Nationalism in New Japanese Religions

Author(s): Catherine Cornille

Source: Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions , Vol. 2, No. 2
(April 1999), pp. 228-244
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/nr.1999.2.2.228

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Nova Religio

Nationalism in
New Japanese Religions

___________________________________

Catherine Cornille

“We will not rest until the teaching reaches every corner of the world,
deserts of Africa, Latin America, lands of atheism, everywhere.”1
Ryuho Okawa, Founder of Kofuku-no-Kagaku

INTRODUCTION

O
ne of the characteristics that seems to distinguish the new
Japanese religions from traditional ones is their universalistic
orientation and their international missionary zeal. While both
Shinto and Japanese Buddhism were focused on the protection and
salvation of Japan, the new religions speak of establishing world peace
and saving all people.2 This is already evident in Tenrikyo, one of the
oldest new religions, which conceives of salvation as “sweeping dust from
human hearts throughout the world,”3 and it continues down to the most
recent of the new Japanese religions, including Kofuku-no-Kagaku. After
the Second World War, Hito-no-michi changed its name to Perfect Liberty
Kyodan because, according to its patriarch, Tokuchika Miki, “The
teachings of PL are universal and should not remain the exclusive
religion of a limited number of Japanese. It is my solemn duty and
responsibility to propagate the PL doctrine throughout the globe. So
words from a language (English) that I consider most universal are used
to signify my conviction that what I teach is for the benefit of mankind.”4
Even those new religions descending from the tradition of Nichiren
(such as Soka Gakkai, Reiyukai, and Rissho-Kosei-Kai) reinterpreted the
ethnocentric teachings of their progenitor in more universalistic terms.
This universalistic orientation of the new Japanese religions has
expressed itself in a worldwide mission. Many of the new religions have
established mission centers, temples, or churches in various countries
of Asia, North and South America, Europe, Africa, and Australia. Sacred

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

texts have been translated, international headquarters established, and

members trained to cater to the needs of foreigners.
While the movements themselves may attribute this universalistic
turn to supernatural causes such as developments in the spiritual world5
or to more practical reasons such as the need to unify the world,6 it may
also be understood as the religious expression of the tendency toward
internationalization and globalization which became part of a more
general Japanese ideology beginning at the end of the nineteenth
century. From a purely doctrinal point of view, the universalism may be
regarded as the logical consequence of a tendency toward monotheism
and toward attributing a unique messianic role to the founder of the
new religion.7 Many of the new Japanese religions view themselves as
the fulfillment of all other religions and thus regard it as their
responsibility to bring the teachings to all corners of the world. While
the traditional religions of Japan often present salvation as a distant
and demanding goal to pursue, the new religions are focused on this-
worldly and universally desirable goals such as health, wealth, harmony,
and world peace. And although for the traditional religions of Japan
salvation was predominantly mediated through ordained priests and
shamans, for many of the new Japanese religions salvation is mediated
through all members. The universalism of the new Japanese religions
might thus be understood as the logical outcome of certain doctrinal
and practical developments that are congruent with the social and
political changes of the past century.
While the new Japanese religions seem to be consciously
universalistic in their teaching and scope, many of them have also
developed explicitly nationalistic and ethnocentric teachings, regarding
Japan as the origin of creation and the cradle of salvation, the Japanese
as the chosen people, and Japanese language and culture as a unique
vehicle of salvation. The new religions preserve and perpetuate such
traditional Japanese values as sincerity and submission and such
traditional Japanese ritual practices as the veneration of ancestors. While
this nationalism may be understood as a vestige of traditional Japanese
religiosity, it acquires a different meaning and requires a different
interpretation within the context of the modern world.
In this article, I shall give an overview of expressions of nationalism
in the new Japanese religions, focusing particularly on Tenrikyo,
Mahikari, and Kofuku-no-Kagaku. Each of these religions emerged in
a different historical context and might be regarded as representative
of the “old,” the “new,” and the “new new” religions respectively.8
Tenrikyo is one of the oldest of the new Japanese religions, having been
founded prior to the Meiji era and the modern period of Japanese
history. Mahikari, on the other hand, was founded after the second
World War as a direct or indirect offshoot of Omoto, another “old”
new religion. Kofuku-no-Kagaku, finally, traces its foundation to 1986,

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Nova Religio

when the movement turned from a spiritual study group to a full-fledged

religion. Since nationalism, whether secular or religious, always develops
in response to particular social and political circumstances, I wish to
examine not only the nationalistic themes that may be found in the
new Japanese religions, but also the shifting social and political contexts
within which these themes have emerged.
Tenrikyo and Mahikari are often classified as Shinto new religions,
while Kofuku-no-Kagaku is regarded as a Buddhist new religion.
However, each of the new Japanese religions is ultimately a syncretism
of Shinto, Buddhist, Confucian, Christian, and Shamanistic elements.9
Out of the hundreds of new religions which have emerged in Japan
over the past century, Tenrikyo, Mahikari, and Kofuku-no-Kagaku may
be considered among the more successful, each counting between five
hundred thousand and four million followers in both Japan and the
rest of the world.10 Much of the literature of these movements has been
translated into English.11

