V.

Modes
VI. God
Benedict “Baruch” Spinoza (1632-1677) VII. Free
VIII. Eternity
-Born in the Netherlands into 7 AXIONS
-He is Jewish convert   I. Everything that exists exists either in itself or in
-From unknown reason he was excommunicated for life from the something else.
II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else
Jewish Community.
must be conceived through itself.
III. From a cause an effect follows; and if no cause then
WORKS effect.
IV. Knowledge of an effect depends and involves
-Principles of Philosophy (1663) knowledge of a cause.
-Theological Political Treatise (1670) V. Things that have nothing in common cannot be
- Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding (post humus) understood, the one by means of the other.
- Ethics demonstrated according to Geometrical Order (post humus) VI. A true idea must correspond to its ideate or object.
- Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being discovered in VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, then its
essence does not involve existence.
1851)

Spinoza is known for using Cartesian term and method of idea, the Part one is containing conclusions and thirty seven (37) propositions,
fundamental example dito is when he used the geometrical method to we can summary the part one in six(6) fundamental points, first is
understand the reality like in his book Ethics- it used the axioms or that God is alone and necessarily one, second is that there must be
God, God is acting base on the needs of his nature, God is the cause
theorems to deduce God, nature, and all that is being in the cosmos.
of all things, and all things must be in God, and the most important
among them all is that God is the substance of all things. Thus
TREATISE ON THE EMENDATION OF THE INTELECT
Spinoza’s Ethics is absolutely giving emphasis on Pantheism
(Spinoza is a Monist derived from Cartesianism-substance to God
-In this book Spinoza explains the importance of philosophy, it gives alone). God is the universe, all things are modification of God.
us a thorough understanding what is good life, and how we can Another philosophy of Spinoza that was tackled by the book is that
achieve that good life. God created necessarily and not freely by as understood by theist.
-This book is divided into three parts: Theist believe that God can abstained or create freely. Because God
1 “Everyman” First-Person Narrative (paragraphs 1-11) created the world, and this world is nust a manifestation of Him,
2. The Highest Good (paragraphs 12-13) therefore the question: what is the purpose of this thing why it was
3. A Life Plan (paragraphs 14-17) made is absolutely negated on his philosophy.

-The perspective of him on the Nature of The Nature of Good Life, HAVING NO FINAL CAUSALITY
the good exemplar of this is the unsatisfactoriness associated with Things are having no direction for moving “to and from, and no end”,
such conditional goods as sensual pleasure, money, and honor. This is no purpose and no final cause, like mathematics, it just gives
also serves as philosophical converter to better path. But Spinoza importance on the essences of things. For Spinoza the TRUTH are
does not negate the importance of the conditional goods as they could all the events which are continues and necessary set of modification
of eternal substance which is simply called as “IS” and that is GOD.
also serves as instrument to attaining the highest good. The Highest
Spinoza also said that system of the ideas must be infinite, and the
good or happiness for Spinoza consists in a special kind of cognition ultimate infinite is no other than God himself. Ontological substances
of God. are just a modification of the REAL, ONE, AND INFINITE
SUBSTANCE which is GOD. And God cannot be called as
ETHICS contingent being.
MAN IS ALSO HAVING NO FREE WILL because God is acts as
-This book is divided into five(5) parts his nature dictates. But we will see a big conflict about it because
Part 1: God ALL HAPPENINGS CAN BE TRACED AND EXPLAINED BY
Part2: Nature and Origin of the Mind EFFICIENT CAUSES, and all that efficient causes can be traced in
Part3: The Origin and Nature of Emotions • the DIVINE NATURE.
