2012
2012
2012
Index of FIGURES
1 DoD Budget Authority (Constant FY2010 $)...............................45 8 East Asia and Australasia Regional Defence Expenditure
2 US Defence Expenditure (Budget Authority) as % of GDP.....48 as % of GDP............................................................................................ 210
3 NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure as % 9 Asia Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Sub-Regional
Breakdown............................................................................................. 211
of GDP.........................................................................................................75
10 Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure
4 Non-NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Sub-Regional Breakdown............................................. 306
as % of GDP...............................................................................................75
11 Middle East and North Africa Regional Defence
5 United Kingdom Defence Budget Trends Expenditure as % of GDP.................................................................. 307
(FY2008/09–FY2014/15)......................................................................84
12 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Defence
6 Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure as % of GDP.......... 190 Expenditure as % of GDP.................................................................. 363
7 South and Central Asia Regional Defence Expenditure 13 Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Defence Expenditure
as % of GDP............................................................................................ 210 as % of GDP......................................................................................... 419
Index of Maps
1 The War in Libya....................................................................................15 4 Côte d’Ivoire........................................................................................ 412
2 Afghanistan............................................................................................29 5 Arctic...........................................................................Inside back cover
3 Japan’s Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Accident............ 221
The Military Balance 2012
Editor’s Foreword
The Military Balance 2012 is a comprehensive and inde- to back, and participate in, military operations. Both
pendent assessment of the military capabilities and the UAE and Qatar deployed combat aircraft, and in
defence economics of 171 territories. It is also a reference Qatar’s case special forces, on operations in Libya, and
work on developments in global military and security other Arab nations deployed military forces to support
affairs. humanitarian missions. However, at least as of the end
One year ago, defence analysts may have assumed a of November 2011 there was little appetite to repeat it
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:04 06 August 2012
number of issues would dominate the defence debate in in Syria, where the Assad regime continues to force-
2011, including the continuing shift in the relative balance fully resist demonstrators’ demands. The intervention
of military power to Asia; China’s rise, and its growing in Bahrain in March 2011 highlighted a different side
strategic reach; deepening budget woes in Western econ- to this military activity, at least in Gulf Cooperation
omies and the effect of this on defence planning; the ten- Council (GCC) states, with a willingness to use the
year anniversary of 9/11; and a decision on a future US GCC’s Peninsula Shield force to maintain internal secu-
presence in Iraq. The year was instead dominated by the rity, based on the GCC charter’s section on military
Arab Awakening. cooperation. However, smaller Gulf states are wary
The strategic landscape in the Middle East and North that the invocation of the charter to deploy into Bahrain
Africa is being reshaped, with new questions and uncer- could serve as a precedent for Saudi intervention in their
tainties affecting long-held assumptions about regional own affairs. Sharpening focus on Iran also drives GCC
power balances, military capabilities and deterrence. The military developments: though the US maintains key
actions of some states’ armed forces have led analysts to regional defence forces and facilities, and plays a central
conclude that they function primarily as internal secu- coordinating role in elements of regional defence coop-
rity forces. Indeed, during the past year, many Arab eration, GCC states have lately indicated a greater desire
militaries have at times behaved as an extension of to improve intra-GCC coordinative mechanisms.
ruling regimes and at times as independent institutional The US withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011
players focused on securing and maintaining their own increases the salience of such developments. The US
positions. In some cases, what had seemed on paper retains key bases and substantial forces in the region, but
to comprise extensive and modern combat forces were the failure to agree terms with Iraq meant the end of a
in fact revealed to consist of relatively small cores of sustained US military presence that began with regime
favoured and well-equipped troops designed to bolster change in 2003. Washington will of course retain a signif-
regimes. icant defence-related presence through the large US
This strategic flux is felt acutely in Israel. Turmoil Embassy, and military contracts signed with Iraq.
in Israel’s immediate neighbourhood sharpens an But for the US, the aftermath of the Iraq and
established focus for the country’s defence planners, Afghanistan wars – combined with the impact of the
for years concerned about Iran’s developing nuclear financial crisis on budgets and perceptions of allied
and ballistic-missile programmes. Within the region, unwillingness to help shoulder the burden – may have
Yemen’s apparent slide into greater instability concerns implications for the nature and extent of US involve-
not only Yemenis and their immediate neighbours, but ment in future crises. This does not necessarily point to
also those nations whose shipping and cargo transit the retrenchment, but Washington may give more careful
vital sea lanes south of the country, already subject to thought to whether intervention in crises is necessarily
the unwanted attentions of Somali-based pirates. As for in the US interest; to the nature and duration of any mili-
the Gulf states, the Arab Awakening has diverted atten- tary response; and to the type of forces the US should
tion from the main threat they also perceive to stability: develop and maintain. That said, not every military
Tehran’s ambitions and its nuclear and ballistic-missile emergency will be of Washington’s choosing, so main-
programmes. taining flexible forces capable of acting in a wide range
But the Arab Awakening has also seen unprec- of contingencies will also preoccupy the Pentagon. The
edented willingness by several Arab governments US nonetheless remains the only NATO member capable
6 The Military Balance 2012
of sustaining large-scale air–sea operations, and the only sure in most NATO and EU states has created a window
one able to project ground forces larger than a handful of opportunity that should, in theory, propel govern-
of brigades in out-of-area operations. While US forces ments towards closer defence cooperation. But the areas
will reduce in size, the adaptability demonstrated in the of potential cooperation hitherto identified have for the
years since 9/11, and particularly since the 2003 inva- most part involved education, training, logistics support
sion of Iraq, means the smaller force will still be highly and maintenance, rather than deployable front-line capa-
capable. However, as former US Secretary of Defense bilities. Such cooperation can save money while creating
Robert Gates said in May 2011, ‘a smaller military, no the same or improved capability, but it will need to be
matter how superb, will be able to go to fewer places and complemented by a coherent long-term approach that
be able to do fewer things’. anchors pooling and sharing in national defence plan-
The US continues to contribute the majority of forces ning and focuses on capabilities relevant for likely tasks.
to the ongoing NATO mission in Afghanistan, where While it might be tempting to feed into pooling and
a transition of full security leadership to the Afghan sharing initiatives projects that otherwise would have
authorities by 2015 is planned. The Afghan National been deleted, this could simply lead to obsolete capabili-
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:04 06 August 2012
Army and Police continue to expand, and many inter- ties being uploaded onto the European level.
national armed forces and security establishments are In the short term, until significant cost savings can
supporting efforts to build the capacity of these forces, be made via interstate cooperation or greater industrial
as well as to develop institutions within the Afghan coordination or competition, countries have resorted
government. The pledge by many Western govern- to cutting personnel and equipment programmes. For
ments to withdraw combat forces by 2015 makes more European governments, the decision to cut military
pressing the widespread assumption of independent capabilities has generally been driven by economic
planning, mission execution and sustainment by Afghan considerations. There has been some reassessment of
security forces; it also increases the pressure on Kabul, national priorities, but little multilateral consultation
and its international supporters, to remedy the institu- over the scale of capability cuts. Real-terms reductions in
tional weakness in governance that has so bedevilled the defence spending have, between 2008–10, occurred in at
NATO campaign. least 16 European NATO member states and, in a signifi-
This continuing US commitment demonstrates, as cant proportion these, real-terms declines exceeded 10%.
did the Libya deployment, the enduring military capa- NATO still maintains its aspiration for member states to
bility retained by the US. Washington’s decision to with- spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence: a figure met
draw for the most part from a direct combat role in an in 2010 by five states: the US, the UK, France, Turkey and
operation in Europe’s backyard showed that, even when Greece.
it is ‘leading from behind’, the US remains the indispen- As noted in last year’s Military Balance, there is a signif-
sible member of NATO. While the Alliance was able to icant and continuing shift in relative military strength
manage its Libyan operation without drawing down away from the West and towards Asia, where rapid
forces in Afghanistan, things might have changed had economic growth and continuing strategic uncertainty
the campaign lasted longer than it did. The operation also have meant both demand for and availability of substan-
highlighted the importance of the enabling capabilities, tially increased resources for defence. Across the region,
such as logistics support and ISR, that the US continued to defence spending increased by a relatively substantial
supply after it withdrew from combat operations. Libya 3.15% in real terms over the last year, despite rising infla-
also revealed significant shortcomings on the part of US tion. China, Japan, India, South Korea and Australia
Alliance partners, notably shortages in will and some key accounted for more than 80% of the total regional spend.
capabilities and military specialisations. Despite Gates’s China, the region’s top spender, increased its share of
chiding over the burden the US had to shoulder in Libya, regional expenditure to above 30%, while Japan and
there is little chance this situation will improve, particu- India saw their shares of the regional total fall below 20%
larly in light of Europe’s economic difficulties and their and 10% respectively. Many key procurement contracts
impact on defence ambitions and resourcing. Indeed, the should soon be awarded. India, Japan and South Korea
desire that European states should take on more of the are all in the process of buying new fighters. India
defence burden for the continent is perhaps as much a continues plans to boost its maritime capabilities with
reflection of Washington’s recognition of defence budget submarine acquisitions and its domestic aircraft-carrier
cuts to come, and the rising importance of Asia, as of US programme (as well as one ex-Russian carrier). Australia
weariness over carrying so much of the load for so long. has also seen maritime-capability enhancements, and
Some European governments continue to explore the acquisition of F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets pending
ways to pool and share capabilities. Defence-budget pres- the arrival of the F-35. After a period of relative stagna-
Editor’s Foreword 7
tion, Indonesia’s defence capacities received a boost in budgets now mean that forces have to consider which
November 2011 with the announcement of acquisition of of the lessons learned from and equipment procured for
24 F-16 C/Ds from the US. these conflicts are retained. Recent military operations
In China, sustained growth has enabled large have, for many Western forces, reinforced the benefits of
increases in defence spending over the past decade; offi- flexibility; access to a full spectrum of capabilities; ‘joint’
cial expenditure in 2011 was more than two-and-a-half military operations; having access to enough ‘boots on
times the 2001 level. The defence budget grew by an the ground’ if needed; and the enduring utility of intel-
average of approximately 10.9% per year in real terms ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, logistical and
over the period, slightly faster than the economy as a support capacities and good doctrine, leadership and
whole. China has been translating these increases into training. They have also highlighted the rising impor-
capability enhancements but, despite the PLA’s aspira- tance of force protection. Many Western nations no
tions, there remain weaknesses in the country’s military longer retain full-spectrum capabilities, and are likely
capabilities. The technological advances demonstrated to shrink forces further, while others may soon have to
by the J-20 and Varyag carrier are more modest than some face such choices. But the relative unpopularity of the
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:04 06 August 2012
alarmist hypotheses of China’s military development Iraq and Afghanistan wars could also make it harder for
have suggested. The Varyag is ageing, China does not yet Western governments to use their declining equipments.
have the capability to operate fixed-wing combat aircraft The US and other Western nations will look to main-
from a carrier and, while its maritime exercises may tain a qualitative and quantitative edge over states such
have become more wide ranging and sustained in recent as China through continued investment in research
years, it has no experience of integrated carrier battle and development, as well as stress on the quality and
group operations. Moreover, while China’s defence reliability of equipment, leadership and training and
industry has made strides in recent years, Beijing still a focus on maximising value from military partner-
relies on external defence technology to fill capability ships and cooperation agreements. Further advantages
gaps. The parallel development of anti-satellite capaci- may be sought in areas such as advanced-technology
ties, anti-ship ballistic missiles and cyber-war capabili- munitions (for instance reduced-lethality, directed-
ties, however, concerns defence planners perhaps as energy and high-speed weapons); unmanned systems;
much as Beijing’s drive to boost its conventional capa- enhanced integration of C4ISR capacities; and informa-
bility. tion and cyber capabilities. But the gaps are narrowing.
The killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden Non-Western states, often with diverse recent military
in a May 2011 US military raid has led to reflections experiences and defence priorities, may look to the
on how war and military capability have changed West for lessons, and perhaps pointers to useful capa-
since 9/11. Certainly in the West, many armed forces, bilities, organisations and tactics, but they may be less
particularly land forces, have changed substantially in constrained financially. In many of these states, moves
outlook, training and equipment from how they began to recapitalise forces, capabilities and precise equipment
the decade. In some cases these changes were driven and weapon variants – and how and in what contingen-
by the requirements of counter-terrorism or counter- cies these forces and capabilities will be employed – will
insurgency operations; the imperatives of shrinking be driven by local defence priorities.
The Military Balance 2012
Preface
The Military Balance is updated each year to provide The Chart of Conflict inserted loose into The Military
an accurate assessment of global military forces and Balance is updated to show data on recent and current
defence economics. This year, 171 countries are covered. armed conflicts up to 1 November 2011.
Each edition contributes to the provision of a unique
compilation of data and information, enabling the reader Using The Military Balance
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:08 13 March 2012
and use of foreign mercenaries. display during and after the February 2011 protests:
the army did not back the police in earlier days and
Military behaviour: between repression and did not coordinate with them once the police left the
self-preservation street. In Syria, raids by the shabbiha (armed regime
During the past year, the military forces of Arab thugs) against protesters often motivated army defec-
states have at times behaved as an organic extension tions. Indeed, the fact that regimes that invested
of ruling regimes, and at times as independent insti- heavily in internal security and coup-proofing could
tutional players bent on securing and maintaining succumb so quickly to popular, often peaceful upris-
their own standing and privileges. This behaviour ings suggests that this emphasis was as much a reason
is a consequence of particular national situations: in for their own demise as a guarantee of survival.
Tunisia and Egypt, where there were no rulers’ rela- A review of the behaviour of the Arab mili-
tives in senior army and police positions, the regular taries shows that they often reflected the evolutions,
military distanced itself from the regime to decisive complexities and tensions within their own soci-
effect. In Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, where eties rather than necessarily following the wishes
the security services remained cohesive or fought and interests of their political leaders. In Tunisia,
back, relatives of the rulers were entrusted with key the military facilitated regime collapse and volun-
command responsibilities. In these cases, depend- tarily stepped aside during the transition. In Egypt,
able elite and generally well-resourced units carried an ambivalent yet pivotal army command eased the
much of the repressive burden: the Republican transition from Mubarak – only to adopt a heavy-
Guard in Yemen, led by Brigadier-General Ahmed handed, albeit uncertain, approach to the transition,
Saleh, son of President Ali Abdullah Saleh; the ethnic- when it became concerned to protect its institutional
Alawite-dominated 4th Armoured Division in Syria power and privileges.
commanded by Brigadier-General Maher al-Assad, In Libya, the regular military rapidly split, with
brother of the president, Bashar; the 32nd ‘Khamis’ significant numbers immediately joining, and
Brigade in Libya, named after Muammar Gadhafi’s organising, the rebellion against Gadhafi. In Syria,
youngest son; the Bahrain Defence Forces and the military remained largely cohesive, although
internal security forces headed by senior members of growing numbers of mostly low-rank defectors
the ruling Al-Khalifa family. In broader terms, tech- joined protesters in clashes against loyal elite units.
niques to exert control over the military have had In Yemen, while some senior military commanders
variable effect. In Syria, the policy of appointing an and their troops defected to the opposition, the
Alawite officer as deputy to any Sunni commander, Saleh regime maintained the allegiance of elite units
and vice versa, has so far succeeded in preventing under the command of family members. In Bahrain,
dissent among the senior ranks of the army (although the military demonstrated its absolute loyalty to the
10 The Military Balance 2012
Al-Khalifa royal family – a function of the exclusion of has sharpened; and its military superiority over a
Shi’ites from its ranks and the recruitment of foreign changing Syria is in danger of becoming irrelevant.
Sunni mercenaries – and took an active part in the This evolving picture could prompt Israeli defence
crackdown. In Algeria, where the military remains planners to adapt their military posture. Conflict with
the backbone of the regime of Abdelaziz Bouteflika Egypt, though unlikely, requires renewed focus on
and a major economic player, events have not yet Israel’s southern flank. At the very least, it will require
required its deployment nor tested its cohesion. contingency planning and greater mobilisation of
This complex picture will not deter Arab govern- forces to contain possible threats from the Sinai and
ments, among others, from deriving lessons from the possible knock-on effects in Hamas-controlled Gaza.
events of the past year. Governments may conclude The reported eastward flow of weapons from former
that investment in security services does help to Libyan stocks will further alarm Israel.
ensure survival, and may question whether their Further north, Israel had grown accustomed to a
security apparatuses should be reformed to increase conventionally weak and minority-ruled Syria that
accountability, or whether money would be better could be deterred and was unwilling and unable
spent on improving social and economic conditions to escalate directly and conventionally. Should the
in a bid to placate rather than coerce the population. Assad regime lose control of large parts of the country
In fact, those engaged in a fight for survival, like the or crumble, Israel would have to deal with new,
Assad regime, will be likely to reward and rely on probably unpleasant realities. A new Syrian govern-
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
their most loyal units, ratcheting up the coercive pres- ment may not be aligned with Iran and Hizbullah
sure applied to demonstrators. but would be unlikely to relinquish its claims on the
Other governments that faced or fear renewed occupied Golan Heights or quickly shed animosity
unrest may well invest more in their security forces. toward Israel. State collapse, fragmentation or civil
This will likely be the case in the Gulf, Algeria, war would complicate Israel’s military options. The
Jordan and Morocco, where tightening internal secu- new reality in its neighbourhood will have caused
rity could accompany timid efforts at political liber- Israel’s planners to consider their options regarding
alisation. Wealthy countries will also try to ensure manning, deployments and capabilities: at this stage
support through recruitment into the armed forces Israel will certainly be looking to hedge, militarily,
and enhanced conditions of service, a course taken by against an increasingly unsettled future. Meanwhile,
Qatar when it raised military salaries in September Israel continues to express concern over Iran’s nuclear
2011, and earlier by Saudi Arabia, which announced and ballistic-missile programmes.
bonuses and promotions for military personnel in Should the Assad regime in Syria fall, Iran could
March 2011, as well as the creation of 60,000 internal be prompted to invest further in conventional and
security positions. But transitioning states like Egypt, asymmetric capabilities as a means of exerting influ-
Libya and Tunisia – depending on the room for ence. A Syrian collapse would also pose difficulties
manoeuvre accorded the new generation of politi- in supplying Hizbullah with arms and ammunition
cians – may want to reform and limit the role of the should it again engage in conflict with Israel. It is
armed forces in political life, moves which could face possible that Iran would speed up delivery of both
some resistance. as a form of contingency planning. There are already
reports that weaponry pre-positioned in Syria since
A new regional military balance 2006 has been transferred to Lebanon because of secu-
The strategic landscape in the Middle East is rity concerns.
changing fast, with new questions and uncertain- Israel’s position could be eased because its
ties affecting long-held assumptions about regional neighbours are unlikely to pursue expensive mili-
power balances, military capabilities and deterrence. tary procurements: they lack the resources, have
This is most acute for Israel. The Arab Awakening varying levels of access to new hardware and have
has exacerbated its isolation in the region. The stra- more pressing priorities. Egypt’s military receives
tegic partnership with Turkey is in tatters; its cold $1.3 billion annually in US military assistance. In
peace with Egypt is brittle; peace with Jordan is recent years Cairo started to modernise its land and
dependent on a fragile Hashemite monarchy; the air inventories, especially with Western, notably
death of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process could American, hardware. The Egyptian military has
lead to renewed conflict; the threat from Hizbullah little incentive to endanger its ability to continue this
Arab militaries and the Arab Awakening 11
process, or to endanger support and maintenance what missions they flew. Special-forces training and
agreements, by turning to other suppliers. But it is support was another possible contribution, and in
not inconceivable in some capability areas: Turkey September the Jordanians pledged to deploy a field
and Egypt have been reported as discussing possible hospital. However, at the time of writing the Libya
sales of Turkish UAVs. The scarce resources at Syria’s intervention seemed to be an exception, and there
disposal will probably be used to ensure regime was little appetite in Arab capitals to repeat it in Syria
survival, by rewarding allies and loyal units. or Yemen. In these cases, the strategic risks, military
For the Gulf states, the Arab Awakening has conditions, political complexities and sectarian over-
strengthened Iranian reach and influence by ousting tones outweigh any political advantages of a direct
Mubarak and by diverting attention from the main military intervention.
threat they perceive to regional stability: Tehran’s The Gulf states’ intervention in March 2011 to
ambitions and its nuclear programme. This threat shore up the faltering monarchy in Bahrain contrasted
perception is unlikely to lead to any reduction in arms with the Libyan case. The deployment of the Gulf
procurements, which in recent years have included Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force
deals on fast jets, helicopters, precision-guided muni- (see p. 307) was based upon clause two of the GCC
tions and missile-defence systems, among other charter’s section on military cooperation, which states
things. One obstacle to these deals could be enhanced that any threat to a GCC state is a threat to all member
Western public and parliamentary scrutiny of arms states: as-yet-unsubstantiated allegations of Iranian
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
deals with the Gulf states. Criticism of security and interference were used as justification. In all likeli-
defence sales to Bahrain has already surfaced in the hood, it was meant to not only end a month of largely
US and the UK after Bahrain’s military participated peaceful protests that rattled the monarchy but also to
in the island state’s crackdown. Another contentious pre-empt any political settlement that would include
issue will be the already controversial Western, in significant concessions to the opposition.
particular American, assistance to elite Yemeni forces, The GCC forces – more than 1,000 Saudi troops
ostensibly for counter-terrorism activities. These from the National Guard and 500 UAE policemen –
units, commanded by Saleh’s relatives, have taken maintained a low profile. They faced protesters in the
part in operations against protesters. first days after their deployment but were involved
in few clashes. Their main mission was to protect key
Interventions abroad: the exception infrastructure and installations, freeing Bahraini mili-
The Arab Awakening has also seen unprecedented tary, National Guard and police units to conduct a
willingness by several Arab governments to back wide-ranging and tough crackdown.
and participate in military interventions. Early Many among Bahrain’s Shia majority consider the
Gulf support for the Libya intervention served to Peninsula Shield troops an occupying force and an
provide essential and symbolic political cover for the instrument of Saudi control. For the Sunni minority,
NATO-led operation. However, the limited power- they guarantee regime survival, its monarchical char-
projection capabilities of Qatar and the United Arab acter and Bahrain’s Gulf identity. Although only
Emirates (UAE) meant that their direct military Saudi troops remain in Bahrain, the length and nature
contribution was limited and critically dependent on of the Peninsula Shield deployment remains uncer-
Western logistical support: Qatar provided six Mirage tain. Among options considered is the establishment
2000 aircraft plus C-17 rotations: the UAE deployed of Peninsula Shield bases in each of the six GCC states.
six F-16s and six Mirage 2000s. Conversely, the Bahrain intervention may militate
However, Qatar’s deployment of special forces to against the ideal of greater GCC military integration:
train Libyan rebels may have been key to improving although a provision of the GCC charter was invoked,
the rebels’ capabilities. Combined with the lesser smaller Gulf states are wary that this could serve as a
toxicity of being Arab Muslim nations, the ability of precedent for Saudi intervention in their affairs.
the UAE and Qatar to disburse money, deliver weap-
onry, train rebels and provide special-forces assistance An opening for security-sector reform?
without public scrutiny and accountability proved a Among the many grievances that fuelled the Arab
useful adjunct to the NATO air campaign in ensuring Awakening, pervasive state repression and inces-
the fall of Gadhafi. Jordan played a discreet role: it sant police brutality ranked near the top. The initial
too provided fast jets, although it remains unclear spark was the self-immolation of 26-year-old fruit
12 The Military Balance 2012
vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia after a dispute ities and find ways to satisfy popular demands while
with local authorities about a permit for his business. maintaining their influence.
In Egypt, a key Facebook group behind the January
revolution was named ‘We are all Khaled Said’, after The war in Libya
a young man beaten to death by police. Security-
sector reform (SSR), which would include political, In February 2011 internal protest in Libya disinte-
cultural, doctrinal and organisational changes, will be grated into civil war. By mid-March Gadhafi’s forces
necessary to sustain efforts at political liberalisation. had cleared rebels from much of western Libya and
This is a demand of Egypt’s revolutionaries, as were close to recapturing Benghazi, the first city to
evidenced by the storming and subsequent dissolu- rise up. Though some rebel strongholds remained
tion of the State Security Investigations Service, an in the Jebel Nafusa mountains south of Tripoli and
internal-security and counter-terrorism force criti- Misrata to the west, the rebels had little prospect of
cised for its methods. The Interior Ministry was simi- holding out and Gadhafi had signalled his intent to
larly sacked and its head sentenced to jail after the exact retribution. The passing of UN Security Council
revolution. Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, and the subsequent mili-
Yet it remains uncertain whether popular demands tary operations by NATO and non-NATO states,
will lead to significant change. The Supreme Council provided crucial support to rebel forces.
for the Armed Forces (SCAF), Egypt’s de facto ruling NATO forces maintained this military mission
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
body, has agreed to limited reforms under pres- for seven months, and the Alliance ended Operation
sure from the street. But with the military seem- Unified Protector on 31 October, following the fall
ingly unwilling to shoulder the task of maintaining of Sirte, and the death of Gadhafi on 20 October.
fragile internal order for much longer, expediency However, the operation exposed gaps in both NATO
may well prevail over long-term requirements to capability and will, with criticism from senior US
reform the security system. The SCAF has another officials over atrophying capability and continuing
reason to resist wholesale reform: its hold on power falls in funding. Indeed, that the war lasted so long
and steering of the transition is primarily motivated was in some ways a consequence of these resource
by the desire to shape the new political order; to constraints. So while the war might lead to short-term
preserve institutional power and autonomy; and to satisfaction in many European capitals, it highlights a
limit any governmental and parliamentary oversight number of cold realities that European NATO states
of its mission, budget, internal functions or extensive will have to consider.
business interests.
In Bahrain, the Independent Commission of Course of the war
Inquiry established to investigate events including UNSCR 1973, passed on 17 March, authorised ‘all
actions by protesters and security forces during necessary means’ to protect civilians and established
February and March 2011, documented a range of a no-fly zone. It forbade any ‘occupation force’.
abuses by security forces and described the routine Enforcement began on the afternoon of 19 March
use of excess force by these agencies. Its recommen- with French air-strikes on a regime column nearing
dations included the revocation of arrest powers from Benghazi, joined that night by UK and US attacks
the country’s National Security Apparatus and the on Libyan air defences, which were rapidly neutral-
establishment of training programmes for Bahrain’s ised. A maritime force also deployed to enforce an
police. While some low-level officers have been arms embargo. Two weeks later, military command
dismissed pending investigation into their actions, passed from USAFRICOM to NATO. President
the question remains whether the upper echelons of Barack Obama withdrew US forces from direct
the Bahraini security apparatus – many of whom are combat on 4 April, although the US continued to
members of the royal family – will be held account- play a major supporting role, providing suppres-
able, whether the practice of recruiting foreign Sunnis sion of air defences and ISR coverage, and 80% of
will end, and whether the ranks of the security forces NATO air-to-air refuelling. Six months of cumula-
will be opened to Bahraini Shi’ites. Across the Arab tive attrition of regime targets by NATO-led attacks
world, political leaders will find themselves locked followed. The international Libya Contact Group and
in awkward, uncomfortable relations with military NATO’s command structure provided political and
leaders, as both groups struggle to adjust to new real- military frameworks that bound together NATO and
Arab militaries and the Arab Awakening 13
participating non-NATO nations, including Sweden, reflecting UK and French views that the regime was
Jordan, Qatar and the UAE, the latter two nations such a threat to Libyan civilians that it had to be
providing considerable discreet political and military directly attacked. By 20 August, the military, internal
support to the rebels. security and repressive capabilities of the regime had
The campaign initially concentrated on the threat been sufficiently eroded by coalition attacks that it
to rebel enclaves. In the west, a combination of tough was outmatched by both rebel military forces and the
defence and NATO air-strikes defeated regime efforts confidence of anti-Gadhafi citizens of Tripoli. The city
to capture Misrata. The rebels had access to supplies fell to a synchronised operation that combined preci-
brought by sea from eastern Libya, and the failure of sion strikes by NATO, advances and an amphibious
regime attempts to close this access by mine-laying landing by rebel units, activation of sleeper cells,
proved costly. Rebel positions in the Jebel Nafusa public calls for an uprising by anti-government
came close to falling, causing such concern to France imams and external disruption of Libyan state broad-
that it covertly air-dropped weapons and supplies in casting. This was followed by political and military
late May. efforts by the rebels and NTC to stabilise Tripoli,
Political divergence manifested itself in varying prevent retribution and re-start essential services.
degrees of military commitment to the operation. All these efforts were guided, like the NATO mili-
Jordan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Turkey tary effort, by a desire to avoid the perceived failures
limited themselves to supporting roles and flying of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions. Gadhafi’s
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
combat air patrols. After the US withdrawal from death at the end of October marked the end of organ-
combat missions, ground attack was left to Belgian, ised resistance.
Canadian, Danish, French, Norwegian, Qatari, UAE
and UK forces. From April, half the combat power Explaining the outcome
and much of the non-US support, such as intelligence In February and early March, Gadhafi’s security
gathering, was provided by the UK and France. forces were incapable of quickly overwhelming the
Many NATO members, notably Poland and Germany rebels, principally because the regime lacked suffi-
(whose foreign minister publicly criticised NATO’s cient loyal and competent troops. After 19 March,
actions), deployed no forces in harm’s way. Gadhafi’s forces rapidly adapted by concealing
From late June, attacks on regime targets tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and rockets in
increased, benefiting from improved intelligence and urban areas. And they equally rapidly fielded large
surveillance from defectors and the Benghazi-based numbers of armed 4×4 vehicles or ‘technicals’. These
National Transitional Council (NTC). The attacks were agile, manoeuvrable and easy to hide, but as
sought to achieve a coercive effect on the regime lead- they were also the principal rebel weapons platform,
ership to persuade it to comply with UNSCR 1973. it was difficult for NATO to distinguish regime and
But while rebels in the east pushed regime forces rebel columns.
back from the edge of Benghazi, they were unable Gadhafi never articulated a strategy. It may be that
to dislodge government defences at Brega, exposing he was hoping for a ceasefire, followed by a period of
their limited military effectiveness. In the west, rebels negotiation, or he may have hoped that time would
pushed back regime troops encircling Misrata and lead the coalition to fracture. However, the regime
expanded their position in the Jebel Nafusa. The inflicted no NATO casualties. NATO air-strikes
rebels and their supporters used this time to supply neutralised Gadhafi’s air force and air defences and,
arms, improve rebel military and governance capa- in time, neutralised naval and coastal-defence forces,
bility and to improve coordination with NATO. eliminating the regime’s ability to challenge the rebel
Meanwhile, the UK led an international effort to help sea line of communication from Benghazi to Misrata.
the NTC develop a plan for Libyan-led post-conflict No attacks were mounted on NATO ships outside
stabilisation and reconstruction, seeking to avoid the range of coastal artillery, NATO air bases, HQs
the problems experienced after previous conflicts, or command and control networks. There were no
notably Iraq. special forces or state-sponsored terrorist attacks in
Lessons learnt in combat, as well as external coalition states. This forfeited opportunities to inflict
supplies, training and advice, increased the effec- casualties and militarily disrupt NATO forces where
tiveness of the rebel forces. By July NATO adopted they were most vulnerable, or to raise the military
a more aggressive interpretation of UNSCR 1973, and political costs of the operation.
14 The Military Balance 2012
Other ships (10) Belgium: 1 MCMV; France: 1 FSG, 1 AORH; Italy: 1 PSOH, 1 AORH; Netherlands: MCMV; Turkey: 1 AORH; UK: 1
AORH, 1 AFSH, 1 MCMV
Air Assets*
Combat aircraft/UAVs Belgium: 6 Ftr; Canada: 7 FGA, 2 ASW; Denmark: 6 Ftr; France: 4 Ftr, 40 FGA; Italy: 8 Ftr, 20 FGA; Jordan: 6 Ftr;
(182) Netherlands: 6 Ftr; Norway: 6 Ftr; Qatar: 6 FGA; Spain: 4 FGA; Sweden: 8 FGA; Turkey: 8 FGA; UAE: 12 FGA;
UK: 22 FGA; US: 6 FGA, 1 ASW, ε6 Cbt/ISR UAV
Support aircraft/UAVs Canada: 2 Tkr; France: 3 ISR, 4 AEW&C, 7 Tkr; Greece: 1 AEW&C; Italy: 2 Tkr; NATO: 3 AEW&C; Netherlands:
(70) 1 Tkr; Spain: 1 MP, 1 Tkr; Sweden: 1 Tkr; Turkey: 1 Tkr; UK: 1 ISR, 2 AEW&C, 2 Tkr; US: 7 EW, 3 ELINT, 2 ISR, 2
AEW&C, 22 Tkr, 2 ISR UAV
Combat helicopters (17) France: ε2 Atk hel, ε10 MRH hel; UK: 5 Atk hel
*Transport and Search and Rescue aircraft and helicopters are not included
Libya’s revolution Clashes on 20 Feb lead 1. Rebels take control of Benghazi and other
5. Rebels hold 26 Feb–11 Mar to heavy crackdown Air defence infrastructure, eastern cities by 20 Feb. Benghazi is briefly
C2, Scud missiles Sicily threatened by Gadhafi’s eastern push on 18
4. Rebels hold 24 Feb–14 Mar Zuwarah March, leading to establishment of no-fly zone
4 Rebels claim the city on 23 Dernah
5 Zlitan
Air defences Zawiya Tripoli Feb. Loyalist forces ordered
3 Martuba Tobruk
and C2 Zintan to blockade city on 4 Mar 1
Operation Odyssey Dawn Gharyan Misrata Benghazi
Yafren Territory gained by
19–30 March: Nalut Mizdah Sirte Manoeuvre Forces anti-Gadhafi forces
sorties = c. 2,125 Bin Jawaad Manoeuvre Forces
by 1 April
combat sorties = c. 1,050 8 Ras Lanuf 2 2. Held by the rebels from 22 Feb until
7 Disputed cities
Map 1 The War in Libya
Siege of Misrata: 4 Mar–15 May Loyalist ships initially blockaded Stalemate: May–July 2011 Sicily
the port until the start of the Homs Mediterranean Sea Dernah
Nato strikes 19 Mar–May 2: approx no-fly zone. After aid ships began Zuwarah
43 tanks, 18 artillery pieces, 16 other Zlitan
delivering aid supplies and Zawiya Tripoli
vehicles, 8 C2 and 4 bunkers attacked removing wounded, loyalist Benghazi
Zintan Misrata
forces began shelling port Gharyan
M I S R ATA
Refugee camps Yafren
Nalut Sirte
Tripoli Street
H Hospital 25 April Port Mizdah
17 April Ras Lanuf Ajdabiyah
Rebels push
Gadhafi 30 March MALTA Brega
Airport Nato blockade: In late April,
forces back loyalists focused their assault on
Al-Qaryat
12 March Air strike Fighting
the port and laid naval and land
Rebels blocked access for tanks and mines in the area, cutting off rebel
Dahra
Territory held by anti-Gadhafi forces
gradually cleared loyalist snipers. supplies. On 12 May NATO ships
Main loyalist base at the city hospital 11 May engaged loyalist fast patrol boats Hun Waddan Territory held by pro-Gadhafi forces
© IISS
The capture of Tripoli Hundreds of rebels from Endgame: August-October 2011
Misrata landed by boat in 19 March–23 October:
Loyalist military leaders with Sorties = 28,000+
eastern Tripoli on 21 August 22 Aug: Zuwarah c.20–24 Aug: Tripoli Mediterranean Sea
veiled sympathies dispersed
Strike sorties = 10,500+
their forces as rebels moved
from the west into Tripoli 20 Aug: Zawiya 20 Aug: Zlitan
TRIPOLI
Sea port Misrata Benghazi
Military port Zintan
22 Aug: 14 Aug: Tawarga
22 Aug: 14 Aug: Gharyan
TV station Martyr’s Sq. Yafren
22 22 Aug: Airport captured
22 Aug Nalut
Au but loyalists continue to Nafusa 17 Oct: 27 Aug:
g
launch attacks nearby Bani Walid Bin Jawaad
23 Aug: Bab al-Azizia mountains Mizda
20 Oct: Sirte Ajdabiyah
20 Aug: Ben Nabi Mosque – Centre of NATO strikes hit 21
Arab militaries and the Arab Awakening
© IISS
16 The Military Balance 2012
present a threat to the civilian population.’ This warships to attack regime targets was limited by the
careful language indicates the degree to which NATO absence of precision shells for naval guns.
had to ‘finesse’ the diverging views of member states: Although attack helicopters have less endurance
some felt the very nature of the Gadhafi regime meant than fast jets and are more vulnerable to ground
all government forces posed a threat to Libyan civil- fire, their integral surveillance systems, missiles and
ians, while others favoured a narrower interpretation cannon meant that from the outset NATO planners
of the mandate. sought to integrate them into the air campaign, to
As in Afghanistan, NATO successfully integrated complicate the calculations of the regime and to
military contributions from non-NATO states. The release jets to attack targets deeper inland. US Marine
Alliance’s ISR operation grew, from a background Corps attack helicopters could have been deployed
of little understanding of Libya, to produce greatly from amphibious vessels early in the campaign, but
improved situational awareness and targeting data. the US scaling back of combat missions closed this
Airborne ELINT platforms such the US Rivet Joint and option. Halfway through the campaign, an impro-
UK Nimrod R1 proved invaluable, as did the RAF’s vised French and British capability was developed,
Sentinel ground-surveillance radar; this was comple- flying from amphibious assault ships.
mented by information provided by defectors. Once This is just one example of how the campaign plan
potential targets were identified, the combination was under-resourced. In June 2011, then-US Defense
of accurate target data, tight rules of engagement, Secretary Robert Gates stated that the NATO air oper-
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
careful targeting under tight political control, and ations centre in Italy managing the campaign had
precision munitions meant that NATO caused rela- been designed to run 300 sorties a day, but was strug-
tively few civilian casualties; the total remains uncer- gling to manage 150, about one-third the number
tain. flown over the much smaller Serbia/Kosovo theatre in
1999. US targeting specialists were, he said, provided
Initial assessments to augment capacity to run the campaign, a ‘“just in
The NATO campaign was constrained by the terms time” infusion of personnel that may not always be
of the UN mandate and complicated by a lack of full available in future contingencies’.
support within the Alliance. The chief participants NATO airpower had to be divided between
clearly aimed to engineer Gadhafi’s downfall, but protecting the rebel enclaves and attacking regime
were unable to direct NATO to do this. One lesson infrastructure. Operations in Iraq have shown that,
of the war is therefore that political intent – not just without ground troops, the threat of bombardment
the stated political aim – and military means should of urban areas can be countered by the persistent
be aligned from the outset. Failure to achieve this presence of armed aircraft. But there were significant
increases the risks involved. periods of time when regime forces threatening rebel
Recent operations have seen increasing use of territory were not themselves threatened by NATO
precision-guided bombs and missiles, as well as the airpower. For much of the campaign, NATO was only
fitting of guidance systems to land-based artillery, able to suppress a relatively small proportion of the
rockets and mortars. And efforts to minimise civilian attacks on Misrata and the Jebel Nafusa. This meant
casualties and collateral damage have resulted in that the war lasted longer than it would have done,
greater use of smaller warheads. Libya confirmed this had NATO’s campaign plan been fully resourced.
trend. It appears that NATO air and missile attacks This is important because civil wars have their
exclusively used precision weapons. The RAF dual- own dynamics. As they proceed, both sides become
mode Brimstone anti-armour missiles were especially more hostile to each other, war crimes mount, radi-
useful; with their low explosive yield these were calisation increases, organised crime proliferates
successfully used to engage targets in urban areas and damage to civil infrastructure accumulates. As
that could not be targeted by bombs. demonstrated in the Balkans, these factors all make
The role of NATO’s naval force was under- post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction and recon-
reported. As well as enforcing a maritime embargo, ciliation more difficult. Some NATO officials claim
warships gathered considerable intelligence and that these risks will have been offset by the work of
provided radar surveillance. There were some the international community and NTC in planning
exchanges of fire between NATO vessels and Libyan for post-war stabilisation. Whether this is actually the
guns and rocket launchers, but the potential of NATO case remains to be seen.
Arab militaries and the Arab Awakening 17
rebel forces’ effectiveness and coordination. The could have deterred some countries from military
seizure of Tripoli, which included NATO precision action and posed significant challenges to NATO, as
attacks, rebel advances, operations to disrupt Libyan well complicating planning and diverting intelligence
state broadcasting and mass text messaging of city and attack capability from other tasks. The country’s
residents, appeared orchestrated. coastline allowed sea power to be brought to bear
and, as Libya is close to Europe, NATO’s limited stra-
Military-strategic implications tegic lift capability was not tested. Fighting did not
France and the UK exercised considerable political spill over into neighbouring states, and the flight of
and military leadership of the NATO operation and nearly one million people from Libya has not (so far)
their military credibility with NATO and the US has destabilised the region.
increased. London and Paris will claim that the war The most important lessons of the Libyan war may
reinforces the requirement for closer bilateral military be those drawn by authoritarian regimes and states
partnership and has provided practice in this. And and non-state actors that require a military capability
the role played by the UAE and Qatar has increased to deter or fight the US, or other forces similarly trained
their influence with the US and NATO. and equipped. Their military and security planners
In Washington the war has probably increased may deduce that they need to improve their internal-
Congressional and government disillusion with security capabilities (such as well equipped, highly
NATO and many of its European members. In his trained, politically loyal elite forces) to halt protests
June speech, Gates asserted that NATO lacked enough before they develop. They will seek to prevent the
modern capability, said that too many NATO coun- Security Council passing similarly broad resolutions
tries opted out of war, and questioned US willing- and to undermine the formation of any coalitions
ness to shoulder future burdens for NATO. Obama’s against them. They might also see value in striking
decision to ‘lead from behind’ increases the potential enemy infrastructure and employing ‘anti-access’
burden for NATO as a whole, particularly members systems. Finally, they could consider Gadhafi foolish
such as the UK and France that aspire to expedi- to have voluntarily surrendered his WMD capability.
tionary warfighting capabilities and military influ- There will be no shortage of advocacy of particular
ence. This will exacerbate existing military tensions capabilities by interest groups in NATO states, where
within the Alliance. militaries and defence industries will be seeking to
further their own causes, but the military lessons of
Implications for future interventions the Libyan conflict identified in coalition forces’ capi-
The Afghanistan and Iraq interventions succeeded tals are unlikely to be novel. Those drawn by author-
in toppling incumbent regimes, but their planning, itarian regimes could have greater ramifications for
execution and resourcing created many of the diffi- future conflicts.
18 The Military Balance 2012
resulting in superior knowledge of the enemy and they shift focus from the wars of the past ten years
better targeted and more effective strikes. This would to broader strategic challenges. These might accrue
enable a modernised networked force to more rapidly from factors as diverse as the rise of aspirant great
defeat adversaries that had not taken advantage of powers, the impact of territorial disputes on regional
new technologies and doctrines. After the defeat of stability, the effect of piracy, and continuing insur-
the Iraqi army in 2003, the tactics and nature of the gent and terrorist activity; they will also affect, to
insurgents facing coalition troops initially blunted the varying degrees, the development of non-western
edge of this advantage. These adaptable adversaries armed forces.
adopted asymmetric tactics to counter the firepower
and tactics of coalition forces. Ground forces
The principal factor in eventual tactical success Over the last decade, conventional state-versus-state
in Iraq was the rediscovery of counter-insurgency land warfare has been generally confined to the first
(COIN) principles established in earlier wars, applied month of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and the short
by concentrating sufficient ground troops to provide Russia–Georgia war of 2008. Both these wars showed
security for the people through a systematic ‘clear, the vulnerability of conventional armies to an oppo-
hold and build’ approach. Nonetheless, as the Iraq nent with superiority in overall firepower, air power,
War progressed, armies and air forces adapted some and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
instruments of the RMA for counter-insurgency, reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities.
including unmanned aerial vehicles providing Regime change in Iraq, and in Afghanistan, was
persistent surveillance, the use of precision weapons, followed by protracted COIN operations against
and high-capacity command and control networks insurgents, including efforts to build new indig-
capable of bringing accurate fire to bear quickly on enous security forces through training, advising
enemy targets. Improvements in intelligence collec- and mentoring. With such insurgencies the domi-
tion and analysis included closer integration of nant experience, Western armies have as a result
tactical and strategic intelligence. changed a great deal. However, lessons derived from
While the Western wars since 9/11 have been the Western experience – and the developments in
primarily fought on land, operations in Iraq, weapons systems arising from that experience – will
Afghanistan and Libya were, from their inception, likely also influence the development of non-Western
‘joint’, with the need for close integration of land, air armies.
and, to a lesser extent, naval forces. Further, military While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
planning and wider operations increasingly involve confirmed the continuing relevance of the classic prin-
non-military government departments including law ciples of counter-insurgency (including the primacy
enforcement and development bodies and, in some of politics, addressing the root causes of insurgency
Combat and capability: military trends since 9/11 19
and making progress across all areas of governance now weigh 40 tonnes compared with the original 27
and development) it is evident that there has been no tonnes. Armies have also purchased and deployed
substitute – in the absence of effective local security wheeled protected patrol vehicles with special protec-
– for large numbers of troops on the ground or the tion against roadside bombs, such as the US Mine
ability to conduct combined arms combat operations. Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. There
has been greater recognition of the utility of v-shaped
Protection and firepower hull designs, first used in southern Africa in the 1970s.
Iraq and Afghanistan have seen periods of intense The US is currently modifying a number of its Stryker
ground combat, and casualty levels have been corre- vehicles into this configuration.
spondingly high for Western armies, local forces With their combination of firepower, mobility and
and civilians. Insurgents have made extensive use of protection, tanks played a decisive role in the ground
IEDs, including roadside bombs, with lethal effect. component of Iraqi Freedom, the Russian attack on
The IED threat has been similar to that presented by Georgia and in the initial attempts by the Gadhafi
landmines and booby traps in conventional warfare, regime to defeat the Libyan rebels. So, the tank is
but in Iraq and Afghanistan the scale of the threat and not obsolete, but its primary role in recent conflicts
its success in inflicting casualties was a strategic shock has involved supporting infantry and fighting insur-
for many Western armies. With increasing insurgent gents, rather than fighting other tanks. They remain
capability, rising casualties and a decline in support vulnerable to air power: many Taliban, Iraqi and
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
for these wars in the West, protecting troops has Libyan armoured vehicles were destroyed by air-
increased in importance. Improved body armour has launched munitions, albeit in relatively permissive
been fielded to protect individual soldiers, though air environments. Nonetheless, the small-arms fire
this has added to the weight that troops must carry. generated by Iraqi and Afghan insurgents has meant
There have been considerable advances in battle- that firepower from armoured vehicles, including
field medicine, including advanced field dressings, tanks and armoured infantry fighting vehicles, has
deployment of military paramedics down to squad been invaluable, as has close tactical cooperation
level and forward deployment of advanced medical between armoured vehicles and dismounted infantry
technology: as a result, survival rates among those in a wide variety of terrain. And the tank’s main gun
with serious wounds are higher than in any previous has provided a unique capability with which to attack
war. fortified positions resistant to cannon and missiles.
A common counter-IED approach has been The tank’s potential utility is reflected in the moderni-
applied across NATO’s national contingents in sation and upgrade programmes devoted to tank
Afghanistan. Counter-IED has become a core activity fleets around the world. For instance, Brazil, China,
for all deployed troops, and initiatives include equip- India and Russia are all modernising. Conversely,
ping infantry with hand-held detectors and forming some Western states are reducing their tank hold-
bespoke ‘Counter-IED task forces’ with high-tech ings due to budget cuts and questions over the utility
equipment such as remotely-operated ground vehi- of maintaining large tank inventories; this could
cles. But without sufficient troops and air assets to increase the number of recent-generation second-
dominate the ground and deter emplacement of hand tanks available on the international market.
IEDs, the initiative has often remained with the insur-
gents. As airlifting troops can largely circumvent the Combat
IED threat, many countries have bought more heli- Since 9/11, Western armies have engaged in consid-
copters and isolated units are often supplied by para- erably more dismounted close-quarter fighting than
chute. However, even the US is limited in the number in the previous decade. The requirement for ‘boots
of troops and supplies it can move by air with its on the ground’ makes infantry the dominant army
helicopters, so logistics vehicles have in turn also had branch in counter-insurgency and conventional
armour and jammers added. fighting in urban areas. Efforts have been made to
Vehicles have been fitted with additional armour, enhance infantry effectiveness through improved
air-conditioning, remotely operated weapons and weapons, sights, hand-held laser range-finders, more
electronic countermeasures, which have increased effective tactical communications nets and night-
their size and weight: variants of the British Warrior vision devices. There has been a notable revival in
infantry fighting vehicle in Afghanistan, for example, sniping. But this ‘infantry renaissance’ has not yet
20 The Military Balance 2012
resulted in a decisive increase in the effectiveness of Rapid adaptation has not been confined to
Western armies’ infantry, partly because the weight western armies: adversaries have also adapted.
of additional equipment and body armour, combined Insurgent roadside bomb technology in Iraq devel-
with the IED threat, has slowed troops down. oped in response to coalition tactics and equipment.
Iraq and Afghanistan have driven a greater appre- In 2011, meanwhile, Gadhafi’s army adapted to
ciation within Western armies of the need to protect NATO attacks by dispersing weaponry in urban areas
the local civilian population, which has led to more to make it more difficult for NATO to engage them.
restrictive rules of engagement and increased use of This in turn led aircraft implementing UNSCR 1973 to
precision weapons. In Afghanistan, US and British use lower-yield precision munitions when engaging
forces have used guided artillery rockets extensively, targets from the air. Gadhafi-loyalists also switched
often instead of air-dropped munitions. Integration much of their capability into armed 4x4 vehicles or
of tactical airpower with land forces has improved. ‘technicals’, making it difficult to distinguish between
Tactical air-control parties now routinely deploy to regime troops and rebels.
company level and below. There has been extensive The Libyan war also illustrated the importance of
use of attack helicopters for precision strike, close air training and leadership. It lasted so long principally
support and escort duties. Armed unmanned aerial because of the low standard of military effectiveness
vehicles (UAVs), such as the Predator and Reaper, have among the rebels. That Western units kept fighting in
similarly been integrated into the tactical battle on Iraq and Afghanistan with considerable effectiveness
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
land, both for intelligence, surveillance and recon- is, in the main, evidence of high standards of lead-
naissance (ISR) and weapons delivery. ership and morale, reinforced by demanding and
comprehensive training.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have underlined Implications
the proposition that the single most important source Since 9/11, fighting at squad, platoon and company
of intelligence in COIN is the local population. This level has remained similar in nature to that expe-
requires decentralised intelligence capabilities and rienced in Korea and Vietnam. But it is not just the
use of human intelligence teams to cultivate and new emphasis on heavy optimisation for counter-
exploit informants. There have been concerted efforts insurgency that has changed armies; other aspects of
to enhance intelligence-gathering on the ground, their deployment and operations are different from
and as a result intelligence staffs across ISAF have those suited to combined-arms manoeuvre against a
expanded at all levels from corps to company. These conventional land army. This is particularly evident
developments are complemented by expanded intel- in the static layout of security bases, which allow
ligence gathering from manned and unmanned lavish logistical support and extensive communica-
aircraft, improvements in intelligence fusion at the tions infrastructure, on a larger scale than could be
tactical and strategic levels, and greater integration achieved in manoeuvre operations. However, such
of national strategic intelligence with military tactical major bases have been vulnerable to insurgent attack,
intelligence. and Western armies have had to develop countermea-
sures, including deploying radars and guns against
Adaptation, leadership and training rocket attack in Iraq.
Having initially been poorly prepared for counter- Land warfare now requires the ability to inte-
insurgency in Iraq, US forces demonstrated impres- grate traditional combined-arms fire and manoeuvre
sive adaptability to the unanticipated demands of the with reconstruction, development and informa-
campaign. This included tactics as well as the rapid tion operations. These capabilities were previously
fielding of new and improved equipment, such as seen by most Western armies as peripheral, and
the MRAP. Funding for these improvements has such capability as existed was often generated from
sometimes been found by delaying or postponing the reserves rather than from regular troops. As US
new generation equipment. The most important Army Lt-Gen Michael Vane (Director of the US Army
adaptation was the rapid evolution of a successful Capabilities Integration Center) has said, ‘special-
tactical approach to COIN. This flowed as much ized skills are essential for successful operations.
from organisation, doctrine and culture as it did They include operational adaptability, cultural and
from technology. language proficiency, negotiation, digital literacy and
Combat and capability: military trends since 9/11 21
space knowledge, weapons technical intelligence, and from minesweeping to anti-submarine warfare and
site exploitation. These specialized skills must now troop transport, depending on its configuration. The
become universal tasks.’ How this is to be achieved UK’s Global Combat Ship (the Type 26) is likely to be
by Western armies is not yet clear. another multirole ship, approximately 1,000 tonnes
As Western armies withdraw from Afghanistan, lighter than the 6,000 tonnes full-load displacement
most will need time to refurbish and maintain equip- originally envisaged. Rather than there being the two
ment, much of which will be worn out. Moreover, sub-classes of vessel (anti-submarine warfare and
the primary orientation of Western armies towards general-purpose) that were originally planned, there
COIN will need to be balanced by reconstituting the will be now be only one version of the Type 26 for
capability to perform the full spectrum of roles often the Royal Navy. A similar trend towards procuring
required by defence policies. Meanwhile, many of the multi-purpose vessels is also clear in Germany’s
advanced conventional weapons previously hoped MEKO series of combatants.
for have been cancelled or delayed as a result of finan- Austerity is accentuating the trend towards more
cial constraints that have grown since 2008. Some affordable, flexible platforms. Budget cuts in major
lessons of the last decade’s wars, probably including Western armed forces are encouraging acquisition
the extensive use of UAVs, body armour, precision of fewer and smaller vessels against the backdrop of
artillery and improvements to dismounted infantry, a relatively benign security environment. Creating
will become core capabilities for Western armies, and consortia is an option increasingly used to share
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
will be studied closely by armies around the world. development costs of major surface combatants. The
Other capabilities, such as MRAP-style protected UK is negotiating with potential partners as diverse
patrol vehicles with limited cross-country mobility, as Australia, Brazil, New Zealand and possibly Chile
may be judged less useful for future ‘general purpose’ for involvement in the Type 26 project. Another
armies. example of a consortium-based project is the ongoing
Franco-Italian FREMM frigate programme, which
Maritime saw its first vessel launched last year with commis-
Although the major conflicts since 9/11 have been sioning expected in 2012 and follows on from the
primarily land-based, naval forces have been involved Franco-Italian Horizon project of the 2000s.
in a wide range of roles, from amphibious assault to Such multirole vessels are not necessarily small: the
carrier-strike aviation in 2001, 2003 and, to a lesser Type 26 will be significantly larger than the Type 42
extent in 2011, as well as maritime patrol and littoral destroyers currently being replaced and the FREMM
manoeuvre. However, the principal focus has been on is as heavy as the Tourville-class destroyers currently
combating asymmetric threats, particularly terrorism, being phased out in France. Multirole vessels often
piracy, counter-narcotics and the threat from fast need to be larger than their single-role equivalents
attack craft. Some navies have learned lessons from as they must embark more equipment, unless they
these roles relating to platform utility and design, as are truly modular, as with the LCS. Nonetheless,
well as integration with air and special forces, and the the move towards multirole vessels reflects the main
developing role of non-lethal weapons. Developed priorities of navies’ sea-based roles today. Although
countries, in particular, are pursuing programmes large destroyers and cruisers are still necessary for
involving multirole vessels, a shift from the twen- power projection and carrier escort, the possibility
tieth century concept of mission-specific vessels. This of a significant state-to-state naval conflict currently
change is also being driven by the challenge of main- seems low. As such, the primary missions of today’s
taining viable fleets and enhancing platform capabili- major navies usually involve dealing with asym-
ties within the context of restricted funding. metric threats, particularly small, fast enemies, such
as pirates, criminals, potentially sea-based terrorists
Multirole vessels and the fast-attack missile craft of developing states’
The concept of modular or multirole vessels reflects navies. These roles require a range of capabilities and
the main operational demands on navies today. The flexibility, rather than the largest capital ships avail-
US Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is perhaps the best able with extensive anti-air warfare capabilities.
example of a modular, multirole vessel: designed to The proliferation of a range of anti-ship missiles
operate in coastal and littoral waters, it is a small, is a concern for developed countries’ navies: these
frigate-sized ship designed to perform roles ranging offer the user the ability to engage the slower, larger
22 The Military Balance 2012
vessels of major navies at relatively little expense. The powers. China sent its first aircraft carrier on sea
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, for instance, has trials in 2011; India is purchasing a refitted Soviet
a fleet of small, fast attack craft that are now armed carrier while simultaneously planning to build
with C-702 anti-ship missiles. These could be used in a two more carriers indigenously. Brazil continues to
swarm effect or with hit-and-run tactics against larger operate a former Clemenceau-class carrier, although
vessels. Similarly, China’s fleet of Type 022 fast attack its service life is questionable and a replacement may
craft, which each carry eight YJ-83 anti-ship missiles, be sought. This only serves to further highlight the
would likely be employed as very mobile platforms dichotomy between developed and developing coun-
in coastal and littoral defence. Indonesia is also devel- tries’ spending and procurement trends. The former
oping its force of missile-armed fast attack craft. continue to move towards smaller, more mobile plat-
Other traditional roles are also in flux or seeing forms adaptable for asymmetric warfare. Developing
decreasing demand. Naval gunfire support, the stal- states in some cases show increasing interest in major
wart weapon of the imperial era, is of seemingly platforms while continuing to pursue exactly those
decreasing utility in the modern age. While utilised in asymmetric warfare capabilities that so concern
the Libyan campaign in 2011, many of the shells fired developed states’ defence planners and naval staffs.
were starbursts rather than high-explosive projectiles.
The vagaries of modern warfare, requiring greater Platform developments
accuracy and fewer civilian casualties, have made However, both developed and developing states’
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
naval gunfire support a less attractive option. Various navies are interested in deploying more and larger
programmes are currently under way to develop amphibious assault vessels, essentially the largest
guided artillery rounds or rocket-assisted munitions form of multirole vessel available. For developed
that would permit greater use in contested shore envi- countries, these ships offer the opportunity to deploy
ronments, such as the BAE Systems/Lockheed Martin rotary wing airpower at sea without using their
Long-range Land Attack Projectile to be used on the limited aircraft carriers, while also providing the flex-
Zumwalt-class destroyer’s Advanced Gun System and ibility to deploy amphibious forces. In developing
Oto Melara’s Vulcano long-range guided ammunition. countries, where aircraft carrier programmes may
be small or non-existent but the desire to project air
Large platforms persist power at sea remains, amphibious assault vessels
In light of this, the UK Royal Navy’s new Type 45 either fill the power projection gap or can act as
destroyer appears to be something of an anomaly. a stepping stone towards larger carriers. Russia’s
Priced at £1 billion per vessel, the Type 45 seems December 2010 decision to purchase four Mistral-
at odds with current Royal Navy priorities, which class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) from France
focus on threats from asymmetric warfare. This helps emphasises the desire for multirole vessels, as they
explain why the initial requirement of 12 was halved act as both helicopter carrier and amphibious assault
to six in 2004. Primarily an anti-air-warfare vessel, vessel, carrying up to 16 heavy helicopters, 40 tanks
they are also carrier escorts, but in a navy with no and 900 troops. South Korea commissioned the first
current carrier strike capabilities, it is unclear whether of its Dokdo-class LHDs in 2007, while Spain brought
the ship is the right fit for present demands. Similarly, the Juan Carlos I into service in 2010. Landing plat-
planned numbers of the Zumwalt-class destroyer to form docks (LPDs), meanwhile, offer amphibious
be built by the US, at a cost of more than US$3bn per capabilities with reduced helicopter carrying capa-
ship, have been cut from 32 to just three. Budget cuts bility: China commissioned its first Type 071 LPD in
have also forced Western navies to reduce their plans 2007 (with a second undergoing sea trials and a third
for new aircraft carriers. The UK has opted to do in build) and Chile purchased the Foudre from France
without carrier strike capabilities until 2020, and then in October 2011. Algeria ordered a San Giorgio-class
will pursue an Anglo-French carrier capability based LPD from Italy in August 2011 which, if delivered,
on two operational carriers with fixed-wing aircraft. would be a substantial boost to its amphibious capa-
Even the US Navy has debated cutting one of its 11 bilities. Australia, meanwhile, purchased the landing
aircraft carriers in a bid to save costs. ship dock RFA Largs Bay from the UK, which was offi-
In the developing world, however, economic cially handed over in October 2011.
growth has remained robust and aircraft carriers The utility of rotary-wing naval aviation has been
remain a major procurement item for emerging proven in recent missions, from the intelligence-gath-
Combat and capability: military trends since 9/11 23
ering capabilities of counter-piracy missions to attack and to provide intelligence, surveillance and recon-
helicopters off the coast of Libya. Although helicop- naissance (ISR). However, the funding crisis facing
ters are more vulnerable to air defences, in conflicts many governments and defence ministries is having
involving near-total air dominance, they can enhance a profound effect on military aerospace, particularly
capabilities and, at sea, they increase a ship’s radius in Europe. It is also – along with the lessons of recent
of action, making them invaluable when dealing with conflicts – helping to propel developments in the
smaller, faster vessels. technology, employment and even theory of air and
Diesel-electric submarines (SSK) equally appeal to space power. In common with the land and sea envi-
both developing and developed country navies that ronments, these will be studied closely by defence
aim to improve their sea denial (as opposed to sea planners and air staffs in countries which are still
control) capabilities without the expense and expertise prospering economically.
required for nuclear submarine operations. Countries While air power’s contemporary utility is not
in Southeast Asia have been active in this field. Vietnam in question, there is less certainty among strategic
has ordered six Kilo-class submarines, Malaysia thinkers and defence planners in the US (where air
has taken delivery of its first two SSKs, Singapore is power has long been central to national war-fighting
bringing the Archer-class of upgraded ex-Swedish and deterrent capacity) and elsewhere over its future
boats into service, and Indonesia and Thailand are direction. The recent wars in which the US has been
expressing interest in new submarine purchases. Japan engaged have generated doctrinal uncertainty over
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
is seeking to expand the number of its submarines how to best configure the air force and other US mili-
from 16 to 22, while Australia has long-term plans for tary aviation in the face of a kaleidoscope of emerging
12 new, larger SSKs as replacements for its six Collins- threats.
class boats. These developments may at least in part
indicate unease over China’s efforts to enhance its ISR
own submarine capabilities. In Europe, Germany and During the initial phases of military operations in
Italy will commission the last of their Type 212 subma- Afghanistan and Iraq leading to regime change,
rines in 2012 and 2014 respectively, while Algeria has advanced ISR and air-launched precision weapons
improved its capabilities with two improved Kilo-class enabled the US and its allies to deploy ground forces
boats. Air-independent propulsion, which allows these at substantially lower levels than would previously
submarines to patrol without having to snorkel, is also have been required. ISR gave the West an asym-
an increasingly common feature. metric edge in terms of improved tactical- and
Overall, the past decade has greatly influenced theatre-level situational awareness. These campaigns
naval thinking and tactics in developed navies. have seen a distribution of ISR assets to platoon
Multirole vessels are increasingly common as the level, enhancing the usability and timeliness of their
perceived threat has migrated from state-based product. Meanwhile, ISR platforms now boast an
naval assets to non-state threats from small, fast array of sensors and systems across an increasingly
craft. Ship-to-shore power projection, particularly in broad range of radar frequencies and electro-optical
the initial stages of a land campaign, mean aircraft bandwidths, with new developments in multi-spec-
carriers, amphibious assault ships and their escorts tral imagery systems. Systems such as the Predator
remain relevant, but the declining use of traditional UAV have also been developed as weapons plat-
naval gunnery and vulnerability to anti-ship missiles forms. Combat operations over Libya during 2011
undermines, in the short term at least, the utility of further reinforced awareness of the value of air- and
capital ships. Nonetheless, key emerging countries space-based ISR systems. Space-based ISR as well as
still perceive a strong navy as crucial to ensuring communications systems, traditionally the domain
the security of their increasingly globalised interests, of only a handful of states, will likely proliferate
and will pursue major shipbuilding programmes to following the emergence of cheaper, and smaller,
improve their power projection at sea. satellites. The UK has considered small satellites as a
means of acquiring a national geo-spatial intelligence
Aerospace capability, while Singapore has examined the utility
The conflicts since 9/11 in Iraq, Afghanistan and of comparatively low-cost remote sensing satellites.
Libya have underscored the strategic importance of Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, also known as
airpower to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic effect, RPAS or Remotely Piloted Air Systems) have emerged
24 The Military Balance 2012
from recent wars as important platforms for carrying of US military aviation, to continue reducing their
ISR systems. Equipping a UAV with a capable sensor personnel and orders of battle. The UK’s 2010 Strategic
suite and an endurance of tens of hours is of immense Defence and Security Review further cut the Royal
value, but also raises the issue of survivability. The Air Force. The latest defence cuts announced in the
level of airborne ISR available in Afghanistan and Netherlands in April 2011 axed a fighter squadron,
Libya is highly desirable for Western armed forces, while a German review in late October is expected to
but similar provision in contested air space would be lead to reductions in the size of the air force.
another, possibly much more costly matter. In Iraq
the permissive air environment enabled the US to New generations
deploy a successful lower-cost platform in the form of While the US F-35 programme struggles with delays
the MC-12 Liberty ISR aircraft, based on the 350 King and cost escalation, watched with anxiety by partner
Air, which moved from concept to first mission-flight nations in the project, Russia and China are flight-
in less than a year; less costly solutions like this might testing their own ‘fifth-generation’ combat aircraft.
prove attractive to militaries with less resources. Three Sukhoi T-50s were being used for flight trials
Anticipated cost savings may have influenced by late 2011, and the Chengdu J-20 first flew in
interest in unmanned systems, but experience over January 2011. After well over a decade of stagnation,
the past decade shows that these systems – at least Russia has revitalised its defence aerospace research
at the high-end – are expensive and require a consid- and development. Whether, and to what extent, it can
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
erable number of support personnel. These systems maintain this effort in the medium-to-long term is
may thus only be affordable for rich, technologically- uncertain: Russia’s defence industry – while innova-
advanced states’ air forces. This problem of afford- tive and capable in small-scale production – continues
ability may be even more acute in relation to the to face challenges in serially producing equipment
low-observable long-range combat UAVs now in the (see Russia, p. 183). The collapse of defence spending
early stages of development. While such systems will in the 1990s resulted in the contraction of Russia’s
doubtless find a place in future air force inventories, defence industry, and a loss of intellectual capital.
the extent and pace of their introduction, and the way This adversely affected serial production manufac-
they are employed operationally (not least in terms turing capacity. For Beijing, the J-20 marks a step
of the level of autonomy granted to the platform) change in ambition from the Chengdu J-10 fighter,
all remain areas of contention. Air arms will need to though how quickly and on what scale production of
consider carefully the optimum force balance between operational variants will commence is unclear.
manned and unmanned platforms, the ownership Nonetheless both the T-50 and J-20 projects high-
and operation of which is likely to remain a source light a closing of the defence-technology gap with the
of friction between armed services. There have been US and Europe. Given the constraints on US defence
debates in the US and in the UK over ownership of spending, Washington may have to accept a reduced
UAVs between respective air and land forces. technological edge, though it will try to ensure that
it remains ahead of its rivals. The Russian, and prob-
Funding for air power ably eventually Chinese, platforms may proliferate as
The funding problems facing many air forces, notably a result of export sales, offering some nations access
in the West, are jeopardising procurement plans. Still to high-capability combat aircraft not available from
deeper cuts are in prospect. One important example the West. Moscow has already secured Delhi as a
concerns US Air Force tactical combat aircraft. The partner in the T-50, while Beijing shows every inten-
USAF’s ageing fighters need to be replaced: the tion of increasing its defence aerospace exports. The
majority of F-15s are more than 20 years old, while JF-17 is already in service with Pakistan. Moscow is
most F-16s are around 15–20 years old. However, promoting what may be the ultimate version of the
delays to the Lockheed Martin F-35 programme, and Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, the Su-35S, for export.
the threat of an extended and reduced procurement But combat and ISR platforms are not alone in
of that type, pose major problems for air force plan- receiving closer attention from air force planners.
ners. Life-extension programmes for combat aircraft Recent wars have reinforced the value of air-to-air
will place additional strain on air force budgets. refuelling as well as strategic and tactical airlift. In
Meanwhile, funding constraints are forcing many the latter case, fixed- and rotary-wing platforms have
European air arms, as well as the various branches been increasingly employed for in-theatre movement,
Combat and capability: military trends since 9/11 25
as one response to the growing use of IEDs targeting penetrators as well as warheads in order to attack
ground forces and their logistic trains. Meanwhile, hardened and buried targets more effectively. Small
there has been development in the tactical use of PGM, meanwhile, are becoming smaller: this can
air power, with greater integration of ground and help to increase the number that aircraft can carry,
air forces on operations, improvements in close-air- while reduced warhead size is intended to mini-
support through greater use of forward air controllers mise collateral damage and non-combatant casual-
and improved munitions, as well as the devolution ties. Maximising the weapons-load by minimising
of airborne ISR platforms and products throughout warhead size becomes important when engaging
ground units. targets in congested terrain; it is also desirable when
platform numbers are under increasing pressure.
PGM and missiles
The US, Russia, China, the UK and France are among Learning lessons
the states continuing to develop laser and radio The wars of the last ten years have had a profound
frequency directed energy weapons. While the US effect in modifying the types of military operations
has continued research into airborne lasers , it is likely Western armed forces have performed in these
to be applied to defend against tactical, rather than conflicts. They have led to developments in the equip-
ballistic, missiles. High-power microwave payloads ments used to prosecute these campaigns and stim-
are being developed for cruise missiles. This type ulated debates over the resources that armed forces
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
of warhead can generate a localised electromagnetic will need for the future. For Western armed forces,
pulse that can damage or disable electronic systems. adapting to the conditions on the ground in Iraq and
Russia and China are re-equipping their inven- Afghanistan provided a challenge that only began
tories of air-launched weapons. The lessons offered to be addressed with a measure of success when
by US-led campaigns over the past decade – and in sufficient troops were deployed to enable sustained
Russia’s case, its experience in Georgia – have led counter-insurgency, a strategy requiring the reacqui-
both Moscow and Beijing to switch to developing sition of specific skills and resources. Against oppo-
and re-equipping their air arms with precision- nents who fought back hard and were able to both
guided munitions (PGM). Both states also continue sustain and inflict substantial casualties, Western
to develop satellite navigation systems primarily for military units needed to prepare for major combat
military purposes, to assist navigation and weapons operations. These wars have also necessitated the
guidance. The Russian air force has introduced a adaptation of existing equipment and the acquisi-
conventional long range air-launched land-attack tion of new equipment to fit the requirements of these
cruise missile (LACM), the Kh-555, into its inventory, theatres. Defence establishments and industries will
as has China with the YJ-63. Beijing also continues be considering how they can increase responsiveness
to develop an air-launched variant of its DH-10 in procurement planning cycles, so that adapted capa-
ground-launched LACM. Conventionally-armed bility can be generated more through conventional
cruise-missile systems and technologies continue to procurement streams rather than as, in the UK case,
proliferate, both in the land attack and anti-ship roles. urgent operational requirements. There is also, across
Indonesia test-fired the Russian 3M-55 (SS-N-26) in all services involved in recent Western campaigns,
April 2011, while Pakistan continued to develop the a greater appreciation of the need to protect civilian
Ra’ad ALCM and the Babur GLCM. Syria ordered the lives, with corresponding restrictions on rules of
Bastion coastal defence version of the 3M-55. As air engagement. Increasing stress is being placed in the
defence technology improves, cruise-missile devel- West on equipment and forces that can be config-
opers are considering very low-observability plat- ured for different operations, as well as being rela-
forms with reduced radar cross-sections, as well tively inexpensive. At the same time, Western states
as high-speed cruise missiles, as countermeasures. face difficult choices over which equipment will have
The US is carrying out both stealth and high-speed enduring utility after withdrawal from Afghanistan.
research, with the same paths being explored in Some lessons will endure from the past ten years.
Russia. India is also planning high-speed weapons The importance of ISR and force protection are two,
research in conjunction with Russia. and both will probably see increased investment
In terms of warheads, large PGM are growing in around the world though, as the MC-12 aircraft noted
size, with some systems designed to accommodate above demonstrates, militaries requiring competent
26 The Military Balance 2012
ISR platforms for operations in non-contested airspace security operations in Gaza and the West Bank at the
need not always consider the latest high-end UAVs. expense of training in combined arms war-fighting.
Flexibility of platforms and flexibility of forces are For Western governments, the unpopularity of the
further lessons: adaptation to the changing require- Iraq and Afghanistan wars may make it more difficult
ments of military campaigns has been demonstrably to contemplate using force than in the aftermath of the
important. Thorough training is essential to the flex- Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, particularly if a conflict
ibility of forces. Furthermore, military planners will is likely to involve a substantial ground commit-
be increasingly aware that adversaries may seek to ment, and with defence budgets already contracting
leverage asymmetric advantages in conflict, examples and likely to shrink further as forces are withdrawn
of which could include cyber activity and IEDs. They from Afghanistan, maintaining the large personnel
will probably also have to take account of the capa- strengths utilised in recent COIN campaigns will
bility of some adversaries to challenge them conven- prove more difficult. Non-western governments,
tionally as well as in asymmetric ways: In its 2006 war often with diverse recent military experiences and
against Hizbullah, Israel fought a hybrid opponent defence priorities, may look to the West for lessons,
that displayed a mixture of capabilities and tactics and perhaps pointers to useful capabilities, organisa-
that might be expected in regular as well as insurgent tions and tactics, but they may be less constrained by
opponents. Israeli forces suffered a number of mili- finances. In many of these states, moves to modernise
tary shocks, not least those arising from unrealistic or recapitalise forces, capabilities and precise equip-
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
expectations of what networked forces and precision ment and weapons variants – and how and in what
weapons could achieve. The Israeli Army’s effective- contingencies these forces and capabilities will be
ness had been reduced as a result of preparing for employed – will be driven by local defence priorities.
The war in Afghanistan
The war in Afghanistan remains the main focus of elite Civil Order Police are still well above the 1.4%
military effort for the US and many other countries in monthly target.
NATO and beyond (see The Military Balance 2011, p.
9), as the refusal to divert resources from Afghanistan The war in 2011
to the Libya campaign demonstrated. But despite ISAF continued offensive operations in 2011, for
some military successes, and record numbers of example successfully contesting insurgent control of
foreign troops, political progress remains elusive. Kunduz and Balkh provinces. This built on progress
In November 2010, NATO and Afghan President in 2010, which included improved intelligence, clear-
Hamid Karzai agreed that Afghan authorities would ance of Taliban strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar
take the lead for security across the country from the provinces, and significant attrition of insurgent leaders
end of 2014, a move enabled by the 2009–10 surge inside Afghanistan by special forces. In July 2011,
of 30,000 additional US troops. In June 2011 US Lashkar Gah (the provincial capital of Helmand);
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
President Barack Obama announced that the surge Kabul (less one district); Bamiyan; Panjsher; Herat;
had peaked and numbers would begin to reduce, Mazar-e Sharif and Mehtar Lam were transferred
with 10,000 US troops due to depart by the end of to Afghan security leadership. A second tranche of
2011. Remaining surge reinforcements were to be districts and provinces was announced in November
withdrawn by September 2012. Obama stated that 2011, to begin transition by the end of the year.
the remaining 68,000 US forces would be ‘coming Southern Afghanistan remained the main effort;
home at a steady pace’ as the Afghan National it appeared that ISAF’s offensive operations to clear
Security Forces (ANSF) assumed security leadership. and hold populated areas in the south had improved
US General David Petraeus, then commander of the security there. Although the insurgents continued
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to attack ISAF and ANSF with small arms and IEDs
(ISAF), recommended a much smaller drawdown. throughout the country, the territorial gains of 2010
US Marine Corps General John Allen, who replaced were not reversed. Indeed, NATO displayed cautious
Petraeus in July 2011, is conducting a review of the optimism that security improvements would endure.
campaign plan and the development of the ANSF. For example, British officers and officials were confi-
The ANSF continued to grow during 2011. By dent that the combination of greater troop numbers,
October, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and successful ‘clear, hold and build’ operations, growing
Afghan National Police (ANP) were around their ANSF capability and confidence, the successful
target strengths of 171,600 and 134,000 respectively.
The intent is to have 195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP
Just how capable?
by 31 October 2012, and these targets will probably In June 2011, ISAF delivered the following assessment of ANA
be met. The ANA is improving its combat support capability: Of six corps and one divisional HQ, all but one of
and combat service support and, as NATO forces these formations were capable of operating with ‘partnered
reduce, it will probably be capable of holding those assistance’; 17 of 20 brigades had reached the same level; of
areas in southern Afghanistan that are now clear 158 kandaks (battalions) two were independent, 55 effective
of insurgents. The ANP will also progress, but its with advisers, 56 effective with assistance and the remainder
effectiveness is dependent on wider improvements ‘developing’. By 2014, the majority need to be independent
in the justice system, including courts, lawyers and or effective with advisers. This transition will require practical
prisons. These areas lag even further behind, with assessment, not that driven by scorecards, by combined ISAF
and ANSF commanders and the Afghan government. Many
reports that NATO will decline to send detainees
units are now being tested and some, such as special forces,
to Afghan prisons that fall below minimum inter-
are well rated, although all operate with ISAF supporting
national standards. Although there has been some assets available. The real test for the ANSF will come in 2014
reduction in casualty and absence rates, the attri- and afterwards.
tion rates for the ANA, the border police and the
28 The Military Balance 2012
handover of Lashkar Gah to Afghan security lead- Karzai subsequently stated that he would no longer
ership, and the maturing of many civilian develop- talk to the Taliban, implying he would negotiate with
ment projects meant that Helmand was on the way Pakistan instead.
to a successful transition to Afghan security lead by
the end of 2014. Assessment
There was a modest reduction in the level of As the 2011 fighting season drew to a close, it was
NATO fatalities – 285 in the first six months of difficult to reconcile NATO’s cautious optimism with
2011 compared with 324 in the same period in the UN’s reporting of increased violence, the apparent
2010. However, civilian deaths rose. In its mid-year success of the insurgent assassination campaign and
report in July 2011, the UN Assistance Mission in media coverage of the ‘spectacular’ attacks in Kabul.
Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 1,462 civilian Although UN statistics show a sustained increase in
deaths in the first six months of the year, an increase complex and ‘spectacular’ attacks, they also suggest
of 15% over the same period in 2010. UNAMA said that insurgents were less successful in areas where
that the main factors behind this rise were ‘increased there is a high density of NATO and Afghan forces.
and widespread use of IEDs, more complex suicide NATO spokespeople claimed that this demonstrated
attacks, an intensified campaign of targeted kill- not only the tactical success of clearance operations,
ings, increased ground fighting, and a rise in civilian but also the impact of the special-forces-led attacks
deaths from air strikes’. In total, UNAMA reported, on insurgent leadership. But significant security chal-
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
‘80% of all civilian deaths in the first half of 2011 were lenges remain. Parts of southern Afghanistan outside
attributed to Anti-Government Elements (up 28% the ‘cleared’ areas remain under insurgent control.
from the same period in 2010), 14% were attributed The end of the surge means that it is unlikely that
to Pro-Government Forces (down 9% from the same further offensive operations would clear more of
period in 2010) and 6% were unattributed.’ Helmand and Kandahar.
The UN Secretary-General’s September 2011 report There has been much less military progress in
to the Security Council assessed that the average eastern Afghanistan, the heartland of the Haqqani
number of security incidents from January to August Network. This insurgent group has been responsible
2011 showed a 39% increase compared with the for the series of ‘spectaculars’ against iconic targets in
same period in 2010. Although there was no overall Kabul. Although these have all been contained and
increase in suicide attacks, the use of suicide bombers then neutralised by the ANSF with ISAF support, they
in complex, ‘spectacular’ attacks had increased by suggest weaknesses in the ANSF’s ability to secure
50% since 2011. In Kabul, ‘spectaculars’ in summer their capital. If such attacks continue with sufficient
2011 included attacks on the InterContinental Hotel, frequency they will create, both within Afghanistan
the British Council, the US embassy and ISAF HQ. and internationally, a pervasive impression of ungov-
Less attention was given to attacks outside Kabul, ernability and failure of transition.
including those in Tarin Kot, Kandahar city and If the insurgent campaign of assassination
Jalalabad. All of these were contained and then continues at the same intensity as in late 2011, it may
defeated by the ANSF, with limited support from cause significant attrition to politicians and officials. It
ISAF advisers and helicopters. also seeks to intimidate the population and reinforce
Insurgents have also intimidated and assassi- propaganda that insurgent victory is inevitable after
nated politicians and security and government offi- 2014.
cials. Much of this effort has been in Kandahar where US troop reductions will probably be matched,
the deputy provincial governor, mayor, provincial if not overtaken, by similar reductions in the 40,000
police chief, head of the Kandahar Shura, as well non-US troops in the country. The Netherlands and
as junior and mid-ranking officials, have all been Canada have withdrawn combat troops, leaving
killed. Two influential figures close to Karzai were reduced contingents training the ANSF. Denmark
also murdered: his special adviser Jan Muhammad plans to reduce troops in combat roles, whilst
Khan and Ahmed Wali Karzai, his half-brother and increasing the number of Danish military and police
an important Pashtun power broker. Meanwhile, trainers. The UK announced that its 10,000-strong
the October 2011 assassination of former president force would be reduced by 1,000 troops by the end
Burhanuddin Rabbani suggested that some insur- of 2012 and that any UK troops remaining after 2014
gents wanted to derail Kabul’s efforts to negotiate. will no longer be in a combat role.
The war in Afghanistan 29
Map 2 Afghanistan
Estimated troop contributions of NATO–ISAF nations – October 2011 Rep. of Korea (ROK) 350 New Zealand (NZL) 188 Sweden (SWE) 614
Albania 286 Canada (CAN) 529 Georgia 937 Latvia 174 Norway (NOR) 562 Tonga 55
Armenia 126 Croatia 317 Germany (GER) 5,150 Lithuania (LTU) 236 Poland (POL) 2,580 Turkey (TUR) 1,840
Australia (AUS) 1,550 Czech Republic (CZE) 694 Greece 153 Luxembourg 11 Portugal 229 Ukraine 23
Austria 3 Denmark (DNK) 750 Hungary (HUN) 415 Macedonia (FYROM) 163 Romania 1,947 United Arab Emirates 35
Azerbaijan 94 El Salvador 24 Iceland 4 (civilians) Malaysia 46 Singapore 39 UK 9,500
Belgium 577 Estonia (EST) 162 Ireland 7 Mongolia 114 Slovakia 326 US 90,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina 55 Finland 195 Italy (ITA) 4,213 Montenegro 39 Slovenia 87 US (OEF-A) 7,000
Bulgaria 597 France (FRA) 3,932 Jordan 720 Netherlands (NLD) 183 Spain (ESP) 1,526 Total (rounded) 137,638
× || ||
US ISAF Provincial 232 (GER)
Reconstruction Team 170 (US) 292 (GER)
× × ×
and troop nationality BADAKSHAN
(see above for key) 1 209 (AFG) 3 209 (AFG) 2 209 (AFG)
GER
KUNDUZ
JAWZJAN Faizabad
Regional Command North BALKH
GER
SWE Kunduz TAKHAR
× ×
TUR
Mazar-e Sharif 11 (FRA) 3 201 (AFG)
Shibirghan
BAGHLAN
× × HUN
PANJSHIR US Regional Command
16 (ESP) 3 207 (AFG) Pul-e Kumri
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
|| ×
HELMAND 5 RAR (AUS) 4 205 (AFG)
Regional Command
Southwest × × × × ||
1 25 (US) 2 4 (US) 3 205 (AFG) 116 (US) 2 (ROM)
× × × || ×
||| × × 495 (ROM) 2 205 (AFG)
20 (UK) 3 10 (US) 504 (US) 1 205 (AFG)
5 RCT (US) 1 215 (AFG)
|| ||
3 (US) (DNK) 3 215 (AFG) Key to symbols
|| || || ×××
2 LAR (US) 33 (GEO) Armoured HBCT (US
Battalion Corps reconnaissance armoured)
||| Battlefield
Regional Command Air Assets Regiment Infantry Airborne surveillance
× × ×
North 1 ACB East 82 Brigade Armoured Mountain infantry Helicopter
× ×
×× |||
South 159 Southwest USMC AIR WG* Division Reconnaissance Mechanised Amphibious
*incl UK assets
Sources: ISAF/IISS Research. Military symbols depict unit/formations’ standard organisation, but many have re-roled for deployment to Afghanistan and operate special
equipment such as PPVs and anti-IED equipment.
© IISS
30 The Military Balance 2012
It is very unlikely that the troop drawdowns will be the insurgents advantages they have lost elsewhere
reversed, because of a combination of war weariness, in the country’. It is likely that the required US forces
financial pressure and the perceived reduction in the will come from southern Afghanistan. This shift of
clear and present danger posed by al-Qaeda. Indeed, effort will probably allow the clearance of some terri-
political and financial difficulties in NATO states may tory, but it is not evident that sufficient resources or
increase pressure to accelerate withdrawals. time are available to adequately neutralise Haqqani
This will encourage insurgents who think that they activity and enclaves before the US drawdown
can outlast the US and NATO effort. The Afghan-led further reduces ISAF’s combat power. Meanwhile,
‘peace and reconciliation programme’ has embraced Afghan and NATO offensives in eastern Afghanistan
several thousand former insurgents. But there is no are unlikely to be complemented by Pakistani efforts
evidence in the public domain that military efforts against Haqqani bases in North Waziristan.
in Afghanistan or Pakistan are having any coercive The greatest threat to the transition strategy is
effect in bringing insurgents to the conference table, continuing poor governance and extensive corrup-
let alone keeping them there and forcing them into an tion. According to Mullen: ‘Pervasive corruption, by
acceptable deal. criminal patronage networks that include govern-
ment officials – at both national and local levels –
What now for transition? impedes all efforts to consolidate tactical successes ...
The IISS Adelphi book Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond If we continue to draw down forces apace while such
Downloaded by [ ] at 01:28 09 March 2012
(December 2011) assesses that, in the short term, public and systemic corruption is left unchecked, we
NATO and the ANSF will attempt to improve secu- will risk leaving behind a government in which we
rity in and around Kabul, to improve their chances of cannot reasonably expect Afghans to have faith. At
detecting or disrupting further efforts at spectacular best this would lead to continued localised conflicts
attacks by the Haqqani Network. Efforts to counter as neighbourhood strongmen angle for their cut,
the assassination campaign will also continue, as will and the people for their survival; at worst it could
messaging to portray security progress made. lead to government collapse and civil war.’ He also
In September 2011 Senate testimony, outgoing said that corruption delegitimised the very authori-
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike ties to which the US was to hand over power. This
Mullen explained that US, NATO and Afghan forces is supported by considerable evidence of insufficient
would ‘increasingly focus on eastern Afghanistan’ in improvement in Afghan governance, or reduction in
2012, but that he did not expect to see the effects of corruption, to neutralise the root causes of the insur-
these operations until the end of that year. In eastern gency, even in areas that have been ‘cleared and
Afghanistan, in Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s held’. It is not obvious that there will be sufficient
view, ‘the topography, the cultural geography and the progress in this area by 2014 to make progress irre-
continuing presence of safe havens in Pakistan give versible.
Chapter Two
Comparative defence statistics
Top 10 Defence Budgets 2011 US$bn
China United Kingdom France 800
United States
700
600
500
89.8 62.7 58.8
Japan Russia Saudi Arabia 400
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:04 06 August 2012
300
200
58.4 52.7 46.2
0
739.3 Other top United
10 countries States
44.2 37.3 36.6
8.26% 6.42% 5.99% 5.50% 4.91% 4.82% 4.47% 4.46% 4.42% 3.77%
*Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea and North Korea.
Planned Global Defence Expenditure by Region 2011† Planned Defence Expenditure by Country 2011†
Latin America Other Latin America
and the and the Caribbean
Caribbean Sub-Saharan 1.8%
4.1% Africa Other Middle East Brazil Sub-Saharan Africa
1.0% and North Africa 2.3% 1.0%
Middle East and 5.0%
North Africa North America
47.0% Saudi Arabia
7.9% United States
2.9%
Russia 45.7%
3.3%
Other Asia and
Asia and Australasia
Australasia 7.0%
18.5% India
2.3%
Japan
3.6%
Russia China
3.3% 5.5%
Non-NATO
Europe
Europe 1.6%
18.3% Other NATO
Germany France United Kingdom
7.8%
†
Figures may not sum due to rounding effects 2.7% 3.6% 3.9%
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:04 06 August 2012
32
The Military Balance 2012
India continues to revamp its combat aircraft fleet, extending the lives of some in-service types, while also acquiring more modern
Fleet aircraft, and retiring older platforms. From 2014, its Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft will bolster the inventory, while the Individual
numbers Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft programme is expected to see first fleet additions around 2020. The Tejas (Light Combat Aircraft) aircraft orders
is also finally nearing entry into service, though the number to be bought remains uncertain. New Delhi is also, in the longer term,
1000 continuing its Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft project, which could enter service by the middle of the next decade. 200
1990–91
824 2000–01
Fleet numbers 772
750 2011 150
(left hand scale) 665
1970–71 1980–81 2021
565 570 570
500 100
Individual
aircraft orders
Deliveries
(right hand scale)
due to start
on these
250 dates 50
0 0
Date of
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
first
delivery
Indian Air Force: Tactical Aviation Variant Induction Dates
be withdrawn well in advance upgraded. India’s Su-30 fleet is turer, with the remainder to be
*Excepting FGFA, MMRCA and Tejas aircraft, expected to eventually number 270. assembled in India
of the upgraded aircraft.
totals reflect present type numbers in service.
33
34 The Military Balance 2012
1,155,000 Heav
Fourth-generation tactical aircraft
(500 ac per unit)
956,000
174,000
1,569,000
747 263 280 916 220 57 56
66
(25 per unit)
Attack helicopters
ISTAR
16 (250 hel per unit) Airborne e
36
292
20
450 355
66
Bomber aircraft (25 per unit) 862 14 4
1
3 4 4
Modern MBT/AIFV: ISD post 1980
Fourth-generation aircraft: ISD post 1980 (includes upgraded third-generation designs)
Fifth-generation aircraft: those designed with low-observable characteristics as a
12 14 fundamental design driver
Comparative defence statistics 35
ing vehicles
83 28
)
Nuclear-powered submarines Principal amphibious ships
5 (25 vessels per unit) (25 vessels per unit)
1
6
3
1
4,960 25 1
7 7
6,452
57
29
13 29 6 20 20
aft
ISTAR
Airborne early-warning and control aircraft Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles
(100 aircraft per unit) (50 aircraft per unit)
n.k. 3 4 n.k. 5
370
862 14 4 2 20 6 104
1
2,809 2 27
1
d third-generation designs) 10
characteristics as a
20 31
36 The Military Balance 2012
Top ten
Top 10 submarines
Submarine holdings
USA China Russia
10 10 10
20 20 20
30 30 30
40 40 40
50 50 50
60 60 60
70 70 70
10 10 10
20 20 20
12 12 12 12
Russia
US
China
2001
India
France
UK
Russia
US
China
2011
India
France
UK
1, 00
0
0
0
00
00
00
00
00
00
0
5
,0
,0
,0
,0
,0
2,
3,
6,
9,
12
15
18
54
57
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:04 06 August 2012
UK Netherlands
USA
7 2
1 2
Singapore
Indonesia
Brazil 4
5
2
Chile
Australia
1
2
LHD LPD
LHA LSD
Comparative defence statistics
LPH LSL
37
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:04 06 August 2012
38
= 10 units
UK Netherlands
Canada
Belgium Slovakia
France
Hungary
Bulgaria
NATO Tactical and Tanker Aircraft Comparison
North America
North America
The United States down after four and a half years in charge; his
deputy, William J. Lynn III, announced his depar-
US forces continued to be heavily engaged in combat ture soon after. Leon Panetta, former director of the
and stabilisation actions in Afghanistan while, at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), succeeded Gates
end of December 2011, the last US troops left Iraq. The at the Pentagon, and Dr Ashton Carter, until recently
aftermath of these wars, combined with the impact of under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology
the financial crisis on government budgeting and US and logistics, replaced Lynn. Panetta and Carter
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
perceptions of its allies’ willingness to shoulder the are both experienced Washington hands. Panetta’s
burden in conflict, may have an impact on the nature earlier service in the US Congress and the Office of
and extent of US involvement in future crises. Management and Budget are particularly relevant in
This is not to say that full-scale global retrench- ongoing defence-budget debates. Panetta, like Gates
ment is on the horizon. For a start, it is difficult for a before him, was keen in his early speeches to stress
superpower to retrench. Moreover, the US maintains the need for carefully considered defence cuts, rather
a number of alliances and security and treaty relation- than attempt to realise set financial savings, such as
ships, such as those with South Korea, Taiwan and those that would result from sequestration (in the
Japan, that could lead to the deployment of military absence of congressional agreement over the budget
assets. Nor do current circumstances mean that the US proposals made by the Joint Select Committee on
will stop providing military support to allies engaged Deficit Reduction, wide-ranging automatic spending
on operations: as happened in Libya, this support cuts – a ‘sequestration’ – of $1.2 trillion over 10 years
may in some cases consist of force enablers, as well will be triggered, starting in January 2013: see p. 44).
as applications of combat power. Yet Washington is In Panetta’s words, the latter ‘would force across-the-
likely to give more careful thought to whether inter- board salami-slicing cuts of the worst kind. It would
vening in crises is necessarily in the US interest; to the hollow out the force, it would leave our military defi-
nature and duration of any military response; and to cient in people, in training, and equipment.’
the type of forces the US should develop and main- At the White House, meanwhile, Thomas Donilan
tain. That said, not every military emergency will be replaced James Jones as National Security Advisor;
of Washington’s choosing, so maintaining flexible and James R. Clapper, a retired Air Force lieutenant-
forces capable of acting in a wide range of contingen- general who had previously served as under secretary
cies will also preoccupy military planners. of defense for intelligence, took over as the director
Debates on the future of American policy and of national intelligence from retired Admiral Dennis
strategy are taking place at a time when cuts in Blair. Panetta was replaced at the CIA by General
defence budgets are widely expected, and when pres- David Petraeus, who retired from active army service
idential hopefuls, in anticipation of the November and handed command of NATO’s International
2012 election, have begun to stake out their foreign- Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan over
policy positions. The strategies and financial reali- to Marine Corps General John Allen. General Martin
ties that emerge from these debates will ultimately Dempsey, after a very brief tenure as Army chief
shape the size, role and posture of US military forces of staff, replaced retiring Admiral Michael Mullen
in the future. Spending will be cut; the question is by as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General
how much, and how the US military will change as Raymond T. Odierno replaced Dempsey as Army
a result. chief of staff, having moved from US Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM), which was disestablished on 31
Leadership changes August as a cost-saving measure. (JFCOM’s functions
2011 was a transitional year for US defence policy, were redistributed to other combatant commands.)
both in terms of leadership and of priorities. On 30 Dempsey and Odierno bring deep operational expe-
June, Secretary of Defense Dr Robert Gates stepped rience to their positions from their service in Iraq.
40 The Military Balance 2012
Finally, Admiral Jonathan Greenert took over as member capable of sustained air–sea operations of
chief of naval operations from retiring Admiral Gary any scale and the only one able to project ground
Roughead. forces of more than a handful of brigades in out-of-
President Barack Obama has stuck to his plans area operations. As Gates pointed out, ‘despite more
in Iraq and Afghanistan, as described in The Military than 2 million troops in uniform – not counting the
Balance 2011 (pp. 9, 293). Following the failure of the US military – NATO has struggled, at times desper-
US and Iraq to agree terms for a continuing US mili- ately, to sustain a deployment of 25 to 40,000 troops,
tary presence (principally the question of the immu- not just in boots on the ground, but in crucial support
nity of US forces to Iraqi law), Obama announced on assets such as helicopters, transport aircraft, mainte-
21 October that remaining US troops would leave Iraq nance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
by the end of 2011. The 2 May 2011 killing of al-Qaeda and much more’.
founder Osama bin Laden in a raid on his compound Despite Gates’s chiding, there is little chance that
in Abbottabad, Pakistan, by US special forces was a this situation will improve, particularly in light of the
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
signal victory in the United States’ 10-year-long ‘war economic difficulties of European NATO members
on terror’. In a speech on 22 June, Obama announced and the effect this is having on their defence ambi-
the beginning of the withdrawal of the surge force tions and resourcing (see p. 71). Thus, NATO’s mili-
from Afghanistan, as he had promised in December tary capabilities will remain defined largely by what
2009. Some 10,000 US troops were due to leave the United States is able and willing to contribute. Yet
Afghanistan by the end of 2011, with 23,000 more Gates warned in his speech that ‘there will be dwin-
following by mid-2012. Obama also stated that, ‘after dling appetite and patience in the US Congress – and
this initial reduction, our troops will continue coming in the American body politic writ large – to expend
home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations
into the lead. Our mission will change from combat that are apparently unwilling to devote the neces-
to support. By 2014, this process of transition will be sary resources or make the necessary changes to be
complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible serious and capable partners in their own defense’.
for their own security.’ Other ISAF partners are also Furthermore, the ability of the United States to cover
likely to reduce their force levels in Afghanistan (see NATO capability gaps will likely diminish in the
p. 28), despite the deteriorating security conditions future.
there.
National consensus shifts
Last ally standing Reduced support among Americans for foreign wars
US military operations in Libya during 2011 showed (a phenomenon which some have termed ‘war weari-
that even when it is ‘leading from behind’, the ness’), coupled with an increasingly challenging
United States is the indispensible member of NATO. economic situation, might indeed be leading to
However, NATO’s Operation Unified Protector also something of a modification in popular and political
demonstrated significant structural shortcomings US perceptions regarding the United States’ global
within the Alliance: although Libya was a NATO role. Gates, in a February 2011 speech at West Point,
operation, few Alliance members participated in reflected this point of view when he said that ‘any
actual strike operations after USAFRICOM handed future defense secretary who advises the president
over operational control on 4 April. Gates made to again send a big American land army into Asia
this point clear in a June speech in Brussels: ‘while or into the Middle East or Africa should “have his
every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, head examined,” as General MacArthur so delicately
less than half have participated at all, and fewer put it’. Gates was not arguing against involvement
than a third have been willing to participate in the in contingencies that might threaten US interests or
strike mission’. Gates assessed the situation in blunt might involve alliance ties, rather that ‘the Army will
terms: ‘the mightiest military alliance in history is be increasingly challenged to justify the number, size
only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly and cost of its heavy formations’ and that ‘what we
armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet can expect in future is that potential adversaries [will]
many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, seek to frustrate America’s traditional advantages, in
requiring the US, once more, to make up the differ- particular our ability to shoot, move and communi-
ence’. Indeed, the United States is the only NATO cate with speed and precision’. US ‘unconventional
North America 41
capabilities will still be needed at various levels Nonetheless, there is some degree of support for
and in various locations’, but ‘the odds of repeating defence cuts as a means of paying for deficit reduc-
North America
another Iraq or Afghanistan – invading, pacifying, tion, with military pay and benefits among the
and administering a large third world country – targets. The Pentagon, already in the midst of dealing
may be low’. Republican Senator John McCain has with Obama’s decision to enforce over $400 billion
reflected this point of view as well. When questioned worth of reductions over 12 years, faces even larger
on 11 September 2011 about the possibility of future cuts, depending on the outcome of discussions on the
interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia, deficit reduction committee proposal of $1.2tr in cuts
McCain responded: ‘I don’t think you’re going to see to federal spending. Regardless of the extent of the
the [US] in another war in that part of the world … cuts, it is clear that, as Gates noted in June when he
I don’t think American public opinion would stand presented the Fiscal Year 2012 defence budget request
for it. I do believe that we have developed new ways to the Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘a smaller
of countering this threat.’ Of course, McCain was not military, no matter how superb, will be able to go
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
saying that the US should not have gone into Iraq or fewer places and be able to do fewer things’.
Afghanistan, or arguing against the use of US combat
power: speaking about the conflict in Libya, he said Strategy: change and continuity
that it ‘could have been over long ago if we had used The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) noted that,
the full weight of American air power. You can’t ‘if necessary, under long-standing principles of self-
lead from behind in this country.’ But while he was defense’, the United States does ‘not rule out the use
perhaps indicating a desire for greater selectivity in of force before attacks occur’. The Obama adminis-
future, possibly in keeping with ‘an emerging Obama tration’s philosophical shift in modifying this posi-
doctrine of muscular but more narrowly focused tion was codified in last year’s Quadrennial Defense
pursuit of American interests’ (see Strategic Survey Review (QDR), which asserted that ‘while the use
2011, p. 149), this has to be balanced against the of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust all
likelihood that not all wars will be of Washington’s other options before war whenever we can, and care-
choosing. fully weigh the costs and risks of action against the
There seems to be support on both sides of the costs and risks of inaction’. (It went on to say that
political divide for Obama’s statement, coming in the US ‘must reserve the right to act unilaterally if
his June speech announcing troop reductions in necessary to defend our nation and our interests’.)
Afghanistan, that, after ten years and an expendi- Importantly, Gates gave a more specific elaboration
ture of a ‘trillion dollars on war, at a time of rising of the broad outlines of US strategy in the aftermath
debt and hard economic times … it is time to focus of Iraq and Afghanistan in his West Point speech: ‘the
on nation-building here at home’. This ‘domestic most plausible, high-end scenarios for the US military
priorities first’ perspective is not particularly new are primarily naval and air engagements – whether in
among Democrats, but it is perhaps more apparent Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere’.
now within the Republican ranks and among those Furthermore, despite NATO’s challenges in Libya,
members of Congress influenced by the Tea Party some argue that the operation shows that combining
movement than it was before. Fiscal conservatives local rebels’ efforts with air power, special-operations
within these groups are inclined to believe that the forces and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and
budget deficit is the principal threat to US national reconnaissance assets can be a militarily successful
security. Indeed, Texas Governor Rick Perry, a candi- way of achieving political objectives. Advocates of
date for the Republican presidential nomination, liberal interventionism and the ‘Responsibility to
argued in an August speech to the Veterans of Foreign Protect’ have already claimed that the strength of
Wars that American soldiers should only go to battle their cause has been reinforced by the Libya experi-
when ‘our vital interests are threatened’ and that ence.
America should not ‘fall subject to a foreign policy of The National Military Strategy (NMS), published
military adventurism’. However, Mitt Romney, also a in April 2011, was consistent with the Obama admin-
candidate for the Republican nomination, argued in istration’s movement towards a modified defence
early October 2011 for a higher base defence budget posture. This document, which essentially provides
(excluding the cost of wars) of ‘about 4 percent’ of the ways and means to execute the national military
GDP. objectives established in the NSS and QDR (coun-
42 The Military Balance 2012
tering violent extremism; deterring and defeating Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia,
aggression; strengthening international and regional Singapore, and other states in Oceania’. China aside,
security; and shaping the future force), is subtitled North Korea remains the most volatile problem in
‘Redefining America’s Military Leadership’. In his Asia, particularly given perennial uncertainties about
introduction, Admiral Michael Mullen, although its intentions and leadership succession, its military
emphasising ‘how the Joint Force will redefine behaviour, and its nuclear activities.
America’s military leadership to adapt to a chal- Regarding the Middle East, the NMS, published
lenging new era’, also acknowledged that ‘hard before the Arab Awakening and operations in Libya,
near-term choices must be made in light of broader identifies ‘an Iranian regime that continues to seek
economic constraints’. The US military will, according nuclear weapons, as well as continuing to provide
to Mullen, have to ‘find innovative and affordable support to terrorist organizations throughout the
ways to provide the full range of capabilities neces- broader Middle East’ as the principal threat to
sary to fulfill this strategy while making difficult trad- regional stability. Thus far, all indications are that
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
eoffs between modernization, capacity, capability, Iran is proceeding with its nuclear programme,
posture, and risk’. despite international sanctions. Preventing Iran from
Although the NMS discusses the gamut of global becoming a nuclear-armed state is a US policy objec-
challenges for which the US military must prepare, its tive; how this will be realised remains uncertain. The
clear priorities are in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle October 2011 allegations of an Iranian plot against
East. As US military capabilities are pressured by the Saudi ambassador in Washington only added to
budgetary reductions, the relative importance of tensions, as did the findings of the November 2011
these regions and the priority they demand will only IAEA report on Iran.
increase. Other regions will receive less attention. The evolving situation in the Middle East will
China is at the top of the agenda. The strategy force a re-evaluation of US military strategy in the
communicates a clear preference for constructive region. This is particularly true with the end of the
engagement rather than military competition with Mubarak regime in Egypt and the uncertainty that
China, expressing a desire, through improved mili- the removal of this pillar of US regional policy has
tary-to-military relationships, ‘to expand areas of caused. In addition, the US military presence in Iraq
mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, has ended. Although the United States ‘seeks a long-
reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation’. term partnership with Iraq’, Baghdad’s long-term
Nevertheless, the NMS’s main message is one of orientation, and the strength of American influence in
concern about China’s military modernisation and that country, remain to be seen.
growing assertiveness, and the implications of this In the realm of capabilities, the NMS says that
trend for US interests, the military balance, access to American strategy is focused ‘on fielding modular,
and use of the global commons and cyberspace, and adaptive, general purpose forces that can be
stability in the region. Indeed, improved Chinese employed in the full range of military operations’.
military capabilities, particularly in the areas of anti- This should not necessarily be interpreted as entailing
access and area denial, were the impetus for coop- a substantially reduced emphasis on operations such
eration between the US Navy and the US Air Force as counter-insurgencies: the ‘force will operate with
in moves to develop the Air–Sea Battle concept, as an aptitude for precise and discriminate action and
discussed in The Military Balance 2011 (p. 47). The increasingly possess security force assistance exper-
NMS’s insistence that ‘the Nation’s strategic priorities tise’. There is also a strong indication in the NMS
and interests emanate from the Asia-Pacific region’ that future operations could increasingly be mounted
echoes broader US policy, as expressed by Secretary from the US homeland or from areas abroad requiring
of State Hillary Clinton who, in November 2011, ‘a smaller logistical footprint’, given the emphasis on
wrote in Foreign Policy that ‘one of the most important expeditionary operations. Finally, the NMS reaffirms
tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will US nuclear policy: ‘Joint nuclear forces will continue
… be to lock in a substantially increased investment to support strategic stability through maintenance of
– diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in an assured second-strike capability … We will retain
the Asia-Pacific region’. Thus, there is a commitment sufficient nuclear force structure to hedge against
in the NMS to ‘expand our military security coopera- unexpected geopolitical change, technological prob-
tion, exchanges, and exercises with the Philippines, lems, and operational vulnerabilities’.
North America 43
In April 2011, Obama signed another key defence Table 3 DoD’s War Budget Authority by
document, the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Title FY2010 (US$bn)
North America
The UCP establishes the missions, responsibilities Regular Titles 2010
and geographical areas covered by US combatant Military Personnel 16.8
commands. Key changes include: Operations & Maintenance 99.2
Defence Health 1.3
• Shifting AOR (area of responsibility) bound- Other Defence Programmes 0.4
aries in the Arctic region to leverage long- Procurement 28.0
Special Funds
tablish US Joint Forces Command. Iraqi Freedom Fund 0
• Expanding US Strategic Command’s respon- Afghan Sec Forces Training Fund 9.2
sibility for combating weapons of mass Iraq Sec Forces Training Fund 1.0
destruction and developing Global Missile Joint IED Defeat Fund 1.8
Defense Concept of Operations. Strategic Reserve Readiness Fund 0
• Giving US Transportation Command Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund 0
responsibility for synchronising planning of Subtotal: Special Funds 11.9
global distribution operations.
DoD Total 160.7
The publication of the NMS and the UCP was followed
in September by the classified Defense Planning
Guidance. This document contains more detailed the economy in hopes of avoiding a double-dip reces-
strategic guidance for key planning and program- sion.
ming priorities to support the NMS and guide the Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the
implementation of cuts in the force structure. combination of falling house prices, large debt over-
hangs and high unemployment have caused the
Defence economics economy to experience a sustained period of nega-
tive or low growth. Following a brief spell of stronger
Changing fiscal environment economic activity in late 2010, lacklustre economic
Most observers expected US defence spending performance returned in 2011 as consumer demand
to decline as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – which accounts for more than two-thirds of total US
tapered off. Spending to cover the cost of the wars output – stagnated in an economic climate character-
alone, known as ‘supplemental budgets’, currently ised by high oil prices; supply disruptions due to the
accounts for nearly 20% of total spending. With March 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami; and
those dollars no longer available, defence spending, declining consumer and business confidence. Overall,
which in 2011 exceeded $710bn, would decline to the International Monetary Fund expects real growth
roughly $550bn. rates to halve from 2010 levels to 1.5% in 2011. Partisan
Instead, US defence spending was captured by a wrangling in Congress over raising the $14.3tr federal
much larger debate about overall national priorities. debt ceiling in July 2011 led to a historic downgrade
Obama had already singled out defence for a $400bn of US debt by the ratings agency Standard & Poor’s.
reduction, but more cuts are now in the making. This caused further uncertainty over US economic
Those who advocate sustaining US defence spending prospects, amid fears that legislative deadlock over
have been drowned out by those seeking to protect fiscal policy may persist, at least until the 2012 elec-
entitlement spending – particularly health-care and tions. However, despite the acrimonious debates
old-age spending – and those seeking to reduce taxes. over the appropriate balance between revenue and
Reducing long-term deficit spending became more tax measures, both Democrats and Republicans
important over the year, even as American political agree that, in the medium term, US governmental
and economic leaders sought new ways to stimulate outlays will be characterised by retrenchment.
44 The Military Balance 2012
The last-gasp debt-ceiling deal achieved just days mental funds (sometimes called overseas-contin-
before the 2 August deadline enabled passage of the gency operations funds). The latter are appropriated
Budget Control Act of 2011, which mandates a total separately to pay the incremental costs of the wars in
of $917bn in cuts over ten years, mostly to discre- Iraq and Afghanistan. This is higher than the previous
tionary spending, starting with $21bn in reductions peaks of US defence spending during the Korea and
for FY2011/12. A bipartisan ‘super-committee’ (the Vietnam wars and during the Reagan-era defence
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction) was build-up. Defence spending in 2011 is up nearly 90%
also created to propose a further $1.2tr in cuts over from the previous low in 1998.
the forthcoming decade, proposals which needed to Dollar allocations per service tell a different story.
be approved by Congress before 23 December 2011. While it is often said that the US military services are
In the absence of congressional agreement over the given equal shares of defence dollars – a third each
committee’s proposals, wide-ranging automatic for the Army, Navy (including the Marines) and Air
spending cuts (a ‘sequestration’) of $1.2tr over ten Force – the picture since 1998 is more complicated.
years will be triggered, starting in January 2013. If The military services have experienced unequal
this occurs, the defence budget will bear the burden growth; so, too, have the defence agencies (such as
of fully half of the $1.2tr in required reductions. the Missile Defense Agency and the National Security
Cuts of this magnitude would bring overall US Agency), which now consume a growing share of the
defence spending more in line with Cold War aver- overall defence budget. Among the military services,
ages, though aggregate numbers can be misleading. the Army has experienced the most significant growth
US defence spending from 1948 to 1973 was premised at 167%; the defence agencies grew at 105%; and
on a conscript force. The United States adopted an spending on the Navy and Air Force grew at 56% and
All-Volunteer Force (AVF) after 1973, but the fully 55% respectively. When compared with the last peak
burdened cost of a professional force was not fully in spending in 1985, Army spending is up nearly 65%,
understood until much later, as pay and benefits, Navy spending is down almost 5%, and Air Force
especially health and retirement benefits, grew over spending is down nearly 20%. From peak to peak,
time. Comparing current spending with spending defence-agency spending is up almost 100%. (Missile
from decades past may not offer a good benchmark defence is covered by defence-agency spending, as is
for the American defence effort. operational intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan.)
Spending within budget categories has changed as
Defence spending by the numbers well. Since 1985, spending for operations and main-
US defence spending in 2011 exceeded $710bn. That tenance has grown 50%; research and development
total accounts for both the base budget and supple- has grown nearly 20%; military personnel spending is
North America 45
Table 5 Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Overseas Contingency Operations
FY2001–FY2011 (US$bn)
North America
Operation and Source FY01 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 Cumulative
of Funding & CRA Pending Total
FY02 Request FY01–FY12 incl.
CRA/Request
Iraq
Dept of Defense 0 50.0 56.4 83.4 98.1 127.2 138.5 92.0 66.5 45.7 10.6 768.8
Foreign Aid & Diplomatic Operations 0 3.0 19.5 2.0 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.2 3.3 2.3 6.2 47.6
VA Medical 0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.3 0.9 7.2
Total Iraq 0.0 53.0 75.9 85.6 101.7 131.3 142.1 95.5 71.3 49.3 17.7 823.2
Afghanistan
Dept of Defense 20.0 14.0 12.4 17.2 17.9 37.2 40.6 56.1 87.7 113.3 107.3 523.5
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
Foreign Aid & Diplomatic Operations 0.8 0.7 2.2 2.8 1.1 1.9 2.7 3.1 5.7 4.1 4.3 29.4
VA Medical 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.1 2.1 4.2
Total Afghanistan 20.8 14.7 14.6 20.0 19.0 39.2 43.4 59.5 93.8 118.6 113.7 557.1
Enhanced Security
Dept of Defense 13.0 8.0 3.7 2.1 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 28.7
Total Enhanced Security 13.0 8.0 3.7 2.1 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 28.7
Total All Missions 33.8 81.1 94.1 107.6 121.5 170.9 185.6 155.1 165.3 168.1 131.6 1,414.8
Source: CRS Report RL33110
500,000
tions, Gates’s efficiency initiatives were viewed by
400,000
the Obama administration and Congress as merely a
300,000 down payment. Much deeper cuts were to come.
200,000 In spring 2011, defence leaders were told to
100,000 prepare for another round of cuts that would total
0 $400bn over the next decade. The military services
were already in the process of building their future-
19 8
19 1
19 4
19 7
19 0
19 3
19 6
19 9
19 2
19 5
19 8
19 1
19 4
19 7
19 0
19 3
19 6
20 9
20 2
20 5
20 8
20 1
14
4
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
0
0
0
1
19
Table 6 US National Defense Budget Function1 and Other Selected Budgets2 1992, 2002–2012
(US$bn) National Defense Department Atomic Department Veterans Total Total Federal
Budget Function of Defense Energy of Administration Federal Budget
Defense Homeland Government Surplus/
Activities Security Outlays Deficit
FY BA Outlay BA Outlay BA BA (Gross) BA
1992 295.1 298.3 282.1 286.9 10.6 n.a. 33.9 1,381 −290
2002 362.1 348.5 344.9 331.9 14.9 30.5 52.1 2,011 −157
2003 456.2 404.9 437.9 387.3 16.4 30.8 59.1 2,160 −377
2004 490.6 455.9 471.0 436.5 16.8 31.6 60.5 2,293 −412
2005 505.7 495.3 483.9 474.1 17.9 100.7 69.2 2,472 −318
2006 617.1 521.8 593.7 499.3 17.4 32.4 71.0 2,655 −248
2007 625.8 551.2 602.9 528.6 17.2 39.7 79.5 2,728 −160
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
2008 696.3 616.1 674.7 594.6 16.6 50.6 88.3 2,982 −458
2009 697.8 661.0 667.5 631.9 22.9 45.3 96.9 3,517 −1,412
2010 721.3 693.6 695.6 666.7 18.2 45.8 124.4 3,456 −1,293
2011 est. 739.3 768.2 712.7 739.7 19.0 46.0 123.7 3,819 −1,645
2012 est. 702.8 737.5 675.7 707.5 19.3 47.4 129.3 3,729 −1,101
Notes International Security Assistance (under Inter- presents its defence budget to Congress for the
FY = Fiscal Year (1 October–30 September) national Affairs), the Veterans Administration, next fiscal year, which begins on 1 October.
1
The National Defense Budget Function sub- the US Coast Guard (Department of Homeland The government also presents its Future Years
sumes funding for the DoD, the Department Security), nor for the National Aeronautics and Defense Program (FYDP), which covers the
of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities Space Administration (NASA). Funding for civil next fiscal year plus the following five. Until
and some smaller support agencies (including projects administered by the DoD is excluded approved by Congress, the Budget is called the
Federal Emergency Management and Selective from the figures cited here. Budget Request; after approval, it becomes the
Service System). It does not include funding for 2
Early in each calendar year, the US government Budget Authority.
Services Committee on 22 September, that cuts of that Defense Secretary William Lynn tried to put this
magnitude have ‘a good chance of breaking us. And prospect to rest when he said that ‘however you
breaking faith with this all-volunteer force.’ modify [US] strategy, you won’t get into a position
where, if you get engaged in a conflict, you won’t be
How is the military coping? able to do anything else. [...] “Once I’m in a conflict,
With bigger and bigger budget cuts looming, US mili- everything else I can’t handle.”’ While Panetta has
tary leaders are quick to issue reminders that they are followed the same line of argument, some analysts
still in the midst of finishing a commitment in Iraq, are not as quick to dismiss the possibility. If this
fighting in Afghanistan, and carrying out day-to-day point of view is accepted, the force levels outlined
commitments across the globe. As their challenges in the 2010 QDR, (see The Military Balance 2011 p.
grow ever larger, they are focused on the impacts of 43), could change. In addition, while countering
proposed reductions on the force as a whole. Admiral terrorist threats will remain a focus, there may be
Mullen summarised the chiefs’ sentiments well when less emphasis on large, enduring troop commit-
he said, ‘Our men and women down range have ments and more emphasis on training foreign part-
enough to worry about just getting their job done. ners and targeting individual adversaries via UAVs
They shouldn’t also be concerned about whether or and stand-off systems.
not they will be paid to do that job or whether or not The Middle East and East Asia, as noted above,
their families will continue to get the support they will increasingly be at the centre of presence and
need during long absences. We can do better than shaping activities, as well as war planning. US forces
that, as a military and as a nation.’ will seek to establish a more durable presence in the
But defence leaders do see important changes Middle East following troop withdrawals from Iraq.
coming as commitments wind down in Iraq and Much of the attention will be given to Kuwait and
Afghanistan, changes they strongly wish to be Qatar. Uncertainties about the viability of the US
driven by strategy. Some have pointed to the possi- Navy presence in Bahrain has led policy leaders to
blity that the Pentagon might be forced into aban- consider alternatives, though these are few. Counter-
doning its long-standing goal of being able to fight terrorism operations are being run from a series of
two major wars simultaneously. Outgoing Deputy undisclosed locations throughout the region.
North America 47
Enhancing the US military posture in East Asia not a substitute for heavy armour. The Army’s plan
has been a policy focus for some time, but is today for a ground combat vehicle, which was part of the
North America
receiving greater attention. Military planners are answer to the now defunct Future Combat System,
increasingly concerned by the growing vulnerability remains troubled. So, too, are the prospects for the
of locations close to China and North Korea, particu- army light tactical vehicle, which would replace the
larly on Okinawa. They have sought to expand the venerable Humvee. Army helicopters, which have
US network of access arrangements while at the same extensive wear-and-tear from the recent wars, are in
time investing in hardening key bases such as Guam, need of replacement, though there is little prospect of
which has seen substantial investment in the last ten this happening soon.
years. Meanwhile, developing defence relations with The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is
Australia appears to be a favourite option for US attempting to position itself between the Army and
planners, borne out by the mid-November agreement special forces. According to Marine Commandant
to enhance US training and base a Marine contin- General James Amos: ‘I refer to our Marine Corps of
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
gent. However, prospects across the region are being today as a “middleweight force.” I liken it to boxing,
considered, and the US has, for instance, indicated a where a middleweight boxer can box up into the
wish to station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore. heavyweight division or box down to the lightweight
In Europe, there will probably be further reductions division simply by changing his weight and training
in US ground and air forces, along with commen- regime. The same is true for the Marine Corps.’
surate changes to the rank structure among key US Few doubt that the corps’ role is secure, but many
personnel there. The senior Army officer, long a four- see changes coming to its troop numbers and espe-
star general, now holds three-star rank. The Air Force cially to its equipment. With active-duty manpower
and Navy are expected to follow suit. now at 202,000, the Marines might well face substan-
The military services themselves are adjusting to tial personnel reductions. Following the cancella-
this change in focus. The Army was heavily taxed by tion of the Marines’ expeditionary fighting vehicle
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is now poised in early 2011, their aviation programmes will almost
for a series of reductions. Army strength is currently certainly be a target for serious reductions, with the
authorised at 562,000 full-time soldiers along with F-35B programme widely thought to be vulnerable.
22,000 temporary authorisations, which were added to Fraught with delays and cost overruns, the F-35B was
support the war. As troop withdrawals from Iraq are placed by former Defense Secretary Robert Gates on
completed in late 2011, the Army will begin personnel a two-year probation in 2011. USMC leaders will not
reductions, first in temporary authorisations and later easily forgo the programme, but may be forced by
in full-time personnel. Army leaders have cautioned financial considerations to do so. Perhaps more trou-
about reductions in manpower that are too fast or too bling for the Marines, a growing chorus of observers
deep. New Army chief General Raymond Odierno have questioned the broader viability of Marine avia-
publicly endorsed a long-held view that manpower tion and asked why a ‘middleweight force’ needs
must not fall below 520,000 full-time soldiers, though to possess a fifth-generation stealth fighter, or any
many observers believe cuts could go much deeper. fighter aircraft for that matter.
Some think manpower numbers will soon approach The Navy and Air Force appear to be in better posi-
those of the Clinton years, which had targeted the tions, but the pressures on each service will be no less
active army at 480,000 soldiers. Perhaps in anticipa- striking. Neither service has fared well in the budget
tion of such an outcome, Odierno has also observed debates over the past decade, and both gave up
that, when it comes to force restructuring and troop substantial manpower and force-structure elements.
reductions, it is important that ‘we do it in such a way The Navy chose a path of incremental modernisation,
that we allow ourselves the flexibility and … capa- particularly of its air and submarine arms, and was
bility to expand’. by 2010 considerably more capable than it was ten
At the same time, Army leaders hope to protect years earlier. But it still needs to modernise its surface
their investment accounts. Army ground vehicles fleet, both carriers and principal surface combatants,
are relatively new, but the V-hulled protected patrol and is scheduled to purchase roughly ten ships a year
vehicles (MRAPs), which were purchased for duty under the Future Years Defense Plan (the service’s
in Iraq and Afghanistan, are not the vehicles Army fiscal- year shipbuilding plan). Even at this rate, naval
leaders would like in the future. They certainly are combatant vessels will fall well below the 313-ship
48 The Military Balance 2012
3
% of GDP
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
floor that Navy leaders have identified; and the force This leaves the Air Force committed to a new long-
will be nowhere near the goal that some naval leaders range strike programme and the F-35, though few
have mentioned of a 375-ship force. In the current believe the Air Force ultimately will procure the 1,763
round of reductions, aircraft-carrier numbers could F-35s currently planned. As Schwartz hinted, the Air
fall to ten or fewer; cruiser numbers could shrink; Force may ultimately trade some of its fighter force
and purchases of the littoral combatant ship could be to build a new long-range bomber. The Air Force
cut back. More worrisome to some, attack-submarine also remains committed to a new refuelling tanker,
numbers could fall well short of a 55-submarine goal. Boeing’s KC-46A, though if its force mix were to
Finally, the Navy is waiting for the F-35 programme change, the Air Force might find itself needing fewer
to modernise its air arm, though, with continuing tankers to support its missions.
purchases of the F/A-18E/F, it perhaps has more fall- US special-operations forces (SOF) appear to be
back options than the other service partners. the one element of the force that might emerge rela-
The Air Force faces similar challenges. It is tively unscathed from the budget debates. While US
confronted with ageing fighter and bomber forces, special forces have been under significant pressure
delays and cost overruns to its space modernisation – its leaders have expresed concern about ‘fraying
efforts, and an intelligence, surveillance and recon- at the edges’ – Admiral William McRaven, new
naissance force that is optimised for the current commander of US special-operations command,
counter-terror and counter-insurgency campaigns had this to say about the forces’ future: ‘As require-
rather than emerging anti-access and area-denial ments begin to subside across United States Central
challenges. Transport aircraft are the one portion of Command’s area of responsibility, SOF employment
the force that have emerged in a relatively healthy can return to a more balanced application against the
position. Yet, since the mobility force is linked to highest priority countries and capability areas from
Army structure, it, too, will likely be reduced in missions that currently consume 86% of the deployed
coming years. force ... SOF presence retains operational access for
So far, Air Force leaders have shown some willing- decisive action if required through a small, unobtru-
ness to trade numbers for capability. In the words of sive, persistent forward engagement in many coun-
Air Force Chief General Norton Schwartz, ‘it is pref- tries where a more overt presence is unacceptable.’
erable to have a smaller, superb force than a larger,
hollow one’. The Air Force is also contemplating a Debate to intensify
different mixture of forces. According to Schwartz, Thus far, the military services have been relatively
‘right now, we have got about 150 bombers and 2,000 restrained in the downsizing debate, focusing atten-
fighters … That balance might change some going tion primarily on how they expect their own services
forward. I think it is absolutely clear that you need to change and staking out their claims in the defence-
both long legs and short legs to deal with the likely budget talks. The year 2012, though, will bring a pres-
threats we are going to face.’ idential election, and with it intensified scrutiny of
North America 49
defence issues. To the extent that American electoral contractors, consultants and private service providers
politics turns to foreign and defence policy, discus- and [invest] the funds in future capital programs
North America
sion of future missions and commitments, and roles as outlined in [the Canada First Defence Strategy].’
for the military services, will heat up. The relatively In parliamentary testimony, Leslie was reported as
polite debate seen as of October 2011 may well give cautioning against cuts in the procurement budget,
way to a more raucous argument over the relative while defending the wider findings of the document.
merits of ground, air and naval power in an era of The extent to which the government will enact the
changing missions and shrinking finances. All of this report’s findings was unclear at the time of writing,
will take place in the context of a larger discussion though Defence Minister Peter MacKay has said
about America’s role in the world, and the resources that ‘the work of the Transformation Team will help
it should devote to fulfilling its aspirations. define necessary organizational changes to prepare
the Canadian Forces for the next decade’.
Canada has been maintaining its significant
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
Canada
procurement plans, in line with the aspirations
After five years of minority government, voters gave detailed in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (see
Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party The Military Balance 2011, p. 52). The plan to replace
a majority for the first time in the May 2011 federal Canada’s F/A-18 A/B Hornets with 65 F-35As has been
election. Government economic plans will likely the cause of some controversy, with the procurement
focus on stimulus measures and moves to reduce featuring in political jousting around the 2011 election,
the deficit, in an environment of continuing GDP as well as in parliament and the media. Disagreement
growth. According to the Department of National has focused on, among other issues, the initial cost
Defence (DND), the 2010 strategic-review process, and potential implications for Canada of any rises in
which was used to identify a series of cost-saving development costs. The DND is indicating, however,
measures within the department, has led to ‘savings that the ‘$9bn in capital costs will come out of the
of close to $1.6bn’ for 2013–14. In a bid to facilitate its [department’s] existing allocation/budget’. Ottawa
Deficit Reduction Action Plan, the government asked argues that Canada’s future operational requirements
the DND’s Chief of Transformation, Lieutenant- ‘can only be met with fifth generation capabilities’
General Andrew Leslie, to propose ‘organizational and that the F-35 ‘is the only available fifth generation
changes that are appropriately balanced and aligned fighter that meets the requirements’ of the air force.
across [the department] and the Canadian Forces’. The 19 October announcement of a Request
His report was submitted in July 2011. In the fore- for Proposals under the National Shipbuilding
word, Leslie noted that he and his team had looked Procurement Strategy marked another waypoint in
at new ways of combining organisations ‘to achieve the country’s procurement plans. Nova Scotia-based
potential efficiencies, to streamline ourselves while Irving Shipbuilding Inc. was selected to build the
maintaining the required operational focus. We have 21 combat vessels in the package, while Vancouver
identified areas that will lead to about $1B in potential Shipyards was selected to build the seven non-combat
yearly administrative savings.’ The report also iden- vessels. The combat component includes between six
tifies possible means of reducing overheads while and eight ice-capable offshore patrol vessels capable
protecting deployable forces and associated equip- of operating in the High North and Canada’s exclu-
ment, training and infrastructure. ‘This will require sive economic zones in the Atlantic and Pacific. It
a determined, collective effort to reduce headquar- also includes construction of the Canadian Surface
ters and overhead, and will involve the rerolling Combatant vessels, designed to replace capabilities
and re-investing in the order of about 11,000 mili- currently seen on the Iroquois and Halifax classes. The
tary and civilian people’. The report’s recommenda- non-combat ship package includes offshore science
tions include the possible demobilisation of full-time vessels for the Coast Guard and a polar icebreaker.
reservists – whom the report notes are employed Canada withdrew its combat contingent from
‘mainly in headquarters and support functions at an Afghanistan between July and December 2011 (as
approximate cost of $1B annually’ – ‘back to a baseline anticipated in The Military Balance 2011, pp. 51–2)
of approximately 4,500’ from a total of about 9,000. with the handover of the Kandahar AOR to US forces.
It also argues that the government should reduce Operation Athena was due to close at the end of 2011.
‘by over 30% over several years the $2.7B spent on Ottawa deployed a Mission Transition Task Force to
50 The Military Balance 2012
manage the conclusion of its combat mission and the to southern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea as
return of necessary forces and equipment. It is not, part of Operation Mobile, Canada’s contribution to
however, the end of the Canadian forces’ deploy- international operations designed to support the
ment to Afghanistan. Operation Attention consti- arms embargo on Libya and enforce the no-fly zone
tutes Canada’s participation in the NATO Training in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1973
Mission–Afghanistan, with over 900 personnel (see p. 14). Operation Mobile consisted of two task
remaining on training and mentoring duties. Forces forces, one on land (Task Force Libeccio) and one at
are due to concentrate in Kabul and, according sea (Task Force Charlottetown, then Vancouver), in
to the DND, two other sites at Herat and Mazar-e the Mediterranean. Task Force Libeccio included the
Sharif; the mission was intended to be capable of Sicily-based air wing that comprised CF-18 Hornets,
conducting ‘its full training mandate’ by November CC-150 Polaris and C-130J Hercules aircraft, and
2011. Canadian forces were in 2011 also deployed CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft.
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
North America 51
Organisations by Service
Canada CAN
North America
Canadian Dollar $ 2010 2011 2012 Army 34,800
GDP CS$ 1.63tr 1.71tr FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
US$ 1.58tr 1.74tr
1 Task Force HQ
per capita US$ 46,687 51,096
MANOEUVRE
Growth % 3.22 2.08 Mechanised
Inflation % 1.8 2.9 1 (1st) mech bde gp (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf
Def exp CS$ 20.9bn bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt)
US$ 20.2bn 2 (2nd & 5th) mech bde gp (1 armd recce regt, 2 mech
Def bdgt CS$ 20.6bn 21.1bn 21.3bn inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt)
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 19.9bn 21.5bn
1 AD regt
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
NATO Flight Training Canada AGOR 10 (coastal and offshore fishery vessels)
AGOS 7
North America
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS • TPT 22 Medium 1 S-61 Light 21: 3 Bell
AIRCRAFT
206L Long Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 14 Bo-105
TRG 45: 26 T-6A Texan II (CT-156 Harvard II); 19 Hawk
115 (CT-155) (advanced wpns/tactics trg)
Cyber
Contracted Flying Services – Southport Canada published its Cyber Security Strategy in October
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2010. The White Paper said that the Communications
AIRCRAFT Security Establishment Canada, the Canadian Security
TRG 34: 11 Grob G120A; 7 King Air C90B; 7 Jet Ranger Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted
(CH-139); 9 Bell 412 (CH-146) Police will all investigate incidents according to their
TPT • Light 7 Beech C90B King Air relevant mandates. Meanwhile, the armed forces will
TRG 11 G-120A strengthen their capacity to defend their own networks.