JAPAN AS THE ORIGIN OF CREATION

While the new Japanese religions of Buddhist origin typically attach

little importance to the notion of creation, new religions in which Shinto
beliefs and practices predominate have developed rather elaborate
accounts of the origins of the world and humanity. These religions
borrow in various ways and different degrees from the original Shinto
creation myth.
According to this myth, the origin of the world coincided with the
creation of the islands of Japan. The first land, we are told, was created
from brine dripping from the sword of the God Izanagi after he dipped
it into the cosmic ocean. This was the island Ono-goro-jima, or
“Spontaneously-congealed-island,” which today is identified with a small
island near Awaji.12 All of the other islands of Japan, as well as the kami
(spirits)of the forces of nature, were then created from the union
between the world-parents Izanagi and Izanami. The most eminent of
these kami was the sun-Goddess Amaterasu, who is represented as the
divine ancestor of the first emperor of Japan, thereby establishing the
divine status and the absolute legitimacy of the imperial house of Japan.
This myth already played an important role in the early nationalistic
Kokutai movement, or “movement for national learning,” which was
based on three principles: “loyalty to the Throne, the sense of mission,
and belief in the possession of superlative inborn qualities.”13 To varying
degrees, these themes also reappear in many of the new Japanese
religions, which emphasize one or another aspect of the original Shinto
creation myth. In the Tenrikyo creation myth, for example, great
importance is attached to the creation of the world in Japan and to the

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

figures of Izanami and Izanagi as the progenitors of the world, while

no attention is paid to the divine origins of the Japanese emperor.14
Miki Nakayama (1798-1887), the foundress of the movement, is said to
have discovered the exact location of the original creation when during
a morning walk she suddenly stopped and declared, “There at the Jiba
did I begin to create all the human beings of the world. The Jiba is the
native place of all people. This shall be our eternal home.”15 Marking
the exact place of origin is the kanrodai, the central place of pilgrimage
and worship within the movement. According to the Tenrikyo creation
myth, human beings were created at this place 900,099,999 years before
October 26, 1838, the date of the beginning of Tenrikyo. The myth,
however, speaks only of the creation of the people of Japan: “After
conceiving them [the first human beings] in three days and three nights,
Izanami-no-Mikoto stayed there for three years and three months, and
gave birth in seventy-five days to those children in the following order:
first in an area of seven ri square between what later became Nara and
Hase; second in the rest of what later became Yamato Province; and
third in what later became Provinces of Yamashiro, Iga, Kawachi; and
in the rest of what later became Japan.”16 While this limitation of the
creation of humanity to the creation of the Japanese people may be
regarded as a form of ethnocentrism, it can also be attributed to the
simple worldview of the foundress, for whom the world probably
coincided with her own valley.
Within Omoto, another new Japanese religion which emerged at
the end of the nineteenth century, it is believed that the creation of
Japan served as a model for the creation of the rest of the world.
According to Onisaburo Deguchi (1871-1948), co-founder of Omoto,
Europe and Russia were created after the model of Honshu, Australia
after Shikoku, North America after Hokkaido, Africa after Kyushu, and
South America after Taiwan—which at that time was occupied by Japan.17
Just before the Second World War, Onisaburo was accused of lese
majesty, and his religion was severely persecuted. However, Mahikari,
an offshoot of Omoto which emerged after the Second World War,
adopted a much more loyal attitude toward the imperial house and
focused again on the Shinto creation myth as a legitimization of the
divine origins of the Japanese emperor.18 This may be understood as a
reaction against the various forms of humiliation suffered by Japan after
the war. In defiant opposition to the declaration of the emperor’s
humanity, Mahikari reemphasized the emperor’s divine origins in the
Sun-Goddess Amaterasu, called Su-God.
While Mahikari assigns to Amaterasu a central role in its soteriology,
its account of creation owes more to the tales of the lost continent of
Lemuria or Mu circulating among the Rosicrucians, Theosophists, and
the writings of Colonel James Churchward. 19 The first lines of
Churchward’s The Lost Continent of Mu read, “The Garden of Eden was

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Nova Religio

not in Asia but on a now sunken continent in the Pacific Ocean. The
biblical story of creation—the epic of the seven days and seven nights—
came first not from the peoples of the Nile or the Euphrates Valley but
from this now submerged continent, Mu—the Motherland of Man.”20
While Churchward locates the sunken continent in the middle of the
Pacific ocean in an area encompassing Hawaii, Fiji, Ladrones, Tahiti,
and the Easter islands, Okada Yoshikazu (1901-1974), the founder of
Mahikari, locates the center of the original paradise, or the civilization
of Mu, in Japan—more precisely in the Province of Hida.21 From Hida,
sixteen princes were sent throughout the world to form the “five colored
races.”22 This is symbolized in the emblem of Mahikari, which consists
of a star with sixteen lines emanating from its center. Thus, all languages,
cultures, religions, and civilizations are believed to have originated in
Japan. This belief in the importance of Japan in the history of creation
is also expressed in the book Mahikari, Thank God for the Answers at Last,
written by a prominent non-Japanese member:

