the people
African, Amerindian, French, and especially who own them, members of Havana’s
Spanish influences. Prior to the country’s wealthiest one percent: the remnants of
1959 revolution, Cuban chefs produced a prerevolutionary elites, well-heeled Cubans
rich cuisine. Once in power, however, the returning from aboard, internationally
revolutionary leader Fidel Castro closed renowned artists, expatriates, diplomats,
private restaurants, and government and the owners of new local businesses,
canteens took on a Soviet-style blandness. including paladares and inviting boutique
Even worse, the end of Soviet subsidies in guesthouses. (The book notably omits the
the 1990s resulted in severe food scarcities, luxury homes of the revolutionary elites.)
and many Cubans suffered significant Each fashionable residence represents “the
weight loss. In recent years, however, with owner’s personal triumph over the island’s
Cuba under the more relaxed rule of Raúl cultural and economic constraints,” Mallea
Castro, private restaurants (paladares) are writes. Looking ahead, Mallea believes
reemerging, and the country is experienc- that these elegant living spaces portend
ing a rebirth of its culinary culture. Von an exciting rebirth of Cuban design, even
Bremzen and Schlow introduce readers to as he warns of the need to balance the
the brave owners and innovative chefs who pursuit of international design trends with
run these new business ventures, who the preservation of the authentic Cuban
struggle to locate essential ingredients and identity flowering in Havana today.
avoid the glare of government inspectors.
Von Bremzen’s well-researched background-
ers on the many mouthwatering, simple Hunter of Stories
recipes—illustrated by Schlow’s handsome BY EDUARDO GALEANO.
photographs—provide an education in TRANSLATED BY MARK F RIED.
culinary history. The new Cuban cuisine, Nation Books, 2017, 272 pp.
like the island’s political economy, is very
much a work in progress. But Paladares Galeano (1940–2015) exemplified the liter-
reveals the spirit and promise of a vibrant ary left that held sway in Latin America
nation, brimming with entrepreneurial from the 1960s through the 1980s. Sales of
improvisation and artistic creativity, the Uruguayan’s most famous polemic,
striving to rejoin global currents. Open Veins of Latin America, spiked in 2009,
In Havana Living Today, Mallea, a when Hugo Chávez, the populist strong-
Cuban American architect, does for man president of Venezuela, handed a
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copy to U.S. President Barack Obama at a caught up in the last century’s most
summit meeting. Hunter of Stories collects dramatic moments. At the center
bite-sized anecdotes and narratives, gener- stands the author’s grandfather, Max,
ally just a few paragraphs long, many with a taciturn, somewhat mysterious man,
ironic intent. They often revisit the central who was a key organizer for the turn-of-
theme of Galeano’s work: the majesty and the-century Russian Bund, a Jewish
wisdom of the indigenous people of the Marxist movement. Hunted by the
Americas juxtaposed against the grave tsar’s police and twice exiled to Siberia,
injustices imposed on the oppressed he later became a dapper marketing
masses by the most powerful, be they representative for the London-based
Spanish conquistadors, military dictators, Yost Typewriter Company. His wife,
hypocritical “democrats,” large U.S. Frouma, had fled revolutionary Russia
corporations, or the International Mon- for the United Kingdom, but most of
etary Fund. Galeano, a self-proclaimed her family had remained, suffered, and
eternal optimist, had a passion for giving survived. Mazower’s father, William,
voice to the weak and illiterate and for grew up thoroughly English, a middle-
recording the heroism of the vanquished: class secular Jew in Depression-era and
“the eternal battle of indignation against wartime England. His half brother,
indignity,” he called it. Galeano was also a André, in an ironic contrast, joined the
close observer of the marvels and rhythms extreme right and wrote anti-Semitic
of the natural world. Contemplating his tracts. Mazower engagingly weaves
own sickness and old age, this passionate together these lives and traces how they
rebel and storyteller once viewed an aston- crossed paths with Felix Dzerzhinsky,
ishing sunset and lamented: “It would be the founder of the Soviet secret police;
so unfair to die and see it no longer.” Maxim Litvinov, Stalin’s foreign
minister; the poet T. S. Eliot; the anar-
chist Emma Goldman; and a host of
Eastern Europe and Former other prominent interwar political and
Soviet Republics literary figures.
Robert Legvold Orders to Kill: The Putin Regime and