Part 4: Of Human Bondage or the Strength of the Emotions
Part 5: Of the Power of the Understanding, or Human For Spinoza GOD IS: cause for itself, substance, attribute, eternal,
Freedom and infinite. So if the thing is happening necessarily we need not
-Spinoza in writing this book was influenced by Descartes, Jewish think to be thankful, because it became a root of good and bad, praise
writers, Renaissance writers (Bruno), Scholasticism , Stoics, Hobbes, and blame but if he did no,t there is no good or bad, not praise and
Leibniz, Bacon. blame.,
-His works also give emphasis on the ontological priorities, order of
ideas, order of methods, he also begins with the Divine Substance  Spinoza asserts that the universe consists of a single,
rather than the empirical data, being rationalist that empiricist. infinite, indivisible "substance," which is equivalent to God. By
substance, Spinoza means a basic entity (or type of entity) that
ETHICS, PART I- GOD makes up reality and acts as the base on which all identifiable
8 Definitions attributes stand.
Self-Caused  God, he argues, consists of infinite attributes that are in turn
II. Finite being "modified" to produce the objects and events of observed
III. Substance reality.
IV. Attribute
  Spinoza uses the term attribute to mean the characteristics identified as pantheism, the doctrine that God and the world are the
the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. same thing – which conflicts with both Jewish and Christian
 Spinoza uses the term infinite to mean "unlimited by teachings. Pantheism can be traced back to ancient Greek thought: it
another thing of the same nature." He gives the example of an was probably advocated by some pre-Socratic philosophers, as well
idea: because it can be replaced with another idea, it is limited.
as by the Stoics. But although Spinoza – who admired many aspects
If it were the only possible idea and therefore irreplaceable, it
would be unlimited. of Stoicism – is regarded as the chief source of modern pantheism, he
 Apart from God, nothing "can be, or can be conceived." does, in fact, want to maintain the distinction between God and the
world.
 God is "free" in the sense of not being subject to any
external constraints. Nonetheless, Spinoza contends, God "acts His originality lies in the nature of this distinction. God and the world
by the necessity of his nature."
are not two different entities, he argues, but two different aspects of a
 Consequently, God is not "free" in the sense of having single reality. Over the next few weeks we will examine this view in
chosen to make the universe in a particular way. The universe, more detail and consider its implications for human life. Since
as it exists, flows inevitably from God's nature. Spinoza presents a radical alternative to the Cartesian philosophy that
 For God, uniquely, existence and essence are the same has shaped our intellectual and cultural heritage, exploring his ideas
thing. According to Spinoza, existence means "being"— may lead us to question some of our deepest assumptions.
whether something is, or exists. Essence is the nature of a thing
or substance, what makes it what it is. In other words, One of the most important and distinctive features of Spinoza's
existence is God's fundamental nature. Things produced by philosophy is that it is practical through and through. His ideas are
God (people, for instance), do not share this property.
never merely intellectual constructions, but lead directly to a certain
 In the Appendix to Part 1, Spinoza criticizes as superstition
way of life. This is evidenced by the fact that his greatest work,
the view that everything exists for the benefit of humankind.
Nature, he maintains, "has no particular goal in view," and any which combines metaphysics, theology, epistemology, and human
appearance to the contrary comes from the imperfections of the psychology, is called Ethics. In this book, Spinoza argues that the
human mind. way to "blessedness" or "salvation" for each person involves an
expansion of the mind towards an intuitive understanding of God, of
the whole of nature and its laws. In other words, philosophy for
Spinoza is like a spiritual practice, whose goal is happiness and
liberation.

Spinoza begins by stating a set of definitions of eight terms: self- The ethical orientation of Spinoza's thought is also reflected in his
caused, finite of its own own nature and conduct. Unlike most of the great philosophers,
kind, substance, attribute, mode, God, freedom, and eternity. These Spinoza has a reputation for living an exemplary, almost saintly life,
definitions are followed by a series of axioms, one of which characterised by modesty, gentleness, integrity, intellectual courage,
supposedly guarantees that the results of Spinoza’s logical disregard for wealth and a lack of worldly ambition. According to
demonstrations will be true about reality. Spinoza quickly establishes Bertrand Russell, Spinoza was "the noblest and most lovable of the
that substance must be existent, self-caused, and unlimited. From this great philosophers". Although his ideas were despised by many of his
he proves that there cannot be two substances with the same attribute, contemporaries, he attracted a number of devoted followers who
since each would limit the other. This leads to the monumental gathered regularly at his home in Amsterdam to discuss his
conclusion of Proposition 11: “God, or substance consisting philosophy. These friends made sure that Spinoza's Ethics was
of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite published soon after his death in 1677.