According to the revelations he [Okada] received from Almighty God the land
that is now called Japan is the cradle of all major religions. The Taka Amahara
(“High plain of Heaven”) referred to in Shintoism is the country today called
Japan, and is where Gods descended on earth and manifested in physical form.
In other words, world history began in Japan. The first humans on earth were
created in Japan, in Hidama (now called Hida) in the area of the city of
Takayama. Japan was the “garden of Eden in the east” that is mentioned in the
Bible (Genesis 2:8) . . . The spiritual name of Japan is Hi no Motosu Kuni which
means “Country of the Origin of the Spirit.” Aeons of time later after
civilizations had spread throughout the world, the continent in the Pacific
Ocean (of which Japan was a part) became known as the Mu continent.23

While Ryuho Okawa, the founder of Kofuku-no-Kagaku, also

mentions the Mu civilization, he does not regard it as the oldest or the
original civilization and does not identify it with Japan, but Indonesia.
According to Okawa, the oldest civilization is that of Gonda-Ana, dating
back 750,000 years. Next came the civilization of Muytram, followed by
that of Lemuria, and after that the civilization of Mu. After Mu sank
into the ocean, the civilization of Atlantis followed, and after its
destruction came our modern civilization.24

JAPAN AS THE CRADLE OF SALVATION

Such theories of Japan as the origin of creation are closely linked to

the belief that Japan plays a unique role in the history of salvation.
Salvation, as Mircea Eliade has demonstrated, is often conceived of as a
return to the original wholeness and purpose of creation.25 This is clearly

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

illustrated in Tenrikyo, where every month the creation story is

reenacted around the kanrodai (focal point for worship marking the
place where God the Parent resides in the center of the Inner Sanctuary
of a Tenrikyo shrine) by prominent leaders of Tenrikyo during the ritual
called the kagura tsutome. Members are encouraged to participate in
this ritual and are greeted with the words “okaeri nasai,” or “welcome
back,” upon their arrival in what has become the city of Tenri.
Participation in the monthly reenactment of the creation story is
believed to be “the extension of God’s work of creation” and “the way
to universal and perfect salvation in every respect.”26
The soteriological function of the story of creation is also expressed
in the Ofudesaki with the following revelation of the foundress: “If only
I can teach the origin of human beings throughout the world, then I
will work whatever kind of salvation. Indeed, with a single word I will
save you from every and any matter.”27 According to Tenrikyo, salvation
thus emanates from the jiba, the place where human beings were first
conceived during human creation. While the jiba may be understood
as no more than an axis mundi, it may also be used to generate Japanese
nationalism, particularly when associated with certain teachings which
seem to juxtapose Japan (Nihon) with “other” countries (Kara):

Until now, those of Kara have done as they pleased with Nihon. What can be
done about the regret of God? Hereafter, Nihon will do as it pleases with those
of Kara. Be aware of it, all of you. Root and branches of the same tree: branches
will break, yet the root will prosper. Until now, those of Kara were said to be
great, but from now on they will only be broken. Look at Nihon! It is thought
to be tiny, but when the root appears, you will be overwhelmed with
amazement.28

While the terms Nihon and Kara are currently interpreted in spiritual
terms as referring to, respectively, “the place settled by those whose use
of mind and way of living are near the intention of God the Parent,
who is one in truth with the Jiba,” versus “the places inhabited by those
whose use of mind and way of living are still distant from God’s
intention,”29 they may also be—and indeed have been—understood in
nationalistic terms. For Miki Nakayama, they were probably little more
than an expression of the ambiguous attitude which existed toward the
opening of Japan to the West in the second half of the nineteenth
century. But Robert Ellwood shows how such verses may be understood
in a more militaristic sense, as when members of Tenrikyo were swept
away in the nationalistic ideology of the 1930s and 1940s and generally
supported the imperial cause with fundraising and prayers.30 The
dancers of the Kagura service use a fan imprinted with the Japanese
flag.

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Nova Religio

For Onisaburo Deguchi, the belief that the world was created after
the model of Japan implies that the Japanese are the chosen people
and that Japan must set the example for the purification and
transformation of the world. This conception of the Japanese as the
chosen people, which we find not only in Omoto, but also later in
Mahikari, is based on the theory—popular in the first decades of the
twentieth century—that the Japanese are the descendants of the “lost
tribes of Israel.”31 This theory was based on various linguistic, cultural,
and psychological resemblances between the two groups and on the
alleged discovery of Jewish relics in Japan. Many Japanese became
supporters of the Zionist cause after the First World War, and thereafter
Judaism has been a continual source of inspiration for some Japanese
writers.32 While some have emphasized the similarities and collaboration
between the Jews and the Japanese, others have developed the idea
that the Japanese were the true Israelites. Ben-Ami Shillony, for example,
mentions the figure of Sakai Shogun, who believed that “the Japanese,
being the descendants of Israel, were the true Jews and that the Japanese
emperor was therefore the Messiah. The goal of Zionism, the
ingathering of the Jews in Palestine, was to serve as a prelude to Japan
ruling the world.”33
In Mahikari, it is not only the idea of the Japanese as the chosen
people but also that of the providential role of Israel which is featured
in its history of salvation. This explains why the present leader of
Mahikari undertook a pilgrimage to Israel in 1995. However, for
Mahikari, Judaism, like Christianity and Islam, belongs to the era of
the “water-Gods” which must be overcome by the “God of fire,” who
has manifested himself first in Mahikari. According to Mahikari, the
biblical texts announcing that “the light comes from the East” (Gen.
3:24, Job 38:24, Isaiah 41:2) in fact anticipate and refer to Mahikari
itself.34 To reinforce the idea of the importance of Japan in the history
of salvation, Mahikari adapted the traditional account of the life of
Jesus and claimed that he had received all his spiritual knowledge and
wisdom from Shinto priests. According to Mahikari, Jesus traveled to
Japan and spent considerable time with Shinto sages prior to his public
life. And rather than having suffered and died on the cross, Jesus
returned to Japan, married a Japanese woman, and died there at an
old age. 35 Mahikari has located the grave of Jesus in Japan and
encourages its members to visit it. Not only Jesus, but also the Buddha,
Lao-Tzu, Confucius, and Mohammed are said to have visited Japan and
gained their insights from Shinto sages. While Tenrikyo sees the kanrodai
as the center of the universe and the source of salvation, for Mahikari it
is the Suza or the world shrine of the movement located in Takayama,
which is the dwelling place of God on earth and the site from which all
salvation emanates. Members are encouraged to participate in the great