Political Murder
BY AMY KNIGHT. Thomas Dunne
What You Did Not Tell: A Russian Past Books, 2017, 384 pp.
and the Journey Home
BY MARK MAZOWER . Other Press, The number of prominent political
2017, 336 pp. figures, journalists, and dissidents
murdered in Vladimir Putin’s Russia
W
hat one might expect to be raises a fundamental question: Have
merely a charming family these crimes occurred, Knight asks,
portrait, albeit one blessed because Putin has “created an environ-
by Mazower’s silk-textured writing, turns ment for the violence but may not be
out to be a riveting account of people personally involved?” Or do “the political

Recent Books
motives of the Putin government that the country known as the Donbas,
hover over the killings and the vast which broke out in the aftermath of
amount of circumstantial evidence” the revolution. In the first half of the
suggest Putin’s direct participation? She book, Shore shares the vivid accounts
comes down squarely on the side of the of those who took part in the Maidan
more sinister explanation. The book is a uprising and their reflections on how
detailed examination of the most the drama redefined their lives and the
dramatic cases, beginning with the bleak realities of Ukraine. The second
1998 murder of Galina Starovoitova, a half records the simple but searing
charismatic liberal politician, and includ- thoughts and impulses of those who
ing a multitude of others, among them fought or were caught up in the war.
the killings of the former intelligence Most of them were on the Ukrainian
officer Alexander Litvinenko and the side; those who came from the pro-
opposition politician Boris Nemtsov. In Russian separatist regions provide
each case, she details the events leading homely but telling insights into what
up to the murder, lays out the evidence, the war meant to them and the people
and describes the subsequent arrests and among whom they grew up. Literature
trials. And in each case, neither Knight offers added resonance: for Shore, echoes
nor those close to the victim are satisfied from novels and short stories run through
with the verdict. As she recognizes, the the tales she hears; for some of those
evidence, with the partial exception of who lived through these events, poetry
the Litvinenko case, is largely circum- was a sustaining force.
stantial. But the book’s value is that Kuzio’s core theme is Russia’s
Knight supplies enough of it for aggression in Ukraine. He examines
readers to decide for themselves. Russia’s motivations from many angles—
a renewed imperialist nationalism,
The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History historical “Ukrainophobia,” anti-Semitism
of Revolution (both in Russia and in the Donbas), and
BY MARCI SHORE. Yale University criminal profiteering. He disagrees with
Press, 2018, 320 pp. those who explain Russian actions in
terms of geopolitical competition with
Putin’s War Against Ukraine: Revolution, the United States and NATO and, even
Nationalism, and Crime more so, those who see Russia as simply
BY TARAS KUZIO. Self-published, avenging the abuse and discrimination
2017, 490 pp. it believes it has suffered at Western hands.
Instead, he locates the explanation in
These two books take radically differ- what he calls “Ukrainian-Russian identity
ent approaches to exploring Ukraine’s relations,” by which he means the process
dramatic recent history. Shore’s book is through which Russian identity has
written at the deepest human level and evolved toward a more primal nationalism,
is built on the testimony of those who including chauvinism toward Ukraine,
participated in the 2014 revolution that while Ukraine has gravitated toward
rocked Ukraine or who experienced Europe and its values. Complicating
firsthand the war in the eastern part of everything, the Donbas, for long-standing
Recent Books
historical and cultural reasons, aligns permits. Within months, as public order
with Russia. The depth with which collapsed, vigilantism and mob violence
Kuzio explores these factors, along with took over. The breakdown, according to
the corruption rampant in the Donbas Hasegawa, greatly abetted the Bolsheviks’
and the wider region’s diseased politics,seizure of power, not least by leaving
represents his book’s most unique value. the public indifferent to the outcome
of the revolution. Once in power, the
Bolsheviks did little to restore public
Crime and Punishment in the Russian safety, treating the disorder as another
Revolution: Mob Justice and Police in hammer wrecking the old system—until
Petrograd it threatened their own position. Then,
BY TSUYOSHI HASEGAWA. Harvard they reacted with a brutality that set a
University Press, 2017, 368 pp. precedent for what would follow in the
decades ahead.
Russia in Flames: War, Revolution, Civil Engelstein, in this culmination of
War, 1914–1921 her life’s work, examines the October
BY LAURA ENGELSTEIN. Oxford Revolution in extraordinary breadth
University Press, 2017, 856 pp. and depth. She places it in the context
of the powerful currents generated by
As Hasegawa notes in his compelling the collapse of the Russian empire and
book, approaches to the history of the ravages of World War I, and also
Russia’s October Revolution of 1917 broadens the frame to capture what was
have evolved over time. Social history happening outside the major Russian
eventually supplanted political history, cities, with whole chapters devoted to
but then gave way to history “across the Finland, Ukraine, Volhynia (which
divide,” which welds together the events included parts of present-day Belarus,
that took place before and after the Poland, and Ukraine), and the Baltic
revolution. Hasegawa adopts the social- region. At its most profound, the book
history approach and focuses on less penetrates the deep subterrain of this
studied elements of Russian society. history. Whatever else the revolution
Engelstein’s book, meanwhile, is very was when it began in early 1917, it
much an example of the “across the expressed a popular desire for democ-
divide” approach. racy, even if different social segments
The story of the October Revolu- had diverging views of democratic
tion, Hasegawa argues, is thoroughly rule. The October Revolution closed
bound up with the collapse of law and that door. Regardless of whether one
order that followed the dissolution of sees Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks’
the tsarist police after the February commitment to social and economic
Revolution. In Petrograd, all forms of justice as genuine, their most important
crime soared. Quality of life also legacy was a new authoritarian state
deteriorated, because the police had that they pursued with single-minded
been responsible for a wide range of determination. Violence was its author.
public services, from sanitary inspec- Engelstein develops these themes with
tions and garbage collection to issuing great subtlety.