essence, necessarily exists.” From the definition of God as a
substance with infinite attributes and other propositions about 2. Ethics
substance, it follows that “there can be, or be conceived, no other
The Ethics is an ambitious and multifaceted work. It is also bold to
substance but God” (Proposition 14) and that “whatever is, is in God, the point of audacity, as one would expect of a systematic and
and nothing can be or be conceived without God” (Proposition 15). unforgiving critique of the traditional philosophical and theological
This constitutes the core of Spinoza’s pantheism: God is everywhere, conceptions of God, the human being and the universe, especially as
and everything that exists is a modification of God. God is known by these serve as the foundation of the major organized religions and
human beings through only two of his attributes—thought and their moral and ceremonial rules. What Spinoza intends to
extension (the quality of having spatial dimensions)—though the demonstrate (in the strongest sense of that word) is the truth about
God, nature and especially ourselves, and the most certain and useful
number of God’s attributes is infinite. Later in Part I, Spinoza
principles of society, religion and the good life. Despite the great deal
established that everything that occurs necessarily follows from the of metaphysics, physics, anthropology and psychology that take up
nature of God and that there can be no contingencies in nature. Part I Parts One through Three, Spinoza took the crucial message of the
concludes with an appended polemic about the misreading of the work to be ethical in nature. It consists in showing that our happiness
world by religious and superstitious people who think that God can and well-being lie not in a life enslaved to the passions and to the
change the course of events and that the course of events sometimes transitory goods we ordinarily pursue, nor in the related unreflective
reflects a divine judgment of human behaviour. attachment to the superstitions that pass as religion, but rather in the
life of reason. To clarify and support these broadly ethical
conclusions, however, Spinoza must first demystify the universe and
show it for what it really is. This requires laying out some
metaphysical foundations, the project of Part One.
Spinoza's most famous and provocative idea is that God is not the
creator of the world, but that the world is part of God. This is often 2.1 God or Nature
“On God” begins with some deceptively simple definitions of terms This proof that God—an infinite, eternal (necessary and self-caused),
that would be familiar to any seventeenth century philosopher. “By indivisible being—is the only substance of the universe proceeds in
substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through three simple steps. First, establish that no two substances can share an
itself”; “By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a attribute or essence (Ip5). Then, prove that there is a substance with
substance, as constituting its essence”; “By God I understand a being infinite attributes (i.e., God) (Ip11). It follows, in conclusion, that the
absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of existence of that infinite substance precludes the existence of any
attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite other substance. For if there were to be a second substance, it would
essence.” The definitions of Part One are, in effect, simply clear have to have some attribute or essence. But since God has all possible
concepts that ground the rest of his system. They are followed by a attributes, then the attribute to be possessed by this second substance
number of axioms that, he assumes, will be regarded as obvious and would be one of the attributes already possessed by God. But it has
unproblematic by the philosophically informed (“Whatever is, is already been established that no two substances can have the same
either in itself or in another”; “From a given determinate cause the attribute. Therefore, there can be, besides God, no such second
effect follows necessarily”). From these, the first proposition substance.
necessarily follows, and every subsequent proposition can be
demonstrated using only what precedes it. (References to If God is the only substance, and (by axiom 1) whatever is, is either a
the Ethics will be by part (I–V), proposition (p), definition (d), substance or in a substance, then everything else must be in God.
scholium (s) and corollary (c).) “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without
God” (Ip15). Those things that are “in” God (or, more precisely, in
In propositions one through fifteen of Part One, Spinoza presents the God’s attributes) are what Spinoza calls ‘modes’ (or ‘affections’).
basic elements of his picture of God. God is the infinite, necessarily
existing (that is, self-caused), unique substance of the universe. There As soon as this preliminary conclusion has been established, Spinoza
is only one substance in the universe; it is God; and everything else immediately reveals the objective of his attack. His definition of God
that is, is in God. —condemned since his excommunication from the Jewish
community as a “God existing in only a philosophical sense”—is
PROPOSITION 1: A substance is prior in nature to its affections. meant to preclude any anthropomorphizing of the divine being. In the
scholium to proposition fifteen, he writes against “those who feign a
PROPOSITION 2: Two substances having different attributes have God, like man, consisting of a body and a mind, and subject to
nothing in common with one another. (In other words, if two passions. But how far they wander from the true knowledge of God,
substances differ in nature, then they have nothing in common). is sufficiently established by what has already been demonstrated.”