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

ceremonies of the spring and the fall at the Suza. In addition, the
advanced course of Mahikari, which contains many of its more
nationalistic teachings, is organized at the world shrine. Within Mahikari
soteriology, the figure of the Japanese emperor continues to play an
important role. While the emperor renounced his divine status at the
end of the Second World War, Mahikari continues to regard him as a
direct descendant of Su-god and a mediator between God and the
world.36 Salvation is understood as the unification of all races under
the emperor of Japan and the founder of Mahikari, who is called
Sukuinushisama, “Lord Savior.”
While Tenrikyo and Mahikari view the importance of Japan from
the perspective of its primacy in the order of creation, Kofuku-no-Kagaku
sees this importance in terms of the culmination of various civilizations
in Japan:

The civilization that emerged in Greece moved westward to the United States
and then to Japan. Likewise, the Oriental civilization, which originated in India,
moved to China and came through Korea to Japan. Thus, both Eastern and
Western civilizations have flowed into Japan. Looking at this stream of history,
I am sure it is a historical necessity that a new, great civilization emerges here
in Japan. And the civilization originating in Japan in turn flows back to the
countries that are their predecessors in history. . . . Therefore, for the period
of the next 100 to 150 years, Japan will be the center of a great civilization in
the world.37

The superiority and special role of Japan in the history of salvation is

based, according to Okawa, on its economic successes: “Rather than
saying that Japan is the source, it is more accurate to say that Japan is
becoming the source for the new spiritual movement. Historical
observation suggests that once a country becomes economically
powerful, it prepares also to become a cultural leader. Accordingly, now
that Japan has become a great economic power, we are in a process of
becoming more culturally influential.”38 The rise of Japan is correlated
with the expected downfall of Europe and America:

The new civilization will begin in this land in Asia. It will spread from Japan to
Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Oceania. Some of the existing continents
(Europe and America) will sink into the ocean, and a new continent of Mu will
rise from beneath the Pacific Ocean to offer a stage for a new civilization. . . .
These future civilizations will only become possible if we let the sun of God’s
Truth rise here and now in Japan. When the world sinks in darkness, Japan
will rise as the sun.39

In the preface to The Challenge of Religion, the importance of Japan in

our day is compared to that of Israel in the time of Jesus or India in the
time of Shakyamuni:

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Nova Religio

The wind of miracles originating in this land, Japan, has begun blowing in all
directions of the world. And the impact it has on Japanese people is comparable
to what happened to the people of Israel who first encountered Jesus Christ’s
teaching, or to those in India who first heard Shakyamuni’s teaching. This is
the greatest religious event that has ever taken place in history, and its shock
wave is beginning to spread to all other nations in the world.40

Many of the Buddhist NRMs in Japan regard themselves as the

harbingers of world reconciliation. The international missions of
movements such as Reiyukai, Rissho Kosei Kai, and Nipponzan Myohoji
are particularly oriented to the establishment of world peace. Rissho
Kosei Kai, for example, played a major role in the sponsoring and
organization of the first World Conference for Religion and Peace in
Kyoto in 1970, and the founder of the movement, Nikkyo Niwano, was
the first president of the Asian Conference for Religion and Peace and
is honorary president of the World Conference for Religion and Peace.
Nipponzan Myohoji attempts to contribute to the establishment of world
peace through the building of peace pagodas throughout the world.
This movement, however, also believes that peace must emanate from
Japan. Its founder, Nichidatsu Fujii (1885-1985), based his notion of
peace on a juxtaposition of Western and Eastern civilizations.41 He
believed that while Western civilization has dominated the world over
the past hundred years and has brought materialism and unbridled
economic expansion to the East, it is necessary for the East to take
control if humanity is to survive. While Western civilization is focused
on reason and competition, the spiritual civilization of the East deals
with the mind and heart and is focused on nonviolence. A spiritual
civilization must emerge from Japan because “except in Japan, there is
no longer a religion that ascribes to the belief of eliminating Western
civilization and leading humanity in the reverse direction.”42 Fujii argues
that Japan is the most peaceful nation in the world and that this is
largely because of Buddhism. The particular mission of Japan thus
consists in spreading Buddhism internationally through the building
of stupas (Buddhist shrines often containing relics of Buddhist saints),
for “He [Shakyamuni] said that stupas will first appear in the skies of
Japan and then in the rest of the world.”43
While Soka Gakkai has developed intense missionary activities and
has recruited many members outside of Japan, it has also become deeply
involved in Japanese politics through its political party, called Komeito.
While the program of the party cannot rightly be called nationalistic,
the original claim of Komeito was, as Anson Shupe has observed, “that
their grounding in the nationalist zeal of Nichiren would restore
Japanese pride and return the nation to its preeminent place in the
community of nations.”44