HELICOPTERS The Canadian Forces Network Operation Centre is the
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
MRH 9 Bell 412 (CH-146) ‘national operational Cyber Defence unit’ permanently
TPT • Light 7 Bell 206; Jet Ranger (CH-139) assigned to support Canadian Forces operations under
Canadian Expeditionary Force Command and Canada
Canadian Special Operations Forces Command.
Command 1,500
FORCES BY ROLE Deployment
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF regt (Canadian Special Operations Regiment) Afghanistan
1 SF unit (JTF2) NATO • ISAF • Operation Athena/Attention 529; 1 air unit
MANOEUVRE with CC-130J
Aviation Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 sqn, with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon – from the RCAF) OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 CBRN unit (Canadian Joint Incidence Response Unit Cyprus
– CJIRU) UN • UNFICYP (Operation Snowgoose) 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Democratic Republic of the Congo
RECCE 4 LAV Bison (NBC) UN • MONUSCO (Operation Crocodile) 8 obs
HEL • MRH Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
Egypt
Canadian Operational Support Command MFO (Operation Calumet) 28
2,000 GERMANY
FORCES BY ROLE NATO (ACO) 287
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr spt coy HAITI
1 (joint) sigs regt UN • MINUSTAH (Operation Hamlet) 11
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Jamaica
3 (spt) log unit Operation Jaguar 65 (providing SAR spt)
4 (movement) log unit
1 med bn Middle East
1 (close protection) MP coy UN • UNTSO (Operation Jade) 7 obs
SERBIA
Canadian Coast Guard 4,500 (civilian) NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise (Operation Kobold) 5
Incl Department of Fisheries and Oceans; all platforms are
OSCE • Serbia 2
designated as non-combatant.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 73 OSCE • Kosovo 9
PSO 2: 1 Leonard J Cowley; 1 Sir Wilfred Grenfell Sierra Leone
PCO 7: 2 Cape Roger; 1 Dumit; 1 Eckaloo; 1 Gordon Reid; 1 IMATT (Operation Sculpture) 9
Nahidik; 1 Tanu
PCC 4: 1 Arrrow Post; 1 Harp; 2 Louisbourg South Sudan
PB 60: 4 Cove Island; 4 Point Henry; 3 Post; 1 Quebecois; 1 UN • UNMISS (Operation Safari) 3; 5 obs
Tembah; 1 Vakta; 5 Type 100; 10 Type 300-A; 31 Type-300B Sudan
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 4
UN • UNAMID 4
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 35
AG 5 Syria/ISRAEL
AGB 13 (2 hvy; 4 med; 7 lt) UN • UNDOF (Operation Gladius) 3
54 The Military Balance 2012
USN SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM NAV sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy, 1
SPASUR 3 strategic transmitting stations; 6 strategic int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 CSS bn); 1 (3rd IBCT) lt inf bde (1
North America
receiving sites in southeast US recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 1
PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK log bde)
CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM PARCS 1 at 1 (1st) cav div (4 (1st–4th HBCT) armd bde (1 armd
Cavalier AFS, (ND) recce sqn, 2 armd/armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt
PAVE PAWS 3 at Beale AFB (CA), Cape Cod AFS (MA), bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
Clear AFS (AK); 1 (phased array radar 5,500km range) 1 (1st) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd HBCT) armd bde (1 armd
located at Otis AFB (MA) recce sqn, 2 armd/armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt
DETECTION AND TRACKING RADARS Kwajalein bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (3rd & 4th IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce
Atoll, Ascension Island, Antigua, Kaena Point (HI), sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt
MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA) avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
GROUND BASED ELECTRO OPTICAL DEEP 2 (3rd & 4th) inf div (3 (1st–3rd HBCT) armd bde (1
SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM GEODSS Socorro armd recce sqn, 2 armd/armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1
(NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT) cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (4th IBCT) lt inf bde; (1 recce
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
STRATEGIC DEFENCES – MISSILE DEFENCES sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt
SEA-BASED: Aegis engagement cruisers and destroyers avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
LAND-BASED: 21 ground-based interceptors at 2 (170th & 172nd) armd inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 armd inf
Fort Greeley, (AK); 3 ground-based interceptors at bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn, 1 recce tp, 1 SP arty bty)
Vandenburg, (CA) Mechanised
1 (2nd) inf div (1 (1st HBCT) armd bde (1 armd recce
Space sqn, 2 armd/armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
SATELLITES 104 CSS bn); 3 (2nd–4th SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce
COMMUNICATIONS 31 sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy, 1
1 AEHF-1; 8 DSCS-III; 2 Milstar-I; 3 Milstar-II; 1 PAN-1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log
(P360); 6 SDS-III; 7 UFO; 3 WGS SV2 bde)
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 31: 11 1 (25th) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd SBCT) mech bde (1 armd
NAVSTAR Block I/II/IIA; 20 NAVSTAR Block IIR recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 engr
METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 6 DMSP-5 coy, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 CSS bn); 1 (3rd IBCT) inf
ISR 10: 1 FIA Radar 1 (NROL-41); 4 Improved Crystal bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS
(visible and infrared imagery, resolution 6 inches); bn); 1 (4th AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1
2 Lacrosse (Onyx radar imaging satellite); 1 ORS-1; 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1
TacSat-3; 1 TacSat-4; log bde)
Light
ELINT/SIGINT 20: 3 Mentor (advanced Orion); 2
1 (10th Mtn) inf div (4 (1st–4th IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce
Advanced Mentor; 2 Mercury; 1 Trumpet; 2 Trumpet-2; 10
sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt
SBWASS (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System);
avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
Naval Ocean Surveillance System
Air Manoeuvre
SPACE SURVEILLANCE 1 SBSS (Space Based
1 (82nd) AB div (4 (1st–4th AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn,
Surveillance System)
2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn)
EARLY WARNING 5: 4 DSP; 1 SBIRS Geo-1
hel bde; 1 log bde)
1 (101st) air aslt div (4 (1st–4th AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce
US Army 571,108; 49,424 active ARNG; 20,938 bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (cbt
active AR (total 641,470) avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (173rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty
Sqn are generally bn sized and tp are generally coy sized bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn)
COMMAND Aviation
4 (I, III, V & XVIII AB) corps HQ 2 indep (cbt avn) hel bde
SPECIAL FORCES Other
(see USSOCOM) 1 (11th ACR) trg armd cav regt (OPFOR) (2 armd cav
MANOEUVRE sqn, 1 CSS bn)
Reconnaissance COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (3rd ACR) armd cav regt (3 armd cav sqn, 1 engr coy, 7 arty bde
1 chemical coy, 1 int coy, 1 hel sqn) 5 engr bde
1 (2nd SCR) cav regt (1 recce sqn, 3 mech sqn, 1 arty 2 EOD gp (2 EOD bn)
sqn, 1 AT tp, 1 engr tp, 1 int tp, 1 sigs tp, 1 CSS sqn) 5 AD bde
5 (BfSB) surv bde 5 int bde
Armoured 1 int regt
1 (1st) armd div (2 (2nd & 4th HBCT) armd bde (1 armd 2 int gp
recce sqn, 2 armd/armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt 4 MP bde
bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (1st SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce 2 NBC bde
56 The Military Balance 2012
UAV • ISR 278 Hawkeye AEW ac; 4 SH-60F Seahawk ASW hel; 2 HH-
Heavy 42: 3 I-Gnat; 20 RQ-5A Hunter; 4 Sky Warrior; 15 60H Seahawk SAR hel)
North America
Warrior 10 Nimitz with 2–3 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-
Medium 236 RQ-7A Shadow 7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-
AD• SAM 1,281+ 116 SAM (typical capacity 55 F/A-18 Hornet FGA
SP 798: 703 FIM-92A Avenger (veh-mounted Stinger); ac; 4 EA-6B Prowler/EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C
95 M6 Linebacker (4 Stinger plus 25mm gun) Hawkeye AEW ac; 4 SH-60F Seahawk ASW hel; 2 HH-
TOWED 483 MIM-104 Patriot 60H Seahawk SAR hel)
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger CRUISERS • CGHM • 22 Ticonderoga Aegis Baseline
RADAR • LAND 251: 98 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty); 2/3/4 with Aegis C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84
56 AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder (arty); 60 AN/TRQ-32 Teammate Harpoon AShM, 2 61 cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2ER
(COMINT); 32 AN/TSQ-138 Trailblazer (COMINT); 5 AN/ SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 2 127mm gun (capacity 2 SH-
TSQ-138A Trailblazer 60B Seahawk ASW hel); (extensive upgrade programme
AEV 250 M9 ACE scheduled from 2006–2020 to include sensors and fire
ARV 2412+: ε2,400 M88A1/2; 12 Pandur; some M578 control systems; major weapons upgrade to include
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
VLB 60+: some M48/M60 AVLB; 20 REBS; 40 Wolverine Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM), SM-3/SM-2 capability
HAB and 2 Mk45 Mod 2 127mm gun)
MW Aardvark JSFU Mk4; Hydrema 910 MCV-2; M58/M59 DESTROYERS 61
MICLIC; M139; Rhino DDGHM 33 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis C2,
2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 32
US Navy 328,648; 4,600 active reservists (total cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASsW/SM-2ER SAM/
333,248) Tomahawk (TLAM) LACM, 1 64 cell Mk41 VLS with
Comprises 2 Fleet Areas, Atlantic and Pacific. All ASROC ASsW/SM-2 ER SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 2
triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun,
combatants divided into 6 Fleets: 2nd – Atlantic, 3rd –
(capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel), (additional
Pacific, 4th – Caribbean, Central and South America, 5th –
ships in build)
Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, 6th – Mediterranean,
DDGM 28 Arleigh Burke Flight I/II with Aegis C2,
7th – W. Pacific; plus Military Sealift Command (MSC);
2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 32 cell
Naval Reserve Force (NRF); for Naval Special Warfare
Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-2ER SAM/Tomahawk
Command, see US Special Operations Command element.
LACM, 1 64 cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC ASsW/SM-2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ER SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 2 Mk49 RAM with RIM-
SUBMARINES 71 116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio (mod) opcon US 1 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
STRATCOM with up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5 FRIGATES 20
strategic SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow FFHM 2:
HWT 1 Freedom with 1 21 cell Mk99 lnchr with RIM-116
TACTICAL 57 SAM, Mk15 Phalanx CIWS, (capacity 2 MH-60R/S
SSGN 43: Seahawk hel or 1 MH-60 with 3 MQ-8 Firescout UAV)
4 Ohio (mod) with total of 154 Tomahawk LACM , 4 1 Independence with 1 11 cell SeaRAM lnchr with
single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT RIM-116 SAM, Mk15 Phalanx CIWS, (capacity 1
8 Los Angeles with 1 12 cell VLS with Tomahawk MH-60R/S Seahawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Firescout UAV)
LACM; 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow FFH 18 Oliver Hazard Perry with 2 triple 324mm ASTT
HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-60B
23 Los Angeles (Imp) with 1 12 cell VLS with Seahawk ASW hel)
Tomahawk LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28
Arrow HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM PCF (8 Cyclone currently non-operational)
8 Virginia with 1 12 cell VLS with Tomahawk LACM, PBF 12
4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 ADCAP mod 6 HWT PBR 16
(4 additional vessels in build) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9
SSN 14: MCO 9 Avenger (MCM-1) with 1 SLQ-48 MCM system, 1
11 Los Angeles with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 SQQ-32(V)3 Sonar (mine hunting)
Sea Arrow HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 2:
3 Seawolf with 8 single 660mm TT with up to 45 2 Blue Ridge (capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCVP; 700 troops; 1 med
Tomahawk LACM/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM, Mk48 utl hel)
Sea Arrow HWT AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 114 PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 29
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 11: LHD 8 Wasp with 2 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/
1 Enterprise with 3 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM- RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116
7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM- RAM SAM (capacity: 5 AV-8B Harrier II FGA; 42 CH-
116 SAM (typical capacity 55 F/A-18 Hornet FGA 46E Sea Knight hel; 6 SH-60B Seahawk hel; 3 LCAC(L);
ac; 4 EA-6B Prowler/EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C 60 tanks; 1,890 troops)
58 The Military Balance 2012
LHA 1 Tarawa with 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM Military Sealift Command (MSC)
SAM (capacity 6 AV-8B Harrier II FGA ac; 12 CH-46E
Sea Knight hel; 9 CH-53 Sea Stallion hel; 4 LCU; 100 Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force
tanks; 1,900 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 42
LPD 8: AEH 1 Kilauea
2 Austin (capacity 6 CH-46E Sea Knight hel; 2 ARS 4 Safeguard
LCAC(L)/LCU; 40 tanks; 788 troops) AH 2 Mercy, with 1 hel landing platform
6 San Antonio with 2 21 cell Mk49 GMLS with RIM- ATF 4 Powhatan
116 SAM (capacity 1 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel or 2 AO 15 Henry J. Kaiser
CH-46 Sea Knight or 1 MV-22 Osprey; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AOE 4 Supply class
AAAV; 720 troops) (5 additional vessels in build) AKEH 12 Lewis and Clark (1 additional vessel in build)
LSD 12: Maritime Prepositioning Program
4 Harpers Ferry with 1–2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 31
SAM, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 2 LCAC(L); AOT 1 Champion
40 tanks; 500 troops)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
AG 1
8 Whidbey Island with 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 AK 8
SAM, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 4 LCAC(L); AKR 12: 3; 1 Bob Hope; 8 Watson
40 tanks; 500 troops) AKRH 5
AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT 269+ AVB 2
LCU 34 LCU-1600 (capacity either 2 M1-A1 Abrams TPT 2 HSV
MBT or 350 troops)
LCVP 8 Strategic Sealift Force
LCPL 75 (At a minimum of 4 days readiness)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16:
LCM 72
AGMS 1
LCAC 80 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops;
AOT 2 (long-term chartered)
(undergoing upgrade programme))
AK 3
SF 6 DDS opcon USSOCOM
AKR 10: 6 Bob Hope; 2 Gordon; 2 Shughart
Combat Logistics Force Special Mission Ships
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17:
AOE 5: 4 Sacramento (capacity 2 CH-46E Sea Knight tpt AS 2 Emory S Land
hel); 1 Supply (capacity 3 CH-46E Sea Knight tpt hel) AGM 2 (additional vessel awaiting commissioning)
ARC 1 Zeus
Navy Reserve Surface Forces AGOS 5: 1 Impeccable; 4 Victorious
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8
AGS 7: 6 Pathfinder; 1 Waters
FFH 8 Oliver Hazard Perry in reserve with 2 triple
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 36 SM-1 MR SAM, 1 US Maritime Administration Support • National
76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) Defense Reserve Fleet
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34:
MCO 5 Avenger in reserve with 1 SLQ-48 MCM system, AOT 4
1 SQQ-32(V)3 Sonar (mine hunting) ACS 3 Keystone State
INSHORE UNDERSEA WARFARE 45 HDS/IBU/MIUW AFS 1
AGOS 3
Naval Reserve Forces 109,222 (incl 6,224 AGS 3
active) AK 16: 4; 12 T-AK (breakbulk)
AKR 2
Selected Reserve 66,455 AP 2
Individual Ready Reserve 42,767 Ready Reserve Force
Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days
Naval Inactive Fleet
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 48:
Under a minimum of 60–90 days notice for reactivation;
ACS 6 Keystone State
still on naval vessel register
AK 6: 2 T-AK (breakbulk); 4 T-AK (heavy lift)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2
AKR 35: 1 Adm WM M Callaghan; 8 Algol; 26 Cape
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1 CV
Island
FRIGATES 1 FFH
AOT 1 Petersburg
AMPHIBIOUS 12
2 LHA Augmentation Force
5 LPD COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
5 LKA 1 (active) Cargo Handling log bn
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 ATF 12 (reserve) Cargo Handling log bn
North America 59
Naval Aviation 98,588 Orion PAX 9: 1 Gulfstream III (C-20A); 2 Gulfstream III
11 air wings (10 active; 1 reserve). Average air wing com- (C-20D); 5 Gulfstream IV (C-20G); 1 Gulfstream V (C-
North America
prises 7 sqns: 4 each with 12 F/A-18 (2 with F/A-18C, 1 37);
with F/A-18E, 1 with F/A-18F), 1 with 6 SH-60, 1 with 4 TRG 647: 47 T-6A Texan II; 2 T-6B Texan II; 269 T-34C
EA-6B, 1 with 4 E-2C Turbo Mentor; 9 T-38 Talon; 1 T-39D Sabreliner; 8 T-39G
Sabreliner; 15 T-39N Sabreliner; 55 T-44A Pegasus; 74
FORCES BY ROLE
T-45A Goshawk; 144 T-45C Goshawk; 21 TC-12B Huron;
(Numbers exclude Fleet Replacement Squadrons)
2 TE-2C Hawkeye
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
TRIALS AND TEST 50: 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 NF/A-
1 sqn with F/A-18A+ Hornet
18A Hornet; 2 NF/A-18C Hornet; 3 NF/A-18D Hornet;
13 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet
1 NP-3C Orion; 11 NP-3D Orion; 1 NT-34C Mentor; 1
11 sqn with F/A-18E Super Hornet
NU-1B Otter; 2 QF-4N Phantom II; 16 QF-4S Phantom II;
10 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet
2 X-26A; 1 X-31A; 1 YF-4J Phantom II (prototype, FGA);
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
1 YSH-60 Seahawk (prototype); 1 YSH-60B Seahawk; 1
7 sqn with HH-60H Seahawk; SH-60F Seahawk
YSH-60F Seahawk
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
North America
1 (VIP) sqn with CH-46E Sea Knight; CH-53E Sea
Stallion; VH-3D Sea King; VH-60N Presidential Hawk Marine Corps Aviation Reserve 11,592 reservists
ISR UAV FORCES BY ROLE
3 sqn with RQ-7B Shadow FIGHTER
AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with F/A-18A/A+ Hornet
2 bn with FIM-92A Avenger; FIM-92A Stinger (can TANKER
provide additional heavy calibre support weapons) 2 sqn with KC-130T Hercules
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRAINING
AC 370 combat capable 1 sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II
FGA 370 ATTACK HELICOPTER
43 F/A-18A/A+ Hornet; 2 F/A-18B Hornet; 83 F/A-18C 1 sqn with AH-1W Cobra; UH-1N Iroquois
Hornet; 94 F/A-18D Hornet; 131 AV-8B Harrier II; 17 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
TAV-8B Harrier 2 sqn with CH-46E Sea Knight
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
SAR 27: 21 HC-130H Hercules (additional 5 in store); 6 1 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
HC-130J Hercules COMBAT/ISR UAV
TPT 14 Light 12 CN-235-200 (HC-144A); PAX 2: 1 CL- 4 sqn with MQ-1B Predator
604 (C-143-A); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A) 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/MQ-9A Reaper
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/RQ-170 Sentinel
SAR 125: 35 HH-60J Jayhawk (additional 7 in store); 90 3 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper
AS-366G1 (HH-65C) Dauphin II (additional 12 in store) ISR UAV
TPT • Light 8 MH-68A (A-109E) Power 1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk
UAV 3 (trials)
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
US Air Force (USAF) 333,729; 6,641 active Provides the air component of PACOM, and commands
ANG; 4,198 active AFR (total 344,568) air units based in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South
Flying hours Ftr 189, bbr 260, tkr 308, airlift 343 Korea. 4 active air forces (5th, 7th, 11th & 13th); 8 wg
Almost the entire USAF (plus active force ANG and FORCES BY ROLE
AFR) is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
FIGHTER
(AEF), each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least 2 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
2 of the 10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with 3 sqn with F-22A Raptor
10,000–15,000 personnel, 90 multi-role Ftr and bbr ac, 31 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
intra-theatre refuelling aircraft and 13 aircraft for ISR and
5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
EW missions.
GROUND ATTACK
Global Strike Command (GSC) 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
2 active air forces (8th & 20th); 6 wg
2 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
MISSILE
1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III
TANKER
BOMBER
2 sqn with KC-135R
5 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress
TRANSPORT
2 sqn with B-2A Spirit
1 sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); Gulfstream V (C-37A)
Air Combat Command (ACC) 2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster
2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 15 wg. ACC numbered 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules
air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM, 1 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21); UH-1N Huey
SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM. TRAINING
1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
FORCES BY ROLE
BOMBER
United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE)
4 sqn with B-1B Lancer
Provides the air component to both EUCOM and
FIGHTER
AFRICOM. 2 active air forces (3rd & 17th); 5 wg
4 sqn with F-22A Raptor
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK FORCES BY ROLE
4 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle FIGHTER
5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
GROUND ATTACK FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
5 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle
ELECTRONIC WARFARE 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
1 sqn with EA-6B Prowler; EA-18G Growler (personnel GROUND ATTACK
only – USN aircraft) 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II
2 sqn with EC-130H Compass Call COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
ISR 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
5 sqn with OC-135/RC-135/WC-135 TANKER
2 sqn with U-2S/TU-2S 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL TRANSPORT
5 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry 1 sqn with C-130J Hercules
COMMAND & CONTROL 2 sqn with Gulfstream III/IV (C-20); Gulfstream V (C-
1 sqn with E-4B 37); Learjet 35A (C-21)
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
6 sqn with HC-130J/N/P King; HH-60G Pave Hawk Air Mobility Command (AMC)
TRAINING Provides strategic and tactical airlift, air-to-air refuelling
2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle; and aero medical evacuation. 1 active air force (18th); 13
1 UAV sqn with MQ-1B Predator wg and 1 gp
North America 63
North America
4 sqn with KC-10A Extender Reaper
8 sqn with KC-135 Stratotanker (+3 sqn with personnel ISR • Heavy 24: 23 RQ-4B Global Hawk; 1 RQ-170 Sentinel
only) MSL
TRANSPORT AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II
1 VIP wg with B-737-200 (C-40B); B-757-200 (C-32A); SARH AIM-7M Sparrow ARH AIM-120A/B/C AMRAAM
Gulfstream III/IV (C-20); VC-25 Air Force One ASM 1,142 AGM-86B (ALCM) LACM (strategic); 239
2 sqn with C-5 Galaxy AGM-86C (CALCM) LACM (tactical); 50 AGM-86D
11 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III LACM (penetrator) 460 AGM-129A (ACM) LACM
8 sqn with C-130E/H/J Hercules (strategic); AGM-130A; AGM-158 JASSM; AGM-65A
1 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A) Maverick/AGM-65B Maverick/AGM-65D Maverick/AGM-
4 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21) 65G Maverick; AGM-88A HARM/AGM-88B HARM ARM
BOMBS
Air Education and Training Command Conventional: BLU-109/Mk 84 (2,000lb); BLU-110/Mk
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
2 active air forces (2nd and 19th), 10 active air wgs 83 (1,000lb); BLU-111/Mk 82 (500lb)
FORCES BY ROLE Laser-guided: Paveway II, Paveway III (fits on Mk82,
TRAINING Mk83 or Mk84)
1 sqn with C-5 Galaxy INS/GPS guided: JDAM (GBU 31/32/38); GBU-15 (with
1 sqn with C-17 Globemaster BLU-109 penetrating warhead or Mk 84); GBU-39B
1 sqn with C-21 Learjet Small Diameter Bomb (250lb); Enhanced Paveway III
3 sqn with C-130E/J Hercules
6 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon Reserve Organisations
1 sqn with F-22A Raptor Air National Guard 106,680 reservists (incl 6,641
1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II active)
2 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
FORCES BY ROLE
24 (flying trg) sqn with T-1 Jayhawk; T-6 Texan II; T-38
BOMBER
Talon; T-43
1 sqn with B-2A Spirit (personnel only)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT 1,435 combat capable 5 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
BBR 139: 64 B-1B Lancer (2 more in test); 19 B-2A Spirit 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only)
(1 more in test); 56 B-52H Stratofortress (4 more in test; FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
18 in store) 13 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
FTR 277: 113 F-15C Eagle; 11 F-15D Eagle; 153 F-22A Raptor GROUND ATTACK
FGA 833: 212 F-15E Strike Eagle; 500 F-16C Fighting 5 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II
Falcon; 115 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 6 F-35A Lightning II ISR
ATK 186 A-10C Thunderbolt II 3 sqn with E-8C J-STARS (mixed active force and
EW 14 EC-130H Compass Call ANG personnel)
ISR 76: 37 Beech 350ER King Air (MC-12W Liberty); 2 COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
E-9A; 2 OC-135B Open Skies; 28 U-2S; 5 TU-2S; 2 WC-135 9 sqn with HC-130 Hercules/MC-130P Combat Shadow;
Constant Phoenix HH-60G Pavehawk
ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V Rivet Joint; 9 RC-135W Rivet Joint; 3 TANKER
RC-135S Cobra Ball; 2 RC-135U Combat Sent 20 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn with
AEW&C 32 E-3B/C Sentry (1 more in test) personnel only)
C2 4 E-4B TRANSPORT
TKR 170: 140 KC-135R Stratotanker; 30 KC-135T 1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C); Gulfstream G100
Stratotanker (C-38A)
TKR/TPT 59 KC-10A Extender 3 sqn with C-5A Galaxy
CSAR 22 HC- 130J/P/N King 2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+1 sqn personnel only)
TPT 464 Heavy 219: 33 C-5B Galaxy; 2 C-5C Galaxy; 3 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan
C-5M Galaxy; 181 C-17A Globemaster III Medium 186 17 sqn with C-130H/J Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only)
C-130E/H/J Hercules; Light 35 Learjet 35A (C-21) PAX 24: 1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H Hercules
2 B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 B-757-200 (C-32A); 5 Gulfstream 4 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A)
III (C-20B); 2 Gulfstream IV (C-20H); 9 Gulfstream V TRAINING
(C-37A); 2 VC-25A Air Force One 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules
TRG 1,130: 179 T-1A Jayhawk; 405 T-6A Texan II; 546 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
T-38A Talon 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
HELICOPTERS COMBAT/ISR UAV
CSAR 81 HH-60G Pave Hawk 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator (+ 3 sqn personnel only)
TPT • Light 62 UH-1N Huey 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
64 The Military Balance 2012
700 (C-40C); 2 B-757-200 (C-32B); 2 Gulfstream G100 HELICOPTERS • CSAR 13 HH-60G Pave Hawk
(C-38A)
HELICOPTERS • CSAR 17 HH-60G Pave Hawk Civil Reserve Air Fleet
UAV • Cbt ISR • Heavy 56: 42 MQ-1B Predator; 14 MQ- Commercial ac numbers fluctuate
AIRCRAFT • TPT 37 carriers and 1,376 aircraft enrolled,
9A Reaper
including 1,273 aircraft in the international segment (990
Air Force Reserve Command 67,500 reservists long-range and 283 short-range), plus 37 national, 50
(incl 4,198 active) aeromedical evacuation segments and 4 aircraft in the
FORCES BY ROLE Alaskan segment.
BOMBER Air Force Stand-by Reserve 16,858 reservists
1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress Trained individuals for mobilisation
FIGHTER
2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (personnel only) US Special Operations Command
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK (USSOCOM) 31,496; 3,376 (civilian); 11,247
3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+1 sqn personnel reservists (SOF) (total 46,119)
only) Commands all active, reserve and National Guard Special
GROUND ATTACK Operations Forces (SOF) of all services based in CONUS
2 sqn with A-10A Thunderbolt II
ISR Joint Special Operations Command
1 (Weather Recce) sqn with WC-130H/J Hercules Reported to comprise elite US SF including Special Forc-
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL es Operations Detachment Delta (‘Delta Force’), SEAL
1 sqn with E-3 Sentry (personnel only) Team 6 and integral USAF support.
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
3 sqn with HC-130P/N Hercules; HH-60G Pavehawk US Army Special Operations Command
TANKER FORCES BY ROLE
4 sqn with KC-10A Extender (personnel only) SPECIAL FORCES
6 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn personnel 5 SF gp (3 SF bn)
only) 1 ranger regt (3–4 ranger bn)
TRANSPORT MANOEUVRE
1 (VIP) sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C); DC-9 (C-9C Aviation
Nightingale) 1 (160th SOAR) regt (4 avn bn)
4 sqn with C-5A/B Galaxy (+2 sqn personnel only) COMBAT SUPPORT
2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+8 sqn personnel only) 1 civil affairs bn (5 civil affairs coy)
10 sqn with C-130H/J Hercules 1 psyops gp (5 psyops bn)
1 (Aerial Spray) sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sigs bn
TRAINING COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
2 sqn with A-10A Thunderbolt II 1 (sustainment) log bde
1 sqn with A-10A Thunderbolt II; F-15 Eagle; F-16 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Fighting Falcon HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress MRH 50 AH-6/MH-6 Little Bird
1 sqn with C-5A Galaxy TPT 123 Heavy 61 MH-47G Chinook; Medium 62 MH-
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 60K/L/M Black Hawk
COMBAT/ISR UAV UAV 57
1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/MQ-9A Reaper (personnel ISR • Light 29: 15 XPV-1 Tern; 14 XPV-2 Mako;
only) TPT • Heavy 28 CQ-10 Snowgoose
North America 65
North America
Army National Guard
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK
SPECIAL FORCES 2 sqn with AC-130H/U Spectre
2 SF gp (3 SF bn) TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26; C-130E Hercules; Mi-8 Hip; UH-1N
Army Reserve
Iroquois
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with C-130 Hercules/MC-130P Combat Shadow
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 sqn with CV-22A Osprey (+2 sqn personnel only)
2 psyops gp 3 sqn with MC-130H Combat Talon
4 civil affairs comd HQ 1 sqn with MC-130P Combat Shadow
8 civil affairs bde HQ 1 sqn with MC-130W Combat Spear
36 civil affairs bn (coy) 2 sqn with PC-12 (U-28A)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
TRAINING
US Navy Special Warfare Command 5,400 1 sqn with CV-22A Osprey
Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is organised 1 sqn with HC-130/MC-130H Combat Talon II; MC-
around eight SEAL Teams and two SEAL Delivery Ve- 130P Combat Shadow
hicle (SDV) Teams. These components deploy SEAL 1 sqn with UH-1H Iroquois
Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; UH-1N Huey
Teams worldwide to meet the training, exercise, contin- ISR UAV
gency and wartime requirements of theatre command- 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator; MQ-9 Reaper
ers. Operationally up to two of the eight SEAL Teams are EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
deployed at any given time. AIRCRAFT 25 combat capable
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 25: 8 AC-130H Spectre; 17 AC-130U Spectre
SPECIAL FORCES CSAR Some HC-130P/N King
8 SEAL team (total: 48 SF pl) TPT 55+ Medium 55+: Some C-130 Hercules; 20 MC-
2 SDV team 130H Combat Talon II; 23 MC-130P Combat Shadow; 12
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MC-130W Combat Spear; Light Some An-26 Curl; Some
PC-12 (U-28A)
SF 6 DDS
TILT-ROTOR 18 CV-22A Osprey (3 more in test)
Naval Reserve Force HELICOPTERS
SPECIAL FORCES CSAR Some HH-60G Pave Hawk
8 SEAL det TPT • Medium Some Mi-8 Hip; Light Some UH-1N
10 Naval Special Warfare det Huey
2 Special Boat sqn UAV • CISR • Heavy 39: 29 MQ-1 Predator; 10 MQ-9
2 Special Boat unit Reaper
1 SDV det
Reserve Organisations
US Marine Special Operations Command Air National Guard
(MARSOC) FORCES BY ROLE
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is a
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
component of USSOCOM consisting of one Marine Spe- 1 sqn with EC-130J/SJ Commando Solo
cial Operations Regiment with five subordinate units:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Marine Special Operations Battal-
AIRCRAFT
ions (MSOBs); the Marine Special Operations Intelli-
EW 7: 3 EC-130J Commando Solo; 4 EC-130SJ
gence Battalion; and the Marine Special Operations Sup-
Commando Solo
port Group. MARSOC Headquarters, the 2nd and 3rd TPT • Medium 4 MC-130P Combat Shadow
MSOB, the Marine Special Operations Intelligence Bat-
talion, the Marine Special Operations School and the Ma- Air Force Reserve
rine Special Operations Support Group are stationed at FORCES BY ROLE
Camp Lejeune, NC. The 1st MSOB is stationed at Camp TRANSPORT
Pendleton, CA. 2 sqn with MC-130E Combat Talon
After its activation in 2006, the structure and personnel 1 sqn with MC-130P Combat Shadow (personnel
of both 1st and 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company only)
transferred to MARSOC to form its first two battalions. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
In 2009, the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group AIRCRAFT
was re-designated as the 3rd MSOB. TPT • Medium 10 MC-130E Combat Talon I
66 The Military Balance 2012
North America
FORCES BY ROLE wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with 2 ftr sqn with 18
1 HQ (US Air Force Europe (USAFE)) at Ramstein F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Misawa AB; 1 ftr wg at
AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 ftr wg Okinawa – Kadena AB with 1 AEW&C sqn with 2
at Spangdahlem AB with 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-16CJ E-3B Sentry, 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk, 2
Fighting Falcon; 1 atk sqn with 18 A-10C Thunderbolt II; ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB
1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 16 C-130E/J Hercules; 2 with 10 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-12J; 1 Special Ops gp at
C-20 Gulfstream; 9 C-21 Learjet; 1 CT-43 Boeing 737 Okinawa – Kadena AB
USMC 377 USMC 17,585
Greece FORCES BY ROLE
US European Command • 378; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 1 Marine div (3rd); 1 ftr sqn with 12 F/A-18D Hornet;
naval base at Soudha Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt hel sqn with
12 CH-46E Sea Knight; 1 tpt hel sqn with 12 MV-22B
Greenland (DNK)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
Norway SPAIN
US European Command • 1 (APS) SP 155mm arty bn set US European Command • 1,483; 1 air base at Morón; 1 na-
val base at Rota
Pacific OCEAN
US Pacific Command • US Navy • 3rd Fleet THAILAND
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US Pacific Command • 162
8 SSBN; 20 SSGN; 10 SSN; 4 CVN; 8 CGHM; 14
Turkey
DDGHM; 9 DDGM; 11 FFH; 2 LCS; 6 MCO; 3 LHD; 1
US European Command • 1,511; MQ-1B Predator UAV at
LHA; 3 LPD; 4 LSD
Incirlik; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1
Persian gulf support facility at Izmir
Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-152: 4 MCO US Strategic Command • 1 Spacetrack Radar at Incirlik
Philippines United ARAB EMIRATES
US Pacific Command • 182 US Central Command • 140: 2 bty with MIM-104 Patriot
Portugal United Kingdom
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
North America
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
Canada (CAN)
LAV III APC (W) 550 CAN$1bn CAN General 2009 2012 Focus on weapons and mobility systems.
Upgrade (US$859.7m) Dynamics Part of FLCV upgrade and procurement
(GDLS) project worth CAN$5bn
Halifax-class FFGHM 12 CAN$3.1bn CAN Halifax 2007 2010 SLEP: Halifax-class HCM/FELEX project. To
Upgrade (US$2.9bn) Shipyard/ be fitted with Sea Giraffe 150 HC surv radar.
Victoria Final delivery due 2017
Shipyards
National DDGHM/ 23 CAN$25 bn CAN Irving 2011 n.k. Contract for 23 vessels signed in October
Shipbuilding FFGHM/ Shipyards 2011, to cover between six and eight Arctic
Procurement PSOH offshore patrol ships, two Joint Support
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:14 13 March 2012
Europe
The question of how to manage the pressure on maintenance, not deployable front-line capabili-
defence budgets remains at the forefront of many ties, and most seem to be destined for pooling, not
defence ministers’ minds, though circumstances vary sharing. So for the time being, member states prefer a
across countries. Governments are applying a range quick win that will have a relatively small impact on
of strategies to cope with the impact of the finan- national autonomy. This can save money and create
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
cial and economic crisis. While some have initiated the same or improved capability at lower cost. But
austerity measures and seem destined for an extended this logic will need to be complemented by a coherent,
period of defence cuts, the procurement cuts and long-term approach that anchors pooling and sharing
delays so far announced do not yet reflect this reality. in national defence planning and focuses on capabili-
Others, notably Germany and the UK, have adjusted ties relevant for likely military tasks. Member states
their national levels of ambition downwards. Dutch should avoid the temptation to feed projects into
forces will give up main battle tanks altogether pooling and sharing initiatives that would be other-
and focus their capability on a deployable air- wise redundant: multinational cooperation on capa-
mobile brigade for international crisis-management bility must not become a way to upload obsolete
operations. Increasingly, governments might be assets to the European level to avoid cuts.
forced to accelerate the process of taking equipment The pooling and sharing debate is a central theme
out of service that is either judged obsolete or too for European defence institutions. But EU member
expensive to maintain. Meanwhile, the drawdown states retain heterogeneous security and defence poli-
in Afghanistan will also force governments to make cies, with little convergence on fundamentals such as
hard decisions over which of the capabilities procured what kind of armed forces nations want and for what
for that conflict they should retain. purpose. Further, member states retain differing
Some European governments continue to explore legal and constitutional frameworks for the external
ways to pool and share capabilities, with initiatives deployment of their armed forces. These factors
under way in the EU and NATO. Pooling and sharing contribute to diverse levels of ambition across EU
is not a new idea (see The Military Balance 2010, p. member states and will become more important if
108). But the budget pressure that most EU member pooling and sharing includes deployable front-line
states feel in the defence realm has created a window capabilities.
of opportunity that should, in theory, propel govern- Further, pooling and sharing could increase
ments toward closer European defence cooperation. mutual dependence. Given that many EU member
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) states currently question whether they can rely on
council conclusions from 8 December 2010 call on EU others to make pooled capabilities available when
member states to ‘seize all opportunities to cooperate needed, the preconditions for successful pooling and
in the area of capability development’ and in partic- sharing may only rarely be met.
ular think about pooling and sharing. While they
have identified some 300 possible areas for pooling Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept
and sharing, member states will now have to accept NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
that these are likely to yield benefits only at the price presented a draft Strategic Concept to member
of somewhat reduced national autonomy. Striking governments in late September 2010. After a final
the right balance between autonomy and capability round of negotiations, Rasmussen’s paper was
is a difficult, but unavoidable, political task. The approved at the November 2010 Lisbon meeting (see
European Defence Agency was due to draw up a list The Military Balance 2011, pp. 73–4).
of pooling and sharing projects by early December At Lisbon, heads of state and government agreed
2011. that NATO should have a missile-defence system
72 The Military Balance 2012
covering all of NATO’s territory. The US decision to security and crisis prevention. Aside from coopera-
make its emerging national missile-defence archi- tion on specific issues such as cyber security, NATO
tecture available as a backbone for the NATO-wide also wants to promote regional security cooperation
system paved the way for the agreement. Russia beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Further, partnership
promoted several ideas, among them a fully inte- programmes may serve to help aspiring candidates to
grated NATO–Russian missile-defence system giving prepare for eventual NATO membership.
both sides control and de facto veto power, and a The new policy puts a clear emphasis on contri-
system in which Russia and NATO would be respon- butions by third countries and organisations to
sible for different geographical sectors. Both ideas met NATO-led operations. A political-military annex to
resistance from NATO allies. NATO leaders quickly the document specifies the roles partners can play
clarified: the Alliance would not have its decision- and is designed to strengthen their interaction with
making autonomy curtailed by an integrated system NATO. NATO uses the term ‘operational partners’
and was equally unwilling to outsource the defence for countries providing troops, military assets or
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
of parts of allied territory to third parties. other capacity that it deems to be of operational rele-
Given that Russia sees NATO’s missile-defence vance (including non-military capability). But even
plans as potentially undermining its own strategic with this new policy, operational partners can only
deterrent, Moscow is unlikely to forgo completely expect to play a role in decision-shaping, not decision-
the quest for assurances from NATO and attempts to making; this will remain the prerogative of the North
limit NATO’s room for manoeuvre. Russia’s ambas- Atlantic Council.
sador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, confirmed on the As the new policy foresees that all NATO coopera-
editorial page of the International Herald Tribune on tion activities should be open to all partner countries,
8 June 2011 that as far as Moscow was concerned, there will be a single ‘menu’ to choose from as partners
‘European missile defenses should be based on design their individual partnership programmes with
equal participation and a common indivisible secu- NATO. Though established partnership frameworks
rity for all the countries of the continent’. The same will continue to exist, their practical importance is
day, Rasmussen said that ‘our vision is two inde- likely to decrease. But coordinating partnership activ-
pendent systems with one goal: two systems that ities could make it difficult to take into account the
would exchange information to make the defence of requirements of NATO’s diverse partners, including
NATO territory and of Russian territory more effec- Russia and ranging from Austria to Afghanistan and
tive’. Progress is incremental, and NATO has set itself Switzerland to Pakistan. Finally, NATO’s operational
a timeline of reaching some form of agreement with partners are likely to enjoy a more privileged posi-
Russia by the next NATO summit in May 2012. tion in the future; the operational connection is likely
Another area where NATO moved quickly after to become the dominant lens for NATO’s partnership
the new Strategic Concept had been agreed was the policy. But perhaps one lesson from Operation Unified
area of partnerships with third countries and other Protector, the NATO operation over Libya (see p. 12),
international organisations. The Strategic Concept is that partnerships can also be ad hoc and mission
had made cooperative security, implemented by specific: over Libya, NATO successfully integrated its
means of partnerships, one of the three core tasks of air operations with those of Sweden, Jordan, Qatar
the Alliance. To give practical content to this agenda, and the UAE (though the environment was benign).
NATO foreign ministers adopted a new partnership A third issue is reform of NATO’s command struc-
policy at their meeting in Berlin on 15 April 2011. tures and agencies. On 8 June 2011, NATO defence
Driven by the assumption that NATO will need ministers agreed to cut one Joint Force Command,
partners to successfully operate in the current three component commands (one for each service)
security environment, NATO will build on its and two combined air operations centres (CAOC).
existing programmes such as Partnership for Peace, (NATO’s air operation over Libya was run from one
the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul of its CAOCs; see p. 12.) This streamlining effort will
Cooperation Initiative. As Rasmussen said in Berlin, lead to a reduction in posts in NATO’s command
NATO will try ‘to work on more issues, with more structure from some 13,000 to about 8,800. NATO’s
partners, in more ways’. The new partnership policy network of agencies will be reorganised under three
will serve differing aims. Partnerships are confidence- areas: procurement, support and communication
building measures that should contribute to stability, and information. Inevitably, a Strategic Concept
Europe 73
agreed by 28 governments against the background of And this at a time other European responses were
continuing operations and an uncertain international fragmentary: shortcomings in EU defence struc-
environment embodies many compromises. tures were exposed and there was ‘never any ques-
tion of framing the Libyan intervention as an EU
European defence after Libya crisis management mission under CSDP’ (see ‘War
NATO’s first new military mission after the Strategic in Libya: Europe’s confused response’, IISS Strategic
Concept, Operation Unified Protector, however, Comments, vol. 17, no. 18, April 2011). So, while the
revealed, according to then-US Defense Secretary NATO mission worked relatively smoothly in terms
Europe
Robert Gates in June 2011, ‘shortcomings – in capa- of military command, control and operations, it was
bility and will’. (He also said that problems existed not without problems: capability gaps and shortages,
in the Afghanistan mission, notably regarding the the ad hoc nature of the coalition (in this case the non-
number of troops and support assets deployed by participation of some member states) and imposition
NATO states.) Gates noted that ‘while every alliance of caveats by other participants would all have given
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
member voted for [the] Libya mission, less than half planners cause for concern. But in addition to these
have participated at all, and fewer than a third have US exhortations on capability and funding, European
been willing to participate in the strike mission’. It states will have to consider what Washington’s
wasn’t that many did not want to take part, he said, decision to ‘lead from behind’ in Libya means for
they simply couldn’t, with particular skill and plat- European defence, and whether Libya marks a water-
form capabilities absent. Falling defence spending shed in the attitude, nature and degree of US military
and resultant falling investment in modernisation involvement in the European theatre.
and other capabilities was one factor. The challenge
wasn’t the total level of spending, but rather how and Defence economics
why resources were allocated. For non-US NATO The protracted sovereign debt crisis in Europe wors-
members, the results of their defence investment ened over the course of 2011 (see Strategic Survey
‘were significantly less than the sum of the parts’. 2011, p. 199). European banks remain undercapital-
Three weeks later, Rasmussen said in the July/August ised and excessively leveraged; while public debt-to-
edition of Foreign Affairs that Libya was a reminder ‘of GDP ratios have risen to uncomfortably high levels in
how important it is for NATO to be ready, capable, and many countries – approaching and exceeding 100% of
willing to act’, and raised the spectre of the impact of GDP in several cases (see Table 8) – as governments
current cuts on future operations. This of course does bailed out ailing banking sectors and ran fiscal defi-
not mean that small militaries cannot play a mean- cits in an attempt to stimulate stagnant economies.
ingful role: indeed, Libya – like Afghanistan – has Portugal applied for a €78bn EU/IMF bail-out in May,
showed that small states with motivated and capable and Greece obtained an additional €109bn in funds
militaries, and willing politicians, can engage to great in July (on top of the €110bn it received in May 2010).
effect. Rasmussen said that ‘smart defence’ was one But the second half of 2011 saw some effects of the
answer, with states setting defence priorities on the financial contagion spread to core Eurozone econo-
basis of ‘threats, cost-effectiveness and performance’, mies such as Italy, Spain and even France. These
while multinational cooperation on procurement events precipitated sharp falls in European bank
was another. Europe should, he said, also increase shares amidst fears over their exposure to distressed
its deployable and sustainable capabilities. But for Eurozone sovereign debt.
Gates, ‘ultimately, nations must be responsible for There is a degree of sub-regional variation in
their fair share of the common defense’. economic health. Extensive trade, investment and
His successor, Leon Panetta, continued the theme, banking links with Greece have led Balkan econo-
identifying capability gaps and shortages in common mies to be particularly exposed to the Greek crisis;
areas such as targeting specialists, tanker aircraft and while weakened banking sectors in Austria, Belgium,
ISR. (He also noted shortages of supplies and muni- Denmark, Ireland and the UK have put pressure on
tions.) Panetta urged European states to consult before their public finances. Deficit reduction has dampened
cutting capabilities, to ensure that these remained in growth in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and
key areas. But he also noted positive aspects of the Slovakia – although the strength of German indus-
NATO involvement, not least that it took NATO trial growth in 2010 contributed to their exports. By
only ‘ten days to decide to act after UNSCR 1973’. contrast, Baltic states recovered strongly following
74 The Military Balance 2012
Table 8 NATO Europe Gross Government Debt and Real Defence Expenditure
2008–101
Government Debt as a % of GDP Real Defence Expenditure2 (US$bn)
Countries* 2008 2010 % Change 2008 2010e % Change
Latvia 17.1 39.9 133.5 0.47 0.24 –48.3
Lithuania 15.6 38.7 148.1 0.47 0.33 –29.8
Bulgaria 15.5 17.4 12.4 1.12 0.83 –25.7
Romania 13.6 31.7 132.7 2.60 2.14 –17.8
Hungary 72.3 80.2 10.9 1.64 1.36 –17.6
Italy 106.3 119.0 11.9 34.0 28.2 –17.0
Slovak Republic 27.8 41.8 50.3 1.31 1.10 –16.4
Estonia 4.6 6.6 42.5 0.39 0.33 –14.5
France 68.2 82.3 20.7 60.9 52.0 –14.5
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
severe recessions in 2009 and the Nordic states Overall, real defence spending in European NATO
continue to maintain healthy public finances. states fell by an average of 7.4% per country, while
total NATO Europe real defence spending fell by
Defence austerity 5.4% over the period (not shown).
As illustrated by Table 8, between 2008 and 2010, The decline in NATO European defence spending
gross government debt as a percentage of GDP in has caused significant concern in the United States
NATO’s European members rose by an average of as well as Europe. Robert Gates’s speech in June
almost 40%, to an average of debt-to-GDP ratio of 2011 noted that ‘For all but a handful of allies,
nearly 60%. In Belgium, Greece, Italy and Portugal, defence budgets ... have been chronically starved of
this figure approached or exceeded 100% of annual adequate funding for a long time, with the shortfalls
output, while for Germany, France and Hungary, compounding on themselves each year.’ Similar senti-
debt-to-GDP ratios rose above 80%. Defence has ments were echoed earlier, in February, by NATO
borne a significant share of subsequent fiscal adjust- Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen: ‘defence
ment, with real-terms reductions in defence spending spending by NATO’s European members (over the
over 2008–10 occurring in approximately 16 out of preceding two years) had shrunk by around $45bn
23 of the NATO Europe member states surveyed. dollars – equivalent to the entire German defence
Moreover, in over 40% of European NATO countries budget’. (This is perhaps a slight overstatement: in
(10 out of 23), these real-terms declines exceeded 10%. nominal terms, NATO’s figures make the reduction
Europe 75
1.93 1.89
2.0 1.86 1.81 1.78 1.75 1.72 1.74
1.62
1.58
1.5
% of GDP
1.0
Europe
0.5
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
1.5
1.31 1.27 1.25
1.18 1.14 1.18 1.19 1.26
1.13
1.2 1.06
0.9
% of GDP
0.6
0.3
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
equal to around $39bn. The real-terms reduction was countries facing declining equipment and research
about $16bn.) Rasmussen also stated that in the last budgets attempt to realise economies of scale by
ten years, the United States’ share of total Alliance engaging in joint development and acquisition. For
spending had risen to almost 75%, and warned that example, by jointly developing and ordering 24 FH-77
‘Europe risked becoming increasingly adrift from BW L52 Archer (6×6) self-propelled artillery systems
the United States. If Europe becomes unable to make each, Sweden and Norway were able to reduce costs
an appropriate contribution to global security, then by around €40m, as compared to if they under-
the United States might look elsewhere for reliable took the project individually. Similarly, Romania is
defence partners.’ exploring the possibility of joint purchases of F-16s
with Bulgaria and Croatia, as more orders would
Cooperation, competition and cuts enable unit cost reductions.
Continued interest in ‘pooling and sharing’ of assets Over the longer term, moves to create a common
is assessed above (see p. 71) and the overall lack of European defence market may serve to increase
momentum has prompted some frustration. The competition in the currently segmented national
Dutch were reported as calling for an EU meeting by defence industries, thereby reducing procurement
the end of 2011, where member states would discuss costs. On 21 August 2011, the European Commission’s
plans for furthering the pooling and sharing agenda. Directive 2009/81/EC on Defence and Security
More fruitful areas of cooperation may be defence Procurement came into force, despite the fact that
procurement and research and development, as many EU member states have yet to transpose its
76 The Military Balance 2012
contents into national legislation. The Commission While the government announced an increase in
intends the directive to foster a European defence the 2012 defence-budget submission, France could
equipment market by increasing industrial compe- well introduce in 2012 measures to rein in defence
tition and ultimately lowering prices. According to spending on top of those that have already been
data from the European Defence Agency, in 2009 (the introduced (see Defence Economics, p. 78). There will
last year for which data is available), some 73% of the be a new government after elections in April 2012,
defence equipment of EU member states was procured and the year is also due to see the publication of a
within national boundaries and about 87% of spending new White Paper, which will take stock of continued
on research and technology occurred at the national economic problems as well as the Arab Awakening
level. Key objectives of the Directive are to introduce and the war in Libya, in which France played a major
free-market principles into defence supply chains role. Hitherto, France has managed to maintain its
and to encourage competitive cross-border defence suite of capabilities amid these uncertainties, but the
procurement. Under the Lisbon Treaty (Article 346), flurry of press releases from service branches trum-
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
security and defence remain exempt from the provi- peting various contributions to the Libya campaign
sions of the common market and EU procurement law may indicate concern over possible hard choices
if member states claim essential security interests. The ahead. The review will take place during the second
Commission is likely to gradually increase the pres- half of 2012, and working groups have been set up
sure on member-state governments by challenging to examine topics including new conflicts (counter-
the legality of exemptions claimed under Article 346, insurgency, the potential for major state-on-state
particularly if these relate to offsets. conflict, cyber warfare), the global redistribution of
In the short term, the absence of significant power, changes to the ‘arc of crisis’ (the area identi-
cost savings via greater inter-state cooperation or fied in the 2008 White Paper as stretching from the
increased industry competition has meant that Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, containing major French
countries have had to resort to cutting personnel interests), capability sharing and pooling (and how
and equipment programmes. Austria, Bulgaria, the this might relate to a desire to maintain strategic
Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Finland and the autonomy), environmental security and strategic
United Kingdom have all either proposed or imple- resources, and the impact of the financial crisis on
mented personnel cuts; while delays to or cancella- defence procurement and defence capabilities.
tions of procurement programmes have occurred in
Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Operations and equipment
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the Netherlands and the French operations in Afghanistan (see map, p. 29)
UK. Bucking this trend towards reductions to equip- have been an incubator for new thinking in the French
ment programmes were Sweden, Norway, Poland army. ‘Soldier-scholars’ such as Colonels Nicolas
and Estonia, reflecting the relative health of their Le Nen, Benoît Durieux, Bruno Heluin and Francis
economies and public balance sheets. Chanson have developed thinking on counter-
insurgency, mountain warfare and manoeuvre
FRANCE warfare, while a new COIN doctrine, JD-3.4.4 Contre-
Insurrection, was published in 2010. Afghanistan has
In 2011 the French military continued with the objec- led French forces to adapt under fire, in terms of
tives of the 2008 Defence White Paper (see The Military equipment as well as strategy, in a way similar to the
Balance 2009, p. 104). As well as emphasising flexible US and UK militaries in the mid-2000s. Equipment
capabilities for a range of contingencies, the docu- quality has improved substantially, especially in the
ment also introduced plans to streamline France’s wake of the 2008 Uzbin ambush, with an emphasis
defence establishment, reducing service and civilian on combat protection and firepower. For instance,
personnel, combat aircraft numbers, and the number Javelin anti-tank missiles were purchased by the
of service establishments, to generate funding for French forces in 2009 in a bid to reinforce the stand-
investment, particularly in capabilities. So far, 123 off firepower of ground units, and first deployed in
units from all three services have been disbanded, Afghanistan in 2011. The decade-long French engage-
while support and logistics functions are being reor- ment in Afghanistan has created a new generation of
ganised into hubs (bases de défense) designed to supply military personnel shaped by combat experience who
several units. will help influence future doctrine.
Europe 77
France has also been at the forefront of the to be equipped every year until 2015. FELIN includes
NATO-led military action in Libya (see p. 12), portable computing, voice and data communications,
deploying substantial assets to the campaign. Aside new combat clothing with improved body armour,
from a significant French maritime presence, it is and a new ballistic helmet. The FAMAS infantry
estimated that, up to September 2011, French aircraft rifle has also been upgraded, now sporting a video-
had carried out 35% of strike missions (25% of overall sight that should give personnel the ability to engage
missions), using an array of weaponry including the objects out of their direct vision. According to the
precision-guided SCALP-EG (used also by UK forces French defence procurement agency (DGA), the capa-
Europe
under the name Storm Shadow) and Armement Air-Sol bility of the weapon has increased by 70% in daylight
Modulaire (AASM). But the campaign highlighted and by 160% at night. However, the overall weight of
some problems relating to platform capabilities. As the system has increased by 5–6kgs, in comparison to
well as modern platforms like Rafale and Mistral, the the existing model. A full FELIN equipment set costs
French inventory also contains ageing equipment €23,000 per soldier, while the overall programme bill,
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
such as Mirage F1 and Super Etendard aircraft and including preliminary studies, engineering, fabri-
Rubis-class nuclear submarines. The high operational cation and initial maintenance, runs to €1bn. Many
tempo seen in 2011 increases the maintenance liability nations have integrated aspects of ‘future soldier’
of older equipment but also, more generally, places technology into front-line combat units, though
stress on equipment as well as personnel. When it left initial aspirations for networking – particularly for
the Libyan coast on 12 August 2011, the carrier Charles dismounted troops – have had in many cases to be
de Gaulle, having deployed to Libya in March 2011, modified in light of reliability, ruggedisation, battery
had been almost continuously at sea since 30 October life and weight issues. But the French integration of
2010, with only a five-day break. It did not enter port the FELIN suit into combat units will likely provide
for a refit – due for March – until August. Further, useful lessons for allied states.
actions over Libya highlighted French (and broader Paris also signed a contract with Dassault to
European) shortcomings in intelligence, surveillance produce a modified version of the Israeli UAV
and reconnaissance (ISR), strategic air refuelling and Heron-TP by 2014 to fill the capability gap created
unmanned vehicles. by the progressive retirement of the current Harfang
President Nicolas Sarkozy hailed the Libya MALE UAV and before any successor enters service
campaign as justification for the 2009 French rein- around 2020. French chief of staff (CEMA) Admiral
tegration into NATO’s integrated command struc- Edouard Guillaud advocated the purchase of US
ture, noting during an August speech in Paris that Reapers, the blog Secret Défense reported on 21 July
reintegration had been an ‘indispensible element’ of 2011, but the government decided otherwise. As
the leadership role played by France. The view of part of the Franco-British defence cooperation agree-
some analysts is that France would have preferred ment (see below), both nations are considering the
Franco-British leadership, but the British preference joint development of a UAV in this class to meet their
for NATO leadership, together with the benefits respective requirements.
NATO could bring, not least in terms of headquar-
ters, interoperability and training, would be unlikely Entente cordiale
to have been matched by a smaller coalition – some- The ambitious goals laid out in the 2010 Franco-
thing Paris eventually acknowledged, as reported British defence treaty (see The Military Balance 2011,
in Le Monde on 13 September 2011. The same article p. 78) have started to be addressed. An ‘Industry Day’
noted that Paris viewed the Libyan campaign model was held in June 2011 for some 30 defence companies,
– a coalition of the willing using NATO assets without with discussions ranging – according to the UK MoD
overt US leadership – favourably. – ‘from joint co-operation on equipment and capabili-
The FELIN infantry combat system was issued ties, including research and technology, to addressing
to three regiments in 2011. FELIN is the individual export licensing and consolidation of industrial
soldier element of the SCORPIO system, designed sectors and investments’. Industry has been encour-
to improve networked capabilities of French ground aged to more closely integrate activities, exempli-
forces. FELIN will first be used operationally when fied by the ‘one MBDA’ project, and the agreements
the 1st Infantry Regiment is deployed to Afghanistan on the light anti-ship missile and the SCALP-EG/
at the end of 2011. The plan is for four new regiments Storm Shadow programmes. Emphasis has also been
78 The Military Balance 2012
placed on joint training and interoperability, in light Table 9 French Defence Budget Proposals
of the planned Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. MPL 2009–14 plan (old) Revised budget 2011–13 (new)
Meanwhile brigade-level cooperation took place 2011: €30.6bn 2011: €30.1bn
during Exercise Flandres 2011 in June. While the part- 2012: €31.8bn 2012: €30.5bn
nership is still at an early stage, Libya has shown that 2013: €32.7bn 2013: €31bn
the two countries can exercise political leadership
while the two militaries can closely cooperate within
a NATO framework. procurement items and has tried to respond to the
financial pressure by delaying several modernisation
Defence economics packages, notably an upgrade for the Mirage 2000D,
France has so far resisted major and fundamental parts of the land-forces modernisation programme,
adjustments to its defence plans in the wake of the and air-to-air refuelling. The military programme
financial and economic crisis: this is set to change in law 2009–14 had already announced a reduction in
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
2012. The 2008 White Paper was completed before the number of fighter aircraft compared to the level
the budgetary implications of the crisis had become noted in the 2008 White Paper. Reducing France’s
apparent. However, with the pressure mounting, military footprint in Côte d’Ivoire was another move
some adjustments have become inevitable. At the to generate savings, the French contingent having
end of 2010 a revised budget law, covering the period supported UN troops during the conflict between
2011–13, provided for a total of €91.6bn in defence forces loyal to former-President Laurent Gbagbo and
spending. Compared to the original allocation in the President-elect Alassane Ouattara earlier in 2011 (see
military programme law (MPL) 2009–14 this amounts map, p. 412).
to a reduction of €3.5bn. However, in absolute terms, Defence-industrial decisions also underline the
the defence budget is set to rise from € 30.1bn in 2011 determination of the French government to pursue a
to €31bn in 2013. strategic posture. To keep the Rafale production line
Despite these initial steps to account for the open, France has committed to buy 11 aircraft per
changing economic situation, further cuts seem year from Dassault between 2011 and 2013. Dassault
inevitable. It is estimated that, by the time the 2010 and the French government hope for export orders to
cuts were announced, the military programme law be placed in the meantime to secure the programme’s
covering the period 2008–13 left a structural deficit future. France continues to aggressively promote
in defence expenditure of €3.6bn. France’s 2009 rein- French defence-industrial interests abroad to facili-
tegration into NATO’s military structures, as well as tate market access for French companies. A recent
rising costs for overseas operations, have increased example is the government-to-government agree-
budgetary pressures further. Attempts to generate ment from January 2011 paving the way for the sale
additional income, to be wholly reinvested in the of four Mistral-class amphibious assault vessels to
defence sector according to the 2008 White Paper, Russia (with two to be built in Russia). This deal is an
through the sale of military real estate (as part of the important order for the STX shipyard in St Nazaire,
bases de défense plan) and the auctioning off of obso- which is judged to be of strategic importance for
lete military radio frequencies were initially expected France because of its expertise in the aircraft-carrier
to generate funds of approximately €2.3bn, though field. Following the governmental agreement, a
€1.09bn was identified in the 2012 budget plan. contract between the French company DCNS and
Even against the increasingly bleak financial back- Russia’s Rosoboronexport was signed on 17 June
ground, France intended to largely shield certain 2011.
capability areas – such as nuclear deterrence, intelli- French budgetary and defence-industrial deci-
gence, reconnaissance and surveillance, all of which sions so far seem to be driven by a desire to maintain
had been singled out as key priorities in the 2008 as much of an autonomous broad-spectrum capability
document – from cuts. Furthermore, defence invest- as possible, reflecting the high importance attached
ment (research and development and procurement) to defence as a policy area that has broad executive
is set to benefit from preferential treatment in general. room for manoeuvre. Collaborative projects seem
The resource envelope in this area is supposed to acceptable if they guarantee access to capability, such
increase by just over €1bn between 2011 and 2013. as the Franco-British defence cooperation treaty. It is
So far, Paris has tried to avoid the cancellation of likely, however, that France will have to introduce
Europe 79
Europe
allocated to the service totals above.
additional significant defence cuts after the 2012 elec- future force structures without conscription emerged
tions, given continuing macroeconomic pressure. largely intact. In January 2011 the last group of
conscripts began their six-month service. Mandatory
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
on concentrating capabilities in specific services. For in Germany mean that the available pool of poten-
example, in the future all heavy transport helicopters tial recruits is diminishing; this will lead to increased
will be air-force operated; the army will operate all competition with other employers. To enable it to
NH90s. Similarly, all air defence will be concentrated have a choice of recruits, it is clear the armed forces
in the air force. In terms of procurement, the guide- need to do more to increase the attractiveness of a mili-
lines argue for more off-the-shelf purchasing and tary career, including measures specifically aiming to
enhanced European cooperation, including in devel- increase the percentage of women in the forces. The
opment and maintenance. Defence Ministry’s early problems recruiting volun-
The level of ambition guiding the reform effort tary conscripts exemplify these difficulties, although
can be described as the ability to conduct the full the recruitment process of those volunteers seems to
spectrum of operations up to high-intensity combat, have picked up pace throughout 2011; between July
to be able to serve as a framework nation for multi- and October 2011, just over 7,000 signed up.
national operations, and to be able to sustain up to De Maizière announced further decisions around
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
10,000 troops on international crisis-management the launch of the DPG. Reform plans will be imple-
operations. The ability to engage in combat is seen mented over 6–8 years and total Bundeswehr strength
as the ‘benchmark for operational readiness’, while will be 170,000 professional and contracted soldiers
Bundeswehr forces not engaged on operations must plus 5,000–15,000 voluntary conscripts, compared to
‘ensure operational readiness across the entire inten- 220,000 (including some 188,000 professional soldiers)
sity spectrum’, which might be problematic in prac- in May 2011. Civilian staff will be cut from some 75,000
tice. But there are some tensions in the document. On to 55,000. Staffing at the Defence Ministry will reduce
the one hand, it is argued that the Bundeswehr needs from 3,500 to 2,000, most of this coming from the relo-
resources enabling it to play a role corresponding cation of service chiefs and staffs. All services have
to Germany’s international position. On the other, been asked to streamline their command structures
it is stressed that the defence budget will have to by eliminating one level of command. Furthermore,
contribute to the overall budget consolidation course the previous distinction into three different tiers with
agreed by the government. Repetition of the expec- different levels of capability (see The Military Balance
tations created by Germany’s international role will 2011, p. 82) will be abandoned. The army will shrink
likely be used to reduce the savings originally agreed to three divisions and the number of brigades will
in 2010 (see p. 79). decline from 11 to 8. Bases will close, and the October
Further tension can be seen in the tasks envis- 2011 announcement on future basing requirements
aged for the Bundeswehr. The first listed is territorial provoked some resistance from regional and local
defence within NATO, followed by conflict preven- political leaders.
tion and crisis management. In addition, fulfilling
the demands of the EU’s common security and Defence economics
defence policy, homeland defence, rescue and evac- In early 2011, various options were considered on
uation tasks, defence diplomacy and humanitarian how to balance the MoD’s finances with its commit-
assistance missions are noted. But crisis-prevention ments, including migrating the funding of pension
and crisis-management tasks are judged the most provisions from the defence budget back to the
likely operational demands for the Bundeswehr, general budget, from which it had only recently
providing guidance for decisions on overall force been transferred. Additionally, it was mooted in
structure. Thus, it remains unclear how the tension mid-2011 that international operations could be
between what is judged most important and what is financed from the general budget, rather than the
judged most likely will be resolved. The DPG assume defence budget itself, although this did not generate
that the forces needed for territorial and collective widespread political support. However, de Maizière
defence will also be relevant for international crisis- announced on 7 September 2011 that expenditure
management missions, a view confirmed by the related to cutting civilian staff in the armed forces
defence minister in a May 2011 interview with the would be financed from the general budget to the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. tune of €1bn per year, thus taking some of the pres-
The DPG also raise the issue of recruitment. When sure off the defence budget. Despite this, resource
mandatory conscription was in force, a number of pressures remain significant. For example, analysis
conscripts turned professional. Demographic trends from the Bundeswehr University in Munich earlier
Europe 81
in 2011 suggested that, based on financial plan- into account the demand for technology transfer and
ning at the time, a Bundeswehr of a total strength of direct defence offsets by these new customers. Like
185,000 would be underfunded by €15bn even if it other companies, Cassidian is also looking to develop
was assumed that the defence budget was to grow by broader security products: law enforcement as well
1.5% between 2015 and 2018. as cyber security and surveillance drones have been
The MoD is determined to create further flexibility singled out as promising areas.
in procurement. Much key equipment arrived too late Rheinmetall posted record revenues in 2010. The
and over budget, often undercutting relevance and company will look to exploit opportunities for acqui-
Europe
utility. But contractual obligations meant that most sitions, in particular as an instrument to expand into
investment funding was tied up in existing contracts. new markets. Klaus Eberhardt, Rheinmetall’s chief,
De Maizière announced that procurement plans focused on expansion in the US, saying that ‘those
would be prioritised regardless of contractual obliga- who are not in the US, are not global market leaders’.
tions, suggesting that defence industry faced a clear Around 70% of Rheinmetall’s revenues already
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
choice: it could insist on contracts being honoured accrue from international business, while the impor-
and accept that in this case there would be no new tance of its German home market is declining rapidly:
funding available for new orders, or companies German orders totalled 60% of revenues in 1999, fell
could adjust current contracts in cooperation with the to 34% in 2010 and are set to drop below 20% in the
ministry, which could then use released funding for near term. Nonetheless, orders from the Bundeswehr
new orders. The latter option was preferred by the are still important for Rheinmetall in its bid to attract
ministry, with the view that this would give industry international customers. Privately owned Diehl,
the option to invest capital in future capabilities, which also had a stronger-than-expected year in
assisting firms to remain competitive. 2010, recently expanded through acquisition in the
German defence industries have strength- civil aerospace service sector, notably in the field of
ened their position, deploying several strategies to civil aircraft cabins. It is unlikely that Diehl will opt
anticipate future challenges. At the end of 2010, the for more acquisitions in the near term, opting instead
Wegmann group bought out the 49% share held by for a strategy of consolidation and internal growth.
Siemens in armoured-vehicle manufacturer Krauss-
Maffei Wegmann (KMW). The Wegmann group is UNITED KINGDOM
now the sole owner of KMW, signalling its long-term
interest in military-vehicle construction in Germany. The October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Berlin’s approval in principle of a sale of up to 270 of Review (SDSR) resulted in a 20–30% reduction in
KMW’s Leopard 2A7 tanks to Saudi Arabia generated UK armed forces’ operational ambition and deploy-
much comment in Germany in mid-2011, not least able capability. Resource increases were confined to
because of the earlier Saudi intervention in Bahrain. improving the support to special forces and £650m for
Another important order was Algeria’s agreement increased cyber capability (for GCHQ and a military
to purchase two frigates from Blohm & Voss with an Cyber Operations Group). It was intended that the
option to buy a third. Further, Rheinmetall and MAN armed forces would modernise to deliver a ‘Future
Military Vehicles are setting up a vehicle maintenance Force 2020’. Both Prime Minister David Cameron and
and assembly line in Algeria. then-Defence Secretary Liam Fox expressed aspira-
Cassidian, EADS’s defence arm, experienced tions to increase defence spending after 2015, but this
uncertainty over its Talarion UAV programme is dependent on the economy, otherwise Future Force
after France decided to pursue its options with 2020 as described by the SDSR is unachievable.
Dassault. Germany is reluctant to make a commit- The media, and politicians of all parties, have
ment to Talarion as well. In reaction to the budgetary criticised both exercises as rushed, seizing on leaked
constraints in Europe, Cassidian is attempting to documents and public comments by senior officers
move into rapidly growing emerging markets. Stefan as evidence that the SDSR is already out of date.
Zoller, Cassidian’s chief executive, argued that Interest groups have criticised the retirement of
‘growth is not coming out of Europe, but out of the aircraft carriers, Harrier aircraft and Nimrod surveil-
Middle East, India or Brazil … In this constellation lance aircraft, as well as personnel reductions that
we cannot grow in Europe.’ But Cassidian, and other have included redundancies across all services as
companies pursuing similar strategies, have to take well as civilians. But the National Security Strategy
82 The Military Balance 2012
and SDSR have been strongly defended by Cameron, command, as well as becoming an institutional advo-
Fox and Fox’s successor as defence minster, Philip cate for joint warfare. The plans have been broadly
Hammond, who argued that events over the last year welcomed by the service chiefs, who anticipate being
– including the Libya war – proved their value. able to regain the means necessary to optimise their
The National Security Council has often met to capability; the plans are also expected to improve on
give strategic direction to operations and planning the previous centralised approach and could make it
and was used extensively to manage the UK role more difficult for future projects to become bogged
in Libya. It seems to have succeeded in making the down.
Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Department Parallel efforts have continued to reform defence
for International Development integrate their work acquisition, long notorious for cost overruns and
by design. Security officials consider this a significant delays in delivering supplies to the front line. Bernard
improvement over the direction and management of Gray was appointed chief of defence materiel, respon-
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was criti- sible for spending 40% of the MoD budget on equip-
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
cised in evidence to the independent Iraq Inquiry. ment and support. Gray’s structural reforms to DE&S
have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Defence reorganisation He has insisted on honesty when it comes to costing
The Ministry of Defence has acquired a reputa- equipment and logistic programmes, part of an effort
tion for inefficiency, indecision and obfuscation. In to root out the optimism that has bedevilled UK
many cases, some of the blame can be shared with defence programmes in the past. This has resulted in
the services and Defence Equipment and Support much greater visibility of potential increases in cost
(DE&S). Its handling of the aircraft-carrier programme than was available before.
was described by the Public Accounts Committee in The government’s deficit-reduction drive required
its Major Projects 2010 report as ‘a new benchmark in MoD to make an 8% reduction in UK defence expen-
poor corporate decision making’, while accumulated diture. It also had to manage away a prospective
delays to the Army’s armoured vehicle programme £36–8bn overspend inherited from previous govern-
were vividly described by former Army head General ments. By 2008 it had been identified by MoD staff but
Sir Richard Dannatt in his memoir Leading from the remained unresolved. In 2010, the Public Accounts
Front. The armed forces have often complained about Committee concluded that MoD’s ‘consistent pattern
over-centralisation and paralysing bureaucracy. of planned overspend demonstrates serious organ-
In June 2011, Fox announced the findings of the isational failings and a dangerous culture of opti-
year-long Defence Reform Review, led by Lord mism’. Despite the force reductions announced in
Levene. A smaller defence board (the highest 2010, it was clear that a considerable budget shortfall
committee in the MoD exercising strategic, but not remained. The outcome of an exercise to match plans
operational, management of defence) will be chaired with resources was announced in July 2011, with Fox
by the defence secretary; the chief of defence staff will claiming that ‘for the first time in a generation, the
be the sole military representative; and the service MoD will have brought its plans and budget broadly
chiefs no longer have seats on the board. The perma- into balance’. Fox contended that it allowed the
nent secretary, chief of defence materiel, finance funding of the Airseeker (Rivet Joint) electronic intel-
director and three non-executive directors comprise ligence aircraft, the purchase of 14 Chinook helicop-
the remainder. ters (of 22 announced by the previous government),
Greater responsibility and flexibility over indi- a mid-life update to the Warrior infantry fighting
vidual service budgets on matters of personnel, equip- vehicle, initial funding for the Joint Strike Fighter, the
ment and training will be given to the service chiefs, fitting of catapults to the future aircraft carriers and
in a bid to improve their control over capability, and development of a Global Combat Ship to replace
overall accountability. This measure, which reverses existing frigates.
almost 30 years of increasing centralisation, will, Fox Although UK reserves contributed significant
said, allow them to ‘veer and haul’ between elements numbers to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
of the budget, including equipment, manpower and resource cuts had resulted in much of their capa-
training. Meanwhile, a new Joint Forces Command bility atrophying. Fox accepted the assessment of
will own the increasing number of joint organisations, an independent commission that reserve capa-
such as special forces, training units and the medical bility had declined and the potential of the reserves
Europe 83
was not fully exploited. Plans to redress this consist The apparent success of NATO’s campaign in
of enhancing the role, training and resourcing of Libya provided a boost to UK military credibility in
reserves, including over £100m per year in additional the Alliance. Apparent weaknesses of British opera-
funding, so they can play a greater role in overseas tions in Basra and under-resourcing of British forces
operations and homeland security. in Helmand from 2006 to 2009 dented British mili-
The SDSR directed that army capability and tary self-confidence and sowed doubts in the US.
manpower be reduced to a lesser degree than the While these doubts may have been partly allayed
navy or air force, and should not be significantly by the British role in Libya, there is little doubt that,
Europe
downsized whilst fighting in Afghanistan. RAF and had the war lasted beyond September, some hard
navy personnel reductions announced during 2011 choices about military strategic priorities, such as
followed the SDSR prescription. But it was revealed withdrawing warships from lower-priority tasks to
in July 2011 that the MoD was directing further army sustain the naval force in the Mediterranean, would
manpower reductions to balance the budget in 2011. have been unavoidable. Spared of these hard choices,
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
The regular forces are now to reduce from 102,000 the government insists that the SDSR is still valid.
to 90,000 by 2015 and to 82,000 by 2020. This will be The US decision to lead the NATO mission in Libya
partially alleviated by increasing the Territorial Army ‘from behind’ may herald a new trend. The MoD
to a trained strength of 30,000 and improving its read- previously assumed that the US would always lead
iness. There is to be no reduction in the deployable any NATO combat operation, providing both combat
forces required by the SDSR: a multinational corps forces and key ‘enablers’ such as EW and SEAD. If
HQ, two division HQs, five ‘multi-role’ brigades, this can no longer be assumed, it will increase pres-
an air-assault brigade and contributions to special sure to retain full-spectrum capabilities, given the
forces and the Royal Marines amphibious brigade. UK’s aspiration to play a leading role in NATO.
But significant reductions will be required in HQs, Afghanistan and Libya have seen many examples of
administration, and training organisations and infra- successful adaptation by British forces, and employ-
structure; and some named battalions and regiments ment of highly capable weaponry, such as the dual-
may be disbanded. Although funding was announced mode Brimstone missile. The dual-mode Brimstone
for the Warrior update and new armoured scout vehi- Urgent Operational Requirement, and much new
cles, no contracts have yet been signed. equipment, has been funded from the Treasury
The army now has some certainty about its role and reserve rather than the core equipment programme.
resourcing, but concern – shared by the other services If any of these capabilities are to be retained, they
– has been voiced about retention of quality personnel. will have to be funded by the MoD. For example,
Pay has been frozen and allowances reduced, and a recent operations have greatly depended on intelli-
redundancy programme is cutting the strength of the gence surveillance, target acquisition and reconnais-
forces. There has already been an outflow of high- sance (ISTAR) capabilities, such as the RAF’s Sentinel
quality middle-ranking officers. Military officials attri- aircraft. Indeed, the prime minister said to the House
bute this to accumulated overstretch resulting from of Commons Liaison Committee on 17 May that ‘if
fighting two wars simultaneously, concerns about there was one lesson, it is that the extra emphasis we
conditions of service and a sense that it is better to put on ISTAR and drones will be even more necessary
jump than be pushed. This may be a temporary blip, in future’. But the SDSR declared Sentinel would be
but there is a risk that a continued pay freeze, coupled scrapped from 2015 and it is unclear whether many
with any further cuts, could trigger a major outflow, of the other ISTAR capabilities fielded in Afghanistan
as happened in the late 1970s. will be funded in the long term. The decision on
Sentinel, however, could yet be revisited.
Capability implications Claims by some commentators that, as the
The House of Commons Defence Committee is reductions continue, the UK would not be able to
unconvinced that the reduced forces are able to meet mount another operation like Libya are overstated.
current and future commitments, and retain ’critical And if the army and RAF reduce their footprint
mass’, or that ‘Future Force 2020’ can be delivered in Afghanistan as planned they will become more
without increased funding, a feeling shared by many capable of contingency operations. Nonetheless,
analysts. Fox stated that plans were dependent on despite repeated declarations that there has been no
British drawdown in Afghanistan remaining on track. ‘strategic shrinkage’, the SDSR is resulting in signifi-
84 The Military Balance 2012
cant reductions in UK defence capability and ambi- Figure 5 United Kingdom Defence Budget
tion. Further difficult choices may have to be made Trends (FY2009/10–FY2014/15)
before 2015, when another SDSR is due.
% change Defence budget
Defence budget as %
Defence economics 12
of government outlays
(real, nominal)
(£m)
Fallout from the economic crisis continues to hamper
10
the UK economy. A return to growth in 2010 (a
modest 1.4%) reflected the lagged effects of the large- 8
40,000
35,000
scale expansionary fiscal policies undertaken by the
30,000
outgoing Labour government as well as inventory 6
25,000
cycle effects following the decline in world trade in Defence budget
20,000
4 as % of GDP
2009, rather than an improvement in underlying 15,000
economic fundamentals or confidence. Overall, much 2 10,000
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Table 12 Recent and Planned UK Defence Personnel, Equipment and Estate Measures
Equipment Measures Schedule Personnel Measures Schedule
Army General
40% reductions to Challenger 2 tank holdings TBD MoD civilian personnel reductions of 25,000 By 2015
35% reductions to AS90 heavy artillery TBD Further reduction of 7,000 civilian personnel* By 2020
Europe
Decommission of remaining four Type-22 frigates Apr-11 Personnel reductions of 7,000 By 2015
Decommission of RFA Largs Bay Apr-11 Further reductions of 11,000 personnel* By 2020
Withdrawal of RFA Bayleaf & RFA Fort George Apr-11
Withdrawal of carrier HMS Illustrious In 2014 Royal Navy
Withdrawal of Sea King Mk7 By 2016 Personnel reductions of 5,000 By 2015
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
budget (i.e. RfR1 Provision of Defence Capability), Table 13 Post-Main Gate Major Equipment
which does not include spending on combat opera- Projects
tions, which are funded from the Treasury Reserve. In-Service Forecast
Date Cost (£m)
Defence spending and reform Type-45 Destroyers (6) 2010 6,464
Between FY2009/10 and FY2014/15, the defence UK Military Flying Training System 2010 916
(UKMFTS)
budget as a percentage of GDP is projected to fall from
Falcon comms system 2010 316
2.64% to 2.08% (see Figure 5), barely above the NATO 7 Astute-class Submarines 2010 6,677
goal of 2%. However, the FY2014/15 budget figure of 54 Watchkeeper WK450 UAVs 2011 889
£36.995bn includes a forecasted allocation of £3.5bn Typhoon and Typhoon Future 2003 & 2012 20,627
from the Treasury Special Reserve for net additional Capability Programme
costs of military operations in Afghanistan. If this Tornado Capability Upgrade Strategy 2012 303
(Pilot)
were excluded and only baseline defence spending
Meteor BVRAAM 2012 & 2015 1,305
were considered, the defence budget as a percentage
14 Voyager Future Strategic Tanker 2014 11,917
of GDP would fall to 1.88%, below the NATO Aircraft (FSTA)
threshold. Overall, the defence budget for FY2011/12 Merlin Mk 1 Capability Sustainment 2014 829
stands at £37.4bn, marking the first contribution of Programme
0.97% towards the required 8% real-terms reduction. 62 AW159 Lynx Wildcat 2014 & 2015 1,689
Cumulative outlays on successive and simulta- 22 A400M Atlas transport aircraft 2015 3,231
neous overseas combat operations in Afghanistan, 2 Queen Elizabeth-class Aircraft 2020 5,900
Carriers
Iraq and Libya over the past decade have topped
Up to 150 Future Joint Combat 2020 2,448
£21bn (see Table 11), with an increased proportion Aircraft (JCA)
of this funded by the core defence budget rather Total Forecast Costs 63,511
than the Defence Special Reserve, as the Treasury Sources: Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) UK Defence
Statistics 2011; House of Commons Research Paper 11/10 (January
tightens its criteria for financing Urgent Operational 2011) – UK Defence and Security Policy: A New Approach?
Requirements (UORs) in response to the MoD’s
86 The Military Balance 2012
Other Expenditure
Fixed Assets Written Off/Written On 424 Excluded Excluded
Other Resource DEL Expenditure 5,790 7,155 8,864
Other Capital Expenditure 539 1,262 1,120
Cost of Capital Charge 3,626 3,828 Excluded
Total Other Expenditure (% of total) 10,379 (28.3%) 12,244 (32.0%) 9,983 (26.9%)
Total Defence Expenditure/Outturn 38,579 40,246 39,461
Source: Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA), United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011.
increasing use of these to make up for the capability 2011/12 to 2020/21 of about £38bn. Key highlights of
risks taken in previous defence-acquisition and plan- the reductions established so far to plug this gap are
ning cycles. The MoD’s equipment-procurement shown in Table 12. Overall, it seems that the scale of
programme has also received severe criticism, with these reductions has largely succeeded in narrowing
Gray’s October 2009 review concluding that habitual the MoD’s funding gap, thereby releasing funds for
underestimation of programme costs and a prefer- additional equipment acquisitions over the course of
ence for delaying rather than cancelling individual 2011 (see p. 82).
projects had created a massive ‘bow wave’ that was In a bid to address the underlying factors
permanently situated beyond the ten-year financial- at the root of current difficulties – inter-service
planning horizon used by the MoD, creating an illu- rivalries, organisational and procurement inef-
sion about the size and scope of the UK’s armed ficiencies, bureaucratic indecision, and lack
forces but ignoring the fact that the budget to fulfil of accountability and financial planning – the
these ambitions did not exist. Defence Reform Review report (see p. 82) could
The upshot of these factors has been a funding have some impact. For instance, the MoD is
gap of ‘unfunded liabilities’ for the ten years from trying to strengthen financial- and performance-
Europe 87
Europe
October 2011. A selection of major equipment proj- the budget. The planning rounds for 2012 and 2013
ects on which the main investment decision has been are set to be even more fraught with stark choices
taken (‘post-Main Gate’) is shown in Table 13. than was the case in 2011. Furthermore, uncertainty
Other reform proposals in the pipeline centre on abounds over funding provisions post FY2014/15;
the UK’s defence-industrial strategy (with a govern- while the current government has allowed the MoD
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
ment White Paper on this due in late 2011) and the to plan on the basis of a 1% annual real-terms growth
future organisational structure of DE&S. Gray is due in its equipment budget, it cannot ensure that any
to deliver plans for a major overhaul of the agency subsequent government will maintain this guarantee
towards the end of 2011. during the 2015 Spending Review.
88 The Military Balance 2012
Land Element
Albania ALB FORCES BY ROLE
Albanian Lek 2010 2011 2012 SPECIAL FORCES
GDP lek 1.24tr 1.32tr 1 cdo regt
MANOEUVRE
US$ 11.7bn 13.0bn
Light
per capita US$ 3,913 4,329 1 (rapid reaction) lt inf bde
Growth % 3.50 2.50 COMBAT SUPPORT
Inflation % 3.6 3.9 1 arty bn
Def expa lek 13.3bn 1 cbt spt bde
US$ 126m 1 sigs bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Def bdgta lek 13.3bn 13.8bn
1 log bn
US$ 126m 136m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FMA (US) US$ 3.0m 5.0m
MBT 3
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
Consists of the Defense Academy, Military University,
NCO Academy, Basic Training Brigade, the consolidated defence from a leased base. The army exercises regularly,
Troops School, Centre for Defense Analysis and Training and aims to be able to deploy and sustain a battalion-sized
Support Centre. contingent by 2015 as part of a multi-national mission. To
inform these developments, Armenia completed a Strate-
Paramilitary ε500 gic Defence Review in May 2011.
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
AT • MSL 22 Afghanistan
SP 22: 9 9P148 Konkurs; 13 9P149 MT-LB Spiral NATO • ISAF 126
AD
SAM Bosnia-Herzegovina
SP 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2
TOWED S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora
Serbia
(SA-3 Goa)
NATO • KFOR 56
GUNS
SP ZSU-23-4 OSCE • Kosovo 1
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
RADAR • LAND 6 SNAR-10 Foreign Forces
AEV MT-LB
Deployment in Armenia and Azerbaijan unless stated
ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1
Bulgaria OSCE 1
Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,061 Hungary OSCE 2
Kazakhstan OSCE 1
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
The air force’s main combat task is to provide air de- Joint Command - Air Force 3,239
fence of national aerospace, as well as the provision of The Air Force is part of Joint Forces Comd and consists of
air-to-ground support. The lack of a significant number of 2 bde; Air Support Comd and Airspace Surveillance Comd
transport aircraft is indicative of the armed forces’ inabil- Flying hours 120 hrs/year on hel/tpt ac; 110 hrs/year on ftr
ity to independently project power at range, though they
do maintain a high readiness element. Priorities include FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
Eurofighter upgrades, MLUs for transport helicopters and
2 sqn with Typhoon
acquisitions to ensure interoperable units for EU Battle-
ISR
groups. The services train regularly, including as part on
1 sqn with PC-6B Turbo Porter
Europe
multi-national exercises. Austria anticipates increased in-
TRANSPORT
ternational cooperation and burden sharing. This, as well
1 sqn with C-130K Hercules
as a shift in focus to new risks and emerging challenges,
TRAINING
is reflected in the drafts of Austria’s new National Security 1 trg sqn with Saab 105Öe*
Strategy. Some trg unit with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
ACTIVE 25,758 (Army 13,115; Air 3,239; Support TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
tee; simplified procedure for humanitarian and rescue forces still rely on conscription, and readiness within the
tasks (Art. 23f IV of the ‘Federal Constitutional Law’; § 2 services varies considerably between units. Peacekeeping
of the KSE-BVG) deployments have included a small number of personnel
in Afghanistan. Azerbaijan maintains defence relationships
Afghanistan
with NATO through an IPAP, and has a close relationship
NATO • ISAF 3 with Turkey. The Internal Troops are developing, with
Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO support, a police support unit to be available for
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 360; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 recce NATO-led operations. US military assistance has included
pl; 1 inf coy support to maritime-security operations in the Caspian
Sea. The air force suffers from training and maintenance
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2
problems. The armed forces cannot organically support ex-
CYPRUS ternal deployments.
UN • UNFICYP 4
ACTIVE 66,940 (Army 56,840 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)
Democratic Republic of The Congo Paramilitary 15,000
EU • EUSEC RD Congo 1 Terms of service 17 months, but can be extended for ground
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
forces.
Middle East
UN • UNTSO 7 obs RESERVE 300,000
Reserves some mobilisation reported, 300,000 with military
Serbia
service within 15 years
NATO • KFOR 592; 1 recce coy; 1 inf coy; elm 1 MP coy
OSCE • Serbia 1
OSCE • Kosovo 14
Organisations by Service
Syria/Israel Army 56,840
UN • UNDOF 374; elm 1 inf bn FORCES BY ROLE
WESTERN SAHARA COMMAND
UN • MINURSO 2 obs 5 corps HQ
MANEOEUVRE
Mechanised
Azerbaijan AZE 23 MR bde
Azerbaijani New Manat m 2010 2011 2012 Other
1 sy bde
GDP m 43.7bn 53.3bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 54.4bn 67.4bn 1 arty bde
per capita US$ 5,846 7,170 1 arty trg bde
Growth % 5.00 0.19 1 MRL bde
Inflation % 5.7 9.3 1 AT bde
Def exp m 1.21bn 1 engr bde
1 sigs bde
US$ 1.5bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Def bdgt m 1.27bn 1.33bn
1 log bde
US$ 1.59bn 1.68bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FMA (US) US$ 3.0m 3.5m MBT 339: 95 T-55; 244 T-72
US$1=m 0.80 0.79 AIFV 111: 20 BMD-1; 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 15 BRM-1
Population 9,397,279 APC 357
APC (T) 336 MT-LB
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) 21: 10 BTR-60; 4 BTR-70; 7 BTR-80A
Male 12.3% 5.1% 5.2% 4.5% 19.8% 2.3% ARTY 458
Female 10.9% 4.8% 5.0% 4.3% 21.7% 4.1%
SP 52: 122mm 46 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 6 2S3
TOWED 219: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm
Capabilities 42: 18 2A36; 24 D-20; 203mm 12 2S7
GUN/MOR 120mm 18 2S9 NONA
The armed forces have yet to successfully transition from a MRL 62: 300mm 12 9A52 Smerch; 122mm 43 BM-21
Soviet-era model, and the standard of equipment availabil- MOR 120mm 107 PM-38
ity remains uncertain. While defence expenditure contin- AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger);
ues to grow, fuelled by rising oil revenues, and acquisitions 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5
include modern systems such as the S-300, analysts believe Spandrel)/9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
the potential benefits have apparently not yet been felt AD • SAM • SP 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 2K11 Krug
significantly in terms of operational capability. The armed (SA-4 Ganef): 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
Europe 93
Europe
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
FS 1 Petya II with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 (24 eff.), 2 twin (4 PBF 6: 1 Osa II (FSU Project 205); 2 Silver Ships 48ft;
eff.) 76mm gun 3 Stenka
PSO 1 Luga (Woodnik 2 Class) (FSU Project 888; additional PB 2: 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk)
trg role)
Militia 10,000+
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
ARTY 1,003
Capabilities SP 432: 122mm 198 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 236: 108 2S3;
Belarus inherited the bulk of its military equipment from 116 2S5; 12 2S19 Farm
the Soviet Union, and Russia’s influence over its military TOWED 228: 122mm 48 D-30; 152mm 180: 48 2A36; 132
doctrine remains strong. Reported poor morale and train- 2A65
ing within the conscript-based armed forces undermines GUN/MOR 120mm 48 2S9 NONA
their capability, and there is little interest in transitioning MRL 234: 122mm 126 BM-21; 220mm 72 9P140 Uragan;
to fully professional armed forces, although draft numbers 300mm 36 9A52 Smerch
have declined. Aircrew flying hours are inadequate for a MOR 120mm 61 2S12
modern air force. Ground-based surface-to-air missile sys- AT • MSL
tems need to be upgraded or replaced and Belarus, which SP 236: 126 9P148 Konkurs; 110 9P149 Shturm
has the S-300, may be eyeing the S-400 system. Belarusian MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs
forces exercise with their Russian counterparts regularly (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9K115 Metis
and could support a regional joint operation with Mos- (AT-7 Saxhorn)
cow. A new National Security concept was adopted in late AD • SAM • SP 350 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); S-300V(SA-
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
2010 and, in late 2011, the government was reportedly con- 12A Gladiator/SA-12B Giant); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher);
cerned to prevent ‘military security from sliding’ and was 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) (700–2,100 eff.)
advocating a new territorial defence force. RADAR • LAND GS-13 Long Eye/SNAR-1 Long Trough/
SNAR-2/-6 Pork Trough (arty); some Small Fred/Small Yawn/
ACTIVE 72,940 (Army 29,600 Air 18,170 Joint SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty)
25,170) Paramilitary 110,000 MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 96: 36 FROG/SS-21 Scarab
Terms of service 9–12 months (Tochka); 60 Scud
AEV MT-LB
RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service VLB MTU
within last 5 years)
Air Force and Air Defence Forces 18,170
Organisations by Service Flying hours 15 hrs/year
FORCES BY ROLE
Joint 25,170 (Centrally controlled units and FIGHTER
MoD staff ) 2 bases with MiG-29S Fulcrum C/MiG-29UB Fulcrum;
Su-27P Flanker-B/Su-27UB Flanker C
Army 29,600 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
FORCES BY ROLE 4 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D/Su-24MR Fencer-E; Su-25
COMMAND Frogfoot/Su-25UB Frogfoot B
2 comd HQ (West & North West) TRANSPORT
SPECIAL FORCES 1 base with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76
1 SF bde Candid; Tu-134 Crusty
MANOEUVRE TRAINING
Mechanised Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
1 (mobile) armd inf bde ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 (mobile) mech bde Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind
6 mech bde TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
COMBAT SUPPORT Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-6 Hook; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24K
2 arty bde Hind G2; Mi-24R Hind G1; Mi-26 Halo
1 arty gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 MRL bde AIRCRAFT 128 combat capable
2 MRL regt FTR 38 MiG-29S Fulcrum C/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
2 SSM bde FGA 21 Su-27P Flanker-B/Su-27UB Flanker C
2 AD bde FGA/ISR 34 Su-24MK Fencer D (FGA)/Su-24MR
2 engr bde Fencer-E (ISR)
2 engr regt ATK 35 Su-25K Frogfoot FGA/Su-25UBK Frogfoot B
1 NBC regt TPT 15: Heavy 4 Il-76 Candid (+12 civ Il-76 available for
1 ptn bridging regt mil use); Medium 3 An-12 Cub; Light 8: 1 An-24 Coke; 6
2 sigs bde An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG Some L-39 Albatros
MBT 515: 446 T-72; 69 T-80 HELICOPTERS
AIFV 1,111: 100 BMD-1; 875 BMP-2; 136 BRM-1 ATK 50 Mi-24 Hind
APC 264 ISR 20: 8 Mi-24K Hind G2; 12 Mi-24R Hind G1
APC (T) 72: 22 BTR-D; 50 MT-LB TPT 168: Heavy 43: 29 Mi-6 Hook; 14 Mi-26 Halo;
APC (W) 192: 39 BTR-70; 153 BTR-80 Medium 125 Mi-8 Hip
Europe 95
MSL
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge) Capabilities
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) Belgian military expenditure is under increasing pressure.
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) While there will be no change to the missions envisaged, all
SARH R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A) forces will reduce in size in terms of personnel and equip-
ment; most of these processes are to complete by end-2013.
Air Defence The armed forces plan to further develop deployable and
AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar
flexible forces. They exercise jointly on a regular basis
FORCES BY ROLE while also participating in a broad range of multinational
AIR DEFENCE training exercises. Belgian forces have been deployed as
Europe
1 bde (2 AD bn) part of ISAF since 2003. Belgium maintains a quick reac-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE tion force, and the military has the ability to project force,
AD • SAM S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-125 Pechora though only as part of a multi-national deployment. Air
(SA-3 Goa); S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) and maritime units deployed in 2011 on Operation Unified
Protector. Belgium is transforming its land component into
Paramilitary 110,000 a wheeled medium bde and an airborne-capable light bde.
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
per capita US$ 3,577 3,938
194 M114/M114A2
Growth % 0.70 2.20
MRL 153: 107mm 28 VLR Type-63; 122mm 43: 37 APRA
Inflation % 2.1 4.0 40; 5 BM-21; 1 Kacusa; 128mm 77: 21 M-63; 21 M-77; 35
Def exp mark 325m M-91; 262mm 5 M-87
US$ 220m MOR 614: 82mm 81 MB M-69; 120mm 538: 23 2B11 (UK-
2); 11 HADID; 7 KROM; 1 M-38; 1 M-43; 460 M-74/M-75;
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MSC 5: 3 Briz (FSU Sonya); 2 Iscar (FSU Vanya)
1 log regt MSI 3: 3 Olya, less than 100 tonnes (FSU)
AMPHIBIOUS 2
Army Reserve 250,500 reservists LSM 1 Polnochny A (FSU) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)
FORCES BY ROLE LCU 1 Vydra
MANOEUVRE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17: 1 AORL; 2 AOL; 1 ARS;
Light 2 APT; 2 AT; 2 YTR; 1 AX; 3 AGS; 1 ADG; 2 ADT
4 inf bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Naval Aviation
MBT 301 T-72 HELICOPTERS
Europe
RECCE Maritza NBC ASW 6 Mi-14 Haze (3 operational; to be replaced by 3
AIFV 160: 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2/3 AS565MB Panther)
APC 1,084
APC (T) 1,002: 315 MT-LB; 687 look-a-likes Air Force 6,706
APC (W) 82 BTR-60 Flying hours 30–40 hrs/yr
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
ARTY 738
FORCES BY ROLE
SP • 122mm 247 2S1 Carnation
FIGHTER/ISR
TOWED 152: 122mm 20 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 132 D-20
1 sqn with MiG-21bis/UM Fishbed
MRL 122mm 124 BM-21
1 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
MOR 120mm 215 2S11 SP Tundzha
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AT
2 sqn with Su-25/UB Frogfoot
MSL
TRANSPORT
SP 24 9P148 Konkurs
1 sqn with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; C-27J Spartan; L-410
MANPATS 236 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)/9K113
UVP; PC-12M; Tu-134B Crusty
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); (200 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Sagger) in store)
GUNS 126: 100mm 126 MT-12; 85mm (150 D-44 in store) 2 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17
AD Hip H; Mi-24D/V Hind D/E
SAM • SP 24 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANPAD 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail) AIRCRAFT 62 combat capable
GUNS 400 100mm KS-19 towed/57mm S-60 towed/23mm FTR 20 MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
ZSU-23-4 SP/ZU-23 towed FGA 18 MiG-21bis/UM Fishbed
RADARS • LAND GS-13 Long Eye (veh); SNAR-1 Long ATK 24 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot (5 upgraded to NATO
Trough (arty); SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty); SNAR-2/-6 standard)
Pork Trough (arty); Small Fred/Small Yawn (veh, arty) ISR 1 An-30 Clank
AEV MT-LB TPT 16: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 13: 1 An-2 Colt;
ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB 3 An-26 Curl; 7 L-410UVP/L-410UVP-E; 1 PC-12M;
VLB BLG67; TMM 1 Tu-134B Crusty
TRG 12: 6 L-39ZA Albatros; 6 PC-9M (basic)
Navy 3,471 HELICOPTERS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ATK 18 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E (12 being upgraded to
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4 NATO standard)
FRIGATES 4 MRH 12 Mi-17 Hip H (6 to be upgraded to NATO
FFGM 3 Drazki (BEL Wielingen) with 2 twin lnchr each standard)
with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 GMLS with TPT 17: Medium 11 AS532AL Cougar; Light 6 Bell 206
RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with Jet Ranger
L5 HWT, 1 sextuple 375mm MLE 54 Creusot-Loire A/S UAV • EW Yastreb-2S
mor, 1 100mm gun AD
FFM 1 Smeli (FSU Koni) with 1 twin lnchr with 2 Osa-M SAM S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) (quad) S-75 Dvina (SA-2
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin Guideline towed); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-200 (SA-5
76mm gun Gammon)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 MSL
PCFGM 1 Mulnaya (FSU Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡ R-73 (AA-11 Archer) SARH
with 4P-15M Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 quad R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A)
lnchr with 8 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 76mm gun ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25
PCM 2 Reshitelni (FSU Pauk I) with 1 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 (AS-10 Karen)
Grail) SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU 1200, 1 76mm gun
PBFG 3 Osa I/II (FSU)† each with 4 P-15/P-15U Termit Paramilitary 34,000
(SS-N-2A/B Styx) AShM
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 Border Guards 12,000
MHC 1 (Tripartite – BEL Flower) Ministry of Interior
100 The Military Balance 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
Paramilitary 12 regt Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE A NATO member since 2009, Croatia continues to work
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 on the long-term goals laid out in its 2005 defence re-
PB 20: 9 Grif (FSU Zhuk); 3 Nesebar (FSU Neustadt); 8 view and the associated 2006–2015 long-term develop-
(other) ment plan. Military tasks cover national sovereignty, the
defence of Croatia and allies, the ability to participate in
Railway and Construction Troops 18,000 crisis-response operations overseas, and support to civil
institutions. Force modernisation and supporting training
Security Police 4,000 remain priorities, with the services regularly taking part
in multinational exercises. Re-equipment plans have been
Deployment hampered by the economic downturn. Perhaps the most
high profile of the projects affected is the air force’s need to
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
replace its obsolescent MiG-21s with a modern combat air-
Constitution: Codified constitution (1991)
craft. This procurement has likely been delayed by several
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
MANPATS 560+: 418 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 2
81 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 23 9K115 Metis (AT-7
Saxhorn); 38 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan Air Force and Air Defence 3,500
(reported) Flying hours 50 hrs/year
RL 90mm M-79
GUNS 100mm 133 T-12 FORCES BY ROLE
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
AD FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MANPADS 619: 539 9K32M Strela 2M (SA-7 Grail); 80 2 (mixed) sqn with MiG-21bis/MiG-21UMD Fishbed
9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) TRANSPORT
GUNS 463 1 sqn with An-32 Cline
SP 62: 20mm 45: 44 BOV-3 SP; 1 decommissioning; TRAINING
30mm 17 BOV-3 1 sqn with PC-9M; Utva-75
TOWED 401: 20mm 390: 177 M55; 213 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
decommissioning; 40mm 11 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ARV M84A1; WZT-3 2 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip H; Mi-8T Hip C; Mi-171Sh
VLB 3 MT-55A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MW Bozena; 1 Rhino AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable
FGA 10: 6 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 4 MiG-21UMD Fishbed
Navy 1,600; 250 conscript (total 1,850) TPT • Light 2 An-32 Cline
Navy Central Command HQ at Split. Two naval districts, TRG 24: 20 PC-9M; 4 Utva-75 (basic trg; being replaced
NAVSOUTH and NAVNORTH by 5 Z-242L)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
SUBMARINES • SDV 3: 1 R-1; 2 R-2 Mala MRH 11 Mi-8MTV Hip H
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 TPT 21 Medium 13: 3 Mi-8T Hip C; 10 Mi-171Sh Light 8
PCGF 1 Koncar with 2 twin lnchr with RBS-15B AShM Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
PCGM 2 Helsinki with 4 twin lnchr with RBS-15M AD
AShM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM SAM
PCG 2 Kralj with 2–4 twin lnchr with RBS-15B AShM SP S-300 (SA-10 Grumble (quad)); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9
PBR 1 OB 93 Gaskin)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MANPAD 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1
MHI 1 Korcula (SA-16 Gimlet)
AMPHIBIOUS 6 RADAR 8: 5 FPS-117; 3 S-600
LCT 2 Cetina MSL • AAM • IR R-3S (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)
LCVP 4 Type 21
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12:
Paramilitary 3,000
AXS 1 Kraljica Mora; YTM 2; YDT 2; YFU 5; AKL 2
Police 3,000 armed
Coastal Defence
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT Deployment
21+ arty bty Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
3 AShM bty with RBS-15K Constitution: Codified constitution (2004)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the parlia-
MSL • TACTICAL • AShM RBS-15K ment (Art. 7 II); simplified procedure for humanitarian aid
and military exercises
Marines Afghanistan
FORCES BY ROLE NATO • ISAF 317
MANOEUVRE
Amphibious BOSNIA-Herzegovina
2 indep mne coy OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
102 The Military Balance 2012
HELICOPTERS
ATK 11 Mi-35P Hind Capabilities
MRH 4 SA-342 Gazelle (with HOT for anti-armour ACTIVE 5,000 (Army 5,000) Paramilitary 150
role) Terms of service conscription, 24 months, then reserve to age
TPT • Light 4: 2 AW139 (SAR); 2 Bell 206C L-3 Long 50.
Ranger
RESERVE 26,000 (first line 11,000 second line
Paramilitary 750+ 10,000 third line 5,000)
Armed Police 500+
Organisations by Service
Europe
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other Army ε5,000
1 (rapid-reaction) paramilitary unit FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MANOEUVRE
Light
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
1 CIMIC pl
Def bdgt Kc 48.9bn 43.9bn 43.6bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
US$ 2.56bn 2.52bn 1 log bde
FMA (US) US$ 6.0m 7.0m
Active Reserve
US$1=Kc 19.12 17.42
FORCES BY ROLE
Population 10,190,213 COMMAND
14 (territorial defence) comd
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MANOEUVRE
Male 6.9% 2.8% 3.2% 3.4% 25.9% 6.5% Armoured
Female 6.5% 2.7% 3.1% 3.3% 25.8% 9.8% 1 armd coy
Light
Capabilities 14 inf coy (1 per territorial comd) (3 inf pl, 1 cbt spt pl,
1 log pl)
While Czech armed forces have gradually reduced in size
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
since the 1990s, capability has increased as a result of mili-
MBT 154: 124 T-72; 30 T-72M4CZ
tary reform and restructuring, equipment improvements,
AIFV 466: 166 BMP-1; 181 BMP-2; 64 BPzV; 55 Pandur II (17
and operational experience. 2011 saw the Czech armed
more on order)
forces end its 12-year long deployment to Kosovo as part APC 72:
of KFOR. Czech forces are also deployed in Afghanistan, APC (T) 29 OT-90
including an OMLT training Afghan forces in Wardak, a APC (W) 43: 20 OT-64; 21 Dingo 2; 2 Pandur II
PRT in Logar, and a special forces unit. Delivery of Pandur LAV 54 LMV Panther
vehicles continues, as do plans for a soldier modernisation ARTY 103
project including new small arms. The ten-year lease of SP 152mm 55 M-77 Dana (7 trg); (50 more in store)
Gripen continues until 2015, and the air force also has plans MRL 122mm (19 RM-70 in store)
to modernise Mi-171Sh helicopters. A Defence White Pa- MOR 120mm 48: 40 M-1982; 8 SPM-85; (42 more in store)
per was released in mid-2011. This said that aspirations to AT • MSL 196
reverse the trend of declining force sizes were unrealistic; SP 21 9P148 Konkurs
the MoD had a budget deficit of Kc80-90bn; and that not MANPATS 175 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
all procurement projects were affordable. The ministry said RADAR • LAND 3 ARTHUR
that measures would include ‘limitation of some military ARV MT-55A; MT-72; VT-72M4CZ; VPV-ARV; WPT-
capabilities’. TOPAS
VLB AM-50; MT-55A
ACTIVE 25,421 (Army 12,833, Air 4,804, Other MW Belarty UOS-155
7,784) Paramilitary 3,100 (Figures are authorised
strength) Air Force 4,804; 686 civilian
Integrated with Joint Forces. Principal task is to secure
CIVILIAN 8,177 (Army 724, Air 686, Other 6,767) Czech airspace. This mission is fulfilled within NATO
Integrated Extended Air Defence System (NATINADS)
Organisations by Service and, if necessary, by means of the Czech national reinforced
air defence system. The Air Force also provides CAS for the
Army 12,833; 724 civilian Army SAR, and performs a tpt role.
FORCES BY ROLE Flying hours 120hrs/yr cbt ac 150 for tpt ac
SPECIAL FORCES FORCES BY ROLE
1 SF gp FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Europe 105
Europe
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL W-3A Sokol parliament (Art. 39, 43) or by the government (Art. 43)
ISR UAV
Some unit with Sojka 3 Afghanistan
AIR DEFENCE NATO • ISAF 694
1 (25th) SAM bde (2 AD gp) UN • UNAMA 1
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Denmark’s armed forces are well practiced in multination- MRL 227mm (12 MLRS in store awaiting disposal)
al operations, and sent an F-16 contingent to take part in MOR • TOWED 120mm 20 K6B1 Soltam
Operation Unified Protector in 2011. Acquisition of the C-130J AT
will aid tactical mobility, and Denmark is a partner in the MSL • MANPATS 20 TOW
F-35 programme, as it considers replacements for its F-16s. RCL 84mm 349 Carl Gustav
Denmark has maintained a battalion-plus deployment to AD • SAM • MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger
ISAF in Afghanistan (though numbers are reducing and RADAR • LAND ARTHUR
the plan is to transition to a 1:1 combat-to-training ratio), ARV 11 Bergepanzer 2
as well as a number of UN peacekeeping missions. Den- VLB 10 Biber
mark hopes to have no combat troops in Afghanistan by MW 14 910-MCV-2
2014. Due to Denmark’s ‘no’ vote to the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992, Denmark cannot participate in EU-led military Navy 2,730; 150 conscript (total 2,880) 306
operations, or the development of EU military capabilities. civilian
ACTIVE 18,628 (Army 9,925 Navy 2,880 Air 3,358 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Joint 2,465) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
TRAINING Iraq
1 unit with MFI-17 Supporter (T-17) Army 23 (sy forces)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE NATO • NTM-I 1
AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable UN • UNAMI 2 obs
FTR 45 F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon (30 operational)
TPT 7: Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 3 CL-604 LEBNANON
Challenger (MP/VIP) UN • UNIFIL 151; 1 log bn
TRG 28 MFI-17 Supporter (T-17) Liberia
HELICOPTERS
UN • UNMIL 2; 3 obs
ASW 8 Super Lynx Mk90B (transferred from naval
Europe
aviation) Lithuania
MRH 8 AS550 Fennec (ISR) (4 more non-operational) NATO • Baltic Air Policing 4 F-16 Fighting Falcon
TPT • Medium 14 AW101 Merlin
MSL Middle East
AAM • IR AIM-9L; IIR AIM-9X; ARH AIM-120 UN • UNTSO 11 obs
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
AMRAAM Serbia
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
NATO • KFOR 35
BOMBS
UN • UNMIK 1 obs
INS/GPS-guided: GBU-31 JDAM; EGBU-12/GBU-24
Paveway LGB south Sudan
UN • UNMISS 1 obs
Control and Air Defence Group
1 Control and Reporting Centre, 1 Mobile Control and
Reporting Centre. 4 Radar sites. No SAM.
Estonia EST
Reserves Euro €a 2010 2011 2012
Home Guard (Army) 40,800 reservists (to age 50) GDP € 14.5bn 16.0bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 1.22bn 1.37bn
MANOEUVRE per capita US$ 14,878 17,435
Light Growth % 3.11 6.55
2 regt cbt gp (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn) Inflation % 2.9 5.1
5 (local) def region (up to 2 mot inf bn)
Def exp € 249m
Home Guard (Navy) 4,500 reservists (to age 50) US$ 330m
organised into 30 Home Guard units Def bdgt € 249m 280m 336bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 330m 393m
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30 FMA (US) US$ 2.5m 3.0m
PB 30: 18 MHV800; 12 MHV900
US$1=€ 0.75 0.71
Home Guard (Air Force) 5,300 reservists (to age a
Although Estonia joined the Euro on 01 January 2011, figures
50) from 2010 have also been adjusted to enable comparisons.
Population 1,282,963
Home Guard (Service Corps) 2,900 reservists
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Deployment Male 7.8% 2.8% 4.0% 3.7% 21.5% 5.8%
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: Female 7.3% 2.7% 3.8% 3.8% 24.9% 11.9%
Constitution: Codified constitution (1849)
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: On approval Capabilities
by the parliament (Art. 19 II)
While its conscript-based armed forces are small, Estonia’s
Afghanistan government sees NATO membership as guaranteeing the
NATO • ISAF 750; 1 mech BG (1 tk pl, 2 mech inf coy, 1 nation’s security against external threats. Estonia contrib-
hel det); 1 fd hospital; 4 Leopard 2A5; 13 CV9030 MkII; 23 utes 165 personnel to ISAF, as well as to UN peacekeep-
M113 ing operations, and is a member of the EU’s Nordic Battle-
UN • UNAMA 2 obs group. Estonia possesses no aircraft capable of airspace
defence, and relies on a NATO Air Policing Mission for
Democratic Republic of the Congo
this task. Following Estonia’s experience of cyber attack in
UN • MONUSCO 2 obs
2007, Tallinn is the location for NATO’s Cooperative Cy-
Gulf of Aden & Somali BAsin ber Defence Centre of Excellence, which conducts training
NATO • Operation Ocean Shield 1 AG (theoretical and practical) for member states’ personnel.
108 The Military Balance 2012
4 def region. All units except Scouts bn are reserve based EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20
MANOEUVRE PB 9: 1 Maru (FIN Viima); 8 (other)
Reconnaissance PBR 11
1 recce bn AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 2
Light LOGISTICS & SUPPORT • AGF 1 Balsam
1 (1st) bde (2 inf bn, 1 CSS bn) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 L-410
3 indep inf bde HELICOPTERS • TPT • 3 AW139
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bn Cyber
1 AD bn
Estonia has developed its cyber-security infrastructure after
1 engr bn
the cyber attacks of 2007. As well as domestic capacities,
1 sigs bn
Tallinn hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Security Centre
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
of Excellence, established in 2008 to enhance NATO’s
1 log bn
cyber-defence capability.
Defence League 12,000
15 Districts Deployment
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
APC 88 Constitution: Codified constitution (1992)
APC (W) 81: 60 XA-180 Sisu; 21 BTR-80 Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By parliament
PPV 7 Mamba (Art. 128). Also, International Military Cooperation Act
ARTY 334 stipulates conditions for deployment abroad; parliament
TOWED 104: 105mm 38 H 61-37; 122mm 42 D-30 (H 63); decides deployment, unless otherwise provided for by in-
155mm 24 FH-70 ternational agreement.
MOR 230: 81mm 51: 41 B455; 10 NM 95; 120mm 179: 14
2B11; 165 41D Afghanistan
AT NATO • ISAF 162; 1 mech inf coy with 14 XA-180 Sisu; 1
MSL • MANPAT Milan, Mapats mor det with 3 81mm
RCL 160 106mm: 30 M-40A1; 90mm 130 PV-1110 Bosnia-Herzegovina
AD • SAM • MANPAD Mistral
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 1
Navy 200 Iraq
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE NATO • NTM-I 2
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 (FIN Middle East
Rista Rihtniemi)
UN • UNTSO 2 obs
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MCD 1 Tasuja (DNK Lindormen) MoLDOVA
MHC 3 Admiral Cowan (UK Sandown) OSCE • Moldova 2
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1 Admiral Pitka with
North Sea
1 76mm gun
NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MCD
Air Force 250 Serbia
Flying hours 120 hrs/year NATO • KFOR 1
Europe 109
FORCES BY ROLE
Finland FIN Recent reorganisation has involved the replacement of
the previous commands with seven military provinces.
Euro € 2010 2011 2012
Finland’s army maintains a mobilisation strength of about
GDP € 180bn 191bn 300,000. In support of this requirement two cycles, each for
US$ 239bn 268bn about 15,000 conscripts and 17,000 reservists, take place
per capita US$ 45,439 51,049 each year. After conscript training, reservist commitment
Growth % 3.64 3.46 is to the age of 60. Reservists are usually assigned to
units within their local geographical area. All service
Inflation % 1.7 3.1
appointments or deployments outside Finnish borders
Europe
Def exp € 2.71bn
are voluntary for all members of the armed services. All
US$ 3.59bn brigades are reserve based.
Def bdgt € 2.71bn 2.44bn 2.52bn
US$ 3.59bn 3.43bn
Reserve Organisations
US$1=€ 0.75 0.71 61,000 in manoeuvre forces and 210,000 in
territorial forces
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Population 5,259,250
FORCES BY ROLE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bn
Male 8.2% 3.2% 3.1% 3.2% 23.9% 7.3%
MANOEUVRE
Female 7.9% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 23.6% 10.5% Armoured
2 armd BG (regt)
Capabilities Mechanised
The primary role of the armed forces is to act as a guar- 2 (Karelia & Pori Jaeger) mech bde
antor of national sovereignty by providing territorial de- Light
fence, and its modern equipment inventory is shaped to 3 (Jaeger) bde
support this aim. Finland retains conscription, reflecting 6 lt inf bde
the continuing importance of a broad section of society be- Aviation
ing able to support territorial defence. In addition it has 1 hel bn
looked more recently to improve its ability to participate COMBAT SUPPORT
Some AD unit
in multinational peace keeping and peace enforcement.
7 engr regt
Defence expenditure is under pressure, with base closures
3 sigs bn
one possible element of cuts. Finland has embarked on a
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
wide-ranging defence reform process in a bid to reconcile
Some log unit
defence priorities with cost-saving imperatives; this is sup-
posed to be complete by 2015. All the armed services exer- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
cise regularly, with an increasingly joint emphasis, and the MBT 100 Leopard 2A4
air force and navy particularly participate in multinational RECCE 10 BMP-1TJ
exercises. As interest continues to grow in expanding its AIFV 194: 92 BMP-2; 102 CV90
APC 613
international role, however, this will further influence doc-
APC (T) 142: 40 MT-LBU; 102 MT-LBV
trine and procurement.
APC (W) 471: 260 XA-180/185 Sisu; 101 XA-202 Sisu; 48
ACTIVE 22,100 (Army 16,000 Navy 3,500 Air 2,600) XA-203 Sisu; 62 AMV (XA-360)
Paramilitary 2,875 ARTY 678
SP 122mm 36 2S1 Carnation (PsH 74)
General Conscription terms of Service 6–9–12 months TOWED 354: 122mm 234 D-30 (H 63); 130mm 36 K 54;
(12 months for officers NCOs and soldiers with special 155mm 54 K 83/K 98
duties. 25,000 reservists a year do refresher training: total MRL 227mm 22 M270 MLRS
obligation 40 days (75 for NCOs, 100 for officers) between MOR 120mm 265: 261 KRH 92; 4 XA-361 AMOS
conscript service and age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60). AT • MSL 100 Spike; TOW 2
Reserve total reducing to 340,000. HELICOPTERS
MRH 7 Hughes 500 D/E
CIVILIAN 4,600 (Army 3,000 Navy 500 Air 1,100)
TPT • Medium 10 NH90 TTH
RESERVE 340,000 (Army 271,000 Navy 31,000 Air UAV • ISR • Medium 11 ADS-95 Ranger
38,000) Paramilitary 11,500 AD • SAM
SP 36 +: 16 ASRAD (ITO 05); 20 Crotale NG (ITO 90);
9K37 Buk (ITO 96)
Organisations by Service MANPAD: 86 RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M)
GUNS 23mm; 30mm; 35mm; 57mm
Army 5,000; 11,000 conscript (total 16,000); AEV 6 Leopard 2R CEV; MT-LB
civilian 3,000 ARV VT-55A
110 The Military Balance 2012
VLB BLG-60M2; 6 Leguan; 9 SISU Leguan FGA 62: 55 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet
MW Aardvark Mk 2; KMT T-55; RA-140 DS TPT • Light 12: 3 C-295M; 3 Learjet 35A (survey; ECM
trg; tgt-tow); 6 PC-12NG
Navy 1,600; 1,900 conscript (total 3,500); TRG 83: 29 Hawk Mk50/Mk51A*; 18 Hawk Mk66*; 8 L-90
civilian 500 Redigo; 28 L-70 Vinka
FORCES BY ROLE MSL • AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120
Naval Command HQ located at Turku; with two AMRAAM
subordinate Naval Commands (Gulf of Finland and
Archipelago Sea); 1 Naval bde; 3 spt elm (Naval Materiel Paramilitary
Cmd, Naval Academy, Naval Research Institute)
Border Guard 2,875
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Ministry of Interior. 4 Border Guard Districts and 2 Coast
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
Guard Districts
PBG 4 Rauma each with 6 RBS-15SF3 (15SF) AShM, 1
sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM FORCES BY ROLE
PCG 4 Hamina each with 4 RBS-15 (15SF) AShM, 1 MARITIME PATROL
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
octuple VLS with Umkhonto SAM 1 sqn with Do-228 (maritime surv); AS332 Super Puma;
MINE WARFARE 18 Bell 206L (AB-206L) Long Ranger; Bell 412 (AB-412)
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 12 Twin Huey; Bell 412EP (AB-412EP) Twin Huey
MHSO 1 Katanpää (2 further vessels in build; expected EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISD 2012) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 66
MSI 11: 7 Kiiski; 4 Kuha PCC 3
MINELAYERS • ML 6: PBO 3
2 Hameenmaa each with 1 octuple VLS with Umkhonto PB 60
SAM, 2 RBU 1200, up to 100–120 mine AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCAC 7
3 Pansio each with 50 mine AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228
1 Pohjanmaa with up to 100–150 mine HELICOPTERS
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 43 MRH 5: 4 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; 1 Bell 412EP
LCU 7: 2 Kala; 3 Kampela; 2 Lohi (AB-412EP) Twin Huey
LCP 36 TPT 10: Medium 3 AS332 Super Puma; Light 7: 4
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 29: AW119KE Koala; 3 Bell 206L Long Ranger (AB-206L)
AGOR 1 Aranda (Ministry of Trade control)
AKSL 15: 6 Hauki; 4 Hila; 5 Valas Reserve 11,500 reservists on mobilisation
AGB 7 (Board of Navigation control)
AGS 1 Prisma (Maritime Administration)
Deployment
AX 5: 3 Fabian Wrede; 2 Lokki
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Coastal Defence Constitution: Codified constitution (2000)
ARTY • COASTAL 118: 130mm 102: 30 K-53tk (static); Specific legislation: ‘Act on Peace Support Operations’
72 K-54 RT 100mm 16 (TK) tank turrets (2000); ‘Act on Military Crisis Management (211/2006)’.
MSL • TACTICAL • 4 RBS-15K AShM Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By president
upon proposal by government (Art. 129 of constitution)
Air Force 1,850; 750 conscript (total 2,600); and after formal consultation of parliamentary Foreign Af-
civilian 1,100 fairs Committee (‘Act on Peace Support Operations’, Ch. 1,
3 Air Comds: Satakunta (West), Karelia (East), Lapland Section 2; ‘Act on Military Crisis Management (211/2006)’).
(North) Afghanistan
Flying hours 90–140 hrs/year NATO • ISAF 195
FORCES BY ROLE
Bosnia-Herzegovina
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 10
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
ISR OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
1 (survey) sqn with Learjet 35A INdia/Pakistan
TRANSPORT UN • UNMOGIP 5 obs
1 flt with C-295M
4 (liaison) flt with L-90 Redigo; PC-12NG Liberia
TRAINING UN • UNMIL 2
1 sqn with Hawk Mk50; Hawk Mk51A*; Hawk Mk66* (air
Middle East
defence and ground attack trg)
UN • UNTSO 14 obs
1 unit with L-70 Vinka
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Serbia
AIRCRAFT 109 combat capable NATO • KFOR 21
Europe 111
Organisations by Service
France FRA
Euro € 2010 2011 2012 Strategic Nuclear Forces
GDP € 1.93tr 1.99tr
Navy 2,200
US$ 2.56tr 2.79tr
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4
per capita US$ 39,503 42,805 3 Le Triomphant with 16 M45 SLBM with 6 TN-75
Growth % 1.38 1.65 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2
Inflation % 1.7 2.1 HWT/SM-39 Exocet AShM
Europe
Def expa € 39.3bn 1 Le Triomphant with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75
US$ 52bn nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2
HWT/SM-39 Exocet AShM
Def bdgta € 39.3bn 42.0bn 40.2bn
AIRCRAFT • FGA 20 Rafale M F3 with ASMP-A msl
US$ 52.0bn 58.8bn
US$1=€ 0.75 0.71 Air Force 1,800
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
a
Autorisations d’engagement LFI 2010
Air Strategic Forces Command
Population 65,102,719
FORCES BY ROLE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus STRIKE
1 sqn with Mirage 2000N with ASMP/ASMP-A msl
Male 9.5% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 22.9% 7.0%
1 sqn with Rafale B F3 with ASMP/ASMP-A msl
Female 9.0% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 23.3% 9.7% TANKER
1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker
Capabilities EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
France maintains rapidly deployable armed forces, capable AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable
of self-sustainment and operation across the full spectrum FGA 60: 40 Mirage 2000N; 20 Rafale B F3
of combat activity. The armed forces’ primary tasks are as- TKR/TPT 11 C-135FR
suring national sovereignty; meeting alliance commitments TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
on collective security; participating in peace enforcement
and peacekeeping; addressing counter-terrorism; and hu- Paramilitary
manitarian missions. The nuclear deterrent continues to Gendarmerie 41
be revamped with the introduction of the M51 SLBM and
the fourth SSBN into service in 2010. An improved version Space
of the M51, the 51.2, is due for entry into service in 2015. SATELLITES 7
The air force and navy introduced the ASMPA nuclear- COMMUNICATIONS 2 Syracuse-3 (designed to inte-
armed cruise missile with the air force role continuing to be grate with UK Skynet & ITA Sicral)
transferred from the Mirage 2000N to the Rafale F3. French ISR 3 Helios (1A/2A/2B)
military units continue to participate in the ISAF mission, EARLY WARNING 2 Spirale
while air and naval forces were heavily involved in Opera-
tion Unified Protector. French armed forces also deployed, Army 130,600 (incl 7,300 Foreign Legion;
from African bases, to augment the existing contingent in 12,800 Marines); 20,600 (civilian)
Côte d’Ivoire during the violence there in early 2011. Regt and BG normally bn size
All of the services exercise regularly and jointly at the
FORCES BY ROLE
national level, while also participating in a broad range COMMAND
of international exercises. Significant procurement pro- 2 (task force) HQ
grammes continue for the army, navy and air force. Stra- MANOEUVRE
tegic airlift will be strengthened with the delivery, if be- Reconnaissance
lated, of the A400M, while the air force is also considering 1 ISR bde (1 recce regt, 1 UAV regt, 2 EW regt, 1 int bn)
a future strategic tanker aircraft. The introduction of these Armoured
platforms will support France’s ability to continue to proj- 2 armd bde (2 armd regt, 2 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt,
ect power on a global scale. 1 engr regt)
Mechanised
ACTIVE 238,591 (Army 130,600 Navy 40,353 Air
2 lt armd bde (1 armd cav regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty
52,669, Other Staffs 14,969) Paramilitary 103,376
regt, 1 engr regt)
CIVILIAN 70,976 (Army 20,600, Navy 7,091, Air 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf
7,517, Other Staffs 35,768) Paramilitary 1,925 regt)
2 mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 mech
RESERVE 33,686 (Army 18,500, Navy 6,012, Air inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
5,186, Other Staffs 3,988) Paramilitary 40,000 1 mech BG (Djibouti)
112 The Military Balance 2012
1 engr regt)
Aviation Navy 40,353 (incl 2,200 opcon Strategic
3 avn regt Nuclear Forces); 7,091(civilian)
Other EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 SMA regt (French Guiana, French West Indies & SUBMARINES 9
Indian Ocean) STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
5 SMA coy (French Polynesia & New Caledonia) 3 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with
COMBAT SUPPORT 16 M45 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single
1 AD regt 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM-39 Exocet AShM
1 CBRN regt 1 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with
1 sigs bde (5 sigs regt) 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM-39 Exocet AShM
1 spt regt TACTICAL • SSN 6:
1 trg regt 6 Rubis each with 4 single 533mm TT with F-17 HWT/
SM-39 Exocet AShM
Special Operation Forces 2,200 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 25
FORCES BY ROLE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1:
SPECIAL FORCES CVN 1 Charles de Gaulle with 4 octuple VLS with
2 SF regt Aster 15 SAM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral
MANOEUVRE SAM (capacity: 35–40 Super Etendard/Rafale M/E-2C
Aviation Hawkeye/SA360 Dauphin)
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 13:
1 avn regt
2 Cassard with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM,
Reserves 18,500 1 Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 2 single 533mm
Reservists form 79 UIR (Reserve Intervention Units) of ASTT with L5 HWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity: 1
about 75 to 152 troops, for ‘Proterre’ – combined land AS565SA Panther ASW hel)
projection forces bn, and 23 USR (Reserve Specialised 2 Forbin with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM,
Units) of about 160 troops, in specialised regt. 1 48-cell VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 sextuple
Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with MU-90, 2 76mm gun, (capacity: 1 NH90 TTH hel)
MBT 254 Leclerc 2 Georges Leygues with 2 twin lnchr with MM-40 Exocet
RECCE 2,050: 256 AMX-10RC; 160 ERC-90F4 Sagaie; 40 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 2 single
VAB Reco NBC; 1,594 VBL M-ll 533mm ASTT with L5 HWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity:
AIFV 563: 232 VBCI; 331 AMX-10P/PC 2 Lynx hel)
APC (W) 3,586: 3,500 VAB; 60 VAB BOA; 26 VAB NBC 2 Georges Leygues with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet
LFV 506 PVP AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 2 single
ARTY 375 533mm ASTT with L5 HWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity:
SP 155mm 114: 37 AU-F-1; 77 CAESAR 2 Lynx hel)
TOWED 155mm 43 TR-F-1 3 Georges Leygues (mod) with 2 quad lcnhr with MM-
MRL 227mm 26 MLRS 40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM,
MOR 120mm 192 RT-F1 2 single 533mm ASTT with L5 HWT, 1 100mm gun,
AT • MSL (capacity: 2 Lynx hel)
SP 325: 30 VAB HOT; 110 VAB Milan; 185 VAB Eryx 2 Tourville with 6 single lnchr with MM-38 Exocet
MANPATS 550 Milan AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 2 single
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 13: 5 PC-6B Turbo-Porter; 8 533mm ASTT with L5 HWT, 2 100mm gun, (capacity:
TBM-700 2 Lynx hel)
Europe 113
Europe
single ASTT, 1 100mm gun SEARCH & RESCUE
PCC 10: 7 L’Audacieuse (all deployed in the Pacific or 1 sqn with AS365F Dauphin 2
Caribbean); 3 Flamant 1 sqn with EC225
PCO 2: 1 Lapérouse; 1 Le Malin TRAINING
PSO 1 Albatros 1 sqn with SA319B Alouette III
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 18 1 unit with Falcon 10 M
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
MCS 7: 3 Antares (used as route survey vessels); 4 Vulcain 1 unit with CAP 10; EMB 121 Xingu; MS-880 Rallye
(used as mine diving tenders) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MHO 11 Éridan AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable
AMPHIBIOUS FGA 54: 20 Rafale M F3; 34 Super Etendard Modernisé;
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 (10 Rafale M F1 in store)
LHD 2 Mistral (capacity mixed air group of up to 16 ASW 25 Atlantique 2
NH90/SA330 Puma/AS532 Cougar/EC665 Tiger hel; 2 AEW&C 3 E-2C Hawkeye
LCAC or 4 LCM; 60 AVs; 450 troops) (1 further vessel TPT 17: Light 11 EMB-121 Xingu; PAX 6 Falcon 10 MER
in sea trials; expected ISD 2012) TRG 16: 7 CAP 10; 9 MS-880 Rallye*
LPD 1 Foudre (capacity 4 AS532 Cougar; either 2 LCT or HELICOPTERS
10 LCM; 22 tanks; 470 troops) ASW 25 Lynx Mk4
LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Batral (capacity 12 trucks; 140 MRH 52: 9 AS365F Dauphin 2; 16 AS565SA Panther; 25
troops) SA319B Alouette III
LANDING CRAFT 21: TPT • Medium 2 EC225 Super Puma
LCT 6: 2 Edic 700; 2 CDIC; 2 EDA-R (2 further vessels MSL
in build; expected ISD 2012) AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF
LCM 15 CTMS AShM AM-39 Exocet
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 115: ASM ASMP-A; AS-30 Laser; AASM
AORH 4 Durance (capacity: 1 SA319 Alouette III/AS-365
Dauphin/Lynx) Marines 2,500
AF 3
Commando Units
AG 3 Chamois
AGE 1 Corraline FORCES BY ROLE
AGI 1 Dupuy de Lome MANOEUVRE
AGOR 1 Reconnaissance
AGM 1 Monge 1 recce gp
Amphibious
AGS 3 Lapérouse
3 aslt gp
ATA 2
1 atk swimmer gp
AXL 11: 8 Léopard; 2 Glycine; 1 other
1 raiding gp
AXS 4: 2 La Belle Poule; 2 other
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
YAG 2 Phaéton (towed array tenders)
1 spt gp
YD 5
YDT 11: 1 Alize; 1 Le Malin; 9 VIP 21 Fusiliers-Marin 1,600
YFRT 2
FORCES BY ROLE
YGS 7 VH8
MANOEUVRE
YTB 3 Bélier
Other
YTL 30: 4 PSS 10; 26 P4
9 (force protection) sy unit
YTM 21: 3 Maïto; 16 Fréhel; 2 Esterel
14 (Naval Base) sy gp
Naval Aviation 6,500 Public Service Force
Flying hours 180–220 hrs/yr on Super Etendard strike/
Naval personnel performing general coast guard, fishery
FGA ac
protection, SAR, anti-pollution and traffic surveillance
FORCES BY ROLE duties. Command exercised through Maritime
STRIKE/FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Prefectures (Premar): Manche (Cherbourg), Atlantique
1 sqn with Rafale M F3 (Brest), Méditerranée (Toulon)
114 The Military Balance 2012
30 fire fighting and rescue scn para regt; 8 AMX 10 RC; 10 VBCI; 449 VAB APC; 76 VBL;
3 intervention paratroop cdo 15 PVP; 3 Rafale C; 3 Mirage 2000D; 3 Harfang UAV; 1
cbt hel bn (3 EC665 TigerAH, 2 AS532 Cougar, 3 EC725; 3
Air Training Command Gazelle AHl)
Over 6,000 personnel
Bosnia-Herzegovina
FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea (Operation Astrée) 1
Some sqn with CAP 10; Grob G120A-F; TB-30 Epsilon OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Europe
AIRCRAFT Operation Boali 240; 1 inf coy; 1 spt det
TRG 48: 5 CAP 10; 18 Grob G120A-F; 25 TB-30 Epsilon
(incl many in storage) Chad
Operation Epervier 950; 1 armd cav BG; 1 air unit with 3
Reserves 5,186 reservists Mirage 2000C; 2 C-160 Transall; 1 CN-235M; 1 C-135FR; 1
hel det with 4 SA330 Puma
Paramilitary 103,376
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Côte D’Ivoire
Gendarmerie 103,376, 1,925 civilians. 40,000 Operation Licorne 700; 1 armd cav BG (to reduce to 450
reservist men by end 2011)
3,193 (Headquarters); 4,092 (Administration); 2,051 (Mar- UN • UNOCI 6
itime Air (personnel drawn from other departments));
Democratic Republic of the Congo
16,754 (Mobile); 4,999 (Republican Guard, Air Tpt,
Arsenals); 5,444 (Schools); 63,162 (Territorial); 1,925 (civil- EU • EUSEC RD Congo 14
ians); 3,640 (Overseas); 41 opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces UN • MONUSCO 5 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Djibouti
LT TK 28 VBC-90 Army 1,048; 1 (Foreign Legion) BG with (1 engr coy, 1 arty
APC (W) 153 VBRG-170 bty, 2 recce sqn, 2 inf coy); 1 (Marine) combined arms regt
ARTY MOR 157+ 60mm; 81mm with (1 engr coy, 1 arty bty, 2 recce sqn, 2 inf coy)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 40 Navy: 1 LCT
PCO 1 Fulmar Air Force: 1 Air unit with 10 Mirage 2000C/D; 1 C-160
PB 39: 4 Géranium; 3 VSC 14; 24 VSCM; 8 EBSLP Transall; 2 SA330 Puma; 1 AS555 Fennec
HELICOPTERS • TPT 35: 20 EC135; 15 EC145
Egypt
Cyber MFO 2
The French Network and Information Security Agency French Guiana
(ANSSI), under the authority of the prime minister and Army 1,619 1 (Foreign Legion) inf regt; 1 (Marine) inf regt;
attached to the office of the secretary general for national 1 SMA regt
security and defence, was established in 2009 to conduct Navy 150; 2 PCC
surveillance on sensitive government networks and re- Air Force 1 tpt unit; 1 DHC-6; 4 SA330 Puma; 3 AS555 Fennec
spond to cyber attacks. The 2008 White Paper called for Gendarmerie 3 coy; 1 AS350 Ecureuil
programmes in offensive and defensive cyber-war capa-
bilities. The White Paper noted that part of the offensive French Polynesia
capability, ‘will come under the Joint Staff and the other Army 429 (incl Centre d’Expérimentation du Pacifique); 1
part … developed within specialised services’. The CALID (Marine) inf regt; 3 SMA coy
(Analysis and combat centre for computer defence) moni- Navy 710; 1 HQ at Papeete; 1 FFGHM with 1 AS565SA
tors military networks and counters intrusions in coordina- Panther ASW hel; 4 PCC; 2 LST; 1 AOT; 3 Falcon 200 Gardian
tion with ANSSI. In July 2011, the MoD produced a classi- Air Force 1 tpt unit; 3 CN-235M; 1 AS332 Super Puma; 1
fied Joint Cyber-defence Concept. AS555 Fennec
French West Indies
Deployment Army 607; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 1 (Marine) inf bn; 2 SMA
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: regt
Constitution: Codified constitution (1958) Navy 450; 1 FFGHM; 1 PCC; 1 LST: 1 naval base at Fort de
Specific legislation: ‘Order of 7 January 1959’ France (Martinique)
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: De jure: by Air Force 1 tpt unit; 3 CN-235M; 2 SA330 Puma; 1 AS555SN
the minister of defence, under authority of the PM and Fennec
on agreement in council of ministers (‘Order of 7 January Gendarmerie 4 coy; 2 AS350 Ecureuil
1959’, Art. 16, Art.20-1 of constitution)
Gabon
Afghanistan Army 762; 1 recce pl with ERC-90F1 Lynx; 1 (Marine) inf bn;
NATO • ISAF/OEF-A 3,932; 1 AB bde HQ; 1 inf regt; 1 4 SA330 Puma
116 The Military Balance 2012
Gulf of Guinea
Operation Corymbe 1 LPD Georgia GEO
HAITI Georgian Lari 2010 2011 2012
UN • MINUSTAH 2 GDP lari 20.8bn 23.6bn
US$ 11.7bn 14.0bn
Indian Ocean
Army 988 (incl La Réunion and TAAF); 1 (Marine) para per capita US$ 2,535 3,042
regt; 1 (Foreign Legion) inf det; 1 SMA regt Growth % 6.38 5.55
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 93 T-72; (3 T-72 & 23 T-55 in store) Deployment
AIFV 63: 17 BMP-1; 45 BMP-2; 1 BRM-1K; (8 BMP-1 & 1 Legal provisions for foreign deployment of armed
BMP-2 in store) forces:
APC 137 Constitution: Codified constitution (1995)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
APC (T) 45 MT-LB; (21 MT-LB in store) Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the presi-
APC (W) 92: 25 BTR-70 (1 in store); 17 BTR-80 (2 in dency upon parliamentary approval (Art. 100)
store); 50 Ejder (15 in store)
ARTY 185 Afghanistan
SP 35: 152mm 32 DANA; 13 2S3; 1 2S19; 203mm 1 2S7 NATO • ISAF 937; 1 inf bn
TOWED 68: 122mm 55 D-30; (3 D-30 in store); 152mm
Serbia
13: 3 2A36; 10 2A65
OSCE • Serbia 1
MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21; 6 GRADLAR; 18 RM-70
MOR 120mm 43: 13 2S12; 21 M-75; 9 M-120; (1 2S12, 13 OSCE • Kosovo 5
M-75 & 9 M-120 in store)
AT ε50 TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
MSL ε10 DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
GUNS ε40
Following the August 2008 war between Russia and
AD • SAM • SP 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared
themselves independent. Data presented here represent
Air Force 1,310 (incl 290 conscript)
the de facto situation and do not imply international
1 avn base, 1 hel air base
recognition as sovereign states.
AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable
ATK 12: 3 Su-25 Frogfoot; 7 Su-25K Frogfoot A; 2 Su-25UB
Frogfoot B FOREIGN FORCES
TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 1 Tu-134A Crusty (VIP); 2 Russia Army 6,900; 2 MR bde; at locations incl Gudauta
Yak-40 Codling (Abkhazia), Djava and Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia)
TRG 9 L-29 Delfin
HELICOPTERS
TPT 29 Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip Light 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H Germany GER
Iroquois) Euro € 2010 2011 2012
AD • SAM 1–2 bn 9K37 Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly), 8 9K33
GDP € 2.48tr 2.57tr
Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko) (two bty), 6-10 9K33 Osa-AKM
updated SAM systems. US$ 3.28tr 3.60tr
per capita US$ 40,187 44,197
National Guard 1,578 active reservists opcon Growth % 3.56 2.73
Army Inflation % 1.2 2.2
FORCES BY ROLE Def expa € 33.3bn
MANOEUVRE US$ 44.1bn
Light Def bdgt € 32.0bn 31.5bn 30.9bn
1 inf bde
US$ 42.3bn 44.2bn
Air Manoeuvre
Capabilities 1 spec ops div (RF) (1 SF bde, 2 AB bde (1 recce coy, 2
The armed forces are undergoing a period of re-structur- para bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn), 1 AD bn, 1 sigs bn)
ing, and substantial down-sizing, as defence expenditure 1 air mob div (RF) (1 air mob bde (1 air mob inf regt, 1
is trimmed out to 2015. Overall personnel numbers will fall atk hel bn, 1 tpt hel bn); 1 avn bde (2 tpt hel regt, 1 lt
by some 37,000, and conscription has been replaced with tpt hel regt, 1 sigs bn); 1 cbt spt bde with (1 arty regt, 1
‘voluntary conscription’. Land forces will be restructured AD bn, 1 NBC regt))
to provide three division-level units rather than the pre- COMBAT SUPPORT
vious five, with brigades down from eleven to eight. Up 1 arty bn (GER/FRA bde)
to 20,000 civilian posts are also being cut. The air force is 1 engr coy (GER/FRA bde)
being re-organised around operational unit and support 1 cbt spt bde (1 arty trg regt, 1 AD bn, 1 NBC regt)
unit commands, replacing its divisional structure, with the COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
navy similarly being organised into capability areas. Late 1 log bn (GER/FRA bde)
in 2011, a further round of defence cuts were announced,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
leading to base closures in Germany and reductions in
MBT 350 Leopard 2A6
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
RIM-162B Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS each with ISR
21 RIM-116 RAM SAM; (capacity; 2 NH-90/Lynx hel) 1 wg (1 ISR sqn with Tornado IDS; 1 UAV sqn (ISAF
FRIGATES 11 only) with Heron)
FFGHM 8 Bremen with 2 quad Mk 141 lnchr with AIR DEFENCE
RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 GMLS 3 wg (each 2 SAM gp) with Patriot
with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with 1 AD gp with C-RAM MANTIS
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 3 (tac air ctrl) radar gp
LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity either 2 MK88 Sea Lynx EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ASW hel or 2 Sea Lynx MK88A ASW) AIRCRAFT 160 combat capable
FFGM 2 Braunschweig (K130) with 2 twin lnchr with FTR 89: 73 Eurofighter Typhoon; 16 F-4F Phantom II
RBS-15 AShM, 2 M49 GMLS each with RIM-116 RAM FGA 51 Tornado IDS
SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (3 more EW/FGA 20 Tornado ECR*
vessels to be commissioned in 2012) UAV • ISR • Heavy 3 Heron
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCGM 10 AD • SAM • TOWED 26: 24 Patriot PAC-3, 2 C-RAM
10 Gepard with 2 twin lnchr with MM-38 Exocet AShM, MANTIS
1 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun MSL
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 35: AAM • IR AIM-9L/Li Sidewinder; IIR Iris-T; ARH
MHO 15: 10 Frankenthal (one used as diving support); 5 AIM 120A/B AMRAAM
Kulmbach LACM KEPD 350 Taurus
MSO 5 Ensdorf ARM AGM-88B HARM
MSD 15 Seehund BOMBS
LGB: GBU-24 Paveway III, GBU-54 JDAM
AMPHIBIOUS 2
LCU 2 Type 520 Transport Command
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 30
FORCES BY ROLE
AO 2 Walchensee Type 703
TANKER/TRANSPORT
AOT 2 Spessart Type 704
1 (special air mission) wg with A310 MRT; A310
AFH 2 Berlin Type 702 (capacity either 2 NH90 utl hel or MRTT; A340; AS532U2 Cougar II (VIP); CL-601 Chal-
2 Sea King MK41 SAR hel; 2 RAMs) lenger
AG 6: 3 Schwedeneck Type 748; 3 Stollergrund Type 745 TRANSPORT
AGOR 1 Planet Type 751 4 wg (total: 2 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1D Iroquois); 3 sqn
AGI 3 Oste Type 423 with C-160 Transall; 1 unit forming with NH-90)
AT 5
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AX 1 AIRCRAFT
SPT 6 Elbe Type 404 (2 specified for PFM support; 1 TKR/TPT 4 A310 MRTT
specified for SSK support; 3 specified for MHC/MSC TPT 89: Medium 80 C-160 Transall; PAX 9: 2 A310
support) MRT; 1 A340 (VIP); 2 A319; 4 CL-601 Challenger (VIP)
Trial Ship 2 HELICOPTERS • TPT 52: Medium 8: 4 AS532U2 Cougar
II (VIP); 4 NH90; Light 44 Bell 205 (UH-1D Iroquois)
Naval Aviation 2,227 (SAR, Tpt)
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
ASW 8 AP-3C Orion Training Command
TPT • Light 2 Do-228 (pollution control) FORCES BY ROLE
HELICOPTERS TRAINING
ASW 22 Lynx Mk88A 1 sqn located at Holloman AFB (US) with Tornado IDS
SAR 21 Sea King Mk41 1 unit (ENJJPT) located at Sheppard AFB (US) with
MSL AShM Sea Skua T-6 Texan II; T-38A
1 hel unit located at Fassberg
Air Force 44, 565 (plan figure) 1 AD unit located at Fort Bliss (US) with Patriot
Flying hours 140 hrs/year (plus 40 hrs high-fidelity EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
simulator) AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable
120 The Military Balance 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Serbia
7 med regt NATO • KFOR 1,451; 1 MRL bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 sigs coy;
5 fd hospital 1 spt bn; elm 1 MP coy; 1 med unit; elm 1 hel gp; 16 TPz-1
Fuchs; 7 UH-1D Iroquois
Cyber OSCE • Serbia 1
Germany established a Department of Information OSCE • Kosovo 8
and Computer Network Operations in 2009 under the south Sudan
guidance of the then chief of the Bundeswehr’s Strategic UN • UNMISS 5; 8 obs
Reconnaissance Command. Bundeswehr units maintain
organic IT monitoring capability: a Bundeswehr CERT team Sudan
(CERTBw) is available. Germany issued a Cyber Security UN • UNAMID 4
Strategy in February 2011. A National Cyber Response Uganda
Centre, involving Police, Customs, Federal Intelligence EU • EUTM 3
Service and the Bunderswehr, began operations on 1
April 2011. It reports to the Federal Office for Information United States
Security. A National Cyber Security Council has also Air Force: trg units at Goodyear AFB (AZ)/Sheppard AFB
been established, with high-level representatives from (TX) with 40 T-38 Talon trg ac; 69 T-6A Texan II; 1 trg sqn
government and, as associate members, business. Holloman AFB (NM) with 24 Tornado IDS; NAS Pensacola
(FL); Fort Rucker (AL) • Missile trg located at Fort Bliss (TX)
Deployment UZBEKISTAN
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: NATO • ISAF 106
Constitution: Codified constitution (‘Basic Law’, 1949)
Specific legislation: ‘Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz’ (2005) Foreign Forces
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: a) By Canada NATO 287
parliament: in general and in the case of military France Army: 1 (FRA/GER) army bde (1 army HQ, 1 armd
intervention; b) by government: in urgent cases of threat cav rgt, 1 mech inf regt); 2,800 (incl elm Eurocorps and
or emergency (parliamentary consent a posteriori), or for FRA/GER bde (2,500))
preparatory measures or humanitarian interventions; c) United Kingdom Army 17,870; 1 armd div (2 armd bde)
simplified procedure for ‘missions of low intensity’ or if the Royal Navy 40; Air Force 240
government seeks an extension of parliamentary approval United States
(§§ 1–5 of the 2005 law)
US Africa Command: Army; 1 HQ at Stuttgart USAF; 1
Afghanistan HQ (17th Air Force) at Ramstein AB.
NATO • ISAF 5,150; 1 div HQ; 1 inf BG; 1 AB BG; Marder US European Command: 54,198; 1 combined service HQ
AIFV; Fennek (Recce); TPz-1 Fuchs APC; Dingo II APC; (EUCOM) at Stuttgart-Vaihingen
PzH 2000 155mm SP arty; Wiesel (TOW) SP AT; KZO UAV; Army 38,625; 1 HQ (US Army Europe (USAREUR)
LUNA UAV Air Force: 6 Tornado ECR (SEAD); CH-53 tpt at Heidelberg; 1 cav SBCT; (2 armd inf bde currently
hel; C-160 tpt ac; Heron UAV deployed to AFG); 1 cbt avn bde; 1 engr bde; 1 int bde;
UN • UNAMA 1 obs 2 sigs bde; 1 spt bde; 1 (APS) armd HBCT eqpt. set
(transforming); M1 Abrams; M2/M3 Bradley; Stryker;
Bosnia-Herzegovina M109; M777; M270 MLRS; AH-64 Apache; CH-47
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 13 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 Navy 470
Europe 121
USAF 14,726; 1 HQ (US Airforce Europe (USAFE)) at Field army to re-org. Units are manned at 3 different levels
Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 ftr – Cat A 85% fully ready, Cat B 60% ready in 24 hours, Cat
wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 atk sqn with 18 A-10C C 20% ready in 48 hours (requiring reserve mobilisation).
Thunderbolt II; 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-16CJ Fighting Falcon); 3 military regions.
1 airlift wg at Ramstein AB with 16 C-130E/J Hercules; 2 FORCES BY ROLE
C-20 Gulfstream; 9 C-21 Learjet; 1 CT-43 Boeing 737 COMMAND
USMC 377 4 corps HQ (incl NDC-GR)
1 armd div HQ
Greece GRC 3 mech inf div HQ
Europe
1 inf div HQ
Euro € 2010 2011 2012 1 log corps HQ
GDP € 230bn 221bn SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 305bn 310bn 1 comd (1 amph bde, 1 cdo/para bde)
per capita US$ 28,364 28,777 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
RCL 3,927: 4 Elli Batch III (NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad Mk
SP 106mm 581 M40A1 141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple
MANPATS 3,346 84mm 2,000 Carl Gustav; 90mm 1,346 Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin
EM-67 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 41: 3 Beech 200 King Air 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
(C-12C/R/AP Huron); 38 Cessna 185 (U-17A) 4 Hydra (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with
HELICOPTERS RGM-84G Harpoon AShM, 1 16 cell Mk48 Mod 5 VLS
ATK 29: 19 AH-64A Apache; 10 AH-64D Apache with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT each
TPT 124: Heavy 15 CH-47D Chinook; Light 109: 95 Bell with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 S-70B
205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 14 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger Seahawk ASW hel)
UAV • ISR • Medium 4 Sperwer PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33
AD CORVETTES • FSGM 5 Roussen (Super Vita) with 2
SAM 1,722 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 Mk49 GMLS
SP 113: 21 9K331 Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet); 38 9K33 with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun (2 additional
Osa-M (SA-8B Gecko); 54 ASRAD HMMWV vessels in build)
TOWED 42 I-HAWK
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
PCFG 12:
MANPAD 1,567 FIM-92A Stinger
5 Kavaloudis (FRA La Combattante II, III, IIIB) with 6
GUNS • TOWED 747: 20mm 207 Rh 202; 23mm 523 ZU-
RB 12 Penguin AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4
23-2
HWT, 2 76mm gun
RADAR • LAND 76: 3 ARTHUR, 5 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder
4 Laskos (FRA La Combattante II, III, IIIB) with 4 MM-38
(arty, mor); 8 AN/TPQ-37(V)3; 40 BOR-A; 20 MARGOT
Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2
ARV 268: 12 Büffel; 43 Leopard 1; 95 M88A1; 113 M578
76mm gun
VLB 12+: 12 Leopard 1; Leguan
1 Votsis (FRA La Combattante) with 2 twin Mk-141 lnchr
MW Giant Viper
with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun
2 Votsis (FRA La Combattante IIA) with 4 MM-38 Exocet
National Guard 32,988 reservists
Internal security role AShM, 1 76mm gun
PCO 8:
FORCES BY ROLE
2 Armatolos (DNK Osprey) each with 1 76mm gun
MANOEUVRE
2 Kasos each with 1 76mm gun
Light
4 Machitis each with 1 76mm gun
1 inf div
PB 8: 4 Andromeda (NOR Nasty); 2 Stamou; 2 Tolmi
Air Manoeuvre
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7
1 para regt
MHO 4: 2 Evropi (UK Hunt); 2 Evniki (US Osprey)
Aviation
1 avn bn MSC 3 Alkyon (US MSC-294)
COMBAT SUPPORT AMPHIBIOUS
8 arty bn LANDING SHIPS • LST 5:
4 AD bn 5 Chios (capacity 4 LCVP; 300 troops) with 1 hel landing
platform (for med hel)
Navy 16,900; 3,100 conscript; (total 20,000) LANDING CRAFT 7
LCU 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LCAC 3 Kefallinia (Zubr) (capacity either 3 MBT or 10
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 8:
APC (T); 230 troops)
4 Poseidon (GER T-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 44:
with SUT HWT
AORH 1 Prometheus (ITA Etna)
3 Glavkos (GER T-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with
UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT AOT 4
1 Papanikolis (GER T-214) with 8 single 533mm TT with AG 2 (ex-GER Luneburg)
UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT (5 additional AWT 6
vessels in build) AE 1
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 14 ABU 2
FRIGATES • FFGHM 14: AXL 1
4 Elli Batch I (NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad Mk YPT 3
141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple YFU 4
Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin YNT 1
324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity: YTM 19
2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
2 Elli Batch II (NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad Mk Naval Aviation
141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple FORCES BY ROLE
Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 76mm gun, (capacity 1 div with S-70B Seahawk; Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW;
2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) SA319 Alouette III
Europe 123
Europe
Tactical Air Force 1 sqn with EMB-135; Gulfstream V
FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT
1 sqn with A/TA-7E/H Corsair II TPT 30: Medium 27: 12 C-27J Spartan (being delivered;
2 sqn with F-4E Phantom II 8 AT and 4 AAR); 5 C-130B Hercules; 10 C-130H
4 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 Fighting Falcon
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
1 EOD/rvn regt
Hungary HUN 1 CBRN regt
1 sigs bn
Hungarian Forint f 2010 2011 2012
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
GDP f 27.1tr 28.3tr 1 spt bde
US$ 130bn 145bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 13,033 14,511 MBT 30 T-72
Growth % 1.20 1.80 RECCE 24 K90 CBRN Recce; PSZH-IV CBRN Recce
Inflation % 4.9 3.7 AIFV/APC (W) 380 BTR-80/BTR-80A
Def exp f 281bn ARTY 68
US$ 1.35bn TOWED 152mm 18 D-20
MOR 82mm 50
Def bdgt f 279bn 275bn
AT • MSL • MANPATS 130: 30 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot);
US$ 1.34bn 1.41bn
100 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
FMA (US) US$ 1.0m 1.0m PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 2
US$1=f 208.25 195.57 AEV BAT-2
Population 9,976,062 ARV BMP-1 VPV; T-54/T-55; VT-55A
VLB BLG-60; MTU; TMM
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 7.7% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 24.2% 6.2% Air Component 5,039
Female 7.2% 2.9% 3.1% 3.1% 25.4% 10.6% Flying hours 50 hrs/yr
FORCES BY ROLE
Capabilities COMMAND
Hungary’s armed forces have fared better than most in the 1 (comd and air surv) rgt
former Soviet bloc since the end of the Cold War, transi- FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
tioning from a conscript-based to a professional structure, 1 sqn with Gripen C/D
with a much smaller but better equipped and trained, order TRANSPORT
of battle. However, budgetary pressures may place some 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; (NATO Hy Airlift Wg with 3 C-
doubt on future procurement plans. Hungary’s defence 17A Globemaster based at Papa)
policy provides for deployed operations under NATO TRAINING
and EU. It has contributed troops to ISAF operations in 1 sqn with Yak-52
Afghanistan. The armed forces conduct regular training ATTACK HELICOPTER
exercises with bilateral and multinational partners. The 1 (cbt) bn with Mi-24 Hind
country is host to NATO’s C-17 airlift unit. TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 bn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
ACTIVE 22,587 (Army 9,911, Air 5,039 Joint 7,637) AIR DEFENCE
Paramilitary 12,000 1 regt (9 bty with Mistral; 3 bty with 2K12 Kub (SA-6
Gainful))
RESERVE 44,000 (Army 35,200 Air 8,800)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable
Organisations by Service FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D
Hungary’s armed forces have reorganised into a joint TPT • Light 5 An-26 Curl
force. TRG 9 Yak-52
Europe 125
HELICOPTERS Uganda
ATK 12 Mi-24 Hind EU • EUTM 4
MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H
Western Sahara
TPT • Medium 10 Mi-8 Hip
AD • SAM 61 UN • MINURSO 7 obs
SP 16 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
MANPAD 45 Mistral Iceland ISL
RADAR: 3 RAT-31DL, 6 P-18: 6 SZT-68U; 14 P-37
MSL Icelandic Krona K 2010 2011 2012
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer) GDP K 1.54tr 1.63tr
Europe
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo A); ARH AIM-120C US$ 12.3bn 14.1bn
AMRAAM per capita US$ 39,915 45,266
ASM 250: 20 AGM-65 Maverick; 150 3M11 Falanga (AT-2
Growth % −3.47 2.55
Swatter); 80 9K113 Shturm-V (AT-6 Spiral)
Inflation % 5.4 4.2
Paramilitary 12,000
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Sy Bdgta K
US$
Border Guards 12,000 (to reduce) US$1=K 124.86 115.70
Ministry of Interior a
Iceland has no armed forces. Budget is mainly for Coast Guard.
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Population 311,058
Other Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 (Budapest) paramilitary district (7 rapid reaction coy)
Male 10.3% 3.8% 3.8% 3.5% 22.9% 5.8%
11 (regt/district) paramilitary regt
Female 10.0% 3.7% 3.6% 3.5% 22.4% 6.9%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (W) 68 BTR-80
Capabilities
Deployment The country has no armed forces, though there is a Coast
Guard that operates ships, fixed-wing and rotary aircraft.
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: A NATO member, the country is reliant on other alliance
Constitution: Codified constitution (1949) members for air policing and air defence.
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By gov in case
of NATO/EU operations (Art. 40/C para 1). Otherwise, by ACTIVE NIL Paramilitary 130
parliament (Art. 19, para 3 point j)
Afghanistan Organisations by Service
NATO • ISAF 415; 1 lt inf coy
Paramilitary
ARMENIA/AZERbaijan
OSCE • Minsk Conference 1 Iceland Coast Guard 130
Bosnia-Herzegovina EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 171; 1 inf coy PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PSOH: 2
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 Aegir
PSO 1 Thor
Cyprus LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Baldur
UN • UNFICYP 77; 1 inf pl AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 DHC-8-300
HELICOPTERS
Democratic Republic of the Congo
MRH 1 AS365N Dauphin 2
EU • EUSEC RD Congo 2 TPT • Medium 2 AS332L1 Super Puma
Egypt
MFO 38; 1 MP unit Foreign Forces
Iraq NATO • Iceland Air Policing: Aircraft and personnel from
NATO • NTM-I 3 various NATO members on a rotating basis.
Lebanon
UN • UNIFIL 4
Serbia
NATO • KFOR 245; 1 inf coy (KTM)
OSCE • Serbia 2
OSCE • Kosovo 4
126 The Military Balance 2012
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Ireland IRL LT TK 14 Scorpion
RECCE 52: 15 Piranha IIIH; 18 AML-20; 19 AML-90
Euro € 2010 2011 2012
APC (W) 67: 65 Piranha III; 2 XA-180 Sisu
GDP € 156bn 157bn ARTY 495
US$ 207bn 221bn TOWED 24: 105mm 24 L-118 Light Gun
per capita US$ 44,700 47,220 MOR 495: 81mm 400; 120mm 95
Growth % −0.43 0.36 AT
MSL • MANPATS 57: 36 Javelin; 21 Milan
Inflation % −1.6 1.1
RCL 84mm 444 Carl Gustav
Def exp € 965m AD
US$ 1.28bn SAM • MANPAD 7 RBS-70
Def bdgt € 953m 933m GUNS • TOWED 40mm 32 L/70 each with 8 Flycatcher
US$ 1.26bn 1.31bn MW Aardvark Mk 2
US$1=€ 0.75 0.71 Reserves 14,500 reservists
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
package of cuts announced in August 2011. The armed
Afghanistan forces’ primary role is territorial defence and participation
NATO • ISAF 7 in NATO operations, with the ability for extended deploy-
ment as part of a multinational force. The belated arrival of
Bosnia-Herzegovina its air-to-air refuelling aircraft will help in this role, which
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 44 is also supported by the navy’s amphibious capability. Ital-
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 ian forces participate in ISAF, though a troop drawdown is
due to begin in the second quarter of 2012. The armed forc-
Côte D’Ivoire
es were also involved in Operation Unified Protector, both
UN • UNOCI 2 obs
in terms of deploying assets, and hosting foreign forces at
Democratic Republic of the Congo Italian military bases. They train to a high standard nation-
UN • MONUSCO 3 obs ally and with bilateral and multinational partners.
Europe
1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II MARITIME PATROL
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn (opcon Navy) with BR1150 Atlantic
5 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin; Bell 212 ASW (AB- TANKER/TRANSPORT
212AS); SH-3D Sea King; NH90 NFH 1 sqn with B-767MRTT; G-222/G-222VS (EW)
TRAINING COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
AD • SAM Deployment
TOWED Spada
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
MSL
Constitution: Codified constitution (1949)
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the govern-
120 AMRAAM
ment upon approval by the parliament
ARM AGM-88 HARM
LACM SCALP EG/Storm Shadow Afghanistan
BOMBS NATO • ISAF 4,213; 1 mech bde HQ; 3 mech inf regt; 1
Laser-guided/GPS: Enhanced Paveway II; Enhanced mne regt; some AIFV Dardo; some A-129 Mangusta; some
Paveway III CH-47; some Tornado; some C-130
Albania
Paramilitary 186,112
Delegazione Italiana Esperti (DIE) 18
Carabinieri 106,716 Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Carabinieri are organisationally under the MoD.
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 5
They are a separate service in the Italian Armed Forces
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
as well as a police force with judicial competence. OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 5
Egypt
Mobile and Specialised Branch MFO 75; 4 coastal patrol unit
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Gulf of Aden & SOMALI BASIN
1 spec ops gp (ROS) NATO • Operation Ocean Shield 1 DDGHM
MANOEUVRE India/Pakistan
Aviation
UN • UNMOGIP 4 obs
1 hel gp
Other Iraq
1 (mobile) paramilitary div NATO • NTM-I 67
(1 bde (1st) with (1 horsed cav regt, 11 mobile bn);
1 bde (2nd) with (1 (1st) AB regt, 1 (Special Inter- Lebanon
vention) GIS gp, 2 (7th & 13th) mobile regt)) UN • UNIFIL 1,686; 1 inf bde HQ; 1 armd recce bn; 1
1 (specialised) paramilitary div armd inf bn; 1 hel bn; 1 sigs coy; 1 CIMIC coy(-)
(1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Carabinieri HQ; 9 Malta
Carabinieri HQ (spt to Civil Ministries)) Air Force 25; 2 Bell 212 (AB-212)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE 18 Fiat 6616 Mediterranean sea
APC 37 NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO
APC (T) 25: 10 VCC-1 Camillino; 15 VCC-2 MIDDLE EASt
APC (W) 12 Puma UN • UNTSO 8 obs
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light: 1 P-180 Avanti
HELICOPTERS MOLDOVA
MRH 33 Bell 412 (AB-412) OSCE • Moldova 1
TPT • Light 40 AW109
Serbia
Customs 68,130 NATO • KFOR 583; 1 arty BG HQ; 1 engr unit; 1 hel unit;
(Servizio Navale Guardia Di Finanza) 1 sigs unit; 1 CSS unit; 1 Carabinieri regt
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 163: OSCE • Serbia 1
PCF 1 Antonio Zara OSCE • Kosovo 17
PBF 123: 24 Bigliani; 24 Corrubia; 9 Mazzei; 34 V-2000;
SUDAN
32 V-5000/V-6000
UN • UNAMID 1
PB 39: 23 Buratti; 16 Meatini
UGANDA
Coast Guard 11,266 EU • EUTM 15
(Guardia Costiera – Capitanerie Di Porto)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 134: Western Sahara
PCC 1 Saettia UN • MINURSO 5 obs
PBF 124
PB 9
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • TRG 1 (ex-US Bannock)
Foreign Forces
AIRCRAFT United States US European Command: 10,771
MP 4 ATR-42 MP Surveyor, 2 P-180 Army 3,088; 1 AB IBCT; some M119; some M198
TPT • Light 7 P-166-DL3 Navy 3,396; 1 HQ (US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR)) at
HELICOPTERS • MRH 9 Bell 412SP (AB-412SP Griffin) Naples; 1 HQ (6th Fleet) at Gaeta; 1 MP Sqn eq. with 9
Europe 131
Europe
US$ 23.7bn 26.9bn National Guard 579; 10,666 part-time (11,445 in
per capita US$ 10,695 12,212 total)
Growth % −0.34 3.96 FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % −1.2 4.2 MANOEUVRE
Def exp L 138m Light
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT Capabilities
1 sqn Like its Baltic neighbours Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania is a
AIR DEFENCE NATO member with small armed forces. The army is by far
1 AD bn the largest of the three, supported by smaller air and naval
1 radar sqn (radar/air ctrl) arms. Reform and re-equipment programmes intended to
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 5: 4 An-2 Colt; 1 L-410 provide deployable land forces drawn from a motorised
Turbolet infantry brigade are underway, but are being slowed by
HELICOPTERS funding constraints, which have also restricted training.
MRH 4 Mi-17 Hip H Discussions continue on the formation of the Lithuanian–
TPT • Light 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite Polish–Ukrainian trilateral army brigade, first proposed in
2009 and planned for 2013. The air force provides a light
Paramilitary transport capability while the naval focus is on mine coun-
termeasures. Lithuania contributes troops to ISAF.
State Border Guard
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ACTIVE 10,640 (Army 8,200 Navy 530 Air 980 Joint
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 Iraq
PCC 3 Standard Flex 300 (DNK Flyvefisken) with 1 76mm
NATO • NTM-I 2
gun
PB 1 Storm (NOR)
FOREIGN FORCES
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Light
1 lt inf bn Macedonia, Former Yugoslav
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Republic FYROM
APC (W) 48 Dingo II
ARTY • MOR 81mm 6 Macedonian Denar d 2010 2011 2012
AT • MSL• MANPATS 6 TOW GDP d 427bn 464bn
US$ 9.13bn 10.5bn
Air Force per capita US$ 4,407 5,048
None, but for legal purposes NATO’s E-3A AEW ac have
Growth % 1.80 3.05
LUX registration
Inflation % 1.5 4.4
FORCES BY ROLE
Def exp d 6.51bn
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with B-707 (trg); E-3A Sentry (NATO standard) US$ 139m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Def bdgt d 6.52bn 6.05bn
AIRCRAFT US$ 139m 137m
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
AEW&C 17 E-3A Sentry (NATO standard) FMA (US) US$ 4.0m 5.0m
TPT • PAX 3 B-707 (trg) US$1=d 46.78 44.22
Population 2,077,328
Paramilitary 612
Age 0–1 4 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Gendarmerie 612
Male 9.6% 3.7% 3.9% 4.0% 23.7% 5.0%
Female 8.9% 3.5% 3.7% 3.8% 23.7% 6.6%
Deployment
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: Capabilities
Constitution: Codified constitution (1868)
Specific legislation: ‘Loi du 27 juillet 1992 relatif à la Ambitious reform plans spelled out in its 2003 Defence
participation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg à des Concept and reiterated in its 2005 Defence White Paper
opérations pour le maintien de la paix (OMP) dans le cadre have so far only partly been realised, though the armed
d’organisations internationales’ forces have been re-organised. The services as of 2006
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By govern- moved from a conscript-based to a professional structure.
ment after formal consultation of relevant parliamentary The 2003 Defence Concept calls for armed forces to sup-
committees and the Council of State (Art. 1–2 of the 1992 port territorial integrity, regional stability, peace support
law) missions and deployed operations. The country contin-
ues to aspire to NATO membership, having joined the
Afghanistan
NATO Membership Action Plan in 1999. The impasse with
NATO • ISAF 11 Greece over the state’s name is one element that hinders
Bosnia-Herzegovina full NATO status. While it deploys forces to ISAF in Af-
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 1 ghanistan, the armed forces have a small air arm consisting
mainly of transport and armed support helicopters, but has
Democratic Republic of the Congo no organic fixed-wing airlift.
EU • EUSEC RD Congo 1
ACTIVE 8,000 (Joint 8,000)
Lebanon
UN • UNIFIL 3 RESERVE 4,850
Serbia
NATO • KFOR 22 Organisations by Service
Europe
FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMBAT SUPPORT APC BTR APC (W)/M-113A APC (T)
1 engr bn (1 active coy) HELICOPTERS 3
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
3 log bn
TPT • Light 2: 1 Bell 206B (AB-206B) JetRanger II; 1
Bell 212 (AB-212)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Reserves
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Deployment
Light Legal provisions for foreign deployment of armed
1 inf bde forces:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Constitution: Codified constitution (1991)
MBT 31: 31 T-72A Specific legislation: ‘Defence Law’ (2005)
RECCE 51: 10 BRDM-2; 41 M1114 HMMWV Decision on deployment of troops abroad: a) by the
AIFV 11: 10 BMP-2; 1 BMP-2K government is deployment is for humanitarian missions or
APC 201 military exercises; b) by the parliament if for peacekeeping
APC (T) 47: 9 Leonidas; 28 M113A; 10 MT-LB operations (‘Defence Law’, Art. 41)
APC (W) 154: 58 BTR-70; 12 BTR-80; 84 TM-170
Hermelin Afghanistan
ARTY 126 NATO • ISAF 163
TOWED 70: 105mm 14 M-56; 122mm 56 M-30 M-1938 Bosnia-Herzegovina
MRL 17: 122mm 6 BM-21; 128mm 11
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 12
MOR 39: 120mm 39
AT • MSL • MANPATS 12 Milan LEbanon
RCL 57mm; 82mm M60A UN • UNIFIL 1
AD
SAM 8 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) Serbia
MANPAD 5 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) OSCE • Kosovo 8
Guns 40mm 36 L20
Marine Wing
Malta MLT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 2 Maltese Lira ML 2010 2011 2012
Botica GDP ML 6.23bn 6.6bn
US$ 8.26bn 9.26bn
Air Wing
per capita US$ 20,299 22,676
Air Wg is directly under Joint Operational Cmd
Growth % 3.15 2.45
FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 2.0 2.6
TRANSPORT
1 (VIP) sqn with An-2 Colt Def exp ML 44m
TRAINING US$ 59m
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) Def bdgt ML 43m 43m 47m
1 sqn with Z-242 US$ 57m 60m
ATTACK HELICOPTER FMA (US) US$ 0.455m 0.6m
1 sqn with Mi-24K Hind G2; Mi-24V Hind E US$1=ML 0.75 0.71
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H Population 408,333
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIRCRAFT
Male 8.0% 3.3% 3.6% 3.7% 24.3% 6.9%
TPT • Light 1 An-2 Colt
TRG 3 Z-242 Female 7.6% 3.1% 3.4% 3.4% 23.9% 8.9%
136 The Military Balance 2012
Uganda
Capabilities EU • EUTM 7
The armed forces consist of a limited number of army per-
sonal supported by small naval and air units. There are FOREIGN FORCES
plans to procure another maritime surveillance aircraft.
Following Malta’s accession to the European Union in Italy 25; 2 Bell 212 (SAR) hel
2004, there was a renewed focus on the country’s armed
services to support its ability to participate in any EU-led Moldova MDA
peace-support or crisis-management deployment. Malta
deploys personnel to the headquarters of EUNAVFOR, and Moldovan Leu L 2010 2011 2012
also a ship-protection team; it also deploys personnel to EU GDP L 71.8bn 84.1bn
FRONTEX activities in Greece. US$ 5.7bn 7.05bn
ACTIVE 1,954 (Armed Forces 1,954) per capita US$ 1,529 1,908
Other Liberia
1 gd bn UN • UNMIL 2 obs
COMBAT SUPPORT
SERBIA
1 arty bn
1 engr bn OSCE • Serbia 1
1 NBC coy
1 sigs coy Foreign Forces
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Bulgaria OSCE 1
AIFV 44 BMD-1 Czech Republic OSCE 1
Europe
APC 164
Estonia OSCE 2
APC (T) 64: 9 BTR-D; 55 MT-LB
France OSCE 1
APC (W) 100: 11 BTR-80; 89 TAB-71
Italy OSCE 1
ARTY 148
TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 52: 21 Latvia OSCE 1
2A36; 31 D-20 Sweden OSCE 1
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 Anona Russia ε1,500 (including 355 peacekeepers) Military Air
MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan Forces 7 Mi-24 Hind/Mi-8 Hip
MOR 59: 82mm 52; 120mm 7 M-120 Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)
AT United Kingdom OSCE 1
MSL • MANPATS 120: 72 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 21 United States OSCE 3
9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 27 9K114 Shturm (AT-6
Spiral)
RCL 73mm 138 SPG-9 Montenegro MNE
GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12 Euro € 2010 2011 2012
AD • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11
GDP € 3.02bn 3.11bn
S-60
US$ 4.0bn 4.36bn
RADAR • LAND 4: 2 ARK-1; 2 SNAR-10
per capita US$ 6,006 6,591
Air Force 826 (incl 259 conscripts) Growth % 1.08 2.02
FORCES BY ROLE Inflation % 0.5 3.1
TRANSPORT Def exp € 56m
2 sqn with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler; Mi-8PS US$ 75m
Hip; Yak-18 Def bdgt € 40m 38m 44m
AIR DEFENCE US$ 53m 54m
1 regt with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa) FMA (US) US$ 1.2m 1.8m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$1=€ 0.75 0.71
AIRCRAFT
Population 661,807
TPT • Light 6: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler
1 Yak-18 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
HELICOPTERS
Male 7.6% 2.7% 3.7% 4.6% 25.9% 5.4%
MRH 4 Mi-17-1V Hip
Female 8.0% 2.9% 3.5% 3.8% 23.9% 8.1%
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8PS Hip
AD • SAM 12 S-125 Neva SA-3 (Goa)
Capabilities
Paramilitary 2,379 In the wake of its separation from Serbia in 2006, Montene-
Ministry of Interior gro shifted from a conscript to professional armed services.
Force and organisational changes are in train that will like-
OPON 900 (riot police) ly see a further reduction in numbers, mainly in the army.
Ministry of Interior The naval capability consists of two patrol boats, while the
air element is limited to a small number of fixed-wing and
Deployment rotary aircraft. Most of these, however, were as of late 2011
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: not in operational use, in part as a result of maintenance
Constitution: Codified constitution (1994) issues, or for modernisation. The country participates in
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the parlia- NATO’s Membership Action Plan, with the aim of becom-
ment (Art. 66) ing a member of the Alliance.
Côte D’Ivoire ACTIVE 2,984 (Army 2,356 Navy 402 Air Force 226)
UN • UNOCI 4 obs Paramilitary 10,100
138 The Military Balance 2012
Europe
Army 20,836 MW Bozena
FORCES BY ROLE MED 58 Boxer; 5 fd hospitals
COMMAND
elm 1 (GER/NLD) Corps HQ Navy 8,502 (incl Marines)
SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 SF coy (4 land; 1 maritime)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Air Force 8,030 In early 2011, the Dutch defence minister indicated that cy-
Flying hours 180 hrs/year ber defence would attract some of the Netherlands declin-
ing budget and, between 2011–15 around €30m plus staff
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK would be allocated, with full capability by 2016. A National
5 sqn (being reduced to 4 sqn) with F-16AM/BM Fight- Cyber Security Strategy was published in 2011.
ing Falcon
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE Deployment
1 sqn with Lynx SH-14D
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with Bell 412SP (AB-412SP Griffin) Constitution: Codified constitution (1815)
TANKER/TRANSPORT Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the
1 sqn with C-130H-30 Hercules; DC-10/KDC-10; Gulf- government (Art. 98)
stream IV
Afghanistan
TRAINING
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer NATO • ISAF 183
ATTACK HELICOPTER Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 76
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS532U2 Cougar II; 1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
AIR DEFENCE
Democratic Republic of the Congo
4 sqn (total: 7 AD Team. 4 AD bty with MIM-104 Patriot
(TMD capable)) EU • EUSEC RD Congo 3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Gulf of Aden & indian Ocean
AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable EU • Operation Atalanta 1 AORH
FTR 72 F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
TKR 2 KDC-10 Iraq
TPT 6: Medium 4 C-130H-30 Hercules; PAX 2: 1 DC-10; NATO • NTM-I 7
1 Gulfstream IV
TRG 13 PC-7 Turbo Trainer MIDDLE EAST
HELICOPTERS UN • UNTSO 12 obs
ATK 29 AH-64D Apache
ASW 5 Lynx SH-14D (to be replaced by NH-90) North Sea
MRH 7: 3 Bell 412 (AB-412SP Griffin); 4 SA316 Alouette III NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO
TPT 28: Heavy 11 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 8 AS532U2
SERBIA
Cougar II
AD • SAM NATO • KFOR 7
TOWED 20 MIM-104 Patriot (TMD Capable/PAC-3 msl) OSCE • Serbia 2
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger
SUDAN
MSL
AAM • IR AIM-9L/M/N ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM UN • UNAMID 1
ASM AGM-114K Hellfire; AGM-65D/G Maverick
BOMBS Foreign Forces
Conventional Mk 82; Mk 84
Laser-guided GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24 United Kingdom Air Force 120
Paveway III (all supported by LANTIRN) United States US European Command: 477
Europe 141
Organisations by Service
Norway NOR
Norwegian Kroner kr 2010 2011 2012 Army 4,500; 4,400 conscript (total 8,900)
GDP kr 2.50tr 2.65tr The mechanised brigade – Brigade North – trains new
US$ 413bn 476bn personnel of all categories, provides units for international
per capita US$ 88,249 101,425 operations, and is a low readiness brigade. At any time
around one-third of the brigade will be trained and ready
Growth % 0.35 1.68
to conduct operations. The brigade includes one high-
Inflation % 2.4 1.7 readiness mechanised battalion (Telemark Battalion) with
Europe
Def exp kr 35.9bn combat support and combat service support units on high
US$ 5.93bn readiness.
Def bdgt kr 34.9bn 35.8bn FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 5.77bn 6.43bn SPECIAL FORCES
US$1=kr 6.05 5.57 1 SF regt
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
MANOEUVRE
Population 4,691,849 Reconnaissance
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 (Border Guard) lt bn (3 coy (HQ/garrison, border
control & trg))
Male 9.2% 3.4% 3.3% 3.0% 23.7% 7.0%
Mechanised
Female 8.8% 3.3% 3.2% 2.9% 23.2% 9.0% 1 mech inf bde (1 ISTAR bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1
arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 CIS bn, 1 spt bn, 1 med
Capabilities bn)
Norway maintains small but capable armed forces that are Light
1 bn (His Majesty The King’s Guards)
well equipped for its primary missions, though the force
relies on conscripts. The military is focused largely on ter- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ritorial defence, particularly in the High North, which en- MBT 52 Leopard 2A4
sures that the armed forces possess skills in cold-weather RECCE Fuchs tpz 1 CBRN recce
AIFV 104 CV9030N
warfare. Recent acquisitions, including destroyers, demon-
APC 390
strate an investment in the kind of equipment necessary
APC (T) 315 M113 (incl variants)
to sustain Norway’s presence in the Arctic region. How-
APC (W) 75 XA-186 Sisu/XA-200 Sisu
ever, these have also added a new element to the country’s
ARTY 240
maritime capabilities. During the Cold War, Norway relied SP 155mm 54 M109A3GN
on small attack craft and submarines to pursue a policy MOR 186:
of sea denial; now, Norway is able to deploy further from SP 36: 81mm 24 M106A1; 12 M125A2
its coast with a more muscular surface platform. Norway 81mm 150 L-16
places importance on its alliances, particularly with Euro- AT
pean states and NATO. Given the small size of the armed MANPATS 90 Javelin
forces, Norway relies on conscription for current person- RCL 84mm 2,300 Carl Gustav
nel levels and reserves for crisis deployment. Conscripts RADAR • LAND 12 ARTHUR
comprise approximately one-third of the armed forces at AEV 22 Alvis
any one point, affecting the level of training and readiness. ARV 3 M88A1; M578; 6 Leopard 1
While the focus of organisational attention has been on VLB 26 Leguan; 9 Leopard 1
adjusting army structures and introducing new naval plat- MW 9 910 MCV-2
forms, the MOD has conducted a study that will inform
a new long-term defence plan, due to reach parliament in Navy 2,450; 1,450 conscripts (total 3,900)
early 2012. Joint Command – Norwegian National Joint Headquarters.
The Royal Norwegian Navy is organised into four elements
ACTIVE 24,450 (Army 8,900, Navy 3,900, Air 3,650, under the command of the chief of staff of the Navy; the
Central Support 7,500, Home Guard 500) naval units ‘Kysteskadren’, the schools ‘Sjoforsvarets Skoler’,
Terms of service: conscription with maximum 18 months of the naval bases and the coast guard ‘Kystvakten’.
duty. Conscripts initially serve 12 months at the age of 19 FORCES BY ROLE
to 21, and then up to 4–5 refresher training periods until SPECIAL FORCES
the age of 35, 44, 55 or 60 depending on rank and function. 1 SF sqn
Numbers above include conscripts during initial service. MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
RESERVE 45,250 (Army 270, Navy 320, Central 1 ISTAR coy (Coastal Rangers)
Support 350, Home Guard 44,250) COMBAT SUPPORT
Reserves: readiness varies from a few hours to several days 1 EOD pl
142 The Military Balance 2012
Europe
with the air force also operating its own tactical transport
Middle East aircraft. The navy is presently structured around a fleet of
UN • UNTSO 12 obs frigates and corvettes, with longer-term plans looking to
a multirole corvette. It is a member of NATO’s 11-nation
North Sea Multinational Corps Northeast, and its armed forces par-
NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC ticipate in bilateral and multilateral exercises.
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
TPT 55: Medium 17 PZL W-3 Sokol; Light 38: 14 PZL NATO • NTM-I 17
Mi-2 Hoplite; 24 SW-4 Puszczyk (trg)
Liberia
AD • SAM
SP 78; 51 S-125 Neva SC (SA-3 Goa); STATIC 6 S-200C UN • UNMIL 1 obs
Vega (SA-5 Gammon) Serbia
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Paramilitary 21,400
Portugal PRT
Euro € 2010 2011 2012
Border Guards 14,100 GDP € 173bn 171bn
Ministry of Interior and Administration
US$ 229bn 240bn
Maritime Border Guard per capita US$ 21,310 22,310
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19: 2 Growth % 1.33 -2.16
PCC; 6 PBF; 8 PB Inflation % 1.4 3.4
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2
Def bdgt € 2.27bn 2.02bn
Prevention Units of Police 6,300; 1,000 US$ 3.01bn 2.83bn
conscript (total 7,300) US$1=€ 0.75 0.71
OPP–Ministry of Interior
Population 10,760,305
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: Male 8.5% 3.0% 3.2% 3.5% 23.3% 7.4%
Constitution: Codified constitution (1997); Act on Prin- Female 7.8% 2.6% 2.8% 3.1% 24.3% 10.6%
ciples of Use or External Deployment of the Polish Armed
Forces (17/12/1998) Capabilities
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: a) By Portugal’s military is moderately equipped and bolstered
president on request of prime minister in cases of direct by a substantial force of well-trained reserves and the air
threat (Art. 136); force retains adequate strike capabilities, but the navy suf-
b) in general, specified by ratified international agreement fers from an ageing surface fleet (the sub-surface fleet has
or statute (both must be passed by parliament, Art. 117) seen a considerable improvement with two new Type 209
Afghanistan submarines commissioned since 2010).
NATO • ISAF 2,580; 1 mech inf bde (2 inf BG); 125 There is good joint training among the services and
Rosomak; 103 other IFV; 5 Mi-24 Hind; 4 Mi-17 Hip joint readiness is relatively high. However, there is only
UN • UNAMA 1 obs limited power projection, with six C-130H Hercules aircraft,
making sustainment of overseas deployments challenging
Armenia/Azerbaijan unless part of an alliance structure. The country’s difficult
OSCE • Minsk Conference 1 economic situation means that it will be hard for the gov-
146 The Military Balance 2012
Army 25,701 35
5 Territorial Comd (2 mil region, 1 mil district, 2 mil zone)
AD
FORCES BY ROLE SAM • MANPAD 58: 32 Chaparral; 26 FIM-92A Stinger
SPECIAL FORCES AEV M728
1 SF unit ARV 6 M88A1, 7 Pandur
MANOEUVRE VLB M48
Reconnaissance
1 ISTAR bn Navy 9,715 (incl 1,563 Marines)
Mechanised EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 mech bde (1 cav tp, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn. SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Tridente (GER Type
1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn) 209) with 8 533mm TT
1 (intervention) bde (1 cav tp, 1 recce regt, 2 mech inf PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES •
bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt FFGHM 5
bn) 3 Vasco Da Gama with 2 Mk141 quad lnchr with RGM-
Air Manoeuvre 84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-
7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk36 triple 324mm ASTT
1 (rapid reaction) bde (1 cav tp, 1 cdo bn, 2 para bn, 1
with Mk46 LWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Lynx Mk95
arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)
(Super Lynx) hel)
Other
2 Bartolomeu Dias (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad
1 (Madeira) inf gp (2 inf bn, 1 AD bty)
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 Mk48
1 (Azores) inf gp (1 inf bn, 1 AD bty) VLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk32 twin
COMBAT SUPPORT 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity:
1 STA bty 1 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel)
1 AD bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24
1 engr bn CORVETTES • FS 7
1 EOD unit 3 Baptista de Andrade with 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing
1 ptn br coy platform
1 EW coy 4 Joao Coutinho with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
2 MP coy platform
1 CBRN coy PSO 2 Viana do Castelo with 1 hel landing platform (2
1 psyops unit additional vessels in build)
1 CIMIC coy (joint) PCC 3 Cacine
1 sigs bn PBR 12: 2 Albatroz; 5 Argos; 4 Centauro; 1 Rio Minho
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Bombarda
1 construction coy LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10:
AORL 1 Bérrio (ex UK Rover) with 1 hel landing platform
1 maint coy
(for medium hel)
1 log coy
AGS 4: 2 D Carlos I (US Stalwart); 2 Andromeda
1 tpt coy
ABU 2
1 med unit AXL 1
AXS 2
Reserves 210,000
FORCES BY ROLE Marines 1,563
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Light SPECIAL FORCES
3 (territorial) def bde (on mobilisation) 1 SF det
Europe 147
Europe
NATO • ISAF 229
HELICOPTERS • ASW 5 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx)
UN • UNAMA 1 obs
Air Force 7,218 Bosnia-Herzegovina
Flying hours 180 hrs/year on F-16 Fighting Falcon EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 18
FORCES BY ROLE OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Democratic Republic of the Congo
2 sqn with F-16 MLU Fighting Falcon
EU • EUSEC RD Congo 3
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with P-3P/C Orion Gulf of Aden & Somali Basin
ISR/TRANSPORT NATO • Operation Ocean Shield 1 FFGHM
1 sqn with C-295M
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE LEBANON
1 sqn with with AW101 Merlin UN • UNIFIL 150; 1 engr coy
TRANSPORT
Serbia
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules
NATO • KFOR 160; 1 inf coy (KTM)
1 sqn with Falcon 50
1 (liaison) sqn with FTB-337 OSCE • Kosovo 2
TRAINING Timor Leste
1 sqn with Alpha Jet* UN • UNMIT 3 obs
1 sqn with SA316 Alouette III
1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon Uganda
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EU • EUTM 17
AIRCRAFT 43 combat capable
FTR 30: 27 F-16A MLU Fighting Falcon; 3 F-16B MLU Foreign Forces
Fighting Falcon
United States US European Command: 731; 1 spt facility
ASW 6: 5 P-3C Orion, 1P-3P Orion (due to be withdrawn
at Lajes
end 2011)
ISR: 7: 5 C-295M (maritime surveillance), 2 C-295M
(photo recce) Romania ROM
TPT 14: Medium 6 C-130H Hercules (tpt/SAR); Light 5
New Lei 2010 2011 2012
C-295M; PAX 3 Falcon 50 (tpt/VIP)
TRG 23: 7 Alpha Jet*, 16 TB-30 Epsilon GDP lei 514bn 543bn
HELICOPTERS US$ 161bn 180bn
MRH 12 SA316 Alouette III (trg, utl) per capita US$ 7,336 8,231
TPT • Medium 12 AW101 Merlin (6 SAR, 4 CSAR, 2 Growth % −1.27 1.49
fishery protection) Inflation % 6.1 6.4
MSL
Def exp lei 7.86bn
AAM • IR AIM-9L/I Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120
US$ 2.46bn
AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65A Maverick Def bdgt lei 8.22bn 8.05bn 8.34bn
AShM AGM-84A Harpoon US$ 2.58bn 2.67bn
BOMBS FMA (US) US$ 13.0m 16.5m
Enhanced Paveway II, GBU-49, GBU-31 JDAM US$1=lei 3.19 3.01
Population 21,904,551
Paramilitary 47,700
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
National Republican Guard 26,100
Male 7.6% 2.8% 3.8% 3.8% 24.7% 6.0%
APC (W): some Commando Mk III (Bravia)
HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 SA315 Lama Female 7.2% 2.7% 3.6% 3.6% 25.3% 8.8%
148 The Military Balance 2012
AT
Capabilities MSL • SP 138: 12 9P122 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 78
NATO membership is at the heart of Romania’s defence 9P133 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 48 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5
posture, and the country has moved from a conscript to a Spandrel). All on BRDM-2
professional military as it attempts to restructure its armed GUNS 100mm 231: 208 M1977 Gun 77; 23 SU-100 SP
forces to perform NATO and EU missions. Since 2008 AD • GUNS 78
however, modernisation efforts have increasingly been SP 35mm 36 Gepard
hampered by funding difficulties. The army has been re- TOWED 42: 35mm 24 GDF-203; 37mm 18
structured to support deployed operations, with Romanian RADARS • LAND 8 SNAR-10 Big Fred
contingents joining in NATO, EU and UN missions. An
ageing fighter fleet undermines air force combat capability, Navy 6,900
with the replacement programme constrained by budget EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
shortfalls. There are a small number of tactical airlifters PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 3
and Romania is a member of NATO’s C-17 unit. Romania’s DESTROYERS 3:
armed forces exercise regularly on a national and a multi- DDGH 1 Marasesti with 4 twin lnchr with P-15M
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
TRANSPORT Iraq
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan NATO • NTM-I 2
1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules
TRAINING Liberia
1 sqn with An-2 Colt UN • UNMIL 2 obs
1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim*
Serbia
1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B)
1 sqn with Yak-52 (Iak-52) NATO • KFOR 58
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER OSCE • Kosovo 1
2 (multirole) sqn with IAR-330 SOCAT Puma UN • UNMIK 1 obs
Europe
3 sqn with SA330 Puma (IAR-330)
AIR DEFENCE south Sudan
1 AD bde UN • UNMISS 2 obs
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 engr regt Serbia SER
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 70 combat capable Serbian Dinar d 2010 2011 2012
FGA 49: 29 MiG-21 Lancer A/B; 20 MiG-21 Lancer C GDP d 2.99tr 3.36tr
ISR 2 An-30 Clank US$ 38.2bn 46.0bn
TPT 21: Medium 7: 3 C-27J Spartan (4 more on order); per capita US$ 5,204 6,292
3 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules; Light 13: 9 An-2
Growth % 0.95 2.01
Colt; 4 An-26 Curl
TRG 33: 10 IAR-99 Soim*; 11 IAR-99C Soim*; 12 Yak-52 Inflation % 6.2 11.3
(Iak-52) Def exp d 65.9bn
HELICOPTERS US$ 844m
MRH 29: 23 IAR-330 SOCAT Puma; 6 SA316B Alouette III Def bdgt d 70.7bn 71.2bn 73.9bn
(IAR-316B) US$ 905m 975m
TPT • Medium 35 SA330 Puma (IAR-330)
FMA (US) US$ 1.0m 2.5m
AD • SAM 6 S-75M3 Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); 8 HAWK
PIP III US$1=d 78.14 73.03
MSL Population 7,310,555
AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; Python 3
ASM Spike-ER Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 7.8% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5% 24.5% 6.7%
Paramilitary 79,900 Female 7.3% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 24.9% 9.7%
Europe
Deployment Kosovo Security Force 2,500; reserves 800
The Kosovo Security Force was formed in January 2009 as
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
a non-military organisation with responsibility for crisis
Constitution: Codified constitution (2006)
response, civil protection and explosive ordnance disposal.
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By parliament
The force is armed with small arms and light vehicles only.
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Poland 295; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs • OSCE (Kosovo) 4 Organisations by Service
Portugal 160; 1 inf coy (KTM) • OSCE (Kosovo) 2
Romania 58 • UNMIK 1 obs • OSCE (Kosovo) 1 Army 6,230
Russia OSCE (Kosovo) 1 FORCES BY ROLE
Slovakia OSCE (Kosovo) 1 MANOEUVRE
Slovenia 318; 1 mot inf coy; 1 CBRN coy Reconnaissance
Spain OSCE (Kosovo) 4 • UNMIK 1 obs 1 (5th Special) recce regt
Sweden 66 • OSCE (Kosovo) 3 Mechanised
1 (1st) mech bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log spt bn)
Switzerland 220; 1 inf coy; elm 1 MP coy; elm 1 hel gp
1 (2nd) mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 mixed SP
Turkey 357; 1 inf coy; elm 1 MP coy • OSCE (Kosovo) 9 arty bn, 1 ISTAR coy, 1 engr coy, 1 log spt bn)
Ukraine 136; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 2 obs • OSCE (Kosovo) 1 COMBAT SUPPORT
United Kingdom 1 • OSCE (Kosovo) 9 1 MRL bn
United States 783; 1 ARNG cbt spt bde • OSCE (Kosovo) 1 engr bn
18 1 MP bn
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
SP S-300 (SA-10B Grumble); 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) operations. Its continuing participation in ISAF, however,
MSL became a domestic political issue during the course of
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); 2011. The air force lacks any fighter aircraft, with air polic-
ing supplied by the Italian air force. Aspirations to procure
SARH R-27R (AA-10A Alamo)
aircraft to fulfil this role nationally are likely to remain that
ASM S5K/S5KO (57mm rockets); S8KP/S8KOM (80mm
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
FORCES BY ROLE TOWED 304: 105mm 226: 56 L118 light gun; 170 Model
Infantry regiments usually comprise 2 bn. Spain deploys 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 78: 44 M114; 34 SBT 155/52
its main battle tanks within its armd/mech inf formations, SIAC (30 more on order)
and its armd cav regt COASTAL 155mm 19 SBT 155/52 APU SBT V07
COMMAND
MRL 140mm 14 Teruel
1 corps HQ (CGTAD) (1 int regt, 1 MP bn)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH- 1 sqn with Hughes 500MD
60B Seahawk ASW hel) 1 flt with TAV-8B Harrier
AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 1 sqn with Bell 212 (HU-18)
LHD 1 Juan Carlos I (capacity 4 LCM; 42 APC; 46 MBT; 1 sqn with SH-3D Sea King
700 troops; able to operate as alternate platform for EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
CVS aviation group) AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable
LPD 2 Galicia (capacity 6 Bell-212 or 4 SH-3D Sea King; FGA 17: 4 AV-8B Harrier II; 12 AV-8B Harrier II Plus; 1
4 LCM or 6 LCVP; 130 APC or 33 MBT; 450 troops) TAV-8B Harrier (on lease from USMC)
LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Pizarro (2nd of class in ASW 7 P-3 Orion
reserve) TPT • Light 4: 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 650
LANDING CRAFT • LCM 14 Citation VII
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 HELICOPTERS
AORH 2: 1 Patino; 1 Cantabria ASW 20: 8 SH-3D Sea King (transport); 12 SH-60B
AO 1 Marques de la Ensenada Seahawk
MRH 9 Hughes 500MD
Navy – Maritime Action Force AEW 3 SH-3H AEW Sea King
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 TPT • Light 8 Bell 212 (HU-18)
PSO 8: MSL
3 Alboran each with 1 hel landing platform AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120
1 Chilreu AMRAAM
4 Descubierta ASM AGM-65G Maverick
PSOH 3 Meteoro (Buquesde Accion Maritime – 6 AShM AGM-119 Penguin
additional vessels on order, of which 4 are PSOH, 1 ASR
and 1 AGS) Marines 5,300
PCO 4 Serviola FORCES BY ROLE
PCC 4 Anaga MANOEUVRE
PB 2 Toralla Amphibious
PBR 3 1 mne bde (1 spec ops unit, 1 recce unit, 1 mech inf
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)
MCCS 1 Diana 5 mne garrison gp
MHO 6 Segura EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 29: MBT 16 M60A3TTS
AGOR 2 (with ice-strengthened hull, for polar research APC (W) 22 Piranha
duties in Antarctica) AAV 18: 16 AAV-7A1/AAVP-7A1; 2 AAVC-7A1
AGHS 4 ARTY 18
AGI 1 SP 155mm 6 M-109A2
ATF 3 TOWED 105mm 12 M-56 (pack)
AK 3 AT • MSL • MANPATS 24 TOW-2
YDT 1 RL 90mm C-90C
AXL 8 AD • SAM • MANPAD 12 Mistral
AXS 7 ARV 1 AAVR-7A1
Europe 157
Europe
2 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CE); Mirage F-1E (F-1EE); ARM AGM-88A HARM
Mirage F-1EDA ASM AGM-65A/G Maverick
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AShM AGM-84C/D Harpoon
5 sqn with F/A-18A/B MLU Hornet (EF-18A/B MLU) LACM Taurus KEPD 350
MARITIME PATROL BOMBS
1 sqn with CN-235 Conventional: Mk 82; Mk 83; Mk 84; BLU-109; BPG-
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
1 sqn with P-3A/B Orion 2000; BR-250; BR-500; BME-330B/AP; CBU-100 (anti-
ELECTRONIC WARFARE tank)
3 sqn with B-707; C- 212 Aviocar; Falcon 20 Laser-guided: GBU-10/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway
SEARCH & RESCUE III; EGBU-16 Paveway II
1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma (HU-21); C-212 Aviocar
1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma (HU-21); F-27 Friendship Emergencies Military Unit (UME)
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; SA330 Puma (AS330) FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with CN-235 (maritime surv/SAR) COMMAND
TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 div HQ
1 sqn with B-707 tkr MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with KC-130H Hercules Aviation
TRANSPORT 1 gp with firefighting planes belonging to the Air
1 sqn with A310; Falcon 900 Force; 1 emergency hel bn belonging to Army
1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma (HU-21); Beech C90 King Aviation (FAMET)
Air (VIP) Other
1 sqn with B-707 5 Emergency Intervention bn
1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar Paramilitary 80,210
1 (spt) sqn with C-212 Aviocar; Canadair CL-215; Cessna
550 Citation V (ISR)
Guardia Civil 79,950
9 regions, 56 Rural Comds
2 sqn with C-295
TRAINING FORCES BY ROLE
1 OCU unit with Eurofighter Typhoon SPECIAL FORCES
1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B (EF-18A/B MLU) Hornet 10 (rural) gp
1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza MANOEUVRE
2 sqn with C-101 Aviojet Other
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar 17 (Tercios) paramilitary regt
1 sqn with T-35 Pillan (E-26) 6 (traffic) sy gp
2 (LIFT) sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter 1 (Special) sy bn
2 hel sqn with EC120 Colibri; S-76C EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE APC (W) 18 BLR
AIRCRAFT 185 combat capable HELICOPTERS
FTR 59: 39 Eurofighter Typhoon; 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter MRH 26 Bo-105ATH
FGA 119: 86 F/A-18A/B Hornet (EF-18A/B – 67 being TPT • Light 12: 8 BK-117; 4 EC-135P2
given MLU); 33 Mirage F-1C (F-1CE)/F-1E (F-1EE)
Guardia Civil Del Mar 760
ASW 7: 2 P-3A Orion; 3 P-3B Orion; 2 P-3M Orion
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53
MP 6 CN-235 MPA
PCC 15
TKR 7: 5 KC-130H Hercules, 2 B-707 Tkr
PCI 1
TPT 97: Medium 7 C-130H/H-30 Hercules; Light 77: 4
PBF 22
Beech C90 King Air; 22 Beech F33C Bonanza; 18 C-212
PB 15
Aviocar; 13 C-295; 14 CN-235 (12 tpt, 2 VIP); 3 Cessna
550 Citation V (recce); 3 F-27 Friendship (SAR); PAX 13:
2 A310; 4 B-707 (incl EW); 2 Falcon 20 (EW, NAVAID); 5 Deployment
Falcon 900 (VIP) Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
TRG 108: 71 C-101 Aviojet; 37 T-35 Pillan (E-26) Constitution: Codified constitution (1978)
158 The Military Balance 2012
EU • EUSEC RD Congo 1
pendently. The air force has only one tanker to support its
UN • MONUSCO 2 obs
aircraft when on operations.
Gulf of Aden & Indian Ocean Swedish forces are well trained and professional, with
EU • Operation Atalanta 1 PSO; 1 LPD; 1 P-3A compulsory military service having been formally abol-
ished in July 2010. A reform process since the 1990s has
LEBANON
attempted to transform the armed forces into a more agile
UN • UNIFIL 1,069; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 armd inf bn force, but they would only likely be able to fully mobilise
Mediterranean SEA and deploy 2,000–3,000 troops within ten days. Budget cuts
NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO are gradually affecting Sweden’s procurement programme,
with upgrades for the country’s capable JAS39 Gripen air-
Serbia craft likely to be reduced significantly. Nevertheless, Swe-
OSCE • Serbia 1 den’s armed forces will likely continue to fulfil one of their
OSCE • Kosovo 4 main goals of contributing small units and support to mul-
UN • UNMIK 1 obs tinational coalitions.
UGANDA ACTIVE 20,363 (Army 6,718 Navy 2,796 Air 3,069
EU • EUTM 38 Staff 7,780) Paramilitary 800 Voluntary Auxiliary
Organisations 30,000
Foreign Forces Terms of service: conscription abolished 2010
United States US European Command: 1,483 1 air base at RESERVE 200,000
Morón; 1 naval base at Rota
Organisations by Service
Sweden SWE
Swedish Krona Skr 2010 2011 2012 Army 6,718
The army has been transformed to provide brigade-
GDP Skr 3.31tr 3.56tr
sized task forces depending on the operational
US$ 459bn 553bn
requirement.
per capita US$ 50,540 60,846
FORCES BY ROLE
Growth % 5.69 4.39
COMMAND
Inflation % 1.9 3.0 1 div HQ (on mobilisation)
Def exp Skr 40.4bn 2 bde HQ
US$ 5.6bn MANOEUVRE
Def bdgta Skr 40.6bn 40.0bn 40.4bn Armoured
US$ 5.63bn 6.21bn 2 armd bn
US$1=Skr 7.21 6.44 Mechanised
a
Excluding Civil Defence 8 mech bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Population 9,088,728 2 arty bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2 AD bn
2 engr bn
Male 8.0% 3.3% 3.6% 3.1% 22.8% 8.8%
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Female 7.5% 3.2% 3.4% 3.0% 22.5% 10.9% 3 log bn
Europe 159
Europe
APC 489
APC (T) 286: 214 Pbv 302; 72 Pbv 401A Amphibious 728
APC (W) 203: 34 XA-180 Sisu; 20 XA-202 Sisu; 149 XA- FORCES BY ROLE
203 Sisu MANOEUVRE
ARTY 280 Amphibious
SP 155mm 24 Archer (being delivered) 1 amph bn
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Population 7,639,961
Air Arm
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 DHC-8Q-300 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 7.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.1% 24.7% 7.1%
Deployment Female 7.3% 2.9% 3.0% 3.2% 24.5% 9.8%
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Constitution: Constitution consists of four fundamental
Capabilities
laws; the most important is ‘The Instrument of The Swiss armed forces are almost entirely reliant on
Government’ (1974) conscripts for their active personnel and reserves for full
mobilisation, with professional, volunteer personnel com-
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the
prising just 5% of the total armed forces. With conscripts
government upon parliamentary approval (Ch. 10, Art. 9)
and reserves serving for short periods of time (the average
AFGHANISTAN service time per conscript in 2010 was 260 days), the armed
forces’ lack adaptability and readiness. The only rapid-
NATO • ISAF 614
reaction force is a small (fewer than 100 personnel) Army
UN • UNAMA 1 obs Reconnaissance Detachment. The armed forces’ equipment
Bosnia-Herzegovina is largely aimed at protecting Switzerland’s territorial sov-
ereignty, with limited power-projection capabilities (only
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 1
light transport aircraft and no tankers). However, Switzer-
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 land is neutral, so the armed forces are more than sufficient
to fulfil its roles of territorial defence in a benign environ-
Democratic Republic of the Congo
ment, and international peace-support operations.
UN • MONUSCO 6 obs The size of Switzerland’s armed forces is likely to be
India/Pakistan severely reduced in forthcoming years. Current plans sug-
gest a reduction to 100,000 personnel (still largely conscript
UN • UNMOGIP 6 obs
and reserves), despite an increasing defence budget in the
Korea, republic of near term. These extra funds will likely go towards equip-
ment replacement, in particular new fighter aircraft to re-
NNSC • 5 obs
place F-5s.
Middle East
ACTIVE 25,287 (Joint 25,287)
UN • UNTSO 6 obs
RESERVE 172,330 (Army 123,720, Air 22,503,
Moldova Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 9,103, Command
OSCE • Moldova 1 Support Organisation 17,004)
Serbia Civil Defence 76,000
NATO • KFOR 66 Terms of service 18 weeks compulsory recruit trg at age
OSCE • Serbia 3 19–20 (19,000 (2006)), followed by 7 refresher trg courses
OSCE • Kosovo 3 (3 weeks each) over a 10-year period between ages 20–30.
(189,000 continuation trg (2006))
south Sudan
UN • UNMISS 3; 2 obs Organisations by Service
Uganda Joint 3,587 active; 21,700 conscript (197,511 on
EU • EUTM 7 mobilisation)
Europe 161
Europe
arty bn, 2 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) ISR UAV
1 (11th) bde (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 1 bn with ADS 95 Ranger
inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light AIRCRAFT 87 combat capable
1 (2nd) bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 engr FTR 54: 42 F-5E Tiger II; 12 F-5F Tiger II
bn, 1 sigs bn) FGA 33: 26 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
1 (5th) bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 engr TPT 22: Light 21: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech1900D;
bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 Cessna 560XL Citation; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 15 PC-6
1 (7th) reserve bde (3 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 2 mtn inf bn, Turbo-Porter; 1 PC-6 (owned by armasuisse, civil
1 sigs bn) registration); 1 PC-12 (owned by armasuisse, civil
Mountain registration); PAX 1 Falcon 50
1 (9th) bde (5 mtn inf bn, 1 SP Arty bn, 1 sigs bn) TRG 47: 30 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 11 PC-9; 6 PC-21
1 (12th) bde (2 inf bn, 3 mtn inf bn, 1 (fortress) arty bn, HELICOPTERS
1 sigs bn) TPT 47: Medium 27: 15 AS332 Super Puma; 12 AS532
1 (10th) reserve bde (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn, 3 inf bn, 2
Cougar; Light 20 EC635
mtn inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 2 sigs bn)
UAV • ISR • Medium 4 ADS 95 Ranger systems
Other
MSL • AAM • IR AIM-9P/9X Sidewinder; ARH AIM-
1 sy bde
120B AMRAAM
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 armd/arty trg unit Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)
1 inf trg unit GBAD assets can be used to form AD clusters to be
1 engr rescue trg unit deployed independently as task forces within Swiss
1 log trg unit territory.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 344 Leopard 2 (Pz-87 Leo)
AD
RECCE 458: 446 Eagle II; 12 Piranha IIIC CBRN
SAM
AIFV 154 CV9030
TOWED Rapier
APC • APC (W) 346 Piranha II
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger
AIFV/APC look-a-likes 581: M113/Piranha I/II(8×8)/
GUNS 35mm
IIIC(8×8)/CV 9030 CP
RADARS • AD RADARS Skyguard
ARTY 497
SP 155mm 200 M109 Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 9,103
MOR SP 81mm 297 M113 with M72/91
on mobilisation
AT
MSL • SP 110 TOW-2 SP Piranha I 6×6 FORCES BY ROLE
AD • SAM • MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 10 1 log bde
Aquarius
Command Support Organisation 17,004 on
AEV 12 Kodjak
ARV 25 Büffel
mobilisation
VLB 14 Brueckenlegepanzer 68/88 FORCES BY ROLE
MW 46: 26 Area Clearing System; 20 M113 A2 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 spt bde
Air Force 22,503 (incl air defence units and
military airfield guard units) Civil Defence 80,000
Flying hours 200–250 hrs/year (not part of armed forces)
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER Deployment
3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet Constitution: Codified constitution (1999)
162 The Military Balance 2012
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: mobile force able to fight across the spectrum of conflict.
Peace promotion (66, 66a, 66b Swiss Mil Law): UN.OSCE The air force is well equipped and trained, and is intro-
mandate. Decision by govt; if over 100 tps deployed or ducing airborne early warning aircraft. It already operates
op over 3 weeks Fed Assembly must agree first, except in tanker aircraft and will bolster its transport fleet with the
emergency. A400M airlifter. Rotary-wing procurement projects will
Support service abroad (69, 60 Swiss Mil Law): Decision benefit the army’s air arm with new light attack and trans-
by govt; if over 2,000 tps or op over 3 weeks Fed Assembly port helicopters in the pipeline. The navy is the smallest of
must agree in next official session the three services, and operates a mix of frigates, corvettes,
Bosnia-Herzegovina fast attack craft and amphibious vessels. Turkish forces are
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 20 deployed to ISAF, and Ankara sent ships to take part in
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 Operation Unified Protector in 2011. Single and inter-service
training is carried out regularly, as is mobilisation training,
BURUNDI and the armed forces participate in multinational exercises
UN • BNUB 1 mil advisor with NATO partners. They also exercised with China for
Democratic Republic of the Congo the first time in 2010, when PLAAF aircraft visited Turkey.
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Europe
M107; 203mm 219 M110A2 2 Barbaros (mod GER MEKO 200 F246 & F247) with 2
TOWED 760+: 105mm 75+ M101A1; 155mm 523: 517 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 8
M114A1/M114A2; 6 Panter; 203mm 162 M115 cell Mk 41 VLS with Aspide SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm
MRL 146+: 107mm 48; 122mm ε36 T-122; 227mm 12 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity: 1 Bell
MLRS (incl ATACMS); 302mm 50+ TR-300 Kasirga (WS-1) 212 (AB-212) hel)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
1 Osman Gazi (capacity 4 LCVP; 17 tanks; 980 troops) SEARCH & RESCUE
(with 1 hel landing platform) 1 sqn with AS532 Cougar
2 Sarucabey (capacity 11 tanks; 600 troops) (with 1 hel TANKER
landing platform) 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
LANDING CRAFT 45: 29 LCT; 16 LCM TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 61: 1 sqn with C-130B/E Hercules
AORH 2 1 sqn with C-160 Transall
AORL 1 1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 560 Citation (UC-35); CN-235
AOT 2 2 sqn with CN-235; Gulfstream III (C-20)
AOL 1 10 (liaison) flt with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); CN-235
AO 1 (harbour) TRAINING
AGS 3 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II; F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
AKL 1 1 sqn with F-5A/B Freedom Fighter
ARS 1 1 OCU sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
ASR 1
1 sqn with SF-260D
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Paramilitary 450: 81mm 175; 107mm 148 M-30; 120mm 127 HY-12; (AT
MSL) 114: 66 Milan; 48 TOW; (RCL) 106mm 192 M40A1;
Gendarmerie/National Guard 100,000; 90mm M67; (AD towed) 20mm Rh 202; 35mm GDF 16
50,000 reservists (total 150,000) GDF-003; 40mm 48 M1; 3 U-17 ac; 1 AS532UL Cougar; 3
Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence in war UH-1H Iroquois hel; 1 PB
FORCES BY ROLE IRAQ
SPECIAL FORCES
NATO • NTM-I 2
1 cdo bde
MANOEUVRE LEBANON
Europe
Other UN • UNIFIL 357; 1 engr coy; 1 PB
1 (border) paramilitary div
Mediterranean sea
2 paramilitary bde
NATO • Operation Active Endeavour 1 FFGHM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO; 1 TRG
RECCE Akrep
APC (W) 560: 535 BTR-60/BTR-80; 25 Condor Serbia
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
hours. The air force inventory is based on aircraft inher- ARTY 3,351
ited from the Soviet Union. Funding restrictions have SP 1,226: 122mm 600 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 527: 40 2S19
constrained naval ambitions, though the programme to re- Farm; 463 2S3; 24 2S5; 203mm 99 2S7
equip the fleet with a new class of corvette is proceeding TOWED 1,065: 122mm 371: 369 D-30; 2 (M-30) M-1938;
slowly. The armed forces take part in national and multi- 152mm 694: 287 2A36; 185 2A65; 215 D-20; 7 ML-70
national exercises , including with the US, Poland, Belarus, GUN/MOR 120mm 69:
Russia and Germany, while also providing personnel for SP 67 2S9 Anona
UN peacekeeping operations. TOWED 2 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 554: 122mm 335: 20 9P138; 315 BM-21; 132mm
ACTIVE 129,925 (Army 70,753 Navy 13,932 Air 2 BM-13; 220mm 137 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 80 9A52
45,240) Paramilitary 84,900 Smerch
Terms of Service Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. MOR 120mm 437: 318 2S12; 119 PM-38
Currently contract servicemen comprise about 50% of the AT • MSL • MANPATS AT-4 9K111 Spigot/AT-5 9K113
Ukrainian armed forces. Spandrel/AT-6 9K114 Spiral
GUNS 100mm ε500 MT-12/T-12
RESERVE 1,000,000 (Joint 1,000,000)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
HELICOPTERS
mil service within 5 years ATK 139 Mi-24 Hind
TPT • Medium 38 Mi-8 Hip
Organisations by Service AD • SAM • SP 435: 60 9K37 Buk-1 (SA-11 Gadfly); ε150
9K35 Strela-10(SA-13 Gopher); 100 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef);
125 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator)
Ground Forces (Army) 70,753 GUNS 470:
Transformation due to be completed by 2015. SP 30mm 70 2S6
FORCES BY ROLE: TOWED 57mm ε400 S-60
COMMAND RADAR • LAND Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big
3 corps HQ Fred (arty)
SPECIAL FORCES MSL • SSM 212: 50 FROG; 90 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); 72
2 SF regt Scud-B
MANOEUVRE AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB
Armoured ARV BREM-2; BREM-64; T-54/T-55
2 tk bde VLB MTU-20
Mechanised
8 mech bde Navy 11,932; 2,000 conscript (total 13,932 incl
1 mech regt Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry)
Air Manoeuvre After intergovernmental agreement in 1997, the Russian
1 AB bde Federation Fleet currently leases bases in Sevastopol and
2 air mob bde Karantinnaya Bays and also shares facilities jointly with
1 air mob regt Ukr warships at Streletskaya Bay. The overall serviceability
Aviation of the fleet is assessed as low.
2 avn regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMBAT SUPPORT SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 1 Foxtrot (T-641)†
3 arty bde PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1
3 arty regt FFHM 1 Hetman Sagaidachny (RUS Krivak III) with 1 twin
1 SSM bde lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm
3 AD regt ASTT with T-53 HWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27
4 engr regt Helix ASW hel)
1 EW regt PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
1 CBRN regt CORVETTES • FSM 3 Grisha (II/V) with 1 twin lnchr
4 sigs regt with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT
with SAET-60 HWT, 1 to 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 76mm
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE gun
MBT 2,988: 10 T-84 Oplot (development complete); 167 PCFGM 2 Tarantul II (FSU Molnya) with 2 twin lnchr
T-80; 1,032 T-72; 1,667 T-64; 112 T-55 with P-15 Termit-R (SS-N-2D Styx) AShM; 1 quad lnchr
RECCE 600+ BRDM-2 (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail); 1
AIFV 3,028: 60 BMD-1, 78 BMD-2; 994 BMP-1; 1,434 BMP- 76mm gun
2; 4 BMP-3; 458 BRM-1K PHG 2 Matka (FSU Vekhr) with 2 single lnchr with P-15
APC 1,432 Termit-M/R (SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM, 1 76mm gun
APC (T) 44 BTR-D PCMT 2 Pauk I (FSU Molnya II) with 1 quad lnchr
APC (W) 1,398: up to 10 BTR 4; 136 BTR-60; 857 BTR-70; (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM,
395 BTR-80 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200, 1 76mm gun
Europe 167
Europe
HELICOPTERS
or 190 troops; either 24 APC (T) or 170 troops) C&C 4 Mi-9
LANDING CRAFT • LCAC 1 Pomornik (Zubr) with TPT 34: Medium 31 Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, AD • SAM 825 S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) (quad)/SA-
(capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T)) 11 Gadfly/S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline) (towed)/S-125
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 31 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) (towed)/S-200V Angara (SA-5 Gammon)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
a
Net Cash Requirement figures. These will differ from official
figures based on Resource Accounting & Budgeting. Excludes
Deployment military pensions.
Legal provisions for foreign deployment: Population 62,698,362
Constitution: Codified constitution (1996)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Specific legislation: ‘On the procedures to deploy Armed
Forces of Ukraine units abroad’ (1518-III, March 2000). Male 8.9% 3.2% 3.5% 3.5% 23.3% 7.3%
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: Parliament Female 8.5% 3.1% 3.4% 3.3% 22.9% 9.2%
authorised to approve decision to provide military
assistance, deploy troops abroad and allow foreign military Capabilities
presence in Ukraine (Art. 85, para 23); Also, in accordance
with Art. 7 of the specific legislation (above), president is Many capabilities are reducing by 20–30% as a result
authorised to take a decision to deploy troops abroad and of cuts made in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Review. And some reductions, such as maritime patrol
at the same time to submit a draft law to the Parliament of
aircraft and NBC reconnaissance, reduce the overall flex-
Ukraine for approval.
ibility of British forces whilst increasing their dependence
AFGHANISTAN on NATO and multinational partners. The combination
NATO • ISAF 23 of a redundancy programme and constraints on pay and
allowances could trigger an outflow of experienced staff.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Although both the government and key politicians have
OSCE• Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 stated an aspiration to rebuild capability after 2015, it is not
Democratic Republic of the Congo clear that this can be afforded. Indeed, unless the UK econ-
UN • MONUSCO 13 obs omy improves, sustaining existing capability may prove
problematic, particularly if equipment or personnel costs
IRAQ increase beyond current planning assumptions.
NATO • NTM-I 9 The culture and high standard of training of the UK
Liberia armed forces mean that they are willing and able to fight.
The RAF and Army are currently optimised for operations
UN • UNMIL 277; 2 obs; 1 avn coy
in Afghanistan, but their contribution and that of the Royal
MOLDOVA Navy to the unforeseen war in Libya displayed a high de-
10 mil obs gree of flexibility. And strategic planning and co-ordina-
tion of British security has been improved by the formation
Serbia of a National Security Council. The MOD plans that, as
NATO • KFOR 136; 1 inf coy force levels in Afghanistan reduce, capability for contin-
OSCE • Serbia 1 gency operations is regenerated.
OSCE • Kosovo 1
ACTIVE 174,030 (Army 99,950, Navy 34,680 Air
UN • UNMIK 2 obs 39,400)
RESERVE 82,274 (Regular Reserve ε51,000
south SUDAN incl 5,420 RAF; Volunteer Reserve 31,274 (Army
UN • UNMISS 10 obs 27,010; Navy 2,785; Air 1,479)
Includes both trained and those currently under training
within the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet units.
Foreign Forces
Russia ε13,000 Navy 1 Fleet HQ at Sevastopol; 1 indep
naval inf regt; 102 AIFV/APC (T)/APC (W); 24 arty
Organisations by Service
Europe
could carry up to 12 MIRV, some Trident D-5 capable of
being configured for sub-strategic role) Armoured
MSL • STRATEGIC 48 SLBM (Fewer than 160 declared 2 armd regt
operational warheads) Light
13 lt inf bn
Space Air Manoeuvre
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Tomahawk tactical LACM/UGM 84 Harpoon AShM Naval Aviation (Fleet Air Arm) 5,520
1 Astute with 6 single 533mm TT with Spearfish HWT/ FORCES BY ROLE
UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Tomahawk tactical LACM ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
(4 additional vessels in build; 2 additional vessels on 4 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin (HM Mk1)
order) 1 sqn with Lynx HAS Mk3/Mk8
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 18 1 flt with Lynx Mk3
DESTROYERS • DDHM 5 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
3 Daring (Type-45) with 1 48 cell VLS with Aster 15/ 3 sqn with Sea King AEW Mk7
Aster 30 SAM, 1 114mm gun, (capacity 1 Lynx/AW101 SEARCH & RESCUE
Merlin hel – 3 additional vessels in build) 1 sqn (and detached flt) with Sea King HU Mk5
2 Sheffield (Type-42 Batch 3) with 1 twin lnchr with Sea TRANSPORT
Dart SAM, 2 single Mk15 Phalanx-1B CIWS, 1 114mm Some (Fleet) sqn with Beech 55 Baron (civil
gun, (capacity 1 Lynx hel) registration); Cessna 441 Conquest (civil registration);
FRIGATES • FFGHM 13 Falcon 20 (civil registration); G-115 (op under contract)
13 Norfolk (Type-23) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with TRAINING
RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 32 cell VLS with Sea Wolf 1 (operational evaluation) sqn with AW101 ASW
SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 Merlin (HM Mk1); Sea King HC Mk4
114mm gun, (capacity either 2 Lynx or 1 AW101 Merlin 1 sqn with Jetstream T Mk2/3
hel) 1 sqn with Lynx Mk3
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PSO 4: 3 River; 1 River (mod) with 1 hel landing platform
AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable
PB 18: 16 Archer (trg); 2 Scimitar
TPT 21: Light 2: 1 Beech 55 Baron (civil registration);
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 16
1 Cessna 441 Conquest II (civil registration); PAX 19
MCO 8 Hunt (incl 4 mod Hunt)
Falcon 20 (civil registration)
MHC 8 Sandown (1 decommissioned and used in trg role)
TRG 27: 5 G-115 (op under contract); 12 Hawk T Mk1*;
AMPHIBIOUS
10 Jetstream T Mk2/T Mk3
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3
HELICOPTERS
LPD 2 Albion (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCVP; 6 MBT; 300
ASW 88: 13 Lynx HAS Mk3; 33 Lynx HMA Mk8; 42
troops) (1 to be kept at extended readiness from Nov
2011) AW101 ASW Merlin (HM Mk1)
LPH 2: 1 Ocean (capacity 18 hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; AEW 13 Sea King AEW Mk7
4 LCVP; 800 troops); 1 Invincible with 3 single Mk15 TPT • Medium 16 Sea King HU Mk5
Phalanx-1B/Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 22 hel; 600 MSL • AShM Sea Skua
troops)
Royal Marines 6,840
LANDING CRAFT 36: 13 LCU; 23 LCVP
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 FORCES BY ROLE
AGB 1 Protector (NOR Polarbjørn, chartered for three MANOEUVRE
years from April 2011) with 1 hel landing platform Amphibious
AGHS 3: 1 Scott; 2 Echo 1 (3rd Cdo) mne bde (1 ISTAR gp (1 EW sqn; 1 cbt spt
AGS 1 Gleaner (inshore/coastal) sqn; 1 sigs sqn; 1 log sqn), 3 cdo; 1 (army) lt inf bn; 1
amph aslt sqn; 1 (army) arty regt; 1 (army) engr regt;
Royal Fleet Auxiliary 1 log regt)
Support and Miscellaneous vessels are mostly manned 3 landing craft sqn opcon Royal Navy
and maintained by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), Other
a civilian fleet owned by the UK MoD, which has 1 Fleet Protestion sy gp
Europe 171
Europe
12 Bell 412EP Griffin HT1
Royal Marines Reserve 600 TPT • Medium 25 Sea King HAR-3A
UAV • CBT/ISR • Heavy 5+ MQ-9 Reaper
Royal Air Force 39,400 MSL
Flying hours 210/yr on fast jets; 290 on tpt ac; 240 on AAM • IR AIM-9L/9L/I Sidewinder; IIR ASRAAM; ARH
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Lynx, 1 arty regt, 1 engr regt, 1 MP coy, 1 log regt, 1 mative national programme to protect ourselves in cyber
med regt) space’. This ‘National Cyber Security Programme’ will be
Aviation supported by £650m – with programme management by
2 hel regt with Lynx OSCIA – and will lead to a new Cyber Security Strategy in
1 trg hel regt with AH-64D Apache, Bell 212, Lynx, 2011. A UK Defence Cyber Operations Group was set up
SA341 Gazelle in 2011 to place ‘cyber at the heart of defence operations,
3 hel flt with Lynx doctrine and training’.
FORCES BY ROLE
Afghanistan
ATTACK HELICOPTER
NATO • ISAF 9,500;
1 lt sqn with Lynx AH7
Army: 1 (20th) armd bde (1 recce regt, 1 armd regt, 6 inf
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
bn, 1 engr regt); Jackal; Scimitar; Warrior; Spartan; Mastiff;
3 hel sqn with Sea King HC4
Ridgeback; Warthog Wolfhound; L-118; GMLRS; AH-64D
Royal Air Force Apache; Lynx; Hermes 450
Royal Navy: Sea King HC Mk4
FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Air Force: Tornado GR4/GR4A; C-130 Hercules; CH-47
3 hel sqn with CH-47 Chinook Chinook; HC Mk3 Merlin; Beech King Air 350 Shadow R1;
2 hel sqn with AW101 Merlin MQ-9 Reaper
2 hel sqn with SA330 Puma Arabian sea & Gulf of Aden
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 FFGHM
HELICOPTERS Armenia/Azerbaijan
ATK 66 AH-64D Apache
OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
MRH 91: 50 Lynx AH7; 22 Lynx AH9; 19 SA341 Gazelle
TPT 155: Heavy 46: 24 CH-47 (HC2/4) Chinook; 14 CH-47 Ascension Island
(HC2A/4A) Chinook; 8 CH-47 (HC3) Chinook; Medium 101: Air Force 23
28 AW101 Merlin (HC3/3A); 36 SA330 Puma (HC1); 37 Sea
ATLANTIC (NORTH)
King (HC4); Light 8 Bell 212
Royal Navy 1 DDHM/FFGHM; 1 AO
UK Special Forces ATLANTIC (SOUTH)
Includes Army, Royal Navy and RAF units Royal Navy 1 DDHM/FFGHM; 1 AO
FORCES BY ROLE
BAHRAIN
SPECIAL FORCES
Royal Navy 100; Air Force 1 BAe-125, 1 BAe-146
1 (SAS) SF regt
1 (SBS) SF regt Belize
1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt Army 60
1 SF spt gp (based on 1 para bn)
MANOEUVRE Bosnia-Herzegovina
Aviation EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 5
1 wg (includes assets drawn from 2 army hel sqn, 1 OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 4
army hel flt, 1 RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn) British Indian Ocean Territory
COMBAT SUPPORT Royal Navy 40; 1 Navy/Marine party at Diego Garcia
1 sigs regt
Brunei
Reserve Army 550; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel flt
FORCES BY ROLE with 3 hel
SPECIAL FORCES
Canada
2 (SAS) SF regt
Army 400; 2 trg units Royal Navy 10: Air Force 10
Cyber Cyprus
The UK’s October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Army 1,600; 2 inf bn
Review said that the country would ‘establish a transfor- Navy 30
Europe 173
Air Force 800; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 1 North sea
radar (on det) NATO • SNMCMG1: 1 MHC
UN • UNFICYP 271; 1 inf coy
Oman
Democratic Republic of the Congo Army 40
EU • EUSEC RD Congo 4 Royal Navy 30
UN • MONUSCO 5 obs Air Force 20: 1 Sentinel; 1 Tristar tkr
Falkland Islands Persian Gulf
Army 420; 1 AD det with Rapier FSC Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-152: 1 FFGHM; 2
Europe
Navy 420; 1 OPV MCO; 2 MHC
Air Force 680; 1 ftr flt with 4 E-F Typhoon FGR.4; 1 SAR
Qatar
sqn with Sea King HAR-3A/Sea King HAR-3; 1 tkr/tpt flt
Air Force 4 C-130J
with C-130 Hercules; VC-10 K3/4
Serbia
Germany
NATO • KFOR 1
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Belgium (BEL)
Piranha IIIC APC (W) 242 €700m CHE General 2006 2010 Delivery in progress. Option on
(US$844m) Dynamics further 104
(MOWAG)
A400M Tpt ac 7 n.k. Int’l EADS 2003 2018 Prototypes now in flight test.
(Airbus) Delivery now likely in 2018–19.
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
NH90 ASW/Tpt 8 €293m Int’l NH 2007 2013 4 TTH, 4 NFH. Delivery expected
Hel (US$400m) Industries to begin mid-2013. Option on two
further NH90 TTH
Bulgaria (BLG)
AS565 Panther MRH Hel 6 See notes Int’l Eurocopter 2005 2010 For navy. Part of €360m (US$460m)
order incl 12 AS532. Order
reportedly cut from six to three as a
result of budget issues
Croatia (CRO)
Patria 8×8 APC (W) 126 €170m CRO/FIN Patria 2007 2009 Contract extended from 84 to 126
(US$218m) veh Jul 2010. Delivery extended
until 2012
Cyprus (CYP)
T-80 MBT 41 €115m RUS Rosoboron- 2010 2010 27 T-80U MBT and 14 T-80UK comd
(US$156m) export veh. Option on a further 41
Denmark (DNK)
Iver Huitfeldt- DDG 3 DKK4.3bn NLD n.k. 2006 2012 Projekt Patruljeskib. First delivery
class (US$471m) due 2012
Estonia (EST)
XA-188 APC (W) 80 €20m NLD n.k. 2010 2010 Second hand Dutch veh. Delivery to
be completed in 2015
Ground Master Radar 2 n.k. FRA/US Thales- 2009 2012 Acquired as part of agreement with
403 Raytheon FIN. Air surveillance for W and SE EST
Finland (FIN)
NASAMS SAM n.k. NOK3bn FIN/US Kongsberg/ 2009 2012 To replace Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly).
(US$458m) Raytheon Delivery delayed; initial trg to
commence in 2012. Expected to
become operational by 2015
Europe 175
Europe
France (FRA)
VBCI 8x8 AIFV 630 n.k. FRA Nexter 2000 2008 To replace AMX10P. Total
requirement of 630 VBCIs (520 VCIs,
110 VPCs), another 332 ordered in
2009. Final delivery due 2015
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
BvS10 Mk II APC (T) 53 n.k. UK/SWE BAE Systems 2009 2010 Options for further 76 vehicles
(Land &
Armaments)
Barracuda SSN 6 €8bn FRA DCNS 2006 2016 One SSN to be delivered every two
(US$10.5bn) years until 2027. First to enter service
2017
FREMM FFG 11 US$23.6bn FRA/ITA DCNS 2002 2012 Multi-mission FFG. First-of-class FNS
(Aquitaine- Aquitaine launched 2010; scheduled
class) for commissioning 2012. Further
three ordered in Oct 2009 (two anti-
air warfare, one ASW). Final delivery
due 2022
Mistral-class LHD 1 €420m FRA DCNS 2009 2012 Expected ISD 2012
(US$554m)
SCALP Naval LACM 200 See notes Int’l MBDA 2007 2013 Original contract value €910m
(US$1.2bn) for 250 msl (now 200).
Test fired Mar 2010. To be deployed
on Barracuda-class SSN and
Aquitaine-class FFG
Rafale F3 FGA ac 180 n.k. FRA Dassault 1984 2006 Order increased to 180 in 2009, but
annual production rate slowed
A400M Tpt ac 50 n.k. Int’l EADS 2003 2013 In development. France now
(Airbus) expected to receive first three of 50
aircraft in 2013
CN-235-300 Tpt ac 8 €225m Int’l EADS 2010 2011 Delivery to commence late 2011 and
(US$305m) (Airbus) be complete by mid-2013
EC665 Tiger Atk Hel 80 n.k. FRA/GER Eurocopter 1999 2005 Forty HAD, 40 HAP variant. Thirty-six
delivered by late 2011
NH90 NFH ASW Hel 27 n.k. Int’l NH 2000 2010 For navy. First delivery Apr 2010.
Industries Final delivery due 2019
NH90 TTH Tpt Hel 34 See notes Int’l NH 2007 2012 For army avn. Twelve ordered 2007
Industries with option for a further 56; 22
more ordered Jan 2009. €1.8bn if all
options taken. First flight Dec 2010
EC725 Super Tpt Hel 14 n.k. Int’l Eurocopter 2009 2010 Eight for army use delivered; six air
Cougar force due 2012
Harfang ISR UAV n.k. n.k. Int’l EADS 2001 2009 Formerly SIDM
Sperwer ISR UAV 3 n.k. FRA Sagem 2011 n.k. Option on five more
Meteor AAM 200 n.k. FRA MBDA 2011 2018 The first stage of missile integration
work for Rafale began in January
2011
Germany (GER)
Puma AIFV 405 €3 bn GER PSM 2007 2010 To replace Marder 1A3/A4/A5 AIFVs.
(US$4.3 bn) To be fitted with Spike LR ATGW
launcher. Final delivery 2020
176 The Military Balance 2012
Greece (GRC)
Katsonis-class SSK 6 Est. €1.67bn GER TKMS/TKMS 2000 2010 First commissioned Dec 2010. All
(Type 214) (HDW) scheduled to be in service by 2018
Roussen/Super PFM 2 €299m GRC Elefsis/VT 2008 2012 Further order to bring total to seven.
Vita (US$405m) Delivery now expected 2012–13
NH90 TTH Tpt Hel 20 €657m NLD EADS 2002 2011 Sixteen tac tpt variants and four
Special Op variants. Option on
further 14. Delivery began Jun 2011
Italy (ITA)
PzH 2000 SP 70 n.k. GER OTO Melara/ 1999 2004 Sixty-five delivered by Sep 2011
155mm KMW
arty
Europe 177
Europe
2014–17
Eurofighter FGA ac 96 n.k. Int’l Eurofighter 1998 2004 Twenty-one ac Tranche 3A order
Typhoon GmbH signed in 2009
KC-767A Tkr/Tpt 4 n.k. US Boeing 2002 2011 Programme suffered significant
ac delay, first two aircraft entered
service May 2011. Third due for
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Luxembourg (LUX)
A400M Tpt ac 1 n.k. Int’l EADS 2003 2010 In development. First deliveries
(Airbus) delayed
Netherlands (NLD)
CV90 AIFV 184 €749m SWE BAE Systems 2004 2007 CV9035NL version; 150 in IFV role
(US$981m (Land & and 34 in CP role. Final delivery due
Armaments) 2011
Boxer (8×8) APC (W) 200 €595m GER/NLD ARTEC 2006 2011 Nineteen cargo/C2, 27 cargo, 55 CP
(US$747m) GmbH variants, 58 ambulances and 41 engr.
To replace YPR 765
Walrus-class SSK 4 €50–150m NLD n.k. 2011 2018 SLEP. Incl combat systems and nav
Upgrade (US$77– upgrades
232m)
Holland-class PSOH 4 €365m NLD Damen 2007 2010 Holland and Zeeland commissioned
Schelde/ 2010; Groningen and Friesland to be
Thales sold after construction
Joint Logistics AFSH 1 €364m NLD Damen 2009 2014 To replace HrMS Zuiderkruis
Support Ship (US$545m) Schelde
(JSS) (DSNS)
NH90 ASW/Tpt 20 n.k. Int’l NH 1987 2010 Twelve NFH, eight TTH. First NFH
Hel Industries delivered Apr 2010. Four NFH
delivered as of late 2011. IOC
targeted for mid-2012
CH-47F Tpt Hel 6 US$335m US Boeing 2007 2011 Delivery delayed; now due late 2011
Chinook or early 2012
Norway (NOR)
Hisnorsat Sat 24 €300m ESP Hisdesat 2010 2013 Military communications satellite
(US$368m)
178 The Military Balance 2012
Poland (POL)
AMV XC-360P APC (W) 690 US$1.7bn FIN Patria 2003 2004 Final delivery due 2014
BM-21 MRL 36 PLN97m POL Centrum 2008 2010 Upgrade to WR-40 Langusta MRL
launchers upgrade (US$43.9m) Produkcji standard
Wojskowej
Spike-LR MANPAT 264 PLN1.5bn FRA Rafael/ZM 2003 2004 Manufactured under licence; 264
(US$512m) Mesko launchers and 2,675 msl
Project FFGM 2 PLN77m POL SMW 2004 2015 Based on GER MEKO A100. Project
621-Gawron (US$24.8m) suspended in Sept 2009; expected
ISD of first vessel in 2015, but status
unclear
RBS 15 Mk 3 AShM 36 PLN560m SWE ZM Mesko 2006 2009 For Orkan-class and Gawron-class.
(US$178m) Incl, spares, spt, trg and simulator.
Final delivery due 2012
Naval Strike AShM 12 NOK800m NOR Kongsberg 2008 2012 Contact value incl six firing veh
Missile (NSM) (US$115m) Defence &
Aerospace
C-130E Tpt ac 5 US$98.4m US SAIC 2006 2007 Refurbished ex-US aircraft. Third ac
Hercules delivered Jan 2011
M-28B/PT Tpt ac 8 PLN399m US Sikorsky (PZL 2008 2010 For air force. Order reduced from 12
Bryza Mielec) to eight ac in 2009 due to budget
cuts. Final delivery due 2013
Portugal (PRT)
Pandur II 8×8 APC (W) 260 €344.3m AUT General 2005 2006 240 for army in 11 config. Twenty for
(US$415m) Dynamics marines in four config. Final delivery
(GDLS Steyr) delayed from 2010 to 2013
Viana do PSO 10 n.k. PRT ENVC 2002 2011 Two Pollution Control Vessels, eight
Castelo-class PSOs. First two commissioned 2011.
(NPO2000) Final delivery due 2015
Romania (ROM)
C-27J Spartan Tpt ac 7 €220m ITA Alenia 2006 2010 To replace An-26. Incl log and trg
(US$293m) Aeronautica support. First two delivered April
2010. Three in service as of mid-2011
Serbia (SER)
Lasta 95 Trg ac 15 n.k. SER Utva n.k. 2010 Delivery to be complete by end 2012
Aviation
Industry
Slovakia (SVK)
C-27J Spartan Tpt ac 2 to 3 €120m ITA Alenia 2008 n.k. Procurement suspended due to
(US$167m) Aeronautica budget cuts
Europe 179
Europe
Spain (ESP)
Paz satellite Sat 2 €160m ESP Hidesat/ 2008 2012 _
EADS CASA
Leopard 2E MBT 239 €1.94bn ESP/GER General 1998 2003 ESP version of 2A6. Incl 16 ARV and
(US$2.34bn) Dynamics four trg tk
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
(SBS)
Pizarro AIFV 212 €707m ESP General 2003 2005 In five variants. Delivery status
(US$853m) Dynamics unclear
(SBS)
Piranha IIIC APC (W) 21 n.k. CHE/ESP/US General 2007 2010 Delivery to be complete by 2013.
Dynamics First four delivered
(GDELS/
MOWAG)
RG-31 Mk 5E APC (W) 100 €75m RSA General 2008 2009 Eighty-five in APC role, ten
(US$118m) Dynamics ambulance and five CP versions.
(SBS) Delivery ongoing
SBT (V07) Towed 70 €181m ESP General 2005 n.k. Four 155/52 APU SBT (V07) how, plus
155mm (US$216m) Dynamics design and production of 66 how
arty (SIAC). Also retrofit of 12 APU SBT
how from V06 to V07 version and 82
towing vehicles
S-80A SSK 4 n.k. ESP Navantia 2003 2013 First vessel, S-81, due for delivery
Dec 2013. Keel laid 2010
Alvaro de DDGHM 1 €71.5m ESP Navantia 2005 2012 Cristóbal Colón. Option for one more
Bazan-class (US$105.4m) vessel. Launched Nov 2010 delivery
F-100 due summer 2012
Meteoro-class PSOH 9 ε€2.4bn ESP Navantia 2005 2011 Deliveries delayed by over a year.
(BAM) First delivery 2011. Batch 2 (three
PSOH, one ASR, one AG) ordered
2011
Eurofighter FGA 74 n.k. Int’l Eurofighter 1998 2004 Twenty-one aircraft Tranche 3A
Typhoon GmbH order signed 2009
A400M Tpt ac 27 See notes Int’l EADS 2003 2015 Spain will begin to take delivery of
(Airbus) the type in 2015
EC665 Tiger Atk Hel 24 €1.4bn FRA Eurocopter 2003 2007 Six delivered
(HAD)
NH90 TTH Tpt Hel 45 n.k. Int’l NH 2007 2010 First flight December 2010.
Industries Deliveries scheduled to begin in
2012
AS532AL Tpt Hel 5 €116m Int’l Eurocopter 2008 n.k. Three for army air wing. Two for
Cougar (US$171m) Emergencies Military Unit
Sweden (SWE)
RG32M APC (W) 60 €18m UK/RSA BAE Systems 2008 2010 _
(US$24m) (Land &
Armaments)
Armoured APC (W) 113 €240m FIN Patria 2009 2011 Seventy-nine APCs and 34 other
Modular (US$338m) variants. Further 113 req. To be
Vehicle (AMV) delivered 2011–13. Was subject to
contractual dispute
FH-77 BW L52 155mm 24 £135m UK/SWE BAE Systems 2010 2011 Contract value is for combined 48
Archer 6×6 SP Arty (US$200m) (Land & unit NOR/SWE order
155mm Armaments)
180 The Military Balance 2012
(US$63.5m)
Switzerland (CHE)
Piranha IIIC NBC 12 See notes CHE General 2008 2010 CHF260m (€167m) incl 232 DURO
Recce Dynamics IIIP. Final delivery due 2012
(MOWAG)
Turkey (TUR)
Gokturk (recce Sat 1 €270m ITA Telespazio/ 2009 2013 Thales Alenia Space responsible for
& SURV sat) (US$380m) Thales Alenia sat. Domestic companies involved in
Space design and development stage and
supply of subsystems
Altay MBT 250 See notes ROK/TUR Otokar 2007 n.k. Four prototypes by 2014 for approx
US$500m. To be followed by an
order for 250 units following testing
Firtina 155mm 350 n.k. ROK/TUR Samsung 2001 2003 ROK Techwin K9 Thunder. Total
155mm/52- SP arty Techwin requirement of 350. Deliveries
cal ongoing
Type-214 SSK 6 €1.96bn GER MFI/TKMS/ 2009 2015 To be built at Golcuk shipyard
(US$2.9bn) TKMS (HDW)
Ada-class FFGHM 8 See notes TUR Istanbul 1996 2011 First of class, TCG Heybeliada,
Naval commissioned Sep 2011. Part
Shipyard of Milgem project which incl
requirement for four F-100 class FFG.
Total expected Milgem cost to be
ε€3bn
Dost-class PSOH 4 €352.5m TUR RMK Marine 2007 2011 Based on Sirio-class PCO design. For
coast guard. First vessel launched
Jun 2010
Tuzla-class PCC 16 €402m TUR Dearsan 2007 2011 First delivered Jan 2011. Final
(US$545m) Shipyard delivery due 2015
F-16C/D Block FGA ac 30 US$1.78bn TUR/US Lockheed 2009 2011 Fourteen F-16C and 16 F-16D
50 Fighting Martin variants. Final assembly in TUR. First
Falcon delivery May 2011. Final delivery
due 2014
ATR-72 MP MP ac 10 US$210m ITA Alenia 2005 2010 First five deliveries by 2010. Final
Aeronautica delivery due 2012
B-737 AEW AEW&C 4 US$1bn US Boeing 2002 2012 Peace Eagle programme. Option for
ac a further two. First aircraft now to
be delivered 2012; remaining three
in 2013
A400M Tpt ac 10 See notes Int’l EADS 2003 2013 Turkey is now due to take the first of
(Airbus) its ten aircraft in 2013
KT-1 Woong- Trg ac 40 US$500m ROK/TUR KAI/TAI 2007 2009 To replace T-37 trg ac. Option for
Bee 15 further ac. First five ac delivered
from ROK; remainder assembled in
TUR. Delivery to be complete in 2012
Europe 181
Europe
CH-47F Tpt Hel 6 See notes US Boeing 2011 2013 Original aim to acquire 14 for
Chinook US$1.2bn, but order cut to six: five
for the army and one for SF Comd
S-70i Black Tpt Hel 109 US3.5bn TUR/US TAI/Sikorsky 2011 n.k. Being acquired to meet military and
Hawk paramilitary utility needs. Aircraft to
be assembled by Turkish Aerospace
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:05 06 August 2012
Industries
Ukraine (UKR)
An-70 Tpt ac 5 n.k. UKR Antonov 1991 2010 Funding issues have again delayed
programme
Project 58250 FFGHM 10 UAH16.2bn UKR Cherno- 2011 2016 All vessels expected to be delivered
(US$2.01bn) morsky by 2016
Shipbuilding
and budgeting difficulties mean some ambitions have intellectual managers’. In September, his explanation
Russia
not been realised on schedule and others not at all. of the Centre 2011 strategic military exercise – with its
The army’s transformation to a combined-arms focus on independent action by brigade-level units
brigade-based structure is proceeding, albeit more and interoperability with other government agen-
slowly than the ministry initially envisaged. The cies practising post-conflict stabilisation – carried
internal composition of these units continues to echoes of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to stabili-
be refined in organisational terms, and the precise sation. The extent to which joint strategic commands
number of permanent-readiness brigades remains a are authorised to take action without reference to
matter of debate. Moscow remains the subject of debate; at the same
Personnel issues continue to bedevil the moderni- time, it is argued by senior Russian service personnel
sation process, with poor manpower planning that part of their purpose is to maintain closer control
and poor conditions for contract servicemen and over the troops in their areas, to prevent uncoordi-
conscripts, as well as difficulties in the creation and nated and unauthorised action such as occurred in
maintenance of an effective senior NCO cadre. Lack the early stages of the armed conflict with Georgia in
of foresight in the management of officer recruit- August 2008.
ment prompted a recruitment freeze last year, but Vladimir Putin’s decision to stand for election as
there is still a temporary glut of junior officers (see president again in 2012 is not expected to have a signif-
text box). However, there has been some progress in icant effect on the military transformation process;
modernising certain defence and ministry processes. the forcing through of reform against substantial
As noted in The Military Balance 2011 (p. 173), opposition has shown that Defence Minister Anatoliy
some commercial practices are being imposed. For Serdyukov enjoys considerable support across the
instance, base catering and other services have been Putin–Medvedev team.
outsourced, as has ground refuelling at air bases and
airfields. Meanwhile, the purchase, from France, of Administrative developments
Mistral amphibious-assault vessels was a significant By the end of 2010, reorganisation of central head-
development in Russian defence procurement. quarters and related staffs, including the work to
Modernising the equipment used by military reallocate responsibilities between the Ministry of
personnel is another challenge. President Medvedev Defence and the General Staff, was announced to be
criticised the failure to place several orders detailed largely complete. In broad terms, the MoD is now a
under the 2010 State Defence Order, and several offi- civilian-led supervisory and supporting body, while
cials in the ministry and some state enterprises were the General Staff is focused on planning, command
eventually sacked. In July, Medvedev apparently and control, and combat training. In large part, this
demanded a report from the defence minister on is designed to enable civilian control over financial
similar problems with the 2011 order. Administrative matters, particularly relating to procurement. The
delays such as this have compounded the often low appointment of civilians to head military depart-
rate of production seen across some defence industries, ments and directorates continues, with civilian staff
all hampering the ambition to field more ‘modern’ also now leading the Federal Special Construction
military hardware for changing military forces. Agency. (Once part of the MoD, this agency is
184 The Military Balance 2012
responsible for the construction of bases, garrisons, evaluate the officer’s motivation to continue serving,
command-and-control centres and similar facili- and to provide an opportunity for early retirement if
ties.) desired. The prospect of relocation outside Moscow
One significant administrative change came in has reportedly increased the numbers deciding to
late August 2011 with the appointment of Aleksandr retire rather than be posted outside the capital, while
Sukhorukov as first deputy minister of defence. others are reportedly unhappy with the appoint-
Sukhorukov worked under Defence Minister ments offered to them.
Serdyukov when the latter headed the Federal Tax The most high-profile requests to retire came from
Service. The first deputy position had been vacant for two-star General Andrei Tretyak, deputy chief of
several months in 2011 after the incumbent, retired the General Staff and chief of the Main Operations
General Vladimir Popovkin, was appointed to lead Directorate of the General Staff; two-star General
the Federal Space Agency. The post is an important Sergei Skokov, first deputy army commander-in-
one for the reform process because the first deputy chief and chief of staff of ground forces; and one-star
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
minister is responsible for the implementation of General Oleg Ivanov, chief of the Electronic Warfare
defence contracts including the State Defence Order. Directorate of the General Staff. The first two of these
As noted above, the conclusion of many contracts were key allies of Makarov and supporters of reform;
was delayed, due both to administrative inertia and their resignations prompted Deputy Minister of
in some cases to failure to reach agreement between Defence Nikolai Pankov (and Tretyak) to say that this
the MoD and production companies over pricing. was not a protest against the reform process and that
Serdyukov has also created an international mili- the generals had been offered senior posts outside
tary cooperation branch in the MoD after a similar Moscow, and in the Military Academy in Moscow,
directorate in the General Staff was abolished. This but they chose retirement instead.
new branch is led by Anatoliy Antonov, deputy
minister of defence since 2 February 2011. Antonov Recruitment and manning
was previously director of the Department for Preliminary results from the October 2010 census
Security and Disarmament Affairs in the Ministry indicated that the overall resident population in
of Foreign Affairs and led the Russian delegation in Russia fell to 142.9 million, from 145.2m in 2002,
talks leading to the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction a drop of just over 1.5%. This was despite hopes
Treaty. One of the first tasks for the new directorate among military planners that the census would show
during 2011 was to represent the MoD in discussions a slight increase in the population. The number of
over US plans to base ballistic-missile defence infra- 18-year-olds available for conscription continues to
structure in Europe. fall sharply year on year. During the period of demo-
The Antonov appointment shows the continuing graphic collapse from 1987–99, live male births in
process of appointing civilians previously uncon- Russia fell by more than 50%, meaning that the pool
nected with the MoD to senior posts that will utilise of available manpower will continue to shrink until
their specific expertise. There can be up to ten deputy the 2020s. The Russian population is only expected to
ministers of defence, but at least one – the chief of the start growing again after 2014.
General Staff, appointed deputy minister ex officio – This has obvious implications for conscription,
is always a serviceman. At the time of writing, six of especially as reports of poor health among conscripts
eight existing deputy ministers were civilians (and also continue. The ministry hopes that increasing
five of those six were former officers of the Federal contract personnel will offset the reduction in poten-
Tax Service). While this appears little different from tial conscripts. This, however, depends on attracting
the top-level situation in 2010, an increasing number and retaining the right number – and right type – of
of civilians have joined the lower levels of the central contract personnel.
military administration during 2011. Reportedly only The drive to increase contract personnel has been
around 3,000 of the 10,500 employees within the under way, with occasional reverses, for some years,
ministry are now serving officers. with target and actual figures varying widely. In
The process of ‘assessment’ of the professional late 2010, for instance, the official total was 150,000;
skills of officers at all levels has, as anticipated, and at that time it was expected to fall to 80,000 by
prompted significant numbers of resignations. 2015. But in light of difficulties relating to conscrip-
Indeed, part of the object of assessment reports was to tion – and notwithstanding the challenges involved
Russia 185
Officer and NCO posts be suspended altogether in 2010. This is a measure that,
Reorganisation plans continue to be made and unmade, because of the length of Russian officer courses, will only
affecting the careers of tens of thousands of servicemen, feed through into graduate numbers in 2014–16. Limited
and calling into question the underlying planning process. officer-cadet enlistment resumed in 2011, with 2,000
The transformation originally envisaged a reduction in cadets enrolled (as compared to an annual average of
officer numbers from 335,000 to 150,000. (Other figures 20,000 before transformation began). Forty percent of
have been quoted at various times.) This would come from these cadets are earmarked for other military and paramili-
the closure of cadre units, the slimming down of head- tary services such as the Interior Ministry or border guards.
quarters and the General Staff, adjustments to the ratio The surplus junior officers passing out have been
between officers and other ranks, and the civilianisation of assigned to NCO instead of officer positions. In March
some services. 2011, there were 7,000 officer graduates from the classes
But when these reductions were already under way, of 2009 and 2010 assigned to NCO ranks and posts. After
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
with officers released or awaiting out-processing, it was graduation in summer 2011, another 14,000 junior lieu-
Russia
announced in February 2011 that no fewer than 70,000 tenants had to be assigned to a much smaller number of
of the posts scheduled for deletion would be retained officer posts. This scenario will, if anything, further damage
– a decision linked to the creation of the new Air–Space Russia’s attempts to institute serious professional NCO
Defence Command. training, which continue to show little result because of
In a similar fashion, there was an apparent failure to cultural, institutional and financial factors. Senior officers
reconcile the number of future junior-officer posts with report that the thousands of servicemen who trained and
the number of officer cadets enrolling at military acad- graduated as officers, but are now serving as NCOs, are
emies. Indeed, such was the nature of this failure that, ‘content’ with their situation, but ‘looking forward to it
instead of a gradual reduction, officer recruitment had to being resolved’.
– the ministry has sharpened its focus on contract accommodation and terms of service would also be
personnel, and official numbers have increased. needed to attract good recruits. An overhaul of the
In late 2011, the number of contract personnel was entire pay and allowances system is promised for
reported at around 180,000, and the ministry aspired the beginning of 2012 (Medvedev was reported as
to some 425,000 by the end of 2017. However, there is having signed a law to this effect on 7 November
no reason to expect this highly ambitious aim to prove 2011), but it was not clear at the time of writing how
any more realistic than earlier targets, and attempts or whether this would address the imbalances and
to assess the real recruitment situation continue disparities that mean servicemen doing the same
to be hampered by confusion both in the public job at the same rank in different units or locations
presentation of MoD figures and in internal calcu- can earn vastly different amounts. It was reported
lations. For instance, all officers are still technically by Interfax that Medvedev indicated salaries ‘will
contract servicemen, and therefore can be added to or increase 2.5–3 times on average, while military
subtracted from the overall contract numbers at will pensions will increase 1.5–1.7 times.’ In the mean-
and without explanation. Officials continue to claim time, the officers’ financial bonus package known as
that the armed forces have one million personnel, to the ‘Order 400’ scheme, an interim measure designed
much scepticism. to address the salary issue by raising the pay of top
The MoD is keen to stress studies on foreign performers, has proved a powerful incentive to
militaries that have reduced their contingents of retention and performance as well as, on occasion,
conscripts and increased their contract personnel, discontent among those left out.
with former Warsaw Pact nations such as Poland
and the Czech Republic often mentioned. In public Air–Space Defence Command
at least, the ministry is also paying greater atten- President Medvedev announced the creation an
tion to the problems caused by uncompetitive pay Air–Space Defence Command in November 2010.
scales and poor conditions. Rectifying problems in The MoD has been tasked with placing air-defence,
these areas would require sustained funding and missile-defence, early-warning and the Space Forces’
consistent planning to enable a realistic expansion in space-monitoring systems under unified command.
numbers, training programmes and bases. Improved This is consistent with the 2010 Military Doctrine,
186 The Military Balance 2012
Tactical air-to-surface missile developments Kh-58UShK is also designed for internal carriage, with
Moscow aims to bolster its domestic guided-weapons folding fins.
inventory and to reinforce its presence in the export The successor to the Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen) family of air-
market with the conclusion of state tests of several key air- to-surface missiles is also due to complete trials around
launched systems, along with continued development of the end of 2013. The Kh-38 is a modular medium-range
weapons for its fifth-generation fighter aircraft. air-to-surface missile with several guidance options.
Between late 2011 and 2013, Russian guided- These include the laser-guided Kh-38ML, the imaging
weapons manufacturer Tactical Missile Corporation will infrared guided Kh-38MT, the radar-guided Kh-38MA and
either complete state trials or begin series production the Kh-38MK, which uses satellite navigation. With an
of several systems. These include the development of increasing emphasis on development, the Russian air force
the Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) anti-radiation missile into the is now trying to considerably increase its inventory of air-
Kh-58UShK and probably the development of the Kh-31P launched precision weaponry, of which the Kh-38 is likely
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
(AS-17A Krypton) anti-radiation missile into the Kh-31PM. to be a significant element. The Kh-38 and the Kh-58UShK
Both upgrades include the replacement of discrete are intended to form part of the air-to-surface weapons
frequency-specific passive seekers with a single broad- inventory of the air force’s fifth-generation combat aircraft,
band seeker providing greater operational flexibility. The the requirement for which is being met by Sukhoi’s T-50.
which emphasises the danger to Russia of the milita- Air force and strategic rocket forces
risation of space and the deployment of strategic non- Assets and personnel of the air-force air regiments and
nuclear high-precision weapons systems. squadrons that existed prior to the reforms are now
Organisationally, the Air–Space Defence organised into 15 ‘air bases’. The largest air bases, also
Command is intended to unify Russia’s Space Forces, occasionally referred to as ‘air wings’, have 150–200
Air–Space Defence Strategic Command (which fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft assigned to them. The
supersedes the defunct Special-Purpose Command air bases are organised as a varying number of squad-
of Moscow Military District Air Defence), as well as rons combined as an air group, distributed across a
air force air-defence units – although at the time of central air station and several satellite airfields. Each
writing the precise composition of the new command air base also now controls independent airfield and
had not become clear. The command’s mission is to radio-technical support units as well as communica-
protect the country from ballistic-missile, medium- tions units.
range-missile, and air-, sea- or ground-launched Military district commanders (who also lead
cruise-missile attacks, including attacks from low Russia’s joint strategic commands, see The Military
altitudes. Some analysts believe that US and NATO Balance 2011, p. 175) are in charge of four air-force and
developments in ballistic-missile defence, consis- air-defence commands (1st to 4th, consisting of air
tently characterised as a threat to Russia’s nuclear bases and air–space defence brigades), while air-force
deterrent potential, have been key in prompting the headquarters organises and controls military training
creation of the new organisation. for these commands. Meanwhile, combat-training
The major air- and missile-defence systems to be centres for frontal aviation, army aviation, long-range
used by the command include the S-300, the S-400 aviation, military transport aviation and unmanned
when it fully enters service, and the S-500 when it is aviation are reportedly commanded by the air
fielded. Officials from manufacturer Almaz-Antey force’s newly organised Fourth State Training and
and the MoD have said that the S-500 is planned Operational Test Centre, headquartered at Lipetsk,
to enter service by 2015–16, although independent the Russian air force’s long-established air-combat-
assessments predict further delay. According to training centre. Air force R&D establishments are also
unconfirmed information, three command-and- under this centre’s command.
control centres are planned for the air–space defence Surface-to-air missile (SAM) and radar and elec-
forces: Zarya, an existing air-defence headquar- tronic warfare (EW) regiments are now led by the
ters north of Moscow; Krasnoznamensk, the loca- commanders of air–space defence brigades. Reform
tion of the outer-space observation control station in has only affected these units organisationally; they
Kaliningrad; and the headquarters of Russian Space have not been relocated, given the need to maintain
Forces in Moscow. wide geographical coverage for effective employ-
Russia 187
Russia
The desired number of constant-readiness combined- fleet within a decade. Sixteen corvettes are planned
arms brigades continues to be adjusted, but 47 were for deployment in the Caspian Sea Flotilla.
planned at the time of writing. Development of The contract for Russia’s acquisition of four Mistral-
the concept of three categories of brigade – heavy, class amphibious-assault ships was signed with France
medium and light – apparently continues, although in June. The second two are to be built in Russia by the
there has been little further reporting on ‘test’ brigades United Shipbuilding Corporation, with the relevant
noted in The Military Balance 2011 ( p. 176). contracts due to be signed in 2012. The vessels will be
Heavy brigades are intended to be primarily assigned to the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Russian
armed with main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry media have reported the testing of Ka-52 helicopters
fighting vehicles (IFVs). Medium brigades will be in maritime conditions, as a likely prelude to deploy-
armed mainly with IFVs and armoured personnel ment on the Mistrals when in service. Meanwhile, it
carriers (APCs) mounted on a planned new Universal has been announced that the Borey-class ballistic-
Combat Vehicle platform. Light brigades will be missile submarine Yuriy Dolgorukiy will be posted to
armed with APCs and other light armoured combat the Pacific Fleet. Although it was indicated that this
vehicles. Two new Arctic brigades are also planned, would take place when tests of the Bulava SLBM had
in light of Russia’s economic and political interests been completed, the slow progress seen in the Bulava
in the region, and in pursuance of the Russian state test schedule has led some to argue that the service
policy for the Arctic to 2020 and beyond, which was induction of the submarine should not be delayed.
published in 2008. These brigades are likely to be Three more Borey-class boats are expected, one of
based around Murmansk or Archangelsk, but even which has already been launched and two that are
in the early stages of their establishment concerns under construction in Severodvinsk. Three Delta-III
have arisen over mobility, equipment and the loss of submarines remain in service in the Pacific Fleet, but
extreme cold-weather skills. due to their age are scheduled to be decommissioned
One view is that the delay in the adoption of the as soon as Borey-class submarines arrive.
new brigade structures is the result of the MoD’s not
yet having selected the new combat-vehicle platform: Military police
one option is based on a modification of the chassis After repeated announcements and cancellations,
developed as part of the Armata new-generation MBT the creation of a military-police service was finally
programme. There has been no apparent progress decreed in 2011. The service is to be 20,000 strong and
towards the goal of attaching a helicopter regiment will be led by Lt-Gen. Sergei Surovikin, a much-deco-
to air-assault brigades to aid tactical mobility (see The rated officer with a colourful career, and lately chief
Military Balance 2011, p. 177). Meanwhile, Makarov of staff of the Central Military District. The service
announced at the end of September that the armed is to be created in two stages. Firstly, traffic control
forces would cease purchasing Kalashnikov AK-74 sub-units (‘regulators’) and commandants’ offices
assault rifles. The army had too many automatic (broadly equivalent to the UK concept of regimental
weapons, Makarov was reported as saying, and they police) will be combined into a temporary ‘provost
no longer suited the military. and control’ service. Subsequently, following the
188 The Military Balance 2012
drafting of legal statutes, this service will be devel- Russia of the global financial crisis, military expen-
oped into a fully fledged military-police force respon- diture saw a real-terms hike in 2009 to above 3% of
sible for patrols, security of detention quarters, GDP. This level was broadly maintained during 2010
general law enforcement in garrisons and barracks, and 2011, but defence spending is set to rise further
assistance in preventing humiliating or violent treat- as a proportion of GDP from 2012 onwards, to at
ment of junior ranks (‘hazing’), assisting the civil least 3.8% of GDP by 2014. This projected increase,
police in combatting crime among service personnel, contained in the draft three-year budget for 2012–
and apprehending deserters. 14, comes despite the continued underperformance
It has been confirmed that the service is to be sepa- of the Russian economy, with growth in 2010 and
rate from the garrison chain of command, after it was 2011 running at a modest 4%, because of persistent
argued that this was essential to its independence weaknesses in the banking sector (which remains
and credibility. But analysts point out that a serious burdened by a large stock of non-performing loans)
impediment to creating an effective military-police and the generally uncertain business climate which
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
force will be the recruitment of necessary specialists, has resulted in chronic underinvestment. (Fixed
and that no relevant training has yet been arranged investment in Russia is considerably lower than
in Russia. When he met German Defence Minister many other emerging economies.)