Besides being false, such an anthropomorphic conception of God
PROPOSITION 3: If things have nothing in common with one another,
standing as judge over us can have only deleterious effects on human
one of them cannot be the cause of the other.
freedom and activity, insofar as it fosters a life enslaved to hope and
PROPOSITION 4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from fear and the superstitions to which such emotions give rise.
one another, either by a difference in the attributes [i.e., the natures or
Much of the technical language of Part One is, to all appearances,
essences] of the substances or by a difference in their affections [i.e.,
right out of Descartes. But even the most devoted Cartesian would
their accidental properties].
have had a hard time understanding (and, certainly, accepting) the
PROPOSITION 5: In nature, there cannot be two or more substances of full import of propositions one through fifteen. What does it mean to
the same nature or attribute. say that God is substance and that everything else is “in” God? Is
Spinoza saying that rocks, tables, chairs, birds, mountains, rivers and
PROPOSITION 6: One substance cannot be produced by another human beings are all properties of God, and hence can be predicated
substance. of God (just as one would say that the table “is red”)? It seems very
odd to think that objects and individuals—what we ordinarily think of
PROPOSITION 7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist. as independent “things”—are, in fact, merely properties of a thing,
PROPOSITION 8: Every substance is necessarily infinite. items that inhere in something else. Spinoza was sensitive to the
strangeness of this kind of talk, not to mention the philosophical
PROPOSITION 9: The more reality or being each thing has, the more problems to which it gives rise. When a person feels pain, does it
attributes belong to it. follow that the pain is ultimately just a property of God, and thus that
God feels pain? All of this has given rise to a great deal of scholarly
PROPOSITION 10: Each attribute of a substance must be conceived debate as to what Spinoza means by saying all things being modes of
through itself. or “in” God. They may also explain why, as of Proposition Sixteen,
there is a subtle but important shift in Spinoza’s language. God is
PROPOSITION 11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes,
now described not so much as the underlying substance of all things,
each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily
but as the universal, immanent and sustaining cause of all that exists:
exists. (The proof of this proposition consists simply in the classic
“From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely
“ontological proof for God’s existence”. Spinoza writes that “if you
many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything that can fall
deny this, conceive, if you can, that God does not exist. Therefore, by
under an infinite intellect)”.
axiom 7 [‘If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does
not involve existence’], his essence does not involve existence. But According to the traditional Judeo-Christian conception of divinity,
this, by proposition 7, is absurd. Therefore, God necessarily exists, God is a transcendent creator, a being who causes a world distinct
q.e.d.”) from himself to come into being by creating it out of nothing. God
produces that world by a spontaneous act of free will, and could just
PROPOSITION 12: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived
as easily have not created anything outside himself. By contrast,
from which it follows that the substance can be divided.
Spinoza’s God is the cause of all things because all things follow
PROPOSITION 13: A substance which is absolutely infinite is causally and necessarily from the divine nature. Or, as he puts it,
indivisible. from God’s infinite power or nature “all things have necessarily
flowed, or always followed, by the same necessity and in the same
PROPOSITION 14: Except God, no substance can be or be conceived. way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to
eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles” (Ip17s1).
