The Fighting Israeli Air Force PDF

THE
FIGHTING
AIR FORCE
3r
SBin-
line Amazing Combat History
of the World's Finest Air Force
1948-1984
Brig. Gen. Stanley ML Ulanoff, USAR

Lt. Col. David Eshel, IDF, Ret.
THE
FIGHTING
ISRAELI
AIR FORCE
Books Written or Edited by Stanley M. Ulanoff
WORLD WAR AIRCRAFT IN COMBAT
II
ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO U.S. MISSILES AND

ROCKETS
MATS-THE STORY OF THE MILITARY AIR
TRANSPORT SERVICE
BOMBS AWAY!
THE FIRST WAR THE AIR, 1914-1918
IN Illustrated
MAN IN A GREEN BERET
Am Combat Classics
WINGED WARFARE, Lieutenant Colonel William A.
Bishop
ACE OF ACES, Captain Rene Fonck
FIGHTING AIRMAN— THE WAY OF THE EAGLE,
Major Charles J. Biddle
FLYING FURY, Major James T.B. McCudden
WIND IN THE WIRES, Captain Duncan
Grinnell-Milne
THE RED BARON, Rittmeister Manfred Frh. von
Richthofen
ACE OF THE IRON CROSS, Oberleutnant Ernst Udet
UP AND AT EM, Lieutenant Colonel Harold E.
Hartney
FLYING IN FLANDERS, Lieutenant Willy Coppens
THE
FIGHTING
ISRAELI
AIR FORCE
Brig. Gen. Stanley M. Ulanoff, USAR
Lt. Col. David Eshel, IDF, Ret.
ARCO PUBLISHING, INC.

NEW YORK
Published by Arco Publishing, Inc.
215 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10003
Copyright © 1985 by Stanley M. Ulanoff
All rights reserved. No part of this book may

be reproduced, by any means, without permission
in writing from the publisher, except by a
reviewer who wishes to quote brief excerpts in
connection with a review in a magazine or
newspaper.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Ulanoff, Stanley M.
The fighting Israeli Air Force.
Includes index.
1. Israel. Hel ha-avir. I. Eshel, David. II. Title.
UG635.I75U43 1985 358.4'0095694 84-16871
ISBN 0-668-05578-2 (Cloth Edition)
Printed in the United States of America
10 987654321
Dedication
To the heroes of the Israel Air Force and their corn-

rades in the Israel Defence Force. May their bravery
be rewarded with peace.
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Chapter 1. Thunder in the Sky— An Overview 1
Chapter 2. The War of Independence, 1948 19

Chapter 3. The Sinai Campaign, 1956 33
Chapter 4. The Six-Day War, 1967 42
Chapter 5. The War of Attrition, 1967-70 62
Chapter 6. The Yom Kippur War, 1973 74
Chapter 7. Entebbe— The Impossible Rescue, July 4, 1976 119
Chapter 8. Baghdad-The Osirak Reactor, 1981 129
Chapter 9. Lebanon— Operation Peace for Galilee, 1982 134
Appendix I. The Missions of the IAF 156

Appendix II. Defense Force (Zahal)
Israeli 157
Appendix III. Uniforms and Insignia 158
Appendix IV. IAF Commanders 162
Appendix V. Air Bases 166
Appendix VI. The Aircraft, Friend and Foe (1947-1983) 169
Appendix VII. Israel— Some Facts and Figures 192
Appendix VIII. A Brief History of Israel 194
Appendix IX. A Chronology of Highlights from Biblical Times
to the Present 197
Appendix X. Religions of Israel 201
Index 203
vii
Acknowledgments
Eshel-Dramit Ltd., Israel. Text and photos excerpted from a number of Eshel-
Dramit periodic publications, including Bom in Battle (now titled Defence Up-
date International), copyright 1978 through 1983 by Eshel-Dramit, Ltd.
Israel Defence Force Spokesman. The Israeli Air Force in the Yom Kippur War,
published by the Historical Division, Israel Air Force, Ministry of Defence,
Tel Aviv, Israel.
Official U.S. Government Publications. Excerpts from DOD PG-10A and

MATS Flyer.
Maj. Charles E. Mayo, "Lebanon: An Air Defense Analysis," Air Defense Ar-
tillery, Winter 1983.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the Israel Defence Force,
which has given its permission to reprint excerpts from various official docu-
ments in this book.
ix
THE
FIGHTING
ISRAELI
AIR FORCE
—
Chapter 1
Thunder in the Sky

An Overview
Knifing across the Lebanese border like giant cloud of debris that had been the MiG he was
juggernauts, four massive columns of Israeli pursuing, his wingman flashed by to finish off
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-pro- a MiG-23. The neophyte, now a veteran, wagged
pelled artillery— each miles long— raced north, the wings of his American-built fighter plane as
past United Nations Force checkpoints, in pur- a sign of victory. The blue, six-pointed Star of
suit of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) David in the white circle shone brightly as he
terrorists. Above them roared the Israeli Air dived after another Syrian MiG. Ironically, he
Force's (IAF) F-16 Fighting Falcons and F-15 dreaded returning to base more than facing the
Eagles, prepared to do battle with the MiG-21s enemy in combat, for traditionally an IAF pilot
and MiG-23s of the Syrian Air Force, if the is dunked in a big tank of water by his ground
Syrians chose to oppose them in the skies over crew following his first air-to-air victory. Dart-
Lebanon. The Israelis called it Operation Peace ing in and out, diving, climbing, he plunged in-
for Galilee; it was the sixth Arab-Israeli war to the fray once more. Other Soviet-made
since Israel declared its independence in 1948. MiG-21s and 23s fell from the sky around him,
Gray wings flashing in the sunlight, the trailing smoke and flame as triumphant Israeli
Israeli F-15 dropped its fuel tanks as it wheeled F-16s and F-15s roared by. Hundreds of fighter
and turned in a long, graceful, descending arc aircraft were engaged over Lebanon in the
to pounce upon a desert-camouflaged Syrian greatest of all air battles since World War II.
MiG-21 above Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. His Neither the Korean nor the Vietnam wars, nor
head constantly turning to the right and to the any other preceding Arab-Israeli conflicts had
left and his eyes darting to the mirror (to make seen such a scrap in the sky— a dogfight most
certain that no enemy fighter was approaching reminiscent of World War I.
from either side or from the rear), the Israeli On two fateful days in early June 1982, Syrian
fighter pilot fixed the MiG in his sights. Clos- fighters tore at the Israeli machines with a
ing the gap between them, he could see clearly vengeance, despite the fact that the government
the green, white, and black cockade with three of Israel had informed Syria and had announced
tiny red stars in the white ring on its fuselage. publicly that its quarrel was not with them and
He fired a Shafrir air-to-air missile that flew un- that Israelis would only fire if fired upon. Un-
erringly at the tailpipe of the enemy aircraft fortunately, this was not to be. Both air forces
ahead of him. It struck with an explosive flash wer equipped with the latest, most up-to-date
of flame and smoke. This was the young Israeli aircraft and weapons— the best that U.S. and
lieutenant's first victory on his first combat Soviet technology could produce. When the
mission, but he had no time to think about it. smoke of battle had cleared, close to 90 Soviet-
As he broke sharply to the right to avoid the built MiGs littered the Bekaa Valley below, and
1
a
2 The Fighting Israeli Air Force
The world's hottest jet fighter— the McDonnell Douglas F-15A Eagle— in IAF colors. This newest addition
to the air force was delivered in December 1976. Each plane cost some 16 million dollars— without spare engines
or parts, or any other ancillary equipment.
not one IAF plane had fallen in air-to-air Force is second to none! In the words of the
combat. Institute, the IAF is "without doubt the best
In the first of these great air battles, the IAF in the world."
tangled with 60 enemy MiGs and destroyed 35 same month Gen. Wilbur L.
Earlier that
of them. The remaining Syrian aircraft with- commander of the USAF Tactical Air
Creech,
drew to lick their wounds. The following day 50 Command, had stated that, up to that time in
MiGs rose to challenge the Israeli Air Force, but the conflict, the IAF had
destroyed 92 Syrian
not a solitary enemy jet returned to base. The Soviet-built MiG-23s and MiG-21s, 85 of them
battle score was an astounding 85 to 0. From in air-to-air combat. The Israelis had accom-
that moment on, the Syrian high command kept plished this without the loss of a single fighter
its fighters on the ground, leaving IAF in un- of their own. According to Gen. Creech, approx-
disputed control of the skies over Lebanon— imately half of the Syrian aircraft losses were
protective cover for the advancing Israeli of the advanced MiG-23 model and the balance
ground forces. were MiG-21s. The U.S.-built Israeli F-15
At the end of August 1982, the prestigious Eagles had shot down 40 of the enemy MiGs;
London-based Institute for Strategic Studies 18 additional MiGs had been brought down
announced that the tiny nation of Israel was the prior to the onset of the conflict in Lebanon.
fourth strongest military power in the world, Forty-four Syrian MiGs fell to Israeli Shafrir
following immediately behind the United and U.S. -made Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
States, the Soviet Union, and China. However, fired by IAF F-16 Fighting Falcons, and one of
it also stated unequivocally that the Israeli Air the MiGs was shot down by an older F-4 Phan-
Thunder in the Sky—An Overview 3
An IAF F-16 Fighting Falcon armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
torn. Another USAF general, America's top One of the reasons given by Gen. Creech for
soldier,Gen. David C. Jones, Chairman of the the brilliant performance of the Israeli Air Force
Joint Chiefs of Staff, had only one word for the was astounding rate of readiness. For ex-
their
stunning performance of the IAF in battle: ample, the IAF reported all of its 72 F- 16s ready
"Fabulous!" for battle each morning. By comparison, the
In addition to the crushing victory over the USAF can field only 60 percent of its force.
Syrian Air Force, U.S. intelligence confirmed (This, however, is a peacetime rate and the
that the IAF had wiped out 23 Syrian Soviet- general predicted that the Americans could
made anti-aircraft missile sites in Lebanon's match it in wartime. However, he added, "I
Bekaa Valley, again without the loss of a single don'tmean to suggest that we (the U.S.) can get
Israeli jet fighter. The missile battalion, which an 85-to-0 kill ratio" against the Soviets, "but
had been brought in from Syria to reinforce I think we can do very, very well.") Another
their existing batteries in the valley after the reason for the unequaled performance of the
had moved into Lebanon, was the IAF's
Israelis IAF in combat is its superior equipment, includ-
primary target when its pilots were opposed by ing the American-built Grumman E-2C Hawk-
the MiGs in that classic dogfight. The de- eye battle-control aircraft— a junior-size AWAC
stroyed SAM missiles consisted of 19 mobile with the capability to provide its fighters with
SA-6s, ten of which were destroyed in one brief the element of surprise. Yet another reason is
ten-minute attack. The remaining missile bat- the superior quality of IAF personnel (pilots
teries were the far superior mobile SA-8s, SA-2s, and ground crews), their training, their high
and SA-3s. In the following days, the Syrians morale, and their reason for fighting. Israeli
brought in more SAMs, but they too were syste- ground crews repair, rearm, and refuel their air-
matically destroyed by the IAF. craft in an extremely short time. Their turn-
around rate unequaled anywhere. However,

is The Air Force is the air arm of the
Israeli
their "reason for fighting" is probably the most Israeli Defense Force (IDF), as the Israeli Navy
important for the success of the Israeli Air is its sea arm. Like the USAF and the RAF, it
Force: They are the air force of a free democratic is simultaneously an integral part of the over-
nation, the only one in the entire Middle East, all defense force and an independent arm. (The
and they are fighting for their very survival! USAF became an independent force in 1947,
To sum up, IAF personnel have high morale shortly after the end of World War II, in which
and spirit, superior skill, a willingness to die for it had served as the Army Air Force. The RAF
theirfreedom and independence, the tenacity to changed its status from the British Army's
hold on to and fight for what they believe in, Royal Flying Corps in the middle of World War
dogged determination not to be "pushed I.) The IAF is known in Israel as Cheyl Ha Avir
around," and sheer military effectiveness. When (the "Ch" is pronounced with a guttural sound,
asked by CBS Network News commentator as it would be in German). It literally means
Mike Wallace about the strength of the Israeli "corps of the air."
military forces, the late Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, Respected by friend and foe alike as a superior
AUS ret., a distinguished military authority, re- fighting unit, the Israeli Air Force is one of the
plied that "they took desperate chances, and most formidable military organizations in the
they are superb marksmen, probably the best world— not in number of aircraft or pilots but
the world has ever seen, both in the air and on as an experienced, professional fighting group.
land." As for professionalism, it is interesting to note
Attesting to that statement is the fact that that a good part of the strength of the Cheyl
the IAF was commonly believed, use
did not, as Ha Avir comes from reservists or part-time
"secret weapons" ("smart" bombs or other elec- soldiers— both officers and enlisted ranks, pilots
tronic weapons) to wipe out the enemy air forces and mechanics— who in most armies are con-
during the Six-Day War. They simply employed sidered "weekend warriors." But the Israeli re-
extremely accurate airborne cannon fire and servists are most definitely first-class
conventional "iron" bombs. In fact, the Israelis professionals. Usually outnumbered but never
had insisted on keeping these "obsolete" outfought, IAF aircrews have seen action on a
weapons in lieu of more modern ones that continuous basis from the inception of their na-
Dassault, the French aircraft manufacturer, tion to the present. They have seen more com-
wanted to install on the IAF's new Mirages and bat and fought in more wars than any other air
Mysteres. force in the world (with the possible exception
At some time before the Israeli drive into of the opposing Arab they
air forces). In all,
Lebanon in the spring of 1982, Menachem have fought six major wars and have been en-
Begin, at that time the peppery, outspoken gaged in a constant series of battles with one
prime minister of the tiny Jewish state, paid a or more of the hostile neighboring Arab states.
glowing tribute to the IAF. Never at a loss for Not only has the IAF been victorious in air-to-
words himelf, in this case he chose to repeat the air combat over its Arab adversaries, but the
historic accolade given to the British Royal Air fighter aircraft of the vaunted British Royal Air
Force, under similar circumstances, by then Force and of the Red Air Force of the USSR
Prime Minister Winston Churchill during the have fallen before their guns, as well.
grim, dark days of World War II: "Never in the Born in battle, in 1948, the Cheyl Ha Avir was
field of human conflict was so much owed by so blooded at that time and has continued to play
many to so few." This glowing, heartfelt tribute a major role in keeping Israel free from those
was Churchill's expression of undying gratitude who would destroy her. It was in mid-May 1948
to the fighter pilots of the RAF, that handful that the British mandate over Palestine was
of men who had saved from
their island nation ending and the State of Israel was about to
annihilation by the powerful Nazi war machine emerge. Poised on the borders of this tiny new
during the critical Battle of Britain. Prime nation (112 kilometers at its widest point and
Minister Begin 's parallel tribute to the IAF was 10 at its narrowest) were the regular armies of
also fully justified, fitting, and proper. six Arab nations, outnumbering the fledgling
Israeli Defense Force ten to one in arms, men, Three of these RAF veterans later served as
and equipment. As the British convoys pulled commanders of the IAF.
out, the Arab hordes poured in. The State of The first commander of the Air Service was
Israel was born. The War of Independence had Yehoshua Eshel. His original command con-
begun! sisted of a "squadron" that flew out of Lydda
History clearly shows that the Jewish people Airport, and later from Sde Dov Airfield in Tel
have always lived with the threat of annihilation Aviv. This force, formerly commanded by Eli
hanging over their heads. The Promised Land Feingras, was immediately expanded into two
and Jerusalem, its capital and site of the Tem- units— the Galil Squadron and the Negev
ple, had the ill fortune of being at the crossroads Squadron. Early in 1948 the Sherut Avir ac-
of the great trade routes of Europe, Asia, and quired 21 British Auster aircraft as surplus
Africa, putting the Hebrews at the mercy of the equipment from RAF bases in Palestine. This
great powers for more than a thousand years. was the tiny force that served the Jewish
From biblical times their land— the same land population in Palestine at the outbreak of the
the Israelis are fighting to hold today— has been War of Independence.
coveted and invaded by other peoples. These
have included the Philistines, Assyrians,
Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Cru-
saders, Turks, British, and Arabs, to name a THE WAR OF
few. And, historically, once the Jewish people
were scattered to the "four corners of the earth" INDEPENDENCE
(the Diaspora) by the Romans, they lived in and
became citizens of many other countries. There, At this time the Air Service undertook recon-
as minorities, they have been the scapegoats naissance missions, and maintained communi-
whenever these countries suffered economic, re- cations with isolated settlements (including be-
ligious, political, military, or other reverses. leaguered Jerusalem and the isolated settle-
Typical of such periods of persecution were the ments of the Ezion bloc, the Negev, and the
Spanish Inquisition, the pogroms or massacres Galil). The Air Service flew mail, supplies,
in Poland and Russia, and the more recent Nazi weapons, and ammunition to the besieged
holocaust of World War II. Fearsome as was settlements, relieved commanders, evacuated
the Arab boast to "push them into the sea," his- casualties, and protected the Negev water pipe-
tory had proven that they could survive, and lines. Its planes accompanied marching columns
the new nation was determined to prevail. The and even engaged in small-scale combat mis-
world's newest fighting force was in a struggle sions. InOperation Nachshon (whose mission
for its very life. was to clear the roads and break through to
Jerusalem) Israeli planes attacked Arab troops
and armor concentrations and guided relief col-
umns making their way to Jerusalem.
BIRTH OF THE IAF On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel declared
its independence. At the end of May, Zahal, or
The IAF began in the Jewish Settlement in the Israel Defense Force, was established, and
the British Mandate of Palestine with the crea- along with it the Israeli Air Force.On the day
tion of the Sherut Avir, or Air Service, by the after the declaration of independence, regular
Haganah on November 10, 1947. The new ser- Arab armies invaded Israel; the Egyptian Air
vice immediately acquired 1 1 light planes from Force, the largest of the Arab air forces, bombed
Aviron, a civilian aviation company. (Most of Tel Aviv and Egyptian Spitfires strafed Sde
these aircraft were manufactured in Poland.) Its Dov airfield. With the armed forces of four
pilots were recruited from among the flying neighboring nations— Egypt, Lebanon, Syria,
clubs that existed in Palestine at that time and and Jordan— plus contingents from Iraq, the
from the few Palestinian Jews who were trained Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco roaring
by, and flew with, the RAF in World War II. across their border, the neophyte IAF, armed
An Israeli Messerschmitt Bf -109. This fighter had been the pride of the Nazi Luftwaffe in World War II.
with only a handful of light planes and facing reached Ashdod, 20 miles south of Tel Aviv.
an onslaught of squadrons of Hurricanes, Spit- The following day, Israeli aircraft foiled an Iraqi
fires, Furies, Fiat G-55s, and other first-class and Jordanian assault from Tulkarm on Kfar
fighter aircraft, was truly born in battle. Yona. On June 3, two Egyptian Dakotas again
On May 18, the Central Bus Station in Tel attempted to bomb Tel Aviv but were shot
Aviv was bombed. Protection against air attack down by Modi Allon flying the only available
amounted to a few rifles and machine guns. An Messerschmitt.
effort was underway to procure transport and Meanwhile, by various unconventional
fighter planes abroad, and Operation Balack methods, the procurement campaign was bring-
brought Messerschmitt fighters from Czecho- ing in B-17s, Spitfires, Beaufighters, Mustangs,
slovakia in the bellies of surplus C-47 Dakotas and other aircraft, which were immediately
bought in the United States. thrown into action. Israeli planes bombed Cairo,
The acquisition of the Messerschmitts pre- Gaza, El-Arish, Damascus, Kuneitra, and Am-
sented a strange situation. Paradoxically, man, though these and other missions required
young Israeli pilots who had flown British Spit- considerable effort and improvisation in the
fires for the RAF two years earlier were now fly- maintenance and arming of aircraft and fight-
ing BF-109s, the great German fighters that ing methods.
had flown against them in World War II. The The initiative of the air was slowly swinging
plane was also a symbol of the Nazi oppression in favor of the Israeli Air Force. Fighters and
that had ruthlessly murdered six million of their bombers began to play an active part in the
fellow Jews. On May Messerschmitts
29, four IDF's large-scale operations in the Negev,
(the first ones in the country) attackedand center and north of the country, while transport
stopped an Egyptian armored column that had planes moved troops to the Negev and kept up
Thunder in the Sky — An Overview 7
Spitfire Mk-IXE being revved up in its hardstand on an air base in southern Israel.
the flow of supplies and ammunition from forces. The logistic potential of the IAF was
abroad. The air force was also beefed up by the demonstrated during the War of Independence
arrival of "Machal" and "Gachal," volunteer in Operations B alack and Avack, in which cargo
pilots from abroad with experience gained in planes of the air cargo wing transported equip-
World War II, who contributed greatly to the ment, armament, and ammunition from abroad
IAF effort. Meanwhile, in the thick of battle, and brought reinforcements and supplies to the
the IAF continued to train new pilots. In spite fronts. As a result, the mobility of the army was
of its small size, the young coped
air force increased. These operations emphasized the
successfully with the Egyptian Air Force in air superiority of the IAF. On January 7, 1949— at
combat and inflicted heavy losses upon it. the end of Operation Horev— this superiority
Toward the end of the war, the IAF led attacks was further demonstrated by the shooting down
on enemy forces on all fronts. During the "Ten of four Spitfires and one Tempest of the RAF,
Days" battle, the IAF supported ground forces which were flying patrols in support of Egyp-
in different operations, and its airplanes tian forces, over the battlefields of the south.
bombed Cairo. Aerial combat in the War
Independence re-
of
During the late operations of the war, the IAF sulted in the destruction of 15 Egyptian and
continued its intensive activity, shooting down two Syrian planes. The two principal Arab air
enemy planes in aerial combat, carrying troops, forces virtually ceded the skies over Israel to
leading tactical attacks, and supporting ground the Israeli Air Force.
s The Fighting Israeli Air Force
FROM THE WAR OF armored vehicles,

vessels, etc.,
500 artillery pieces, naval
began to arrive on the Middle
INDEPENDENCE TO Eastern scene. The balance of power was
decidedly tilting against Israel.
THE SINAI CAMPAIGN In 1952, the IAF acquired the last of its
propeller-driven fighters, the Mosquito. Israel
At the end of the war, most of the Machal,
could not afford to lag behind the Arabs, and
the foreign volunteers, returned to their homes,
so, in 1953, the first Meteor jets were purchased
and the IAF Command began to shape and in England. Strengthened political ties with
organize the Israeli Air Force as a permanent
France led to the procurement, in 1955, of
arm of the IDF. The first task was to create a Ouragans and, in 1956, of swept-wing Mystere
structure for training pilots and mechanics. A IVs. However, the Israeli Air Force did not suc-
most important milestone in this development ceed in closing the quantitative gap and there-
of the IAF was the formation of the Flight
fore did not withdraw piston-engine aircraft
School. Its first four graduates received their
from its tables of organization and equipment
wings That same year, the Air Force
in 1950.
or order of battle. Consequently, all systems
Technical School was also founded, with the
had to be capable of operating and maintaining
purpose of preparing ground crews and main- both modern and obsolete craft.
tenance personnel. The beginning of 1950 was
The IAF kept a constant vigil. Egyptian Air
also marked by the establishment of tactical
Force jets flew reconnaissance sorties near the
conceptions. These concepts were at the base
border and attempted to penetrate Israeli air-
of the air combat doctrine in the following order
space. One result was an aerial battle over Yad
of priority:
Mordechai in which two Egyptian Vampire jets
were shot down, followed by another skirmish
• protection of Israeli skies
in April 1956. These clashes proved the
• achievement of aerial superiority by superiority of IAF pilots, closing the quantita-
destruction of enemy airpower
tive gap by means of quality.
• participation in the ground war, transport,
and casualty evacuation
Organizationally, the IAF was structured on THE SINAI CAMPAIGN

the principle of centralized control, with three
main branches: Air (Operations), Equipment, In this campaign, Israel fought alongside its
and Manpower. Following prolonged discussion British and French allies. When the IDF
in the IDF General Staff, it was decided that entered the Sinai campaign on October 29, 1956,
the IAF was to be an independent arm, oriented the IAF employed jet formations for the first
to combat in the air and from the air. Because time. The operation included approximately 50
of budgetary limitations and the severe jet fighters and an equal number of piston-
economic straits of Israel, aircraft procurement engine fighters. Before it began, eight pairs of
abroad was directed to World War II-vintage Mustangs severed telephone lines in the Sinai
piston-engine planes: Mosquitoes and with their propeller blades after special equip-
Mustangs began to replace Messerschmitts and ment designed for the purpose failed to func-
Spitfires in the order of battle. tion. The campaign opened when 16 IAF C-47
The Arab states had not reconciled them- Dakotas dropped 395 paratroopers of the 890th
selves to the existence of Israel, and the ar- Battalion in the Mitla Pass. The planes, es-
mistice agreements were not considered as any corted by 12 Ouragans, flew at low altitude to
more than a temporary "time-out" in the war avoid Egyptian radar. With the parachute
to destroy thenew state. The Arabs began to drops in the Mitla and later at At-Tur, the
rearm with modern weapons that included jet Israeli Air Force demonstrated its striking
aircraft from Britain. Then, in 1955, Egypt attributes: mobility, speed, operational range,
signed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia under and payload capability. The Mitla drop added
which 200 Soviet jet fighters and bombers, 530 new dimensions to IDF strategic doctrine: the
Thunder in the Sky— An Overview 9
A Dassault Myst'ere IVA jet fighter-bomber. IAF during

the 1956 Sinai campaign
First seen in action with the
as an interceptor, it remained in service as a ground-support aircraft
beginning of the 1970s. Note the
to the
M4A3E8 Sherman (M50) tank mounting a 75-mm gun with a searchlight on the turret.
transfer of battle to the enemy's rear, surprise,

and the indirect approach. During the cam-
BETWEEN THE SINAI
paign, the air force was called on to support
ground forces by strafing roads and attacking
CAMPAIGN AND THE
enemy positions. The transport wing flew men, SIX-DAY WAR
equipment, and supplies. In every air battle, the
IAF demonstrated its superiority. Israeli pilots Following the Sinai campaign, the General
shot down seven Egyptian jets and scored hits Staff formulated the concept— already accepted
on two others. No Israeli fighters were lost. On by the air force— that the key to victory in war
October 31, 1956, IAF planes joined naval craft lies in the achievement of superiority in the air
in attacking and capturing the Egyptian de- over the battlefield. The criteria for the distri-
stroyer Ibrahim el-Awal. Piper Cubs of the IAF bution of defense resources were fixed accord-
did great work in facilitating effective control ingly, and priority was given to air power. At
and coordination of ground forces by transfer- the same time the IAF was formulating its own
ring senior officers from unit to unit, maintain- concept: Victory should be achieved by an air
ing communications and reconnaissance flights, attack on, and the destruction of, enemy air
and evacuating the wounded. The campaign forces in the first stage of war. The freedom of
ended with a cease-fire on November 6. the airspace over the battlefield that would thus
Fitting 127-mm rockets to P-51D Mustang.
be acquired would allow fast and efficient sup- forces were on the Sinai border separating Israel
port to the IDF ground forces. In a parallel from Egypt, and Egypt was busy with a remote
cushion, the air force also opted for the princi- war in Yemen. The Israeli Air Force continued
ple that multipurpose aircraft, both interceptor to train with its new aircraft and to develop tac-
and attack planes, should form part of the order, tics and modern weapons systems. Exercises
of battle. were held, lessons were learned, and con-
Organization of the force was determined by tingency plans were prepared. Beginning in the
the procurement of aircraft. First, all of the mid-1960s, Israel developed a large-scale pro-
piston-engine planes were withdrawn and re- gram, the National Water Carrier, which was in-
placed by additional Mysteres, Super Mysteres, tended to be a major factor in the economy of
and Vautours. In 1962 the IAF acquired the the country. The Arab countries, led by Syria,
French Dassault Mirage, one of the most made considerable efforts to prevent imple-
modern warplanes in the world at the time. The mentation of the project and, following failure
Arab countries, meanwhile, were receiving of those efforts, began to dig a canal on the
MiG-17s, 19s, and 21s, Sukhoi-7s, and TU-16 Golan Heights to divert water sources from
bombers from the Soviet Union. Israel. Border incidents were frequent. In No-
The period was characterized by tranquility vember 1964 the IAF was activated to attack
on the Egyptian border. After the Sinai cam- Syrian heavy equipment on the Golan. Tensions
paign, the waterway to Eilat was open, UN grew, and in July 1966 the Israeli Air Force
Mystere pilots receiving a final briefing before a mission.
struck at the heavy excavation equipment. in the north. Egypt publicly complied with the
There were also dogfights that claimed a Soviet request and sounded fanfares of martial
number of Syrian MiGs. trumpets. Israel, with no interest in increased
At the end of 1966, two Egyptian MiG-19s tension, repeated that it was not preparing for
were shot down on the southern frontier as they war and denied the Syrian allegations. The
attempted to shoot down a light I AF Piper fly- Israeli denials were taken by the Arabs, and pri-
ing over Israeli territory. April 1967 saw more marily by President Nasser of Egypt, as a sign
violent incidents on the Syrian border and on of weakness. The tension was further aggra-
April 7, following a Syrian artillery bombard- vated by the removal, upon Nasser's demand,
ment of targets inside Israel, the IAF was called of UN troops from the Sinai and by the closing
upon to silence the source of the gunfire. In the of the straits leading to the port of Eilat. Israel
course of the attack, two aerial battles were did everything possible to prevent war but
fought in which six Syrian MiG-21s were could not accept Egyptian forces massed on the
brought down. border and, above all, could not accept the
Israeli leaders warned the Syrians against a blockade of Eilat.
recurrence of the attacks on Israel's northern
settlements. The Syrians spread rumors of con-
centrations of Israeli forces preparing for an
assault on Syria. The Soviets and Eastern Bloc THE SIX-DAY WAR
countries "confirmed'' the concentrations, and
the Russians recommended that the Egyptians At the start, it should be noted that the Six-
mass forces on the southern border in order to Day War was the greatest feat of the IAF with
compel Israel to thin out troop concentrations the possible exception of the aforementioned
victory over the Syrian Air Force, above began to provide support to the ground forces,
Lebanon, 15 years later. The war began, on primarily by flying sorties against enemy col-
Israel's initiative, on June 5, 1967. The open- umns on the move toward Israeli lines in the
ing move was an Israeli Air Force strike on the Sinai, on both sides of the Jordan, and on the
Egyptian airfields. Within the first three hours, Golan Heights. The transports flew men,
most of Egypt's air power was destroyed. The dropped supplies by parachute, and evacuated
IAF followed up with attacks on all air forces casualties, while the light planes flew reconnais-
of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, with similar results. sance missions and operated as artillery spot-
By noon of the first day, the Israeli Air Force ters.In the IAF strikes against enemy airfields,
held unchallenged superiority on the fronts and 391 planes were destroyed and 26 airfields were
made completely unusable. Another 60 Egyp- in support of the Arabs and the resultant
tian, Syrian,Jordanian, and Iraqi aircraft were French embargo on the supply of planes and
shot down in aerial combat. On the ground I AF parts forced Israel to seek alternative sources.
planes destroyed some 500 tanks, other ve- The era of American acquisitions was heralded
hicles, gun batteries, dugouts, camps, supply by the A-4 Skyhawk, an excellent little fighter-
bases, and many radar stations. bomber that contributed greatly to the air
The Israeli Air Force conception of air supe- force's power. These were followed by the F-4
riority as thekey to victory was confirmed irre- Phantom II, the American "top-of-the-line"
futably, as was the wisdom of coping with fighter. In addition, the Israeli-built Kfir was
hostile air power on the ground in preemptive added to the IAF inventory.
strikes as a means of achieving that superior- To the IDF, the War of Attrition on the Egyp-
ity. The IAF's capability— the result of years tian front posed the problem of Israeli artillery
of planning and training— was brought into play Suez Canal. Israeli Air
inferiority along the
in the first three hours of the war. Israeli armor Force Skyhawk and Phantom jets attacked and
was free to move under skies free of hostile air- silenced Egyptian missile, anti-aircraft, and ar-
craft and, even more important, could receive tillery batteries, thereby closing the "artillery
massive air support to facilitate rapid mobility. gap." In addition, the Israeli Air Force took
Within six days, four Arab armies had been part in the IDF's daring raids behind enemy
routed, their dispositions smashed, their armor lines, some of which were well within Egyptian
destroyed, and their forces dispersed. The IAF's territory. In one such assault a complete Soviet
share in this was decisive, and the airplane radar station was transported by air to Israel.
proved to be a versatile tool for a multitude of In January 1970 the IAF undertook strategic
battlefield tasks. The IAF itself listed five bombing missions deep in the heart of Egypt,
reasons for the decisive victory: which were to hit hard at Egypt's combat capa-
bility and expose her weaknesses, weaknesses
1. Simplicity of planning and faith in that forced Egypt to demand Soviet military in-
success. volvement in the form of an anti-aircraft defense

2. Almost total compatibility of planning system, built, regulated, and controlled by
and implementation. Soviet personnel.
3. Precise execution of orders by pilots. The significant increase in Soviet involvement
4. Centralized control. did not force the IAF to discontinue attacks on
5. Precise intelligence. Egyptian positions along the Canal. On one
such patrol, on July 30, 1970, Israeli pilots, fly-
ing Phantoms and Mirages, found themselves
WAR OF ATTRITION doing battle with Soviet MiG-21s flown by So-
viet pilots, and shot down five of them— with-
AND AFTER out the loss of a single Israeli fighter.
Continuing air operations, in conjunction with
Immediately after the Six-Day War, the Zahal ground activity and the resistance of the
Israeli Air Force participated in a new kind of troops in forward strongholds, brought the
warfare— against terrorists. At the end of 1967 Egyptians to a cease-fire agreement that took
IAF planes bombed terrorist concentrations in effect on August 7, 1970. In the last stage of
Jordan and silenced Jordanian artillery that had the War of Attrition the principal problem fac-
been shelling the Jordan River Valley settle- ing IAF pilots was missile batteries supplied by
ments in Israel. Simultaneously, IAF helicop- the USSR Egyptian and Syrian armies.
to the
ters played an important role in pursuing The Air Force developed various tech-
Israeli
terroristswho had penetrated Israeli territory, nological means and combat techniques to cope
enabling ground forces to find and destroy with the enemy's new anti-aircraft weapons (as
them. Meanwhile, the IAF continued to build will be discussed later).
up its strength in planes and manpower. How- After the cease-fire agreements with Egypt
ever, Gen. Charles de Gaulle's political switch took effect, IAF pilots continued the effort of
training for types of attack and evasive

all was able to mobilize in its emergency bases,
maneuvers combat, ground support, night
in air move up to the lines, and go into battle with-
fighting, and, particularly, the attack on and out fear of attack from the air. Not a single
evasion of missile batteries. Following the cease- enemy plane penetrated Israeli airspace to at-
fire, the main operational activities were in the tack mobile columns or other targets— though
northern sector, where the air force took part not for want of trying.
in battles with the Syrian Army and in at- Once the IDF had deployed its reserves and
tacking terrorist bases under Syrian protection. had begun to repel the invaders, the air force
However, the Egyptian front was not abso- turned to attack Syrian and Egyptian positions,
lutely calm, and I AF planes occasionally had to bridges, and armor. Sorties were also flown
respond to provocations and penetrations of against enemy airfields and missile batteries.
Israeli airspace. The Syrians, having failed to attack targets in
the north, began to launch ground-to-ground
Frog missiles against civilian objectives in
Israel. The Israeli Air Force responded by at-
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR tacking economic and strategic targets in Syria,
including the General Staff, air force and navy
At the start of the Yom Kippur War, the headquarters, power stations, fuel storage
Israeli Defense Force was effectively deprived tanks, bridges, radar stations, and military
of its strategic arm— the great IAF. Now Israeli installations.
pilots had to face the greatest density and mix The Syrians were pushed back from the Golan
of air defense systems ever deployed. More than by October 10 with the help of massive air sup-
10,000 systems— including conventional port. On the next day the IDF Northern Com-
anti-aircraft guns and the latest mobile SA-6 mand opened a large-scale offensive on the
and SA-8 missiles, in addition to SA-2s and Kuneitra-Damascus road. The IAF took part
others— were physically arranged to provide a by bombing positions, gun batteries, and ar-
devastating cross fire and to cover both highl- mored columns as ground forces moved through
and low-altitude attacks. Clearly, it was a prac- the "Bulge" to within 32 kilometers of
tical example of how the power of air superior- Damascus. At this point the Israeli Air Force
ity can be substantially diminished by massive attacked airfields, forcing the Syrian Air Force
air defense. With the Israeli Air Force prac- into aerial combat in which they lost scores of
tically immobilized, Egyptian forces were able MiGs and Sukhois. In the last stage of the war
to cross the Suez Canal and establish a beach- in the north, infantrymen were landed from the
head. Although the Egyptian advantage was air on Mount Hermon and were supported
short-lived, it was a costly operation in terms throughout their assault on the Hermon posi-
of loss of life and equipment to both the IAF tions by air strikes. The IAF also attacked Iraqi
and the IDF. columns on the Golan Heights.
The war began on October 6, 1973, as a sur- On the Egyptian front, the enemy succeeded
prise attack initiated by Egypt and Syria, with in capturing all the Suez Canal line positions
a heavy artillery bombardment and air attacks apart from the "Budapest" strongpoint in the
on IDF targets on the Golan Heights and in the extreme north, but could not transfer massed
Suez Canal area. Close on the heels of the bom- armor to the Sinai because of constant harass-
bardment, Egyptian troops crossed the Canal ment from the air. A brigade-strength column
and Syrian forces broke through the IDF lines from the Egyptian Third Army attempted to
on the Golan. The few regular IDF units on both advance southward to Abu-Rodeis and At-Tur,
fronts were unable to prevent the breakthrough. but was attacked constantly by Israeli aircraft.
The IAF went into action against the Canal For five days the brigade tried to move south,
crossings in the south and the advancing but to no avail. The Egyptians finally gave up
Syrians in the north in order to block their ad- after sustaining heavy losses. On October 14,
vance long enough for the reserve army to it seemed to the Egyptians that they had
report for duty and move forward. Due to the amassed sufficient armor to attempt a break-
efforts of the IAF, the entire reserve complex through toward the central Sinai. In the tank
Thunder in the Sky—An Overview
battles that ensued, the Egyptians were pushed dan not to join the war for fear of similar
back with heavy losses. treatment.
The IAF Egypt, disrupted
hit airfields in 8. Hundreds of Syrian and Egyptian aircraft
Egyptian Air Force attempts to support their were destroyed.
ground forces, strafed convoys, and prevented
reinforcements from reaching the front. IDF The results of the war convinced the leaders of
troops encircled the Egyptian Third Army on Egypt and Syria to accept the cease-fire and the
the east bank of the Canal, and the IAF pushed later separation of forces. The Syrians, in an at-
back all Egyptian attempts to reach the trapped tempt to achieve better terms, kept up a war
units. of attrition until April 1974 (in which they were
Under pressure from the United States and the losers).
other powers, Egypt agreed to a cease-fire. With Together with the artillery duels, the IAF
Israel's agreement, the cease-fire took effect on fought aerial battles and hit targets inside
October 24. During the war, Arab losses Syria. However, both sides depended very
amounted to 450 aircraft. Egypt lost 300, 180 heavily on foreign sources for resupply of ma-
in air-to-air dogfights and others to anti-aircraft jor weapons and equipment. The Arab forces re-
missiles and guns. The Syrians lost 150 planes, ceived their replacement material by airlift from
100 of them in aerial combat. Israeli losses were the Soviet Union, and the Israelis were resup-
100 planes (nearly 25 percent of its strength) of plied by a massive airlift from the United
which six were lost in dogfights; and the re- States. Giant C-5As and C-141s of the USAF's
mainder were hit by missiles and anti-aircraft Military Airlift Command (MAC) delivered
guns. replacement Phantoms and Skyhawks, in addi-
tion to tanks and other weapons.
As a result of the Yom Kippur War, the IAF
Following the war, the IAF continued to train
was able to accomplish the following:
its personnel and to update its aircraft and
equipment, including the design of its new
1. Though the enemy achieved initial sur-
During this time, it was called
fighter, the Lavi.
prise, their air forces were unable to pene-
upon to perform a number of major missions.
trate Israeli airspace and disrupt reserve
Among these were the unprecedented rescue at
mobilization.
Entebbe, Operation Litani and other retaliatory
2. The Israeli Air Force played a major role
actions against PLO terrorists, resultant air
in the blocking actions on the Golan and
battles with the Syrians, the amazing attack on
in the Sinai.
the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and Operation Peace
3. Effective and comprehensive air support
for Galilee.
was supplied on both fronts as Israeli
ground forces turned to the offensive.
4. The enemy was prevented from bringing
up reinforcements at the critical stage of RESCUE AT ENTEBBE
the war.
5. The IAF paralyzed Egyptian and Syrian On June French commercial air-
27, 1976, a
airfields and thus prevented air assaults liner was hijacked en route from Israel to
on Israeli forces. Europe and forced to land at Entebbe in Ugan-
6. The Syrian missile system was hit hard, da, 3,600 kilometers from Israel. There were 245
while the Egyptian missiles were com- passengers, but the terrorists released the non-
pletely destroyed. Israelis and non-Jews and held the Israeli and
7. Severe damage was done to the Syrian Jewish passengers against demands for the
economic infrastructure. The IAF effec- release of terrorists from prisons in Israel and
tively destroyed its strategic and national elsewhere. The government of Israel first re-
resources: electric power stations, water sorted to diplomatic efforts. Meanwhile, Opera-
and gasoline systems, Syrian Air Force tion Jonathan, a military operation to release
and Naval Command headquarters, and the hostages, was planned. At the heart of the
the GHQ. This apparently convinced Jor- plan was the airlifting of a task force to Entebbe
in order to gain control of the airport and release Israel; but terrorist activity continued, en-
the prisoners. Once it became clear that diplo- couraged by Syria. The Baghdad Summit, in
matic efforts were not going to resolve the November 1978, aimed at torpedoing the Camp
was decided to go ahead with the mili-
crisis, it David Agreement between Israel and Egypt,
tary action. On the night of July 3, 1976, four added fuel to flames. In response to the contin-
IAF C-130 Hercules aircraft, escorted much of uing terrorism, and particularly after the
the way by Phantoms, landed at Entebbe with Nahariya raid in which Israeli children were
the task force. In the ensuing action seven killed, the IAF was called in to strike at terror-
terrorists and 20 opposing Ugandan soldiers ist targets in Lebanon. The Israeli Air Force
were killed. The Israelis also destroyed 1 1 Ugan- played a part in the military policy of combined
dan MiG-17s and MiG-21s. The element of sur- activity, both in response to terrorist raids and
prise was the key factor. The hostages were as a preventive measure.
released and brought home, receiving medical
care on the planes on the way.
SUBSEQUENT AERIAL
OPERATION LITANI BATTLES
On March 11, 1978, a PLO terrorist unit Motivated by interests Lebanon, opposition
in
landed by sea and moved onto the Tel Aviv- to the peace treaty with Egypt, and internal
Haifa highway. Gaining control over a busload problems, Syria took measures likely to hamper
of daytrippers, they tried to enter Tel Aviv IAF freedom of action in Lebanon. The Syrian
while firing indiscriminately at traffic on the objective was to prevent IAF activity in
road. In a rescue operation 34 people were killed Lebanon, even at the cost of losing Syrian air-
and many more injured. In response to this raid craft. On five occasions, aerial battlestook place
it was decided to occupy southern Lebanon and and resulted in the following Syrian losses:
clean out the terrorist nests. In a combined
operation, between March 15 and 21, armor, air- 1. June 27, 1979: five MiG-21s were shot
borne, and other units moved north while IAF down.
planes attacked terrorist targets, artillery 2. September 24, 1979: four MiG-21s were
batteries, etc., and interceptor aircraft patrolled downed.
the area, protecting both their comrades on 3. October 24, 1980: two MiGs were shot
strafing and bombing missions and the ground down.
forces from enemy aircraft. The air force also 4. February 13, 1981: one MiG was brought
provided aerial photography and reconnais- down.
sance. Transport planes and helicopters took
part in the operation, movingmen and supplies, All of these actions underlined the IAF's aerial
maintaining communications, evacuating superiority.
wounded, and so forth. Some 300 terrorists were
killed in this operation. The Israeli Air Force
sustained no losses; two planes were slightly
damaged but returned safely to base.
HONORING THE CAMP
DAVID AGREEMENT
AIR ATTACKS IN WITH EGYPT
LEBANON In conformity with the peace treaty with
Egypt, by which it was agreed that Israel would
After Operation Litani, Israeli forces with- evacuate the Sinai with American help, the con-
drew from southern Lebanon, and UN forces struction of alternative airfields in the Negev
moved in to prevent terrorist action against began, at Nevetim, Mashabim, Ramon, and Ov-
da.During 1979-80, IAF airfields at Refidim, attack the atomic reactor under construction
Atour, Santa-Katherina, and elsewhere were near Baghdad in Iraq. Precision bombing placed
evacuated from the Sinai. In total approxi- accurate hits directly into the reactor core and
mately 600 structures were moved, with 200 left delayed its completion date by three to five
behind because of an inability to displace them. years. All IAF planes returned safely to base.
THE IRAQI NUCLEAR The next major milestone in the relatively

REACTOR short history of the IAF was Operation Peace
for Galilee inLebanon, which began this over-
On June 7, 1981, IAF
American-built F-15 view. This and all the operations sketched here
and F-16 fighters, bearing the blue Israeli six- will be covered in greater detail in the pages
pointed star, flew over three hostile nations to that follow: the exciting saga of the IAF.
Chapter 2
The War of Independence,
1948
The true origin of the IAF can be traced back regular armies. With no suitable aircraft
to World War II. Under neither Turkish nor available, the multitude of complex problems in-
later British rule did the Jews develop air train- herent in attempting to build an air force from
ing to any really significant extent. Although scratch were of utmost concern to the Jewish
some Palestinian Jews were flying light planes leaders. They began a frantic worldwide search
and gliders during the 1920s and 1930s, the for combat and transport planes and for trained
British refused to train them as members of men to fly them.
combat aircrews— even during World War II. While the victorious Allies were scrapping,
When the war broke out thousands of Jews burning, and junking war-surplus arms and
flocked to local recruiting offices, but all the munitions by the millions of tons all over the
volunteers to the RAF were shuffled to ground world, the British blockade on arms supplies to
crew and support services, and only the most Jewish Palestine made the purchase of any sort
persistent later made it to flight school. Of the of aircraft extremely difficult and hazardous.
30 or so who did receive flight training from the Although American public opinion sided with
RAF or one of the Commonwealth air forces, the Jewish cause, the U.S government observed
three laterbecame IAF commanders— Aharon a very strict embargo on arms exports to the
Remez, Dan Tolkovsky, and Ezer Weizman. Middle East, and anyone caught smuggling
Remez and Tolkovsky served in RAF fighter arms out of the country faced being charged
squadrons, but Weizman got his wings too late with committing a major federal offense. Euro-
to see combat. pean countries also observed this rule, mainly
During the war, the Jewish underground in as a result of British pressure. Meanwhile,
Palestine created a small contingent of flyers parked on airfields throughout the United
who secretly photographed almost the entire States were thousands of surplus aircraft of all
country from the air. Concentrating on pro- kinds and sizes, some of which had never actual-
spective landing grounds near isolated Jewish ly seen active service. The U.S. government,
settlements, especially in the Negev Desert, this anxious to help war veterans and also wishing
survey was of great use in airlifting troops
aerial to expand the civilian aircraft industry and ser-
and supplies during the War of Liberation in vices, sold these planes at a small fraction of
1948. their original cost to pilots wanting to set up
As the end of the British Mandate loomed and their own charter air companies.
with it the evacuation of the British troops, the One of these ambitious American veterans
Jewish leadership was forced to prepare to de- willing to try his luck was Al Schwimmer. A
fend the Yishuv (the Jewish population in placid flight engineer with much experience in
Palestine) against the threat of invading Arab the World War II Transport Command,
19
Schwimmer approached the Haganah (as the up the momentum Balak airlift, addi-
of the
IDF was called before the State of Israel was tional transport aircraft were urgently needed,
proclaimed) purchasing mission in New York and the airworthy C-46s bought by Schwimmer
with the idea of buying surplus transports and were flown to Europe as soon as possible.
bombers and flying them out to Israel im- From Independence Day, May 15, 1948, to
mediately after its declaration of independence May 29 when the first Bf-109s were put into ser-
in 1948. His first acquisitions on behalf of the vice, Israeli airspacewas completely controlled
budding air force were three Lockheed Con- by enemy Arab air forces. The north and center
stellation four-engine transports at $5,000 each. of the country were dominated by the Syrians
He then set about recruiting experienced air- and Iraqis, and the region from Tel Aviv to the
crews and technicians to recondition the planes. south became the hunting ground of the Egyp-
(Schwimmer's aircraft-renovating operation tians. While the Syrian and Iraqi air forces were
continued and expanded in Israel, eventually still rather backward— flying mainly Harvard
developing into the Israel Aircraft Industries). fighters— the Egyptian Air Force contained all
The Western powers' embargo on vital arms the elements required for a modern force.
supplies for the new country forced the Jewish Founded in the early 1930s with the help of the
leaders to look for other sources. Ironically, the RAF, some of its pilots had seen combat dur-
saviors of that period were the Eastern Bloc ing World War II and were qualified to form the
countries, such as Czechoslovakia and staff, command, and training nucleus of its
Yugoslavia, who, with Russian endorsement force. On the eve of the invasion of Israel the
and for payment much-sought-after
in Egyptian Air Force consisted of two fighter
American dollars, sold arms and services to the squadrons (about 40 Spitfires) and two trans-
hard-pressed Jews (and to the Arabs as well). port squadrons (C-46s and C-47s), some of which
In March 1948, the underground purchasing had been equipped as medium bombers. The El
mission in Czechoslovakia bought some surplus Arish air base became the operational head-
Messerschmitt Bf-109s that the Czech factory quarters for the attacks on the Jewish state.
at Prag-Cakovice had manufactured for the Ger- To oppose the attacking Arabs, the Israelis
mans during the war. With the rise of the Com- could muster only three flights of light planes,
munist government, the Czechoslovakian Air mainly Auster army liaison aircraft. Though
Force was equipped with more modern Russian these were useful for transporting supplies and
planes, and the dollar-hungry Czechs welcomed casualties and supporting isolated settlements
the opportunity for a lucrative deal. Thus, the while the RAF still ruled the skies, they were
Jews who had served with the Allied forces and now at the mercy of the Arab pilots.
flown British Spitfires againstGerman Messer- The Arabs wasted no time in taking ad-
schmitts would now be flying Messerschmitts vantage of their position. Early on Inde-
against Spitfires in the hands of their enemies. pendence Day, Egyptian Spitfires attacked the
But first these precious aircraft had somehow main IAF base at Sde Dov just north of Tel
to reach Israel— and fast. To dismantle, crate, Aviv, damaging the field and three planes. The
and transport them by sea was out of the ques- Egyptian Air Force pilots flew low over Tel
tion, the earliest they could arrive would be Aviv, bombing and strafing the nearly
three months after packing, much too late to be defenseless city. Their self-confidence proved
effective in the forthcoming battles. The only exaggerated, however, when in an attack later
possible solution was to transport the in the day a Spitfire was shot down by anti-air-
Messerschmitts by air. craft fire and the pilot captured. In general,
The Bf-109 to leave for Israel in May
first however, during the first weeks of the war the
1948 was dismantled and transported in a Arab pilots roamed freely all over Israel, attack-
chartered American Skymaster in the airlift ing targets at will, unopposed from the air.
code-named Operation Balak. A number of During this time, the IAF was also stepping
volunteer pilots and Czech technicians accom- up its activity, though operating mainly at
panied the dismantled planes to reassemble night to avoid the Arab fighters. The lightly
them in Israel, and by the end of May a num- armed Israeli planes flew close-support missions
ber of fighters were ready for action. To step in aid of hard-pressed troops and settlers in all
The War of Independence 21
Messerschmitt Bf -109s purchased by Israel from Czechoslovakia.
parts of the country. For many settlements, es- changes in personnel came dramatic develop-
pecially in the Negev,which was cut off from ments in equipment as well as in its fighting
the north by the invading Egyptian army, the capabilities.
planes of the IAF were the sole means of sup- By the end of May 1948, the Czech techni-
port and supply. cians at Ekron airfield had completed the
With all restrictions to immigration now re- assembly of four Messerschmitts, and an attack
moved, the IAF was quickly undergoing impor- was planned on the Egyptian Air Force field at
tant changes with the influx of highly El-Arish in the north Sinai, from which the
experienced volunteers from abroad. Coming Egyptian attacks on Tel Aviv originated. As
mainly from English-speaking countries, these the Israeli planes were preparing to take off on
fliers rapidly occupied key positions on the staff their mission, an urgent call was received for
and as flying personnel in the force, and English help in stopping Egyptian armored columns
soon became almost exclusively the operational that had advanced to a point along the coastal
language of the air force. Along with these road only 32 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.
Loading jeeps into a Curtiss C-46 commando transport during Operation Dustbowl, autumn 1948. This airlift
brought in some 1500 men and 2500 tons of materiel to the beleaguered Negev settlements in 417 sorties-
preparing the way for the offensive that liberated the whole of southern Israel and entrapped an Egyptian brigade
in the Faluga Pocket (including Maj. Gamal Abdel Nasser).
The four aircraft took off, flown by two Israeli bailed out over a Jewish settlement on the
pilots (one of them Ezer Weizman), and two vol- coast, shouting down frantically in Yiddish to
unteers. They dived on the surprised Egyptians save his from the angry settlers who took
life
coming in from the direction of the sea and him for an Arab. At that time the Jewish
bombed the column. Little actual damage was farmers did not even know that they had fighter
caused, but the resulting confusion succeeded aircraft!
in stopping the advance. During this sortie one But the Messerschmitts continued to enter
plane, flown by a South African volunteer, was service at the rate of one or two a day. On June
brought down by anti-aircraft fire, and another 3, the Israelis won the first of their aerial vic-
crash-landed at the base. The Israeli Air Force tories. In time,such victories began to indicate
had lost 50 percent of its strength on its first a measure of yet not serious-
air superiority as
mission. It was soon down to one serviceable ly threatened. That evening two Egyptian Air
plane after losing yet another near Natanya in Force Dakotas began what had become routine
an attack on an Iraqi armored column ap- bombing runs over Tel Aviv, when an IAF
proaching the coast from Tulkarem. When his Messerschmitt flown by Mody Allon suddenly
aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire, the pilot dived on them, shooting down one immediate-
ly.The other fled but did not get far and was IAF had emerged as a factor with which the
downed by the same Bf-109. From that time the Arab air forces had to reckon.
Egyptian Air Force ceased bombing Tel Aviv The IAF took great advantage of that first
almost completely and confined itself to attacks month-long truce for an extensive reorgani-
on remote and defenseless settlements. zation, establishing an Air Transport Command
The next day three Egyptian ships ap- to coordinate airlift capabilities, and sending a
proaching the Tel Aviv shore with their guns group of pilots abroad for advanced training,
blazing were counterattacked by an assortment among other things. When the truce broke
of IAF light planes. While scoring only one down on July 8, the IAF sent its meager forces
bomb hit, the aircraft drove off the Egyptian on attacks reaching from Faluga in the Negev
vessels, suffering the loss of one plane and its to Mishmar Hayarden in the north. Approxi-
crew. After these victories, in the air and mately one month earlier, Al Schwimmer had
against naval units, the IAF rapidly gained acquired four B-17 heavy bombers as well as
confidence andits makeshift bombers attacked some A-20 medium bombers at surplus dumps
Ramallah, Amman, and Damascus. By the on- in Oklahoma and Florida. Though stripped of
set of the first truce on June 10, 1948, the IAF their military equipment, they were in relatively
had become a full-fledged air force. Though good flying condition. Because of the urgency
usually engaged in tactical "fire-fighting" mis- of the situation, it was decided to smuggle the
sions without an overall strategic objective, the planes out of the United States as fast as pos-
The first 1 AF fighter pilots of the first fighter squadron, stationed at Herzlia Airfield, discussing tactics prior
to takeoff on a combat mission. Ezer Weizman, later Israel's defense minister, then a young fighter pilot, makes
his point.
sible,without even attempting to receive per- to take charge. In July orders were received to
mission from the authorities. On June 12, 1948, fly the bombers out to Israel, bombing Cairo en
three of the four B-17s were ready at Miami route, but the planes were far from ready to fly
International Airport. The fourth was delayed a combat mission. Of the three planes, only one
by technical problems. The planes did not at- had a makeshift oxygen system put together
tract undue attention among the numerous from welder's oxygen tanks. This was also the
and
flights of ex-military aircraft at that time, only aircraft with a bombsight. Rudimentary
the formation took off for Milville, New Jersey, bomb releases were installed, together with a
the first leg in the long flight which ran north motley collection of instruments, making the
through Greenland, then southeast to Zatec, whole project precarious and unreliable. But
Czechoslovakia. urgency threw caution to the winds, and Kurtz
Volunteer technicians at Zatec, working on decided to fly the mission despite the diffi-
the Messerschmitts acquired in Czechoslovakia, culties.