Recent Books
Middle East Yitzhak Rabin: Soldier, Leader, Statesman

BY ITAMAR RABINOVICH. Yale
University Press, 2017, 304 pp.
John Waterbury
In 1995, near the end of his tenure as
Israel’s prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin was
Hezbollah: The Political Economy of assassinated by a right-wing Jewish zealot.
Lebanon’s Party of God As with all high-profile assassinations,
BY JOSEPH DAHER. Pluto Press, one asks, futilely, what might have been.
2016, 248 pp. Rabin had guided Israel through the Oslo
Accords and a treaty with Jordan and had
W
hat is original about Daher’s engaged in a long-distance dance with
useful treatment of Hezbollah President Hafez al-Assad of Syria before
is his emphasis on the trans- concluding that Assad was not ready for
formation of its base, which used to draw peace. In this thorough book, Rabinovich,
on the lower-middle class and the clergy who served for a time as Rabin’s point
but is now more closely aligned with a person on Syria and as Israel’s ambassa-
new Shiite capitalist class. As a result, dor to the United States, portrays Rabin
Hezbollah is comfortable with Lebanon’s as old school: a military man from 1941
neoliberal economic policies. Daher on. He was harsh in his treatment of
explores the group’s changing relation- Palestinians during the war in 1948 and
ship with organized labor and Lebanese then again, 40 years later, during the first
civil society, the rising levels of corruption intifada. He pushed for the development
in the party, and the role of Hezbollah’s of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Yet he saw
military apparatus in the Syrian civil Israel’s security as inextricably linked to
war. Daher sees Hezbollah as an increas- peace with all its neighbors. He was not
ingly status quo force that uses its reli- in favor of giving up all of the West Bank,
gious and military power to enhance its occupied by Israel in 1967, but he knew that
national and regional influence, rather hanging on to it would mean that Israel
than to merely confront Israel, which would remain forever a garrison state. Had
had been its traditional primary objec- he survived, Rabin would have been at
tive. There is one major lacuna in Daher’s loggerheads with Likudniks and neocon-
narrative, however, which partly prevents servatives in Washington, who have long
him from clinching all his arguments: wanted to separate the Palestinian issue
he makes no comprehensive analysis of from broader questions of regional security.
Hezbollah’s finances, which depend on
support from Iran; the Lebanese Shiite
diaspora in the United States, Latin Egypt
America, and West Africa; and the BY ROBERT SPRINGBORG. Polity
levying of a tithe on Shiites at home. Press, 2017, 272 pp.
Much ink has been spilled on “deep states.”