The existence of the world is, thus, mathematically necessary. It is
impossible that God should exist but not the world. This does not There is some debate in the literature as to whether God is also to be
mean that God does not cause the world to come into being freely, identified with Natura naturata. The more likely reading is that God,
since nothing outside of God constrains him to bring it into existence. as Nature, is both Natura naturans and Natura naturata, and that the
But Spinoza does deny that God creates the world by some arbitrary infinite and finite modes are not just effects of God or Nature’s power
and undetermined act of free will. God could not have done but actually inhere in and express that infinite substance. Be that as it
otherwise. There are no alternatives to the actual world—no other may, Spinoza’s fundamental insight in Book One is that Nature is an
possible worlds—and there is no contingency or spontaneity within indivisible, eternal or self-caused, substantial whole—in fact, it is
the world. Nothing could possibly have been otherwise. Everything is the only substantial whole. Outside of Nature, there is nothing, and
absolutely and necessarily determined. everything that exists is a part of Nature and is brought into being by
Nature with a deterministic necessity. This unified, unique,
(Ip29): In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been productive, necessary being just is what is meant by ‘God’. Because
determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and of the necessity inherent in Nature, there is no teleology in the
produce an effect in a certain way. universe. God or Nature does not act for any ends, and things do not
(Ip33): Things could have been produced by God in no other way, exist for any set purposes. There are no “final causes” (to use the
and in no other order than they have been produced. common Aristotelian phrase). God does not “do” things for the sake
of anything else. The order of things just follows from God’s
There are, however, differences in the way things depend on God. As essences with an inviolable determinism. All talk of God’s purposes,
an infinite being, God has infinite “attributes”. An attribute is best intentions, goals, preferences or aims is just an anthropomorphizing
understood as a most basic way of being, a general nature that is fiction.
expressed in determinate ways by particular things. We have
knowledge of only two of these attributes: thought and extension. All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that
Some features of the universe follow necessarily from God—or, more men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as men do, on
precisely, from the absolute nature of one of God’s attributes—in a account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself
direct and unmediated manner. These are the universal and eternal directs all things to some certain end, for they say that God has made
aspects of the world, and they do not come into or go out of being; all things for man, and man that he might worship God. (I, Appendix)
Spinoza calls them “infinite modes”. They include the most general
principles of the universe, together governing all things in all ways. God is not some goal-oriented planner who then judges things by
From the attribute of extension there follow the principles governing how well they conform to his purposes. Things happen only because
all extended objects (the truths of geometry) and laws governing the of Nature and its laws. “Nature has no end set before it … All things
motion and rest of bodies (the laws of physics); from the attribute of proceed by a certain eternal necessity of nature.” To believe
thought, there follow laws of thought (understood by commentators otherwise is to fall prey to the same superstitions that lie at the heart
to be either the laws of logic or the laws of psychology). Particular of the organized religions.
and individual things are causally more remote from God. They are
nothing but “affections of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s People] find—both in themselves and outside themselves—many
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way” (Ip25c). means that are very helpful in seeking their own advantage, e.g., eyes
More precisely, they are finite modes. for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for
light, the sea for supporting fish … Hence, they consider all natural
There are two causal orders or dimensions governing the production things as means to their own advantage. And knowing that they had
and actions of particular things. On the one hand, they are determined found these means, not provided them for themselves, they had
by the general laws of the universe that follow immediately from reason to believe that there was someone else who had prepared those
God’s natures. On the other hand, each particular thing is determined means for their use. For after they considered things as means, they
to act and to be acted upon by other particular things. Thus, the actual could not believe that the things had made themselves; but from the
behavior of a body in motion is a function not just of the universal means they were accustomed to prepare for themselves, they had to
laws of motion, but also of the other bodies in motion and rest infer that there was a ruler, or a number of rulers of nature, endowed
surrounding it and with which it comes into contact. with human freedom, who had taken care of all things for them, and
made all things for their use.