set about rearming the arriving bombers with After a briefing at the Stalingrad Hotel in
jerry-rigged guns. Ray Kurtz, a former USAAF Zatec and last-minute instructions for the long
bomber squadron commander in the European flight ahead, the three bombers took off, loaded
theater of operations, was flown in from Israel to maximum with fuel and bombs. Trouble hit
Three of the first IAF-trained fighter pilots spring of 1949. These flyers began flight training on light
in the
They continued their training during the War of Indepen-
civilian planes before the establishment of the State.
dence, but received their wings only after the fighting ended.
them almost as soon as they were airborne. Im- northern Sinai on their way to Israel.
mediately after takeoff, Kurtz lost one engine, As he put his aircraft into a steady climb to
and the artificial horizon gave out. Then the air use the commercial airliner flight paths to
pressure fell, rocking the aircraft in the sky. As Egypt, trouble struck Kurtz again. At 7,500
if this were not enough, the bombers ran into meters the navigator suddenly fell unconscious
bad weather over the Alps and lost each other over his chart table. Other crew members
in heavy cloud turbulence. Skirting the Alba- fainted soon after. Beginning to feel queasy
nian coast, they were fired upon by anti-aircraft himself, Kurtz realized that the pressure and
batteries of the ever suspicious Albanians. concentration of the welder's oxygen were ap-
Fighting to bring their rocking planes through parently inadequate. He then brought the ship
the stormy skies, the exhausted pilots finally down to 4,500 meters until all the crew re-
emerged into clear weather over the Mediterra- covered. In order not to lose precious time, he
nean and, to their relief, located each other ordered everyone onto emergency oxygen and
again. Reaching the Greek islands, the forma- then regained altitude, but there was no way of
tion parted company. Only Kurtz was flying to knowing if the supply would last, expended at
Cairo; the other two pilots were making bomb- that rate, through the run over Cairo.
ing runs over Egyptian bases located in the When they reached the African coastline 160
A B-17G over the Mediterranean. The midsection upper gun turret is missing and the direction-finder aerial
seen here was not standard on USAAF B-17s.
kilometers west of the Nile Delta, the crew took Damascus. However, the Arab pilots avoided
action stations, some still faint from lack of ox- airencounters and concentrated on hit-and-run
ygen. Homing in on the RAF Fayid radio attacks against isolated settlements in Israel.
beacon in the Canal Zone, they saw Cairo below This pattern of air warfare continued until the
them, fully lit and unaware of the impending end of the war, the IAF steadily becoming more
danger. Making his run over the Royal Palace, powerful and aggressive and the Arabs restrict-
the bombardier directed the plane on target and ing themselves to isolated bombing attacks and
released the bombs. Although some 2.5 tons of engaging only in unavoidable dogfights.
high explosives were dropped, mainly around One IAF worthy of special note was the
effort
the Abadin Palace, physical damage was not airlift of soldiers and munitions to the Negev
heavy. However, the psychological impact of in preparation for the final offensive against the
surprising the Egyptian defenses was immense, Egyptian Army positioned in the Gaza Strip
and public pressure forced the army to devote and El Arish. During two months of intensive
much more of its combat resources to defending flying, Air Transport Command made over 400
Cairo. flights, delivering 5,000 tons of equipment and
As the bombs fell Pilot Kurtz felt a sharp carrying more than 10,000 passengers.
lurch as the suddenly lighter bomber gathered As the war was coming to a close, a strange
speed. Pushing the nose down he set course for series of events took place. Early in 1949, the
Israel and landed at the Ekron airfield in the road to the Suez Canal seemed unobstructed as
south at 2245 local time. the Israeli troops advanced swiftly into the
On that day, July 14, the Israeli Air Force Sinai, pushing the remnants of the Egyptian
received a major reinforcement when the three Army back through their last defenses.
B-17 Flying Fortresses landed. Now flying However, the British still maintained large
"real" bombers, the IAF carried out numerous forces in the Canal Zone and, acting under the
strikes against objectives from Cairo to 12-year-old Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, they deliv-
ered an ultimatum demanding immediate Israeli El Auga-Beersheva road and then turned north
withdrawal from Egyptian territory. (This was Gaza-Rafah area.
to fly in the direction of the
in sharp contrast, to say the least, to their Mistaking them for Egyptian planes, Israeli
apathy toward the Arab invasion of Israel in ground troops opened fire, but missed.
May 1948— even though the British still re- However, one Spitfire was hit over Rafah, per-
tained military control of the northern area!) haps by Egyptian fire, and the pilot bailed out,
Faced with the British ultimatum and landing near Israeli troops.
numerous political threats, especially from the Circling overhead, watching their comrade
United States, the Israelis halted their advance descend, the remaining British Spitfires were
near El Arish. suddenly pounced upon by Israeli Spitfires.
To verify Israeli compliance with the ulti- Two RAF aircraft were downed at once. One
matum, the RAF flew several photo recon- crashed, its pilot dead at the controls. Another
naissance missions close to the Israeli border crash-landed in the dunes,its pilot survived and
on the morning of January 7, 1949. Flying un- returned to his base with the help of Bedouins.
disturbed, they carried out their mission and The dogfight was short and sharp, as the
returned to their base in the Canal Zone. But Israelis quickly broke away with nearly empty
a more extensive mission was flown later the fuel tanks.
same day. Six Mk-XVIII Spitfires of the 208th Although taking an active part in the air war
Middle East Tactical Squadron roared low over since the beginning, Ezer Weizman, the new
the desert and entered Israeli airspace over the operations officer of the fighter squadron (later
The Fighting Israeli Air Force
28
rr -
itnr-
these entered service with the

Maintenance crews reconditioning a Spitfire Mk-IX. The first of ^rt Bren
1948, when an Egyptian Spitfire crash-landed on the
beach after being hit by a lucky shot from an
heaps on abandoned RAF airfields, the fighter
gunner on a roof in northern Tel A viv. Using parts found in scrap
was refitted to fly again.
to become the IAF commander), had yet to added that he too had brought down a British
shoot down an enemy plane, a feat many of his fighter.
pilots had achieved both in World War II and Now that the cease-fire with the Egyptians
in the air battles over Israel. From his office at was about to come into effect, Weizman saw his
the airfield at Hatzor, Weizman watched a flight last chance for a personal victory in the war.
of Spitfires return and land. One of the pilots, Quickly convincing headquarters that a final
a Canadian volunteer, casually sauntered over "show the flag" patrol over El Arish would be
to him and reported shooting down a Spitfire, valuable, Weizman took off immediately, closely
adding just as casually and almost as an after- followed by three other pilots. Climbing to 2,000
thought, "a British Spitfire." Catching his meters they reached the border area and saw
breath for several moments in astonishment, eight unknown aircraft approaching from the
Weizman was amazed at the audacity of the west. They were soon identified as British Spit-
pilots in striking at the mighty empire that on- fires and Tempests crossing into Israeli
ly a few months earlier had ruled his country. airspace.
But he agreed wholeheartedly with the pilot's Attacking from above, the four Israeli Spit-
reasoning for his action. To retain air sover- fires closed quickly onto the tails of the British
eignty, a country must keep out all intruding aircraft. One immediately trailed smoke and
foreign warplanes. Later in the day another crash-landed; the others scattered, with the
pilot came in and reported that the British were Israelis in hot pursuit. The RAF pilots seemed
trying to locate their missing aircraft, and inexperienced, whereas the Israelis, being old
An Egyptian Spitfire, brought down by ground fire at Ashod, being examined by Israeli technicians.
hands at the game, picked them off like sitting Mosquitos on a French Air Force base at
ducks. Finding himself alone,Weizman pursued Chateaudun, where they stood waiting to be
a British Spitfire climbing away from the bat- sold for scrap. A group of technicians was flown
tle and opened fire with his two 20-mm guns. over to prepare them for transfer to Israel. This
The British craft turned over and went down, time the French cooperated and the work pro-
crash-landing near El Arish. The pilot, unin- gressed smoothly. The reconditioned aircraft
jured but thoroughly shaken, walked away. were tested by the highly experienced British
Soon afterwards the cease-fire put an end to volunteer John Harvey, a gentile who held the
hostilities. However, following the War of Inde- rank of captain in the Israeli Air Force. On one
pendence the Israeli Air Force continued to of these test flights hisMosquito went down in
enlarge and upgrade its inventory of aircraft. a spin, killing this brave man. In this crash the
The remaining Mk-IX Spitfires purchased from young air force lost one of its most skillful
the Czechs during the war were delivered early pilots. Harvey had contributed immensely to
in 1949, bringing the total of IAF
planes to 50. the building of the IAF in its first years by fly-
A number of additional Spitfires, of the more ing a collection of motley aircraft to Israel from
advanced model HF Mk-IX, were obtained from all over Europe and passing on his vast knowl-
the Italian Air Force, enabling the IAF to phase edge and experience to the young Israeli pilots.
out the unreliable Messerschmitts. An early commander of the air force was an
While looking for suitable aircraft to fill the RAF-trained pilot named Aharon Remez, who
various needs of an expanding air force, the pur- envisaged the growth of the air force to a size
chasing mission came across a few hundred enabling it to perform missions beyond the per-
"
A pair of Spitfires taking off from a northern Israeli air base. The aircraft on the right is already "tucking-in
his undercarriage.
ception of his superiors at that time. The Israeli Laskov (1951-53) resigned over differences in
High Command's concept of the future air force budgetary concepts.
was that of a medium-size air corps for use in Though the IAF commanders were eager to
supporting role in much the same way as they equip their first-line squadrons with jets, 25 ex-
regarded the Armored Corps. But this was not Swedish Air Force P-51 Mustangs were pur-
Remez's view; his ideas went far beyond this. chased as interim replacements for some of the
He foresaw the creation of an offensive weapon Spitfires. It was therefore around the Mustang
with the main objective of achieving air superi- and Mosquito, thoroughly proven and highly ef-
ority before rendering offensive support to fective weapons in their time, that the early
ground troops. Eventually these very objectives multirole fighter-bomber concept was con-
became the basic doctrine of the IAF, but the ceived.
more pressing problems in the eyes of the High In 1954 Dan Tolkovsky, a former RAF pilot
Command were organizational. With this in and one of the few Palestinian Jews to achieve
mind, GHQ appointed nonflying army officers officer status, became commander of the IAF.
as the next two air force commanders. Lack of Under his leadership, the air force lost the
agreement on the organization and shape of the temporary and makeshift atmosphere that had
air force and disputes over budget priorities characterized it from the beginning and became
severely complicated the development of the air a highly disciplined and professional fighting
force during the early 1950s. Two air force com- force. By then the veteran volunteers had gone
manders, Aharon Remez (1948-50) and Haim back to their countries of origin, and young, en-
thusiastic Israelis joined the IAF. The early Day War, and from which both parties profited,
models of organization were on the lines of prov- militarily and politically.
en RAF procedures, but soon a completely new On the "other side of the hill" things looked
style was devised to suit the conditions pre- very different. The low-level guerrilla war that
vailing in Israel and the Middle East. The best had been going on for years increased in inten-
pilots and commanders were sent abroad for ad- sity and volume with time. Early in 1955, after
vanced courses, mainly to Britain. a series of Israeli retaliatory attacks on Egyp-
It was under Tolkovsky that the IAF devel- tian army positions in the Gaza Strip and Khan
oped the concept of a force relying solely on Yunis that caused serious losses in men and
multipurpose fighter planes to be operated in prestige, President Nasser resolved to build an
two successive stages: first, the seizure of air armed force capable of overcoming the Israelis
superiority and, second, tactical support of land in any future conflict. In August 1955 he con-
and naval operations. In the Middle East, where cluded an arms deal with the Czechs, en-
most weapons were imported and the wars brief, couraged by the Soviets, that would completely
the effects of "strategic" bombing were too modernize the Egyptian armed forces. Acquir-
slow. The heavy bomber was therefore not a ing large numbers of MiG-15 fighters, the EAF
priority item for the IAF. was rebuilt into a modern all-jet force, stationed
The IAF started to phase out the last of the on air bases abandoned by the British in their
veteran Spitfires after it obtained its first jets, recent evacuation of the Canal Zone.
Gloster Meteors, from Belgium and Great Bri- The massive Egyptian modernization, backed
tain in 1954. Thirty of the Spitfires were sold by the Soviet bloc, presented a potential threat
to Burma, but the Israelis were faced with the that had to be countered quickly if Israel wished
problem of delivery. Since the Arabs would to retain air superiority. As the French Ouragan
refuse overflight and refueling privileges to any was somewhat inferior to the MiG-15, the
plane that they knew originated in Israel, the Israelis had to choose between the Dassault
Israeli aircraft were painted in Burmese colors Mystere IIC, which could be supplied imme-
and flown to Sicily.From there a British charter diately, or wait for the newly designed Mystere
company was to flythem to Burma with false IVA, which would not be available until early
flight plans indicating that they came directly 1956. After intense deliberations and a visit to
from Britain. However, several aircraft crash- France by senior IAF officers to watch test
landed on the way to Burma, and the story flights of the Mystere IVA, the IAF com-
leaked out. The planes were then refitted with manders decided to wait; and as time showed,
long-range fuel tanks and flown via an alter- their patience was handsomely rewarded. The
native route over Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Mystere IVA proved to be more than a match
and East Pakistan, eventually reaching Burma. for any Soviet fighter in the area at the time,
The Israelis were now in the market for more and it was to stay in service for a long time, fly-
modern and sophisticated jet aircraft. The ing countless missions with great effectiveness.
acquisition of advanced jet aircraft presented The IDF now had its hands full. The threat
political as well as financial problems that were of the Soviet buildup of Egypt's arsenal, in-
not easy to solve. After the failure of nego- creasing terrorist raids into Israel from both the
tiations for the purchase of Canadian-manu- Sinai and Jordan, Egyptain artillery shelling of
factured F-86 Sabre jets, the Israelis turned to Jewish settlements along the Gaza Strip, and
France, whose problems with the Arabs in Israel's repeated reprisal raids kept the IDF
North Africa were expected to influence very busy maintaining a semblance of normal
favorably the political consideration of the deal. peacetime life. On April 12, 1956, the first clash
Negotiations were completed successfully for between Egyptian and Israeli jets occurred,
the purchase of sturdy Dassault Ouragan resulting in an Egyptian Vampire being shot
fighter-bombers in 1955. This deal marked the down by Meteors and crashing on Israeli terri-
beginning of the era of Franco-Israeli friendship tory. The Sinai War loomed ahead.
and cooperation that was to last until the Six-
Chapter 3
The Sinai Campaign, 1956
The Sinai campaign, which was intended to Dakotas, escorted by Mysteres and Meteors, to
break the Egyptian blockade of the Tiran the Mitla Pass, where paratroopers would be
Straits leading to Eilat and to eliminate the ter- dropped. Prior to that the Mustangs would be
rorist attacks from the Gaza Strip, was coordi- assigned to cut the Egyptian telephone lines in
nated with an Anglo-French operation to and around the Mitla area, in order to preserve
capture the recently nationalized Suez Canal. At the atmosphere of total surprise. Following the
the specific request of Prime Minister Ben detailed briefing Mustang crews were sent to
Gurion, two French Mystere IV squadrons were Lod to pick up another seven Mustangs from
brought to Israel to protect civilian targets storage at what was then known as the Aircraft
from possible attack by Egyptian IL-28 jet Overhaul Facility— now headquarters for Israel
bombers while the Israeli fighters were engaged Aircraft Industries. The Mustangs arrived at
in the offensive. As it turned out, the Egyptain Ekron with neither armament nor sights, and
Air Force was in no condition to pose a threat squadron mechanics had to work furiously all
to towns in Israel, but the fear of a repeat per- night to ready them for combat.
formance of May 1948, when the Egyptians The line-cutting teams had been selected on
ruled the skies over Israel, was everpresent in the morning of October 29. Two pairs of
the minds of the Jewish leaders and was to re- Mustangs would go out, headed by Zachik, the
main so even later, notwithstanding the argu- squadron CO, and Harry, his deputy. Zachik's
ments of the IAF commanders. Number Two was Rabbit; Harry's wingman
Identified by the code name Operation was a young but widely experienced pilot nick-
Kadesh,* the Sinai campaign opened with a dar- named Cheetah, a graduate of the first IAF
ing mission deep behind enemy lines. Four pro- Flight School pilot course. Harry, with his thick
peller-driven P-51 Mustang fighters, retreads mustache and thicker English accent, was to
from World War II, had been given a strange earn the nickname "Harry the Cutter" as a
assignment that would take them dangerously result of his part in the operation.
close to several enemy MiG bases. After days The four pilots were carefully briefed. They
of grueling training and nerve-wracking were to approach the targets at 30 meters— high
waiting, the day finally arrived: October 29, enough to avoid dragging their cutter cables,
1956. The day before, the four pilots scheduled but low enough to avoid being spotted by Egyp-
to take part in the operation were summoned tian radar. One pair was assigned to a target
to a briefing. There, they were informed that 10 kilometers east of Suez City, and the other
within 24 hours Israel would be at war with to a spot 30 kilometers east of the Mitla Pass.
Egypt. The first stage would be the dispatch of Navigation would be done by the configuration
of desert hills and streambeds rather than by
*IAF activities were specifically designated Opera- (nonexistent) roads. Takeoff was scheduled for
tion Machbesh ("Press"). 1400; at the last moment, this was delayed to
33
1415. Since a prerequisite for the operation's Their fears were to prove ungrounded: At 300
success was absolute radio silence, the four meters they could clearly see the then brand-
coordinated visual signals. A waggle of wings new Mystere jets escorting them into battle. Of
meant "Come closer "; a thumb pointed back- course, the Mustangs, too, were intended to pro-
ward meant "How's my cable?" The last ques- tect the paratroopers, but not by their physical
tion was answered by either thumb up or thumb presence. Rather, they would prevent the news
down— "Cable OK" or "Cable torn off." of their landing from reaching the Egyptian rear
Each pilot was issued what was then the stan- lines during the 48 hours to come, hours critical
dard IAF survival kit: a pistol, a knife, an over- for the success of the entire campaign.
all, two ammunition clips, a Mae West life At 1435 hours Zachik and Rabbit took off
jacket, a heliograph, combat rations, first-aid without trouble and headed for the Sinai. Before
kits including morphine, and— of course— the them lay a 150-minute flight to their target,
"lucky scarf," a vividly colored silk scarf worn near Temed, east of the Mitla Pass. Harry and
loosely around the neck. All documents except Cheetah's target— near Suez City on the
their International Pilot's Certificates, recog- Canal— was even farther away, necessitating a
nized by the Geneva Convention, were left full three hours in the air. As they raced toward
behind. As the pilots strode to their aircraft- their targets at 30 meters, the ground poured
one Swedish and three Italian Mustangs- out beneath them at an amazing rate.
ready for the first combat mission of the war, Near the Ramon Crater, Harry and Cheetah
they were understandably tense. The tension executed their first scheduled turn, from south
dissolved into laughter soon afterward: Enter- to west-southwest, and flew 16 kilometers south
ing the aircraft, they were surprised to discover to the main road into the Sinai. Once they
that the water-filled cushions designed to block crossed this road, their entire navigational pro-
the shock of cable impact had heated up in the cedure would be based on streambeds and hills,
sunlight and were nearly at the boiling point. with no other roads in sight.
Harry, the perpetual Englishman, did not waste The ground streams under the Mustangs at
a moment. "Anyone want a cup of tea?" he a staggering rate. Harry flashes the thumbs-up
smiled, pointing to the steaming cushions. signal at Cheetah, who responds in kind: Both
The pilots started their engines and rolled to cables are still intact. The pair is cruising at 320
the last checkpoint. There they were met by a Km/h, slowed by their cables to 80 Km/h below
6X6 truck bearing the cutter cables. Two the Mustang's usual cruising speed, but fast
teams jumped down from the truck and enough for Harry and Cheetah. The aircraft are
attached the cables to the first pair of armed with 12.7-mm machine guns (MGs) and
Mustangs. Cheetah's aircraft, its motor roaring, are full of ammunition. True, HQ hasn't autho-
raced down the runway and lifted off. Behind rized opening fire, but sometimes you have to
it, the cable tossed back and forth a moment on fire anyway. . . .
the runway, then climbed into the sky behind Suddenly Harry waggles his wings. Cheetah
the Mustang. Now it was Harry's turn. Down closes in, astounded to see that his Number
the runway he roared, making a lovely takeoff, One's thumb is pointed down. Cheetah's cable
but, to his astonishment, the cable tore off and has snapped. Chances of success are now 50 per-
remained behind on the runway. Making as cent at best, but the pair has already reached
tight a turn as possible, Harry came back, the Mitla area and it is pointless even to think
landed and rolled back to the checkpoint, where of going back at this stage. Nearing the target,
a spare cable was attached. The second time, the they climb to 900 meters, skimming along the
takeoff went off without a hitch. streambeds between the hilltops. Suddenly, the
As
the second pair readied for its takeoff 20 landscape opens up as if by magic and the Suez
minutes later, the runway was lined with dozens Canal plain spreads out before them, with the
of apprehensive paratroopers heading for the Gulf of Suez gleaming 20 kilometers away.
Uakotas that were to take them into the Sinai. The pair drops lower and lower, to a bare 30
Some, glancing at the Mustangs, apparently meters. Within minutes, their target is below
thought that these outmoded aircraft were all them— in the heart of enemy territory, hundreds
the IAF could offer in the way of an escort. of kilometers from home, and only minutes
The Sinai Campaign 35
away from three Egyptian bases well

air scant kilometers from Suez City and its defend-
stocked with MiGs. On the outskirts of Suez ing MiGs. Revving his engine up to 3,000 rpm,
City, the telephone cables stretch out below the Harry went in for the kill.
Mustangs, almost inviting them to come down On the first pass, with Cheetah following,
and "have a go." Harry rushed toward the cables at 320 Km/h.
Harry continues the story: However, at the last second, pilot instinct took
over; instead of tearing through the telephone
We approached the target from the northeast. lines, Mustangs sailed over them. Refusing
the
It was nearly sunset, and we were headed right to give up,Harry went into yet another pass.
into the sun and nearly blinded by the glare. I This time he managed to overcome his natural
raised my fist to the back of my neck, signalling reluctance to use his aircraft as pliers. Staying
my Number Two to fly behind me, and went in- low, he headed into the wires— which sprayed
to an identifying run. Spotting the easiest point his windshield with a fine fog of metal— feeling
to attack, I made a full turn and entered the at-
a light jolt as the aircraft sped through: He had
tack pass. The telephone lines rushed up at me,
cut through the cables. Cheetah picked two
but I couldn't see them because of the strong
other poles, also fogged in, and proceeded to
sunlight; I therefore selected a promising-looking
duplicate Harry's feat. As they turned and
gap between two poles and headed into it. I
thought I'd torn the lines, but I couldn't be headed next target, the pair could clear-
for their
sure— I hadn't felt the impact. What I did know, ly see the cut lines lyingon the yellow ground
however, is that my cable had torn off. below. This encouraged them to repeat the
process at the second target, several kilometers
to the north. Within minutes, those lines were
In other words, the pair was not sure they had also cut to ribbons. Any fears the pair might
completed their mission, but even if they had have had as to possible engine damage proved
not, doing so looked hopeless at first glance. ungrounded; even after the most unorthodox
Neither Harry nor Cheetah still had their line- mission, the Mustangs functioned perfectly, as
cutter cables. detailed examinations back at Ekron were to
The however, was not inclined to give up
pair, point out. Jubilantly, Harry and Cheetah
easily. Glancing at each other, each seemed to headed home. On their way back their path
read his partner's thought. They were recalling crossed that of the Dakotas, bringing the IDF
an incident that had happened several years pre- paratroopers to the Mitla. Knowing that they
viously, with a Stearman from the IAF Flight had helped to keep those young men safe, the
School. One of the instructors had inadvertently pair smiled at each other and sped for home.
passed too close to some high-tension electric Meanwhile Zachik and Rabbit were also
cables, cutting through them with his propeller. receiving moral support from the ground
The Stearman landed safely, with no damage forces— in their case, the armor of the famous
whatsoever, but the entire area was blacked out Seventh Brigade, deployed near Abu Agheila.
for hours. Passing over the armor, they continued in flight
"I thought to myself, that old junk heap
'If for another 45 minutes, to the eastern end of the
of a Stearman could do that to a high-tension Mitla Pass. Spotting the target, they dropped
cable, I'll bet my Mustang can cut its way below 30 meters, a maneuver fatal to both their
through a miserable telephone line!' " recalls line-cutter cables. First Zachik, then Rabbit, felt
Harry. His and Cheetah's decision to cut the the shock of impact as their cables hit the
cables with their propellers— a feat totally ground and tore away. However, they too
against pilot instinct— has remained through- remembered the incident with the Stearman and
out the years a shining example of deter- decided to take a chance on their propellers. On
mination and perseverance in the history of the their first pass, as had been the case with Harry
IAF. and Cheetah, Zachik 's pair climbed above the
"We made a tight turn and came back to the cables instinctively at the last moment. This,
first attack point. We tried to identify the they realized, would never do. Accordngly, on
them." Another identi-
cables, but couldn't see the next pass, they utilized "flight psy-
fying pass would have endangered the pair, chology"— each took turns forcing the other
lower and lower, until they were nearly touching Suez Canal under observation. But all remained
the desert sand. This time they tore through the quiet, and the only Egyptian reaction to the ap-
cables with no difficulty; Rabbit later admitted pearance of the Israeli planes was to disperse
not even having felt the jolt. Another three their aircraft from their neat lines on the
passes totally destroyed the telephone lines in tarmac. This airborne attack was the first of its
the area, and the pair moved on to its second kind in the Middle East.
target. That evening another force from the same
Passing northwest of Temed, they reached brigade crossed the Israeli-Egyptian border
another concentration of telephone lines. This north of Eilat to link up with the Mitla force.
time Rabbit had decided to try something new. Spearheaded by the First Battalion, which used
His instinctive dislike for things that got tan- armored personnel carriers, the remaining sol-
gled in his propeller made him decide to take on diers and equipment were loaded into con-
this lot of lines with his wing. On the first pass scripted civilian trucks. But some 242 kilo-
Rabbit came in low, too low. Realizing that he meters of partly fortified desert lay in the way,
could not pull up in time, he flew under the and the paratroopers at Mitla had to rely on air
cables like a crop duster, then came around for support until their comrades joined them— quite
another try. This time, as he approached the a risk, with the Egyptian Air Force bases along
telephone lines, he dipped his wings and cut the Canal only 2 /2 minutes of flying time away.
1
through the cables with no effort. (Back at The IAF commanders had their own ideas on
Ekron, the I AF engineers were shocked to hear how best to deal with this danger. However,
of Rabbit's feat, commenting rightly that this political considerations ruled out preventive air
was much more dangerous than attempting to strikes on the enemy fields prior to the drop.
use the propeller.) Fifteen minutes over this Thus the IAF was in the very precarious posi-
target were enough to tear through anything tion of having to wait for the Egyptians to make
remotely resembling a telephone cable. Smiling their move before planning its counter-strategy.
as they looked down on the useless strands of Two hours after the drop, the transports
wire scattered over the sand, the pair turned made another run, parachuting anti-tank
and headed back to base, also passing on their weapons, jeeps, and supplies; and still the Egyp-
way the Dakotas headed for the Mitla. tians did not react. But the next morning, as
The flight back to Ekron was uneventful, and the reinforcing column of paratroopers in half-
all the Mustangs landed safely with ample fuel tracks and trucks was moving toward the pass,
and untouched ammunition. Following the de- it was attacked by two EAF MiG-15s sweeping
briefing, a similar mission was scheduled in the in low from the west and strafing the column
northern Sinai the next afternoon, with Cheetah with cannon fire. A few vehicles were set on fire
and Rabbit as leaders; their Number Twos were and a number of casualties sustained.
two pilots hurriedly trained for the mission. Having spent a quiet night deep in enemy
This, too, was a success, earning the squadron territory, at sunrise the Mitla force received
the unofficial nickname of "The Cutters." These another supply drop from French Nord-Atlases
missions had completely disrupted the Egyp- flying out of Haifa. The first serious attack on
tian military communication systems, based as Mitla was made on October 30 at 0745, some
they were on land-line telephones. Moreover, as 14 hours after the force set down. A pair of
the IDF ground forces took over the Sinai, they MiG-15s raked the pass with cannon fire, knock-
endeavored without success to use the existing ing out the Piper Club liaison plane on the
telephone system, not realizing that the IAF ground. Fortunately, the pilot was not in it at
had cut the lines. the time. A second attack, an hour later, this
Later that afternoon the Israeli airborne time by Vampires flown from Fayid, did little
assault began when 395 paratroopers were damage, but neither of these attacks was inter-
dropped from 16 C-47 Dakotas near the Mitla cepted by the Israeli patrols. The battalion com-
Pass in the western Sinai. Flying close escort mander called for immediate air cover and the
for the transports were ten Gloster Meteor jets. force dug in deeper, waiting for the inevitable
A few miles to the west at a higher altitude 12 counterattack that it would have to face. Later,
Mysteres kept the Egyptian air bases on the however, air patrols were kept up almost with-
A flight of GlosterMeteors over Israel. The first combat of jet planes in the Middle East took place on August
31, 1955, when five intruding Egyptian D.H. Vampires were shot down over the Negev by IAF Meteors.
out a break. In a battle that developed in the moving towards Jebel Libni, halfway to the
afternoon over the Kabrit airfield between 12 Canal, and the mechanized column of the Air-
Egyptian MiGs and eight Israeli Mysteres, two borne Brigade had linked up with the Mitla
MiGs were shot down and two more were "prob- Pass force, beating off enemy counterattacks as
ables"; one of the Mysteres was hit but man- heavy fighting developed.
aged to return to base and land safely. Patrolling the sky above the Mitla, two pairs
Though air activity at this time was limited of Israeli Mysteres spotted a flight of Egyptian
largely to close support and cover for the para- Vampires strafing the pass. Diving on the
trooper forces at the Mitla Pass, there were fighter-bombers, the Mysteres shot down three
many attacks against Egyptian ground targets, of them in seconds, leaving their burning
mostly convoys of vehicles and artillery mov- wreckage scattered over the hills. The Egyptian
ing from the Canal Zone into the Sinai. Follow- pilots had been so engrossed in their attack that
ing their telephone line-cutting gambit, the they had not spotted the oncoming danger.
propeller-driven P-51 Mustangs had been break- Unhampered by any intervention from Egyp-
ing up enemy motor columns east of the Suez tian reinforcements, which had been success-
Canal whenever they could spot them. fully stopped by the IAF attacks on the roads
For the hundreds of sorties flown by the IAF to the west, the Israeli advance was picking up
on the first day, the Egyptians flew only 40. The momentum. In the northern sector, they now
following day the Arabs were more enterprising mounted another attack on the Egyptian-held
and dogfights developed all over the Sinai, as Gaza Strip, with the objective of taking El
the Egyptians finally realized the magnitude of Arish and the northern coastal road to the Suez
the Israeli operation. By this time, IDF forces Canal. One Israeli light-plane pilot on a recon-
had also entered the Sinai along the central axis, naissance patrol spotted a glittering object just
De Havilland DH-98 Mk-VI Mosquitos gracefully banking over Israel's coastal plain. Mostly assembled from
scrapped parts purchased throughout Europe, these planes entered service with the RAF after the War of In-
dependence and were used as interceptors, bombers, and photo reconnaissance craft until just after the Sinai
campaign.
Bardawil Lagoon west of El

off the coast of the turned. The boarded quickly and towed
Israelis
Arish. He circled lower and identified it as an the destroyer into Haifa port. The vessel, re-
apparently intact MiG-15 that had crash-landed named Haifa, was later put into the service of
in the shallow waters. Navy salvage experts the Israeli Navy.
who were called in raised the aircraft, placed it As Operation Kadesh moved rapidly to a suc-
on a makeshift raft, and towed it to an Israeli cessful climax, the Anglo-French Operation
port. Air force technicians restored the MiG-15 Musketeer to capture the Canal Zone got under-
to flying condition, and it was subjected to way. The general plan, disregarding the Israeli
thorough flight and technical tests to discover operations in the Sinai, was to capture the Canal
the secrets of the first Soviet jet interceptor Zone beginning with an amphibious landing and
captured. parachute drop at Port Said, at the northern
On October 31 the air force and navy again end of the Canal. The assembled force, which
combined forces in a successful mission. In the consisted of some five French and British divi-
pre-dawn darkness an Egyptian destroyer, the sions, was supported by an armada of warships
Ibrahim-el-Awal, bombarded Haifa with 220 and over 450 combat aircraft. It turned out to
100-mm high-explosive shells. The destroyer be a classic overestimation of enemy potential.
was spotted and attacked by the French cruiser A massive preparative aerial bombardment
Crescent patrolling off Haifa, but contact was was to destroy the Egyptian Air Force on the
lost in the dark. Israeli destroyers patrolling far- ground prior to the landing. By this time the
ther out at sea were ordered to intercept the Egyptian Air Force was already heavily en-
Egyptian attackers. Shortly after dawn they gaged with the Israelis and, as a result of con-
sighted, identified, and opened fire at her from stant dogfights in which it had lost several
a range of 8,200 meters. Answering a request aircraft, had become extremely discouraged.
for air support,two Ouragans dived on the ship Though the RAF attack on the airfield was not
and caused heavy damage with salvos of armor- very effective materially, as it took place at
piercing rockets. The Egyptian captain ordered night and from high altitude, it was lethal to
the crew to abandon and scuttle the ship, but Egyptian morale. When followed up the next
the seacocks were rusty and could not be day by a low-level Anglo-French air attack, the
Egyptians, fearing complete destruction, flew vulnerable to ground fire, and though they had
their remaining aircraft to bases in Syria and done an outstanding job, they needed to be re-
Saudi Arabia. Their IL-28 bombers were flown placed. The same applied to the Mosquitos and
to faraway Luxor for protection, but they were the B-17s, both of which had taken only a
eventually destroyed by French F-84 Thunder- limited part in the fighting.
streaks modified for the long-range flight from The question was, what would best
aircraft
Lydda, in Israel. suit the needs of the air force and, more impor-
After the unnecessary four-day-long air prep- tant, be available to the Israelis? France was
aration, the Anglo-French attack finally began still the only country that was willing to sell
with a paratrooper drop and a heliported group them modern jets. The French aircraft had
flown in from aircraft carriers in the area of the proven their worth in the fighting, especially the
northern end of the Canal. But the whole opera- Ouragan, which had played a leading part in
tion ended in a great fiasco and gave the Egyp- ground support as it was able to carry heavy
tians every reason to be jubilant and arrogant, combat loads. A new order for 45 of these air-
even though they had lost the Sinai to the craft was immediately placed. A jet-powered re-
Israelis. The vast number of troops and sup- placement for the Mosquitos was found in Sud
porting arms contributed by the British and Aviation's Vautour, a rugged twin-engine
French failed to achieve their objectives due to fighter-bomber that fulfilled the air force's re-
slow implementation, weak political leadership, quirements for a true multipurpose aircraft. The
and intervention by the United States and the Israelis were now better equipped to strike at
UN. the enemy's hinterland, countering the Arab
There remained one more objective for the capacity to attack Israeli population centers
Israelis to attain, in fact the primary objective and rear-area installations with their IL-28
of the campaign— in opening of the Tiran bomber force.
Straits. Sharm el-Sheikh, guarding the outlet to The IAF was now in the process of becoming
the Red Sea from the Gulf of Eilat, was a forti- an all-jet force. The newly created Israel Air-
fied position held by a strong force supported craft Industries— or Bedek, as it was then
by naval guns. On November 2 the Ninth In- called— signed a contract with the French Air-
fantry Brigade set out from Eilat towards the Fouga Company for rights to assemble the
southern tip of the peninsula, making its way Fouga-M agister jet trainer in Israel. The first
along the coast by a track that had been secret- aircraft left the new plant in June 1960 and
ly reconnoitered in 1955. The attack was well started a production line that by 1974 was to
supported by air. An Egyptian officer of the produce the modern Kfir fighter-bomber.
Sharm el-Sheikh garrison has been quoted as By the beginning of the 1960s, the Israelis
saying, "I learned about close air support ... in were again seriously worried about the extent
England, or so I thought until I stood at Sharm of a new Arab arms buildup. Russian weapons
el-Sheikh." were being supplied in great quantities, and the
With the capture of Sharm el-Sheikh, the Egyptian armed forces, especially the air force,
Sinai campaign was brought to an end. The were receiving, by Middle East standards, ultra-
Israelis had achieved all of their objectives in modern combat equipment such as the latest
a lightning war of only 100 hours. The IAF had MiG-19 interceptors. To strengthen Israel's
gone into action facing an air force equipped defenses against the increased Arab air warfare
with more and better aircraft, and under severe capabilities, 24 Super Mystere B-2s were or-
strategic limitations that prohibited a pre- dered. This advanced Mystere model was able
emptive strike and raids against bases across to reach the speed of sound in level flight, but
the Canal. Four days later, the air force had it was only an interim solution to the problem.
emerged from the Sinai campaign with a clear- The answer was found in the Dassault Mirage
cut victory over its opponent. The air battles possessed a speed of Mach
III. Theoretically it
during the Sinai campaign showed clearly that 2.2 at 12,000 meters and, with the help of a
piston-engine planes could no longer cope with rocket booster-motor, could climb to 15,000
modern combat conditions. The Mustang meters in six minutes flat. At subsonic speeds
fighter bombers had proved to be quite it had a combat radius of 1,200 kilometers,
Sud Aviation SA-4050 Vautour single-seat light bomber landing on a northern Israeli air base. The braking
chute is out, helping to stop the airplane. Later versions were painted with camouflage colors. These aircraft
flew long-range bombing missions as far apart as the upper Nile Valley in Egypt and Iraqi airfields during
the Six-Day War.
enabling it to reach far into Egypt or any other the air force's combat wings, General Weizman
Middle Eastern country. Redesigned to Israeli now took charge and set out to hone the air
specifications, the extremely powerful and force into the formidable weapon that under his
versatile weapons system could also carry a successor, Motti Hod, would reach its zenith
significant load of outside hardware for fighter- with the lightning destruction of the Arab air
bomber missions. The outstanding qualities of forces on June 5, 1967.
this aircraft were evaluated by Israeli experts, The special emphasis in Weizman 's doctrine
and, after the Egyptians received the Mach 2 + was on the creation of a highly motivated, ex-
MiG-21, the initial order for 24 was increased ceptionally well-trained professional pilot who
to 72. would overcome the Arab advantage of quan-
In July 1958, General Ezer Weizman was ap- tity by higher quality. Constantly stressing this
pointed commander of the air force. Trained as point, he set out to achieve his aim by placing
a pilot in the RAF during World War II, he had very stringent qualifications on trainee ad-
served with the first Israeli fighter squadron in vancement, standards so high that a pilot's
the War of Independence and was among the course in 1960 ended with only one graduate re-
pilotswhose attack stopped the Egyptian ad- ceiving his wings, the rest having "washed out."
vance toward Tel Aviv. Having been General But his persistence paid off, and the pilots that
Tolkovsky's deputy after commanding two of graduated from the courses were the very es-
A formation of Mirage IIICs, still in the original silver paint, over the Jezreel Valley before the Six-Day War.
The IAF basic combat formation was a flight of four aircraft.
sence of Israeli military enterprise— or, as they The was now* an impressive fighting
air force
chose to call themselves with no undue pride, force equipped with modern combat equipment.
"the best of the best." Flying mainly French aircraft, it operated 72
Several air battles took place, especially with Mirage IIICJ fighter-bombers in three squad-
the Syrians, prior to the Six-Day War. Con- rons, one 18-plane-strong Super Mystere squad-
stantly gaining the upper hand, the Israelis ron, and one squadron each of Mystere and
were convinced of their technical as well as pro- Ouragan fighter-bombers. Including the ob-
fessional superiority. This aerial ascendancy solete Vautour light bombers and transport
was the basic premise for the dynamic planning planes, total IAF strength amounted to some
of the preemptive strike concept with which the 350 opposed to some 800 first-line
aircraft, as
Israeli High Command prepared for war. combat combined enemy air
aircraft of the
General Mordechai Hod was appointed com- forces, now equipped almost solely with Soviet-
mander of the air force in the spring of 1967, made planes. The MiG-21s were the backbone
replacing General Weizman, who was appointed of the Arab fighter force and, with thebomber
head of the General Staff Division. Weizman force of Tupolev-16 medium jet bombers, posed
was the first air force officer to be named to this the main challenges to the IAF.
post, which is second only to the chief of the
General Staff. According to foreign military analysts.
Chapter 4
The Six-Day War, 1967
It was a frightening time for the people of attack the enemy, pursue him to ruination, draw
Israel. The neighboring countries had been arm- his fangs, scatter him in the wilderness, so that
ing themselves at a rapid rate, and some had the people of Israel may live in peace in our land,
their armies massed on the borders of the tiny and the future generations be secured.
state. To the south the Egyptian dictator,
Gamal Abdel Nasser, was shouting provocative In a flash Israeli Mirages, Mysteres, Super
threats and rattling his saber. To wait for their Mysteres, Vautours, Ouragans, and Fouga-
enemies to engulf them would have been a folly Magisters roared into action, clawing for the
tantamount to suicide for the Israelis. sky. Operation Focus— the air strike— was
By the night of June 3, D day and H hour had underway.
already been chosen: 0745 hours on June 5. This The first wave of IAF aircraft, flying in
hour was ideally suited for the kind of pre- double-pair formation, reached Egypt exactly
emptive air strike Israel would have to take. In on schedule. Flying close to the ground at first,
the first place, it was an unusual hour for at- to avoid Egyptian (and perhaps Soviet) radar,
tacking; most air attacks were carried out at the aircraft climbed into detection range a few
dawn. Accordingly, Egypt had gotten into the minutes before reaching their targets. Thus
habit of sending up MiG-21s to patrol Egyptian they succeeded in catching Egyptian fighter air-
skies at first light. By 0745 (0845 Cairo time), craft, alerted too late, on the runways.
these patrols would have landed. In addition, In the IAF command and control center in Tel
the mist that covers the Nile, the Delta, and the Aviv, Gen. Hod, affectionately known as "Mot-
Suez Canal in the early morning usually dis- ti," sat calmly, watching and listening. As the
perses by 8:00 A.M., leaving excellent visibility first reports began to come in, the excitement
and still air. Another important consideration was unbearable; but Motti Hod remained cool,
(according to Israeli intelligence) was that almost detached. The one sign of the terrible
Egyptian military personnel get to their offices strain the IAF commander felt was the pro-
at 9:00 A.M. Striking 15 minutes before that digious quantities of water he consumed. While
time would catch much of the Egyptian Air others clenched their fists and held their
Force between home and base. breaths, Hod
picked up jug after jug of water
Early in the morning of June 5, 1967, Maj. and drained them dry. IDF Head of General
Gen. Mordechai Hod, commander of the IAF, Staff Division Ezer Weizman, seated beside
issued a battle order to his troops. That order Hod in the IAF bunker, recalls: "I relieved my
might well have come directly from the Old tension with a momentary thought: 'What will
Testament: happen first— will a couple of hundred Egyptian
planes go up in flames— or will (Hod's) radiator
"
Soldiers of the air force, the blustering and burst?'
swash-buckling Egyptian Army is moving The radiator did not burst. By 0855 hours 11
against us to annihilate our people. . . . Fly on, Egyptian airfields had been attacked. Some 197
42
The Six-Day War 43
A last-minute check before takeoff at dawn.
enemy aircraft had been destroyed— 189 on the All but 19 of the IAF strike force made it
ground and two MiG-21 foursomes in air com- home undamaged and set out immediately on
bat. Six airfields had been rendered inoperable a second wave. ("Immediately," by the way,
and 16 radar stations disabled. All this had been meant just that: In those crucial first hours of
accomplished by 185 aircraft, nearly all of the war, air turnaround time had been reduced
Israel's first-line planes. The IAF High Com- to an incredible 1\ minutes!) The second wave
mand, playing for high stakes, had left only attacked 14 air bases, destroying an additional
three foursomes to guard the whole of Israel, 107 Egyptian aircraft. After destroying the air-
eight flying top cover and four on standby at IAF strike force attacked the runways
craft, the
the end of the runway. with "dibber" bombs. These included a retro-
0630 hours, June 5, 1967, at an IAF air base. The fuel tanker is filling up the Mirage IIIC on which the ground
crew has worked all night, readying it for the mission. Matra R-530 air-to-air missile and drop tanks indicate
that this plane is assigned an interceptor, high cover, or air superiority role.
rocket to stop the bomb's forward impetus, a commanders, complete frustration, vainly
in
booster rocket to drive the bomb deep into the tried to find a base where they could land. As
concrete runway, and a time fuse. Some of the they searched, they watched the bases along the
bombs exploded instantaneously, others only whole length of the Canal going up in flames.
after the original damage had been repaired. (At They finally landed at Cairo International Air-
one El Arish near the Gaza Strip,
airfield, port and rushed to the Command Room, only
specific ordershad been given not to use bombs to be informed that for all practical purposes the
on the runaway. As the fighting progressed the Egyptian Air Force no longer existed.
reason for this became obvious. Forty-eight For two hours, the IAF ravaged the Egyptian
hours after the start of the war El Arish was airfields; as each flight of four fighter-bombers
already being used by the IAF as a forward completed its attack, the next formation of four
base!) took over. The results of the precise air strikes
At the time of the initial attack a single Egyp- far surpassed the expectations of the Israeli
tian plane was airborne: a twin-engine Illyushin commanders and stunned the world.
heading westward over the Sinai and carrying So accurate was the marksmanship that the
three of the highest-ranking Egyptian com- pilots rarely missed. The enemy aircraft were
manders, including Chief of Staff Gen. Amer. knocked out by unerring aerial cannon* fire, and
Listening in on the Israeli frequencies, the com- the runways were destroyed with bombs: con-
manders could not make out any unusual traf- ventional "iron" bombs that were right on
fic, and flying west, the Illyushin headed for target, not the new radar- and TV-guided
Kabrit air base. At that precise moment, the "smart" bombs.
control tower informed the pilot that it was At Cairo West Airfield the Israeli Mirages
under air attack. Confused by chatter which caught all 30 of the Egyptian Tu-16 bombers
covered all frequencies with excited announce-
ments that all air bases were being attacked, the Israeli-manufactured 30-mm DEFA cannon.
The Six-Day War 45
A Dassault Super Mystere B-2 jet fighter-bomber pilot strapped into his seat. The hood is already closed for
takeoff— target: Egypt. Along the top canopy brace can be seen two rear-view mirrors. The transparent rect-
angle below the left mirror is the gun sight.
parked hardstands and blew them to