Springborg takes readers inside one.
Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi,
Recent Books
Egypt’s deep state is deeper and darker Riedel, a former National Security
than ever before. In one of his more Council staffer and CIA analyst, relies
surprising claims, Springborg depicts on unclassified sources to present a
the Egyptian state under King Farouk lucid account of an often troubled
in the 1940s in relatively flattering terms relationship. He makes clear that Saudi
and asserts that a succession of Egyptian leaders have shared a sincere commit-
autocrats have led the country down a ment to the Palestinian cause and a
path to politically vicious, economically consistent desire to see Washington
unsustainable authoritarianism. Sisi has involved in seeking Arab-Israeli peace.
built on this dubious inheritance. Eco- Riedel echoes others who have depicted
nomic strategy has been sacrificed to the Saudi monarchy as shocked by U.S.
prop up the intelligence services and to President Barack Obama’s abandonment
enrich the military, which controls much of Egyptian ruler Hosni Mubarak during
of the economy. Consumer subsidies, the uprising that rocked Egypt in 2011.
debt servicing, and civil-service wages But it is hard to believe that successive
take up 90 percent of the budget. The Saudi leaders had not closely followed
military lives off external and internal the fates of a parade of fallen autocrats
rents. Springborg examines how the who had enjoyed American support—
presidency, the military, and the intel- the shah of Iran, Suharto of Indonesia,
ligence apparatus manipulate and control Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines,
Parliament, the judiciary, and the bureau- Augusto Pinochet of Chile, and oth-
cracy. He then shows how the regime ers—and drawn the logical conclusion.
deals, in turn, with citizens (Muslims
and Copts), labor, and students. He
ends with a kind of Malthusian portrait The Hazaras and the Afghan State:
of Egypt as living so far beyond its Rebellion, Exclusion, and the Struggle for
neglected means that it will surely fall Recognition
off a cliff. BY NIAMATULLAH IBRAHIMI.
Hurst, 2017, 288 pp.
Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and The Hazaras of Afghanistan are Shiites
the United States Since FDR who are widely believed to have roots in
BY BRUCE RIEDEL. Brookings Mongolia and are thus both ethnically
Institution Press, 2017, 272 pp. and religiously distinct from the Pashtun
Sunnis who dominate the country. In
The U.S.-Saudi alliance is peculiar. It the 1890s, Afghanistan’s Pashtun leader,
began with a 1945 meeting between U.S. Abdur Rahman Khan, perpetrated what
President Franklin Roosevelt and King can be legitimately termed a genocide
Ibn Saud and has always rested, as Riedel against the Hazaras: killing, enslaving,
states, “on shared interests, but no shared and dispossessing the bulk of the popu-
values.” The terms of the arrangement lation. For decades afterward, the Hazaras
have not changed: Washington offers were at the bottom of what Ibrahimi, in
Riyadh security protection in exchange this sympathetic but nonpolemic book,
for affordable oil for the world economy. calls a caste system. Despite the absence of