Spinoza’s metaphysics of God is neatly summed up in a phrase that
occurs in the Latin (but not the original Dutch) edition of the Ethics: And since they had never heard anything about the temperament of
“God, or Nature”, Deus, sive Natura: “That eternal and infinite being these rulers, they had to judge it from their own. Hence, they
we call God, or Nature, acts from the same necessity from which he maintained that the Gods direct all things for the use of men in order
exists” (Part IV, Preface). It is an ambiguous phrase, since Spinoza to bind men to them and be held by men in the highest honor. So it
could be read as trying either to divinize nature or to naturalize God. has happened that each of them has thought up from his own
But for the careful reader there is no mistaking Spinoza’s intention. temperament different ways of worshipping God, so that God might
The friends who, after his death, published his writings left out the love them above all the rest, and direct the whole of Nature according
“or Nature” clause from the more widely accessible Dutch version, to the needs of their blind desire and insatiable greed. Thus this
probably out of fear of the reaction that this identification would, prejudice was changed into superstition, and struck deep roots in their
predictably, arouse among a vernacular audience. minds. (I, Appendix)
There are, Spinoza insists, two sides of Nature. First, there is the A judging God who has plans and acts purposively is a God to be
active, productive aspect of the universe—God and his attributes, obeyed and placated. Opportunistic preachers are then able to play on
from which all else follows. This is what Spinoza, employing the our hopes and fears in the face of such a God. They prescribe ways of
same terms he used in the Short Treatise, calls Natura naturans, acting that are calculated to avoid being punished by that God and
“naturing Nature”. Strictly speaking, this is identical with God. The earn his rewards. But, Spinoza insists, to see God or Nature as acting
other aspect of the universe is that which is produced and sustained for the sake of ends—to find purpose in Nature—is to misconstrue
by the active aspect, Natura naturata, “natured Nature”. Nature and “turn it upside down” by putting the effect (the end result)
before the true cause.
By Natura naturata I understand whatever follows from the necessity
of God’s nature, or from any of God’s attributes, i.e., all the modes of Nor does God perform miracles, since there are no, and cannot be,
God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things that are in departures whatsoever from the necessary course of nature. This
God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God. (Ip29s). would be for God or Nature to act against itself, which is absurd. The
belief in miracles is due only to ignorance of the true causes of is seeking to eliminate anything, it is that which is above or beyond
phenomena. nature, which escapes the laws and processes of nature. But is he a
pantheist in the first, reductive sense?
If a stone has fallen from a room onto someone’s head and killed
him, they will show, in the following way, that the stone fell in order The issue of whether God is to be identified with the whole of Nature
to kill the man. For if it did not fall to that end, God willing it, how (i.e., Natura naturans and Natura naturata) or only a part of Nature
could so many circumstances have concurred by chance (for often (i.e., Natura naturans alone), which has occupied a good deal of the
many circumstances do concur at once)? Perhaps you will answer recent literature, might be seen as crucial to the question of Spinoza’s
that it happened because the wind was blowing hard and the man was alleged pantheism. After all, if pantheism is the view that God is
walking that way. But they will persist: why was the wind blowing everything, then Spinoza is a pantheist only if he identifies God with
hard at that time? why was the man walking that way at that time? If all of Nature. Indeed, this is exactly how the issue is often framed.
you answer again that the wind arose then because on the preceding Both those who believe that Spinoza is a pantheist and those who
day, while the weather was still calm, the sea began to toss, and that believe that he is not a pantheist focus on the question of whether
the man had been invited by a friend, they will press on—for there is God is to be identified with the whole of Nature, including the
no end to the questions which can be asked: but why was the sea infinite and finite modes of Natura naturata, or only with substance
tossing? why was the man invited at just that time? And so they will and its attributes (Natura naturans) but not the modes. Thus, it has
not stop asking for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the been argued that Spinoza is not a pantheist, because God is to be
will of God, i.e., the sanctuary of ignorance. (I, Appendix) identified only with substance and its attributes, the most universal,
active causal principles of Nature, and not with any modes of
This is strong language, and Spinoza is clearly aware of the risks of substance. Other scholars have argued that Spinoza is a pantheist, just
his position. The same preachers who take advantage of our credulity because he does identify God with the whole of nature.