in their Influenced by Egyptian boasts of their as-
pieces, eliminating the danger to the Israeli cendancy over the Jewish state, Jordanian,
cities posed by the Egyptian Air Force. Twin- Syrian, and Iraqi aircraft attacked targets in
engine Vautours crossed the Red Sea and Israel. Twelve Syrian MiG-17s took off from
streaked deep into Upper Egypt to destroy the Damascus at 1250 hours. Of these, only three
planes at Luxor and Ras Banas, where the attacked a military target, an airfield in the
Egyptians had dispersed their aircraft in search Jezreel Valley; the others bombed, strafed, and
of safety. rocketed civilian kibbutzim, a dam on the Jor-
Though most Arab planes were de-
of the dan River (which they missed), and a convales-
stroyed on the ground, some dogfights never- cent home near Nazareth. Jordanian Hawker
theless did develop. The largest one took place Hunter aircraft took off at noon, attacking one
over Abu Suweir, near Ismailia, where 16 airfield and destroying a Noratlas transport air-
Mirages and 20 MiG-21s clashed high over the craft on the ground, as well as bombing the
battle zone. The Egyptians courageously hurled coastal resort of Natanya in the mistaken belief
themselves at the Israelis, but four of them were that they had reached Tel Aviv. At 1400 hours
shot down within a few seconds and the remain- three Iraqi Hawker Hunters rocketed the Israeli
der scattered; trying to land on the bomb-pitted settlement of Nahalal (coincidentally, Moshe
runways of their airfields, many crashed in the Dayan's home), causing no damage.
attempt. This was enough to convince Motti Hod to
A MiG-21 destroyed on the runway— the pilot hastily abandoned the aircraft before it went up in flames.
use the IAF to attack Syria, Jordan, and Iraq Syria— and ten pilots. An additional four pilots
as well. Minutes after the first reports of Syrian were taken prisoner. The air forces of Egypt,
aircraft over Israeli territory, eight flight forma- Syria, Jordan, and Iraq were effectively put out
tions were diverted in midair toward air bases of action.
in Syria and Jordan. That same day Israeli jets The Israeli ground war could now pursue its
destroyed the entire Royal Jordanian Air Force, objectives, supported by a victorious air force
as well as its two main air bases at Mafraq and that could operate at will over the battlefield.
Amman. Syria lost 53 aircraft— out of a total Battles were raging on all three borders. In the
of 112— in attacks on five airfields: Damascus, west the Israeli armored divisions advanced in-
Dmeir, Seikal, Marj Rial, and T-4. And a single to the Sinai with the objective of reaching the
three-sortie attack on H-3 airfield in Iraq de- Suez Canal.
stroyed ten Iraqi aircraft. During and after the strikes on the Arab air-
By the evening of June 5 the skies above the fields the IAF was also used against the enemy
Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the entire ground forces. In fact, some two thirds of the
Sinai Desert were the exclusive province of the total IAF sorties flown during those six days
Israeli Air Force. Total Israeli losses on that were directed against ground forces. These
day were 19 planes— nine in Egypt and ten in operations were carried out by every kind of
The Six-Day War 47
Morning, June 6, 1967— Cairo West Airfield under IAF attack. Note the neatly lined-up transport on the far
side of the runway. Many were destroyed in the first surprise attack.
warplane in commission in the Israeli Air Force, On June 6, the IAF was used against the
from the supersonic Mirage IIICs, through the ground forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq.
Super Mysteres, Mysteres, and Ouragans, down The principal area of activity, however, was in
to the Fouga-Magisters, training aircraft out- the Sinai; IAF aircraft smashed everything that
with machine guns and rockets for use on
fitted moved along the desert roads all the way to the
armored and mechanized troops. Suez Canal, as well as the railroad line to El
On the first day of the war IAF aircraft flew Arish. That same day IAF planes carried out
missions against artillery batteries protecting strikes against Jordanian Pattons engaged in
the Rafah and Umm Katef fortifications, win- a tank battle in the Jenin area, and knocked out
ning a respite for the attacking IDF armored several artillery batteries in Qalqilya farther
and parachute units. Fouga-Magisters also shot south. The Iraqi mechanized brigade sent to
up a munitions train in El Arish, with what one Jordan's assistance never reached the West
IAF correspondent described as "spectacular Bank of the Jordan: A devastating air strike
effects." Toward evening Israeli warplanes at- forced the brigade back across the Damiya
tacked Jordanian tank reinforcements moving Bridge, which it had just begun to cross, and
up the Jordan Valley toward Jerusalem; by it took no part in the fighting. On the Syrian
morning almost all of the Jordanian tanks had front the IAF took out artillery on the Golan
been destroyed. Heights as well as reinforcements being moved
Entrance to Mitla Pass, June 1967. Egyptian military convoys destroyed by IAF fighter-bombers.
up to the front lines. Syrian infantry and armor bringing to an end Jordanian rule over the terri-
that had tried to break through the defenses of tories annexed in 1948. In the heavy fighting
two Israeli border settlements were quickly for the Old City of Jerusalem, the Israeli fighter-
routed in an air strike. bombers strafed Jordanian army positions on
On the second day of the fighting Algerian Mount Scopus, enabling the Israeli para-
MiG-21s that had been rushed to the battle area troopers to capture their objectives.
made several surprise attacks, mainly on the After June 7 Jordan was no longer in the war,
coastal sector in the northern Sinai. Though ef- and the IAF concentrated its efforts on Egypt
fective, they could not replace the strength of and Syria. In the Sinai the aircraft kept the
the shattered Egyptian force. The third day of roads blocked to retreating Egyptians while
fightingwas marked by mass destruction of systematically destroying those enemy units
Egyptian convoys in retreat. Air strikes at the still at large. In Syria the air force attacked the
Mitla and Gidi passes trapped thousands of Golan Heights on June 8 and ran long-range
Egyptian vehicles jammed at their approaches. missions deep into Syria on the last two days
From the air the pilots could see the Egyptians of the war.The most intense bombing and straf-
abandoning their immobilized, burned-out ing of war was directed against the
the
equipment and setting out on foot for the Suez Syrian-fortified Golan Heights. This major
Canal, 60 kilometers to the west. On the Jordan- obstacle was subjected to heavy bombing,
ian front the IAF softened up Arab Legion posi- which was ineffective because the well-dug-in
tions at Augusta Victoria East Jerusalem
in fortifications were almost impenetrable. This
and helped attack Jordanian tanks west of necessitated hand-to-hand fighting, with the air
Nablus prior to taking the city. force holding off enemy reinforcements and at-
On the eastern front the Israeli attack on the tacking concentrations of artillery inside Syrian
West Bank gained momentum with the capture territory. It was during this fighting that the
of Jerusalem and the hills of Samaria, thus Russian SA-2 surface-to-air missile was first en-
The Six-Day War 49
An Israeli Mirage III on its way to the target.
Gun camera sequence of downing of Syrian MiG-21 during Six-Day War. The Syrians lost eight MiG-21s and
three in aerial combat during that war. A t the beginning the Syrians had abou 1 40 MiG-21 s, 40 MiG-1 7s,
MiG-1 7s
and a few bombers.
Tracking Destruction
Samoa, Jordan, 1967. A Royal Jordanian Air Force Hunter Mk-IX shot down by IAF jets in a dogfight during
an Israeli retaliatory raid prior to the Six-Day War. The rocky heights on the left are the hills of Judea near
the Dead Sea. The Jordanian pilots showed a high standard of training and fighting spirit in these air battles.
countered. (This was the same deadly missile Syrian Air Forces lost all effectiveness as
the USAF encountered later over Vietnam.) fighting units; the Royal Jordanian Air Force,
Though the SAMs did not succeed in downing in effect, ceased to exist. Moreover, the IAF had
an Israeli plane, they were to have an immense protected Israeli airspace, shooting down every
impact on the combat environment of future plane that crossed Israel's borders. All this does
wars. not take into account the destruction of hun-
When the cease-fire came into force on Satur- dreds of Arab tanks and vehicles, nor the abso-
day, June 10, the IAF had lost a total of 46 air- lute air superiority that played a decisive role
craft, all but three of which had been brought in breaking enemy resistance on every front.
down by ground fire. Some badly damaged Without a doubt, this gave the elated IAF air-
planes had crashed on return to their base, and crews an overwhelming sense of victory. On the
a few pilots had bailed out over enemy territory other hand, they were under no illusions that
and were taken prisoner. For an air force that the fighting was over and the final battle won.
had started the war with fewer than 200 com- It is fascinating to study the background of
bat aircraft, this was a serious loss. However, a war and the steps that led to it. The Six-Day
a crushing blow had been dealt to the enemy in War is a classic case. Most military analysts
the destruction of 452 of their aircraft, 79 of agree— and with good reason— that the Six-Day
them in air combat. Eight SA-2 missile batter- War was Israel's finest hour. It is certainly true
ieshad been destroyed and a ninth taken intact that the events of June 5 through 10, 1967 are
by ground forces with air support. A total of 18 without parallel in modern military history. In
radar stations had been put out of action in Jor- six shortdays the armed forces of Israel, most-
dan, Syria, and Egypt. The Egyptian and ly made up of reservists, vanquished three
The Six-Day War 51
regular enemy armies, each of which was

equipped with materiel as good as or better than
that of the IDF. The incredible valor and per-
sistence of Israel's army, navy, and air force
brought about the conquest of territories three
times the size of prewar Israel.
The usual description of the war's begin-
ning—the Israeli Air Force suddenly swooping
down on more than two dozen enemy air-
fields—is incomplete and inaccurate for two
reasons. First of all, although the IAF was in-
deed the spearhead of the striking force, the role
played by Israel's ground forces was no less
important. And second, to those who had fol-
lowed Middle Eastern developments in the
months prior to June 1967, the Israeli pre-
emptive strike was not at all "sudden."
For nearly three years before the Six-Day
War Israel's northern border had been the scene
of escalating hostilities, nearly all of which were
carrried out by Syrian armed forces against
Israeli civilian agricultural settlements in the
Galilee. They stemmed from a long-standing
dispute over Israel's plan to operate a National
Water Carrier from Lake Kinneret to the
parched Negev Desert in the south. Syria
(wrongly, according to the UN) felt that Israel
would be stealing water from the Arabs. Ac-
cordingly, a two-pronged plan was devised. The
Syrians developed a blueprint for a water car-
rier of their own that would divert the Jordan
sources even before they got as far south as
Lake Kinneret. At the same time they began to
disrupt the construction and operation of
Israel's water carrier with massive artillery and
rocket attacks on Israeli tractors and engi-
neering machinery, as well as on Israeli fields
near the Syrian border. When IDF patrols be-
gan protecting the civilian border settlements,
the Arabs fired on them, too. On several oc-
casions IDF armored and mechanized troops
were sent in, putting a rapid end to the Syrian
water carrier project. But the harassment con-
tinued, and grew in intensity. In the early
months of 1967 Prince Minister Levi Eshkol
gave permission for the Israeli Air Force to
enter the scene. Several air clashes took place
in March and April 1967; one of these, on April
7, resulted in the downing of six Syrian MiGs
over the Syrian capital.
It was not only the Syrian Army that used
IAF Mirage Ills. Israel's northern border as a springboard for
Israeli Air Force
The Fighting
52
Ground-support bombing of Egyptian positions at last light in the Sinai.
A Sud Aviation Potez-Air Fouga CM170 Magister jet trainer during the 1967 war. These aircraft were armed
with 7.5-mm machine guns, 12 to 16 80-mm rockets or four 100-pound bombs, and, flown by reserve pilots, car-
ried out ground-attack missions during the Six-Day War on the Eygptian and Jordanian fronts. On the first
day the Fougas destroyed three radar stations, 40 tanks, an ammunition train, and many light vehicles. Lack-
ing an ejection seat and too slow to evade anti-aircraft fire or enemy fighters, the Fougas were dangerous air-
craft to fly. Note stencils on fuselage— this plane has already taken out two trucks and a tank.
hostilities. The Palestine Liberation Organi- out any overtly hostile acts against Ad-
Israel.
zation, a terrorist group dedicated to the annihi- mittedly, the Egyptian government tended to
lation of the State of Israel, was founded in sympathize with Syria and the PLO; however,
1958. Six years later its leaders obtained Syrian they neither sent assistance to Syria nor per-
permission to stage raids into Israel from inside mitted terrorist activity against Israel from
Syria. In addition— although without the of- within Egypt. As it happened, Egypt had very
ficial sanction of the governments in- good reason for not wishing to get involved.
volved—terrorist cells operated from within First of all, since 1962 the Egyptian Army had
Jordan and Lebanon, striking at undefended been conducting a long, arduous campaign in
civilian targets inside Israel. In 1965 and 1966 Yemen. In 1967 some 50,000 Egyptian troops
the IDF carried out several reprisal raids into were committed in Yemen; almost daily, Egyp-
Arab villages known to be harboring terrorist tian Air Force missions bombed and strafed
activists. These however, had two un-
reprisals, hundreds of Yemeni villages. Further, President
fortunate effects: They tended to escalate Gamal Abdel Nasser had no desire to see his vil-
terrorism instead of repressing it, and they pro- lages razed by IDF commandos or his new
vided an excuse for the Arab nations to turn UN MiGs shot down over Cairo, as the Syrian MiGs
and world sympathy against Israel. had been downed over Damascus. Accordingly,
Through all this time Egypt had not carried Egypt confined itself to promises of aid to any
1
The Six-Day War 55
Arab countries attacked by Israel— promises complete withdrawal of the UNEF from Egyp-
that seemed empty to Syria's rulers. tian territory. However, by the time this reply
In May 1967, however, the situation shifted. was received, Egyptian troops had already be-
Following the April 7 incident Syria decided to gun the forcible eviction of the UN forces from
force Nasser's hand. A few weeks after the bat- the Sinai. Taking this as Nasser's answer, U
tle Syria began to convey deliberately falsified Thant ordered his forces home. This, in effect,
intelligence reports to Egypt, reports that leftthe Sinai clear for action.
claimed an Israeli military presence of up to 1 The next steps were rapid. On May 20, both
brigades on the Syrian border. Echoes of these Israel and Egypt ordered partial mobilizations
reports were amplified by the Soviet Embassy of reservists. Two days later Nasser announced
in Tel Aviv, despite efforts by Israel to dis- that the Straits of Tiran— and hence the Gulf
qualify them. Actually, at the time Israel had of Aqaba— were closed to Israeli ships. The
no more than a single company in the area, a Egyptian president was fully aware that this
fact that was confirmed by UN observers. But was tantamount to a military challenge; ten
Nasser chose to listen to his allies, Syria and the years earlier, UN Ambassador Golda Meir had
Soviet Union. The Egyptian president realized stated that Israel would regard interference
that caution on his part could mean the loss of with her shipping in the Straits of Tiran "as en-
Soviet support— and possibly that of the titling her to exercise her inherent rights of self-
"hawks", among his own people as well. Ac- defense." Had United
States President Lyndon
cordingly, on May 14, 1967, Nasser decided on Johnson not promised international assistance
a demonstration of strength: He dispatched two Levi Eshkol
in clearing the straits for Israel,
divisions into the Sinai, tripling the number of might well have sent the IDF into the Sinai as
troops committed east of the Suez Canal. This early as May 24. In the face of such an
move was calculated to fulfill a dual purpose: American promise— which never material-
Not only would it convince Syria of Egypt's sin- ized— Eshkol decided not to take immediate ac-
cerity and loyalty, but Israel, in the face of an tion. Israel's reserves were fully mobilized, a
Egyptian troop concentration in the Sinai, move that seriously affected the country's econ-
would be deterred from attacking Syria. Thus omy. But the troops sat on the border, teeth
Nasser would be spared having to rush troops clenched, and waited.
and materiel to the assistance of her northern Meanwhile surprising things were happening
ally. Israel, which had never intended to attack on Israel's eastern front. On May 24 Radio Am-
Syria, was not unduly distressed by the Egyp- man had announced King Hussein's permission
tian move at this stage. Apart from the mobili- for Saudi Arabia and Iraq to send expeditionary
zation of one IDF reserve brigade, life in Israel forces to Jordan. At the time, these countries
on May 15 was normal. ignored the "little king's" invitation. But six
Nasser's next move, however, was escalatory days later, on May 30, to the surprise of all and
On May 16, following the
rather than deterrent. the great dismay of Israel, Hussein suddenly
transfer of the Egyptian divisions into the turned up in Cairo. His mission: the signing of
Sinai, he asked his chief of staff. Gen. Fawzy, a defense pact between Jordan and Egypt. The
to cable Gen. Rikhye, commander of the United following day Iraq's President Aref agreed to
Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) in the Sinai. send troops and armored units into Jordan. And
In the telegram, Fawzy instructed Rikhye to when PLO spokesman Ahmed Shukairy an-
withdraw his troops from the Sinai, concen- nounced in Amman that it was "possible and
trating them inside the Gaza Strip. The reason even most likely" that his organization would
given ("The complete secure [sic] of all UN fire the first shot, none of the Arab rulers even
troops .along our borders") convinced
. . bothered to protest.
neither Rikhye nor UN Secretary-General U These developments convinced Levi Eskhol,
Thant. Thant's reply, the following day, stated who was then both prime minister and minister
that the UNEF troops could not in conscience of defense, of two things. First of all, he realized
perform such a partial withdrawal. Nasser his country was definitely headed for all-out war
would either have to allow the UN troops to re- on at least two fronts. This led to the realization
main in their existing positions or request the that Eshkol himself, a gifted statesman but one
with no real military experience to speak of, the start of the war. Israel could not hope for
could not hope to continue holding both his air support from the United States or any other
portfolios if he wanted Israel to end that war friendly nation. It would have to take preemp-
with victory. A senior military man, an "old tive action and destroy the Arab air forces
fox" at the art of fighting the Arabs would have alone.
to be appointed as minister of defense. At first, This requirement, obvious as it may seem,
Eshkol considered giving the post to the former represented a tall order for the existing Israeli
chief of staff, Yigael Yadin; the Israeli public, Air Force. The many targets which would have
however, demanded that it be assigned to to be destroyed in order toknock out Arab air
Moshe Dayan, who as chief of staff had led the power on the first run would make it necessary
IDF to victory in the Sinai campaign. Dayan to carry more than 1,000 tons of armament.
himself, as it happened, had thought he would This was an obvious impossibility: Most of the
be appointed GOC (General Officer Command- aircraft in Israel's possession prior to June 1967
ing) Southern Front. The possibility of a min- could carry less than 500 kilograms of arma-
istry had not occurred to him, as he had ment apiece, and some only 250 kilograms. The
resigned the Ministry of Agriculture on leaving 48 A-4 Skyhawk jets on order from the United
Israel's ruling Mapai party two years pre- States had a considerably higher payload; these,
viously. As Dayan whimsically remarked in an however, would not be delivered until some
interview the day after his appointment, "It months later.
took 80,000 Egyptian troops to get me back in- Accordingly, a plan was devised which met
to the government!" the I AF limitations and still rendered a decisive
As May gave way to June, it became more blow to the Arab air forces. A strict timetable
and more evident that the only way for Israel of flight schedules, approach routes, and high-
to win the impending war would be by preemp- priority targets was worked out. All IAF air
tive strike.The willing Soviet assistance given bases received standing orders to cut turn-
to Egypt and Syria had brought the Arab ar- around time below the minimum known any-
senals to such power that they could easily wipe where else in the world. Highly efficient,
the Israeli nation out of existence if allowed to up-to-date air intelligence was obtained for
attack first. The Egyptian forces, now six divi- dozens of targets Israel would have to destroy.
sions strong in the Sinai, were an imposing All this considered, Israel had reason to be op-
threat indeed— and not the only one. Syria had timistic. Even so, former IAF commander Ezer
already shown over the years what it could do Weizman— who had handed over his command
to Israel's northern settlements without even to Motti Hod ten months previously and was
moving troops over the border. Should the now serving as IDF head of General Staff
Syrian and Jordanian armies decide to adopt a Division— was regarded as overconfident fol-
more concentrated version of this harassment, lowing his public statement that Israel could
they would be able to control the Jerusalem-Tel wipe out the Arab air forces in a matter of
Aviv and Jerusalem- Haifa highways, all of hours.
Israel's airfields, and many of its cities. But the Meanwhile, the situation on the ground had
main danger lay with the Arab air power. By become extremely grave. The IDF High Com-
this time Israel's three closest neighbors had mand watched with awe the daily reports of
more than 800 first-line combat aircraft between Arab troop buildups on all of Israel's borders.
them, massed in dozens of ultramodern air More and more forces poured in from nations
bases in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, as well as farther away: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
two Iraqi squadrons brought forward from Iraq, and many more sent contingents to the aid
Habaniya Air Force Base near Baghdad to H-3, of their brothers in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
Iraq's westernmost military airfield— only All this was accompanied by a "saber-rattling"
minutes away from Israel. This fearsome mass-hate campaign on Arab radio and tele-
strength, ranged against 350 Israeli aircraft (of vision, calling for an all-out Jihad— a holy war-
which only 197 were first-line), meant that, if that would eliminate, by driving the Jews into
preemptive action were not taken, Arab aircraft the sea, the "pestilence" that had infested the
could saturate Israel's defenses minutes after Middle East. And what was most frightening
The Six-Day War 57
was that the Arabs seemed to believe this Nazi- had about 150 tanks— mostly Sherman M50s
style propaganda. Inciting to violence
were the with one battalion of Centurions and one of
radio messages from Damascus, Cairo, and AMX13s. With Yoffe's two undersized Cen-
Baghdad: turion brigades and some 50 tanks in the
southern Negev, Israel had under 600 tanks de-
The time has come! Silence the enemy! Destroy ployed in the south against an enemy with 50
him! Liberate Palestine! O ye Arabs! Soon we percent greater numerical strength. Even this
shall return to the captive homeland! Yes, yes! comparison did not take into account the fact
See you in Tel Aviv! that many of the Egyptian tanks were modern
Soviet T54/5s and Stalin Ills.
The echo of this threat had a sobering effect In the north and east Israel's situation was
throughout the world: Once again the Jewish no less grave. The Jordanians had seven
people faced annihilation. tank-supported infantry brigades strung out
Israel's defense plans on the ground were, like along Israel's border. Two armored brigades
those in the air, basically offensive in nature. were deployed in the Jordan Valley: the Fortieth
The main effort would be directed at the (Jordan's elite tank formation, later to be sent
destruction of the most numerous and po- to Syria in the Yom Kippur War) in the north
tentially dangerous enemy, Egypt. To this end, and the Sixtieth in the south. In addition to
the majority of Israel's ground forces were con- these 270 tanks, an Iraqi mechanized brigade
centrated in the Negev. Three "divisions" were had already assumed position at Mafraq, a mili-
deployed (not regular divisions but the Ugda, tary complex serving ground and air forces in
unique to the IDF; an Ugda is a division-sized the north of Jordan. The Syrians had some 300
formation that allows much more freedom of ac- tanks ready to fight. Against all these, Israel
The regular ar-
tion for its individual brigades). could deploy only two undersized mechanized
mored by Maj. Gen. Israel Tal was
division led brigades, one west of Jerusalem and the other
stationed along the southern Gaza Strip near in the Jezreel Valley. An armored brigade,
Rafah, facing the Egyptian Seventh Infantry equipped with obsolescent Sherman M50/51s
Division and the Twentieth Palestinian Divi- and light AMXl3s, was held at GHQ reserve
sion. A second Ugda led by Maj. Gen. Ariel near Haifa. In all, Israel had only 180 mostly
Sharon was deployed against the strongly held inferior tanks available to head off two Arab
Second Infantry Division sector, which con- armies.
trolled the Abu Ageila-Kusseima axis through The following serves as an effective summary
the Sinai to the Suez. A third division, under of how the IAF accomplished its mission:
the command of Maj. Gen. Avraham Yoffe, was In those devastating attacks on June 5, 1967,
kept in reserve between the two, to ward off the Israeli Air Force knocked out, on the
possible intervention by the Egyptian Fourth ground, most of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jor-
Armored Division (concentrated at Bir Gafgafa) danian Air Forces. These missions were carried
and the division-size force commanded by Gen. out according to specifications set up in an
Shazali (headed east from El Arish to the operational plan called Moked ("Focus"), a re-
Negev). To stem off any offensive efforts to the sult of an air warfare study made by the IAF
Negev itself, a mechanized brigade commanded from 1962 to 1965. The purpose of this mission
by then Brig. Gen. Albert Mendler (later to was, in case of emergency, to destroy the enemy
reach the rank of major general and to be killed air forces on the ground in one surprise, preemp-
commanding the Sinai in the Yom Kippur War) tive attack.
was operating as an independent force near Surprise was the key. Aircraft were to take
Kuntilla. off and ingress in complete radio silence, at a
Against an Egyptian force of seven divisions very low level, and on precise schedule. Routes
and 900 tanks, the IDF deployed three divisions chosen were not the shortest to the target, thus
and one independent brigade. The strongest not disclosing their objectives The major ob-
division, that commanded by Tal, included some jective was to cripple enemy bomber and inter-
205 tanks— mostly Patton M48s and Cen- ceptor forces (Tu-16, 11-28, and MiG-21). In
turions with some AMX13s. Sharon's division order to achieve this goal, the IAF tested all
Egyptian aircraft caught napping on the ground.
possible solutions— high-level penetration using would not have time to arm before hitting the
accurate dive bombing, and low-level approach runway and would bounce back from the run-
under enemy radar coverage, providing total way surface. The Israel Military Industry con-
surprise and relative freedom from SAM threat. structed a special device to solve this problem,
Various runway attacks were tested on dummy the Runway Destruction Bomb (RDB)— a new
targets constructed in the Negev Desert. At- concept (now widely known and manufactured
tacks were practiced on centerlines, crossed run- in various countries) consisting of a retarding
ways, parallel runways, taxiways, installations, mechanism to slow the bomb, thus protecting
etc. the aircraft from the blast. The mechanism, a
One of the lessons gleaned from these tests small parachute, also aims the weapon at a 60°
was the need for special weapons for runway angle to the ground and activates a rocket
destruction where, on low-level attacks, bombs motor that pushes the warhead to penetrate
The Six-Day War 59
through the runway's thick concrete layer. Then craft) against four radar sites and com-
the bomb explodes, creating a 5-meter-diameter munication facilities in the eastern Sinai, to
crater,about 1.60 meters deep. Tests were con- ensure total surprise. The first wave of 95 air-
cluded in 1966, and the IAF received about 250 craft was already en route to its targets— and
bombs just before June 1967. just in time!
When the Gulf of Aqaba was blocked on June The attacks went off like clockwork.Each for-
5, 1967 (two years after planning for Operation mation reached its target on time and most of
Moked had been terminated), the order was the runways were hit by the RDBs on the first
given to implement it and the IAF took off. The pass. Mystere IVs and Mirage Ills carried the
first missions that day were carried out by RDBs. Each plane carried two bombs (70 or 100-
Fouga-M agister trainers (turned combat air- kilograms each), fuel tanks, and guns. Vautours,
the heaviestIAF bombers, carried 500-1000 115 sorties against Egyptian bases. The already
kilogram bombs and four 30-mm guns; Super hard-hit bases did not pose much of a threat.
Mysteres, two 250-kilogram bombs or rockets Attacks launched in this wave swept deeper in-
and fueltanks with two guns; and Ouragans, to the Delta and Nile Valley, where they hit the
either 16 rockets or four 100-kilogram bombs Egyptian Tu-16 bombers that had escaped from
with four 20-mm guns. their bases in Cairo West and Bnei Sueif. These
The formations flew very low, about 10 missions were carried out successfully and some
meters or lower, their exhausts trailing steam formations were diverted to other targets after
and spray over the sea. They hardly had time their primary objectives had been destroyed.
to locate themselves over the dense and homo- Each attack consisted of one bomb pass and
geneous Delta topography, where navigation three to six strafing passes— a total of five to
proved very difficult. Hazards presented by seven minutes over the target depending on
electric lines and trees were no less formidable range and type of aircraft. Runways were de-
than those of possible anti-aircraft artillery. At- stroyed with RDBs, installations with general-
tacking the Sinai bases, the IAF formations purpose 100-1000-kilogram bombs and aircraft
concentrated over the Bardawil area, and co- by gunfire. Of the 16 airfields attacked, three
ordinated their timing, which was crucial due of four Sinai bases were closed
on the first wave,
to the relatively clustered positions of the and seven others were closed on the second. On-
enemy bases: Escaping enemy aircraft could en- ly two were able to stay open throughout the
danger the IAF aircraft attacking other bases. day (Inshas and Abu Sueir). The key to the over-
In the Sinai most airfields proved to be easy whelming success of this operation was again
targets, except Bir Gafgafa. Being the Egyp- the surprise factor.
tian Air Force's main forward interceptor base, This successful series of attacks highlighted
it was heavily defended with anti-aircraft ar- some important points. Using the low-low-high
tillery (AAA) and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. profile enabled the IAF to stage a complete sur-
Five MiGs were scrambled to intercept— but too prise in the first wave, while a low-high-high pro-
late. Four were hit on the runway, with only one file on the second wave gave them more time
managing to escape. over their targets. Each wave, with about

Less lucky were the aircraft attacking Abu 100-150 sorties attacking from altitudes of
Sueir. This air base, one of Egypt's biggest, re- 30-1800 meters, was capable of knocking out
ceived the alert call on time. MiGs were already 50 percent of the force available at the time,
taking off when IAF Mirages started diving at leaving the enemy with only 25 percent of the
the runways. Escaping the craters caused by force it had had only three hours previously!
the RDBs, the MiGs took off quickly, shooting Later that same day, at 1300 hours, the IAF
down one of the oncoming Vautours. A long commenced the same kind of operation in Syria.
time passed before an IAF Mirage CAP was In one continuous wave all the Syrian Air Force
able to reach this area and shot down three of bases capable of threatening Israel were at-
the MiGs. tacked. Five of the Syrian airfields were devas-
However, most of the missions carried out in tated. RDBs were not used in these strikes, so
this first wave were successful. Egyptian air- general-purpose bombs, rockets, and gunfire
craft, set in lines exposed and unprotected on demonstrated their powers. However, runways
the parking area, were destroyed. Airfield infra- were operational, MiGs were airborne, and the
structure was damaged, including control cost the IAF paid for the lack of surprise was
towers, maintenance hangars, and ammunition high. In all, six Israeli aircraft were shot down
and fuel dumps. In less than an hour about 200 (an attrition rate of 7.32 percent, almost twice
planes were left burning on the runway: half of that of the average at the Egyptian front). How-
the Egyptian Air Force strength. The IAF lost ever, a total of 61 Syrian aircraft were destroyed
eight aircraft, a relatively small loss that was on the ground, and seven MiG-21s and three
due mainly to the surprise factor. MiG-17s were shot down in dogfights. Due to
To complete its mission the IAF launched a the availability of fighter aircraft cover and
second attack wave at 0934, making a total of more time to engage in dogfights, the IAF man-
The Six-Day War 61
aged to keep its loss rate down. throughout the whole war. A fast and thorough
After destroying the Egyptian, Jordanian, hardening program was commenced after June
and Syrian air forces, the IAF had no trouble 1967 and has since been implemented. In Egypt
offering close air support to ground troops, and and Syria all aircraft in parking areas are now
flying counter air missions throughout the war. protected in concrete shelters capable of main-
Many lessons were learned from this war, tenance operations, refueling, and arming. Taxi-
both by the Israeli and the Arab forces. For in- ways have been reconstructed to act as emer-
stance, where fighters were scrambled with ad- gency runways. In Egypt secondary runways
vance notice, capable of taking off or being on have been paved, reinforced with concrete, and,
runway in time, they could hamper the Israeli where crossed runways had previously been
attack, but not prevent it. The pilots' readiness used, third runways have been built. Installa-
and determination to fight were crucial factors. tion hardening was also carried out, and the
An air base's runway layout and repair capa- Egyptians instigated a weapons research pro-
bility largely determined its chances for sur- gram to acquire more effective runway-destruc-
vival, because air bases capable of being re- tion weapons. All these programs, innovations,
paired in order to meet the second-wave attack and renovations were put to their greatest test
stood a better chance than those crippled in the Yom Kippur War.
Chapter 5
The War of Attrition, 1967-70
The War of Attrition is the one Mideast war and the Politburo resulted, as do most interna-
about which the rest of the world knows very tional alliances, from highly disparate motives.
little. It was, by far, the longest of the Arab- Egypt's main reason for requesting what
Israeli conflicts, and it probably came closer to amounted to a Soviet takeover of Egyptian air
erupting into a world war than any of the defense was, simply, the need to build up an ef-
others. (Despite its length and all of the armed fective counterforce to what even Nasser recog-
confrontation, some historians do not consider nized as Israel's air superiority. This, reasoned
it to be one of the Arab-Israeli wars.) More in- the Egyptian president, was the only way in
teresting, however, in the War of Attrition the which the Sinai might be taken; once this was
Soviet Air Force took an actual part in air-to- accomplished, the Russians could be (and, in
air combat— and lost to the Israelis! Needless fact, eventually were) sent home.
to say, the Russians never reported the battle Russia, however, did not see matters quite
to the press, and, like the Soviet participation this way. Obviously, the Politburo would never
in the Korean War, it has been a closely guarded have agreed to send thousands of experts, hun-
secret . until now.
. . dreds of aircraft, and an entire air defense divi-
The protracted series of raids, shellings, and sion into Egypt for purely altruistic reasons, no
bombings on both sides of the Suez Canal be- matter what their opinion might be of "Israeli
tween the Six-Day War and the cease-fire on imperialism" versus "the struggle of the Egyp-
August 7, 1970, is generally termed the War of tian masses." Had Brezhnev not believed Egypt
Attrition. This usage, though customary, is not would reward his efforts by allowing a per-
quite correct. It is erroneous to speak of the War manent Soviet presence in the Middle East—
of Attrition: There was not one but several mili- and especially on the Mediterranean Sea— he
tary efforts directed against Israel during that would never have committed himself to such an
period. Responsible for those sporadic flare- extent. However, he knew that failure to do so
ups— no two of which were coordinated to any would almost definitely result in the rapid
great extent— were the various nations defeated downfall of the Nasser regime; to prevent such
by Israel in the 1967 conflict, as well as the then- a development— which would have seriously en-
fledgling group known as the Palestine Libera- dangered Soviet strategic as well as political
tion Organization. However, the most serious aims— he called in the Soviet air defense.
of these, both from the standpoint of IDF Immediately after the cease-fire of June 1967
casualties (367 killed, 999 wounded) and that of the Russians again rebuilt shattered Arab
Israel's continued strategic security, was the forces. Avast Soviet airlift replenished the
ongoing struggle between Israel and Egypt— Arab arsenals so quickly that by the end of June
or, rather, between Israel and the joint forces 1967, only two weeks after the defeat, the Egyp-
of Egypt and the Soviet Union. tians had almost 200 aircraft, mainly MiG-21s
The unusual— indeed, unparalleled— degree of and Sukhoi-7s— an air force more modern and
cooperation between the Nasser/Sadat regime formidable than the one annihilated by the
62
The War of Attrition 63
Against the guerrillas. A Bell 205 giving support to an anti-guerrilla search in the Hebron hills. Operating in
a tightly integrated force with crack paratroopers, the helicopter pilots flew countless missions helping to break
the back of PLO guerrilla activities, which made life difficult on the frontiers.
Israelis. The Arabs, who had learned their les- Israelis, unable to match the massive Egyptian
son from the air strike that destroyed their air artillery force, dug in and prepared to absorb
forces on the ground, now dispersed their planes the blows, hitting back here and there with
widely in underground hangars with thick con- deep-penetration commando raids.
crete roofs. Since most of their aircraft had been Although the War of Attrition is generally
destroyed on the ground, the Egyptians had considered to have started in the summer of
lost only a few aircrews in the fighting, and thus 1969, in actual fact it began only a few short
were at no loss for trained personnel to man the weeks after the end of the Six-Day War. On Ju-
new planes. Furthermore, the Soviets agreed to ly 1, 1967, an IDF armored patrol moving north
train hundreds more pilots in their flying toward Port Fuad on the eastern bank of the
schools in Russia. Suez Canal was cut off by an Egyptian infiltrat-
Israel, however, found it difficult to acquire ing force that had crossed the Canal under cover
replacement aircraft. The loss of some 40 planes of darkness the previous night. The resulting
in the war, with a few others damaged, serious- battle continued for several days until— with
ly diminished the IAF's inventory. The one- the help of the Israeli Air Force— the Egyptians
sided French embargo imposed before the war were finally defeated.
was holding up delivery of 50 custom-designed Egypt, however, did not give up easily. Three
and paid-for Mirage Vs. The Americans also days later two events occurred, both confirm-
became evasive about fulfilling their commit- ing what was then the Egyptian policy of con-
ment to supply Skyhawks, which they finally tinued harassment. On July 4, a MiG-17— the
honored toward the latter part of the year. first of many Egyptian aircraft to attempt
The Egyptians, gaining confidence with the flights over the Sinai— was shot down; that
growing stream of arms and not wanting the same day Egyptian artillery opened fire on Is-
status quo to solidify, began shelling Israeli po- raeli positions across the Canal. Another Egyp-
sitions along the Suez Canal intermittently. The tian aircraft, this time an SU-7, was downed
over the Sinai a week on July 14, six

later; tians:The fierce bombardment of the Israeli po-
Egyptian MiGs were downed and one IAF air- sitions was resumed. Days later, on March 8,
craft lost in a combined air/ground battle in the 1969, the first major battle (excluding IAF reac-
Suez area, which also claimed the lives of many tions to Egyptian Air Force incursions) took
Israeli soldiers. place.Four Egyptian MiGs, their pilots trained
Such skirmishes as these continued until Oc- by the Soviet Union, attempted to penetrate the
tober, when a more serious exchange of inci- airspace over the Sinai. Almost at once, a pair
dents occurred. On October 21, 1967, the Israeli ofIAF Mirages challenged them. Two of the
destroyer Eilat, on a routine patrol mission MiGs fled westward at once; a third, less cau-
along the Sinai coasts, was hit and sunk by a tious, opened fire on the Mirages and was im-
Soviet-made Styx sea-to-sea missile fired from mediately blown out of the sky. The fourth MiG
within Port Said harbor, itself protected from tried to flee, but was hit by IAF cannon fire;
Israeli reprisal by the presence of several Rus- its pilot bailed cut over the Sinai and was taken
sian warships. Israel, however, chose to respond prisoner.
to the loss of its flagship and 47 Israeli Navy This incident caused no small amount of con-
officers and men by striking at a target far away cern in Soviet circles. Despite the incredible
from Port Said. On October 24, the Egyptian amounts of money, materiel, time, and human
oil refineries at Suez were shelled and set ablaze resources expended by Soviet Air Force instruc-
by IDF gunfire. tors and logistics experts on the Egyptian Air
Despite Nasser's late November declaration Force, Russia did not feel the Egyptians were
of intent to renew the war, the October incidents ready to challenge the IAF on a large scale, and
were the last in the Canal area for nearly a year hundreds of Egyptian pilots were trained at
(during most of which time the IDF was busily Krasnodar and Saratov operational training es-
fighting off terrorists on the Jordanian and tablishments in the USSR. Nevertheless, some-
Syrian fronts). It was not until September 8, thing had to be done to keep up the pressure
1968, that the Egyptian Army renewed on Israel. Accordingly, the Soviets accelerated
hostilities with a thunderous artillery barrage deliveries of artillery and ammunition to
along 100 kilometers of the Canal. Ten Israeli Egypt's ground forces, making it possible to
soldiers, taken by surprise in the midst of a foot- keep up the deadly shelling of Israeli positions
ball game, were killed instantly, 18 more were on the Canal. (Ironically, they also invited Is-
wounded, some of them seriously. Seven weeks raeli artillery reprisals, one of which— on March
later, on October 26, another barrage killed 15 9— was responsible for the death of the Egyp-
Israelis and wounded 30. This barrage resulted tian chief of staff, Gen. Abdel Muneim Riad,
in two distinct actions: The first, immediate who was visiting a forward command post on
reprisal consisted of heavy Israeli shelling of the the west bank of the Canal.) At the same time,
cities of Suez and Ismailia, as well as of the now they reduced shipments to the Egyptian Air
rebuilt refineries, followed five days later by a Force.
daring heliborne commando raid on two bridges The following weeks were marked by escala-
spanning the Nile and a new power transformer and commando raids on
tion of both artillery
at Nag Hammadi, hundreds of kilometers west both one Egyptian
sides; in all of April only
of Suez. The second reaction— which made itself MiG was downed. However, on May 21, several
felt in the four months' respite Egypt granted formations of Egyptian aircraft tried to fly over
Israel following the October 31 raid— involved the Sinai. In the Port Said sector a formation
the construction of a series of reinforced con- ofMiGs was scattered and its leader's aircraft
crete strongholds from Ras el Eish in the north shot down by an IAF Hawk missile, the first
to Port Tewfik in the south; this was later downing of a Soviet-made aircraft by a Hawk
named the Bar-Lev Line. missile anywhere in the world. Farther south,
Aside from the downing of a single Egyptian three out of a formation of eight MiGs were
aircraft south of Sharm-el-Sheikh in December downed by air-to-air missiles.
1968, there were no serious clashes between From the middle of June to July no fewer
7
Egypt and Israel until the beginning of March than nine Egyptian aircraft were shot down by
1969. The first move was made by the Egyp- the IAF. However, the IAF action that had the
most decisive effect on Egyptian air policy was awaited permission for Israeli pilots to launch
a sortie in which no bombs were dropped, no an all-out attack along the Suez Canal.
Egyptian aircraft appeared to challenge, and no The aerial attack was preceded by an extreme-
damage, other than smashed windows and ly audacious commando raid on a potentially
wounded dignity, was inflicted on any target threatening Egyptian position, Green Island,
anywhere in Egypt. On June 17, 1969, a pair of the day before. Green Island, located in the Gulf
IAF Mirages set out from an air base "some- of Suez, was used by the Egyptians as part of
where in Israel" with a very special mission: their anti-aircraft system; in addition to a radar
scaring the president of Egypt out of his wits. station, it housed AAA gun emplacements of
This was accomplished, quite simply, by flying several kinds— all deadly. At dawn on July 19,
in low over the prestigious Cairo suburbs of a composite force made up of naval commando
Heliopolis and Manshieh el Bakri at speeds high and elite Special Forces units landed on Green
enough to produce the loudest sonic boom Island. The force, led by Col. Ze'ev Almog (now
Nasser had ever heard. Windows were shattered a major general and O/C Israeli Navy), stormed
throughout the area. Nasser's immediate reac- the radar and gun nests, putting them out of
tion was to dismiss both his air force chief, Air action and neutralizing the Egyptian troops sta-
Marshal Hinawi, and O/C (Officer Commanding) tioned there. Within hours Green Island no
Air Defense Hassan Kamal, both of whom had longer presented any kind of threat to the fly-
been on duty at the time and neither of whom ing force to come.
had been able to warn him of the impending "at- At noon on the next day the skies over the
tack." However, the daring IAF action pro- Sinai were suddenly filled with wave after wave
duced another, more significant result: For the of IAF aircraft. Missile sites, radar installa-
first time, the Egyptian president began to tions, conventional and AAA emplacements,
think seriously about improving his country's everything west of the waterline was fair game
air defense. to the attackers. On they came, discharging
The first step in the implementation of their deadly payload of bombs, napalm, rockets,
Nasser's decision involved improving both the and cannon fire; then they quickly returned to
number and quality of Egypt's early warning IAF bases, where the unbelievably rapid turn-
systems. In addition, the SA-2 surface-to-air around techniques the IAF had used in the Six-
missile systems (which Egypt had begun receiv- Day War once more came into play. By last
ing from the Soviet Union even before the Six- light hundreds of sorties had been flown, wreak-
Day War, but which were made operational only ing havoc up and down the west bank of the
later)were moved to sites south of Suez, only Canal. Not many missile batteries or gun em-
100 kilometers from Cairo. It did not, however, placements remained intact.
take long before the IAF had shown that these The stunned Egyptians hardly reacted to this
changes were largely ineffectual— witness the onslaught. Only three hours later, while the
downing, mentioned earlier, of nine Egyptian Israeli pilots were still harassing the Egyptian
planes. The first three of these were shot down positions, did the Egyptian Air Force finally
on June 24, in a dogfight over the Gulf of Suez; show its hand. A flight of Sukhoi-7s and
the remaining six, in July, on two separate oc- MiG-17s struck in a low-level hit-and-run attack
casions over Suez City. into the Sinai, causing little damage. However,
By now not only Nasser, but his Soviet ad- the Israeli high-cover interceptors fell on the at-
visors as well, were extremely perturbed by the tackers and shot down five Egyptian aircraft
trend of events. Having no possibility of match- for one Israeli plane hit.
ing the Israelis in the air, Egypt continued It was at this point that certain Egyptian
pounding the Bar-Lev strongpoints with with- General Staff officers began entertaining
ering artillery fire. The effect of the continued thoughts of a Canal crossing. However, this
barrages was to create a vicious cycle: (1) Egyp- plan did not meet with Nasser's approval, nor
tian aircraft downed, (2) Egyptian artillery that of his Soviet advisors— far from it. Nasser
shells IDF posts, (3) Israel, incensed at the shell- knew— and, in fact, had stated as early as
ing, increases its aerial efforts. Finally, on July March of that year— that he could not hope to
20, the IAF High Command gave the long- succeed in an invasion of the Sinai. According-
ly, he instructed his General Staff to keep up ber of priority military targets. Once again
the shelling; at the same time he instituted an Nasser was not informed of the raid, nor of the
intensive training program for Egypt's armor fact that neither aircraft nor armor had chal-
and infantry, thereby giving these forces the il- lenged the raiders, until the Israelis had already
lusion of doing something useful. Meanwhile, leftEgypt eastward across the Gulf. Nasser's
the Russians simply made it impossible for the response was typical: He dismissed his chief of
Egyptian armed forces to organize any attempt staff.
to cross the Suez Canal and invade the Sinai. September 11, 1969, was a red-letter day in
Crucial supply orders were "lost" or mixed up; the annals of the Israeli Air Force. On that day
shipments of spare parts were "unaccountably" the IAF's pilots and air defense crews downed
delayed. Eventually, even the most obdurate of- 11 Egyptian seven of them MiG-21s—
aircraft,
ficers of Egypt's General Staff were forced to the largest number of enemy aircraft to be shot
accept Nasser's plan for a protracted war of down in one day since the Six-Day War. On that
attrition as being— at least for the present— the day, the Egyptian Air Force had attempted to
most viable. retaliate for the IDF armored raid of the ninth.
In the interim the IDF High Command began At least 40 Egyptian aircraft were slated to fly
to plan a series of joint armor/air strikes deep attack sorties on IDF targets; dozens of others
into Egypt, in retaliation for the constant shell- were scrambled for intercept and cover mis-
ing that had by then cost Israel hundreds of sions. The assault began at 0900 hours; it was
casualties and tremendous economic damage. met by a "welcoming committee" of Israeli
The a deep-thrusting raid on
first of these, Hawk missiles and anti-aircraft artillery down-
Egyptian territory southwest of the Gulf of ing two of the potential attackers before they
Suez, was planned September 9. However,
for had had a chance to reach their targets. Three
it would first be necessary to knock out an SA-2 hours later, the Egyptian Air Force launched
missile battery some 30 kilometers from Suez a second wave; it, too, was repulsed, pushing the
City, in order to ensure freedom of movement attacking Egyptians back into their own air-
for the IAF air cover. There was no way to space and downing several more. The third
launch a commando raid against this battery; wave, later that afternoon, never even crossed
it had to be taken out from the air. According- the Canal. IAF formations engaged them 15
ly, at dawn on September 9, shortly after Israeli kilometers west of the waterline, chasing them
armor had landed on the west bank of the Gulf, 65 kilometers into Egyptian territory and down-
several pairs of IAF aircraft swooped in low ing three MiG-21s.
over the battery. The first bombs shattered the Israeli aircraft began attacking the western
SA-2 command and control center; another pair shore of the Gulf almost daily. As the weeks
of fighter-bombers knocked out the launchers; passed, the Port Said sector became another
while still others attacked additional targets routine target. Although the IDF spokesman
further inland, including an important Egyptian made it clear that the Israeli offensive would
radar station in the Ras Zafrani area. One IAF cease the moment the Egyptians silenced their
aircraftwas lost in this action. The aircraft was artillery, Egypt showed no sign of wanting to
hit by Egyptian anti-aircraft artillery fire near do so, and so the raids continued. Eventually,
Ras Zafrani; the pilot, despite efforts to bring the IAF began flying night bombing missions
his aircraft back to base, was forced to eject as well. This had an understandably destructive
over the Gulf of Suez and drowned in the swirl- effect on the Egyptian Army's morale, which
ing water. Israel's naval commandos also began to founder seriously as the IAF again
played their part inthe preparations for this proved its ability to dominate the skies.
strike: The day before, commandos penetrated While the fighting continued along and over
the harbor of Ras Sadat on the Gulf of Suez, the Canal, the air force also had its role to play
sinking two torpedo boats and damaging har- in the fight against the guerillas and their Arab
bor facilities. The subsequent armored strike regular army backing on the Jordanian front.
was very many Egyptian
successful, killing By this time the Iraqis had also entered Jordan
military personnel, among them Soviet ad- with a strong force concentrated around Irbid
visors, and causing extensive damage to a num- in the north, opposite the Israeli side of the Jor-
dan River Valley. The PLO guerillas were not "copycat" tactics— sending assault aircraft to
making much headway in their efforts to in- bomb IDF targets along the east bank of the
filtrate into Israel. To support them, the Iraqis Canal. These attempts, however, were few and
and Jordanians began shelling Jewish settle- far between; in addition, the great majority of
ments in the valley. The air force was again them were wildly inaccurate.
called in to stop the artillery harassment. On New Year's Day 1970 showed a definite edge
December 12, the IAF subjected the Iraqis to They had already man-
in favor of the Israelis.
a smashing blow, bombing their installations aged to knock out most of the hundreds of ar-
and artillery concentrations and causing heavy tillery pieces the Egyptians had concentrated
losses of men and materiel. along the Canal, making it nearly impossible for
Then the Syrians joined in the fighting. Shell- Egypt to continue shelling IDF positions. Other
ing started along the Golan Heights and the
all materiel lost included AAA guns, ammunition
Israelis retaliated by bombing El Fatah camps dumps, and three Soviet-made P-12 radar sta-
near Damascus. In one dogfight between Syrian tions. (Two of these, located in Jordan and
and Israeli planes over Damascus, a MiG-17 manned by an Egyptian expeditionary force,
was shot down by a Skyhawk still carrying its were bombed in an IAF raid on November 17,
full load— an unprecedented feat. It became 1969. The third, at Ras Gharib on the Gulf of
clear that the Israeli pilots still retained an un- Suez, was captured intact and transported back
questionable superiority over their Arab to Israel in an IDF/IAF heliborne commando
counterparts, however modern their aircraft raid.) An attempt to move more missile bat-
and however advanced their training in Russia. teries to the Canal Zone in mid-December had
In December 1969 the Israelis executed been discovered by Israeli intelligence within a
another spectacular operation. Reconnaissance matter of days. The IAF struck on December
units had located a newly erected Egyptian 25, smashing every battery from Kantara to
radar station on the western shores of the Gulf Suez City in one continuous eight-hour wave of
of Suez. From aerial photos, experts identified bombings. In addition, concentrated IDF armor
the installation as a new Soviet type. Because and artillery assaults had become more or less
of its threat to future air operations, it was es- the order of the day. Four major Egyptian cities
sential to determine its technical characteris- along the Canal— Port Said, Ismailia, Kantara,
tics. This was a classic mission for the para- and Suez City— had been evacuated, and the
troopers, and a raid was mounted to "lift" the west bank of the Canal was rapidly turning in-
complete station. to a sort of no-man's-land.
Landing silently by boat at night on the And then, on January 7, 1970, the long-range
western shore of the Gulf of Suez, the raiding bombings began.
party overcame the guards and dismantled the Several senior IAF officers had been advocat-
radar station. Helicopters then arrived in the ing long-range bombing months beforehand,
dark, and, hovering over the base, they lifted claiming that this was the only way to maintain
off the entire secret tracking station. While the the advantage Israel had so painstakingly built
troopers fought off Egyptian reinforcements, up in the War of Attrition. One of these, De-
helicopters flew the equipment over the Gulf to fense Minister Ezer Weizman, also stressed that
the Israeli side. This operation was a severe this tactic would be the only way to convince
blow to Egyptian use of Russian electronic tech- Egypt to halt the war— which was, after all,
niques and hardware. what Israelwas most interested in doing. The
By the end of October the IAF had destroyed arrival of the first Phantom fighter-bombers—
the last two missile batteries on the Canal, leav- aircraft whose range, payload, strength, and
ing its entire length clear of any effective air de- instrumentation greatly exceeded anything pre-
fense. Now there was no way Egypt could halt viously held in the IAF inventory— allayed the
the raids. Intercept missions were strongly dis- fears of the more conservative officers in IAF
couraged both by Egyptian Air Force Com- Command. At the beginning of January, then
mand and its Soviet advisors; the Israelis found O/C Air Force Motti Hod concluded that the
it easy to avoid what few AAAguns remained IAF could now successfully bomb targets in the
in the Canal area. The Egyptian Air Force tried heart of Egypt.
Against the Egyptians. McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bomber— the workhorse of the IAF—ouer
the Sinai hills. These were the first American-manufactured combat aircraft officially supplied to the IAF.
The success of the first such mission proved The following day the Egyptian Air Force at-
unqualifiedly that Hod had been right. On Jan- tempted a reprisal, raiding the Israeli-operated
uary 7, while IAF A-4 Skyhawk formations oil fields of Ras Sudar on the eastern shore of
pounded targets along the Canal, Israeli F-4 the Gulf of Suez. While they did succeed in pene-
Phantoms were speeding farther west, toward trating Sinai airspace and causing damage, two
three military sites in central Egypt. These were of their SU-7 bombers were downed over the
evenly spaced at some 40 to 50 kilometers from Sinai.
Cairo: one at Inshas to the northeast, another On January 13, the IAF struck again, this
at Dahshur in the Nile Valley south of the capi- time even closer to the capital. IAF aircraft
tal, and the third at Tel el Kebir, on the Cairo- bombed the Egyptian supply depot at El
Ismailia road. The Egyptians were, amazingly, Hanka, only 25 kilometers northeast of the
taken completely by surprise; Egyptian Air capital, near Cairo International Airport. On the
Force Command did not even manage to order 16th, during a deep-penetration raid in the Tel
the air force base near Inshas to scramble air- el Kebir area, the IAF lost one aircraft to AAA
craft in pursuit until the Israelis had already re- fire. This, however, did not deter them from
crossed the Canal. bombing the military camps of Huckstep, some