Recent Books
an official census, the Hazaras today are clarity how the Allies handled difficult
estimated to represent somewhere between issues, such as the boundaries of necessary
ten and 20 percent of Afghanistan’s violence in war and the limits of command
roughly 30 million inhabitants. Their responsibility, thus forging new precedents
homeland, in the middle of the country, for international law. It also shows how
is grossly underdeveloped. Ibrahimi has attitudes toward the trials changed as
undertaken field and archival research to Japan became a Western ally during the
trace the efforts of the Hazaras to protect Cold War, leading to the release of all
their identity and patrimony and to find a Japanese prisoners by the late 1950s. For
legitimate place in the Afghan state. The several reasons, the trials did not produce
Hazaras were recognized as a group by the kind of acceptance of historical guilt
the 2004 Afghan constitution. They hold among Japanese that the trials of Germans
ministerial positions and have elected yielded in Germany. The Japanese were
representatives to the national assembly. less inclined to view their actions as
It takes a strong state, Ibrahimi avers, to unprovoked aggression, because many
mitigate ethnic politics, but a strong state thought the West had started the conflict
will almost inevitably be an instrument when it tried to strangle Japan’s access
of the Pashtuns, the group to which the to resources. The Japanese had not
fiercely anti-Shiite Taliban belong. committed ethnic genocide, so they
were tried only for the kinds of crimes
that the Allies themselves had commit-
Asia and Pacific ted before or during the war, leading
many to see the trials as victors’ justice.
Andrew J. Nathan
Authoritarian Legality in China: Law,
Workers, and the State
Japanese War Criminals: The Politics of BY MARY E. GALLAGHER. Cambridge
Justice After the Second World War University Press, 2017, 264 pp.
BY SANDRA WILSON, ROBERT
CRIBB, BEATRICE TREFALT, AND The Contentious Public Sphere: Law,
DEAN ASZKIELOWICZ. Columbia Media, and Authoritarian Rule in China
University Press, 2017, 440 pp. BY YA-WEN LEI. Princeton University
Press, 2017, 304 pp.
A
lthough studied less often than
the Nuremberg trials, the pros- China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law and
ecution of Japanese war criminals 2011 Social Insurance Law set high
after World War II was a major undertak- labor-protection standards for factories
ing. The United States and its European and for local governments that had
allies tried 5,707 people; 4,524 were found powered their export-driven economies
guilty. (Few data are available regarding with cheap, temporary migrant labor
people prosecuted by the Chinese and the from rural areas. Yet the central govern-
Soviets.) This legal and political history ment has not enforced the laws, empow-
explores with exemplary nuance and ered the official labor union to enforce
Recent Books
them, or tolerated the formation of censorship, corruption, unsafe con-

independent unions. Instead, workers sumer products, and environmental
can pursue their rights only by under- pollution. As in labor relations, so, too,
taking mediation or arbitration or by on the Web and on social media: the
suing in court. Gallagher argues that government struggles to keep control
the government’s purpose in providing over social forces it has created.
“expansive rights that are weakly pro-
tected” is to use workers as a “strategic
lever” to force enterprises and local Thailand: Shifting Ground Between the
authorities to take on higher labor and US and a Rising China
welfare costs without giving workers BY BENJAMIN ZAWACKI. Zed Books,
the tools to create fundamental change. 2017, 448 pp.
As is true elsewhere in the Chinese
system, officials use laws more to Zawacki indicts U.S. policy in Thailand
articulate policy goals than to regulate since the turn of the century for ceding
behavior. But such “authoritarian legal- influence to a rising China. Thailand is
ity” has created its own inconsistency: important to the United States for trade
workers expect more protection than and for the U.S. military facilities the
they actually get, so labor protests have country hosts, and to China for the
increased. The regime now faces a choice access route it provides to the South
between giving workers more power to China Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Even
fight for their interests or cutting back though Thai elites are polarized between
on legal protections. Gallagher says the populist Red Shirt movement and
the government is considering the the royalist-cum-militaristic Yellow
latter option. Shirt movement, both sides approve of
Lei likewise explores what she calls Chinese-style authoritarian capitalist
the “authoritarian dilemma of modern- development, and this has led to more
ization.” Even the Chinese Communist trade, cooperation on infrastructure,
Party’s idiosyncratic version of the rule and weapons sales between China and
of law must be administered by legal Thailand. Zawacki believes that the
professionals, and even government- erosion of U.S. influence could have
dominated mass media require profes- been stemmed if the State Department
sional journalists; those are two groups and the Pentagon, backed by academia,
that tend to have their own ideas about had fielded a cadre of Thai experts who
how to serve the public. The govern- spent the time necessary to understand
ment’s legal-education campaigns have the country and build trust. He himself
made citizens more conscious of their has done so. Although the book over-
rights, and Internet portals such as Sohu whelms the reader with details in some
and Sina have created new networks of places, Zawacki’s frank interviews with
discourse. The result has been waves of scores of former and current officials
public criticism on the Internet—which offer insight into the reasons why Thai
authorities refer to as “public opinion elites have shifted from a pro-U.S.
incidents”—in which citizens make alignment to a tilt toward China.
use of legal concepts to criticize