Thomas de Maizière in September, Serdyukov was The projected increase in defence spending can
reported as expressing interest in Germany’s experi- be explained by two factors. Firstly, pay rates for
ence in creating military-police units. Similar struc- MoD servicemen will increase from the beginning
tures in other countries have been studied as part of 2012. Secondly, spending will increase sharply
of the MoD’s renewed efforts to learn from overseas because of increased budget allocations under the
practice. new state armaments programme (see below). It is
estimated that full implementation of the armaments
Russian defence ECONOMICS programme could lead to spending on national
defence of more than 4% of GDP by 2015. In addi-
From 2000–07, Russia’s economy grew at an average tion, analysis must not omit expenditure on Russia’s
annual rate of some 7%, while export earnings from other armed forces, notably the interior troops of the
oil and gas generated healthy budget surpluses. In Ministry of Internal Affairs, and on items of military
this period, military spending began to recover from spending under other budget chapters.
the very low levels seen during the 1990s. However, If present trends are maintained, Russia could
careful analysis is required to assess real spending soon be spending at least 5% of GDP on defence.
trends. With rapidly escalating costs of weapons and However, it is debatable whether Moscow will be
other materials, the consumer price index does not able to sustain such a substantial commitment to
provide an adequate deflator for assessing spending military spending increases, given other urgent
in real terms; a more realistic perspective can be claims on the budget, such as pensions and other
obtained by using the annual GDP deflator, a broader social costs, as well as infrastructure spending and
index that more fully reflects price trends relating to the demands of ‘modernisation’ promoted by both
goods and services purchased by government agen- President Medvedev and his likely successor, Putin.
cies. Spending under the budget chapter ‘national It cannot, therefore, be ruled out that the new arma-
defence’ includes outlays on MoD forces, nuclear ments programme will be amended or replaced at an
weapons and various other categories of direct mili- early date.
tary support. As shown in Table 16, this grew much
in line with GDP growth during Vladimir Putin’s Procurement
first term as president (2000–04). However, things Since 2009, the system of arms procurement for the
changed during Putin’s second term, as growth in Russian armed forces – and, above all, the MoD – has
defence spending started to lag behind GDP growth. been undergoing a potentially significant change.
In 2007, it fell to 2.5% of GDP. Under the system inherited from the Soviet Union the
This declining trend was dramatically reversed military customer had very limited market power.
after the August 2008 war with Georgia. Military Instead, the defence industry was the dominant party,
reform and modernisation became a national able to dictate the range of weapons available, the
priority. Notwithstanding the severe impact on volumes supplied and the prices demanded. Under
Russia 189
Russia
2011 53,274.0 4.29% 1,532.80 5.12% 2.88%
2012 58,683.0 4.08% 1,853.34 12.94% 3.16%
2013 64,803.0 4.05% 2,329.41 17.39% 3.59%
2014 72,493.0 4.00% 2,737.44 10.23% 3.78%
Sources: Federal Service of State Statistics (Rosstat), Russian Ministry of Finance, Kremlin Annual Laws on Budget
Implementation, 2011 budget and 2012–14 draft budget.
1
National defence expenditure figures 2000–10 reflect actual expenditure, figure for 2011 reflects the amended federal
budget, and 2012–14 figures reflect the draft national budget.
Serdyukov, the MoD has at last addressed these prob- from the initial year. Thus it overestimates the rise
lems. As part of a more general reform of the armed in procurement expenditure by failing to take into
forces, it has reorganised the acquisition process, account inflationary effects. Simulations based on
effectively reviving a relatively new civilian agency likely estimates of future GDP growth and inflation
for ordering armaments and other military hardware, suggest that total funding is more likely to be in the
Rosoboronpostavka, which will work alongside the region of around R14tr at constant 2011 prices.
control agency, Rosoboronzakaz. Rosoboronpostavka The placing of military orders in 2011 was compli-
was set up by former Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov cated by the reform of the acquisitions system; a delay
in 2007 but remained moribund until the 2010 in the replacement of Vladimir Popovkin, first deputy
appointment, by Serdyukov, of Nadezhda Sinikova defence minister for procurement, by Aleksandr
to lead the body. Its precise relationship with the Sukhorukov, formerly head of Rosoboronzakaz; the
military’s organisation for material and technical transition to longer, three-year, orders; and the adop-
provision (MTO) remains unclear, with the latter tion of a new system of state-guaranteed credits for
believed to be focused more the maintenance of mili- arms producers. But perhaps the most significant
tary hardware and armament than orders (see The factor was a tough new approach by the MoD, which
Military Balance 2011, p. 179). This development coin- for the first time acted as a demanding customer,
cided with the elaboration and approval, at the end of insisting on a supply of modern weapons meeting its
2010, of a new ten-year state armaments programme requirements, and on acceptable prices justified by
to 2020. This highly ambitious programme provides actual costs incurred.
for a total budget funding of R23tr (around US$7.5bn
at 2011 exchange rates) for the entire armed forces Defence industry
(including R19–20tr allocated to the MoD), and it will The Russian defence industry has exhibited rela-
shape the annual state defence order over the coming tively strong growth in recent years, with much of
decade. Of the total funding, 31% has been allocated this driven by exports. However, it has contracted
to the period 2011–15, the remaining 69% to 2016–20. since the Soviet era. Output levels of armaments and
However, the projected volume of funding may not other military hardware remain significantly below
be as large as it first appears. Unlike earlier Russian 1991 levels, and many of the remaining enterprises
armaments programmes, to 2010 and 2015, the new and R&D organisations operate with obsolete equip-
programme is calculated at current prices, not prices ment and relatively aged employees. According
190 The Military Balance 2012
3.5
3.06
3.0 2.77 2.73 2.69 2.84
2.69
2.53 2.53 2.50 2.52
2.5
% of GDP
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
to Russian data, by the first half of 2011 military to both Boeing and Airbus; and Russia’s largest truck
output was little more than half its 1991 level, while plant, KamAZ, whose products include an expanding
the civilian output of the defence industry was just range of vehicles for the military.
over three-quarters. Because of a change of defini- Of the other corporate structures, the three
tion a few years ago, the precise scale of the defence largest after Rostekhnologii are the United Aircraft
industry is now difficult to establish. Since the mid- Corporation, incorporating all the main developers
2000s, there has been an official register of organisa- and manufacturers of fixed-wing aircraft; the United
tions engaged in military work. This includes some Shipbuilding Corporation, which now includes most
1,380 enterprises and R&D organisations, including of Russia’s naval R&D, design organisations and
683 overseen by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, shipyards; and Almaz-Antey, bringing together more
290 in the Rostekhnologii (Russian Technologies) than 40 entities responsible for air-defence systems.
corporation (see below), 197 under the MoD, 84 These corporations are all state owned. The present-
belonging to the Russian Space Agency and 49 under day Russian defence industry now has relatively few
Rosatom, the nuclear industry agency. Of the organ- fully private companies; many enterprises, if not fully
isations formerly belonging to the Soviet defence state owned, have large enough state shareholdings
industry, some 1,700 remain. They employ around to secure effective state control.
2m people (1.5m in manufacturing and 500,000 in Since the early 1990s, the Russian defence industry
R&D), compared with 5.5m in 1991. has received little new investment, and today those
A recent development has been a process of corpo- companies with relatively modern production equip-
ratisation, whereby formerly independent companies ment tend to be those with regular export orders.
have been grouped into large corporate structures. Enterprises mainly serving the domestic market,
The largest is the state corporation Rostekhnologii, fulfilling orders for the MoD, are often in a less satis-
created at the end of 2007. In terms of scale, this is factory state, raising questions as to their ability to
comparable to a Soviet-era industrial ministry. It now manufacture the modern systems now demanded
has almost 600 enterprises and R&D organisations, by the armed forces. Furthermore, many enterprises,
including 330 from the defence complex, grouped especially those without an export orientation, are
into 25 holding companies, with a total employment unable to offer high wages and salaries. They find
of some 600,000. At the heart of the corporation is it difficult to recruit young personnel and often
the state arms-export company Rosoboronexport, continue to employ many specialists and skilled
whose former general director, Sergei Chemezov, is workers beyond the normal male retirement age of 60.
now director of Rostekhnologii. Its constituent units Whereas in 1990 the average age of defence industry
also include the diversified group Oboronprom personnel was 39 years, by 2008 it had reached 50.
(which includes Vertolety Rossii, Russia’s successful For R&D and design personnel, the average age is
producer of military and civil helicopters, and United now probably much higher. Again, export-orientated
Aero-Engine Corporation); the ‘VSMPO-AVISMA’ companies are often in a position to offer competitive
titanium plant, which has become a major supplier rates of pay and recruit young employees.
Russia 191
Another problem facing the industry is that growing volume of helicopters. Naval equipment,
many enterprises lack modern quality-manage- air-defence systems and armour for ground forces
ment systems. There is mounting evidence that also feature heavily.
both domestic and foreign customers have been Russia now faces two main problems. Firstly, it
experiencing quality problems with armaments needs to develop a new generation of armaments
delivered. with export prospects, as most systems now offered
Notwithstanding these and other problems, represent modernised variants of Soviet-era weapons.
Russia occupies a significant position in the world Secondly, it needs to develop new export markets, as
armaments market, second only to the US by annual several important existing export markets, notably
volume of sales. According to the Russian Federal China and India, seek to increase their own arms-
Service for Military–Technical Cooperation, the manufacturing capabilities. Venezuela, some North
government oversight agency for arms exports, the African and some Middle Eastern countries have
volume of exports increased from US$3.7bn in 2000 become important clients, although political change
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
to US$10.4bn in 2010, with a forecast of more than wrought by the Arab Awakening may open some
Russia
US$11.5bn for 2011. Sales are dominated by aircraft, former markets for Russian defence material to other
notably Sukhoi combat aircraft, but also by a steadily producers.
192 The Military Balance 2012
Organisations by Service
Russia RUS
Russian Rouble r 2010 2011 2012 Strategic Deterrent Forces ε80,000 (incl
GDP r 44.9tr 53.5tr personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)
US$ 1.48tr 1.84tr Navy
US$ a 2.23tr 2.38tr SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 12
per capita US$ 10,593 13,270 3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 Stingray)
Growth % 4.00 4.29 strategic SLBM;
Inflation % 6.9 8.9
5 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 RSM-54 (SS-N-23 Skiff)
strategic SLBM;
Def exp r 1.98tr
1 Delfin (Delta IV) in refit with 16 RSM-52 (SS-N-23
US$ 65.2bn Skiff) strategic SLBM;
US$a 98.5bn 2 Akula (Typhoon) in reserve awaiting decommissioning
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Def bdgt r 1.28tr 1.53tr 1.85tr with 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20 Sturgeon) strategic SLBM;
US$ 41.9bn 52.7bn 1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve with capacity for 20
RSM-52 (SS-N-20) Sturgeon strategic SLBM/Bulava (SS-
US$ a 63.4bn 68.0bn
N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing);
US$1=r MER 30.43 29.08 (2 Borey limited OC undergoing sea trials; 2 additional
PPP 20.14 22.53 units in build)
a
PPP estimate
Strategic Rocket Force Troops
Population 138,739,892 3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers
Ethnic groups: Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%; organised in 12 divs (reducing to 8). Launcher gps
Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8% normally with 10 silos (6 for SS-18) and one control centre
MSL • STRATEGIC 292
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ICBM 292: 60 RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) (mostly mod 5, 10
Male 7.8% 2.7% 4.1% 4.2% 23.1% 3.9% MIRV per msl); 120 RS12M (SS-25 Sickle) (mobile single
Female 7.4% 2.6% 4.0% 4.2% 26.7% 9.1% warhead); 40 RS18 (SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod 3, 6
MIRV per msl.); 52 Topol-M (SS-27) silo-based/18 Topol
Capabilities M (SS-27) road mobile (single warhead); 12 RS-24 (ε3
Russia remains a significant power, with a substantial MIRV per msl)
nuclear arsenal. All three elements of the nuclear triad
are being revamped. Russia’s land and air forces continue
Long-Range Aviation Command
to draw lessons from its armed incursion into Georgia in FORCES BY ROLE
2008, which highlighted areas of comparative weakness. BOMBER
Within the army there is a recognition of the need for 1 sqn with Tu-160 Blackjack
greater networking and digital communications, while the 3 sqn with Tu-95MS Bear
air force is attempting to bolster its inventory of precision- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
guided tactical air-to-surface weaponry. The defence AIRCRAFT •
reform process initiated in 2008 continues. 2012 is due LRSA 79: 16 Tu-160 Blackjack each with up to 12 Kh-
to see new pay and pension scales, to make military pay 55 SM (AS-15A/B Kent) nuclear ALCM; 32 Tu-95MS6
more competitive with the civilian sector and try to ensure (Bear H-6) each with up to 6 Kh-55/SM (AS-15A/B Kent)
recruitment and retention of more contract servicemen. nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS16 (Bear H-16) each with up
Meanwhile, Russia will retain conscription. Not all defence to 16 Kh-55 (AS-15A Kent) nuclear ALCM
budget funding has materialised, while industry has not
always been able to fulfil orders. Moscow continues to Warning Forces 3rd Space and Missile
exercise its armed forces regularly, including medium- and Defence Army
large-scale all-arms training. The state remains capable of ICBM/SLBM launch-detection capability: 3 operational
deploying a significant force regionally and a smaller force satellites
at greater range. RADAR (9 stations) 1 ABM engagement system
ACTIVE 956,000 (Army 270,000 Airborne 35,000 located at Sofrino (Moscow). Russia leases ground-
Navy 154,000 Air 167,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus); Balkhash
80,000 Command and Support 250,000) Paramilitary (Kazakhstan); Gaballa (Azerbaijan). It also has radars on
its own territory at Lekhtusi, (St Petersburg); Armavir,
474,000
(southern Russia); Olenegorsk (northwest Arctic);
Terms of service: 12 months conscription.
Pechora (northwest Urals); Mishelevka (east Siberia).
RESERVE 20,000,000 (all arms) MISSILE DEFENCE 2,064: 32 SH-11 Gorgon (stored
Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; Reserve or withdrawn); 68 SH-08 Gazelle; 1,900 S-300 (SA-10
obligation to age 50. Grumble); 64 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Russia 193
Army ε205,000 (incl 35,000 AB); ε100,000 SP 1,820: 122mm 400 2S1; 152mm 1,400: 800 2S3; 150 2S5;
conscript (total 305,000) 450 2S19; 203mm 20 2S7; (4,050 in store: 122mm 1,800 2S1;
Russia
Transformation process continues; previous 6 Military 152mm 1,950: 1,000 2S3; 800 2S5; 150 2S19; 203mm 300 2S7)
Districts have been consolidated into 4 (West (HQ St TOWED 550: 122mm 400 D-30; 152mm 150 2A65; (12,215
Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ in store: 122mm 7,950: 4,200 D-30; 3,750 M-30 M-1938;
Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk), each with a 130mm 650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36; 600 2A65;
unified Joint Strategic Command. Current plans call for the 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 M-1943; 100 ML-20 M-1937; 203mm
establishment of 28 new bdes (6 MR; 2 air aslt; 1 engr; 1 AD 40 B-4M)
& 18 army avn), and for the restructuring of the existing MR GUN/MOR 970+
brigades into new light, medium and heavy formations. SP 120mm 870+: 790 2S9 NONA-S; 30 2S23 NONA-
SVK; 50+ 2S34
FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K
COMMAND
MRL 1,106+ 122mm 800 BM-21; 220mm 200 9P140
10 army HQ
Uragan; 300mm 106 9A52 Smerch; (2,920 in store: 122mm
SPECIAL FORCES 2,120: 1,700 BM-21; 420 9P138; 132mm 100 BM-13; 220mm
7 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 700 9P140 Uragan)
1 (AB Recce) SF regt MOR 990
MANOEUVRE SP 240mm 20 2S4; (410 2S4 in store)
Reconnaissance TOWED 970+: 120mm 970: 50+ 2B23; 920 2S12; (2,100
1 recce bde in store: 120mm 1,800: 900 2S12; 900 PM-38; 160mm
Armoured 300 M-160)
4 tk bde (1 armd recce bn; 3 tk bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AT
MRL bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy) MSL • SP & MANPATS 9K11/9K14 Malyutka (AT-3
Mechanised Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K112 Kobra (AT-8
1 (201st) MR div Songster); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm
31 MR bde (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 MR bn; 2 arty bn; 1 (AT-6 Spiral); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-1
MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K116 Bastion/Basnya (AT-
NBC coy) 10 Stabber); 9K119 Reflex/Svir (AT-11 Sniper); 9K123
2 MR bde (4—5 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn) Khrisantema (AT-15 Springer); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 MR bn; 1 arty bn) Spriggan); 9M120 Ataka (AT-12 Swinger)
1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 RCL 73mm SPG-9
AD bn) RL 105mm RPG-27/RPG-29
GUNS 562+
Air Manoeuvre
SP: 125mm 36+ 2S25
4 (VdV) AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD
TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12; (100mm 2,000 T-12/
regt)
MT-12 in store)
1 (VdV) indep AB bde
AD
SAM 1,570+
3 (army) air aslt bde SP 1,320+: 350+ 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 400
COMBAT SUPPORT 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko); 400 9K35M3 Strela-10
8 arty bde (SA-13 Gopher); 120+ 9K330/9K331 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet)
4 MRL bde SPAAGM 250+ 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison)
2 MRL regt MANPAD Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18
1 SSM bde with Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) Grouse): 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-
8 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab — to be replaced 14 Gremlin)
by Iskander-M) GUNS
10 AD bde SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
1 engr bde TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
194 The Military Balance 2012
UAV • Heavy Tu-143 Reys; Tu-243 Reys/Tu-243 Reys-D; Tu- 4 Schuka (Victor III) (of which 1 in reserve) with 4
300 Korshun Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21
MSL • SSM 200+: 200 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); some Sampson) SLCM, 2 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT
Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone); (some FROG in store; some Scud SSK 20:
in store) 15 Paltus (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-53
AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IRM; MT-LB HWT
ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/D/K/L; BREhM-D; BTR-50PK(B); 4 Varshavyanka (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT
M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A 1 Lada with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels
VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2 in build)
MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2 SUPPORT 8
SSAN 7: 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch) (undergoing
Reserves maintenance in late 2011); 1 Losharik; 2 Project 1851
Cadre formations, on mobilisation form (Paltus); 3 Kashalot (Uniform)
MANOEUVRE SSA 1 Sarov
Armoured PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 32
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
10 single 533mm ASTT, 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 2 Grachonok with 4 9K38 Igla SAM (one further vessel
Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) under construction; original design was as diving
DDGM 1: tender)
1 Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin mod) with 2 quad PHG 4 Vekhr (Matka) with 2 single lnchr with P-15M
lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, Termit (SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM
2 twin lnchr with Volnya (SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single PHT 1 Sokol (Mukha) with 2 quad 406mm TT (currently
533mm ASTT, 1 twin 76mm gun in reserve following damage in 2007)
FRIGATES 8 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 53
FFGHM 2: MHO 2 Rubin (Gorya) (of which one laid up in 2011 for
2 Jastreb (Neustrashimy) with 4 octuple VLS with repair)
3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 6 single MSO 10 Akvamaren (Natya); 1 Agat (Natya II)
533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000, 1 100mm gun, (capacity MSC 23 Yakhont (Sonya); 2 Project 1258 (Yevgenya)
1 Ka-27 Helix ASW) (3rd in build) MHI 15: 9 Sapfir (Lida); 3 Project 696 (Tolya); 3 Malakhit
FFGM 6: (Olya)
1 Gepard with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 AMPHIBIOUS 39
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Russia
(2nd vessel on trials) 1 Project 771 (Polnochny B) (5 more in reserve)
1 Burevestnik (Krivak I mod) with 1 quad lnchr with (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)
Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 1 twin lnchr LST 19:
with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm 4 Tapir (Alligator) (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
ASTT, 2 twin 76mm gun 12 Project 775 (Ropucha I) (capacity either 10 MBT
2 Burevestnik M (Krivak II) each with 1 quad lnchr with and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)
RPK-3 Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 2 twin 3 Project 775M (Ropucha II) (capacity either 10 MBT
lnchr with 10 Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2 quad and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)
533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 (24 eff.), 2 100mm gun (1 Tapir (Alligator (mod)) (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B; 13
2 Steregushchiy with 2 quad lnchr with Kashtan (SA-N- MBT; 300 troops) (expected ISD 2012)
11 Grisson) SAM, 1 100mm gun (4 additional vessels in LANDING CRAFT 19
build, of which one is an improved Steregushchiy II) LCU 5:
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 80 1 Dyagon (launched July 2009; expected ISD 2012;
CORVETTES 47: four more in build)
FSGM 15: 4 Project 11770 (Serna) (capacity 100 troops)
2 Sivuchi (Dergach) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 LCM 7 Akula (Ondatra) (capacity 1 MBT)
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with LCAC 7:
Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 76mm gun 2 Dzheryan (Aist) (capacity 4 lt tk)
12 Ovod (Nanuchka III) with 2 triple lnchr with P-120 2 Pomornik (Zubr) (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT
Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with or 10 APC (T)
Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko), 1 76mm gun 3 Kalmar (Lebed) (capacity 2 lt tk)
1 Ovod (Nanuchka IV) with 2 triple lnchr with 3M55 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 249
Onix (SS-N-26) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA- A significant element of the RUS Auxiliary and Support
N-4 Gecko), 1 76mm gun Fleet (estimated at 370+ vessels) is either no longer active,
FSM 32: at extended readiness or awaiting disposal.
3 Albatros (Grisha III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M AOR 5 Boris Chilikin
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU AOL 13: 2 Dubna; 5 Uda; 6 Altay (mod)
6000 Smerch 2 AORL 3: 1 Kaliningradneft; 2 Olekma
21 Albatros (Grisha V) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M AWT 2 Manych
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU AS 3: 1 Project 2020 (Malina); 2 Amga (msl spt ship)
6000 Smerch 2, 1 76mm gun ARS 14: 4 Mikhail Rudnitsky; 10 Goryn
8 Parchim II (one in reserve following a fire in 2008) AR 13 Amur
with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 ARC 7: 4 Emba; 3 Klasma
twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 76mm gun AG 2 Vytegrales
PATROL CRAFT 33: ATF 48: 2 Baklazhan; 5 Katun; 3 Ingul; 2 Neftegaz; 14
PCFG 25: Okhtensky; 18 Prometey; 1 Prut; 3 Sliva
6 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M AH 3 Ob †
Termit (SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM AGOR 6: 2 Akademik Krylov; 2 Sibiriyakov, 2 Vinograd
19 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80 AGE 2: 1 Tchusovoy; 1 Zvezdochka
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM AGSH 4: 1 Samara; 3 Vaygach
PCM 3: AGI 12: 2 Alpinist; 2 Balzam; 2 Moma; 6 Vishnya
1 Astrakhan (Buyan) with some 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 AGM 1 Marshal Nedelin
Gimlet) SAM, 1 100mm gun (two more vessels in AGS 18: 3 BGK-797; 6 Kamenka; 9 Onega
build) AGS(I) 52: 8 Biya; 25 Finik; 7 Moma; 12 Yug
196 The Military Balance 2012
1 sqn with Mi-8PPA Hip Alamo A/C); R-33/33S (AA-9 Amos A/B); ARH R-77 (A-12
ISR Adder) K-37M (AA-X-13) (due to complete development
Russia
1 sqn with MIG-25RB Foxbat* by end 2011); PRH R-27P/EP (AA-10 Alamo E/F)
8 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer*
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter); Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-
1 flt with An-30 Clank
15P (AS-16 Kickback) Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-13
1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay
Kingbolt/AS-18 Kazoo); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-31A (AS-
TANKER
17 Krypton); Kh-38 (AS-XX — in development)
1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M Midas
LACM Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-55/55SM (AS-15 Kent
TRANSPORT
A/B); Kh-101; Kh-102 (in development); Kh-555 (AS-15C)
7 (mixed) sqn with An-12 Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/
BOMBS • Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L • TV-guided
Mi-8 Hip/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-154 Careless
2 sqn with An-124 Condor KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD;UPAB 1500
1 flt with An-12BK Cub
1 sqn with An-22 Cock Russian Military Districts
13 sqn with Il-76MD Candid
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Western Military District
(ex-Leningrad & Moscow Military Districts & Kalinin-
1 sqn (forming) with Ka-52A Hokum B
13 sqn with Mi-24 Hind grad Special Region) HQ at St Petersburg
2 sqn (forming) with Mi-28N Havoc B
Army
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
17 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE COMMAND
35 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) (quad); S-300PM 2 army HQ
(SA-20 Gargoyle (quad) SPECIAL FORCES
2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler) (two more planned in 2 (Spetsnaz) bde
2012). 1 (AB Recce) bn
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 1,793 combat capable Armoured
BBR 251: 172 Tu-22M/M-3/MR Backfire C; 32 Tu-95MS6 2 tk bde
Bear; 31 Tu-95MS16 Bear; 16 Tu-160 Blackjack Mechanised
FTR 786: 226 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 40 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 218 5 MR bde
MiG-31/31BM Foxhound; 281 Su-27 Flanker; 21 Su-27UB Air Manoeuvre
Flanker 3 (VdV) AB div
FGA 356: 28 MiG-29 SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT COMBAT SUPPORT
Fulcrum; 232 Su-24/Su-24M Fencer; 12 Su-24M2 Fencer; 2 arty bde
1 MRL bde
48 Su-27SM2 Flanker; 12 Su-27SM3 (being delivered); 4 1 bde with Iskander-M
Su-30M2; 14 Su-34 Fullback 2 bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
ATK 256: 241 Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB 2 AD bde
Frogfoot
ISR 148: 4 An-30 Clank; 20 MiG-25RB Foxbat*; 124 Su- Reserves
24MR Fencer* FORCES BY ROLE
AEW&C 20 A-50 Mainstay/A-50U Mainstay MANOEUVRE
C&C 4 Il-87 Maxdome Armoured
TKR 20 Il-78/Il-78M Midas 1 tk bde
TPT 337: Heavy 151: 12 An-124 Condor; 21 An-22 Cock Mechanised
(Under MoD control); 118 Il-76MD/MF Candid; Medium 2 MR bde
198 The Military Balance 2012
Army Army
Russia
FORCES BY ROLE FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND COMMAND
2 army HQ 2 army HQ
SPECIAL FORCES SPECIAL FORCES
1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
MANOEUVRE MANOEUVRE
Armoured Reconnaissance
1 recce bde
1 tk bde
Mechanised
Mechanised
7 MR bde
1 (201st) MR div
2 MR bde (Armenia)
7 MR bde
1 MR bde (Abkhazia)
Air Manoeuvre
1 MR bde (South Ossetia)
1 (VdV) AB bde
3 (lt/mtn) MR bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
Air Manoeuvre
1 arty bde
1 (VdV) AB div
1 MRL regt
1 (army) air aslt bde
2 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 AD bde
1 arty bde
1 MRL bde
Reserves
1 MRL regt
FORCES BY ROLE 1 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised Black Sea Fleet
3 MR bde The RUS Fleet is leasing bases in Sevastopol and
Karantinnaya Bay, and is based, jointly with UKR
Military Air Force warships, at Streletskaya Bay.
2nd Air Force & Air Defence Command EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 1 SSK (also 1 Som
(ex-5th & elm ex-14th Air Army)
(Tango) in reserve)
FORCES BY ROLE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5: 2 CGHM;
FIGHTER 1 DDGM; 2 FFGM
4 sqn with MiG-31 Foxhound PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16: 4
GROUND ATTACK FSGM; 6 FSM; 1 PHM; 5 PCFG
2 sqn with Su-24 Fencer MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9:
ISR 1 MCO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E AMPHIBIOUS 8: 7 LST; 1 LCU
TRANSPORT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6+
3 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; Il-86; Tu-134
Crusty; Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip Naval Aviation
ATTACK HELICOPTER FORCES BY ROLE
2 sqn with Mi-24 Hind FIGHTER
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR
3 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo 2 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer
200 The Military Balance 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
Naval Infantry COMMAND
FORCES BY ROLE 4 army HQ
MANOEUVRE SPECIAL FORCES
Mechanised 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
1 naval inf bde MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Coastal Defence 1 tk bde
1 battalion with 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Stooge) Mechanised
10 MR bde
Caspian Sea Flotilla 1 MGA div
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Air Manoeuvre
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1 FFGM 2 (army) air aslt bde
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6: 2 COMBAT SUPPORT
PCFG; 3 PHG; 1 PCM 4 arty bde
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7: 2 MRL bde
5 MSC; 2 MHI 3 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
AMPHIBIOUS 10: 2 LCM; 3 LCU; 5 LCAC 4 AD bde
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5+
Reserves
Military Air Force FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
4th Air Force & Air Defence Command Mechanised
(ex 4th Air Army)
8 MR bde
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER Pacific Fleet
3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum (Armenia) SUBMARINES 21
3 sqn with Su-27 Flanker STRATEGIC 3 SSBN
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK TACTICAL 18: 5 SSGN; 4 SSN; 9 SSK
1 sqn with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9: 1 CGHM;
GROUND ATTACK 8 DDGHM (of which one in reserve)
4 sqn with Su-24M Fencer PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23: 4
6 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot FSGM; 9 FSM; 10 PCFG
ISR MINE WARFARE 8: 2 MSO; 5 MSC; 1 MHI
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer-E AMPHIBIOUS 4 LST
TRANSPORT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15+
1 sqn with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip
ATTACK HELICOPTER Naval Aviation
3 sqn with Mi-24 Hind FORCES BY ROLE
2 sqn (forming) with Mi-28N Havoc B ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo 1 sqn with Il-38 May*
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J*
AIRCRAFT TRANSPORT
FTR 121: 63 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 58 Su-27 Flanker 2 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl
Russia 201
Russia
Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
2 sqn with An-124 Condor
MANOEUVRE
1 flt with An-12BK Cub
Other
1 sqn with An-22 Cock
1 coastal def bde
13 sqn with Il-76MD Candid
Military Air Force EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT 157 Heavy 151: 12 An-124 Condor;
3rd Air Force & Air Defence Command 21 An-22 Cock (Under MoD control); 118 Il-76MD/MF
(ex 11th & elms 14th AF and AD Army) Candid Medium 6 An-12BK Cub
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
Paramilitary 474,000
3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum Federal Border Guard Service ε160,000
3 sqn with MiG-31 Foxhound active
4 sqn with Su-27SM2 Flanker; Su-30M2 Directly subordinate to the president; now reportedly
GROUND ATTACK all contract-based personnel
4 sqn with Su-24M/M2 Fencer FORCES BY ROLE
5 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot 10 regional directorates
ISR MANOEUVRE
3 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer-E Other
TRANSPORT 7 frontier gp
2 sqn with An-12 Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/Tu- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
134 Crusty/Tu-154 Careless AIFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR
ATTACK HELICOPTER ARTY • SP 90: 122mm 2S1 Carnation; 120mm 2S12;
2 sqn with Mi-24 Hind 120mm 2S9 Anona
1 sqn (forming) with Ka-52A Hokum B PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER FRIGATES • FFGHM 7 Nerey (Krivak III) each with
5 sqn with Mi-8 Hind/Mi-26 Halo 1 twin Inchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) naval SAM,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 quad 533mm TT Inchr, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 Inchr,
(capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix A ASW hel; 1 100mm)
AIRCRAFT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 220
FTR 104: 60 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 44 MiG-31 Foxhound
CORVETTES • FSM 3: 1 Albatros (Grisha II); 2 Albatros
FGA 130: 70 Su-24M Fencer; 10 Su-24M2 Fencer; 48
(Grisha III)
Su-27SM2 Flanker; 2 Su-30M2
PCM 46:
ATK 72 Su-25 Frogfoot 2 Molnya II (Pauk II) each with 1 quad Inchr with SA-
ISR 28 Su-24MR Fencer-E* N-5 Grail naval SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT Inchr, 2 RBU
TPT 22 An-12 Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl; 1 Tu- 1200 Inchr, 1 76mm
134 Crusty; 1 Tu-154 Careless 27 Svetljak (Svetlyak) each with 1 quad Inchr with SA-
HELICOPTERS N-5 Grail naval SAM, 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm
ATK 32: 24 Mi-24 Hind; 8 Ka-52A Hokum B 17 Molnya I (Pauk I) each with 1 quad Inchr with SA-
TPT 48 Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo Medium 56 Mi-8 Hip N-5 Grail naval SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm
AD • SAM S-300P (SA-10 Grumble) PHT 2 Antares (Muravey)
202 The Military Balance 2012
Kyrgyzstan Syria
Military Air Forces ε500; 5 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip spt hel Army/Navy 150; 1 naval facility under renovation at
Tartus
Liberia
UN • UNMIL 4 obs Tajikistan
Army 5,000; 1 mil base (subord Volga-Ural MD) with (1
Middle East
MR div (201st – understrength); 54 T-72; 300 BMP-2/BTR-
UN • UNTSO 4 obs 80/MT-LB; 100 2S1/2S3/2S12/9P140 Uragan
Moldova/Transdnestr Military Air Forces 5 Su-25 Frogfoot; 4 Mi-8 Hip
Army ε1,500 (including 335 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 Ukraine
MBT/AIFV/APC;
Navy • Coastal Defence • 13,000 including Naval Infantry
Military Air Forces 7 Mi-24 Hind; some Mi-8 Hip (Marines) 1,100; 102 AIFV/APC: 24 arty
Serbia Navy Black Sea Fleet 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol:
OSCE • Kosovo 2 Strategic Deterrent Forces. Warning Forces; 2 radar
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Russia
UN • UNMISS 135; 6 obs; 1 hel coy
Western Sahara
Sudan
UN • MINURSO 21 obs
UN • UNISFA 1 obs
204 The Military Balance 2012
countries, Asia is becoming increasingly militarised. significant. Japan aims to develop major military plat-
In a regional context of strategic uncertainty, many forms, even though its defence spending remains stag-
Asian countries’ sustained rapid economic growth is nant. Tokyo’s revised National Defence Programme
providing substantially increased resources for their Guidelines, issued in December 2010, and its August
armed forces. Asian states’ growing defence budgets 2011 Defence White Paper have highlighted Tokyo’s
are being used to purchase increasingly sophisti- concerns over China’s military modernisation and
cated conventional military systems that poten- Beijing’s assertiveness in the East and South China
Asia
tially provide armed forces in the region with the Seas, as well as worries about North Korea’s nuclear
capacity to locate and destroy targets at longer ranges programme and provocative behaviour. Tokyo is
and with greater accuracy. Asian nations are also emphasising the development of its air and naval
expanding their capacities to deploy more substantial forces. The F-X fighter competition is a core near-
forces over greater distances. New equipment does term acquisition for the air force, but other crucial
not automatically translate into better military capa- programmes include expansion of Japan’s submarine
bilities, but when supplemented by developments in force and the construction of large helicopter carriers.
doctrine, training, C4ISR, logistic support and joint- South Korea’s military modernisation is
service operations – in circumstances in which local proceeding rapidly, with a similarly strong emphasis
defence industries are increasingly able to adapt, inte- on enhancing air and naval capabilities while main-
grate and sometimes produce advanced systems for taining a powerful army. Deterrence of North Korean
national purposes – it is apparent that many Asian aggression remains the armed forces’ primary oper-
armed forces are improving their all-round capabili- ational goal as they prepare to assume wartime
ties. operational control of both US and South Korean
forces on the Korean peninsula in 2015. However,
Military modernisation proceeds Seoul’s defence planners may also be thinking about
Clearly China and India, the region’s two major wider roles. The ROK navy is known to be plan-
emerging economies and aspirant powers, want to ning to defend Seoul’s territorial claims in the East
procure and indigenously develop advanced military Sea against the growing naval power of China and
systems and improve the effectiveness of their armed Japan. The air force continues to replenish its combat
forces, and they support expanding defence budgets inventory with F-15K long-range strike aircraft, and
for these purposes. In the past year, much media will order a further 40–60 new aircraft under the
coverage has focused on developments in China’s F-X-III programme. In the longer term, Korea plans to
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), notably its aircraft develop an indigenous fighter aircraft, the KF-X, for
carrier and J-20 fifth-generation combat-aircraft service after 2020.
programmes. However, other aspects of the PLA’s Taiwan’s defence thinking remains almost entirely
expanding capabilities, such as its anti-ship missile focused on maintaining a deterrent to Chinese mili-
and submarine programmes (see p. 211), are perhaps tary adventurism aimed at intimidating or occupying
more strategically significant, particularly for the US the island, which Beijing views as a renegade prov-
Navy. New Delhi, meanwhile, is providing substan- ince. During 2011, Taipei’s continued efforts to nego-
tially increased funding to develop the capabilities of tiate new defence contracts with the US caused some
206 The Military Balance 2012
Korean tensions remain high 50 missiles will be deployed on Yeonpyeong and Baeng-
The Korean peninsula has remained tense after North nyeong in 2012. Other measures include the upgrading
Korea’s sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and the purchase of 40
in March 2010 and its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in Surion amphibious assault helicopters, built locally but
November 2010. Regional and international concerns developed jointly with Eurocopter.
also continue over Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons and In March 2011, the ROK’s defence ministry announced
ballistic-missile programmes. a 73-point military reform plan aimed at strengthening
The 2010 provocations exposed weaknesses in the its armed forces’ deterrent capacity, including ‘early in-
armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK), particularly troduction of spy drones and stealth fighters’. At the IISS
in joint operations and anti-submarine warfare. With fur- Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in early June 2011, ROK
ther aggressive moves feared as the North’s armed forces Minister of National Defence Kim Kwan-jin said that Seoul
attempted to legitimise Kim Jong-il’s son and eventual would deliver ‘immediate and strong punishment’ in re-
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
successor, Kim Jong-un, the South Korean national as- sponse to any further provocation from Pyongyang. For
sembly decided to fortify Yeonpyeong, and in December detailed analysis of North Korean military capabilities,
2010 it approved funding to purchase Israeli-made Spike see the IISS Strategic Dossier, North Korean Security Chal-
GPS-guided missile systems. According to Yonhap, about lenges: a net assessment, published in July 2011.
friction. Taipei has been requesting F-16C/D combat will also cooperate with South Korea on Seoul’s KF-X
aircraft since 2006, to help maintain the credibility of aircraft programme.
the island’s armed forces in the face of both growing Malaysia had planned substantial military
Chinese military capabilities and Washington’s wish procurement under the 2011–15 Tenth Malaysia Plan.
not to be responsible for Taiwan’s defence. However, However, the 2012 budget was announced in October
the US has been anxious not to exacerbate its uneasy 2011 against a backdrop of strengthened political
strategic relations with Beijing. After blocking a opposition and the government’s recognition of the
renewed request from Taipei in June 2011 for 66 need to focus on social and developmental goals. As a
F-16C/Ds, Washington announced in September that result, it indicated slightly reduced defence spending.
it would instead sell Taiwan an upgrade programme Procurement projects were also postponed, including
for 145 F-16A/B aircraft acquired during the 1990s. the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) intended to
replace the air force’s MiG-29 fighters. Nevertheless,
Southeast Asia Malaysia has deployed two Scorpene submarines
that were delivered in 2009–10 and are now moving
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and towards operational capability. Supplementary
Vietnam are all investing rising defence budgets in defence funding of US$166m approved in August
improving air and naval capabilities. Their rationales 2011 was largely intended to support the submarines.
are diverse and complex, ranging from generalised Singapore’s defence spending remains the highest
concern over regional uncertainty to more specific in Southeast Asia and its armed forces the best
concerns over relations with neighbouring states. equipped, reflecting the government’s acute aware-
In April 2011, Indonesia’s navy successfully test- ness of the city-state’s distinct lack of strategic depth
launched a Russian-built Yakhont (3M-55/SS-N-26) and vulnerabilities in relation to potential regional
supersonic anti-ship missile, indicating its efforts to threats. The introduction into service of F-15SG
develop a sea-denial capability within its extensive combat aircraft and two Archer-class (ex-Swedish
archipelago, as a result of concerns over potential Västergötland-class) submarines, the first of which
intervention or interference by larger powers as well arrived in Singapore in August 2011, will substan-
rivalry with sub-regional peers, notably Malaysia. tially enhance the capabilities of the air force and
Indonesia’s defence industry is also collaborating navy respectively. But the Singapore Armed Forces
with Chinese companies on the C-705 and C-802 anti- are a balanced and highly integrated force, and
ship missiles. Another indication of Indonesia’s naval incremental re-equipment of army units with new
ambitions is its order for three new submarines from armoured vehicles and artillery continues.
South Korea in January 2012, following a bilateral Between October 2008 and May 2010, Thailand’s
defence MoU signed in September 2011. Indonesia armed forces were involved in sporadic border clashes
Asia 207
with those of neighbouring Cambodia, and there expand its overall Su-27/30 fleet to around 60 aircraft,
were also border tensions with Myanmar. Thailand is when delivered. Such forces are small compared with
also increasingly interested in protecting its extensive the PLA, but they may eventually be large enough to
maritime interests, and during 2011 a major defence complicate China’s military calculations.
issue was the navy’s plan to acquire as many as six Australia watches China’s growing military reach
submarines. Although the defence ministry returned warily, despite the close economic relations between
the navy’s bid for re-drafting in September 2011, it the two countries. Part of Canberra’s response to the
still seems likely that funding will be provided for pervasive strategic uncertainty of its region has been
the submarine procurement during Fiscal Year 2012. to enhance defence ties with the US, notably through
Meanwhile, the Royal Thai Air Force declared in July a September 2011 agreement that will allow greater
2011 that its six Gripen combat aircraft and associated US use of military bases in Australia and the prepo-
Erieye AEW platform had reached Phase 1 of opera- sitioning of US military equipment there. However,
tional capability. Under Phase 2 of the programme, under plans set out in the 2009 Defence White Paper
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
a further six fighters are scheduled to be in service the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is set to benefit
by 2013. A planned Phase 3 will see the integration of from a series of capability enhancements, including
Saab RBS-15F anti-ship missiles, giving the Gripens a a doubling of the navy’s submarine fleet in the long
maritime-strike capability. term and the acquisition of 100 F-35 joint strike
Vietnam is concerned about China’s renewed fighters. In June 2011 it was announced that an ADF
assertiveness towards its territorial claims in the Posture Review would be finalised early in 2012 and
South China Sea. Hanoi is making serious efforts would provide the context for the next defence white
Asia
to improve its naval and air capabilities. Central paper, scheduled for early 2014.
to plans for enhanced maritime capability are six
Project 636MV Kilo-class submarines, due for delivery The dangers of arms competition
between 2014 and 2017. In 2009–10, Hanoi also Concerns over China’s growing power and asser-
ordered 20 more Su-30MK combat aircraft; these will tiveness, doubts over the future US strategic role,
South China Sea tensions parent naval competition. In June 2011, China staged an
Gunboat diplomacy and brief confrontations between anti-submarine-warfare exercise off Hainan Island, one of
naval, paramilitary and civilian vessels continued in the six major exercises held by the People’s Liberation Army
South China Sea during 2011. Vietnam and the Philip- Navy (PLAN) that month. Beijing denied that these had
pines accused China several times of harassing their civil- anything to do with maritime disputes. More bellicose
ian oil-exploration vessels. Beijing, meanwhile, accused rhetoric paralleled these activities at sea. Editorials in
Vietnam’s navy of chasing away its civilian vessels. It also China’s state-run media in June and July claimed that ‘if
reiterated its right to patrol its ‘sovereign waters’ through- Vietnam wants to start a war, China has the confidence
out the South China Sea and prevent unauthorised re- to destroy invading Vietnam battleships’, and that ‘no-one
source exploitation there. should underestimate China’s resolve to protect every
Most of the reported incidents involved paramilitary inch of its territories’. Vietnam, in turn, allowed rare pro-
rather than naval vessels. China is making a concerted effort tests condemning China’s activities in the South China
to expand its maritime paramilitary forces, especially the Sea. These continued for nearly three months between
China Marine Surveillance (CMS) organisation controlled by June and August.
the State Oceanic Administration. Sun Shuxian, deputy di- In an attempt at dispute resolution, guidelines were
rector of the CMS, said in May 2011 that the agency would agreed in July 2011 to implement a 2002 Declaration of
expand its fleet by 36 vessels over the next five years and Conduct and a six-point Sino-Vietnamese agreement
recruit 1,000 more personnel. Increased patrolling by the reached in October. However, these agreements failed
CMS, along with the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command to advance the previous Declaration of Conduct, which
and the Maritime Safety Administration, have greatly ex- itself was non-binding and vague. Naval competition
panded China’s maritime footprint in the South China Sea. in the South China Sea is therefore likely to continue as
Nonetheless, naval activity has also increased. Live- procurements such as the purchase of submarines by
fire exercises in the sea by both China and Vietnam have Vietnam and Malaysia are made in an attempt to offset
heightened regional concerns about these countries’ ap- China’s improving surface capabilities.
208 The Military Balance 2012
anxiety over North Korea’s behaviour and renewed or above potential, concerns in Asia have centred on
worries over Taiwan’s security – all of these factors economic overheating and rising inflation, which was
allow Asian governments to justify increases to their projected to increase from a regional average of 3.85%
defence budgets. What makes contemporary Asian in 2009 to 7.72% in 2011.
military modernisation programmes potentially Growth in 2010 was highest in East Asia (aver-
dangerous is that they often reflect unspoken efforts aging 7.8%) and Southeast Asia (7.2%), led by
to hedge against the assumed ulterior motives of double-digit rates in China, Taiwan and Singapore
other regional players. This risks destabilising inter- (10.3%, 10.8% and 14.5% in 2010 respectively) on the
action between defence strategies, doctrines and back of high investment expenditure and private
capability-development programmes. consumption. Similar factors drove growth in
China’s strategists are thinking about how to Indonesia (6.1%), while the rebound in global trade
apply military power not just in relation to Taiwan in manufactured goods in late 2010 contributed to
but also in relation to the country’s territorial claims growth in Hong Kong (6.8%), South Korea (6.1%)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
in the East and South China Seas. Some Southeast and much of Southeast Asia – including in Thailand
Asian states are upgrading their armed forces not (7.1%), the Philippines (7.6%), Malaysia (7.2%) and
on the basis of their declared anodyne ‘military Vietnam (6.8%). Southeast Asian economies were
modernisation’ plans, but because they want to deter projected by the IMF to grow an average 5.4% in
adventurism by China – and by each other – in the 2011, with East Asia averaging a slightly lower
South China Sea. South Korea’s defence planners 4.5%, due in part to the slowdown and supply-chain
think not just about a potential crisis on the penin- disruptions after the earthquake and tsunami in
sula, but also about Korea’s wider strategic interests Japan in March 2011.
in any post-unification scenario. And as China’s navy South Asia also barely noticed the economic slow-
expands its operations into the Indian Ocean, India down in advanced economies, growing by 5.2%
thinks increasingly in terms of balancing its major in 2008, 7.2% in 2009 and 6.8% in 2010. Increased
power rival. infrastructure spending played an important role
While enhanced conventional deterrence may in India’s 10% growth rate in 2010, which occurred
be the leitmotif of these developments, there is an despite fiscal consolidation and monetary tightening.
emphasis on developing capabilities that could By contrast, Pakistan experienced drags on its growth
be used offensively and possibly pre-emptively. (3.8% and 2.6% in 2010 and 2011) stemming from
Contemporary military developments in Asia do not several years of contracting infrastructure expen-
closely resemble classic arms races, such the pre-1914 diture, as well as the impact of severe floods in July
Anglo-German naval competition or the US–Soviet 2010 and September 2011. Demand for commodities
missile race of the 1960s. However, whether or not in fuelled strong performance in several Pacific econo-
technical terms they constitute an arms race, without mies, such as Papua New Guinea (7% and 9%) and
mechanisms to effectively mitigate inter-state tensions Australia (2.7% and 1.8%). Australia also enjoyed high
in the region there is a danger of these multiple sub- private investment in mining, which helped offset
regional military competitions themselves seriously the effects of Cyclone Yasi and floods in key mining
undermining regional security. and agricultural areas in Queensland in late 2010 and
early 2011.
Asia Defence Economics Central Asian economies continued their recovery
from the global financial crisis, with average regional
Macroeconomics & capital flows growth rising from 4.4% in 2009 to 6% in 2010 and
Asia experienced buoyant and broad-based economic a projected 7.3% in 2011. Output in non-commodity-
growth in 2010 and 2011, with strengthening based economies such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
domestic consumption, rising exports, expansionary was lifted by higher trade, investment and remit-
fiscal policies and, in several cases, accommodating tances from an economically revived Russia, while
(but incrementally tightening) monetary environ- global energy and commodities demand spurred
ments. Unlike much of the developed world, output export growth in Kazakhstan (oil and base metals),
gaps (the difference between actual and potential Turkmenistan (natural gas), Uzbekistan (natural gas,
output) in many Asian economies narrowed consid- gold and cotton) and Mongolia (coal, copper and
erably. Indeed, with much of the region operating at gold). Central Asian governments continued to raise
Asia 209
Table 18 Asia Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Top 10 and Sub-Regional Breakdown1 (US$bn)
2010 % of Regional Total 2011 % of Regional Total Real % Change3
Top 10 Defence Spending Countries
China2 76.36 29.44% 89.76 30.54% 6.8%
Japan 53.55 20.64% 58.42 19.87% -0.1%
India 29.66 11.44% 31.88 10.85% -2.2%
Korea, South 25.49 9.83% 28.48 9.69% 1.7%
Australia 23.52 9.07% 27.68 9.41% 0.6%
Taiwan 9.30 3.59% 9.90 3.37% -2.7%
Singapore 8.40 3.24% 9.66 3.28% 1.7%
Thailand 4.82 1.86% 5.52 1.88% 5.2%
Indonesia 4.70 1.81% 5.42 1.84% 4.8%
Pakistan 4.47 1.73% 5.16 1.76% 2.2%
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
Total 258.96 294.04 3.15%
1
Current prices and exchange rates. Analysis excludes Lao PDR, Mongolia and North Korea due to incomplete data.
2
The figures for China only include central government expenditures. Local government defence-related spending is included in Table XXI.
3
Percentage-change figures reflected in this column are calculated in real terms (i.e. constant 2010 prices and exchange rates). They will thus differ
from any percentage-change calculations made based on defence expenditure figures contained in the rest of the table, which are based on
current prices and current exchange rates.
4
For this table, sub-regional groupings as follows: Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), East Asia (China,
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) and Australasia (Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand).
1.94
2.0
% of GDP
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
1.2
0.9
% of GDP
0.6
0.3
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
reflect base effects, where spending has been very Overall, with a real increase in spending of 3.58%
low and any increase looks substantial). Significant in 2011, East Asia dominated regional expendi-
real increases also occurred in Papua New Guinea ture (making up 63.45% of the total); while strong
(15.6%), Thailand (5.2%), China (6.8%) and Vietnam expenditure growth of 4.85% in Southeast Asia saw
(4.5%). Conversely, real expenditure fell in Fiji (-9.0%), its regional share of regional expenditure rise from
Bangladesh (-7.8%) and Sri Lanka (-5.1%). 10.89% to 11.18% in 2011. Even larger increases in
With total planned expenditure of the top ten excess of 16% were reported in Central Asia (the
defence-spending countries rising to US$271.9bn (a continued opacity of governmental accounts makes
real increase of 2.7%), these states continued to domi- trends in the sub-region difficult to assess accurately),
nate regional expenditure, accounting for 92.47% of and the region now makes up around 1.2% of total
all spending in the region. Indeed, the top five coun- Asian defence spending. South Asia was the only
tries (China, Japan, India, South Korea and Australia) sub-region in Asia to experience a real-terms decline
accounted for more than 80% of the total regional in expenditure, with its 1.12% spending reduction
defence spend (see Table 18). China, the region’s top partly reflecting the corrosive effects of higher infla-
spender, increased its share of regional expenditure tion (which rose from 6.81% in 2009 to a forecast
to above 30%, while Japan and India saw their shares 10.15% in 2011). This was the second-highest average
of the regional total fall below 20% and 11% respec- inflation rate across all Asian sub-regions, with the
tively. exception of Central Asia (12.17% in 2011).
Asia 211
Japan
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
31.31%
Thailand 16.79%
Asia
Australia
Malaysia 13.82%
92.45%
Myanmar 6.21%
these goals, current trends suggest they remain Naval power projection
within reach. Meanwhile, there appears to be increasing confi-
dence in Beijing and within the PLA about the mili-
Growing ambitions tary capabilities at their disposal. The PLA Navy
The public test flight in January 2011 of the J-20 (PLAN), in particular, is operating further from
aircraft, a symbol of China’s military modernisation, China’s coast. It has maintained a counter-piracy
demonstrated the country’s growing military-techno- mission in the Indian Ocean since December 2008.
logical competence. The test flight occurred during In February and March 2011, it went even further
a visit to Beijing by then-US Secretary of Defense afield, sending the Xuzhou, a Type 054A frigate that
Robert Gates and provided a reminder to Washington was on counter-piracy duties, to assist the evacua-
of China’s military development. Publication of the tion of nearly 36,000 Chinese citizens from Libya.
defence white paper followed soon afterwards. This was the first operation in the Mediterranean
Among the four goals for the PLA that it enumerated, in the PLAN’s history and, although the frigate
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
the white paper mentioned for the first time a desire was used only to escort civilian ferries, it was the
to ‘maintain world peace and stability’. This seemed first time a military asset had been used in a non-
to represent a step change from ambitions expressed combatant evacuation operation.
in previous white papers, being the first indication in China’s growing strategic confidence has also
a policy document of China’s intent to use its military been made apparent in its recent naval exercises.
power more often to further its regional and wider In April 2010 and June 2011 respectively, flotillas
international interests. sailed to the Western Pacific through the East China
The sea trials of China’s first aircraft carrier from Sea and Miyako Strait, conducting a variety of exer-
August 2011 may have demonstrated this intent. cises en route and showcasing some of China’s most
Three voyages in late 2011 took the former Soviet advanced ships and technologies. The latest excur-
carrier Varyag (yet to be renamed) into the Yellow sion of this possibly annual series involved at least 11
Sea off northeast China. The government said that vessels: three Sovremenny-class destroyers, four frig-
the vessel would only be used for ‘training and ates, an oiler, a tug, an electronic-intelligence vessel
research’, a statement that international observers and a submarine-rescue ship. (The presence of the
treated with some scepticism. Another indication of latter suggests there may have been sub-surface assets
the PLA’s growing power came in December 2010 as well; in 2010 two Kilo-class submarines surfaced
when Admiral Robert Willard, commander of US while passing through the strait.) This muscular
Pacific Command, reported that China’s DF-21D show of naval power cruised within 110km of the
anti-ship ballistic missile had attained initial opera- island of Miyako-Jima in Okinawa prefecture, within
tional capability. The DF-21D is widely seen as a Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Japanese
‘carrier killer’, specifically designed to prevent photographs appeared to show an unmanned aerial
large naval vessels, presumably from the US and vehicle (UAV) in flight astern of one vessel, demon-
perhaps Japan, from approaching China’s littoral strating the utility of deployments for testing new
waters. equipment. The PLAN has also become increasingly
China’s Chengdu J-20: just how stealthy? front of the aircraft appears optimised for stealth, the
The J-20 aircraft, first flown in public in January 2011, rear appears considerably less stealthy. It appears to
showcases China’s ambitions to develop next-genera- have one main internal weapons bay in the main sec-
tion combat aircraft. Only the US F-22 can currently be tion of the fuselage and two smaller side-mounted bays.
classed as an in-service ‘fifth-generation fighter’, while A weapon in similar size and configuration to the PL-12
Russia’s T-50 programme shows Moscow’s aspirations. radar-guided medium range AAM, but with cropped
The J-20 design includes some low-observable charac- fins (indicative of a weapon intended for internal car-
teristics, such as the shape of its nose and forward fu- riage) has also been seen on the J-11. As yet there are
selage, edge alignment and its internal weapons bays. no indications of the aircraft’s ASM suite. Any significant
However, its delta-wing and canard layout, and specifi- problems in developing the weapons fit, avionics, radar
cally its canard-fuselage join, to some extent undermine and engines could delay the planned in-service date of
reduction in the aircraft’s radar signature. Although the around 2018.
Asia 213
active in exercises closer to home in the East China armies from the Beijing, Lanzhou and Chengdu mili-
and South China Seas. tary regions taking part. (Although the PLA ground
forces were predominant in the exercise, the air force
Capability gaps remain offered support, while PLA aviation transport assets
Despite the PLA’s aspirations, there are weaknesses were also involved.)
in China’s military capabilities. The technological Since the late 1990s, army reform has focused on
advances demonstrated by the J-20 and the Varyag building a smaller, more mobile force. This has been
are more modest than some alarmist analyses of partially achieved by reducing the size of the army;
China’s military development have suggested. The a stuttering process of forming modular battalions;
Varyag, for example, is an ageing vessel. Launched in developing more mobile armoured vehicles such
1988, her design is of the Soviet-era Kuznetsov class. as the Type-97/Type-04 (ZBD-97/ZBD-04) infantry
Although she has had various weapons systems fighting vehicles; and deploying information capa-
installed, including the HQ-10 surface-to-air missile, bilities such as digital radios and wireless networks
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
a 30mm gun and multi-rocket-launcher systems, it with infantry. Heavy armour has also seen limited
is unlikely that she could be used in a high-intensity improvements, with the Type-99 main battle tank
conflict. China does not yet have a fixed-wing combat deployed to selected battalions.
aircraft to operate from a carrier: the J-15, based on Army amphibious and naval marine units remain
the Russian Su-27, began test flights in July 2011, but a relatively small part of the overall PLA structure,
it remains a prototype. Doubts remain as to whether but this allows them to adopt new equipment and
China yet has in place all of the assets and capabilities modernise relatively quickly. Type-05 (ZBD-05)
Asia
necessary to form an effective carrier task group for amphibious armoured fighting vehicles have been
blue-water operations. deployed with the 1st brigade of the PLAN Marines
Moreover, while China’s defence industry has and with amphibious units of group armies in the
made strides in recent years to the extent that it can Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions. The PLA
develop armoured vehicles and conduct research into has also launched two Type 071 landing platform
high-technology equipment such as long-endurance docks, the largest ships in the navy. The second of
UAVs, Beijing still relies on external sources of defence these began sea trials in September 2011, and a third
technology to fill capability gaps. Orders in 2011 for is now under construction. Amphibious capabili-
Russian aircraft engines, one for 150 AL-31F engines ties remain constrained by a lack of air- and sea-lift,
for the J-11 and another for 120 AL-31FN engines for but this is receiving attention in training and exer-
the J-10, provided evidence of an enduring problem cises, suggesting an awareness that a highly trained
in the country’s defence industry. amphibious force is necessary, given China’s growing
The most significant near-term developments in emphasis on Asian regional contingencies rather than
PLA capabilities may be occurring as a result of the land-based border defence.
less-observed incremental changes in China’s ground However, launching effective expeditionary oper-
forces. These continue to receive substantial funding ations, particularly in contested areas, will require
and political support because of the army’s historical greater expertise in joint-service operations. It is ten
importance in China’s defence thinking. This is grad- years since the first major joint-service exercise on
ually changing: the fact that the 2010 defence white Dongshan Island. Since then, incremental exercises
paper noted that the army was merely the ‘first among have improved interoperability, and the creation
equals’ reflected the greater resources and prestige of Joint Logistics Departments in all seven mili-
accorded to the navy and air force. Nevertheless, tary regions during 2000, followed by the Theatre
Beijing is acutely aware that the most severe threats Joint Logistic Department in Jinan Military Region
to its stability are either internal – whether in the in 2007, has demonstrated intent to enhance capa-
form of ethnic unrest in its western provinces or from bilities across the services. However, Chinese forces
broader political-reform movements – or close to its have never been tested in significant joint-service
borders in North Korea, Taiwan and India. Hence the combat operations.
army remains the politically and financially domi- The PLA’s process of informationisation, devel-
nant service. The PLA’s first group-army-level exer- oping network-centric capabilities and situational
cise, Mission Action, in October 2010 reaffirmed the awareness, is aimed at improving joint-service opera-
importance of major land operations, with group tions. Space-based intelligence assets are seen as central
214 The Military Balance 2012
military exploitation of these satellites will allow the 5.2% of GDP in 2010. Buoyed by the impact of this
PLA to enhance its situational awareness, improve aggressive government fiscal expansion, as well as
the accuracy of its guidance systems and continue to by increases in private consumption and net exports,
develop its network-centric warfare capabilities. 2010 economic growth rose to 10.3%, in a return to the
The PLA’s attempts to exploit force multipliers double-digit rates experienced during the pre-crisis
is also indicated in its use of cyber operations. period of 2001–07, when growth averaged 10.8%.
Verifiable information on China’s military cyber China’s official fiscal position remains healthy,
capabilities is hard to find, as deniability is a core with gross government debt between 2001 and 2009
goal of PLA cyber operations. Nonetheless, there has averaging just 18% of GDP – although IMF projections
been a series of attacks on commercial and govern- indicated that this would spike to 33% in 2010 as a
mental organisations, including Google, Lockheed result of the 2008 economic stimulus measures, before
Martin and the US Departments of Defense and returning to normal levels by 2013. However, China’s
State, that, among other incidents, led former CIA official figures do not present a complete picture of its
director Michael Hayden to note in October 2011 that public finances as they exclude off-budgetary items,
the US was subject to ‘a massive [cyber] campaign including elements of military expenditure that
being conducted by the Chinese government’. The remain obscure and difficult to quantify. In addition,
PLA set up a temporary ‘cyber blue team’, effec- Chinese local-government finances are likely to have
tively a training module rather than a military unit, deteriorated rapidly since 2008 due to the combined
in May 2011. This comprised 30 personnel from the effects of increased borrowings to finance outlays (as
Guangzhou Military Region and was designed to part of the 2008 stimulus) and diminished revenues
improve awareness of Internet security. It is tiny from land sales. The latter was due to restrictive regu-
when compared with the links that the PLA has latory measures adopted in January 2011 to cool a
developed with universities and commercial organ- nascent property-market bubble, which in 2010 had
isations involving thousands of unofficial ‘cyber contributed to a 10% average rise in property prices
militias’. One such organisation, Nanhao Group, in 70 major cities. These difficulties notwithstanding,
admitted to the Financial Times in October 2011 and despite a 15% increase in government expendi-
that ’all staff under the age of 30’ belong to a cyber ture during the year, China’s budget deficit narrowed
militia unit organised and maintained by the PLA from 2.9% of GDP in 2009 to 2.1% in 2010. This was
since 2005. Such militias may be relatively ineffec- due to an even larger 23% increase in tax revenues, a
tive and focused on dedicated denial-of-service consequence of higher prices and the strong economic
attacks (flooding or otherwise disabling an online performance outlined above.
resource to prevent legitimate users from accessing
it). However, their organisation demonstrates the Defence spending
PLA’s awareness of the importance of cyber warfare. These sustained growth rates have enabled large
Embracing information-based capabilities is a key increases in Chinese defence spending over the past
aspect of China’s military modernisation and will decade, with official defence expenditure in real terms
help it advance towards its goal of launching joint in 2011 running at more than two-and-a-half times its
operations using modern technology by 2020. 2001 levels (and 4.1 times higher in nominal terms,
Asia 215
Asia
249 and 2010, p. 392).
although this includes inflationary effects). Between to calculate China’s true military spending should
2001 and 2011, annual increases in the official Chinese include funds allocated to the People’s Armed Police
defence budget have averaged approximately 10.9% (PAP). As shown in Table 19, if estimates of these
in real terms (15.7% in nominal terms), indicating additional items of military-related expenditure are
that, on average, Chinese defence spending has been included, Chinese defence spending rises by a factor
increasing slightly faster than the overall economy, of approximately 1.4 relative to officially published
at 10.6%. Correspondingly, official defence spending figures, to an estimated RMB753.4bn (US$111.1bn)
as a proportion of GDP has increased from 1.29% in using market exchange-rate (MER) conversions.
2001 to 1.45% in 2009 (although China’s total military- However, when it comes to making international
related spending is likely to be closer to 2% of GDP comparisons of defence spending, the use of MERs
when other items of expenditure are incorporated; (determined in foreign-exchange markets) to esti-
see Table 19). However, annual increases in the offi- mate Chinese defence expenditure is likely to under-
cial defence budget have risen and fallen, with large state the true level of economic resources allocated
increases in spending (exceeding 15%) in 2002, 2006 towards defence; in general, US$1 purchases signifi-
and 2009, but much lower rates of increase (typically cantly more goods and services produced in China
less than 10%) in intervening years. For example, than MERs imply. Items such as food, material and
the largest annual real increase in official defence housing cost less in absolute and relative terms for
spending over the past decade was in 2009 (close to the PLA than for many Western militaries. Similarly,
20%). But this was followed in 2010 by the smallest weapons and equipment produced by domestic
increase – just 1.8% to US$78.8bn (RMB533.3bn), industries enable China to tap its lower-cost labour
despite the strong expansion in the economy. force and existing industrial infrastructure and
While official defence-budget figures may be supply chains to produce output at highly competi-
useful benchmarks of Chinese military expendi- tive costs, although China’s cost advantages prob-
ture, they probably underestimate the true extent of ably decrease when it comes to more technologically
defence spending. Although official figures include intensive R&D and production. Taking these factors
personnel, operations and equipment expenses, it is into account, Table 19 also estimates total Chinese
widely believed that they omit other military-related military expenditure using a combination of MER
expenditures, including weapons purchased from and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates, to
overseas and funding for R&D. In addition, attempts enable better international comparisons. The result is
216 The Military Balance 2012
that total Chinese military-related expenditure rose to concerns, combined with growing Indian and
an estimated US$178bn in 2010 – that is, the value of Chinese ambitions to ensure their sea lines of commu-
goods and services purchased by defence spending in nication, will require careful management by both
China is equivalent to the value of goods and services governments. Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony,
purchased by US$178bn in the United States. controversially told the Indian Navy Commanders
Conference in October 2011 that the navy had been
Note: The use of PPP rates is a valid tool when ‘mandated to be a net security provider to island
comparing macroeconomic data, such as GDP, between nations in the Indian Ocean region’. However, he
countries at different stages of development. However, no earlier downplayed the potential for a clash with
specific PPP rate exists for the military sector, and its use for Beijing over the South China Sea when he told the
this purpose should be treated with caution. Furthermore, Indian national press in September 2011 that the
there is no definitive guide as to which elements of military ‘South China Sea is not our worry. Our worry is to
spending should be calculated using the limited PPP rates guard our own backyard and our core area is our
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
those with possible nuclear capability. Flight tests tinent, which has averaged just above 10% annu-
of the Shourya, a land-based variant of the Sagarika, ally between 2008 and 2010. As a result, real defence
continued, with an October 2011 test reportedly using expenditure for FY2011/12 increased by only 3.4%
a missile from an initial production batch. A first test- over FY2010/11 levels, less than half the 7.8% growth
firing of the 5,000km+ range Agni V ballistic missile is projected for the Indian economy as a whole. As
reportedly planned for February 2012. Beijing would defence-spending growth fails, in real terms, to
be within the range of this weapon. keep up with the growth in the rest of the economy,
Asia
Flight testing of the Nirbhay subsonic cruise defence spending as a proportion of GDP also saw a
missile is also anticipated in 2012, although little is corresponding decline, accounting for just 1.88% of
known about this missile. An air-launched version is projected 2011 GDP, down from 2.32% in FY2009/10.
intended for integration with the air force’s Su-30MKI Defence spending as a proportion of total govern-
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), which would mental outlays has also fallen – from 13.84% of total
then be capable of conventional stand-off precision- outlays in FY2009/10 to 13.07% in FY2011/12. This
attack missions and possibly nuclear strike missions. reflects increased government spending on other
After repeated delays, the year could see testing of an priorities such as health, education and rural infra-
air-launched variant of the Brahmos supersonic cruise structure.
missile, which will also arm the Su-30MKI. While the Disaggregating the headline figures, the defence-
Brahmos has a cruise speed nearly three times that of related revenue budget (which allocates funding
the Nirbhay, the latter has more than three times the towards non-capital expenditure items such as
range. personnel, operations and maintenance) grew by 9%
Irrespective of the delays affecting the Vikramaditya in FY2011/12 to INR952.17bn (US$20.6bn), and 58% of
and Chakra, Russia remains India’s most important the defence budget), while capital expenditure (which
international defence partner. India is now involved in allocates funds towards items such as equipment
Russia’s Sukhoi T-50 fifth-generation fighter project, procurement and military infrastructure) rose by
with the air force now planning to take 166 single around 15% to INR691.98bn (US$14.98bn, and 42% of
and 48 two-seat variants. New Delhi and Moscow the budget). Significantly, the ratio between revenue
signed a preliminary design contract in December expenditure and capital expenditure has improved
2010 for what India refers to as its Fifth-Generation in recent years in favour of the latter, reflecting the
Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). The deal covers the design government’s greater focus on modernising the
of an Indian variant of the T-50, which is intended to armed forces. The improvement is largely due to the
meet the Russian air force’s PAK FA combat aircraft substantial increase in the capital acquisition budget,
requirement and is now being flight tested. India’s air which has grown by more than 25% to INR556.04bn
force wishes to bring the FGFA into service from 2017, (US$12bn). The air force has the largest acquisition
although this may be overly optimistic. Meanwhile, budget with INR283.55bn (US$6.1bn), followed by
it continues to expand its fleet of Su-30MKI aircraft. the army with INR141bn (US$3.1bn) and the navy
In mid-2010, the government ordered a further 42 with INR131.49bn US$2.8bn). (Note: service acqui-
Su-30MKIs, bringing the total number purchased to sition budgets indicated here include allocations for
272. both military and non-military capital expenditure,
218 The Military Balance 2012
Other Expenditure
Other Revenue Expenditure3 49.6 53.3 61.0
Land Acquisition and Maintenance 2.2 1.4 2.2
Military Construction 50.2 70.2 73.4
Other Capital Expenditure3,4 8.3 21.6 21.3
Total Other Expenditure (% of total) 110.3 (7.8%) 146.5 (9.9%) 157.8 (9.6%)
and thus differ from the service breakdowns indi- to 200. The first 18 aircraft will be delivered from the
cated in Table 20). manufacturer, with the remainder either assembled
These increases in the capital-acquisition budget or (eventually) manufactured in India. However,
over the past five years have meant that, despite a judging by the slower-than-planned delivery of
large proportion of the capital budget going towards Indian-assembled Su-30MKI and Hawk aircraft, the
‘committed liabilities’ (i.e. payments toward previous transition to local production may prove a challenge.
purchases), there have still been surplus funds avail- Other major air-force programmes involve
able for the MoD to make new purchases. Assuming combat-aircraft upgrades. The first MiG-29UPG
that 60% of the capital-acquisition budget is allo- with an improved radar and cockpit avionics (along
cated towards committed liabilities, in FY2011/12 the with a further modification of the RD-33 turbofan
Ministry of Defence (MoD) will still have approxi- engine) took to the skies in February 2011. The air
mately INR222.40bn (US$4.8bn) for new acquisitions. force plans to upgrade its remaining 64 Fulcrums
India has already become one of the world’s biggest to this standard. A Russian-provided radar and
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
purchasers of military equipment, with a procure- avionics upgrade for the Su-30MKI will involve
ment budget of as much as INR 9.24tr (US$200bn) by a fully active, electronically scanned array radar,
2025. Indeed, the challenge facing India is not a short- replacing the existing N-011M Bars radar. Other
fall of funds for defence acquisitions, but the inability elements of the upgrade, together with its timing,
to fully disburse allocated funds because of corrup- still awaited agreement in late 2011. Under a July
tion, bureaucratic delays and inefficiencies in the 2011 agreement with Dassault and Thales, 52 Mirage
procurement process. In the past, these factors have 2000s will also be modernised.
Asia
all too often forced the MoD to return large amounts While New Delhi may not have been ready to
of unspent funds to the Exchequer (see The Military purchase combat aircraft from the United States – two
Balance 2011, p. 213), although FY2010/11 differed in US contenders did not progress to the final round of
that the MoD retained the unspent allocations. the MMRCA competition – it does see the US as an
important source of other defence equipment. An
Procurement programmes agreement in June 2011 for the purchase of ten Boeing
Bureaucratic inefficiencies notwithstanding, the C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft will boost the
increased capital outlays over several years have air force’s strategic-lift capacity, with deliveries begin-
enabled the armed forces to embark upon a substan- ning in 2013. A follow-on order for a second batch of
tial equipment-modernisation process, which may six C-130J tactical airlifters is anticipated. Meanwhile,
be set to continue until at least the end of the 2020s – India’s Hindustan Aeronautics and Russia’s United
with a focus on special forces, as well as air and naval Aircraft Corporation are continuing to develop a
capability enhancements. In the absence of a mature proposed Joint Medium Transport Aircraft, with a
indigenous defence-industrial base (see Procurement first flight tentatively planned for 2016.
Reforms, below), the services continue to pursue a Although the navy and air force dominate high-
parallel approach involving both indigenous proj- profile defence procurement, the army is also
ects and international purchases. While a proto- re-equipping. It intends to develop its ability to
type carrier-variant of the Hindustan Aeronautics conduct armoured operations at night by introducing
Tejas light combat aircraft is now entering flight test, improved fire-control systems, and it has issued a
not only has the navy ordered a follow-on batch contract for T-72 night sights. Deliveries of the T-90
of MiG-29Ks, it has also widened its net to include MBT continue, while the army is also carrying out
European and US manufacturers as possible suppliers trials of the indigenously developed Arjun Mk II, of
of combat aircraft for its future aircraft carriers. The which it expects to receive 124. The Arjun project has
air-force variant of Tejas has gained initial operational been under way for three decades and, although two
capability, with 40 of the type now on order and a Mk regiments are equipped with the Arjun Mk I, these
II version under development. The air force opened delays illustrate some of the challenges India faces in
bids from the two final contenders for its MMRCA deploying locally developed equipment.
procurement in October 2011, with a choice between
the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon antic- Procurement reforms
ipated in 2012. The initial requirement is for 126, with Indian defence procurement procedures (DPP) have
additional purchases potentially increasing the total undergone at least seven rounds of reviews in the last
220 The Military Balance 2012
nine years (see The Military Balance 2010, pp. 475–6). Strategic preoccupations
The latest of these – DPP-2011 – came into effect in The spike in inter-Korean tensions following the
January 2011. Two changes stand out. Firstly, it intro- Yeonpyeong shelling and Cheonan sinking in 2010
duced new guidelines for naval shipbuilding contract (see box, p. 206) exacerbated Japanese anxieties over
tenders that aim to improve the transparency of Pyongyang’s military intentions and drew Tokyo
the bidding process. In doing so, the MoD hopes to closer to the United States and South Korea. As a
increase certainty and to ‘level the playing field’ over demonstration of trilateral unity, Japanese and US
such contracts, thereby encouraging private ship- combined military exercises were observed by South
yard involvement in naval shipbuilding. Pipavav Korean navy officers for the first time in December
Shipyard, ABG Shipyard and Larsen & Toubro 2010. Japan’s defence ministry initiated discus-
are likely to be major beneficiaries of this reform. sions with its South Korean counterpart about an
Secondly, DPP-2011 expanded the list of products Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement for
and services eligible for discharging defence offsets, UN and peacetime logistical support, modelled on
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
to include major areas of civil aerospace (including Japanese agreements with the US and Australia.
for both fixed-wing and rotary aircraft design and However, China remained the primary long-
engineering services, airframes, engines, avionics, term influence on Japanese defence policy. Tensions
components and materials), as well as weapons and flared in late 2010 following the Japan Coast Guard’s
services used for counter-terrorism and internal detention in September of a Chinese trawler captain
security. Overall, India has struggled to attract offset near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China
work to benefit its domestic defence industrial base. suspended political and diplomatic exchanges with
Although there have been some large contracts (see Japan, halted bilateral talks on the joint exploitation
The Military Balance 2011, p. 213), foreign companies of gas fields in the East China Sea, and strength-
have generally stayed away from offsets because ened its unofficial embargo on the export of rare-
onerous ownership limitations prevent these firms earth minerals. Japan managed to restore diplomatic
from exercising management control. This situation normality with China by early 2011. However, this
is unlikely to change in the near term, as DPP-2011 was not before it had extracted reassurances from
retained the 26% limit on foreign direct investment, both the US defence secretary and secretary of state
despite private-sector pressure to raise this equity that Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty covered
cap. Although the refinements undertaken have the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and identified China’s
made procurement procedures more transparent, military modernisation in the revised NDPG and
efficient and effective, they have had only a limited white paper as a ‘matter of concern for the regional
impact; key elements in the procurement process and the international community’. Japan’s suspicions
still require significant reform, including qualitative of Chinese military intentions only deepened in 2011
requirements, evaluation processes and post-contract as China enhanced its maritime activities around
management. Japan’s territorial waters and then sent its first aircraft
carrier on sea trials.
Japan From March 2011 onwards, Japan’s other defence
preoccupation was the deployment of the Japan Self-
Japan released its revised National Defence Defense Forces (JSDF) in response to the Tohoku
Programme Guidelines (NDPG) in December 2010, earthquake, subsequent tsunami and Fukushima
along with the Mid-Term Defence Programme nuclear disaster. The JSDF mobilised around 100,000
(MTDP) for 2011–15. The NDPG stated ambi- personnel (or 180,000 if support personnel are
tious goals for the further reform of Japan’s defence included) for disaster-relief efforts. This represented
doctrine and capabilities, adopting the new concept nearly half of the forces’ total strength and was the
of a ‘dynamic defence force’ and continuing the shift largest mobilisation in JSDF history. It also provided
away from Cold War era forces focused on the threat valuable experience of operating alongside American
of invasion. However, the NDPG, MTDP and the forces involved in the US Operation Tomodachi post-
August 2011 Defence White Paper all underlined the earthquake and tsunami support mission. Disaster
difficulties faced in drawing up consistent defence and relief has long been a core JSDF function, but the
procurement plans amid a shifting power structure in swift and effective response to the Fukushima
East Asia, while constrained by a pacifist constitution. disaster – unlike the slow, much-criticised response
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
MARCH The devastating earthquake and tsunami of 11 March provided a test for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. These forces, and their
11 14:46 – A magnitude 9.0 earthquake strikes 80km off the assets, proved crucial in the aftermath of these disasters, as well as assisting with the radiation emergency at the Fukushima
northeastern coast.
plant. Their swift response might strengthen the legitimacy of the military in Japan and the case for the procurement of certain
14:50 – Ministry of Defense establishes emergency HQ at
headquarters in Tokyo and orders information-gathering
types of ‘dual-use’ capabilities for disaster relief. The important role played by US forces, meanwhile, improved their public
activities. Eight ASDF reconnaissance planes are profile and could provide a boost to the US–Japan alliance. Japan’s December 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines aspired
launched from Hyakuri Air Base. to a ‘dynamic defense force’ capable of rapid response. The JSDF response, which at its height mobilised around 100,000
15:30 – First meeting at defence headquarters. personnel, close to half its strength, suggests that the transition was necessary and timely.
18:00 – SDF units first dispatched to earthquake area,
including 190 aircraft and 40 ships.
International response
19:30 – Military forces dispatched to site of nuclear
The US used around 24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft, and
accident. Initial 2km evacuation zone established. 8,400
24 Navy vessels at the peak of its Operation Tomodachi
SDF troops mobilised on the first day.
(friend) response. The USS Ronald Reagan Carrier
12 17:00 – MSDF forces begin to arrive in disaster zone after
The Essex Amphibious Misawa air base, home to Strike Group was diverted from Korea to act as a
being sent from Yokosuka.
Ready Group, centred on the US 35th Fighter Wing, refuelling hub and for SAR (the 7th Fleet’s USS George
13 USS Ronald Reagan carrier group arrives in Sendai Bay.
USS Essex and USS suffered minimal damage, Washington was docked in Yokosuka for maintenance).
50,000 SDF troops are in place.
Germantown, and carrying and was a key staging post The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), based on
14 Joint Japanese–US task force for the Great East Japan
the 31st MEU, conducted for US and Japanese forces. the Essex Amphibious Ready Group, was redeployed to
earthquake was formed under the command of the GSDF
relief supply operations Japan to transport supplies and support activties. As
Tohoku HQ. 500 personnel mobilised from the Central
from locations off the west well as international civilian disaster-response teams,
NBC Defense Unit.
coast, focusing initially on Earthquake epicentre some governments deployed military assets for
15 Nuclear evacuation zone extended to 20km.
the Sendai area, then tsunami and earthquake relief, as well as the radiation
17 USS Essex, carrying 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Oshima island. The MEU emergency, such as Australia (C-17 transport aircraft),
(MEU), arrives off the coast at Akita. then repositioned off the Thailand and South Korea (supplies delivered via
18 100,000 SDF troops are in place. east coast. C-130) and Israel (a field hospital).
26 Peak deployment of 107,000 SDF troops reached.
APRIL
21/22 New nuclear exclusion zones established.
ONAGAWA Matsushima air base suffered substantial damage. 18 F-2B fighters, five UH-60J
MAY
helicopters, five Kawasaki T-4 trainers and two Hawker 800XPS were damaged, with
9 Japanese defence minister announces scaling back of
Sendai 12 F-2Bs of the 21st Fighter Training Squadron written off. The runway was cleared
disaster-relief operations.
by US and Japanese forces, and used as a transit point for the MEU.
By the end of May, 18,000 maritime and air troops are
withdrawn alongside 20,000 ground troops.
AUGUST Yamagata airport was a
31 Major relief operations end. 200 personnel kept to help FUKUSHIMA
crucial logistical hub, The GSDF Camp
with decontamination for people who temporarily return command location and Tagajo was also
to their homes in the exclusion zone. J A PA N refuelling point for the MEU. damaged, though units
Hyakuri Air Base IWATE Miyako
Tokyo Hanamaki and Fukushima from the base were
Yokota Base airports were also dispatched on relief
Nuclear facility US air base important logistical hubs. efforts and it was used
Atsugi Air Base
Yokosuka Kamaishi as a rescue and
SDF air base Naval air base
Iwakuni Air Base Sendai: Japan Coast refuelling hub.
HAMAOKA Guard reportedly
Logistics loses some Hachinohe, Miyako
200km
With the Eastern Army HQ located in Sendai, the helicopters and King and Oshima ports were
Northeastern Army controlled operations. After initial Air aircraft at a Sendai badly damaged by the
MIYAGI
search and rescue (SAR) operations, focus shifted to maintenance facility. tsunami. Cleared by US
Map 3 Japan’s Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Accident: The Military Response
demonstrated interoperability notably in land and air with securing the evacuation zone and decontamination activities. disaster zone, dispatched for US and Japanese aircraft.
relief operations, and supply and logistics tasks. 8,000 troops in the initial
Okinawa Sources: Japanese Ministry of Defense, New Pacific Institute, East Asia Forum, Asia Pacific response.
© IISS Defense Forum, Congressional Research Service, BBC, Aviation Week, Japan Times
221
Asia
222 The Military Balance 2012
to the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake – has helped that Japan ‘forever renounces war as a sovereign right
to strengthen both the military’s legitimacy and the of the nation’ and that ‘the right of belligerency of the
case for procuring certain types of dual-use capabili- state will not be recognised’. As such, the country is
ties for disaster relief. only able to retain defensive military forces (hence
‘Self-Defense Forces’). Since the end of the Cold
NDPG and the ‘dynamic defence force’ War, Tokyo has gradually moved to normalise its
The NDPG lays down Japan’s defence doctrine defence policy. The country deployed military peace-
and necessary force structure, and the revised 2010 keepers with the UN for the first time in 1992 and
version – the fourth iteration of the basic document passed legislation to enable maritime deployments
since 1976 – attempted to at last bring JSDF planning in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring
into the post-Cold War era. The NDPG is based on the Freedom–Maritime Interdiction Operation in 2001, the
assumption that it is no longer possible to maintain deployment of JSDF personnel to Iraq until 2008 and
a conceptual distinction between peacetime deter- a counter-piracy deployment to the Indian Ocean and
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
2010, the highest in the developed world, and its GDP but also argues in favour of maintaining a domestic
contracted a further 0.5% in 2010. The impact of the defence-industrial base, which could be assisted by
Asia
tsunami has further pushed Japanese government replacing Japan’s arms-export ban with an export-
finances into the worst position since the immediate licence system enabling international collaboration
post-war period, with reconstruction costs estimated on product development.
at ¥25tr (US$312bn), tipping the Japanese economy The MoD and JSDF will find extra finances hard
back into negative growth for most of 2011. to come by, but they may find that the appetite for
In September 2009, the Democratic Party of further defence cuts in Japan has dissipated. Tensions
Japan (DPJ) entered government with a mandate to between Japan and China in 2010 convinced the
prioritise domestic welfare spending and to restrict DPJ of the need to bolster Japan’s defences. The
defence spending. The DPJ’s first two defence defence establishment may also now have an ally
budgets for 2010 and 2011 followed the trend estab- in the guise of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, in
lished by Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) govern- post since August 2011 and the son of a JSDF officer.
ments of virtual stagnation in spending. Defence Additionally, Seiji Maehara, the chair of the DPJ’s
budgets have remained under a de facto ceiling of Policy Affairs Research Committee, is seen as an
¥5tr (US$62.4bn) – around 5% of total government expert on defence affairs.
expenditure and 1% of GDP. Japan’s defence plan- Moreover, the MoD and JSDF may hope that
ners also face the problem that an increasing propor- the ‘dynamic defence force’ concept will reconcile
tion of the defence budget, 45% in 2011, has been the problems of Japan’s immediate defence needs
devoted to JSDF salaries and pensions. The propor- and ever-tightening defence budgets. The concept
tion allocated to equipment procurement has shrunk is intended to oblige both organisations to focus
to less than 17%. less on the quantitative build-up of defence forces
Japan’s MoD has sought to protect its budgets and more on channelling resources into operating
but, aware of financial constraints, it has made only capabilities efficiently at a higher state of readiness.
limited requests for increases, seeking a 0.6% rise for Hence, Japanese defence planning should sharpen
2012. In deliberations over the NDPG, the Ministry its focus in future on qualitative force improvements,
of Finance has been keen to maintain a tight grip expanding activities and rationalising total asset
on defence spending, arguing that the MoD must strength if necessary.
reform its procurement practices through efficiency
savings, private finance initiative (PFI) schemes JSDF priorities and capabilities
and increasing imports of cheaper foreign equip- The MoD has thus opted to emphasise key missions
ment. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in the NDPG and the subsequent 2011 and 2012
agrees on the need to reform procurement practices, budgets. These include responding to incursions into
224 The Military Balance 2012
Japan’s airspace and territorial waters; attacks on its Transition from Cold War defence planning
offshore islands; guerrilla incursions; ballistic-missile Additional security taboos have obstructed the devel-
attacks; cyber attacks; and chemical, biological and opment of Japan’s defence planning. The DPJ came
nuclear disasters. In terms of overall force structures close to lifting the arms-export ban in the lead-up to
and capabilities, the NDPG emphasises the need to the NDPG, arguing that this was essential to preserve
strengthen the MSDF by maintaining a 48-strong a shrinking domestic defence industry. The industry
destroyer fleet, an increase in the submarine fleet to has the JSDF as its sole customer, faces declining
22 vessels by 2013, and the addition of larger, 19,500- equipment budgets and is unable to exploit the
tonne helicopter carriers. The MSDF will further economies of scale available to those pursuing inter-
complete the fitting out of six of its Aegis-equipped national programmes. The proposed change was,
destroyers for a ballistic-missile defence (BMD) capa- however, scuppered by the DPJ’s need to rely on the
bility. pacifist Social Democratic Party of Japan for votes to
The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is moving to pass its broader budgets in the National Diet, and by
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
deploy the Patriot PAC-3 BMD system nationwide other factors. In September 2011, Maehara pushed
across all six air-defence missile groups; to procure again for the arms-export ban to be relaxed, and on 27
the 6,500km-range C-2 transport aircraft; and to December Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura
upgrade the combat capabilities of its F-15s. The announced the government’s decision to ease its
MoD issued its request for proposals (RFP) for the long-standing restriction on arms exports.
F-X fighter programme to replace the JASDF’s ageing In attempting to set out a new vision for defence
F-4s in September 2011; the three prime contenders policy, Japan’s policymakers have been given impetus
were the Lockheed-Martin F-35, Boeing F/A-18E/F by recent international and domestic develop-
and Eurofighter Typhoon. The F-35 was the preferred ments. However, inertia in the policymaking system
option because of its advanced capabilities, though continues. The GSDF still receives the most funding
the F/A-18E/F and Typhoon were readily available, of all three services, even though Japan’s greatest
less expensive options, and could have provided local external-security priorities lie in maritime and air
production and development opportunities. In the defence. Additionally, the concept of the ‘dynamic
final calculation resulting in the choice of the F-35, the defence force’ will only fully take root once the JSDF
wider political cost of procuring a European aircraft has more comprehensively changed its focus from
and the need to consolidate alliance ties with the US building force numbers to using them more actively.
probably also figured. The MoD may be keen to develop this more dynamic,
Meanwhile, the GSDF’s call for greater resources slimmer and more deployable force; but Tokyo’s
has been strengthened somewhat by its key role assumption of a greater role in international opera-
in post-tsunami disaster-relief, and it may be able tions and the development of a force capable of deter-
to boost its helicopter transport and NBC assets. ring transgressions of its sovereignty may only raise
Moreover, the GSDF will play a key role in garrisoning anxieties in the region, as potential adversaries see
Japan’s offshore islands in Okinawa Prefecture, to Japan’s defence policy ‘normalising’ and position
deter Chinese incursions. themselves accordingly.
Asia 225
COMBAT SUPPORT
Afghanistan AFG 1 sigs bn
New Afghan Afghani Afs 2010 2011 2012 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC 173
GDP Afs 712bn 826bn
APC (T) 173 M113A2
US$ 15.3bn 17.7bn ARTY
per capita US$ 526 596 TOWED 109: 122mm 85 D-30; 155mm 24 M114A1
Growth % 8.23 7.07 MSL • SSM SS-1 Scud†
Inflation % 7.7 8.4 MW Bozena
Def bdgt Afs 12.9bn 29.6bn 43.3bn
Afghan Air Force (AAF) 5,000
US$ 277m 635m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=Afs 46.54 46.60 AIRCRAFT
Population 29,757,566 TPT 21: Medium 12 G-222 (C-27A) (8 more being
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Ethnic groups: Pashtun 38%; Tajik 25%; Hazara 19%; Uzbek 12%; acquired) Light 9: 3 Cessna 182; 6 Cessna 208B being
Aimaq 4%; Baluchi 0.5% delivered
TRG 2 L-39 Albatros†
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus HELICOPTERS
Male 21.7% 6.2% 5.0% 3.8% 13.4% 1.2% ATK 11 Mi-35
Female 20.6% 5.8% 4.7% 3.5% 12.9% 1.3% MRH 39: 6 MD-530F being delivered; 33 Mi-17
Asia
The Afghan National Army (ANA) is fighting the Taliban Afghan National Police 136,100
alongside NATO forces while continuing to improve Under control of Interior Ministry. Includes 80,000
its capability. With most of the planned force structure Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 13,000 Afghan
established, the priority is to develop leadership and National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 25,000 Afghan
technical expertise. Plans call for the ANA to reach full Border Police (ABP) and 7,000 Afghan Anti-Crime Police.
capability as a counter-insurgency force in time for the (AACP)
Afghan assumption of security leadership by the end
of 2014, by which time ANA units should be operating Foreign Forces
independently, or with minimal support from advisers.
All under ISAF comd unless otherwise specified. ISAF HQ
Already some elements – notably the Special Forces –
resembles a static HQ with contributing NATO countries
are highly rated by ISAF. However, most army units still
filling identified posts.
require considerable support from NATO. Governance
Albania 286; 1 inf coy
shortcomings and widespread corruption undermine the
Armenia 126
army’s effectiveness. There are plans to develop Afghan
Air Force capability, with training by NATO’s Combined Australia 1,550; 1 inf BG with (1 mot inf coy; 1 armd recce
Air Power Transition Force. sqn); elm 1 arty regt; 1 hel gp with 2 CH-47D; 1 UAV det
with Scaneagle; 25 Bushmaster IMV LFV; 3 C-130J Hercules •
ACTIVE 170,700 (Army 165,700 Air Force 5,000) UNAMA 2 obs
Paramlitary 136,100 Austria 3
Azerbaijan 94
Organisations by Service Belgium 577; 6 F-16 Fighting Falcon
Bosnia-Herzegovina 55
Afghan National Army (ANA) 165,700 Bulgaria 597; 1 mech inf coy
5 regional comd. The ANA is expanding rapidly but still Canada 529; 1 air unit with CC-130J
suffers from high wastage and poor retention. Croatia 317
FORCES BY ROLE Czech Republic 694; 19 IVECO DV LMV Panther •
SPECIAL FORCES UNAMA 1 obs
1 Spec Ops div (1 SF gp; 1 cdo bde with (3 cdo bn) Denmark 750; 1 mech inf BG with (2 mech inf coy; 1 tk pl)
MANOEUVRE • UNAMA 2 obs
Light El Salvador 24
1 (201st) corps (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bde, 1 mech bde, 1 EOD Estonia 162; 1 mech inf coy with 14 XA-180 Sisu; 1 mor det
coy) with 3 81mm
3 (207th, 209th & 215th) corps (1 cdo bn, 3 inf bde, 1 Finland 195
EOD coy) France 3,932; 1 AB bde HQ; 1 inf BG; 1 para BG; 3 Rafale C;
2 (203rd & 205th) corps (1 cdo bn, 4 inf bde, 1 EOD coy) 3 Mirage 2000D; 1 cbt hel bn with (3 EC665 Tiger; 2 AS532
1 (111st Capital) div (2 inf bde) Cougar; 3 EC725; 3 Gazelle)
226 The Military Balance 2012
Luxembourg 11 a
Including military pensions
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 163 Population 21,766,711
Malaysia 46
Mongolia 114 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Montenegro 39 Male 9.4% 3.4% 3.6% 3.7% 23.7% 6.4%
Netherlands 183 Female 8.9% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 23.3% 7.6%
New Zealand 188 • UNAMA 1 obs
Norway 562; 1 mech inf coy; 1 spt coy • UNAMA 1 obs Capabilities
Poland 2,580; 1 mech inf bde HQ; 2 inf BG; 35 Rosomak Australia has a strong military tradition and its relatively
AIFV; 68 IFV; 6 Mi-24; 4 Mi-17 • UNAMA 1 obs compact armed forces’ considerable operational experi-
Portugal 229 • UNAMA 1 obs ence, together with the country’s high levels of techno-
Romania 1,947; 2 inf bn; some TAB-77; some TAB-79; some logical expertise, substantial defence-industrial base, and
Piranha IIIC strong international defence relationships (particularly
Singapore 39 with the US) contribute substantially to its military ca-
Slovakia 326 pabilities. Continuing modernisation of all three services
Slovenia 87 seems likely to ensure that the sophistication of the ADF’s
Spain 1,526; 1 lt inf bde equipment at least matches, and in many cases continuing
Sweden 614 • UNAMA 1 obs to surpass, that of nations in Australia’s immediate region.
Tonga 55 Notable planned future procurement includes 100 F-35
Joint Strike Fighters and 12 large new conventional sub-
Turkey 1,840; 1 inf bde HQ; 2 inf bn
marines. ADF units benefit from high training standards
Ukraine 23
and participate in regular joint-service exercises at the na-
United Arab Emirates 35
tional, bilateral and multinational levels. The ADF trains
United Kingdom 9,500; 1 (20th) armd bde HQ (1 recce regt;
with a view to future operational deployments in South-
1 armd regt; 6 lt inf bn; 1 engr regt); 1 GMLRS tp; 2 UAV
east Asia and possibly further afield, as well as in defence
bty; 1 EOD unit (bn sized); 1 spt bn; 1 theatre log spt gp; 1
of the Australian continent. However, the national capacity
medical bn; Warrior; Mastiff; Viking; L118; GMLRS; 8 AH-
to tolerate other than occasional casualties in the course of
64D Apache; 5 Lynx; Hermes 450; MQ-9 Reaper 6 Sea King HC
discretionary international operations is questionable. This
MK 4 8 Tornado GR4; 4 C-130 Hercules; 8 CH-47 Chinook; 6
factor will probably continue to limit the nature and scale
Merlin HC Mk3; 4 Shadow R1 (Beech King Air 350)
of future deployments.
United States 90,000; 1 corps HQ; 2 div HQ; 1 armd HBCT;
2 armd inf bde; 1 mech inf SBCT; 4 lt IBCT; 1 BfSB; 3 cbt ACTIVE 56,552 (Army 28,246 Navy 14,250 Air
avn bde; 1 ARNG IBCT; 1 ARNG IBCT HQ; 1 MEF with (2 14,056)
RCT); M1A1 Abrams; Stryker; 3,200 MRAP; M-ATV; M119,
M198, M777; F-15E Strike Eagle; F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; RESERVE 20,440 (Army 15,840 Navy 2,000 Air
A-10 Thunderbolt II; AV-8B Harrier; EC-130H Compass Call, 2,600)
C-130 Hercules, MV-22B Osprey, KC-130J Hercules, AH-64 The High-Readiness Reserve of 2,800 army and 1,400 air-
Apache; OH-58 Kiowa; CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; force personnel is intended to strengthen the Australian
HH-60 Pave Hawk; AH-IW Cobra, CH-53 Sea Stallion; UH-1 Defence Force (ADF) with members trained to the same
Iroquois; RQ-7B Shadow; MQ-1 Predator; MQ-9 Reaper skill levels as the Regular Force. Integrated units are
(Equipment includes both ISAF and OEF-A forces) • formed from a mix of reserve and regular personnel. All
Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan ε7,000 ADF operations are now controlled by Headquarters Joint
Uruguay UNAMA 1 obs Operations Command (HQJOC).
Asia 227
3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated) troops); 6 LCM-2000 (not yet operational)
Mechanised HELICOPTERS
1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 recce regt, 1 armd regt, 2 mech ATK 22 EC665 Tiger
inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 CSS TPT 103: Heavy 5 CH-47D Chinook Medium 59: 22 NH90
bn) TTH (MRH90 TTH) (18 more on order); 35 S-70A Black
Light Hawk Light 41 Bell 206B-1 Kiowa (being replaced by Tiger);
1 (7th ) mot inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 mot inf bn, 1 arty (20 Bell-205 (UH-1H Iroquois) in store/decommissioned)
regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs sqn, 1 CSS bn) UAV • ISR • Heavy 8 Heron (leased)
1 (3rd) lt inf bde (1 recce regt, 1 (IMV) mot inf sqn, 2 lt AD • SAM • MANPAD 150 RBS-70
Asia
inf bn, 1 AB bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, RADAR • LAND 21: 7 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor);
1 CSS bn) 14 RASIT (veh, arty)
Aviation ARV 10 ASLAV-F; 1 ASLAV-R; 7 M88A2; M806A1
1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt VLB 5 Biber
hel sqn), 1 regt (1 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn)) MW 3 Chubby; 8 ST-AT/V
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 1 UAV bty, Navy 14,250
1 CSS bty), 1 AD regt (integrated), 1 int bn) Fleet Comd HQ located at Stirling; Naval Systems Comd
1 EW regt located at Canberra
COMBAT SERVICE SUPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn) SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6 Collins each with 6
1 engr regt (2 (construction) engr sqn, 1 (topographic) single 533mm TT each with Mk48 Sea Arrow ADCAP HWT/
engr sqn) UGM-84C Harpoon AShM
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 12
Special Operations Command FFGHM 12
FORCES BY ROLE 4 Adelaide (Mod) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84C
SPECIAL FORCES Harpoon AShM/SM-2 MR SAM, 1 8 cell Mk41 VLS
1 (SAS) SF regt with RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32
1 (incident response) SF regt 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity
2 cdo bn 2 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel)
COMBAT SUPPORT 8 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr
3 sigs sqn (incl 1 reserve sqn) with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 8 cell Mk41 VLS with
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm
1 CSS sqn ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1
S-70B Seahawk ASW hel ASW hel), (capability upgrades
Reserve Organisations in progress)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PHSC 14
Force Command 15,840 reservists Armidale
FORCES BY ROLE MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9
COMMAND MHO 6 Huon
1 (2nd) div HQ MSD 3
MANOEUVRE AMPHIBIOUS
Light PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2:
6 inf bde (1 recce unit, 23 inf bn, some cbt spt/CSS LSD 1 Choules (UK Bay) (capacity 4 LCU; 2 LCVP; 1
unit) LCU; 24 MBT; 350 troops)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT LSL 1 Tobruk (capacity 2 Sea King Mk50A hel; 2 LCM; 2
2 (construction) engr regt LCVP; 40 APC and 18 MBT; 500 troops)
228 The Military Balance 2012
LANDING CRAFT 10: TRG 95: 33 Hawk Mk127*; 62 PC-9/A (incl 4 PC-9/A(F)
LCH 6 Balikpapan (capacity 3 MBT or 13 APC) for tgt marking)
LCVP 4 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5–7 S-76 (civil contract)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24 RADAR • AD RADAR 8
AE 3 Wattle OTH-B Jindalee 4
AGSH 2 Leeuwin Tactical 4
AGS 4 Paluma MSL
AORH 1 Success AShM AGM-84A Harpoon
AOR 1 Sirius ASM AGM-142E Raptor; AGM-158 JASSM (IOC end 2011)
AOL 4 Warrigal AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR ASRAAM: SARH
ASR 3 AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM
AX 3: 1 AXL; 2 AXS BOMBS
YPT 3 Conventional Mk 82 500lb GP; Mk 84 2,000lb GP; BLU-
109/B 2,000lb penetrator
Naval Aviation 990 Laser-guided Paveway II/IV
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
MALAYSIA
Army 115; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours)
Capabilities
Air force 13; 1 AP-3C Orion crew Bangladesh has a limited military capability. The military
has previously taken a political role, which ended in 2008
MIDDLE EAST with a general election. In 2009 there was a rebellion by
UN • UNTSO 12 obs some paramilitary forces, sparked partially by a pay dis-
pute. Relatively few inter-service exercises are reported,
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
although 2011 saw exercises taking place with India and
Army 38; 1 trg unit the US. Bangladesh’s long record of service in UN peace-
SOLOMON ISLANDS keeping missions has brought considerable operational
RAMSI (Operation Anode) 80; 2 inf pl; 4 OH-58 Kiowa; 2 experience.
S-70 Black Hawk; 2 Armidale PCC; 2 DHC-4 Caribou ACTIVE 157,053 (Army 126,153 Navy 16,900 Air
south SUDAN 14,000) Paramilitary 63,900
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
UN • UNMISS 8; 6 obs
Organisations by Service
TIMOR LESTE
ISF (Operation Astute) 380; 1 inf bn HQ; 2 inf coy; 1 AD Army 126,153
bty; elm 1 cbt engr regt; 1 hel det with 4 S-70 Black Hawk;
FORCES BY ROLE
3 C-130
COMMAND
UN • UNMIT 4 obs 7 inf div HQ
United Arab Emirates SPECIAL FORCES
1 cdo bn
Asia
Air Force 313; 1 tpt det with 3 C-130 Hercules; 1 MP det
MANOEUVRE
with 2 AP-3C Orion
Armoured
1 armd bde (1 armd regt)
Foreign Forces 6 indep armd regt
Light
New Zealand Army: 9 (air navigation) trg
17 inf bde (total: 68 inf bn)
Singapore Air Force 230: 1 school at Pearce with PC-21 trg Aviation
ac; 1 op trg sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 Super Puma/AS532 1 avn regt (2 avn sqn)
Cougar COMBAT SUPPORT
United States US Pacific Command: 178; 1 SEWS at Pine 20 arty regt
Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine 1 AD bde
Gap 1 engr bde
1 sigs bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bangladesh BGD MBT 232: 58 Type-69/Type-69G; 174 Type-59
LT TK 8 Type-62
Bangladeshi Taka Tk 2010 2011 2012
APC 248
GDP Tk 7.41tr 8.47tr APC (T) 134 MT-LB
US$ 105bn 114bn APC (W) 92: 75 BTR-80; 17 Otocar
per capita US$ 670 717 PPV 22 Cobra
ARTY 815+
Growth % 6.38 6.32
TOWED 343+: 105mm 170: 56 Model 56A1; 114 Model
Inflation % 8.1 10.1 56/L 10A1 pack howitzer; 122mm 111: 57 Type-54/54-1
Def exp Tk 87.6bn (M-30), 54 T96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46)
US$ 1.24bn MOR 472: 81mm 11 M-29A1; 82mm 366 Type-
Def bdgt Tk 91.8bn 93.2bn 120bn 53/87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 MO-120-AM-50 M67/
UBM 52
US$ 1.3bn 1.25bn
AT • RCL 106mm 238 M-40A1
FMA (US) US$ 1.5m 1.5m AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA-31T
US$1=Tk 70.82 74.49 Cheyenne
Population 158,570,535 AD • SAM • MANPAD QW-2; 20 HN-5A (being
replaced by QW-2)
Religious groups: Muslim 90%; Hindu 9%; Buddhist 1%
GUNS • TOWED 164: 37mm 132 Type 65/74 57mm 34
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Type 59 (S-60)
AEV MT-LB
Male 17.4% 4.8% 4.0% 3.5% 16.7% 2.3%
ARV T-54/T-55; Type 84
Female 16.9% 5.2% 4.8% 4.3% 17.8% 2.4% VLB MTU
230 The Military Balance 2012
Asia
US$ 351m AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 4: 2 Teraban;
Def bdgt B$ 512m 514m 2 Cheverton Loadmaster
US$ 371m 406m
US$1=B$ 1.38 1.27 Air Force 1,100
FORCES BY ROLE
Population 401,890
MARITIME PATROL
Ethnic groups: Malay, Kedayan, Tutong, Belait, Bisaya, Dusun, 1 sqn with CN-235M
Murut 66.3%; Chinese 11.2%; Iban, Dayak, Kelabit 6%; Other TRAINING
11.8%
1 sqn with PC-7; Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 214 (SAR)
Male 13.2% 4.3% 4.5% 4.6% 21.7% 1.7%
1 sqn with Bo-105
Female 12.4% 4.3% 4.7% 5.0% 21.8% 1.8% 1 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk
AIR DEFENCE
Capabilities 2 sqn with Mistral
The small, professional Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
are an important source of employment in this oil-rich AIRCRAFT
mini-state. Despite being well-trained, they could offer MP 1 CN-235M
little resistance on their own to a determined aggressor. TRG 4 PC-7
However, the Sultanate has long-established defence rela- HELICOPTERS
tions with the United Kingdom and Singapore, with which TPT 23 Medium 5: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 4 S-70A Black Hawk
its forces train. It has deployed small contingents, under Light 18: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 10 Bell 212; 6 Bo-105
Malaysian command, to the Lebanon (UNIFIL) and south- (armed, 81mm rockets)
ern Philippines (IMT). AD • SAM 12 Mistral
ACTIVE 7,000 (Army 4,900 Navy 1,000 Air 1,100) Paramilitary ε2,250
Paramilitary 2,250
Gurkha Reserve Unit 400-500
RESERVE 700 (Army 700)
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Organisations by Service Light
2 inf bn (-)
Army 4,900
FORCES BY ROLE Royal Brunei Police 1,750
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 10: 3
3 inf bn Bendaharu; 7 PDB-type
232 The Military Balance 2012
Some arty bn
Cambodia CAM Some AD bn
3 fd engr regt
Cambodian Riel r 2010 2011 2012 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
GDP r 47.8tr 53.3tr 1 (construction) engr regt
US$ 11.3bn 13bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 779 883 MBT 150+: 50 Type-59; 100+ T-54/T-55
Growth % 6.02 6.71
LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63
RECCE BRDM-2
Inflation % 4.0 6.4
AIFV 70 BMP-1
Def bdgt r 1.15tr 1.23tr APC 190+
US$ 271m 298m APC (T) M-113
FMA (US) US$ 1.0m 1.0m APC (W) 190: 160 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64
ARTY 428+
US$1=r 4245.30 4109.44
TOWED 400+ 76mm ZIS-3 M-1942/122mm D-30/122mm
Population 14,701,717 M-30 M-1938/130mm Type-59-I
Ethnic groups: Khmer 90%; Vietnamese 5%; Chinese 1% MRL 28+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 8 BM-21; 132mm BM-
13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20 BM-14-16 (BM-14)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160
Male 16.2% 5.5% 5.7% 5.0% 14.6% 1.4% AT • RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11
Female 16.0% 5.6% 5.8% 5.1% 16.9% 2.3% AD
MSL • MANPAD 50 FN-6; FN-16 (reported)
GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm
Capabilities M-1939; 57mm S-60
Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia’s formal sta- ARV T-54/T-55
tus as a constitutional monarchy, and their integration in MW Bozena, RA-140 DS
the early 1990s of two non-communist resistance armies,
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are essentially Navy ε2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry)
the modern manifestation of the armed forces of the for- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
mer People’s Republic of Kampuchea, established in 1979 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
following Vietnam’s invasion. The army is organised into PBF 2 Stenka
many under-strength ‘divisions’, and is top heavy with se- PB 7: 4 (PRC 46m); 3 (PRC 20m)
nior officers. Minor skirmishes on the border with Thailand PBR 2 Kaoh Chhlam
since 2008 provide little indication of the RCAF’s capacity Naval Infantry 1,500
for high-intensity combat, which is probably limited.
FORCES BY ROLE
ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500 MANOEUVRE
Provincial Forces 45,000) Paramilitary 67,000 Light
Terms of service conscription authorised but not 7 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
implemented since 1993
1 arty bn
TRANSPORT
1 VIP sqn (reporting to Council of Ministers) with An- Capabilities
24RV Coke; AS350 Ecureuil; AS355F2 Ecureuil II The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is engaged in a mod-
1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Y-12 (II) ernisation programme fuelled by the country’s rapid eco-
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER nomic development. With a fleet of more modern subma-
1 sqn with Mi-26 Halo; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-8 Hip rines and naval escorts, more capable fighter aircraft and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE advanced armoured vehicles, it is now superior to the
AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable armed forces of less developed countries in Southeast Asia;
TPT • Light 11: 2 An-24RV Coke; 1 BN-2 Islander; 5 P-92 the PLA also now matches the capabilities of Taiwan. How-
Echo (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II) ever, a lack of war-fighting experience (China has not been
TRG 5 L-39 Albatros* involved in a significant conflict since the war with Viet-
HELICOPTERS nam in 1979), questions over training and morale, and key
MRH 3 MI-17 Hip H capability gaps such as C4ISTAR and anti-submarine war-
TPT 10: Heavy 2 Mi-26 Halo Medium 4 Mi-8 Hip Light 4: fare mean that it remains inferior to more technologically
proficient militaries in the region, such as South Korea and
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
Terms of service selective conscription; all services 2 years
APC (W) 700: 100 Type-09 (ZBL-09); 500 Type-92B; 100 VLB KMM; MTU; TMM; Type-84A
WZ-523 MW Type-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84
ARTY 12,462+
SP 1,785: 122mm 1,371: 1,296 Type-70-I/Type-89/Type- Navy ε215,000; 40,000 conscript (total 255,000)
07 PLZ-07 ; ε75 Type-09 (PLC-09) 152mm 324 Type-83; The PLA Navy is organised into five service arms:
155mm 126 Type-05 (PLZ-05) submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and
TOWED 6,176: 122mm 3,800 Type-54-1 (M-30) M-1938/ marine corps, as well as other specialised units. There are
Type-83/Type-60 (D-74)/Type-96 (D-30); 130mm 234 three fleets, the Beihai Fleet (North Sea), Donghai Fleet
Type-59 (M-46)/Type-59-I; 152mm 2,106 Type-54 (D-1)/ (East Sea) and Nanhai Fleet (South Sea).
Type-66 (D-20); 155mm 150 Type 88 WAC-21 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GUN/MOR 150+: 120mm 150+: 100 2S23 NONA-SVK; SUBMARINES 71
50+ PLL-05 STRATEGIC • SSBN 3:
MRL 1,770+ 1 Xia (Type 092) with 12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3) strategic SLBM
SP 1,716+: 107mm some 122mm 1,620 Type-81/Type-
2 Jin (Type 094) with up to 12 JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) strategic
89; 300mm 96 Type-03 PHL-03
SLBM (full operational status unknown; 2 additional
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
Sardine AShM, 8 single 533mm TT (test platform)
8E
SSK 52:
RCL 3,966: 75mm Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10)/Type-
12 Kilo (2 Project 877, 2 Project 636, 8 Project 636N)
78; 105mm Type-75; 120mm Type-98
with 3M54 Klub (SS-N-27B Sizzler) ASCM; 6 single
RL 62mm Type-70-1
533mm TT with up to 18 Test-71/96 HWT
GUNS 1,730: 100mm 1,658: 1,308 Type-73 (T-12)/Type-
20 Ming (4 Type 035, 12 Type 035G, 4 Type 035B)
86; 350 Type-02 PTL02 120mm up to 72 Type-89 SP
AIRCRAFT • TPT 8 Medium 3 Y-8 Light 5 Y-7 with 8 single 533mm TT
HELICOPTERS 16 Song (Type 039/039G) with YJ-82 (CSS-N-8)
ATK ε16 Z-10 Saccade ASCM, 6 single 533mm TT
MRH 401: 22 Mi-17 Hip H; 33 Mi-17-V5 Hip H; 24 Mi- 4 Yuan (Type 039A/B) with 6 533mm TT (2 further
17-V7 Hip H; 8 SA316 Alouette III; 8 SA342L Gazelle; 80 vessels launched in 2010; expected ISD 2011)
Z-9/9B; 200 Z-9 WA; 26 Z-9W SS 1 Golf (SLBM trials)
TPT 234 Heavy 21: 4 Mi-26 Halo; 7 SA321 Super Frelon; 10 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 78
Z-8 Medium 145: 50 Mi-8T Hip; 69 Mi-171; 8 Mi-172; 18 DESTROYERS 13
S-70C2 (S-70C) Black Hawk Light 68: 53 AS350 Ecureuil; DDGHM 11:
15 EC120 4 Hangzhou (RUS Sovremenny) with 2 quad lnchr with
UAV • ISR • Heavy BZK-005; WZ-5 Medium ASN-105; 3M80/3M82 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 3K90
ASN-206 Light ASN-104; W-50 Unknown WZ-6 BZK-006 Uragan (SA-N-7 Grizzly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT,
AD 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3, 2 twin 130mm gun, (capacity
SAM 290+: either 1 Z-9C (AS-565SA Panther) hel or 1 Ka-28 Helix
SP 290: 200 HQ-7A; 60 9K331 Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet); A hel)
30 HQ-6D Red Leader 2 Luyang (Type 052B) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
MANPAD HN-5A/HN-5B Hong Nu; FN-6/QW-1/ AShM, 2 single lnchr with 3K90 Uragan (SA-N-7
QW-2 Grizzly) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1
GUNS 7,700+ 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
SP 25mm Type-95/Type-04; 35mm Type-07 37mm 2 Luyang II (Type 052C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
Type-88; 57mm Type-80 62 AShM, 8 sextuple VLS with HHQ-9 SAM, 2 triple
TOWED 23mm Type-80 (ZU-23-2); 25mm Type-85; 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity
35mm Type-90 (GDF-002); 37mm Type-55 (M-1939)/ 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
Type-65/Type-74; 57mm Type-59 (S-60); 85mm Type- 1 Luhai (Type 051B) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
56 (M-1939) KS-12; 100mm Type-59 (KS-19) AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HQ-7 SAM, 2 triple
RADAR • LAND Cheetah; RASIT; Type-378 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 twin 100mm gun,
MSL (capacity 2 Z-9C (AS-565SA Panther)/Ka-28 Helix A
AShM HY-1 (CSS-N-2) Silkworm; HY-2 (CSS-C-3) hel)
Seersucker; HY-4 (CSS-C-7) Sadsack 2 Luhu (Type 052) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
ASM KD-10 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HQ-7 SAM, 2 triple
ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500, 1 twin
236 The Military Balance 2012
100mm gun, (capacity 2 Z-9C (AS-565SA Panther) 11 Huangfen (Type 021) with 2 twin lnchr with HY-2
hel) (CSS-N-3 Seersucker) AShM
DDGM 2: PCG 26
2 Luzhou (Type 051C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 6 Houjian (Type 037/II) with 2 triple lnchr with YJ-1
(C-803) AShM; 6 sextulpe VLS with SA-N-20 Grumble (CSS-N-4 Sardine) AShM
SAM, 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 20 Houxin (Type 037/IG) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-1
FRIGATES 65 (CSS-N-4 Sardine) AShM
FFGHM 25: PCC 75
2 Jiangkai (Type 054) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 3 Haijui (Type 037/I) with 4 RBU 1200 (20 eff.)
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 50 Hainan (Type 037) with ε4 RBU 1200 (20 eff.)
324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200, 1 100mm 22 Haiqing (Type 037/IS) with 2 Type-87 (12 eff.)
gun, (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C (AS-565SA PB 34+ Haizui/Shanghai III (Type 062/I)
Panther) hel) MINE WARFARE 73
9 Jiangkai II (Type 054A) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ- MINE COUNTERMEASURES 88
83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with HQ-16 SAM (reported), MCO 7: 6 Wochi; 1 Wozang
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
ARTY 40+
1 regt with Su-30MK2
SP 122mm 40+: 20+ Type-07; 20+ Type 89
ATTACK
MRL 107mm Type-63
2 regt with JH-7
MOR 82mm
3 regt with JH-7A
AT
ELINT/ISR/AEW
1 regt with Y-8J/JB/W MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8
MARITIME PATROL RCL 120mm Type-98
1 regt with SH-5 AD • SAM • MANPAD HN-5 Hong Nu/Red Cherry
TRANSPORT
Asia
1 regt with Y-7; Y-7H; Y-8 Air Force 300,000–330,000
1 regt with Y-7; Y-8; Z-8; Z-9 The PLAAF organises its command through seven
TRAINING military-region air forces (MRAF) – Shenyang, Beijing,
1 regt (forming) with JL-9 Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu – and
HELICOPTER 14 div-level command posts.
1 regt with Mi-8; Ka-28; Ka-31 Flying hours Ftr, ground attack and bbr pilots average
1 regt with AS365; Ka-28; Z-8; Z-8A/JH/S 100–150 hrs/yr. Tpt pilots average 200+
AIRCRAFT 311 combat capable per year. Each regt has two quotas to meet
BBR 50: 20 H-5; 30 H-6G during the year – a total number of hours,
FTR 72: 24 J-7E Fishbed; 24 J-8F Finback; 24 J-8H Finback and the percentage of flight time dedicated
FGA 172+: 120 JH-7/JH-7A; 24 J-10A/S; 4+ J-11B/BS; 24 to tactics trg.
Su-30MK2 Flanker
FORCES BY ROLE
ASW 4 SH-5
BOMBER
ELINT 7: 4 Y-8JB High New 2; 3 Y-8X
2 regt with H-6A/M
AEW&C 6: 4 Y-8J; 2 Y-8W High New 5
3 regt with H-6H/K with YJ-63
ISR 7 HZ-5
1 (nuclear ready) regt with H-6E
TKR 3 H-6DU
FIGHTER
TPT 66: Medium 4 Y-8 Light 62: 50 Y-5; 4 Y-7; 6 Y-7H;
10 regt with J-7 Fishbed
2 Yak-42
TRG 106+: 38 CJ-6; 5 HJ-5*; 21 HY-7; 14 JJ-6*; 4 JJ-7*; 12 8 regt with J-7E Fishbed
JL-8*; 12+ JL-9 5 regt with J-7G Fishbed
HELICOPTERS 1 regt with J-8B Finback
ASW 28: 13 Ka-28 Helix A (6 additional ac on order); 2 regt with J-8F Finback
25 Z-9C 4 regt with J-8H Finback
AEW 2 Ka-31 1 regt with Su-27SK/UBK Flanker
SAR 2 Z-8S 6 regt with J-11/Su-27UBK
TPT 46 Heavy 38: 15 SA321 Super Frelon; 20 Z-8/Z-8A; 1 regt with J-11B/BS
3 Z-8JH Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip 3 regt (forming) with J-11B/BS
MSL FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AAM • IR PL-5; PL-9; R-73 (AA-11 Archer) SARH PL- 3 regt with Su-30MKK Flanker
11 IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) ARH R-77 (AA-12 6 regt with J-10A/S
Adder) GROUND ATTACK
ASM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton); YJ-61 (CAS-1 3 regt with JH-7A
(improved) Kraken); YJ-8K (CSS-N-4 Sardine); YJ-83K 5 regt with Q-5C/D/E Fantan
(CSSC-8 Saccade) ELECTRONIC WARFARE
BOMBS 1 regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ
Conventional: Type-200-4/Type-200A 1 regt with Y-8CB/G
238 The Military Balance 2012
ISR AD
2 regt with JZ-6* SAM 600+
1 regt with JZ-8 Finback* SP 300+: 24 HD-6D; 60+ HQ-7; 32 HQ-9; 24 HQ-12 (KS-
1 regt with JZ-8F Finback* 1A); some HQ-16; 32 S-300PMU (SA-10B Grumble); 64
1 regt with Y-8H1 S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 64 S-300PMU2 (SA-20
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL Gargoyle)
1 regt with KJ-200/KJ-2000/Y-8T TOWED 300+ HQ-2 (SA-2) Guideline Towed/HQ-2A/
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE HQ-2B(A)
1 regt with Mi-171; Z-8 GUNS 16,000 100mm/85mm
TANKER MSL
1 regt with H-6U AAM • IR PL-2B‡; PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (AA-11 Archer);
TRANSPORT SARH PL-11; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); ARH PL-
1 (VIP) regt with B-737; CRJ-200/700 12; R-77 (AA-12 Adder)
1 (VIP) regt with B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D ASM KD-88; Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-31A/P (AS-17
1 regt with Il-76MD Candid B Krypton); Kh-59 (AS-18 Kazoo); YJ-91 (Domestically
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt) regt with H-6E)
38th Group Army 37th Fighter Division
(1 armd div, 2 mech inf div, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 (1 ftr regt with J-8H; 1 ftr regt with J-7G; 1 ftr regt
engr regt, 1 avn regt) (forming) with J-11B)
65th Group Army Other Forces
(1 armd div, 1 mech inf div, 1 mot inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 (2 trg school with CJ-6, JJ-5; PLAAF Msl Test regt with
JJ-6, J-7B; 1 (mixed) SAM/ADA div; 1 SAM bde; 4
AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 avn regt)
indep SAM regt)
Other Forces
(1 SF unit, 2 (Beijing) gd div; 1 mot inf bde; 1 ADA bde) Jinan MR (Centre)
North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation Land Forces
7th Naval Air Division (Shandong, Henan MD)
(1 trg regt with JL-9, 1 FGA regt with JH-7A) 20th Group Army
Other Forces (1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 mot inf bde, 1 arty bde,
(1 bbr regt with H-5; H-6DU/G; Y-8X; 1 tpt regt with 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt)
Y-7/Y-8) 26th Group Army
(1 armd div, 3 mot inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 avn
Beijing MRAF regt)
7th Fighter Division 54th Group Army
(1 ftr regt with J-11; 1 ftr regt with J-7G; 1 ftr regt with (1 armd div, 2 mech inf div (RRU), 1 arty bde, 1 AD
J-7) bde, 1 avn regt)
15th Fighter/Attack Division Other Forces
(1 ftr regt with J-7; 1 atk regt with Q-5C) (1 SF unit; 1 EW regt)
24th Fighter Division
(1 ftr regt with J-8F; 1 FGA regt with J-10A)
North Sea Fleet
Coastal defence from DPRK border (Yalu River) to
Other Forces
south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10´N); equates to
(1 Flight Test Centre with Su-30, Su-27/J-11, J-8C, J-10,
Shenyang, Beijing and Jinan MR, and to seaward;
J-7E, JJ-7 (on rotation); 1 trg base with J-7B, JJ-7; 2 trg HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Qingdao. 9
schools with CJ-6/JJ-5/K-8; 3 SAM div; 1 (mixed) SAM/ coastal-defence districts
ADA div) 2 SSBN; 3 SSN; 23 SS; 2 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 2
FFGHM; 2 FFGM; 1 FFGH; 10 FFG; 1 ML; ε20 PCFG/
Other Forces PCG; 9 LS; ε7 MCMV
34th VIP Transport Division
(1 tpt regt with B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation
B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 5th Naval Air Division
(flight test) regt) (1 FGA regt with JH-7A; 1 ftr regt with J-8F)
240 The Military Balance 2012
Nanjing MR (East) (1 armd bde, 1 amph mech div (RRU), 1 mot inf div, 1
Land Forces arty div, 1 AD bde, 1 avn regt)
(Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Other Forces
Anhui MD) (1 SF unit; 1 mot inf bde; 1 (composite) mot inf bde
1st Group Army (Composed of units drawn from across the PLA and
(1 armd bde, 1 amph mech div, 1 mot inf bde, 1 arty deployed to Hong Kong on a rotational basis); 1 AD
div, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 avn regt); bde; 1 SSM bde; 1 EW regt)
12th Group Army
(1 armd div, 3 mot inf bde (1 RRU), 1 arty bde, 1 AD South Sea Fleet
bde, 1 engr regt); Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx 23°30´N)
31st Group Army to VNM border; equates to Guangzhou MR, and to
(1 (amph) armd bde, 2 mot inf div (incl 1 RRU), 1 mot seaward (including Paracel and Spratly Islands); HQ
inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 avn regt) at Zuanjiang; support bases at Yulin, Guangzhou
Other Forces 1 SSBN; 2 SSN; 18 SS; 5 DDGHM; 9 FFGHM; 15
(1 SF unit; 1 SSM bde) FFG; ε40 PCFG/PCG; 1 LPD; 51 LS; ε10 MCMV
(1 armd bde, 1 (jungle) mot inf div, 1 mot inf div, 1 arty In July 2010, colours were presented by General Cheng
bde, 1 AD bde) Bingde, head of the PLA General Staff Department, to a
Other Forces new ‘Information Safeguards Base’, tasked with address-
(1 SF unit; 1 (high alt) mech inf bde; 2 mtn inf bde; 1 ing cyber threats and safeguarding China’s information
EW regt) security and information infrastructure. Some PLA sources
Chengdu MRAF claim that the base is not an offensive cyber capability but
4th Transport Division rather is intended to bolster resilience.
(2 tpt regt with Y-8; 1 tpt regt with Y-7) The PLA has devoted much attention to information
33rd Fighter Division warfare over the past decade, both in terms of battlefield
Asia
(1 ftr regt with J-7E; 1 ftr regt with J-11) EW and wider, cyber warfare capabilities. The main doc-
44th Fighter Division trine is the ‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare’ docu-
(1 ftr regt with J-7; 1 FGA regt with J-10) ment, which guides PLA computer network operations
Other Forces and calls for the combination of network warfare and EW
(1 trg school with H-5, HJ-5, CJ-6; 1 (mixed) SAM/ADA tools at the start of a conflict in order to paralyse (or at least
bde; 3 indep SAM regt) degrade) an opponent’s C4ISR capabilities. China’s cyber
assets fall under the command of two main departments
Paramilitary 660,000+ active of the General Staff Department (GSD). Computer network
attacks and EW would in theory come under the 4th De-
People’s Armed Police ε660,000 partment (Electronic Countermeasures), and computer
network defence and intelligence gathering comes under
Internal Security Forces ε400,000
the 3rd Department (Signals Intelligence). The 3rd Depart-
FORCES BY ROLE ment is supported by a variety of ‘militia units’ comprising
MANOEUVRE
both military cyber warfare personnel and civilian hack-
Other
ers. In 2011, the PLA said that a much-reported ‘Cyber Blue
14 (mobile) paramilitary div
Team’ was a body designed to improve the PLA’s ‘ability
22 (mobile) indep paramilitary regt
to safeguard internet security.’
Some (firefighting/garrison) unit
The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are a small but IRAQ
tough fighting force that has secured substantial opera- UN • UNAMI 278; 3 sy unit
tional experience since the participation of Fijian units in South SUDAN
the Second World War, Malayan Emergency, and subse- UN • UNMISS 5 obs
quently as part of international peacekeeping missions in
Lebanon, the Sinai and Iraq. Involvement in international TIMOR LESTE
peacekeeping has provided an important revenue source UN • UNMIT 1 obs
for Fiji’s government. Since the 1980s, however, the RFMF
has also been heavily involved in domestic politics, mount-
ing a coup for the third time in 2006. This intervention dis-
rupted relations with Fiji’s traditional military partners,
Australia and New Zealand, leading the military-con-
trolled government to emphasise the potential of defence
ties with China and other ‘Asian friends’. In January 2011,
the RFMF Engineers Regiment received a gift of major civil
engineering equipment from China, allowing a major ex-
pansion of its developmental role. The RFMF’s small Naval
Unit operates primarily in EEZ protection and search-and-
rescue roles. Though it has operated helicopters in the past,
the RFMF presently has no aircraft.