18 kilometers from Cairo International Airport, president would be such a close friend of the
and the fuel and ammunitions depot of Wadi Soviet Union.
Hof, 20 kilometers southeast of Cairo itself. In the end the Politburo (whose meetings
Meanwhile, the IDF ground forces had not were attended by a full complement of 12 Soviet
been idle. On January 21, an armored raiding marshals for the first time since World War II!)
party smashed into the west bank of the Gulf decided on a solution that would meet Egypt's
of Suez, destroying, among other targets, radar needs while protecting the Soviet materiel. Not
and early-warning installations. The following only would Russia provide Egypt with all the
day a combined IAF/IDF operation resulted in interceptors, missiles, AAA guns, and radar it
the capture of Shadwan Island in the Red Sea could possibly use, but it would also send in
and the sinking of two Egyptian MTBs about Soviet military personnel to man them. It was
18 kilometers south of the island. Although the decided that the Soviets would take over
Israelis withdrew from Shadwan after only 36 Egypt's air defense by stages; in addition,
hours of occupation, they took with them a com- Soviet instructors would continue to train
plete British-made radar unit, as well as quanti- Egyptian Air Force personnel, and the Soviet
ties of arms, ammunitions, and Egyptian Navy would establish at least one base in Egyp-
prisoners. tian waters. A complete, detailed battle order
That was the day Nasser finally admitted was devised by the Soviet High Command,
that Egypt could no longer hope to defend its alerting Air Defense, Frontal Aviation, and
own airspace. On January 22, while the Israelis Transport commands for a massive effort
were busy taking Shadwan Island, Gamal without delay.
Abdel Nasser was en route to Russia. Despite The first massive Soviet airlift of new
his failing health and the bitter Moscow cold, weapons and materiel began in late January. By
the Egyptian president flew to the Soviet capi- that time the Israelis had made several more in-
tal for four days of intensive, secret meetings. depth raids in both the Cairo and northern Delta
During the course of these talks, the ailing areas, including the bombing of the El Maadi
leader stressed that Israel had achieved definite camps in what was practically a residential
air superiority— a fact the Soviets had already suburb of Cairo on January 28. For the first
known for some time— and that Egypt would time the Egyptian civilian population began
have to receive massive Soviet assistance in the showing signs of concern. Civil defense prepara-
field of air defense. tions became the order of the day. Even some
To Leonid Brezhnev and the Politburo, Egyptian Air Force base commanders in the
Nasser's request posed a definite problem. The Cairo area, as yet unaware of the help to come,
Soviet Union did indeed have the weapons appealed to Nasser to order their bases moved
Egypt needed, including sophisticated SA-3 farther west; some Egyptian aircraft were ac-
surface-to-air missiles. However, they were tually dispatched to Sudan and Libya, to pre-
understandably quite reluctant to let these out vent their being destroyed on the ground by the
of the Communist and especially into
bloc, IAF (as had happened on June 5, 1967, in the
Egypt. Their reasons for this position were two- opening move of the Six-Day War).
fold: First, they feared the new materiel would Meanwhile, however, the Soviet transports
be too complex for Egypt to maintain and had begun to arrive. The first of these landed
operate effectively (as had been the case with at the airfield known as Cairo West; however,
the SA-2s the Soviets had deployed in North after the bombing of the El Maadi installations,
Vietnam). Second, and more pressing, was the the Russians apparently felt it more prudent to
danger that Israel might manage to capture one move their airlift to the Alexandria area. Thus
or more of the new SA-3 batteries, as it had done the first of the new SA-3s were set up by Soviet
with the P-12 radar installation the previous air defense crews near Alexandria; there they
month. Nevertheless, Brezhnev was well aware protected the airspace of the western Delta,
that, should he refuse to grant his ally Nasser which was usually full of Soviet AN-22
the aid his country so desperately needed, the transport aircraft, sometimes as many as five
Nasser regime might well topple. In such a case, per hour!
it was doubtful whether the next Egyptian Following the transports came the intercep-
tors flown in from the Soviet Frontal Aviation confidence of the Egyptian Air Force. In late
Air Army
based in Tokol, Hungary. These were February it began attempting to engage IAF
Soviet-made MiG-21J aircraft, a considerable combat, while Soviet pilots flew
aircraft in aerial
improvement over the basic MiG-21s that high cover. Although this proved rather less of
Egypt had been operating for some time. The a success than the Egyptians had hoped for— 13
new interceptors had better radar, more effec- Egyptian-piloted MiGs were downed by the
tive fire control, and were capable of carrying IAF between February 26 and the end of
detachable fuel tanks, increasing their range to March— the fact remains that now the Egyptian
the point where air strikes within Israel could Air Force was at least trying to interfere with
become not only possible, but practical. As op- the Israeli bombings.
posed to the SA-3s, the interceptor aircraft were By the end of March 1970 the Soviet presence
based in the Cairo area; by mid-May a total of in Egypt was considerable. A complete air
some 150 Soviet-piloted MiG-21Js would be defense division had been flown out of the
operating in ten combat squadrons on five Odessa air defense district and posted through-
Egyptian air bases. However, for the time be- out the western Delta region, with its head-
ing, Soviets refrained from
the active en- quarters at Alexandria. A special forward Air
counters with Israeli aircraft. Transport Command had been installed at Cairo
Shortly after the beginning of the Soviet air- West, with direct links to the air transport com-
the I AF nearly plunged the area into all-out
lift munications network. Also included were the
war— according to Israel, totally by mistake. On squadrons of MiG-21J and SU-15 (Flagon A) air-
February 12, IAF aircraft set out to bomb three craft, with their maintenance and ground facili-
targets inside Egypt, including the Hanka ties that had been flown out of Russia and
encampment already attacked the previous Hungary into the Cairo and Delta areas. And
month. Less than three kilometers from Hanka, more arms were coming all the time.
at Abu Zaabal, lay a huge civilian smelting That same month the IDF spokesman an-
plant, which, however, bore an astonishing simi- nounced that Israel was aware of the presence
larity to a military complex when viewed from of Soviet-manned SA-3 missiles in Egypt. In ad-
the air. One of the Israeli aircraft had a tech- dition, the Israeli ground forces along the Canal
nical malfunction; its pilot was forced to choose were dismayed to discover that the Egyptians,
between identifying his target visually or abort- their confidence restored along with their ar-
ing his mission. He chose the former course and, tillery,had begun to renew the deadly shellings
mistaking the plant at Abu Zaabal for the of IDF positions, which had slowed to a near
Hanka encampment, leveled it with five tons of halt in the previous months. The IAF now had
bombs. This would have been bad enough; but to play a dual role: In addition to the in-depth
even worse was the realization that one of the bombings, it now had to knock out Egyptian
bombs dropped on Abu Zaabal was of the de- gun emplacements and other military targets
layed-action type, set to explode the following along the Canal, as it had done in the first
day, when, in all probability, diplomats and months of the War of Attrition.
foreign press would be visiting the site. Bear- An excellentexample of the spirit of those
ing this possibility in mind, Israel's defense days is provided by the events of March 24-25.
minister and O/C air force agreed to ask the Red On the morning of the 24th, IAF Skyhawks and
Cross and the UN to inform the Egyptians of Phantoms attacked nearly 20 surface-to-air
the delayed-action bomb. By this move, which missile sites, along with a large number of AAA
in effect amounted to an IAF apology, Israel guns, radar stations, and other installations.
hoped— rightly, as it turned out— that Nasser These represented the bulk of the Soviet air de-
would be sufficiently placated to avoid escalat- fense effort of the preceding two months. The
ing the conflict into full-scale war. In addition, Soviets were now faced with the problem of
the IAF Command ordered the in-depth bomb- reconstructing their SA-3 screen as rapidly as
ings halted for three days and a comprehensive possible, with the additional requirement that
inquiry carried out. it afford greater protection for the now almost
Meanwhile, the arrival of the Soviet regular constantly besieged Canal Zone. This they did,
troops and materiel had begun to bolster the incredibly, in a single night. The first step was
the positioning of several Russian-staffed AAA quent Egyptian reports) sank an Egyptian de-
regiments as close as 30 kilometers from the stroyer and missile boats off Ras Banas near the
waterline. Behind this protective screen the Sudan border. Despite the distance and diffi-
Soviets readied two complete air defense regi- culty involved, both targets were hit without
ments; these were to move at first light into incident, and the IAF aircraft returned to base
sites constructed by thousands of Egyptians, unscathed.
working at fever pitch throughout the night, During the night of June 29, the Soviets be-
under cover of darkness and protected by Soviet gan what then Israeli Defense Minister Moshe
interceptors flying night missions from the Day an termed the "electronic summer." New-
Delta airfields of Mansoura, Bilbeis, and Beni ly organized Soviet SAM regiments were moved
Suef. At dawn on the 25th, the air defense regi- forward into the central sector, some 30 kilo-
ments were in position and operative, which meters west of the Canal Zone, in an all-night
meant, of course, that Israeli intelligence had operation reminiscent of the one they had
no difficulty spotting them in its morning recon- staged in March. However, this time the results
naissance check. Immediately, IAF aircraft were slightly different. The following morning,
were sent to demolish the air defense line. This a few minutes after the start of the customary
resulted in a pitched air/ground battle with the Egyptian artillery barrage, the Israeli aircraft
Soviet troops, the first battle fought by any showed up on scene as usual, only to be con-
Soviet expeditionary force since World War II. fronted by scores of SA-3 missiles fired from
While Israeli aircraft pounded the missile sites clusters of six launchers apiece, instead of the
and gun emplacements, the Russians manning former single-launcher technique. One Phantom
them fired frantically at the IAF attackers. was immediately downed, its pilot taken
Within hours, however, the IAF had gained the prisoner; a second soon followed. The shaken
upper hand, reducing the new air defense posi- Israelis, unused to the cluster system, in which
tions to rubble for the second time in two days. the launchers protected each other, were forced
The Russians, taken aback by their inability to to withdraw without having damaged the
defend their sites, flew in top experts from Mos- missile batteries.
cow to devise a new operational plan. In the days to come the Soviets reinforced
Less than a month later, on April 18, IAF air- their air defense even further. More and more
craft had their first definitive encounter with MiG-21Js were flown into the Delta area, en-
Soviet pilots. During an Israeli incursion into abling the Soviets to fly high cover on every
Egyptian airspace south of Cairo, the IAF pi- Egyptian air strike. Hundreds of SA-7 Strela
lots overheard the Soviets talking with their surface-to-air missiles, operated by infantry
home base— in Russian. (At the time, the Soviet troops, on top of scores of radar-controlled
forces in Egypt were not yet equipped with quick-firing anti-aircraft guns, were added to
data-link systems, which would have obviated the impressive array of Soviet-made weaponry
the necessity for voice communication.) A quick gracing the Egyptian front line. The Israelis put
check revealed that all MiGs in sight bore Egyp- through a top-priority request for ECM (elec-
tian Air Force markings; a second glance, how- tronic countermeasures) equipment to the
ever, made it evident that some of them were Pentagon; United States officials ignored it,
not ordinary MiG-21s. The IAF Command put leaving Israel to cope with this new develop-
two and two together, realized that Soviets were ment on its own.
flying MiG-21Js to protect Egypt's airspace On July 3, the IAF began attacking the new
and, to avoid direct confrontation, called off all SAM regiments, using a new form of flying tac-
deep-penetration bombing at once. The new tics: They would zoom in extremely low, release
policy of confining IAF aerial activity to the the pay load just inside effective range, then
Canal Zone itself was breached only once. Fol- climb as steeply as possible to evade the SAMs.
lowing Egyptian attacks on the port of Eilat Several aircraft would attack each cluster base,
and on an Israeli fishing boat in the Mediter- starting from the launchers on the fringes of the
ranean in early May, the IAF decided to launch cluster and working their way in, until they met
a retaliation raid. On the afternoon of May 16 for a combined attack on the command and con-
IAF aircraft (Phantoms, according to subse- trol center. These tactics resulted in the im-
mediate destruction of two SA-2 batteries; one unique in his memory:

Phantom, however, was lost to an SA-3 missile.
Several days later a second Israeli request for We had beenwaiting for a long time for some-
thing like that to happen. When they attacked
electronic countermeasures was answered in the
the Skyhawk, we knew the next step could be for
affirmative, a fitting reward for IAF valor,
us to take them on in combat— and frankly, many
though perhaps more to test their effectiveness of us welcomed the chance. We'd been doing a
under combat conditions prevailing on the lot ofbombing, and nothing had happened to us
Canal. in weeks and weeks— nobody fired on us, hardly
Meanwhile, as June progressed into July, the anybody even chased us. But now the Russians
Soviet pilots had begun to take a more active had broken the agreement, and we hoped some-
role in the defense of Egypt's airspace. No thing would come of it.
longer confining themselves to high-cover mis- None of us knew what degree of skill to expect
sions, they had begun chasing Israeli Phantoms from them. The Egyptians weren't the best fliers
in the world— that's why they had orders to stay
home from bombing sorties in Egypt. The IAF
out of dogfights with us. I assumed the Russians
High Command instructed its pilots at first to
couldn't be all that much better, especially as
refrain from challenging the Soviets, hoping
they'd had no combat experience since World
this new audacity would cease with the passage War II. They might have a numerical advantage,
of time. On Julyhowever, Israel realized the
25, of course; but that was nothing new for us.
Russians were out for a fight. That afternoon On July 30, we were sent to attack a radar sta-
two MiG-21Js piloted by Soviets fired on an tion at Ras Gharib, south of the Gulf of Suez.
IAF Skyhawk in the middle of a bombing run. Our reconnaissance aircraft went in close to the
Although they did not down the aircraft, they target. On their first pass the Russians scram-
did manage to damage its tail assembly; only bled four MiG-21s; on their second pass three
through consummate skill was the Israeli pilot foursomes were in the air and two of them headed
straight for our reconnaissance aircraft. We
able to coax his plane home and crash-land un-
didn't lose any time— we had none to lose— but
hurt.
jettisoned our fuel tanks and pounced on them.
It did not take the IAF High Command long By the time they realized what we were up to,
to decide that Israel would not sit still for a the fight was on.
repetition of this incident. Five days later, on I was Number Two Phantoms; we
of a pair of
July 30, the I AF's chance for revenge came up. and two Mirages were up against about 10 MiGs.
Two Phantoms and two Mirages were ordered It was a little unsettling to see so many aircraft
to attack an Egyptian radar station at Ras at once, so many

tanks being jettisoned all
fuel
Gharib, the same location from which the P-12 over the place. I didn't care about numerical su-
had been spirited away by Israeli commandos periority; I was just afraid someone might bump
seven months before. By the time the reconnais-

into my aircraft!
One of the Mirages fired an air-to-air missile
sance aircraft had made two passes over the tar-
seconds after the battle began. The missile hit
get, the Russians had scrambled three flights
a MiG and set it on fire. The pilot bailed out; the
of MiG-21 Js. The IAF pilots, realizing the odds aircraft went into a spin and dropped like a stone
were against them, had no choice but to jetti- from 30,000 feet. The Russian pilot's parachute
son their fuel tanks. Within minutes, however, didn't open right away.
more IAF aircraft had arrived on scene. By the It's not supposed to: Chutes are designed to
end of the battle four of the Soviet planes had open automatically at 10,000 feet, so their
been downed; a fifth exploded in midair. On the wearers don't freeze or suffocate at high alti-
Israeli side, one Mirage was hit by a Russian tudes. But this pilot used the manual apparatus
missile but managed to reach home safely. and opened the chute himself! Maybe he didn't
want to be taken alive ... or maybe he just didn't
This incident is retold here by a veteran IAF
know any better.
combat pilot (and, as of this writing, squadron
Now some more of our aircraft had joined the
leader). Although young, he has flown
relatively
battle; the Russians no longer had numerical
many combat missions in the Six-Day War, the superiority. I started looking for a MiG to kill.
War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War; but Finally, found one— its pilot was making a right
I
to him, as to the other pilots who took part in turn, trying to close in on my Number One. I
the events of July 30, 1970, that day remains broke to the right. The MiG left my Number One
and started chasing me! We stuck together for other. More Israeli planes joined the battle. Brak-
a while, dropping to about 15,000 feet; at that ing hard, I succeeded in getting my sights on a
point he was only about 500 feet from me. I could MiG. He had guts and turned into the fight, but
see the pilot's helmet clearly. I quickly realized he was inexperienced. He made
By this time I'd realized the Russian pilot was elementary mistakes. Diving down to 2,000
inexperienced; he didn't know how to handle his meters, I cut him off and soon locked on my
aircraft in a combat situation. At 15,000 feet he radar— then we had time. It was clear that he
proved this fact by trying to escape in a steep could not get away. At a range of 1,000 meters
dive to 7,000 feet. All we had to do was follow we fired a missile. The MiG exploded into a flam-
him and lock our radar onto him— and fire a mis- ing ball but, surprisingly, flew on. We fired
sile. There was a tremendous explosion, but the another missile, but this was no longer necessary.
MiG came out of the cloud of smoke apparently The Russian plane suddenly disintegrated in the
unharmed. That made me mad and I fired a sec- air. The pilot ejected and I observed him swing-
ond missile, which turned out to be unnecessary. ing down in his parachute. Breaking off combat,
The Russian aircraft had, in fact, been severely I returned to base.
damaged by the first missile; suddenly it burst
into flames and fell apart. By the time the second
Five Russian planes were shot down in a bat-
missile reached it, it wasn't there any more.
tle that lasted only a few minutes. There were
On my way home something interesting hap-
pened. I noticed my Number One had two mis- no Israeli losses.
siles missing. But I couldn't ask him about it This was the last great battle of the War of
over the radio, not with Russians so close to us Attrition. Eight days later, on August 7, 1970,
and possibly listening to every word. I pointed the UN cease-fire between Israel and Egypt
at his missiles, hoping to catch his eye. He went into However, incredibly, this cease-
effect.
grinned and spoke into his radio: "I hit one with fire was breached the very day it was
your dog.'' Because my dog's name was Shafrir, * signed— by a deliberate collusion of the air
the same as that of our missiles, but the Russians
defense forces of Egypt and the Soviet Union.
couldn't possibly know that. No one could, ex-
Scant hours before it was to have gone into ef-
cept a friend like my Number One.
fect, the Egyptians, with a good deal of "help
from their friends," moved a large number of
According to another Israeli fighter pilot, the
dummy missile batteries up close to the Canal.
Russians flew "by the book," making them-
This move, of course, was intended to enable the
selves easy game for the experienced Israeli
Egyptians to replace the fake batteries with real
pilots. He recounts:
ones as soon as possible, which they did. Al-
though both Israel and the United States were
They came and we let them pass
at us in pairs
aware of what was going on, they preferred not
in order not to be sandwiched between the pairs,
to intervene, restricting their reactions to ver-
as they had anticipated we would. They passed
one after another as couples in a procession. We bal protests. In the words of one American elec-
waited and got in behind, now sandwiching them, tronics expert:

and had before us 16 MiGs!
The sky was filled with planes as the forma- It became increasingly obvious that the Egyp-
tions broke up, and the danger of collision was tians were rushing SAMs into the cease-fire zone
very acute. Also flying about were a lot of jetti- to construct a solid SAM box, a firm barrier, that
soned fuel tanks, so you could hit anything if on was slowly creeping towards the Canal. This was
our side. Then I saw my Number One fire a confirmed by a report on September 5, which
Shafrir missile, and then another. Soon his target stated that 45 missile sites had been constructed
was on fire, spinning down from 9,000 meters and within the cease-fire zone since August 7, of
the pilot bailed out fast. which 30 had been armed since the cease-fire.
The melee continued, planes turning and twist-
ing around, and firing guns and rockets at each
It was this move that later prompted former
IDF Air Force Commander Ezer Weizman to
*Its name means "Dragonfly," and it is a deadly air- state that the Yom Kippur War actually started
to-air missile manufactured in Israel at one-quarter in August 1970 and not, as most of the world
the cost of a U.S. Sidewinder. believed, in October 1973.
Chapter 6
The Yom Kippur War, 1973
At the start of the Yom Kippur War IAF was usually overestimated and conclusions were
pilots had to face a veritable wall of fire, the found to have been drawn hastily through un-
greatest depth and mix of air defense systems professional or exaggerated reports.
ever deployed in battle. More than 10,000 One of these reports dealt with the efficiency
systems, including conventional anti-aircraft of Arab air defense systems and, especially, of
guns that supplemented the latest Soviet SA-6 their Soviet SAMs. In considering the worth of
and the mobile SA-8 missiles, were positioned these systems, it is well to remember that the
to provide a murderous cross fire and to cover Israeli Air Force was initially put to an extreme-
both high- and low-altitude attacks. The Israeli ly difficult test: having to stem, as the only
Air Force was practically immobilized. The major defense force available at the time, over-
Egyptian Army used its temporary advantage whelming armored assaults on two fronts simul-
to make a preemptive strike across the Suez taneously. This mission, of vital importance,
Canal. placed the IAF under extreme pressure, as did
Within ten hours after the War of Attrition the inconvenient modus operandi forced upon
cease-fire became Egyptians ad-
effective, the
vanced their missile bases right up to the Suez
Canal, in defiance of the military stand-still
agreement. The lack of a forceful Israeli or
American reaction seemed to confirm the view
that the cease-fire indicated an Israeli weakness,
despite the crushing defeat handed to the armed
forces of the four Arab nations. The War of At-
trition was the first Arab-Israeli conflict that
did not end with a complete victory for the
Israelis. This had great influence on Arab mili-
tary strategy, bringing to an end, it was
thought, the long period of deterrence by
Israeli's military superiority. The belief in
Israel's weakness encouraged the attack on
Yom Kippur, in 1973.
With the possible exception of the Vietnam
This Soviet-built SA-7, NATO code-named GRAIL,
conflict, the Yom Kippur War was the world's
a shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile, was first
first real electronic war. In it modern weapon
seen in the Middle East during the War of Attrition.
systems were put to the test, in quality as well The lightweight (20 pound) weapon, with a range of
as in density.But although most of the systems about 4 kilometers and a speed of Mach 1.5, is de-
were effective, their actual combat evaluation signed for defense against low-level attacks.
74
The Yom Kippur War 75
Egyptian SA-3s captured by on the west bank of the Suez Canal, October 1973. More modern
Israeli forces
than the SA-2, the SA-3, NATO code-named GOA, is effective from low to medium altitudes— 100 to 4,500
meters— supplementing the higher-flying SA-2s. These missiles were integrated with radar-directed anti-aircraft
cannons and machine guns, creating a tight anti-aircraft network.
it: flying front interdiction missions against the tions to Egyptian air defense were the tactically
best-defended enemy sectors. Losses under operated SA-6 Gainful, of which several bat-
these circumstances were inevitably heavy. teries operated with the Egyptian ground forces
Following the Israeli preemptive surprise at- in the Suez Canal bridgehead, and scores of new-
tack of the Six-Day War, which resulted in the ly arrived ZSU-23/4 mobile, tracked radar-
destruction of several Arab air forces within a directed anti-aircraft cannons.
few hours on the morning of June 5, 1967, Egyp- The SAM on the west bank of the Suez
sites
tian air defense (with Soviet assistance) had Canal operated in an integrated, mutually pro-
grown to considerable proportions. During the tective defense system. All missile sites were
drawn-out War of Attrition, between 1968 and built with earth-protective walls and concrete
1970, the first SAMbelt system on the Suez shelters, the perimeter defended by anti-aircraft
Canal came into being; in the early 1970s the gun positions. The whole system worked within
whole of the Nile Delta and the Egyptian rear a well-planned radar surveillance network
areas were covered by a dense air defense spread over wide areas and situated on well-
system, including over 60 SAM batteries de- chosen vantage points. Control centers and sec-
ployed in well-chosen and protected sites. The tor command posts, in underground dugouts,
shape of the system was perfected by Soviet ad- supervised the integrated air defense and inter-
visors during the last stages of the War of At- ceptor operations.
trition, following combat experience gained in A typical SAM site would have looked some-
Vietnam and the Middle East. The latest addi- what like this: Situated in a circular position are
the SAM launchers, missiles deployed in pairs

and protected by a round earthwork wall, forti-
fied, ifnecessary, by concrete. The missiles—
SA-2 Guideline or SA-3 Goa types— are usual-
ly placed directionally for better control from
the command post dugout, located in the center.
This structure, containing the Fan Song for
SA-2 Guideline, or Spoon Rest (P-12) and Flat
Face (P-15) for SA-3 Goa radar trailers and the
control caravan, is the heart of thesite. The
center is well protected by earth and concrete
walls, including vents for air conditioning; addi-
tionally, all-around light anti-aircraft protection
is deployed. Around the site are scattered skill-
fully interspaced decoy ramps made of wood,
making the identification of the real launcher
positions sometimes extremely difficult. In an
outer circle, multibarreled anti-aircraft guns
cover all possible approaches. The whole site is
served by an extensive communication network
consisting of underground telephone cable and
radio. Several SAM sites and their all-around
AAA are integrated into a mutually protective
sector system, controlled by a sector coordi-
nation site, which supervises the whole area
with the aid of additional radars. These centers
are again defended by densely deployed AAA.
Some 60 of these sites were deployed along a
strip 160 kilometers long and 20 kilometers
deep, with one large concentration north of the
swamps near Port Said, a second near Ismailia
in the center, and a third in the southern center
between the Bitter Lakes and the town of Suez.
Deeply influenced by Russian defense concepts,
the Arabs regarded this missile array as a
counter to Israeli air supremacy. Now possess-
ing hundreds of the latest Soviet SAM laun-
Egyptian MiG-21 exploding from a hit by Israeli can-
chers, the Egyptians constructed an
non fire. IAF fighter pilots preferred sharpshooting
interlocking air defense system that was the with their 30-mm cannons over using their expensive
thickest and most effective ever de- and less personally satisfying air-to-air missiles.
ployed—superior even to that protecting Hanoi
during the American bombing offensive over
North Vietnam. truction extremely difficult. An abundance of
The older SA-2 Guideline with its 30-kilo- SA-7 Grail shoulder-fired light anti-aircraft
meter range against high-flying aircraft was missiles, also mounted in eight-barrel launchers
supplemented with the faster, more agile SA-3 on an armored chassis, together with the thou-
Goa batteries with a 27-kilometer range, to com- sands of anti-aircraft machine guns and
bat low-flying aircraft, by scores of the ultra- radar-controlled multibarreled cannons, com-
modern and mobile SA-6 Gainful missiles pleted the network. This complex formed an
mounted on armored The SA-6 is
carriers. almost impenetrable air defense system.
capable of rapidly changing position and radar But the Israeli Air Force had already en-
frequency, thus making its location and des- countered similar sites during the War of At-
Bomb attack on Nazaria air base in the north of Syria during the Yom Kippur War.
trition, mostly containing SA-2 Guideline tian missile sites, thus clearing the area for anti-
batteries. At the time, tactics were devised to artillerystrikes— at the time urgently needed to
destroy these sites by direct attack, as the I AF silence devastating Egyptian artillery barrages
lacked the sophisticated electronic equipment on the Bar-Lev Line. But following Soviet inter-
and armament available to American airmen in vention in the Canal war, new SA-3 Goa missiles
Vietnam. The Israeli tactics were quiet efficient and unknown radar and electronic equipment
and succeeded in destroying most of the Egyp- had arrived, rendering the previous tactics in-
Syrian anti-aircraft missile site, some 40 kilometers southeast of Damascus, under heavy bomb attack,
the many emplacements and trenches to guard it against attacks from the ground.
An A-4N Skyhawk II returning from a strike mission.
effective and causing heavy losses to the I AF. troops, vehicles, and military camps. The Arab
True, in the last stages of the war, the Israelis air strategy was to prevent the IAF from con-
had captured a sophisticated Soviet radar (P-12) centrating its efforts. This was achieved by forc-
by a daring commando attack, and even ac- ing it to spread its forces widely between
quired some effective anti-SAM armament. distant battle fronts in order to support the
Nevertheless, the war itself ended with a draw scores of surrounded Israeli positions both in
and the missile sites remained in position. the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. The air
The commander of the IAF at the time of force was also called on to destroy or beat back
the Yom Kippur War was Gen. Benjamin Pel- the columns of invading armor and to retain air
ed, a highly experienced fighter pilot who had superiority over the battlefield. A desperate bat-
been shot down and rescued near Sharm el- tle ensued in which the IAF had to fly
Sheikh in the Sinai campaign of 1956. (During thousands of sorties through the thick of the
the Yom Kippur War, his son, flying a Phan- Arab air defense system.
tom, was also shot down and rescued.) The Arab The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal on Oc-
air offensive began with Egyptian attacks on tober 6, 1973, under a most effectively planned
major installations in the Sinai. Many of the and implemented air defense umbrella. As the
attacks cost the Egyptian Air Force dearly. For IAF roared into the attack to destroy the
example, on a fighter-bomber sweep by 12 MiGs bridges spanning the Canal, it encountered
against Sharm el-Sheikh, patrolling Israeli defense of unprecedented density and accuracy,
fighters shot down seven of the attacking Egyp- and losses were extremely heavy. At the time
tian planes. At the same time scores of Syrian there was little the IAF could do except to go
fighter-bombers swooped in low over Israeli in lower. Here, however, it encountered an even
positions on the Golan Heights, attacking more deadly and devastating fire by thousands
of light anti-aircraft weapons ranging from many of them crash-landing on their return,
tank- and BTR-mounted 12.7-mm Dushka and were repaired as quickly as possible and sent
the heavier 14.5-mm AAMG, to 23-mm shells back into action.
from highly accurate ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2. On the Egyptian front, IAF pilots attacked
To make matters worse, several SA-6 Gainful the Canal bridges. But no sooner had they
batteries operated from changing positions on damaged a bridge than the Egyptian engineers
both banks. repaired it. It was a seemingly endless battle,
The situation was very dangerous, and and losses were very heavy. During the fierce
several Phantoms, Skyhawks, and Super battles of the first few days, the IAF lost half
Mysteres, flinging themselves against the many of the planes that were brought down during the
targets massing along the Canal bridgeheads, entire war— all from ground anti-aircraft guns
were lost. During the next few days, as the bat- and missiles. The Israeli Air Force commanders
tle raged in the Sinai, the IAF recuperated. New were presented with two choices: one, to destroy
ECM equipment was received and, as tactics or at least neutralize as many sites as possible
improved, losses decreased considerably. But as by air attack— a matter that could be achieved
the plans for an all-out effort to regain initiative but would entail substantial losses of aircraft;
proceeded, the problem of air support to ground second, to launch a combined air and ground
operations became acute. In order to cross the SAM-destruction campaign. The second seemed
Canal to the West Bank and drive a wedge be- both attractive and feasible under the circum-
tween the two Egyptian armies deployed in stances and the plan of operations. Several tac-
their bridgehead along the East Bank in the tics were considered. One of these entailed a
Sinai, a daring and massive armored operation heliborne commando strike against major radar
was envisaged. One of the prerequisites was the and control sites followed by attacks on SAM
early destruction of the SAM sites. Some 150 sites. Another plan called for destruction by
of these SA-2 and SA-3 missile batteries had tanks that were to cross the Canal on barges
been set up in Egypt, more than 60 right along immediately following the infantry assault.
the Canal. Quite effective when fired in salvos The first option was scrapped because the
at targets at higher altitudes, they forced the units envisaged for the mission had to be used
Israeli planes to come in low, where they en- for other, more urgent jobs to clear and hold the
countered a seemingly solid wall of anti-aircraft
fire from thousands of guns, SA-7 shoulder-fired
missiles, and volleys of SA-6s. All IAF plans to
deal effectively with this anti-aircraft umbrella
were coming to naught, as most of the sorties
flown were of ground-support character. Realiz-
ing the grave situation of the country, the
Israeli pilots repeatedly flew into the heavy fire.
Losses in the first days were so heavy that
Israeli ground forces, seeing the planes sub-
jected to the shattering barrage of Arab
missiles, refused to call for more air support.
A most ferocious battle developed on the
Syrian front, where the missiles were all concen-
trated along the border. Each attacking Israeli
plane was subjected to salvos of dozens of
SAMs. More planes were lost over Syria— 30 in
one day— than in any combat zone thus far, but
the pilots continued to attack the advancing
Syrian armor columns. As the IDF's holding ac- Gun camera photo of MiG-21 hit by IAF interceptor.
tion eventually stabilized the front, the hard- Israeli pilots preferred to use their 30-mm cannons
pressed IAF could reorganize and systematical- instead of air-to-air missiles— especially in large-scale
ly attack the missile sites. Damaged planes, melees with many planes dodging in and out.
bridgehead. Accordingly, the SAM destruction they were hit the SAMs exploded in a yellow
became a mission for armor. Following the flash; some, launched by electric faults, spun
assault 28 Patton tanks from "Bren" Adan's crazily into the air. Within a few hours five ac-
division crossed on barges into the bridgehead tive SAM sites were destroyed by tanks and
at Deversoir. Once over they refueled and, several decoy sites were overrun. Once the skies
grouping several M-113 APCs (armored person- were clear of the SAM danger, the IAF
nel carriers) into their ranks, made for the screamed into action, pouncing on the Egyptian
bridge over the Sweetwater Canal, which was tank reinforcements that, alerted by the
already secured by Israeli paratroopers. Racing debacle, had raced to the area.
over the bridge, the tanks formed into small By the following day, a complete Israeli
teams, each making for a predetermined SAM armored division had crossed over the Canal on
base. Operating with complete secrecy— the the first constructed bridge. This division, com-
whole crossing operation was still undetected manded by Maj. Gen. "Bren" Adan, directed its
by the Egyptian command— the Israeli tanks three brigades into the open, with primary
approached the missile bases and opened dead- orders to destroy all missile sites in the southern
ly accurate direct fire on the sites. The outer sector, the rear of the Third Egyptian Army
earthworks and missile launchers were area. During the following day scores of SAM
destroyed by combinations of HESH (high- sites were destroyed by tanks, supported by
explosive) and APDS (armor-piercing shells). As artillery and mortars; some of them were also
A MiG-21 on an IAF Mirage. Both aircraft are arm with air-to-air missiles.
taken complete by armored infantry. The Egyp- to the rear. Now the IAF was in control of the
tians, realizing the danger, displaced several of skies, and the Egyptian armor reinforcements
their far sites to the rear, thus clearing the skies were in trouble. In several instances, the Egyp-
over the entire battlefield for the IAF, which tian Fourth Amoured Division, lying in reserve
came into the battle in force, operating against not far away on the Suez-Cairo road, was
reinforcements and rendering close support for repeatedly called to counterattack Adan's divi-
the roaming tanks. On several occasions, the sion. However, intercepted radio messages
Egyptian SAM-site crews, devoid of ground reported that the Egyptian division was under
protection, tried to engage the tanks with direct constant and severe air attack and unable to
SAM fire launched at lowest angle. The giant move.
SAMs usually exploded in a deafening roar soon Following the SAM destruction in the south,
after launching, a shattering experience to the the IAF now flew SAM-suppression missions
tankers watching these monsters coming at from both south and north on the remaining
them; none of the IDF tanks, however, were ac- SAM belt in the central area. By the cease-fire
tually hit by SAMs. More effective was the most had been neutralized. Both
of the batteries
direct fire by anti-aircraft artillery; never- Israeli military arms had gained considerably
theless, as the crews were not trained for ground by the combined operation. First, the tanks had
action, this fire was too erratic and inaccurate cleared the corridor for the air force, knocking
to do much damage. out the deadly SAM sites for them; when clear
Altogether, the combined action had of danger, the IAF had swung into the area and
destroyed 75 percent of the SAM bases; one- prevented enemy reinforcements from en-
fourth of the remaining ones were hastily taken dangering the armor and its newly gained
SA-6 GAINFUL transporter/launcher vehicle and Egyptian SA-6 STRAIGHT FLUSH fire control radar. Elec-
tronic and electronic countermeasure (ECM) weapons became an important element of the war between the
IAF and the Arab defense systems, reaching its highest level during the Yom Kippur War.
An unusual photo of a surface-to-air missile exploding

near an IAF Super My stere during the Yom Kippur
War. Though not actually hit by the missile, the plane
was disabled by fragments and crashed.
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM). * Able to jam the radar of the SA-2 and SA-3 systems, the
lack of wide-bank ECM gear made effective jamming of the SA-6 and ZSU-23-4 mobile gun impossible. To cope
with this very acute problem the IAF developed several relatively effective defensive techniques. The weakness
of the SA-6 system was its limited search capacity and altitude discrimination, which the IAF exploited by
high-altitude approaches followed by steep-angle attacks to release bombs on the target. Great quantities of
"chaff —thin, metal-coated strips— were released in the air to confuse enemy radar.
*Based on foreign sources only (Air Warfare Book, etc.).
freedom of action. The IDF came once more in- down in air combat, while the Egyptians lost
to its element and was able to contribute large- 300 aircraft,180 in dogfights in the air. Israeli
ly to the overall battle, encircling the Egyptian losses in air-to-air combat were six, out of a total
Third Army before the cease-fire came into of 99. The remainder were hit by surface-to-air
effect. missiles and anti-aircraft guns. In comparison,
Clearly, itwas no longer a one-sided battle. during the Six-Day- War only 50 Arab planes
The losses had mounted on the other side as were shot down in aerial combat, compared to
well. On October 8alone, 29 enemy aircraft were the loss of ten IAF aircraft.
shot down. In contrast to the Six-Day-War, As part of the Arab offensive, scores of giant
when most of the enemy planes were destroyed Russian-built helicopters filled with commando
on the ground and the pilots left unhurt, the ma- troops tried to seize strategic positions behind
jority were now shot down in combat and the the Israeli front lines. Many of these helicopters
pilots killed. The Arabs did not relish air com- were destroyed by defending Israeli aircraft. In
bat, and most air battles took place when enemy all, some 40 helicopters were downed. However,
planes flying ground attacks were caught by these audacious efforts by the Egyptians pro-
Israeli interceptors. By the end of the war, of duced little effect on the course of the battle.
a total 222 Syrian planes downed, 162 were shot Another IAF feat was the shooting down of
TACTICAL CO UNTERMEA S URES. ECM available to IAF pilots proved to be only partially effective against
the new Russian-built SA-6 hands of Arabs, and there were many strikes directed against the mobile
in the
radar-launcher system itself One of the riskier, but effective, techniques was the lo-hi-lo attack flight profile,
which takes advantage of the SA-6's slow elevation and depression rates. Thus the IAF fighter-bomber would
come in directly against the launcher on a very low-level flight trying to hide from the anti-aircraft radar in
the "ground clutter, "pop up just past the target, then dive steeply, releasing his stores. As he breaks away,
again at a very low altitude, he drops flares to confuse the heat-seeking missile.
an airlaunched Kelt missile fired at Tel Aviv into Egypt after crossing the Canal, the IAF
from long range by an Egyptian Tupolev heavy was again operating freely over the battlefield.
bomber. The missile was observed in flight by The enemy missile system, which had taken so
two patrolling Mirage pilots, who shot it down great a toll of the IAF, was now broken and in-
over the sea. A Syrian air attack on the northern effective. Israeli control of the air was once more
settlements near Safed was foiled by inter- firmly established.
ceptors who shot down three of the attacking In the battles that raged throughout the
Sukhoi-20 fighter-bombers. This was the first Mideast's skies, the IAF flew four times as
time that this kind of plane had been seen in many sorties as it did in the Six-Day-War and
combat. shot down or destroyed more than 500 planes
The Israeli Air Force had turned to the offen- while losing over 100 of its own. The confirmed
sive. It set about attacking targets of strategic results of the Yom Kippur War showed that
importance, mainly in Syria, systematically most IAF planes lost in combat were destroyed
destroying oil installations, electric power sta- or damaged not by the highly sophisticated
tions, and military camps throughout the coun- SAMs but by simple optically directed anti-air-
try. In a retaliatory attack following Syrian craft fire. (The SAMs, mainly effective at high
bombardment of Israeli towns in the Jezreel altitude, forced the attacking aircraft to operate
Valley with Frog surface-to-surface missiles, at low level where they became prey to dense
heavy damage was caused in Damascus. No light flak, which, when concentrated, is devas-
more Frogs were launched. In the Sinai the IAF tating in its effect.) However, a clear and de-
flew many ground-support sorties, first clean- cisive victory was gained against the massive
ing out the Egyptian sites in the northern sec- Soviet air defense system that defended the
tor and then working southward. In all some 40 Arab By the end of the war, the
battlefields.
out of a total of 60 sites were destroyed, most Israeli Air Force had again won supremacy in
of them by air attacks. As the armor advanced the air against the heavy odds.
INFRARED CO UNTERMEA SURES. The IAF used several techniques to avoid the infrared (IR) tracking
anti-aircraft missiles. Simplest was dispersing flares to attract the IR tracking missile by simulating the hot
exhaust. However, the new and efficient IR filters were very difficult to spoof. More tricky to perform and
requiring split-second reflexes and coordination was, upon sight detection or radio warning of missile approach,
to fly a "cross" in the sky with two aircraft, with one plane intersecting the exhaust trail of the other, thereby
creating a "hot spot" to attract the missile's heat-sending IR homing device. Other defenses were extremely
violent maneuvers that the missile guidance system could not follow, or twisting the plane to present its "cool"
side to the heat-seeking missile.
A very important part of the Yom Kippur Early in the afternoon of 6 October 1973 on
War was the enormous airlift resupply missions Yom Kippur, a high holy day in Israel, war
that were flown by both the Soviet Union's erupted in the Mideast. It was a two-front inva-
sion of Israel with Syria attacking from the
Aeroflot to their Arab allies and by the United
northeast through the Golan Heights and with
States to Israel.
Egypt attacking across the Suez Canal and mov-
This is how these operations were summar-
ing into the Sinai Peninsula. After initial suc-
ized by the official journal of the U.S. Military cesses by Syrian and Egyptian tanks and
Airlift Command, in an "The
article entitled aircraft, the Israeli forces held and by 10 October
Israeli Airlift (Oct.-Nov. 1973)" and written by counter-attacked, first in the Golan Heights area
Charles W. Dickens. where they pushed to within 30 miles of
Damascus, and a week later in the Sinai where
The Yom Kippur War K7
The Latakia oilterminals on the Syrian Mediterranean coast under heavy air attack. Retaliating with inten-
sive air strikes after the Syrian surface-to-surface Frog missile attacks on Jewish towns in northern Israel,
the IAF struck a heavy blow at the Syrian economic infrastructure during the Yom Kippur War.
they eventually pushed the Egyptians back collected at onload ports, and MAC crews were
across the Suez Canal. alerted.On 14 October the first aircraft, a C-5,
The intensity of the fighting severely depleted landed at Lod International Airport, Tel Aviv
the combat equipment and military supplies of Israel; the airlift was underway.
American
both sides. The need for resupply was urgent. The were routed from the CONUS
aircraft
First to respond was Russia in behalf of Syria onload bases to Lajes in the Azores for refueling
and Egypt. While American observers looked on and crew changes and then on to Tel Aviv. The
with growing apprehension, the Russians flew route of flight through the Mediterranean was
supplies and weapons into Syria and Egypt carefully chosen and flown to avoid African and
aboard their AN- 12 and AN-22 transports. As Arab air space and to avoid overflying other
diplomatic talks to end the war continued, it foreign territorial space. With traffic flowing in
became apparent that for those efforts to succeed both directions, Lajes became the choke point of
a massive resupply of war material to Israel the entire operation.
would be necessary to reestablish the balance of Much of the cargo airlifted to Israel could be
military strength. Plans for accomplishing the carried only by the C-5. The large and sometimes
of supplies to Israel were quickly drawn;
airlift extremely heavy items included the Army's M-60
items to be airlifted were identified, located, and and M-48 battle tanks, each weighing nearly
100,000 pounds; 175mm cannons at 56,000 ammunition and equipment reportedly reached
pounds each; 155mm self-propelled howitzers at the northern front within three hours after off-
48,000 pounds; CH-53 helicopters; and fuselages load. One source reported that 155mm shells de-
for A-4E attack aircraft. livered by MAC actually reached combat units
By 2 November, 19 days after the airlift was on the Sinai front and were fired within 20 hours
initiated, the MAC aerial resupply had approxi- after offload.
mately equalled that of the Soviet airlift to the Another, and perhaps an even more significant
Arabs, even though the Soviet effort was under- example of the impact of the airlift on the war,
way well in advance of American activities, and was the efectiveness of the Tow and Maverick
by then totalled over 900 missions. Comparing missiles. According to the Defense Intelligence
the Soviet airlift with that of MAC, the Soviets Agency, the great majority of Israel tank kills
flew 935 missions over a distance of 1,700 miles, came from using the Tow and Maverick (Arab
lasted 40 days, and carried about 15,000 tons. losses were estimated at 1,900 tanks during the
MAC aircraft, on the other hand, flew only 566 course of the war). Since the Tow and Maverick
missions over a distance of 6,450 miles and deli- were not present in the Israeli inventory in any
vered over 22,000 tons in 32 days. significant numbers before the war began, it is
The impact of MAC's airlift was evidenced by apparent that the MAC airlift made the dif-
the speed with which the supplies were moved ference.

from the aircraft to the front lines. Military The assessment by Israeli Prime Minister
Golda Meir was probably the most meaningful: The dramatic events of this war were summed
"For generations to come, all will be told of the up on a day-by-day basis in an official publi-
miracle of the immense planes from the United cation by the historical branch of the Israeli Air
States bringing in the material that meant life
Force and the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
to our people."
Following is The Israeli Air Force in the Yom
Airlift had possibly saved a country. Kippur War:
FOREWORD
This . deals with the activities of the Air Force during the Yom Kippur War,
. .
from Oct. 6th, through Oct. 24th, 1973. The war began with the premeditated assault
by the Egyptians and Syrians on both fronts, along the Suez Canal and the Golan
Heights, apparently giving them an initial advantage. However, anyone studying the
events of the war a little closer, considering its results, will see things in a totally dif-
ferent light. Despite the extensive preparations by the Arab armies, led by Egypt and
Syria, the unprecedented amounts of weapons employed in the battle, the coordinated
opening of two fronts and above all the very short notice we had in the opening move,
the Arab armies were unable to achieve any meaningful military gains. Zahal, the Israel
Defense Forces, led by its striking force— The Israeli Air Force— upset the enemy plot:
a. Despite repeated attempts, the Egyptians did not succeed in reaching the
Baluza- Romany route north east of the Canal because of the massive air at-
tacks on the Egyptian bridges, plus the attacks of our tank units and armored
troop carriers, as well as air attacks against the Egyptian infantry.
b. The retreat of Zahal from the artillery route along the Canal was avoided due
to the intensive action of our Air Force.
c. The advance of the Egyptians army toward Rass-Sudar and Sharem El Sheik
was also halted thanks to continuous attacks of enemy positions at Rass-Massala
and Eyun-Mussa, by our aircraft.
d. The destruction of the Egyptian commando units in the Sinai was done mostly
by the Air Force.
e. The Syrian plan of occupying the sources of the Jordan River, and the Sea of
Gallilee was upset when their armor was repelled by intensive Air Force assist-
ance to our forces.
f. Jordan avoided going to war due its fear of the Israeli Air Force.
g. Above all, the Air Force totally upset attempted enemy air-raids on strategic
targets in Israel; such as large cities, ports, air fields, power and water plants.
The intensive Force during the first two days of the war, while en-
activities of the Air
gaging and decisive battle to stop the advancing enemy, enabled Zahal
in a difficult
to call up its reserves, have them reach the fronts, beat back the enemy, drive him back
beyond the "purple" line, and then transfer the war into his own territory and occupy
a sizeable area of his land.
The Israeli Air Force strikes on the enemy were heavy and decisive:
a. Many airfields were raided and deactivated for long periods, thereby eliminating
enemy interference in the air.
b. Strategic targets in Syria, such as electric plants, fuel and water installations,
were bombed.
c. The Air Force initiated and gained control of many air battles in which hun-
dreds of enemy aircraft were downed, giving the Air Force absolute superiority
on both battle zones.
This ... is unclassified. For obvious reasons we are unable to publish information about
special operations, methods of attack, details on quantity or quality, and the method
of operation and management of Air Force activity, due to the classified nature of this
information. However, a close study of the contents will reveal the tremendous achieve-
ments of the Air Force during this war. The actions of the Air Force in the war are put
down chronologically and according to the various stages of the battle.
February 1975 Joseph Abboudi— Major

Historical Officer of the
I.D.F.-Air Force
FORCE ACTIVITIES
ISRAELI AIR
DURING THE
"YOM KIPPUR WAR''
1. The Yom Kippur War broke out on the 6th of October, 1973, at approximately
14.00 hours, with the invasion by Egyptian and Syrian forces into the Sinai and
the Golan Heights and their attack on Israeli targets in the Sinai and the Golan
Heights and their attempt to deploy air-to-ground missiles against Tel-Aviv.
2. The Israeli Air Force was immediately deployed to defend the country's air space,
and to stop the invading enemy forces. Our Air Force first attacked the Egyp-
tian forces crossing the Canal and assisted in stopping the Egyptian and Syrian
advance. The Air Force then proceeded to attack strategic enemy targets and
airfields in Syria and Egypt.
3. As our forces pushed the Syrian army back across the Purple Line, the Air Force
assisted by attacking armor units, infantry, vehicle concentrations, and camps,
as well as the numerous missile batteries covering the enemy forces.
4. When Zahal proceeded to repel and destroy the attacking Egyptian forces, and
cross the Canal and surround the Third Army, the Air Force joined in, providing
intensive support and assistance to its advancing forces and maintaining the
skies "clean" of enemy aircraft.
5. Many took place in this war. These were mostly battles initiated by
air battles
the Israeli Air Force, although some were developed by intercepting enemy air-
craft who tried to attack our forces, or enemy aircraft flying cover for other at-
tacking aircraft.
6. In addition, many missions were flown by helicopters and transport aircraft,
moving troops and supplies and evacuating casualties whose condition required
quick transfer to medical centers. Light aircraft flew reconnaissance missions,
and were extensively used by VIPs and commanders for travel and recon-
naissance.
7. Following is a concise review of the activities of the Israeli Air Force during
the Yom Kippur War, chronologically and by battle sectors.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 6, 1973-THE FIRST DAY

A. The Egyptian Sector
1. The Egyptian attack (coordinated with the Syrians) began at approximately
14.00 hours. The Egyptians deployed artillery and aircraft to attack military
targets including airfields, in the Sinai. Vast numbers of infantry and armored
units kept crossing the Canal while transferring large amounts of military equip-
ment to the east side.
2. The regular forces of Zahal began a braking battle against the intruders.
3. THE AIR FORCE
The primary mission of the Air Force during the first day of the war was to
stop the advance of the enemy. The Air Force attacked the Egyptian forces on
both sides of the Canal, which included armored and infantry forces at the follow-
ing locations:
a. at Ismailia
b. at Port Said
c. south of the large Bitter Lake
d. near Kabrit
e. near the "Budapest" stronghold, in the north of Sinai
f. bridges along the Canal
g. Egyptian vessels near Zafrana
4. The following results were achieved in these attacks:
a. Egyptian armored units, vehicles and infantry were hit near Port-Said.
b. Good hits were seen near the "Budapest" stronghold.
c. Missile batteries south of Kantara were hit.
d. Bridges built by the Egyptians were hit.
e. A Kelt missile, deployed from a Tupolev aircraft toward Tel-Aviv, was suc-
cessfully intercepted and downed by an Air Force plane.
f. 37 Egyptian planes were downed in air battles between our aircraft and the
enemy aircraft. (Some were shot down by our ground-to-air missiles and some
by anti-aircraft fire).
B. The Syrian Sector

1. The Syrian attack in the Golan Heights began parallel with the Egyptian at-
tack, using the same method of massive bombardment, air attacks and pene-
tration by massive infantry and armored forces into our territory. Most of the
pressure was on the Hushnieh sector and a secondary effort was made toward
Kuneitra.
The Hermon outpost was captured by enemy commando forces.
The Syrians deployed "Frog" ground to ground missiles during the night, hit-
ting civilian settlements in Migdal-Ha'emek.
2. The Air Force was engaged in battles to repel the enemy.
3. Navy missile boats attacked enemy vessels during the night in the Latakia
sector.
4. THE AIR FORCE
The Air Force participated in repelling the attacking enemy forces, bombing
and strafing armor and infantry units on the Kuneitra-Damascus route. Enemy
forces south of Rapid were also attacked. Good hits were observed.
5. Five Syrian aircraft were downed in air battles.
C. Summary
Most of Air Force activities during the first day of the war consisted of repelling the
attacking enemy forces on both fronts. The Air Force in conjunction with our ground
forces stopped the advance of the enemy forces into our territory.
The Air Force also completed numerous patrol missions within Israel, and along the
borders to engage and destroy intruding enemy aircraft.
42 enemy aircraft, including attack aircraft interceptors and helicopters, were downed
on that day.
D. Our Air Losses

A number of our Air Force planes were hit by anti-aircraft missiles and by conventional
anti-aircraft fire, falling in the Syrian and Egyptian sectors.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 7, 1973— THE SECOND DAY

1. Our forces continued repelling the enemy forces.
2. The Air Force concentrated its activities on assisting our ground forces and at-
tacking the bridges on the Canal. In addition, our aircraft, attacked the following
targets:
a. Egyptian infantry and armored units on both sides of the Canal, at the great
Bitter Lake, the Gidi Pass and near the "Budapest" stronghold.
b. Vessels near the island of Shaduan and near Ras-Zafrana.
c. Bridges along the Canal.
d. Egyptian airfields at Beni-Suef, Bir-Arido, Tanta, Mansurah, Shubrah-hit,
Gankelis and Kutamieh.
e. Missile batteries.
3. Good results were observed of infantry and armored units being hit in these
attacks, while many bridges were hit as well. Good hits were observed on run-
ways and missile batteries at the airfields.
4. 12 Egyptian aircraft were downed in air battles and by anti-aircraft fire.