Recent Books
The China Mission: George Marshall’s The Broken Ladder: The Paradox and
Unfinished War, 1945–1947 Potential of India’s One Billion
BY DANIEL KURTZ-PHELAN . BY ANIRUDH KRISHNA. Cambridge
Norton, 2018, 416 pp. University Press, 2017, 314 pp.
In the 1940s, China was filled with Krishna examines the wasted potential
towering personalities who left behind of the two-thirds of the Indian popu-
highly quotable archives. Kurtz-Phelan, lation that is effectively locked up in
the executive editor of this magazine, villages by a lack of education, networks,
has produced an intimate portrait of and job opportunities. The belief that
U.S. General George Marshall’s year- they can’t move up in society is well
long mediation effort, launched in founded but also self-reinforcing, and
1946, to stave off civil war between the Krishna argues that India will never
Nationalists and the Communists. The succeed without tapping this reservoir
book is at once a character study of the of talent. With a mix of data and vivid
charismatic and dedicated Marshall; a anecdotes, he shows why the problem
narrative account of the mission’s mirac- can’t be fixed with macro-level policies,
ulous early successes and prolonged, such as easing licensing requirements,
painful collapse; and a meditation on the courting foreign investment, and build-
impossibility of reconciling parties that ing roads and schools. The bottom-up
are determined to remain enemies. In policies that he suggests—local control
Kurtz-Phelan’s telling, most of the blame of school boards, village-level mentor-
for the peace effort’s failure falls on the ship programs, internships for village
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, children in cities, more rural libraries,
who refused to remedy the misrule that empowered field-level officials and
ultimately doomed his regime. But a new local institutions to hold them
deeper obstacle was Washington’s accountable—are rooted in his devel-
inability to uphold the mediator’s core opment experience and aim to trans-
requirement of neutrality. Both Chiang form a culture of hopelessness. But it’s
and the Chinese Communist Party chief, not clear who will carry out those steps
Mao Zedong, could see that Marshall’s in a country whose government and
true purpose was to get the Communists elites remain wedded to a city-centric
to accept continued Nationalist rule so development model.
that China would remain aligned with
the United States. This might have been
a reasonable goal if one believed the
Communists could not win the civil war.
But Mao did not accept that premise—
and he turned out to be right.
Africa
Nicolas van de Walle
The Away Game: The Epic Search for

Soccer’s Next Superstars The Internship
BY SEBASTIAN ABBOT. Norton, 2018, Program
304 pp.
The Council on Foreign Relations is seek-
I
ing talented individuals who are consider-
n 2007, Qatar, in an effort to build ing a career in international relations.
up its national soccer team, began a Interns are recruited year-round on a semester
project to identify the most talented basis to work in both the New York City and
young soccer players in Africa and Washington, D.C., offices. An intern’s duties
generally consist of administrative work,
bring them to Doha for training. The editing and writing, and event coordination.
effort was led by a Barcelona-based
The Council considers both undergraduate
talent scout whose claim to fame was and graduate students with majors in Interna-
that he had discovered perhaps the most tional Relations, Political Science, Economics,
famous soccer player of the current era, or a related field for its internship program.
the Argentine forward Lionel Messi. A regional specialization and language skills
Abbot’s book follows the fortunes of may also be required for some positions. In
addition to meeting the intellectual require-
three young African players who partic-
ments, applicants should have excellent
ipated in the Qatari program and for skills in administration, writing, and re-
whom soccer represented a ticket out search, and a command of word processing,
of poverty. In the end, none of the three spreadsheet applications, and the Internet.
made it: it turns out that it is hard to To apply for an internship, please send a
predict who will be the next Messi, résumé and cover letter including the se-
mester, days, and times available to work
particularly in countries where it is easy to the Internship Coordinator in the Hu-
to forge a birth certificate and convince man Resources Office at the address listed
a scout that a 12-year-old is actually 16. below. Please refer to the Council’s Web
African recruits have become stars on site for specific opportunities. The Coun-
cil is an equal opportunity employer.
many of the world’s top professional
teams, but a far more common trajectory
for them involves shameless exploitation
by a motley assortment of fixers, coaches,
scouts, and other intermediaries who all
hope to profit off the players. Abbot’s
Council on Foreign Relations
book is an excellent introduction to this Human Resources Office
shady world. 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065
tel: 212.434 . 9400 fax: 212.434 . 9893
humanresources@cfr.org http://www.cfr.org
189
Recent Books
the cross-border networks in central