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE AS VEHICLES OF

SALVATION

For many of the new Japanese religions, Japan’s language and

traditional customs have come to play a constitutive role in the process
of salvation. The Japanese language used in mantras, prayers, and spells
is believed to possess a special power that does not function in
translation. In Mahikari, it is said that the words of the prayers are not
Japanese, but kotodama, variously understood as “the language of the
Gods,” “the deeper spiritual meaning of words,” or “the spiritual and
magical power of words.” The term kotodama generally refers to a popular
form of pseudo-etymology based on the different possible meanings of
Japanese syllables.45 While the meaning of the prayers may be translated
into other languages for the prayer books used outside of Japan, all
members still must learn and recite the prayers in the original kotodama
Japanese. The words are believed to carry particular vibrations which
would be lost in translation. The Japanese language itself is thus believed
to have a salvific function.
Besides the Japanese language, there are other manifestations of
Japanese culture believed to have a unique soteriological function.
Several of the Japanese new religions attach a great importance to beauty
and purity as both a means to and an expression of salvation. This is
the case, for example, for Sekai Kyusei Kyo, whose founder, Okada
Mokichi (1882-1955), went so far as to equate Japanese identity with
the creation of beauty: “Every race in the world has its own thought
and culture. The national characteristic of the Japanese people is to
give expression through the medium of beauty and thus to contribute
to the development of culture. From this the future course of Japan is
self-evident. I believe that eternal peace and prosperity will be brought
about if we adhere to the above ideal.”46 Sekai Kyusei Kyo has created
art museums and Japanese gardens in Atami and Hakone which are
considered to be “earthly paradises” or sacred grounds and regarded
as models for the rest of the world.47 Okada explains, “If a pattern is
worked out somewhere in the world, it will in time be imitated on a
worldwide scale.”48 The missionary activities of Sekai Kyusei Kyo outside
of Japan have focused mainly on the dissemination of Japanese culture
and art through the organization of Japanese language classes, courses
in flower arrangement, and Japanese art exhibitions. This has occurred
under the auspices of the Mokichi Okada Association. Several other
new religions, such as Tenrikyo, Reiyukai, and Soka Gakkai, have also
organized Japanese art exhibitions and Japanese language courses as
part of their mission abroad.
The new Japanese religions that have spread outside of Japan have
thus remained closely linked to their country and culture of origin.
This also becomes evident in the ritual practices of the new religions,

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Nova Religio

which undergo little or no change or adaptation when introduced into

non-Japanese cultures. A Mahikari dojo (school) outside of Japan is an
exact copy of the Japanese original. The altar is modeled after traditional
Shinto shrines, and most of the sacred objects, such as the goshintai
(the scroll on which the name Mahikari and the chuon, the comma-
shaped symbol of God, are inscribed), are imported directly from Japan.
The rites of purification are practiced in the same form as they are in
Japan, and Western members have even adopted the age-old Japanese
practice of the veneration of the ancestors.49 While some movements,
including Soka Gakkai, have attempted to adapt to local cultures
through the celebration of their festivals and through the appointment
of local leaders, most of the centers of the new religions outside of
Japan are run by Japanese leaders. Mahikari initially attempted to
appoint local leaders to its foreign branches, but soon realized that
Japanese leaders were more loyal and submissive to its theocratic
authority and changed its policy. Inculturation, of course, does not
happen overnight, as illustrated by the history of Christianity and
Buddhism outside of their lands of origin. It often takes centuries to
come to an understanding of the universal essence of a particular
teaching or practice as opposed to the accidents of its original historical
and cultural context. However, while every religion has a particular
symbol, belief, or practice which is regarded as essential, irreducible,
and unadaptable to the changes of time and culture, within many of
the new Japanese religions this essence seems to be inseparable from
the particularity of Japanese language and culture.

CONCLUSION

While many of the new Japanese religions have adopted a

universalistic and international facade through their establishment of
mission centers abroad and their integration of Western aesthetic and
ideological elements, most of these religions remain fundamentally and
essentially Japanese. Creation stories developed within these movements
situate the origin of the universe or of humanity in Japan, and Japan
and the Japanese are believed to play a crucial role in the history of
salvation. An identification with Japanese language and culture has led
several of the new Japanese religions to assume the roles of cultural
ambassadors of Japan when moving abroad. While some new religions,
such as Perfect Liberty Kyodan and Soka Gakkai, have made
considerable steps toward adapting to local cultural habits and
celebrations, most of the new Japanese religions have maintained their
original ritual, linguistic, and cultural forms outside of Japan. Whereas
it may be asked whether a religion can ever fully detach itself from the
particularities of its original historical and cultural context, within new