1. On the second day of the war, Syrian forces reached the area by Ramat-
Magshimim. The Syrian force which attacked in the Kuneitra sector was stopped.
2. As a result of the Syrian advance, a number of our strongholds were evacuated.
The civilian population of the settlements in the Golan Heights was also evacu-
ated. The Jordan River bridges were covered by our forces.
3. The Air Force continued attacking and repelling the enemy forces. It attacked
and hit enemy concentrations at Hushnieh and near Ramat Magshimim where
the Syrian force was stopped. The Air Force also attacked enemy forces near
Ahmedieh, Tel-Pharas and the oil road along the border.
4. In addition to assisting our forces, the Air Force massively attacked anti-air-
craft batteries SA-2 and SA-3 aircraft missile sites. Good hits were observed
and numerous anti-aircraft batteries were put out of action.
5. 19 Syrian aircraft were downed in fierce air battles in the area.
C. Summary
1 . During the second day of the war, the Air Force continued its assault on enemy
forces in order to stop their advances. Both Egyptian and Syrian forces were
attacked.
2. The Air Force also attacked targets deep in enemy territory, including Egyp-
tian airfieldsand Syrian conventional anti-aircraft and missile batteries.
3. The Air Force flew numerous patrol and interception missions.
31 aircraft were downed by our aircraft, by Hawk missiles and by conventional
anti-aircraft fire.
D. Our Losses
The Egyptians and the Syrians set up a very dense wall of anti-aircraft guns and missiles
on both fronts, trying to protect their attacking forces.
Some of our aircraft were downed in both sectors by these guns and missiles during
their attacks.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 8, 1973-THE THIRD DAY

1. Our forces began their assault on the Egyptian forces.
2. The Air Force attacked enemy concentrations, bridges and assisted our ground
forces. The targets attacked were:
a. Bridges built along the Canal.
b. Military targets in the area of Ismailia.
c. Conventional and missile anti-aircraft batteries and fuel dumps at Port Said.
d. Military targets in the southern sector of the Canal.
e. A radar station.
3. Good hits were observed at most targets and anti-aircraft gun batteries at Port
Said were hit and destroyed. Egyptian infantry and armored units on the east
side of the Canal were hit.
4. Many air battles took place between our interceptors and Egyptian planes. Egyp-
tian planes, trying to attack our forces, were also downed by our anti-aircraft
fire. Altogether, 35 Egyptian aircraft were downed.

1. The advance of the Syrian forces was decisively stopped and counter-attacking
action began to move them back across the "Purple Line" (the old border).
2. The Air Force participated by assisting our forces and attacked military tar-
gets deep in Syrian territory, which included:
a. Dmeir, Halhul, Nasserieh, and Seikel airfields.
b. Radar stations.
c. Missile batteries.
3. The following results were achieved in these attacks;
a. Good hits were observed at tank concentrations on the Oil line.
b. Hits on buildings, anti-aircraft guns and runways at the airfields were ob-
served.
c. Syrian armored units were hit in the area of Hushnieh.
4. 36 Syrian aircraft were downed in air battles and by anti-aircraft fire.
C. Summary
1. On the third day of the war, the Air Force concentrated primarily on the attack
of targets on the east side of the Suez Canal as well as targets deep in Syria.
The Air Force also massively attacked enemy infantry and armored units in
both sectors.
2. 71 enemy aircraft were downed in air battles and by anti-aircraft fire on that day.
D. Our Losses
Some Air Force planes were hit by Syrian and Egyptian conventional and missile anti-air-
craftfire, and were downed in both sectors.
OCT. 9, 1973-THE FOURTH DAY

1. Beginning Oct. 9th our forces began battles with the Egyptians who tried to
advance, with the primary purpose to tire them out. Break-through attempts
by Egyptian armor through the Gidi pass toward Ras-Sudar were stopped.
2. The Air Force massively attacked infantry and armored units on both sides of
the Canal. Bridges, anti-aircraft guns and airfields were also hit.
The following targets were attacked by the Air Force:
a. Armored and infantry units near the lakes, near Ismailia, and near Kantara.
b. Bridges along the Canal.
c. Anti-aircraft guns at Port Said and along the Canal.
d. Manzura and Kutmieh airfields.
3. Following are the results of these Air Force attacks:
a. The runways, the radar, aircraft and other targets at the Manzura airfield
were hit.
Runways at Kutmieh airfield were also hit.
b. There were good hits of the bridges on the Canal.
c. Egyptian forces near the "Budapest" stronghold were hit.
4. Six Egyptian planes were downed in air battles.

1. All of the Golan Heights (except the Hermon stronghold) were returned to our
control during the day.
2. The Air Force attacked many targets in Syria, including military targets near
the border and strategic targets deep in Syrian territory. These targets included:
a. Syrian armor at Tel-Ashur, Tel Achmar, Ein Manshic, Sarunah, Jedidat,
Hushnieh, Achmadieh and near the Hermon Stronghold.
b. The Syrian General Headquarters and Air Force Headquarters building in
Damascus, and the refineries.
c. An Iraqi convoy moving from the east toward Damascus.
d. Missile batteries and radar stations.
3. Following are the results of these attacks:
a. Good hits of the Syrian General Headquarters building and the Air Force
Headquarters were observed, also observed were hits at the Homs refineries,
and at nearby power station.
b. Missile and conventional anti-aircraft batteries were hit.
c. A military camp near Hushnieh was hit.
d. Good hits of Syrian armored units near the border were observed.
4. Ten Syrian aircraft were downed in air battles.
C. Summary
1. The Air Force continued its attacks on Egyptian and Syrian armored and in-
fantry units and continued assisting our forces. Also attacked were deep and
strategic targets in Egyptian and Syrian territory, including airfields, missile
sights, and other economically valuable targets.
2. Sixteen enemy aircraft were downed in air battles and by anti-aircraft fire.
OCT. 10, 1973 — THE FIFTH DAY

1. Our ground forces continued their defense while breaking up enemy forces try-
ing to advance toward the east.
2. The Air Force attacked armored units, tanks and other strategic targets in this
sector along the front. The targets attacked were:
a. Airfields at Kuisna and Abu-Hamed.
b. Bridges on the Canal.
c. Armored units near Ismaila.
d. Anti-aircraft missile batteries.
e. Radar stations.
f. Ground assitance for our forces battling the enemy.
3. The following results were achieved in these attacks:
a. Good hits were observed at the Kuisna and Abu-Hamed airfields.
b. Egyptian armored units on the east side of the Canal were accurately hit.
4. At dusk, the Air Force massively attacked Egyptian armored units trying to
advance toward the Gidi and Abu-Rodes. The Egyptian attacks were repelled.
5. Five Egyptian aircraft were downed in air battles and by anti-aircraft fire.

1. Our Golan Heights continued putting the pressure on the retreat-
forces on the
ing Syrians and cleaned up all the remaining pockets in the Golan Heights (ex-
cept for the Hermon Stronghold).
2. As the Syrians were preparing for defense east of the ceasefire line, the Air Force
continued attacking strategic targets deep in Syria. These targets included:
a. The refineries at Homs.
b. Airfields at Damascus, Haleb, Halhul and Blei.
c. Mont-el-Bida Port.
d. In addition, the Air Force continued close assistance to our forces near Mount
Paras, east of Kuneitra.
3. a. The following results were achieved in these attacks as good hits were seen
at the Haleb, Blei and Halhul airfields,
b. There were good hits against the Syrian armored units.
4. Syrian aircraft tried attacking our forces. In the ensuing air battles between
our aircraft and the Syrian aircraft, the Syrian lost 18 aircraft, some of which
were downed by ground anti-aircraft fire.
C. Summary
1. The Air Force concentrated primarily on attacks of strategic targets in Egypt
and Syria. Attacked were radar stations and other eco-
airfields, missile sites,
nomically vulnerable targets. The Air Force also performed many attacks to
assist our ground forces.
2. Twenty-three Egyptian and Syrian planes were downed on the fifth day of the
war.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 11, 1973 — THE SIXTH DAY

1. Our forces continued their defensive battle.The Egyptians concentrated their
efforts in the central sector of theCanal and tried to advance toward the Gidi,
the Mitla and in the direction of Abu-Rodes. Their efforts failed after fierce bat-
tles, and they retreated to their positions suffering heavy casualties.
2. Most of the Air Force activities on that day focused on the attack of armored
and infantry units in the northern sector. The Air Force also assisted our forces
in repelling the enemy forces.
3. The airfield at Zalahieh was raided, and hits were seen in the center of the main
runway.
4. Missile sites west of the Canal were massively attacked and accurate hits were
observed.
5. Good hits of the Egyptian armored units in the northern sector were observed.
6. The Egyptian aircraft tried to attack our forces on this day.
Twelve (12) Egyptian planes were downed in the ensuing air battles.

1. While our aircraft continued softening enemy targets and attacking airfields,
our ground forces began a general attack toward enemy territory in the north-
ern sector on the Kuneitra-Damascus route.
2. Our forces advanced about 15 kilometers into Syria and reached the outskirts
of Mizreat-Beit-Ghan and Tel-Shams.
3. Early in the morning, the Air Force began concentrated attacks on Syrian air-
fields and missile sites east of the border. It also assisted our forces in their
advance and attacked Syrian armor and armored vehicles.
4. The Air Force attacked airfields at Blei, Seikal, Halhul, Dmeir, Maza, Nasarieh,
Damascus and T-4. Good hits were observed at all targets, and most airfields
were closed for long durations, due to accurate hits on their runways.
5. Good hits were also seen at the missile sites, and most sites were destroyed.
6. The Syrian Air Force activities were disturbed due to the many attacks on its
airfields, resulting in its deactivation most of the day.
7. A dump north of Damascus was attacked in the afternoon, and was
fuel badly
damaged. Two (2) Syrian planes were downed in air battles.
C. Summary
1. On the sixth day of the war, the Air Force participated in the attack of armor
and infantry along the fronts, but also massively attacked Syrian airfields, bad-
ly disturbing the Syrian Air Force's activities.
2. Our day penetrated deep into Syrian territory, where forces went
forces on that
into defensive and retreating action.
3. The Egyptian forces who tried to advance on that day were beaten and began
retreating after suffering heavy casualties.
4. Our Air Force downed 14 enemy planes.
OCT. 12, 1973-THE SEVENTH DAY

1. The Egyptians continued digging in on the east side of the Canal, but their ef-
forts to "bite-off " parts of our force's defense formations failed again, this time
in the area of the Gidi.
2. Beginning on that day. the Air Force began shifting its fulcrum of activities
to the Egyptian sector. It massively attacked missile sites at Port Said, assist-
ing our forces along the front, and attacked Egyptian armor and infantry at
Ismailia. near the lakes and in the southern area of the Canal.
3. The Egyptians lost 3 planes on that day.

1. Our forces took Beit-Jan and the village of N'assag.
2. The Syrian .Air Force tried unsuccessfully to attack our forces on the Golan
Heights.
3. The spearhead force of the Iraqi division arrived on that day and placed itself
our forces.
in front of
4. The Air Force attacked the following targets in Syria:
a. .Airfields at Al-Meza Blei. Latakieh. Babila. Seikal. Damascus. N'azarieh and
Dmeir.
b. Bridges.
c. Missile batteries.
d. Tank and armor concentrations.
e. The .Air Force also assisted our forces at Mizreat Beit-Ghan.
5. Good results were observed at the attacked targets.
6. The Syrians suffered heavy aircraft losses to anti-aircraft fire and in air bat-
tles. A total of 16 planes were shot down.
C. Summary
1. As mentioned, the Air Force shifted the fulcrum of its activities to the Egyp-
and massively attacked Egyptian missile sites and armor. But the
tian sector,
Air Force was also active in the Syrian sector, attacking airfields, missile sites
and armor.
2. Nineteen 119) enemy aircraft were downed that day.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 13, 1973-THE EIGHTH DAY

1. The following targets were attacked by the Air Force on that day:
a. Missile sites on the west side of the Canal near Port Said.
b. Infantry forces west of the Mitla Pass.
c. Egyptian armor and vehicles in the center and southern sectors of the Canal.
2. The following results were achieved in these attacks.
a. Missile sites west of the Canal and at Port Said were destroyed.
b. Egyptian vehicles and armor at the center and southern sector of the Canal
were hit.
c. Large numbers of Egyptian armor were hit on various movement routes and
roads.
3. The Egyptians lost 9 aircraft; mostly in air battles and some by anti-aircraft fire.

1. Our forces destroyed about 40 Iraqi tanks in an ambush near Mashara. The
Syrians tried to develop an attack near A-Teiha, but were repelled.
Meza airfield, near Damascus, was shelled by our artillery units.
2. The Air Force attacked Syrian airfields including Meza, Blei, Halhul, Damas-
cus, Dmeir and Seikal, as well as missile sites and Syrian armor.
Our forces received great assistance from the Air Force.
Syrian airfields were hit, some
at their runways, others at vital installations.
Good hits of missile sites and of Syrian armor were observed.
4. Twelve (12) Syrian aircraft were downed in air battles.
C. Summary
1 . On the 8th day of the war, the Air Force attacked strategic targets deep in enemy
territory including airfields and missile batteries. It attacked armor and other
vehicles along the border and interfered with the flow of enemy forces to the front.
2. Twenty-one (21) enemy aircraft were downed on both fronts.
3"
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1 5
AIR FORCE ATTACKS IN THE SYRIAN SECTOR, OCT. 8th-OCT. 12th, 1973
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 14, 1973- THE NINTH DAY

1. At 05.30 hours the Egyptians began a massive armor attack on all sectors. Those
attacks were repelled by our Southern Command divisions, while destroying over
200 enemy tanks.
2. At dawn the Air Force began attacking military targets, including:
a. Egyptian armor and infantry south of the Canal, near Rass-Massala,
Eyun-Mussa and in the central sector.
b. Missile batteries west of the Canal.
c. Salahieh, Mansura and Tanta airfields.
d. Bridges.
3. Good were observed at most targets.
hits
4. The Egyptians lost 10 planes; some in air battles and some by ground fire.

1. The gap became an enclave. Our forces advanced to the outskirts
in this sector
of Sassa after takingTel-Arum and the village of Kefar Shams. Syrian attacks
near Mizreat-Beit-Ghan and Nassag were repelled.
2. The Air Force attacked the Meza airfield and assisted our forces on the front.
Good hits were observed and the runways at the airport were damaged.
3. The Syrians lost 4 aircraft. Three in air battles and one by ground fire.
C. Summary
a. The Air Force operated massively, especially in the Egyptian sector, attack-
ing airfields, missile sites and bridges. Air Force missions in the Syrian sec-
tor were relatively few.
b. A total of 14 enemy aircraft were downed on that day.
OCT. 15, 1973- THE TENTH DAY

1. The breaking of the Egyptian attack began and the Southern Command began
taking the attack initiation into its own hands. A bridgehead was started at
Dwer-Sueir.
2. The Air Force massively attacked the Egyptian ground forces east of the Canal,
as well as airfields and ground-to-air missile sites including:
a. Armor concentrations at Kantar, Port Fuad, near Firdan, near the Bitter
Lake, Suez, north of Dwer-Sueir and near Ismailia.
b. Airfields, including Kutmieh, Shubra Hit and Tanta.
c. Missile batteries east and west of the Canal.
d. The railroad tracks between Cairo and Suez.
3. Good hits were observed at the airports; runways, aircraft pits, warehouses,
were damaged.
etc.,
4. The Egyptians lost 4 aircraft in air battles.

1. The armor was again beaten in armor battles. Our forces extended their
Iraqi
control to Tel-Antar. The Syrians employed long range artillery to attack settle-
ments in the Hula Valley.
2. The Air Force activities in this sector were limited to assisting our ground forces
and attacking fuel dumps at Tartus and Latakia. Good hits were observed.
3. Three (3) enemy aircraft were downed in air battles in the Syrian skies.
C. Summary
1. The emphasis of Air Force activities shifted to the Egyptian sector as of the
tenth day of the war, even though the Syrian forces kept trying to break through
Zahal's formation.
2. Military targets in Egypt were massively attacked and our forces near the Canal
received much assistance from the Air Force. The Air Force also attacked eco-
nomically vulnerable targets in Syria and continued assisting our forces in that
sector.
3. Seven (7) Egyptian planes were downed in air battles.
AIR FORCE ATTACKS IN THE EGYPTIAN SECTOR, OCT. lOth-OCT. 15th, 1973
OCT. 16, 1973- THE ELEVENTH DAY

1. In the early hours of morning a bridgehead was taken, and the first tanks of
Zahal began crossing the Canal westward near Dwer-Sueir. At the same time,
our forces stopped the enemy's attempts to "plug" the breakthrough by pressure
from the north and south.
2. The Air Force continued attacking Egyptian armor and infantry, and assisted
our forces along the Canal and in other areas on the west bank of the Canal.
3. At Port Said, the Air Force attacked artillery positions and missiles sites.
4. Egyptian radar stations were also attacked from the air.
5. Good hits were observed at most attacked targets:
a. Numerous missile sites were damaged and put out of action.
b. Radar sites were damaged and put out of action.
c. Large Egyptian infantry forces and many vehicles were hit near the lakes,
near Ismailia and on the west bank of the Canal near breakthrough area.
6. Following the breakthrough, the Egyptian Air Force began a continuous attack
on our forces. Despite their losses, their aircraft performed tens of attack mis-
sions, and some of their planes were downed by our anti-aircraft fire. Heavy
air battles followed and a total of 21 Egyptian aircraft were downed that day,
by ground fire and in air battles.

1 . Our forces in the Syrian sector found themselves facing three armies which tried
to attack at dawn army, the Iraqi and the Jordanian army). The
(the Syrian
Syrian and Iraqi attacks were repelled. The first encounter with Jordanian forces
began to take place in the form of armor battles near Tel-Hara. The massive
Syrian shelling continued and Zahal employed 175mm cannons to shell Syrian
camps.
2. The Air Force attacked Syrian targets, including:
a. The Hermon stronghold, where good hits were observed.
b. Two bridges in northern Syria. One bridge was destroyed, the other damaged.
c. An economically valuable target near Harasta was attacked and accurate
hits were observed.
d. The Air Force assisted our forces at Sassa, and hits on enemy armor and
vehicles were observed.
3. Eight (8) Syrian planes were downed in air battles which developed during the
day.
C. Summary
1 . On the eleventh day of the war, the Air Force provided massive assistance to
our forces who broke through to the west bank of the Canal, and attacked ar-
mored vehicles along the Canal and on the Golan Heights. Strategic and eco-
nomically valuable targets deep in the enemy territory were also attacked.
2. The enemy lost 29 aircraft, mostly in air battle, and some to conventional ground
anti-aircraft fire, and to our Hawk missiles.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 17, 1973-THE TWELFTH DAY

1. Our forces widened the approached sector to the Canal, while battling heavily
with enemy armor. Other forces continued widening the break on the west side
of the Canal. A stable bridge was put over the Canal in the afternoon and ar-
mored forces began crossing the Canal to the west.
2. The Air Force aircraft attacked Egyptian targets since dawn, including:
a. The Egyptian Navy Headquarters and anti-aircraft guns at Port Said. The
Navy Headquarters was damaged.
b. Missile batteries west of the Canal. Good hits were observed and a number
of missile sites were put out of action.
c. Kutmieh airfield.
d. Vehicle armor concentrations, as well as anti-aircraft batteries along the

Canal, both east and west of it.
3. Egyptian aircraft, trying to intervene in the attacks or attack our forces, suf-
fered losses. Five (5) enemy aircraft were downed in the developing battles.

1. Syrian armor tried to develop a counter attack at Mizreat-Beit-Ghan, but was
repelled and beaten.
The Syrians continued their heavy shelling on the Golan Heights.
2. The Air Force attacked military targets at Nabek, bridges at Latakieh and the
Iraqi armored units. Good hits were observed. Ammunition dumps at Nabek
were damaged and one bridge was destroyed near Latakia.
3. The Syrians lost 7 aircraft during these attempts to intervene in the attacks.
C. Summary
1. The Air Force concentrated its efforts in the Egyptian sector while massively
assisting our forces east and west of the Canal. Strategic and economically
valuable targets deep inenemy territory were also attacked, with the intent of
weakening enemy efforts.
2. Twelve (12) Egyptian and Syrian planes were downed in air battles and by ground
fire.
OCT. 18, 1973- THE THIRTEENTH DAY

1. Our forces continued their advance on the west side of the Canal in a south-
westerly direction, and penetrated 10 km., while destroying enemy armor and
infantry, and damaging missile sites in the area. Another force moved north,
paralleling the Canal.
2. Our aircraft attacked the missile formations in the northern sector of the Canal.
Some were damaged and put out of action in this assault.
of these missile sites
3. Our aircraft also attacked the airfield at Salahieh. Good hits on the runways
were seen and the field was paralyzed.
4. Egyptian radar stations were attacked.
5. Military and economically valuable targets at Port Said were attacked. Good
hits were observed at the port, at the fuel dumps and at the gun emplacements.
6. The Egyptian Air Force scrambled and sent many aircraft toward our forces,
especially in the breakthrough area west of the Canal. Effective anti-aircraft
fire was shot at them and interceptors were sent to meet them as well. In the
ensuing air battles the Egyptians lost twenty seven (27) planes, including 6 heli-
copters.

1. The Air Force was not used in the Syrian sector on this day, and there were
no air battles with Syrian aircraft.
C. Summary
1. The Air Force limited its operations on this day to the Egyptian sector only.
Massive assaults on missile batteries, anti-aircraft emplacements, airfields and
other targets took place.
2. The enemy lost 27 aircraft.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 19, 1973- THE FOURTEENTH DAY

1. The west bank was reinforced by additional armored forces who participated
in the advance to the west and southwest. There were also armored battles on
the east side north of the bridgehead. On the south side of the canal were many
armored battles and the Egyptians were pressed northward.
2. The Air Force massively attacked Egyptian ground forces west of the Canal
near the breakthrough area, as well as east of the Canal and along its full length,
particularly around Kantara, Ismailia, Ras-Massala and Port Said in the north.
3. Missile batteries and bridges near Kantara were attacked.
4. The Egyptians tried to attack our crossing forces from the air. In these attempts
they lost twenty five (25) aircraft in air battles and to ground fire.

1. Our forces captured Um-Butna in the central sector. Counter-attacks by the
Syrians, Jordanians, and Iraqis near the village of Kfar-Shams, and Kfar Nasseg
were repelled.
2. The Air Force assisted our forces in the northern Syrian sector.
3. Two enemy aircraft were downed in air battles.
C. Summary
1. On the 14th day too, the primary efforts of the Air Force were concentrated
on the Egyptian sector. The Air Force attacked enemy forces on both sides of
the Canal, as well as assisting our forces. It also attacked targets deep in enemy
territory, including missiles, bridges, armor and vehicles.
2. In the Syrian sector, the Air Force attacked enemy armor.
3. Twenty seven (27) aircraft were downed in the air battles and by ground fire
in both sectors.
OCT. 20, 1973 — THE FIFTEENTH DAY

1. Our forces continued their rapid advance, west and south of the breakthrough
area, and even built a third bridge over the Canal. All that in spite of desperate
efforts of the enemy to try to stop them by heavy artillery shelling.
The Egyptians began preparing a defense line west of the penetration area, to
prevent our forces from breaking through to the heart of Egypt. Our forces con-
tinued to move southward toward the city of Suez, destroying large amounts
of armor and missile bases on their way. On the east bank, the attack and pres-
sures continued to the south and north of the Canal.
2. The Air Force continued massive support of our forces on both sides of the Canal.
Enemy strongholds, mobile artillery, batteries, armored vehicles and enemy
tanks were attacked.
3. Bridges over the Canal, bunkers, and military camps were attacked.
4. Good hits were observed when an airfield was attacked. The Air Force also at-
tacked missile sites far west of the Canal.
5. The Egyptians tried desperately to launch many air attacks on our forces.
Effective ground fire and interceptors downed 11 of the attacking Egyptian
aircraft.

1. The Syrians continued shelling the Golan Heights.
2. The activities in this sector slowed down a bit, but the Air Force continued assist-
ing our forces.
3. One Syrian aircraft was downed in an air battle.
C. Summary
1. The main efforts of Zahal were concentrated on the Egyptian sector.
2. The aerial activities also centered on massive and continuous assistance to the
army in this sector and the Air Force attacked many Egyptian targets.
3. The Arab air forces lost a total of 12 aircraft on this day.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 21, 1973-THE SIXTEENTH DAY

1. Our forces continued moving south on the west bank toward Suez, while destroy-
ing enemy armor and missile bases. On the east bank, pressure on enemy forces
continued toward the south and north.
2. Air Force activities concentrated on massive assistance to our ground forces.
The following targets were attacked:
a. Mobile artillery batteries near and south of Kantara.
b. Armor and infantry concentrations near Kantara and El-Balah.
c. The camps of Faid and Kasprit west of Canal.
d. Armor and vehicles on routes west of the Canal.
e. Missile batteries near Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.
3. The Egyptians sent many aircraft to the area to attack our forces. These air-
craft were met by effective ground fire and by our planes, resulting in the loss
of 25 Egyptian aircraft.
4. An air base opposite Faid was activated on that day and for the first time,
transport aircraft landed there with supplies for our forces on the west bank.

1. The enemy formation was reinforced by a Jordanian armored division and an
Iraqi mechanized A
Syrian attack in the north section of this sector
division.
was repelled in the for the Hermon strongholds began
morning hours. The battle
in the afternoon. The Syrians also tried to land forces on the Hermon with heli-
copters.
2. The Air Force attacked Syrian military targets near the Hermon stronghold
and near the border.
3. The Syrians tried to attack our forces from the air, but their planes were met
by our Air Force interceptors who downed 9 of them in air battles.
Eleven (11) Syrian aircraft were shot down that day.
C. Summary
1. On the sixteenth day of the war, the Air Force planes continued their massive
attacks in the Egyptian sector, but also attacked in the Syrian sector and de-
stroyed many enemy targets in both sectors. Our aircraft attacked armor, infan-
try, mobile artillery, conventional anti-aircraft and missile batteries and
continually assisted our ground forces.
2. The enemy tried to activate his aircraft and attack our forces in both sectors.
They lost 36 aircraft to ground fire and in air battles.
3. The Air Force activated the air base at "Faid" west of the canal, on that day,
naming it "Nachshon."
OCT. 22, 1973- THE SEVENTEENTH DAY

1. Our forces advanced in all areas of the front on the west side of the Canal, try-
ing to beat the ceasefire deadline at 18.50 hours.
One force reached the southern Suez-Cairo route, another force reached Ismailia
and controlled the route Ismailia-Cairo and a third force arrived at a point north
of the town of Suez. Our forces' control expanded to include the area of Shluffa.
2. The Air Force attacked Egyptian positions east of the Canal and various forces
west of the Canal since the early morning hours. These air attacks were massive
attacks to assist our forces to break the enemy. The attacked targets included:
a. Anti-aircraft and mobile artillery in the area of Port Said.
b. Blocking the route along the east side of the Canal.
c. A base south east of the Bitter Lake.
d. The Gidi Pass.
e. Bridges along the Canal.
f. Military camps west of the Canal, along the shores of the Bitter Lake, infan-
try and armored bases.
g. Blocking routes of the Canal, especially at the Cairo-Suez route.
h. Missile batteries west of the Canal.
4. The Egyptians tried to attack our forces west of the Canal, but were met by
effective anti-aircraft fire, and by our interceptors. A total of 1 1 Egyptian planes
were downed.

1. Our forces captured the Syrian and Israeli Hermon strongholds. (The Israeli
stronghold was captured by the Syrians at the beginning of the war).
2. The Air Force assisted our forces in capturing these strongholds.
3. The Syrians tried to attack our forces, even using attack aircraft, however these
aircraft were met by interceptors and 5 Syrian planes were downed in the result-
ing air battles.
C. Summary
1. The Air Force attacked many targets, mostly west of the Canal to assist our
forces, who were advancing rapidly in order to reach dominant areas and sur-
round the Third Army before the ceasefire deadline. In the Syrian sector, the
Air Force also assisted our forces in capturing the Hermon strongholds.
2. The enemy tried to attack our forces from the air in both sectors, but was en-
gaged in air battles by our interceptors resulting in the loss of 16 Egyptian and
Syrian aircraft.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 23, 1973- THE EIGHTEENTH DAY

1 . The ceasefire which took effecton the 22nd of October, was violated by the Egyp-
tians who tried to gain better positions and especially to break the siege on the
Third Army. As a result, our forces continued their advance attacking the Egyp-
tian both west and east of the Canal.
2. The Air Force continued attacking Egyptian targets, including:
a. Egyptian ranges west of the Bitter Lake and north and south of the town
of Suez.
b. Third ArmyHeadquarters.
c. Military camps west of the Canal.
d. Bridges on the south end of the Canal.
e. Egyptian vehicles moving on the Cairo-Suez route.
3. The Egyptians tried to attack our advancing forces west of the Canal, and also
tried to intercept our attacking aircraft. A number of air battles took place, and
11 Egyptian planes were downed.

1. There was no ground action in this sector.
2. In the early morning hours, the Air Force attacked Syrian tanks and armor mov-
ing toward the Hermon stronghold. Missile batteries were also attacked.
3. Fuel dumps northeast of Damascus were attacked during which the Syrians tried
to intercept our aircraft. In two large air battles, the Syrians lost 9 aircraft.
C. Summary
1. Because of the Egyptian break of the ceasefire, our forces continued their ad-
vance. The Air Force attacked many military targets west of the Canal and
assisted our forces. The Air Force also attacked Syrian targets.
2. Twenty (20) enemy aircraft were downed in air battles and by ground fire in
both sectors.
23rd, 1973
AIR FORCE ATTACKS IN THE SYRIAN SECTOR, OCT. 13th-OCT.
The Yom Kippur War
OCT. 24, 1973- THE NINETEENTH DAY

1. Until the ceasefire deadline, set for Oct. 24, at 17.00 hours, our forces continued
moving advance and reached the northeast beach of the Gulf of Suez,
their fast
Ras-El Abadieh, completing the total envelopment of the Egyptian Third Ar-
my and the town of Suez.
2. On this last day of the war, the Air Force completed the following missions:
a. Massive attacks on enemy forces west and east of the Canal.
b. Attacks of bridges at Suez and at Port Said.
c. Attacks of fuel dumps south of the Canal.
d. Attacks of armor, vehicle concentrations, infantry forces, mobile artillery
and anti-aircraft batteries along the Canal.
e. Attacks of military camps on the west bank of the Canal.
f. Concentrated assaults on the Suez-Cairo routes.
g. Attacks on camps and strongpoints in the town of Suez, Port-Ibrahim and
near Ras-el-Adabieh.
3. The Egyptians tried to interfere with our attacking aircraft by sending large
numbers of interceptors to meet them. In the ensuing air battles which took
place, the Egyptians lost 14 fighters.

There was no activity in the Syrian sector on that day.
C. Summary
1. The Air Force participated by massive attacks on Egyptian targets on the last
day of the war as assistance and cover for our advancing forces. Many enemy
concentrations were attacked on both sides of the Canal.
2. The Air Force fought serious air battles on this last day, during which 14 Egyp-
tian interceptors were downed.
3. The ceasefire went into effect on that day, and all firing stopped at 17.00 hours
by the orders of the Israeli Chief of Staff.
AIR FORCE ATTACKS IN THE EGYPTIAN SECTOR, OCT. 16th- OCT. 24th, 1973
The Yom Kippur War
SUMMARY OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES IN

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
1. The Yom Kippur War began suddenly and without sufficient notice, as far as
the state of preparedness of the forces of Zahal was concerned. The war broke
out on Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, October 6th, when the Egyptian
and Syrian armies, with the aid of other Arab forces, invaded the Sinai along
the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights along the Syrian border and attacked
our forces.
2. Zahal, the Israel Defense Army,an army which is founded and based on
is
its reserve forces. Because of this, it can operate at full strength only after
sufficient warning period, so as to enable it to call up the reserves, arm them,
and place them along the borders.
3. Since the war began with no warning at all, Zahal met the massive enemy at-
tacks and invasion with only its regular forces, who could not, because of their
limited numbers, prevent the enemy from attaining first advantages, during
the first stages of the war.
4. The enemy performed his attacks while being almost completely covered by
an aerial umbrella of missile batteries and this, as a result of their conclusive
understanding, that the Egyptian and Syrian air forces have a slim chance
of fighting against the Israeli Air Force.
5. Therefore, in the beginning stages of the war, the Air Force attacked the enemy
infantry and armor forces, stopping their advance; at the same time engaging
hard and ruthless battle with the enemy's ground-to-air missiles, fired at
in a
them by the hundreds.
6. During the first stages of the Yom Kippur War the Air Force massively at-
tacked enemy armor and missiles, participating in very effectively stopping
the enemy's advance.
7. At the same time, the Air Force fulfilled its primary responsibility of guard-
ing the country's skies and engaged in many battles with enemy aircraft, try-
ing to attack targets in the country and along the borders.
8. After the reserves were called up and fought armored battles with the enemy
and went into the repelling stage, the Air Force joined in and provided large
assistance to our advancing forces, all that while destroying the very closely
positioned Egyptian and Syrian missile battery formations.
9. The Air Force also performed many raids deep in enemy territory, destroying
strategic and military targets, including airfields, fuel dumps, radar stations,
missile batteries, bridges, vessels and transportation routes. Many enemy air-
ports were attacked and paralyzed in these raids, and most economically
valuable strategic targets were damaged. During these raids, the enemy sent
tens of aircraft in an attempt to intercept ours. In the air battles which de-
veloped the enemy lost many aircraft.
10. A large number of Egyptian and Syrian planes were downed by effective fire
of conventional aircraft guns and Hawk missiles during their attempted air
attacks on our forces.
11. When Zahal moved into the phase of repelling the enemy, pushing him back
across the border and taking territory across the Purple Line. The Air Force,
as mentioned, participated in providing effective and massive assistance to
our forces. In that, the Air Force helped in breaking the enemy's resistance,
who changed from an attacking army into a defending and retreating army.
12. All units of the Air Force operated in this war with all their might and with
maximum efficiency. The enemy lost a total of 451 aircraft in this war. Most
of them in air battles, and some by ground fire and Hawk missiles (283 Egyp-
tian aircraft and 168 Syrian aircraft).
13. The Air Forces' helicpoter and transport were used very effectively
aircraft
in this war, participating in many operations involving the rescue and evacua-
tion of hundreds of casualties of Zahal, who were moved to the rear and to
medical centers, thus saving hundreds of lives.
14. The war on the Syrian front ended, with our forces positioned about 40 km.
from the capital city of Damascus. The Air Force gained total aerial superiority
on this front, and toward the end of the war the Syrian Air Force could not
operate in a manner that could endanger our forces.
15. On the Egyptian front the war ended with the Egyptian Third Army complete-
ly encircled;the Egyptian army completely weakened and our forces control-
ling the west side of the Canal from Ismailia to the Port of Adabieh on the
Gulf of Suez and Zahal stationed about 100 km. from Cairo. The Egyptian Air
Force was badly beaten and lost hundreds of its aircraft. Toward the end of
the war, the Egyptian Air Force tried desperately to stop our forces advanc-
ing on Egyptian soil, but was badly beaten by the Israeli Air Force which
completely controlled the air space in this theatre of operations.
16. The Air Force participated in the Yom Kippur War in an efficient and decisive
manner during the first stages; to stop the enemy forces breaking through and
then together with Zahal 's armor and infantry repel the enemy far beyond its
lines.
Chapter 7
Entebbe — The Impossible
Rescue, July 4, 1976
For the sake of security many brave deeds of This third choice would have been impossible
Israel's airborne forces must remain forever un- for any other government. Entebbe, some 4,000
told. But one incredible action, top secret kilometers from Israel, was guarded by the
throughout its feverish planning, may now be Ugandan Army— not to mention the terrorists
published in great detail. The victory scored by themselves. But Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.
the IDF paratroopers and commandos at En- Mordechai "Motta" Gur, himself a veteran
tebbe has gone down in history as the most in- paratrooper, had confidence in his men. Gur
credible raid ever accomplished by any army in delegated the planning of the land forces' role
the world. in the action to a young and energetic officer,
The story Entebbe began on June 29, 1976.
of Brig. Gen.Dan Shomron. Shomron, a veteran
Air France Flight 139, en route from Tel Aviv of many bloody battles and now O/C Paratroop
to Paris via Athens, was hijacked by terrorists and Infantry Forces, was assisted by the O/C
operating under the aegis of the Palestine Lib- Israeli Air Force, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Peled,
eration Organization (PLO). After landing at whose job it was to plan the mission of the IAF.
Benghazi, Libya, to refuel, the pilot of the Air The final plan, approved by Israel's cabinet at
France Airbus was directed to head for Uganda. the last possible moment, involved a hand-
On landing late that evening at Uganda's En- picked team of paratroopers and commandos,
tebbe International Airport, the passengers to be flown out to Entebbe in four C-130 Her-
were taken to the airport's old terminal under cules transport aircraft. Once the aircraft had
heavy guard. During the seemingly endless landed on the old runway, the troops were to
week the passengers spent as "guests" of the rush out, storm the old terminal, dispose of the
smiling dictator Idi Amin, the non-Jewish hos- guards and terrorists, and escort the hostages
tages were released and flown to safety. The to the Hercules waiting to fly them home.
Jews, however— along with the courageous crew The leader of the team, Lt. Col. Jonathan
of the Airbus, who elected to stay with them— "Yonni" Netanyahu, was a truly remarkable
were not to be released unless the government character. This odd mixture of intellect and guts
of Israel decided to accede to the terrorists' de- was brought up in New York by Zionist parents.
mands. These— especially the liberation of 54 On reaching the age of 18, Yonni went to Israel
convicted terrorists— were unthinkable. So was to join one of the elite units of the IDF. Rising
what at first seemed the only viable alternative: quickly in rank, he distinguished himself in the
letting the hostages be murdered. Out of the Six-Day War of 1967 and again in the fighting
seemingly insoluble dilemma arose a third on the Golan Heights during the October War
alternative: to free the hostages by military of 1973. In a daring operation Yonni rescued his
action. best friend, an armor battalion commander
119
King of the transports is the C-130 Hercules, which proved itself in combat during the Entebbe raid in 1976.
wounded and left to die by the Syrians, but was craft took off, followed closelyby the other
himself wounded grievously in the process and three transport planes, and headed south.
was discharged from the IDF with a 30 percent As they headed down the Gulf of Eilat, the
disability. Technically, he was still 30 percent four Hercules took necessary evasive action, in
disabled when he returned— after years of an effort to dodge the watchful radars of Egypt
excruciating operations— and convinced the and Saudi Arabia. Once over the Red Sea, they
chief of staff to let him have command of his set course on the route that would take them
old unit, a crack commando force. Now, deep into Africa. The lead pilot, listening in on
squeezed into the front seat of a black Mercedes the radio, tensed as he heard the latest weather
lashed down inside the lead Hercules, Yonni report: clouds and thunderstorms over the
faced the toughest mission of his life. African airspace. This could ruin the timetable,
As the first Hercules, piloted by the transport scotch the entire mission, he thought. Then,
squadron leader, rumbled along the runway, glancing back into the cabin, he saw the calmly
Yonni 's men settled down in their bucket seats, dedicated faces of the paratroopers and was
preparing for the long journey ahead. Their himself reassured.
commander had trained them to the utmost: Thick clouds covered the sky, driving rain
Time and time again, they had sprinted down beat down on the windshields; the monotonous
a training course matching the distance from sweep of the windshield wipers alternated with
the aircraft to the Entebbe terminal, until they the fitful pitching of the airframes in the tur-
could finish the sprint in less than 120 seconds. bulence. Unearthly flashes of lightning il-
Now, hanging by its turboprops, the lead air- luminated the black sky; rolls of thunder vied
Entebbe — The Impossible Rescue 121
with the noise of the engines. The pilots, fight- forward. Swiftly his second-in-command took
ing the controls, kept the aircraft in strict over; within minutes, the hostages were inside
formation. As they approached their target, the aircraft, ready to take off. As the heavily
Yonni slid out of the Mercedes and joined the laden transports rolled down the runway, the
lead pilot in the cockpit for a moment. A reas- entire airport was suddenly illuminated in a
suring hand on the shoulder, a confident wink, vast display of fireworks. A special demolition
and the young commander returned to his sta- team had blown up the seven MiG-21s and four
tion, readying his men for action. MiG-17s constituting Uganda's fighter
Over Lake Victoria the formation split up, strength. Now the Israeli aircraft were safe
each pilot taking his station for landing accord- from pursuit.
ing to plan. Amazingly, Entebbe Airport was Hours on the morning of July 4,
later, early
fully lit, runways ablaze with easily visible land- 1976,t four IAF Hercules aircraft flew over the
ing lights. The lead aircraft crept warily into the towns and cities of southern Israel to land at
approach, glided silently onto the
final leg of the Ben Gurion Airport. The rejoicing, unparalleled
runway and stopped precisely on the spot IAF in Israel's history, grew even wilder as a tide
intelligence had planned. Incredibly, the land- of excited Israelis literally swept the intrepid
ing was 30 seconds late, an achievement rarely soldiers off their feet. Crowds danced horas on
matched even by veteran airline pilots who have the tarmac; flowers and champagne were show-
flown the Africa run for years. ered on the victors. It seemed as if the whole
Yonni and his men rolled down the lowered nation were one large carnival. But this was not
ramp of the first aircraft in the black Mercedes, quite the case. Inconspicuously, in incongruous
followed by two unmarked Land Rovers.* Scant silence, a stern, sad band of tired men filed out
seconds behind them, paratroopers poured from a side exit. On their shoulders, in an unwitting
the other aircraft. The black Mercedes rolled parallel to the red-bereted troops carried shoul-
past the Ugandan sentry, who, standing at at- der-high by the jubilant crowd, they bore the
tention and unable to perceive the whiteness of lifeless body of their commander, Yonni
the faces, mistook the car for that of his presi- Netanyahu, the only man lost in the raid.
dent and, saluting, stepped back to let Yonni
through. Now the assault parties had a clear
path to the terminal. Surprising the terrorists PRESS CONFERENCE^
before they could shoot, they gunned them
down one by one. Then, shouting for the terri-
fied hostages to he low, the airborne forces The Defence Minister,
stormed into the terminal, submachine guns
Mr. Shimon Peres
blazing. Support groups silenced the Ugandan
guards, who had begun to concentrate fire on Sokolow House,
Yonni's men. A bazooka smashed the control
July 4, 1976
tower searchlight. Under cover of the resulting
darkness, the paratroopers began to assemble
Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not need to intro-
the hostages for the journey home.
duce Gen. Gur, the Chief-of-Staff or Brig. Dan
Suddenly, horrifyingly, a single shot rang out Shomron, who commanded last night 's operation
in the darkness and Yonni Netanyahu toppled in Entebbe. I believe that, when the force left
Israeli intelligence reports identified Idi Amin's of- tit is interesting to note that, although the day was
car as a black Mercedes-Benz. He was always
ficial not selected for that reason, this mission for freedom
accompanied by his PLO bodyguards, who rode in was accomplished on the 200th anniversary of the in-
Land Rovers. Amin had made several visits to the dependence of the United States of America.
hijackers at Entebbe in this fashion. This was an
aspect of the "cloak and dagger" part of the opera- JThis is an official statement made by the Israeli
tion. Another report, unconfirmed, had an American minister of defense at a press conference on the day
female spy "occupying" Amin in his bed that night. of the rescue at Entebbe.
Israel yesterday afternoon— they were leaving an about the behavior of the French crew of the air-
anxious country, and when they returned this craft. All the passengers, without exception,
morning, it was to a proud nation. This night and made a point of praising the captain and his crew
the change that it brought was achieved by an for their comportment during every minute of the
IDF force that unveiled one of the army's most hard days which they had to endure.
brilliant pictures— of intelligence and wisdom in The I DP" this time had to cope with, on the one
planning, boldness in approach, surprise in hand, the greatest distance ever over which it
conception and courage in execution. From had been called on to stage an operation— more
was a supreme test
Israel's point of view, this than four thousand kilometers from the home
of command ability, planning and performance base— and, on the other hand, the very short time
by the IDF. The nation, its Government and at its disposal, which was in fact a matter of one
Knesset have expressed their appreciation to the or two short days and nights. Within this very
Chief-of-Staff, the General Staffand the officers short time, the General Staff had to find answers
and men who carried out this act of exceptional to problems with which they were not familiar,
courage. training the forces, finding the means and car-
What faced us was that, in the terror war, for rying out the operation itself— an operation
the first time a State and its President, Field which the Chief-of-Staff defined as a calculated
Marshal Idi Amin, with his army cooperated risk that the country could take. We see in this
with the terrorists in order to extract blackmail operation a decisive battle in the war against ter-
by threat and murder. In the history of terror ror. But we do not delude ourselves; the terror-
there is no mention or memory of such a com- ists can still try their hand elsewhere and at other
plete cooperation. The fact that there were only times. But, as in all wars, the one who is reso-
four terrorists in the aircraft, and something like lute, daring and determined not to surrender
double that number at the airfield, is an indica- must eventually win.
tion that terrorists were brought by the Govern- And, finally, this was an operation by the
ment of Uganda to help in the implementation IDF— a purely Israeli operation, decided on by
of this serious act. Israel, at her responsibility, with her knowledge
Their operation was carried out by an organiza- solely, and at her risk, with all the success there-
tion headed by Wadia Hadad. We know this or- fore solely to her credit.
ganization as one that does not hesitate to shoot
at innocent aircraft, and kill all the passengers
that they carry.
This is not the first nor the second occasion in PRESS CONFERENCE§
which we have been placed in a critical situation
but, this time, the situationwas made worse be-
cause in addition to demands made of Israel,
the The Chief of Staff,
the hijackers posed demands to other States.
There was a demand addressed to the Govern-
Lt.-Gen. Mordechai Gur
ment of Kenya, which says that it does not have Sokolow House,
the requested terrorists. There was a demand of
the Government of Germany, because among the July 8, 1976
hijackers were two Germans from the Terror In-
ternationale. This factor was also to be seen in This conference is taking place today because,
the separation carried out at the airport, not be- since the Entebbe operation, we have succeeded
tween children and adults, not between men and in holding debriefings and— during the last
women, but between Israelis— and those sus- days— have already applied some of the lessons
pected to be Israelis— and all the others. learnt from the operation. This means that we
The entire world is today celebrating the Bi- can be even more ready for such incidents if they
centennial of the greatest democracy of all— the were to occur this week or in the near future,
United States of America. The concept inherent and— with completion of the debriefing and of ap-
in American democracy— of freedom of man and plication of the lessons— we can paint a clearer
his equality before the law, of recognition of his and more responsible picture of what happened
existence and liberty as a supreme value— was during the operation.
to a very large extent put to the test in these last
few days. §An official statement by the Israeli chief of staff
I must note, and I do so willingly, a few words summing up details of the Entebbe operation.
Entebbe— The Impossible Rescue 123
I have no intention of referring to the political ent kinds and varied means, and operational and
aspects involved in this operation, nor to the po- maintenance echelons such as Communications
litico-military aspects. I believe that this func- and the Medical Corps, the entire maintenance
tion of poktico-military decision making is too complex, Military Intelligence— of course— with
secret, and that the interaction between the two the whole intelligence community which in this
planes which eventually results in a decision in case pooled their work effort to help each other,
favour of such a mission should not be a public achieving exceptional results.
matter— certainly not through the agency of my- There is no doubt that a mission like Entebbe,
self. I will, therefore, be concentrating on the mili- and the speed at which it was mounted and with
tary aspect, and on many of the elements the precision of its execution, was the result of
involved, without of course divulging profes- a well-oiled military system— and the basic
sional secrets of which there were many. I am army is the result of hard work,
capability of the
sure that you will forgive me say that this
if I put over a long period by a great many men,
in
is the reason that I asked that no questions be work carried out quietly and modestly and seri-
posed. In other words, what I will not say I have ously. The most important thing is that it is per-
no intention of saying, and what I will say is on formed with a responsibility that does not show
this paper, which I will cover point by point. Ac- itself other than when necessary. If anyone was
cordingly, what I consider worthwhile and im- in need of proof that Israel s restraint in various
portant for the public to learn— you will know. political and military situations is based on mili-
It can now be said that the operation was suc- tary might, then Entebbe is that proof. A nation
cessful both militarily and politically, and these does not need to strike matches as proof that
are in fact the two main objectives in a mission they will light, when we have shown that there
of this kind— beyond, of course, the concrete ob- is a great flame which burns properly whenever
jective of rescuing the hostages. We certainly it is needed.believe that the message is clear.
I
view the mission as a successful operation— yet The extent which the plan was good and com-
to
I can say that the risks we took were very many plete can be learnt from the simple fact of the
and in fact covered almost every aspect of plan- closeness of performance to the plan. Most of the
ning, execution and of the situation that could details reviewed in preliminary exercises proved
have developed afterwards. I am glad to say now themselves in practice, and it may be said that
that the risks were calculated— and that to no 90% of the planned operational detail was car-
small extent the success was greater than we ried out in the field— including everything con-
could have estimated— and that we took into ac- nected with the timetable.
count in recommending implementation of the A point which in my estimation is most im-
operational plan. portant of all is that this operation could demon-
However, it must be remembered that we took strate the full moral posture of the fighting
no risk beyond what was calculable, particular- Jewry of a fighting State of Israel. This entire
ly in view of the national danger involved in mission was based on "purity of arms" and bat-
capitulation to terrorist demands. It is also im- tle morality. I will make do with only one exam-
portant to remember that the planning was en- ple: it can be said that our main weapon system
tirely an IDF matter, that the performance was in the operation was a group of 33 doctors, with
entirely by the IDF including in certain reason- civilian and military medical equipment, with
ably marginal aspects about which I will be milk churns for abdominal cases, with water-
speaking, and that no other party or body took in other words with "weapons" not fundamental-
part. ly of the combat variety, but rather for treating
The units that took part in the operation were human beings even in the middle of the opera-
a cross-section of the entire IDF. There is fre- tion itself. This while the men were faced with
quent mention of the apparent need for a special questions of combat morality. And the orders
counterterror unit. Of course we did not invent were explicit: not to harm men who are clearly
this operation to disprove that argument, yet if not offering resistance or bearing weapons. In-
we speak about conclusions and lessons, it could deed, all those in the new terminal building (of
be said that when the entire army is prepared and Entebbe) who were not active in the battle— were
alert, there isno need to entrust jobs such as also not attacked or harmed. These are my main
these to one or other small unit. Taking part in introductory remarks, and I now want to move
this mission were paratroops from a variety of on to a description of the timetable of how it all
units, infantrymen, members of Golani, different developed.
elements of the Air Force, squadrons of differ- On the night of Sunday— the day the aircraft
was hijacked— the Defence Minister and I spent the danger to our soldiers was certainly a risk
the entire night keeping careful watch on the that we could take. In other words, the problem
flight plan of the plan, to be able to give appro- was not the safety of the force, but of the hos-
priate orders at any moment according to where tages—and the intelligence picture enabled us to
it would land. Once
landed in Uganda, opera-
it take a responsible decision for an operation of
tional planning began to keep abreast of develop- this kind.
ments at every stage. On Thursday the picture was clearer, and we
On Monday there were almost no dramatic de- could put together a more informed operational
velopments, because it was impossible to know plan, which was presented in the Defence Min-
clearly what was happening to the plane, or the ister's office that afternoon. The whole afternoon
nature of the terrorists' demands. Activity real- was devoted to marathon debates, under pres-
ly began at a greater intensity on Tuesday. At sure from the Minister to reach the optimum of
noon, I was called to a meeting in Jerusalem. On feasible operational schemes. By the evening, we
the assumption that the subject was the hijacked indeed had a certain plan, but I must say that
plane, I stopped on the way to give orders to I could not yet offerit as operative, and there
have a unit ready for the same evening. At the were aspects that I called "charlatan and ir-
still
Tuesday afternoon session in Jerusalem I was responsible.'' I explained that I was not about
asked, and replied, about whether a military op- to recommend the plan until there were addi-
tion was possible. This was of course dependent tional data.
on more thorough and basic directions, and we Throughout all these hours, the Head of Opera-
began ongoing planning of the operation. That tions Branch directed the planning work while,
evening a number of planning teams were set up at this stage, the Senior Paratroop and Infantry
in the General Staff, to work on the various pos- Officer was brought into the picture, and he pro-
sibilities—with most of the planning contained posed one of the plans on which the final version
within the General Staff mainly for reasons of was based. The differences between the various
secrecy; we did not wish at this early stage to versions was not great, but in an operation of this
involve other elements. sort every detail is of great importance and might
On Wednesday morning a number of plans have drastic significance when it comes to per-
were submitted to me, all of them in keeping with formance. And so, the Head of Operations con-
the objectives of the operation, and all capable ducted this work, when in practice he was
of hitting the terrorists, but there were weak matched against two major factors— one of
points and I could not clearly and singleminded- which was the Commanding General Air Force,
ly support and recommend them as operations with Air Force Headquarters and all the pilots.
for execution. The main point was that I could The head of the Air Force, from the first moment,
not satisfactorily guarantee the non-vulnerabil- confirmed clearly and unmistakably that an
ity of the hostages. After all, the operation was operation over this range could be carried out,
being planned to release the hostages, and we are and the problem was only to find the right way
experienced in this type of mission and have seen to use this air detachment.
more than once that they are difficult and com- The second factor matching the Head of Opera-
plex. There is a certain degree of risk that can tions was the ground force, under the Senior
be taken, with a good chance that the hostages Paratroop Officer, who came in only at this stage
will not be hurt. But, on Wednesday, I could not as commander of the operation. One way or an-
yet promise myself that the plan amply covered other they discussed all the possibilities on the
this aspect. ground, while a number of central points de-
A second point was that intelligence data was manded an answer: the correct and fastest con-
not sufficiently complete, and for an operation trol over the entire area, quick and correct
of thiskind— with all its possibilities— it is very break-in to the terminal building, in order to
important that intelligence should be as precise guarantee that a minimum of hostages would be
as possible. I will give an example, which I bring hurt. Of course, the factor which constantly ac-
because it was bearing on all the rest of the plans: companied the planning was the intelligence com-
there were at the Airport between one to two munity, in all its arms, which had to complete
Ugandan battalions, or 500-1000 men, and we the picture as it could.
needed to know where they were located. Their Although, as I have already noted, I still saw
assembly points. How they were guarding, and holes in this plan and did not yet intend to offer
with what weapons, instruments and so on. it as a plan for execution, we ordered the units
I am prepared to note that, in all this planning, to prepare because there was a minimum of
Entebbe — The Impossible Rescue 125
preparation needed, and we wanted to see how aspect, it would be and that if there
alright,
it was done. On Thursday, in the afternoon, the would be hitches these boys would overcome.
force began to organise and the planning moved This was true of the pilot, the navigators and the
into the very detailed stage. overall Air Force system. In fact we felt the same
On Friday morning a picture took shape which thing after taking part in the ground exercise,
allowed me to conclude that I could recommend after which I brought them in for a short sum-
the plan. During the day we checked a number ming-up and improvement of a few professional
of tactical aspects, and some weapons system matters— and I asked the officers, Dan Shomron,
questions, then— towards evening— I asked to Yanosh, the commanders of paratroops, infantry
see two aspects that I considered central. We and Golani, in all seriousness whether they felt
made a model (practice) flight, because I wanted that this was an operation they could carry out
to see how the air component would function al- in their professional fields of expertise. Were they
most without any external air help. I flew with all least able to create the option of achieving a
the squadron commander and the pathfinder maximum? And the answer from all of them was
navigator, and posed them certain problems to unmistakeably positive.
see how they would be solved. After two hours I would say that a similar conversation took
of flight, I decided that the air aspect was strong- place with the Defense Minister two days
ly enough covered. earlier— with officers of a higher rank, who also
The second subject was that of the ground expressed their confidence. But I wanted to get
forces, and the speed of their arrival at the point the feeling from the men who would have to run
of action— in other words, at the hostages. In this on the spot, who would have to find the terror-
exercise, I saw that all the units were fully con- ists, deal with them and hit them before they hit
versant with the plan, knew the terrain, and had the people— and we have had no little experience
developed enough operational techniques to per- in this field.
mit a maximum security in everything connected And so, the feeling of confidence that we got
with quick arrival and control over the building. from all the men was such that, with minor cor-
When these aspects were clear, it was possi- rections the following morning, I could recom-
ble from my personal viewpoint to put together mend this as an operation for execution. On
a far more basic recommendation. And here for Saturday morning a series of discussions began,
a moment permit me to deal not with the chain and from the beginning I was able to present the
of events but with the influences on decision plan with the opening remark that this time it
making within the army. was operational. The discussions went on a num-
It is nothing new that a commander is influ- ber of hours, in parallel with advanced opera-
enced by his men and influences them. Confi- tional preparation, and I can tell you that a part
dence is radiated from an officer to his of the movements were made before we had the
subordinates, and very often, at the most deci- final decisions— of course with the ability at any
sive moments, there is a spirit that radiates up moment to stop the operation. But we slowly
from the ranks to him. I must say that, on Fri- learnt that the direction was indeed that of go-
day, more than I was impressed by the profes- ing ahead.
sional achievements of the men, I was impressed And yet, when we received final ap-
at the hour
by their confidence— a responsible confidence proval, I must say that a great many of the men
that they were going to carry this operation out involved did not quite believe it, despite all the
as we wanted to be done, while they recognised preparations and their self-confidence. The con-
the full responsibility of the decision. ception was so daring and dangerous that they
The subject that for me was very im-
first were not certain until the last minute that it
portant was the air aspect. The personal confi- would be approved.
dence of the Commanding General Air Force, I want to analyse a number of major considera-
which influenced his men or perhaps derived from tions and then I will go on to the actual per-
them has already been mentioned. But in my con- formance on the battlefield. An initial
versation with the four captains and their navi- consideration was of course to reach the hostages
gators before their flight, with all the complexity as fast as possible. I must remind you here that
of bringing their planes to the Airport, they we some 10 terrorists and 60, 80,
are speaking of
spoke quietly and confidently and impressed me or 100 Ugandan soldiers who were near the build-
with their navigational capabilities and confi- ing. And so, we had to overcome a not insignifi-
dence in their powers of improvisation. This in cant force. Of course the basic consideration that
fact could give me the feeling that, in the air guided all the planning was how to get there
quickly. How to arrive at the place where the hos- planes worked properly according to plan, and
tages were to be released as a total surprise? I the touchdown of the first aircraft was exactly
also want to mention that, according to the in- as planned. Dan Shomron, the operation com-
formation, the aircraft and the building were pre- mander, who was in the first plane, could look
pared for demolition, or at least contained out the doors and check the correct navigation
explosive charges. on the ground, and was able to tell himself what
The second consideration was correct naviga- he had told the Defence Minister three days earli-
tion and arrival at the spot as far as the air opera- er that: from his point of view, if the first plane
tion was concerned. I have already said earlier succeeds in making an innocent landing, the
that I not go into detail on this aspect, be-
will operation will succeed.
cause we developed a complete system of forces The plane did indeed reach the appointed place,
and means which are better not discussed, but and the pilots say that they have never seen a
allwere to guarantee that the first force would force disembark so quickly. Within tens of sec-
arrive at the objective in conditions of surprise. onds, the force was outside and immediately
The entire flight, flight plan and navigation had moving towards the target. That was Yoni's
but one objective— to bring in the planes to a force which had to reach the building, surprise
situation of absolute surprise. and hit the terrorists. They were on their course
The third consideration was how precise the immediately because the pilots told them exact-
intelligence picture needed to
Operations such
be. ly where they were, and what direction to go.
as these in fact stand or on precise intelli-
fall And because the boys from the plane were al-
gence, and I must say that the cooperation of all ready conversant with the area, they did not lose
aspects of intelligence, of the whole intelligence a second in moving out. While travelling they en-
community, in fact bore exceptional fruit, but it countered two Ugandan soldiers on guard not far
must be remembered that any intelligence sys- from the building, who signalled them to stop.
tem, especially at such a distance from home, had Yoni and the boys with him hit them and kept
its problems and difficulties, and one of the ma- moving. They succeeded in getting within prox-
jor considerations was to what extent we could imity of the terminal building at a fantastic speed
take a risk on one or other picture? And of course and with almost total surprise.
we were looking at the intelligence picture at our When they arrived on the spot, the force de-
disposal when the decision was made. ployed immediately, their intention being to
The fourth consideration is that of field secur- break in simultaneously through all the en-
ity. When mentioned before that nobody par-
I trances, and reach the hostages as fast as possi-
ticipated in this operation other than the IDF, ble, hitting most of the terrorists with the first
this was not only because of political considera- burst. The came out of the
first terrorist in fact
tions. I specifically forbade any foreign element, building. must mention at this point that the
I
no matter how essential it may be, from par- area was floodlit, and the building was il-
ticipating in anything that meant knowledge luminated inside. The first terrorist came out,
about an operation that might take place. And and the deputy commander of our force fired im-
we prepared to take our internal operational risks mediately, hitting him, and the teams burst in
on the clear and specific condition that no ex- simultaneously through all entrances. According
ternal body would be party to it with us, and that to estimates, four terrorists were killed within
no such party should have any idea that a mis- 45 seconds. Two were immediately to the left of
sion was being planned. the door— apparently the German couple, an-
Now I want to go on to the mission itself. First- other was beyond the hostages, about 10 yards
ly, the flight lasted 7 hours, and there were no away, and a burst from one of the boys got him
few interferences by weather, since we flew in dif- in the middle of the body. A fourth terrorist was
fering conditions according to the terrain. There on the other side of the room, and was hit by an-
were storms and it was necessary to deviate from other burst. He fell, tried afterwards to rise, and
the flight plan. Yet, despite a certain difficulty was hit again. With that the hostages were in
with the weather close to target, which compelled fact free— as a result of a sharp, fast and com-
a change, and despite the distance flown, the pletely smooth strike. The four terrorists who
boys arrived at their objective within a minute were guarding them and who could have hit
of plan. I think that there are few precedents for them, were in fact eliminated much faster than
that. we had thought could be done.
When they arrived, the complex plans we had Additional forces burst through two entrances
prepared in advance to allow them to land the in order to get on to other floors and adjoining
Entebbe— The Impossible Rescue 127
rooms, and one of the forces did encounter two we at least feared results far worse than what
more terrorists hiding in the toilets, and hit both actually happened, and I am happy that we did
of them. A third force working in the more north- not need all of them, though every loss in this
ern wing of the terminal building sought terror- battle is a loss, but we saw the risk when we sug-
ists who could have hostages. These were hit gested the operation, and I cannot but mention
immediately, two others within seconds, and the that we were overjoyed not to have to use more
last a few seconds later. The terrorists managed than a small part of the medical setup that we
to fire very few bullets in this exchange of fire prepared.
before they were hit. At the same time another After the MiGs were set on fire and began to
force was guarding the perimeter of the terminal, explode, and the hostages were on the plane, the
near the MiGs, and fired on the Ugandan soldiers men moved to the planes and prepared for
in the neighborhood and in the building. Some evacuation. While this main operation in the old
of them were trapped and killed inside, some of terminal was taking place, other forces took con-
them ran out, and others were outside. Accord- trol of the new terminal and the whole complex
ing to the instructions, the boys hit the MiGs and by the control tower, gained good control over
saw them catch fire and explode one after the various areas of the airport, and allowed the air-
other at a distance of 100-150 meters. craft to move from place to place according to
While this was going on, the vehicle with the the operational requirement. I can tell you that
doctors arrived, and the boys began immediate- we spent 20 tense minutes, but that the tension
ly to evacuate the wounded. At this point there was reduced somewhat as a result of accurate de-
was a firing incident from the control tower, and tailing of the men on the field.
it was apparently a Ugandan soldier. He was The operation on the ground was commanded
struck from behind. The boys opened fire on the by Dan Shomron and a team of officers, and from
tower to silence the fire, and began to bring out interim stations by the Head of Operations
the hostages. The hostages behaved perfectly, branch and the Commanding General Air Force,
because from the first seconds the boys shouted both of whom could give immediate operative so-
to them to he down and not raise their heads. lutions to any problem which might crop up.
Most of them did, but there were some who did They were in a situation where they could hear
not obey the order and were wounded. The mo- the conversations between all the forces in the
ment an order was received to move out of the field and the secondary units. Since I have
building, they behaved quietly and responsibly, worked with Kuti (Adam) for a few years previ-
most of them moving on foot in the direction of ously and in a good many operations, I could
the planes, those who were wounded being car- know that as long as he is silent it is going well,
ried by the boys or put on vehicles to take them and I will not tell you what a curse he got from
to the plane, which was to receive them and take me when I got his report that the hostages
finally
off first. were on their way out. But the first thing he said
The whole operation lasted two minutes, less was— you sent me, and you knew who you were
than in theFriday night exercise, up to the mo- sending, and you know me well. But it is a fact
ment that the plane with the wounded took off. that the communications worked exceptionally
In other words, the operation was perhaps 5 min- well, though there were a few hitches on the
utes less, with 2-3 minutes taken up in the plane ground because of aircraft noise. However, the
taxiing to the main runway. That in fact ended network was quiet and responsible, all questions
the main part of the operation. When the were brief and answers were brief. There were
hostages were on the plane, the doctors began quite a few occasions in which officers changed
to deal with the wounded. There were 10 doctors the plan according to needs on the spot, and I
with the hostages and this permitted maximal must say that the best of values found expres-
treatment as early as possible. As I told you be- sion in all the little details, and in all the bigger
fore there were 33 doctors in all, but they were decisions, as they were heard over the com-
distributed in various places, with ready operat- munications system through all stages of the
ing theatres, in order to drop in at various places operation. And the decisions taken down below
at our instruction, and deal with people wherever by Dan Shomron, by the aerial commander at-
they could be brought. The medical treatment tached to him, by the pilots who had to make a
was covered from every direction, with some of number of far-from-simple decisions— and their
the best medical teams that we have in Israel and complaint in exercise was that they were not
the most modern operating theatres. According given enough responsibility— but they did at a
to these preparations you can understand that number of very delicate points have to take de-
I
cisions onwhat to do and how to continue— I had given a clear and strict instruction against
must say that all this system when you hear it any contacts with outsiders which could indicate
recorded is a cause of enjoyment professionally, a mission of any sort, because no one could rely
from the point of view of control, of coolness and on it not being leaked. In other words, the mo-
of the ability to give to-the-point answers to un- ment we gave permission to the aircraft to take
expected developments. off from Entebbe, we decided to force ourselves
And so one of the forces took control of the ter- on the Kenyans, and indeed on the basis of all
minal building, and in the course of mopping up, the days of preparation, we did just that and pre-
one of our boys, Hershko, was hit at close range pared the landing of the aircraft, the medical
by bullets fired by two Ugandans who were rac- teams to deal with the wounded with all the
ing towards him. He then hit them— he is still equipment that was ready for the operation, and
gravely wounded. Taking control of the building the system of refuelling in such a fashion that
was completed fairly quickly as was the area it would be as little burdensome as possible for
around and silence in fact prevailed. Then the