Searching for Boko Haram: A History of and western Africa on which jihadist
Violence in Central Africa groups rely. The book reminds readers
BY SCOT T M AC EACHERN. Oxford that jihadist rebellions have long been a
University Press, 2018, 248 pp. feature of the region’s politics. During
the precolonial era, Muslim extremists
African Border Disorders: Addressing used violence to enforce “purer” forms
Transnational Extremist Organizations of Islam and to subjugate local non-
EDITED BY OLIVIER J. WALTHER Muslim populations. Later, during
AND WILLIAM F. S. MILES. the colonial period, jihadists fought
Routledge, 2017, 210 pp. against the infidel invaders. Echoes
of both periods can be detected today.
These two exceptional books offer Groups such as Boko Haram deny the
significant new insights into the rise of legitimacy of modern borders (even as
jihadist violence in Africa. MacEachern they exploit them to great advantage),
situates Boko Haram, the Islamic State because their ideology harks back to a
affiliate based in Nigeria, in the history “golden age” before foreigners drew the
of a complex region that includes parts lines. And just as civilians in colonial
of four countries: southern Chad, north- times suffered from both British and
ern Cameroon, northeastern Nigeria, French “pacification” campaigns and
and southeastern Niger. This is a border- jihadist violence, so, too, do Nigerians
land between the Sahara to the north, today often fear the violence of the
where Islam prevails, and the savanna Nigerian army as much as the brutality
and forest areas to the south, which of Boko Haram.
are home to various animist traditions.
Boko Haram’s leadership is currently
thought to have retreated to the Mandara Economic Development in Africa Report
Mountains, on the Nigerian-Cameroonian 2017: Tourism for Transformative and
border, which MacEachern demonstrates Inclusive Growth
have long been a haven for smugglers, BY THE UN CONF ERENCE ON
slave traders, and various militias. His TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT. UN
book explores the interesting parallels Conference on Trade and Development,
between Boko Haram and Hamman 2017, 206 pp.
Yaji, a notorious warlord who, in the
early twentieth century, struck out from This UN report makes available a trove
his stronghold in the Mandaras to attack of interesting data on the recent devel-
local communities and enslave young opment of tourism in Africa. The num-
women—just like Boko Haram. It comes ber of international tourists arriving on
as no surprise, then, that local residents the continent increased from 24 million
interpret Boko Haram through the between 1995 and 1998 to 56 million
lens of the story of Hamman Yaji, as between 2011 and 2014; the revenue
MacEachern reports. they generated in the respective periods
The contributors to Walther and rose from $14 billon to around $47 billion.
Miles’ strong edited volume focus on Tourism now accounts for 8.5 percent
Recent Books
of the continent’s GDP. Such numbers lowing a coup in 1983 and ruled until
are still relatively small, and the benefits he was ousted by Compaoré in 1987.
of tourism are distributed unevenly: the Sankara’s status as a Third World
poorer countries of central and western revolutionary icon rests on his per-
Africa receive far fewer visitors than sonal charisma, his considerable skill
the middle-income countries of north- as an orator, and the relative success of
ern and southern Africa. But the report the socialist reforms his regime put in
makes a strong case for the potential place, which Harsch describes in
of tourism, a relatively labor-intensive extremely favorable terms. Harsch
industry that can create significant ends the book on a note of tempered
employment possibilities, including for optimism. The army has run the coun-
skilled workers. In addition, the report try for most of its postcolonial history
suggests that growth in tourism is likely and has instilled in the Burkinabe
to boost other sectors of African econo- state a paternalistic culture of control
mies, in part by spurring investment in that is not compatible with its limited
human capital and in physical and capacities. But Harsch believes that the
communications infrastructure. protests that helped topple Compaoré
invigorated civil society in a way that
will force greater accountability in
Burkina Faso: A History of Power, Protest, future governments.∂
and Revolution
BY ERNEST HARSCH. Zed Books,
2017, 352 pp.
Harsch’s is the first English-language