will fulminate against anyone who tries to pull aside the curtain and
reveal the truths of Nature. “One who seeks the true causes of However, this debate about the extent of Spinoza’s identification of
miracles, and is eager, like an educated man, to understand natural God with Nature is not really to the point when the question is about
things, not to wonder at them, like a fool, is generally considered and Spinoza’s alleged pantheism. To be sure, if by ‘pantheism’ is meant
denounced as an impious heretic by those whom the people honor as the idea that God is everything, and if one reads Spinoza as saying
interpreters of nature and the Gods. For they know that if ignorance is that God is only Natura naturans, then Spinoza’s God is not
taken away, then foolish wonder, the only means they have of everything and consequently Spinoza is not a pantheist, at least in the
arguing and defending their authority is also taken away.” ordinary sense. Finite things, on this reading, while caused by the
eternal, necessary and active aspects of Nature, are not identical with
For centuries, Spinoza has been regarded—by his enemies and his God or substance, but rather are its effects. But this is not the
partisans, in the scholarly literature and the popular imagination—as interesting sense in which Spinoza is not a pantheist. For even if
a “pantheist”. It is not clear, however, that this is the proper way to Spinoza does indeed identify God with the whole of Nature, it does
look at his conception of God. Of course, Spinoza is not a traditional not follow that Spinoza is a pantheist. The real issue is not what is the
theist, for whom God is a transcendent and providential being. But proper reading of the metaphysics of Spinoza’s conception of God
does Spinoza’s identification of God with Nature mean that he is, as and its relationship to finite modes. On either interpretation,
so many have insisted for so long, from the early eighteenth century Spinoza’s move is a naturalistic and reductive one. God is identical
up through the most recent edition of the Cambridge Dictionary of either with all of Nature or with only a part of Nature; for this reason,
Philosophy, a pantheist? Spinoza shares something with the reductive pantheist. But—and this
is the important point—even the atheist can, without too much
In general, pantheism is the view that rejects the transcendence of difficulty, admit that God is nothing but Nature. Reductive pantheism
God. According to the pantheist, God is, in some way, identical with and atheism maintain extensionally equivalent ontologies.
the world. There may be aspects of God that are ontologically or
epistemologically distinct from the world, but for pantheism this must Rather, the question of Spinoza’s pantheism is really going to be
not imply that God is essentially separate from the world. The answered on the psychological side of things, with regard to the
pantheist is also likely to reject any kind of anthropomorphizing of proper attitude to take toward Deus sive Natura. And however one
God, or attributing to the deity psychological and moral reads the relationship between God and Nature in Spinoza, it is a
characteristics modeled on human nature. The pantheist’s God is mistake to call him a pantheist in so far as pantheism is still a kind of
(usually) not a personal God. religious theism. What really distinguishes the pantheist from the
atheist is that the pantheist does not reject as inappropriate the
Within this general framework, it is possible to distinguish two religious psychological attitudes demanded by theism. Rather, the
varieties of pantheism. First, pantheism can be understood as the pantheist simply asserts that God—conceived as a being before which
denial of any distinction whatsoever between God and the natural one is to adopt an attitude of worshipful awe—is or is in Nature. And
world and the assertion that God is in fact identical with everything nothing could be further from the spirit of Spinoza’s philosophy.
that exists. “God is everything and everything is God.” On this view, Spinoza does not believe that worshipful awe or religious reverence
God is the world and all its natural contents, and nothing distinct is an appropriate attitude to take before God or Nature. There is
from them. This is reductive pantheism. Second, pantheism can be nothing holy or sacred about Nature, and it is certainly not the object
understood as asserting that God is distinct from the world and its of a religious experience. Instead, one should strive to understand
natural contents but nonetheless contained or immanent within them, God or Nature, with the kind of adequate or clear and distinct
perhaps in the way in which water is contained in a saturated sponge. intellectual knowledge that reveals Nature’s most important truths
God is everything and everywhere, on this version, by virtue of being and shows how everything depends essentially and existentially on
within everything. This is immanentist pantheism; it involves that higher natural causes. The key to discovering and experiencing God,
claim that nature contains within itself, in addition to its natural for Spinoza, is philosophy and science, not religious awe and
elements, an immanent supernatural and divine element. worshipful submission. The latter give rise only to superstitious
Is Spinoza, then, a pantheist? Any adequate analysis of Spinoza’s behavior and subservience to ecclesiastic authorities; the former leads
identification of God and Nature will show clearly that Spinoza to enlightenment, freedom and true blessedness (i.e., peace of mind).
cannot be a pantheist in the second, immanentist sense. For Spinoza,
there is nothing but Nature and its attributes and modes. And within
Nature there can certainly be nothing that is supernatural. If Spinoza