it, the Kenyans. Then they were to come home as
soldiersand airmen began to move around to fast as possible, and that indeed is what hap-
check a number of essential points concerning the pened. The planes arrived. The doctors decided
operation of the aircraft, then waited for the who needed more immediate attention in
forces to return. Because the evacuation of the hospital. The planes were refuelled fairly quick-
hostages was faster than planned, and permis- ly, and began to return home keeping to the time-
sion was given for the aircraft with the wounded table but for a delay of half an hour because, after
to take off immediately, the officers on the spot all, when you force yourself on a refuelling
decided— and this in parallel, both Dan Shomron system, it does not always serve you at 100% of
and his orders group, the commander of the four its speed, so it took a few more minutes.
aircraft and the ground commander who was by Thus far the operation and its details, and ac-
his side— that it would be more correct to leave cording to my estimation this is what we can give
immediately, and this takeoff of course obliged without arousing questions which are best not
us to make a decision that was anything but sim- brought up in the political or field-security
ple. We decided to force ourselves on the Ken- aspects of the operation— and I found it correct,
yans, because here was a possibility for as I told you in the beginning, to give you all this,
refuelling, which did exist and which could be because this is undoubtedly an exceptional opera-
done. We made a consideration of timetable as tion, and everything that we can tell I thought
against forcing ourselves on the Kenyans, and it best to tell.
this was most difficult for, as I mentioned earlier, Thank you.

Chapter 8
Baghdad— The Osirak Reactor, 1981
The time was 1600, June 7, 1981. In the af- Now. as they thundered over the wasteland
ternoon light, eight General Dynamics F-16 of the Middle East, the pilots were confident.
fighters, heavily laden with fuel and external Knowing they were capable of fulfilling the mis-
weapons stores, took off from Etzion air base sion as briefed, and realizing its vital im-
in the Sinai to the south of Israel. This in itself portance, they pressed on toward Baghdad.
was not an unusual sight— the I AF is constant- They had no doubt of their ability to destroy
ly flying training and combat missions, more the reactor, and they were all too aware that,
than any air force in the world. This mission should they fail, there would be no second
however, was different. chance.
Why? Because, at the same time, a formation After flying for over an hour, the pilots ap-
of six McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagles also took proached their target. Climbing to 600 meters,
off fully loaded; other F-15s had been readied the F-16s lined up for weapon delivery. Sudden-
Because both forma-
to provide aerial refueling. ly they spotted the reactor— familiar from the
tions linked up and disappeared over the hills detailed practice sessions— just below them.
to the east. Because these takeoffs, seemingly The leader picked his target and released his
innocuous, were actually the first move in one bombs; the other pilots followed suit, each aim-
of the most daring and difficult air-attack mis- ing for the exact part of the target area assigned
sions in history. tohim at briefings before the mission. The huge
Streaking at zero feet (about 30 meters) over dome, 20 meters in height and 32 meters in
the desert, the two formations headed for their diameter, began to crumble instantly. Addi-
target— the Osirak nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, tional bombs soon followed, battering the entire
Iraq, on the west bank of the Tigris, 17 kilo- objective, including its laboratories, computer
meters southeast of Baghdad and over 1,000 stations, and sensitive installations. The sub-
kilometers east of Israel. The pilots, tense at the sequent chain reaction totally destroyed the
controls in their air-conditioned cockpits, had nuclear core, located deep underground at the
been training for this assignment for many center of an 11 -meter pool of water, covering
months, flying countless simulated combat mis- core and pool with tons of debris. Within four
sions and poring over numerous intelligence re- minutes the entire complex had been reduced
ports and data between sorties. The flight plan to rubble.
itself, with all its contingencies and alternatives, By then the IAF attackers— their mission a
had been drilled into the flight leaders and then- complete success— were already on their way
pilots in briefing after briefing, yet both the tar- back. Covered closely by the F-15 Eagles, the
get and its mission profile had always been kept F-16s streaked toward home on their long, dan-
under strictest secrecy by its many partici- gerous flight over unfriendly territory protected
pants, all painfully aware of the consequences by many hundreds of supersonic interceptors
of even the slightest breach of security. and SAMs. The pilots' eyes darted again and
129
again to the radar screens, but all was clear, and The 14 Israeli aircraft had flown 1,000 kilo-
remained clear during the long flight westward. meters eastward for one-and-a-half hours, over
As they came in over the Israel coastline a pair three hostile countries. On their way to the tar-
of F-15s shattered the evening silence with a get they had succeeded in avoiding the three
sonic boom, startling the few bathers on the Boeing AWACs aircraft flown by U.S. crews in
beach below. The latter, ignorant of the deadly Saudi Arabia, the Saudi and Jordanian air
mission from which the planes had just re- forces, and Iraq's 300 ultramodern Mirage F-Cs,
turned—a mission that saved them and their MiG-23s, and MiG-25s, plus an entire brigade
children from possible annihilation— went on of Soviet- and French-manufactured SAM mis-
peacefully splashing in the waves. The pilots, siles and radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery at
observing them smiled grimly. That, after all, the nuclear site; and they had traveled home for
they thought with satisfaction, is what it is all another hour and a half over this hostile terri-
about. tory. Despite all this they had returned safely
Amazingly, the entire time spent over the tar- to base— after successfully destroying the Iraqi
get had been barely two minutes, and the mis- nuclear reactor with surgical precision.
sion had been accomplished with a single pass Some of the success of Operation Babylon, as
by each of the light, bomb-carrying F-16s. It it was officially called, was due to the months
had happened so fast that the Iraqis had not of preparation and training of the aircrews and
had time to respond. the accuracy of their intelligence reports. Most
Baghdad — The Osirak Reactor 131
Returning from the mission, the F-15 pilot is assisted by the ground crew.
important, perhaps, was the skill of the pilots. "crying wolf." However, this time the "wolf"
To confuse the enemy the attacking planes had was not the one they were expecting, but one
varied their flying formations. Some aircraft with real fangs.
had flown individually at low altitudes; others The decision to "take out" the Osirak nuclear
had flown at extremely high altitudes. The re- reactor was arrived at after a great deal of de-
maining fighters had flown in tight formations liberation and a and take by the lead-
lot of give
that resembled the pattern of a commercial air- ers of a responsible democratic government.
liner on the radar screen. Clearly, the reactor was in the hands of Saddam
Using an old fighter-pilot tactic from World Hussein, a chief of state who had sworn to de-
War I, the Israeli fighters had come over tar- stroy Israel. (Following an earlier, superficial at-
get at approximately 1830 hours Iraqi time, tack on the reactor by Iran, Saddam Hussein
with the setting sun behind them, lighting up openly remarked that it was ridiculous for the
the target sufficiently for them to see, but blind- Iranians to go after the reactor because it was
ing the defenders. being built solely for use against Israel.) Intel-
Another factor in the pilots' success had been ligence reports showed that Iraq's need for
the complete laxity of the Iraqis. Having been peaceful nuclear energy was negligible and that
at war with Iran for some time, they had ig- the reactor's logical use was more than likely
nored or paid little attention to Iranian air at- to be the production of nuclear bombs. With the
tacks, which up to that time had not been very fear of another holocaust directed against them,
effective. The Iraqis looked upon the air raids the defensive cry "Never again!" came to the
from their Moslem neighbors as something, to fore, and the IAF was given the task of neu-
quote Macbeth, "full of sound and fury, signi- tralizing the threat.
fying nothing." This may have been a case of Needless to say, the pilots were all hand-
The latest addition to the IAF inventory is the F-16, which played an active role in the attack on the Iraqi
nuclear plant.
picked for the mission, although IAF officials two 900-kilogram bombs
of the aircraft carried
would certainly maintain that any of their fight- might have raised an eyebrow or two if known,
er pilots could have handled the assignment Clearly, the relatively small American-built F-16
with equal effectiveness. Their commander was Falcon was designed as a fighter, not as a bomb-
a young colonel, a veteran of three air wars er. It can outfly and outfight any other fighter
against Arab adversaries. While it was stated in the sky today, with the possible exception of
earlier that a formation of F-16s taking off is the F-15 Eagle, which flew top cover for it on
not an unusual sight in Israel, the fact that each the mission to Baghdad. But, then again, noth-
Baghdad— The Osirak Reactor 133
ing is unusual in Israel. Their ingenious engi- predecessors. These bombs had bored down in-
neers have done many unusual and unorthodox to the guts of the reactorand torn it apart.
things with tools of peace, as well as weapon A French technician who had observed the
systems, to adapt them to their needs. raid attested to the surgical accuracy of the
It is interesting to note that at first military bombing, "The precision of the attack was
analysts had assumed that Israeli F-4 Phan- stupefying! The central building is completely
toms using "smart" bombs had participated in collapsed. The atomic reactor is hit and the
the raid; but they were wrong on both counts. radiation shield has disappeared." His eyewit-
The IAF had used conventional "iron" bombs ness report was corroborated by U.S. satellite
manufactured by the Israel Armament Indus- photos.
try, not the new exotic bombs that can be The concern of the Israeli government for hu-
guided by the pilot directly to the target. Israeli man life must also be taken into account. The
pilots are superior marksmen, as they surely attack was carried out on a Sunday so that 100
proved in the Six-Day War when they practical- to 150 foreign experts and advisors, who nor-
ly wiped out the air forces of three of their ad- mally worked at the reactor, would not be there
versaries and ehminated a fourth using only when the bombs fell. Unfortunately, one French
pinpoint precision bombing. They had perfected scientist was killed.
their tactics during months of practice on a The opening paragraph of the official Israeli
mock-up of the reactor in the desert. The first government announcement, issued immediate-
bombs had delayed-action fuses that had en- ly following the raid, tersely summed up the
abled them to penetrate the concrete-lead dome situation: "The Israeli Air Force yesterday at-
before exploding. The pilots of the F-16s that tacked and destroyed completely the Osirak
followed had placed their conventional bombs nuclear reactor, which is near Baghdad. All our
unerringly into the gaping holes made by their planes returned home safely."
Chapter 9
Lebanon — Operation Peace for
Galilee, 1982
Following repeated PLO terrorist attacks the PLO terrorists to move in

and impose their
across the Israel-Lebanon border and the at- willon the nation; and that they did, and mur-
tempted assassination and severe wounding of dered large segments of the Christian civilian
Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to the population. They did what they wanted and
Court of St. James in London, the State of went where they chose to with complete im-
Israel was finally provoked into action. Four punity. They became a nation within a nation
IDF task forces— massive armored columns- and thrust themselves, by force of arms, on the
roared north in a multipronged attack. Their people and government of Lebanon. They set up
mission, coordinated with Bashir Gemayel, was schools funded by the Soviet Union for foreign
to drive the terrorists away from Israel's north- terrorists, which were attended by German,
ern border. Clearing them 40 kilometers for the Italian, Japanese, and other nationals. They
border would mean that the Palestine Libera- built up massive stores of arms supplied by the
tion Organization's Soviet-made Katyusha Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and others.
rockets and artillery would be out of range of These they used to maintain their hold on
the peaceful settlements in Israel's northern Lebanon and to attack Israel, launching their
Galilee and marauding bands of PLO terrorists deadly rockets and shells across the border.
would be prevented from continuing their The Israeli military machine moved across
murderous attacks on defenseless children and the border only after clear provocation. While
other unarmed civilians. the immediate reason for committing its air-
In 1970 the PLO made an attempt on the life craft, tanks, and troops to battle was the seri-
of King Hussein of Jordan and sought to take ous wounding of the Israeli ambassador to
over his country. Although supported by Syrian Great Britain by Arab terrorists, the IDF
troops and tanks, the PLO was soundly de- (Zahal) had been acting with more than due re-
feated in battle by the king and the Jordanian straint for some time. The attempted assasina-
Army. Many thousands of its followers were tion was, in effect, "the straw that broke the
killedand the rest were driven out of Jordan camel's back."
during August and "Black September" of that Nearly one year before, on July 24, 1981, there
year. The PLO then moved their base of opera- had been a cessation of hostilities between
tions to Lebanon and accomplished there what Israel and the PLO that was supposed to have
they had failed to do in Jordan. Lebanon, a put an end to those senseless, unprovoked at-
much weaker country than the Hashemite King- tacks. However, since that time, more than 25
dom, fell easy prey to the PLO. Part Christian Israeli men, women, and children had been
and part Moslem, Lebanon was split by bloody killed and 250 wounded in 150 attacks by PLO
internal strife, and it was relatively simple for terrorists in Israel and against Jews in Europe.
134
Lebanon— Operation Peace for Galilee 135
Returning from mission, this Phantom is momentarily shrouded by the smoke of the tires' touchdown.
The Grumman E2C Hawkeye, one of the IAF keys for modern deployment of combined airborne force.
These bloody attacks had escalated in May forcesroamed freely through the country, often
1982. There had been 26 attacks in the month molesting (wounding and killing) and making
preceding Operation Peace for Galilee alone. demands of the Lebanese people. These forces
And commencing on June 4, during a 48-hour included other Palestinian paramilitary groups,
period the PLO had directed massive fire bar- the Syrian Army, the Druse, and the Christian
rages (including Soviet Katyusha rockets, Phalangist militia, who had once been allies of
130-mm and 152-mm artillery rounds, and tank the Israelis.
23 Israeli towns and villages, killing,
shells) at Each of these forces had its own substantial
wounding, and causing heavy damages. They geographical sphere of influence, or territory,
fired 600 Katyusha rockets alone, forcing the within Lebanon itself. The area on the border
civilian population along Israel's entire north- with Israel, for a depth of about 30 kilometers,
ern border to live in bomb shelters, in constant was controlled by the Lebanese Christians un-
fear for their lives. der the command of Maj. Saad Haddad. Im-
It is interesting to note that Lebanon is the mediately to the north of this sector, stretching
only Arab neighbor with whom Israel had had to the Litani River, was the UN zone, which also
any semblance of a long-standing friendly rela- sheltered some 700 PLO guerrillas. It was this
tionship. But, as has been stated, the Lebanese group of terrorists that had constantly violated
political situation was an unusual one— one that the Israeli border and attacked and murdered
invited disaster. The weak government had Israeli civilians by infiltration and with artillery
been forced to tolerate a number of dissident and Katyusha rocket barrages. A large area
armed forces in addition to the PLO. These above the UN zone, extending on the west along
Lebanon — Operation Peace for Galilee 137
the Mediterranean coast to the environs of armed forces rolled into action. As the four col-
Beirut, Lebanon's capital, was the stronghold umns of IDF armored vehicles, self-propelled
of more than 8,000 well-armed PLO terrorists. artillery, and mechanized infantry pushed north
Surrounding the capital in a wide area, except in pursuit of the PLO terrorists, the IAF oper-
for a Lebanese Christian enclave to the north ated over all the advance routes, flying combat
of Beirut, were some 30,000 regular Syrian missions against PLO armored vehicles, artil-
troops with tanks, missiles and other heavy lery emplacements, anti-aircraft, and command
military equipment. The Syrian-controlled area posts. Later the IAF flew close-support sorties,
extended to the east and north to the Syrian especially against PLO blocking positions. Am-
border. Within this territory (the largest part phibious landings were also supported from the
of Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley) the air. Over the ground combat Israeli air-superi-
Syrians allowed an additional 6,000 PLO terror- ority fighters flew intercept patrols against in-
ists, some of Colonel Qaddafi's Libyan Army truding Syrian combat aircraft. Reconnaissance
troops, and notorious international terrorists: aircraft flew photographic sorties over most
the German Bader-Meinhoff gang, the Italian Lebanese and other areas to detect enemy
Red Brigade, the Japanese Red Army, and movements and gain intelligence.
others. Once the Syrian Air Force decided to inter-
Of obvious immediate concern to the Israelis vene, the IAF intercepted them and shot down
was the zone closest to their border that har- several Syrian MiGs. On the ground, activities
bored the PLO one from which
terrorists, the along the central region axis, as well as the
Katyusha rocket barrages were launched. The Bekaa Valley, involved the IAF in the fighting,
Russian Katyusha is a particularly dangerous with growing numbers of close air-support mis-
and destructive conventional weapon system sions flown by the fighter-bombers and attack
that fires a salvo (a large quantity of rockets helicopters in support of the advancing armor
launched simultaneously from a rapid-firing formations. Repeated attempts by the Syrian
multiple-barrel launcher); it inflicted heavy Air Force to attack Israeli ground forces were
casualties on the Israeli civilian population. foiled by IAF fighters, which shot the attack-
(During World War II, British and American ers out of the air before they could cause seri-
troops called similar Soviet weapons "Stalin's ous damage. The IAF not only destroyed 17 out
Organs" because of their resemblance to the of 19 Syrian SAM batteries in a single attack
musical pipe organ.) Today they are called but flew battlefield interdiction missions, de-
multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). stroying a large part of the vanguard of the
With the merciless shelling continuing and Syrian Third Armored Division advancing on
the attack on a member of its diplomatic corps, tank transporters along the main Damas-
the government of Israel was left with no al- cus-Beirut road. Later, after knocking out new-
ternative. A new
war of attrition could not be ly deployed SA-6 mobile batteries, the IAF
endured. According to the official statement, pounced on Syrian ground reinforcements ad-
they made the decision on June 5, 1982, to: vancing from the north into the Bekaa Valley,
destroying tanks and artillery. In air-to-air com-
1. Order the IDF to place the civilian popu- bat, IAF air-superiority fighters destroyed at
lation of the Galilee beyond the range of least 85 Syrian aircraft, including MiG-23BM
the terrorists' fire from Lebanon, where Flogger F, MiG-21 PF/MF, and Sukhoi-20 fight-
they, their bases, and their headquarters er-bombers. A few more were downed by ground
were concentrated. fire.
2. Name the operation "Peace for Galilee." Matching the superb performance of the IAF
3. Order that the Syrian Army not be at- air and ground crews in combat was the un-
tacked unless it attacks our forces. equaled performance of their equipment, includ-
4. Aspire to the signing of a peace treaty ing: the two new U.S. -built fighters, the
with independent Lebanon, its territorial multirole F-16, and the F-15 air-superiority
integrity preserved. fighter, which had seen action on the long-range
raid on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq and
Under a partial mobilization, the Israeli which had been victorious in many battles
IAF F-16 with two kills in battle.
against the Syrian MiGs prior to Operation Aerospatiale Gazelles on the side of the Syrians.
Peace for Galilee; the amazing Grumman E-2C Helicopter losses were two for the Israelis ver-
Hawkeye, airborne early-warning and bat- sus six on the Syrian side.)
tle-control aircraft thatcan track 600 air targets Israeli MEDEVAC helicopters lifted more
over 620,000 square kilometers of land and than 1,000 casualties from the battle zone di-
water; the battle- tested, older but still effective rectly to Israeli hospitals, saving many lives.
F-4 Phantom and A-4 Skyhawk, veterans of the IAF transports flew resupply missions with
Yom Kippur War, which came through with fly- fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, supporting
ing colors in action above Lebanon (despite the ground formations having supply difficulties
fact that the new F-16 can do what the Phan- over the mountainous routes. Later, a forward
tom does on half the fuel); the home-grown Kfir logistical air base was prepared to which IAF
C-2, manufactured by Israel Aircraft Industries, C-130 Hercules and "ancient" C-47 Dakotas
which was employed successfully en masse for flew cargo missions.
the first time in Lebanon; the IAI Scout RPV The Lebanon war was unique not only in the
pilotless drone, which provided continuous mo- length of time it took but in the fact that the
bile surveillance over enemy missile sites; and IDF had to fight on only one front. Despite that
the Hughes Defender and Bell Huey Cobra heli- fact, the variety of combat and logistical mis-
copters, which were magnificent in anti-tank sions flown by the IAF gave it ample oppor-
and other support missions. (These combat heli- tunity to demonstrate its exceptional combat
copters were in action for the first time on the effectiveness, leadership, and technological in-
Israeli side, as were Mi-24 HINDs and frastructure. These place it second to none
F-15 Eagle with four kills has the inscription "Skyblazer" in Hebrew on its nose cone.
among the leading air forces of the world. objective. Experiences during the Yom Kippur
One of the most impressive acts of the war War had demonstrated the deadliness of the
was the complete destruction of the Syrian Soviet SAM, especially the mobile SA-6, and
SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley. Several of the IAF planners took this particular mission
these air defense systems had been deployed extremely seriously, integrating hard training,
there since the spring of 1982, when the IAF technical ingenuity, and original thinking into
had downed two Syrian Air Force Mi-8 helicop- a brillant plan that made the most of the ad-
ters that had been part of the Syrian pressure vanced equipment in hand.
of the Lebanese Phalangist defenses on Mount The Israeli planners did not leave anything
Lebanon. However, during Operation Peace for to chance. As
already demonstrated in the high-
Galilee the Syrians deployed 19 SAM batteries ly successful mission against the Osirak nuclear
in a dense air defense complex to cover the reactor in June 1981, effective operational plan-
movements of two of their armored units into ning and careful, realistic training ensured a
the combat zone. The majority were SA-6 Gain- flawless implementation of the most difficult
fuls, with some SA-2s and SA-3s deployed as combat missions. Here again, such preparations
well. The batteries tied into the existing and were envisaged to prevent anything from going
reinforced early-warning system situated on wrong.
vantage points overlooking the battle area. According to their practice, to meet their
Judging by its density, the deployed air defense particular needs the Israelis made modifications
complex in the Bekaa Valley that IAF pilots to acquired materiel. Based on the combat
faced on Wednesday, June 9, was a formidable experiences of the October War, improvements
The PLO combat training center, on the outskirts of Beirut, hit by IAF aircraft on June 4, 1982.
were made to the Texas Instruments Shrike achieved were far above expectations. Some of
The AGM-45A
air-to-surface anti-radar missile. this overwhelming success must be accorded to
proved to be a major weapon system in the de- the fact that most of the Syrian SAM batteries
struction of the SAMs. Although many attacks recently deployed had not been fortified in em-
were made during the latter stages of the Yom placements. As the attack commenced they
Kippur War against the Syrian SAM batteries, started a defensive smoke screen, which aided
results were limited and achieved at high cost. the attackers in pinpointing the targets.
These experiences were studied carefully, es- However, the attack on the SAM complex
pecially those that were successful near the was far from easy. The Syrians had deployed
Suez Canal. It turned out that where combined a dense air defense system with a complete ar-
air and ground action was implemented success ray of advanced and sophisticated materiel. In
was maximal; an important factor was the in- fact, the Bekaa Valley SAM system was simi-
troduction of the Shrike and— finally— an inte- lar in density to the air defense encountered in
grated attack combining low-level approach the Yom Kippur War. And the Syrians could
with effective electronic countermeasures call on their entire air force from bases in Syria
(ECM) and decoy systems. scant minutes away. The IAF used all kinds of
The Israeli Air Force implemented these les- attack aircraft in the mission. The durable F-4E
sons into an exhaustive and realistic training Phantoms and A-4 Skyhawks played leading
program involving low-level flight under com- roles with Kfirs, F-16s, and F-15s also taking
bat configuration as well as advanced modifi- part in the battle. As the Israeli fighter-bomb-
cations to existing materiel. These measures, ers screamed into the Bekaa Valley, Syrian in-
combined with extensive preparations before terceptors swooped into the fray from nearby
the mission, paid off in full. In fact, the results air bases in Syria, just over the mountains to
Above and right: Smoke rises over the Bekaa Valley from the ruins of the Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites destroyed in a devastating attack by the IAF.
the northeast. Soon a tremendous air battle de- reportedly took part. The IAF fighters shot
veloped, with more and more aircraft being down 29 Syrian MiGs while destroying 17 out
drawn into the fight. of 19 SAMbatteries and radar installations
A young Israeli captain led his formation in without loss of their own aircraft. Even the
an attack on a SAM battery; as he approached, tough IAF planners were surprised by the un-
he identified Syrian MiGs over the target. The precedented success of operations in the Bekaa
immediate dilemma was whether to go into the Valley. Casualties had been expected, especial-
attack as planned or deal with the MiGs first. ly from the deadly ZSU-23-4 air defense guns,
A quick decision convinced the leader that he which had wreaked havoc on many IAF aircraft
should complete his mission, and the formation in the Yom Kippur War.
dropped its warload on the SAM as briefed. As According to foreign reports, the successful
they emerged from the objective, they set onto attack was made by the integration of aerial
two Syrian MiGs and shot them out of the sky. by attack aircraft
surveillance, precision strikes
From above, the covering F-15 Eagles inter- and new, advanced surface-to-surface weapons
vened with devastating effect, knocking down that employed radar-homing sensors from
scores of MiGs as they swarmed over the Bekaa ground deployments within range. The use of
like moths drawn During the en-
to a candle. remote-piloted vehicles (RPV) designed for spe-
gagement, which took two hours and lasted un- cial mission applications enabled the planners
til around midday, hundreds of aircraft to receive near real-time intelligence and elec-
tronic battlefield capability over the target area. Following the experience gained in the Octo-
These systems tied into the overall air warfare ber War, the IAF planners thoroughly re-
control systems of the Grumman E-2C Hawk- searched the method that offered the best
eye and ground EAW infrastructure, allowing chance of taking out advanced SAM systems
full control over the combat airspace, including and their infrastructure with acceptable losses.
the key Syrian airfields from which potential In the Yom Kippur War, the IAF— insufficient-
threat aircraft could be located prior to its tak- ly equipped and trained— had been badly
ing off. The RPV, used in their advanced mis- mauled by these enemy systems. During the
sion capacity for the first time in combat, late stages along the Suez Canal, there had been
provided zoom magnification and high-resolu- some partial successes against the SA-6, but in
tion imagery, allowing full display at various Syria the air defense system had kept the IAF
command levels on screen or overlay maps of severely limited in its action and had caused
the combat area. According to these foreign heavy losses to close-support aircraft operating
sources, Israel fielded a new Zeev-type (Wolf) in the combat zone.
ground-launched missile designed to be fired The main conclusions drawn from these
against air defense radars, using a sensor to activities were that the best chance against the
home on radiation emissions. Based on the con- SAMs would be offered by integrated air and
tinuous real-time information, the coordinated ground action using tanks, artillery, and para-
air attacks achieved unprecedented success. trooper assault teams to clear the way for air
action. This aim was dramatically achieved by Weasel" ECM and SAM
suppression aircraft,
the combined operation over the Suez Canal as followed by saturation attacks from attack air-
spearheads of an armored division destroyed craft. The West German and British approach
most of the Egyptian SAMs in the area, open- to the problem prefers low-level penetration
ing the way for extensive air action over wide with contour-hugging supersonic aircraft out-
ranges in Egypt. However, it was also realized flying the SAM and radar cover— an "under the
that the use of advanced technologies employed fence" approach, as the new Tornado program
with imagination and skill could overcome is called.
many of the problems attacking aircraft had to The actual tactics employed by the Israelis
face from the extensive and powerful Soviet- to neutralize the Syrian SAMs still carry a high
type air defense. and have not yet been dis-
security classification
Western concepts for such action, drawing closed even to the U.S. Air Force. However, re-
from experience gained over Vietnam and the liable sources attribute the IAF's spectacular
Middle East, advocated different methods of victories to a combination of factors: superior
combat. The American concept favors a medi- air and ground force coordination; effective elec-
um-level approach, taking out the Soviet air de- tronic countermeasures; the U.S. -built Grum-
fense by sophisticated means, including a man E-2C Hawkeye miniature AWACs and bat-
pathfinder technique with special "Wild tle-control aircraft; U.S. Shrike anti-guided-
Frontal view of Kfir C-2.
missile missiles; F-15 and F-16 air-superiority Israeli-designed and manufactured RPVs
fighters; F-4 Phantoms employing "Wild equipped with special electronic warfare (EW)
Weasel" counter-missile techniques; Israeli- and ECM packages were able to illuminate pre-
made small RPVs, or remote-piloted drones; the cision targets so that they could be attacked ac-
Israeli's own Kfir C-2 fighter; tremendous accurately from stand-off range with laser-tracked
curacy with the employment of conventional weapons. Forward air controllers used the Scout
"iron" and cluster bombs; ground observers; RPVs, built by Israel Aircraft Industries to ob-
and exceptional flying and combat skills. serve targets and guide attack pilots to preas-
The Hawkeye E-2C proved to be a key factor signed objectives. Several RPVs used television
in the success of the strike. Its capacity for images, relayed to distant ground stations and
simultaneously handling multiple targets, in ad- displayed on large screens, to provide real-time
dition to its ability to pinpoint various electro- intelligence of the battle zone displayed.
magnetic emitters (PDS), could account for the But the Israeli pilots deserve most of the
tremendous success of the I AF in air-to-air and credit. Not even specially designed equipment,
air-to-ground operations. As to the SAM bat- materiel, and devices could have ensured such
teries, the IAF had been evaluating possible at- smooth, well-coordinated missions in so dense
tack tactics since April 1981. Exercises and an armed area. In fact, more than 150 aircraft
training missions had been rehearsed. Special from both sides were flown into a 260-square-
equipment had been modified, developed, and kilometer area at various heights. Merely avoid-
acquired, such as upgrading ELQ 119 ECM ing collisions was a distinct accomplishment.
pods, improving Shrike anti-radiation air-to-sur- As learned from several pilot interviews, the
face missiles, and developing other ECMde- Israelis used a kind of improved radiation hom-
vices (installed in a modified B-707) and sensors ing weapon (Shrike) for radar and guidance cen-
installed in drones. ter destruction (Straight Flush, Fan Song).
The IAF successfully integrated low-altitude Missile battery destruction was accomplished
attacks with sophisticated ECM and decoy by use of regular "iron" bombs. However, it is
techniques. Thorough, realistic training pro- widely stated that the attack's success was
grams and imaginative planning did the rest. made possible by the joint operation of ground-
to- air forces (reminiscent of the Egyptian mis- Some of the dogfights took place after the
sile destruction in the Yom Kippur War). ground attack was accomplished and 29 MiGs
The attack lasted two hours. It is assumed had been shot down. Pilots' orders were strict:
that the opening move was made against the First destroy the missile site, then take on the
Syrian Ground Control Intercept (GCI). As the Syrian MiGs.
IDF had decided to restrict the attack to Probably the best analysis of this unprece-
Lebanese territory, the problem of neutralizing dented victory of the IAF over the sophisti-
Syrian radar had to be solved in several differ- cated Soviet air defense systems and the Syrian
ent ways. Radars located on Mt. Hermon, in Air Force's Russian-built MiGs was presented
Anti-Lebanon, and elsewhere had to be jammed. by Maj. Charles E. Mayo in the U.S. Army's
Others, especially on the Khalde hills, were to Air Defense Artillery magazine.
be taken by ground forces. As the southern
On June 9, 1982, the Israeli Air Force
and/or western approaches to the Bekaa Valley
destroyed the Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM)
through the Beirut-Damascus road were
complex in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley without los-
cleared, the IAF took out the missile control
ing a single aircraft to Syrian air defense
radars and Zahla GCI one by one, probably by weapons. The success of Israeli warplanes
means of Shrike missiles (under the cover of spe- against the same family of air defense weapon
cially designed "diversionary bodies") and by systems which had controlled the skies over por-
utilizing constant, sophisticated jamming de- tions of the Yom Kippur battlefield a decade
vices to protect the attacking force. earlier captured the attention of the air defense
Even though all altitudes were open for the community.
IAF, masses of interceptors were being sent in- Had the Israelis discovered an Achilles heel
that might relegate air defense to a less domi-
to the area from Syria. As the SA-6 could also
nant role on future battlefields than popularly
be operated optically, the IDF had to saturate
supposed, or had the Syrians mismanaged their
the area with artillery barrages. Then scores of
air defense assets?
IAF fighters could destroy the batteries either An analysis of the Syrian air defense ca-
by cluster bombs or regular "iron" bombs. In tastrophe reveals that the well-thought-out and
addition to their fighter-bomber mission the air- brilliantlyexecuted Israeli anti-SAM offensive
craft were also equipped for air-to-air battle. took advantage of Syrian mistakes rather than
for Galilee 147
Lebanon— Operation Peace
Test pilot about to enter his cockpit.