Asia 243
FORCES BY ROLE
India IND MISSILE
1 gp with Agni I
Indian Rupee Rs 2010 2011 2012
1 gp with Agni II
GDP Rs 75.1tr 87.5tr 2 gp with SS-150/250 Prithvi I/II
US$ 1.64tr 1.89tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 1,394 1,591 MSL • STRATEGIC 54
Growth % 10.09 7.84 IRBM 24+: ε12 Agni I (80–100 msl); ε12 Agni II (20–25
msl); some Agni III (successfully tested)
Inflation % 12.0 10.6
SRBM 30+: ε30 SS-150 Prithvi I/SS-250 Prithvi II; some
Def expa Rs 1.42tn SS-350 Dhanush (naval testbed)
US$ 30.9bn Some Indian Air Force assets (such as Mirage 2000H or Su-
Def bdgta Rs 1.36tr 1.47tr 1.64tr 30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role
US$ 29.7bn 31.9bn
Space
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
MISSILE
Capabilities 2 msl gp with Agni I/II
India has the third-largest army in the world and is among 2 msl gp with SS-150/250 Prithvi I/II
the largest providers of personnel for UN peace-keeping SPECIAL FORCES
operations. Its armed forces regularly carry out combined 8 SF bn
arms and joint-service exercises, and have joined multina- MANOEUVRE
tional exercises with the US, France and the UK, among Armoured
others. All three services have wide-ranging procurement 3 armd div (2–3 armd bde, 1 SP arty bde (1 medium
programmes to modernise their inventories, although this regt, 1 SP arty regt))
procurement, particularly from the inefficient indigenous 8 indep armd bde
defence industry, has often been hampered by delay. Mos- Mechanised
cow remains the country’s main source of defence equip- 4 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1
ment. New Delhi has also revived procurement from Eu- arty bde)
rope and has begun to buy equipment from the United 2 indep mech bde
States. Acquistions have improved mobility and extended Light
reach, though the navy’s ability to sustain carrier aviation 17 inf div (2–5 inf bde, 1 arty bde)
capability is threatened by delays in the arrival of an air- 7 indep inf bde
craft carrier from Russia. Air Manoeuvre
1 para bde
ACTIVE 1,325,000 (Army 1,129,900, Navy 58,350 Mountain
Air 127,200, Coast Guard 9,550) Paramilitary 12 mtn div (3-4 mtn inf bde, 3–4 art regt)
1,300,586 2 indep mtn bde
Aviation
RESERVE 1,155,000 (Army 960,000 Navy 55,000 Air
14 hel sqn
140,000) Paramilitary 987,821 COMBAT SUPPORT
Army first-line reserves (300,000) within 5 years of full
2 arty div (2 arty bde (3 med art, 1 STA/MRL regt)
time service, further 500,000 have commitment to the age
6 AD bde
of 50.
2 SSM regt with PJ-10 BrahMos
4 engr bde
Organisations by Service
Reserve Organisations
Strategic Forces Command Reserves 300,000 reservists (first- line reserve
Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is a tri-service command within 5 years full time service); 500,000 reservists
established in 2003. The Commander-in-Chief of SFC, a (commitment until age of 50) (total 800,000)
senior three-star military officer, manages and administers
all Strategic Forces through separate Army and Air Force Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000
chains of command. regular establishment)
244 The Military Balance 2012
SAM. 1 twin lnchr with M-1 Volna (SA-N-1 Goa) LANDING SHIPS 10
SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 LSM 5 Kumbhir (FSU Polnocny C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5
76mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-25 Hormone/Ka-28 Helix APC; 160 troops)
A hel) LST 5:
FRIGATES 10: 2 Magar (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks;
FFGHM 9: 500 troops)
3 Brahmaputra with 4 quad lnchr with SS-N-25 3 Magar mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10
Switchblade AShM, 1 octuple VLS with Barak SAM, trucks; 500 troops)
2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 LANDING CRAFT • LCU 8 Vasco de Gama Mk2/3 LC
SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King Mk42 ASW (capacity 2 APC; 120 troops)
hel) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 49
3 Godavari with 4 single lnchr with R-15 Termit M AORH 4: 1 Aditya (mod Deepak); 2 Deepak; 1 Jyoti
(SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 octuple VLS with Barak AOL 6
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity ASR 1
AWT 2
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
1 Nilgri with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 twin 114mm YTL/YTM 15
gun (capacity 1 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) hel/Sea
King Mk42 ASW hel) Naval Aviation 7,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 61 Flying 125–150 hrs/year on Sea Harrier
CORVETTES 26: hours
FSGM 22: FORCES BY ROLE
4 Khukri with 2 twin lnchr with R-15M Termit M (SS- FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with 9K32M Strela- 1 sqn with MiG-29K Fulcrum
2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing 1 sqn with Sea Harrier FRS 1 (Mk51); Sea Harrier T-4N
platform (For Dhruv/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) (T-60)
4 Kora with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE
Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with 9K32M Strela- 5 sqn with Ka-25 Hormone; Ka-28 Helix A; Ka-31 Helix
2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing B; SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King Mk42A/B
platform (For Dhruv/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) MARITIME PATROL
12 Veer (FSU Tarantul) with 4 single lnchr with 2 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Do-228-101; Il-38 May; Tu-
R-15 Termit M (SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr 142M Bear F
(manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 SEARCH & RESCUE
Grail), 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King
2 Prabal (mod Veer) each with 4 quad lnchr (16 eff.) Mk42C
each with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 TRANSPORT
quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M 1 (comms) sqn with Do-228
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with HS-748M (HAL-784M)
FSM 4: TRAINING
4 Abhay (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual 2 sqn with HJT-16 MkI Kiran; HJT-16 MkII Kiran II;
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, HPT-32 Deepak
2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1200, 1 76mm gun TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PSOH 6 Sukanya (capacity 1 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) 1 sqn with UH-3H Sea King
PCC 16: 10 Car Nicobar; 6 Trinkat (SDB Mk5) ISR UAV
PBF 8 Super Dvora 1 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII
PB 5: 3 Plascoa 1300 (SPB); 2 SDB Mk3 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8 AIRCRAFT 31 combat capable
MSO 8 Pondicherry (FSU Natya) FTR 11 MiG-29K Fulcrum
AMPHIBIOUS 17 FGA 11: 9 Sea Harrier FRS 1 (Mk51); 2 Sea Harrier T-4N
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1 (T-60)
Jalashwa (US Austin) (capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either ASW 9: 5 Il-38 May; 4 Tu-142M Bear F
9 LCM or 4 LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 930 troops) MP 14 Do-228-101
246 The Military Balance 2012
TPT 37: Light 27: 17 BN-2 Islander; 10 Do-228 PAX 10 4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748
HS-748M (HAL-784M) 2 sqn with Il-76 Candid
TRG 12: 6 HJT-16 MkI Kiran; 6 HJT-16 MkII Kiran II; 1 flt with EMB-135BJ
HELICOPTERS TRAINING
ASW 54: 7 Ka-2-5 Hormone; 12 Ka-28 Helix A; 21 Sea Some units with An-32; Do-228; Hawk Mk 132*; HJT-16
King Mk42A; 14 Sea King Mk42B Kiran; HPT-32 Deepak; Jaguar IS/IM; MiG-21bis; MiG-
MRH 53: 4 Dhruv; 26 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 23 21FL; MiG-21M/MF; MiG-27ML*; SA316B Alouette III
SA319 Alouette III (Chetak)
AEW 9 Ka-31 Helix B ATTACK HELICOPTER
TPT • Medium 11: 5 Sea King Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H 2 sqn with Mi-25 Hind; Mi-35 Hind
Sea King TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
UAV • ISR 12 Heavy 4 Heron Medium 8 Searcher Mk II 2 sqn with Dhruv
MSL 9 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
AShM Sea Eagle; KH-35/Sea Skua (Bear and May a/c 6 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-1V Hip H
cleared to fire Sea Eagle and Kh-35) 1 sqn with Mi-26 Halo
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within north-eastern For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved
states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF. to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army standard
infantry weapons and equipment.
FORCES BY ROLE
Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND MANOEUVRE
7 HQ Other
MANOEUVRE 24 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn (cdo trained)
Other
42 paramilitary bn
Reserve Organisations
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Civil Defence 500,000 reservists
ARTY • MOR 81mm 252 Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units
for NBC defence
Border Security Force 208,422
Ministry of Home Affairs. Home Guard 487,821 reservists (515,000
FORCES BY ROLE authorised str)
MANOEUVRE In all states except Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala; men
Other on reserve lists, no trg. Not armed in peacetime. Used
157+ paramilitary bn for civil defence, rescue and fire-fighting provision
in wartime; 6 bn (created to protect tea plantations in
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Assam)
Small arms, lt arty, some anti-tank weapons
ARTY • MOR 81mm 942+
AIRCRAFT • TPT some (air spt) Cyber
National agencies include the Computer and Emergency
Central Industrial Security Force 94,347 Response Team (CERT-In), which has authorised
(lightly armed security guards only) designated individuals to carry out penetration tests
Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations against infrastructure. The Defence Information Assurance
and Research Agency (DIARA) is mandated to deal with
Central Reserve Police Force 229,699 cuber-security related issues of the armed services and
Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal security duties, only defence ministry. All services have their own cyber-
lightly armed, deployable throughout the country security policies, and headquaters maintain information-
FORCES BY ROLE security policies. In 2005, the Indian Army raised the
MANOEUVRE Army Cyber Security Establishment and in April 2010 set
Other up the Cyber Security Laboratory at the Military College
125 paramilitary bn of Telecommunications Engineering in Mhow (under
13 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn the Corps of Signals). There is no Indian national cyber
2 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female) security strategy.
248 The Military Balance 2012
Deployment
Indonesia IDN
AFGHANISTAN
Indonesian Rupiah Rp 2010 2011 2012
400 ε2 cdo coy (Protection for road construction project)
GDP Rp 6,423tr 7,223tr
Côte D’Ivoire
US$ 704bn 825bn
UN • UNOCI 8 obs
per capita US$ 2,898 3,357
Democratic Republic of the Congo Growth % 6.11 6.40
UN • MONUSCO 3,707; 60 obs; 3 mech inf bn; 1 inf bn; 3
Inflation % 5.1 5.7
hel coy; 1 fd hospital
Def exp Rp 65.5tn
Gulf of Aden US$ 7.18bn
Navy: 1 PSOH
Def bdgt Rp 42.9tr 47.5tr
Lebanon US$ 4.7bn 5.42bn
UN • UNIFIL 896; 1 mech inf bn; elm 1 fd hospital
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
RESERVE 400,000
Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45
for officers
Organisations by Service
Army ε233,000
12 Mil Area Command (KODAM) 150,000
Provincial (KOREM) and District (KODIM) Comd
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
8 cav bn
Asia 249
Light MRH 30: 12 Bell 412 Twin Huey (NB-412); 18 Mi-17V5 Hip
2 inf bde (total: 6 bn) H
60 indep inf bn TPT • Light 30: 8 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2
Air Manoeuvre EC120B Colibri
5 AB bn TRG 12 Hughes 300C
Aviation AD • SAM 93: 51 Rapier; 42 RBS-70
1 composite avn sqn SP 2 Kobra (with 125 GROM-2 msl)
1 hel sqn MANPAD QW-3
COMBAT SUPPORT GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 121 Rh 202; 23mm Giant
10 fd arty bn Bow; 40mm 90 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60
7 AD bn ARV 9+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; Stormer;
8 engr bn T-54/T-55
VLB 12+: 10 AMX-13; Leguan; 2 Stormer
Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS)
ε5,000 Navy ε45,000 (including Marines and Aviation)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
2 div HQ
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised FRIGATES 11
2 armd bn FFGHM 7
Light 5 Ahmad Yani with 2 quad Mk 141 lnchr with RGM-
4 inf bde (total: 9 inf bn) 84A Harpoon AShM, 2 SIMBAD twin lnchr (manual)
Air Manoeuvre with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
3 AB bde LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 Ahmad Yani with 4-cell VLS with 3M55 Yakhont (SS-
2 fd arty regt (total: 6 arty bn) N-26 Strobile) AShM; 2 SIMBAD twin lnchr (manual)
1 AD regt (2 AD bn) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
2 engr bn LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)
1 Hajar Dewantara (trg role) with 2 twin lnchr with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MM-38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with
LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76; 60
Scorpion 90 SUT HWT, (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)
RECCE 142: 55 Ferret (13 upgraded); 69 Saladin (16 FFGM 4:
upgraded); 18 VBL 4 Sigma with 2 twin lnchr with MM-40 Exocet Block
AIFV 22 BMP-2 II AShM, 2 quad Tetral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2
APC 519 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
APC (T) 90: 75 AMX-VCI; 15 FV4333 Stormer platform
APC (W) 437: 14 APR-1; ε150 Anoa; 40 BTR-40; 34 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 67
BTR-50PK; 22 Commando Ranger; 45 FV603 Saracen (14 CORVETTES 19:
upgraded); 100 LAV-150 Commando; 32 VAB-VTT FSGH 1:
PPV Barracuda; Casspir 1 Nala with 2 twin lnchr with MM-38 Exocet AShM,
ARTY 1,079 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun (capacity 1 lt
TOWED 115: 105mm 110: KH-178; 60 M101; 50 M-56; hel)
155mm 5 FH-88 FSG 2:
MOR 955: 81mm 800; 120mm 135: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52 2 Fatahillah with 2 twin lnchr with MM-38 Exocet
MLR 70mm 9 NDL-40 AShM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3/Mk32 324mm ASTT with
AT A244/Mk46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm
MSL SS.11; 100 Milan; 9M14M (AT-3 Sagger) gun
RCL 135: 106mm 45 M40A1; 90mm 90 M67 FSM 16:
RL 89mm 700 LRAC 16 Kapitan Patimura† (GDR Parchim I) with 2 quad
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 9: 1 BN-2A Islander; 6 C-212 lnchr with 9K32M Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 4
Aviocar (NC-212); 2 Turbo Commander 680 single 400mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2
HELICOPTERS PCFG 4 Mandau with 4 single lnchr with MM-38 Exocet
ATK 6 Mi-35P Hind AShM
250 The Military Balance 2012
PCT 4 Singa with 2 single 533mm TT (capability upgrade APC (W) 100 BTR-50P
programme in progress) ARTY 62+
PCC 8: 4 Kakap; 4 Todak TOWED 50+: 105mm 22 LG1 MK II; 122mm 28 M-38
PBG 1 Clurit with 2 twin lnchr with C-705 AShM M-1938
PB 33: 1 Cucut; 13 Kobra; 1 Krait; 8 Sibarau; 10 Viper MRL 140mm 12 BM-14
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11 MOR 81mm
MCO 2 Pulau Rengat AD • GUNS 150: 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; 57mm S-60
MSC 9 Palau Rote†
AMPHIBIOUS Air Force 24,000
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 5: 1 Dr 2 operational comd (East and West) plus trg comd.
Soeharso (Ex-Tanjung Dalpele; capacity 2 LCU/LCVP; 13
FORCES BY ROLE
tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma); 4 Makassar
FIGHTER
(capacity 2 LCU/LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
Super Puma)
1 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
LANDING SHIPS • LST 26: 1 Teluk Amboina (capacity
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28
Ethnic groups: Korean <1%
PSO 2 Bisma
PB 26: 14 Bango; 12 (various) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 6.7% 2.5% 2.6% 3.0% 24.3% 9.7%
Police ε280,000 (including 14,000 police
‘mobile bde’ (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT Female 6.4% 2.3% 2.5% 2.8% 24.1% 13.2%
unit (Gegana))
APC (W) 34 Tactica Capabilities
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 5: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 Aviocar Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are the most modern
(NC-212); 1 Turbo Commander 680 Asian armed forces in terms of their equipment, despite be-
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 22: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; ing constrained in their activities by the country’s post-war
19 Bo-105 (NBo-105) constitution. Tokyo aims to ‘normalise’ its defence posture
and policy, and the 2010 National Defence Programme
KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence Guidelines describe the goal of creating a ‘dynamic defence
Command) force’ that would seek to create a more responsive, deploy-
Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency able military rather than relying on the ‘static deterrence’
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 of previous years. Future operations would probably also
PCO 2 Arda Dedali include humanitarian assistance and disaster-response op-
PB 9: 4 Golok (SAR); 5 Kujang erations, as demonstrated during the earthquake and tsu-
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Jadayat nami of March 2011, or anti-piracy and counter-terrorism
missions.
Reserve Organisations
ACTIVE 247,746 (Ground Self-Defense Force
Kamra People’s Security ε40,000 (report for 151,641; Maritime Self- Defense Force 45,518; Air
3 weeks’ basic training each year; part time Self-Defense Force 47,123; Central Staff 3,464)
police auxiliary) Paramilitary 12,636
2 triple 324mm TT with Mk46 LWT, 1 16-cell Mk41 ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with
VLS with ASROC, 2 76mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-60 ASROC, 1 Mitsubishi Type 71 ASW RL, 1 76mm gun; 1
Seahawk ASW hel) Tenryu (trg spt ship); 1 Kurobe (trg spt ship)
5 Takanami (improved Murasame) with 2 quad SPT 5 Hiuchi
lnchr with SSM-1B AShM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with YAC 1 Hashidate
ASROC/RIM-7M/ESSM Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple YDT 6
324mm TT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity YTM 17
1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
Naval Aviation ε9,800
Asia
DDGM 6:
2 Hatakaze with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C 7 Air Groups
Harpoon AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1 MR SAM, FORCES BY ROLE
2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE
platform 7 sqn (shipboard/trg) with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K
4 Kongou (Aegis Baseline 4/5) with 2 quad Mk141 Seahawk
lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 29-cell Mk41 MARITIME PATROL
VLS with SM-2 MR SAM/ASROC, 1 61-cell Mk41 6 sqn (incl 1 trg) with P-1; P-3C Orion
VLS with SM-2 MR SAM/ASROC, 2 triple 324mm ELECTRONIC WARFARE
ASTT, 1 127mm gun 1 sqn with EP-3 Orion
DDM 2: MINE COUNTERMEASURES
2 Shirane with 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 1 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon; MCH-101
1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-162A Sea Sparrow SEARCH & RESCUE
SAM, 2 triple ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 127mm gun, 1 sqn with Shin Meiwa US-1A/US-2
(capacity 3 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 2 sqn with UH-60J Black Hawk
FRIGATES • FFGM 15: TRANSPORT
6 Abukuma with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C 1 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Beech 90 King Air
Harpoon AShM, 2 triple ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 (LC-90); YS-11M
Mk112 octuple lnchr with ASROC, 1 76mm gun TRAINING
9 Hatsuyuki with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C 1 sqn with OH-6D; OH-6DA
Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7F/M 3 sqn with T-5; Beech 90 King Air (TC-90); YS-11T
Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple ASTT with Mk46 LWT, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 1 76mm gun, AIRCRAFT 95 combat capable
(capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) ASW 93: 2 P-1 (additional ac on order); 91 P-3C Orion
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 ELINT 5 EP-3C Orion
PBFG 6 Hayabusa with 4 SSM-1B AShM, 1 76mm gun SAR 7: 4 Shin Meiwa US-1A; 3 Shin Meiwa US-2
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 33 TPT • Light 39: 4 YS-11M; 6 YS-11T; 5 Beech 90 King
MCM SPT 4: Air (LC-90); 24 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90)
2 Nijma TRG 33 T-5
2 Uraga with 1 hel landing platform (for MH-53E) HELICOPTERS
MSO 25: 3 Hirashima; 12 Sugashima; 7 Uwajima; 3 Yaeyama ASW 93: 61 SH-60B Seahawk (SH-60J); 31 SH-60K
MSD 4 Seahawk; 1 USH-60K Seahawk
AMPHIBIOUS MCM 11: 9 MH-53E Sea Dragon; 2 MCH-101
LS • LST 5:
3 Osumi with 1 hel landing platform (for 2 ISR 6: 1 OH-6D; 5 OH-6DA
x CH-47) (capacity 10 Type-90 MBTs; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; SAR 18 UH-60J Black Hawk
330 troops) TPT 9 Medium 7: 4 AW101 Merlin (CH-101) (additional
2 Yura (capacity 70 troops) ac being delivered); 3 S-61A; Light 2 EC135
254 The Military Balance 2012
7 Ojika; 12 Shiretoko
SEARCH & RESCUE
PCO 32: 3 Aso; 3 Bihoro; 9 Hateruma; 14 Natsui; 2
1 wg with U-125A Peace Krypton; MU-2 (LR-1); UH-60J
Takatori; 1 Teshio
Black Hawk
PCC 19: 4 Amani; 15 Tokara
TANKER PBF 39: 15 Hayagumo; 5 Mihashi; 11 Raizan; 2 Takatsuki;
1 sqn with KC-767J 6 Tsuruugi
TRANSPORT PB 257: 9 Akizuki; 4 Asogiri; 205 CL-Type; 15 Hayanami;
1 (VIP) sqn with B-747-400 1 Matsunami; 13 Murakumo; 2 Natsugiri; 1 Shikinami; 3
3 sqn with C-1; C-130H Hercules; YS-11 Shimagiri; 4 Yodo
Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4* LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25:
TRAINING ABU 1
1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J Eagle AGHS 12
TEST AKSL 9
1 wg with F-15J Eagle; T-4* TRG 3
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER AIRCRAFT
4 flt with CH-47 Chinook MP 2 Falcon 900 MPA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ISR 2 Beech 200T
TPT 21 Light 12: 10 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2); 1 Cessna
AIRCRAFT 371 combat capable
206 Stationair (U-206G); 1 YS-11A PAX 9: 3 CL-300; 2
FTR 202 F-15J Eagle
Gulfstream V (MP); 4 Saab 340B
FGA 146: 76 F-2A/B; 70 F-4E Phantom II (F-4EJ)
HELICOPTERS
EW 3: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA
MRH 7 Bell 412 Twin Huey
ISR 17: 13 RF-4E Phantom II* (RF-4J); 4 YS-11EB TPT 39 Medium 6: 4 AS332 Super Puma; 2 EC225 Super
AEW&C 17: 13 E-2C Hawkeye; 4 E-767 Puma Light 33: 5 AW139; 4 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 20
SAR 26 U-125A Peace Krypton Bell 212; 4 S-76C
TKR 4 KC-767J
TPT 64 Medium 16 C-130H Hercules PAX 48: 13 Beech Cyber
T-400; 26 C-1; 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4); 4 YS-11
The Self-Defense Forces established a command control
TRG 248: 199 T-4*; 49 T-7 communication computer systems command in 2008. The
HELICOPTERS government’s ‘Secure Japan 2009’ document said the MoD
SAR 41 UH-60J Black Hawk was to be involved in investigating the latest technological
TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47 Chinook trends in cyber attacks. In order to analyse attacks on
MSL MoD information systems, and response capabilities,
ASM ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93) government agencies were to ‘study the basics of illegal
AAM • IR AAM-3 (Type-90); AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR access monitoring and analysis technology, cyber attack
AAM-5 (Type-04); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AAM-4 analysis technology, and active defense technology’.
(Type-99) Further, the ‘Information Security 2010’ document
stated that: ‘At the end of FY2010, a cyber planning and
Air Defence coordination officer (provisional title) will be stationed in
Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites the joint staff office of the ministry of defense to enhance
FORCES BY ROLE […] preparedness against cyber attacks.’
AIR DEFENCE
6 SAM gp (total: 24 SAM bty with MIM-104 Patriot; Deployment
16+ bty with PAC-3)
1 (Air Base Defence) AD gp with FIM-92A Stinger; GulF of ADEN & Indian Ocean
Type-81 Tan-SAM; Type-91 Kin-SAM; M-167 Vulcan MSDF: 2 DDGHM; 2 P-3C Orion
Asia 255
Asia
18D Hornet; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt hel 1 (KAZBRIG) peacekeeping bde
sqn with 12 CH-46E Sea Knight; 1 tpt hel sqn with 12 MV- COMBAT SUPPORT
22B Osprey; 3 tpt hel sqn with 10 CH-53E Sea Stallion 7 arty bde
2 MRL bde
2 AT bde
Kazakhstan KAZ 1 SSM bde
1 coastal defence bde
Kazakhstani Tenge t 2010 2011 2012 3 cbt engr bde
GDP t 21.8tr 26.4tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 146bn 178bn MBT 980 T-72
per capita US$ 8,544 10,283 RECCE 280: 140 BRDM; 140 BRM
AIFV 1,520: 730 BMP-1; 700 BMP-2; 90 BTR-80A; 2 BTR-
Growth % 7.25 6.52
3U
Inflation % 7.4 8.9
APC 410
Def exp t 221bn APC (T) 180 MT-LB
US$ 1.48bn APC (W) 190 BTR-70/BTR-80
Def bdgt t 165bn 259bn 340bn PPV 40 HMMWV
US$ 1.11bn 1.74bn
ARTY 1,502
SP 246: 122mm 120 2S1 Carnation; 6 Semser; 152mm 120
FMA (US) US$ 3.0m 2.4m
2S3
US$1=t 149.46 148.43 TOWED 670: 122mm 400 D-30; 152mm 270: 180 2A36;
Population 17,304,513 90 2A65
GUN/MOR 120mm 25 2S9 Anona
Ethnic groups: Kazakh 51%; Russian 32%; Ukrainian 5% ; German
2% ; Tatar 2% ; Uzbek 13% MRL 398: 122mm 200: 150 BM-21 Grad, 50 in store;
220mm 180 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 18 Lynx (with 50 msl)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MOR 163 SP 120mm 18 CARDOM 120mm 145 2B11/
Male 11.0% 4.3% 5.2% 4.7% 20.3% 2.5% M120
Female 10.5% 4.1% 5.1% 4.7% 22.5% 4.9% AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-6 Spiral)
Capabilities GUNS 100mm 68 MT-12/T-12
MSL • SSM 12 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
The Soviet origins of Kazakhstan’s conscript-based armed AEV MT-LB
forces are still evident, as is the continuing influence of
Russia, Kazakhstan’s main partner for military exercises. Navy 3,000
Kazakhstan also participates in military exercises by the PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collec- PB 17: 4 Almaty; 1 Dauntless; 5 Guardian; 3 Sea Dolphin; 2
tive Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), of which it is a Turk (AB25); 2 Zhuk
256 The Military Balance 2012
Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence) State Border Protection Forces ε9,000
Flying hours 100 hrs/year Ministry of Interior
HEL • TPT • Medium 1 Mi-171
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
1 regt with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum Korea, Democratic People’s
1 regt with MiG-25 Foxbat; MiG-31 Foxhound
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Republic of DPRK
1 regt with Su-24 Fencer North Korean Won 2010 2011 2012
1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot
GDP US$
1 regt with Su-27 Flanker
ISR per capita US$
1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E* Def exp won
TRANSPORT US$
1 comd regt with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless US$1=won
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
1 SSM bde with Scud 12; 100mm KS-19
1 SSM bde with FROG-7 MSL
5 - 8 engr river crossing / amphibious regt SSM 64+: 24 FROG-3/FROG-5/FROG-7; some Musudan;
1 engr river crossing bde ε10 No-dong (ε90+ msl); 30+ Scud-B/Scud-C (ε200+ msl)
6 Sohung with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2) ATTACK HELICOPTER
AShM 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind
PBF 229: 54 Chong-Jin; 142 Ku Song/Sin Hung/Sin Hung TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
(mod); 33 Sinpo Some regt with Hughes 500D†; Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H;
PB 97 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; Z-5
59 Chaho AIR DEFENCE
6 Chong-Ju with 2 RBU 1200, 1 85mm gun 19 bde with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina (SA-2
13 Shanghai II Guideline); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 9K36 Strela-3
19 SO-1 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 24: 19 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; (New medium-range SAM system
Yukto I; 5 Yukto II shown in 2010 – designation unk.)
AMPHIBIOUS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 10 Hantae (capacity 3 tanks; AIRCRAFT 603 combat capable
350 troops) BBR 80 H-5†
LANDING CRAFT 257: FTR 441+: 40 F-7B Airguard; 107 J-5; 100 J-6; 120 J-7†; 46
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
LCPL 96 Nampo (capacity 35 troops) MiG-23ML Flogger; 10 MiG-23P Flogger; 18+ MiG-29A/S
LCM 25 Fulcrum
LCVP 136 (capacity 50 troops) FGA 48: 30 MiG-21bis Fishbed†; 18 Su-7 Fitter
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23: ATK 34 Su-25 Frogfoot
AS 8 (converted cargo ships); ASR 1 Kowan; AGI 14 TPT 217: Light 208: 6 An-24 Coke; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; ε200
(converted fishing vessels) Y-5 PAX 9: 2 Il-18 Coot; 2 Il-62M Classic; 4 Tu-154 Careless;
1 Tu-204-300
Coastal Defence TRG 215: 180 CJ-6; 35 FT-2
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT ATK 20 Mi-24 Hind
2 AShM regt with HY-1 (CSS-N-2) Silkworm (6 sites, MRH 80 Hughes 500D†
and probably some mobile launchers) TPT 202 Medium 63: 15 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H; 48 Z-5
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Light 139 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
ARTY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 152mm M-1937 UAV • ISR • Light Pchela-1 (Shmel)
COASTAL 130mm M-1992; SM-4-1 AD • SAM 3400+
MSL • AShM HY-1 (CSS-N-2) Silkworm; KN-01 (in TOWED 312+: 179+ S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); 133
development) S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
STATIC/SHELTER 38 S-200 (SA-5 Gammon)
Air Force 110,000 MANPAD 3,050+ 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36
4 air divs. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divs (cbt) responsible for N, Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
E and S air defence sectors respectively; 8th Air Div (trg) MSL
responsible for NE sector. The AF controls the national ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
airline. AShM KN-01
Flying hours 20 hrs/year on ac AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
(AA-11 Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex);
FORCES BY ROLE
R-27R/ER (AA-10 A/C Alamo)
BOMBER
AShM KN-01
3 (lt) regt with H-5†
FIGHTER
Paramilitary 189,000 active
1 regt with F-7B Airguard
6 regt with J-5 Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards,
4 regt with J-6 public safety personnel)
5 regt with J-7 Ministry of Public Security
1 regt with MiG-23ML/P Flogger
1 regt with MiG-29 Fulcrum Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK reservists
1 regt with Su-7 Fitter Org on a provincial/town/village basis; comd structure is
GROUND ATTACK bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns
1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot (but many units unarmed)
TRANSPORT
Some regt with Y-5 (to infiltrate 2 air-force sniper Cyber
brigades deep into ROK rear areas), but possibly Since the 1970s the KPA has maintained a modest electron-
grounded; An-24 Coke; Il-18 Coot; Il-62M Classic; Tu-134 ic warfare (EW) capability. After Operation Desert Storm,
Crusty; Tu-154 Careless the KPA established an information warfare (IW) capabil-
TRAINING ity under the concept of ‘electronic intelligence warfare’
Some regt with CJ-6; FT-2; MiG-21 Fishbed (EIW). The KPA is also believed to have expanded its EW
Asia 259
Asia
Other
US$1=won 1159.87 1102.64 3 (Counter Infiltration) bde
Aviation
Population 48,754,657
1 (army avn) comd
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus COMBAT SUPPORT
3 SSM bn
Male 8.2% 3.8% 3.4% 3.9% 26.2% 4.6%
3 ADA bde
Female 7.5% 3.3% 3.0% 3.5% 25.9% 6.8%
3 SAM bn with I-HAWK
2 SAM bn with Nike Hercules
Capabilities 6 engr bde
More than half a century of tailoring its defence posture 5 engr gp
around the possibility of an invasion from its northern 1 CBRN defence bde
neighbour has left South Korea with some of the best- 8 sigs bde
equipped and most capable armed forces in East Asia. But COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
4 log cpt cmd
not even this has been able to deter lethal aggression from
5 sy regt
the north – as demonstrated by the sinking of the Cheonan
in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island in EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
November 2010. These attacks took Seoul by surprise, lead- MBT 2,414: 1,000 K1; 484 K1A1; 253 M48; 597 M48A5; 80
ing to a commitment to invest in improving the South’s T-80U; (400 M-47 in store)
AIFV 165: 40 BMP-3; ε125 K21
capacity to deter and, if necessary, respond to northern
APC 2,780
aggression. South Korea has demonstrated a willingness
APC (T) 2,560: 300 Bv 206; 1,700 KIFV; 420 M113; 140
to deploy forces overseas in support of international coali-
M577
tions and operations. The Cheonghae Unit is a dedicated
APC (W) 220; 20 BTR-80; 200 KM-900/-901 (Fiat 6614)
counter-piracy task force that has operated in the Indian ARTY 11,038+
Ocean since April 2009. SP 1,353+: 155mm 1,340: ε300 K9 Thunder; 1,040 M109A2
ACTIVE 655,000 (Army 522,000 Navy 68,000 Air (K55/K55A1); 175mm some M107; 203mm 13 M110
TOWED 3,500+: 105mm 1,700 M101/KH-178; 155mm
65,000) Paramilitary 4,500
1,800+ KH-179/M114/M115
Terms of service conscription: Army, Navy and Air Force 26
MRL 185: 130mm 156 Kooryong; 227mm 29 MLRS (all
months
ATACMS capable)
RESERVE 4,500,000 MOR 6,000: 81mm KM-29 (M-29); 107mm M-30
Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn);
Forces (Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat TOW-2A
Forces (Homeland Defence Forces) to age 33. RCL 57mm; 75mm; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A2
GUNS 58
Paramilitary 3,000,000 SP 90mm 50 M36
Being reorganised TOWED 76mm 8 M18 Hellcat (AT gun)
260 The Military Balance 2012
SP 170: 20mm ε150 KIFV Vulcan SPAAG; 30mm 20 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
BIHO Flying Tiger LWT, 2 76mm gun
TOWED 160: 20mm 60 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 20 GDF- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 110
003; 40mm 80 L/60/L/70; M1 CORVETTES 30
RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor); AN/ FSG 7:
TPQ-37 Firefinder (arty); RASIT (veh, arty) 3 Gumdoksuri with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
MSL • SSM 30 NHK-I/-II Hyonmu AShM, 1 76mm gun (additional vessel in build)
AEV 207 M9 4 Po Hang with 2 single lnchr with MM-38 Exocet
ARV 238: 200 K1; K288A1; M47; 38 M88A1 AShM, 2 triple ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
VLB 56 K1 FS 23:
4 Dong Hae with 2 triple ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1
Reserves 76mm gun
FORCES BY ROLE 19 Po Hang with 2 triple ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
COMMAND 76mm gun
1 army HQ PBF 80 Sea Dolphin
MANOEUVRE MINE WARFARE 10
Light MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9
24 inf div MHO 6 Kan Kyeong
MSO 3 Yang Yang
Navy 68,000 (incl marines) MINELAYERS • ML 1 Won San
AMPHIBIOUS
Naval HQ (CNOROK) located at Gyeryongdae, with an
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 1:
Operational Cmd HQ (CINCROKFLT) located at Jinhae
LPD 1 Dokdo (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700 troops;
with three separate fleet elements; 1st Fleet Donghae (East
10 UH-60 hel)
Sea/Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow
LANDING SHIPS 5:
Sea); 3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); additional
LST 6: 4 Alligator (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops); 2 Un
three flotillas (incl SF, mine warfare, amphibious and spt
Bong (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)
elements) and 1 Naval Air Wing (3 gp plus Spt gp).
LANDING CRAFT 41:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LCAC 5: 3 Tsaplya (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF-
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 23 II
SSK 12: LCM 10 LCM-8
9 Chang Bogo with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT LCT 6
3 Son Won-ill (KSS-2; AIP fitted) with 8 single 533mm LCVP 20
TT with SUT HWT (additional vessels in build) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24
SSC 11: 9 Cosmos; 2 Dolgorae (KSS-1) with 2 single 406mm AORH 3 Chun Jee
TT ARS 1
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28 AG 1 Sunjin (trials spt)
CRUISERS • CGHM 2 ATS 2
2 Sejong (KDX-3) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- AGOR 17 (civil manned, funded by the Ministry of
84 Harpoon AShM, 1 48-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR Transport)
SAM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR SAM, 1 Mk49
GMLS with RIM-116, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 Naval Aviation
LWT, 1 32-cell VLS with ASROC (intended for Cheon AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
Ryong LACM), 1 127mm gun, (capacity 2 Lynx Mk99 ASW 16: 8 P-3C Orion; 8 P-3CK Orion
hel); (additional vessel in build) TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 Caravan II
Asia 261
Asia
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Civilian Defence Corps 3,000,000 reservists
3 sqn with F-4E Phantom II (to age 50)
11 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
3 sqn with F-15K Eagle Coast Guard ε4,500
10 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 50:
ISR PSO 5: 1 Sumjinkang; 3 Mazinger; 1 Sambongho
1 wg with KO-1 PCO 16: 1 Han Kang; 15 Tae Geuk
1 sqn with RF-4C Phantom II* PCC 10: 4 Bukhansan; 6 (430 tonne)
SIGINT PB 19: 5 Hyundai Type; ε14 (various)
1 sqn with Hawker 800RA/XP LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ARS 29
SEARCH & RESCUE AIRCRAFT
2 sqn with AS332L Super Puma; Belll 412EP; HH-47D MP 5: 1 C-212-400 MP; 4 CN-235-110 MPA
Chinook; HH-60P Black Hawk; Ka-32 Helix C; TPT • PAX 1 CL-604
TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS
1 VIP sqn with B-737-300; B-747; CN-235-220; S-92A MRH 8: 6 AS365 Dauphin II; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP
Superhawk; VH-60P Black Hawk (VIP) TPT • Medium 8 Ka-32 Helix-C
3 sqn (incl 1 Spec Ops) with C-130H Hercules
2 sqn with CN-235M-100/220 Cyber
TRAINING
South Korea established a Cyber Warfare Command
2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
Centre in early 2010, with over 200 personnel, in the wake
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
of a substantial distributed denial of service attack in 2009.
1 sqn with Hawk Mk67
The new centre responds to the attention given to cyber
4 sqn with KT-1
and information security by the National Intelligence
1 sqn with Il-103
Service and the Defense Security Command. South Korea
3 sqn with T-50/TA-50 Golden Eagle*
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER published an ‘Internet White Paper’ in 2009.
1 sqn with UH-60P Black Hawk (Spec Ops)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Deployment
AIRCRAFT 390 combat capable
Afghanistan
FTR 176: 142 F-5E Tiger II; 32 F-5F Tiger II
FGA 286: 70 F-4E Phantom II; 52 F-15K Eagle (8 more NATO • ISAF 350
on order 2012); 118 F-16C Fighting Falcon (KF-16C); 46 ARABIAN SEA & Gulf of Aden
F-16D Fighting Falcon (KF-16D); (some F-4D Phantom II Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM
)in store
AEW&C 1 B-737 AEW CÔTE D’IVOIRE
*ISR 41: 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1; 17 RF-4C Phantom II UN • UNOCI 2 obs
262 The Military Balance 2012
HAITI
UN • MINUSTAH 242; 1 engr coy
Capabilities
India/Pakistan Kyrgyzstan’s military capability is limited and its air force
has only small numbers of jet trainer and transport aircraft.
UN • UNMOGIP 8 obs
A larger number of armed and transport helicopters are in
Lebanon the inventory, but maintenance problems probably mean
UN • UNIFIL 369; 1 mech inf bn most of these are not operationally ready. Despite their
weakness, Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces participate in Shang-
Liberia
hai Cooperation Organisation exercises, such as the SCO’s
UN • UNMIL 1; 1 obs
counter-terrorism exercises, and has hosted SCO exercises
South sudan within its training areas, indicating the ability to offer com-
UN • UNMISS 6 obs mand and control facilities to disparate military units and
progress towards improving national capabilities.
sudan
UN • UNISFA 1 obs ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Paramilitary
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
9,500
UAE
Terms of service 18 months
140 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School)
WESTERN SAHARA Organisations by Service
UN • MINURSO 4 obs
Army 8,500
Foreign Forces FORCES BY ROLE
Sweden NNSC: 5 obs SPECIAL FORCES
Switzerland NNSC: 5 obs 1 SF bde
United States US Pacific Command: 25,374 MANOEUVRE
Army 17,130; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Seoul; 1 div HQ (2nd Mechanised
Inf) at Tongduchon; 1 armd HBCT with M1 Abrams; M2/ 2 MR bde
M3 Bradley; M109; ; 1 cbt avn bde with AH-64 Apache; 1 (mtn) MR bde
CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; 1 arty (fires) bde with COMBAT SUPPORT
M270 MLRS; 1 AD bde with MIM 104 Patriot/FIM-92A 1 arty bde
Avenger 1 AD bde
Navy 254 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
USAF 7,857; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at MBT 150 T-72
Kunsan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 RECCE 30 BRDM-2
ftr wg at Kunsan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting AIFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2
Falcon, 1 ftr sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II at Osan AB) APC (W) 35: 25 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80
USMC 133 ARTY 246
SP 122mm 18 2S1 Carnation
TOWED 141: 100mm 18 M-1944; 122mm 107: 72 D-30;
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 35 M-30 M-1938; 152mm 16 D-1
GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 Anona
Kyrgyzstani Som s 2010 2011 2012
MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan
GDP s 212bn 254bn MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120
US$ 4.61bn 5.52bn AT • MSL • MANPATS 26+: 26 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger);
per capita US$ 838 987 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel)
Growth % -1.36 7.00 RCL 73mm SPG-9
GUNS 100mm 18 MT-12/T-12
Inflation % 7.8 19.1
AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Def bdgt s 889m 1.5bn GUNS 48
US$ 19m 33m SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4
FMA (US) US$ 3.5m 2.4m TOWED 57mm 24 S-60
US$1=s 45.99 46.10
Air Force 2,400
Population 5,587,443
FORCES BY ROLE
Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 56%; Russian 17%; Uzbek 13%; Ukrainian 3% FIGHTER
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 regt with L-39 Albatros*
FIGHTER/TRANSPORT
Male 14.9% 5.2% 5.4% 4.7% 16.8% 2.0%
1 (comp avn) regt with MiG-21 Fishbed; An-2 Colt; An-26
Female 14.3% 5.0% 5.3% 4.7% 18.5% 3.2% Curl
Asia 263
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip Capabilities
AIR DEFENCE The Lao People’s Armed Forces (LPAF) have considerable
Some regt with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 2K11 Krug historical military experience from Second Indochina War
(SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) and the 1988 border war with Thailand. However, Laos is
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE one of the world’s poorest countries and the defence bud-
AIRCRAFT 33 combat capable get and military procurement have been extremely lim-
FGA 29 MiG-21 Fishbed ited for the last 20 years. The armed forces remain closely
TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl linked to the ruling communist party, and their primary
TRG 4 L-39 Albatros* orientation is towards internal security, with operations
HELICOPTERS continuing against Hmong rebel remnants. Contacts with
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces continue, but the
TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip LPAF have made no international deployments and have
AD • SAM little capacity for sustained high-intensity operations.
SP 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
4 Mil Regions
National Guard 1,000 MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Deployment 1 armd bn
Light
bosnia-herzegovina 5 inf div
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 7 indep inf regt
65 indep inf coy
Liberia
Aviation
UN • UNMIL 2 obs
1 (liaison) flt
South Sudan COMBAT SUPPORT
UN • UNMISS 4 obs 5 arty bn
9 ADA bn
1 engr regt
Foreign Forces 2 (construction) engr regt
Russia ε500 Military Air Forces: 5 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 25: 15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-34/85
Laos LAO LT TK 10 PT-76
APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152
New Lao Kip 2010 2011 2012 ARTY 62+
GDP kip 54.2tr 63.4tr TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30
M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114
US$ 6.46bn 7.8bn
MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M-2A1; 120mm
per capita US$ 1,014 1,204 M-43
Growth % 7.93 8.26 AT • RCL 57mm M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40;
Inflation % 6.0 8.7 107mm B-11
Def exp kip ε119bn AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 25
Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
US$ ε14.1m
GUNS
US$1=kip 8393.39 8135.07 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
Population 6,477,211 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm
Ethnic groups: Lao 55%; Khmou 11%; Hmong 8%
M-1939; 57mm S-60
ARV T-54/T-55
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus VLB MTU
Male 18.5% 5.6% 4.9% 4.2% 14.7% 1.7%
Army Marine Section ε600
Female 18.2% 5.6% 5.0% 4.2% 15.2% 2.0% PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 52
264 The Military Balance 2012
(HJ-8); C90-CRRB; SS.11 PBG 4 Handalan (Spica-M) with 2 twin lnchr with MM-38
RCL 260: 84mm 236 Carl Gustav; 106mm 24 M40 Exocet AShM
AMPHIBIOUS • LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 PBF 17 Tempur
(capacity 10 troops) PB 8: 6 Jerong (Lurssen 45); 2 Sri Perlis
HELICOPTERS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
TPT • Light 11 AW109 MCO 4 Mahamiru
AD SAM 15 Jernas (Rapier 2000) AMPHIBIOUS
MANPAD 88+: Anza; HY-6 (FN-6); 40 9K38 Igla (SA-18 LANDING CRAFT 115 LCM/LCU
Asia
Grouse); QW-1 Vanguard; 48 Starburst; LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13
GUNS • TOWED 60: 35mm 16 GDF-005; 40mm 36 AOR 2; AG 1; ARS 2; AGS 2; ATG 2; AX 1; AXS 1; AP 2
L40/70
AEV 9: 3 MID-M; 6 WZT-4
Naval Aviation 160
HELICOPTERS
ARV 41+: Condor; 15 ACV300; 4 K-288A1; 22 SIBMAS
ASW 6 Super Lynx 300
VLB 5+: Leguan; 5 PMCz-90
MRH 6 AS555 Fennec
Reserves MSL • AShM Sea Skua
Asia
Def exp t ε54.8bn AT • GUNS 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm M-1944/MT-12
US$ ε40.4m AD • SAM 2+ S-125 Pechora 2M (SA-3B Goa)
FMA (US) US$ 4.5m 5.0m ARV T-54/T-55
US$1=t 1355.85 1244.82
Air Force 800
Population 3,133,318
FORCES BY ROLE
Ethnic groups: Khalka 80%; Kazakh 6% TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Male 14.0% 4.8% 5.5% 4.9% 19.1% 1.7% 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-171
Female 13.4% 4.6% 5.4% 4.8% 19.5% 2.3% AIR DEFENCE
2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23
Capabilities EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 Coke; 1 An-26 Curl
Mongolia’s armed forces are small and generally under-
HELICOPTERS
equipped. Its army fields largely obsolete armoured ve-
TPT • Medium 13: 11 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171
hicles and its air force maintains no fixed wing combat AD • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23;
aircraft and few attack helicopters. The military has made 57mm S-60
some attempts to contribute to international operations,
and in September 2011, the defence minister announced Paramilitary 7,200 active
that 850 soldiers would be sent to South Sudan. However,
Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total
the armed forces possess no logistical capabilities for sup-
6,000)
porting and sustaining forces deployed internationally.
Attempts are being made to modernise the armed forces, Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript
with an annual simulation exercise, and collaboration with (total 1,200)
partners from Europe, the US, Russia and China ensuring FORCES BY ROLE
continued training and a relatively good level of readi- MANOEUVRE
ness. However, improving the equipment and capability Other
of Mongolia’s armed forces would require considerable 4 gd unit
investment.
Construction Troops 300
ACTIVE 10,000 (Army 8,900 Air 800 Construction
Troops 300) Paramilitary 7,200 Deployment
Terms of service conscription: one year (males aged 18–25)
Afghanistan
RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000) NATO • ISAF 114
268 The Military Balance 2012
Democratic Republic of the Congo ons, artillery, combat aircraft and naval vessels from China,
UN • MONUSCO 2 obs Russia and other diverse sources coming into service. More
recently, the armed forces have sponsored the growth of a
South Sudan
substantial domestic defence industry.
UN • UNMISS 2 obs
ACTIVE 406,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 16,000 Air
Sudan
15,000) Paramilitary 107,250
UN • UNAMID 44; 26 obs
Western Sahara Organisations by Service
UN • MINURSO 4 obs
Army ε375,000
Myanmar MMR 12 regional comd, 4 regional op comd, 14 military op comd,
34 tactical op comd (TDC)
Myanmar Kyat K 2010 2011 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
FRIGATES • FFG 1 Aung Zeya (reported) with 2 twin People’s Militia 35,000
lnchr with C-802 AShM, 1 76mm gun
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 99 People’s Pearl and Fishery Ministry ε250
CORVETTES • FS 3 Anawrahta with 1 76mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 6
PCG 6 Houxin with 2 twin lnchr with C-801 (CSS-N-4 Carpentaria
Sardine) AShM
PCO 2 Indaw
PCC 9 Hainan Nepal NPL
PBG 4 Myanmar with 2 twin lnchr with C-801 (CSS-N-4 Nepalese Rupee NR 2010 2011 2012
Sardine) AShM
GDP NR 1.17tr 1.33tr
PB 18: 3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 9 Myanmar; 3
Swift US$ 15.7bn 17.9bn
PBR 57: 4 Sagu; 9 Y-301; 1 Y-301 (Imp); 43 (various) per capita US$ 544 609
AMPHIBIOUS • CRAFT 18: 8 LCU 10 LCM Growth % 4.55 3.48
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
Population 29,391,883
FORCES BY ROLE Religious groups: Hindu 90%; Buddhist 5%; Muslim 3%
FIGHTER
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
3 sqn with F-7 Airguard; FT-7; MiG-29B Fulcrum; MiG-
29UB Fulcrum Male 17.6% 6.2% 4.9% 3.7% 14.6% 2.0%
GROUND ATTACK Female 17.0% 6.0% 5.1% 4.3% 16.3% 2.3%
2 sqn with A-5M Fantan
TRANSPORT Capabilities
1 sqn with An-12 Cub; F-27 Friendship; FH-227; PC-6A
Nepal’s army continues to struggle to integrate former
Turbo Porter/PC-6B Turbo Porter
Maoist insurgents following a 2006 peace accord and the
TRAINING
subsequent transition from a monarchy to a republic. A
2 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; PC-9*
draft national security policy, in early 2011, focused on ter-
1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna
ritorial integrity. Mobility remains a challenge for the mili-
180 Skywagon; K-8 Karakorum*
tary. The army is involved in UN peace support operations.
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
The army receives training-support from several countries,
4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H;
including the US. The Indian and British armies both recruit
PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3 Sokol; SA316 Alouette III
personnel for their Gurkha units in Nepal.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 136 combat capable ACTIVE 95,753 (Army 95,753) Paramilitary 62,000
FTR 69: 49 F-7 Airguard; 10 FT-7*; 8 MiG-29B Fulcrum; 2 Nepal is attempting to integrate the 23,500-strong (Maoist)
MiG-29UB Fulcrum; People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into the national army.
ATK 22 A-5M Fantan
TPT 19 Light 15: 2 An-12 Cub; 4 Cessna 180 Skywagon; Organisations by Service
1 Cessna 550 Citation II; 3 F-27 Friendship; 5 PC-6A Turbo
Porter/PC-6B Turbo Porter PAX 4 FH-227
TRG 45+: 12 G-4 Super Galeb*; 12+ K-8 Karakorum*; 12
Army 95,753
PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 9 PC-9* FORCES BY ROLE
HELICOPTERS COMMAND
MRH 20: 11 Mi-17 Hip H; 9 SA-316 Alouette III 6 inf div HQ
TPT 46: Medium 10 PZL W-3 Sokol Light 36: 12 Bell 205; 1 (valley) comd
6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 18 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite SPECIAL FORCES
MSL • AAM • IR Pl-5; R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/SARH R-27 1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn , 1 mech inf bn)
(AA-10 Alamo) MANOEUVRE
Light
Paramilitary 107,250 16 inf bde (total: 63 inf bn)
32 indep inf coy
People’s Police Force 72,000 1 ranger bn
270 The Military Balance 2012
Asia
ARV 3 LAV-R TPT • Light 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) (to be replaced
by 8 NH90 from 2011)
Reserves TRG 5 Bell 47G (to be replaced by 5 AW-109 from 2011)
MSL • ASM AGM-65B/G Maverick
Territorial Force 1,789 reservists
Responsible for providing trained individuals for
incrementing deployed forces Deployment
FORCES BY ROLE Afghanistan
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT NATO • ISAF 188
6 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt UN • UNAMA 1 obs
Organisations by Service
Pakistan PAK
Pakistani Rupee Rs 2010 2011 2012 Strategic Forces
GDP Rs 14.8tr 17.5tr Operational control rests with the National Command Au-
thority (NCA); Army and Air Force strategic forces are re-
US$ 173bn 202bn
sponsible for technical aspects, training and administrative
per capita US$ 936 1,079
control of the services’ nuclear assets.
Growth % 3.76 2.56
Inflation % 11.7 13.9 Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000-
Def exp Rs 481bn
15,000
Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces.
US$ 5.6bn
MSL • STRATEGIC 60
Def bdgt Rs 384bn 447bn 501bn MRBM ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5)/Shaheen-2 (Haft-6
US$ 4.47bn 5.16bn - in test)
SRBM ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 - PRC M-11)/Shaheen-1
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Type-59-I; 155mm 322: 144 M114; 148 M198; ε30 Panter 3 Khalid (FRA Agosta 90B – 1 with AIP) with 4 single
203mm 28 M115 533mm ASTT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM-39 Exocet
MRL 88+ 107mm Type 81; 122mm 52+: 52 Azar (Type-83); AShM
some KRL-122 300mm 36 A100 SSI 3 MG110 (SF delivery) each with 2 single 533mm TT
MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50; M-61 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 10
AT FFGHM 3:
MSL 3 Sword (PRC Type 054) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
SP M901 TOW 83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HQ-7 SAM, 2 triple
MANPATS 11,100: 10,500 HJ-8/TOW; 600 9K119 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity
Refleks (AT-11 Sniper)
1 Z-9C Haitun hel)
RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1
FFGH 4:
RL 89mm M20
4 Tariq (UK Amazon) with 2 twin Mk141 lnchr with
GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44)
RGM-84D Harpoon AShM, 2 single TT with TP 45 LWT,
AIRCRAFT
1 114mm gun, (capacity 1 hel)
ISR 30 Cessna O-1E Bird Dog
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King FFHM 2:
Air; 3 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 Citation; 2 Tariq with 1 sextuple lnchr with LY-60 (Aspide) SAM,
1 Cessna 560 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 690; 4 Y-12(II) 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 114mm gun,
TRG 90 Saab 91 Safir (50 obs; 40 liaison) (capacity 1 hel)
HELICOPTERS FFH 1
ATK 42: 25 AH-1F Cobra with TOW; 16 AH-1S Cobra; 1 1 Alamgir (US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 2 triple 24mm
Mi-24 Hind ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
MRH 114+: 10 AS550 Fennec; 6 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
Twin Huey; 40+ Mi-17 Hip H; 12 SA315B Lama; 20 SA319 PBFG 2 Zarrar each with 4 single each with RGM-84
Asia
Alouette III Harpoon AShM
TPT 59 Medium 36: 31 SA330 Puma ; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi-172 PBG 4:
Light 23: 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB- 2 Jalalat II with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8
205A-1); 13 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II Saccade) AShM
TRG 22: 12 Bell 47G; 10 Hughes 300C 2 Jurrat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade)
UAV • ISR • Light Bravo; Jasoos; Vector AShM
AD PBF 4: 2 Kaan 15; 2 Kaan 33
SAM PB 2: 1 Larkana; 1 Rajshahi
SP some M113 with RBS-70
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
MANPAD 2,990+: 2,500 Mk1/Mk2; 60 FIM-92A Stinger;
MHC 3 Munsif (FRA Eridan)
HN-5A; 230 Mistral; 200 RBS-70
AMPHIBIOUS
GUNS • TOWED 1,934: 14.5mm 981; 35mm 248 GDF-
LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 4 Griffon 2000
002/GDF-005 (with 134 Skyguard radar units); 37mm 310
Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; 40mm 50 L/60; 57mm 144 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11
Type-59 (S-60); 85mm 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12 AORH 2:
RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor); RASIT 1 Fuqing (capacity 1 SA319 Alouette III utl hel)
(veh, arty); SLC-2 1 Moawin (capacity 1 Sea King Mk45 ASW hel)
MSL AOT 3: 1 Attock; 2 Gwadar
STRATEGIC AGS 1 Behr Paima
MRBM up to 25 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5); some AXS 1
Shaheen-2 (Haft-6 - in test) YTM 5
SRBM 50 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 - PRC M-11); up to 10
Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4); Marines ε1,400
LACM some Babur (Hatf-7 - in development) FORCES BY ROLE
TACTICAL • SRBM 105+: 105 Hatf-1; some Abdali (Hatf- SPECIAL FORCES
2); 1 cdo gp
ARV 117+: 65 Type 653; Al Hadeed; 52 M88A1; T-54/T-55
VLB M47M; M48/60 Naval Aviation
MW Aardvark Mk II AIRCRAFT 7 ac combat capable
ASW 9: 3 Atlantic; 4 P-3C Orion (additional 4 ac on
Navy 22,000 (incl ε1,400 Marines and ε2,000 order)
Maritime Security Agency (see Paramilitary)) MP 6 F-27-200 MPA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT • PAX 1 Hawker 850XP
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 8 HELICOPTERS
SSK 5: ASW 12: 5 Sea King Mk45; 7 Z-9C Haitun
2 Hashmat (FRA Agosta 70) with 4 single 533mm ASTT MRH 6 SA319B Alouette III
with F17P HWT/UGM- 84 Harpoon AShM MSL • AShM AM-39 Exocet
274 The Military Balance 2012
Asia
Western Sahara Light
UN • MINURSO 11 obs 2 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr bn
Foreign Forces
1 EOD unit
Unless specified, figures represent total numbers for 1 sigs sqn
UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Chile 2 obs
ARTY • MOR 3+: 81mm; 120mm 3
Croatia 9 obs
Finland 5 obs Maritime Element ε400
Italy 4 obs
1 HQ located at Port Moresby
Korea, Republic of 8 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Philippines 3 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4:
Sweden 6 obs PB 4 Pacific
United Kingdom some (fwd mounting base) air elm AMPHIBIOUS 2:
located at Karachi LANDING SHIPS • LSM 2 Salamaua
Uruguay 2 obs
Air Force 200
Papua New Guinea PNG FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
Papua New Guinea Kina K 2010 2011 2012 1 sqn with CN-235M-100; IAI-201 Arava
GDP K 25.4bn 31.2bn TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
US$ 9.4bn 12.8bn 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)†
per capita US$ 1,550 2,075 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 5: 2 CN-235M-100; 3 IAI-201
Growth % 7.03 8.96
Arava
Inflation % 6.0 8.4
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)†
Def bdgt K 116m 145m
US$ 43m 60m
Deployment
US$1=K 2.70 2.43
Solomon Islands
Population 6,187,591
RAMSI 40; 1 inf pl
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 18.5% 5.2% 4.5% 3.9% 17.1% 2.0% Foreign Forces
Female 17.9% 5.1% 4.4% 3.8% 15.8% 1.7% Australia Army 38; 1 trg unit
276 The Military Balance 2012
Light
Philippines PHL 10 div (each: 3 inf bde; 1 arty bn)
Other
Philippine Peso P 2010 2011 2012
1 (Presidential) gd gp
GDP P 9.0tr 9.87tr COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 199bn 228bn 1 arty regt HQ
per capita US$ 1,992 2,235 5 engr bde
Growth % 7.63 4.66 1 int gp
Inflation % 3.8 4.5 1 sigs gp
Def exp P 91.5bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LT TK 7 Scorpion
US$ 2.02bn
AIFV 36: 2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV
Def bdgt P 73.4bn 101bn 113bn APC 293
US$ 2.13bn 2.34bn APC (T) 70 M113
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
FMA (US) US$ 32.0m 15.0m APC (W) 223: 77 LAV-150 Commando; 146 Simba
US$1=P 45.24 43.35 ARTY 254+
TOWED 214: 105mm 204 M101/M102/M-26/M-56
Population 101,833,938
155mm 10 M114/M-68
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MOR 40+: 81mm M-29; 107mm 40 M-30
AT • RCL 75mm M20; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
Male 17.7% 5.1% 4.7% 4.4% 16.4% 1.8%
AIRCRAFT
Female 17.0% 4.9% 4.6% 4.2% 16.9% 2.4%
TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 1 Cessna 170; 1
Cessna 172; 1 Cessna P206A
Capabilities UAV • ISR • Medium Blue Horizon
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly ARV ACV-300; Samson; M578
the army and marines, are deployed extensively in an in-
ternal security role across the country in the face of con- Navy 24,000
tinuing challenges from insurgent groups. Until the with- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
drawal of the US military presence in 1992, the Philippines PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES
had largely relied on Washington to provide for its external FF 1 Rajah Humabon with 3 76mm gun
defence, and since then perennially low defence budgets PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 63
have thwarted efforts to develop any significant capacity PSOH 1 Gregorio del Pilar (US Hamilton)
for conventional warfighting or deterrence. Although in PCF 1 Cyclone
August 2011 President Benigno Aquino III vowed that the PCO 11:
Philippines would provide a stronger military defence for 3 Emilio Jacinto with 1 76mm gun
its South China Sea claims, this promise may have been as- 6 Miguel Malvar with 1 76mm gun
pirational rather than grounded in concrete policy-making 2 Rizal with 2 76mm gun
or budgetary provision. PBF 18: 10 Conrodo Yap; 8 Tomas Batilo
PB 32: 2 Aguinaldo; 22 Jose Andrada; 2 Kagitingan; 2 Point;
ACTIVE 125,000 (Army 86,000 Navy 24,000 Air 4 Swift Mk3
15,000) Paramilitary 40,500 AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LST 7:
RESERVE 131,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 15,000 Air 2 Bacolod City (Besson-class) with 1 hel landing platform
16,000) Paramilitary 40,000 (to age 49) (capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops)
5 Zamboanga del Sur (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)
Organisations by Service LANDING CRAFT 26: 8 LCU; 2 LCVP; 16 LCM
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7: AOL 2; AR 1; AK 1; AWT
Army 86,000 2; TPT 1
5 Area Unified Comd (joint service), 1 National Capital
Naval Aviation
Region Comd
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 4 BN-2A Defender 2 Cessna
FORCES BY ROLE 177 Cardinal
SPECIAL FORCES HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4 Bo-105
1 spec ops comd (1 Scout Ranger regt, 1 SF regt, 1 lt
reaction bn) Marines 8,300
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Mechanised MANOEUVRE
1 lt armd div with (3 lt armd bn; 3 lt armd coy; 4 armd Amphibious
cav tp; 4 mech inf bn; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 avn bn) 4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn)
Asia 277
ISR Other
1 sqn with Turbo Commander 690A 56 militia bn (part-time units which can be called up
SEARCH & RESCUE for extended periods)
4 (SAR/Comms) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1M Iroquois);
AUH-76 Deployment
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; L-100-20 Côte D’Ivoire
1 sqn with N-22B Nomad; N-22SL Searchmaster UN • UNOCI 3; 4 obs
1 sqn with F-27-200 MPA; F-27-500 Friendship
Asia
HAiti
1 VIP sqn with F-28 Fellowship
UN • MINUSTAH 173; 1 HQ coy
TRAINING
1 sqn with SF-260F/TP India/PAkistan
1 sqn with T-41B/D/K Mescalero UN • UNMOGIP 3 obs
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Liberia
1 sqn with MD-520MG
UN • UNMIL 115; 2 obs; 1 inf coy
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AUH-76 South sudan
4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) UN • UNMISS 3 obs
1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk
SYRIA
(S-70A-5)
UN • UNDOF 343; 1 inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable Timor Leste
MP 2: 1 F-27-200 MPA; 1 N-22SL Searchmaster UN • UNMIT 3 obs
ISR 12: 6 OV-10A Bronco*; 6 OV-10C Bronco*
TPT 7 Medium 4: 3 C-130H Hercules; 1 L-100-20 Light 4: Foreign Forces
1 F-27-500 Friendship; 1 N-22B Nomad; 1 Turbo Commander
Brunei IMT 9
690A PAX 1 F-28 Fellowhip (VIP)
Libya IMT 3
TRG 40: 12 S-211*; 8 SF-260F; 10 SF-260TP; 10 T-41B/D/K
Mescalero Malaysia IMT 13
HELICOPTERS United States US Pacific Command: 182
MRH 19: 3 AUH-76; 3 Bell 412EP Twin Huey;
2 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 11 MD-520MG
TPT 40 Medium 1: 1 S-70A Black Hawk (S-70A-5) Light 39
Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
UAV • ISR • Medium 2 Blue Horizon II
MSL • AAM • IR AIM-9B Sidewinder‡
Paramilitary
Philippine National Police 40,500
Deptartment of Interior and Local Government. 15
regional & 73 provinicial comd. 62,000 auxiliaries.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 14
Rodman
278 The Military Balance 2012
Organisations by Service
Singapore SGP
Singapore Dollar S$ 2010 2011 2012 Army 15,000; 35,000 conscript (total 50,000)
GDP S$ 304bn 330bn FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 223bn 264bn SPECIAL FORCES
1 cdo bn
per capita US$ 43,319 50,286
MANOEUVRE
Growth % 14.47 5.30
Reconnaissance
Inflation % 2.8 3.7 4 lt armd/recce
Def exp S$ 11bn Armoured
US$ 8.1bn 1 armd bn
Def bdgt S$ 11.5bn 12.1bn Mechanised
3 combined arms div (mixed active/reserve formations)
US$ 8.4bn 9.66bn
(1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 2 inf bde (3 inf bn), 2 arty bn, 1
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
US$1=S$ 1.36 1.25 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log spt cmd)
Population 5,246,787 Light
Ethnic groups: Chinese 76%; Malay 15%; Indian 6% 1 rapid reaction div (mixed active/reserve formations)
(1 inf bde, 1 air mob bde, 1 amph bde (3 amph bn), 1 AD
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log spt cmd)
Male 7.1% 2.9% 3.2% 3.3% 28.0% 4.1% 8 inf bn
Female 6.6% 2.8% 3.1% 3.5% 30.2% 5.1%
COMBAT SUPPORT
4 arty bn
Capabilities 4 engr bn
1 int bn
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are the best-equipped 1 CBRN coy
military force in Southeast Asia, and have benefitted since
the late 1960s from steadily increasing defence spending Reserves
and the gradual development of a substantial national de- 9 inf bde incl in mixed active/inactive reserve formations
fence industry capable of producing and modifying equip- listed above; 1 op reserve div with additional inf bde;
ment for specific national requirements. The SAF is organ- People’s Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with
ised essentially along Israeli lines, the air force and navy inf bn 12
being staffed mainly by professional personnel while apart FORCES BY ROLE
from a small core of regulars the much larger army is based SPECIAL FORCES
on conscripts and reservists. Much training is routinely 1 cdo bn
carried out overseas, notably but not only in Australia, Bru- MANOEUVRE
nei, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. The SAF also Reconnaissance
engages in multilateral exercises through the Five Power 6 lt armd/recce bn
Defence Arrangements. Singapore’s government has tradi- Mechanised
tionally been reluctant to make public details of its strate- 6 mech inf bn
gic outlook or military doctrine, but it is widely presumed Light
ε56 inf bn
that the SAF has been developed primarily with a view to
COMBAT SUPPORT
deterring near-neighbours from attacking the city-state or
ε12 arty bn
impinging on its vital interests (such as its water-supply
ε8 engr bn
from Malaysian reservoirs). Since the 1990s, however, the
SAF has increasingly also become involved – albeit on a EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
relatively small-scale – in multinational peace-support op- MBT 96 Leopard 2A4; (80–100 Tempest (Centurion) in store)
erations. While these deployments have provided some LT TK ε350 AMX-13 SM1
operational experience and SAF training and operational RECCE 22 AMX-10 PAC 90
AIFV 372+: 22 AMX-10P; 100 AV-81 Terrex; 250 IFV-25
readiness standards are high by international standards,
Bionix; 50+ M113A1/M113A2 (some with 40mm AGL, some
the army’s reliance on conscripts and reservists limits its
with 25mm gun)
capacity for sustained operations away from Singapore.
APC 1,695+
ACTIVE 72,500 (Army 50,000 Navy 9,000 Air 13,500) APC (T) 1,400+: 250 IFV-40/50; 700+ M113A1/M113A2;
Paramilitary 75,100 400+ ATTC Bronco
Terms of service conscription 24 months APC (W) 280: 250 LAV-150 Commando/V-200 Commando;
30 V-100 Commando
RESERVE 312,500 (Army 300,000 Navy 5,000 Air PPV 15 MaxxPro Dash
7,500) Paramilitary 44,000 ARTY 798+
Annual trg to age of 40 for army other ranks, 50 for officers SP 155mm 54 SSPH-1 Primus
Asia 279
TOWED 88: 105mm (37 LG1 in store); 155mm 88: 18 Air Force 13,500 (incl 3,000 conscript)
FH-2000; ε18 Pegasus; 52 FH-88 5 comds
MRL 227mm 18 HIMARS
FORCES BY ROLE
MOR 638+
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SP 90+ 81mm; 120mm 90: 40 on Bronco; 50 on M113
2 sqn with F-5S/T Tiger II
TOWED 548 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65 160mm 12
1 sqn with F-15SG Eagle
M-58 Tampella
3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (some used for ISR
AT • MSL • MANPATS 60: 30 Milan; 30 Spike MR
with pods)
RCL 290: 84mm ε200 Carl Gustav; 106mm 90 M40A1
ISR
RL 67mm Armbrust
1 ISR sqn with RF-5
AD • SAM 75+
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
SP Mistral; RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) (on
1 sqn with F-50
V-200/M-113)
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
MANPAD Mistral; RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
1 sqn with G550-AEW
GUNS 34
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
TANKER
SP 20mm GAI-C01
1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
TOWED 34 20mm GAI-C01; 35mm 34 GDF (with 25
TANKER/TRANSPORT
Super-Fledermaus firecontrol radar)
1 sqn with KC-130B/H Hercules; C-130H Hercules
UAV • ISR • Light Skylark
TRAINING
RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder; AN/TPQ-37
Firefinder (arty, mor); 3 ARTHUR (arty) 1 (France-based) sqn with A-4SU/TA-4SU Super Skyhawk
AEV 80: 18 CET; 54 FV180; 8 M728 4 (US-based) units with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D
ARV Bionix; Bueffel; LAV-150; LAV-300 Chinook; F-15SG: F-16C/D
Asia
VLB Bionix; LAB 30; Leguan; M2; M3; 12 M60 1 (Australia-based) sqn with PC-21
MW 910-MCV-2; Trailblazer ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
Navy 3,000; 1,000 conscript; ε5,000 active TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
reservists (total 9,000) 1 sqn with CH-47SD Super D Chinook
2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISR UAV
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 5:
2 sqn with Searcher MkII
3 Challenger with 4 single 533mm TT
1 sqn with Hermes 450
1 Challenger (trg role) with 4 single 533mm TT
1 Archer (SWE Västergötland class) (AIP fitted) with 6 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
single 533mm TT for WASS Black Shark LWT (2nd vessel AIRCRAFT 148 combat capable
expected ISD 2011) FTR 37: 28 F-5S Tiger II; 9 F-5T Tiger II
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: FGA 78: 18 F-15SG Eagle (6 more to be delivered by 2012);
FRIGATES • FFGHM 6 Formidable with 2 quad lnchr 20 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 40 F-16D Fighting Falcon (incl
with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 4 octuple VLS with Aster reserves)
15 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 1 ATK 14: 4 A-4SU Super Skyhawk; 10 TA-4SU Super
S-70B Sea Hawk hel) Skyhawk
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 35: MP 5 F-50 Maritime Enforcer*
CORVETTES • FSGM 6 AEW&C 4 G550-AEW
6 Victory with 2 quad Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C TKR 5: 1 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-135R Stratotanker
Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple lnchr with Barak SAM, 2 TKR/TPT 4 KC-130B Hercules
triple 32mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun TPT 9 Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (2 ELINT) PAX 4 F-50
PCO 11 Fearless with 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral TRG 19 PC-21
SAM, 1 76mm gun HELICOPTERS
PBF 6 ATK 19 AH-64D Apache
PB 12 ASW 6 S-70B Seahawk
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES TPT 40+ Heavy 16: 6 CH-47D Chinook; 10 CH-47SD Super
MHC 4 Bedok D Chinook Medium 30: 18 AS332M Super Puma (incl 5
AMPHIBIOUS SAR); 12 AS532UL Cougar
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Endurance TRG 5 EC120B Colibri (leased)
with 2 twin lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun UAV • ISR 45 Heavy 5 Hermes 450 Medium 40 Searcher
(capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops) MkII
LANDING CRAFT 34 LCU 100 LCVP MSL • TACTICAL
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 ASM: AGM-65B/G Maverick; Hellfire
AR 1 Swift Rescue AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM-39 Exocet
TRG 1 ARM AGM-45 Shrike
280 The Military Balance 2012
Cyber
The Singapore Ministry of Defence has long identified the
potential damage that could be caused by cyber attacks,
with this concern perhaps more acute following its
Asia 281
COMBAT SUPPORT
Sri Lanka LKA 1 med arty regt
1 MRL bty
Sri Lankan Rupee Rs 2010 2011 2012
1 lt arty regt
GDP Rs 5.6tr 6.48tr 4 fd engr regt
US$ 49.4bn 58.8bn 5 sigs regt
per capita US$ 2,345 2,761 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Growth % 8.01 6.96 MBT 62 T-55AM2/T-55A
Inflation % 5.9 8.4
RECCE 15 Saladin
AIFV 62: 13 BMP-1; 49 BMP-2
Def exp Rs 160bn
APC 221+
US$ 1.41bn APC (T) 30+ some Type-63; 30 Type-85; some Type-89
Def bdgt Rs 211bn 217bn 214bn APC (W) 191: 25 BTR-80/BTR-80A; 31 Buffel; 20 Type-92;
US$ 1.86bn 1.97bn 105 Unicorn
ARTY 908
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
ARV 16 VT-55
VLB 2 MT-55
Internal security was the main focus for Sri Lanka’s armed
forces, including the air force and navy, from 1983 until
Navy 15,000 (incl 2,400 recalled reservists)
2009 when they defeated the insurgency of the LTTE (Tamil
1 (HQ and Western comd) located at Colombo
Tigers). The air force’s role is to provide tactical air support
to the army and navy, and it has performed competently EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
despite ageing equipment and considerable losses to LTTE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 139
anti-aircraft fire. The navy has a littoral protection capabil- PSOH 1 Sayura (IND Vigraha)
ity, is equipped with fast attack and patrol vessels, and has PCG 2 Nandimithra (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 3 single lnchr with
experience of coordinating with foreign navies in exercise 1 GII Gabriel II AShM, 1 76mm gun
scenarios. The armed forces have no capability for force PCO 3: 1 Reliance; 2 Sagara (IND Vikram)
projection beyond national territory. PCC 1 Jayesagara
PBF 87: 26 Colombo; 3 Dvora; 3 Killer (ROK); 6 Shaldag; 14
ACTIVE 160,900 (Army 117,900 Navy 15,000 Air Super Dvora (Mk1/II/III); 3 Simonneau; 5 Trinity Marine;
28,000) Paramilitary 62,200 27 Wave Rider
PB 18: 4 Cheverton; 2 Prathapa (PRC mod Haizhui); 3
RESERVE 5,500 (Army 1,100 Navy 2,400 Air Force Ranajaya (PRC Haizhui); 1 Ranarisi (PRC mod Shanghai II);
2,000) Paramilitary 30,400 5 Weeraya (PRC Shanghai II); 3 (various)
PBR 27
Organisations by Service AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Yuhai (capacity 2 tanks; 250
Army 78,000; 39,900 active reservists (recalled) troops)
(total 117,900) LANDING CRAFT 8
Regt are bn sized LCU 2 Yunnan
LCM 2
FORCES BY ROLE
LCP 3 Hansaya
COMMAND
9 div HQ UCAC 1 M 10 (capacity 56 troops)
SPECIAL FORCES LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2: 1 TPT; 1 TRG
1 indep SF bde
MANOEUVRE Air Force 28,000 (incl SLAF Regt)
Reconnaissance FORCES BY ROLE
3 armd recce regt FIGHTER
Armoured 1 sqn with F-7BS/G; FT-7
1 armd bde (under strength) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Light 1 sqn with MiG-23UB Flogger C; MiG-27M Flogger J2
33 inf bde 1 sqn with Kfir C-2/C-7/TC-2
1 cdo bde 1 sqn with K-8 Karakoram*
282 The Military Balance 2012
TRANSPORT sudan
1 sqn with An-32B Cline; C-130K Hercules; Cessna 421C UN • UNISFA 1 obs
Golden Eagle
Western Sahara
1 sqn with Beech B200 King Air; Y-12 (II)
TRAINING UN • MINURSO 2 obs
1 wg with PT-6, Cessna 150L
ATTACK HELICOPTER Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC
1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind; Mi-35P Hind
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER New Taiwan Dollar NT$ 2010 2011 2012
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H GDP NT$ 13.6tr 14.6tr
1 sqn with Bell 206A/B (incl basic trg), Bell 212 US$ 431bn 499bn
1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412 Twin Huey
per capita US$ 18,725 21,644
ISR UAV
1 sqn with Blue Horizon-2 Growth % 10.88 5.24
1 sqn with Searcher II Inflation % 1.0 1.8
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
Asia
3 CBRN group ARV CM-27/A1; 37 M88A1
3 sigs gp
VLB 22 M3; M48A5
Missile Command
FORCES BY ROLE
Navy 45,000
3 district; 1 (ASW) HQ located at Hualein; 1 Fleet HQ
AIR DEFENCE
2 AD/SAM gp (total: 6 SAM bn with MIM-23 HAWK; located at Tsoying; 1 New East Coast Fleet
PAC-3 Patriot; 6 Tien Kung I Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bow) SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
2 Hai Lung with 6 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT
Reserves 2 Hai Shih (trg role) with 10 single 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4aft)
FORCES BY ROLE with SUT HWT
MANOEUVRE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26
Light CRUISERS • CGHM 4 Keelung (ex US Kidd) with 1 quad
7 lt inf div lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon AShM, 2 twin Mk26 lnchr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE with SM-2MR SAM, 2 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC,
MBT 565: 200 M60A3; 100 M48A5; 265 M48H Brave Tiger 2 127mm gun, (capacity 1 S-70 ASW hel)
LT TK 855: 230 M24 Chaffee (90mm gun); 625 M41/Type-64 FRIGATES 22
RECCE 48: BIDS (CBRN recce); 48 K216A1 (CBRN recce); FFGHM 20:
KM453 (CBRN recce) 8 Cheng Kung with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng
AIFV 225 CM-25 (M113 with 20–30mm cannon) AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 2 triple
APC 950 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun,
APC (T) 650 M113 (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel)
APC (W) 300 LAV-150 Commando
6 Chin Yang with 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC/
ARTY 2,204
RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple lnchr with SM-1
SP 492: 105mm 100 M108; 155mm 321: 225 M109A2/A5;
MR SAM, 2 twin lnchr with SM-1 MR SAM, 2 twin
48 M44T; 45 T-69; 203mm 70 M110; 240mm 4
324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun,
TOWED 1,060+: 105mm 650 T-64 (M101); 155mm 340+:
90 M-59; 250 T-65 (M114); M-44; XT-69 203mm 70 M115 (capacity 1 MD-500 hel)
COASTAL 127mm ε50 US Mk 32 (reported) 6 Kang Ding with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng
MRL 330: 117mm 120 Kung Feng VI; 126mm 60 Kung AShM, 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 2
Feng III/Kung Feng IV; 150 RT 2000 Thunder (KF towed triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun,
and SP) (capacity 1 S-70C ASW hel)
MOR 322 FFGH 2:
SP 162: 81mm M-29; 72 M125; 107mm 90 M106A2 2 Chin Yang with 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC/
TOWED 81mm 160 M-29; T75; 107mm M30; 120mm RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with
K5; XT-86 Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 MD-500 hel)
284 The Military Balance 2012
(SA-3 Goa)
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger (reported); 9K32 Strela-2
Tajikistan TJK (SA-7 Grail)‡
Tajikistani Somoni Tr 2010 2011 2012
Air Force/Air Defence 1,500
GDP Tr 24.7bn 31.4bn
FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 5.64bn 6.86bn TRANSPORT
per capita US$ 753 900 1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty
Asia
Growth % 6.50 6.00 ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H
Inflation % 6.5 13.6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt Tr 264m 331m
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty
US$ 60m 72m
HELICOPTERS
FMA (US) US$ 1.5m 1.2m ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
US$1=Tr 4.38 4.58 TPT • Medium 12 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H
Population 7,627,200
Paramilitary 7,500
Ethnic groups: Tajik 67%; Uzbek 25%; Russian 2%; Tatar 2%
Interior Troops 3,800
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 17.3% 5.2% 5.6% 4.8% 15.4% 1.4% National Guard 1,200
Female 16.7% 5.1% 5.5% 4.7% 16.4% 1.9%
Emergencies Ministry 2,500
Capabilities Border Guards
Tajikistan’s military capability is limited. The conscript-
based land force is hampered by lack of adequate training, Deployment
while the air element operates only a small number of fixed
and rotary-wing aircraft to support ground forces. There Bosnia-Herzegovina
is little capacity to deploy other than token forces, though OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
the Tajik military is an active participant in CSTO and SCO
military exercises. Russia maintains a military base in the Foreign Forces
country, housing the 201st Motor-Rifle Division.
India Air Force: 1 Fwd Op Base located at Farkhar
ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300, Air Force/Air Defence Russia 5,000 Army: 1 mil base (subord Central MD) with
1,500) Paramilitary 7,500 (1 (201st) MR div(-); 54 T-72; 300 BMP-2/BTR-80/MT-LB;
Terms of service 24 months 100 2S1/2S3/2S12/9P140 Uragan • Military Air Forces: 5
Su-25 Frogfoot; 4 Mi-8 Hip
Organisations by Service
Army 7,300
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
3 MR bde
286 The Military Balance 2012
SPECIAL FORCES
Thailand THA 2 SF div
MANOEUVRE
Thai Baht b 2010 2011 2012
Reconnaissance
GDP b 10.1tr 11tr 4 recce coy
US$ 316bn 360bn Mechanised
per capita US$ 4,768 5,390 2 cav div
Growth % 7.78 3.54 1 indep cav regt
3 armd inf div
Inflation % 3.3 4.0
2 mech inf div
Def bdgt b 154bn 169bn
Light
US$ 4.82bn 5.52bn 1 lt inf div
FMA (US) US$ 1.6m 1.06m 1 Rapid Reaction force (1 bn per region forming)
US$1=b 31.95 30.55 8 indep inf bn
Aviation
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
TRG 33: 18 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 15 T-41B Mescalero 1 Pin Klao (trg role) with 6 single 324mm ASTT, 3
HELICOPTERS 76mm gun
ATK 3 AH-1F Cobra PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 83
MRH 3 Mi-17V-5 Hip H CORVETTES 7
TPT 175 Heavy 6 CH-47D Chinook Medium 7 UH-60L FSG 2 Rattanakosin with 2 quad Mk140 lnchr with
Black Hawk Light 162: 92 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 28 RGM-84A Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr
Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 37 Bell 212 (AB-212); 3 Enstrom 480B with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun
TRG 42 Hughes 300C FS 5:
UAV • ISR • Medium Searcher 3 Khamronsin with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm
AD • SAM gun
STATIC Aspide 2 Tapi with 6 single 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
MANPAD 36 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); FIM-43 1 76mm gun
Redeye; HN-5A PCFG 6:
GUNS 202+ 3 Prabparapak with 2 single lnchr with 1 GI Gabriel I
SP 54: 20mm 24 M-163 Vulcan; 40mm 30 M-1/M-42 SP AShM, 1 triple lnchr with GI Gabriel I AShM
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
TOWED 148+: 20mm 24 M-167 Vulcan; 37mm 52 Type- 3 Ratcharit with 2 twin lnchr with MM-38 Exocet AShM,
74; 40mm 48 L/70; 57mm 24+: ε6 Type-59 (S-60); 18+ 1 76mm gun
non-operational PCO 5: 3 Hua Hin with 1 76mm gun; 2 Pattani with 1
RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor); RASIT 76mm gun
(veh, arty) PCC 9: 3 Chon Buri with 2 76mm gun; 6 Sattahip with 1
ARV 43: 22 M88A1; 6 M88A2; 10 M113; 5 Type-653; WZT-4 76mm gun
VLB Type-84 PBF 4
MW Bozena; Giant Viper PB 52: 10 T-11; 9 Swift; 3 T-81; 9 T-91; 3 T-210; 13 T-213; 1
T-227; 3 T-991; 1 T-994
Asia
Reserves MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 19
FORCES BY ROLE MCM SPT 1 Thalang
COMMAND MCO 2 Lat Ya
4 inf div HQ MCC 2 Bang Rachan
MSC 2 Bangkeo
Navy 44,011 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines, MSR 12
Coastal Defence); 25,849 conscript (total AMPHIBIOUS
69,860) LANDING SHIPS 8:
LS 2 Prab
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LST 6:
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10
4 Chang with 6 40mm gun (capacity 16 tanks; 200
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVS 1:
troops)
1 Chakri Naruebet (capacity 9 AV-8A Harrier† FGA ac; 6
2 Sichang training with 2 40mm gun, 1 hel landing
S-70B Seahawk ASW hel) platform (capacity 14 tanks; 300 troops)
FRIGATES 10 LANDING CRAFT 56:
FFGHM 2: LCU 13: 3 Man Nok; 6 Mataphun (capacity either 3–4
2 Naresuan with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A MBT or 250 troops); 4 Thong Kaeo
Harpoon AShM, 1 8 cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-7M Sea LCM 24
Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT, 1 127mm gun, LCVP 12
(capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel) LCA 4
FFGM 4: UCAC 3 Griffon 1000TD
2 Chao Phraya with 4 twin lnchr with C-801 (CSS-N-4 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14
Sardine) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with HQ-61 (CSA-N-2) AORH 1 Similan (capacity 1 hel)
SAM (non-operational), 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm AOR 1 Chula
gun AOL 5: 4 Prong; 1 Samui
2 Kraburi with 4 twin lnchr with C-801 (CSS-N-4 AWT 1
Sardine) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with HQ-61 (CSA-N-2) AGOR 1
SAM, 2 RBU 1200, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1 hel landing AGS 2
platform ABU 1
FFGH 2: TRG 1
2 Phuttha Yotfa Chulalok (leased from US) with 1 TPT 1
octuple Mk112 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/
ASROC, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Naval Aviation 1,200
127mm gun, (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) AIRCRAFT 39 combat capable
FF 2: FGA 7: 5 AV-8A Harrier II†; 2 TAV-8A Harrier†
1 Makut Rajakumarn with 2 triple 34mm ASTT, 2 ASW 2 P-3A Orion (P-3T)
114mm gun RECCE 9 Sentry O-2-337
288 The Military Balance 2012
Asia
Inflation % 4.9 10.5 Brazil UNMIT 3 obs
China, People’s Republic of UNMIT 2 obs
Def bdgt US$ 1.24m 5.85m 8.95m
Fiji UNMIT 1 obs
Population 1,177,834 India UNMIT 1 obs
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Japan UNMIT 2 obs
Male 19% 6% 5% 3% 16% 1% Malaysia UNMIT 2 obs
Nepal UNMIT 1 obs
Female 18% 6% 5% 3% 16% 2%
New Zealand ISF (Operation Astute) 80; 1 inf coy • UNMIT
Capabilities 1 obs
Pakistan UNMIT 4 obs
The Timor-Leste Defence Force was formed in 2001 from Philippines UNMIT 3 obs
the former Falintil insurgent army. However, it soon be-
Portugal UNMIT 3 obs
came clear that the new force suffered from poor morale
Sierra Leone UNMIT 1 obs
and weak discipline. In 2006 these problems culminated
in the dismissal of large numbers of military personnel Singapore UNMIT 2 obs
who had protested over poor conditions and alleged dis-
crimination on regional lines, which precipitated the col-
lapse of both the Defence Force and the national police.
Turkmenistan TKM
These circumstances forced the government to call for an Turkmen New Manat TMM 2010 2011 2012
international intervention. Australian-led foreign forces GDP TMM 57bn 68.7bn
will remain in Timor-Leste until after elections in 2012.
US$ 20bn 24.1bn
Meanwhile, the government has attempted to rebuild
the Defence Force. Long-term plans outlined in the Force per capita US$ 4,048 4,824
2020 document, made public in 2006, call for an expanded Growth % 9.22 9.90
defence force, conscription, the establishment of an air Inflation % 4.5 6.1
component, and acquisition of modern weapons. In the Def bdgt TMM ε565m
meantime, the defence force continues to depend heavily
US$ ε198m
on foreign assistance and training, notably from Australia,
Portugal and Brazil. FMA (US) US$ 2.0m 1.2m
USD1=TMM 2.85 2.85
ACTIVE 1,332 (Army 1,250 Naval Element 82)
Population 4,997,503
Organisations by Service Ethnic groups: Turkmen 77%; Uzbek 9%; Russian 7%; Kazak 2%
Army 50,000
AIRCRAFT 135 combat capable
4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd
FTR 30 MiG-29 Fulcrum/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
FORCES BY ROLE
FGA 74: 26 Su-17M (Su-17MZ) Fitter C/Su-17UM-3 (Su-
SPECIAL FORCES
17UMZ) Fitter G; 23 Su-24 Fencer; 25 Su-27 Flanker/Su-
1 SF bde
27UB Flanker C
MANOEUVRE
Armoured ATK 20 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot
1 tk bde EW/Tpt 26 An-12 Cub (med tpt)/An-12PP Cub (EW)
ELINT 11 Su-24MP Fencer F*
Asia
Mechanised
11 MR bde ELINT/Tpt 13 An-26 Curl (lt tpt)/An-26RKR Curl (ELINT)
Air Manoeuvre TPT • Light 2: 1 An-24 Coke; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
3 air aslt bde TRG 5 L-39 Albatros (9 more in store)
1 AB bde HELICOPTERS
Mountain ATK 29 Mi-24 Hind
1 lt mtn inf bde C2 2 Mi-6AYa Hook-C
COMBAT SUPPORT TPT 79 Heavy 27: 26 Mi-6 Hook; 1 Mi-26 Halo Medium
6 arty regt 52 Mi-8 Hip
1 MRL bde AD • SAM 45
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TOWED S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3
MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64; 170 T-62
RECCE 19: 13 BRDM- Goa)
2; 6 BRM STATIC S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)
AIFV 399: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2; 270 BMP-2 MSL
APC 309 ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
APC (T) 50 BTR-D ARM Kh-25P (AS-12 Kegler); Kh -28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58
APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80 (AS-11 Kilter)
ARTY 487+ AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
SP 83+: 122mm 18 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 17+: 17 2S3; 2S5 SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
(reported); 203mm 48 2S7
TOWED 200: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 140 2A36
Paramilitary up to 20,000
GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 Anona
MRL 108: 122mm 60: 24 9P138; 36 BM-21; 220mm 48 Internal Security Troops up to 19,000
9P140 Uragan Ministry of Interior
MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11; 19 2S12; 18 PM-120
AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 National Guard 1,000
Spigot) Ministry of Defence
GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12
SPECIAL FORCES
Vietnam VNM 1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt)
MANOEUVRE
Vietnamese Dong d 2010 2011 2012
Armoured
GDP d 1,981tr 2,470tr 10 armd bde
US$ 102bn 119bn Mechanised
per capita US$ 1,144 1,318 3 mech inf div
Growth % 6.78 5.75 Light
58 inf div(-)
Inflation % 9.2 18.8
15 indep inf regt
Def exp d 49.7tn COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 2.57bn 10+ arty bde
Def bdgt d 44.4tr 55.1tr 8 engr div
US$ 2.32bn 2.66bn 20 indep engr bde
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
FSG 5: TRANSPORT
3 Petya II (FSU) with 1 quintuple 406mm ASTT, 4 RBU 3 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; Mi-6 Hook; Mi-8 Hip;
6000 Smerch 2, 4 76mm gun Mi-17 Hip H; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Yak-40 Codling
2 Petya III (FSU) with 1 triple 533mm ASTT, 4 RBU 2500 (VIP)
Smerch 1, 4 76mm gun TRAINING
PCFGM 7: 1 regt with L-39 Albatros; MiG-21UM Mongol B*; BT-6
4 Tarantul (FSU) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit ATTACK HELICOPTER
(SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with SA-N-5 Grail 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind
SAM (manually operated), 1 76mm gun
AIR DEFENCE
3 Tarantul V with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N- 4 ADA bde
25 Switchblade) AShM; 1 quad lnchr with SA-N-5 Grail Some (People’s Regional) force (total: ε1,000 AD unit, 6
SAM (manually operated), 1 76mm gun radar bde with 100 radar stn)
PCC 2 Svetlyak (Further 2 on order) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBFG 8 Osa II with 4 single lnchr with 1 SS-N-2 AShM AIRCRAFT 235 combat capable
PBFT 3 Shershen† (FSU) with 4 single 533mm TT FGA 231: 140 MiG-21bis Fishbed L & N; 10 MiG-21UM
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
PHT 3 Turya† with 4 single 533mm TT Mongol B; 53 Su-22M-3/M-4 Fitter (some ISR); 7 Su-27SK
PH 2 Turya† Flanker; 5 Su-27UBK Flanker; 16 Su-30MK2 Flanker
PB 26: 2 Poluchat (FSU); 14 Zhuk†; 4 Zhuk (mod); 6 ASW 4 Be-12 Mail
(various) TPT • Light 28: 12 An-2 Colt; 12 An-26 Curl; 4 Yak-40
PBR 4 Stolkraft Codling (VIP)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 13 TRG 43: 10 BT-6; 18 L-39 Albatros
MSO 2 Yurka HELICOPTERS
MSC 4 Sonya ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind
ASW 13: 3 Ka-25 Hormone; 10 Ka-28 Helix A
Asia
MHI 2 Yevgenya
MSR 5 K-8 MRH/Tpt 30 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H
AMPHIBIOUS TPT 48 Heavy 4 Mi-6 Hook Medium 2 KA-32 Helix C; 4
LANDING SHIPS 6 PZL W-3 Sokol Light 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
LSM 3: AD • SAM
1 Polnochny A† (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) SP 12+: 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 12 S-300PMU1 (SA-20
2 Polnochny B† (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) Gargoyle)
LST 3 LST-510-511 (US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) TOWED S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora
LANDING CRAFT 30: 15 LCU; 12 LCM; 3 LCVP (SA-3 Goa)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25: MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1
AKSL 20; AWT 1; AGS 1; AT 1; SPT 2 (floating dock) (SA-16 Gimlet)
GUNS 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm
Naval Infantry ε27,000 MSL
ASM Kh-29T/L (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-31A (AS-17 Krypton);
Air Force 30,000 Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo)
3 air div (each with 3 regt), 1 tpt bde ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
FORCES BY ROLE
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
FIGHTER
7 regt with MiG-21bis Fishbed L
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Paramilitary 40,000 active
2 regt with Su-22M-3/Su-22M-4 Fitter (some ISR Border Defence Corps ε40,000
designated); Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker; Su-30MK2
ASW/SAR Local Forces ε5,000,000 reservists
1 regt with Ka-25 Hormone; Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) Helix A; Incl People’s Self-Defence Force (urban units), People’s
KA-32 Helix C; PZLW-3 Sokol Militia (rural units); comprises of static and mobile cbt
MARITIME PATROL units, log spt and village protection pl; some arty, mor
1 regt with Be-12 Mail and AD guns; acts as reserve.
294 The Military Balance 2012
MD-530F MRH Hel 6 US$19.9m US MD 2011 2011 Option on further 48. Aircraft due for
Helicopters delivery by end of 2011
Australia (AUS)
Bushmaster LFV 293 n.k. AUS Thales 2008 n.k. Deliveries ongoing. Final delivery
Australia June 2012
Bushmaster LFV 101 US$127m AUS Thales 2011 n.k. Includes 31 to replace lost and
Australia damaged veh from previous orders
Hobart-class DDGHM 3 US$8bn AUS/ESP AWD 2007 2014 Aka Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD).
Alliance Second to be delivered 2016, third
2017. Option on fourth. All to be
fitted with Aegis system
Canberra-class LHD 2 A$3.5bn AUS/ESP Navantia 2007 2012 To replace HMAS Tobruk and one
(US$3.5bn) Kanimbla-class amphib tpt. To be
named Canberra and Adelaide. First
vessel launched Feb 2011
B-737 AEW AEW&C ac 6 A$3.6bn US Boeing 2000 2010 First two delivered 2010; 6th ac due
Wedgetail (US$3.4bn) by end 2011
A330-200 Tkr/Tpt ac 5 A$1.5bn Int’l EADS 2004 2011 (KC-30B). First aircraft handed over
(MRTT) (US$1.4 bn) to RAAF Jun 2011, all to be delivered
within 18–24 months
MH-60R ASW Hel 24 US$3bn+ US Sikorsky 2011 2014 Will replace navy’s S-70Bs
Seahawk
NH90 Tpt Hel 46 A$2bn AUS/Int’l NH 2005 2007 Replacement programme. Six for
(US$1.47bn) Industries 2006 navy; 40 for army. AUS variant of
NH90. First four built in Europe;
remainder in AUS. Option for a
further 26. Deliveries ongoing
CH-47F Tpt Hel 7 A$755m US Boeing 2010 2014 All to be operational by 2017. To
Chinook (US$670m) replace CH-47Ds
Bangladesh (BGD)
MBT-2000 MBT 44 Tk 1,201 PRC NORINCO 2011 n.k. Order also includes three ARVs
crore
n.k. PCC 5 US$42m BGD Khulna 2010 2012 First vessel expected ISD Dec
Shipyard 2012; all vessels to be delivered
by Dec 2013. Programme includes
technology agreement with
China Shipbuilding and Offshore
International Corporation
Do-228NG Tpt ac 2 n.k. GER RUAG 2011 2013 -
Aviation
Type-07 (PLZ- 122mm SP n.k. n.k. PRC NORINCO n.k. n.k. 122mm tracked SP howitzer, first
07) arty displayed in public at 2009 parade
Type-09 (PLC- 122mm SP n.k. n.k. PRC NORINCO n.k. n.k. Truck mounted 122mm howitzer.
09) arty Also referred to as SH2
Type-05 (PLZ- 155mm SP n.k. n.k. PRC NORINCO n.k. n.k. 155mm tracked SP howitzer, first
05) arty displayed in public at 2009 parade
Type-03 300mm n.k. n.k. PRC NORINCO n.k. n.k. 8x8 truck mounted MRL. Also
MRL referred to as AR2
HQ-16 SAM n.k. n.k. PRC n.k. n.k. 2011 First delivered to Shenyang MR in
Asia
2011
Type-07 (PGZ- SPAAG n.k. n.k PRC n.k. n.k. n.k. Twin 35mm-armed tracked SPAAG
07)
Jin-class (Type SSBN 5 n.k. PRC n.k. 1985 2008 Commissioning status unclear; two
094) vessels believed to be in service;
three more awaiting commissioning
Shang-class SSN 2 n.k. PRC Bohai 1994 2006 Production status unclear. Second
(Type 093) Shipyard boat commissioned, with third
reportedly laid down in 2003, but
no confirmation of launch. Probable
cancellation of programme
Yuan-class SSK 7 n.k. PRC Wuchang n.k. 2006 Four boats commissioned. Unclear
(Type 039A/B) Shipyard/ status on future hulls
Jiangnan
Shipyard
Admiral CV 1 n.k. PRC Dalian 1998 2012 Refit of ex-RUS Varyag. Sea trials
Kuznetsov-class Shipyard begun Aug 2011; re-entered dry
(Varyag) dock late 2011 for resurfacing;
possible ISD as test platform 2012
Luyang II-class DDGHM 4 n.k. PRC Jiangnan 2002 2004 Third vessel launched 2010, sea
(Type 052C) Shipyard trials begun Oct 2011; expected ISD
2012. Fourth and fifth units under
construction; probable launch in
2012
Jiangkai II-class FFGHM 16 n.k. PRC Huangpu 2005 2008 Tenth and 11th vessels launched
(Type 054A) Shipyard 2011; expected ISD for both 2012
/ Hudong
Shipyard
Houbei-class PCFG 60+ n.k. PRC n.k. n.k. 2004 Production status unclear. Likely
(Type 022) planned total of 85+ boats
Yuzhao-class LPD 3 n.k. PRC Hudong 2006 2008 Second vessel launched 2010; sea
(Type 071) Shipyard trials begun Sep 2011; ISD 2012.
Third launched 2011
Zubr-class LCAC 4 US$315m PRC/UKR PLAN/Morye 2009 n.k. Deal finalised in July 2010; two to be
hovercraft Shipyard constructed in Ukraine, two in China,
with blueprints also transferred to
China
J-10A/S FGA ac n.k. n.k. PRC AVIC (CAC) n.k. 2004 In service with PLAAF and PLANAF.
Improved J-10B variant currently in
flight test
296 The Military Balance 2012
India (IND)
Agni III IRBM n.k. n.k. IND DRDO n.k. 2010 Reportedly entered service mid-
2011. Designed to carry 200–250 KT
warhead with a range of 3,000km
Agni V IRBM n.k. n.k. IND DRDO n.k. 2012 In development. Est 5,000km range
Prithvi II SRBM 54 INR12.13bn IND Bharat 2006 n.k. For air force
Dynamics
Sagarika K-15 SLBM n.k. n.k. IND Bharat 1991 n.k. Test-firing programme under way;
Dynamics est 700km range with 1 tonne
payload
BrahMos Block AShM/ n.k. US$1.73bn IND/RUS Brahmos 2010 n.k. To equip additional two regiments
II (Land Attack) LACM Aerospace
Nirbhay ALCM n.k. n.k. IND DRDO n.k. n.k. In development
T-90S Bhishma MBT 347 US$1.23bn IND/RUS Avadi Heavy 2007 n.k. Delivery in progress
Vehicles
Arjun II MBT 124 n.k. IND ICVRDE 2010 2014 Upgraded variant. Currently in trials
Akash SAM 36 INR12bn IND DRDO 2009 2009 To equip two squadrons. Final
(US$244m) delivery due 2012
Akash SAM 12 bty INR125 bn IND DRDO 2009 2009 To equip three army regiments
(US$2.77bn)
Akash SAM 96 INR42.7bn IND DRDO 2010 n.k. To equip six squadrons. For the IAF
Medium-range SAM/AD 18 units US$1.4bn ISR IAI 2009 2016 For air force. Development and
SAM procurement contract for a medium-
range version of the Barak long-
range naval AD system
Advanced SSBN 5 n.k. IND DRDO n.k. 2012 SSBN development programme. INS
Technology Arihant launched Jul 2009; expected
Vessel (ATV) ISD 2012. Second keel laid mid-2011
Scorpene SSK 6 INR235.62bn FRA/IND DCNS 2005 2015 First delivery delayed until 2015. Cost
increases owing to three-year delay
currently unclear. Option for a further
six SSK
Kiev-class CV 1 US$2.5bn RUS Rosoboron 1999 2012-3 Incl 16 MiG 29 K. To be renamed
Admiral export INS Vikramaditya. Sea trials delayed
Gorshkov by six months until 2012. Expected
to be commissioned late 2012, but
delay to 2013 possible
Project 71/ CV 1 US$730m IND Cochin 2001 2012 To be named Vikrant. Formerly
Indigenous Shipyard known as Air Defence Ship (ADS).
Aircraft Carrier Expected ISD has slipped to 2015.
Second vessel of class anticipated
Project 17 DDGHM 3 INR69bn IND Mazagon 1999 2010 Lead vessel commissioned Apr 2010.
(Shivalik-class) Dockyard INS Satpura commissioned Aug
2011. INS Sahyadri launched 2005;
expected commissioning 2012
Asia 297
Project 28 FFGHM 4 INR70bn IND GRSE 2003 n.k. ASW role. First of class launched Apr
(Kamorta-class) 2010; second launched Oct 2011. ISD
expected from 2012–16
3M14E Klub-S SLCM 8 INR8.44bn RUS Zvezdochka 2006 n.k. For several Sindhughosh-class SSK.
(SS-N-27 (US$182m) Shipyard Four boats modernised by 2009.
Sizzler) Second contract for further four
boats signed Sep 2009. Upgrades
expected by 2015
BrahMos ASCM n.k. US$2bn IND/RUS Brahmos 2006 2010 Built jointly with RUS. For army, navy
Aerospace and air force. Air and submarine
Asia
launch versions undergoing testing
Su-30MKI FGA ac 140 See notes IND/RUS HAL/ 2000 n.k. Delivered in kit form and completed
Rosoboron in IND under licence. Part of a 1996
export US$8.5bn deal for 238 Su-30. Final
delivery due 2015
Su-30MKI FGA ac 40 US$1.6bn RUS Rosoboron 2007 2008 First four delivered early 2008
export
Su-30MKI FGA ac 42 INR150bn RUS HAL/ 2010 n.k. Delivery to be complete by 2016–17.
(US$3.3bn) Rosoboron 40 + 2 accident replacements
export
MiG-29K FGA ac 16 US$600m RUS Rosoboron 2004 2007 Incl four two-seat MiG-29KUB. For
Fulcrum D export INS Vitramaditya (ex CV Gorshkov). As
of mid-2011, 11 aircraft delivered
MiG-29K FGA ac 29 US$1.5bn RUS Rosoboron 2010 n.k. Initial manufacturing work on first
Fulcrum D export airframes under way as of mid-2011
Tejas FGA ac 20 INR20bn IND HAL 2005 2011 Limited series production. To be
US$445m delivered in initial op config. Option
for a further 20 in full op config. Plans
for 140
P-8I Poseidon ASW ac 8 US$2.1bn US Boeing 2009 2013 To replace current Ilyushin Il-38 and
Tupolev Tu-142M. Deliveries due
2013–15. First flight Sep 2011
Il-76TD Phalcon AEW&C ac 3 US$1bn ISR/RUS IAI 2008 2012 Option on 2003 contract exercised.
Two delivered by end 2010; third
aircraft yet to be handed over as of
Nov 2011
EMB-145 AEW&C ac 3 US$210m BRZ Embraer 2008 2014 Part of a INR18bn (US$400m) AEW&C
project. Aircraft to enter service in
2014
C-17A Tpt ac 10 US$4.1bn US Boeing 2011 2013 -
Globemaster III
Hawk Mk132 Trg ac 66 US$1.7bn IND/UK BAE/HAL 2004 2007 24 in fly-away condition and 42 built
Advanced Jet under licence. As of late 2011 HAL
Trainer had delivered 28 licence-built aircraft
Hawk Mk132 Trg ac 57 US$780m IND HAL 2010 n.k. 40 for air force and 17 for navy
Advanced Jet
Trainer
Dhruv MRH Hel 245 n.k. IND HAL 2004 2004 Deliveries ongoing of 159 Dhruvs and
76 Dhruv-WSI
298 The Military Balance 2012
P-8I MPA
Indonesia (IDN)
Satellite Sat 1 n.k. PRC n.k. 2009 n.k. Remote-sensing sat, to monitor IDN
seas
K21 AIFV 22 US$70m ROK Doosan DST 2010 n.k. Delivery to be complete 2014
CN-235 Tpt ac 2 n.k. IDN PT 2008 n.k. Delivery status unclear
Dirgantara
CN-235-220 MP ac 3 US$80m IDN PT 2009 n.k. To be delivered by 2012
MPA Dirgantara
EMB-314 Super Trg ac 8 US$142m BRZ Embraer 2010 2012 To replace OV-10F ac
Tucano
EMB-314 Super Trg ac 8 n.k. BRZ Embraer 2011 2012 Follow-on order
Tucano
T-50 Golden Trg ac 16 εUS$400m ROK KAI 2011 n.k. Delivery to be complete in 2013
Eagle
Bell 412EP MR Hel 20 US$250m IDN PT 2011 n.k. Manufactured under licence from
Dirgantara Bell Helicopter
Japan (JPN)
Theatre Missile BMD n.k. n.k. JPN/US n.k. 1997 n.k. Joint development with US from
Defence 1998. Programme ongoing and incl
System SM-3 and PAC-3 systems
Soryu-class SSK 6 n.k. JPN KHI / MHI 2004 2009 Second batch may be ordered. Third
vessel (Hauryu) delivered May 2011;
fourth vessel (Kenryu) launched Nov
2010; ISD expected 2012
Akizuki-class DDGHM 4 ¥84.8 bn JPN Mitsubishi 2007 2011 To replace the oldest five Hatsuyuki-
(19DD) (US$700m) Heavy class. First vessel launched Oct 2010;
Industries ISD expected 2012
Hirashima-class MSO 2 n.k. JPN Universal n.k. 2012 –
(improved) Shipbuilding
Standard SAM 9 US$458m US Raytheon 2006 – Part of Aegis BMD System for Kongou-
Missile 3 (SM-3) class DDGH
AH-64D Atk Hel 13 n.k. JPN Boeing 2001 2006 Up to six in Longbow config. Original
Apache ambition for 62 abandoned on cost
grounds. Three airframes remain to
complete
AW101 Merlin/ ASW/MCM 14 n.k. ITA/JPN/UK Agusta- 2003 2006 For JMSDF to replace MH-53E and
MCH-101 Hel Westland/ S-61 hel under MCH-X programme.
KHI Deliveries ongoing
Enstrom 480B Trg Hel 30 n.k. US Enstrom 2010 2010 Delivery to be complete by 2014. For
Helicopter JGSDF
Corporation
Asia 299
K2 MBT up to 400 n.k. ROK Hyundai 2007 2013 Production delayed due to problems
Rotem with engine and transmission. Due to
enter operational testing Mar 2012
K21 AIFV ε500 US$3.5m per ROK Doosan 2008 2009 Delivery resumed after accident
unit Infracore investigation
M-SAM (Multi- SAM n.k. n.k. ROK n.k. 1998 2009 In development. To replace current
function army HAWK SAMs
Surface to Air
Missile)
KSS-II (Type SSK 6 εUS$3bn ROK DSME 2008 2014 A second batch of six KSS-II (with
Asia
214) AIP); three keels laid down. Expected
ISD of first boat 2014
KSS-III SSK 3 εUS$800m ROK n.k. 2006 2015 Construction due to start 2012.
Further three or six SSK to follow in
a second phase. To replace Chang
Bogo-class (Type 209) KSS-I SSK
Sejong CGHM 3 n.k. ROK DSME 2002 2008 Two vessels commissioned; third
Daewang-class launched Mar 2011. Final delivery
KDX-3 due 2012. Three additional vessels
may be ordered
Ulsan-1-class FFGHM 6 KRW1.7bn ROK Hyundai 2006 2015 To replace current lsan-class FFG.
FFX (US$1.8bn) Heavy First vessel (Incheon) launched May
Industries 2011. ISD by 2015. Up to 15 vessels
may be built
Gumdoksuri- FSG 9 n.k. ROK Hyundai 2003 2008 Further batches considered for total
class (PKX) Heavy of 20. Seven hulls launched; three
Industries/ commissioned
STX
Shipbuilding
Haeseong (Sea ASCM 100 KRW270m ROK n.k. 2006 2010 Delivery status unclear
Star – ASM/ (US$294m)
SSM-700K)
F-15K Eagle FGA ac 20/21 US$2.2bn US Boeing 2008 2010 Exercised option of the 2002
(KRW2.3trn) contract. Final delivery due 2012
B-737-700 AEW&C ac 4 US$1.7bn US Boeing 2006 2011 E-X programme. First ac delivered
AEW&C (E-737) Sep 2011; remaining three due 2012
CN-235-110 MP ac 4 INR1trn IDN PT 2008 2010 For coast guard. Final delivery due
MPA (US$91m) Dirgantara 2011
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 4 εUS$500m US Lockheed 2011 2014 -
Hercules Martin
Malaysia (MYS)
Pars APC (W) 257 US$559m MYS/TUR/ FNSS 2010 2012 Letter of intent signed Apr 2010
UK/US
A400M Tpt ac 4 MYR907m Int EADS 2006 2013 In development. First delivery
(US$246m) (Airbus) possible late 2014
EC 725 Cougar Tpt Hel 12 MYR1.6bn FRA Eurocopter 2010 2012 Initial contract scrapped Oct 2008.
(US$500m) Contract reinstated Apr 2010. Eight
for air force, four for army. To be
delivered 2012–13
300 The Military Balance 2012
Pakistan (PAK)
Hatf 8 (Raad) ALCM n.k. n.k. PAK n.k. n.k. n.k. In development. Successfully test
fired
Al Khalid (MBT MBT 460 n.k. PAK Heavy 1999 2001 Delivery status uncertain
2000) Industries
Taxila
Spada 2000 AD system 10 €415m ITA MBDA 2007 2009 Delivery in progress. Final delivery
due 2013
Zulfiquar-class FFGHM 4 See notes PAK/PRC Hudong- 2005 2009 Improved version of Jiangwei II FF.
(F-22P) Zhonghua Fourth ship to be built at Karachi.
Shipyard Deal worth εUS$750m, incl six Z-9EC
hels. Three vessels in service; final
delivery due 2013
Azmat-class FSG 2 n.k. PAK/PRC Xinggang 2010 2012 First vessel built in PRC and launched
Shipyard / Sep 2011; ISD 2012. Second to be
KS&EW built in PAK
JF-17 (FC-1) FGA ac 150–200 n.k. PAK/PRC PAC 2006 2008 Contract signed for 42 production ac
in early 2009
F-16 Block 15 FGA ac 42 US$75m TUR TAI 2009 2014 Upgrade to Block 40 standard. Initial
Fighting Falcon Upgrade ac upgraded in TUR; remainder to be
upgraded in PAK.
P-3C Orion ASW ac 8 US$970m US n.k. 2004 2007 Ex-US stock. Final delivery due 2011.
One for spares – two destroyed in
terrorist attack
Saab 2000 AEW&C ac 4 SEK8.3bn SWE SAAB 2006 2009 Plus one tpt ac for trg. Order reduced
Erieye (US$1.05bn) from six ac. Second ac delivered Apr
2010
ZDK-03 (KJ- AEW&C ac 4 n.k. PAK/PRC n.k. 2008 2011 First ac delivered
200)
Il-78 Midas Tkr/Tpt ac 4 n.k. UKR n.k. 2008 2010 Last aircraft reportedly due Nov 2011
Philippines (PHL)
SF-260F/PAF Trg ac 18 US$13.1m ITA Alenia 2008 2010 Contract renegotiated. First eight
Aermacchi delivered 2010. Final delivery due
2012
W-3 Sokol Tpt Hel 8 PHP2.8bn POL Agusta 2010 2011 First four now due for delivery in
(US$59.8m) Westland 2011; remainder to be delivered 2012
(PZL
Świdnik)
Tagbanua-class LCU 1 PHP189.9m PHL 2008 2011 Launched in Oct 2011; expected ISD
2012
Singapore (SGP)
Archer-class SSK 2 US$127m SWE Kockums 2005 2011 Archer delivered Sep 2011;
Swordsman to follow in 2012
Asia 301
M-346 Trg ac 12 SGD543m ITA/SGP ST Aerospace 2010 2012 To be based at Cazaux in France.
(US$411m) Delivery to begin in 2012
MiG-29 FGA ac 5 US$75m RUS Rosoboron 2008 n.k. Four MiG-29SM and one MiG-29UB
Fulcrum export
MA60 Tpt ac 4 n.k. PRC AVIC 2010 2010 First two to be delivered in 2010;
remainder in 2011
Asia
upgraded from PAC-2 to PAC-3
Patriot PAC-3 AD n.k. US$154m US Raytheon 2009 n.k. Upgrade from config 2 to config 3
upgrade kits Upgrade
P-3C Orion ASW ac 12 US$1.3bn US Lockheed 2010 2013 Refurbished by Lockheed Martin
Martin
E-2C Hawkeye AEW ac 6 US$154m US Northrop 2009 n.k. Upgrade from Group II config to
Upgrade Grumman Hawkeye 2000 (H2K) export config. To
be completed by 2013
AH-64D Block Atk Hel 30 US$2.5bn US Boeing 2010 2014 –
III Apache
Longbow
UH-60M Tpt Hel 60 US$3.1bn US Sikorsky 2010 n.k. FMS
Blackhawk
AGM-84L AShM 60 US$89m US Boeing 2007 2009 For F-16. Delivery under way
Harpoon
Block II
Hsiung Feng IIE AShM n.k. n.k. ROC n.k. 2005 n.k. In production
Thailand (THA)
T-84 Oplot MBT 49 US$241m UKR KMP 2011 2013 -
BTR-3E AIFV 121 US$140m UKR KMDB 2011 n.k. -
BTR-3E1 8×8 APC (W) 96 THB4bn UKR ADCOM 2007 n.k. Amphib APC. Order on hold since
(US$134m) Oct 2007. First 14 delivered 2010
WMZ 551 APC (W) 97 US$51.3m PRC NORINCO 2005 n.k. Delivery date unknown
OPV PSO 1 n.k. THA Bangkok 2009 2012 Built to BAE design
Dock
141m landing LPD 1 THB5bn SGP ST Marine 2008 2012 Contract value incl two 23m landing
platform dock (US$144m) craft mechanised and two 13m
landing craft vehicle and personnel
Gripen C/D FGA ac 6 See notes SWE SAAB 2010 2013 THB14.8bn (US$415.5m) incl one
340 Erieye
Saab 340 Erieye AEW ac 1 See notes SWE SAAB 2010 n.k. THB14.8bn (US$415.5m) incl six
Gripen
Vietnam (VNM)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:18 13 March 2012
have behaved has depended on particular national In Yemen and Syria, however, fighting continued
situations (see p. 9 and Strategic Survey 2011, pp. at least into November. A September 2011 report
43–76). In some cases, such as Tunisia and Egypt, the by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
armed forces distanced themselves from the regime; Human Rights (OHCHR) noted that ‘the Yemeni
in others, such as Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and, for a Government had lost effective control of parts of the
time, Libya (see p. 9), where relatives of the rulers country and within the major cities, where armed
were entrusted with command responsibilities, opponents appeared to have de-facto control’.
security forces remained more cohesive or fought Demonstrations calling for Saleh’s departure started
back. In these cases, dependable, elite and generally in February and, despite initial concessions, the
well-resourced units carried much of the repressive president organised counter demonstrations and
burden. ordered a crackdown. Violence spread outside the
Middle East
Tensions within regional armed forces have at
times led to fractures. In Libya, the regular military force was used against demonstrators. Further,
quickly split, with significant numbers joining rebel fighters from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
forces. In Syria, the military has remained largely (AQAP) ‘took advantage of the distraction of Saleh’s
cohesive, though there have been some defections security forces to temporarily seize the town of
to protesters’ ranks. In Yemen, General Ali Muhsin Zinjibar and advance through the region of Abyan’.
al-Ahmar, commander of the 1st Armoured Division Saleh’s stalling, and refusal to sign the power-
and former confidant of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, transfer deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation
defected in March and ordered his troops to protect Council (GCC), led tribal fighters to declare support
crowds protesting against Saleh’s rule. This led to an for the opposition; clashes with forces loyal to the
armed stand-off with loyalist units; defections from president worsened across the country and, after an
military units continued in late 2011. In other cases, attack on his palace in June, a wounded Saleh left for
however, regimes have improved military pay and Saudi Arabia to seek medical treatment, though he
conditions in a bid to forestall discontent among the returned in late September.
armed forces, and ensure support. The OHCHR report said that the government
In the three cases where there was some frac- ‘resorted to using all the armed units at its disposal,
turing of the military, fighting proved persistent: in from the army to intelligence and law enforcement
the Libyan case this erupted into civil war. This war agencies, in responding to demonstrations or in
involved external military action in the wake of UN dealing with armed efforts to bring about regime
Security Council Resolution 1973 (see p. 12). UN change. The Yemeni air force was involved in clashes
member states were authorised to ‘take all necessary with armed groups around Sana’a and Abyan. In
measures … to protect civilians and civilian popu- addition, the Yemeni navy reportedly supported
lated areas under threat of attack’. After seven months ground troops fighting in Abyan, by shelling from the
of bitter fighting, anti-Gadhafi forces – by then the sea.’ The elite Republican Guard, concentrated near
Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC) main towns, reportedly engaged in crowd control
was internationally recognised as the Libyan admin- along with other army units. The situation in Yemen
istration – defeated the former dictator’s remaining is complicated by the pre-existing tensions between
304 The Military Balance 2012
north and south, as well as tribal dynamics: key oppo- Strategic Comment noted increasing defections to the
nents of Saleh lead the Hashid tribal confederation, ‘Free Syrian Army’ (FSA), based across the border in
while other tribes remain loyal to the government. Turkey, headed by former Syrian army officers and
Notwithstanding Saleh’s decision, in late November, intent on overthrowing the regime. Estimates of FSA
to transfer power after signing the GCC-brokered strength varied between hundreds and, according
deal, instability persisted. Should fighting continue, to the FSA’s General Riadh Asaad, ‘10,000’. As of
and the Yemeni security forces fracture further, November, demonstrations and counter-demonstra-
the risk of this strategically significant country tions, and strikes, were occurring in some cities; and
descending once more into civil war increases; this low-level armed clashes continued.
will trouble regional as well as international states, Though there has been considerable international
notably Saudi Arabia, nearly two years on from its pressure, both diplomatic and in terms of personal
military actions against Houthi forces straddling the sanctions on regime officials, the government has not
Saudi–Yemeni border. relented in its tough response to protests. Unlike in
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Meanwhile, Yemen remains a source of interna- the Libyan case, there was little appetite for interna-
tional concern due to the presence of AQAP fighters. tional involvement and in October the UN Security
The preoccupation of Yemeni security forces with Council was unable to agree a resolution condemning
the political dispute – and the sharpened focus on the actions of the regime. Regional responses tough-
these issues of loyal units such as the US-equipped ened in November, with the Arab League announcing
special-forces units – has granted AQAP greater sanctions on Syria and reports that, while it had no
freedom of movement. It has not, thus far, led to plans to intervene in Syria, Turkey was ‘ready for any
a halt in US-led counter-terrorist actions: another scenario’.
Predator strike on a Yemen-based target killed, in Egypt’s Supreme Council for the Armed Forces
late September, the Islamist ideologue and terrorist (SCAF), headed by Defence Minister Field Marshal
suspect Anwar al-Awlaki. Washington faces a Mohammed Tantawi, assumed power in February
dilemma: on the one hand it has criticised Sana’a’s after the departure of former President Hosni
use of force and called both for Saleh to leave and Mubarak (see Strategic Survey 2011, pp. 63–4.) SCAF
for an orderly transition of power in Yemen. On the is overseeing the transition towards elections and,
other hand, further instability after Saleh’s depar- while the armed forces have generally proved to be
ture could increase AQAP’s freedom of action and a steadying hand, their actions have been governed
could make it more problematic for Washington by a desire to preserve military power and privileges.
to obtain accurate information of use for counter- After further demonstrations in April and May, the
terrorism purposes. military did address some of the demonstrators’
In Syria, as detailed in Strategic Survey 2011 (pp. grievances, but it also arrested activists and jour-
88–91), the heavy-handed response to anti-regime nalists ‘deemed to be endangering the transition or
sloganeering in the southern city of Deraa (when attacking the military’. There is little appetite for the
security forces arrested several children and killed armed forces to change strategic orientation. Cairo
three protesters) inflamed the city. Popular resis- still receives $1.3bn in US military aid, and has long
tance to security forces emerged, and assets and been upgrading its inventories with US systems.
symbols of the regime were destroyed. By mid-April, Indeed, a further notification of a foreign military
anti-regime demonstrations started in Baniyas, Deir sale to Egypt, of 125 Abrams tank kits, was made by
el-Zour, Hama, Homs, Lattaqiyah and in the Kurdish the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency in July.
northwest. Military units loyal to the regime have There is little incentive for the military to endanger its
been heavily mobilised, including elite troops from ability to continue this process, or endanger support
the 4th Armoured Division – commanded by Maher and maintenance agreements. But, as noted on p.
al-Assad, the president’s brother – the Republican 11, it is conceivable that Cairo might widen its list of
Guard and the Alawite shabbiha militia (see essay, suppliers in some capability areas.
p. 9). Conventional army units considered less reli- The fall of established rulers and continuing
able were kept away from the centres of dissent, but upheaval in the region has unnerved Israeli secu-
there were a growing number of defections, mostly rity planners. The persistent disturbances and secu-
from junior officers and soldiers, raising questions rity crackdown in Syria, and the impact any change
about the army’s cohesiveness. An October 2011 IISS of direction in Damascus could have on Lebanese
Middle East and North Africa 305
stability, raises concerns in Israel over the future around critical infrastructure. Kuwait, after its parlia-
activities of Hizbullah, now a part of the Beirut ment had vetoed ground troops, sent a naval force
government and which, Israel alleges, continues to to Bahrain’s waters. Bahrain’s military sealed off
build its weapons holdings in villages south of the protest sites, established military checkpoints and
Litani River. In the south, the long-established ‘cold enforced a curfew. Military authorities then took
peace’ with Egypt is also under increased scrutiny measures designed to crush the political opposition.
and, while conflict there remains unlikely, there will Pearl roundabout was bulldozed, the largest hospital
be renewed focus on the southern flank. At the very was placed under military control and a number of
least, Israel might engage in contingency planning human-rights violations took place, including the
to contain possible threats from Sinai and knock-on destruction of Shia mosques. The Peninsula Shield
effects in Gaza. force was still deployed as of November (see Strategic
Indeed, the continued intermittent firing of rockets Survey 2011, pp. 76–9). However, for many Gulf armed
from Gaza remains a concern for Israel and has driven forces and international military forces stationed in
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
some recent capability additions. The Iron Dome the region the effects of the Arab Awakening merely
short-range anti-missile system was used operation- added a new layer of security preoccupations to those
ally for the first time in April, and by August three already motivating military planners.
batteries had been deployed in Ashdod, Ashkelon
and Beersheba. Defence Minister Ehud Barak has Middle East AND North Africa
announced a plan for a fourth battery by the end of Defence Economics
2011. The Trophy active defence system for armoured
vehicles was also deployed on vehicles near the Gaza The region continued to experience reasonably robust
border. Iran, and its ballistic-missile and nuclear economic growth, largely owing to high global oil
programmes, remains another concern. In the field prices. Despite relatively stable levels for most of 2010
of ballistic-missile defence, Arrow 3 continues under ($75–$85 per barrel), oil prices rose dramatically from
Table 23 Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Top 10 and Regional Break-
down1 (US$bn)
2010 % of Regional Total 2011 Estimate % of Regional Total Real % Change2
Saudi Arabia 45.17 38.11% 46.18 36.18% –3.1%
Israel 17.17 14.49% 18.25 14.30% –2.8%
Iran* 10.56 8.91% 11.96 9.37% –3.4%
UAE 8.65 7.29% 9.32 7.30% 5.1%
Algeria 5.59 4.72% 8.61 6.74% 44.0%
Egypt 5.43 4.58% 5.53 4.33% –3.2%
Iraq 4.19 3.53% 4.79 3.75% 8.9%
Oman 4.19 3.53% 4.29 3.36% –1.6%
Kuwait 3.91 3.30% 4.05 3.17% –6.2%
Qatar 3.12 2.63% 3.45 2.71% 8.2%
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
7 6.48
6.21
5.67 5.86
6 5.49 5.29 5.06 5.09 5.01
4.62
5
% of GDP
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Figure 11 Middle East and North Africa Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP
The GCC, cooperative defence and regard to interoperability, integration, unified logis-
Iran tics, joint training and sustainment, or collective
combat effectiveness. There are to date no projects that
The GCC has been successful in promoting greater enable GCC forces to deploy rapidly and coherently
diplomatic, economic and cultural cooperation to meet an external military threat. And despite two
amongst its members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, decades of discussions and external encouragement,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) since it the GCC has yet to establish a regional air-defence
Jeddah, there were calls for more joint alignment of approached. With this in mind, the US Iraq Training
GCC defence capabilities, such as coordinated early- and Advisory Mission’s goal was to train and mentor
warning and missile-defence structures. While these the Iraqi security forces in the hope that they could
advanced systems, particularly the air and missile reach what the US government termed the ‘minimum
defences, are operated individually by each of the essential capability’ standards needed to replace US
Gulf states, they are electronically linked to a US infor- forces by 2012.
mation and operations ‘hub’. The US-coordinated By April 2011, it was clear that the US government
system, while operationally effective at protecting was keen to renegotiate the SOFA to allow between
against limited strikes on any one sector within the 10,000 and 20,000 American troops to remain past the
Gulf, is far from optimised and remains vulnerable original deadline. Both the then-Secretary of Defense
to concentrated Iranian fire against a single sector or Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
country. The US, and its private defence contractors, Admiral Mike Mullen visited Baghdad in an attempt
will therefore likely push hard to create a region- to persuade the Iraqi government to allow the troops
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
wide, interconnected air- and missile-defence system to stay, secure legal protection for American soldiers
that pools all space- and ground-based sensor data from Iraqi law, and gain approval from the Iraqi parlia-
collected within the region to all parties to provide an ment. In late May, Gates estimated that the US would
enhanced and unified threat picture and notification need a minimum of 8,000 soldiers in the country to
of attack. Further, with no compromise of sovereignty, meet its ongoing commitments to training Iraqi forces.
operational protocols and weapon-system algorithms By October 2011, however, it was apparent that
could be negotiated in advance to commit intercep- the US would not get an extension to the SOFA on
tors in one country to launch at incoming threats to terms that would allow them to retain several thou-
a neighbour, increasing the number of interceptors sand troops in Iraq. In private, key Iraqi politicians
available at any given moment. Such action would acknowledged that the Iraqi armed forces, particu-
only be taken if the target country had consented in larly the Iraqi air force, were still heavily dependent
advance to the operational protocol automatically on US support for key functions. In public, however,
authorising such action. With cooperative air and Iraqi opinion was against any renegotiation. Muqtada
missile defence as a precedent, greater GCC defence al-Sadr’s party mobilised popular sentiment in oppo-
cohesion and collective action could be fostered over sition to a continuing US presence, staging demon-
the long term strations and promising to use violence if necessary
to drive the remaining American troops from Iraq.
Iraq: the US military departs In his public statements, Maliki attempted to balance
the needs of the Iraqi military with the political reality
US President Barack Obama announced on 21 of Iraqi opinion. In an interview he gave to the Wall
October 2011 that ‘the rest of our troops in Iraq will Street Journal at the end of 2010, he appeared to leave
come home by the end of the year. After nearly little room for treaty revision, stating: ‘I do not care
nine years, America’s war in Iraq will be over.’ This about what’s being said. I care about what’s on paper
announcement came after a failure to agree terms and what has been agreed to. The withdrawal of
to continue a US military presence in Iraq, and ‘the forces agreement expires on December 31, 2011. The
determination of the Iraqi people to forge their own last American soldier will leave Iraq.’ Yet he also left
future’ as discussed between Obama and Iraqi Prime open the possibility of a new agreement if the Iraqi
Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The timetable for US troop parliament agreed to it. Given that the Sadrists are the
withdrawal, set in place by the Status of Forces largest party in parliament and only the Kurdistan
Agreement (SOFA) signed in 2008, had been a key Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
discussion point between the US and Iraq throughout were expressly backing a new agreement, enacting
2011 as well as the major factor shaping the Iraqi secu- legislation before the deadline was always highly
rity forces since August 2010. Under the SOFA, all US unlikely.
forces were to leave the country by 31 December 2011. This means that from 2012, the US State
From August 2010 onwards, the working assump- Department will have to shoulder the responsibility
tion of American ground commanders was that the for protecting its own diplomats and overseeing the
US deployment would be reduced to the ‘tens or low continued training of the Iraqi security forces. To do
hundreds’ as the final deadline of 31 December 2011 this the American Embassy has hired 5,000 private
Middle East and North Africa 309
security contractors. It will also take over a substan- MoD budget grew annually by 28% between 2005
tial proportion of the base adjacent to Baghdad and 2009, compared to an average increase of 45%
International Airport and open consulates in both annually for the MoI. The size, speed and scale of
the north and south of the country. The Embassy will the Iraqi armed forces’ expansion since 2005 raises
also house an Office of Security Cooperation with 157 two key questions. Firstly, against a background of
military personnel to manage the US government’s Iraq’s recent civil war, can a force built so quickly
relations with Iraq’s armed forces and their purchase by an external actor function coherently once that
of new weaponry. actor (the US) ends its military presence at the end
of 2011? If not, the domestic stability of the country
Iraqi security capacity and capabilities could again be in doubt. Secondly, and perhaps of
It will now be up to the Iraqi security forces to guar- greater importance in the long term, given Iraq’s
antee order across the country and protect Iraq’s history of military-led regime change, can such
borders. They have had the lead in these tasks since armed forces be kept out of politics, subservient to
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
the US withdrew all its combat forces in August 2010. the civilian arm of government and ultimately to the
As of June 2011, the Iraqi security forces employed Iraqi electorate?