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

Japanese religions we find a tendency toward the glorification and

absolutization of that national and cultural particularity. This defines
religious nationalism.
The type of nationalism manifested in the various new Japanese
religions differs, however, according to the period in which these
religions emerged. The centrality of Japan in the teaching of Tenrikyo,
for example, may be understood as a reflection of the simple worldview
of its foundress, Miki Nakayama. While the original teachings of the
foundress may not be called nationalistic in the strict sense of the term,
they have been used for nationalistic purposes over the course of time.
The nationalism found in post-World War II new religions such as
Mahikari, on the other hand, may be regarded as a reactionary attempt
to return to the past glory of Japan in the face of the humiliation of
defeat in war. The resurgent nationalistic voices in new Japanese
religions toward the end of the twentieth century sound distinctly
triumphalistic, linking the religious importance of Japan to the country’s
economic successes. This form of triumphalistic nationalism is especially
evident in Kofuku-no-Kagaku.
In general, the nationalistic traits of the new Japanese religions may
be understood as the religious expression of a more general tendency
toward what has been called “ethnic nationalism” in twentieth-century
Japan. This nationalism has found expression in the nihonjinron
literature, which focuses on the uniqueness of Japanese character,
culture, and society. This literature is characterized by the beliefs that
the Japanese form one historically continuous and homogenous racial
group, that they differ radically from all other people, and that their
culture and tradition should be preserved and protected from external
influences and corruptions.50 Kosaku Yoshino interprets this ethnic
nationalism as a reaction against internationalization and the related
loss of a distinct identity or as a compensation for the exclusively
economic identity which Japan has acquired in the second half of
the twentieth century.51 Peter Dale, on the other hand, understands
it as a “severe, defensively combative endeavor to overcome a diffuse
sense of inferiority to the West, a West which, in the first place, we
must understand as a symbolic entity, as the image of a hostile
diversity . . . .”52
A reaction against what is called the “Great Western Transformation”
or “Westoxication” is also generally regarded to be a major reason for
the emergence of fundamentalisms throughout the world.53 In his article
for the Fundamentalism Project, Winston Davis points precisely to the
nationalism of new Japanese religions as the expression of
fundamentalism in Japan. 54 Considering, however, the different
meanings and forms of nationalism which we have detected in the
various movements—which in turn depend upon the social and
economic context in which they emerged—one may wonder whether

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Nova Religio

the term fundamentalism should be applied to the expressions of

nationalism in all of these movements. Each of the new Japanese
religions manifests a certain ambiguity toward the West. While most of
the new Japanese religions have eagerly integrated Western science,
technology, and even fragments of Western aesthetics and religion, this
does not come without a certain resentment and reaction. But whereas
in Tenrikyo this takes the form of a mild cultural and national pride, it
evolves into a full-blown triumphalism and aggression in Kofuku-no-
Kagaku. This development is related to the increasing influence of the
West on Japan in the course of the twentieth century, combined with a
growing sense of self-confidence and superiority as Japan became
regarded as an economic powerhouse. While Tenrikyo focuses mainly
on the past and on creation as the basis for the unique role of Japan in
salvation history, Kofuku-no-Kagaku considers salvation history to
culminate in Japan as its summit and goal. While the unique role of the
foundress in salvation history is already advanced in Tenrikyo, in Kofuku-
no-Kagaku the superiority of the founder is established over against
the founders of other religious traditions. Mahikari marks a transition
in the Japanese attitude toward the West from the beginning to the
end of the twentieth century. While it bases itself on the myth of creation
to substantiate its own special role in the history of salvation and it
views itself as the fulfillment of all other religions, it continues to search
in the West for legitimization of its superiority, regarding itself as the
lost tribe of Israel and Jesus as having foretold the coming of their own
founder.
Just as the nationalism manifested in the new religions of Japan
differs in kind and purpose from movement to movement, the term
fundamentalism cannot be applied in the same sense to all new Japanese
religions. Indeed, in the case of Tenrikyo, I would argue that the term
fundamentalism cannot be used at all, since there is very little reaction
against the West in any of its teachings or practices. The nationalism
manifested in Mahikari, on the other hand, displays clear signs of
fundamentalism and is probably a reaction against the humiliation of
Japan by the West after the Second World War. The most distinct
example of a fundamentalist form of nationalism, however, is manifested
in Kofuku-no-Kagaku, which considers it the vocation of Japan to
dominate the world, not only economically, but also culturally, politically
and religiously.