The Kfir, designed and built by Israel Aircraft Industries, is shown with its weapons systems.
any inherent weakness or unsuspected vulner- RPVs gave the Israelis a decided edge on the eve
ability of air defense artillery. The Israeli attack of battle.
succeeded because the Syrian air defenders dis- The Scout can carry a payload of 50 pounds.
regarded basic air defense countersuppression One of its principal elements is a gyrostabilized
measures. platform on which is mounted a television camera
with a 15:1 zoom lens that can be aimed and
zoomed by a remote operator via a radio data
Prelude link. The camera transmits high
resolution mo-
tion pictures at50 frames per second. The Scout
The Syrian air defense force guarding the is tracked through its data-link transmitter and
Bekaa Valley consisted of two SA-2 batteries, a parabolic antenna that determines range and
two SA-3 batteries and 15 SA-6 batteries. For bearing. From the information, the Scout's loca-
more than a year before the attack and also dur- tion is calculated and automatically plotted on
ing the attack, the Israelis sent remotely piloted a ground station mapboard. The ground station
vehicles (RPV) such as the Scout over the Bekaa computer displays the coordinates of any object
Valley. These RPVs, equipped with electro-opti- caught in the camera's crosshairs. The RPVs co-
cal sensors, located Syrian missile batteries and ordinates and altitude are continuously dis-
relayed the data to ground stations for real-time played, along with the time and date on the
analysis. The Israelis learned that the Syrian operator's TV console, and are taped.
SAM batteries had, for the most part, remained At a typical cruise altitude of 3,000 feet, the
static for many months, a tactical blunder that camera provides surveillance of about 20 square
allowed the Israelis to precisely target known miles (50 square kilometers), while at maximum
sites located in a confined geographic area. The zoom the area viwed measures approximately
intelligence gained through the use of Scout 130 X 160 feet (40 X 50 meters). The lens can
be zoomed from one extreme to the other in less

than four seconds.
Deception
The use of remotely piloted vehicles enabled
Next, the Israelis initiated the deception phase.
Israeli commanders to have a near real-time pic-
According to the Israelis, waves of decoy drones,
ture of the battlefield situation. Senior officers
which simulated strike aircraft, were sent over
were able to watch the attacks on the SAM sites
the Syrian batteries. The Syrians reacted by
on their television monitors.
turning on their radars and tracking the decoy
After thorough planning and preparation, the
drones. They even engaged the drones, expend-
Israeli Air Force launched a coordinated four-
ing valuable, ready-to fire missiles. In some in-
phase operation against the Syrian air defense
stances, once the radars were turned on, the
complex. The four phases were electronic war-
Syrians continued to radiate long after there was
fare, deception, SAM attack and counterair.
a need for tracking information.
Additionally, the Israelis used rockets or other
means to drop chaff which further confused the
Electronic Warfare Syrian missile site radar operators.
To execute the electronic warfare phase, the

Israeli air force used modified Boeing 707s and
other aircraft as electronic warfare platforms SAM Attack
near the battle area. These aircraft carried a vari-
ety of electronic sensors and palletized jammers Once satisfied that the Syrian SAM batteries
which could be reconfigured as the tactical situa- had been deceived, the Israelis began the SAM
tion dictated. The sensors, along with support- attack phase. First, F-4 Phantom fighter bomb-
ing equipment, automatically identified missile ers armed with anti-radiation missiles (ARM) (in-
site radars and performed real-time analysis. The cluding the AGM-78 Standard ARM and
jammers disrupted Syrian communications nets possibly the AGM-45 Shrike) attacked each SAM
and blanked out missile site radars. battery. These missiles were launched against
\ VI
or
Other aircraft, including Kfir C-2s, attacked the missile sites with cluster munitions and regular bombs.
site radarsby homing in on the radars' radio fre- fense system in Lebanon had suffered a ca-
quency beams. tastrophic defeat.
The Standard ARM is a large missile that
turns toward the target radar even when the air-
craft is not pointed directly at it. By com- Counterair
municating with a radar homing system in the
aircraft, the missile determines the target loca- To provide cover for its attacking F-4s, the
air
tion before launch and can turn, after firing, to Israelis employed an E-2C Hawkeye as an air-
acquire and home on the target. borne command post and F-15s and F-16s as
The Shrike is smaller than the Standard ARM counterair aircraft. The Syrian air force reacted
and was designed to destroy a SAM battery's to the attack on their SAM by launching
sites
radar antenna. The missile is fired when the air- MiG-21s and MiG-23s toward the Bekaa Valley.
craft is pointed at the emitter. The Shrike finds The E-2C Hawkeye used an onboard radar sys-
the radar emitter, then locks on and homes on tem to track the Syrian MiGs as they took off.
the signal until impact. Consequently, as soon as the MiGs rose off run-
Once the Syrian missile battery radars were de- ways, the Israelis knew how many were coming
stroyed, other attack aircraft, which included and from what azimuth. By continuously moni-
some of the missile sites with
Kfir C-2s, attacked toring theMiGs in flight, the E-2C directed the
cluster munitionsand regular bombs. When the IsraeliF-15s and F-16s on intercept paths that
attack was over, the Israeli Air Force had de- enabled them to shoot down the MiGs with AIM
stroyed 17 of 19 Syrian SAM batteries deployed 9-L Sidewinder heat-seeking and Sparrow radar-
in the Bekaa Valley and had damaged the other guided missiles. The Sidewinder is capable of an
two while losing no aircraft. The Syrian air de- all-aspect attack; its infrared seeker homes on not
ebanon —Operationn Peace for Galilee
fo 151
only the target aircraft's exhaust, but also on the In conjunction with movement, the employ-
aircraft's surfaces that become heated from air ment of radar emission control (with selected bat-
friction. teries remaining silent) would have enhanced the
The E-2C can scan three million cubic miles of SAM units' survivability and mission accom-
airspace and its radar can detect fighters at plishment. Only the minimum number of radars
ranges up to 250 nautical miles. It can control in the airdefense network should have been al-
up to 130 separate engagements and can moni- lowed on the air for acquisition coverage. Also,
tor more than 200 aircraft simultaneously. the Syrians should have minimized tracking time
Augmenting the radar is a passive detection by waiting until Israeli targets were within en-
system, a multiband, 360-degree, azimuth cov- gagement range before tracking.
erage receiving system that detects radar signals After applying movement and radiation con-
to a distance of 500 miles, thereby doubling trol measures, the Syrian air defenders should
Hawkeye's detection range. The detected radar have heavily camouflaged their SAM equipment,
emitter's characteristics such as pulse width, doing everything possible to reduce the visual
pulse repetition frequency and amplitude are contrast between their equipment and the sur-
analyzed by a digital signal processor that identi- rounding areas.
fies the type signals, alerting the crew to new Finally, the Syrians should have implemented
threats. A computer links all the detection sys- a deception operation by using dummy or decoy
tems, processes the radar signals in real time and SAM positions to deceive the Israelis as to the
automatically provides target intercept data, giv- actual number and locations of its SAM bat-
ing the Israeli F-15s and F-16s a jump on the teries. These could have included nonoperational
Syrian MiGs as they approached. items of SAM equipment or facsimiles of radars,
Also contributing to the Israeli success in the launchers and missiles. Along with the dummy
air were the Boeing 707s. Their electronic equip- sites, the Syrians could have added more realism
ment jammed the communications links between by integrating infrared radiators, radios and
Syrian ground controls and pilots, causing the other electronic emitters into the sites to simu-
Syrian pilots to fly according to inflexible Soviet late the electromagnetic signature of real SAM
tactics without ground radar control or vectors sites.During the 1973 Middle East war, the
to targets. The Syrians, therefore, were vulner- Egyptians made extensive use of dummy sites.
able to Israeli fighters from various azimuths. These elaborately detailed fakes, many of which
included active radar transmitters, were used for
two reasons: to lure the attacking Israeli air force
Countersuppression away from real sites to attractive, but useless,
targets; and to destroy the decoyed aircraft in
Measures ADA flak traps surrounding the dummy posi-
tions. These flak traps consisted of air defense
The Syrians could have avoided the ca- guns and camouflaged SA-6 units. According to
tastrophic loss of its entire SAM complex in one report, there were more dummy sites west
Lebanon through proper use of air defense of the Suez than there were actual sites. In the
countersuppression measures such as movement, 1982 Israeli-Syrian conflict, the Syrians made no
radar emission control, camouflage and decep- attempt to use dummy sites.
tion.The most significant measure which Syria
should have used to prevent a successful Israeli
SAM suppression and attack operation was to
move its SAM batteries as often as possible. Conclusion
More specifically, the Syrian batteries should
have been moved after each overflight by Israeli Early reports of the Bekaa Valley campaign
remotely piloted vehicles or manned aircraft. were characterized by half-truths and inac-
Since hostilities existed with Israel, Syria should curacies; many of them, apparently, purposely
have moved its SAM batteries at least every 24 planted by Israeli briefing officers. Newsweek,
hours even if there were no known reconnais- for example, reported the first wave of reconnais-
sance overflights. Also, these moves should have sance drones was followed by "killer drones"
been conducted at night. The Syrians, however, armed with warheads that demolished the SAM
kept many of their mobile SAM batteries in the sites. The Israeli program of disinformation, in
same positions for more than a year, a clear vio- fact,appears to have been so effective that some
lation of the air defense principle of mobility. details of the battle may remain obscured for
years. It seems however, that the Israelis

clear, gets and bombing them accurately and with in-
built on already existing technology and em- credible speed.They knocked out fixed, dug-in
ployed conventional rather than exotic tech-
targets as well as moving ones such as tanks
niques.
and self-propelled artillery. Excellent interarm
The Israeli Air Force's success in destroying
combat procedures were in evidence at all
Syria's air defense network in Lebanon must be
levels. The closely knit combat teams demon-
credited to a number of factors. These include the
intelligence gathering by RPVs, thorough plan- strated high training standards and operational
ning and preparation and the skillful execution discipline, which inevitably reduced casualties
of a four-phase operation featuring electronic and resulted in a speedy and clean-cut execu-
warfare, deception, SAM attack and counterair tion of the operation. In the end the Israelis suc-
operations. More importantly, however, Israeli ceeded in driving out 14,000 PLO and other
success was due primarily to Syria's tactical terrorists to eight Arab countries in North
errors. Africa and the Middle East.
The failure of the Syrian air defense system in
the Bekaa Valley underscores the absolute neces-
sity for U.S. air defense units to actively prac-
tice as many countersuppression measures as THE WAR IN LEBANON
possible on the modern battlefield. Failure to do
so could result in catastrophic defeat for U.S. air
defenders, just as it did for Syrian air defenders. The Sequence of Main
Events
Cautioning against overconfidence, Maj. Gen.
David Ivry, I AF commander during Operation June 3, 1982, close to midnight— The Israeli
Peace for Galilee, warned that the air force ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mr.
would start assessing future developments of Shlomo Argov, is shot by Arab assailants as he
air defense to prevent repetition of surprises as leaves the Dorchester Hotel in Park Lane,
a result of this startling success. To underline London.
his warnings the IAF was soon put to a new test
June 4—1515 hours— IAF aircraft attack PLO
as the Syrians deployed newly arrived
targets in Beirut. Among the objectives are the
Soviet-supplied SA-8 Gecko SAM batteries to
ammunition dumps at the sports stadium near
replace the depleted air defense in the Bekaa.
Sabra and Shatila as well as 22 other targets
On Saturday, July 24, IAF jets attacked and
nearby. The PLO retaliates immediately with
destroyed three of these systems, the first ever
Katyusha and artillery fire on Israeli settle-
to go into action, without loss to the attackers,
ments in the Galilee panhandle.
though an IAF RF 4E was shot down by a
Syrian-based SA-6. A few days later the IAF June 5— Heavy artillery bombardments con-
destroyed a Libyan SA-9 Gaskin along the tinue across the whole Israeli northern border.
Damascus-Beirut main road. Twenty-three settlements are attacked with
In all of the air combat over Lebanon, the IAF continuous fire; several dead and injured are ac-
destroyed 102 Syrian aircraft, including counted for. Israeli artillery and naval units
MiG-21s, MiG-23s, and SU-20s, and 50 SAMs, open a counterbarrage on the PLO artillery posi-
losing only two of their own aircraft to ground tions while the IAF intervenes to knock out
fire.
point targets in South Lebanon.
In addition to the aerial combat and anti-mis- June 6— While the artillery bombardment con-
sile efforts, the IAF yeoman duty in
also did tinues, four IDF armored columns cross into
support of IDF ground troops. They attacked southern Lebanon and, with close air and artil-
PLO ground positions and helped to root the lery support, advance rapidly on four separate
terrorists out of their hiding-places among the axes, outflanking resistance by PLO defenders.
civilian population, and they dropped leaflets to By nightfall the western IDF formations reach
guide Lebanese civilians to safety. The entire a line north of Tyre on the coastal road. On the
Operation Peace for Galilee was supported by eastern sector the IDF advances, carefully
Israeli Air Force fighter-bombers locating tar- avoiding Syrian forces, while in the central sec-
tor, moving over heavy ground obstacles, the fended by PLO and the Syrian Eighty-fifth Ar-
Israeli forces enter the mountain ridges, facing mored Brigade. Heavy fighting as the Israelis
the Syrians there. An IAF Skyhawk is lost, its enter the township. IDF
engineers force a by-
pilot captured by the PLO. pass over the mountain ridge, outflanking the
June 7— After midnight Israeli infantry cap- Syrians from the east. In the central region an
tures the PLO stronghold, the Beaufort castle, Israeli armored force is ambushed by Syrian
in a coup de main; in other sectors the armor commandos supported by T-62 tanks. The en-
is advancing while the accompanying infantry evacuacted under a combined
circled Israelis are
starts to mop up the built-up areas where the armor and artillery barrage, at close quarters
PLO has constructed its main defense. To the against heavy odds. IAF Cobra and Defender
north of Sidon, the Israeli Navy launches helicopters come into action against Syrian re-
several amphibious landings, placing tanks, inforcements in the northern Bekaa Valley,
APCs (Armored Personnel Carriers), and fresh operating with IAF fighters, knocking out
infantry units on vantage positions along the tanks and SP artillery. Several Syrian Gazelle
coastline. In the central sector, Israeli tanks helicopters are shot down and some captured
clash with Syrian armor near Jezzin, while almost intact. Twenty-five Syrian MiGs are
Israeli vanguards push the Syrian forward units shot down in continuous air battles, as two more
back from the village of Kankaba at the en- SA-6 batteries are destroyed. In all, close to 90
trance to the Bekaa Valley. Syrian fighter-planes are destroyed in air-to-air
combat. No IAF aircraft are lost in all these air
June 8— IDF armored spearheads link up with
battles.
the units landed along the coast by amphibious
vessels and push north towards Damour, while June 11— At noon a cease-fire is arranged be-
infantry supported by tanks continues mop- tween the Syrian and Israeli forces in Lebanon.
ping-up operations in the coastal towns and Shortly before, an Israeli force ambushes a
refugee camps— the main PLO redoubts. Heavy Syrian unit with T-72 tanks in the Bekaa Val-
fighting between Israeli and Syrian armor con- ley.Following a sharp clash, nine of the Syrian
tinues in the Jezzin as PLO tank-killer teams T-72s are destroyed and go up in flames. In the
and Syrian commando units exploit the excel- coastal sector the IDF reaches the outskirts of
lent cover to retard the Israeli advance. IAF Beirut overlooking the airport. Fighting con-
fighter-bombers fly close support missions and tinues in the coastal towns as the PLO fighters
in three separate air battles six Syrian MiGs are are routed out in bloody battles.
downed, one pilot captured. June 12— The cease-fire with the Syrians holds,
June 9— In a dramatic attack, 17 out of 19 but heavy fighting continues in the coastal sec-
Syrian SAM batteries, with their infrastructure, tor south of Beirut as the Israelis close in.
are destroyed in the Bekaa Valley. The attack June 13— A cease-fire is arranged between the
is by a
carried out combined air and ground ac- PLO and IDF but does not hold long as rapid
tion.During continuous air battles, 29 Syrian firing exchanges escalate. IDF units enter East
MiGs are shot down by IAF fighters. In the Beirut, taking the Baabde presidential palace
coastal sector, heavy fighting goes on in the and the nearby outskirts.
towns where PLO defenders fight for their lives June 14— Following a six-day siege, IDF troops
against advancing IDF paratrooper teams. storm Ein Hillwe camp and capture it after a
Israelispearheads reach a point 18 kilometers savage close-in battle with the PLO.
south of Beirut. In the central sector, Israeli ar-
June 15— Sporadic fire exchanges escalate into
mor captures vantage positions overlooking the
artillery barrages by evening over West Beirut.
Bekaa valley and the Damascus-Beirut main
road.Heavy opposition from Syrian forces sup- June 16— The new cease-fire holds temporarily
ported by ATGW (anti-tank guided weapons), as diplomatic efforts start to prevent an Israeli
anti-tank helicopters, and artillery. attack on Beirut.
June 10— In the coastal sector the IDF enters June 17-21— Sporadic fire exchanges in Beirut
Kafr Sill on the outskirts of the capital, de- and the east.
June 21— The cease-fire breaks down. IDF at- July 30— Cease-fire broken as artillery
duels
tacks the Syrian forces and PLO positions along start. IAF aircraft together with Israeli
naval
the Beirut-Damascus road in the Alei- units attack PLO targets. Libyan forces take
Bahamdoun sector, with heavy artillery and air up positions with the Syrians.
support. August 1— Artillery duels in Beirut. IDF armor
June 23— The battles along the main road con- and engineers advance along the main runways
tinue as the Syrians throw in reinforcements. of Beirut airport and capture the terminal.
Syrian commando units are destroyed at El August 2— IDF forces enter El Salloum camp
Mansourije. at nightfall and capture it from the PLO.
June 24-26— Heavy fighting on the Damascus-
Beirut road. The IDF pushes all Syrian forces August 3— IDF infantry assaults El Uzay camp
from the high ground into the Bekaa Valley, north of the airport and starts mopping up.
links up with the Christian militia to the north,
Heavy fighting during the night as PLO with-
and closes the ring around Beirut from the east, draws under pressure.
encircling PLO and Syrian forces in the city. A August 4— Israeli forces advance with fire sup-
cease-fire is arranged, which lasts, with sporadic port into the Museum complex, where the PLO
fire exchanges, until the first week of July. has built a stronghold on the "green line" be-
Early July— During the first half of July spor- tween East and West Beirut. In the afternoon
adic fire exchanges take place on the outskirts heavy fighting as artillery and air attacks come
in on the PLO concentrations.
of Beirut, escalating into sharp artillery duels
from time to time. Heavy sniper activity causes August 5— Protracted exchanges of shoul-
casualties to IDF troops in forward positions. der-fired ground-to-air missiles (RPG) and artil-
Most of the fighting takes place around the air- lery fire near Beirut Port. IDF advances further
port where IDF positions are in the open, con- north at El Uzay camp and encircles Burj-el-
trolled by PLO in high buildings nearby. As Barajne quarter housing the PLO HQ.
losses mount, the IDF calls in air support to hit August 6— Further IAF attacks on PLO
PLO positions unattainable by direct ground quarters, direct hits on HQ buildings at
fire. Fakahany soon after Yassir Arafat leaves.
July 21— Repeated incidents and cease-fire August 8— IDF armor races to Junia port,
violations in the eastern sector; five IDF sol- north of Beirut, to take positions preventing
diers killed by Syrian action. landings of French forces from naval vessels off
July 22— IDF armor and artillery opens fire the coast. PLO artillery shells East Beirut and
along the whole eastern sector, hitting Syrian Junia with Katyusha and Grad rockets.
and PLO targets on a broad front. Later, IAF August 10— IAF aircraft destroy Syrian SA-9
fighter-bombers initiate an intense two-hour Gaskin that entered Lebanon to stem depletion
fire-fight; 72 Syrian tanks are destroyed. of air defense.
July 23— IAF strikes at several PLO camps in August 11— IDF armor advances towards the
Beirut as IDF artillery and tanks fire directly Hippodrome and its nearby woods. Heavy fight-
at targets on the outskirts. ing with PLO. IAF intervenes, flying close sup-
July 24— IAF fighters destroy three Syrian port. In the afternoon there is a marked
SA-8 Gecko SAMs that had taken up positions decrease in PLO fire due to shortage of ammuni-
in the Bekaa during the night. An IAF recce tion. Large reinforcements are
Israeli troop
Phantom is hit by a Syrian SA-6 and crashes moved to Lebanon to exert pressure on PLO
in flames. and Syrians.
July 25-27— Continuous air over
activity August 12— The breaking point of PLO re-
Beirut. IAF attacks PLO targets at Sabra, sistance in Beirut. IDF bombards the PLO
Shatila, and Fakahany quarters where main quarters for 11 hours with artillery, air, and
PLO headquarters are based. A cease-fire is naval fire. In the evening, as the fire ceases, the
called on July 27. PLO finally declares its willingness to withdraw
on Israeli conditions. A cease-fire is arranged Israeli territory. The Lebanese army enters
as final talks begin. West Beirut for the first time after eight years.
August 21— PLO starts its withdrawal from
The siege is over.
Beirut as multinational force takes position. In September 1—14,000 PLO and other terrorists
the port the Second Battalion French Foreign expelled to eight Arab countries over a two-
Legion takes charge, later relieved by a USMC week period.
Unit from the Sixth Fleet. An Italian con- September 13— IAF pounds Syrian and PLO
tingent made up of paratroopers and Bersaglieri positions in the Bekaa.
takes up position along the "green line" in the
September 14— Lebanon's newly elected presi-
city.
dent Bashir Gemayel is killed in an explosion
August 23— Bashir Gemayel is elected by demolition charges placed at his HQ in
Lebanon's new president. Beirut by Murabitoun. (Later, his brother Amin
August 30— The Syrian Eighty-fifth Armored is elected in his place.) Heavy Syrian and PLO
Brigade withdraws from Beirut along the main troop concentrations in the Bekaa. IDF rein-
road with its heavy equipment. At this stage forcements take up positions as tension grows.
half of the PLO have already withdrawn from September 15— IDF enters West Beirut and be-
the city and left for Arab countries. On the east- gins taking vantage points in the city and
ern sector the Syrians move in further reinforce- former PLO concentrations. The IAF flies top
ments, building up to a two-divisional size force. cover.
Part of the Israeli reserve forces are moved to
Appendix I
The Missions of the IAF*
1. To protect the State of Israeland Israeli force places continuous stress on the acquisition
airspace, as well as IDF troops beyond the ofnew materiel and weapon systems and the de-
state's borders. velopment of new modes of combat. Likewise,
2. To maintain air superiority over enemy air the IAF pays special attention to the training
forces and armies in the IDF's theater of of high-quality technical cadres at its own
operations. school as well as in specially coordinated pre-
3. To support ground and sea forces. military programs offered at civilian insti-
4. To fulfill IDF transportation, recon- tutions.
naisance, communications, and intel- The IAF maintains its high operational level
ligence needs. through repeated exercise alerts and operational
employment, as well as by developing esprit de
The IAF is constantly upgrading its equip- corps and the command capacity of its officers
ment and adapting it to the special fighting con- at all levels. The IAF, furthermore, continues
ditions of the Middle Eastern theater. The air to upgrade its proficiency in the handling of air-
craft, weapons systems, electronics, and tech-
nology.
In short, the IAF is the strategic arm of Zahal
*As given in The Israel Air Force, 1983, an official (IDF), with the primary role of deterring the
publication of the IDF. enemy during peacetime and subduing it in war.
156
Appendix II
Israeli Defense Force (Zahal)
More than 11 percent of the population of The ground forces are made up of about
Israel— well over one-half of all Israeli men and 140,000men and women— 20,000 career soldiers
a significant number of Israeli women— are ac- and 120,000 conscripts. This highly mechanized
tive-duty members of the defense forces. force is backed up by an estimated 250,000 men
Manpower in the Israeli Defense Force con- and women serving in reserve units.
sists of career service-members (sherut qevah) The sea force is the smallest unit of the na-
and those men and women who are fulfilling tion's defense forces, consisting of about 5,000
theirterm of compulsory service (sherut hovah). men, 1,000 of whom are conscripts.
Military service is compulsory for both men and The air force is composed of approximately
women when they reach the age of 18. Women 21,000 men, of whom 19,000 are career profes-
must serve between 18 and 24 months of active sionals and some 2,000 are conscripts.
duty, while men must serve between 24 and 42 These regular forces are supported by the
months of active service. In addition, every con- Noar Halutzi Lohem (Pioneer Fighting Youth),
script must enter a reserve unit upon comple- an organization that combines military service
tion of activeduty and continue to train for one with agriculture training and has established
day a month plus one month a year, until age outposts in farming towns and villages along
39 for women and 55 for men. the nation's borders.
The nation's naval and air forces are not sep- Law enforcement is carried out by a national
arate services. They are known as Cheyl Ha police force of approximately 17,000 men and
Yam (Sea Corps) and Cheyl Ha Avir (Air Corps) women.
as part of the Israeli Defense Force.
157
Appendix III
Uniforms and Insignia
When the War of Independence broke out, the exploits, but also because of its members, sev-
primary concern was the acquisition of aircraft. eral of them internationally renowned. At first,
As has been detailed earlier, Israeli purchasing as the rest of the IDF installed a rank insignia
teams were busy all over the world trying to scheme, the IAF decided to keep its own ver-
buy combat aircraft— in many cases even non- sion of rank insignia and designation, which had
combat aircraft were acquired. In this way the a marked similarity to the familiar RAF system.
polyglot Israeli Air Service grew, with surplus Shoulder rings of blue-gray on a dark blue back-
World War II aircraft from the U.S., Great Bri- ground were worn by officers, arm straps of
tain, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Italy, and else- white on blue by other ranks. Progressing from
where. These were the colorful Messerschmitts, a single ring for a pilot officer, the highest rank
Spitfires, and Mustangs that bore the blue, six- at the time was equivalent to an RAF air com-
pointed star (the Mogen David) in a white circle. modore, this being the IAF commander. Pilot
By the same token, with the exception of Dan wings, originating in 1948 and still in service,
Tolkovsky, Ezer Weizman, and Aharon Remez, are two cloth wings centered by a shield with
the fledgling air service was made up pre- a dark blue six -pointed Star of David, the em-
dominantly of foreigners. Here, too, the Air Ser- blem of the IAF. RAF-style battledress of dark-
vice depended on "surplus" World War II pilots er and lighter blue-gray was later supplied but
from the USAAF, the USN, the RAF, the seldom worn. Instead, the tropical khaki shorts
RCAF, the RAAF, and the RSAAF. These and blouses were preferred by the foreign volun-
American, British, Canadian, Australian, and teers who made up the majority of the IAF air-
South African pilots were for the most part Jew- crews. B-17 bomber crews used to wear colored
ish, but many were not. They brought with them USN baseball caps. Officially, blue-colored
their own flying gear and uniforms. This made berets with metal, winged-shaped cap
a
them a diversified and motley group, but their badge*was authorized; not many of the airmen
skills and tradition of victory remain with the wore these, preferring their own style or no
I AF today. headgear at all. Some years later, when former
As the Service progressed and the IAF was RAF Flight Lietenant Dan Tolkovsky took over
created as a separate fighting service,some sort and most of the foreign volunteers had gone
of order and discipline was instilled— a matter
easier said than done— but by the end of 1948,
with more aircraft coming in, the forces were di- *This metal cap badge was exactly the same design
vided into a few squadrons. Among them, the as the embroidered pilots' wings worn over the left
101st Squadron became famous, not only for its breast pocket.
158
AIR FORCE INSIGNIA
1973
111! 1948
L
1956
I tr1967
PARACHUTIST
SI
PILOT WINGS
NAVIGATOR
FLIGHT SURGEON FLIGHT MECHANIC
RADIO OPERATOR LOADMASTER
Air Force Wings and Campaign Ribbons.

160 Appendix III. Uniforms and Insignia
OT HAMOFET OT HAOZ OT HAGVURA

Medal for Distinguished and Out- Second Highest Award for Medal of Supreme Bravery, Israel's
Israel's
standing Service in Action. Courage on the field of battle. Highest Award for Bravery in the
field of battle.
home, discipline and service regulations were at battledress below the left shoulder patch.
last enforced. Dress uniform is not usually worn, but for
The uniform became, for most of the
official ceremonial occasions a gabardine-cloth
year, a light khaki uniform of trousers and blue-gray— formerly the RAF service dress uni-
blouse, rank insignia and designation being form with cloth belt— was issued, to be worn
standard IDF. Officers, however, wore silver on with a light blue or white shirt and black tie.
a blue backcloth sleeve on their shoulder straps. This was later modified to the USAF-style ser-
Pilots' wings were unchanged, but other air- vice uniform, but lacking the belt. Winter uni-
crews were allotted special double wings with forms are usually worn with open collar, rarely
aircrew trades on the center shield instead of with black tie.
the blue star. Blue berets became standard for Flight clothing has undergone many changes
other ranks, whereas officers wore a field-service since 1948, when flight helmets originating from
cap with or without a black center band over worldwide sources became fashionable, together
the peak. The new IAF cap badge— a winged with goggles and "Mae Wests." Some pilots
Star of David centered over a sword with scrolls painted colorful crests and drawings on their
below— became standard for all ranks on berets flight coveralls, according to their taste and
worn RAF-style. Later, shoulder straps with imagination. Later some order was achieved,
colored insignia for air units or support com- but only the jet era brought modern flight cloth-
mands, as well as IAF HQ, were authorized to ing into the IAF. From the older, dome-shaped
be worn on the shoulder strap or on RAF-type pilot's helmet used in the Six-Day War, the IAF
has now progressed to the modern, most up-to- boat-shaped cap and waist belt of the same
date flight clothing and visored helmets and the color.
rest of the special supersonic equipment used Since the days of the colorful individuals who
in ultra-modern combat aircraft. served in it 30 years ago, the IAF has become
Ground crews wear IDF fatigues on duty and a top professional service, highly disciplined
sport colored baseball caps for the various both in the air and on the ground. Its appear-
ground duties. IAF women soldiers wear the ance immaculate, it remains, without doubt, the
usual IDF uniforms, but have a distinctive blue best-dressed service in the IDF.
Appendix IV
IAF Commanders
YEHOSHUA ESHEL (Nov. 1947-May in 1940.He served as a major in the British Ar-
1948)— Eshel was the first commander of the my during World War II. Shamir commanded
preindependence Air Service, a division of the an IDF infantry brigade during the 1948-49
Haganah, which was established on November War of Independence. Later he commanded the
10, 1947. Born in 1900 in Poland, Eshel served fledgling Israeli Navy. An excellent organizer,
with the Jewish battalions in the British Army he undertook to reorganize the IAF but, due to
during World War I. Later he became a mem- illness, relinquished his command after a short
ber of the Haganah. He died in 1966. (He was time.
not a relative of coauthor David Eshel.)
HAIM LASKOV (Aug. 1951-June 1953)-Born
ISRAEL AMIR (SABLODOVSKI) (May in Russia Laskov lived and was edu-
in 1919,
1948)— Born in Poland in 1903, Amir was a cated in Haifa. A member of the Haganah, he
Haganah member with the rank of lieutenant joined the British Army, in which he attained
colonel. He became the first commander of the the rank of major in the Jewish Brigade fight-
IAF upon its establishment, a position he held ing in Italy. He commanded an Israeli Brigade
for only two weeks. Later he became chief of during the War of Independence and was a lead-
ordnance at the Ministry of Defense. ing commander in the Sinai campaign. He was
promoted to general in charge of training before
AHARON REMEZ (May 1948-Dec. 1950)-A taking command of the IAF. A strict disci-
Sabra born in Israel in 1919, he was the son of plinarian, he reorganized the force and its infra-
a leading personality of the Jewish Yishuv. He structure. In 1958 he became chief of staff of
joined the British RAF in 1942 and, following the IDF. Laskov was a much-decorated officer.
training in Canada, became a fighter pilot. He
served in a U.K. -based fighter squadron flying DAN TOLKOVSKY (June 1953-July 1958)-
Supermarine Spitfires and laterHawker Born in Israel in 1921,he joined the RAF in
Tempests. Remez commanded the IAF during 1942 during World War II. Following flight
the 1948-49 War of Independence. training in South Africa, Tolkowski became a
fighter pilot. He reached the rank of flight
SHLOMO SHAMIR (Dec.1950-Aug. 1951)- lieutenant, serving in the Middle East, Greece,
Born in Russia in 1915, Shamir was a member and southern Europe. During his tenure as com-
of the Haganah. He was active in the prewar mander, the IAF converted to its first jets and
armament industry and became a civilian pilot fought the Sinai campaign.
162
A
AHARON REMEZ HAIM LASKOV

Commander in Chief Commander in Chief
IAF: 1948-50 IAF: 1951-53
Flight Sergeant
RAF: 1942-45
EZER WEIZMAN (1958-1966)-Weizman was Army in World War II, serving as a driver in
born in Haifa in 1924, a nephew of the first the Royal Army Service Corps. As a Palmach
president of Israel. During World War II he member he took part in a pilots' course in Italy
joined the RAF at the age of 18. He became a Later Hod was assigned to the Czech
in 1947.
fighter pilot and served in the Far East, flying flight training course where he flew Messer-
Spitfires. In the War of Independence he served schmitt Bf-109s (AVIA 210s). He took part in
as a Messerschmitt pilot and later flew Spitfires the long-range ferry flights of Spitfires to Israel
again. Weizman took part in the battle with the in 1948. After the War of Independence he
RAF above the Negev. Under his command the trained on jets in Britain. Commander of a Mus-
IAF developed into the first-class fighting force tang squadron, he also led an Ouragan squadron
it is today, received its first supersonic Mirages into battle, escorting the paradrop at Mitla Pass
and trained for its mission in the Six-Day War. during the Sinai campaign. He commanded the
Later Weizman served as chief of operations to IAF in its lightning strike on June 5, 1967 (the
the chief of staff during the Six-Day War, and Six-Day War). Under his command the IAF
became minister of defense in the first ad- changed over from French aircraft to American
ministration of Prime Minister Begin. Skyhawks and Phantoms.
MORDECHAI HOD (1966-1973)-Born at BENJAMIN PELED (1973- 1977)-

Kibutz Degania in 1926, he joined the British third-generation Israeli, Peled was born in Tel
164 Appendix IV. IAF Commanders
DAN TOLKOVSKY EZER WEIZMAN
Commander in Chief Commander in Chief

IAF: 1953-58 IAF: 1958-66
Flight Lieutenant Sergeant Pilot

RAF: 1942-47 RAF: 1942-45
Aviv in 1928 and received his wings in 1950 fly- War. Commanding a combat wing in 1973, he
ing Messerschmitts and Spitfires. Following ad- became chief of operations during the Yom Kip-
vanced training with the RAF
in 1953, he pur War. Under his command the IAF received
became an Ouragan squadron commander. In its F-16 Falcon fighters and Grumman Hawk-
1955 Peled also commanded a Mystere IV eye E AW (electronic airborne warning) aircraft.
squadron. During the Sinai campaign his jet He also supervised the difficult withdrawal
was hit by anti-aircraft fire near Sharm-el- from the Sinai air bases, under the Camp David
Sheikh. Evading capture, he was flown to safe- Agreement and the build-up in the Negev. Gen.
ty by a Piper Cub. Peled was in command of the Ivry also had command of the IAF during
IAF in the Yom Kippur War. During that con- Operation Peace for Galilee, the incursion into
flict he was shot down again and was rescued Lebanon in pursuit of the PLO terrorists.
by a helicopter. The IAF received its first
American-built F-15 Eagles while he was com-
mander. AMOS LAPIDOT (Dec. 1982- )-Brig. Gen.
Amos Lapidot assumed command of the IAF
DAVID IVRY (1977-1982)-Ivry was born in while the Israeli Defense Force was still in
Tel Aviv in 1934. He joined the IAF when he Lebanon, following Operation Peace for Galilee.
was 18 and learned to fly in Spitfires. He flew He had been in charge of the Lavie (Lion) air-
Ouragan jets in combat during the 1956 war. craft project, the new strike plane being manu-
Next he advanced to Super Mysteres and later factured by the Israel Aircraft Industries to
to Mirages. He flew the latter in the Six-Day replace the American-built A-4 Skyhawk.
DA\ ID IVRY
Commander in Chief
IAF: 1977-1982
Appendix V
Air Bases
Although an extremely tiny country (and

it is are at Haifa, Ramat David, Herzlia, Ben
there are those who would have it even smaller Gurion/Sde Dov/Tel Nof, Lod, Hatzor,
by making it give up more of its territory to the Hatzerim, Sedom, and Ramon. Following are
Arab countries), Israel has a number of air bases brief descriptions of some of these Israeli bases.
that dot the countryside. In most cases, how-
ever, they are well hidden, well protected, and Ramat David AFB
under tight security. The casual traveler would Built by the RAF in 1942, this northernmost
not be aware that he was passing in the vicin- combat air base operated as a bomber base, fly-
ity of an base unless, of course, a
Israeli air ing Baltimores and later accommodating the
flight of F-16s or F-15s happened to be taking 208th and Thirty-second Squadrons, attacked
off or roaring in low for a landing. in 1948 by Egyptian Spitfires. Taken over by
These air bases were either taken over from the IAF following the establishment of the
the RAF when British forces left Palestine, built State of Israel, the base has become one of its
by the IAF, captured from Arab adversaries, major airfields, from which countless operations
by the United States to replace airfields
or built have been mounted in the country's 33 years of
in the Sinai turned over to Egypt according to existence.
the Camp David Agreement. Recently, Israel
turned over one of these captured bases to Tel Nof AFB
Egypt together with four of their own I AF-built This base, known during its RAF days as Aqir,
fields, including Etzion and Eitam, under the was used at the time as the training base for
terms of the treaty of peace with their neigh- the Sixth Airborne Division Paratroop School.
bor to the south. As part of that same treaty, During the War of Independence the IAF flew
the United States is building air bases in the many supply and combat missions from this
Negev to replace those presented to the Egyp- base, located only minutes from Tel Aviv. For
tians by Israel. In addition to the airfields built a time it housed the IAF Flight School without
inthe Negev at Ovda and Matred (Ramon) are interrupting its function as an operational base,
new bases at Nevetim and Mashabim. These which it fulfills to this day. Tel Nof also includes
take the place of the air bases in the Sinai a logistical center for newly introduced aircraft.
(Refidim, Atour, Santa Katorina, and others)
turned over to Egypt. Hatzor AFB
Hence, air bases range from Mahanayim in Formerly RAF Qastina, from where Halifax
the north, near the Lebanese and Syrian bombers were flown, it was abandoned by the
borders, to the new American-built fields in the British in the 1940s and taken over by the
Negev to the south. Other bases in the south Israeli Defense Force during the fighting in
166
Appendix V. Air Bases 167
1948. Itwas soon refurbished and provided an Ophir (Sharm-el-Sheikh) AFB

operational field for the IAF. The Sinai cam- Israel's southernmost air base, located at the
paign in 1956 saw many Mosquitos and Mus- tip of the Sinai Peninsula, was one of the first
tangs using Hatzor for their home. Hatzor is to be hit during the Yom Kippur War. The field
still one of the major IAF air bases in service. was attacked by eight Egyptian MiGs— a com-
plete surprise move— but seven of them were
Hatzerim AFB shot down by IAF Phantoms scrambled to in-
This fairly new air base near Beersheva, unlike tercept during the attack.
several other bases, was built entirely to IAF
specifications. It is the current home of the IAF Ben Gurion AB
Flight School, as well as of several combat Located near Ben Gurion International Airport,
formations; the latter have seen much action in this base houses transport squadrons and light
Sinai and the Canal front. aircraft such as Westwind and Arava.
Eitam AFB Sde Dov AB

One of the two bases
air constructed
in Sinai This on the northern outskirts of Tel Aviv,
field,
entirely by Israel in the light of its experiences was the IAF's first operational airfield in 1948,
in recent wars, this base on the Mediterranean flying supply missions to the cutoff Negev and
coastline has been evacuated, in accordance Jerusalem fronts. Liaison aircraft and light
with the peace treaty signed with Egypt. transport helicopters are now stationed here.
Etzion AFB Refidim AFB

This base, too, was specially constructed in the Now evacuated, this was a major operational air
Sinai by Israel. Located northwest of Eilat, it base in the Sinai. Formerly an Egyptian fight-
was also evacuated and turned over to Egypt. er base named Bir Gafgafa, it was captured by
Israel for the first time during the 1956 Sinai
Negev Air Bases campaign while still under construction, and
Two new air bases, Ovda and Ramon (Matred), was destroyed before the enforced evacuation
were constructed by American engineering per- at the close of that year. During the 1 1 years
sonnel. The site for a third has been selected at preceding the Six-Day War, Bir Gafgafa was re-
Malhata, east of Beersheva. built and modernized by the Egyptian Air
IAF AIR BASE

STRUCTURE
WING (WING COMMANDER— COL.)
FIGHTER FIGHTER FIGHTER (SQUADRON

SQUADRON SQUADRON SQUADRON COMMANDERS
-LT. COL.)
AA INFANTRY CONSTRUCTION MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

BATTALION BATTALION FLIGHT SQUADRON SQUADRON SQUADRON
168 Appendix V. Air Bases
Force. One of the first fields to be hit by the I AF as of the airspace assigned to it. Each base is
on June 5, 1967, it was captured relatively in- capable of mounting all forms of attack, and
tact by Maj. Gen. Israel Tal's armored division bases are connected to the IAF command and
and soon became an operational IAF base, fly- control center.
ing Mirages. Later extensively enlarged, it be- The various administrative functions ensure
came a forward operations base during the swift maintenance and proper treatment of all
1968-70 War of Attrition. Despite damage by aircraft and equipment on base. Each base is
the Egyptian Air Force during the Yom Kippur capable of being adequately defended by its own
War, it remained in operation during and after aircraft and AA. In addition, ABC defense ex-
the war, until evacuated as part of the peace ists on all bases. A permanent transport sched-
process under the Camp David Agreement. ule connects all IAF bases. Each base is capable
All IAF intercept squadrons of each specific of operating even after being hit hard. They fea-
base take part in the base intercept alert duty ture modern designs of structure, shelters, and
roster for the defense of their own base as well fast damage-repair programs.
Appendix VI
The Aircraft, Friend and Foe
(1947-1983)
Following are some facts and data on the prin- ply of aircraft and spare parts, the Israeli Air
cipal aircraft employed by both the Israeli Air Force met the onslaught of the combined Arab
Force and the air arms of the opposing Arab Phantoms, and A-4
forces with U.S. -built F-4
forces from 1947 through 1983. Some of the air- Skyhawks. In that Yom Kippur War they ac-
craft served on both sides and on occasion quitted themselves well against the Soviet
fought against each other. Such examples in- MiGs and Sukhois, but suffered heavy casual-
clude the Supermarine Spitfire and the Douglas ties from the Russian surface-to-air missiles.
C-47 Dakota in the War of Independence. An- Although most of the aircraft described and
other is the Mirage, which was the backbone of depicted in this book are fighter aircraft, one
the IAF in the Six-Day War but also flew with transport plane is worthy of note, the Ameri-
the Egyptian Air Force in the Yom Kippur War can-built Lockheed C-130 Hercules. This
(a gift from Libya). A particularly bizarre com- medium airlift transport was invaluable at En-
bination was the Messerschmitt BF-109 (Avia tebbe Airport in an anti-terrorist action that will
S199), the former German Nazi Luftwaffe live in the annals of air rescue, conveying 103
fighuer-plane, flown by the Jewish pilots of the hostages to freedom. Another noteworthy air-
IAF. craft that is not a fighter is the Fouga-Magister,
During the Israeli War of Independence most a French-designed, Israeli-built trainer that was
by the Israelis and their
of the aircraft flown used for combat missions in the Six-Day War.
Arab adversaries were surplus USAAF and In the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee it was
RAF planes of World War II vintage. This the American-built, Israeli-flown General
situation lasted until the Sinai campaign, at Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons and McDon-
which time the Israelis were armed with new jet nell Douglas F-15 Eagles that delivered an
fighters from France, and the Arabs had mod- astounding defeat to the Syrian Air Force with
ern British and Soviet jets. In the Six-Day War their Russian-built MiG-21s and MiG-23s— and
the IAF was armed predominantly with French their SAM batteries as well. The F-16s and
aircraft, and the Arab air forces, with one ex- F-15s were controlled from the air and vectored
ception, had planes supplied by the USSR. The into battle by the U.S.-manufactured Grumman
Jordanians flew British Hawker Hunters. Six E2C Hawkeye. The home-built Israeli Kfirs al-
years later, after Gen. Charles de Gaulle's so acquitted themselves well, along with the old-
France had suddenly switched allegiance from er F-4 Phantoms. In this operation the
Israel to the Arabs and cut off the IAF's sup- American-built Hughes Defender helicopters
169
170 Appendix VI. The Aircraft, Friend and Foe
saw action for the first time. Just one year great success in the long-distance strike on the
earlier, on June 7, 1981, the F-15s and F-16s had Osirak nuclear reactor and their performance
first seen combat in the IAF precision attack above Lebanon in theOperation Peace for Gali-
that crippled the Iraqi nuclear reactor near lee is unparalleled in the history of aerial com-
Baghdad. bat. The three-view drawings provided are
The aircraft listed below are organized under limited to fixed-wing aircraft. However, this is
the heading of the conflict in which they ap- in no way intended to diminish the part played
peared in the greatest numbers or in which they by such great helicopters as the Bell 47, the
played their most important part. For example, Huey Cobra and Jet Ranger, the Hughes De-
while the C-47 Dakota and P-51 Mustang saw fender, the Aerospatiale Gazelle, the Sikorsky
action in the War of Independence, they played S-58 and S-65, the Sud Aviation Alouette and
their biggest roles in the Sinai campaign. By the Super Frelon, the Mi-24 Hind, and others. Some
same token, the F-15 and F-16 fighters enjoyed are covered elsewhere in this book.
WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE, 1948
I
Messerschmitt Bf-109 (A via S199)
Wingspan: 32 ft 6 \ in (9.92 m)
Length: 29 ft 10^- in (9.1 m)
Engine: Junkers Jumo Ju 211F/1,350 hp
Speed: 366 mph (590 km/h)
Armament: 2 20-mm cannons, 2 12.7-mm
machine guns
Appendix VI. The Aircraft, Friend and Foe 171
Supermarine Spitfire
Wingspan: 40 ft 2 in (12.24 m)
Length: 31 ft 4 in (9.55 m)
Engine: Rolls Royce Merlin 64 Vee/1,710 hp
Speed: 408 mph at 25,000 ft (658 km/h at
7,620 m)
Armament: 2 20-mm cannons and 2 .303-caliber
(7.7-mm) machine guns
Bristol Beaufighter
Engines: 2 Rolls Royce Merlin XX/1,280 hp
each
Armament: 4 20-mm cannons, 6 .303-caliber
(7.7-mm) machine guns, bombs
Boeing B-17 Fortress

Length: 74 ft 9 in (22.8 m) i
Engines: 4 Wright R-1820-97/1,200 hp each
Armament: 13 .50-caliber (12.7-mm) machine
guns, bombs
Lockheed C-121 Constellation

Wingspan: 123 ft (37.49 m)
Length: 95 ft 1~ in (28.99 m)
Engines: 4 Wright R-3350 air-cooled
radial/2,200 hp each
Armament: None; transport (also used as
bomber)
Appendix VI. The Aircraft, Friend and Foe
Hawker Hurricane
Length: 32 ft l\ in (9.81 m)
Engine: Rolls Royce Merlin XX Vee/1,300 hp
Speed: 330 mph at 18,000 ft (532 km/h at
5,486 m)
Armament: 8-12 machine guns or 4 20-mm
cannons
Hawker Sea Fury

Length: 34 ft 8 in (10.57 m)
Engine: Bristol Centaurus, radial/2,470 hp
Armament: 4 20-mm cannons, 12 3-in (1.2-cm)
rockets, 2 500-pound (227-kg)
bombs
174 Appendix VI. The Aircraft, Friend
North American P-51 Mustang

Wingspan: 37 ft 0.5 in (11.29 m)
Length: 32 ft 3^- in (9.83 m)
Engine: Rolls Royce Merlin V-1650/1,495 hp
Armament: 6 .50-caliber (12.7-mm) machine
guns
DeHavilland Mosquito
Length: 40 ft 6 in (12.34 m)
Engines: 2 Rolls Royce Merlin/ 1,230 hp each
Armament: 4 20-mm cannons, 4 .303-caliber
(7.7-mm) machine guns, bombs
Dassault M.D. 450 Ouragan

Length: 35 ft 2-f- in (10.74 m)
Engine: Hispano-Suiza Nene/5,000-lb (2,268-kg)
thrust
Armament: 4 20-mm cannons, rockets
Gloster Meteor
Length: 44 ft 7 in (13.59 m)
Engine: Rolls Royce Derwent 8/3,500-lb
(1,588-kg) thrust
Armament: 4 20-mm cannons
176 Appendix VI. The Aircraft, Friend
Dassault M.D. 452 Mystere

Length: 35 ft (10.67m)
Engine: Hispano-Suiza Tay/6,270-lb (2,884-kg)
thrust
Armament: 4 20-mm or 30-mm cannons, 16
rockets
Douglas C-47 Dakota

Length: 64 ft 5 \ in (19.65 m)
Engines: 2 Pratt & Whitney R-1830-92/1,200
hp each
Armament: None; transport (used by Egyp-
tians as bombers)
Mikoyan/Gurevich MiG-15 (Falcon and Fagot)

Engine: VK-l/6,000-lb (2,722-kg) thrust
Speed: 661 mph (1,067 km/h)
Armament: 1 37-mm cannon or 2 23-mm
cannons
DeHavilland Vampire
Engine: DeHavilland Goblin 3 turbojet/3, 500-lb
(1,588-kg) thrust
Armament: 4 20-mm cannons, bombs or
rockets
SIX-DAY WAR
Dassault Mirage III
Length: 50 ft 10-^- in (15.5m) I
Engine: Snecma Atar 9B single-shaft turbo-

jet/13,225-lb (5,999-kg) thrust
Armament: 2 30-mm cannons, bombs
SNCASO Vautour
Wingspan: 49 ft 7 in (15.11m)
Length: 54 ft 1 in (16.48m)
Engines: 2 SNECMA Atar 101-3/7,7 16-lb
(3,500-kg) thrust each
Armament: 4 30-mm cannons, bombs
Fouga-Magister
Length: 33 ft (10.06 m)
Engines: 2 Turbomeca Marbore IIA turbo-
jets/880-lb (399-kg) thrust each
Armament: 2 7.62-mm guns, bombs, air-to-
surface missiles, or rockets
Hawker Hunter
Length: 42 ft (12.8 m)
Engine: Rolls-Royce Avon/6,500-lb (2,948-kg)
thrust
Armament: 4 30-mm cannons
Mikoyan/Gurevich MiG-17 (Fresco)

Length: 36 ft 3 in (11.05 m) J81
Engine: Klimov VK-1 single-shaft centrifugal
turbojet/5,952-lb (2,700-kg) thrust
Armament: 1 37-mm cannon, 3 23-mm cannons,
bombs, and air-to-air rockets
A
Mikoyan/Gurevich MiG-19 (Farmer)
Wingspan: 29 ft 6y in (9 m)
Length: 42 ft \\~ in (13.09 m)
Engines: 2 Mikuliu AM-5 single-shaft after-
burning turbojets/6,700-lb (1,484 km/h
at 6,096 m) each
Speed: 920 mph at 20,000 ft
Armament: Rockets, cannon
Sukhoi SU-7 Fitter

4fa
Length: 50 ft (15 m)
Engine: Lyulka AL-7F turbojet/15,430-lb
(6,999-kg) thrust (22,050 [10,002] with
afterburner)
Speed: 1,055 mph (1,700 km/h)
Armament: 2 30-mm cannons plus additional
weapons in wing pylons
9HII
Ilyushin 11-28 "Beagle"

Engines: 2 VK-1 turbojet/6,000-lb (2,722-kg) 2
thrust each
Armament: 4 23-mm cannons and bombs
n
Tupolev Tu-16 "Badger"

Length: 120 ft (36.58 m)
Engines: 2 Mikulin AM-3M turbojets 20,950-lb
(9,503-kg) thrust each
Armament: 7 23-mm cannons and 9 tons (9.9
metric tons) of bombs, or 2 Kennel
air-to-surface missiles, or 1 Kipper
ASM
YOM KIPPUR WAR,

1973
McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk
Engine: Wright J65-16A single-shaft turbo- —
"i
jet/7,700-lb (3,493-kg) thrust

Armament: Bombs, rockets, 2 20-mm cannons
McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II

Length: 58 ft 3 in (17.75 m)
Engines: 2 General Electric J79-8 turbojets
with afterburner/17,000-lb (7.71 1-kg)
thrust each
Speed: 1,600 mph (2,581 km/h)
Armament: 6-8 air-to-air rockets and a 20-mm
Gatling gun
Mikoyan/Gurevich MiG-21 (Fishbed)

Wingspan: 23 ft 5 y in (7.15 m)
Length: 46 ft 11 in (14.16 m)
Engine: Turmansky single-shaft turbojet with
afterburner/1 1,240-lb (5,098-kg) thrust
Speed: 1,285 mph (2,073 km/h)
Armament: Rockets
RESCUE AT ENTEBBE,
1976
Lockheed C-130 Hercules
Length: 97 ft 8^ in (29.78 m)
Engines: 4 Allison T56-A-78 turboprops/
4,050 hp each
Armament: None, transport
THE IRAQI NUCLEAR

REACTOR, 1981
McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle
Wingspan: 42 ft 9 f in (13.05 m)
Length: 63 ft 9 f in (19.45 m)
Engine: Pratt & Whitney F100-100 two-shaft
turbofans/1 4,871 -lb (6,745-kg) thrust
(23,810-lb [10,800-kg] with afterburner)
each (2)
Speed: 1,650 mph (2,661 km/h)

Armament: 1 20-mm multibarrel cannon, 8 air-
to-air rockets, and more

General Dynamics F-16 Falcon

Length: 46 ft 6 in (14.17 m)
Engine: Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-100 two-
shaft afterburning turbofan/24,000-lb
(10,886-kg) thrust
Speed: 1,300 mph (2,097 km/h)
Armament: 1 20-mm multibarrel cannon, 2 air-
to-air rockets, and more
OPERATION PEACE
FOR GALILEE
Israel Aircraft Industries Kfir C2
Length: 51 ft 4 in (15.65 m)
FT
Engine: General Electric J79-JlE/17,860-lb
(8,101-kg) thrust
Speed: Mach 2
Armament: 2 30-mm cannons, 2 Shafrir
missiles, bombs and rockets
Grumman E-2C Hawkeye

Length: 57 ft 7 in (17.55 m)
Engines: 2 Allison T56-A-425 turboprops/4,910
hp each
Armament: None; early-warning aircraft, radar,
electronic countermeasures, etc.
Mikoyan/Gurevich MiG-23 Flogger

Length: 53 ft (16.15 m)
Engine: Turmansky R-29B/17,640-lb (8,001-kg)
thrust (25,350-lb [11,499-kg] with after-
burner)
Speed: 1,520 mph (2,443 km/h)
Armament: 1 23-mm twin-barrel guns, air-to-air
missiles
THE FUTURE
Israel Aircraft Industries Lavie
Wingspan: approx. 26 ft (8 m)
Length: approx. 50 ft (15 m)
Engine: Pratt & Whitney 1120720,600-lb
(9,344-kg) thrust with maximum after
burner
Speed: approx. 1,350 mph (2,170 km/h)
Armament: data not available at this time
2^ 1 _
THE PRINCIPAL which over 60 have anti-tank roles, with more

to come. In action for the first time, the Gazelle,
COMBAT an extremely powerful tank-killer, was used in
unison with the Syrian commando units in the
HELICOPTERS OVER Bekaa Valley and central axis, although the
LEBANON, 1982 techniques used were unimaginative and re-
sulted in little success. Several Gazelles were
brought down by Israeli ground air action, some
Syrian Air Force taken almost intact.
Aerospatiale Gazelle (French-built) Mi-24 Hind D (Soviet-built)

Armed with 4-6 Euromissile Hot ATGW
with The Mi-24 Hind D, the most powerful helicop-
4000-meter range, the SA-342 Gazelle is cur- ter in the world today, is armed with four ad-
rently the French Army's standard anti-tank vanced Swatter ATGMS, a multibarrel
helicopter.Powered by Turbomeca Asta 1 OU Gatling-type quick-fire gun, four pods for 32
XIV turboshaft with 858 hp,it is also armed 57-mm rockets each. The Hind is the first Soviet
with two pods of 36-mm rockets and two for- helicopter with an integral weapon system and
ward-firing miniguns. The Gazelle is part of retractable landing gear. In action over Afghan-
Syria's 150-strong combat helicopter force, of istan, Iraq, and Iran, it was also used by the
The Soviet Hind D attack helicopter used by the Syrian Air Force during the war in Lebanon.
Syrians in Lebanon. Although a formidable op- otherwise inaccessible to direct fire. The De-
ponent, Israeli tanks and aircraft knocked down fender operated well integrated in the ground
a number of Hinds. A new type, the Hind F, is formation, but also tied in extremely well with
reportedly armed with a more powerful twin- fixed-wing aircraft flying close-support mis-
barrel gun. sions. The combined effort resulted in the de-
struction of many Syrian and PLO targets.
Israeli Air Force

BellAH-1S Huey Cobra (U.S.-built)
Hughes 5000MD Defender (U.S.-built) The other IAF anti-tank helicopter, the Bell
A recent addition to the IDF, this small, agile, AH-IS Huey Cobra, was also extremely success-
and powerful anti-tank helicopter came through ful over Lebanon, where its variety of powerful
its first combat action Lebanon with great
in
armament came into action. It is a much im-
success. Armed with four Hughes Tow missiles
proved descendant of the U.S. Army Huey
(4000-meter range), the Defender's quiet ap- Cobra attack gunship of the Vietnam War.
proach proved a great asset in mountain war-
fare. Operated with skill and originality by
highly trained pilots, it destroyed large num-
bers of Syrian tanks hiding behind boulders
.A
The Bell Huey Cobra was acquired by the IAF after the Yom Kippur War demonstrated the need for a gunship
that could be used against tanks and armored infantry.
In addition to serving with the Israeli Air Force,

SURFACE-TO-AIR the Hawk can be found in the armed forces of
MISSILES (SAMs) IN Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait,
and Iran. Also, several of the North African
THE ARAB-ISRAELI Arab countries, including Libya, Morocco, and
WARS Egypt, are armed with Crotale, a French SAM.