806,600 people, spread between the MoD, the The speed with which the Iraqi army was recon-
Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Prime Minister’s stituted after 2003 meant that up to 70% of old,
Counter-Terrorism Force. The fact that these forces pre-regime-change officers were eventually reinte-
are primarily designed to impose order on Iraq’s own grated into the new officer corps. To counter this,
population, not protect the country from external Iraq’s ruling elite inserted so-called dimaj officers
aggression, is indicated by their size: the MoI has into senior military ranks. These political appoint-
double the staff of the MoD. The latter employs a total ments were either militia leaders or had no mili-
of 271,400 personnel, spread between the Iraqi army tary experience at all. They owe their allegiance and
(193,421), the air force (5,053) and subsidiary organisa- appointment to the sectarian political parties who
Middle East
tions. The Ministry of Interior employs 531,000. The
Iraqi police has 302,000 on its payroll, the Facilities tie the military to the parties rather than the state.
Protection Service 95,000, Border Enforcement 60,000, The result is a struggle within the security forces
Iraqi Federal Police 44,000 and Oil Police 30,000. In between those who gained their experience under
2010, the total number of people employed by the the old regime and those who were inserted into the
security forces equalled 8% of the Iraqi workforce, or senior ranks of the military by those who dominate
12% of the total population of adult males. the new government.
Rebuilding the security forces has played a domi- Some 75–80% of the army’s rank and file are
nant role in Iraqi government policy since 2003: the Shi’ites. This is comparable to the pre-regime-change
Iraq’s F-16 deal 50/52s along with weapons and support was made in
A decade of stagnation, with two wars at either side, September 2011. The Iraqi government had delayed
destroyed Iraq’s air force. The pull-out of US combat the purchase in early 2011, instead prioritising social
forces at the end of 2011 rendered further rebuilding of expenditure. Iraq had first considered ordering 36 aircraft,
a national air capability that much more desirable. US subsequently reduced to 24, and then further cut to the
mentors and others have been training and supporting initial procurement number of 18. Training and support is
the embryonic Iraqi air force, which at least initially projected to extend over 15 years. US Defense Secretary
constituted a mix of junior pilots and a scattering of older Leon Panetta said in October 2011 that the US would
aircrew, some with thousands of hours of flight time on ‘work with [Iraq] to try to ensure they have the capability
Soviet-era aircraft types. and training … to use [them] to protect their own air
Initially a mix of light utility and rotary-wing aircraft, space’. It would be logical to assume that training and
the air force now also operates medium transport aircraft maintenance aspects of the deal would lead to a USAF
and is acquiring a multi-role fighter in the shape of the presence in some capacity. However, the announcement
Lockheed Martin F-16; there is currently no indigenous that US forces were to leave Iraq at the end of December
capability to police and defend national airspace. 2011 leaves uncertain the precise level of any continuing
The first payment on a package of 18 F-16C Block US military support in-country.
310 The Military Balance 2012
figure. The senior ranks of the army are more reli- The politicisation of the military has extended well
giously and ethnically balanced, with divisional beyond the national police, special forces and intelli-
commanders coming from the three major ethnic gence services. From 2006 onwards, Maliki has used
and religious communities. The ethnic diversity of a number of tactics to tighten his personal grip over
specific army divisions and the influence of political Iraq’s armed forces. First he used the Office of the
parties on them is, to a large extent, dependent upon Commander in Chief to control overall security policy,
whether they were recruited locally or have had their undermining the independent chains of command
rank and file diluted. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 15th and 16th within both the MoI and MoD. Maliki then forced
divisions of the army have high numbers of Kurdish a number of technocratic senior commanders aside,
soldiers and are considered to be heavily influenced appointing individuals close to him into positions
by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic of influence in both ministries. These appointments
Union of Kurdistan. were labelled ‘temporary’ to avoid parliamentary
The MoI has acquired responsibility not only for oversight. Finally, Maliki set up nine joint-operation
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
day-to-day law and order but also for paramilitary commands. Each of them consolidates, under one
counter-insurgency. The risks involved in this expan- commanding officer, the management of all the secu-
sion of its role are evident in Iraq’s recent history. rity services operating in one of the nine provinces
Between 2005 and 2006, MoI forces were a major (out of 18) considered unstable. The officers, in turn,
factor in driving Iraq into civil war. The Ministry’s are appointed and managed from a central office in
Special Police Commandos (later renamed the Federal Baghdad under Maliki’s control. Through the use of
Police) were alleged to have acted as a sectarian death the joint-operation commands, Maliki has bypassed
squad, frequently resorting to extra-judicial execu- the security ministers and their senior commanders,
tion and torture. After 2007, the Federal Police was securing control over Iraq’s armed forces at the oper-
purged of its most egregious sectarian elements ational level. While this arrangement has made a mili-
when 60,000 officers were dismissed and the force tary coup in Iraq highly unlikely, it has also brought
was greatly expanded and further restructured. But incoherence to the chain of command, allowed
despite extensive vetting, restructuring and sustained the promotion of political cronies over talented
expansion, the force is still plagued by corruption and commanders and detracted from the military’s esprit
sectarianism. de corps.
The politicisation of Iraq’s security forces is most Beyond political interference, a broad set of prob-
evident in the Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Force. lems continue to plague Iraq’s army and need to be
Over 6,000-strong, it is organised into two brigades addressed for it to fulfil its new responsibilities. The
and is considered to be one of the best trained in the first involves weaknesses in management, logistics
Middle East. It operates its own detention centres and and strategic planning. The unwillingness of senior
intelligence-gathering operations and has surveil- military officials to delegate responsibility down the
lance cells in every governorate. Its politicisation chain of command also stifles innovation and inde-
began in April 2007, when managerial responsibility pendent decision-making at junior level. Overall,
was transferred from US Special Forces, which estab- in spite of ongoing inefficiencies and politicisation,
lished the force, to the Iraqi government. The prime Iraq’s security forces will probably be able to impose
minister set up a ministerial body, the Counter- a rough order on the country from 2012 onwards.
Terrorism Bureau, to control it, effectively removing They will not, however, be able to defend the coun-
the force from the oversight of parliament or the try’s borders or air space.
control of either MoI or the MoD. Since then, the In 2011, Iraq’s defence procurements reached
force has become known as the Fedayeen al-Maliki, new levels. Though acquisitions of tanks and other
a reference to its reputation as the prime minister’s armoured vehicles have taken place in recent years,
tool for covert action against his rivals as well as an the long-mooted deal for F-16 fighters from the US (see
ironic comparison to Saddam Hussein’s militia. Iraq’s box, page 309) has started to proceed. In September,
intelligence services have been similarly politicised. Iraq transferred the first funds for 18 Block 50/52 aircraft
Maliki’s personal control over them has directly and the sale is valued – according to the Pentagon – at
hampered their ability to collect and analyse intelli- around $3bn. Earlier in the year, it was reported that
gence professionally and objectively without close US Iraq had delayed the deal and diverted some $900m of
supervision. funding to its national food-ration programme.
Middle East and North Africa 311
Determining these requirements is problematic. Abdullah and his branch of the royal family, and the
Riyadh does not publish defence and security poli- latter to the late Crown Prince Sultan (the king’s half-
cies and doctrines, and even private discussions brother) who was defence and aviation minister from
with Saudi officials rarely go into more detail than 1982 until his death in October 2011.
‘the security of the nation and its borders, and of Coordination and cooperation between the
the Two Holy Places’ (Mecca and Medina). The regular armed forces remains poor, and deci-
main factors threatening that security seem clear sion-making at the highest levels is hampered by
to outside analysts: they include indigenous and inter-service competition as well as the age and
regional terrorist groups; internal unrest; instability infirmity of senior ministers. The king himself has
within neighbours, particularly Iraq and Yemen; become much more closely involved in issues hith-
threats to oil and gas installations and export routes; erto the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence
Riyadh’s preference for diplomacy over force is The preference has historically been to procure
illustrated by its approach to other regional players. equipment through government-to-government
Even in the case of Iran, dialogue has, at least in public, arrangements. Most procurement from the US has
been the preferred course. For many years Saudi been carried out using Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Arabia pursued quiet diplomacy in relations with procedures; and both the SBDCP and the Salam
Syria, notwithstanding the latter’s close alliance with project consist of formal arrangements between
Iran; and the king’s public criticism in mid-2011 of the the Saudi Arabian and UK governments, with BAE
attempts by Damascus to suppress its own internal Systems being the nominated prime contractor
opposition indicates Riyadh’s alarm and frustration. for the delivery of all systems included within the
programmes. For many years, government policy has
Deployments required a commitment by suppliers to maximise the
Contingents of the Land Forces were deployed use of Saudi Arabian companies to support and main-
during the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, tain, and increasingly to manufacture or assemble,
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
but played no combat role at least in the last two. the equipment procured. For instance, the Salam deal
Elements of all forces, including the National Guard, specified that the final 48 Typhoon aircraft out of the 72
took part in Coalition operations during the 1991 ordered should be assembled in Saudi Arabia. (This
Gulf War to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait (and commitment may now not be met, mainly as a conse-
from Khafji in the Eastern Province). More recently, quence of Riyadh’s failure to agree on a location for
the RSLF and RSAF took part in operations against final assembly.) It has also been long-standing policy
Houthi militias straddling the Yemeni–Saudi border to require as many posts as possible within compa-
in 2009–10 and, in March 2011, units of the National nies operating in the kingdom to be filled by Saudis:
Guard were deployed to Bahrain after the Bahraini about half of BAE Systems’ 4,000 or so employees
government requested support from the GCC in based in Saudi Arabia are now Saudi nationals.
suppressing Bahrain’s protest movement. This obligation has in the past made it necessary for
companies to invest in their own technical training
Partnerships and procurements programmes, both within Saudi Arabia and else-
The long-standing partnerships with key allies – where, to make up for the shortfall of personnel with
notably the US, but also the UK – allow Saudi Arabia relevant skills emerging from the Saudi educational
to maintain the capabilities of its armed forces system. It remains to be seen whether recent substan-
and equipment. Most of the Land Force’s inven- tial investments by Riyadh in domestic education and
tory is American, and most air-force equipment has training programmes will improve the supply of suit-
been procured from the US and UK. Much atten- ably qualified individuals.
tion has been paid to the procurement from the US
of an additional 84 F-15SA aircraft, together with Capability
supporting equipment, munitions and upgrades to The Saudi armed forces continue to rely to a consider-
existing aircraft, in a package with a lifetime value able extent on overseas partners for training and other
of some $60bn. However, the Saudi–British Defence support. The US maintains a substantial Military
Cooperation Programme (SBDCP), which supplanted Training Mission. This was created under the 1951
the former Al Yamamah project in 2006 to main- Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and is funded
tain and upgrade the equipment procured under through the FMS Security Assistance Program to
that project, and the Salam project for the procure- ‘train, advise and assist the Saudi Arabian Armed
ment and support of Typhoon aircraft, will together Forces’. Its six divisions interact with all the main
be worth about as much over the lifetimes of those Saudi armed services except the National Guard, for
programmes. Other significant suppliers include which there is a separate US Program Management
France, which has provided a number of naval Office. The UK also maintains a liaison mission to the
vessels and aircraft, as well as air-defence equipment. SANG and a small Royal Navy liaison team at the
Nevertheless the US remains the primary supplier, King Faisal Naval Academy; in addition, one of the
evidenced by other substantial deals in recent years, tasks of the UK MoD Saudi Arabian Projects Team
including the October 2010 $25.6bn deal for a range is to provide advice and assistance to the RSNF and
of helicopters (including AH-64D and AH-6i), muni- RSAF. The Saudi armed forces also place importance
tions and support assets for the SANG. on access to overseas training courses, ranging from
Middle East and North Africa 313
officer training to higher command and staff courses ministry, although it is still not clear whether lessons
to specific qualifications such as fast-jet flying. If have been learned. Given the scale and compara-
financial considerations and capacity limitations lead tive lack of sophistication of the Houthis, the ability
Western military training establishments to reduce the of the Saudi Arabian armed forces to withstand on
number of places available to international students, their own a determined attack by a well-armed and
it is possible that the Saudi armed forces will seek to -trained enemy must remain in some doubt. And the
place their students elsewhere. It is unlikely that their will and resources needed to resolve that doubt are
own military schools will be capable of fully meeting unlikely to be forthcoming as long as the Saudi leader-
the requirement. ship continues to be compromised by slow decision-
The three main regular forces increasingly partic- making, family rivalry, poor health and uncertainty
ipate in exercises with other nations, either bilater- about the succession.
ally or multilaterally, which allows some insight into
their professional military capabilities. All three have Defence economics
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
held recent exercises with their counterparts in both Saudi Arabia recovered swiftly from the global finan-
India and Pakistan. The army has exercised with cial crisis, with growth of 0.1% in 2009 accelerating
Egyptian and US forces, often with units of the US to 4% in 2010, buoyed by domestic fiscal expan-
National Guard. The navy frequently takes part in sion as well as by higher oil prices stemming from
passage exercises with US, French and UK forces, as improving global demand. The upwards trajectory
well as more complex exercises with deployed task in oil prices continued into 2011, as the shutdown in
groups. In June 2011, the Royal Navy’s Cougar task Libyan production and heightened uncertainty over
group conducted a series of exercises (Red Alligator) the political turmoil across the region caused prices
with the RSNF, ranging from maritime security and to spike nearly to the record levels seen in 2008; they
counter-piracy operations to a full-scale amphib- remained above $100 per barrel for much of the year.
ious assault. Saudi naval forces have joined CTF In response to concern that persistently high oil
Table 24 Saudi Arabia Macroeconomic and Budgetary Trends 2001–10 (SR bn)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Saudi Arabia GDP 686 707 805 939 1,183 1,336 1,443 1,786 1,409 1,679
Inflation –1.1 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 2.3 4.1 9.9 5.1 5.4
Gross Government Debt (as a %
of GDP) 93.7% 96.9% 82.0% 65.0% 38.9% 27.3% 18.5% 13.2% 15.9% 9.9%
Average Oil Price ($) 23.1 24.4 28.1 36.1 50.6 61.1 69.1 94.5 61.1 77.5
Total Revenue 228 213 293 392 564 674 643 1,101 510 742
Oil Revenue 184 166 231 330 505 604 562 983 434 670
Oil Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 80.6% 78.0% 78.8% 84.1% 89.4% 89.7% 87.5% 89.3% 85.2% 90.4%
Total Expenditure 255 234 257 285 346 393 466 520 596 654
Defence Budget 78.9 69.4 70.3 78.4 95.1 110.8 132.9 143.3 154.8 169.7
Annual % Change in Defence
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Budgets 5.3% –12.0% 1.3% 11.5% 21.3% 16.4% 20.0% 7.8% 8.0% 9.6%
Defence Budget (% of Planned
Outlays) 36.7% 34.3% 33.6% 34.1% 34.0% 33.1% 35.0% 35.0% 32.6% 31.4%
Defence Budget (% of GDP) 11.49% 9.81% 8.74% 8.35% 8.05% 8.29% 9.21% 8.02% 10.98% 10.10%
Annual % Change in Real
Defence Budget* 9.0% –14.5% –4.1% 0.6% 1.7% 6.3% 13.3% –9.2% 36.75 –3.9%
*Real defence and national-security budgets calculated based on IMF GDP deflator figures at 1999 constant prices. The large fall in the 2008
figures are in part due to an inflation rate that was more than double the rate during the previous year. These figures may underestimate true
defence spending due to large outlays on foreign equipment procurement and maintenance programmes.
Sources: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Economy and Planning, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry
of Finance, Saudi Arabian Central Department of Statistics and Information, OPEC Annual Basket Price Statistics, International Monetary Fund
2011 Article IV Consultation Country Report No. 11/292 (September 2011), International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database
(September 2011).
allowances, hospital expansions, mosque restorations of total planned outlays in 2000 (not shown) to just
and the building of 500,000 affordable homes. over 30% of planned outlays in 2010 (see Table 24).
These extraordinary measures came on top of However, despite this relative decline, the defence
the planned 2011 budget, announced in December budget has more than doubled over the period (in
2010, which at SR580bn (US$165bn) was scheduled nominal terms), whilst real defence spending in 2010
to be the largest-ever national budget plan – SR40bn was 20.5% higher than 2001 levels. Furthermore, the
(US$11bn) or 7.4% higher than the planned allocation defence budget has consistently hovered at around
for the 2010 budget. It focused heavily on job creation, 10% of Saudi GDP, one of the highest levels of defence
economic diversification away from the oil sector and spending, as a proportion of GDP, in the world.
on investments in education, health and infrastruc- Indeed, various decisions and negotiations over
ture projects. More generally, Saudi Arabia has used the course of 2010 and 2011 indicate that Saudi
the steady rise in oil prices since 2001 to pay down defence spending is set to rise significantly. Personnel
government debts, which has resulted in a dramatic expenditure increments are likely to be driven by the
decline in its gross government debt-to-GDP ratio increase in military wages introduced from late 2010
from almost 97% of GDP in 2002 to a projected 7% of onwards, as well as by the creation of 60,000 addi-
GDP in 2011 (see Table 24). tional security jobs at the interior ministry announced
by King Abdullah in March 2011, as part of Riyadh’s
Defence and Security Spending Trends reaction to the Arab Awakening.
The recent budgetary emphasis on education, health Increases in procurement expenditure are also
and civil infrastructure projects follows a decade- anticipated, with the Obama administration’s October
long effort to reform and diversify the economy, in 2010 proposal, noted above, to sell up to $60bn worth
response to the financial crisis the country experi- of fast jets and helicopters to the kingdom over a
enced in the late 1990s. This shift in emphasis towards 15–20 year period receiving Congressional assent the
debt reduction and economic development has following month. As the largest proposed US Foreign
meant that defence has occupied a shrinking share Military Sale (FMS) ever, the deal provided for the
of total government outlays, falling from over 40% acquisition of 84 F-15SA multi-role fighters, 190 mili-
Middle East and North Africa 315
tary helicopters, and up to 12,000 missiles and 15,000 Table 25 Notifications of October 2010
bombs; as well as the upgrade of the existing RSAF Proposed US Foreign Military Sales to Saudi
fleet of 70 F-15S aircraft to the F-15SA configuration. Arabia ($bn)
However, despite claims on 5 January 2011 by Royal Saudi Land Forces 5.5
Assistant Defence Minister Prince Khaled bin Sultan 34 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow helicopters
that final details of the package were being negoti- 24 Hellfire training missiles
ated, overall progress on the final composition of the 2,176 AGM-114R Hellfire II missiles
transfer slowed in 2011, with the Letter of Agreement 6,000 2.75in 70mm laser-guided rockets
only signed at the end of 2011. Analysts have argued Royal Saudi Air Force 29.4
the delay may have stemmed from political factors 84 F-15SA aircraft and associated equipment, parts and
logistical support
either in Riyadh or Washington: in the former case
600 AGM-88B HARM missiles
perhaps due to concern over Washington’s posi-
400 AGM-84 Block II Harpoon missiles
tion on the Arab Awakening and related regional
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
sify arms suppliers, including by entering into arms 2,592 AGM-114R Hellfire II Missiles
Total Estimated Value: 60.5
discussions with Russia (in late 2011, discussions
were reported to have centred on assets includng
air-defence systems). Indeed, even the current a variety of other vessels. Although no decisions are
US$60bn package only received Congressional imminent (the Saudis have reportedly been consid-
blessing after strong assurances from both the then- ering Aegis-class Littoral Combat Ship designs from
defence secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State both Austal USA and Lockheed Martin since at least
Hillary Clinton that the deal would not adversely 2008), if the existing arms package was expanded
affect Israel’s qualitative military edge, assurances to incorporate these additional items, the value of
that were given in response to a bipartisan letter in the final deal could eventually rise to US$90bn.
November 2010 from 198 members of the House of Elsewhere, the kingdom received 24 tranche-2
Representatives. Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from BAE Systems,
Furthermore, the magnitude of the currently part of Project Salam (see above). Negotiations over
envisaged purchases does not necessarily diminish elements of this project continued during 2011, as
the prospect that further acquisitions may be in the parts of the overall programme were recast. This
pipeline. For example, signs emerged in May 2011 included the possibility that the final 24 aircraft be
of possible sales to the Royal Saudi Navy after a delivered to the tranche-3 standard. Saudi ambitions
reported briefing by US Navy officials on the capabil- to licence assembly of 48 of the 72 aircraft have been
ities of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, also providing reconsidered, with the likelihood that aircraft will
the kingdom with information and price estimates on now be assembled in the UK.
316 The Military Balance 2012
MANOEUVRE
Algeria ALG Armoured
2 armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp)
Algerian Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
1 indep armd bde
GDP D 11.7tr 14.1tr Mechanised
US$ 156bn 193bn 2 mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp)
per capita US$ 4,497 5,502 4 indep mech/mot bde
Growth % 3.26 2.86 Air Manoeuvre
1 rapid reaction div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt)
Inflation % 3.9 3.9
COMBAT SUPPORT
Def bdgt D 422bn 631bn
2 arty bn
US$ 5.59bn 8.61bn 7 AD bn
US$1=D 75.45 73.32 4 engr bn
Population 34,994,937 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
MBT 1,080: 185 T-90S; 325 T-72; 300 T-62; 270 T-54/T-55
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus RECCE 134: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2; 64 BRDM-2M with
Male 12.3% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 20.0% 2.4% 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
Female 11.8% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 19.8% 2.8% AIFV 1,089: 100 BMP-3; 304 BMP-2M with 9M133 Kornet
(AT-14 Spriggan); 685 BMP-1
Capabilities APC 707
APC (W) 705: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55 M3
Algeria’s military has experience in counter-insurgency, Panhard; 100 Fahd
although recent procurement has been focused on PPV 2 Marauder
conventional weaponry for state-on-state contingencies, ARTY 1,019
with which the armed forces have little familiarity. SP 170: 122mm 140 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 30 2S3
There is limited experience of tri-service joint operations, TOWED 375: 122mm 160 D-30; 25 D-74; 100 M-1931/37;
and few training exercises have focused on this issue. 60 M-30 M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 152mm 20 ML-20
Nonetheless, Algeria has been a leading proponent M-1937
of combined training with regional powers, partially MRL 144: 122mm 48 BM-21; 140mm 48 BM-14/16;
to build capacity in neighbouring states to combat al- 240mm 30 BM-24; 300mm 18 9A52 Smerch
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Algeria, Mali, Niger and MOR 330: 82mm 150 M-37; 120mm 120 M-1943; 160mm
Mauritania formed a joint operation staff committee in 60 M-1943
2010 to co-ordinate intelligence and operations. Algiers has AT
conducted joint operations with Mali. Limited combined MSL • MANPATS Milan; 9K133 Kornet-E (AT-14
training has occurred with the US, with SF exercises and Spriggan); 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (AT-13 Saxhorn-2); 9K11
through the International Military Education and Training (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel)
programme, as well as with France, the UK and Belgium. RCL 180: 107mm 60 B-11; 82mm 120 B-10
The army maintains a division-sized rapid-reaction force, GUNS 250: 57mm 160 ZIS-2 M-1943; 85mm 80 D-44:
although the fact that two-thirds of the army is conscript- 100mm 10 T-12; (50 SU-100 SP in store)
based reduces expertise and the ability to deploy quickly. AD • SAM 288+
Mobility is enhanced by a large fleet of light armoured SP 132+: ε48 9K-33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); ε20 9K31 Strela-1
vehicles and helicopters. A modest power-projection (SA-9 Gaskin); 4+ S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle); ε20
capability is also apparent in the transport and tanker air S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3 Goa); ε40 2K12 Kub (SA-6
fleet, although given the size of the country these may be Gainful)
more useful for internal rather than overseas deployment. MANPAD 200+: ε200 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7A/B Grail)
GUNS ε830
ACTIVE 130,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 6,000 Air SP ε225 ZSU-23-4
14,000) Paramilitary 187,200 TOWED ε605: 14.5mm 100: 60 ZPU-2; 40 ZPU-4 23mm
Terms of service Conscription in army only, 18 months (6 100 ZU-23 37mm ε150 M-1939 57mm 75 S-60 85mm 20
months basic, 12 months wth regular army often involving M-1939 KS-12 100mm 150 KS-19 130mm 10 KS-30
civil projects)
Middle East
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS Medium 19: 9 C-130H Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 Hercules;
SAR 10: 6 AW101 SAR; 4 Super Lynx Mk130 2 L-100-30 Light 15: 6 Beech 200T (additional units on
order); 6 Beech 1900D (electronic surv); 3 F-27 Friendship
Coast Guard ε500 PAX 8: 3 Falcon 900; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream V
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 TRG 99: 36 L-39ZA Albatros; 7 L-39C Albatros; 16 Yak-130
PBF 6 Baglietto 20 being delivered; 40 Z-142
PB 49: 6 Baglietto Mangusta; 12 Jebel Antar; 21 Deneb; 4 HELICOPTERS
El Mounkid; 6 Kebir ATK 33 Mi-24 Hind
SAR 3 Ka-27PS Helix D
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
MRH/TPT 75 Mi-8 Hip (med tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H
ARL 1 El Mourafek
TPT 40 Medium 4 Ka-32T Helix Light 36: 8 AS355
AXL 7 El Mouderrib (PRC Chui-E) (2 in reserve†)
Ecureuil; 28 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
AD
Air Force 14,000 SAM ε140 SA-2 Guideline Towed/SA-3 Goa/SA-6 Gainful
Flying hours 150 hrs/year SP/SA-8 Gecko SP (140–840 eff.)
FORCES BY ROLE GUNS 725 100mm/130mm/85mm
FIGHTER MSL
1 sqn with MiG-23MF/MS/U Flogger (possibly with- ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-23
(AS-7 Kerry); Kh-31P/A (AS-17A/B Krypton); Kh-59ME
drawn)
(AS-18 Kazoo)
1 sqn with MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)
4 sqn with MiG-29C/UB Fulcrum
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (A-
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
11 Archer) IR/SARH R-40/46 (AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24 (AA-7
2 sqn with Su-24M/MK Fencer
Apex); R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
2 sqn with Su-30MKA Flanker
MARITIME PATROL Paramilitary ε187,200
2 sqn with Beech 200T
ISR Gendarmerie 20,000
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E*; MiG-25RBSh Foxbat D* Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions
TANKER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with Il-78 Midas RECCE AML-60/110 M-3 Panhard APC (W)
318 The Military Balance 2012
APC (W) 100 Fahd The GCC’s defence obligations were invoked in 2011,
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light Some PZL Mi-2 Hoplite reflecting the Bahraini military’s inability to quench
protests. Following a series of crackdowns on protesters
National Security Forces 16,000 a state of emergency was declared and Saudi, Qatari and
Directorate of National Security. Small arms
Emirati personnel were deployed to Bahrain as part of
Republican Guard 1,200 the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force. The deployment was a
tacit admission by Manama that its security forces needed
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE AML-60 assistance in the internal security role and suggested
APC (T) M-3 greater training and improved rules of engagement might
be required for any similar future operations.
Legitimate Defence Groups ε150,000
Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000)
ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500)
Paramilitary 11,260
Deployment
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Organisations by Service
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
UN • MONUSCO 5 obs Army 6,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Bahrain BHR SPECIAL FORCES
1 bn
Bahraini Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
MANOEUVRE
GDP D 8.52bn 9.94bn Armoured
US$ 22.5bn 26.3bn 1 armd bde(–) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn)
per capita US$ 19,044 21,610 Mechanised
Growth % 4.09 1.48
1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn)
Light
Inflation % 2.0 1.0
1 (Amiri) gd bn
Def exp a D 279m COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 736m 1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 lt arty bty,
Def bdgt a D 283m 330m 358m 1 MRL bty)
US$ 747m 873m 1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty)
1 engr coy
FMA (US) US$ 19.0m 19.5m
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
US$1=D 0.38 0.38 1 log coy
a
Includes expenditure on National Guard and the Supreme 1 tpt coy
Council for Defence Secretariat General. Excl arms purchases 1 med coy
Population 1,214,705 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Ethnic groups: Nationals 64%; Asian 13%; other Arab 10%; Iranian MBT 180 M60A3
8%; European 1%) RECCE 30: 22 AML-90; 8 S52 Shorland; (8 Ferret & 8 Saladin
in store)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIFV 25 YPR-765 (with 25mm)
Male 12.6% 4.4% 4.2% 3.8% 27.8% 2.4% APC 375
Female 12.4% 4.3% 4.0% 3.5% 18.6% 2.0% APC (T) 200 M113A2
APC (W) 120: 10 AT105 Saxon; 110 M3 Panhard
Capabilities PPV 55: 49 Cobra; 6 Nimer-1
Bahrain retains moderately well trained and equipped ARTY 151
forces, but their small size limits their effectiveness. SP 82: 155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2
While in general focused on the possibility of state-to- TOWED 36: 105mm 8 L118 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198
state conflict, their role in internal security became more MRL 227mm 9 M270 MLRS (with 30 ATACMS)
apparent in 2011. With regards to its primary role, defence MOR 24: SP 120mm 12 M113A2; 81mm 12 L16
of the island from an amphibious invasion and/or aerial AT • MSL • MANPATS 75: 60 Javelin; 15 BGM-71A TOW
assault from Iran, Bahrain could mount a sturdy defence RCL 31: 106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT
though it would eventually be overwhelmed by concerted AD • SAM 91
operations. The kingdom therefore relies on the security SP 7 Crotale
umbrella offered by the Gulf Cooperation Council and TOWED 6 I-HAWK MIM-23B
the deterrent effect provided by the presence of the US MANPAD 78: 18 FIM-92A Stinger; 60 RBS-70
through Fifth Fleet/NAVCENT. Bahrain is a member of the GUNS 24: 35mm 12 Oerlikon; 40mm 12 L/70
GCC, and has participated in GCC military exercises. ARV 53 Fahd 240
Middle East and North Africa 319
Cairo might widen its list of suppliers is not inconceivable AIFV 390 YPR-765 (with 25mm); (220 BMP-1 in store)
in some capability areas, but since the two countries’ APC 3,560
Peace Vector deal in 1980, US equipment has increasingly APC (T) 2,000 M113A2/YPR-765 (incl variants); (500
replaced Egypt’s ageing Soviet-era equipment. Though the BTR-50/OT-62 in store)
armed forces have not been tested in large-scale combat APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMP-600P; 250 BTR-60S; 410 Fahd-30/
since Operation Desert Storm, they maintain a regular TH 390 Fahd; 650 Walid
exercise schedule including with foreign militaries (such as
ARTY 4,468
the Bright Star series). However, while training will be at a
SP 492: 122mm 124 SP 122; 155mm 368: 164 M109A2; 204
high standard for many within the military, it is harder to
judge effectiveness across the entire force, given the level M109A5
of conscription. TOWED 962: 122mm 526: 190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300
M-30 M-1938; 130mm 420 M-46; 155mm 16 GH-52
ACTIVE 438,500 (Army 310,000 Navy 18,500 Air MRL 450: 122mm 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 Sakr-10; 50
30,000 Air Defence Command 80,000) Paramilitary Sakr-18; 100 Sakr-36; 130mm 36 Kooryong; 140mm 32 BM-
397,000 14; 227mm 26 M270 MLRS; 240mm (48 BM-24 in store)
Terms of service 12 months–3 years (followed by refresher
MOR 2,564
training over a period of up to 9 years)
SP 136: 107mm 100: 65 M106A1; 35 M106A2 120mm
RESERVE 479,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 14,000 Air 36 M1064A3
20,000 Air Defence 70,000) 81mm 50 M125A2; 82mm 500 120mm 1,848: 1,800
M-1943; 48 Brandt 160mm 30 M160
Organisations by Service AT • MSL
SP 262: 52 M-901, 210 YPR 765 PRAT
Army 90,000–120,000; 190,000–220,000 MANPATS 2,100: 1,200 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
conscript (total 310,000) (incl BRDM-2); 200 Milan; 700 TOW-2
FORCES BY ROLE UAV • ISR • Heavy R4E-50 Skyeye
SPECIAL FORCES AD • SAM
5 cdo gp SP 96: 50 FIM-92A Avenger; 26 M48 Chaparral; 20 9K31
1 counter-terrorist unit Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin)
MANOEUVRE MANPAD 2,764: 2,000 Ayn al-Saqr/9K32 Strela-2 (SA-
Armoured 7 Grail)‡; 164 FIM-92A Stinger; 600 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
4 armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) GUNS
4 indep armd bde
SP 355: 23mm 165: 45 Sinai-23; 120 ZSU-23-4; 37mm
1 Republican Guard bde
Mechanised 150; 57mm 40 ZSU-57-2
7 mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) TOWED 700: 14.5mm 300 ZPU-4; 23mm 200 ZU-23-2;
4 indep mech bde 57mm 200 S-60
Light RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder; AN/TPQ-37
1 inf div Firefinder (arty/mor)
2 indep inf bde MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 Sakr-80; some
Air Manoeuvre
(trials); 9 Scud-B
2 air mob bde
ARV 355+: Fahd 240; GMR 3560.55; 220 M88A1; 90 M88A2;
1 para bde
COMBAT SUPPORT M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV
15 arty bde VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20
1 SSM bde with FROG-7 MW Aardvark JFSU Mk4
Middle East and North Africa 321
Navy ε8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000 AX 5: 1 El Fateh† (UK ‘Z’ class); 1 El Horriya (also used
conscript (total 18,500) as the presidential yacht); 1 Al Kousser; 1 Intishat; 1 other
YPT 2 Poluchat 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4 Romeo† (PRC Type YDT 2
033) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon
Coastal Defence
AShM
Army tps, Navy control
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8
MSL • AShM 4K87 (SSC-2B Samlet)
FRIGATES 8:
LNCHR 3: 3 twin lnchr with Otomat MkII AShM
FFGHM 4 Mubarak (US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1
GUN 100mm; 130mm SM-4-1; 152mm
Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MP
SAM, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite Naval Aviation
ASW hel) All aircraft operated by Air Force
FFGH 2 Damyat (US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk16 GMLS AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 Beech 1900C (Maritime
with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/ASROC, 2 twin 324mm Surveillance)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Middle East
FIGHTER
324mm TT, 4 single RL 1 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
PBFG 21 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
4 Hegu (PRC – Komar type) with 2 single lnchr with 6 sqn with J-7/MiG-21 Fishbed/MiG-21U Mongol A*
SY-1 AShM 2 sqn with Mirage 5D/E
5 October (FSU Komar – 1†) with 2 single lnchr with 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C
Otomat MkII AShM FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
12 Osa I (FSU – 3†) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit 2 sqn with F-4E Phantom II
(SS-N-2A Styx) AShM 1 sqn with Mirage 5E2
PBFM 4 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
4 Shershen (FSU) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) 1 sqn with SH-2G Super Seasprite
SAM (manual aiming), 1 12 tube BM-24 MRL 1 sqn with Sea King Mk47
PB 8 MARITIME PATROL
4 Shanghai II (PRC) 1 sqn with Beech 1900C
2 Shershen (FSU – 1†) with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 8-tube ELECTRONIC WARFARE
BM-21 MRL 1 sqn with Beech 1900 (ELINT); Commando Mk2E (ECM)
2 Swiftships 28 ELECTRONIC WARFARE/TRANSPORT
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 14 1 sqn with C-130H/VC-130H Hercules
MHC 5: 2 Osprey; 3 Dat Assawari (US Swiftships) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
MSI 2 Safaga (US Swiftships) 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
MSO 7: 3 Assiout (FSU T-43 class); 4 Aswan (FSU Yurka) TRANSPORT
AMPHIBIOUS 12 1 sqn with An-74TK-200A;
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny A (FSU) (capacity 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules
6 MBT; 180 troops) 1 sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo
LANDING CRAFT • LCU 9 Vydra (capacity either 3 1 sqn with B-707-366C; B-737-100; Beech 200 Super King
AMX-30 MBT or 100 troops) Air; Falcon 20; Gulfstream III; Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26: IV-SP
AOT 7 Toplivo (1 additional in reserve) TRAINING
AE 1 Halaib (Westerwald-class) 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
AKR 3 Al Hurreya 1 sqn with DHC-5 Buffalo
ARL 1 Shaledin (Luneberg-class) 3 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
ATA 5† Okhtensky 1 sqn with Grob 115EG;
322 The Military Balance 2012
ε6 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* ADA bn), 12 SAM bty with I-HAWK MIM-23B, 14
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; L-59E Albatros* SAM bty with Crotale, 18 SAM bn with Skyguard, 110
ATTACK HELICOPTER SAM bn with S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3A Goa); 2K12 Kub
2 sqn with AH-64D Apache (SA-6 Gainful); S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline))
2 sqn with SA-342K Gazelle (with HOT) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with SA-342L Gazelle AD
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER SYSTEMS 72+: Some Amoun with RIM-7F Sea Sparrow
1 sqn with CH-47C/D Chinook SAM, 36+ quad SAM, Skyguard towed SAM, 36+ twin
2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip 35mm guns
1 sqn with S-70 Black Hawk; UH-60A/L Black Hawk SAM 702+
UAV
SP 130+: 24+ Crotale; 50+ M48 Chaparral; 56+ SA-6
Some sqn with R4E-50 Skyeye; Teledyne-Ryan 324 Scarab
Gainful
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TOWED 572+: 78+ I-HAWK MIM-23B; S-75M Volkhov
AIRCRAFT 589 combat capable (SA-2 Guideline) 282+ Skyguard; 212+ S-125 Pechora-M
FTR 82: 26 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16B Fighting
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
(SA-3A Goa)
Falcon; ε50 J-7 GUNS 1,566+
FGA 310: 29 F-4E Phantom II; 127 F-16C Fighting Falcon; SP • 23mm 266+: 36+ Sinai-23 (SPAAG) each with Ayn
38 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 3 Mirage 2000B; 15 Mirage al-Saqr MANPAD, Dassault 6SD-20S land; 230 ZSU-23-4
2000C; 36 Mirage 5D/E; 12 Mirage 5E2; ε50 MiG-21 TOWED 57mm 600 S-60; 85mm 400 M-1939 KS-12;
Fishbed/MiG-21U Mongol A* 100mm 300 KS-19
ELINT 2 VC-130H Hercules
ISR 6 Mirage 5R (5SDR)*
Paramilitary ε397,000 active
AEW&C 7 E-2C Hawkeye
TPT 56 Medium 24: 21 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Central Security Forces 325,000
Hercules Light 21: 3 An-74TK-200A (3 more on order); Ministry of Interior; Includes conscripts
1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Beech 1900 (ELINT); 4 Beech APC (W) 100+: 100 Hussar; Walid
1900C; 9 DHC-5D Buffalo PAX 11: 1 B-707-366C; 3 Falcon
20; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP National Guard 60,000
TRG 331: 36 Alpha Jet*; 54 EMB-312 Tucano; 74 Grob Lt wpns only
115EG; 120 K-8 Karakorum*; 10 L-39 Albatros; 35 L-59E FORCES BY ROLE
Albatros* MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS Other
ATK 35 AH-64D Apache 8 paramilitary bde (cadre) (3 paramilitary bn)
ASW 15: 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite (opcon Navy); 5 Sea EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
King Mk47 (opcon Navy)
APC (W) 250 Walid
ELINT 4 Commando Mk2E (ECM)
MRH 70: 65 SA-342K Gazelle (some with HOT); 5 SA- Border Guard Forces 12,000
342L Gazelle (opcon Navy) Ministry of Interior; lt wpns only
TPT 93: Heavy 19: 3 CH-47C Chinook; 16 CH-47D
FORCES BY ROLE
Chinook; Medium 74: 2 AS-61; 24 Commando (of which
MANOEUVRE
3 VIP); 40 Mi-8 Hip; 4 S-70 Black Hawk (VIP); 4 UH-60L Other
Black Hawk (VIP) 18 Border Guard regt
TRG 17 UH-12E
UAV • ISR • Heavy 49: 20 R4E-50 Skyeye; 29 Teledyne-
Ryan 324 Scarab Deployment
MSL
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
ASM 245+: 80 AGM-65A Maverick; 123 AGM-65D
UN • UNOCI 176; 1 engr coy
Maverick; 12 AGM-65F Maverick; 30 AGM-65G Maverick;
AGM-119 Hellfire; AGM-84 Harpoon; AM-39 Exocet; AS- Democratic Republic of the Congo
30L HOT UN • MONUSCO 1,000; 24 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 SF coy
ARM Armat; Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)
AAM • IR R-3(AA-2 Atoll)‡; AIM-9FL/P Sidewinder; Liberia
R-550 Magic; SARH AIM-7E/F/M Sparrow; R530 UN • UNMIL 7 obs
South Sudan
Air Defence Command 80,000 conscript; UN • UNMISS 8; 7 obs
70,000 reservists (total 150,000)
FORCES BY ROLE Sudan
AIR DEFENCE UN • UNAMID 2,398; 21 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs
5 AD div (geographically based) (total: 12 SAM bty with coy; 1 tpt coy
M48 Chaparral, 12 radar bn, 12 ADA bde (total: 100 UN • UNISFA 11; 4 obs
Middle East and North Africa 323
Western Sahara prime antagonists, the US and Israel, and also the ability to
UN • MINURSO 21 obs act with greater impunity regionally.
The Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s and various counter-
insurgency campaigns mean the military is battle hardened
Foreign Forces and experienced. Yet its lack of modern and useable
Australia MFO (Operation Mazurka) 25 equipment means the military must rely on personnel
Canada MFO 28 and platform numbers rather than technology to wage
Colombia MFO 354; 1 inf bn war. Large numbers of small, fast-attack craft with anti-
Czech Republic MFO 3 ship missiles, for instance, would be able to use swarm
Fiji MFO 338; 1 inf bn or hit-and-run tactics to attempt to disable much larger
France MFO 2 opponents. Similarly, army equipment may rely on
Hungary MFO 38; 1 MP unit numerical superiority, not sophistication, to prevent an
opponent’s advance. The air force’s ageing fleets of US
Italy MFO 75; 4 coastal ptl unit
and European fighters is of limited value and many may
New Zealand MFO 28 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit
already have been cannibalised to keep others flying. The
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Iranian Rial r 2010 2011 2012 ACTIVE 523,000 (Army 350,000 Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000 Navy 18,000 Air
GDP r 4,212tr 5,314tr
30,000) Paramilitary 40,000
US$ 413bn 499bn
Armed Forces General Staff coordinates two parallel
per capita US$ 5,365 6,400
organisations: Regular Armed Forces and Revolutionary
Middle East
Inflation % 12.4 22.5
Def bdgt r ε108tn ε128tn
RESERVE 350,000 (Army 350,000, ex-service
volunteers)
US$ ε10.6bn ε12bn
US$1=r 10,206.31 10,658.37
Organisations by Service
Population 77,891,220
Ethnic groups: Persian 51%; Azeri 24%; Gilaki/Mazandarani 8%; Army 130,000; 220,000 conscript (total
Kurdish 7%; Arab 3%; Lur 2%; Baloch 2%; Turkman 2%
350,000)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus FORCES BY ROLE
Male 12.3% 5.1% 6.2% 5.6% 19.1% 2.4% 5 corps-level regional HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Female 11.7% 4.8% 5.8% 5.4% 18.8% 2.6%
2 cdo div (3 cdo bde)
Capabilities 3 cdo bde
1 SF bde
Iran’s military, and in particular the Iranian Revolutionary MANOEUVRE
Guard Corps (IRGC), is a capable organisation well versed Armoured
in a variety of different operations. Although the armed 4 armd div (1 recce bn, 2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 SP
forces suffer from a generally outdated arsenal, innovative arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn, 1 tpt bn)
and cost-effective tactics and techniques (particularly 1 indep armd bde
the use of asymmetric warfare) mean that Iran is able to Mechanised
pose a challenge to most potential adversaries, especially 2 mech inf div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 2–3 mech bde, 1
its weaker neighbours. At the same time, the inability to SP arty bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn, 1 tpt bn)
offer effective deterrence to an advanced military such Light
as that of the United States, or even potentially Turkey, 4 inf div (3–4 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 log bn, 1 tpt bn)
may be a motivation for Iran’s pursuit of dual-use nuclear 1 indep inf bde
programmes. Tehran claims its uranium enrichment is for Air Manoeuvre
a civil energy purpose but, in conjunction with evidence 1 AB bde
of weapons-design work, it provides a potential break-out Aviation
capability. A nuclear deterrent, based on its burgeoning Some avn gp
ballistic-missile programme, would, in Tehran’s view, COMBAT SUPPORT
afford Iran greater security in its relations with two of its 6 arty gp
324 The Military Balance 2012
Middle East
FSGM 1 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 – 1 more under MCM 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion
construction at Bandar-e Abbas, expected ISD 2013) TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206
with 2 twin lnchr with CSS-N-4 Sardine AShM, 2 lnchr JetRanger (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212)
with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1
hel landing platform Air Force 30,000 (incl 12,000 Air Defence)
FSG 4 FORCES BY ROLE
3 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and
CSS-N-4 Sardine AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 about 80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC Air Force
114mm gun equipment.
1 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 FIGHTER
AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 76mm gun 1 sqn with F-7M Airguard; JJ-7 Mongol A*
FS 1 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 76mm gun 2 sqn with F-14 Tomcat
PCFG 13 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1–2 twin lcnhr 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
with CSS-N-4 Sardine AShM FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
PBFG 8 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E; F-5E/F Tiger II
ε4 Mk13 with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar) AShM 1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D
4 China Cat with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar) 5 sqn with F-4D/E Phantom II
AShM 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
PBF 16: 15 Kashdom II; 1 M155 MARITIME PATROL
PB 22: 3 Kayvan; 6 MkII; 10 MkIII; 3 Parvin 1 sqn with P-3MP Orion*
PTF 3 Kajami (semi-submersible) ISR
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 1 (det) sqn with RF-4E Phantom II*
MSC 3: 2 Type-292; 1 Shahrokh (in Caspian Sea as trg SEARCH & RESCUE
ship) Some flt with Bell-214C (AB-214C)
MSI 2 Riazi (US Cape) TANKER/TRANSPORT
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F
LANDING SHIPS 13 TRANSPORT
LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops) 1 sqn with B-707; Falcon 50; L-1329 Jetstar; Bell 412
LST 4 Hengam each with up to 1 hel (capacity 9 tanks; 2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules
225 troops) 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 20
LSL 6 Fouque 1 sqn with Il-76 Candid; An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz)
326 The Military Balance 2012
FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K331 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process
Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported) of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
AIRCRAFT 336 combat capable MANOEUVRE
FTR 189+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 60+ F-5E Tiger II/F- Other
2,500 militia bn (claimed, limited permanent member-
5F Tiger II; 24 F-7M Airguard; 44 F-14 Tomcat; 35 MiG-
ship)
29A/U/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh reported
FGA 108: 65 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; 30 Su-
24MK Fencer D; up to 3 Saegheh reported
Cyber
Iran is believed to have a developed capacity for cyber
ATK 13: 7 Su-25K Frogfoot; 3 Su-25T Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UBK
operations. The precise relationship of groups such as the
Frogfoot
‘Iranian Cyber Army’ to regime and military organisations
ASW 5 P-3MP Orion
is unclear, but the former has launched hacking attacks
ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II*
against a number of foreign organisations. In 2011, it was
TKR/TPT 3: ε1 B-707; ε2 B-747
reported by state-sponsored media that Iran was stepping
TPT 117: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium 19 C-130E/H
up its cyber defences and conducting exercises in this area,
Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140
and that Iran was establishing its own cyber command.
Faraz) (45 projected); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar;
10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago;
3 Turbo Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1 Deployment
B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50 GUlf of Aden and SOMALI Basin
TRG 151: 25 Beech F33A/C Bonanza; 15 EMB-312 Tucano; Navy: 1 FSG; 1 AORH
15 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17 Mushshak; 12 Parastu; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7
Turbo Trainer; 9 T-33
HELICOPTERS Iraq IRQ
MRH 32: 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); 2 Bell 412 Iraqi Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
TPT 4+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A
Jet Ranger (AB-206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous GDP D 94.9tr 127tr
versions in production); some Shabaviz 2061 US$ 80.2bn 107bn
AD • SAM 279+: FM-80 (Crotale); 30 Rapier; 15 Tigercat; per capita US$ 2,704 3,534
150+ MIM-23B I-HAWK/Shahin; 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Growth % 0.84 9.65
Guideline); 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 29 9K331 Inflation % 2.4 5.0
Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported)
Def exp D 5.73tn
MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm Oerlikon US$ 4.85bn
MSL Def bdgt D 4.95tn 5.66tn
ASM AGM-65A Maverick; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 US$ 4.19bn 4.79bn
(AS-14 Kedge); C-801K (CSS-N-4 Sardine) AShM US$1=D 1,182.71 1,182.80
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
AAM • IR PL-2A‡; PL-7; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA- Population 30,399,572
11 Archer): AIM-9 Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Ethnic and religious groups: Arab 75–80% (of which Shia Muslim
Alamo) SARH AIM-54 Phoenix; AIM-7 Sparrow 55%, Sunni Muslim 45%) Kurdish 20–25%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities MBT 336+: 140 M1A1 Abrams; 120+ T-72; 76 T-55;
In conjunction with the police and other security services, RECCE 73: 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascavel; 20 Fuchs NBC
the Iraqi Army’s prime role is to provide internal security. AIFV 120: 100 BMP-1; 20 BTR-4
The speed with which the Iraqi Army was reconstituted APC 2,799+
after 2003 meant that up to 70% of old, pre-regime-change APC (T) 605+: 100 FV 103 Spartan; 400+ M113A2; 61
officers were eventually reintegrated into the new officer MT-LB; 44 Talha
corps. To counter this, Iraq’s ruling elite have inserted so- APC (W) 850: 570 Akrep/Scorpion; 60 AT-105 Saxon; 100
called dimaj officers into the senior ranks of the military. BTR-80; 50 M3 Panhard; 60 Mohafiz; 10 VCR-TT
These political appointments were either militia leaders PPV 1,344: 600 DZIK-3; 12 Barracuda; 607 ILAV Cougar;
or had no military experience at all. Beyond political 10 Cobra; 115 Mamba
interference, a broad set of problems continue to plague ARTY 1,386+
the Iraqi Army and need to be addressed for it to fulfil SP 48+: 152mm 18+ Type 83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24
its new responsibilities. The first involves weaknesses M109A5
in management, logistics and strategic planning. The TOWED 138+: 130mm 18+ M-46; 155mm 120 M198
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Middle East
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28+:
Military Forces PCO 5
Figures for Iraqi security forces reflect ongoing changes in 1 RiverHawk (one further in build; expected ISD
organisation and manpower. 2012)
4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti)
Army 193,400 PB 17: 9 Swiftships 35; 5 Predator (PRC-27m); 3 Al
FORCES BY ROLE Faw
SPECIAL FORCES PBR 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010
2 SF bde
MANOEUVRE Iraqi Air Force 5,050
Armoured FORCES BY ROLE
1 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 lt mech bde, 1 engr bn, 1 ISR
sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 sqn with CH-2000 Sama; SB7L-360 Seeker
Light 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna AC-
8 mot div (4 mot inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log 208B Combat Caravan*
bde) 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
2 mot div (3 mot inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log TRANSPORT
bde) 1 sqn with C-130E Hercules
1 inf div (1 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 air mob bde, 1 engr TRAINING
bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 sqn with Cessna 172
1 inf div (4 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log 1 sqn with Lasta-95
bde) 1 sqn with T-6A
1 inf div (3 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
bde) AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
2 (presidential) mot bde ISR 5: 3 Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan*; 2 SB7L-360
1 (Baghdad) indep mot bde Seeker
Aviation TPT 25: Medium 3 C-130E Hercules; Light 22: 6 Beech
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 350 King Air; 8 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 8 Cessna
1 sqn with Bell 206; OH-58C Kiowa 172
1 sqn with Bell T407 TRG 33+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A
3 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171 MSL
1 sqn with SA342M Gazelle ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
328 The Military Balance 2012
AShM, 1 16-32 Cell Mk56 VLS with Barak SAM, 1 76mm 1 medevac unit with CH-53D Sea Stallion
gun UAV
PCG 2 Reshef (Sa’ar 4) with 4–6 single lnchr with Gabriel 1 ISR sqn with Hermes 450
II AShM, 1 twin Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon 1 ISR sqn with Searcher MkII
AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval); Heron TP (Eitan)
PBFT 13: 9 Super Dvora MkI with 2 single 324mm TT with AIR DEFENCE
Mk 46 LWT (AShM may also be fitted); 4 Super Dvora 3 bty with Arrow/Arrow 2
MkII with 2 single 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT (AShM 1 bty with Iron Dome
may also be fitted) 17 bty with MIM-23 I-HAWK
PBT 15 Dabur with 2 single 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT 6 bty with MIM-104 Patriot
PBF 18: 5 Shaldag; 3 Stingray; 10 Super Dvora MK III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(AShM & TT may be fitted) AIRCRAFT 440 combat capable
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCT 1 Ashdod FTR 143: 16 F-15A Eagle; 6 F-15B Eagle; 17 F-15C Eagle; 11
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 F-15D Eagle; 77 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 16 F-16B Fighting
AG 2 (ex German Type T45) Falcon
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
evant agencies and expand the cyber-security of national FMA (US) US$ 300m 300m
infrastructure. US$1=D 0.71 0.71
a
Excludes expenditure on public order and safety
Foreign Forces Population 6,508,271
UNTSO unless specified. Figures represent total numbers Ethnic groups: Palestinian ε50–60%
for mission in Israel, Syria & Lebanon
Argentina 3 obs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Australia 12 obs Male 18.1% 5.5% 4.9% 4.3% 15.6% 2.4%
Austria 7 obs Female 17.1% 5.2% 4.6% 4.2% 15.5% 2.5%
Belgium 2 obs
Canada 7 obs • 9 (Operation Proteus) USSC Capabilities
Chile 2 obs
Long-standing political accommodation with Israel
Middle East
Denmark 11 obs means that the country does not face a major external
Estonia 2 obs threat. Jordan’s armed forces are capable of combat and
Finland 14 obs contributing to international expeditionary operations,
France 3 obs as demonstrated by the deployment of Jordanian fighter
aircraft to escort Jordanian C-130s flying humanitarian
Ireland 12 obs
aid to Libya. Jordanian special forces (SF) have served
Italy 8 obs
alongside US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan and
Malawi 1 obs
participate in various UN missions. Jordanian forces are
Nepal 3 obs
well trained, particularly their SF and aircrew, and regular
Netherlands 12 obs
exercises take place with foreign air forces.
New Zealand 7 obs
Norway 12 obs ACTIVE 100,500 (Army 88,000 Navy 500 Air 12,000)
Russia 4 obs Paramilitary 10,000
Slovakia 3 obs
Slovenia 3 obs RESERVE 65,000 (Army 60,000 Joint 5,000)
Sweden 6 obs
Switzerland 11 obs Organisations by Service
United States 1 obs • US European Command; 1 AN/
TPY-2 X-band radar at Nevatim Army 88,000
Jordan has reorganised from a divisional structure to
4 commands (Northern, Central, Eastern and Southern), a
strategic reserve and a special operations command. The
strategic reserve still has a divisional structure and special
operations command is responsible for counter terrorism
and unconventional operations. The Royal Guard also
comes under this command.
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops bde (2 SF bn, 2 AB bn, 1 AB arty bn, 1 psyops
unit)
332 The Military Balance 2012
Khalid; 88 M60 Phoenix; (292 Tariq Centurion; 115 M60A1A3; 1 unit with Seeker SB7L
23 M47/M48A5 in store) ISR/TRANSPORT
LT TK (19 Scorpion; in store) 1 (spec ops) sqn wth SA 2-37B; EC 635; AS-350,
RECCE 153: 103 Scimitar; 50 Ferret TRANSPORT
AIFV 472: 31 BMP-2; 321 Ratel-20; ε120 YPR-765 1 sqn with Il-76MF; C-130H Hercules; CN-235; Cessna
APC 450+ 208B
APC (T) 400+: 100 M113A1; 300 M113A2 Mk1J; some 1 (Royal) flt with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60 Black Hawk
Temsah TRAINING
PPV 50: 25 Marauder; 25 Matador 4 sqn with F-5E (OCU); T-67M Firefly; C-101 Aviojet;
ARTY 1,339 AS-350B3; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Hughes 500
SP 468: 105mm 30 M-52; 155mm 290: 270 M109A1/A2; 20 ATTACK HELICOPTER
M-44; 203mm 148 M110A2 2 sqn with AH-1F Cobra (with TOW)
TOWED 100: 105mm 72: 54 M102; 18 MOBAT; 155mm TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
28: 10 M-1/M-59; 18 M114; 203mm (4 M115 in store) 2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; Bell 205 (UH-1H
MRL 227mm 12 HIMARS (with 432 guided msl) Iroquois)
MOR 759: AIR DEFENCE
SP 81mm 50 1 comd (5–6 bty with PAC-2 Patriot; 5 bty with I-HAWK
TOWED 709: 81mm 359; 107mm 50 M-30; 120mm 300 MIM-2BB Phase III; 6 bty with Skyguard/Aspide)
Brandt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AT • MSL 975 AIRCRAFT 115 combat capable
SP 115: 70 M901; 45 YPR-765 with Milan FTR 46: 30 F-5E/F Tiger II; 16 F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon
MANPATS 860: 30 Javelin (116 msl); 310 M47 Dragon; 320 FGA 69: 39 F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon; 15 Mirage F-1C
TOW/TOW-2A; 200 9K123 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan with (F-1CJ – possibly stored); 15 Mirage F-1E (F-1EJ – possibly
2,000 msl) stored)
RL 112mm 2,300 APILAS ISR 1 SA 2-37B
AD TPT 15: Heavy 2 Il-76MF Candid; Medium 4 C-130H
SAM 1,112 Hercules; Light 9: 2 C-295; 2 CN-235; 5 Cessna 208B
TRG
SP 140: 92 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 48 9K33 26: 16 T-67M Firefly; 10 C-101 Aviojet
Osa-M (SA-8 Gecko) HELICOPTERS
MANPAD 972: 250 FIM-43 Redeye; 9K32M Strela-2M ATK 25 AH-1F Cobra (TOW)
(SA-7B2 Grail); 300 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); MRH 13 EC-635 (Tpt/SAR)
240 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla/Igla-1 (SA-18 TPT 75: Medium 25: 12 AS332M Super Puma; 13 S-70A
Grouse); 182 209-OPU Dzhigit (for use with SA-18) Black Hawk; Light 50: 36 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 8
GUNS • SP 356: 20mm 100 M163 Vulcan; 23mm 40 ZSU- Hughes 500D; 6 AS350B3
23-4; 40mm 216 M-42 (not all op) AD • SAM 80+: 24 I-HAWK MIM-23B Phase III; 40 PAC-
RADAR • LAND 7 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder/AN/TPQ-37 2 Patriot
Firefinder (arty, mor) MSL
ARV 137+: Al Monjed; 55 Chieftain ARV; Centurion Mk2; 20 ASM AGM-65D Maverick; BGM-71 TOW
M47; 32 M88A1; 30 M578; YPR-806 AAM • IR AIM-9J/N/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH
MW 12 Aardrvark Mk2 AIM-7 Sparrow; R530; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Kuwait KWT
Other
Kuwaiti Dinar D 2010 2011 2012
1 security bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GDP D 38bn 48.1bn
LT TK: Scorpion US$ 132bn 174bn
APC (W) 55+: 25+ EE-11 Urutu; 30 FV603 Saracen per capita US$ 51,841 66,974
Growth % 3.41 5.73
Reserve Organisations 60,000 reservists
Inflation % 4.1 6.2
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Def exp D 1.34bn
Armoured US$ 4.65bn
1 Royal Guard armd div with (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde, Def bdgt D 1.13bn 1.12bn
1 AD bde) US$ 3.91bn 4.05bn
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Middle East
UN • MINUSTAH 612; 1 inf bn greater joint force capabilities and a higher state of
readiness. However, the force remains too small to deter
IRAQ
a resolute threat from its larger neighbours, and hence
UN • UNAMI 2 obs
the country relies on its membership of the GCC and
Liberia relationship with the US to guarantee its security.
UN • UNMIL 120; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital A close defence relationship with the US has afforded
Kuwait access to high-technology weapons systems and
South Sudan
combined training exercises. This has allowed Kuwait to
UN • UNMISS 2
develop a professional, relatively well-equipped, land-
Sudan focused force. The US maintains large bases in the country,
UN • UNAMID 7; 4 obs latterly preoccupied with managing the drawdown of
UN • UNISFA 3 obs personnel and equipment from Iraq. Kuwait’s navy is
small, with patrol boats capable of ensuring maritime
security within and defence against small flotillas entering
Kuwaiti waters. The air force regularly deploys aircraft to
GCC air exercises and flew humanitarian flights during
2011 to bring injured Libyans to Kuwait.
Organisations by Service
Army 11,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit (forming)
334 The Military Balance 2012
1 MP bn ATTACK HELICOPTER
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
1 log gp 1 atk/trg sqn with SA342 Gazelle with HOT
1 fd hospital TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS532 Cougar; SA330 Puma; S-92
Reserve AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 comd (5–6 SAM bty with PAC-2 Patriot; 5 SAM bty
MANOEUVRE with MIM-23B I-HAWK Phase III; 6 SAM bty with
Mechanised Skyguard/Aspide)
1 bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable
MBT 293: 218 M1A2 Abrams; 75 M-84 (75 more in store) FGA 39: 31 F/A-18C Hornet; 8 F/A-18D Hornet
RECCE 11 TPz-1 Fuchs TPT • Medium 3 L-100-30
AIFV 432: 76 BMP-2; 120 BMP-3; 236 Desert Warrior (incl TRG 27: 11 Hawk Mk64*; 16 EMB-312 Tucano (Tucano
variants) Mk52)*
APC 260 HELICOPTERS
APC (T) 260: 230 M113A2; 30 M577 ATK 16 AH-64D Apache
APC (W) (40 TH 390 Fahd in store) MRH 13 SA342 Gazelle with HOT
ARTY 218 TPT 13: Medium 3 AS532 Cougar; 7 SA330 Puma; 3 S-92
SP 155mm 106: 37 M109A3; 18 (AMX) Mk F3; 51 PLZ45; MSL
(18 AU-F-1 in store) ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-84A Harpoon; AGM-
MRL 300mm 27 9A52 Smerch 114K Hellfire
MOR 78: 81mm 60; 107mm 6 M-30; 120mm ε12 RT-F1 AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH
AIM-7F Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
AT • MSL 118+
SAM 76: 40 PAC-2 Patriot; 24 MIM-23B I-HAWK Phase III;
SP 74: 66 HMMWV TOW; 8 M901
12 Skyguard/Aspide
MANPATS 44+: 44 TOW-2; M47 Dragon
RCL 84mm ε200 Carl Gustav
AD • SAM 60+
Paramilitary ε7,100 active
STATIC/SHELTER 12 Aspide National Guard ε6,600 active
MANPAD 48 Starburst; Stinger
FORCES BY ROLE
GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon
SPECIAL FORCES
ARV 24+: 24 M88A1/2; Type 653A; Warrior
1 SF bn
MW Aardvark Mk2
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Navy ε2,000 (incl 500 Coast Guard) 1 armd car bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Other
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 3 security bn
PCFG 2: COMBAT SUPPORT
1 Al Sanbouk (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr 1 MP bn
with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 Istiqlal (GER Lurssen FPB-57) with 2 twin lnchr with RECCE 20 VBL
MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun APC (W) 97+: 5+ Desert Chameleon; 70 Pandur; 22 S600
PBF 1 Al Nokatha (US Mk V Pegasus) (a further 9 on order; (incl variants)
ISD by end-2013) ARV Pandur
Middle East and North Africa 335
Middle East
US$ 1.62bn 1 AB regt
Def bdgt LP 1.74tr 1.69tn 1.73tn Amphibious
US$ 1.15bn 1.11bn 1 mne cdo regt
FMA (US) US$ 100m 100m Other
1 Presidential Guard bde
US$1=LP 1,519.01 1,519.61
5 intervention regt
Population 4,143,101 2 border sy regt
Ethnic and religious groups: Christian 30%; Druze 6%; Armenian COMBAT SUPPORT
4%, excl ε300,000 Syrians and ε350,000 Palestinian refugees 2 arty regt
1 engr regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 MP bde
Male 11.8% 4.6% 4.8% 4.5% 19.2% 4.2% COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Female 11.2% 4.4% 4.6% 4.4% 21.5% 4.8% 1 log bde
1 med regt
Capabilities EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The most capable armed forces in Lebanon are those of MBT 326: 233 T-54/T-55; 93 M48A1/A5
Hizbullah. These have extensively re-armed since the 2006 RECCE 54 AML
war with Israel and have sufficient rockets and missiles AIFV 16 AIFV-B-C25
to pose a significant threat to at least northern Israeli APC 1,240
territory. Although it could not prevent an attack by the APC (T) 1,164 M113A1/A2
modernised Israeli land forces, it has continued to develop APC (W) 76: 1 M3 VTT; 75 VAB VCT
its forces, fortifications and military infrastructure to ARTY 522
impose significant costs on any Israeli ground incursion. TOWED 166: 105mm 13 M101A1; 122mm 41: 8 D-30; 33
Its armed forces are more than capable of protecting its M-30 M-1938; 130mm 15 M-46; 155mm 97: 18 M114A1; 65
political position within Lebanon, where it now is part of M198; 14 Model-50
the government. Meanwhile, the Lebanese regular military MRL 122mm 22 BM-21
is able to meet internal-security requirements for those MOR 334: 81mm 134; 82mm 112; 120mm 88 Brandt
parts of the state not controlled by Hizbullah. But they are AT
not capable of countering Hizbullah influence and activity. MSL • MANPATS 38: 26 Milan; 12 TOW
The army in recent years has seen a number of inventory RCL 106mm 113 M40A1
modernisation drives, such as that to re-equip its APC fleet RL 73mm M-50; 90mm 8 M-69
336 The Military Balance 2012
AD Customs
SAM • MANPAD 84 9K32 Strela-2/2M (SA-7A Grail/SA- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
7B Grail)‡ PB 7: 5 Aztec; 2 Tracker
GUNS • TOWED 81: 20mm 23; 23mm 58 ZU-23
ARV M113 ARV; T-54/55 ARV reported Foreign Forces
VLB MTU-72 reported
Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent
MW Bozena
total numbers for the mission in Israel, Syria & Lebanon.
UAV • ISR • Medium 8 Mohajer IV
Argentina 3 obs
Navy 1,100 Australia 12 obs
Austria 7 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bangladesh UNIFIL 326: 1 FFG; 1 PCO
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
Belarus UNIFIL 3
PB 11: 1 Aamchit (GER Bremen); 1 Al Kalamoun (FRA Avel
Gwarlarn); 7 Tripoli (UK Attacker/Tracker Mk 2); 1 Naquora Belgium 2 obs • UNIFIL 99: 1 engr coy
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Slovenia 3 obs • UNIFIL 14; 1 inf pl transitional government controls a small number of
Spain UNIFIL 1,069: 1 mech inf bde HQ; 1 armd inf bn formations, including the Tripoli brigade. Other brigades,
Sri Lanka UNIFIL 151: 1 inf coy including the Misrata brigade, are of fluctuating size and
Sweden 6 obs organisation and are not fully under control of the new
Switzerland 11 obs government. A tank company and artillery battery appear
Tanzania UNIFIL 154; 2 MP coy extant, but there is no evidence of their use of any other
combat support.
Turkey UNIFIL 357: 1 engr coy; 1 PB
United States 1 obs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Much equipment was damaged or destroyed during the
civil war. It is not yet clear how much of Libya’s previous
Libya LBY holdings are still operational and available to the new
Libyan Dinar D 2010 2011 2012 government.
MBT some: T-72; T-62; T-55
GDP D 90.3bn -
RECCE some: BRDM-2; EE-9 Cascavel
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Middle East
MANPATS some: 9K11 Maljutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K11
Capabilities Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan
RCL some: 106mm M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustav
Although the National Transitional Council is acting AD • SAM • SP: Crotale (quad); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;
as interim government, it is not clear that it has any 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin);
meaningful authority over the forces of the former rebels. 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
These consist of a large number of ‘brigades’, most of GUNS
which have little formal structure of command and SP 23mm some ZSU-23-4
control and vary in size from a few tens of personnel to TOWED: 14.5mm some ZPU-2; 30mm M-53/59; 40mm
several thousand. These include the relatively cohesive L/70; 57mm S-60
and capable ‘Misrata Brigade’ and the externally trained RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
‘Tripoli Brigade’. Several hundred foreign advisers, many MSL • TACTICAL • SSM some: FROG-7; Scud-B
from Qatar, assisted the rebel forces during the war. It ARV T-54/55 ARV
is not clear how many, if any, remain. Although only a
proportion of Gadhafi-regime weapons were destroyed
Navy (incl Coast Guard) not known
in the fighting, the rebels are mostly infantry mounted in
4×4 ‘technical’ vehicles, largely armed with anti-aircraft EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
cannon. Although it is possible to estimate remaining SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Khyber† (FSU
warships and military aircraft (many were destroyed Foxtrot) each with 10 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft)
during the air campaign), it is not clear if Libya retains any PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
credible air or maritime capability. FRIGATES • FFGM 1 Al Hani† (FSU Koni) with 2 twin
lnchr (with P-15 Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 1 twin
ACTIVE not known lnchr with 9K33 Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin
RESERVE not known 406mm ASTT with USET-95 Type 40 LWT, 1 RBU 6000
Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm gun
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
Organisations by Service CORVETTES • FSGM 1Tariq Ibin Ziyad (FSU Nanuchka
II) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit-M (SS-N-2C
Army not known Styx) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with SA-N-4 Gecko SAM
FORCES BY ROLE PBFG 10:
The old Libyan army effectively ceased to exist as an 4 Al Zuara (FSU Osa II) with 4 single lnchr with P-15
organised force during the 2011 civil war. The new Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM
338 The Military Balance 2012
1 cdo/para bn Dah Ould Bah (FRA Amgram 14); 1 Yaboub Ould Rajel (FRA
Other RTB 18)
2 (camel corps) bn
1 gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bn
Morocco MOR
4 ADA bty Moroccan Dirham D 2010 2011 2012
1 engr coy GDP D 767bn 815bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 90.4bn 101bn
MBT 35 T-54/T-55 per capita US$ 2,857 3,147
RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 Saladin
Growth % 3.70 4.62
APC
Inflation % 1.0 1.5
Middle East
ARTY 194 Def bdgt D 26.9bn 27.0bn
TOWED 80: 105mm 36 HM-2/M-101A1; 122mm 44: 20 US$ 3.16bn 3.34bn
D-30; 24 D-74 FMA (US) US$ 9.0m 9.0m
MOR 114: 60mm 24; 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt US$1=D 8.49 8.10
AT • MSL • MANPATS 24 Milan
Population 31,968,361
RCL 114: 75mm ε24 M20; 106mm ε90 M40A1
AD • SAM 104 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SP ε4 SA-9 Gaskin (reported)
Male 14.1% 4.6% 4.7% 4.5% 18.5% 2.8%
MANPAD ε100 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Female 13.7% 4.6% 4.8% 4.7% 19.6% 3.3%
GUNS • TOWED 82: 14.5mm 28: 16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU-
4; 23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60;
100mm 12 KS-19
Capabilities
ARV T-54/55 ARV reported Morocco’s armed forces are well trained, enjoying a good
relationship with the US and French militaries. The armed
Navy ε620 forces have gained extensive experience in counter-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE insurgency operations in difficult operating conditions
in the Western Sahara. This has given them expertise
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
in desert warfare and combined air–land operational
PCO 1 Voum-Legleita
experience, although there is little capability to launch tri-
PCC 5: 1 Abourbekr Ben Amer (FRA OPV 54); 1 Arguin; 2
service operations. The country has taken part in many
Conjera; 1 Limam El Hidran (PRC Huangpu)
peacekeeping operations, providing overseas experience for
PB 6: 1 El Nasr (FRA Patra); 4 Mandovi; 1 Yacoub Ould Rajel
thousands of its troops.
However, there has been little experience in state-on-
Air Force 250 state warfare. The military is relatively mobile, relying
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE on mechanised infantry, supported by a modest fleet of
AIRCRAFT medium-lift, fixed-wing transport aircraft and various
TPT 7: Light 6: 2 BN-2 Defender; 2 PA-31T Navajo/ transport helicopters. Air force equipment is ageing, with
Cheyenne II; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 1 Basler BT-67 the bulk of the combat fleet procured in the 1970s and
TRG 8: 4 EMB-312 Tucano; 4 SF-260E 1980s. However, this is being rectified by an order for 24
HELICOPTERS F-16 fighter aircraft that have begun delivery, one of the
MRH 3: 1 SA313B Alouette II; 2 Z-9 benefits of a closer relationship with the US since the early
340 The Military Balance 2012
2000s built amid a shared concern over non-state armed APC (T) 486: 400 M113A1/A2; 86 M577A2
threats. The navy is the least favoured and used of the APC (W) 365: 45 VAB VCI; 320 VAB VTT
three services, with a moderately sized but ageing fleet of ARTY 2,141
patrol and coastal craft that is incapable of preventing fast- SP 282: 105mm 5 Mk 61; 155mm 217: 84 M109A1/A1B;
boat smuggling across the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, 43 M109A2; 90 (AMX) Mk F3; 203mm 60 M110
the navy’s two French-built frigates have, over the past TOWED 118: 105mm 50: 30 L118 Light Gun; 20 M101;
decade, provided a much-improved sea-control capability. 130mm 18 M-46; 155mm 50: 30 FH-70; 20 M114
Morocco is a partner in the FREMM frigate programme. MRL 35 BM-21
MOR 1,706
ACTIVE 195,800 (Army 175,000 Navy 7,800 Air SP 56: 106mm 32–36 M106A2; 120mm 20 (VAB APC)
13,000) Paramilitary 50,000 TOWED 1,650: 81mm 1,100 Expal model LN; 120mm
Terms of service conscription 18 months authorised; most 550 Brandt
enlisted personnel are volunteers AT • MSL 790
RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) SP 80 M-901
MANPATS 710: 40 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 440
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
PB 26: 6 El Wacil (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10 15 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules (with side-looking
Rodman 101 radar); Light 21: 4 Beech 100 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King
AMPHIBIOUS 6 Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 3 Beech
LANDING SHIPS 4: 350 King Air; 7 CN-235; 2 Do-28; PAX 9: 1 B-737BBJ; 2
LSM 3 Ben Aicha (FRA Champlain BATRAL) (capacity 7 Falcon 20; 2 Falcon 20 (ELINT); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1
tanks; 140 troops) Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream V-SP
LST 1 Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah (US Newport)
TRG 64: 12 AS-202 Bravo; 19 Alpha Jet*; 2 CAP-10; 8 T-6C
(capacity 3 LCVP; 400 troops)
Texan; 9 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 14 T-37B Tweet
LANDING CRAFT 2
HELICOPTERS
LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5)
LCU 1 Lt Malghah (FRA Edic) MRH 19 SA342L Gazelle (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: TPT 70: Heavy 7 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 24 SA330
AK 2; AGOR 1 (US lease); YDT 1 Puma; Light 39: 25 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 Jet
Ranger (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212)
Marines 1,500 MSL
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Middle East
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 (mobile) paramilitary gp
2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II 1 coast guard unit
1 sqn (forming) with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CH)
1 sqn
1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EH)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with EC-130H Hercules; Falcon 20 (ELINT) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PB33
MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT • TRG 2 R-235 Guerrier
1 flt with Do-28 HELICOPTERS
TANKER/TRANSPORT MRH 14: 3 SA-315B Lama; 2 SA-316 Alouette III; 3 SA-
1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H Hercules 318 Alouette II; 6 SA-342K Gazelle
TRANSPORT TPT 8: Medium 6 SA-330 Puma; Light 2 SA-360
1 sqn with CN-235 Dauphin
1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Beech 200/300 King Air; Falcon
50; Gulfstream II/III/V-SP Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile
TRAINING
Intervention Corps)
1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
ATTACK HELICOPTER Customs/Coast Guard
1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle (Some with HOT) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PB 49: 4 Erraid; 18 Arcor 46; 15 Arcor 53; 12 (other SAR
1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB- craft)
206); Bell 212 (AB-212)
1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook
1 sqn with SA330 Puma Deployment
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE CÔTE D’IVOIRE
AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable
UN • UNOCI 726; 1 inf bn
FTR 22: 19 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II
FGA 31: 4 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; 16 Mirage F-1C Democratic Republic of the Congo
(F-1CH); 11 Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) UN • MONUSCO 848; 5 obs; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital
ELINT 2 EC-130H Hercules
TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules Serbia
TPT 49: Medium 19: 2 C-27J Spartan (2 more on order); NATO • KFOR 158; 1 inf coy
342 The Military Balance 2012
Light
Oman OMN 1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 fd engr regt, 1 engr
regt, 1 sigs regt)
Omani Rial R 2010 2011 2012
1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt)
GDP R 22.2bn 25.7bn 1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force)
US$ 57.5bn 66.6bn Air Manoeuvre
per capita US$ 19,386 21,983 1 AB regt
Growth % 4.11 4.35 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty)
Inflation % 3.3 3.8
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Def bdgt R 1.62bn 1.65bn 1 tpt regt
US$ 4.18bn 4.27bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FMA (US) US$ 11.85m 13.0m MBT 117: 38 CR2 Challenger 2; 6 M-60A1; 73 M-60A3
US$1=R 0.39 0.39 LT TK 37 Scorpion
RECCE 137: 13 Sultan; 124 VBL
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Population 3,027,959
APC 206
Expatriates: 27% APC (T) 16: 6 FV 103 Spartan; 10 FV4333 Stormer
APC (W) 190: 175 Piranha (incl variants); 15 AT-105 Saxon
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ARTY 233
Male 16.0% 5.2% 5.6% 6.3% 20.3% 1.6% SP 155mm 24 G-6
Female 15.2% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 13.6% 1.5% TOWED 108: 105mm 42 ROF lt; 122mm 30 D-30; 130mm
24: 12 M-46; 12 Type-59-I; 155mm 12 FH-70
Capabilities MOR 101: 81mm 69; 107mm 20 M-30; 120mm 12 Brandt
AT • MSL 88
Oman’s armed forces are relatively capable and, although
SP 8 VBL (TOW)
small in comparison to larger regional neighbours, the MANPATS 80: 30 Javelin; 32 Milan; 18 TOW/TOW-2A
military is well-staffed given the country’s population, RL 73mm RPG-7 Knout; 94mm LAW-80
with a strong history of cooperation and training with the AD • SAM 74+
UK armed forces. It retains an effective inventory handled SP 20: up to 12 Pantsyr S1E SPAAGM; 8 Mistral 2
by well-trained personnel. Despite a lack of warfighting MANPAD 54: 20 Javelin; 34 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
experience it maintains a good state of readiness. GUNS 26: 23mm 4 ZU-23-2; 35mm 10 GDF-005 (with
The armed forces have remained well funded. This has Skyguard); 40mm 12 L/60 (Towed)
ensured a steady flow of new equipment, primarily from ARV 11: 4 Challenger; 2 M88A1; 2 Piranha; 3 Samson
the UK and the US, to maintain military effectiveness.
Although focused on territorial defence, there is some Navy 4,200
versatility of roles within the military, with a small EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
amphibious capability, a relatively high proportion of SUBMARINES • SWIMMER DELIVERY VEHICLES 2
airlift and modest sealift and the Royal Guard brigade, Mk 8
which reports directly to the sultan and carries out internal PRIMARY SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
security and ceremonial functions. FFGHM 1 Al-Shamikkh with 2 quadruple lnchr with MM-
40 Exocet Block III AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr with VL MICA
However, there are capability gaps, such as anti-
SAM, 1 76mm gun
submarine warfare, and greater training and equipment
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
(particularly ISR systems) are required to cope more
CORVETTES • FSGM 2
effectively with security issues such as smuggling across 2 Qahir Al Amwaj with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet
the Strait of Hormuz. Oman is a GCC member. AShM, 2 triple 324mm TT (to be fitted), 1 octuple lnchr
ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200 Air with Crotale SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
PCFG 4 Dhofar with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet
5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household 6,400)
AShM, 1 76mm gun
Paramilitary 4,400 PCC 3 Al Bushra (FRA P-400) with 4 single 406mm TT, 1
76mm gun
Organisations by Service PB 4 Seeb (UK Vosper 25m, under 100 tonnes)
AMPHIBIOUS 6
LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Nasr el Bahr (with hel deck)
Army 25,000
(capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops)
FORCES BY ROLE LANDING CRAFT 5: 1 LCU; 3 LCM; 1 LCT
(Regt are bn size) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
MANOEUVRE AK 1 Al Sultana
Armoured AKSH 1 Fulk Al Salamaf
1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt) AGHS 1
Middle East and North Africa 343
AP 2 Shinas (Commercial Tpt - Auxiliary military role Royal Yacht Squadron 150
only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • MISC
AX 1 Al Mabrukah (with hel deck, also used in OPV role) BOATS/CRAFT • DHOW 1 Zinat Al Bihaar
AXS 1 Shabab Oman LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
YAC 2 RY 2: 1 Al Said; 1 (Royal Dhow)
TPT 1 Fulk Al Salamah (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332
Air Force 5,000 Super Puma hel
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Royal Flight 250
1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon; AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 5: 2 B-747SP; 1 DC-8-73CF; 2
1 sqn with Hawk Mk103; Hawk Mk203 Gulfstream IV
2 sqn with Jaguar S (OS)/Jaguar B (OB) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6: 3 SA330 (AS330)
TRANSPORT Puma; 2 AS332F Super Puma; 1 AS332L Super Puma
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules;
1 sqn with SC.7 3M Skyvan (7 radar-equipped, for MP) Paramilitary 4,400 active
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
TRAINING
1 sqn with MFI-17B Mushshak; PC-9*; AB-206 Tribal Home Guard 4,000
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER org in teams of ε100
3 (med) sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205) Jet Ranger; Bell 212
(AB-212); Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR)
Police Coast Guard 400
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 56
AIR DEFENCE
PCO 2 Haras
2 sqn with Rapier; Blindfire; S713 Martello
PBF 23: 20 Cougar Enforcer 33; 3 Mk V Pegasus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PB 31: 5 Vosper 75; 1 CG27; 3 CG29; 1 P1903; 14 Rodman
AIRCRAFT 54 combat capable 58; 2 D59116; 5 Zahra
FGA 26: 8 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block
50 Fighting Falcon; 12 Jaguar S (OS); 2 Jaguar B (OB) Police Air Wing
TPT 12: Medium 3 C-130H Hercules; Light 7 SC.7 3M AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Turbine Islander; 2
Skyvan (7 radar-equipped, for MP); PAX 2 A320-300 CN-235M; 1 Do-228
Middle East
Mushshak; 12 PC-9* 214ST (AB-214ST)
HELICOPTERS
MRH 15 Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR)
TPT 31: Medium 6 NH-90 (20 on order); Light 25: 19 Bell
Foreign Forces
205 (AB-205); 3 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 212 United Kingdom Army 40; Navy 20; Air Force 20; 1
(AB-212) Tristar tkr; 1 Sentinel
AD • SAM 40 Rapier
RADAR • LAND 6+: 6 Blindfire; S713 Martello
MSL Palestinian Territories PT
AAM • IR AIM-9N/M/P Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C
AMRAAM New Israeli Shekel NS 2010 2011 2012
ASM 20 AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-65 Maverick GDP US$
per capita US$
Royal Household 6,400
Growth %
(incl HQ staff)
Inflation %
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES US$1=NS 3.74 3.55
2 SF regt *definitive economic data unavailable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LT TK 9 VBC-90
Capabilities
APC (W) 73: ε50 Type-92; 14 VAB VCI; 9 VAB VDAA The Palestinian Authority’s National Security Force is a
ARTY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A paramilitary organisation intended to provide internal se-
AT • MSL • MANPATS Milan curity support within Gaza and the West Bank. However,
AD • SAM • MANPAD 14 Javelin since 2007 the Gaza strip has been run by Hamas, which
GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA seems to be transitioning from solely a terror group to a
344 The Military Balance 2012
Population 1,849,257
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Organisations by Service Ethnic groups: Nationals 25%; Expatriates 75% of which Indian
18%; Iranian 10%; Pakistani 18%
There are few data available on the status of the organisa-
tions mentioned below. Following internal fighting in June Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
2007, Gaza is under the de facto control of Hamas, while
Male 11.2% 4.1% 5.3% 7.8% 37.1% 0.9%
the West Bank is controlled by the emergency Palestinian
Authority administration. Female 10.5% 3.0% 3.0% 3.1% 13.3% 0.6%
Paramilitary Capabilities
Qatar maintains a small military with limited capability,
National Forces ε56,000 (reported) although its equipment is relatively modern and its forces
GENERAL SECURITY are well trained and motivated. As with other small Gulf
Presidential security 3,000 states, Qatar relies on its international alliances, primarily
SF 1,200 with the US and through the GCC, to guarantee its security.
Police 9,000 However, a high proportion of government spending goes
to defence, so the Qatari military has been able to maintain
Preventative Security n.k.
an adequate defence capability despite its small size. Some
Civil Defence 1,000 equipment, particularly main battle tanks and fast missile
AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; craft, are ageing, but high-technology weapons, such as
Stinger reported Exocet anti-ship missiles, make these platforms capable
The Al-Aqsa Brigades profess loyalty to the Fatah group of fulfilling their primary role of border and maritime
that dominates the Palestinian Authority. The strength of security.
this group is not known. The armed forces suffer from a number of capability
Hamas groupings include internal-security groupings gaps, particularly in air defence, and the age of some
such as the Executive Force (est strength: 10–12,000; major equipment may hamper its ability to perform in high-
equipment include: artillery rockets, mortars, SALW) and tempo operations. A substantial boost to spending and
the al-Qassam Brigades (est strength: 10,000; major equip- procurement is unlikely without a more immediate external
ment include: mines and IEDs, artillery rockets, mortars, stimulus. However, the air force has seen investment in
SALW) recent years, with the arrival of C-17 transports, which
– along with Mirage 2000 aircraft – were deployed on
operations over Libya to enforce UNSCR 1973. Later in the
year, the chief of staff also admitted that Qatar deployed
‘hundreds’ of ground troops to conduct liaison duties.
Organisations by Service
Army 8,500
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF coy
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 AT bn, 1 mor sqn)
Middle East and North Africa 345
Mechanised TRANSPORT
3 mech inf bn 1 sqn with C-17; C-130J (4 on order, delivery to begin by
Light end 2011)
1 (Royal Guard) bde (3 inf regt) 1 sqn with A-340; B-707; B-727; Falcon 900
COMBAT SUPPORT ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 fd arty bn 1 ASuW sqn with Commando Mk3 with Exocet;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SA342L Gazelle with HOT
MBT 30 AMX-30 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
RECCE 68: 12 AMX-10RC; 20 EE-9 Cascavel; 12 Ferret; 8 Some sqn with Commando Mk2A; Commando Mk2C;
V-150 Chaimite; 16 VBL AW139; SA341 Gazelle
AIFV 40 AMX-10P EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC 226 AIRCRAFT 18 combat capable
APC (T) 30 AMX-VCI FGA 12: 9 Mirage M-2000ED; 3 Mirage M-2000D
APC (W) 196: 36 Piranha II; 160 VAB TPT 8: Heavy 2 C-17 Globemaster; Medium (4 C-130J on
ARTY 89 order); PAX 6: 1 A340; 2 B-707; 1 B-727; 2 Falcon 900
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Middle East
1 HQ located at Doha Deployment
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 LEBANON
PCFG 7: UN • UNIFIL 3
4 Barzan (UK Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM-40
Exocet AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Foreign Forces
76mm gun
United Kingdom Air Force: 4 C-130J
3 Damsah (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr with
United States US Central Command: 678; elm 1 (APS)
MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
HBCT set (equipment in use); USAF CAOC
PB 3 Q-31 series
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCT 1 Rabha
(capacity 3 MBT; 110 troops)
Marine Police
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
PBF 4 DV 15
PB 7: 4 Crestitalia MV-45; 3 Halmatic M160
Coastal Defence
FORCES BY ROLE
MISSILE
1 bty with 3 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MSL • AShM Some MM-40 Exocet AShM
Middle East
MHC 3 Al Jawf (UK Sandown) ISR 10 Tornado GR1A*
AMPHIBIOUS 8 AEW&C 5 E-3A Sentry
LCU 4 1610 (capacity 120 troops) ELINT 3: 2 RE-3A/1 RE-3B
LCM 4 LCM 6 (capacity 80 troops) TKR/TPT 7 KC-130H Hercules
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17
TKR 8: 7 KE-3A, 1 A330 MRTT (total of 6 on order)
AORH 2 Boraida (mod FRA Durance) (capacity either 2
TPT 53 Medium 35: 29 C-130H; 2 C-130H-30 Hercules; 4
AS365F Dauphin 2 hel or 1 AS332C Super Puma)
YAC 2 L-100-30HS (hospital ac); Light 18: 13 Cessna 172; 4 CN-
YTB 2 235; 1 Jetstream Mk31
YTM 11 Radhwa TRG 101: 25 Hawk Mk65* (incl aerobatic team); 16 Hawk
Mk65A*; 20 MFI-17 Mushshak; 40 PC-9
Naval Aviation HELICOPTERS
HELICOPTERS MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR)
MRH 34: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 15 AS565 with AS-15TT TPT 30: Medium 10 AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Light 20: 20
AShM; 13 Bell 406CS Combat Scout
Bell 212 (AB-212)
TPT • Medium 12 AS332F Super Puma/AS532B Super
MSL
Puma with AM-39 Exocet AShM
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
Marines 3,000 AShM Sea Eagle
FORCES BY ROLE LACM Storm Shadow
MANOEUVRE ARM ALARM
Amphibious AAM • IR AIM-9P/AIM-9L Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7
1 inf regt with (2 inf bn) Sparrow; AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (W) 140 BMP-600P Royal Flt
AIRCRAFT • TPT 20; Medium 4 VC-130H; Light 3: 1
Air Force 20,000 Cessna 310; 2 Learjet 35; PAX 13: 1 B-737-200; 2 B-747SP; 4
FORCES BY ROLE BAe-125-800; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 A340; 2 Boeing 737-BBJ;
FIGHTER 1 Gulfstream GIV
1 sqn with F-15S Eagle HELICOPTERS • TPT 3+; Medium 3: 2 AS-61; 1 S-70
4 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle Black Hawk; Light Some Bell 212 (AB-212)
348 The Military Balance 2012
of protesters. Elite units have demonstrated loyalty 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with SS-21)
to the Assad regime and ruthlessness in suppressing 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with Scud-B/C)
demonstrators. Conventional army units, seen as less
reliable, have been kept away from the centres of dissent. Reserves
Even so, a growing number of defections, mostly from FORCES BY ROLE
junior officers and soldiers, have been recorded, raising COMMAND
questions about the army’s cohesiveness. A proportion 1 armd div HQ
of conscript and regular personnel have refused to fight. MANOEUVRE
Armoured
There is some evidence that a ‘Free Syrian Army’ composed
4 armd bde
largely of defectors from the regular forces has a limited 2 tk regt
capability to mount small-scale attacks on government Light
forces. It is not clear that the regime has sufficient loyal 31 inf regt
forces to guarantee survival against a sustained campaign COMBAT SUPPORT
of protest or an active armed insurgency, particularly if 3 arty regt
violence spreads further across the country. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Since the unhindered 2007 destruction, by airstrike, of MBT 4,950: 1,500–1,700 T-72 T-72M; 1,000 T-62K/T-62M;
the alleged Syrian nuclear reactor at Deir Al Zoir – which 2,250 T-55/T-55MV (some in store)
was widely believed to have been carried out by Israel – the RECCE 590 BRDM-2
conventional balance has moved further in Israel’s favour, AIFV up to 2,450 BMP-1/BMP-2/BMP-3
with doubts over Syrian air defence raised by that raid, and APC (W) 1,500: 500 BTR-152; 1,000 BTR-50/BTR-60/BTR-
the combat capability of Syrian land forces being eroded 70
by the adverse effects of their current internal-security ARTY up to 3,440+
operations. However, capability acquisitions continue, and SP 500+: 122mm 450+: 400 2S1 Carnation (Gvosdik);
in late 2011 it was reported that Syria was due to procure 50+ D-30 (mounted on T34/85 chassis); 152mm 50 2S3
the Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missile for the Bastion (Akatsiya)
coastal defence system from Russia. TOWED 2,030: 122mm 1,150: 500 D-30; 150 (M-30)
M1938; 500 in store (no given designation); 130mm
ACTIVE 295,000 (Army 220,000 Navy 5,000 Air 700-800 M-46; 152mm 70 D-20/ML-20 M1937; 180mm
Middle East
MRL up to 500: 107mm up to 200 Type-63; 122mm up
RESERVE 314,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 4,000 Air
to 300 BM-21 (Grad)
10,000 Air Defence 20,000)
MOR 410+: 82mm; 120mm circa 400 M-1943; 160mm
Terms of service conscription, 30 months
M-160 (hundreds); 240mm up to 10 M-240
AT • MSL 2,600
Organisations by Service SP 410 9P133 BRDM-2 Sagger
MANPATS 2190+: 150 AT-4 9K111 Spigot; 40 AT-5
Army 220,000 (incl conscripts) 9K113 Spandrel; AT-7 9K115 Saxhorn; 800 AT-10
FORCES BY ROLE 9K116 Stabber; 1,000 AT-14 9M133 Kornet; 200 Milan
COMMAND RL 105mm RPG-29
3 corps HQ AD • SAM 4,184+
SPECIAL FORCES SP 84: 14 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 20 9K31 Strela-1
1 SF div (10 SF gp) (SA-9 Gaskin); 20 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 30 9K35
MANOEUVRE Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
Armoured MANPAD 4,100+: 4,000+ 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
7 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 100 9K36 Strela-3
1 (Republican Guard) armd div (3 armd bde, 1 mech (SA-14 Gremlin)
bde, 1 arty bde) GUNS 1,225+
1 indep tk regt SP ZSU-23-4
Mechanised TOWED 23mm 600 ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm
3 mech div(-) (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) 600 S-60; 100mm 25 KS-19
Light MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 94+: 18 Scud-B/Scud-C/
4 indep inf bde Scud-D; 30 look-a-like; 18 FROG-7; 18+ SS-21 Tochka
5 (Border Guard) lt inf bde (under command of the (Scarab); 4 P-35 (SS-C-1B Sepal); 6 P-15M Termit-R (SS-C-3
General Security Directorate for border sy) Styx) (ε850 SSM msl total)
COMBAT SUPPORT ARV BREM-1 reported; T-54/55
2 arty bde VLB MTU; MTU-20
2 AT bde
1 (coastal defence) AShM bde with SS-C-1B Sepal and Navy 5,000
SS-C-3 Styx EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with FROG-7) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32:
350 The Military Balance 2012
CORVETTES • FS 2 Petya III (1†) with 1 triple 533mm TPT 23: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Light 13: 1 An-24 Coke; 6
ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1†, 2 twin An-26 Curl; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 4 Yak-40 Codling; PAX 7: 2
76mm gun Falcon 20; 1 Falcon 900; 4 Tu-134B-3
PBFG 22 TRG 81: 40 L-39 Albatros*; 35 MBB-223 Flamingo (basic);
16 Osa I/II with 4 single lnchr with P-15M Termit-M (SS- 6 MFI-17 Mushshak
N-2C Styx) AShM HELICOPTERS
6 Tir with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) ATK 33 Mi-25 Hind D
AShM MRH 70: 40 Mi-17 Hip H; 30 SA342L Gazelle
PB 8 Zhuk TPT • Medium 40 Mi-8 Hip
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7: MSL
MHC 1 Sonya ASM Kh-25 (AS-7 Kerry); HOT
MSO 1 Natya AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
MSI 5 Yevgenya (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-40/46 (AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny B (AA-7 Apex); R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
(capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Japan UNDOF 31; elm 1 log bn in the short term. As such, the country will most probably
Malawi 1 obs continue to rely on surplus stocks of US, French and Italian
Nepal 3 obs equipment for its arsenal, and will continue to use its
Netherlands 12 obs ageing combat equipment for the foreseeable future.
New Zealand 7 obs ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000)
Norway 12 obs Paramilitary 12,000
Philippines UNDOF 343; 1 inf bn Terms of service 12 months selective
Russia 4 obs • Army/Navy 150, naval facility reportedly
under renovation at Tartus Organisations by Service
Slovakia 3 obs
Slovenia 3 obs Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000)
Sweden 6 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
Switzerland 11 obs SPECIAL FORCES
United States 1 obs
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
1 SF bde
1 (Sahara) SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Tunisia TUN Mechanised
3 mech bde (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1
Tunisian Dinar D 2010 2011 2012 AD regt, 1 engr bn, 1 log gp)
GDP D 63.4bn 66.3bn COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr regt
US$ 43.9bn 47.3bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 4,129 4,452
MBT 84: 30 M60A1; 54 M60A3
Growth % 3.05 0.01 LT TK 48 SK-105 Kuerassier
Inflation % 4.4 3.5 RECCE 60: 40 AML-90; 20 Saladin
Def exp D APC 268
APC (T) 140 M113A1/A2
Middle East
FMA (US) US$ 15.0m 4.9m
ARTY 276
US$1=D 1.44 1.40 TOWED 115: 105mm 48 M101A1/A2; 155mm 67: 12
Population 10,629,186 M114A1; 55 M198
MOR 161: 81mm 95; 107mm 48 (some SP); 120mm 18
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Brandt
Male 11.3% 4.6% 4.8% 5.0% 21.4% 3.4% AT • MSL 590
Female 10.6% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 21.5% 4.0% SP 35 M901 ITV TOW
MANPATS 555: 500 Milan; 55 TOW
Capabilities RL 89mm 600: 300 LRAC; 300 M20
AD • SAM 86
Small and relatively poorly equipped by regional SP 26 M48 Chaparral
standards, Tunisia’s armed forces are reliant on conscripts, MANPAD 60 RBS-70
and much of the equipment across the three services is GUNS 127
outdated and in some cases approaching obsolescence. In SP 40mm 12 M-42
terms of internal security, the military’s role is limited as TOWED 115: 20mm 100 M-55; 37mm 15 Type-55 (M-
the National Guard, arguably better trained and designed 1939)/Type-65
to act as a counterbalance to the armed forces, takes the RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
lead on domestic stability. AEV 2 Greif
Nonetheless, the army was integral to the ‘Jasmine ARV 3 Greif; 6 M88A1
Revolution’ of January–February 2011, as it refused to
fire on protesters and verbally leant its support to the Navy ε4,800
demonstrations. The military was also utilised during the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Libyan uprising in 2011, with the army and air force able PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25
to patrol the borders relatively successfully and the navy PCFG 3 La Galite (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad
competently dealing with migrant flows and search-and- Mk140 lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
rescue operations in Tunisian waters. Tunisia’s armed forces PCG 3 Bizerte (FRA P-48) with 8 SS 12M AShM
were well suited to these constabulary roles, with more PCF 6 Albatros (GER Type 143B) with 2 single 533mm TT
traditional military roles such as high-tempo warfighting PB 13: 3 Utique (mod PRC Haizhui II); 4 Istiklal; 6 V Series
largely beyond their current capabilities. Modernisation of LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7:
the military’s current equipment may be undermined by AWT 1
the 2011 revolution, which will hamper economic growth AGS 1
352 The Military Balance 2012
ABU 3
AX 1 Salambo (US Conrad, survey) United Arab Emirates UAE
YTB 1
Emirati Dirham D 2010 2011 2012
Organisations by Service
Middle East
APC 892 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Learjet 35A
APC (T) 136 AAPC (incl 53 engr plus other variants) HELICOPTERS
APC (W) 756: 90 BTR-3U Guardian; 120 EE-11 Urutu; ASW 7 AS332F Super Puma (5 in ASUW role)
370 M-3 Panhard; 80 VCR (incl variants); 20 VAB; MRH 11: 7 AS565 Panther; 4 SA316 Alouette III
76 RG-31 Nyala
ARV 46 Air Force 4,500
ARTY 561+ Flying hours 110 hrs/year
SP 155mm 221: 78 G-6; 125 M-109A3; 18 Mk F3 FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 93: 105mm 73 ROF lt; 130mm 20 Type-59-I FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MRL 92+: 70mm 18 LAU-97; 122mm 48+: 48 Firos-25 (est 3 sqn with F-16E/F Block 60 Fighting Falcon
24 op); Type-90 (reported); 227mm 20 HIMARS being 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-9DAD/EAD/RAD
delivered; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch SEARCH & RESCUE
MOR 155: 81mm 134: 20 Brandt; 114 L16; 120mm 21 2 flt with AW109K2; AW139
Brandt TRANSPORT
AT • MSL 305+ 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules; L-100-30
SP 20 HOT 1 sqn with CN-235M-100
MANPATS 285+: 30 HOT; 230 Milan; 25 TOW; (Vigilant 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with AS-365F Dauphin 2; AS-550C3
in store) Fennec; AW-139; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; CH-47C
RCL 262: 84mm 250 Carl Gustav; 106mm 12 M-40 Chinook; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter
AD • SAM • MANPAD 40+: 20+ Blowpipe; 20 Mistral TRAINING
GUNS 62 1 sqn with Grob 115TA
SP 20mm 42 M3 VDAA 1 sqn with Hawk Mk63A/C*
TOWED 30mm 20 GCF-BM2 1 sqn with Hawk Mk102*
MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 6 Scud-B (up to 20 msl) 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
AEV 53 ACV-AESV TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ARV 143: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85 BREM-L; 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey
46 Leclerc ARV EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS AIRCRAFT 178 combat capable
ATK 30 AH-64D Apache FGA 139: 54 F-16E Block 60 Fighting Falcon (Desert
TPT 15 Heavy 4 CH-47F Chinook Medium 11 UH-60L Eagle); 25 F-16F Block 60 Fighting Falcon (13 to remain in
Black Hawk US for trg); 16 Mirage 2000-9DAD; 44 Mirage 2000-9EAD
354 The Military Balance 2012
Population 24,133,492
Hakeem 1/2/3 (A/B) HOT
LACM Black Shaheen (Storm Shadow/SCALP EG variant) Ethnic groups: Majority Arab, some African and South Asian
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; IIR/ARH
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Mica; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM
Male 21.9% 5.7% 5.0% 4.5% 12.4% 1.2%
Air Defence Female 21.1% 5.5% 4.9% 4.1% 12.2% 1.4%
FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE Capabilities
2 AD bde (3 bn with I-HAWK MIM-23B)
Yemen’s armed forces are under-equipped, poorly trained,
3 (short range) AD bn with Crotale; Mistral; Rapier; RB-
and in light of events in 2011, will have problems with
70; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
morale across the force. Despite a relatively high level
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE of defence spending compared to GDP, the country’s
AD • SAM underdeveloped economic status means that the state is
SP Crotale; RB-70 unable to exercise full control over internal security. The
TOWED I-HAWK MIM-23B; Rapier army is the best equipped of the services, but still relies
MANPAD Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) on Soviet-era equipment. The importance of tribal ties
NAVAL Mistral
within Yemen, combined with a conscription service
that was reintroduced in 2007, highlights the difficulties
Paramilitary facing the military in encouraging loyalty to the armed
Coast Guard forces and morale. This was compounded in early 2011
Ministry of Interior by the instability that beset the country as part of the Arab
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 Awakening, as a number of high-ranking military officers
PBF 9 (ITA Baglietto) deserted the president, defections were reported across
PB 44: 2 Protector; 16 (US Camcraft ’65); 5 (US military units and, in certain cases, loyal military units
Camcraft ’77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 Halmatic Work; 3 Al exchanged fire with defectors. The Yemeni air force and navy
Saber (a further 9 are in build; ISD by 2013) are unable to fulfil their core roles of defending territorial
sovereignty, with insufficient equipment and training.
UAE National Infrastructure Authority Given the size of the country, airlift is almost non-existent,
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS leading to severe problems in rapid internal military
PBF 7 MRTP 16 (a further 27 are in build) deployments. Some of the combat aircraft, meanwhile –
particularly the aged MiG-21s – are unreliable. The navy’s
Deployment Chinese-supplied Hounan class patrol boats may well be
unserviceable and, while international maritime forces on
AFGHANISTAN counter-piracy duties do liaise with representatives from
NATO • ISAF 35 the Yemeni Coast Guard, the rest of the small naval force
faces challenges in monitoring and securing the country’s
Foreign Forces extensive coastline. In an unusual privatisation of the
military, four naval patrol boats are hired by Yemen LNG,
Australia 313; 1 tpt det with 3 C-130 Hercules; 1 MP det
a Total-led foreign investment, to provide security outside
with 2 AP-3C Orion
a maritime exclusion zone around the LNG plant.
France 800: 6 Rafale, 1 KC-135F; 1 (Foreign Legion) BG (2
recce sqn, 2 inf sqn, 1 aty bty, 1 engr coy) ACTIVE 66,700 (Army 60,000 Navy 1,700 Air Force
South Korea: 140 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School) 3,000, Air Defence 2,000) Paramilitary 71,200
United States: 140; 2 bty with MIM-104 Patriot Terms of service conscription, 2 years
Middle East and North Africa 355
Middle East
BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152 in store) Candid
PPV 18 YLAV Cougar ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ARTY 1,307 3 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H); Bell 212; Ka-27; Mi-8 Hip;
SP 122mm 25 2S1 Carnation Mi-17 Hip H; Mi14PS; Mi-35 Hind
TOWED 310: 105mm 25 M101A1; 122mm 200: 130 D-30; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
30 M-1931/37; 40 M-30 M-1938; 130mm 60 M-46; 152mm AIRCRAFT 79 combat capable
10 D-20; 155mm 15 M114 FTR 10 F-5E Tiger II
COASTAL 130mm 36 SM-4-1 FGA 69: 15 MiG-21 Fishbed; 4 MiG-21U Mongol A*; 15
MRL 294: 122mm 280 BM-21 (150 op); 140mm 14 BM-14
MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 1 MiG-29UBT; 30 Su-22 Fitter D; 4
MOR 642: 81mm 250; 82mm 144 M-43; 107mm 12;
Su-22UM3 Fitter G
120mm 136; 160mm ε100
TPT 12: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Medium 3: 2 An-12 Cub; 1
AT • MSL • MANPATS 71: 35 AT-3 9K11 Sagger; 24 M47
C-130H Hercules; Light 6 An-26 Curl
Dragon; 12 TOW
TRG 36: 24 L-39C; 12 Z-242
RCL 75mm M-20; 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11
HELICOPTERS
RL 66mm M72 LAW
ATK 8 Mi-35 Hind
GUNS 50+
ASW 1 Ka-27 (tpt role)
SP 100mm 30 SU-100
TOWED 20+: 85mm D-44; 100mm 20 M-1944 MRH 10 Mi-17 Hip H
AD • SAM ε800 TPT 26: Medium 9 Mi-8 Hip; Light 6: 2 Bell 212; 4 Bell
SP 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 205 (UH-1H)
Gopher)
MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36 Strela-3 Air Defence 2,000
(SA-14 Gremlin) AD • SAM:
GUNS 530 SP 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin);
SP 70: 20mm 20 M163 Vulcan; 23mm 50 ZSU-23-4 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
TOWED 460: 20mm 50 M-167 Vulcan; 23mm 100 ZU- TOWED S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-
23-2; 3 Goa)
37mm 150 M-1939; 57mm 120 S-60; 85mm 40 M-1939 MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-
KS-12 14 Gremlin)
MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 28: 12 FROG-7; 10 SS-21 Scarab MSL • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); AIM-9
(Tochka); 6 Scud-B (ε33 msl) Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
356 The Military Balance 2012
Table 26 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Middle East and North Africa
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
Algeria (ALG)
T-90S MBT 300 US$1bn RUS Rosoboron 2006 2006 Deliveries ongoing
export
S-300PMU-2 SAM 8 US$1bn RUS Rosoboron 2006 2008 1st battery delivered 2008
export
Pantsir-S1 AD 38 US$500m RUS Rosoboron 2006 2010 Delivery underway
export
n.k. LPD 1 EUR 400 ITA Orizzonte 2011 2015 Contract signed in July 2011. To be
million Sistemi based on San Giusto class
(US$550 Navali
million)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Su-30MKA FGA ac 16 US$1bn RUS Rosoboron 2010 2011 Delivery to be complete by end 2012
export
Yak-130 Trg ac 16 US$250m RUS Rosoboron 2006 2011 Incl simulator. First delivered late
export 2011
Bahrain (BHR)
M113A2 APC n.k. n.k. TUR FNSS 2007 n.k. Refit with MKEK 81mm mortars
Upgrade
Egypt (EGY)
M1A1 Abrams MBT 125 US$349m US General 2007 2009 Co-production with Cairo plant. Final
Dynamics delivery due 2011
Middle East
(SA-3 Goa) Upgrade elniye to be upgraded in three stages. First
Sistemy stage completed 2006. Second stage
ongoing
Ambassador PCFG 4 US$1.3bn US VT Halter 2008 2012 Phase II of the Fast Missile Craft (FMC)
Mk III Marine project. First vessel delivered Oct
2011
n.k. PCC 4 US$20.2m US Swiftships 2011 n.k. Delivery to be complete by 2014
F-16C/D Fighting FGA ac 20 n.k. US Lockheed 2010 n.k. Sixteen F-16C and four F-16D. To be
Falcon Martin complete by 2013
C-295 Tpt ac 3 n.k. ESP EADS-CASA 2010 2011 First ac delivered Sep 2011;
remainder due late 2011
Iraq (IRQ)
BTR-4 APC (W) 420 US$2.5bn UKR Khariv 2010 2011 Contract value includes six An-32
Morozov tpt ac
Swiftships 35m PB 15 US$181m US Swiftships 2009 2012 For navy. Initial order was for
nine vessels. Option for further
three exercised with another
option for three more. First vessel
commissioned Sep 2010. As of Oct
2011, six had arrived in Iraq
F-16C/D Fighting FGA ac 18 εUS$3bn US Lockheed 2011 n.k. -
Falcon Block 52 Martin
Beech 350ER Tpt ac 6 US$10.5m US Hawker 2008 2010 Five Extended Range (ER) ISR ac; one
King Air Beechcraft lt tpt ac, plus spares and spt
C-130J Super Tpt ac 4 US$292.8m US Lockheed 2009 2012 Delivery to begin late 2012 and
Hercules Martin continue through 2013
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 2 US$140.3m US Lockheed 2009 n.k. For air force
Martin
358 The Military Balance 2012
Table 26 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Middle East and North Africa
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
An-32 Tpt ac 6 US$2.5bn UKR Antonov 2010 2011 Three aircraft complete, further two
ASTC/Aviant near completion. As of late 2011
delivery delayed by row between
purchaser and manufacturer.
Contract value includes 420 BTR-4
APC
Lasta-95 Trg ac 20 see notes SER UTVA 2007 2010 Option for further 16. Part of
US$230m deal. First 3 delivered Aug
2010
EC635 Tpt Hel 24 €360m FRA Eurocopter 2009 n.k. Cost incl training and maintenance
(US$490m)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Bell 407 Tpt Hel 24 US$60.3m US Bell 2009 n.k. For air force. FMS contract
Israel (ISR)
Arrow 2 ATBM/BMD n.k. n.k. ISR/US IAI 2008 n.k. Number and cost not known
Merkava Mk IV MBT up to 400 n.k. ISR n.k. 2001 2004 Estimated 50–60 tk per year over
four years
Dolphin (Type SSK 3 €1bn GER HDW 2006 2012 With Air-Independent Propulsion
800) class (US$1.21bn) (AIP) system. Third boat confirmed
by German defence minister in July
2011; contract not yet signed
F-35 Lightning II FGA ac 20 US$2.75bn US Lockheed 2010 2016 Option for a further 75
Martin
C-130J Hercules Tpt ac 1 US$98.6m US Lockheed 2010 2013 -
Martin
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 1 US$76.2m US Lockheed 2011 n.k. Contract includes long-lead items for
Hercules Martin additional C-130J-30 ac
Skylark I-LE ISR UAV 100 n.k. ISR Elbit 2008 n.k. Delivery in progress. Part of Sky Rider
Systems programme
Hermes 900 ISR UAV n.k. US$50m ISR Elbit 2010 2010 Price includes additional Hermes 450
Systems UAVs. Deliveries to occur 2010–13
Jordan (JOR)
YPR-765 AIFV 510 n.k. NLD n.k. 2010 2010 Order includes 69 M577s and
unknown number of YPR-806s.
Deliveries to be complete by 2014
M109A2 155mm SP 121 n.k. NLD n.k. 2010 2010 Deliveries to be complete by 2014
Arty
Kuwait (KWT)
Mk V PBF 10 US$461m US USMI 2009 July 2011 For navy. Final delivery due 2013
KC-130J Tkr ac 3 US$245m US Lockheed 2010 2013 Deliveries to be complete in early
Martin 2014
Lebanon (LBN)
T-72 MBT 31 Free transfer RUS n.k. 2010 n.k. Delivery status unclear
Mi-24 Hind Atk Hel 6 Free transfer RUS n.k. 2010 2010 In place of previously offered MiG-29
Fulcrum ac. Delivery status unclear
Libya (LBY)
Molniya-class PCGM 3 est $150m– RUS Vympel 2009 n.k. Contract status unclear following
$200m regime change
Yak-130 Trg ac 6 εUS$100m RUS Rosoboron 2010 2011 Contract status unclear following
export regime change
Middle East and North Africa 359
Table 26 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Middle East and North Africa
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
Morocco (MOR)
FREMM DDGHM 1 €470m FRA/ITA DCNS 2008 2012 Vessel launched in September 2011.
(US$676m) Delivery now expected 2013. Ship
named Mohammed VI
SIGMA FFGHM 3 €600m NLD Schelde 2008 2011 (Ship Integrated Geometrical
(US$875m) Modularity Approach) First vessel
launched Jul 2010. Final delivery due
2013
OPV-70 PSO 4 US$140m FRA STX 2008 2010 First vessel launched Aug 2010;
contract to be completed by 2014
F-16C/D Block 52 FGA ac 24 US$841.9m US Lockheed 2008 2011 Inc. mission equipment and spt
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Oman (OMN)
Project Khareef FFGHM 3 GB£400m UK BAE Systems 2007 2011 First vessel (Al-Shamikh) launched Jul
(US$785m) 2009; delivered 2011. Second vessel
(Al-Rahmani) launched Jul 2010
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 1 n.k. US Lockheed 2009 2012 -
Hercules Martin
C-130J-30 Tpt ac 2 n.k. US Lockheed 2010 2013 Delivery due in 2013 and 2014
Middle East
NH90 TTH Tpt Hel 20 n.k. NLD EADS 2003 2010 First delivered Jun 2010
Qatar (QTR)
AW139 MRH Hel 18 €260m ITA/UK Agusta 2008 2010 Twelve delivered by end 2011
(US$413m) Westland
AW139 MRH Hel 3 n.k. ITA/UK Agusta 2011 n.k. -
Westland
Table 26 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Middle East and North Africa
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
UH-60L Black Tpt Hel 2 US$28.6m US Sikorsky 2011 2012 Delivery to be complete in 2012
Hawk
Syria (SYR)
Buk-M2 SAM n.k. US$200m RUS Rosoboron 2007 2008 Delivery status unclear
export
96K6 Pantsir- AD 36 US$730m RUS Rosoboron n.k. 2007 Delivery reported to have begun in
S1E (SA-22 export late 2009; status unclear
Greyhound)
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Tunisia (TUN)
C-130J Hercules Tpt ac 2 n.k. US Lockheed 2010 2013 To be delivered 2013–14
Martin
SA342L Gazelle MRH Hel 6 n.k. FRA Aerotec 2010 n.k. Delivery status unclear
Central American challenges Zetas drug gang into Guatemala’s Petén province.
The most significant driver of policy change in the Costa Rica also signed agreements on law-enforce-
region in 2011 was non-state in nature – a security ment cooperation and border security with Mexico
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
the Caribbean
tive and rehabilitative activities. Notwithstanding In this context, one southern neighbour in partic-
the US commitment to provide Central America ular made its presence felt. Colombia has sought to
with US$300m of counter-narcotics funding, SICA play a greater role in Central America. It carried out
appealed unsuccessfully for approximately US$1bn joint air-interdiction exercises and signed an over-
from various prospective donors, including European flight agreement with Honduras and agreed trea-
governments preoccupied with their own sovereign- ties with Mexico on extradition, prisoner exchange,
debt crisis. Some external actors offered assistance in and legal and counter-narcotics cooperation. This
the form of credit. was closely linked to a wider effort by Bogotá to
Despite this setback, the SICA conference marked strengthen its regional defence and security ties.
an important milestone for the sub-region’s govern- As part of this drive, bilateral military–military
ments, which were united in recognition of the ties that had largely fallen into disuse in the final
scale of the security challenge they face. It was also years of the previous Álvaro Uribe administration
accompanied by a raft of policy initiatives aimed were reactivated, leading to fresh border-security
at improving Central American capabilities and accords with Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Brazil,
cooperation. The Guatemalan government began a and a Memorandum of Understanding on defence
programme to expand radar coverage of its airspace; and security cooperation with Chile. Meanwhile, a
moved to annul a 2004 cap on the defence budget Defence and Military Cooperation agreement with
of 0.33% of GDP (the new ceiling will be the 0.66% Brazil (originally signed in 2008 to promote joint
of GDP established in the 1996 peace accords); and research and development in naval and air capabili-
agreed to improve information exchange and coop- ties) continues to progress in respective legislatures,
eration with Mexico to counter the incursion of the while the August 2011 Binational Border Security Plan
362 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
was swiftly followed by a joint river patrol involving the need to respond to illegal drug trafficking flows
Colombia’s army and Brazil’s army and marines. through the region, have focused on improving
Colombia’s relationship with Venezuela, poten- surveillance and control of their airspace and borders.
tially most difficult of all, was the key target of The Paraguayan government began to implement
Bogotá’s diplomacy – and here it was least satis- integrated civil–military airspace control and report-
factory. The countries’ defence ministers signed a edly directed funds towards increasing the number
counter-narcotics information exchange agreement of military outposts along its northwestern border;
on 26 January, which was followed by the handover Argentina channelled extra spending, under the
of a small number of guerrillas and drug traffickers. ‘Northern Shield’ programme, into the development of
Nevertheless, cooperation between the governments a radar system that would allow for the interdiction of
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
was shaky and the extent of ongoing Colombian unauthorised flights; and Bolivia also announced that
insurgent presence in Venezuela remained unclear. it would install radar along its borders. Furthermore,
In addition, in a move that suggested the Venezuelan some governments also focused on improving the
armed forces’ underlying doctrinal hypothesis of administration of defence resources, expressing or
defensive war had not changed, Caracas continued acting on concerns over alleged corruption in defence
to build up its capabilities along the border with ministries. In Colombia, the perceived need to miti-
Colombia. Brigades in this area received significant gate the risk of maladministration led to the decision
amounts of their weaponry arriving from Russia. The to re-centralise all military procurement, reversing a
introduction of new Russian infantry-fighting vehi- decree issued by the Uribe government in 2006; and in
cles allowed the mechanisation of an existing infantry Paraguay, Congress and the military high command
brigade into the new 25th Mechanised Infantry clashed over allegations of bribery and the latter’s will-
Brigade, based only 13km from the Colombian ingness to contract services without issuing tenders.
border; this brigade and another (likely the 21st While long-standing inter-state disputes over
Infantry) based in the border town of San Cristóbal, territory and resources did not disappear, rhetoric
received Russian heavy mortars; and a new helicopter was cooler than before. Tensions between Costa Rica
battalion was created in the border state of Barinas. and Nicaragua, for example, subsided in early 2011
after both sides were ordered by the International
Policy matters Court of Justice to stand down, in a ruling phrased
At a strategic level, only Colombia and Peru imple- so that neither lost face by doing so. The dispute
mented major policy changes during 2011. The govern- over contested territory on the Caribbean side of
ment of Juan Manuel Santos in Colombia introduced their border did, however, lead to policy changes
the ‘Policy of Security and Defence for Prosperity’ in in Costa Rica. The government not only announced
May. This was essentially a modification of previous plans to improve defence infrastructure, such as heli-
initiatives to reflect improved state control over ports, along the shared border and the restoration
many areas of the country and the emergence of new of a substantial border police force abolished by the
threats, notably criminal bands (BACRIM) associated previous government, but also publicly mooted the
with drug trafficking. However, growing concern creation of armed forces (abolished more than 60
over security later in the year resulted in a set of new years ago). The first unit of the new border police
appointments at the Ministry of Defence and an order force was set up in March. It is believed that the force
to undertake an urgent revision of strategy. In Peru, will be paramilitary in character, with a focus on
President Ollanta Humala began his term in office countering transnational threats.
with a reform of the government’s security strategy In general, the region enjoyed a high degree
that would look to provide an integrated response to of benign neglect from extra-regional powers.
the growing problem of coca cultivation and associ- Despite high-profile visits by US President Barack
ated terrorist activity. Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and
There has generally been less equipment procure- the routine contacts and multilateral military exer-
ment than in recent years, with the notable excep- cises of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the
tion of Venezuela, which poured resources into the US maintained a low profile. Only SOUTHCOM’s
purchase of hardware and claimed it received further co-hosting with the Chilean Joint Staff of the third
credit from Russia, its principal arms supplier. Several Annual Conference of South American Defence
countries in the Southern Cone, increasingly aware of Chiefs, held in Santiago in late August, provided a
Latin America and the Caribbean 363
substantial public platform. This event focused on Guyana and Suriname) participated in its first mili-
regional military disaster-response and humani- tary exercise, UNASUR I, in Argentina. Meanwhile,
tarian-relief missions, with the US seeking to wrest some countries made bilateral progress in initia-
back some of the initiative regarding this topic from tives aligned with UNASUR’s agenda for confi-
the Union of South American Nations’ (UNASUR) dence- and security-building measures: Peru and
South American Defence Council (SADC). Russia Ecuador agreed that their plan to adopt a common
continued to channel substantial arms sales and mili- methodology for measuring defence expenditure
tary assistance to Venezuela, and Foreign Minister would be brought in by the end of the year, and in
Sergey Lavrov visited the region in August, but other- June Argentine and Chilean defence ministers Arturo
wise Moscow was cautious. It barred Venezuela from Puricelli and Andrés Allamand formally presented
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
a mooted transfer of an S-300 air-defence system to their binational peacekeeping force ‘Southern Cross’
Iran. However, Chinese defence contacts with the to visiting UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and
region showed little sign of slowing. The People’s signed a Memorandum of Understanding incorpo-
Liberation Army (PLA) liaised and/or signed agree- rating the force into the UN’s peacekeeping reserves.
ments with Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Uruguay; The first exercise for the binational force, one of the
Venezuela bought eight Chinese tactical transport most potent symbols of recent improvements in
aircraft (possibly Y-8s, due for delivery in mid-2012) Argentine–Chilean defence cooperation, is set to take
and Bolivia received six K-8 aircraft. place in mid-2012.
Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, various
Latin American countries had promoted their DEFENCE ECONOMICS
majority participation in the UN Haiti Stabilisation
Mission (MINUSTAH) as an example of Latin The years since the financial crisis have witnessed
Americanist South–South cooperation. However, in diverging growth trajectories in Latin America
2011 questions emerged over the entity’s future as and the Caribbean. High growth rates – sometimes
a result of alleged abuses committed by Uruguayan above 7% – have been experienced in countries
troops and consequent protests in Haiti. This, which have successfully decoupled themselves from
along with other factors, led Brazil and other Latin the advanced industrial economies of the US and
American governments to begin discussing a gradual Western Europe, and reoriented themselves towards
drawdown of their peacekeeping commitments on fast-growing emerging economies such as China.
the Caribbean
in October, but with reduced troop numbers.) Most and Uruguay are net commodities exporters, and
governments normalised their expectations and rhet- have benefited from strong demand for commodities,
oric about the SADC, although Brazil continued to rapidly expanding international trade with emerging
promote the institution. Despite the SADC’s reduced markets, and low dependence on remittances from
visibility, in September ten member states (all except industrial countries. With relatively healthy public
1.46 1.47
1.5 1.37 1.35
1.31 1.29 1.33 1.29
1.25
1.19
1.2
% of GDP
0.9
0.6
0.3
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 12 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP
364 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
Table 27 Latin America Defence Expenditure 2010–2011: Top 10 and Sub-Regional Breakdown1 (US$ bn)
2010 % of Regional Total 2011 % of Regional Total Real % Change3
Top 10 Defence Spending Countries
Brazil 33.70 55.71% 36.55 55.27% - 5.1%
Colombia 5.92 9.79% 6.43 9.72% 1.3%
Mexico 4.62 7.93% 5.15 7.79% 3.9%
Venezuela2 4.26 7.05% 4.38 6.62% - 6.4%
Chile 3.49 5.76% 4.24 6.41% 9.0%
Argentina 3.22 5.32% 3.10 4.68% - 9.7%
Peru 1.31 2.16% 1.82 2.75% 31.7%
Ecuador 1.51 2.50% 1.51 2.28% - 4.6%
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
balance sheets before the crisis, they have been able to Defence Spending
pursue expansionary fiscal policies between 2009 and Although total regional defence spending in 2011
2010, spurring domestic demand to counterbalance rose by 9.3% in nominal terms from 2010 levels (to a
shortfalls in global demand. However, the positive total of US$66.1bn), the effects of high inflation and
economic performance of these countries has meant currency appreciation across the region meant that
that they have also attracted strong capital inflows, regional defence spending actually fell in real terms
which have posed policy tensions as policymakers by 2.7% between 2010 and 2011. Of the 2011 total,
grapple with real exchange-rate appreciation, rapid approximately 80% consisted of planned expendi-
credit growth and rising inflation. These concerns ture by the region’s top four defence spending coun-
have been particularly relevant for the group of coun- tries (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela), while
tries termed by the IMF as ‘financially integrated the remaining six countries in the region’s top ten
commodity exporters’: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru defence spenders (Chile, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador,
and Uruguay (see textbox for details). Panama and Uruguay) accounted for over 17% of
In contrast, countries that are heavily reliant on the regional total (see Table 27). Together, these
commercial links with advanced industrial coun- ten countries made up 97.0% of aggregate regional
tries – such as Mexico, Central American states defence spending. Commodities exporters which
(Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and saw large spending increases included Paraguay
Panama) and Caribbean countries – have experienced (43.0%) and Peru (31.7%). Although strong commod-
lower growth rates (on average under 4%): this has ities-led growth enabled Brazil to maintain its share
been due to higher commodity prices (these countries of regional defence spending at around 55% of the
are net importers of commodities), lower remittances nominal regional total, rising domestic inflation
and sharp reductions in tourism from industrial coun- resulted in an overall 5.1% decline in real expenditure
tries, particularly the US. Additionally, Caribbean between 2010 and 2011. This economic overheating
Community countries have been hamstrung by high has also raised a degree of uncertainty over whether
public debt levels (on average above 90% of GDP) due the recent trend of rising Brazilian defence spending
to severely diminished levels of revenue collection; will continue in the near term (see Brazil: Overheating
they are only just beginning to recover from deep and and Capital Flows – pp. 365). Defence expenditure in
protracted recessions caused by the financial crisis. Venezuela is estimated to have risen by around 18%
Latin America and the Caribbean 365
Brazil: Overheating and Capital Flows which was instituted between November 2010 and June
Since 2007, with the exception of a mild recession in- 2011) saw US$600bn worth of liquidity injected into global
duced in 2009 by the financial crisis, Brazil has experi- financial markets over the period. These funds were easily
enced strong growth rates of over 5%. In 2010, real GDP and rapidly shifted from US Treasuries to more risky asset
expanded by almost 7.5%, spurred by global demand for classes, such as commodity currencies like the Brazilian
commodities and by expansionary fiscal policy. However, real, as investors engaged in ‘risk-on’ currency trades dur-
as Brazil’s output gap (the difference between actual and ing periods of higher risk appetite from mid-2010 onwards.
potential output) narrowed in 2010, the economy started Overall, these factors caused the Brazilian real to appreci-
showing signs of overheating, with inflation increasing ate by nearly 50% against the US dollar between end-2008
steadily over the course of the year. By August 2011, it and mid-2011, reaching a 12-year high in July 2011.
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
had risen above 7%, exceeding the inflation target upper While some of these inflows were absorbed by a com-
limit of 6.5% set by the central bank. In response to this bination of exchange-rate appreciation, record Brazilian
sustained rise in inflation, and in a bid to cool economic equity and corporate bond issues, as well as other mac-
activity by raising borrowing costs, the bank consistently ro-prudential measures undertaken by the authorities to
raised its benchmark ‘Selic’ overnight rate from the first sterilise inflows (where the central bank attempts to in-
quarter of 2010 onwards. This continued though to July sulate the money supply from foreign-exchange markets
2011, when its policy rate peaked at 12.5%. by limiting domestic credit creation), overall these factors
Brazil simultaneously experienced strong capital in- failed to prevent substantial increases in credit growth
flows, which in 2010 reached their highest levels in more within the Brazilian banking system of between 10% and
than a decade, as part of a general reallocation of investor 20% per year. Brazilian per capita credit in 2010 almost
portfolios away from poorly performing advanced econo- doubled from its 2006 levels, thereby fuelling inflationary
mies towards high-growth emerging economies. Flows pressures further and negating the impact of the policy-
were also driven by increased ‘carry trade’ positions (trades rate hikes outlined above. With the effect of monetary
where investors engage in interest-rate arbitrage by taking policy tools neutralised by inflows, Brazil has resorted to
advantage of interest rate differentials between countries) fiscal measures in an attempt to curb inflation, with the
in emerging market fixed-income instruments financed by government announcing R$50bn in spending reductions
cheap US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc denominat- in February 2011. Defence spending – particularly discre-
ed borrowings, as investors sought to take advantage of tionary spending – has borne a disproportionate burden
the higher policy (interest) rates that Brazil had instituted of these reductions, with a number of planned equipment
procurement programmes put on hold. Non-discretionary
the Caribbean
any currency appreciation that was likely to occur in the items such as salaries and pensions have been less af-
process. Flows were further boosted when the US Federal fected. At the time of writing, the schedule for reinstating
Reserve’s ‘quantitative easing’ policy (a second round of these programmes was uncertain (see pp. 368).
in nominal terms, but even higher inflation rates (at able in 2012, while the remaining $2bn is earmarked
around 25%, Venezuela had the highest rate of infla- to be disbursed in 2013.
tion in the region) mean that the net effect was a 6.4% Despite relatively modest rates of overall economic
decline in real spending. Also, Venezuelan figures growth, Central American defence spending
should be treated with caution due to the opacity increased considerably in 2011, with the sub-region’s
of the country’s public finances, the increased use aggregated defence budget total rising by 30.1% in
of off-budget mechanisms and para-fiscal funds nominal terms between 2010 and 2011 (21.4% in real
(which disburse revenues not covered by the legisla- terms) – reflecting the growing importance being
tive process) to channel government expenditures; as placed on defence and security noted above (see p.
well as due to conversion difficulties caused by large 361). The largest increases were seen in Nicaragua
adjustments in official exchange rates which distort (37.6%), Panama (40.5%) and Costa Rica (31.7%).
year-on-year US dollar figures used for international By contrast, the economic difficulties afflicting the
comparisons. Venezuela continues to receive sizeable Caribbean filtered through to its defence spending,
lines of credit from Russia for arms procurement, which fell by nearly 8% to make up 0.89% of total
with a new $4bn facility reportedly agreed in October regional defence spending. The largest declines
2011 following a $4bn package agreed a year earlier. were seen in Antigua and Barbuda (-15.8%), Jamaica
Half of the new facility is scheduled to become avail- (-15.9%) and Barbados (-21.7%).