political history of Burkina Faso to
appear in many years. It is a superb
introduction to this small, landlocked
country in the Sahel region, covering
the precolonial era, the era of French
colonization, and the postcolonial
period, culminating in a popular
uprising in 2014 that forced out the
country’s longtime dictator, Blaise
Compaoré. The heart of the book is a
glowing assessment of the regime of
Thomas Sankara, an idealistic junior
military officer who took power fol-
Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), March/April 2018, Volume 97, Number 2. Published six times annually (January, March, May, July,
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A Brave New Foreign Policy?
Foreign Affairs Brain Trust
We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that U.S. foreign policy has changed
dramatically over the past year. The results from those who responded are below:
15
10
0
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
DISAGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 8 AGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 10

John Mearsheimer Rachel Vogelstein
R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Douglas Dillon Senior Fellow and Director
Professor of Political Science, of the Women and Foreign Policy Program,
University of Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
“If you look beyond President Trump’s hot “The Trump administration’s retreat from
rhetoric, U.S. foreign policy certainly global leadership and erratic decision-making
has changed in a handful of ways, but not have eroded trust in the United States and
in most ways, and certainly has not fueled doubts about our role in the post–
changed dramatically.” World War II international order.”
See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/USForeignPolicyChanges

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HOW WASHINGTON GOT CHINA WRONG

Global Master of Arts Program GMAP CLASS AT A GLANCE

• One-year master’s degree in international affairs COUNTRIES REPRESENTED: 20+

(including 1000 GMAP alumni)

fletcher.tufts.edu/GMAP CLASSES START JULY 30, 2018

The World After Trump 10

The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony 20

The Post-American World Economy 28

Giving Up the High Ground 39

America’s Retreat on Human Rights

— ELIOT COHEN, PhD

NOW ACCEPTING APPLICATIONS FOR

The China Reckoning 60

Life in China’s Asia 71

How to Crack Down on Tax Havens 94

Iran Among the Ruins 108

The President and the Bomb 119

The Clash of Exceptionalisms 139

REVIEWS & RESPONSES

Still Crazy After All These Years 156

Future Fights 162

Recent Books 168

MIA HIGGINS Interim Publisher

LISA SHIELDS, IVA ZORIC, ZACHARY HASTINGS HOOPER Media Relations

SUBSCRIP TION SERVICES: Foreign Affairs

In 1998, after graduating from college, SARAH MARGON

One of the United States’ preeminent political philosophers,

ADAM HOCHSCHILD has spent his career in search of

Trump’s Lucky Year The Post-American World Economy

The World After Trump Giving Up the High Ground

The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony

improve his commitment to facts, or

In addition to the intrinsic limits on of his directives has practically invited

McMaster has been the most visibly at A YEAR OF TRUMP

remarkably cordial toward Russian as a tool of geopolitics are accelerating.

than this assessment suggests. There is no

JAKE SULLIVAN is a Senior Fellow at the A RESILIENT ORDER

Missing link: Trump at an ASEAN summit in the Philippines, December 2017

the U.S.-brokered version, which the overwhelmingly approved new sanctions,

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Dr. Bruce Hoffman, SSP Director,

“I believe so strongly in As the world leader in security studies, Georgetown’s

ORDER BEGINS AT HOME National Endowment for Democracy

noninterference, on the one hand, and TROUBLE FROM WITHOUT

translated into a broader role as security damental global challenge—especially if

30-year stretch—the period from the A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

administration has effectively withdrawn

No retreat: U.S. marines in Afghanistan, July 2017

geopolitical competition with the world’s decades, the defense contributions of

past. In April 2017, in response to scenes, the Trump administration seems

security. It then recommends narrow politics, especially nationalism, and

Trade Organization, encouraged China