In the Yom Kippur War, for example, the
committed Arab forces had 1,280 SAM launch-
Arab SAMs (Soviet-built) ers as opposed to 75 Israeli SAM launchers.
For the most part the surface-to-air missiles em-

ployed by the Arab forces have been supplied SA-2 Guideline
by the Soviet Union. One exception is the Introduced in 1957, this radio commanded mis-
United States Hawk and its new, up-to-date ver- silesystem covers an altitude of 28 km. Its
sion, known as the Improved Hawk or I-Hawk. 130-kg HE warhead is effective at high altitude.
The Guideline has seen more action than any ZSU-23-4, the SA-6 was the main target for the
other SAM worldwide. Modified, it received the IAF attack in the Bekaa Valley on June 9, 1982.
Fan Song F radar system in 1968. SAM-2 bat-
teries were destroyed by the IAF in Lebanon. SA-7 Grail (Strela)
Operational since 1966, with a modified version
SA-3 Goa in 1972. It is a man-portable IR homing light
Coming into service in 1964, the Goa fires a anti-aircraft missile, similar to the U.S. Redeye
Mach 3.5, 60-kg HE warhead to 12.5 km alti- concept. Overall weight is 33 lb., minimum al-
tude, complementing the Guideline at low- and titude 135 ft. (advanced version), maximum
medium-altitude layers. Still extensively used 5,000 ft. It was used by the PLO in very large
by the Soviet air defense in Russia, it operates quantities in Lebanon, but only one IAF Sky-
colocated Squat Eye and Flat Face radar sys- hawk was hit. The Soviet SA-9 Gaskin was de-
tems for low-altitude coverage. veloped on this design.
SA-5 Gammon SA-8 Gecko

First deployed in the USSR in 1963, Gammon One of the latest Soviet designs in mobile air
is a long-range interceptor missile designed to defense systems is the Gecko, first seen in 1974.
counter the threat of high-performance aircraft. The wheeled quadruple SA-8 launcher and its
It is effective at medium to high altitudes multipurpose Roll radar mounted on the six-
(30,000 meters), has a long slant range of 300 wheeled amphibious vehicle form the first inte-
kilometers, and a maximum speed greater than grated tactical SAM effective at 145 ft. to a
Mach 3.5. The Russians supplied the SA-5 to 32,800 ft. altitude. Able to fire two missiles si-
Syria at the close of Operation Peace for Gali- multaneously, it came into action for the first
lee, after the PLO forces had been expelled from time in Lebanon, and three systems were de-
Lebanon. The stationing of these two-stage stroyed by the IAF.
solid-propellant SAMs in Syria raised a protest
from the United States in early 1983, since the SA-9 Gaskin
long range and high altitude of these missiles Also introduced in 1974, this wheeled BRDM-2
could threaten any aircraft flying over Lebanon mount fires four missiles in two launching con-
and Israel. The principal cities of Tel Aviv, tainers. The single-stage IR missile is effective
Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem are well within the on heat-homing targets, i.e., aircraft heading
missile's effective range if positioned in the away from the launcher. Its minimum altitude
south of Syria. Obviously a threat of this na- is 65 ft. to a maximum of 16,400 ft. It usually
ture does not contribute to peace; it readily in- ties in with ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft artillery de-
vites a preemptive strike. The latest reports fense systems. The Gaskin was first introduced
show two operational SA-5 batteries, one placed to Lebanon by a Libyan contingent and some
12 kilometers south of Damascus and the other were destroyed in May 1981 by the IAF. Dur-
near Horns. Each is manned by a Soviet crew ing the Lebanon war, an SA-9 was destroyed by
of 500 to 600 men. The Russians have threat- the IAF on the Damascus-Beirut road.
ened to intercede if the IAF attacked the SA-5s.
SA-6 Gainful
Fielded in 1967, this became the foremost and Israeli SAMs (U.S.-built)
deadliest aircraft-killer in the Yom Kippur War.
Designed to defeat low-flying aircraft, thus fill- Hawk and Improved Hawk
ing a crucial gap in Soviet tactical air defense, Its name is the acronym for its descrip-
it is highly effective between 30 and 18,000 tion— Homing /lll-the- Way-Killer. The Ameri-
meters. Fully mobile, the Gainful launches three can-built Hawk surface-to-air missile was inte-
missiles with 80-kg HE
warheads from a grated into the U.S. air defense system in 1959.
tracked launcher. Cooperating with a tracked Five years later it entered Israeli service. An
St might Flush radar vehicle, similar to the Israeli Hawk claimed its first victory in the
The American Hawk SAM is used by several Arab armed forces as well as by the IAF.
Mideast when an attacking Egyptian MiG-21 tery Control Central (housing tactical displays
was shot down on May 24, 1969, from an alti- and data processor, and two or three
controls), a
tude of 6,700 meters. The Improved Hawk is an firing platoons. Each platoon has a tracking
all-weather, low- to medium-altitude ground-to- radar and three launchers with three ready mis-
air missile system. The improved version, first siles per launcher.
fielded by the U.S. Army in FY 73, provided ad- Hawk uses a high-reliability missile with a
vances in fire control, range, lethality, reliabil- high-explosive, proximity-fused warhead that
ity, and effectiveness against j amming over the needs only to pass near the target aircraft to
basic version. destroy it. The system is being kept up to date
The I-Hawk basic element, the firing battery, through a series of planned product improve-
has two acquisition radars (one to detect ments. I-Hawk resembles the SA-6. Though it
medium-altitude targets and another for low al- is less mobile than the Soviet missile, it has a
titude), a radar to give range information, a Bat- greater range and altitude.
Appendix VII
Israel — Some
Facts
and Figures
Official Name: State of Israel LEBANON (

fel Akhziv
Area: 7,850 square miles (20,325 square ISRAEL (oncient ru
Zelol* HE/GH7S
kilometers) « Intemofionol
| ,}'
boundary
Holty/ Nczce.hQ /SYRIA
Capital: Israel proclaimed Jerusalem (400,000) ™ Armistice line
its capital in 1950; the U.S., like most other

countries, maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv.
Population figure includes East Jerusalem,
which Israel occupied in 1967
Other Major Cities: Greater Tel Aviv
(1,158,000); Haifa (534,000)
Type of Government: Parliamentary democracy
(the only one in the Middle East)
Population: 3,800,000. Jewish: 85 percent; Arab:
15 percent
Languages: Hebrew, Arabic, English
Literacy Rate: Jewish: 90 percent; Arab: 65
percent • Mo on
Religions: Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Druse Ras on Noqb
Per Capita Income: $3,800

Currency: Israeli shekel (IS) which is divided in-
to 100 agorot (sometimes referred to as a grush.) Al Aqabah
EGYPT Al Mudowworh
There are coins of 1, 5, and 10 agorot and half-
a-shekel; banknotes are IS 1, 5, 10, and 50.
Flag: White field on which is centered a blue six-
pointed Star of David bordered above and be-
low by blue horizontal stripes (design based on stretches 260 miles (420 kilometers) from top to
Jewish prayer shawl) bottom.
The State of Israel is an area of 7,850 square It is bordered on the west by the Mediter-
miles (20,325 square kilometers) located on the ranean, on the north by Lebanon, on the north-
eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea at the east by Syria, on the east by Jordan, and on the
meeting point of Asia Minor and Africa. It south by Egypt.
192
Appendix VII. Israel — Some Facts and Figures 193
Within the compact country are four distinct The Jordan Rift Valley, in which is located
regions: Lake Tiberias.
The Negev Desert, which comprises some
The coastal that borders the
plain 60 percent of Israel's total area and joins
Mediterranean— the nation has 120 miles up with the Sinai Desert at the Egyptian
of sandy beaches along the sea— and border.
stretches from the Lebanese border to
Gaza. This is a fertile, humid region,
densely populated, and the location of Israel, in general, has a Mediterranean cli-
much of the nation's agriculture. mate characterized by a long, hot, dry summer
The central hill region, with mountains and a short, cool, rainy winter.
nearly 1,200 meters high. To the north are In the Negev, there are two seasons: a short,
the hills of Galilee; to the south, the sometimes comfortable spring, and a very hot
Samarian and Judean mountains. nine-month summer.
Appendix VIII
A Brief History of Israel
The Middle East is an area rich in history. The were exiled, the people made slaves, and their
birthplace of many and peoples
civilizations temples destroyed.
whose thoughts have influenced others through- Their belief in their religion was so strong,
out the world, the Middle East is also the area though, that wherever the Jews went they kept
where three of the world's great religions— Ju- it alive.
daism, Christianity, and Islam— were founded. Rome next conquered the region. Roman rule
But the Middle East has also been an arena of of the land they called Palestine was not harsh
violence from the days of its earliest recorded at first, but when a fanatical Jewish sect known
history up to the present time. as the Zealots revolted, Jerusalem and the Tem-
Some of the area's nations have histories dat- ple were destroyed. Rather than surrender, the
ing back more than 4,000 years, while others last Zealot survivors died by their own hand at
came on the world scene only as creations of the the mountain fortress of Masada. Fewer than
twentieth century, when foreign domination fi- 900 Zealots including women, children, and old
nally ended. men, held out for two years against an entire
One of the peoples who have claimed a part Roman Legion plus reinforcements. When the
of the land as their own for 40 centuries are the Roman governor issued laws that repressed
Jews, since what is now part of the State of their religion even further, Jews revolted again
Israel was once the ancient land of Canaan in the Bar Kokhba War of A D. 132. Later they
where Judaic tribes first accepted a single, were forbidden to enter Jerusalem except on the
all-powerful God— Yahweh (Jehovah). one day of the year when they were allowed to
This is the land that was promised to mourn at the remaining fragment of the Tem-
Abraham and his descendants according to the ple, its western wall, which became known as
Old Testament, the Jews' Book of Books. the Wailing Wall. (It is called the Western Wall
King David sat on the throne of Israel. He by the Israelis today.)
was followed in the tenth century B.C. by Solo- Jews were dispersed (the Diaspora) through-
mon, who brought ancient Israel to new heights out the Roman Empire. Some settled in the col-
and made it the commercial and intellectual onies along the North African coastline, others
center of the Middle East. crossed the strait to settle in Spain, while still
For unknown reasons the kingdom gradual- others made their way into what is now France
ly lost its vitality and became easy prey for and Italy. Wherever they went, they were per-
other tribes. The ancient Kingdom of Israel was secuted, as were the followers of a new religion,
conquered by the Assyrians, then by the Baby- Christianity.
lonians. Under their harsh rule, Jewish leaders As Rome's power waned, some Jews returned
194
Appendix VIII. A Brief History of Israel 195
to Palestine, but for the most part the land was under United Nations administration.
taken over by Arabs. By the time the Turkish This plan appealed to no one, however, al-
Ottoman Empire spread across the face of the though the Jewish Agency reluctantly endorsed
Middle East in the fourteenth century, Islam it, and violence continued. As the end of the
had become a firmly established religion for the British Mandate approached, both sides were
majority of the people living in Palestine. There prepared for war.
were Jewish communities scattered in among On May 14, 1948, as the last British soldier
the Arab villages; they flourished there as they departed, the State of Israel was proclaimed.
did elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Armed forces from neighboring Arab nations
However, wherever Jews were, they held hope immediately entered Palestine and engaged in
of returning to the land of Israel— the "prom- open warfare with the defense forces of the new
ised land." state. After heavy fighting a truce was negoti-
It was not founding of the Zionist
until the ated under UN auspices, and in 1949 four sep-
movement at the end of the 19th century that arate armistice agreements were entered into
practical steps were taken toward securing in- between Israel and its neighboring states,
ternational aid for large-scale Jewish resettle- Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. These
ment in Palestine. agreements only stopped the immediate fight-
November 1917 a letter that became
In ing. Since peace treaties were never signed, the
known as the Balfour Declaration was issued by de facto borders of the new state were those of
the British government. The letter stated that the armistice lines.
the government favored "the establishment in Unfortunately, violence continued on both
Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish sides. In October 1956, as British and French
people ... it being clearly understood that noth- armed forces mounted operations against
ing shall be done which may prejudice the civil Egypt in theSuez Canal area, Israel took ad-
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com- vantage of the confusion to invade the Gaza
munities in Palestine. ..." area and the Sinai in order to end an Egyptian
At the end of World War I Great Britain was arms buildup and terrorist attacks originating
given a mandate over Palestine by the League from the area.
of Nations, which called upon it to aid in the Once again the UN stepped in to bring peace
establishment of a Jewish national homeland to the area. The international organization also
there. set up the United Nations Emergency Force
Following this policy the British permitted (UNEF) in an effort to keep Egyptian and
the immigration of Jewish families into Israeli forces separated in Gaza and the Sinai.
Palestine in the 1920s, a flow that increased The peace that followed was an uneasy one.
sharply in the 1930s due to Hitler's persecution Open warfare broke out again in June 1967 be-
of German Jews. Palestinian Arabs who had tween Egyptian and Syrian forces and Israel af-
lived on and farmed the land for centuries be- ter the Egyptian leader insisted that the UN
came increasingly concerned. Their concern led forces be removed. At the end of six days of
to attacks on Jewish settlements and counter- fighting a cease-fire was again obtained by the
attacks by Jewish guerilla groups. At times the UN. By this time, however, Israel had occupied
British units in Palestine became targets. At all of the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the Golan
best a very uneasy truce— one frequently bro- (Kuneitra) area of Syria, and the West Bank of
ken—existed in the area at the end of the World the Jordan River, including the eastern sector
War II. of Jerusalem, an area that had been occupied
Great Britain, unable to find an acceptable since 1948 by Jordan.
solution to the Palestine problem, finally re- Sporadic fighting continued. In early 1969 the
ferred the matter to the United Nations in 1947. UN was again called in to bring a halt to war-
After months of investigation and testimony fare. On October 6, 1973, Syrian forces attacked
the UN adopted a partition plan in November Israeli positions in the Golan area while Egyp-
of that year. It called for dividing Palestine in- tian forces attacked along the Suez Canal. The
to a Jewish state and an Arab state and for UN, aided by the diplomacy of the United
establishing Jerusalem as an international city States, negotiated a cease-fire. This time the
196 Appendix VIII. A Brief History of Israel
way seemed open for productive negotiations. Canal in March 1974, permitting Egypt to as-
Suffering and damages had been high on all sume control of both banks of that waterway.
sides, but one of the greatest tragedies of the Further U.S. efforts led to a Syrian-Israeli dis-
years of fighting in the area was the estimated engagement agreement in May 1974. This was
1.7 million Palestinian Arabs who were now followed in 1975 by an Egyptian-Israeli agree-
refugees from their homeland and living in ment leading to further withdrawal of Israeli
camps in adjoining Arab countries. forces in the Sinai, limiting the number of units
The efforts of the United States, the United along the new line, and setting up of U.S.-
Nations, and other countries to bring about manned observation stations in the Sinai.
peace in the Middle East were based on the UN One of the most dramatic breakthroughs in
Security Council's Resolution 242, which was the search for peace in the Middle East was the
adopted in November 1967 and was reaffirmed visitby Egypt's president to Israel in Novem-
in a later resolution. ber 1977. By this unprecedented official and
Resolution 242 calls for, among other things: public act, Egypt became the first Arab state
to recognize Israel's right to exist as a state.
• withdrawal of all Israeli forces from terri- It also set up the basis between
for direct talks
tories occupied in 1967 the two countries. These led to the Camp David
• the end of all fighting by all parties. Agreement of 1978, in which Egypt and Israel
• respect for, and acknowledgment of, the agreed on a framework for a negotiated peace
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and po- between them, for a resolution of the Palestinian
litical independence of every state in the problem in all its aspects, and for an eventual
area negotiated peace between Israel and all its Arab
• the right of all peoples in the area to live neighbors.
in peace within secure and recognized After further talks in which the U.S. played
boundaries. a major role, a peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt was signed on March 26, 1979, in Wash-
The UN resolutions also affirm the need for free- ington, D.C., and ratified by the two countries
dom of navigation for all ships through inter- on April 25. Among the accomplishments of the
national waterways in the area and a just treaty are the recognition for the first time of
settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem. an international boundary for the State of
With the UN resolutions as a cornerstone, the Israel, Israel's agreement to withdraw fully
United States has actively pursued efforts to from the Sinai, the establishment of the diplo-
aid Israeland its Arab neighbors negotiate a matic relations between the two countries, and
resolution of their conflict. the right of free passage for Israeli ships
The process has not been an easy one. It was through the Suez Canal.
not until the Geneva Peace Conference in De- Negotiations on other phases of the Middle
cember 1973 that Arabs and Israelis met face East peace, particularly the question of
to face to discuss peace. Egyptian- 1 sraeli agree- autonomous self-government and eventual final
ment on disengagement of forces was subse- status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have
quently achieved as a result of the efforts of the continued with U.S. participation since the sign-
U.S. Israeli forces pulled back from the Suez ing of the treaty.
Appendix IX
A Chronology of Highlights
from Biblical Times to the
Present
B.C. Babylon, grants permission

1750* Abraham settles in Canaan for Jews to return to
1700-1600 The Israelites migrate from Jerusalem
Canaan to Egypt 520-515 Rebuilding of Temple
1280 Exodus of Israelites from 490 Battle of Marathon
Egypt led by Moses 336-323 Alexander the Great
1280-1250 Israelites wander in Sinai 167 Maccabean revolt, leading to
Desert; Moses given Ten Jewish independence from the
Commandments Greeks and Syrians
1250-1200 Conquest of Canaan 63 Pompey captures Jerusalem;
1150-1000 Philistines rise to power beginning of Roman
1020-1000 Saul overlordship
1000-961 David 37-4 Herod the Great
961-922 Solomon
922 Division of the realm into the
Kingdoms ofJudah and Israel A.D.
722 Samaria falls; kingdom no c. 0 Birth of Jesus Christ
longer divided 29 John the Baptist executed
621 Deuteronomy 26-36 Pontius Pilate
586 Fall of Jerusalem; destruction c. 33 Jesus is crucified
of Temple; Nebuchadnezzar; 70 Jerusalem destroyed by Titus
Exile of Jews to Babylon; 70-72 960 Jewish men, women, and
Diaspora— Jews scattered to children hold out at Masada
other countries from Palestine for two years against a vastly
538 Cyrus of Persia conquers superior military force, the
entire Tenth Roman Legion
plus auxiliaries
*This date and some of the others in the B.C. era are 116 Jews rise up against Trajan
approximate. 132-135 Bar Kochba Rebellion crushed
197
198 Appendix IX. A Chronology
by Hadrian; start of Great Germany (father of

Diaspora Emancipation; also father of
bef.300 Settlement in Spain Felix Mendelssohn); published
311-337 Constantine the Great; first periodical in Hebrew
becomes a Christian in 312 language
321 First documentary proofs of 1700 French Jews begin to resettle
Jewish settlement having 1776 American Revolution;
been established earlier within Declaration of Independence
the Roman Empire (in 1791 Jews declared full citizens in
Germany) France following the French
622 Hegira, Muhammad's flight; Revolution
spread of Islam 1812 Prussian Jews emancipated
711 Moslems invade Spain 1815 Battle of Waterloo
732 Battle of Tours; the Franks 1825-1855 Czar of Russia Nicholas I;
halt the advance of the severe oppressions
Moslems into western Europe 1848 Immigration of German Jews
768-814 Charlemagne; Jews serve at to U.S.
his court 1870 French Jews establish
1066 Battle of Hastings; Normans agricultural school near Jaffa,
conquer Britain Palestine
1206-1227 Genghis Khan conquers much 1878 Founding of first agricultural
of Asia and eastern Europe settlement in Palestine
1096 First Crusade; immigration 1881-1882 Pogroms in Poland and
begins to Poland and Russia Russia, a continuation of
1215 Magna Carta murders and theft; May Laws
1290 Jews expelled from England against Jews; mass migration
1348-1349 Black Death; Jews in of Russian Jews to America
Germany falsely accused of begins; third and largest wave
poisoning wells; immigration of Jewish immigration to the
to Poland and Russia to U.S.
escape persecution in 1882 First Russian farm settlers
Germany arrive in Palestine
1492 Inquisition causes expulsion 1883 Baron Edmond de Rothschild
from Spain; Spanish supports Jewish agriculture in
Inquisition; settlement in Palestine
Turkey (Palestine), Holland; 1860-1904 Theodore Herzl (founder of
Moslems driven out of Spain; Zionism)
Columbus discovers America 1891 Jews expelled from Moscow
1519-1522 Magellan circumnavigates the 1894-1895 Dreyfus affair in France;
globe Emile Zola's J'Accuse leads to
1648-1655 Chmielnicky massacres of complete vindication of
Jews in Russia and Poland; Jewish officer in French
mass murders Army
1654 First Jewish settlement in 1901 Jewish National Fund
America established to purchase land
1655 First synagogue in U.S.; first in Palestine
stream of immigration 1903 Wright brothers make first

(Sefardim) flight in a powered airplane
1656 Oliver Cromwell invites Jews 1907 First Jewish defense units in
to return to England; Puritan Palestine organized
Revolution 1909 Hashomer established as
1729-1786 Moses Mendelssohn in settlement guards
Appendix IX. A Chronology 199
1910 Establish first kibbutz 95,000 Jews emigrated from

(Degania) England to Palestine; the
1914-1918 World War I; Zion Mule following year immigration to
Corps in action at Gallipoli; Israel was swelled by 30,000
airplanes engage in aerial more German Jews escaping
combat for first time from Hitler
1916 David Ben-Gurion sails for 1933-1945 Adolph Hitler, Nazi German
America after expulsion from dictator; the systematic
Palestine; Chaim Weizman, murder of six million
Nobel Prize laureate, assumes European Jews
leadership of Zionist 1939-1945 World War II; Jewish troops
movement in England serve in all Allied armies,
1917 Balfour Declaration promises navies, and air forces; Jewish
Palestine as a homeland for Brigade Army;
in British
the Jews; U.S. enters war; 26,000 Palestinian Jews in
Jabotinsky joins British military service
Army; Jewish Battalions of 1934 Immigration continues to rise
Royal Fusiliers organized in by 42,000 more, although now
Britain, Canada, and Egypt; being limited; Velos first
Gen. Allenby's troops illegal immigrant ship
advance into Judea 1939 Haganah members imprisoned
1919 Brutal pogroms against Jews formarksmanship training
in the Ukraine 1940 British laws restrict Jews
1920 Haganah replaces Hashomer from purchasing land in
as defense force; Britain given Palestine
Palestine Mandate and France 1941 Palmach units of Haganah
the Syrian Mandate; France join British in invasion of
separates Lebanon from Syria Syria
and expels Feisal; Sir Herbert 1945 Arab League established
Samuel, a British Jew, 1946 Jewish leaders arrested in
appointed first high Palestine, Haganah goes on
commissioner of Palestine the offensive; Irgun Zvai
1921 Britain separates Transjordan Leumi, under leadership of
including Judea and Samaria, Menachem Begin, blows up
parts of biblical Israel- King David Hotel; Jewish
today's West Bank from refugees interned in Cyprus
Palestine and names Abdullah as illegal immigrants
king; his brother, Feisal, 1947 Refugee ship Exodus denied
named king of Iraq entry to Palestine; Sherut
1922 British Colonial Secretary Avir (Air Service) established
Winston Churchill excludes 1948 British Mandate ends; David
Transjordan from the Jewish Ben-Gurion proclaims State of
National Home policy; new Israel and heads provisional
villages established in government; the new nation is
reclaimed Jezreel Valley invaded by combined Arab
1924 Economic crisis and resultant armies; start of War of
anti-Jewish laws encourage Independence; new state
new migration from Poland recognized by U.S. and
1927 Lindbergh makes first USSR. Establishment of
nonstop flight across the IsraeliDefense Force (Zahal)
Atlantic and the Israeli Air Force
1932 Since the end of the war (Cheyl Ha Avir)
200 Appendix IX. A Chronology
1949 Chaim Weizmann elected and massive airlift from major

sworn in as first president of allies
the State of Israel; UN 1976 IAF's impossible rescue at
admits Israel as 59th member Entebbe, Uganda
1956 Suez campaign; Israel, with 1981 The Cheyl Ha Avir
French and British allies, neutralizes Iraqi nuclear
invades Egypt to break the reactor in Baghdad
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee,
and the Egyptian seizure of the invasion of Lebanon in
the Suez Canal pursuit of PLO terrorists,
1967 The Six-Day War; the IAF's Israel's sixth major war since
"finest hour" 1948; the IAF achieves one of
1969-1970 War of Attrition; first Israeli its greatest victories, shooting
contact with Soviet SAMs down 85 Syrian MiGs and
1973 Yom Kippur War; destroying 23 SAM batteries
Arab-employed Soviet without the loss of a solitary
surface-to-air missiles take Israeli aircraft in air-to-air
serious toll on IAF; both combat.
sides are resupplied by
Appendix X
Religions of Israel
In addition to being a melting pot for Jews Judaism has its basis in two works— the Old
from around the world, Israel is also a nation Testament's Pentateuch, the first five books of
of different religions. the Bible, known as the Torah in the Hebrew
Jerusalem, for example, is a city sacred to language; and the Talmud, a collection of cen-
Jews, Christians, and Moslems. This is the city turies-old teachings and interpretations that
where the stones of the Western Wall of the have been handed down from generation to gen-
Temple are visited annually by tens of thou- eration. The Torah contains the legends of its
sands of Jews. It also holds the Church of the own origin. According to these beliefs, God gave
Holy Sepulchre, the awe-inspiring destination the Ten Commandments and the Torah to
for Christians who live in or visit the country. Moses on Mount Sinai as the Jews camped in
And this is the third holiest city in the world the wilderness after being freed from Egyptian
to Moslems, who make their pilgrimage to the bondage.
Dome of the Rock mosque. The original Ten Commandments were added
The major religions among the citizens of to until the laws covered every aspect of a be-
Israel are Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. liever's life. The Talmud is, in effect, an exten-
sion to the Ten Commandments designed to
meet conditions that Jews faced in later times.
JUDAISM There is no central religious leader in Ju-
daism. Each congregation governs itself; rab-
An estimated 16 million people practice this bis are laymen, not priests.
religion, one of the oldest in the world. It is the Generally speaking, Judaism can be sepa-
predominant religion in Israel. In fact, Judaism rated into Orthodox Judaism, Conservative
is more than a religion; it is a way of life. Six Judaism, and Reform Judaism.
Jewish holidays are celebrated as national holi- In some Jewish communities the Sabbath is
days in Israel, and certain Jewish religious laws strictly observed. No manual work is permitted,
are part of the national law of the country. meals are cooked ahead of the day, and Jewish
Judaism bases its creed on the experiences of families leave their homes only to go to the
Jews for the past 4,000 years, beginning with synagogue. Individuals driving cars into these
Abraham, and was the first religion to teach be- communities during the Sabbath observance
lief in one God. have been attacked with stones.
202 Appendix X. Religions of Israel
ISLAM Baptist, who preached of a new kind of life

marked by repentance for past wrongdoings.
Islam, derived from the Arabic word aslama— Jesus took this message to the cities of Judea,
submission— is the second largest religion in the where he faced not only ridicule from the peo-
ple but persecution from the Roman soldiers.
world, with more than 600 million followers. The
religion was founded by Muhammad, who is re-
His primary commandment was to believe in
vered as the last prophet of their one great God,
God and through this belief to take part in do-
ing the work of God among fellow men. Jesus
Allah. The simplicity of the religion, which
started in A.D. 610, appealed from the first to
spoke to the common man and woman, often us-
ing parables to make his points and illustrate
the desert dwellers in what is now Saudi Arabia.
his teachings. He stressed the virtues of meek-
Muhammad received the contents of Islam's
ness and aid to the poor. To Jesus the Kingdom
Holy Book, the Qur'an (Koran), from the Arch-
angel Gabriel.
of God was the ultimate goal, and this Kingdom
did not depend on a certain time or place.
Within 100 years after the founder's death in
632, Islam had spread throughout the Middle
The Christian religion based on the belief
is
East and into North Africa, Spain, and eastern that Jesus was the son God, that He was
of
Europe. born to save the world and was crucified for His
With the death of Muhammad, there occurred teachings, but was resurrected and will return
a religious split that continues to this day. Sun- on the last day of the world to judge humanity.
ni Muslims believe that the leadership of Islam The denominations of Christianity that have
can pass to any individual according to merit, developed over the centuries since its founding
in much the same manner as the leadership of can be generally categorized as:
desert tribes is decided. Shia (Shiite) Muslims
believe that only direct descendants of Muham- • the Catholic Church, with its Roman,
mad through his daughter, Fatima, and her hus- Alexandrian, Maronite, Antiochene, Chal-
band, Ah, should be leaders of Islam. dean, Armenian, and Byzantine rites
Whatever their sect, Muslims practice the • the Protestant churches, which include
five main duties required by the Qur'an, namely: Lutherans, Anglicans, Presbyterians,
Baptists, and Methodists as major groups
• recitingand believing in the Islamic creed • the Eastern Orthodox Church, which was
that "There is no god but God, and formed after disputes with Rome as a re-
Muhammad is His Prophet" sult of the splitting of the Roman Empire
• praying five times a day
• giving of money to those less fortunate
• fasting during the holy month of DRUSE
Ramadan
• completing a pilgrimage to the holy city
An
estimated 300,000 followers of the Druse
of Mecca during the follower's lifetime.
Middle East. In Israel they
religion live in the
number about 35,000 and are found mostly in
villages in the Galilee and Carmel range. The
CHRISTIANITY Druse are forbidden to reveal the secret doc-
trines they follow; only the uggal— sages— can
An estimated one billion persons are followers pass on the teachings of their God, al-Hakim bi-
of the various denominations of Christianity. Amr Allah, the sixth caliph of the Fatimid
This religion is based on the teachings of dynasty of Egypt. The Druse religion is an off-
Jesus of Nazareth, who was born in Bethlehem. shoot of Islam. The Druse serve in the Israel
He was one of the early followers of John the Defense Force.
Index
Bristol Beaufighter, 6, 171
A
Boeing 707, 149
A-4 Skyhawk, 13, 56 B-17 Flying Fortress, 6, 23, 24, 26, 172
Operation Peace for Galilee, 139, 141 "Budapest" stronghold, 93
War of Attrition, 13, 68, 70, 72 Burma, delivery of Spitfires, 32
Yom Kippur War, 80, 182
A-20 (bomber), 23 C
Abadin Palace, 26
Adan, Major General "Bren," 81 C-5. 87
ADA flaktraps, 151 C-46 Dakota, 20
Aerospatiale Gazelle, 139, 170 C-47 Dakota, 20, 170, 177
AGM-78 Standard ARM, 149, 150 War of Independence, 8, 20
AH-1S Huey Cobra, 139, 188 Operation Peace for Galilee, 139
Air bases, list of Israeli, 166-168 Sinai Campaign, 9, 36
Airlift resupply missions
C-130 Hercules, 119, 120
Soviet, 62, 69, 86-89 Entebbe Rescue, 17
United States, 86-89 Operation Peace for Galilee, 139
Air superiority, 8, 9, 13, 69, 137 C-141, 16
Allon, Mody, 22 Cairo, 22, 26, 55
Almog, Col. Ze'ev, 65 Cairo International Airport, 44, 69
American Skymaster, 20 Camp David Agreement, 17, 18
Amin, Ugandan President Idi, 119, 121, 122 Cheyl Ha Avir. See Israeli Air Force (IAF)
AN-12 (transport), 87 "Cheetah," 33-36
AN-22 (transport), 69, 87
Cheyl Ha Yam, 157
APDS (armor-piercing shells), 81 Centurion tank, 57
Arafat, PLO Chief Yassir, 154 Christianity, 202
Aref, President of Iraq, 55 Christian Phalangist militia, 136
Argov, Shlomo; assassination of, 134, 152 Cluster bombs, 146
"Artillery gap" during War of Attrition, 6 Commando raid on P-12 radar, 79
ATGW (anti-tank guided weapon), 153 Creech, USAF General Wilbur, 2
Atour (AFB), 18 Czechoslovakia, 20, 24
AW AC aircraft, 130
B D
Bader-Meinhoff gang, 137 Damascus, 14, 23

Baghdad raid. See Osirak Reactor. Dayan, Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe, 45, 56, 71
Baghdad Summit, 17
"Dibber" bombs, 43, 44
Balak Airlift, 20 Druse, 202
Bar-Lev Line, 77 Druse militia, 136
Beaufort Castle, capture of, 153 Defender (Hughes 5000 MD), 170
Begin, Prime Minister Menachem, 4, 199
Bekaa Valley, 1, 137, 146, 148 E
SAM batteries, 140, 141, 152, 153
Ben Gurion International Airport, 121, 167 Eastern Block Countries, 11, 20
Ben Gurion, David, 199 Egypt
Ben Gurion (AB), 167 Air Force
Bf-109, 170 MiG-21 as backbone of, 41
War of Independence, 6, 20, 23 Quality of, 20
"Black September," 134 Soviet training, 63
Brezhnev, Russian President Leonid, 69 Soviet takeover, 62, 63
203
204 Index
Sinai Campaign "Fire- fighting" mission, 23

Air sorties flown, 37 Fouga— Magister, 47, 179
Losses, 38 Six-Day War, 42, 47, 178
Tiran Straits, blockade, 33 Frog Missiles, 14, 85
PLO, sympathy with, 54 Yom Kippur War, 14
Six-Day War
Airfields, destruction of, 44, 45 G
Operation Focus, 43 "Gachal" volunteers, 7, 8
War of Attrition
Gaza strip, 26, 27, 32, 44, 55
Harassment by Egyptian forces as cause, 68
Gemayel, Lebanon President Bashir, 155
Dogfights, 66
Assassination of, 155
Soviet training, 62, 53, 69, 70
Election of, 155
Yemen, campaign against, 54, 55 Gemayel, Lebanon President Amin, 155
Yom Kippur War, 16
Glouster Meteor, 9, 32, 175
Military stand-still agreements, 74
Sinai Campaign, 36
SAM missile sites, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82
Golan Heights, 10, 12, 14, 16, 47, 48, 79, 106,
Suez Canal crossing, 81, 82
110, 117, 119
Third Army, 81, 82
Ekron (AB), 16, 21
GRAD rockets, 154
Green Island, capture of, 65
El Arish (AB), 20, 87
Gulf of Aqaba, blocking of, 59
Electronic warfare, 71, 74
Gur, Mordechai Motta, 119
Operation Peace for Galilee, 149
SAM missle sites, 77, 78
Entebbe Operation, 122-128
Entebbe Rescue Operation, 16, 17, 119-128 H
C-130, 17
Entebbe Airport, 121 Hadad, Wadia, 122
MiG-17, 17 Haddad, Major Saad, 136
MiG-21, 17 Haganah, 20
Gur, Chief of Staff Mordechai, 122-128 Harvard fighters, 20
Netanyahu, Lt. Col. Jonathan "Yoni," 119. 120, "Harry the Cutter," 33-36
121, 126 Harvey, John, 30
Operation Jonathan, 16, 17 Hatzerim (AFB), 167
PLO, 119 Hawker aircraft
Peres, President Shimon, 121. 122 Hunter, 179
Shomron, Dan, 127 Hurricane, 173
Terror Internationale, 122 Helicopters
Ugandan Army, 119 Aerospatiale Gazelle, 139, 170, 187
Eshel, Yehoshua, 162 AH-1S Huey Cobra, 139, 170, 188
Eshkol, Prime Minister Levi, 51, 55 Bell 47, 170
Etiam (AFB), 167 Defender (Hughes 5000 MD), 170, 188
Etzion (AFB), 167 Jet Ranger, 170
E-2C Hawkeye S-58, 170
Counteraircraft, use as, 150 S-68, 170
Operation Peace for Galilee, 3, 139, 185 Sud Aviation Alouette, 170
Remote-piloted Vehicles (RPV), 143 Super Frelon, 170
HESH (high explosive), 81
F Hod, Gen. Mordechai ("Motti"), 56, 67, 68, 163
IAF, commander of, 41
F-4 Phantom, 133, 149 Six-Day War, 42, 45, 46
Reputation, 13 Hussein I, King of Jordon, 55
Operation Peace for Galilee, 139, 150 Assassination attempt, 34
War of Attrition, 13, 68, 70, 72 Hussein, Iraq President Saddam, 131
Yom Kippur War, 80, 182-183
I
F-15 Eagle
Operation Peace for Galilee, 1, 2, 137, 141, 142, IL-28 "Beagle," 33, 38, 39, 181
145, 150 Sinai Campaign, 33, 38, 39
Osirak Reactor, 18, 129, 130, 170 Six-Day War, 44, 178
F-16 Falcon Iraq
Operation Peace for Galilee, 1, 2, 137, 141, 145, Air Force
150 Backwardness of, 20
Osirak Reactor, 18, 129, 170 Six-Day War, 45, 46, 47
F-84 Thunderstreak, 18, 39 War of Attrition, 66, 67
Index
Osirak Reactor. See Osirak Reactor. Mayo, Major Charles E., 146
"Iron" bombs, 44, 133, 145, 146 MEDEVAC Helicopter, 139
Israel Meir, UN Ambassador Golda,55
History of, 194-200 Messerschmitt, 1, 6, 20-24, 169
Facts and figures, 192-193 Nazi oppression, plane as symbol, 6
Israeli Air Force (IAF) (Cheyl Ha Avir) Bf-109, 1, 6, 20, 23, 170
Air base structure, 167 Mi-24 Hinds, 139, 170, 187
Birth of, 5 MiG-15
Centralized control, concept of, 8 War of Independence, 177
Commanders, 162-165 Ouragan, comparison with, 32
Flight School pilot course, 33 Sinai Campaign, 36, 38
Missions of, 156 MiG-17
Morale of, 4 Six-Day War, 45, 178-182
Moked, 57 War of Attrition, 53, 65, 67
Six-Day War, strength prior to, 41 Sinai Campaign, 10
Soviet-piloted jets, clashes with, 72, 73 Entebbe, 17
Survival kit, contents, 34 MiG-19, 11, 180
Uniforms and insignias, 158-161 Six-Day War, 178-182
Yom Kippur War Sinai Operation, 10, 39
Losses during, 80, 84 MiG-21, 11, 183
Official history of, 89-118 Egyptian Air Force, as backbone of, 41
IsraeliDefense Force (IDF) (Zahal) Entebbe Rescue Operation, 17
Birth of, 4 Operation Peace for Galilee, 1, 2, 137, 152
Population, percentage comprising, 157 Sinai Campaign, 10, 11
War of Attrition, casualties, 62 Six-Day War, 42. 43, 57, 62, 178-182
Uniforms and insignias, 158-161 War of Attrition, 66, 70, 71, 72
War of Independence, role in, 5-9, 20 Yom Kippur War, 1, 17, 40, 42
Ugda, 57 MiG-23, 137
Italian Red Brigade, 137 Operation Peace for Galilee, 1, 2, 137, 152,
Ivry, David, 164-165 185-187
M113 APC, 81
J Military Airlift Command (MAC), 16, 87, 88
Mirage
Japanese Red Army, 137 Mirage III, 39, 40, 41, 59
Jerusalem, capture of, 48 Mirage V, 63
Jihad, 56 RDB, use to drop, 59
Jones, Gen. David C, 3 SinaiCampaign, 10, 33, 37, 41
Jordan, 155 Six-Day War, 42, 47
Defense pact with neighbors, 55 Yom Kippur, 85
Destruction of air force, 46, 50, 57 Moked ("Focus"), 57, 59
PLO attempt on, 134 Missiles
Six-Day War, 45, 46, 57 Hawk missile, 64, 66
KELT, 84
K Maverick, 88
Shafir, 1, 2, 73
Katyusha rocket attacks, 134, 136, 137, 152
Sidewinder, 2
KELT missile, 84
Styx, 64
Kfir C-2
Surface-to-air. See Surface to Air Missiles
Operation Peace for Galilee, 139, 141
(SAMs).
Kurtz, Ray, 24-26
Tow, 88
Zeev-Type, 143
L
Mosquitoes, 8
Lapidot, Amos, 165 War of Independence, 30, 170-177
Laskov, Haim, 31, 162 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 137
Lebanon, air attacks from, 17 Mysteres
Lebanese Civil War, 134 Mystere IIC, 32
Litani River, 136 Mystere IV, 8, 33, 37
RDB, 59
M Sinai Campaign, 33, 37
Six-Day War, 42
"Machal" volunteers, 7, 8 Super Mystere, 10, 41
"Mae Wests," 160 War of Independence, 170-177
206 Index
N P
National Water Carrier Program, 10, 51 P-51 Mustang

Nasser, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel, 32, 42, Acquisition of, 8
65, 69 Operation Kadesh, 33-36
Sinai Campaign, 11 Sinai Operation, 33, 39
War of Attrition, 65 War of Independence, 6, 31, 170-177
Yemen, campaign against, 54 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 1, 16
Negev (AFB), 166-168 Founding of, 54
Negev Squadron, 5 Israeli reprisal raids, 54
Netanyahu, Johnathan "Yoni," 119, 120, 121, 126 Operation Peace for Galilee, 152, 154, 155
Noar Halutzi, 157 Entebbe Operation, 119
War of Attrition, 62
O Paratroopers
Anglo-French, 38
Operation Avack, 7 Sinai Campaign, 36
Operation Babylon, 130 Patton M48 tank, 57
Operation Balack, 7 SAM sites, 81, 82
Operation Focus, 42-44 Peled, Benjamin, 79, 119, 163-164
Operation Horev, 7 Peres, Shimon, 121, 122
Operation Jonathan, 16, 17 Piper Cub, 11
Operation Kadesh, 33-38 Port Said, 38, 67, 108, 109, 115
Operation Litani, 17 Preemptive strike, 13, 56
Operation Moked, 56, 57, 59 P-12 radar station, 67, 69, 72
Operation Musketeer, 38, 39
Operation Nachson, 5
Operation Peace for Galilee, 1-4, 18, 134-155 R
A-4, 139, 141
Boeing 707, 149 Radar stations
C-47, 139 P-12, 67, 69, 72
C-130, 139 Six-Day War, 50
Counterair phase, 150, 151 Ramat David (AFB), 166
Countersuppression measures, 151 Refidim (AFB), 18, 167-168
Deception phase, 149 Remez, Aharon, 9, 162-163
Electronic warfare, 149 Resignation, 31
F-4, 139, 150 War of Independence, 30, 31
F-15, 1, 2, 137, 141, 142, 145, 150 Remote-Piloted Vehicles (RPV), 142
F-16, 1, 2, 137, 141, 145, 150 E-2C. See E-2C Hawkeye.
Kfir C-2, 139, 141 Royal Air Force (RAF)
MiG 21, 1, 2, 137, 152 Photo reconnaisance, 27
MiG-23, 1, 2, 152, 169 Planes, 24, 29, 30, 32
PLO terrorist attacks, 134 Spitfire. See Spitfire.
SA-2, 140 IAF, air battle, 29, 30
SA-5, 140 RPG missiles, 154
SA-6, 140, 141, 154 Runway Destruction Bombs (RDB), 58, 59, 60
SU-20, 152
SAM attack phase, 3, 149, 150 S
Destruction of SAMs, 140, 141 Sadat, Anwar, 62
Ophir (AFB), 166-167 Santa-Katherina (AFB), 18
Osirak Reactor, 129-133 Schwimmer, Al, 19, 20, 23
Aircraft, choice of, 129, 132 Scout RPV, 145
F-15, 18, 129, 130 Sde Dov (AB), 20, 166
F-16, 129, 132 Shadwan Island, capture of, 69
Nuclear energy, Iraqi need for, 131 Sharon, Major Gen. Ariel, 57
Operation Babylon, 130 Shamir, Shlomo, 162-163
Time spent to accomplish mission, 130 Shomron, Brigadier Gen. Dan, 119, 127
Training for mission, 129 Shrike
Ouragans, 8, 41 Introduction, 141, 142
War of Independence, 170-177 Fan Song, 145
MiG- 15, comparison with, 32 Straight flush, 145
Sinai Campaign, 8, 38 Sinai Campaign, 8-11, 33-42
Six-Day War, 42, 47 Anglo-French Operation Musketeer, 38
Index 207
Causes of, 33 Operation Peace for Galilee, 140

C-47, 9, 36 Yom Kippur 76, 80, 93
IL-28, 33, 38, 39 War of Attrition, 69-71
MiG-15, 36, 38 SA-5 Gammon, 190
MiG-17, 10 SA-6 Gainful, 190
MiG-19, 10, 39 Operation Peace for Galilee, 137, 140, 141,
MiG-21, 10, 11, 40 143, 146, 154
Mirage III, 10, 41 Yom Kippur War, 76
Mystere IV, 33, 37, 41 SA-7 Grail, 71, 190
Nasser, President Gamal Abdel, 11 War of Attrition, 71
Operation Kadesh, 33-38 Yom
Kippur War, 76, 80
Ouragan, 8, 38 SA-8 Gecko, 190
P-51, 33, 39 Yom Kippur War, 14, 74
Salvage of MiG-15, 37, 38 SA-9 Gaskin, 190
TU-16, 10, 41 SA-80, 152
Vampire, 36, 39 Tornado program, 144
Six-Day War, 11-13, 42-62 Typical construction of site, 75-77
Dog fight, largest, 45 Sweetwater Canal, 81
Hawker Hunter, 45, 179 Syria
Iraqi ground force, 47 Air Force
11-28, 181 Backwardness
of, 20
MiG-17, 180 Destruction during Yom Kippur War, 45, 46,
MiG-19, 180 57
MiG-21, 42, 43, 57, 62 Sinai Campaign, 41
Operation Focus, 42 Operation Peace for Galilee, 136, 137, 139, 142,
Ouragan, 47 144
SA-2, 48, 50, 60 Six-Day War, 45, 46, 50, 51
Sorties, 83 Yom Kippur, 90-117
SU-7, 181 Syrian Ground Control Intercept (GCI), 146
Tu-16, 44, 45, 57, 60, 182 SU-7
Turnaround time, 43 Sinai Campaign, 10
Vautours, 12, 42 Six-Day War, 178-183
"Smart" bombs, 44, 133 War of Attrition, 63, 64, 65
Sonic boom, 65, 130 SU-15, 70
Soviet Air Force SU-20
Airlift resupply missions, 62, 69, 86-89 Operation Peace for Galilee, 137, 152
War of Attrition, 62, 64, 69, 72 Yom Kippur War, 85
IAF, clash with, 72, 73
South African volunteer, 22 T
Soviet Embassy, 55
Spitfire Tal,Major Gen. Israel, 57
Burma, sale to country of, 32 Tanks
Mk-IX, 30 AMX-13, 57
Mk-XVIII, 27 Centurion, 57
War of Independence, 6, 7, 27, 29, 30, 170-177 M-48, 87
"Stalin Organs," 137 M-50, 57
Suez Canal, 55, 95, 96, 98, 106, 107, 108, 112 M-51, 57
Egyptian Crossing, 14, 70 M-60, 87
Nationalization, 33 Stalin III, 57
Operation Musketeer, 38, 39 T-72, 57, 153
Six-Day War, 47, 48 Tel Aviv, 17, 20, 21, 23, 42, 45, 55, 84, 87
War of Attrition, 62, 63, 64, 66 Tel Nof (AFB), 166
Surface-To- Air Missiles (SAMs) Tempests, 29
Bekaa Valley, placement, 140, 141, 152, 153 "Ten Days" battle, 7
Patton tank, use of, 81, 82 Terror Internationale, 122
SA-2 Guideline, 76, 77, 189 Thant, Secretary-General U, 55
Operation Peace for Galilee, 140 Tiran Straits, 33, 39, 55
Six-Day War, 48, 50, 60 Tolkovsky, Dan, 19, 162
War of Attrition, 65, 66 RAF training, 31, 32
Yom Kippur War, 14, 76, 77, 80, 93 War of Independence, 31, 32
SA-3 Goa, 190 Tornado Program, 144
Cluster system, 71 TU-16
208 Index
Sinai Campaign, 10 Gloster Meteor, 175

Six-Day War, 44, 45, 57, 60, 178-183 Hawker Sea Fury, 173
Mystere, 176
Operation Avack, 7
U
Operation Balak, 7, 20
Operation Horev, 7
Uniforms and insignias, 158-161
Operation Nachshon, 5
Umm fortification, 47
Ouragan, 175
Uganda. See Entebbe Operation.
P-51, 6, 31, 170
Ugda, 57
Vampire, 177
United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF), 55
United Sates Air Force
Weizman, Ezer, 19, 56, 73, 163
Airlift resupply mission, 86-89
Commander, appointment to, 40
Doctrine of the professional pilot, 40, 41
Six-Day War, 42
V War of Attrition, 67
War of Independence, 22, 27, 29, 30
Vautours "Wild Weasel" ECM, 144, 145
Six-Day War, 42, 45, 60 Syrian SAMs, use against, 145
Vampire, 9, 32
Sinai Campaign, 36, 37, 39 Y
War of Independence, 170-177
Yigael Yadin, 56
W Yemen, country of, 54
Yishuv, 19
War of Attrition, 13, 14, 62-73 Yoffe, Major Gen Avraham, 57
A-4, 13, 68, 70, 72 Yom Kippur War, 14, 16, 74-118
"Artillery gap," 13 A-4, 182
Causes, 62, 63 Air defense system, 14
F-4, 13, 68, 70, 72 Airliftresupply mission, 86
MiG-17, 63, 65, 67 C-141, 16
MiG-21, 66, 70, 71, 72 C-SAs, 16
Nasser, President Gamal Abdel, 65 Day-by-day analysis, 89-118
P-12 radar station, 67 Electronic warfare, 74
SA-2, 65, 66 F-4, 74
SA-3 screen, 69-71 Frog missiles, 14
SU-7, 63, 64, 65, 71 MiG-21, 183
Sonic boom, use of, 65 SAM sites, destruction of, 81, 82
Soviet Air Force, 62, 64, 69, 72 SA-2, 14, 80
Zahal ground activity, 13 SA-6, 14, 80
War of Independence, 5-9, 19-32 SA-8, 14
A-4, 68 SU-20, 85
American public opinion, 19 Yugoslavia, country of, 20
B-17, 26
6, 23, 24,
Bristol Beaufighters, 6, 171 Z
Bf-109, 6, 20, 23, 170
British blockade, effect, 19 Zachik, Harry, 33-37
British mandate, 19 Zahal. See Israel Defense Force (IDF).
C-46, 20 Zeev-type (Wolf) missile, 143
C-47, 20, 169 ZSU-23/4, 75, 80
C-121, 172 ZSU-57-2, 80
IAF Mirage pilot in full flying clothes
and dome-shaped helmet: This kind
of flight equipment became standard
just after the Six-Day War.
Ground crewman with ammunition

beltand American -style baseball cap
wearing standard IDF fatigues.
THUNDER IN THE SKY. . .
An Overview, 1947-1982 • War of Independence,

Campaign, 1956
1948 • Sinai Six-Day War, 1967 ••
War of Attrition, 1967-1970 • Yom Kippur War, 1973 •

Entebbe — The Impossible Rescue, 1976 • Baghdad
— The Osirak Reactor, 1981 • Lebanon — Operation
Peace for Galilee, 1982 • Missions of the IAF • Israel
Defense Forces • Uniforms, Insignia, Decorations, and Awards • IAF Com-
manders • Air Bases • The Aircraft — Friend and Foe • Israel — Some Facts
and Figures • A Brief History of Israel • A Chronology • Religions of Israel
ISBN 0-668-05578-2
ARCO PUBLISHING, INC.

215 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, N.Y 10003

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THE

Brig. Gen. Stanley ML Ulanoff, USAR

ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO U.S. MISSILES AND

ARCO PUBLISHING, INC.

Copyright © 1985 by Stanley M. Ulanoff

All rights reserved. No part of this book may

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Printed in the United States of America

To the heroes of the Israel Air Force and their corn-

Chapter 1. Thunder in the Sky— An Overview 1

Chapter 2. The War of Independence, 1948 19

Appendix I. The Missions of the IAF 156

Official U.S. Government Publications. Excerpts from DOD PG-10A and

Thunder in the Sky

2 The Fighting Israeli Air Force

An IAF F-16 Fighting Falcon armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

around rate unequaled anywhere. However,

FROM THE WAR OF armored vehicles,

Organizationally, the IAF was structured on THE SINAI CAMPAIGN

A Dassault Myst'ere IVA jet fighter-bomber. IAF during

transfer of battle to the enemy's rear, surprise,

Fitting 127-mm rockets to P-51D Mustang.

Mystere pilots receiving a final briefing before a mission.

success. volvement in the form of an anti-aircraft defense

training for types of attack and evasive

THE IRAQI NUCLEAR The next major milestone in the relatively

Messerschmitt Bf -109s purchased by Israel from Czechoslovakia.

the Messerschmitts acquired in Czechoslovakia, culties.

these entered service with the

away from three Egyptian bases well

Bardawil Lagoon west of El

A last-minute check before takeoff at dawn.

parked hardstands and blew them to

An Israeli Mirage III on its way to the target.

regular enemy armies, each of which was

The Six-Day War 55

Egyptian aircraft caught napping on the ground.

managing to escape. over their targets. Each wave, with about

over the Sinai a week on July 14, six

crossed the Canal. bombing the military camps of Huckstep, some

mediate destruction of two SA-2 batteries; one unique in his memory:

to attack an Egyptian radar station at Ras at once, so many

seven months before. By the time the reconnais-

waited and got in behind, now sandwiching them, tronics expert:

the SAM launchers, missiles deployed in pairs

An A-4N Skyhawk II returning from a strike mission.

An unusual photo of a surface-to-air missile exploding

*Based on foreign sources only (Air Warfare Book, etc.).

the speed with which the supplies were moved ference.

February 1975 Joseph Abboudi— Major

OCT. 6, 1973-THE FIRST DAY

B. The Syrian Sector

D. Our Air Losses

OCT. 7, 1973— THE SECOND DAY

A. The Egyptian Sector

B. The Syrian Sector

OCT. 8, 1973-THE THIRD DAY

B. The Syrian Sector

OCT. 9, 1973-THE FOURTH DAY