366 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
Rousseff did not institute any strategic changes in between Rousseff and Jobim grew throughout the
defence policy during 2011. The schedule for imple- year, before boiling over in July with a series of
menting the 2008 National Defence Strategy’s long- inflammatory comments to the press that resulted
term plan for procurement and reorganisation has in Jobim’s resignation and replacement with former
slipped, but the plan was not much altered, and foreign minister Celso Amorim. In addition, ques-
important moves were made in both defence-indus- tions regarding the readiness of military hardware
trial policy and in border control and cooperation. added urgency to procurement uncertainties. A
The armed forces also continued to be committed to Ministry of Defence report, leaked early in the year to
internal security duties in Rio de Janeiro. Folha de São Paolo newspaper, revealed that only 53%
Rousseff took office in January 2011, prom- of armed forces equipment was battle-ready; and in
ising continuity in defence policy, and she initially September Amorim stated that progress with the
retained her predecessor’s Defence Minister, Nelson fighter contract was ‘very urgent [and] very impor-
Jobim. However, economic imperatives led her to tant’ because all of the air force’s 12 existing Mirage
reduce spending across government, including in 2000s would become unusable by 2013. The original
defence, and there were delays to some of the armed plan to buy 36 fighters by 2013, with a total of 120 by
forces’ flagship programmes. First, Rousseff delayed 2025, was timed to avoid any gap in fighter capability.
the decision on a contract plan for five ocean-patrol The acquired momentum from existing contracts
boats, five frigates and a logistical support vessel (the led to some key deliveries. These include Leopard
PROSUPER programme). Marine group Fincantieri 1A5s from the 2008 contract with Krauss-Maffei
had been favourite to win the bid, with Britain’s Wegmann (KMW); a further five-year contract for
BAE Systems and France’s DCNS its main rivals; it integrated training, support and repairs was signed
was reported in October that the navy was restarting with the same company in September. Work also
the programme. Meanwhile, budget cuts have also continued on the development of the VBTP-MR
affected Brazil’s plans for submarine development Guaraní: Italy’s Iveco made progress in preparing a
(See The Military Balance 2011, p.348). Although production plant, and the Israeli firm Elbit was sub-
the navy completed the work necessary to begin contracted to provide a turret with 30mm cannon.
producing reactor fuel, reports emerged of significant Tests on the prototype Guaraní were completed by
delays with respect to the construction of the subma- September. The extent of reorganisation associated
rine base and shipyard at Itaguaí, Rio de Janeiro. with the army’s ‘Protected Amazon’ and ‘Homeland
However, the plan for advanced conventionally Guard’ programmes was uncertain. The airborne
powered submarines proceeded: in July, construction infantry brigade, for example, has not yet moved
began on the first of four S-BR Scorpene diesel-electric from Rio de Janeiro to Anápolis, but as of June at least
submarines in partnership with DCNS, the first of three more Special Border Platoons (PEFs) had been
which is due to enter service in 2017. installed in the Amazon, taking the total to 24, out of
The most notable casualty was the long-discussed a target of 49.
contract for the purchase of 36 fighter aircraft for Throughout the year the air force remained
the air force; this was delayed until further notice. engaged with Embraer, as the Brazilian defence-
This FX2 programme (see The Military Balance 2011, industrial giant progressed with the development of
p.347) is a potentially lucrative fighter replacement the KC-390 tanker-transport aircraft. (In 2010 the air
contract for which Boeing, Dassault and Saab have, force had signed a letter of intent to acquire 28). In
with the FA-18E/F Super Hornet, Rafale and Gripen NG September the air force received the first P-3AM, a
Latin America and the Caribbean 367
maritime-patrol aircraft aimed at improving Brazil’s Operation Sentinel, a law-enforcement initiative dating
ability to protect its offshore oilfields. By mid-year, from 2010 and led by the Ministry of Justice. However,
at least three of the 18 Piranha IIICs purchased in it also mandated the deployment of Agate I in August
2008 for the Marines had been delivered, while the and Agate II in September, two major operations in
navy also increased its contract with Sikorsky from 4 the Amazon and the southern tri-border area respec-
to 6 S-70B helicopters, the first of which is due to be tively. Both involved the federal police, intelligence
delivered in 2012. Two key contracts signed during services, customs, environmental and local authori-
the year were with Embraer and local Eurocopter ties, and 3,500-7,000 armed forces personnel, in a
subsidiary Helibras to modernise AMX aircraft and crackdown on transnational crime. Both Agate opera-
36 AS350 helicopters respectively. The EC725 Super tions also involved social actions and the provision
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
Cougar helicopter deal noted in last year’s Military of healthcare to build support among local popula-
Balance continues: 50 helicopters, jointly developed tions and extensively used Hermes UAVs and substan-
by Helibras and Eurocopter, are being built at a cost tial numbers of aircraft from the air force and army
of R$5bn. The army, navy and air force will receive aviation. Agate I was focused on the identification
16 each, with two more destined for the office of the and destruction of clandestine airstrips and Agate II
president. on mobile patrols.
However, the only real dynamism in new procure-
ment during the year was seen – as in much of the Defence economics
rest of Latin America – in relation to border control Brazil’s defence spending has increased steadily in
and surveillance. This was part of a broader develop- recent years, rising by about 35% in nominal terms
ment in policy. As in previous years, the government between 2008 and 2011 (see Table 28). Around one-
looked to translate into reality its rhetoric on Brazilian fifth of this increase was channelled towards equip-
sovereignty over the Amazon. In 2011, however, it ment procurement, the budget for which doubled
also sought to respond to mounting public disquiet over the period, with more resources being allocated
over the scale of a range of transnational threats to the acquisition of new weapons. Brasilia regards
along the country’s extensive land borders, princi- defence investments as vital. Firstly, they will help
pally lawlessness, drug trafficking, the smuggling of to protect the recently discovered riches of the ‘Blue
various goods and the penetration of foreign armed Amazon’ (this Atlantic coast region is estimated to
groups, notably the Colombian FARC. hold 10bn barrels of oil, sufficient to expand the coun-
the Caribbean
planned to spend US$6bn to complete development of in the fight against transnational threats to security,
the Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON) principally on the western border, especially the
before 2019. SISFRON is intended to link 33 border Amazon rainforest. Thirdly, they are seen as a means
outposts with command centres along Brazil’s land to enhance economic and technological development.
borders. After the government announcement, The government has introduced measures in 2011
Embraer bought a controlling stake in Orbisat, the with the aim of boosting the national defence industry
Brazilian electronic and radar surveillance company. and making it more competitive internationally.
This move was rewarded the following month when However, the rise in defence spending over recent
the air force signed a letter of intent for the purchase of years may be set to reverse in 2011 and 2012. The
four M-60 Saber radars, devices used for low-altitude defence budget faces the prospect of cuts as part of
search and surveillance. In addition, the Brazilian a more general reduction in public spending that
subsidiary of Elbit won a contract in January to has affected ministries across the Brazilian govern-
supply RQ-450 Hermes UAVs to the Brazilian air force. ment, although the precise scale and distribu-
This monitoring and surveillance procurement tion of budgetary reductions is at present unclear.
is tied to immediate operational requirements. In Brazil’s economy is slowing, with GDP growth
tandem with increasing cooperation in counter- in 2011 projected at 3.5–4%, significantly lower
narcotics and law enforcement with neighbouring than the impressive 7.5% registered in 2010. On 5
countries, Rousseff in June launched a Strategic October 2011, the IMF listed Brazil as the second-
Border Plan aimed at countering transnational threats worst performer in South America in 2011, with
with a multi-institutional approach. The plan inte- only Venezuela predicted to register slower growth
grated and revived the pre-existing Federal Police rates. In addition, inflation hit a six-year high and
368 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
Equipment Procurement
Weapons Systems Total (of which:) 566 1,209 2,578
Army 301 395 475
Navy 231 769 2,063
Air Force 34 45 40
Physical Infrastructure 278 456 1,549
Other Equipment 2,389 2,795 3,738
Total Equipment Procurement Expenditure (% of total) 3,233 (7.3%) 4,460 (8.8%) 7,865 (13.2%)
the government came under considerable pressure was one of the hardest-hit ministries. Despite some
to reduce spending in order to prevent the economy resources being made available throughout the
from overheating. In February 2011, President year, authorities said that major procurement proj-
Roussef’s government announced an R$50bn ects would have to be curtailed, though by October
(US$30bn) budget cut. Partly because of this, overall 2011 there was no public statement on which projects
investment by the Federal government has grown by would be affected. One key development was noted
just 0.2% during the first eight months of the year, in above: the programme to buy new fighters has been
comparison with the same period in 2010. frozen and, while the government has said that the
The moderation in growth has meant that Brazil acquisition process might resume in 2012, industry
is struggling to keep its commitments to modernise insiders suggest this is likely to be postponed to
the armed forces as part of the 2008 National Defence 2013 or later. Procurement costs have remained low
Strategy (NDS), and timelines have slipped. While in comparison to personnel expenditure. The latter
total procurement under the NDS was planned at constitutes by far the largest share of the budget and
R$21.9bn between 2008 and 2011, the MoD was has remained untouched by the recent spending cuts.
forced to freeze R$4.3bn of the R$14.4bn earmarked In 2011, procurement was predicted to receive 10.5%
for procurement, operations and maintenance under of the budget – down from 13.2% in 2010, whereas
the original budget for 2011. In terms of cuts, it spending on personnel (that is, wages and pensions)
Latin America and the Caribbean 369
the Caribbean
to the previously launched programme of industrial
amounted to no less than 73.6% of the total defence incentives, the ‘Greater Brazil Plan’, the government
budget, a proportion that was unchanged from 2010. announced a set of new incentives specific to the
If defence policy faltered in 2011 with respect to defence sector. The first of these was an exemption
procurement, progress on the defence-industrial from several key taxes and social security contribu-
component of the NDS proved less directly vulner- tions for the production of ‘strategic’ defence mate-
able to budget cuts. Through the NDS, Brazil aspires riel, which is estimated in net terms to reduce the
to develop an internationally competitive defence- effective tax burden on the sector by 30%. The govern-
industrial base gaining autonomy through tech- ment also gave the Ministry of Defence the ability to
nology transfer, allowing the armed forces to procure contract from domestic providers at costs up to 25%
from domestic sources, and supporting the country’s greater than those offered by international competi-
economy and foreign policy priorities as an aspirant tors. Defence-sector representatives greeted the new
great power. As noted above, the KC-390 programme policy with optimism, predicting it would create
continues to make progress. Partnership agreements 23,000 new jobs within ten years, but its effectiveness
were signed in April between Embraer and defence remains to be proven, and the unequal contracting
aviation companies FAdeA and Aero Vodochody, conditions in particular could harm the international
from Argentina and the Czech Republic respectively. competitiveness of Brazilian defence products in the
Argentina intends to acquire six KC-390s, and the long term – an outcome that would be at odds with
Czech Republic two. During the year Embraer also the aims set out in the NDS.
370 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
1 engr bn
2 quad lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, 2 triple
1 sigs gp (1 EW bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
B515 ILAS-3 324mm with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun,
1 sigs bn
(capacity 1 AS555 Fennec/SA316B Alouette III hel)
1 sigs coy
DDH 1 Hercules (UK Type 42 - utilised as a fast troop
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
transport ship), with 1 114mm gun, (capacity 1 SH-3H
5 maint bn
Sea King hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FRIGATES • FFGHM 6:
MBT 213: 207 TAM, 6 TAM S21
6 Espora (GER MEKO 140) with 2 twin lnchr with
LT TK 123: 112 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 6 SK-105A2
MM-38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm
Kuerassier; 5 Patagón
ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity either 1
RECCE 81: 47 AML-90; 34 M1025A2 HMMWV
SA319 Alouette III utl hel or 1 AS555 Fennec utl hel)
AIFV 337: 263 VCTP (incl variants); 114 M-113A2 (20mm
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
cannon)
CORVETTES • FSG 3 Drummond (FRA A-69) with 2
APC (T) 294: 70 M113 A1-ACAV; 224 M113A2
twin lnchr with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple Mk32
ARTY 1,103
324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 100mm gun
SP 155mm 37: 20 Mk F3; 17 VCA 155 Palmaria
PSO 3:
TOWED 179: 105mm 70 M-56 (Oto Melara); 155mm
2 Irigoyen (US Cherokee AT);
109: 25 M-77 CITEFA/M-81 CITEFA; 84 SOFMA L-33
MRL 105mm 4 SLAM Pampero 1 Teniente Olivieri (ex-US oilfield tug)
MOR 883: 81mm 492; 120mm 353 Brandt PCO 3:
SP 38: 25 M106A2; 13 TAM-VCTM 2 Murature (US King - trg/river patrol role) with 3
AT 105mm gun
1 Sobral (US Sotoyomo AT)
the Caribbean
RCL 150 M-1968 PCGT 1 Interpida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 single lnchr
RL 78mm MARA with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-
AIRCRAFT 4 HWT, 1 76mm gun
ISR 1+ OV-1D Mohawk PCT 1 Interpida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 single
TPT 18 Medium 3 G-222; Light 15: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 1 76mm gun
1 C-212-200 Aviocar; 3 Cessna 207 Stationair; 1 Cessna PB 6: 4 Baradero (Dabur); 2 Point
500 Citation (survey); 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 3 SA-226 AMPHIBIOUS 18 LCVP
Merlin IIIA; 3 SA-226AT Merlin IVA; 1 Sabreliner 75A LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12
(Gaviao 75A) AOR 1 Patagonia (FRA Durance) with 1 hel platform
TRG 5 T-41 Mescalero AORL 1 Ingeniero Julio Krause
HELICOPTERS AK 3 Costa Sur
MRH 4 SA315B Lama AGOR 1 Commodoro Rivadavia
TPT 48 Medium 3 AS332B Super Puma Light 45: 5 AW109; AGHS 1 Puerto Deseado (ice breaking capability, used
1 Bell 212; 30 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois - 6 armed); 9 UH- for polar research)
1H-II Huey II AGB 1 Almirante Irizar
TRG 8 UH-12E ABU 3 Red
AD AX 1 Libertad
SAM 6 RBS -70
GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 230 GAI-B01; 30mm 21 Naval Aviation 2,000
HS L81; 35mm 12 GDF Oerlikon (Skyguard fire control); AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable
40mm 148: 24 L/60 training, 40 in store; 76 L/60; 8 L/70 FGA 2 Super Etendard (9 more in store)
RADAR • AD RADAR 11: 5 Cardion AN/TPS-44; ATK 1 AU-23 Turbo-Porter
6 Skyguard ASW 11: 5 S-2T Tracker; 6 P-3B Orion
LAND 18+: M-113 A1GE Green Archer (mor); 18 TPT 9 Light 7 Beech 200F/M King Air PAX 2 F-28
RATRAS (veh, arty) Fellowship
ARV Greif TRG 10 T-34C Turbo Mentor*
372 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
the Caribbean
US$ 7.65bn 8.03bn
per capita US$ 24,641 25,637 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Growth % 0.96 2.00 Male 9.5% 3.4% 3.6% 3.8% 24.3% 3.8%
Inflation % 1.0 2.5 Female 9.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.8% 25.4% 6.0%
M-1938
MOR 250+: 60mm M-224: 81mm 250 M-29; Type-W87; TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
107mm M-30; 120mm M-120 1 (anti-drug) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
AT • MSL• MANPATS 50+ HJ-8 (2 SP on Koyak) AIR DEFENCE
RCL 106mm M-40A1; 90mm M-67 1 regt with Oerlikon; Type-65
RL 89mm 200+ M-20 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT 39 combat capable
TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 C-212 Aviocar; 1 ATK 15 AT-33AN Shooting Star
Cessna 210 Centurion
TPT 84: Medium 5: 1 C-130A Hercules; 3 C-130B
AD • GUNS • TOWED 37mm 18 Type-65
Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules Light 69: 1 Aero-Commander
ARV 4 4K-4FA-SB20 Greif; M578
690; 3 Beech 90 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech
Navy 4,800 1900; 3 C-212-100; 10 Cessna 152; 2 Cessna 172; 19
Organised into 6 naval districts with HQ located at Puerto Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 210; 1 Cessna 402; 1 CV-580; 9
Guayaramerín DA40; 3 F-27-400M Troopship; 4 IAI-201 Arava; 2 Learjet
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 25B/D; 2 MA60; 1 PA-32 Saratoga; 3 PA-34 Seneca; 1
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 1 Sabreliner 60 PAX 10: 7 BAe-146-100; 2 DC-10; 1 Falcon
Santa Cruz (additional five patrol boats under 10 tonnes) 900EX (VIP)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 19: TRG 58: 28 A-122 Uirapuru; 6 K-8W Karakorum*; 6 T-25;
AH 2 10 T-34B Turbo Mentor; 18 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*
YFL 10 (river transports) HELICOPTERS
AG 7 MRH 1 SB315B (HB315B) Lama
HAITI Other
UN • MINUSTAH 207; 1 inf coy 1 sy bde (total 6 lt inf bn)
Aviation
LIBERIA 1 hel bde (4 hel bn with (2 hel sqn))
UN • UNMIL 1; 2 obs COMBAT SUPPORT
4 SP arty gp
Brazil BRZ 6 med arty gp
1 ADA bde
Brazilian Real R 2010 2011 2012 2 engr gp (total: 11 engr bn)
GDP R 3.68tr 4.05tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 2.08tr 2.46tr MBT 267: 128 Leopard 1A1BE; 48 Leopard 1A5BR (172 more
per capita US$ 10,339 12,086 on order); 91 M-60A3/TTS
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
LT TK 152 M-41B/M-41C
Growth % 7.49 3.77
RECCE 408 EE-9 Cascavel
Inflation % 5.0 6.6 APC 807
Def expa R 59.0bn APC (T) 584 M-113
US$ 33.4bn APC (W) 223 EE-11 Urutu
Def bdgta R 59.6bn 60.2bn 63.7bn ARTY 1,805
SP 109: 105mm 72 M-108/M-7; 155mm 37 M-109A3
US$ 33.7bn 36.6bn
TOWED 431
US$1=R 1.77 1.65
105mm 336: 233 M-101/M-102; 40 L-118 Light Gun; 63
a
Includes military pensions Model 56 pack howitzer
Population 203,429,773 155mm 95 M-114
MRL 20+: 70mm SBAT-70; 20 ASTROS II
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MOR 1,245: 81mm 1,168: 453 Royal Ordnance L-16, 715
Male 13.4% 4.2% 4.2% 4.3% 20.5% 2.8% M936 AGR; 120mm 77 M2
Female 12.9% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 21.5% 3.9% AT
MSL • MANPATS 30: 18 Eryx; 12 Milan
Capabilities RCL 343: 106mm 194 M-40A1; 84mm 149 Carl Gustav
HELICOPTERS
ACTIVE 318,480 (Army 190,000 Navy 59,000 Air MRH 49: 32 AS565 Panther (HM-1); 17 AS550U2 Fennec
69,480) Paramilitary 395,000 (HA-1 - armed)
TPT 27 Medium 12: 8 AS532 Cougar (HM-3); 4 S-70A-36
RESERVE 1,340,000 Black Hawk (HM-2) Light 15 AS350 LI Ecureuil (HA-1)
Terms of service 12 months (can be extended to 18) AD
MANPAD 53 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE GUNS 66: 35mm 39 GDF-001 towed (some with Super
Fledermaus radar); 40mm 27 L/70 (some with BOFI)
Army 120,000; 70,000 conscript (total 190,000) RADAR: 5 SABER M60
AEV Greif; HART; Leopard 1; M578
FORCES BY ROLE
VLB XLP-10
COMMAND
7 mil comd HQ
12 mil region HQ
Navy 59,000
7 div HQ (2 with regional HQ) FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Organised into 9 districts with HQ I Rio de Janeiro, HQ II
1 SF bde with (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn) Salvador, HQ III Natal, HQ IV Belém, HQ V Rio Grande,
MANOEUVRE HQ VI Ladario, HQ VII Brasilia, HQ VIII Sao Paulo, HQ
Armoured IX Manaus
2 armd bde (2 armd cav bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
engr bn) SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 5:
Mechanised 4 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
4 mech cav bde (1 armd cav bn, 2 mech cav bn, 1 arty MK 24 Tigerfish HWT
bn) 1 Tikuna with 8 single 533mm TT with MK 24 Tigerfish HWT
Light PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 15
8 mot inf bde (total: 29 mot inf bn) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1:
2 lt inf bde (total: 6 lt inf bn) 1 Sao Paulo (FRA Clemenceau) (capacity 15–18 A-4 Skyhawk
Air Manoeuvre atk ac; 4–6 SH-3D/SH-3A Sea King ASW hel; 3 AS-355F/
1 AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 arty bn) AS-350BA Ecureuil hel; 2 AS-532 Cougar hel)
Jungle DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Greenhaigh (UK Broadsword,
5 jungle inf bde (total: 15 jungle inf bn) 1 low readiness) with 4 single lnchr with MM-38 Exocet
Latin America and the Caribbean 377
AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr with Sea Wolf SAM, 6 single ANTI SURFACE WARFARE
324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, (capacity 1 Super Lynx 1 sqn with Super Lynx Mk21A
Mk21A hel) ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE
FRIGATES 11: 1 sqn with SH-3G/H Sea King
FFGHM 6 Niteroi with 2 twin lnchr with MM-40 Exocet TRAINING
AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III
triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
A/S mor, 1 115mm gun, (capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk21A 1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar
hel) 4 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); AS355 Ecureuil II
FFGH 5: (armed)
4 Inhauma with 2 twin lnchr with MM-40 Exocet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
115mm gun, (1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel) ATK 9 AF-1 (A-4/4M) Skyhawk; 3 AF-1A (TA-4/4M)
1 Barroso with 2 twin lnchr with MM-40 Exocet AShM, Skyhawk
2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 115mm HELICOPTERS
gun, (capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk21A utl hel) ASW 16: 12 Super Lynx Mk21A; 4 SH-3G/H Sea King
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 42: TPT 49: Heavy 1 EC725 Super Cougar (UH-15)
PCO 7: 4 Bracui (UK River); 2 Imperial Marinheiro with 1 Medium 7: 5 AS332 Super Puma; 2 AS532 Cougar Light
76mm gun; 1 Parnaiba with 1 hel landing platform 41: 18 AS350 Ecureuil (armed); 8 AS355 Ecureuil II
PCC 2 Macaé (additional vessels in build) (armed); 15 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III
PCR 5: 2 Pedro Teixeira; 3 Roraima MSL • AShM: AM-39 Exocet; Sea Skua
PB 28: 12 Grajau; 6 Marlim; 6 Piratini (US PGM); 4 Tracker
(Marine Police) Marines 15,000
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • FORCES BY ROLE
MSC 6 Aratu (GER Schutze) SPECIAL FORCES
AMPHIBIOUS 1 SF bn
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LSD 2: MANOEUVRE
2 Ceara (US Thomaston) (capacity either 21 LCM or 6 Amphibious
LCU; 345 troops) 1 (Fleet Force) div (1 comd bn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty gp)
LANDING SHIPS 3: 8+ (regional) mne gp
LST 1 Mattoso Maia (US Newport) (capacity 3 LCVP; 1 3 mne inf bn
LCPL; 400 troops) COMBAT SUPPORT
LSLH 2: 1 Garcia D’Avila (UK Sir Galahad) (capacity 1 1 engr bn
hel; 16 MBT; 340 troops); 1 Almirante Saboia (UK Sir
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bedivere) (capacity 1 med hel; 18 MBT; 340 troops)
the Caribbean
LANDING CRAFT 27: 3 LCU; 8 LCVP; 16 LCM
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 39: APC 45
AOR 2: 1 Gastao Motta; 1 Marajo APC (T) 30 M113
ASR 1 Felinto Perry (NOR Wildrake) APC (W) 15 Piranha IIIC (additional 15 on order)
AG 2: 1 (troop carrier); 1 (river spt) AAV 25: 13 AAV-7A1; 12 LVTP-7
AH 4: 2 Oswaldo Cruz; 1 Dr Montenegro; 1 Tenente ARTY 59
Maximiano TOWED 41: 105mm 33: 18 L118 Light Gun; 15 M101;
AK 5 155mm 8 M114
AGOR 3: 1 Ary Rongel (Ice-strengthened hull, used for MOR 18 81mm
polar research); 1 Cruzeiro do Sul (research); 1 Almirante AT
Maximiano MSL• MANPATS RB-56 Bill
AGHS 1 Sirius RL 89mm M20
AGS 4: 1 Antares; 3 Amorim Do Valle (UK Rover) AD • GUNS 40mm 6 L/70 (with BOFI)
ABU 6: 1 Almirante Graca Aranah (lighthouse tender); 5 AEV 1 AAVR7
Comandante Varella
ATF 5: 3 Tritao; 2 Almirante Guihem Air Force 69,480
AP 2: 1 Paraguassu; 1 Piraim (river transports) Brazilian air space is divided into 7 air regions, each of
AX 4: which is responsible for its designated air bases. Air assets
AXL 3 Nascimento are divided among four designated air forces (I, II, III & V)
AXS 1 for operations (IV Air Force temporarily deactivated).
FORCES BY ROLE
Naval Aviation 2,500 FIGHTER
FORCES BY ROLE 1 gp with Mirage 2000B/C
GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with F-5EM/FM Tiger II
1 sqn with AF-1 (A-4/4M) Skyhawk; AF-1 (TA-4/4M) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Skyhawk 2 sqn with AMX (A-1A/B)
378 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
the Caribbean
FORCES BY ROLE
Currently being reorganised into 4 armd, 2 mot, 2 mtn MBT 262: 122 Leopard 1; 140 Leopard 2 A4
and 1 SF brigade. Standard regt/gp are single bn strength, AIFV 191: 173 Marder; 18 YPR-765
reinforced regt comprise multiple bn. APC 436
COMMAND APC (T) 252 M113A1/A2
6 div HQ APC (W) 184 Cardoen Piranha
ARTY 1,016
SPECIAL FORCES
SP 155mm 35: 24 M109A3; 11 (AMX) Mk F3
1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 (mtn) SF Gp, 1 log coy)
TOWED 235: 105mm 195: 90 M101; 105 Mod 56; 155mm
2 cdo coy
40 M-68
MANOEUVRE
MRL 160mm 12 LAR-160
Reconnaissance
MOR 734:
1 (5th) reinforced cav regt (1 armd cav gp, 1 arty gp)
81mm 650: 300 M-29; 150 Soltam; 200 FAMAE; 120mm
2 armd cav regt
170: 110 FAMAE; 60 Soltam M-65
Armoured SP 120mm 84: 36 FAMAE (on Piranha 6x6); 48 M-5L1A
1 (1st) armd bde (1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty AT
gp, 1 engr bn) MSL• MANPATS 55 Spike
1 (2nd) armd bde (1 cdo coy, 1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf RCL 106mm M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustav
bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy, 1 log coy) AIRCRAFT
1 (3rd) armd bde (1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty TPT • Light 12: 5 C-212 Aviocar; 3 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1
gp, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) Cessna 650 Citation III; 3 CN-235
1 (4th) armd bde (1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty HELICOPTERS
gp, 1 engr coy) ISR 9 MD-530F Lifter (armed)
Mechanised TPT 25 Medium 16: 2 AS332B Super Puma; 8 AS532AL
1 (4th) reinforced mech inf regt (1 mech inf bn, 1 engr Cougar; 6 SA330 Puma Light 9: 2 AS350B2 Ecureuil; 6
bn, 1 sigs coy) AS350B3 Ecureuil; 1 AS355F Ecureuil II
380 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
the Caribbean
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRG 42: 12 EMB-314 Super Turano*; 30 T-35A/B Pillan
HELICOPTERS Male 13.7% 4.8% 4.6% 4.1% 19.7% 2.6%
MRH 16 Bell 412 Twin Huey Female 13.0% 4.6% 4.5% 4.0% 20.9% 3.5%
TPT 17: Medium 1 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 16: 13 Bell
205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 3 Bell 206B (trg) Capabilities
AD
SYSTEMS Mygale
ACTIVE 283,004 (Army 235,798, Navy 33,138 Air
SAM Mistral 13,758) Paramilitary 158,824
SP 5 Crotale RESERVE 61,900 (Army 54,700 Navy 4,800 Air 1,200
GUNS • TOWED 20mm M163/M167 Vulcan; 35mm Joint 1,200)
GDF-005 Oerlikon
MSL • AAM • IR AIM-9J Sidewinder; Python III; Python
IV; Shafrir‡; ARH Derby; AIM-120 Amraam ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
bn, 2 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 PPV 4 RG-31 Nyala
EOD gp) ARTY 710
Light TOWED 121: 105mm 106: 20 LG1 MkIII;
1 (2nd) div (1 (5th) lt inf bde (3 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 86 M101; 155mm 15 155/52 APU SBT-1
AD bn, 2 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap MOR 589: 81mm 141: 125 M1; 16 M125A1 (SP) 107mm
gp); 1 (18th) lt inf bde (1 airmob cav bn, 4 lt inf bn, 2 148 M2; 120mm 300: 210 Brandt, 38 HY12; 52 AM50
engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn); 1 (30th) lt inf bde (1 cav recce AT
bn, 2 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)) MSL• SP 8+: 8 TOW; Nimrod
1 (3rd) div (1 (3rd) lt inf bde (1 cav recce bn, 3 lt inf bn, MANPATS 10+: 10 TOW; Spike-ER, APILAS
1 mtn inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 Fd arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 RCL 106mm 63 M40A1
cbt spt bn, 1 MP bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (8th) RL 15+: 89mm 15 M20; 90mm C-90C; 106mm SR-106
lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 Fd arty bn, 1 engr AD
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (29th) mtn bde (1 mtn SAM • TOWED 3 Skyguard/Sparrow
inf bn)) GUNS 39+
1 (4th) div (1 airmob bde (2 airmob inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 SP 12.7mm 18 M-8/M-55
COIN bn, 1 (anti-terrorist) SF bn, 1 airmob engr bn, 1 TOWED 21+: 35mm GDF Oerlikon; 40mm 21 M-1A1
cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (21st) lt inf bde (with 7 Eagle Eye radar)
with (3 lt inf bn)) AIRCRAFT
1 (5th) div (1 (1st) lt inf bde (1 cav recce bn, 2 lt inf bn, 1 ELINT 3: 2 Beech B200 King Air; 1 Beech King Air 350
COIN bn, 1 fd arty bn, 2 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula TPT • Light 22: 2 An-32B; 2 Beech 350 King Air; 2 Beech
anti-kidnap gp); 1 (6th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn,1 mtn inf 200 King Air (Medevac); 1 Beech C90 King Air; 2 C-212
bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); Aviocar (Medevac); 1 CV-580; 1 Cessna 206; 6 Cessna 208B
1 (13th) lt inf bde (2 cav recce bn, 1 airmob inf bn, 2 lt Grand Caravan; 2 PA-34 Seneca; 3 Turbo Commander 695A
inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 engr HELICOPTERS
bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 2 MP bn))
MRH 22: 8 Mi-17-1V Hip; 9 Mi-17MD; 5 Mi-17-V5 Hip
1 (6th) div (1 (12th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1
TPT 105 Medium 44 UH-60L Black Hawk Light 61: 30 Bell
COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap
205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 27 Bell 212 (UH-1N Twin Huey); 4
gp); 1 (26th) jungle bde (1 lt jungle inf bn, 1 COIN bn,
K-Max
1 cbt spt bn, 1 coast guard det); 1 (27th) lt inf bde (2 lt
inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 2 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn))
1 (7th) div (1 (4th) lt inf bde (1 cav recce bn, 3 lt inf bn, 1
Navy 33,138; (incl 7,200 conscript)
HQ (Tri-Service Unified Eastern Command HQ) located at
COIN bn, fd 1 arty bn, 2 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 2 Gaula
Puerto Carreño
anti-kidnap gp, 1 (anti-terrorist) SF coy); 1 (11th)
COIN bde (1 airmob inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 2 COIN bn, 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn); 1 (14th) lt inf bde (3 lt inf bn, 2 SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 4
COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn); 1 (17th) lt inf bde (2 SSK 2 Pijao (GER T-209/1200) each with 8 single 533mm
lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)) TT each with SUT HWT
1 (8th) div (1 (16th) COIN bde (1 mech cav recce bn, 1 lt SSW 2 Intrepido (ITA SX-506, SF delivery)
inf bn, 3 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4
gp);1 (28th) jungle bde (2 inf, 3 COIN, 2 marine (river- FRIGATES • FFG 4 Almirante Padilla (undergoing
ine) bn, 1 cbt spt bn)) modernisation programme) with 2 twin lnchr with MM-
3 COIN mobile bde (each: 4 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn) 40 Exocet AShM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM,
Other 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm ASTT each with A244 LWT,
1 indep counter-narcotics bde (3 counter-narcotics bn, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 1 Bo-105/AS555SN Fennec hel)
1 spt bn) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 56
Aviation PSO 1 20 de Julio
1 div PCO 2: 1 Reliance with 1 hel landing platform; 1 San
1 bde (4 hel bn; 5 avn bn; 1 (SF) avn bn) Andres
COMBAT SUPPORT PCC 2: 1 Espartana (ESP Cormoran); 1 Lazaga
6 EOD gp (bn) PCR 16: 3 Arauca; 2 Nodriza (PAF-VII/VIII); 8 Nodriza
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (PAF-II) with hel landing platform; 3 LPR-40 (additional
2 spt/log bde (each: 1 spt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 supply bn, 1 vessels on order)
tpt bn, 1 medical bn, 1 log bn) PBF 1 Quitasueño (US Asheville) with 1 76mm gun
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PB 13: 1 11 de Noviembre (CPV-40); 2 Castillo Y Rada
RECCE 226: 123 EE-9 Cascavel; 6 M8 (anti-riot vehicle); (Swiftships 105); 2 Jaime Gomez; 2 José Maria Palas
8 M8 with TOW; 39 M1117 Guardian; 50 VCL (Swiftships 110); 4 Point; 2 Toledo
APC 114 PBR 21: 7 Diligente; 3 Swiftships; 9 Tenerife; 2 PAF-L
APC (T) 54: 28 M113A1 (TPM-113A1); 26 M113A2 (TPM- AMPHIBIOUS 10:
113A2) LCM 3 LCM-8
APC (W) 56 EE-11 Urutu LCU 7 Morrosquillo (LCU – 1466)
Latin America and the Caribbean 383
the Caribbean
ARTY • MOR • 81mm 20 HELICOPTERS
ISR 20 OH-58 Kiowa being delivered
Air Force 13,758 MRH 17: 12 AH-60L Arpia III; 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2
6 Combat Air Commands (CACOM) plus CACOM 7 Hughes 500M; 1 MD-500E
(former Oriental Air Group) responsible for air ops in TPT 55 Medium 10: 8 UH-60A Black Hawk (6 being
specific geographic area. Flts can be deployed or ‘loaned’ upgraded to UH-60L); 4 UH-60L Black Hawk Light 45:
to a different CACOM 22 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 12 Bell 206B3 JetRanger III;
FORCES BY ROLE 11 Bell 212
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR MSL•IR Python III; R530 ARH Derby
1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly
1 sqn with AC-47T; Hughes 369 Paramilitary 144,097
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
2 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* (A-29) National Police Force 136,097
2 sqn with Kfir C-10/C-12/TC-12 AIRCRAFT
EW/ELINT ELINT 3: 1 Cessna 208B, 2 C-26B Metroliner
2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; Cessna 208; Cessna 560; TPT • Light 29: 15 AT-802; 1 ATR-42; 3 Beech 200 King
C-26B Metroliner; SA-2-37 Air; 3 Beech 300 King Air; 2 Beech 1900; 1 Beech C99;
MARITIME PATROL/SEARCH & RESCUE 4 BT-67; 5 C-26 Metroliner; 2 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 172;
1 sqn with Bell 212, EMB-110P1 (C-95) 7 Cessna 206; 5 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DHC 6 Twin
TRANSPORT Otter; 4 PA-31 Navajo
1 (Presidential) sqn with B-707 Tkr; B-727; B-737BBJ; HELICOPTERS
KC-767; Bell 212; Bell 412; C-295M; F-28 Fellowship MRH 4: 1 Bell 412EP; 1 MD-500D; 2 Hughes 369
1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules TPT 54 Medium 7 UH-60L Black Hawk Light 47: 25
1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air; C-212; CN-235M; Do- Bell 205 (UH-1H-II Huey II); 3 Bell 206B; 7 Bell 206L
328; IAI Arava Long Ranger; 10 Bell 212; 1 Bell 407
384 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
DEPLOYMENT PB 8: 2 Cabo Blanco (US Swift 65); 1 Isla del Coco (US
Swift 32m); 3 Point; 1 Primera Dama (US Swift 42); 1
EGYPT Puerto Quebos (US Swift 36)
MFO 354; 1 inf bn
Air Surveillance Unit 400
AIRCRAFT •TPT • Light 10: 2 Cessna T210 Centurion;
FOREIGN FORCES 4 Cessna U206G Stationair; 1 DHC-7 Caribou; 2 PA-31
United States US Southern Command: 64 Navajo; 1 PA-34 Seneca
HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 MD-500E
Costa Rica CRI Rural Guard 2,000
Costa Rican Colon C 2010 2011 2012 Ministry of Government and Police. Small arms only
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
the Caribbean
(SA-9 Gaskin) FGA 12: 4 MiG-21ML Fishbed; 8 MiG-21U Mongol A (up
MANPAD 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 to 70 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 30 MiG-21F Fishbed; 28 MiG-
(SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ 21PFM Fishbed; 7 MiG-21UM Fishbed; 20 MiG-23BN
GUNS 400 Flogger in store)
SP 57mm ZSU-57-2 SP/23mm ZSU-23-4 SP/30mm ISR 1 An-30 Clank
BTR-60P SP TPT 11: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; Light 9: 1 An-2 Colt; 3 An-
TOWED 100mm KS-19/M-1939/85mm KS-12/57mm 24 Coke; 2 An-32 Cline; 3 Yak-40 (8 An-2 Colt; 18 An-26
S-60/37mm M-1939/30mm M-53/23mm ZU-23 Curl in store)
TRG 45: 25 L-39 Albatros; 20 Z-326 Trener Master
Navy ε3,000 HELICOPTERS
Western Comd HQ at Cabanas; Eastern Comd HQ at ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind (8 more in store)
Holquin ASW (5 Mi-14 in store)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H (12 more in store)
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8P Hip
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
AD • SAM SA-3 Goa; SA-2 Guideline towed
PCM 1 Pauk II† (FSU) with 1 quad lnchr (manual
MSL
aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail SAM), 4 single
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡
ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.), 1 76mm gun
AAM • IR R-3 ‡ (AA-2 Atoll); R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
PBF 6 Osa II† (FSU) each with 4 single lnchr (for P-15 (AA-11 Archer) IR/SARH R-23/24 ‡ (AA-7 Apex); R-27
Termit (SS-N-2B Styx) AShM – missiles removed to (AA-10 Alamo)
coastal defence units)
MINE WARFARE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 Paramilitary 26,500 active
MHI 3 Yevgenya† (FSU)
MSC 2 Sonya† (FSU) State Security 20,000
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 AG; 1 ABU; 1 AX Ministry of Interior
386 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
Jungle
2 (17th & 21st) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1
Ecuador ECU sigs coy, 1 log coy)
1 (19th) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 jungle trg bn, 1 cbt
Ecuadorian Sucre ES 2010 2011 2012 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)
GDP ES 1,484tr 1,671tr Aviation
US$ 58.0bn 65.3bn 1 (15th) avn bde (2 tpt avn gp, 2 hel gp, 1 mixed avn gp)
COMBAT SUPPORT
per capita US$ 4,211 4,351
1 (27th) arty bde (1 SP arty gp, 1 MRL gp, 1 ADA gp, 1
Growth % 3.58 5.78 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)
Inflation % 3.6 4.4 1 ADA gp
Def bdgt ES 38.7tr 38.5tr 1 (23rd) engr bde (3 engr bn)
US$ 1.51bn 1.51bn 2 indep MP coy
FMA US$ 0.3m 0.75m 1 indep sigs coy
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
US$1=ES 25,587 25,587
1 (25th) log bde
Population 15,007,343 2 log bn
2 indep med coy
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 15.3% 4.9% 4.6% 4.1% 17.7% 3.1% MBT 30 Leopard 1V (from Chile, being delivered)
Female 14.7% 4.8% 4.5% 4.2% 18.6% 3.3% LT TK 24 AMX-13
the Caribbean
APC 123
ACTIVE 58,483 (Army 46,500 Navy 7,283 Air 4,200) APC (T) 95: 80 AMX-VCI; 15 M-113
APC (W) 28: 18 EE-11 Urutu; 10 UR-416
Paramilitary 500
ARTY 541+
Terms of Service conscription 1 year, selective
SP 155mm 5 (AMX) Mk F3
RESERVE 118,000 (Joint 118,000) TOWED 100: 105mm 78: 30 M101; 24 M2A2; 24 Model 56
Ages 18–55 pack howitzer; 155mm 22: 12 M114; 10 M198
MRL 24: 18 122mm BM-21, 6 RM-70
MOR 412+: 81mm 400 M-29; 107mm M-30 (4.2in);
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
160mm 12 M-66 Soltam
AT
Army 46,500 RCL 404: 106mm 24 M40A1; 90mm 380 M67
FORCES BY ROLE AIRCRAFT
gp are bn sized. TPT • Light 17: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 2 C-212; 2 CN-235;
COMMAND 4 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 4 IAI-
4 div HQ 201 Arava; 1 PC-6B Turbo-Porter
SPECIAL FORCES TRG 4: 2 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 2 T-41D Mescalero
1 (9th) SF bde (3 SF gp; 1 SF sqn, 1 para bn,1 sigs sqn, 1 HELICOPTERS
log comd) MRH 26: 6 Mi-17-1V Hip; 2 SA315B Lama; 18 SA342L
MANOEUVRE Gazelle (13 with HOT for anti-armour role)
Mechanised TPT 10 Medium 7: 5 AS332B Super Puma; 2 Mi-171E (3
1 (11th) armd cav bde (3 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SA330 Puma in store) Light 3 AS350 Ecureuil
SP arty gp, 1 engr gp) AD
1 (5th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 2 mech cav gp, 2 inf bn, 1 cbt SAM • MANPAD 185+: 75 Blowpipe; 20+ 9K32 Strela-2
engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) (SA-7 Grail)‡; 90 9K39 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
388 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
the Caribbean
LCM 3
US$ 21.2bn 22.6bn
per capita US$ 3505 3,725 Naval Inf (SF Commandos) 90
Growth % 1.43 2.00 FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 1.2 4.6 SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF coy
Def exp C 1.2bn
US$ 135m Air Force 771 (incl 200 Air Defence)
Def bdgt C 1.15bn 1.21bn Flying hours 90 hrs/year on A-37 Dragonfly
US$ 129m 138m 141m
FORCES BY ROLE
FMA US$ 1.0m 4.8m FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
US$1=C 8.92 8.79 1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly; O-2A Skymaster*
Population 6,071,774 TRANSPORT
1 sqn with BT-67; Cessna 210 Centurion; Cessna 337G;
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Commander 114; IAI-202 Arava; SA-226T Merlin IIIB
Male 15.7% 5.7% 4.7% 3.9% 15.5% 2.9% TRAINING
1 sqn with R-235GT Guerrier; T-35 Pillan; T-41D
Female 14.9% 5.5% 4.8% 4.1% 18.8% 3.6%
Mescalero; TH-300
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Capabilities 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 407; Bell
ACTIVE 15,500 (Army 13,850 Navy 700 Air 771) 412EP Twin Huey; MD-500E; UH-1M Iroquois
Paramilitary 17,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Terms of Service conscription 18 months voluntary AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable
ATK 4 A-37B Dragonfly
RESERVE 9,900 (Joint 9,900) ISR 12: 7 O-2A/B Skymaster*; 5 OA-37B Dragonfly*
390 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
Capabilities
DEPLOYMENT
ACTIVE 15,212 (Army 13,444 Navy 897 Air 871)
AFGHANISTAN
Paramilitary 19,000
NATO • ISAF 24
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
RESERVE 63,863 (Navy 650 Air 900 Armed Forces
UN • UNOCI 3 obs 62,313)
LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 2 obs ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SOUTH SUDAN
Army 13,444
UN • UNMISS 4 obs 15 Military Zones
WESTERN SAHARA FORCES BY ROLE
UN • MINURSO 3 obs SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 trg bn)
FOREIGN FORCES MANOEUVRE
Light
United States US Southern Command: 1 Forward
Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs 1 (strategic reserve) mech bde (1 inf bn, 1 cav regt, 1 log
personnel) coy)
6 inf bde (1 inf bn)
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB bde with (2 AB bn)
Other
1 (Presidential) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CSS coy)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr comd (1 engr bn, 1 construction bn)
1 MP bde with (1 MP bn)
Reserves
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
ε19 inf bn
Latin America and the Caribbean 391
the Caribbean
1 sqn with BT-67; Beech 90/100/200/300 King Air; IAI-201 Guyanese Dollar G$ 2010 2011 2012
Arava
GDP G$ 460bn 507bn
1 (tactical support) sqn with Cessna 206; PA-31 Navajo
TRAINING US$ 2.24bn 2.47bn
1 sqn with Cessna R172K Hawk XP; T-35B Pillan per capita US$ 2,989 3,310
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Growth % 4.37 5.26
1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 212 (armed); Bell 412 Inflation % 3.7 5.8
Twin Huey (armed); UH-1H Iroquois Def bdgt G$ 5.86bn 6.1bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 29m 30m
Serviceability of ac is less than 50% FMA US$ 0.3m -
AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable
US$1=G$ 205.65 205.66
ATK 2 A-37B Dragonfly
TPT • Light 20: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 100 King Population 744,768
Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 BT-67; 2 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
208B; 5 Cessna R172K Hawk XP; 4 IAI-201 Arava; 1 PA-31
Male 16.2% 5.7% 4.6% 3.8% 17.4% 2.0%
Navajo
TRG 11: 7 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 4 T-35B Pillan Female 15.7% 5.4% 4.3% 3.4% 18.5% 2.8%
HELICOPTERS
MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey (armed)
Capabilities
TPT • Light 19: 3 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 9 Bell 206 Jet ACTIVE 1,100 (Army 900 Navy 100 Air 100)
Ranger; 7 Bell 212 (armed) Paramilitary 1,500
Active numbers combined Guyana Defence Force
Tactical Security Group
Air Military Police RESERVE 670 (Army 500 Navy 170)
392 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
1 (spt wpn) cbt spt coy Brazil 2,188; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy
1 engr coy Canada 11
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Chile 500; 1 inf bn; 1 avn coy; elm 1 engr coy
RECCE 9: 6 EE-9 Cascavel (reported); 3 S52 Shorland Ecuador 67; elm 1 engr coy
ARTY 54 France 2
TOWED 130mm 6 M-46†
Guatemala 148; 1 MP coy
MOR 48: 81mm 12 L16A1; 82mm 18 M-43; 120mm 18
Indonesia 20
M-43
Japan 225; 1 engr coy
Navy 100 Jordan 612; 1 inf bn
Korea, Republic of 242; 1 engr coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 Nepal 1,075; 2 inf bn
PCO 1 Essequibo (ex-UK River) Paraguay 131; 1 engr coy
PB 4 Barracuda Peru 372; 1 inf coy
Philippines 173; 1 HQ coy
Air Force 100 Sri Lanka 960; 1 inf bn
FORCES BY ROLE United States 8
TRANSPORT Uruguay 1,090; 2 inf bn; 1 mne coy, 1 avn sect
1 unit with Bell 206; Cessna U206G; Y-12 (II)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2: 1 Cessna 206; 1 Y-12 (II)
Honduras HND
HELICOPTERS Honduran Lempira L 2010 2011 2012
MRH 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey†
GDP L 291bn 328bn
TPT • Light 2 Bell 206
US$ 15.1bn 17.1bn
Paramilitary 1,500+ per capita US$ 1,892 2,095
Growth % 2.77 3.46
Guyana People’s Militia 1,500+ Inflation % 4.7 7.8
Def bdgta L 2.59bn 2.68bn
US$ 135m 140m
Haiti HTI FMA US$ 1.075m 1.3m
Haitian Gourde G 2010 2011 2012 US$1=L 19.25 19.22
GDP G 265bn 298bn a
Excludes military pensions
US$ 6.54bn 7.27bn Population 8,143,564
per capita US$ 678 747
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Growth % -5.42 6.14
Inflation % 4.1 7.3 Male 18.8% 5.7% 5.1% 4.4% 14.6% 1.7%
FMA US$ 1.6m 1.6m Female 18.0% 5.5% 4.9% 4.3% 14.9% 2.1%
Light
3 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn) Skylane; 1 Cessna 185; 1 Cessna 210; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 1
1 inf bde (3 inf bn) PA-31 Navajo
Other TRG 12: 9 EMB-312 Tucano; 3 MXT-7-180 Star Rocket
1 (Presidential) gd coy HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT MRH 7: 5 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 2 Hughes 500
1 engr bn TPT • Light 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
MSL • AAM • IR Shafrir‡
Reserves
FORCES BY ROLE Paramilitary 8,000
MANOEUVRE
Public Security Forces 8,000
Light
Ministry of Public Security and Defence; 11 regional
1 inf bde
comd
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LT TK 12 Scorpion
RECCE 57: 13 RBY-1 RAMTA; 40 Saladin; 3 Scimitar; 1 DEPLOYMENT
Sultan WESTERN SAHARA
ARTY 118+
UN • MINURSO 12 obs
TOWED 28: 105mm: 24 M-102; 155mm: 4 M-198
MOR 90+: 60mm; 81mm; 120mm 60 FMK-2; 160mm 30
M-66 Soltam FOREIGN FORCES
the Caribbean
AD • GUNS 48: 20mm 24 M-55A2; 24 TCM-20 CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk
Navy 1,400
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Jamaica JAM
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
PB 17: 1 Chamelecon (Swift 26m); 1 Tegucilgalpa (US Jamaican Dollar J$ 2010 2011 2012
Guardian 32m); 4 Guanaja; 3 Guaymuras (Swift 31m); 6 GDP J$ 1.16tr 1.26tr
Nacaome (Swiftship, 65); 2 F&H (US PB Mk III) US$ 13.2bn 14.6bn
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 1 Punta Caxinas per capita US$ 4,632 5,078
Marines 830 Growth % -1.22 1.49
MANOEUVRE
Light Inflation % 4.2 3.4
2 inf bn Def exp NP 68.4bn
COMBAT SUPPORT US$ 5.41bn
1 engr regt (4 engr sqn) Def bdgta NP 58.4bn 62.8bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT US$ 4.62bn 5.15bn
1 log bn
FMA (US) US$ 265.25m 8.0m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=NP 12.65 12.19
APC (W) 4 LAV-150 Commando a
Excluding paramilitaries
MOR 81mm 12 L16A1
Population 113,724,226
Reserves
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Male 14.4% 4.8% 4.5% 4.0% 18.3% 2.9%
Light Female 13.8% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2% 20.4% 3.6%
1 inf bn
Capabilities
Coast Guard 190 ACTIVE 280,250 (Army 212,000 Navy 56,500 Air
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
11,750) Paramilitary 51,500
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
PBF 3 Reserve 87,344 (National Military Service)
PB 8: 3 Cornwall (Damen Stan 4207); 4 Dauntless; 1 Paul
Bogle (US 31m) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Air Wing 140 Army 212,000
Plus National Reserve
12 regions (total: 46 army zones). The Army consists of
FORCES BY ROLE
one manoeurvre corps (1st), with three inf bde and one
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
armd bde, one SF corps one AB corps and one MP corps.
1 flt with BN-2A Defender; Cessna 210M Centurion Command and control functions have been redesigned
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER and decentralised, allowing greater independence for each
1 flt with Bell 407 of the 12 Military Region commanders and establishing C4
1 flt with Bell 412EP units in every region.
TRAINING
FORCES BY ROLE
1 unit with Bell 206B-3; DA-40-180FP Diamond Star
SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 SF bde (12 SF bn)
AIRCRAFT 1 amph SF bde (5 SF bn)
TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2A Defender; 1 Cessna 210M MANOEUVRE
Centurion; 2 DA40-180FP Diamond Star Reconnaissance
HELICOPTERS 2 armd bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt armd recce bn, 1
MRH 3 Bell 412EP (Canon) AT gp)
TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 206B-3 Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 407 3 armd recce regt
2 lt armd recce regt
DEPLOYMENT 24 mot recce regt
Light
SIERRA LEONE 1 (1st) armd corps (1 armd bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt
IMATT 1 armd recce bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 3 inf/rapid reaction
Latin America and the Caribbean 395
bde (each: 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 1 cbt 3 Sierra (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer);
engr bde (3 engr bn)) 6 Uribe (ESP Halcon) (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
3 indep lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp) PCO 10 Leandro Valle (US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun
107 indep inf bn (being withdrawn from service; to be replaced with 4
12 indep inf coy additional Oaxaca class)
Air Manoeuvre PCG 2 Huracan (ISR Aliya) with 4 single lnchr with
1 para bde with (1 (GAFE) SF gp, 3 bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp)
Gabriel II AShM, 1 Phalanx CIWS
Other
PCC 2 Democrata
1 (Presidential) gd corps (1 SF gp, 1 mech inf bde (2 inf
bn, 1 aslt bn) 1 mne bn (Navy), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 MP PBF 69: 6 Acuario; 2 Acuario B; 4 Isla (US Halter); 48 Polaris
bde (3 bn, 1 special ops anti-riot coy)) (SWE CB90); 9 Polaris II (SWE IC 16M; additional vessels
COMBAT SUPPORT under construction)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
6 indep arty regt PB 15: 10 Azteca; 3 Cabo (US Cape Higgon); 2 Punta (US
2 MP bde (3 MP bn) Point)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AMPHIBIOUS • LS • LST 3: 2 Papaloapan (US Newport); 1
RECCE 237: 124 ERC-90F1 Lynx (4 trg); 40 M-8; 41 MAC-1; Panuco (ex US LST-1152)
32 VBL LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17:
APC 706 AK 2
APC (T) 472: 398 DNC-1 (mod AMX-VCI); 40 HWK-11; AGOR 3: 2 Robert D. Conrad; 1 Humboldt
34 M-5A1 half-track AGS 4
APC (W) 234: 95 BDX; 25 DN-4; 19 DN-5 Toro; 26 LAV- ATF 4
150 ST; 25 MOWAG Roland; 44 VCR (3 amb; 5 cmd post) TRG 4: 1 Manuel Azuela; 2 Huasteco (also serve as troop
ARTY 1,390
transport, supply and hospital ships)
TOWED 123: 105mm 123: 40 M101; 40 M-56; 16 M2A1,
AX 1
14 M-3; 13 NORINCO M-90
MOR 1,267: 81mm 400 M1, 400 Brandt, 300 SB
Naval Aviation 1,250
120mm 167: 75 Brandt; 60 M-65; 32 RT61
AT FORCES BY ROLE
MSL • SP 8 Milan (VBL) MARITIME PATROL
RCL 1,187+ 5 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; MX-7 Star Rocket;
SP 106mm M40A1 Lancair IV-P
106mm M40A1 1 sqn with CASA 212PM Aviocar*; CN-235 MPA
GUNS 37mm 30 M3 Persuader
AD 1 sqn with L-90 Redigo
the Caribbean
TOWED 12.7mm 40 M-55; 20mm 40 GAI-B01 1 sqn with An-32B Cline
ARV 3 M-32 Recovery Sherman 1 (VIP) sqn with DHC-8 Dash 8; Learjet 24; Turbo
Commander 1000
Navy 56,500 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
HQ at Acapulco; HQ (exercise) at Vera Cruz. Two Fleet
2 sqn with AS-555 Fennec; AS-565MB Panther; MD-
Commands: Gulf (6 zones), Pacific (11 zones)
602; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with Bo-105 CBS-5
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7
FRIGATES 7: 5 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
FFGHM 4 Allende (US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk112 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
lnchr with ASROC/RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 Mk29 AIRCRAFT 7 combat capable
GMLS with Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT ISR 7 CASA 212PM Aviocar*
with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 MD-902 MR 4 CN-235 MPA Persuader
hel) TPT • Light 21: 3 An-32B Cline; 2 C-295M; 1 Cessna
FF 3: 404 Titan; 1 DHC-8 Dash 8; 6 Lancair IV-P; 3 Learjet 24;
1 Quetzalcoatl with 2 twin 127mm gun, 1 hel landing 5 Turbo Commander 1000
platform
TRG 15: 3 L-90TP Redigo; 4 MX-7 Star Rocket; 8 Z-242L
2 Bravo (US Bronstein) with 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr
HELICOPTERS
with ASROC, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform MRH 7: 2 AS555 Fennec; 4 MD-500E; 1 Mi-17-V5 Hip
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 119 MRH/TPT 22 Mi-8 Hip (med tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H
PSOH 4 Oaxaca with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS-565MB SAR 4 AS565MB Panther
Panther hel) TPT 23 Medium 3 UH-60M Black Hawk Light 20:
PCOH 17 : 4 Durango (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel); 11 Bo-105 CBS-5; 6 MD-902 (SAR role); 2 PZL Mi-2
4 Holzinger (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer); Hoplite; 1 R-44
396 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Air Force 1,200
Male 16.5% 5.8% 5.3% 4.7% 16.2% 1.5% FORCES BY ROLE
Female 15.9% 5.7% 5.2% 4.6% 16.7% 1.9% TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; Beech 90 King Air;
Capabilities Cessna U206; Cessna 404 Titan (VIP)
TRAINING
ACTIVE 12,000 (Army 10,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200) 1 unit with Cessna 172; PA-18 Super Cub; PA-28 Cherokee
Terms of service voluntary, 18–36 months
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H (VIP/tpt/armed)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AIR DEFENCE
1 gp with ZU-23; C3-Morigla M1
Army ε10,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE AIRCRAFT
SPECIAL FORCES TPT • Light 6: 1 An-2 Colt; 4 An-26 Curl; 1 Cessna 404
1 SF bde with (2 SF bn) Titan (VIP)
Reserves
MANOEUVRE
Light
14 inf regt (cadre)
4 cav regt (cadre)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 3 M4A3 Sherman
LT TK 12 M3A1 Stuart (6†)
Latin America and the Caribbean 399
Paramilitary 14,800
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
the Caribbean
HELICOPTERS
UN • MINURSO 5 obs
TPT • Light 2 AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo)
TRG 1 Bell 47 (OH-13 Sioux)
4 mil region 350 King Air; 1 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 152; 1 Cessna 208
FORCES BY ROLE Caravan I; 2 Cessna U206 Stationair; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II;
SPECIAL FORCES 1 PA-34 Seneca
1 (1st) SF bde (4 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp) TRG 4 IL-103
1 (3rd) SF bde (3 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 AD gp) HELICOPTERS
1 SF gp (regional troops) MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H
MANOEUVRE TPT 20 Heavy 1 Mi-26T Halo (2 more in store) Medium
Armoured 6 Mi-171Sh Light 13: 2 AW109K2; 9 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 2
1 (3rd) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AD R-44
gp, 1 engr bn) TRG 5 F-28F
Mechanised AD
1 (3rd) armd cav bde (3 mech cav bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 SAM • MANPAD 298+: 70 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin);
arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn) 128 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 100+ 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
Grail)‡
1 (1st) cav bde (4 mech cav bn, 1 arty gp)
GUNS 165
Light
SP 23mm 35 ZSU-23-4
2 (2nd & 31st) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp)
TOWED 23mm 130: 80 ZU-23-2; 50 ZU-23
1 (1st Reinforced) inf bde (1 tk bn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty gp)
ARV M578
2 (7th & 32nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty gp)
1 (8th) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AD bn)
Mountain
Navy 24,000 (incl 1,000 Coast Guard)
Commands: Pacific, Lake Titicaca, Amazon River
1 (4th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp)
1 (5th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf bn, 3 jungle coy, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 arty gp) SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6:
Jungle 6 Angamos (GER T-209/1200 – 2 in refit/reserve) with 6
1 (5th) jungle inf bde (1 SF gp, 3 jungle bn, 3 jungle coy, single 533mm TT with A-185 HWT
1 jungle arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 jungle engr bn) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9
1 (6th) jungle inf bde (4 jungle bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr bn) CRUISERS • CG 1 Almirante Grau (NLD De Ruyter) with 8
Other single lnchr with Otomat Mk 2 AShM, 4 twin 152mm gun
FRIGATES • FFGHM 8:
1 (18th) armd trg bde (1 armd regt, 2 tk bn, 1 armd inf
4 Aguirre (ITA Lupo) with 8 single lnchr with Otomat
bn, 1 engr bn, 1 SP fd arty gp)
Mk 2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM,
Aviation
2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun,
1 (1st) avn bde (1 atk hel/recce hel bn, 1 avn bn, 2 aslt
(capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Sea King)
hel/tpt hel bn)
4 Carvajal (mod ITA Lupo) with 8 single lnchr with
COMBAT SUPPORT
Otomat Mk 2 AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-
2 arty gp (regional troops)
7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244
1 AD gp (regional troops)
LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-
1 engr bn (regional troops)
3D Sea King)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
MBT 165: 165 T-55; (75† in store) CORVETTES • FSG 6 Velarde (FRA PR-72 64m) with 4
LT TK 96 AMX-13 single lnchr with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
RECCE 95: 30 BRDM-2; 15 Fiat 6616; 50 M9A1 PCR 5:
APC 299 2 Amazonas with 1 76mm gun
APC (T) 120 M113A1 1 Manuel Clavero (additional vessel in build)
APC (W) 179: 150 UR-416; 25 Fiat 6614; 4 Repontec 2 Marañon with 2 76mm gun
ARTY 998 PBR 3
SP • 155mm 12 M109A2 AMPHIBIOUS • LS • LST 4 Paita (capacity 395 troops)
TOWED 290 (US Terrebonne Parish)
Latin America and the Caribbean 401
MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; PC-6 Turbo-Porter; Y-12(II)
1 sqn with Beech 200T; Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 1 sqn with L-100-20
F-27 Friendship; F-60; SH-3D Sea King TRAINING
TRANSPORT 2 (drug interdiction) sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
1 flt with An-32B Cline; Cessna 206 1 sqn with MB-339A*
TRAINING 1 sqn with Z-242
1 sqn with F-28F; T-34C Turbo Mentor 1 hel sqn with Schweizer 300C
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; Mi-8 Hip
1 sqn with Mi-25/Mi-35P Hind
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIRCRAFT 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H
MP 8: 4 Beech 200T; 4 F-60 1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412
ELINT 1 F-27 Friendship Twin Huey; Bo-105C
TPT • Light 4: 3 An-32B Cline; 1 Cessna 206 AIR DEFENCE
TRG 5 T-34C Turbo Mentor 6 bn with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
HELICOPTERS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ASW 5: 2 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 3 SH-3D Sea
AIRCRAFT 78 combat capable
King
FTR 20: 15 MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 3 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 2
TPT 5 Medium 2 Mi-8 Hip Light 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger
II MiG-29UB Fulcrum B
TRG 6 F-28F FGA 12: 2 Mirage 2000ED (M-2000DP); 10 Mirage 2000E
MSL • AShM AM-39 Exocet (2000P)
the Caribbean
Marines 4,000 25UB Frogfoot B†
FORCES BY ROLE ISR 6: 2 Learjet 36A; 4 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26B)
SPECIAL FORCES TPT 17: Medium 2 L-100-20; Light 11: 4 An-32 Cline; 1
1 cdo gp Commander 690; 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 PC-6 Turbo-Porter;
MANOEUVRE 2 Y-12(II) PAX 4 B-737
Light TRG 50: 19 EMB-312 Tucano; 10 MB-339A*; 6 T-41A
2 inf bn Mescalero/T-41D Mescalero; 15 Z-242
1 inf gp HELICOPTERS
Amphibious ATK 18: 16 Mi-25 Hind D; 2 Mi-35P Hind E
1 mne bde (1 SF gp, 1 recce bn, 2 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 MRH 21: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 19 Mi-17 Hip H
arty gp) TPT • Light 21: 8 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 6 Bell 212 (AB-212);
Jungle 1 Bo-105C; 6 Bo-105LS
1 jungle inf bn TRG 5 Schweizer 300C
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AD
APC (W) 35+: 20 BMR-600; V-100 Commando; 15 V-200 SAM 100+: S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 100+ Javelin
Chaimite MSL
ARTY 18+ ASM AS-30
TOWED 122mm D-30 AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)‡; R-73
MOR 18+: 81mm; 120mm ε18 (AA-11 Archer)R-550 Magic; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M-40A1 Alamo) ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder)
AD • GUNS 20mm SP (twin)
Paramilitary • National Police 77,000
Air Force 17,000 (100,000 reported)
Air Force divided into five regions – North, Lima, South, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Central and Amazon. APC (W) 100 MOWAG Roland
402 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
AT 2 armd regt
RCL 84mm ε24 Carl Gustav 1 armd cav regt
5 mech cav regt
Coast Guard 1,063 8 mech inf regt
Light
FORCES BY ROLE 1 mot inf bn
COMMAND 5 inf bn
1 mne HQ Air Manoeuvre
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 para bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 COMBAT SUPPORT
PCO 1 Nelson (UK Island) 1 (strategic reserve) arty regt
PB 19: 2 Gasper Grande; 1 Matelot; 4 Plymouth; 4 Point; 5 fd arty gp
6 Scarlet Ibis (Austal 30m); 2 Wasp; (1 Cascadura (SWE 1 AD gp
Karlskrona 40m) non-operational) 1 (1st) engr bde (2 engr bn)
4 cbt engr bn
Air Wing 50 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT MBT 15 TI-67
TPT • Light 3: 1 Cessna 310; 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26) LT TK 38: 16 M24 Chaffee; 22 M41A1UR
HELICOPTERS RECCE 110: 15 EE-9 Cascavel; 48 GAZ-39371 Vodnik; 47 OT-
TPT • Light 1 S-76 93;
AIRSHIPS • ISR 1 Aeros-40B SkyDragon AIFV 18 BMP-1
the Caribbean
APC (T) 29: 24 M113A1UR; 3 M-93 (MT-LB); 2 PTS
APC (W) 147: 54 Condor; 53 OT-64: 40 MOWAG Piranha
Uruguay URY ARTY 185
Uruguayan Peso pU 2010 2011 2012 SP 122mm 6 2S1 Carnation
TOWED 44: 105mm 36: 28 M101A1; 8 M-102; 155mm 8
GDP pU 808bn 914bn
M114A1
US$ 39.5bn 46.8bn
MOR 135: 81mm 91: 35 M1, 56 LN; 120mm 44 SL
per capita US$ 11,972 14,142 AT
Growth % 8.47 6.00 MSL • MANPATS 15 Milan
Inflation % 6.7 7.7 RCL 69: 106mm 69 M40A1
Def bdgt pU 8.64bn 9.34bn 9.34bn UAV • ISR • Light 1 Charrua
AD • GUNS • TOWED 14: 20mm 14: 6 M167 Vulcan;
US$ 423m 478m
8TCM-20 (w/Elta M-2016 radar)
FMA (US) US$ - 0.57m AEV MT-LB
US$1=pU 20.44 19.54
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • TPT 21 Medium 2 C–130B Hercules; Light 18: 2 Beech
MSO 3 Temerario (Kondor II) 58 Baron (UB-58); 4 C–212 Aviocar; 9 Cessna 206H; 2
AMPHIBIOUS 4: 2 LCVP; 2 LCM EMB–110C Bandeirante; 1 EMB-120 Brasilia
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7: TRG 21: 5 PC-7U Turbo Trainer; 12 SF-260 EU; 4 T–41D
ARS 1 Vanguardia Mescalero
AR 1 Artigas (GER Freiburg, general spt ship) HELICOPTERS
AG 1 Maldonado MRH 1 AS365 Dauphin
AGHS 2: 1 Helgoland; 1 Triestre TPT • Light 10: 6 Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois); 4 Bell 212
ABU 1 Sirius
AXS 1 Paramilitary 818
Naval Aviation 211 Guardia de Coraceros 368 (under Interior
Ministry)
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE
Guardia de Granaderos 450
1 flt with Beech 200T*; Jetstream Mk2
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANPSORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS350B2 Ecureuil (Esquilo); Bo-105M; DEPLOYMENT
Wessex HC2/Mk60
AFGHANISTAN
TRANSPORT/TRAINING
UN • UNAMA 1 obs
1 flt with T-34C Turbo Mentor
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE CÔTE D’IVOIRE
AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable UN • UNOCI 2 obs
MP 2 Jetstream Mk2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
ISR 1 Beech 200T*
UN • MONUC 1,248; 45 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 mne coy; 1 hel pl;
TRG 2 T-34C Turbo Mentor
1 engr coy
HELICOPTERS
MRH 6 Bo-105M EGYPT
TPT 2 Medium 1 Wessex HC2/Mk60 Light 1 AS350B2 MFO 58; 1 engr/tpt unit
Ecureuil (Esquilo)
HAITI
Naval Infantry 450 UN • MINUSTAH 1,090; 2 inf bn; 1 mne coy, 1 avn sect
FORCES BY ROLE INDIA/PAKISTAN
MANOEUVRE UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs
Amphibious
WESTERN SAHARA
1 mne bn(-)
UN • MINURSO 1 obs
Air Force 2,984
Flying hours 120 hrs/year Venezuela VEN
FORCES BY ROLE Venezuelan Bolivar Fuerte
2010 2011 2012
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Bs
1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly GDP Bs 1.01tr 1.33tr
1 sqn with IA-58B Pucará US$ 240bn 309bn
ISR per capita US$ 8,818 11,180
1 flt with EMB–110 Bandeirante Growth % -1.49 2.83
TRANSPORT
Inflation % 28.2 25.8
1 sqn with C–130B Hercules; C-212 Aviocar; EMB–110C
Bandeirante; EMB–120 Brasilia Def bdgt Bs 8.7bn ε10.2bn
1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 206H; T– 41D US$ 2.06bn ε2.38bn
1 (liaison) flt with Cessna 206H US$1=Bs 4.21 4.30
TRAINING
Population 27,635,743
1 sqn with PC- 7U Turbo Trainer
1 sqn with Beech 58 Baron (UB-58); SF–260EU Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Male 15.0% 5.0% 4.4% 4.0% 18.6% 2.4%
1 sqn with AS365 Dauphin; Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois);
Female 14.5% 4.9% 4.4% 4.1% 19.6% 3.0%
Bell 212
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Capabilities
AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable
ATK 15: 10 A–37B Dragonfly; 5 IA–58B Pucará ACTIVE 115,000 (Army 63,000 Navy 17,500 Air
ISR 1 EMB–110 Bandeirante 11,500 National Guard 23,000)
Latin America and the Caribbean 405
Terms of service 30 months selective, varies by region for all ARTY 439
services SP 20: 152mm 8 2S19 (replacing Mk F3s) 155mm 12
(AMX) Mk F3
RESERVE 8,000 (Army 8,000) TOWED 92: 105mm 80: 40 M101; 40 Model 56 pack
howitzer; 155mm 12 M114
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE MRL 44: 122mm 24 BM-21 160mm 20 LAR SP (LAR-160)
GUN/MOR 120mm 13 2S23 Nona-SVK
Army ε63,000 MOR 270+: 81mm 165; 120mm 84: 60 Brandt; 24 2S12
FORCES BY ROLE SP 21+: 81mm 21 Dragoon 300PM; AMX-VTT
MANOEUVRE AT
Armoured MSL • MANPATS 24 IMI MAPATS
1 (4th) armd div RCL 106mm 175 M40A1
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
(1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde, 1 mot cav bde, 1 AD bty) GUNS 76mm 75 M18 Hellcat
Mechanised AD
1 (9th) mot cav div SAM 8 Tor M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (18 more to be delivered)
(1 mot cav bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sy and spt bde) MANPAD RBS-70; Mistral
Light GUNS 6+
1 (1st) inf div SP 23mm ZSU-23-2 40mm 6+ AMX-13 Rafaga
(1 SF unit, 1 armd unit, 2 inf bde, 1 arty unit, 1 ADA TOWED 40mm M-1; L/70
bty, 1 spt unit) RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
1 (2nd) inf div AIRCRAFT
(2 inf bde, 2 ranger bde (2 ranger bn), 1 AD Bty, 1 TPT • Light 28: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air;
special dev and sy bde) 1 Beech 300 King Air; 1 Cessna 172; 6 Cessna 182 Skylane;
1 (3rd) inf div 2 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 207 Stationair; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 2
(1 inf bde, 1 ranger bde (2 ranger bn), 1 sigs regt, 1 MP IAI-202 Arava; 11 M-28 Skytruck
bde) HELICOPTERS
Air Manoeuvre ATK 10 Mi-35M2 Hind
1 para bde MRH 34: 10 Bell 412EP; 2 Bell 412SP; 22 Mi-17-1V Hip H
Jungle TPT 9 Heavy 3 Mi-26T2 Halo Medium 2 AS-61D Light 4:
1 (5th) inf div 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger, 1 Bell 206L-3 Long Ranger II
(1 cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bde (3 jungle inf bn, 1 hy mor ARV 5: 3 AMX-30D; 2 Dragoon 300RV; Samson
bty), 1 engr bn) VLB Leguan
Aviation
1 avn comd (1 tpt avn bn, 1 atk hel bn, 1 ISR avn bn) Navy ε14,300; ε3,200 conscript (total 17,500)
the Caribbean
1 AD bty with Tor M1 SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2:
1 cbt engr corps with (3 engr regt) 2 Sabalo (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SST-4 HWT
1 log comd with (2 log regt) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6
FFGHM 6 Mariscal Sucre (ITA mod Lupo) with 8 single
Reserve Organisations 8,000 lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr
FORCES BY ROLE with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT,
MANOEUVRE 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
Armoured PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9:
1 armd bn PSOH 3 Guaiqueri with 1 76mm gun
Light PBG 3 Federación (UK Vosper 37m) with 2 single lnchr
4 inf bn with Otomat Mk2 AShM
1 ranger bn PB 3 Constitucion (UK Vosper 37m) with 1 76mm gun
COMBAT SUPPORT AMPHIBIOUS 7
1 arty bn LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Capana (capacity 12 tanks;
2 engr regt 200 troops) (FSU Alligator)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LANDING CRAFT 3:
MBT 116: 81 AMX-30V; 35 T-72 LCU 2 Margarita (river comd)
LT TK 109: 31 AMX-13; 78 Scorpion 90 UCAC 1 Griffon 2000TD
RECCE 441: 42 Dragoon 300 LFV2; 10 TPz-1 Fuchs (CBRN); LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6
79 V-100/-150; 310 UR-53AR50 Tiuna AORH 1
AIFV 52: 16 BMP-3M; 36 BTR-80A AGOR 1 Punta Brava
APC 81 AGHS 2
APC (T) 45: 25 AMX-VCI; 12 VCI-PC; 8 VACI-TB ATF 1
APC (W) 36 Dragoon 300 AXS 1
406 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*
1 sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5 Hip H
GROUND ATTACK/ISR
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
MP 3 C-212-200 MPA* ELECTRONIC WARFARE
TPT • Light 7: 1 Beech C90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King 1 sqn with Falcon 20DC; SA-227 Metro III (C-26B)
Air; 4 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Turbo Commander 980C TANKER/TRANSPORT
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules/KC-137
ASW 5 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW) TRANSPORT
MRH 12: 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 6 Mi-17V-5 Hip 1 sqn with A319CJ; B-737
TPT • Light 1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II (trg) 4 sqn with Cessna T206H; Cessna 750
TRG 1 Bell TH-57A Sea Ranger 1 Squadron with Cessna 500/550/551; Falcon 20F; Falcon
900
Marines ε7,000
1 sqn with G-222; Short 360 Sherpa
FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING
COMMAND
1 sqn with Cessna 182N; SF-260E
1 div HQ
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
MANOEUVRE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Light
1 VIP sqn with AS532UL Cougar; Mi-172
6 inf bn
3 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; AS532 Cougar
Amphibious
2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H
1 amph bn
AIR DEFENCE
1 (rvn) mne bde
6 (rvn) inf bn 1 bty with Tor-M1 (3 bty planned); Barak
2 (landing) mne bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT 99 combat capable
1 arty bn ( 3 arty bty, 1 AD bn) FTR 31: 5 F-5 Freedom Fighter (VF-5), 4 F-5B Freedom
1 engr bde (1 cbt engr bn, 3 maint/construction bn) Fighter (NF-5B); 1 CF-5D Freedom Fighter (VF-5D); 17
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE F-16A Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting Falcon
APC (W) 32 EE-11 Urutu FGA 24 Su-30MKV
AAV 11 LVTP-7 (to be mod to -7A1) EW 4: 2 Falcon 20DC; 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26B)
ARTY • TOWED 105mm 18 M-56 TKR 1 KC-137
MOR 120mm 12 Brandt TPT 53 Medium 7: 6 C-130H Hercules; 1 G-222 Light 41: 5
AD • GUNS • SP 40mm 6 M-42 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 350 King Air; 10 Cessna 182N
AD • SAM RBS-70 Skylane; 12 Cessna 206 Stationair; 4 Cessna 208B Caravan;
AT•AT-4 Skip 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna
RCL 84mm M3 Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1 551; 1 Cessna 750 Citation X; 2 Short 360 Sherpa; PAX 5: 1
AEV 1 AAVR7 A319CJ; 1 B-737; 1 Falcon 20F; 2 Falcon 900
TRG 47: 18 EMB-312 Tucano*; 17 K-8W Karakorum*
Coast Guard 1,000 (deliveries in progress); 12 SF-260E
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 48 MRH 8 Mi-17 (Mi-17VS) Hip H
PSOH 3 Guaicamacuto with 1 76 mm gun, (capacity 1 TPT • Medium 16: 4 AS332B Super Puma; 8 AS-532
Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) (1 additional vessel in build) Cougar; 2 AS532UL Cougar; 2 Mi-172 (VIP)
PB 20: 1 Dianca; 12 Gavion; 1 Pegalo; 4 Petrel (USCG SAM 32+: 4 Tor-M1 (further 8 on order); 10+ Barak; 18
Point); 2 Protector S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
PBR 25: 18 Constancia; 2 Guaicapuro; 2 Manaure; 3 MANPAD 200 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); ADAMS;
Terepaima (Cougar) Mistral
Latin America and the Caribbean 407
Table 30 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Latin America and the Caribbean
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
Argentina (ARG)
OPV 80 PSO 4 ARS619 m ARG/GER Astillero Rio 2009 2010 Based on Fassmer OPV 80 design.
(US$145m) Santiago Patrulleros de Alta Mar (PAM)
programme. Project suspended but
resumed in 2010. First vessel ISD 2012
Mi-171E Tpt Hel 3 n.k. RUS Rosoboron- 2011 n.k. Exercised option from previous
export US$27m contract
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
Bolivia (BOL)
MA60 Tpt ac 2 n.k. PRC AVIC 2011 n.k. -
H425 MRH Hel 6 n.k. PRC Harbin 2011 n.k. -
Brazil (BRZ)
Leopard 1A5 MBT 270 €8m GER n.k. 2006 2009 Ex-GER; 220 tk, plus 20 for spares
and 30 in trg or engr role. Delivery in
progress
Piranha IIIC APC (W) 18 n.k. CHE Mowag 2008 2010 For marines. One Ambulance, 14 APC,
one ARV and two CP versions. First
delivered 2010
VBTP-MR APC (W) up to R6bn BRZ/ITA IVECO Latin 2009 2012 To replace EE-9 Cascavel and EE-11
2044 (€2.5bn) America Urutu; Delivery to be complete by 2030
SN-BR SSN 1 see notes BRZ DCNS 2009 2025 Part of €6.7bn (US$8.3bn) naval
(Submarino programme. Contract covers work
Nuclear on the non-nuclear sections of the
Brasileiro) submarine
S-BR SSK 4 see notes FRA DCNS 2009 2017 Part of €6.7bn (US$8.3bn) naval
(Submarino programme. To be built by Itaguaí
Brasileiro - Construções Navais (JV between
Scorpene-class) DCNS and Odebrecht). Delivery to be
completed 2022. First steel cut May
2010
NAPA 500 PCC 6 n.k. BRZ/FRA INACE/ 2006 2009 Delivery in progress. Call for tender
(Vigilante-class CMN/2nd for third batch in early 2010. First two
400 CL 54) batch: EISA commissioned in 2009 and 2010.
Possible future expansion of order
P-3A Orion ASW ac 8 US$401m ESP EADS-CASA 2005 n.k. Upgrade to P-3AM. Option on a ninth
Upgrade ac. First ac upgraded by Apr 2009
Mi-35M Hind Atk Hel 12 US$150- RUS Rosoboron- 2008 2009 Contract value incl spares and trg. Six
(AH-2 Sabre) 300m export delivered by mid-2011 with order to be
completed by late 2011 or early 2012
S-70B Seahawk ASW Hel 4 US$195m US Sikorsky 2009 2011 Option for two more. To replace SH-
3A/B Sea King hels. To be delivered
from Dec 2011
AS365K MRH Hel 34 R376m BRZ EADS Brazil 2009 2011 To be manufactured in BRZ by Helibras.
Panther (US$215m) Final delivery due 2021
EC725 Super Tpt Hel 50 US$2bn BRZ EADS Brazil 2008 2010 First three to be built in FRA.
Cougar Remainder to be manufactured in BRZ
by Helibras. Delivery in progress
UH-60L Black Tpt Hel 10 US$60.4m US Sikorsky 2009 2010 For air force SAR. Part of FMS
Hawk programme
Heron-1 ISR UAV 14 US$350m ISR Israel 2009 2010 For federal police
Aerospace
Industries
Hermes 450 ISR UAV n.k. n.k. ISR Elbit 2011 2011 Delivery to be complete in 2012
Systems
A-Darter AAM n.k. ZAR1bn BRZ/RSA Denel 2007 n.k. Missile firings continued during
(US$143m) 2011. Delivery of production
standard missiles due to begin
2013. Programme led by SA’s Denel
Dynamics
Latin America and the Caribbean 409
Table 30 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Latin America and the Caribbean
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
Chile (CHL)
Satellite Sat 1 US$72m FRA/GER EADS 2008 2011 Role incl border surv and military uses.
Financed by military. Launch delayed
until late 2011
Foudre-class LPD 1 US$80m FRA n/a 2011 2012 Sale of former Foudre (L9011), with
delivery expected mid-2012
C-295 MPA/ MP/ASW 3 US$120m ESP EADS-CASA 2007 2010 For navy. One C-295 MPA; two C-295
ASW ac ASW. Cost incl ASM and torp. Option
for a further five MPA. MPA ac delivered
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
Colombia (COL)
Pohang-class FS 1 nil ROK n/a 2011 2012 Excess defence article being provided
free to Colombia. Vessel is the former
ROKS Gunsan. Unclear armaments
package
PAF-L (light) PBR 10 n.k. COL Cotecmar n.k. 2010 Delivery in progress
shipyard
Kfir C10 FGA ac 24 US$200m ISR IAI 2008 2009 Eleven previously delivered and 13
(est) ex-ISR stock being upgraded from C7
to C10 by IAI. First delivery mid-2009;
deliveries ongoing
Ecuador (ECU)
Leopard 1V MBT 30 n.k. CHL n.k. 2009 2009 Ex-CHL stock. To replace 90 AMX-13.
the Caribbean
Shyri (Type SSK 2 US$120m CHL ASMAR/ 2008 2012 SLEP. To extend service life by 20 years
209/1300) Upgrade DCNS
Cheetah C/D Ftr ac 12 US$43.4m RSA Denel 2010 n.k. Second-hand RSA ac. Ten Cheetah
C and two Cheetah D; to replace 12
Mirage F-1s. Three delivered. Further
deliveries suspended pending
investigation
Mexico (MEX)
MEXSAT Sat 3 n.k. US Boeing 2010 2012 -
C-27J Spartan Tpt ac 4 US$200m ITA Alenia 2011 2011 Delivery to be complete by end 2012
Aeronautica
EC725 Super Tpt hel 6 n.k. Int’l / MEX Eurocopter 2009 2011 For tpt and civil security missions
Cougar de Mexico
EC725 Super Tpt hel 6 n.k. Int’l / MEX Eurocopter 2010 2013 Follow on from similar order signed
Cougar de Mexico in 2009
S4 Ehecatl (S4E) ISR UAV 3 US$3m MEX Hydra Tech- 2009 n.k. For navy. Primary anti-narcotics role
nologies and secondary SAR role. Delivery
status unclear
Buque LSL 2 US$64 m MEX Astilleros 2009 2012 First vessel, Montes Azules, launched
Logistico Multi- de Marina in August 2011. Second keel laid at
propositos No 20 same time
Panama (PAN)
AW139 Tpt Hel 6 n.k. ITA/UK Agusta 2010 n.k. Four for national/public security roles,
Westland one for utility role, one for VIP tpt role.
Delivery status unclear
410 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2012
Table 30 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Latin America and the Caribbean
Designation Type Quantity Contract Supplier Prime Order First Notes
Value Country Contractor Date Delivery
Due
Peru (PER)
Clavero-class PCC 2 n.k. PER Sima n.k. 2010 First of class (CF-16) launched Jun
2008, commissioned 2010. Second of
class expected to commission 2012
Newport-class LST 2 n.k. US n.k. 2009 n.k. Ex-US stock. USS Fresno (LST 1182) and
USS Racine (LST 1191). Delivery status
unclear
Mi-17 Hip MRH Hel 6 see notes RUS Rosoboron- 2010 2010 Part of εUS$250m order for six Mi-
export 17 and two Mi-35. Delivery to be
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:06 06 August 2012
Suriname (SUR)
Dhruv MRH Hel 3 INR750m IND HAL 2009 n.k. Delivery status unclear
(US$15.3m)
Venezuela (VEN)
T-72M1M MBT 92 n.k. RUS n.k. 2009 2011 First 35 delivered May 2011. Financing
reportedly from loan agreement with
Moscow
Tor-M1 SAM 3 bty n.k. RUS Rosoboron- 2006 2007 First bty delivered Dec 2007. Further
export delivery status unclear
Project 636 SSK 1 n.k. RUS n.k. 2008 n.k. Varshavyanka (original procurement
(Imp Kilo) plan of 3 SSK reduced for financial
reasons). Delivery status unclear
POVZEE/ PSOH 4 See notes ESP Navantia 2005 2010 US$2.2bn incl four Buque de Vigilancia
Guaiqueri-class de Litoral-class coastal patrol ships.
First vessel commissioned in April
2011. Final keel laid in February 2010
BVL/ PSOH 4 See notes ESP Navantia 2005 2008 US$2.2bn incl four Patrullero
Guicamacuto- Oceánico de Vigilancia de la Zona
class Económica Exclusiva. First three vessels
commissioned; final vessel’s ISD
expected 2012
Y-8 Tpt ac 8 n.k. PRC AVIC 2011 2012 -
Chapter Nine
Sub-Saharan Africa
African Standby Force contacts and develop expertise, and learn lessons
through participation at regional training centres
How to best address the range of diverse secu- and in multinational exercises such as the large-scale
rity challenges on the continent has in recent inter-operability exercises run by USAFRICOM.
years been a preoccupation of many defence and
security establishments. The Military Balance has
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
West Africa
traced the evolving debates and practical develop-
ments surrounding the African Peace and Security West African states faced a range of ongoing secu-
Architecture and the African Standby Force (ASF). rity challenges in 2011, notably the conflict in Côte
The ASF is the African Union’s prescribed instrument d’Ivoire and continued efforts to combat Islamist
for eventually meeting the military demands of the armed groups operating in the Sahel. Despite the
continent. Five brigades of roughly 6,500 soldiers are threat that conflict may spill over in the region, as
planned. Of course, generating adequate capacity to it did in Liberia (1989–2003) and in Sierra Leone
support AU initiatives relating to peace and security (1991–2002), most militaries remain small and lightly
(such as AU and AU/UN deployments) and the ASF equipped. Defence expenditure, as a percentage of
hinges on the success of individual states in gener- GDP, is 18% lower and national armed force size is
ating deployable combat power, or other relevant 28% smaller than East Africa (The Military Balance,
and deployable assets. On this, the situation remains 2011, pp. 410–49, comparisons omit Ethiopian and
mixed (see below). While some African militaries are Eritrean forces). These differences in scale partly
restructuring at a fast pace, with realistic ambitions relate to the continued, albeit diminishing, presence
to become comparatively modern, responsive and of French forces in the region, which many govern-
well equipped forces, others deploy small forces that ments see as some insurance against foreign aggres-
have barely changed in size and capability since the sion. They are also a legacy of regimes that have tried
1960s. Many African states suffer domestic conflict to keep armed forces small, relying on well-equipped
and insurgency, which hampers military reform and ‘presidential’ guard forces to secure the presidency.
modernisation. These differences matter for Africa’s Côte d’Ivoire’s armed forces, for instance, were
current and future military balance. lightly equipped even before the 2002–11 hostili-
Nonetheless, the AU is pressing ahead with ties and the UN arms embargo (2004–present). Most
the ASF concept, and practical moves – such as armoured vehicles were unserviceable, often due to
Sub-Saharan
earmarking sites and constructing logistics hubs for cannibalisation; mobility depended on civilian pickup
Africa
the regional brigades, such as in Douala, Cameroon trucks; barracks were decrepit due to several decades
– are under way. The AU in April sponsored a work- without maintenance; and forces retained many
shop on the third roadmap for ASF operationalisation, inoperable weapons. The army had benefitted from
with a desire to sharpen focus on rapid deployment sporadic investment over the years, such as the partial
capabilities, humanitarian security, maritime security replacement of infantry weapons and the acquisition of
and the protection of civilians. But arguably as impor- BM-21 MLRS. By 2011, however, the army had lost the
tant as AU planning in realising a deployable capa- technical capacity to operate its few remaining larger
bility are the actions of individual states in reforming weapon systems and the conflict was fought primarily
or reshaping their defence establishments and capa- with small arms and light weapons. Following the
bilities, the support given to them by other nations, April 2011 cessation of hostilities, the government of
and that given by regional economic and political President Alassane Ouattara faces the challenge of
groupings. Useful lessons will also be learned from rebuilding national armed forces and integrating rebel
the early operation of the AU’s regional standby forces, which, at time of writing, remained under the
brigades. These factors will help militaries to build control of ten semi-independent rebel commands.
412 The Military Balance 2012
Around 3,000 Ivorians died and 900,000 fled in the violent aftermath of a contested presidential poll in late 2010. The
much-delayed election was meant to finally unite Côte d’Ivoire, which was split into a rebel-run north and government-
controlled south by a civil war in 2002–03. Instead, the poll threatened to push the country back into war, when the
southern-backed incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to cede defeat to his northern rival, Alassane Ouattara, the
internationally recognised winner. Months of clashes and political stalemate ended with Gbagbo’s capture in April and
Ouattara’s May inauguration. But reported massacres during the unrest and human-rights abuses by both sides are new
obstacles on the path to reconciliation, as is security-sector reform. The humanitarian situation remains dire: around
20,000 IDPs remain in camps in Côte d’Ivoire; up to 170,000 more displaced people reside with host communities and
families.
advance south
Golf Hotel
French embassy UNOCI bases UNOCI inter-
sector boundary
Gbagbo UNOCI = UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire
Presidential palace Korhogo
residence
Bouna
UN helicopter International airport
attacks (under French control)
Pro-Gbagbo East Sector
Pro-Ouattara French military camp West Sector
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
The Golf Hotel was Ouattara HQ from Dec 2010.
Pro-Outtara forces reached Abidjan on 31 Mar 29 Mar: Bondoukou
2011 and joined the move on Gbagbo strongholds.
Bouaké
Man Zuénoula
Charavine
GHANA
30 Mar: Tiebissou Daoukro
28/29 Mar: Duekoué
25 Feb: Zouan-Hounien
Daloa Bouaflé
6 Mar: Toulepleu 29 Mar: Abengourou
30 Mar: Yamoussoukro
Sinfre
Guiglo Abidjan
LIBERIA 21 Mar: Bloléquin
Tai Issia
30 Mar: Gagnoa Adzopé
Divo
30 Mar: Soubré
Armed forces in Côte d’Ivoire
Planned Forces Armées Nationales 31 Mar: Abidjan
de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI): 29,000
ex-FDS personnel, 9,000 ex-FN
troops, and 2,000 volunteers, 10,000
troops demobilised Port-Bouët: French OP Licorne base
Tabou
Operation Licorne troops: Around 700 31 Mar: San Pédro
UNOCI troops: 9,150 troops; 197
military observer; 1,301 police The French Navy has a permanent
(including formed units) naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea
under Operation Corymbe. As of
Armed militias and large numbers of
August, FS Germinal, a Floreal class
small arms remain a security problem
frigate is deployed to the region.
Security-sector reform
Security-sector reform remains a priority. The disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration into civilian life of former International forces in Côte d'Ivoire
combatants is also a challenge. Until March 2011, the country had Due to the violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN augmented UNOCI with
two separate armed forces, the 55,000-strong Forces de Defense around three companies of troops, three armed Mi-24 helicopters (mainly
et de Securité (FDS) loyal to ex-President Gbagbo, and the Forces tasked in the west) and two utility helicopters from UNMIL in Liberia.
Nouvelles (FN, loyal to Outtara), around 10,000-strong. On 17 France’s Opération Licorne, deployed in 2002, numbered around 700
March, President Ouattara announced the creation of the Forces personnel in October 2011. France rapidly boosted Licorne to a reported
Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), composed of FN and some 1,700 extra personnel during and after the post-election violence.
former FDS forces. Though security has improved, establishing Deployments included marine and Foreign Legion units already training
trust among former combatants and with the population, has in Gabon as well as a Gendarmerie contingent. French equipment
proved problematic. In early October, Outtara announced the reportedly included Gazelles (with HOT) and Pumas already in-country.
revival of the FANCI. Both UNOCI and French troops are reported Logistical support was provided by the LPD Foudre, already in the Gulf of
to be engaged in training the new army. Guinea as France’s Operation Corymbe standing patrol.
Sources: Strategic Survey 2011, The Military Balance 2011, IRIN, French MOD, OCHA, UN, Defense News
© IISS
Sub-Saharan Africa 413
if not the total number of attacks. In 2010, 49 successful raises the possibility that pirates may diversify their targets
hijackings were carried out, according to the IMB; by the to indulge in traditional kidnap-for-ransom. At time of
end of September 2011 that number was 24. This might writing, the culprits of the kidnappings were unknown.
owe as much to increased awareness of the problem by A surge in piracy has also been witnessed in other areas
international shipping companies as the deployment of of the world, particularly the Gulf of Guinea. According to
naval forces. More companies are now adopting the Best the IMB, 38 attempted attacks had occurred in the area
Management Practices, developed by a variety of ship- by early September 2011. In the first half of the year, 12
ping companies, multinational forces and non-govern- attacks on tankers were identified by the IMB, compared to
mental organisations and now in its fourth iteration, that none the previous year. Fuelled by a lucrative energy trade
suggest the use of ship-based defences, high freeboards, from the Gulf’s oil producers and the lack of constabulary
a minimum speed and particular manoeuvres to under- naval or maritime forces in the region, piracy is becoming
take during a suspected attack. More private security an increasingly frequent activity, though it remains far
companies are also being employed to provide armed less frequent and serious there than it does in the Indian
guards on vessels, and governments are beginning to take Ocean. Without a concerted international response in the
more active steps in backing these initiatives. In October near future, West Africa will remain a permissive environ-
2011, the UK prime minister indicated that the UK would ment for increased piracy.
While these issues are true of many states in the air force placed orders for five aircraft (two C-295
region, whose militaries essentially resemble gendar- transport aircraft, one EMB-190 and two DA-42
meries, they do not apply to all states. Ghana, for MPP Guardian surveillance aircraft) with funding
instance, has launched a ‘bottom-up’ force-moderni- from loan agreements. In 2009, the army acquired
sation programme. In the mid-2000s, the government 30 new Spanish-manufactured light military vehi-
realised that it could not address military deficiencies cles (ten VAMTAC and 20 VAM TL). Two features of
Sub-Saharan
with piecemeal procurement of the kind adopted by the programme mark it out from many West African
Africa
many states in the region. Instead, Ghana embarked states: the programme is comprehensive, rather than
on a sustained (2009–25) restructuring programme, ad hoc; and defence acquisitions have been of new,
beginning with the rehabilitation of military barracks, rather than surplus, materiel. Ghana’s programme is
on which US$800,000 was spent; MoD offices, for likely to be aided by increasing oil revenues.
which China donated US$7.25 million and Ghana States in northern West Africa have particular secu-
spent US$1.75m; and the acquisition of small arms rity concerns regarding Islamist armed groups oper-
and light weapons. Ghana envisages that Phase I ating across the Sahel region, from Niger to Senegal.
of the programme, from 2009–15, will cost around Mali, for example, has launched repeated operations
US$750m. It will encompass all arms of the military. against groups close to the Algerian and Nigerien
In 2008–10, the Navy received seven offshore patrol borders. These long-range operations, usually in
vessels, with an estimated value of US$2.7m, donated desert terrain, require mobile armoured forces and
through the US Navy’s African Partnership Station air support. In regional terms, Mali’s military is well
(APS) programme. There are reportedly other naval equipped. Its defence expenditure has remained high,
contracts with China and South Korea. In 2011, the and stable, since the mid-1990s. At 2.24% of GDP in
414 The Military Balance 2012
2010, this expenditure is well above the regional and South Sudan. As a result, East African mili-
average of 1.05% of GDP (The Military Balance, 2011, taries are the continent’s most diverse in terms of
pp. 410–49). The United States assists Mali and size and equipment. Eritrea and Ethiopia’s armed
other states in the region through the Trans-Sahara forces together maintain more than 300,000 active
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) programme. personnel (more than all other East African mili-
Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) taries combined). East Africa also hosts large, well-
provides military support to the TSCTP to increase the equipped military forces, such as those of Kenya and
capacity of states to combat terrorist activities. West Uganda, but also small, lightly equipped militaries,
African OEF-TS programme states include Burkina such as Djibouti.
Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. Meanwhile, it As in West Africa, some states have launched
remains unclear how, in Nigeria, deployment of the military reforms, while others have changed little in
military on internal security tasks in the wake of terror recent years. For example, Uganda – where defence
attacks by the Islamist Boko Haram group will affect expenditure is 15–20% of government spending and
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
procurement and planning in the long term. growing – invests heavily in procurement and force
Meanwhile, moves are again under way to assist modernisation. Eritrea and Burundi, by contrast,
security-sector reform (SSR) in Guinea–Bissau. (In have downsized and reformed little post-conflict.
previous editions of The Military Balance, various Unlike West Africa, however, the region also hosts
initiatives such as the 2008–10 EU SSR mission have an emerging military power, South Sudan. South
been noted.) According to the UN secretary general’s Sudanese defence forces are a new, large and increas-
special representative, speaking in June, ‘the polit- ingly well-equipped military presence in the region.
ical and security situations were improving, but ... Since the late 2000s, several states in the region,
economic reforms had yet to be bolstered by other including Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, have launched
reforms, notably in the defence and security sector’. substantial military modernisation programmes.
The UN has noted that its Mission to Guinea–Bissau Ethiopia, for example, reduced its forces to 140,000
(UNIOGBIS) has been working with the Ministry active personnel following the end of the 1998–2000
of Defence on ‘training modules and the drafting of conflict with Eritrea. It aims to restructure its (former
modules for a training of trainers programme’. And revolutionary) armed forces, cutting them down from
Angola early in 2011 deployed a military-technical four military commands to three, and a headquarters
mission to support security and defence reform. in Addis Ababa, with support from China, Israel,
These capacity-building moves were underpinned Russia and the US. Ethiopia also appears set to invest
by the development of a roadmap for SSR, adopted heavily in procurement. In 2011, it began discussions
on 24 March by ECOWAS and Portuguese Language with Ukraine to purchase 200 T-72 main battle tanks
Community states. The roadmap includes aspira- in a deal estimated at US$100m. Since Eritrea and
tions to downsize the military, and create a military Ethiopia relied primarily on older T-54/T-55 tanks
pension fund. According to the UN, the SSR process during the 1998–2000 conflict, these and associated
will focus on implementing the SSR strategy; ‘demo- acquisitions are strategically significant and indicate
bilisation in the defence and security sectors and a growing qualitative imbalance between Eritrean
progress in the vetting and certification process for and Ethiopian forces. While Eritrea continues to
policing and internal security personnel, in accor- field around 200,000 active armed forces, Ethiopia’s
dance with gender and human rights standards’; defence objectives appear to involve further down-
increasing access to justice; and ‘coordination and sizing and consolidation, with an emphasis on quality
resource mobilisation activities for the pension fund rather than size.
and related initiatives’. It is reported that the govern- South Sudan gained independence from Sudan
ment allocated $4.5m for the pension fund. on 9 July 2011. The country faces acute security chal-
lenges, including conflict with Sudan on the South
East Africa Kordofan and Northern Bahr el Ghazal borders and
operations against armed groups in Jonglei, Upper
East Africa faced a range of disparate security chal- Nile and Unity states. The South Sudan Armed
lenges in 2011, including the continued Ethiopia– Forces (SSAF) is currently restructuring and re-equip-
Eritrea stand-off, war in Somalia, drought and ping. (Under the terms of South Sudan’s 2011 tran-
ongoing hostilities between and within Sudan sitional constitution, the Sudan People’s Liberation
Sub-Saharan Africa 415
Central Africa
Incursions into Somalia
On 14 October, Kenyan ground forces entered Somalia Many Central African militaries face the severe chal-
in a combined ground and air assault intended to lenges of protracted internal armed conflict and
reduce the capacity of al-Shabaab fighters to threaten foreign insurgency. While some have attempted to
Kenyan territory. It is alleged that al-Shabaab were restructure their armed forces, many have had to
responsible for a series of kidnappings and bombings defer ‘deep’ reform in favour of short-term strategies
in Kenya. It is reported that at least two battalions of to enhance immediate operational requirements.
Kenyan troops were deployed on Operation Linda Nchi. The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of
While troops from the AU Mission in Somalia have the Congo (FARDC), for example, suffer internal
been pushing back al-Shabaab fighters in Mogadishu, divisions and a lack of coordinated investment.
the Kenyan advance is likely designed to pressure Only with the assistance of the UN mission in the
DRC, now called MONUSCO, and Rwanda, has the
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Sub-Saharan
in Unity state confuse the issue further. Defence Force.’ In effect, this means that the FARDC
Africa
In the mid-2000s, the SPLA began to re-equip on is likely to remain decentralised for some time to
a large scale, beginning in 2006–07 with Ural-4320 come.
troop transport trucks from an unknown supplier, Like the DRC, the Central African Republic’s
in addition to small arms, light weapons and ammu- (CAR) armed forces are severely restricted in
nition. Around 110 T-72M tanks and 11 BM-21 their operational capacity. CAR faces a number of
MLRS were acquired between 2007 and 2008, and persistent security threats, including lawlessness
nine Russian Mi-17-V5 helicopters and one Mi-172 in the north of the country and sporadic attacks by
helicopter in 2009–10. In 2007, the World Bank esti- armed groups, including the domestic Convention
mated GOSS defence expenditure at US$555m. Some of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and LRA
analysts project that figure has risen to US$ 1 billion insurgents. The army has difficulties projecting
in 2010–11; the GOSS, meanwhile, pledged to double force beyond the capital, Bangui, due to the near-
defence spending in 2010. If estimates are correct, total destruction of military infrastructure during
South Sudan’s defence budget is larger than those of the 1996–2003 violence, and unserviceable military
Ethiopia or Eritrea. vehicles. Since 2008, CAR has attempted to restruc-
416 The Military Balance 2012
ture its military into a ‘garrison’ force, based in six The latest round of French assistance, agreed in the
regions. This has been aided by support from China mid-2000s, includes command restructuring, logis-
and France (the latter under a new defence agree- tical support and training for Chad’s defence and
ment signed in April 2010), including the construc- security forces, valued at around US$500,000 in 2010.
tion of barracks and the procurement of equipment. Chad continues to receive Foreign Military Financing
In 2004, France supplied a US$3.2m defence package (FMF) and International Military Education and
including 46 military vehicles. The CAR procure- Training (IMET) assistance from the US, worth a
ment programme, however, appears to be quite combined US$780,000 in 2011.
limited. Since 2008, the country has acquired three
APCs from Slovakia, in addition to small quanti- Southern Africa
ties of unspecified equipment supplied by Austria,
China, France and Israel. Although 2010 defence A number of Southern African militaries are rela-
spending was a high 2.6% of GDP, Bangui’s defence tively young, having emerged from anti-colonial/
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
reforms can best be described as nascent. The govern- anti-minority rule conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s.
ment still does not fully control the countryside and However, their development paths have differed.
CAR remains reliant on Ugandan forces to combat Botswana, for example, responded to the more
the LRA. However, in October US President Obama relaxed regional security climate of early the 1990s
announced that up to 100 US military personnel will with defence restructuring and acquisitions. Namibia
be deployed to assist regional forces combating the has launched similar initiatives in recent years.
LRA; the troops will be combat-equipped, but will Despite considerable gains in the 1980s, however,
only engage LRA forces in self-defence. The Military Zimbabwe’s defence forces are deteriorating due to
Balance 2011 (p. 407) analysed regional actions against increasing politicisation and involvement in domestic
the LRA, and Washington’s focus on the threat to repression.
regional states from that group. The Namibia Defence Force was created in
In contrast to CAR and DRC, Chad has weath- 1990 from People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
ered a period of intense instability and may have (PLAN) and South West African Territorial Force
entered a period of military reform and consolida- (SWATF) units. It received initial training from
tion. The 2003–10 proxy conflict with Sudan resulted Kenyan forces under a UN mandate, followed by
in substantial procurement and expenditure. At sustained assistance from the UK between 1990–95,
almost 3.5% of GDP (2010), Chad’s defence spending including force structuring, training and logistics.
is one of the highest in Africa. Since 2006, government Namibia’s deployments in Angola and the DRC
defence acquisitions include: BMP-1 AIFVs, BTR-3U between 1999–2002, and the Namibian Caprivi
APCs, Su-25 FGA aircraft, and Mi-24 combat helicop- region between 1998–2002 appear to have spurred
ters from Ukraine between 2006–09; light armoured investment in the defence sector. Although the
vehicles from China in 2007; Eland/AML recon- military is relatively small (9,200 active forces in
naissance vehicles from South Africa and Belgium, 2010), it has begun to invest heavily in high-value
between 2007 and 2008; VAB APCs from France in military assets, including the first of 12 F-7 fighter
2008 and RAM-2000 reconnaissance vehicles from aircraft from China in 2006; one Cheetah and two
Israel in 2008. Chetak helicopters from India in 2009, and radar
Although Chad–Sudan tensions have dissipated upgrades of its F-7s conducted in Italy in 2007.
following the January 2010 ‘N’Djamena Accord’, the Between 2009 and 2011–12, Namibia’s defence
government faces continued threats from residual budget has expanded and, standing at 3.5% of GDP
elements of rebel forces, including the Movement for in 2010, the defence allocation far exceeded those
Democracy and Development (MDD) and Movement of its neighbours. In Botswana the figure was 0.7%
for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) groups and in South Africa 1.1%. The Botswana Defence
in the northwest, and groups aligned to the Union of Force, with approximately 9,000 active forces,
Resistance Forces (UFR) in the east. In May 2009, the is around the same size as the Namibia Defence
government repulsed a UFR attack, thereby renewing Force. In contrast to Namibia, however, Botswana
its hopes for a military solution to rebel activity. embarked on a substantial military modernisation
The country has since accelerated procurement and plan in the mid-1990s and its defence spending has
ongoing reform of its defence and security forces. since reduced.
Sub-Saharan Africa 417
The 1990s modernisation initiative was a response eroding rapidly. Recent defence acquisitions, such
to Botswana’s increasing participation in regional as K-8 aircraft from China between 2005–06, suggest
collective security arrangements, including joint that Zimbabwe continues to invest in major conven-
operations with Southern African Development tional weapons. Some commentators believe that
Community (SADC) states and involvement in peace such procurement, rather than reflecting regional
support operations, such as Somalia (UN, 1992–94), security conditions, indicates the government’s fear
Mozambique (UN, 1993–94) and Lesotho (SADC, of foreign intervention aimed at regime change.
1998). These engagements boosted military pres-
tige and domestic support for force modernisation. South Africa
During the 1990s, Botswana’s defence spending
averaged 3.8% of GDP as the country expanded its As in last year’s Military Balance (p. 407), it can still be
armed forces from around 6,000 in 1990 to 9,000 in said that the South African National Defence Force
2011, initiated structural reforms and procured new remains one of the most capable militaries on the
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
equipment, including: 20 Scorpion light tanks from the continent, but it continues to face challenges in main-
UK between 1995 and 1996); ten CF-5A fighter aircraft taining combat effectiveness. Some new platforms
and three CF-5D trainer jets from Canada in 1996 have arrived. But recent deployments – such as the
(with up to four more CF-5Ds in 2000); and 20 SK-105 late-2011 decision to send around 200 personnel
tanks and turrets from Austria and France in 2000. and vessels on anti-piracy patrols – coupled with
Botswana maintains close ties with Western militaries continuing focus on border security, have added to
and a majority of its officers have received training debates on equipment and strategic direction. These
in the US. Despite significant reductions in defence came in light of budget allocations that, in 2011,
expenditure since the 1990s, the country maintains were described by Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu
a steady level of investment in its inventory: Spain as ‘hopelessly inadequate’. Sisulu was reported as
delivered two CN-235 transport aircraft in 2010 and, having responded in the affirmative when asked
in 2011, Botswana signed a US$45m contract with in a parliamentary question whether budget issues
Switzerland for the delivery in 2013 of five PC-7 MkII were having an impact on readiness; she told parlia-
training aircraft. ment in October 2011 that the defence-funding issue
The role and capacity of Zimbabwe’s military ‘has not been dealt [with] to the full satisfaction of
differs from those of Botswana and Namibia. Like the ministry and the department and we remain
these two states, Zimbabwe initially – between 1980 hopeful that the budget would be increased in the
and 2000 – received extensive UK military assistance not-too-distant future’. In August, Sisulu announced
in defining the structure of its armed forces and inte- a public defence-review process, led by a ten-strong
grating and training former revolutionary fighters. committee containing two former defence minis-
Since the late 1990s, however, domestic insecurity, ters, supported by a secretariat of experts. While it
repression and deteriorating relations with the EU was reported that the defence ministry had earlier
and the UK in particular have led Zimbabwe to alter produced an updated draft (the last defence review
Sub-Saharan
its defence priorities and the role of its armed forces. was in 1998), the Review Committee has a remit to
Africa
The military’s strong roots in anti-colonial/anti- look broadly at South Africa’s strategic environment
minority rule operations, reinforced by operations and aspirations, as well as the resources needed
in the 1980s against Apartheid-era South African to meet these requirements. The Department of
forces, closely aligned military elites with the ruling Defence’s Annual Report FY2010/2011, released in
ZANU-PF party. Since 2000, these links have become October, painted a bleak picture of overstretch in
further politicised with the military’s involvement in key capability areas. While noting that the services
farm seizures (Operation Tsuro in 2000) and the 2002 had achieved many of the targets set for the year,
election ‘security’ operation. the army was ‘severely overstretched, particularly
The army faces a number of internal challenges, in the infantry, engineer and support capabilities’,
including large-scale, voluntary retirement of offi- the navy ‘continued to experience critical shortages
cers (allegedly politically motivated), deteriorating of personnel within the technical, combat, diver,
conditions of barracks and escalating recruitment of submariner and logistics domains’ while, for the
low-grade militia into the army. As a result, many air force, the report asserted that it provided clear
accounts suggest that the army’s professionalism is evidence ‘that the previous cuts and under funding
418 The Military Balance 2012
in the SAAF operating budget has reached culmina- Sub-Saharan Africa defence
tion point in terms of adverse effects on SAAF capa- economics
bilities.’
Funding remains a perennial problem for the Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing a relatively
South African Air Force as it tries to continue robust recovery from a period of uncertainty after the
revamping its inventory, while sustaining capability start of the global financial crisis in 2008 – a conclu-
with types recently introduced into service. The air sion broadly reached by both the UN Economic
force will receive the last four of its 26 Saab Gripen Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the IMF. The
combat aircraft in 2012, though it has struggled to return to growth has, however, been uneven among
find adequate numbers of aircrew and secure suffi- states that are broadly described as middle- and low-
cient flight hours. Efforts are ongoing to acquire income countries and oil-producing states. Middle-
transport and maritime patrol aircraft to replace income countries, those more fully integrated into
ageing in-service platforms. Incidents of piracy have the world economy, are experiencing a more hesi-
sharpened focus on maritime surveillance. The air tant recovery, and this helps to explain why growth
force is currently dependent on its C-47TP TurboDaks across southern Africa has been more restrained than
to meet this role, though it is trying to identify and in other regions, while countries such as South Africa
procure a replacement maritime patrol platform. have had to recover from a negative growth rate
Meanwhile, the air force’s transport aircraft plan seen in 2009. Meanwhile, those countries less inte-
has had to be revisited following the government’s grated into the global economy have been relatively
2010 decision to withdraw from the Airbus Military shielded from the financial crisis and, according to
A400M programme. One effect has been that the air the IMF in September 2011, ‘most of the region’s low-
force’s ageing C-130Bs will need to be kept in service income countries have returned to their pre-crisis
longer than previously anticipated, probably with an growth rates’. Those nations relying on oil exports for
associated increase in maintenance and support costs. the majority of their receipts have also witnessed an
Sufficient funding was, however, available to improvement in growth, which is likely to continue
conclude integration of the South African Denel into 2012, according to the IMF. The Fund ascribes
Dynamics A-Darter imaging infra-red guided air-to- this to ‘continued strength in domestic public-invest-
air missile (IIR AAM) on the Gripen during mid-2011. ment spending, as well as some idiosyncratic factors,
The A-Darter is now jointly funded by South Africa such as a strong rebound in oil production in Angola
and Brazil. It is anticipated to enter production following a disruption in 2011’.
towards the end of 2012. The South African Air Force Improved growth in 2011 has been driven
presently operates Gripen with a small number of in general terms by buoyant commodity prices,
IRIS-T IIR AAMs, but has no radar-guided AAM in sustained (according to the African Development
its inventory. Denel is working on a medium-range Bank) by a robust Chinese demand for commodi-
AAM to meet this role. ties, though with Europe and the US also key trading
Sub-Saharan Africa 419
1.92
2.0 1.82
1.75
1.62 1.65 1.62 1.58
1.0
0.5
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
partners, further economic problems in these regions increase the combat capability of Uganda’s air force
could have an impact on African growth. However, when the aircraft are fully inducted – and providing
as was pointed out in the 2011 IISS Strategic Survey, they are properly maintained – it was reported by the
‘for a number of countries such as Ethiopia and South Financial Times in June 2011 that the government had
Africa, impressive economic figures belied a trend turned to the central bank to help finance it, sending
of “jobless growth”’. As UNECA have pointed out, ‘reserves down from six months’ worth of imports
‘job creation remains limited in countries where to four’. (Though Uganda is still referenced, by the
much of the economic upturn was driven by capital- IMF, in the context of a low-income country, oil reve-
intensive extractive sectors’ having few links with the nues likely to accrue in the future could lead to an
wider economy. This has led to African growth rates improvement in its balance sheet.) Aircraft purchases
remaining below the level needed to ‘create adequate have been pursued by many continental states in
employment and to reduce poverty’. Exchange-rate recent years. Ghana – as noted above – has embarked
volatility and inflation also qualify the actual impact on a sustained restructuring programme, with new
of these growth rates. Across the continent, infla- aviation capabilities forming a central plank in this
tion generally increased in early-to-mid-2011 due to process. Orders have included two C-295s, report-
oil-price fluctuations and, according to the African edly loan financed to the tune of €60m, one EMB-190
Development Bank, rising prices for raw materials at a reported cost of US$105m and two DA-42 MPP
and food. aircraft. South Africa received more of its Gripen
Nonetheless, states across the continent have fighters this year.
generally viewed defence-spending plans through Speaking at the time of the April budget vote, South
Sub-Saharan
the prism of their security imperatives, and have, in African Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu noted in
Africa
the main, found the funds to finance some key capa- 2011 that the defence budget allocations for the South
bility enhancements. Uganda experienced a drop in African National Defence Force were ‘hopelessly
inflation between 2009 and 2010 – largely due to falls inadequate’. In October she returned to that theme,
in food prices – though the rate has risen dramati- saying: ‘to bemoan the inadequacies of the budget is
cally in 2011 (coupled with currency depreciation). to repeat what each one here understands is a matter
According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, the we should all seek to address as a matter of urgency
annual headline rate of inflation rose to 30.5% for the … The priorities we outline now will require a signifi-
year ending October 2011, from 28.3% for the year cantly increased budget.’ However, the budget was
ending September to 30.5% in October. This is the in fact reduced under the revised Appropriations
highest rate since January 1993. However, Kampala Bill in October. As the SANDF Annual Report notes,
continues to introduce newly purchased military these budget cuts have had an impact on capabilities;
equipment, such as the two (of six planned) Su-30s for the air force, ‘previous cuts and underfunding in
that arrived during 2011, reportedly as part of a wider the SAAF operating budget has reached culmination
arms package agreed with Russia. While this deal will point in terms of adverse effects on SAAF capabili-
420 The Military Balance 2012
ties. A risk exists that not all the required system tests in GDP during the first quarter or 2011, though this
can be effectively done due to lack of adequate flying slowed a little during the second quarter. CPI infla-
hours.’ Indeed, while the report notes that for combat tion, meanwhile rose from 3.2% in September 2010 to
air power, flights as part of the operation to protect 5.3% in July 2011. However, defence allocations have
the 2010 Football World Cup boosted hourly totals, to be viewed in light of the treasury’s 2011 Budget
for the important task of medium and light transport Review, which stated that ‘spending is focused on
the total number of hours flown in 2010 was some core social priorities and economic infrastructure’.
2,000 less than projected. Sisulu has expressed her While South Africa is consolidating its recovery, and
hope to parliament that the budget can be increased is engaged in moves to increase export growth to the
but, while spending allocations might grow year-on- fast-developing markets of Asia, its economic pros-
year, it remains to be seen whether these increases will pects are, as the Budget Review notes, ‘highly depen-
be designed to track rising GDP growth. According dent on global trade and investment patterns, and
to the ADB, South Africa experienced 3.6% growth risks to the global outlook must be considered’.
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Sub-Saharan Africa 421
ARV T-54/T-55
Angola ANG MW Bozena
New Angolan Kwanza
2010 2011 2012
AOA Navy ε1,000
GDP AOA 7.58tr 9.80tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 82.2bn 105bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
per capita US$ 4,825 5,962 PCC 5 Rei Bula Matadi
Growth % 3.41 3.68 PBF 5 PVC-170
Inflation % 14.5 15.0 PB 4 Mandume
Def bdgt AOA 343bn 340bn 352bn Coastal Defence
US$ 3.72bn 3.63bn MSL • AShM SS-C-1B Sepal (at Luanda)
USD1=AOA 92.16 93.72
Population 17,544,728
Air Force/Air Defence 6,000
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Sub-Saharan
AIRCRAFT 92 combat capable
RECCE 600 BRDM-2
Africa
AIFV 250+: 250 BMP-1/BMP-2; BMD-3 FTR 24: 6 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker; 18 MiG-23ML Flogger
APC (W) ε170 BTR-152/BTR-60/BTR-80 FGA 54: 20 MiG-21bis/MiG-21MF Fishbed; 8 MiG-23BN/
ARTY 1,408+ UB Flogger; 14 Su-22 Fitter D; 12 Su-24 Fencer
SP 16+: 122mm 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 4 2S3; 203mm 12 ATK 10: 8 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B
2S7 TPT 50: Heavy 4 Il-76TD Candid; Medium 6 An-12 Cub
TOWED 552: 122mm 500 D-30; 130mm 48 M-46; 152mm Light 40: 12 An-26 Curl; 3 An-32 Cline; 8 An-72 Coaler;
4 D-20 8 BN-2A Islander; 3 C-212-200 Aviocar; 4 C-212-300M
MRL 90+: 122mm 90: 50 BM-21; 40 RM-70 Dana; 240mm Aviocar; 1 Do-28D Skyservant; 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy 600
BM-24 (VIP)
MOR 750: 82mm 250; 120mm 500 TRG 30: 13 EMB-312 Tucano; 6 L-29 Delfin; 2 L-39C
AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger) Albatros; 5 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 4 PC-9*
RCL 500: 400 82mm B-10/107mm B-11 †; 106mm 100† HELICOPTERS
GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100† ATK 44: 22 Mi-24 Hind; 22 Mi-35 Hind
AD • SAM • MANPAD 500 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; MRH 26: 8 AS565 Panther; 10 SA316 Alouette III (IAR-
9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K 310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) 316) (incl trg); 8 SA342M Gazelle
GUNS • TOWED 450+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; MRH/TPT 27 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H
37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60 TPT • Light 8 Bell 212
422 The Military Balance 2012
MANOEUVRE
Armoured Paramilitary 1,500
1 armd bde (-)
Light Police Mobile Unit 1,500 (org in territorial coy)
2 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 4 inf bn, 1 cdo unit, 2 ADA
regt, 1 engr regt, 1 log bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
Burkina Faso BFA
1 AD bde (-) CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2010 2011 2012
1 engr coy
GDP fr 4.37tr 4.68tr
1 sigs coy
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT US$ 8.67bn 9.81bn
1 log gp per capita US$ 534 586
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Growth % 7.93 4.88
LT TK 55: ε30 SK-105 Kuerassier; 25 Scorpion Inflation % -0.6 1.9
RECCE 72+: RAM-V-1; ε8 RAM-V-2; 64 VBL Def bdgt fr 62.4bn
APC 156
US$ 124m
APC (T) 6 FV 103 Spartan
APC (W) 150: 50 BTR-60; 50 LAV-150 Commando (some US$1=fr 504.09 476.56
with 90mm gun); 50 MOWAG Piranha III Population 16,751,455
ARTY 46
TOWED 30: 105mm 18: 12 L-118 Light Gun; 6 Model 56 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
pack howitzer; 155mm 12 Soltam Male 23.0% 5.5% 4.5% 3.8% 12.0% 1.0%
MOR 28: 81mm 22; 120mm 6 M-43 Female 22.9% 5.4% 4.5% 3.7% 12.3% 1.5%
AT
MSL 6+ Capabilities
SP V-150 TOW
MANPATS 6 TOW ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 6,400 Air 600 Gendarmerie
Sub-Saharan
RCL 84mm 30 Carl Gustav 4,200) Paramilitary 250
Africa
AD • SAM • MANPAD 27: 5 Javelin; 10 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-
16 Gimlet); 12 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 20mm 7 M167 Vulcan
Organisations by Service
ARV Greif; M578
Army 6,400
Air Wing 500 3 Mil Regions
FORCES BY ROLE FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with F-5A Freedom Fighter; F-5D Tiger II Armoured
ISR 1 tk bn (2 tk pl)
1 sqn with O-2 Skymaster Light
TRANSPORT 5 inf regt with (3 inf bn with (1 inf coy with (5 inf pl)))
2 sqn with BD-700 Global Express; BN-2A/B Defender*; Air Manoeuvre
Beech 200 Super King Air (VIP); C-130B Hercules; C-212- 1 AB regt with (1 AB bn, 2 AB coy)
300 Aviocar; CN-235M-100 COMBAT SUPPORT
TRAINING 1 arty bn (2 arty tp)
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer* 1 engr bn
424 The Military Balance 2012
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE 83: 19 AML-60/AML-90; 24 EE-9 Cascavel; 30 Ferret; Burundi BDI
2 M20; 8 M8 Burundi Franc fr 2010 2011 2012
APC (W) 13 M3 Panhard GDP fr 1.83tr 2.14tr
ARTY 18+
US$ 1.47bn 1.71bn
TOWED 14: 105mm 8 M101; 122mm 6
per capita US$ 149 168
MRL 107mm ε4 Type-63
Growth % 3.85 4.22
MOR 81mm Brandt
Inflation % 6.4 8.7
AT
Def bdgt fr 70.4bn 79.7bn
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 84mm Carl Gustav
US$ 56m 64m
RL 89mm LRAC; M20
US$1=fr 1250.46 1249.23
AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail‡)
GUNS • TOWED 42: 14.5mm 30 ZPU; 20mm 12 TCM- Population 10,216,190
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
RCL 75mm 60 Type-52 (M-20) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
RL 83mm RL-83 Blindicide
Male 20.4% 5.4% 5.0% 4.3% 13.6% 1.5%
AD • SAM • MANPAD ε30 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Female 20.1% 5.3% 4.9% 4.1% 13.6% 1.8%
GUNS • TOWED 150+: 14.5mm 15 ZPU-4; 135+ 23mm
ZU-23/37mm Type-55 (M-1939)
Capabilities
Air Wing 200 ACTIVE 14,200 (Army 12,500 Navy 1,300 Air 400)
AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable Paramilitary 9,000
TPT 4 Light 2 Cessna 150L† PAX 2 DC-3
TRG 1 SF-260W Warrior*
HELICOPTERS Organisations by Service
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
MRH 2 SA342L Gazelle Army 12,500
TPT • Medium (2 Mi-8 Hip non-op) 3 Mil Regions
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
Paramilitary 31,050 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Marine Police 50 1 armd recce bn
16 territorial districts Light
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3 3 inf bn (under comd of mil regions)
PHT 3 Huchuan† 5 inf bn
AMPHIBIOUS 1 LCT Air Manoeuvre
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 SPT 1 cdo/AB bn
Other
General Administration of State Security 1 inf bn (trg)
ε1,000 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Local Defence Militia ε30,000 1 arty bn (5 arty bty)
1 AD bn (6 AD bty)
1 engr bn
Deployment
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Central African Republic RECCE 65: 31 AML-90; 6 AMX-10RC; 15 Ferret; 8 M-8; 5
ECCAS • MICOPAX 5 VBL
AIFV 22: 8 LAV-150 Commando with 20mm gun; 14 LAV-
SOMALIA 150 Commando with 90mm gun
AU • AMISOM 4,400; 5 inf bn APC 33
APC (T) 12 M3 half-track
SUDAN
APC (W) 21 LAV-150 Commando
UN • UNAMID 4; 2 obs ARTY 112+
SP 18 ATMOS 2000
Foreign FORCES TOWED 58: 75mm 6 M-116 pack; 105mm 20 M-101;
130mm 24: 12 Model 1982 gun 82 (reported); 12 Type-59
Sub-Saharan
All forces part of BINUB unless otherwise stated.
(M-46); 155mm 8 I1
Africa
Switzerland 1 obs
MRL 122mm 20 BM-21
MOR 16+: 81mm (some SP); 120mm 16 Brandt
AT • MSL 49
Cameroon CMR SP 24 TOW (on Jeeps)
MANPATS 25 Milan
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2010 2011 2012 RCL 53: 106mm 40 M-40A2; 75mm 13 Type-52 (M-20)
GDP fr 11.1tr 12.0tr RL 89mm LRAC
US$ 22.0bn 25.1bn AD • GUNS • TOWED 54: 14.5mm 18 Type-58 (ZPU-2);
35mm 18 GDF-002; 37mm 18 Type-63
per capita US$ 1,143 1,276
Growth % 3.20 3.80 Navy ε1,300
Inflation % 1.3 2.6 HQ located at Douala
Def bdgt fr 171bn 164bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 339m 344m PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
US$1=fr 504.97 476.96 PCC 2: 1 Bakassi (FRA P-48); 1 L’Audacieux (FRA P-48)
PB 7: 2 Rodman 101; 4 Rodman 46; 1 Quartier Maître Alfred
Population 19,711,291 Motto
426 The Military Balance 2012
PBR 2 Swift-38
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 2 (93 ft) Cape Verde CPV
Cape Verde Escudo E 2010 2011 2012
Air Force 300-400
GDP Ε 138bn 152bn
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK US$ 1.66bn 1.90bn
1 sqn with MB-326K; Alpha Jet*† per capita US$ 3,272 3,679
TRANSPORT Growth % 5.39 5.56
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; DHC-4 Caribou; DHC- Inflation % 2.1 5.0
5D Buffalo; IAI-201 Arava; PA-23 Aztec
Def bdgt Ε 674m 722m
1 VIP unit with AS332 Super Puma; AS365 Dauphin 2;
Bell 206B Jet Ranger; Gulfstream III US$ 8.1m 9.0m
TRAINING US$1=E 83.13 79.83
1 unit with Tetras
Population 516,100
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
1 sqn with SA342 Gazelle (with HOT) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Male 16.4% 5.8% 5.4% 4.5% 14.3% 2.1%
1 sqn with Bell 206L-3; Bell 412; SA319 Alouette III
Female 16.2% 5.8% 5.4% 4.5% 16.2% 3.4%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable
ATK 5: 1 MB-326K Impala I; 4 MB-326K Impala II
Capabilities
TPT 18 Medium 3: 2 C-130 Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 ACTIVE 1,200 (Army 1,000 Coast Guard 100 Air 100)
Hercules Light 14: 1 DHC-4 Caribou; 1 DHC-5D Buffalo; 1
Terms of service conscription (selective)
IAI-201 Arava; 2 J.300 Joker; 2 PA-23 Aztec; 7 Tetras PAX 1
Gulfstream III
TRG 4 Alpha Jet*† Organisations by Service
HELICOPTERS
MRH 8: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Army 1,000
SA319 Alouette III; 4 SA342 Gazelle (with HOT)
FORCES BY ROLE
TPT 7 Medium 4: 2 AS332 Super Puma; 2 SA330J Puma
Light 3: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 206L-3 Long Ranger MANOEUVRE
LIGHT
Paramilitary 9,000 2 inf bn (gp)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Gendarmerie 9,000 1 engr bn
FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE RECCE 10 BRDM-2
Reconnaissance
ARTY 42
3 (regional spt) paramilitary gp
TOWED 24: 75mm 12; 76mm 12
MOR 18: 82mm 12; 120mm 6 M-1943
Deployment AT • RL 89mm (3.5in)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AD • SAM • MANPAD 50 SA-7 Grail‡
ECCAS • MICOPAX 19 GUNS • TOWED 30: 14.5mm 18 ZPU-1; 23mm 12 ZU-
23
Democratic Republic of the Congo
UN • MONUSCO 5 obs Coast Guard ε100
SUDAN PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3
UN • UNAMID 3 obs PCC 1 Kondor I
PB 2: 1 Espadarte; 1 Tainha (PRC-27m)
PBF 1 Archangel
HELICOPTERS
Central African Republic CAR TPT • Light 1 AS350 Ecureuil
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2010 2011 2012
Paramilitary
GDP fr 983bn 1.05tr
US$ 1.95bn 2.21bn Gendarmerie ε1,000
per capita US$ 402 446 FORCES BY ROLE
% 3.30 4.08 MANOEUVRE
Growth
Other
Inflation % 1.5 2.8
8 paramilitary bde
Def bdgt fr 25.5bn 3 (Regional Legion) paramilitary units
US$ 51m
US$1=fr 504.97 476.96 Foreign FORCES
Population 4,950,027 Burundi MICOPAX 5
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Age
Cameroon MICOPAX 19
0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Chad MICOPAX 117
Male 20.6% 5.4% 4.9% 4.0% 13.0% 1.5%
Congo MICOPAX 123
Female 20.4% 5.3% 4.8% 4.0% 13.7% 2.2%
Democratic Republic of the Congo MICOPAX 118
Capabilities France Operation Boali 240; 1 inf coy; 1 spt det
Gabon MICOPAX 143
ACTIVE 2,150 (Army 2,000 Air 150) Paramilitary
1,000)
Terms of service conscription (selective), 2 years; reserve
obligation thereafter, term n.k.