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

ENDNOTES

1
Ryuho Okawa, The Age of Choice in Religion (Tokyo: IRH Press, 1995), 29-30.
2
While many of the traditional Japanese religions have come to establish churches and
centers in the West during the past century, this has most often been in service of
expatriate Japanese who continued to practice their faith abroad, rather than the
expression of a conscious missionary impulse. A. Peel, a European Shin Buddhist priest,
even states that “Caucasian converts were not too warmly welcomed in the Buddhist
temples, which functioned not so much as places of religion but more often as guardians
of the Japanese cultural identity.” See “Acculturation of Shin Buddhism in Europe,” The
Pure Land 2 (1985): 99. Whereas the Zen tradition has developed a more active
missionary attitude in the West, the initiative for this has come mostly from Western
converts or from single individuals such as D. T. Suzuki.
3
The Sacred Scripture of Tenrikyo, the Ofudesaki, 6th ed. (Tenri, Japan: Tenrikyo Church
Headquarters, 1993), 17:11. Emphasis added.
4
Quoted in Marcus Bach, The Power of Perfect Liberty (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1971), 142. Okada Mokichi also changed the name of his movement from Nippon
Kannon Kyodai (“Greater Japan Society of Kannon”) to Sekai Kyusei Kyo (“Church of
World Messianity”).
5
This is the case in Omotokyo, Sekai Kyusei Kyo, and Mahikari, but also in Shinnyo-en,
a Buddhist new religion. In Shinnyo-en, the decisive figure in this regard was the wife of
the founder, Shojuin-sama, who through her death in 1967 laid the spiritual foundation
for universal salvation.
6
This is the case for Kofuku-no-Kagaku and its founder, Ryuho Okawa, who believes
himself to have founded a religion which will unify the world: “In the present age the
world is about to become one, and we should think that God’s will might be that a
religion that could unify the world is desirable” (Ryuho Okawa, The Challenge of Religion
[Tokyo: IRH Press, 1993], 161-63).
7
Both of these tendencies may be attributed to Christian influences in the syncretistic
mix which often constitutes the doctrine of the new Japanese religions.
8
While the terms “old,” “new,” and “new new” religions are often used in the study of
new Japanese religions with reference to a particular historical era or event—regarding
the pre-World War II religions as “old,” the post-World War II religions as “new,” and the
religions which have emerged since the 1970s or 1980s as “new new”—I use a more
sociological criterion or point of demarcation, regarding new religions as religions with
no more than three generations of followers, new new religions as religions with only
one generation of followers, and “old” new religions as religions of relatively recent
origin which may be regarded as the antecedents of the new religions. At this point,
however, the historical and the sociological ways of demarcation more or less coincide.
9
Shinto is Japan’s indigenous religious tradition, as opposed to imports such as
Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity.
10
Determining the exact number of members of these religions is made extremely
difficult by the variety of ways in which membership is counted, the different degrees of
commitment of members, and the high turnover within these movements. Tenrikyo
claims about 1.2 million followers, Mahikari about 700,000, and Kofuku-no-Kagaku about
4 million.
11
The research for this paper is directed mainly toward the European branches of these

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Nova Religio

new Japanese religions and is based mostly on English language materials. It should be
pointed out that the nationalistic expressions might be even stronger in the Japanese
sources. A comparison of the English and Japanese sources of these movements is,
however, food for further research and for another article.
12
W. G. Aston, trans., The Nihongi (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), 21.
13
Richard Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Patriotism (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1957), 5.
14
This turn away from the unique status and role of the emperor is one of the main
reasons why Tenrikyo was persecuted prior to the Second World War, when its scriptures
were censured and its rituals banned in their original form.
15
Ofudesaki, 17:7-8. The Ofudesaki, the primary sacred scripture of Tenrikyo, is believed
to contain the words “God the Parent” spoken through the foundress.
16
Tadasama Fukaya, The Truth of Origin (Tenri, Nara, Japan: Tenrikyo Overseas Mission
Department, 1983), 85.
17
Mr. Yamazaki, Director of International Affairs, interview with author, Kameoka, Japan,
25 July 1996.
18
This religion was founded by Okada Yoshikazu or Okada Kotama (1901-1974), also
called Sukuinushisama (Lord Savior) within the movement. After his death, a split
occurred within the movement between Mahikai Bunmei Kyodan, led by his disciple
Sakae Sekiguchi, and Sukyo Mahikari, led by the founder’s step-daughter Okada Sachiko.
We shall focus here on the latter movement, which became the largest faction and took
control over all of the Mahikari centers which had been established outside of Japan.
19
James Churchward, The Lost Continent of Mu (London: Neville Spearman, 1959). Other
sources of Okada were Kiku Yamane’s Authentic History of the World (Yamane, Japan: n.p.,
1964), and Masahilo Nakazono’s Ancient World History (Nakazono, Japan: n.p., 1977).
20
Churchward, The Lost Continent of Mu, 1.
21
Winston Davis points out how this myth of the sunken continent of Mu has been used
to feed the ethnocentrism of various groups and individuals. See Winston Davis, Dojo,
Magic and Exorcism in Contemporary Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 81
n.
22
Elaborate but rather esoteric evidence for this is provided during the advanced course
of Mahikari. As opposed to lower level courses, this advanced course is taught only in
Japan, and the course notes are only for participants. It seems that not even the advanced
members of Mahikari are unanimous in their belief in these teachings. Leaders explain
this by the fact that they are “very difficult to understand,” requiring “a high level of
spiritual purity and insight.” Doshi Mino, interview with author, Takayama, Japan, 20
July 1996. The expression “difficult to understand” is used in many new religions as an
excuse for embarrassing or seemingly nonsensical teachings or practices.
23
Andris K. Tebecis, Mahikari: Thank God for the Answers at Last (Tokyo: Yoko Shuppan,
1982), 389-90.
24
Ryuho Okawa, The Laws of the Sun (Tokyo: IRH Press, 1990), 147-79.
25
Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History (New York: Harper, 1959).
26
The Teachings and History of Tenrikyo (Tenri, Nara, Japan: Tenrikyo Overseas Mission
Department, 1986), 51.
27
Ofudesaki 12:129-30.
28
Ofudesaki 3:86-90.
29
Ofudesaki, The Tip of the Writing Brush (Tenri, Nara, Japan: Tenrikyo Church
Headquarters, 1993), 267.
30
Robert Ellwood, Tenrikyo: A Pilgrimage Faith (Tenri, Nara, Japan: Tenri University Press,
1982), 52-66. It must be taken into consideration that the different movements were
also under severe pressure to conform with the imperialistic ideology of the times.

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 Cornille: Nationalism and New Japanese Religions

31
In 1879, Norman McLeod, a Scottish businessman, published a book called Japan and
the Lost Tribes of Israel. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Saeki Yoshiro, a Japanese
Christian professor, developed the theory of the common ancestry of the Japanese and
the Jews, arguing that the Hata clan which arrived in Japan from Korea in the third
century was a Jewish-Nestorian tribe. As late as 1980, the Israeli Joseph Eidelberg
published a book entitled The Japanese and the Lost Tribes of Israel. For a general discussion,
see Ben-Ami Shillony, The Jews and the Japanese (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1991).
32
See Ben-Dasan (Yamamoto Shichihei), Nihonjin to Yudayajin (The Japanese and the
Jews) (Tokyo: Yamamoto Shoten, 1970).
33
Shillony, The Jews and the Japanese, 168-69. Sakai published more than sixteen books on
the Jews between 1924 and 1940.
34
The notion of “light” plays an important salvific role in Mahikari (“true light”) as the
ultimate source and means of purification and healing. Other texts cited by Mahikari as
proof that it is the fulfillment of biblical prophecies are John 16:7-8 and 12-14, which
concern the sending of the Paraclete, the spirit of truth.
35
This account is part of the advanced course of Mahikari, but it may also be found in
Mahikari: Thank God for the Answers at Last, 354-60. The Mahikari version of the life of
Jesus is based on the “Takenouchi Documents.” While the Takenouchi, a family of Shinto
priests, claims that Jesus is buried in a mound at Herai, others refer to the stump of an
old tree on the nearby Mayagatai plateau. On this, see also my article “Jesus in Japan:
Christian Syncretism in Mahikari” in Japanese New Religions in the West, eds. Peter B. Clarke
and Jeffrey Sommers (Kent: Japan Library/Curzon Press, 1994), 88-102.
36
The reverence of Mahikari for the Japanese emperor became evident at the
enthronement ceremonies for the new emperor in 1990, when members lined the streets
in an organized way to greet him.
37
Ryuho Okawa, Buddha Speaks (Tokyo: IRH Press, 1995), 54-55.
38
Ibid.
39
Ryuho Okawa, The Laws of the Sun (Tokyo: IRH Press, 1990), 178-79.
40
Ryuho Okawa, The Challenge of Religion (Tokyo: IRH Press, 1993), preface.
41
According to him, there is mention in the Lotus Sutra of different vibrations of the
world, leading to different forms of dominance: sayuu-toomotsu, when the West is elevated
and the East sunk down, and tooyuu-saimotsu, when the East is dominant.
42
Nichidatsu Fujii, Buddhism for World Peace (Tokyo: Japan-Bharat Sarvodaya Mitra, 1980),
25-28.
43
Nichidatsu Fujii, Itten Shikai Myoho (Tokyo: Japan-Bharat Mitrata Sangha, 1984), 66.
44
“Soka Gakkai and the Slippery Slope from Militancy to Accommodation,” in Religion
and Society in Modern Japan, eds. Mark R. Mullins, Shimazono Susumu, and Paul L.
Swanson (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1993), 234.
45
This has made the translation of the sacred scripture of Mahikari, the Goseigenshu,
which abounds with kotodama, an almost impossible task. While this text has been
translated into various languages, none has fully satisfied the Japanese leaders.
46
Okada Mokichi, Handbook of the Hakone Art Museum and the Atami Art Museum (Atami,
Japan: MOA Productions, 1986), 3.
47
The idea of “art as salvation” was already prominent in Omotokyo, of which Sekai
Kyusei Kyo is an offshoot.
48
Sekai Kyuseikyo, Sekai Kyuseikyo, World Messianity and What it Means (Atami, Japan: SKK
Headquarters, 1957), 30.
49
See my article, “The Phoenix Flies West: The Dynamics of Inculturation of Mahikari
in Europe,” Japanese Journal for Religious Studies 18 (1991): 265-85.
50
See Peter Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (London: Routledge and Nissan Institute
for Japanese Studies, 1986), 1-2.
51
Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1992),
163-81.

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Nova Religio

52
Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, 176.
53
See, for example, Bruce Lawrence, Defenders of God: Fundamentalist Revolt against the
Modern Age (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989).
54
“Fundamentalism in Japan: Religious and Political,” in Fundamentalisms Observed, eds.
Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 782-
813. He also points out that the absence of moral rigorism in these religions as well as
their compromising attitude toward the wider society preclude a wholesale designation
of these movements as fundamentalist.

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