Chad CHA
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2010 2011 2012
Organisations by Service GDP fr 4.23tr 4.48tr
US$ 8.38bn 9.38bn
Joint per capita US$ 794 872
FORCES BY ROLE % 13.03 2.45
Growth
MANOEUVRE
Inflation % -2.1 2.0
OTHER
Def bdgt fr 63.7bn
1 intervention and spt bn
US$ 126m
Army ε2,000 FMA (US) US$ 0.5m 0.4m
FORCES BY ROLE US$1=fr 504.97 476.96
MANOEUVRE
Population 10,758,945
Mechanised
1 inf regt (1 mech bn, 1 inf bn) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Other
Male 23.3% 5.5% 4.2% 3.4% 10.4% 1.2%
1 territorial def regt (bn) with (2 territorial intervention
Sub-Saharan
Female 22.7% 5.7% 4.8% 4.1% 13.0% 1.7%
bn)
Africa
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 HQ/spt regt Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 25,350 (Army 17,000–20,000 Air 350
MBT 3 T-55† Republican Guard 5,000) Paramilitary 9,500
RECCE 9: 8 Ferret†; 1 BRDM-2 Terms of service conscription authorised
AIFV 18 Ratel
APC (W) 39+: 4 BTR-152†; 25+ TPK 4.20 VSC ACMAT†;
10+ VAB† Organisations by Service
ARTY • MOR 12+: 81mm†; 120mm 12 M-1943†
AT • RCL 106mm 14 M40† Army ε17,000–20,000 (being re-organised)
RL 89mm LRAC† 7 Mil Regions
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 PBR† FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Air Force 150 Armoured
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 armd bn
AIRCRAFT • TPT 7 Medium 1 C-130A Hercules Light 6: Light
3 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 172RJ Skyhawk; 2 J.300 Joker 7 inf bn
428 The Military Balance 2012
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ Male 20% 6% 5% 4% 14% 1%
TRANSPORT
Female 21% 6% 5% 4% 13% 1%
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-32 Cline
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-35P Hind
Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ACTIVE ε40,000 target
AIRCRAFT
RESERVE n.k.
FGA 2 Mirage F-1AZ
In October 2011, President Outtara announced the
TPT • Light 2: 1 An-24 Coke; 2 An-32 Cline
formation of the Forces Armées Nationale de Côte d’Ivoire.
HELICOPTERS†
It is reported that these will consist of 29,000 ex-CIV
ATK (2 Mi-35P Hind in store)
military forces, 9,000 ex-Forces Nouvelles troops and 2,000
TPT • Medium (3 Mi-8 Hip in store)
volunteers. Moves to restructure and reform the armed
MSL • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡
forces continue.
Paramilitary 2,000 active
Organisations by Service
Gendarmerie 2,000
FORCES BY ROLE Army n.k.
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other MBT 10 T-55†
20 paramilitary coy LT TK 5 AMX-13
RECCE 34: 15 AML-60/AML-90; 13 BRDM-2; 6 ERC-90F4
Presidential Guard some Sagaie
FORCES BY ROLE AIFV 10 BMP-1/BMP-2†
MANOEUVRE APC (W) 41: 12 M3 Panhard; 13 VAB; 6 BTR-80
Other ARTY 36+
Sub-Saharan
1 paramilitary bn TOWED 4+: 105mm 4 M-1950; 122mm (reported)
Africa
MRL 122mm 6 BM-21
MOR 26+: 81mm; 82mm 10 M-37; 120mm 16 AM-50
Deployment AT • MSL • MANPATS AT-14 9M133 Kornet (reported);
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AT-5 9K113 Spandrel (reported)
ECCAS • MICOPAX 123 RCL 106mm ε12 M40A1
RL 89mm LRAC
AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
(reported)
GUNS 21+
SP 20mm 6 M3 VDAA
TOWED 15+: 20mm 10; 23mm ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/60
VLB MTU
AIRCRAFT • TPT 1 An-12†
Navy n.k.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3
430 The Military Balance 2012
Gendarmerie n.k.
APC (W): some VAB DRC
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PB
Congolese Franc fr 2010 2011 2012
Militia n.k. GDP fr 11.9tr 14.8tr
US$ 12.9bn 15.6bn
Foreign FORCES per capita US$ 184 217
All forces part of UNOCI unless otherwise stated. Growth % 7.25 6.53
Bangladesh 2,183; 13 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 avn coy(-); 1 engr Inflation % 23.5 14.8
coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital Def bdgt fr 179bn 203bn 213bn
Benin 426; 8 obs; 1 inf bn US$ 193m 214m
Bolivia 3 obs FMA (US) US$ 1.45m 1.45m
Brazil 3; 4 obs US$1=fr 923.43 949.47
Chad 1; 3 obs
China, People’s Republic of 6 obs Population 71,712,867
Ecuador 1 obs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Egypt 176; 1 engr coy
Male 23.3% 5.6% 4.6% 3.7% 11.4% 1.0%
El Salvador 3 obs
Female 23.1% 5.6% 4.6% 3.7% 11.7% 1.5%
Ethiopia 1 obs
France 6 • Operation Licorne 700; 1 armd cav BG; 1 hel unit Capabilities
with 3 SA330 Puma
Gambia 3 obs ACTIVE ε144,000–159,000 (Central Staffs ε14,000,
Ghana 535; 6 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 hel coy; 1 fd hospital Army 110–120,000 Republican Guard 6–8,000 Navy
Guatemala 5 obs 6,703 Air 2,548)
Guinea 3 obs
India 8 obs Organisations by Service
Ireland 2 obs
Jordan 1,068; 8 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 SF coy Army (Forces du Terre) ε110–120,000 (to be
Korea, Republic of 2 obs reduced)
Malawi 853; 3 obs; 1 inf bn The DRC has eleven Military Regions. A draft Armed
Moldova 34obs Forces law would group these regions into three Defence
Morocco 726; 1 inf bn Zones.
Namibia 2 obs FORCES BY ROLE
Nepal 1; 3 obs The following represents the theoretical structure of the
Niger 934; 7 obs; 1 inf bn armed forces following the 2005 reform plan. It is not clear
Nigeria 1; 6 obs how many of these formations are combat effective in prac-
tice.
Pakistan 1,187; 11 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 tpt coy
MANOEUVRE
Paraguay 2; 7 obs
Mechanised
Peru 3 obs 1 mech bde
Philippines 3; 4 obs Light
Poland 3 obs 2 cdo bn
Romania 6 obs 18 (integrated) inf bde
Sub-Saharan Africa 431
59 I Bolivia 10 obs
MRL 57: 107mm 12 Type-63; 122mm 24 BM-21; 128mm Bosnia and Herzegovina 5 obs
6 M-51; 130mm 3 Type-82; 132mm 12 Burkina Faso 9 obs
MOR 328+: 81mm 100; 82mm 200; 107mm M-30; 120mm Cameroon 5 obs
28: 18; 10 Brandt Canada (Operation Crocodile) 8 obs
AT • RCL 36+: 57mm M18; 73mm 10; 75mm 10 M20; China, People’s Republic of 218; 16 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 fd
106mm 16 M40A1 hospital
GUNS 85mm 10 Type-56 (D-44) Czech Republic 3 obs
AD • SAM • MANPAD 20 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Denmark 2 obs
GUNS • TOWED 114: 14.5mm 12 ZPU-4; 37mm 52
M-1939; 40mm ε50 L/60† (probably out of service) Egypt 1,000; 24 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 SF coy
France 5 obs • EUSEC RD Congo 14
Republican Guard circa 6–8,000 Germany EUSEC RD Congo 3
FORCES BY ROLE Ghana 415; 24 obs; 1 mech inf bn
MANOEUVRE Guatemala 150; 8 obs; 1 SF coy
Armoured Hungary EUSEC RD Congo 2
1 armd regt India 3,707; 60 obs; 3 mech inf bn; 1 inf bn; 3 hel coy; 1 fd
Light hospital
3 gd bde Indonesia 175; 16 obs; 1 engr coy
COMBAT SUPPORT Ireland 3 obs
1 arty regt
Jordan 220; 25 obs; 1 SF coy; 1 fd hospital
Kenya 24 obs
Navy 6,703 (incl infantry and marines)
Luxembourg EUSEC RD Congo 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Malawi 17 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3
PB 23: 1 Shanghai II; 2 Swiftships†; 20 various (all under Malaysia 15 obs
50ft) Mali 19 obs
Sub-Saharan
Mongolia 2 obs
Air Force 2,548
Africa
Morocco 848; 5 obs; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital
AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable Mozambique 1 obs
FTR 2: 1 MiG-23MS Flogger; 1 MiG-23UB Flogger C Nepal 1,026; 25 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
ATK 3 Su-25 Frogfoot Netherlands EUSEC RD Congo 3
TPT 6 Medium 1 C-130H Hercules Light 3 An-26 Curl
Niger 15 obs
PAX 2 B-727
Nigeria 26 obs
HELICOPTERS
ATK 9: 4 Mi-24 Hind; 5 Mi-24V Hind Norway 1 obs
TPT 4 Heavy 1 Mi-26 Halo (non op) Medium 3: 1 Pakistan 3,562; 57 obs; 3 mech inf bn; 1 inf bn
AS332L Super Puma; 2 Mi-8 Hip Paraguay 17 obs
Peru 7 obs
Paramilitary Poland 3 obs
Portugal EUSEC RD Congo 3
National Police Force
Romania 22 obs
incl Rapid Intervention Police (National and Provincial
Russia 30 obs
forces)
Senegal 20 obs
People’s Defence Force Serbia 6; 2 obs
432 The Military Balance 2012
South Africa (Operation Mistral) 1,202; 12 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 COMBAT SUPPORT
avn coy; 1 engr coy • Operation Teutonic 16 1 arty regt
Spain 2 obs • EUSEC RD Congo 1 1 demining coy
Sri Lanka 4 obs 1 sigs regt
Sweden 6 obs 1 CIS sect
Switzerland 3 obs COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Tanzania 2 obs 1 log regt
Tunisia 31 obs 1 maint coy
Ukraine 13 obs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
United Kingdom 5 obs • EUSEC RD Congo 4 RECCE 39: 4 AML-60†; 15 VBL; 16-20 Ratel
United States 2 obs APC (W) 20: 8 BTR -80; 12 BTR-60†
Uruguay 1,248; 45 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 mne coy; 1 hel flt; 1 engr ARTY 96
coy TOWED 122mm 6 D-30
Yemen, Republic of 6 obs MOR 45: 81mm 25; 120mm 20 Brandt
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Zambia 21 obs AT
RCL 106mm 16 M40A1
Djibouti DJB RL 89mm LRAC
AD • GUNS 15+
Djiboutian Franc fr 2010 2011 2012 SP 20mm 5 M693
GDP fr 201bn 225bn TOWED 10: 23mm 5 ZU-23; 40mm 5 L/70
US$ 1.12bn 1.26bn
per capita US$ 1,515 1,665 Navy ε200
Growth % 3.49 4.82 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 4.0 7.1 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
PBF 2 Battalion-17
Def bdgt fr 1.72bn
PB 11
US$ 10m
FMA (US) US$ 2.0m 2.5m Air Force 250
US$1=fr 178.83 178.61
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 757,074 AIRCRAFT
Ethnic groups: Somali 60%; Afar 35% TPT • Light 3: 1 Cessna U206G Stationair; 1 Cessna 208
Caravan; 1 L-410UVP Turbolet
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus HELICOPTERS
Male 17.5% 5.4% 4.9% 3.9% 13.0% 1.5% ATK (1 Mi-35 Hind in store)
Female 17.5% 5.8% 5.8% 5.2% 17.7% 1.8% MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H
ACTIVE 10,450 (Army 8,000 Navy 200 Air 250 TPT 2 Medium (1 Mi-8 Hip in store) Light 2 AS355F
Gendarmerie 2,000) National Security Force 2,500 Ecureuil II
Gendarmerie 2,000 +
Organisations by Service Ministry of Defence
FORCES BY ROLE
Army ε8,000 MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE Other
4 military districts (Tadjourah, Dikhil, Ali-Sabieh and 1 paramilitary bn
Obock)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 PB
Mechanised
1 armd regt (1 recce sqn, 3 armd sqn, 1 (anti-smuggling)
sy coy) Paramilitary ε2,500
Light
4 (joint) inf regt (3-4 inf coy, 1 spt coy)
National Security Force ε2,500
1 rapid reaction (incl CT and cdo/AB role) regt (4 inf Ministry of Interior
coy, 1 spt coy)
Other Deployment
1 Republican Guard regt (1 sy sqn, 1 (close protection)
sy sqn, 1 cbt spt sqn (1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 arty pl), western sahara
1 spt sqn) UN • MINURSO 1 obs
Sub-Saharan Africa 433
Sub-Saharan
RECCE 6 BRDM-2
Africa
AIFV 20 BMP-1 Army ε200,000
APC (W) 10 BTR-152 Heavily cadreised
FORCES BY ROLE
Navy ε120 COMMAND
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† 4 corps HQ
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 MANOEUVRE
PCC 2 OPV 62 Mechanised
1 mech bde
PB 6: 1 Daphne; 1 Estuario de Muni; 2 Shaldag II; 2 Zhuk
Light
19 inf div
Air Force 100 1 cdo div
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable Reserve ε120,000
ATK 4: 2 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B FORCES BY ROLE
TPT 4 Light 3: 1 An-32B Cline; 2 An-72 Coaler PAX 1 MANOEUVRE
Falcon 900 (VIP) Light
TRG 2 L-39C Albatros 1 inf div
434 The Military Balance 2012
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 270 T-54/T-55 Ethiopia ETH
RECCE 40 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 Ethiopian Birr EB 2010 2011 2012
AIFV 15 BMP-1
GDP ΕB 383bn 488bn
APC • APC (W) 25 BTR-152 APC (W)/BTR-60 APC (W)
ARTY 208+ US$ 26.2bn 28.5bn
SP 45: 122mm 32 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 13 2S5 per capita US$ 298 314
TOWED 19+: 122mm D-30; 130mm 19 M-46 Growth % 8.01 7.54
MRL 44: 122mm 35 BM-21; 220mm 9 BM-27/9P140 Inflation % 8.01 7.54
Uragan Def bdgt ΕB 4.5bn 4.4bn 6.5bn
MOR 120mm/160mm 100+ US$ 308m 257m
AT FMA (US) US$ 0.843m 2.0m
MSL • MANPATS 200 AT-3 9K11 Sagger/AT-5 9K113
US$1=EB 14.62 17.09
Spandrel
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
a
Includes funds allocated to Republican Guard
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Population 1,576,665
SA316 Alouette III
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 26 combat capable Male 21.2% 5.4% 4.8% 3.9% 12.8% 1.6%
FGA 26: 15 MiG-21MF Fishbed J/MiG-21UM Mongol B†; Female 21.0% 5.4% 4.8% 3.9% 13.0% 2.2%
8 Su-27 Flanker; 3 Su-27UB Flanker
TPT 10 Medium 6: 3 An-12 Cub; 2 C-130B Hercules; 1 Capabilities
L-100-30 Light 4: 1 An-26 Curl; 1 An-32 Cline; 1 DHC-6
Twin Otter; 1 Yak-40 Codling (VIP) ACTIVE 4,700 (Army 3,200 Navy 500 Air 1,000)
TRG 16: 12 L-39 Albatros; 4 SF-260 Paramilitary 2,000
HELICOPTERS
ATK 18: 15 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-35 Hind Organisations by Service
MRH 1 AW139; 6 SA316 Alouette III
MRH/TPT 12 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H
MSL Army 3,200
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 Presidential Guard under direct presidential control
(AA-11 Archer) IR/SARH R-23/R-24 (AA-7 Apex) R-27 FORCES BY ROLE
(AA-10 Alamo) MANOEUVRE
Light
Deployment 1 (Presidential Guard) gd gp (bn)
(1 armd/recce coy, 3 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 ADA bty)
COTE D’IVOIRE 8 inf coy
UN • UNOCI 1 obs Air Manoeuvre
Liberia 1 cdo/AB coy
COMBAT SUPPORT
UN • UNMIL 4; 9 obs
1 engr coy
Sub-Saharan
SUDAN
Africa
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
UN • UNAMID 2,386; 14 obs; 1 recce coy; 2 inf bn; 1 hel RECCE 70: 24 AML-60/AML-90; 12 EE-3 Jararaca; 14 EE-9
coy; 1 log coy; 1 tpt coy
Cascavel; 6 ERC-90F4 Sagaie; 14 VBL
UN • UNISFA 1,645; 135 obs; 2 inf bn AIFV 12 EE-11 Urutu (with 20mm gun)
APC (W) 28+: 9 LAV-150 Commando; 6 Type-92 (reported);
Foreign FORCES 12 VXB-170; M-3 Panhard; 1 Pandur (Testing)
United States some MQ-9 Reaper ARTY 51
TOWED 105mm 4 M-101
MRL 140mm 8 Teruel
MOR 39: 81mm 35; 120mm 4 Brandt
AT • MSL • MANPATS 4 Milan
RCL 106mm M40A1
RL 89mm LRAC
AD • GUNS 41
SP 20mm 4 ERC-20
TOWED 37: 23mm 24 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 40mm
3 L/70
436 The Military Balance 2012
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
US$ ε7m
1 sqn with Mirage 5G/5DG; Mirage 5E2; Mirage F-1AZ
TRANSPORT US$1=D 28.49 29.15
1 (Presidential Guard) sqn with AS332 Super Puma; Population 1,797,860
ATR-42F; Falcon 900; Gulfstream IV-SP
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; CN-235M-100 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRAINING Male 21.7% 5.5% 4.6% 3.7% 13.0% 1.4%
1 (Presidential Guard) sqn with T-34 Turbo Mentor
Female 21.5% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 13.4% 1.5%
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); SA-330C/H
Puma; SA342M Gazelle
Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 800 (Army 800)
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable
FGA 14: 4 Mirage 5E2; 2 Mirage 5G (Mirage 5); 2 Mirage Organisations by Service
5DG (Mirage 5D); 6 Mirage F-1AZ
MP (1 EMB-111* in store)
TPT 5 Medium 1 C-130H Hercules ( 1 L-100-30 in store) Gambian National Army 800
Light 2: 1 ATR-42F; 1 CN-235M-100 PAX 2: 1 Falcon 900; FORCES BY ROLE
1 Gulfstream IV-SP MANOEUVRE
TRG 3 T-34 Turbo Mentor (4 CM-170 Magister in store) Light
HELICOPTERS 2 inf bn
MRH 2: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); 1 SA-342M Other
Gazelle (2 SA342L Gazelle in store) 1 (Presidential Guard) gd coy
TPT 5 Medium 4: 1 AS332 Super Puma; 3 SA-330C/H COMBAT SUPPORT
Puma Light 1 EC135 1 engr sqn
Navy 2,000
Ghana GHA Naval HQ located at Accra; Western HQ located at
Ghanaian New Cedi C 2010 2011 2012 Sekondi; Eastern HQ located at Tema
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP C 46.2bn 57.9bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
US$ 31.9bn 37.5bn
PCO 2 Anzole (US)
per capita US$ 1,311 1,513 PCC 4: 2 Achimota (GER Lurssen 57m); 2 Dzata (GER
Growth % 7.72 13.53 Lurssen 45m)
Inflation % 10.7 8.7 PB 1(US)
Def bdgt C 179m 198m
Air Force 2,000
US$ 124m 128m
FORCES BY ROLE
FMA (US) US$ 0.35m 0.45m
GROUND ATTACK
US$1=C 1.45 1.54 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*; L-39ZO*: MB-326K; MB-
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Sub-Saharan
1 sigs sqn UN • UNMIL 706; 9 obs; 1 inf bn
Africa
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log gp Sudan
1 tpt coy UN • UNAMID 7; 5 obs
2 maint coy Western Sahara
1 trg bn UN • MINURSO 7; 8 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE 3 EE-9 Cascavel
AIFV 39: 24 Ratel FSC-90; 15 Ratel-20
APC (W) 50 Piranha
ARTY 84
TOWED 122mm 6 D-30
MOR 78: 81mm 50; 120mm 28 Tampella
AT • RCL 84mm 50 Carl Gustav
AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 8+: 14.5mm 4+: 4 ZPU-2; ZPU-4;
23mm 4 ZU-23-2
ARV Piranha reported
438 The Military Balance 2012
Sub-Saharan
1 AB bn
Africa
Navy ε350 COMBAT SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 arty bde (2 arty bn)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 1 ADA bn
Alfeite† 1 engr bde (2 engr bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Force 100 MBT 78 Vickers Mk 3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RECCE 92: 72 AML-60/AML-90; 12 Ferret; 8 S52 Shorland
HELICOPTERS • MRH 1 SA-319 Alouette III† APC (W) 94: 10 M-3 Panhard in store; 52 UR-416; 32 Type-
92 (reported)
ARTY 110
Paramilitary 2,000 active
TOWED 105mm 48: 8 Model 56 pack howitzer; 40 Light
Gendarmerie 2,000 Gun
MOR 62: 81mm 50; 120mm 12 Brandt
AT • MSL • MANPATS 54: 40 Milan; 14 Swingfire
Foreign FORCES RCL 84mm 80 Carl Gustav
Angola MISSANG 200 (providing trg and assistance with AD • GUNS • TOWED 94: 20mm 81: 11 Oerlikon; ε70
SSR) TCM-20; 40mm 13 L/70
440 The Military Balance 2012
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
TRANSPORT Lesotho LSO
Some sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo†; DHC-8 Dash 8†; F-70†
Lesotho Loti M 2010 2011 2012
(VIP); Y-12(II)†
TRAINING GDP M 17.0bn 19.6bn
Some sqn with Bulldog 103/Bulldog 127†; EMB-312 Tu- US$ 2.28bn 2.74bn
cano†*; Hawk Mk52†*; Hughes 500D† per capita US$ 1,187 1,423
ATTACK HELICOPTER Growth % 3.64 5.15
2 sqn with Hughes 500M†; Hughes 500MD Scout
Inflation % 3.4 6.5
Defender†(with TOW); Hughes 500ME†; Z-9W
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Def exp M 654m
1 sqn with SA330 Puma† US$ 88m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Def bdgt M 418m 348m 374m
AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable US$ 56m 48m
FTR 22: 18 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II US$1=M 7.44 7.17
TPT 18 Light 17: 4 DHC-5D Buffalo†; 3 DHC-8 Dash 8†;
Population 1,924,886
10 Y-12(II)†; (6 Do-28D-2† in store); PAX 1 F-70† (VIP)
TRG 24: 8 Bulldog 103/127†; 11 EMB-312 Tucano†*; 5 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Hawk Mk52†*
Male 16.8% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 14.9% 2.6%
HELICOPTERS
MRH 38+: 2 Hughes 500D†; 12 Hughes 500M†; 11 Female 16.7% 5.3% 5.7% 5.7% 14.6% 2.7%
Hughes 500MD Scout Defender† (with TOW); 10 Hughes
500ME†; 3 Z-9W Capabilities
TPT • Medium 13: 2 Mi-171; 11 SA330 Puma† ACTIVE 2,000 (Army 2,000)
MSL
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder
ASM AGM-65 Maverick; TOW Organisations by Service
TOWED 105mm 2 Bangladesh 1,437; 13 obs; 1 inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 MP coy; 1
MOR 81mm 10 sigs coy; 1 log coy; 1 fd hospital
AT • RCL 106mm 6 M40 Benin 1; 2 obs
Bolivia 1; 2 obs
Air Wing 110 Brazil 2; 2 obs
AIRCRAFT Bulgaria 2 obs
TPT • Light 3: 2 C-212-300 Aviocar; 1 GA-8 Airvan China, People’s Republic of 564; 2 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 tpt
HELICOPTERS coy; 1 fd hospital
MRH 3: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey Croatia 2
TPT • Light 2: 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 1 Bo-105LSA-3 Denmark 2; 3 obs
Ecuador 1; 2 obs
Deployment Egypt 7 obs
El Salvador 2 obs
sudan
Ethiopia 4; 9 obs
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Sub-Saharan
Togo 1; 2 obs
Africa
Organisations by Service Ukraine 277; 2 obs; 1 hel coy
United States 5; 4 obs
Army 2,000 Yemen, Republic of 1
Zambia 3 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
Zimbabwe 2 obs
MANOEUVRE
Light
1 (23rd) inf bde with (2 inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 trg unit (forming)
Coast Guard 50
8 craft (Zodiac) under 10t FLD
Foreign FORCES
All under UNMIL comd unless otherwise specified
442 The Military Balance 2012
HELICOPTERS
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MRH 4 SA318C Alouette II
Male 21.7% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 12.9% 1.3%
Female 21.4% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 13.3% 1.7% Paramilitary 8,100
Capabilities Gendarmerie 8,100
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • 5 PB
ACTIVE 13,500 (Army 12,500 Navy 500 Air 500)
Paramilitary 8,100
Terms of service conscription (incl for civil purposes) 18 Malawi MWI
months Malawian Kwacha K 2010 2011 2012
GDP K 812bn 896bn
Organisations by Service US$ 5.3bn 5.69bn
per capita US$ 343 358
Army 12,500+
Growth % 6.51 4.59
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Inflation % 7.4 8.6
Armoured Def exp K ε6.7bn
1 armd bn US$ ε43m
Light US$1=K 153.28 157.37
3 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT Population 15,879,252
1 arty bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 engr regt
1 sigs bn Male 22.6% 5.5% 4.7% 4.0% 11.8% 1.1%
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Female 22.5% 5.5% 4.8% 4.0% 11.8% 1.5%
1 log bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Capabilities
LT TK 12 PT-76 ACTIVE 5,300 (Army 5,300) Paramilitary 1,500
RECCE 73: ε35 BRDM-2; 10 Ferret; ε20 M3A1; 8 M8
APC (T) ε30 M3A1 half-track
ARTY 25+ Organisations by Service
TOWED 17: 105mm 5 M101; 122mm 12 D-30
MOR 8+: 82mmM-37; 120mm 8 M-43 Army 5,300
AT • RCL 106mm M40A1 FORCES BY ROLE
RL 89mm LRAC MANOEUVRE
AD • GUNS • TOWED 70: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-4; 37mm 20 Light
Type-55 (M-1939) 3 inf bn
Air Manoeuvre
Navy 500 (incl some 100 Marines) 1 para bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COMBAT SUPPORT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 1 (general) bn (1+ mne coy, 1 armd recce sqn, 2 lt arty
PCC 1 Chamois bty, 1 engr unit)
PB 6 (USCG) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 (FRA Edic) 8 log coy
Sub-Saharan Africa 443
SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SF bn
AIRCRAFT • TPT 2 Light 1 Do-228; PAX 1 Falcon
MANOEUVRE
900EX
Armoured
HELICOPTERS • TPT 3 Medium 2: 1 AS532UL Cougar;
2 tk bn
1 SA330H Puma Light 1 AS350L Ecureuil
Light
4 inf bn
Paramilitary 1,500 Air Manoeuvre
Mobile Police Force 1,500 1 AB bn
RECCE 8 S52 Shorland COMBAT SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT 2 arty bn
TPT • Light 4: 3 BN-2T Defender (border patrol); 1 3 AD bty
SC.7 3M Skyvan 1 engr bn
HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 AS365 Dauphin 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
MBT 33: 12 T-54/T-55; 21 T-34
LT TK 18 Type-62
Deployment RECCE 64 BRDM-2
Côte D’Ivoire APC (W) 84: 44 BTR-60; 30 BTR-40; 10 BTR-152
UN • UNOCI 853; 3 obs; 1 inf bn ARTY 46+
TOWED 14+: 100mm 6 M-1944; 122mm 8 D-30; 130mm
Democratic Republic of the Congo M-46 (reported)
UN • MONUSCO 17 obs MRL 122mm 2 BM-21
MIDDLE EAST MOR 30+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 30 M-43
AT • MSL • MANPATS AT-3 9K11 Sagger
UN • UNTSO 1 obs GUNS 85mm 6 D-44
SUDAN AD • SAM 12+
UN • UNAMID 2; 4 obs TOWED 12+ S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Sub-Saharan
GUNS • TOWED 12: 37mm 6 M-1939; 57mm 6 S-60
Africa
ARV T-54/T-55 reported
Mali MLI
Navy 50
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2010 2011 2012
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP fr 4.64tr 5.10tr PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3 PBR†
US$ 9.21bn 10.7bn
per capita US$ 667 756 Air Force 400
Growth % 5.85 5.28 FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
Inflation % 1.3 2.8
1 sqn with MiG-21MF Fishbed; MiG-21UM Mongol B
Def bdgt fr ε103bn TRANSPORT
US$ ε204m 1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; BN-2 Islander; BT-
FMA (US) US$ 0.2m 0.2m 67
US$1=fr 504.09 476.56 TRAINING
1 sqn with L-29 Delfin; SF-260Wl Warrior*; Tetras
Population 14,159,904 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Ethnic groups: Tuareg 6-10% 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24D Hind; Z-9
444 The Military Balance 2012
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable Capabilities
FGA 2: 1 MiG-21MF Fishbed; 1 MiG-21UM Mongol B ACTIVE NIL Paramilitary 2,000
TPT • Light 10: 1 An-24 Coke; 2 An-26 Curl; 1 BT-67; 2
BN-2 Islander; 4 Tetras
TRG 8: 6 L-29 Delfin; 2 SF-260WL Warrior*
Organisations by Service
HELICOPTERS
ATK 4 Mi-24D Hind Paramilitary 2,000
MRH 1 Z-9
Special Mobile Force ε1,500
TPT 1 Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip Light (1 AS350 Ecureuil in
store) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
Paramilitary 4,800 active
6 (rifle) inf coy
Gendarmerie 1,800 Other
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Mauritius MUS
Mauritian Rupee R 2010 2011 2012
Mozambique MOZ
Mozambique New Metical
GDP R 299bn 328bn 2010 2011 2012
M
US$ 9.4bn 11.0bn GDP M 313bn 373bn
per capita US$ 7,260 8,456 US$ 9.44bn 12.6bn
Growth % 4.16 4.20 per capita US$ 421 551
Inflation % 2.9 6.7 Growth % 6.81 7.19
Def bdgta R 449m 295m 310m Inflation % 12.7 10.8
US$ 14m 10m Def bdgt M ε2.02bn
US$1=R 31.86 29.71 US$ ε61m
a
Defence and Home Affairs Budget US$1=M 33.19 29.48
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 11.1% 4.1% 3.9% 3.8% 23.2% 3.0% Male 22.0% 6.0% 4.7% 3.3% 12.3% 1.2%
Female 10.7% 4.0% 3.8% 3.7% 24.0% 4.5% Female 21.8% 5.9% 4.8% 3.3% 13.0% 1.7%
Sub-Saharan Africa 445
Sub-Saharan
Light
Africa
Navy ε200 6 inf bn
Other
Air Force 1,000 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT
TRANSPORT 1 cbt spt bde with (1 arty regt)
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; FTB-337G Milirole 1 AT regt
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 AD regt
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind† COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
AIR DEFENCE 1 log bde
Some bty with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)†‡ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MBT T-54/T-55†; T-34†
AIRCRAFT RECCE 12 BRDM-2
FGA (some MiG-21bis Fishbed L & N non-op) APC (W) 60: 10 BTR-60; 20 Casspir; 30 Wolf Turbo 2
ISR 2 FTB-337G Milirole ARTY 69
TPT • Light 2 An-26 Curl; (4 PA-32 Cherokee non-op) TOWED 140mm 24 G2
HELICOPTERS MRL 122mm 5 BM-21
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind† MOR 40: 81mm; 82mm
446 The Military Balance 2012
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Population 165,822,569 Navy 8,000 (incl Coast Guard)
Ethnic groups: North (Hausa and Fulani) South-west (Yoruba) Western Comd HQ located at Apapa; Eastern Comd HQ
South-east (Ibo); these tribes make up ε65% of population located at Calabar;
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 20.9% 5.5% 4.8% 4.2% 14.1% 1.5%
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
FRIGATES • FFGHM 1 Aradu (GER MEKO 360) with 8
Female 20.0% 5.2% 4.6% 4.0% 13.6% 1.6%
single lnchr with Otomat AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr
with Aspide SAM, 2 triple STWS 1B 324mm ASTT with
Capabilities A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 1 Lynx Mk89 hel)
ACTIVE 80,000 (Army 62,000 Navy 8,000 Air 10,000) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
Paramilitary 82,000 CORVETTES • FSM 1 Enymiri (UK Vosper Mk 9) with
Reserves planned, none org 1 triple lnchr with Seacat SAM, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor,
1 76mm gun
PSOH 1 Thunder (US Hamilton) with 1 76 mm gun
Organisations by Service PCFG 1 Ayam (FRA Combattante) each with 2 twin lnchr
with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (Additional 2
Army 62,000 vessels†)
448 The Military Balance 2012
Sub-Saharan
Other
Local Defence Forces ε2,000
Africa
1 (Presidential Guard) horse cav bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Deployment 1 arty bn
1 engr bn
south Sudan
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
UN • UNMIS 3; 3 obs
3 construction coy
Sudan EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
UN • UNAMID 3,237; 10 obs; 4 inf bn RECCE 118: 30 AML-60; 74 AML-90; 10 M-8; 4 M-20
UN • UNISFA 3 obs APC 36+
APC (T) 12 M-3 half-track
APC (W) 24: 16 M-3 Panhard; 8 Casspir
ARTY 28
TOWED 12: 105mm 6 HM-2/M-101; 155mm ε6
Model-50
MOR 16: 81mm 8 Brandt; 120mm 8 Brandt
AT • MSL • MANPATS 4 Milan
RL 89mm 31 LRAC
450 The Military Balance 2012
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 22.6% 4.8% 4.5% 3.5% 13.6% 1.0%
Female 22.5% 4.8% 4.6% 3.7% 13.2% 1.4%
Male 20.8% 4.9% 4.5% 3.7% 13.0% 1.6%
Female 21.1% 5.2% 4.8% 4.0% 14.4% 2.0%
Capabilities
Capabilities No national armed forces since 1991. Transitional
government attempting to establish armed forces but
ACTIVE 10,500 (Joint 10,500) hampered by defections, financial difficulties, UN arms
embargo and institutional deficiencies. Militia forces
Organisations by Service and armed groups within the country. Somaliland and
Puntland have their own militias. Heavy equipment in
Armed Forces 10,500 poor repair or inoperable.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARTY • MOR 31: 81mm ε27; 82mm 2; 120mm 2 Military Forces
AT • RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
Sub-Saharan
HELICOPTERS • MRH/TPT 2 Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) Hip H/ Transitional Federal Government
Africa
Mi-8 Hip†
AD • GUNS 7: 12.7mm 4; 14.5mm 3 Army ε2,000 (Ethiopian trained)
Navy ε200
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Foreign FORCES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 Burundi AMISOM 4,400; 5 inf bn
Shanghai III Kenya 1,600; 2 inf bn
Sierra Leone AMISOM 5
Deployment Uganda AMISOM 5,200; 6 inf bn
LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 3
TERRITORY WHERE THE RECOGNISED
AUTHORITY (TFG) DOES NOT EXERCISE
somalia
EFFECTIVE CONTROL
AU • AMISOM 5
Data presented here represent the de facto situation. This
south SUDAN does not imply international recognition as a sovereign
UN • UNMIS 4 obs state.
452 The Military Balance 2012
Somaliland
Population 3.5m
South Africa RSA
Militia unit strengths are not known. Equipment numbers South African Rand R 2010 2011 2012
are generalised assessments; most of this equipment is in GDP R 2.66tr 2.95tr
poor repair or inoperable. US$ 363bn 417bn
per capita US$ 7,383 8,505
Organisations by Service Growth % 2.84 3.40
Inflation % 4.3 5.9
Army ε15,000
Def exp R 31.3bn
FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 4.27bn
MANOUEVRE
Armoured Def bdgt R 30.7bn 30.4bn 34.6bn
2 armd bde US$ 4.18bn 4.29bn
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
troops)
3 tk bn AGOS 1 (use for Antarctic survey, privately operated for
Mechanised Dept of Environment)
6 mech inf bn AGHS 1 Protea (UK Hecla)
Light YTM 5
16 mot inf bn (1 bn roles as AB, 1 as amph)
3 lt inf bn (converting to mot inf) Air Force 10,653
Air Manoeuvre
Air Force office, Pretoria, and 4 op gps
1 AB bn
Command & Control: 2 Airspace Control Sectors, 1
COMBAT SUPPORT
Mobile Deployment Wg
7 arty regt
1 Air Force Command Post
4 AD regt
2 engr regt FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn (forming) with Gripen C/D (JAS-39C/D)
MBT 34 Olifant 1A (133 Olifant 1B in store)
TRANSPORT
RECCE 82 Rooikat-76 (94 in store)
1 (VIP) sqn with B-737 BBJ; Cessna 550 Citation II; Falcon
AIFV 534 Ratel-20 Mk III-20/Ratel-60 Mk III-60/Ratel-90 Mk
50; Falcon 900;
III-90 FSV 90 (666 in store)
1 sqn with BT-67 (C-47TP)
APC (W) 810: 370 Casspir; 440 Mamba
2 sqn with C-130B/BZ Hercules; C-212; Cessna 185; CN-
ARTY 1,255
SP 155mm 2 G-6 (41 in store) 235
TOWED 140mm (75 G2 in store); 155mm 6 G-5 (66 in 9 (AF Reserve) sqn with ε130 private lt tpt ac
store) TRAINING
MRL 127mm 21: (26 Valkiri Mk I in store) (24 tube)); 21 1 (Lead-in Ftr Trg) sqn with Hawk Mk120*
Valkiri Mk II MARS Bataleur (40 tube); (4 in store (40 ATTACK HELICOPTER
tube)) 1 (cbt spt) sqn with AH-2 Rooivalk
MOR 1,226: 81mm 1,190 (incl some SP); 120mm 36 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Sub-Saharan
AT • MSL • MANPATS 59: 16 ZT-3 Swift (36 in store); 43 4 (mixed) sqn with Oryx; BK-117; A109UH
Africa
Milan ADT/ER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RCL 106mm 100 M-40A1 (some SP) AIRCRAFT 42 combat capable
RL 92mm FT-5 FGA 18: 9 Gripen C (JAS-39C); 9 Gripen D (JAS-39D)
AD • GUNS 76 (further 8 Gripen C to be delivered by 2012)
SP 23mm 36 Zumlac TPT 55 Medium 8 C-130B/BZ Hercules; Light 43: 3
TOWED 35mm 40 GDF-002 Beech 200C King Air; 1 Beech 300 King Air; 10 BT-67
RADAR • LAND ESR 220 Kameelperd; 2 Thales Page (C-47TP - 5 maritime, 3 tpt, 2 EW); 2 C-212-200 Aviocar; 2
ARV Gemsbok C-212-300 Aviocar; 10 Cessna 185; 11 Cessna 208 Caravan;
VLB Leguan 2 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 CN-235; 1 PC-12 PAX 4: 1
UAV • ISR • Light up to 4 Vulture B-737 BBJ; 2 Falcon 50; 1 Falcon 900
TRG 74: 24 Hawk Mk120*; 50 PC-7 Mk II Astra
Navy 6,244 HELICOPTERS
Fleet HQ and Naval base located at Simon’s Town; Naval Atk 11 AH-2 Rooivalk
stations located at Durban and Port Elizabeth MRH 4 Super Lynx 300
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT 76 Medium 39 Oryx Light 37: 29 AW-109; 8 BK-117
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 3 Heroine (Type 209) UAV • ISR • Medium Seeker II
with 8 533mm TT MSL •AAM • IR V3C Darter IIR IRIS-T
454 The Military Balance 2012
Inflation % 13.0 20.0 TOWED 123+ 105mm 20 M-101; 122mm 16+: 16 D-30;
D-74; M-30; 130mm 75 M-46/Type-59-I; 12 M-114A1
Def exp sdg ε2.56bn ε3.1bn
MRL 635: 107mm 477 Type-63; 122mm 158: 90 BM-21; 50
US$ ε1.08bn ε1.15bn
Saqr; 18 Type-81
US$1=sdg 2.37 2.69 MOR 81mm; 82mm; 120mm AM-49; M-43
Population 36,787,012 AT • MSL • MANPATS 4+: 4 Swingfire; AT-3 9K11 Sagger
Ethnic and religious groups: Muslim 70% mainly in North; RCL 106mm 40 M-40A1
Christian10% mainly in South; 52% mainly in South; Arab 39% GUNS 40+: 40 76mm ZIS-3/100mm M-1944; 85mm D-44
mainly in North AD • SAM • MANPAD 54 9K32 Strela-2 ‡ (SA-7 Grail)
GUNS 996+
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SP 20: 20mm 8 M-163 Vulcan; 12 M3 VDAA
Male 21.5% 5.7% 4.8% 3.9% 12.9% 1.4% towed 976+: 740+ 14.5mm ZPU-2/14.5mm ZPU-
Female 20.6% 5.5% 4.7% 3.9% 13.8% 1.3% 4/37mm Type-63/57mm S-60/85mm M-1944; 20mm 16
M-167 Vulcan; 23mm 50 ZU-23-2; 37mm 110: 80 M-1939;
Capabilities 30 unserviceable; 40mm 60
RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
ACTIVE 109,300 (Army 105,000 Navy 1,300 Air
3,000) Paramilitary 17,500 Navy 1,300
Terms of service conscription (males 18–30) 2 years
HQ located at Port Sudan
RESERVE NIL Paramilitary 85,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 4
Organisations by Service Kurmuk
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 7
LCT 2 Sobat
Army 85,000; ε20,000 conscripts (total 105,000)
LCVP 5
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Air Force 3,000
5 SF coy
Sub-Saharan
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Africa
Reconnaissance FIGHTER
1 indep recce bde 2 sqn with MiG-29SE/UB Fulcrum
Armoured GROUND ATTACK
1 armd div 1 sqn with A-5 Fantan
Mechanised 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UB Frogfoot
1 mech inf div TRANSPORT
1 indep mech inf bde Some sqn with An-26 Curl* (modified for bombing); An-
Light 30 Clank; An-32 Cline; An-72 Coaler; An-74TK-200/300;
6 inf div C-130H Hercules; Il-76 Candid; Y-8
7 indep inf bde 1 VIP unit with Falcon 20F; Falcon 50; Falcon 900; F-27;
Air Manoeuvre Il-62M Classic
1 AB div TRAINING
Other 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
1 (Border Guard) sy bde ATTACK HELICOPTER
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-24P/Mi-24V/Mi-35P Hind
3 indep arty bde TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 engr div (9 engr bn) 2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171
456 The Military Balance 2012
Organisations by Service AD
SAM 160:
SP 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)†; 20 S-125 Pechora (SA-
Army ε23,000
3 Goa)†
FORCES BY ROLE MANPAD 120 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
MANOEUVRE GUNS 200
Armoured TOWED 14.5mm 40 ZPU-2/ZPU-4†; 23mm 40 ZU-23;
1 tk bde 37mm 120 M-1939
Light
5 inf bde Paramilitary 1,400 active
COMBAT SUPPORT
4 arty bn Police Field Force 1,400
1 mor bn 18 sub-units incl Police Marine Unit
2 AT bn
2 ADA bn Air Wing
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
Sub-Saharan
FIGHTER
3 sqn with F-6/FT-6; F-7/FT-7; FT-5; K-8 Karakorum* Togo TGO
Africa
TRANSPORT CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2010 2011 2012
1 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; DHC-5D Buffalo; F-28
GDP fr 1.57tr 1.69tr
Fellowship; F-50; Gulfstream G550; Y-12 (II)
US$ 3.12bn 3.55bn
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205); Bell 412 Twin Huey per capita US$ 474 524
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Growth % 3.71 3.83
Few air defence assets serviceable. Inflation % 3.2 4.0
AIRCRAFT 22 combat capable Def bdgt fr 28.1bn 27.8bn
FTR 16: 10 J-6; 6 J-7 US$ 56m 58m
TPT 12: Medium 2 Y-8 Light 7: 2 Cessna 404 Titan; 3 US$1=fr 504.09 476.56
DHC-5D Buffalo; 2 Y-12(II) PAX 3: 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1
F-50; 1 Gulfstream G550 Population 6,771,993
TRG 9: 3 FT-5 (JJ-5); 6 K-8 Karakorum* Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
HELICOPTERS
Male 20.5% 5.3% 4.9% 4.1% 13.4% 1.4%
MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey
TPT • Light 1 Bell 205 (AB-205) Female 20.4% 5.3% 4.9% 4.2% 13.8% 1.8%
458 The Military Balance 2012
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Capabilities AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable
ACTIVE 8,550 (Army 8,100 Navy 200 Air 250) TPT 5 Light 2 Beech 200 King Air PAX 3: 1 DC-8; 2 F-28-
1000 (VIP)
Paramilitary 750
TRG 10: 3 Alpha Jet*; 4 EMB-326G *; 3 TB-30 Epsilon*
Terms of service conscription, 2 years (selective)
HELICOPTERS
MRH 4: 2 SA315 Lama; 1 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA319
Organisations by Service Alouette III
TPT • Medium (1 SA-330 Puma in store)
Army 8,100+
FORCES BY ROLE Paramilitary 750
MANOEUVRE
Gendarmerie 750
Light
Ministry of Interior
1 inf regt with (2 armd sqn, 3 inf coy, some spt units
FORCES BY ROLE
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
(trg))
2 reg sections
1 inf regt with (1 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn)
MANOEUVRE
Air Manoeuvre
Other
1 cdo/para regt with (3 cdo/para coy)
1 (mobile) paramilitary sqn
Other
1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt with (1 gd bn, 1 cdo bn, 2
indep gd coy) Deployment
COMBAT SUPPORT
Côte D’Ivoire
1 spt regt with (1 fd arty bty, 2 ADA bty, 1 engr/log/tpt
UN • UNOCI 524; 7 obs; 1 inf bn
bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Liberia
MBT 2 T-54/T-55 UN • UNMIL 1; 2 obs
LT TK 9 Scorpion SUDAN
RECCE 61: 3 AML-60; 7 AML-90; 36 EE-9 Cascavel; 3 M-20;
UN • UNAMID 8 obs
4 M-3A1; 6 M-8; 2 VBL
AIFV 20 BMP-2
APC (W) 30 UR-416 Uganda UGA
ARTY 30 Ugandan Shilling Ush 2010 2011 2012
SP 122mm 6
GDP Ush 34.5tr 38.9tr
TOWED 105mm 4 HM-2
MOR 82mm 20 M-43 US$ 15.7bn 15.2bn
AT • RCL 22: 75mm 12 Type-52 (M-20)/Type-56; 82mm 10 per capita US$ 470 440
Type-65 (B-10) Growth % 5.18 6.40
GUNS 57mm 5 ZIS-2 Inflation % 9.4 6.5
AD • GUNS • TOWED 43 14.5mm 38 ZPU-4; 37mm 5
Def bdgt Ush 465bn 484bn 617bn
M-1939
US$ 211m 189m
Navy ε200 (incl Marine Infantry unit) FMA (US) US$ 0.3m 0.3m
Sub-Saharan
1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 412 Twin Huey; Mi- Sweden 7
Africa
17 Hip H; Mi-24 Hind; Mi-172 (VIP) UK 3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable
FGA 11: 5 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 1 MiG-21U Mongol A; Zambia ZMB
1 MiG-21UM Mongol B; 4 Su-30Mk2
TPT 4 Medium 1 L-100-30 Light 2 Y-12 PAX 1 Zambian Kwacha K 2010 2011 2012
Gulfstream 550 GDP K 77.7tr 90.5tr
TRG 3 L-39 Albatros†* US$ 15.9bn 18.5bn
HELICOPTERS
per capita US$ 1,185 1,333
ATK 1 Mi-24 Hind (5 more non-op)
MRH 5: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 3 Mi-17 Hip H (1 more Growth % 7.60 6.72
non-op) Inflation % 8.5 9.1
TPT 4: Medium 1 Mi-172 (VIP) Light 3 Bell 206 Jet Def bdgt K 1.22tr 1.42tr 1.85tr
Ranger US$ 251m 291m
MISSILE
US$1=K 4870.06 4888.09
AAM • IR R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton) Population 13,881,336
460 The Military Balance 2012
FORCES BY ROLE TPT 18: Light 16: 5 Do-28; 2 MA60; 4 Y-12(II); 5 Y-12(IV)
COMMAND PAX 2: 1 Cl-604; 1 HS-748
3 bde HQ TRG 28: 8 K-8 Karakourm*; 10 MB-326GB; 10 MFI-15
SPECIAL FORCES Safari
1 cdo bn
HELICOPTERS
MANOEUVRE
MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H
Armoured
1 armd regt (1 tk bn, 1 armd recce regt) TPT • Light 13: 10 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/AB-205); 3
Light Bell 212
6 inf bn TRG 5 Bell 47G
COMBAT SUPPORT AD • SAM S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
1 arty regt (2 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) MSL • ASM AT-3 Sagger
1 engr regt AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; PL-2; Python 3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Some equipment† Paramilitary 1,400
MBT 30: 20 Type-59; 10 T-55
LT TK 30 PT-76 Police Mobile Unit 700
RECCE 70 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (ε30 serviceable) FORCES BY ROLE
APC (W)33: 20 BTR-70; 13 BTR-60 MANOEUVRE
ARTY 182 Other
TOWED 61: 105mm 18 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm 1 police bn (4 police coy)
25 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46
MRL 122mm 30 BM-21 (ε12 serviceable) Police Paramilitary Unit 700
MOR 91: 81mm 55; 82mm 24; 120mm 12
FORCES BY ROLE
AT • MSL • MANPATS AT-3 9K11 Sagger
RCL 12+: 57mm 12 M-18; 75mm M-20; 84mm Carl MANOEUVRE
Gustav Other
AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ 1 paramilitary bn (3 paramilitary coy)
GUNS • TOWED 136: 20mm 50 M-55 (triple); 37mm 40
M-1939; 57mm ε30 S-60; 85mm 16 M-1939 KS-12 Deployment
ARV T-54/T-55 reported
Côte D’Ivoire
Reserve 3,000 UN • UNOCI 2 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
Democratic Republic of the Congo
MANOEUVRE
Light UN • MONUSCO 21 obs
3 inf bn Liberia
UN • UNMIL 3 obs
Air Force 1,600
FORCES BY ROLE south Sudan
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK UN • UNMISS 3; 6 obs
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
Sudan
1 sqn with MiG-21MF Fishbed J†/MiG-21U Mongol A
TRANSPORT UN • UNAMID 6; 14 obs
1 sqn with MA60; Y-12(II)/(IV) UN • UNISFA 12; 2 obs
Sub-Saharan Africa 461
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sqn with Cessna 337/O-2A Skymaster*
ISR/TRAINING
Male 21.2% 6.2% 4.3% 3.9% 11.0% 1.6%
1 sqn with SF-260F/M; SF-260TP*; SF-260W Warrior*
Female 20.7% 6.2% 5.4% 5.2% 12.2% 2.2% TRANSPORT
1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; CASA 212-200 Aviocar (VIP)
Capabilities ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-35 Hind; Mi-35P Hind (liaison); SA316
ACTIVE 29,000 (Army 25,000 Air 4,000) Paramilitary
Alouette III; AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
21,800 1 trg sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey, SA316 Alouette III
AIR DEFENCE
Organisations by Service 1 sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Army ε25,000 AIRCRAFT 46 combat capable
FORCES BY ROLE FTR 9: 7 F-7II†; 2 FT-7 †
COMMAND FGA (12 Hawker Hunter in store)
ISR 2 O-2A Skymaster
1 mech bde HQ
TPT • Light 26: 5 BN-2 Islander; 8 C-212-200 Aviocar
5 inf bde HQ
(VIP - 2 more in store); 13 Cessna 337 Skymaster*; (10
MANOEUVRE
C-47 Skytrain in store)
Armoured
TRG 35: 11 K-8 Karakorum*; 5 SF-260M; 8 SF-260TP*; 5
1 armd sqn
SF-260W Warrior*; 6 SF-260F
Mechanised
HELICOPTERS
1 mech inf bn ATK 6: 4 Mi-35 Hind; 2 Mi-35P Hind
Light MRH 10: 8 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 SA-319 Alouette III;
15 inf bn TPT • Medium 2 AS-532UL Cougar (VIP)
1 cdo bn MSL • AAM • IR PL-2; PL-5
Air Manoeuvre AD • GUNS 100mm (not deployed); 37mm (not
1 para bn deployed); 57mm (not deployed)
Sub-Saharan
Other
Africa
3 gd bn Paramilitary 21,800
1 (Presidential Guard) gd gp
COMBAT SUPPORT Zimbabwe Republic Police Force 19,500
1 arty bde incl Air Wg
1 fd arty regt Police Support Unit 2,300
1 AD regt PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5: 3
2 engr regt Rodman 38; 2 Rodman 46
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 40: 30 Type-59†; 10 Type-69† Deployment
RECCE 100: 20 Eland; 15 Ferret†; 80 EE-9 Cascavel (90mm)
APC 85 Côte D’Ivoire
APC (T) 30: 8 Type-63; 22 VTT-323 UN • UNOCI 3 obs
APC (W) 55 TPK 4.20 VSC ACMAT
LIBERIA
ARTY 242
UN • UNMIL 2 obs
TOWED 122mm 20: 4 D-30; 16 Type-60 (D-74)
MRL 76: 107mm 16 Type-63; 122mm 60 RM-70 Dana Sudan
MOR 146: 81mm/82mm ε140; 120mm 6 M-43 UN • UNAMID 1; 4 obs
462 The Military Balance 2012
Ethiopia (ETH)
T-72 MBT c.200 εUS$100m UKR Ukrspec- 2011 n.k. -
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:22 13 March 2012
export
Ghana (GHA)
Chemle-class PC 2 n.k. PRC Poly 2008 2011 -
Technologies
n.k. PC 2 n.k. ROK n.k. n.k. 2013 -
DA42 MPP ISR ac 2 €11.75m CAN Diamond 2011 n.k. -
Aircraft
C-295 Tpt ac 2 n.k. ESP EADS (CASA) 2011 2011 First delivered Nov 2011
EMB-190 Tpt ac 1 US$105.3m BRZ Embraer 2011 n.k. Contract value includes cost of
hangar complex
Kenya (KEN)
n.k. APC 150 US$20m RSA OTT 2010 2011 -
Technologies
Mozambique (MOZ)
Conejera-class PB 1 EUR100 ESP Navantia 2011 2012 Excess defence article being sold for
token sum. Former Dragonera (P32)
Senegal (SEN)
Conejera-class PB 1 EUR100 ESP Navantia 2011 2012 Excess defence article being sold for
token sum. Former Conejera (P31)
Uganda (UGA)
Su-30MK2 FGA ac 6 n.k. Russia n.k. 2010 2011 Delivery under way
Chapter Ten
Country comparisons –
force levels and economics
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:07 06 August 2012
comparisons
Country
464 The Military Balance 2012
11–26 Aug 2011 RED FLAG- ALASKA 11-3 US Air interop ex n.k.
08–22 Sep 2011 BOLD QUEST US Combat identification AUS, BEL, DNK, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD, NOR,
ex POL, ESP, UK, US
Europe
04–17 Feb 2011 PROUD MANTA 2011 ITA ASW ex BEL, CAN, FRA, GER, GRC, ITA, ESP, TUR, UK, US
28 Feb–10 Mar 2011 NOBLE MARINER 11 ESP MAREX BEL, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD, NOR, POL, PRT, ESP,
UK, US
26–31 Mar 2011 n.k. TUR CT ex AFG, PAK, TUR
27–29 Mar 2011 NORTHERN FALCON 2011 Greenland Air transport ex DNK, UKR
04–08 Apr 2011 BALTIC HOST 2011 LTU CPX AUT, GER, DNK, FIN, FRA, NOR, POL,SWE, US
04–15 Apr 2011 VIKING 2011 SWE PKO ex AUT, GEO, GER, IRL, KAZ, NOR, UKR, SWE
22–26 Apr 2011 BLACKSEAFOR RUS NAVEX BLG, ROM, RUS, TUR, UKR
07–17 May 2011 POMOR 2011 NOR, RUS NAVEX NOR, RUS
11–17 May 2011 BOLD MERCY 2011 Baltic Sea SAREX DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, GER, LVA, LTU, POL, SWE,
UK
09–20 May 2011 NATO TIGER MEET 2011 FRA Air interop ex AUT, CHE, CZE, GER, GRC, FRA, ITA, POL, PRT,
ESP, SVK, TUR, UK
24 May–09 Jun 2011 ITALIAN CALL 2011 ITA Helo trg ex AUT, BEL, CZE, GER, SVN
30 May–10 Jun 2011 BOLD MONARCH 2011 ESP SMER ex FRA, GRC, ITA, NLD, NOR, POR, RUS, ESP, SWE,
TUR, UK, US
31 May–03 Jun 2011 ARGONAUT 2011 CYP CIMIC ex CYP, GRC, UK
01–15 Jun 2011 PHOENIX EXPRESS 2011 GRC (Crete) NAVEX ALB, ALG, CRO, EGY, GRC, ITA, MLT, MRT, MOR,
ESP, TUN, TUR, US
02–10 Jun 2011 NORTHERN VIKING ISL Air ex DNK, FIN, ITA, ISL, NOR, US
06–10 Jun 2011 VIGILANT SKIES 2011 RUS, POL, TUR CT air ex RUS, POL, TUR
13–24 Jun 2011 ANATOLIAN EAGLE 2011 TUR Air interop ex JOR, PAK, SAU, ESP, TUR, UAE, US
13–24 Jun 2011 AMBER HOPE 2011 LTU Crisis-response ex CAN, EST, GEO, FIN, LTU, LVA, NOR, POL, US,
15–16 Jun 2011 SEA BREEZE 2011 UKR NAVEX ALG, AZE, BEL, DNK, GEO, GER, FYROM, MDA,
SWE, TUR, UKR, UK, US
22–29 Jun 2011 SPANISH AMPHIB LANDING ESP PHIBLEX ESP, US
EXERCISE
22–29 Jun 2011 FLANDRES 2011 FRA Bde interop ex FRA, UK
23 Jun 2011 SAMAR DAUPHIN 2011 FRA SAREX FRA, ITA
Jun–Jul 2011 n.k. GRC Helo trg ex GRC, ISR
05–15 Jul 2011 n.k. BLR CT ex BLR, PRC
21–29 Jul 2011 SAFE SKY 2011 UKR Air ex POL, UKR, US
25 Jul–05 Aug 2011 RAPID TRIDENT 2011 UKR AB FTX BLR, CAN, EST, LVA, LTU, MDA, POL, SRB, SVN,
UK, UKR, US
01–14 Aug 2011 n.k. ROM Air ex ISR, ROM
19 Aug–03 Sep 2011 OPEN SPIRIT 2011 LVA Mine-clearing ex RUS, BEL, EST, FIN, FRA, GER, LVA, LTU, NOR,
POL
30 Aug–09 Sep 2011 COSSACK STEPPE 2011 UKR PKO ex UKR, POL
Country comparisons 465
2011
16–22 Sep 2011 UNION SHIELD 2011 RUS Combined forces ex RUS, BLR
19–27 Sep 2011 TSENTR-2011 RUS CSTO ex RUS, UKR, KAZ, BLR, KGZ, TJK
Asia
02–16 Jan 2011 AGNI WARRIOR IND Arty ex IND, SGP
27 Jan–3 Feb 2011 YAMA SAKURA JAP Guerrilla warfare ex US, JAP
03–18 Feb 2011 COBRA GOLD 2011 THA CPX, H/CA, FTX THA, SGP, JAP, IDN, ROK, MYS
28 Feb–11 Mar 2011 KEY RESOLVE/FOAL EAGLE ROK CPX, FTX ROK, US
01–29 Mar 2011 BOLD KURUKSHETRA IND Armd trg ex IND, SGP
08–12 Mar 2011 AMAN 2011 PAK NAVEX PAK, AUS, PRC, FRA, IDN, JAP, MYS, SAU, TUR,
LKA, UK, US
11–25 Mar 2011 SHAHEEN 1 PAK Interop ex PAK, PRC
18–25 Mar 2011 n.k. IND, SGP NAVEX IND, SGP
21 Mar–4 Aug 2011 PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP South Pacific HADR ex AUS, JPN, NZ, US
25 Mar–5 Apr 2011 MCMEX IDN, SGP NAVEX AUS, FRA, IND, IDN, MYS, NZL, ROK, SGP, THA,
US, VNM
25 Mar–5 Apr 2011 DIVEX IDN, SGP NAVEX AUS, FRA, IND, IDN, MYS, NZL, ROK, SGP, THA,
US, VNM
03–10 Apr 2011 MALABAR IND NAVEX US, IND
05–15 Apr 2011 BALIKATAN PHL HADR ex US, PHL
06–07 May 2011 TIANSHAN-II (2011) PRC SCO CT ex KGZ, PRC, TJK
02–13 May 2011 BERSAMA SHIELD 2011 MYS FPDA NAVEX MYS, NZL, SGP, UK
16–27 May 2011 ANGKOR SENTINEL 2011 CAM PKO ex US, IDN, MNG, NPL, CAM
20–25 May 2011 TERMINAL FURY US PACOM CPX, Cyber sy ex US
08–16 Jun 2011 HARINGAROO MYS Interop ex MYS, AUS
11 Jun 2011 n.k. IND NAVEX NZL, IND
20–29 Jun 2011 SHYGYS-2011 KAZ COMD, Staff and AIR ex KAZ, RUS
28 Jun–8 Jul 2011 CARAT PHL NAVEX US, PHL
01 Jul 2011 DENIZ ASLAN II PAK ASW ex PAK, TUR
10–13 Jul 2011 PELICAN SGP NAVEX SGP, BRN
comparisons
Turkey 13,531 10,883 17,445 179 142 224 1.85 1.77 2.38 511 379 102
United Kingdom 60,794 59,131 57,796 986 954 927 2.27 2.71 2.57 174 82 0
467
Country
comparisons
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:07 06 August 2012
Total 191,400 199,803 220,906 92 95 102 1.42 1.44 1.44 6,715 13,585 1,741
469
Country
comparisons
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:07 06 August 2012
Israel 14,772 13,516 14,043 2,077 1,868 1,910 7.33 6.91 6.46 177 565 8
Jordan 2,127 1,393 1,425 347 222 222 9.68 5.51 5.42 101 65 10
Kuwait 6,812 4,184 4,654 2,799 1,681 1,830 4.58 4.26 3.53 16 24 7
Lebanon 1,155 1,426 1,620 286 348 393 3.84 4.13 4.16 59 0 20
Libya 3 1,086 1,708 2,540 176 270 393 1.14 2.84 3.62 n.k. n.k. n.k.
Mauritania 119 115 107 39 37 34 3.36 3.80 3.02 16 0 5
Morocco 2,977 3,061 3,163 96 98 100 3.35 3.34 3.50 196 150 50
Oman 4,671 4,018 4,177 1,637 1,381 1,408 7.71 8.71 7.26 43 0 4
Palestinian Authority n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 0 56
Qatar 1,756 2,500 3,117 1,238 1,594 1,813 1.53 2.54 2.45 12 0 0
Saudi Arabia 38,223 41,276 45,170 1,534 1,630 1,755 8.01 10.98 10.10 234 0 16
Syria 1,941 2,229 2,296 91 102 103 3.69 4.15 3.94 295 314 108
Tunisia 534 532 535 52 51 51 1.19 1.22 1.22 36 0 12
UAE 13,733 7,957 16,057 2,972 1,658 3,227 4.36 3.55 5.32 51 0 0
Yemen 1,492 883 1,826 67 39 78 5.55 3.51 5.82 67 0 71
Total 111,286 107,694 126,598 332 291 337 4.66 5.09 5.01 2,671 2,097 1,534
Latin America and Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda 7 8 7 79 95 78 0.48 0.73 0.54 0 0 0
Argentina 2,031 2,352 2,999 50 57 73 0.62 0.76 0.82 73 0 31
Bahamas, The 49 49 47 161 160 152 0.59 0.67 0.62 1 0 0
Barbados 30 26 30 106 91 104 0.75 0.67 0.73 1 0 0
Belize n.k. 14 16 n.k. 44 52 n.k. 1.01 1.16 1 1 0
Table 34 International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower
Country
comparisons
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:07 06 August 2012
1
2010 figure includes Minstry of Defence funding but excludes other expenditures on public order and safety included in previous years.
2
‘Official Budget’ only at market exchange rates - excludes extra-budgetary funds.
3
Estimated figures.
4
Includes decentralised expenditures, such as civil defence and military pensions.
Country comparisons
Country
comparisons
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:07 06 August 2012
Table 35 Arms Deliveries to Table 36 Arms Transfer Agree Table 37 Global Arms Table 38 Global Arms Transfer
474
Developing Nations ments with Developing Nations Deliveries Leading Suppliers Agreements Leading Suppliers
Leading Recipients in 2010 Leading Recipients in 2010 in 2010 in 2010
(current US$m) (current US$m) (current US$m) (current US$m)
1 India 3,600 1 India 5,800 1 United States 12,189 1 United States 21,255
2 Saudi Arabia 2,200 2 Taiwan 2,700 2 Russia 5,200 2 Russia 7,800
3 Pakistan 2,200 3 Saudi Arabia 2,200 3 Germany 2,600 3 Israel 2,000
4 UK 2,300 4 Italy 1,800
4 Egypt 900 4 Egypt 1,800
5 China 2,200 5 United Kingdom 1,400
5 Algeria 900 5 Israel 1,100
6 France 1,400 6 France 1,300
6 Israel 700 6 Algeria 1,000
7 Sweden 1,300 7 China 900
7 Taiwan 700 7 Syria 1,000
The Military Balance 2012
8 Canada 1,200
8 UAE 600 8 South Korea 900 8 Sweden 700
9 Israel 1,100
Singapore 800 9 Spain 700
9 South Korea 600 9 10 Italy 900
Jordan 800 10 Netherlands 500
10 Iraq 600 10 11 Brazil 500
11 Finland 300
Table 39 Value of Global Arms Transfer Agreements and Market Share by Supplier, 2003–10 (constant 2010US$m – % in italics)
Total Russia US UK France Germany Italy All Other European China Others
2003 38,308 6,437 16.6 17,437 45.5 3,662 9.6 3,418 8.9 854 2.2 732 1.9 2,807 7.3 732 1.9 2,319 6
2004 49,420 9,701 19.6 14,640 29.7 4,969 10 3,431 6.9 4,732 9.6 473 1 6,388 13 1,183 2.4 3,904 7.9
2005 52,607 10,227 19.4 14,311 27.2 3,295 6.3 6,705 12.7 2,273 4.3 1,818 3.4 8,636 16.4 3,182 6 2,159 4.1
2006 62,849 16,352 26.2 16,975 27.1 4,500 7.2 8,450 13.4 3,073 4.9 1,317 2.1 6,146 9.8 2,085 3.3 3,951 6.3
2007 64,909 10,997 17 25,511 39.3 10,143 15.6 2,242 3.4 1,815 2.8 1,495 2.3 7,047 10.9 2,883 4.4 2,776 4.3
2008 69,251 6,830 9.9 37,998 54.9 310 0.4 3,622 5.2 5,692 8.2 4,450 6.4 5,485 7.9 2,173 3.1 2,691 3.9
2009 65,218 12,805 19.6 22,637 34.7 1,524 2.3 8,232 12.6 4,268 6.5 3,049 4.7 7,215 11.1 2,134 3.3 3,354 5.1
2010 40,355 7,800 19.3 21,255 52.7 1,400 3.4 1,300 3.2 100 0.2 1,800 4.4 3,300 8.2 900 2.2 2,500 6.2
Table 40 Value of Global Arms Deliveries and Market Share by Supplier, 2003–10 (constant 2010US$m – % in italics)
Total Russia US UK France Germany Italy All Other European China Others
2003 41,676 5,126 12.3 13,237 31.8 8,300 19.9 2,929 7 3,051 7.3 488 1.2 4,638 11.1 976 2.3 2,929 7
2004 41,185 6,625 16.1 13,740 33.4 3,786 9.2 6,625 16.1 2,366 5.7 237 0.6 2,839 6.9 1,065 2.6 3,904 9.5
2005 34,744 3,750 10.8 13,381 38.5 4,205 12.1 3,068 8.9 2,159 6.2 1,136 3.2 3,523 10.1 1,250 3.6 2,273 6.5
2006 38,982 6,914 17.7 13,521 34.7 5,378 13.8 1,975 5.1 2,634 6.8 439 1.1 4,061 10.4 1,646 4.2 2,414 6.2
2007 37,485 5,552 14.8 13,141 35.1 2,349 6.3 2,562 6.8 3,203 8.5 747 1.2 4,484 12 2,135 5.7 3,310 8.8
2008 37,486 6,416 17.1 12,339 33 2,277 6.1 1,656 4.4 3,829 10.2 621 1.7 5,174 13.8 1,966 5.2 3,208 8.6
2009 38,013 4,268 11.2 14,538 38.2 2,541 6.7 1,321 3.5 2,947 7.7 813 2.1 5,589 14.7 1,728 4.5 4,268 11.2
2010 34,989 5,200 14.9 12,189 34.9 2,300 6.6 1,400 4 2,600 7.4 900 2.6 3,900 11.1 2,200 6.3 4,300 12.3
US DoD Price Deflator. All data rounded to nearest $100m. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms
Transfers to Developing Nations 2003-2010 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service)
Country comparisons 475
Table 41 Arms Deliveries to Middle East and North Africa, by Supplier, 2003–10
(current US$m)
Major West All other
2003-2006 US Russia China European* European Others Total
Algeria 200 100 300
Bahrain 300 100 400
Egypt 6,300 200 500 100 300 7,400
Iran 300 200 100 200 800
Iraq 100 300 100 500
Israel 5,300 100 5,400
Jordan 400 100 100 600
Kuwait 1,100 200 1,300
Downloaded by [Ohio State University Libraries] at 05:07 06 August 2012
Lebanon -
Libya 100 100 200
Morocco 100 100 100 100 400
Oman 500 300 800
Qatar -
Saudi Arabia 4,200 200 15,400 400 100 20,300
Syria 400 200 200 800
Tunisia -
UAE 500 200 5,500 300 6,500
Yemen 400 200 100 700
2007-2010
Algeria 3,600 400 200 4,200
Bahrain 300 300
Egypt 4,000 200 200 300 4,700
Iran 400 100 200 700
Iraq 2,000 100 100 300 100 2,600
Israel 4,500 300 100 4,900
Jordan 900 100 100 100 100 1,300
Kuwait 1,300 1,300
Lebanon 100 100
Libya 100 300 100 500
Morocco 200 100 300 100 100 800
Oman 300 500 800
Qatar 100 100
Saudi Arabia 5,300 700 2,200 400 100 8,700
Syria 1,200 300 200 1,700
comparisons
Country
Tunisia -
UAE 900 400 100 400 300 2,100
Yemen 200 200 100 500
476
The Military Balance 2012
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
2 May 2011. Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri took over as leader; he is also thought to be in Pakistan. Junior members
are believed to hide in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they are constantly targeted by US UAVs. AQ has cells
worldwide and provides a rallying point for other global jihadis. Training: Before the 2001 US invasion, AQ
openly operated training camps in Afghanistan (and Pakistan), also inviting foreigners. The group has kept a
low profile since, generally helping to plan other terrorist groups’ operations. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, mines
AFG Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) 5,000– AFG, PAK Organisation: This faction of the Hizb-e-Islami party is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who promotes an
7,000 extreme anti-Western ideology and aims to overthrow the current Afghan administration in favour of an
Islamic state. Among the most effective Mujahadeen to fight against the Soviet occuption of Afghanistan,
HIG has connections with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Weapons: SALW, rockets, IEDs, mines
PAK/ Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT)/Jamaat- 2,000+ PAK (Muridke, Organisation: LeT is the military wing of a Punjab-based political organisation commanded by Hafiz
AFG (Kunar) ud-Dawa (JuD) fighters in Lahore), IND Muhammad Saeed. Originally fighting against Indian control of Kashmir, it is blamed for several deadly
J&K, JuD (Jammu & attacks in India, including the 2008 mass shootings in Mumbai and a 2005 bomb attack in Delhi. Although
ca 150,000 Kashmir), AFG banned by Islamabad in 2002, it continues to operate from Pakistani soil. It has close ties with al-Qaeda,
members LKA, NPL, OMA, whose movement into Pakistan it is thought to have facilitated. Training: Operates 12 militant training
Maldives, BGD, US camps and 31 ‘communication control stations’. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, arty (mor), explosives, mines
PAK (FATA Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)/ 20,000– PAK (FATA Organisation: The TTP is an umbrella organisation claiming to represent 40 Pakistani Taliban groups from
& KP) Pakistani Taliban 25,000 and Khyber all seven tribal areas of FATA and several Khyber Pakhtunkhwa districts. It operates out of FATA with a
Pakhtunkhwa), stronghold in South Waziristan, and has close links with al-Qaeda, while offering allegiance to the Afghan
AFG, Middle East Taliban’s Mullah Omar. The TTP’s current leader is Hakimullah Mehsud, who controls the groups operating
and Chechnya out of FATA. TTP fighters operate in groups of 4–15 and use classic guerrilla tactics: sniper fire, roadside
bombs and ambushes. Training: Most TTP members are trained in explosives handling in South Waziristan.
Weapons: SALW, RL, IEDs, suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), mines
AFG/PAK Haqqani Network 5,000– AFG, PAK ( North Organisation: Based in Miranshah, North Waziristan, and led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, this group is thought
7,000 Waziristan) to be behind many high-profile attacks in Afghanistan in recent years: from the attempted assassination of
President Hamid Karzai, the Kabul Serena Hotel attack and assault on the Indian embassy in 2008, to the
Non-State Groups and Affiliates
2009 siege of a UN guesthouse and 2011 rocket attack on the US embassy. Alleged to have close ties with
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, the network also has connections with Arab fighters, its
main financiers. Training: Al-Qaeda and other groups still provide suicide training. The network previously
477
set up training camps and bomb-making factories in North Waziristan. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, MANPATS
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
Origin Strength
PAK Harkat ul-Mujahedin (HuM) 400 PAK (Muzaffara- Organisation: The radical Islamist ‘Movement of Holy Warriors’ seeks to install Pakistani rule in Indian-
bad, Rawalpindi), controlled Kashmir, where it focuses its operations. Its methods include hijacking, as well as the kidnap and
AFG, IND (south execution of foreigners and Indian officials. US interests are also considered legitimate targets. A breakaway
Kashmir and from Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami, HuM was also once known as Harkat-ul-Ansar. It was involved in forming
Doda regions) Jaysh-e-Mohammad (see below). Training: HuM had training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan before
2001. The group has allegedly been trained by Pakistan’s ISI. Weapons: SALW, arty (mor, rockets), explosives
IND Communist Party of India– 20,000+ IND Organisation: Agitating for the rights of India’s landless poor, the Naxal movement harks back to a peasant
Maoist (CPI–Maoist)/Naxalites uprising in West Bengal in 1967. But violence surged after 2004 when a merger of the People’s War Group
and Maoist Communist Centre formed the the CPI–Maoist. In 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called
the group ‘India’s biggest internal security threat’. Muppaala Lakshmana Rao (‘Ganapati’) is current general
secretary. Training: Guerrilla warfare training in remote villages and forests. Weapons: SALW, mines, IEDs
IND United Liberation Front of Asom 3,000 IND (Assam) Organisation: Although the most sophisticated insurgent group in Assam, the ULFA has been weakened
The Military Balance 2012
(ULFA) by counter-insurgency offensives, internal splits and declining popular support. Founder and current leader
Paresh Baruah lives near the Sino-Burmese border. Several militants are believed to be in China’s Yunnan
province and in Bangladesh. Weapons: SALW, arty, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
IND/PAK Jaysh-e-Mohammad (JeM)/ 500–700 IND (Jammu & Organisation: JeM’s founding aim was to overthrow Indian rule in Kashmir, but it is now in active opposition
Army of Mohammad/Khudam- Kashmir) PAK, to the Pakistani state. Led by Mufti Adbul Rauf, it has ties with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. JEM was involved in
ul-Islam/Tehrik-ul-Furqaan/JeM AFG, BGD attacks on former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Training: JeM allegedly received training from the
Eastern Command ISI. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, IEDs
Table 42 Non-State Groups and Affiliates
PAK Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (MTT)/ 13,000 PAK (North & Organisation: Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar created the MTT in 2008 as a distinct local group from
Local Taliban Movement/ South Waziristan, the TTP. Having ties with the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda and the TTP, it operates under
North Waziristan Taliban/Waziri other parts of the general Taliban banner from the FATA region. Training: Training and support from al-Qaeda, and the
Alliance FATA) Haqqani Network in the Waziristan region. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, IEDs
PAK Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) 3,000+ PAK, AFG Organisation: Integrated unwillingly into Pakistan in 1947, ethnic Baluch are waging their fifth revolt against
Islamabad. The BLA emerged in 2000, five years before the latest round of serious fighting began, with the
stated aim of founding an independent pan-Baluch state across Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The death of
leader Akbar Khan Bugti, a 79-year-old Bugti tribal chief and former Baluchistan chief minister, in a Pakistani
air strike in 2006 only worsened the violence. Bugti’s son became commander. Training: Some allege the
BLA is trained in Afghanistan by Indian intelligence agents. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, AT mines, IEDs
PAK Baluch Republican Army (BRA) not PAK Organisation: Little is known about this group, which first came to public attention in 2007, although it
known maintains a website on which it regularly catalogues attacks on security forces and Baluchistan’s extensive
gas industry.
PAK Baluch Liberation United Front not PAK Organisation: This previously unknown group made news in 2009 when it kidnapped United Nations official
(BLUF) known John Solecki, an American citizen, in Quetta.
PAK Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) 300 PAK (Peshawar, Organisation: LeJ was formed in 1996 when Riaz Basra and Akram Lahori broke away from Sipah-e-Sahaba
Rawalpindi, (see following entry), which they accused of deviating from its founding goal of countering Shia influence in
Karachi), IRN; Pakistan. Since then LeJ has gained a reputation for extreme violence: killing hundreds of Shias, perpetrating
sleeper cells in car and truck bombings, and attempting high-profile assassinations. The group has small independent
AUS, FRA, IND, cells of 5–8 fighters each. Training: LeJ’s training camp in Sarobi, Afghanistan, was destroyed after the US
SGP, UK, US invasion in October 2001. Pakistani camps in Muridke and Kabirwal have also been closed. Weapons: SALW
PAK Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)/ 3,000– PAK (southern Organisation: This Sunni group was founded in the early 1980s on a platform of limiting Shia influence
Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan/ 6,000 Punjab, Karachi); in Pakistan after the Islamic Revolution in neighbouring Iran in 1979. Formerly registered as a Pakistani
Army of Prophet Mohammad’s transnational political party, SSP was banned in 2002, after which it adopted the name Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat. The group
companions/Ahle Sunnat Wal is believed to provide fighters to the TTP and to have ties with al-Qaeda. Training: Many SSP cadres have
Jamaat received arms training from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Some are also reported to have been trained by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Weapons: SALW, IEDs
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
Origin Strength
PHL Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 350–400 PHL (south) Organisation: Extortion and kidnap-for-ransom are trademark activities of this loosely based, clan-centred
group. However, its stated goal is an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines, and US military
personnel are a favourite target. In 2004, it was responsible for the deadliest terrorist act in Philippines
history: a ferry bombing near Manila in which 116 were killed. After key jihadis were expelled from Mindanao
in 2005, ASG’s main presence has been on the Sulu Archipelago. Training: Early ASG members are thought
to have trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, although links between the two diminished after 9/11.
Weapons: SALW, IEDs, arty (mor), explosives
THA/MAL Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 60–80 THA (south), MAL Organisation: One of the insurgent groups lobbying for independence for the predominantly Malay Muslim
provinces of Thailand’s south, especially Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. (Songkhla is less and Satun is not
affected by insurgency.) BRN Coordinate is the political wing in Malaysia; BRN Congress, chaired by Rosa
Burako, runs the Thai military campaign. Weapons: SALW
THA Pattani Islamic Mujahideen 150 THA (south) Organisation: Reports suggest that this group is now part of PULO (see following entry)
The Military Balance 2012
Movement/Gerakan Mujahideen
Islam Pattani (GMIP)
THA, SAU Pattani United Liberation 100 THA Organisation: The main separatist movement in Thailand’s predominantly Malay Muslim southern border
Organisation (PULO) region, PULO targets symbols and officials of the government in Bangkok – from military police to teachers
and civil servants. Officially founded in Saudi Arabia in 1968, the group split into factions before reunifying in
2005. Since 2009, PULO has been led by Nur Abdur Rahman. Training: Some leaders were reportedly trained
in Syria and Libya in the 1980s. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, possibly bombs
Table 42 Non-State Groups and Affiliates
THA Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) 500 THA (south) Organisation: Closely cooperating with PULO and BRN are RKK (small patrol groups). Training: Weapons-
handling, bomb making, unarmed combat and sharp shooting. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, IEDs
Middle East and North Africa
ALG Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 300 ALG, MLI, MRT, Organisation: AQIM resulted from the decision by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) to
(AQIM) NER align itself with al-Qaeda in late 2006/early 2007. The group operates and recruits throughout the Maghreb.
It has been implicated in drugs running and kidnapping, and its presence prompted the relocation of the
Dakar Rally to South America. Abu Musab Adbel is the group’s current leader. AQIM is accused of establishing
terrorist cells in FRA, ITA, NLD, POR, ESP. Training: Most main leaders are believed to have trained in AQ
camps in Afghanistan. Weapons: SALW, arty (mor), SAM, IEDs, AAA
IRN Jundallah (Soldiers of God)/ ≤600 IRN (Baluchistan), Organisation: Based in Iran’s impoverished southeast province of Sistan and Baluchistan, this group claims
Jund Allah/Jundollah/People’s (1,000 AFG, PAK to fight for the rights of the Sunni Baluch people in the Shia-dominated Islamic Republic. It has been
Resistance Movement of Iran fighters) accused of shootings, suicide bombings and narco-trafficking and having a separatist agenda for Sistan and
(PRMI) Baluchistan. Muhammad Dharir Baluch became leader in October 2011. Training: Some members received
training in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where there are other Baluch communities. Weapons: SALW, IEDs
IRQ Al-Qaeda in Iraq/Tanzim Qa’idat 1,000+ IRQ, JOR Organisation: This mainly Sunni organisation based around the city of Mosul emerged out of the Ansar-e-
al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn/ (AQI) Islam terrorist group around 2003/4. Under leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, it conducted major attacks against
Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two 1,000+ Shia civilians and holy sites. After he was killed in 2006, AQI created an umbrella Mujahideen Shura Council
Rivers. (Islamic (MSC) to unify Sunni insurgents, but this did not prevent offshoots such as the Islamic State of Iraq, Islamic
State of Army of Iraq and 1920 Revolution Brigades. Meanwhile, Sunni tribal leaders began to cooperate with the
Iraq) US against AQI, leading to the Sunni Awakening. By 2010, 80% of AQI leaders had been killed or captured,
or had left Iraq. Abu Dua became chief of the disorganised, albeit active rump in 2011. Training: Reports
suggest AQI has new training bases on the desert border with Syria. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, MANPADs
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
Hadramaut, caliphate. Before he was killed by a UAV strike in September 2011, prominent AQAP leader Anwar al-Awlaki
Mahrib, Shabwa) inspired attacks overseas, including the mass shooting at the Fort Hood military base in Texas, and the
SAU, QAT, SOM attempted Christmas Day bombing of an airliner over Detroit, both in 2009. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, IEDs
YEM, SAU Al-Houthi Rebels/Shabab al- 7,000– YEM (north) and Organisation: Yemen’s fight against the al-Houthi clan and its militant wing, the ‘Believing Youth’, began in
Muomineen (Believing Youth) 10,000 SAU (south) 2004 when arresting officers killed former MP Hussein al-Houthi, an outspoken critic of US involvement in
fighters, Yemen. The fallout from his death sparked a full-scale insurgency. Despite two ceasefires, the Houthis were
10,000– still inflicting mass casualties on security forces in late 2010. But in early 2012 they formed a political party,
120,000 seeking participation in the changes wrought by the Arab Awakening. Training: Hizbullah has provided
followers training. No independent evidence exists of alleged Iranian instruction. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, IEDs
YEM Southern secessionist not YEM Organisation: The independence movement in the former People’s Democratic Republic of South Yemen
movement known is driven by southerners’ belief that they have become second-class citizens in a unified Yemen. Weapons:
SALW, RPGs
PT Hamas (Islamic Resistance 20,000 ISR, PT Organisation: The largest Palestinian militant Islamist group, Hamas was formed in 1987 at the start of
Movement)/Izz al-Din al-Qassam the first intifada (uprising) against Israel’s occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. Dedicated to Israel’s
Brigades (IDQ) destruction, it has been designated a terrorist group by the US and EU. But many Palestinians view it as
a legitimate resistance, and in 2006 it won Palestinian parliamentary elections, leading to negotiations
with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) over a unity government. In 2007, though, Hamas overthrew
the PA in Gaza and seized control of the strip. Even after Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in 2008/2009, Hamas
has continued to fire rockets at Israel from Gaza. Its military wing, Iz al-Din al-Qassam, is seen as its most
disciplined force. In early 2012, the group’s Damascus-based leader, Khaled Meshal, stepped down after
16 years at the helm. Training: Palestinian sources say Iz al-Din troops undergo rigorous military and
ideological training. Six months of basic training include live-fire exercises using arty rockets, mortars and
AT systems, plus urban-warfare training and live-fire FIBUA assault exercises. Some instructors trained in Iran
and Lebanon. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, MANPADS, MANPATs, arty rockets
PT Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AMB) several ISR, PT Organisation: This network of Palestinian militant groups emerged in 2000 at the outset of the second
Non-State Groups and Affiliates
hundred Palestinian ‘Al-Aqsa’ intifada. Loyal to the secular-nationalist Fatah party, it first focused on Israeli targets
in the West Bank and Gaza, but became more radical over time. In 2004, it threatened to break with Fatah
during a payments dispute. Marwan Baghouti leads the AMB. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, suicide bombs
481
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
Origin Strength
Latin America
BRZ Primeiro Comando da Capital 12,000+ BRZ (São Paulo) Organisation: This criminal group relies on a vast prison network of cells with connections in the favelas
(PCC) (slums). Training: Includes urban guerrilla. Weapons: SALW.
BRZ Comando Vermelho (CV)/Red not BRZ (Rio de Organisation: The CV has become an umbrella group for semi-autonomous criminal gangs headed by
Commandos known Janeiro) individual chiefs. CV was originally composed of ordinary convicts and left-wing political prisoners who were
members of the Falange Vermelha (Red Phalanx), and fought the military dictatorship. CV dominates 40% of
Brazilian drug trafficking. Training: Includes urban guerrilla techniques. Weapons: SALW
COL Ejército de Liberación Nacional 1,300+ COL (Northeast Organisation: Founded in 1963, the ELN is a left-wing guerrilla group that mainly operates in northeastern
(ELN)/National Liberation Army and Southwest) Colombia. It reached the height of its power in the late 1990s with a wave of kidnappings and bomb attacks,
but has since been weakened by the government’s security crackdown, battles with right-wing paramilitaries
and competition with FARC. It is increasingly reliant on drug trafficking for its income. It is headed by Nicolás
The Military Balance 2012
Rodríguez Bautista (‘Gabino’). Training: Members received training on how to use explosives, mines, sniper,
special operations and guerrilla combat. Weapons: IEDs, SALW, mines
COL Fuerzas Armadas 9,000+ COL; presence in Organisation: Originally established as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, and then
Revolucionarias de Colombia ECU, VEN a left-wing insurgency, FARC today is better known as a drug-trafficking and criminal group. It has an
(FARC)/Revolutionary Armed extensive civilian support network and enjoys complex business relationships with other drug trafficking
Forces of Colombia and criminal gangs. It makes frequent use of the territory of neighbouring countries and maintains relations
with a range of international non-state and sometimes state actors. Apart from a number of mobile
columns, FARC’s basic unit is the ‘front’, a tactical grouping of 50–300 operatives (roughly equivalent to a
Table 42 Non-State Groups and Affiliates
Western light infantry company) linked to a fixed area and comprised of squads (12 operatives), guerrillas
(2 squads) and companies (about 50 operatives). Overall 60–70 of these currently exist, although some are
now undermanned. All of the columns and fronts across the country are organised in five blocs and two
joint commands. The leadership of the group as a whole is comprised by a seven-man Secretariat, with each
member exercising supervision of a particular bloc or joint command, and a Central General Staff (the Estado
Mayor Central or EMC). The EMC theoretically comprises the highest decision-making body at conferences
and plenaries, but the Secretariat is in charge of the group in between these events (which now rarely take
place) and in practice holds supreme authority. Training: all operatives given basic training in explosives
and guerrilla warfare. Special units trained in kidnapping, advanced bomb-making, sniping, intelligence-
gathering. Long history of technical exchange with foreign terrorist organisations including PIRA and
ETA. Weapons: SALW, IEDs and mines, artisanal arty, self-propelled semi-submersible vessels for maritime
trafficking
COL Bandas emergentes en 4,000+ COL Organisation: BACRIM is a label for medium to large criminal gangs bringing together drug traffickers with
Colombia/Bandas Criminales former members of right-wing paramilitaries such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC).
(BACRIM) Two of the most powerful BACRIM are the Rastrojos (estimated membership of 2,000) and the Urabeños
(about 1,300 strong). Training: Members receive training in explosives, special operations and anti-guerrilla
combat. Weapons: IEDs, SALW
MEX Sinaloa Cartel not MEX (Sinaloa, Organisation: Arising from a region where peasant farmers turned to lucrative opium crops, the Sinaloa
known Sonora, Baja Cartel remains Mexico’s most powerful and cohesive drugs cartel. Cells have been deployed in the US,
California), COL, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and more recently Colombia and Peru. In the first half of 2011, three key
NIC, PER, SLV, US leaders were captured or killed: Jesus Raul Ochoa, Bruno (‘El Gato’ ) Garcia and Martin (‘El Aguila’) Beltran.
However, leader Joaquin (‘El Chapo’) Guzman Loera remains at large. Weapons: SALW
MEX Gulf Cartel not MEX, BOL, COL, Organisation: One of the oldest and most powerful of Mexico’s criminal groups, working with Colombian
known PER, US, West suppliers to move drugs north from its main base in Tamaulipas state, this cartel has been losing territory
Africa and influence recently. In May 2011, leader Garcia (‘El Choche’) Trujillo was captured. Weapons: SALW.
MEX Los Negros not MEX Formed in 2003 as the armed enforcers of the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Negros switched its alliance to the Beltrán-
known Leyva Cartel, before going independent in 2010. Weapons: SALW
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
River Valley (VRAE) to the south, and the other in Alto Huallaga to the north – used profits from the cocaine
trade to rebuild. However, in December 2011 Comrade Artemio, the northern group’s leader, admitted defeat
and said he was ready to begin peace talks with the government. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS
Sub-Saharan Africa
DRC/RWA Forces Démocratiques de 8,000+ DRC (North Organisation: These Rwandan Hutu fighters are remnants of the ‘Interahamwe’ militias that targeted Tutsis
Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and South Kivu, and moderate Hutus during the 1994 Rwandan genocide: they fled to the DRC after Tutsis came to power
Katanga) in Kigali at the end of that conflict. Today, the FDLR’s official aim is to unseat the Tutsi-led government in
neighbouring Rwanda. However, it also preys on Congolese civilians and has close links with Mai Mai militias
. Training: Some received training in Rwanda before they were forced to leave. Weapons: SALW
DRC/RWA Mai-Mai militias 20,000+ DRC, RWA Organisation: This loose confederation of militias operating in the DRC includes such groups as the Alliance
pour la Resistance Democratique (ARD), the Popular Self-Defence Forces (FAP) and Mudundu 40. Weapons:
SALW
NGA Movement for the Emancipation 1,600 NGA (Niger Delta) Organisation: This loose coalition of armed groups emerged in 2006 demanding that more of the wealth
of the Niger Delta (MEND) generated by the Niger Delta’s oil industry go to local people. While an amnesty for its top leaders in
2009 led to a substantial decline in its activities, MEND-affiliated groups have since resumed bombing oil
infrastructure and kidnapping workers in the industry. Weapons: SALW, AAA, VBIEDs
NGA Boko Haram not NGA (northern Organisation: These militants from Nigeria’s impoverished Muslim north have called for the establishment
known and central of Sharia law and led a revolt against the government’s perceived southern bias and repressive security
states) forces. Although established in 2002, the group only began its violent campaign in 2009. A series of
killings and spectacular bomb attacks led President Goodluck Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in
December 2011. Training: Some training alleged at camps in Burkina Faso, Niger and Somalia by al-Qaeda
sympathisers. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, suicide bombs
Non-State Groups and Affiliates
483
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
Origin Strength
SOM Al-Shabaab (AS)/Mujahideen 7,000– SOM (particularly Organisation: Al-Shabaab, meaning ‘the youth’ emerged out of the Islamic Courts Union towards the end of
Youth Movement (MYM) Hizbul 9,000 Mogadishu the last decade and now controls much of southern Somalia. Initially, this Islamist militant group focused on
Shabaab (The Youth) and southern its domestic struggle with Somalia’s weak, Western-backed interim government. However, in 2009 it began
Somalia), KEN to align itself with al-Qaeda. In July 2010, the group showed that it could strike abroad with twin bombings
in Uganda. More recently it has been linked to the pirate groups operating off Somalia’s coastline. Training:
Al-Qaeda allegedly provide training and equipment. Pirate groups active in Somalia also provide access to
weaponry and training. Weapons: SALW, MANPATS, mines, IEDs, MANPADS, arty, small boats
SOM Somali Marines not SOM Training: Believed provided by al-Shabaab. Weapons: SALW, MANPADS, IEDs, arty, MANPATS, mines and
known other explosives
SOM Puntland Group not SOM (Puntland) Organisation: Loose organisation ostentibly of Somali fishermen. Training: Believed provided by al-
known Shabaab. Weapons: SALW, IEDs, arty, MANPATS, mines and other explosives
The Military Balance 2012
SOM Marka Pirate Group not SOM (Marka) Organisation: Led by Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad. Consists of several scattered, ill-organised groups.
known Training: Believed provided by al-Shabaab. Weapons: SALW, MANPADS, MANPATS, IEDs, arty, mines and
other explosives
SOM National Volunteer Coast Guard 50+ SOM (Kismaayo, Organisation: Bases in Hoomboy and El Dere. Believed to have close alliance with al-Shabaab and generally
(NVCG)/Kismaayo pirate group Puntland, operate as security units (28 pers) and attack units (12 pers). Training: Al-Shabaab and other foreign
Somaliland), KEN instructors may be providing combat training to the group. Weapons: SALW, MANPADs, MANPATS, IEDs, arty,
small boats, mines and other explosives
Table 42 Non-State Groups and Affiliates
SOM Harardheere pirate group 50+ SOM Weapons: SALW, MANPADS, MANPATS, IEDs, arty, small boats, mines and other explosives
(Harardheere)
SDN Janjaweed militia 20,000 SDN (Darfur) Organisation: Drawn from nomadic mainly Arab tribes in Sudan’s west, this violent militia was responsible
in the early twenty-first century for hit-and-run attacks on horseback on Darfuri villages. Its attacks focused
on Fur, Tunjur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups presumed to be sympathetic to rebels opposing the
government in Khartoum, leading to allegations that the Janjaweed was backed by Khartoum and was
perpetrating genocide against black Africans (which some observers dispute). Training: Allegedly provided
by the Sudanese and Eritrean governments. Main camp in Misteria, North Darfur. Weapons: SALW
SDN Justice and Equality Movement Up to SDN (Darfur) Organisation: This Islamist rebel group has been a major actor in the Darfur conflict, seeking to topple the
(JEM) 5,000 government and end inequality between the country’s north and other regions. It launched its first attack on
Khartoum in 2008 and is now believed to be mainly based in North Kordofan state. Leader Khalil Ibrahim was
killed in December 2011. Training: Military training provided by the Ugandan government outside Kampala
Weapons: SALW, crew-served weapons, at least two tanks seized from the government
SDN Sudan Liberation Movement 4,000 SDN (Darfur) Organisation: Emerging out of tribal self-defence militia in the late 1980s, this rebel group originally called
(SLM) for the creation of a united democratic Sudan. In 2006, it split into two major factions – North (SPLM–N),
and South Kordofan (SPLM–SK) – after disagreement over the Darfur Peace Agreement. In November 2011,
both factions, along with JEM, formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) to oppose the government of
President Omar al-Bashir and create a liberal, secular country. Training: Most recruits are former government
militiamen. Weapons: SALW
UGA Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1,500+ DRC, UGA, (Gulu, Organisation: Infamous for its night-time kidnapping of child fighters, the LRA emerged in Uganda in the
Kitgum), CAR, late 1980s. Led by the demagogic Joseph Kony, the group has terrorised civilians as its small ‘brigades’ of
SDN 10–20 fighters have spread from Uganda to the DRC, CAR and South Sudan. Since UPDF attacks on the main
LRA bases in northeastern DRC in 2008, LRA commanders have become more autonomous, some with their
own satellite militias. Training: Khartoum is alleged to provide training and support. Weapons: SALW, anti-
personnel mines, anti-tank mines
Part two
Explanatory Notes
The Military Balance is updated each year to provide an The data presented each year reflect judgements based
accurate assessment of the military forces and defence on information available to the IISS at the time the book
expenditures of 171 countries and territories. Each edition is compiled. Where information differs from previous
contributes to the provision of a unique compilation of editions, this is mainly because of changes in national
data and information, enabling the reader to discern trends forces, but it is sometimes because the IISS has reassessed
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
through the examination of editions as far back as 1959. the evidence supporting past entries. Given this, care must
The data in the current edition are accurate according to be taken in constructing time-series comparisons from
IISS assessments as at November 2011, unless specified. information given in successive editions.
Inclusion of a territory, country or state in The Military
Balance does not imply legal recognition or indicate support
ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
for any government.
The large quantity of data in The Military Balance has
General arrangement and been compressed into a portable volume by the extensive
contents employment of abbreviations. An essential tool is therefore
The Editor’s Foreword contains a summary of the book the list of abbreviations for data sections, which appears
and general comment on defence matters. on page 495. The abbreviations may be either singular or
Part I of The Military Balance comprises the regional plural; for example, ‘elm’ means ‘element’ or ‘elements’.
trends, military capabilities and defence economics data for The qualification ‘some’ is used to indicate that while the
countries grouped by region. Thus North America includes IISS assesses that a country maintains a capability, a precise
the US and Canada. Regional groupings are preceded by inventory is unavailable at time of press. ‘About’ means the
a short introduction describing the military issues facing total could be higher than given. In financial data, ‘$’ refers
the region. Essays at the front of the book analyse impor- to US dollars unless otherwise stated; billion (bn) signifies
tant defence trends or debates. Tables analyse aspects of 1,000 million (m).
defence activity including salient comparative analyses, Within the country entries, a number of caveats are
selected major training exercises, international defence employed to aid the reader in assessing military capabili-
expenditure and the international arms trade. ties. The * symbol is used to denote aircraft counted by the
Part II comprises reference material. IISS as combat capable (see ‘Air Forces’, below); † is used
Maps include selected deployments in Afghanistan, the when the IISS assesses that the serviceability of equipment
war in Libya, the military response to Japan’s March 2011 is in doubt; and ‡ is used to denote equipment judged
earthquake and tsunami, and Arctic security issues. obsolescent (weapons whose basic design is more than
The loose Chart of Conflict is updated for 2011 to show four decades old and which have not been significantly
data on recent and current armed conflicts. upgraded within the past decade); these latter two quali-
tative judgements should not be taken to imply that such
Using The Military Balance equipment cannot be used.
The country entries in The Military Balance are an assess-
ment of the personnel strengths and equipment holdings COUNTRY ENTRIES
of the world’s armed forces. Qualitative assessment is
enabled by relating data, both quantitative and economic, Information on each country is shown in a standard
to textual comment, as well as through close reference format, although the differing availability of information
to qualitative judgements applied to inventory data. The and differences in nomenclature result in some variations.
strengths of forces and the numbers of weapons held are Country entries include economic, demographic and mili-
Reference
based on the most accurate data available or, failing that, tary data. Population figures are based on demographic
on the best estimate that can be made. In estimating a statistics taken from the US Census Bureau. Data on
country’s total capabilities, old equipment may be counted ethnic and religious minorities are also provided in some
where it is considered that it may still be deployable. country entries. Military data include manpower, length
486 The Military Balance 2012
of conscript service where relevant, outline organisation, parity (PPP) rate is used in preference to official or market
number of formations and units and an inventory of the exchange rates and this is indicated in each case.
major equipment of each service. Details of national forces
stationed abroad and of foreign forces stationed within the Definitions of terms
given country are also provided. Despite efforts by NATO and the UN to develop a stan-
dardised definition of military expenditure, many coun-
Arms ProcurementS AND DELIVERIES tries prefer to use their own definitions (which are often
not made public). In order to present a comprehensive
Tables at the end of the regional texts show selected arms picture, The Military Balance lists three different measures
procurements (contracts and, in selected cases, major of military-related spending data.
development programmes that may not yet be at contract
stage) and deliveries listed by country buyer, together with • For most countries, an official defence-budget
additional information including, if known, the country figure is provided.
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
supplier, cost, prime contractor and the date on which • For those countries where other military-related
the first delivery was due to be made. While every effort outlays, over and above the defence budget,
has been made to ensure accuracy, some transactions may are known, or can be reasonably estimated, an
not be fulfilled or may differ – for instance in quantity – additional measurement referred to as defence
from those reported. The information is arranged in the expenditure is also provided. Defence expendi-
following order: land; sea; air. ture figures will naturally be higher than official
budget figures, depending on the range of addi-
DEFENCE ECONOMICS tional factors included.
• For NATO countries, an official defence-budget
Country entries include defence expenditures, selected figure as well as a measure of defence expenditure
economic performance indicators and demographic aggre- (calculated using NATO’s definition) is quoted.
gates. There are also international comparisons of defence
expenditure and military manpower, giving expenditure NATO’s definition of military expenditure, the most
figures for the past three years in per capita terms and as comprehensive, is defined as the cash outlays of central or
a % of GDP. The aim is to provide an accurate measure federal governments to meet the costs of national armed
of military expenditure and the allocation of economic forces. The term ‘armed forces’ includes strategic, land,
resources to defence. All country entries are subject to revi- naval, air, command, administration and support forces.
sion each year as new information, particularly regarding It also includes other forces if these forces are trained,
defence expenditure, becomes available. The information structured and equipped to support defence forces and
is necessarily selective. are realistically deployable. Defence expenditures are
Individual country entries show economic perfor- reported in four categories: Operating Costs, Procurement
mance over the past two years, and current demographic and Construction, Research and Development (R&D)
data. Where these data are unavailable, information from and Other Expenditure. Operating Costs include sala-
the last available year is provided. Where possible, official ries and pensions for military and civilian personnel; the
defence budgets for the current and previous two years cost of maintaining and training units, service organisa-
are shown, as well as an estimate of actual defence expen- tions, headquarters and support elements; and the cost of
ditures for those countries where true defence expendi- servicing and repairing military equipment and infrastruc-
ture is thought to be higher than official budget figures ture. Procurement and Construction expenditure covers
suggest. Estimates of actual defence expenditure, however, national equipment and infrastructure spending, as well
are only made for those countries where there are suffi- as common infrastructure programmes. R&D is defence
cient data to justify such a measurement. Therefore, there expenditure up to the point at which new equipment can
will be several countries listed in The Military Balance for be put in service, regardless of whether new equipment is
which only an official defence budget figure is provided actually procured. Foreign Military Aid (FMA) contribu-
but where, in reality, true defence-related expenditure is tions of more than US$1 million are also noted.
almost certainly higher. For many non-NATO countries the issue of transpar-
All financial data in the country entries are shown both ency in reporting military budgets is fundamental. Not
in national currency and US dollars at current year – not every UN member state reports defence-budget data (even
constant – prices. US-dollar conversions are generally, but fewer real defence expenditures) to their electorates, the
not invariably, calculated from the exchange rates listed UN, the IMF or other multinational organisations. In the
in the entry. In some cases a US-dollar purchasing power case of governments with a proven record of transparency,
Explanatory Notes 487
official figures generally conform to the standardised defi- and frequent revisions of recent data (not always accom-
nition of defence budgeting, as adopted by the UN, and panied by timely revision of previously published figures
consistency problems are not usually a major issue. The in the same series) pose transparency and consistency
IISS cites official defence budgets as reported by either problems. Another problem arises with certain transitional
national governments, the UN, the OSCE or the IMF. economies whose productive capabilities are similar to
For those countries where the official defence budget those of developed economies, but where cost and price
figure is considered to be an incomplete measure of total structures are often much lower than world levels. No
military-related spending, and appropriate additional specific PPP rate exists for the military sector, and its use for
data are available, the IISS will use data from a variety of this purpose should be treated with caution. Furthermore,
sources to arrive at a more accurate estimate of true defence there is no definitive guide as to which elements of military
expenditure. The most frequent instances of budgetary spending should be calculated using the limited PPP rates
manipulation or falsification typically involve equipment available. The figures presented here are only intended
procurement, R&D, defence-industrial investment, covert to illustrate a range of possible outcomes depending on
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
weapons programmes, pensions for retired military and which input variables are used.
civilian personnel, paramilitary forces and non-budgetary
sources of revenue for the military arising from ownership Arms trade
of industrial, property and land assets. The source for data on the global and regional arms trade is
Percentage changes in defence spending are referred the US Congressional Research Service (CRS). It is accepted
to in either nominal or real terms. Nominal terms relate to that these data may vary in some cases from national decla-
the percentage change in numerical spending figures, and rations of defence exports, which is due in part to differ-
do not account for the impact of price changes (i.e. infla- ences in the publication times of the various sets of data
tion) on defence spending. By contrast real terms account and national definitions of military-related equipment.
for inflationary effects, and may thus be considered a more
accurate representation of change over time. GENERAL MILITARY DATA
The principal sources for national economic statistics
cited in the country entries are the IMF, the Organisation Manpower
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The ‘Active’ total comprises all servicemen and women on
the World Bank and three regional banks (the Inter- full-time duty (including conscripts and long-term assign-
American, Asian and African Development Banks). For ments from the Reserves). When a gendarmerie or equiva-
some countries basic economic data are difficult to obtain. lent is under control of the MoD, they may be included in
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures are nominal the active total. Under the heading ‘Terms of Service’, only
(current) values at market prices. GDP growth is real, not the length of conscript service is shown; where service is
nominal, growth, and inflation is the year-on-year change voluntary there is no entry. ‘Reserve’ describes formations
in consumer prices. Dollar exchange rates are annual aver- and units not fully manned or operational in peacetime, but
ages for the year indicated, except 2011 where the average which can be mobilised by recalling reservists in an emer-
exchange rate from 1 January to 1 November is used. gency. Unless otherwise indicated, the ‘Reserves’ entry
includes all reservists committed to rejoining the armed
Calculating exchange rates forces in an emergency, except when national reserve
Typically, but not invariably, the exchange rates shown service obligations following conscription last almost a
in the country entries are also used to calculate GDP and lifetime. Some countries have more than one category
defence budget and expenditure dollar conversions. Where of ‘Reserves’, often kept at varying degrees of readiness.
they are not used, it is because the use of exchange rate Where possible, these differences are denoted using the
dollar conversions can misrepresent both GDP and defence national descriptive title, but always under the heading of
expenditure. For some countries, PPP rather than market ‘Reserves’ to distinguish them from full-time active forces.
exchange rates are sometimes used for dollar conversions
of both GDP and defence expenditures. Where PPP is used, Other forces
it is annotated accordingly. Many countries maintain paramilitary forces whose
The arguments for using PPP are strongest for Russia training, organisation, equipment and control suggest they
and China. Both the UN and IMF have issued caveats may be used to support or replace regular military forces.
Reference
concerning the reliability of official economic statistics These are detailed after the military forces of each country,
on transitional economies, particularly those of Russia, but their manpower is not normally included in the Armed
some Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Forces totals at the start of each entry. Home Guard units
Non-reporting, lags in the publication of current statistics are counted as paramilitary.
488 The Military Balance 2012
Forces by Role and Equipment by Type section. Information in the country data files detail deploy-
Quantities are shown by function (according to each ments of troops and military observers and, where avail-
nation’s employment) and type, and represent what able, the role and equipment of deployed units.
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
A typical land force organisation could be (in order of decreasing size): Army group; army or corps; division; brigade; unit
and sub-unit:
Formations: These normally consist of varying combinations of units of several arms and services. Several
brigades (groups of several combat units and dedicated command, CS and CSS elements) may combine
into a division, several divisions into a corps or army and several corps or armies into an army group.
Battalion: The smallest grouping capable of independent operations. Battalions typically contain inte-
gral combat command support, combat service support and limited combat support. The majority of
personnel are of one arm or service.
Company: A subdivision of a battalion, which normally has 3–5 companies. Companies are normally
subdivided further into platoons, of between about 12 and about 35 soldiers, which are then organised
as vehicle crews and/or dismountable sections or squads.
National variations of terminology: The manpower strength, equipment holdings and organisation of
formations such as brigades and divisions vary from country to country. For instance, some armies
use the term ‘regiment’ to mean brigade-sized groupings of several battalions, usually with integral
combat support and combat service support, while in others the term regiment is used for battalion-
sized units; ‘squadron’ can be used as an alternative term for company; ‘battery’ is often used by artil-
lery units; and ‘troop’ is sometimes used when referring to platoons.
Explanatory Notes 489
The Military Balance translates national military terminology for unit and formation sizes so that, for example the ‘kandaks’
of the Afghan National Army are shown as ‘battalions’. National designations, however, are used where possible: for example
’motor rifle’ and ‘armoured cavalry’. The Military Balance categorises forces by role, to make comparison of forces easier and
more consistent.
Forces by role
Command. It is assumed that all combined arms formations and single arms units have an integral HQ with
a communication capability. Free-standing formation HQs and signals units/formations are detailed.
Special Forces (SF). SF are elite forces specially trained and equipped for unconventional warfare and oper-
ations in enemy-controlled battlespace. Many are employed in counter-terrorist roles. Army SF retained
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
such as ‘Presidential Guards’ and deployable manoeuvre units or formations permanently employed
in training or demonstration tasks.
490 The Military Balance 2012
Combat Support (CS): CS supports combat units and formations to enable them to fight and manoeuvre.
This includes artillery, engineers, air defence, intelligence, EOD and other CS not integral to
manoeuvre formations.
Combat Service Support (CSS): CSS includes logistic, maintenance, medical, personnel administration
capabilities and provision and maintenance of water, rations, power and supply routes. Combat
support and combat service support organic to formations is shown with those formations. For
example, brigade supply and maintenance battalions would be listed as part of the brigade.
Equipment by type
Definitions of land weapons and equipment have been revised. Weapon and armoured-vehicle categories remain
based on those used in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, but categories have been added and revised to
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
reflect new developments in armoured vehicles. The considerable diversity of armies and their role, as well as the large
number of irregular forces, make it impossible to apply obsolescence criteria to land equipment.
Light Weapons. Light weapons include all small arms, machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers
and unguided man-portable anti-armour and support weapons, such as the ubiquitous RPG. These
weapons have proliferated so much and are sufficiently easy to manufacture or copy that listing
them would be impracticable. It should be assumed that all soldiers and officers carry a personal
small arm.
Crew Served Weapons. Crew-served recoilless rifles, man-portable ATGW, MANPADS and mortars of
greater than 80mm calibre are listed, but the high degree of proliferation and local manufacture of
many of these weapons means that estimates of numbers held may not be reliable.
Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs):
Main Battle Tank (MBT): Armoured, tracked combat vehicles, weighing at least 16.5 metric tonnes
unladen, that may be armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm calibre. Wheeled combat
vehicles that meet the latter two criteria are considered MBTs.
Reconnaissance: Combat vehicles designed and equipped to facilitate reconniassance operations. Some
reconnaissance vehicles are unarmoured.
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV): Armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to
transport an infantry squad, armed with an integral/organic cannon of at least 20mm calibre.
Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC): Lightly armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to
transport an infantry squad and armed with integral/organic weapons of less than 20mm calibre.
Protected Patrol Vehicle (PPV). Role-specific armoured vehicles designed to protect troops from small
arms, RPG and roadside bomb threats. Most have little or no cross-country mobility and are not
designed for combined-arms manoeuvre. Protection levels and weights can vary.
Artillery: Weapons (including guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and
gun/mortars) with a calibre greater than 100mm for artillery pieces and 80mm and above for mortars,
capable of engaging ground targets with indirect fire.
Anti-Tank (AT): Guns, guided weapons and recoilless rifles designed to engage armoured vehicles and
battlefield hardened targets.
Air Defence (AD): Guns and missiles designed to engage fixed-wing, rotary-wing and unmanned aircraft.
CS and CSS Equipment: Includes bespoke military systems, such as assault bridging, engineer tanks,
armoured recovery vehicles and armoured ambulances. Civilian equipment, such as civil engineering
equipment used by engineers and civilian medical equipment, is excluded.
Explanatory Notes 491
cally infantry and armour, with combat support (CS) such and airborne forces are part of the air forces. An increasing
as engineers and artillery. Medical and logistic capabilities number of land units and formations are part of joint
are provided by combat service support (CSS). organisations.
The Military Balance 2012 carries more detail on armies’
combat support and combat service support capabilities, in NAVAL FORCES
a bid to make it easier to assess the ability of armies to fight,
deploy and sustain, thus making land-force comparisons Classifying naval vessels according to role is increasingly
more meaningful. complex. A post-war consensus on primary surface combat-
Land forces are generally structured into formations, ants revolved around a distinction between independently
units and sub-units. Most armies achieve flexibility by operating cruisers, air-defence escorts (destroyers) and
adopting a modular approach which enables grouping anti-submarine-warfare escorts (frigates). However, new
for specific operations, or phases within operations. So for ships are increasingly performing a range of roles; the
armies, organisation is as important a factor as equipment Littoral Combat Ship produced by the US, for example,
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:25 13 March 2012
in assessing operational effectiveness. However, while is a frigate-sized vessel that carries surface-to-air missiles
most land forces are part of armies, there are exceptions. and can be reconfigured for anti-submarine warfare, anti-
In some countries, amphibious forces are part of the navy surface warfare or a mine counter-measures role. For this
To aid comparison between fleets, the following definitions, which do not necessarily conform to national definitions, are
used:
Submarines: All vessels equipped for military operations and designed to operate primarily under water.
Submarines with a dived displacement below 250 tonnes are classified as midget submarines; those
below 500 tonnes are coastal submarines. Those vessels with submarine-launched ballistic missiles
are also listed under ‘Strategic Nuclear Forces’.
Principal surface combatants: All surface ships primarily designed for operations on the high seas, either
as escorts or primary ships in a task force. These vessels usually have a FLD above 1,500 tonnes.
Such ships will have offensive ship-to-ship capabilities and may include anti-submarine-warfare and/
or anti-air capabilities. Principal surface combatants include aircraft carriers (including helicopter
carriers), cruisers (with a FLD above 9,750 tonnes), destroyers (with a FLD above 4,500 tonnes) and
frigates (with a FLD above 1,500 tonnes).
Patrol and coastal combatants: All surface vessels designed for coastal or inshore operations, in an escort,
protective or patrol role. These vessels include corvettes, which usually have a FLD between 500
and 1,500 tonnes and are distinguished from other patrol vessels by their heavier armaments, often
including ship-to-ship and/or ship-to-air missiles. Also included in this category are offshore patrol
ships, with a FLD greater than 1,500 tonnes, patrol craft, which have a full-load displacement between
250 and 1,500 tonnes and patrol boats with a FLD between ten and 250 tonnes. Fast patrol craft or
boats have a top speed greater than 35 knots.
Mine warfare vessels: All surface vessels configured primarily for mine laying or counter-measures.
Counter-measures vessels are either: sweepers, which are designed to locate and destroy mines in a
maritime area; hunters, which are designed to locate and destroy individual mines; or counter-meas-
ures vessels, which combine both roles.
Amphibious vessels: All surface vessels designed to transport personnel and/or equipment on to unpre-
pared shorelines. Such vessels are classified as amphibious-assault vessels, which can embark fixed-
wing and/or rotary wing air assets as well as landing craft; landing platforms, which can embark
Reference
rotary wing aircraft as well as landing craft; landing ships, which are amphibious vessels capable
of ocean passage; and landing craft, which are smaller vessels designed to transport personnel and
492 The Military Balance 2012
equipment from a vessel or across small stretches of water. Landing ships have a hold; landing craft
are open vessels.
Auxiliary vessels: All ocean-going surface vessels performing an auxiliary military role, supporting
combat ships or operations. Such vessels are either very lightly armed or unarmed. These generally
fulfil five roles: underway replenishment (such as tankers and oilers); logistics (such as cargo ships);
maintenance (such as cable-repair ships or buoy tenders); research (such as survey ships); and special
purpose (such as intelligence-collection ships and ocean-going tugs).
Yard craft/miscellaneous vessels: All surface vessels performing a support role in coastal waters or to
ships not in service. These vessels often have harbour roles, such as tugs and tenders. Other miscel-
laneous craft, such as royal yachts, are also included here.
Weapons systems: Weapons are listed in the following order: land-attack missiles, ship-to-ship missiles,
surface-to-air missiles, guns, torpedo tubes, anti-submarine weapons and aircraft. Missiles with a
range less than 5km and guns with a calibre less than 76mm are generally not included, unless for
some lightly armed minor combatants.
Organisations: Naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons frequently change and are shown only
where doing so would add to qualitative judgements.
Explanatory Notes 493
Countries regularly use military aircraft in a variety of roles, with determinants including platform equipment,
weapons and systems fit, as well as crew training. The Military Balance uses the following main definitions as a
guide.
Fighter (Ftr): This term covers aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat, with the associated
sensors, weapons and performance. It may include a limited air-to-surface capability. Ftr units are
equipped with aircraft intended to provide air superiority, which may have a secondary and limited
air-to-surface capability.
Fighter/Ground Attack (FGA): indicates a multi-role fighter-size platform with a significant air-to-surface
capability, potentially including maritime attack, and some air-to-air capacity. FGA units are multi-
role units equipped with aircraft capable of air-to-air and air-to surface attack with varying degrees
of capability.
Ground Attack (Atk): is used to describe aircraft designed solely for the air-to-surface task, with limited
or no air-to-air capability. Atk units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft to undertake air-to-surface
missions.
Attack Helicopter (Atk Hel): Rotary platforms designed for delivery of air-to-surface weapons, and fitted
with an integrated fire control system.
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): Fixed and rotary-wing platforms designed to locate and engage subma-
rines, many with a secondary anti-surface-warfare capacity. ASW units are equipped with fixed- or
rotary-wing aircraft for anti-submarine missions.
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW): units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing-aircraft intended for anti-
surface-warfare missions.
Maritime Patrol (MP): Fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended for maritime
surface surveillance, which may possess an anti-surface-warfare capability. MP units are equipped
with fixed-wing aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles intended for maritime surveillance. May also
have an ASuW/ASW capability.
Electronic Warfare (EW): Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended for electronic countermeas-
ures. EW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used for electronic counter-
measures.
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR): Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended to
provide radar, visible light, or infra-red imagery, or a mix thereof. ISR units are equipped with fixed-
or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the ISR role.
Combat/Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (CISR): is used to describe those UAVs which have
the capability to deliver air to surface weapons, as well as undertaking ISR tasks. CISR units are
equipped with armed UAVs for the ISR and air-to-surface missions.
COMINT/ELINT/SIGINT: Fixed and rotary-wing platforms and UAVs capable of gathering electronic
Reference
(ELINT), communication (COMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT). COMINT units are equipped
with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the communications-intelligence task. ELINT
494 The Military Balance 2012
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): units are equipped with armed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for
recovery of personnel from hostile territory.
Tanker (Tkr): Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed for air-to-air re-fuelling. Tkr units are equipped
with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used for air-to-air refuelling.
Tanker Transport (Tkr/Tpt): describes those platforms capable of both air-to-air refuelling and military
airlift.
Transport (Tpt): Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft intended for military airlift. Light transport aircraft are
categorised as having a maximum payload of up to 11,340kg, medium up to 27,215kg, and heavy
above 27,215kg. Medium transport helicopters have an internal payload of up to 4,535kg; heavy trans-
port helicopters greater than 4,535kg. PAX aircraft are platforms are platforms generally unsuited for
transporting cargo on the main deck. Tpt units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing platforms to
transport personnel or cargo.
Trainer (Trg): A fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft designed primarily for the training role, some also have
the capacity to carry light to medium ordnance. Trg units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing
training aircraft intended for pilot or other aircrew training.
Multi-role helicopter (MRH): Rotary-wing platforms designed to carry out a variety of military tasks
including light transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Remotely piloted or controlled unmanned fixed- or rotary-wing
systems. Light UAVs are those weighing between 20–150kg; medium are those from 150kg–600kg;
and large are those weighing more than 600kg.
Reference
– part of unit is detached/less than AKR roll-on/roll-off cargo ship ATGW anti-tank guided weapon
* combat capable AKSL stores ship (light) ATK attack/ground attack
’’ unit with overstated title/ship class ALARM air-launched anti-radiation missile ATP advanced targeting pod
nickname ALCM air-launched cruise missile ATTC all terrain tracked carrier
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:27 13 March 2012
AIFV armoured infantry fighting vehicle ASuW anti-surface warfare CISR Combat ISR
AIP air independent propulsion AT tug/anti-tank CIMIC civil–military cooperation
AK cargo ship ATACMS army tactical missile system CIWS close-in weapons system
aka also known as ATBM anti-tactical ballistic missile CLOS command-to-line-of-sight
AKL cargo ship (light) ATF tug, ocean going COIN counter insurgency
496 The Military Balance 2012
mod modified/modification PSO/H offshore patrol vessel over 1,500 SSK attack submarine with ASW
mor mortar tonnes/with hangar capability(hunter-killer)SSM surface-to-
ptn pontoon bridging surface missile
mot motorised/motor
PTRL/SURV patrol/surveillance SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
MP maritime patrol/military police
qd quadrillion SSP attack submarine with air-
MPA maritime patrol aircraft independent propulsion
MPS marine prepositioning squadron R&D research and development
SSW midget submarine
MR maritime reconnaissance/motor rifle RAM rolling airframe missile
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks/
MRAP mine-resistant ambush-protected RAS replenishment at sea Treaty
MRAAM medium-range air-to-air missile RCL recoilless launcher / ramped craft STO(V)L short take-off and (vertical)
logistic landing
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
RCWS remote controlled weapon station str strength
MRL multiple rocket launcher
RCT regimental combat team SUGW surface-to-underwater GW
MRTT multi-role tanker transport
recce reconnaissance SURV surveillance
MS/A/C/D/I/O/R mine sweeper/auxiliary/
coastal/drone/inshore/ocean regt regiment SUT surface and underwater target
msl missile RIB rigid inflatable boat sy security
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:27 13 March 2012
Note: This index covers the essays Antigua and Barbuda 365, 370 Berlin (Germany) 72
on defence issues, regional policy Antonov, Anatoliy 184 Best Management Practices 413
and economic analysis and the top Antony, A.K. 216 Binational Border Security Plan (Colombia/
ten defence budgeting nations, found Arab Awakening 9–17, 42, 76, 191, 305, Brazil) 361
in chs 1 and 3–9. Page numbers for 313, 314, 315 bin Laden, Osama 40
the military capabilities data for Arab–Israeli wars 312 Black Sea Fleet (Russia) 187
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:27 13 March 2012
individual states are indicated in bold Arab League 304 Blair, Dennis 39
type. Capability data, figures, tables Archangelsk (Russia) 187 Blohm & Voss 81
and maps are not included. Arctic 43, 49, 187 ‘Blue Amazon’ (Brazil) 367
Argentina 362, 363, 364, 369, 370 Boeing 48, 190, 219, 224, 366
A Armenia 89 Boko Haram 414
Abbottabad (Pakistan) 40 Army Capabilities Integration Center Bolivia 362, 363, 374
King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (United States) 20 Border Enforcement (Iraq) 309
311, 313, 314 Asaad, Riadh 304 Bosnia-Herzegovina 17, 97
Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz 311 Ashdod (Israel) 305 Botswana 416, 417, 422
ABG Shipyard 220 Ashkelon (Israel) 305 Bouazizi, Mohamed 12, 303
Abyan (Yemen) 303 Asia 40, 41, 205–224, 420 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 10
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) 414 al-Assad, Bashar 9, 10 Brazil 18, 19, 21, 22, 81, 361ff, 366–369,
Aegean Sea 305 al-Assad, Maher 9, 304 376, 418
Aero Vodochody 369 Atech 369 Brega (Libya) 13
Afghanistan 13, 16ff, 23ff, 27–30, 39, 40, 41, Austal USA 315 British Council 28
43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77, Australia 21, 22, 23, 47, 207ff, 220, 226 Brunei 231
82, 83, 85, 209, 225 Australian Defence Force 207 Brussels (Belgium) 40
Afghan National Army 27 Austria 72, 73, 76, 90, 416, 417 Budget Control Act of 2011 (United States)
Afghan National Police 27 Avibras 369 44
Afghan National Security Forces 27, 28, 30 al-Awlaki, Anwar 304 Bulgaria 75, 76, 98
African Development Bank 418, 419 Azerbaijan 92 Bundeswehr University (Germany) 80
African Partnership Station (United States) Burkina Faso 414, 423
413 B Burundi 414, 424
African Peace and Security Architecture 411 BAE Systems 22, 312, 315, 366
African Standby Force 411 Baghdad International Airport (Iraq) 309 C
African Union 411, 415 Baghdad (Iraq) 308, 310 Calderón, Felipe 361
AFRICOM (United States) 12, 14, 40, 411 Bahamas 373 Cambodia 207, 232
al-Ahmar, Ali Muhsin 303 Bahrain 9, 11, 12, 46, 81, 303, 305, 307, 312, Cameron, David 81, 82
Airbus 190, 418 315, 318 Cameroon 411, 425
Air–Space Defence Command (Russia) Bahrain Defence Forces 9 Canada 13, 28, 49–50, 51
185, 186 Balkans 16, 26, 73 Canada First Defence Strategy 49
Alawites 9, 304 Balkh (Afghanistan) 27 Cape Verde 426
Albania 88 Baltic states 73 Caprivi (Namibia) 416
Algeria 10, 22, 23, 81, 306, 316, 413 Bamiyan (Afghanistan) 27 Caribbean 362, 363, 365
Al-Khalifa family 9, 10 Bangladesh 210, 229 Caribbean Community 364
Allamand, Andrés 363 Bangui (Central African Republic) 415 Carpathian mountains 305
Allen, John 27, 39 Baniyas (Syria) 304 Carter, Ashton 39
Allied Democratic Forces–National Army Ban Ki-moon 363 Caspian Sea Flotilla (Russia) 187
for the Liberation of Uganda 415 Barak, Ehud 305 Cassidian 81
All-Volunteer Force (United States) 44 Barbados 365, 373 Central Africa 415–416
Almaz-Antey 186, 190 Barinas (Venezuela) 362 Central African Republic 415, 416, 427
al-Qaeda 30, 40 Basra (Iraq) 83 Central America 361, 364, 365
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 303, 304 Beersheba (Israel) 305 Central American Integration System 361
al-Shabaab 415 Beijing (China) 212 Central Asia 41, 208, 210
Amazon 366, 367 Beijing Military Region (China) 213 Central Command (United States) 48
Amorim, Celso 366 Belarus 93 Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
Amos, James 47 Belgium 13, 73, 74, 95, 415, 416 39, 214
Anápolis (Brazil) 366 Belize 374 Central Military District (Russia) 187
Angola 414, 416, 418, 421 Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidene 9 Chad 416, 427
Annual Conference of South American Benghazi (Libya) 12, 13, 14, 303 Chanson, Francis 76
Defence Chiefs 362 Benin 422 Chemezov, Sergei 190
500 The Military Balance 2012
Common Security and Defence Policy 71, Department of State (United States) 214, Federal Special Construction Agency
73 308 (Russia) 183
Compass Navigation Satellite System Deraa (Syria) 304 Federal Tax Service (Russia) 184
(China) 214 Diehl 81 Fifth Fleet (United States) 313
Comprehensive Spending Review (United Direction générale de l’armement (France) Fiji 210, 242
Kingdom) 87 77 Fincantieri 366
Congo 428 Directive on Defence and Security Finland 76, 109
Conservative Party (Canada) 49 Procurement (European Commission) 1st Armoured Division (Yemen) 303
Convention of Patriots for Justice and 75 1st Infantry Regiment (France) 77
Peace (Central African Republic) 415 Djibouti 222, 414, 432 Fisheries Law Enforcement Command
Costa Rica 361, 362, 365, 384 Dominican Republic 386 (China) 207
Côte d’Ivoire 78, 411, 429 Dongshan Island (China) 213 Foreign Military Financing (United States)
Cougar task group (United Kingdom) 313 Donilan, Thomas 39 416
Council of Ministers (Saudi Arabia) 311 Douala (Cameroon) 411 Foreign Military Sales (United States) 312,
Counter-Terrorism Bureau (Iraq) 310 Durieux, Benoît 76 314
Croatia 75, 100 Foreign Office (United Kingdom) 82
CTF 151 313 E 4th Armoured Division (Syria) 9, 304
Cuba 384 EADS 81 Fourth State Training and Operational Test
Cyber Operations Group (United East Africa 411, 414–415 Centre (Russia) 186
Kingdom) 81 East Asia 46, 47, 208, 210, 211, 220 Fox, Liam 81, 82, 83
Cyprus 102 East China Sea 205, 208, 212, 213, 220 France 13, 16, 17, 21, 22, 25, 73, 74, 76–79,
Czech Republic 73, 76, 185, 104, 369 Eastern Military District (Russia) 187 81, 111, 183, 187, 312, 313, 411, 413,
Eastern Province (Saudi Arabia) 312 416, 417
D East Sea 205 Franco-British defence treaty 77, 78
Dannatt, Richard 82 Eberhardt, Klaus 81 ‘Free Syrian Army’ 9, 304
da Silva, Luis Inácio Lula 366 ECOWAS 414 Fujimura, Osamu 224
Dassault 77, 78, 81, 219, 366 Ecuador 361, 363, 364, 387 Fukushima (Japan) 220
‘Day of Rage’ 305 Egypt 9ff, 42, 303, 304, 305, 313, 319 Funes, Mauricio 361
DCNS 78, 366 Elbit 366, 367, 369 Future Years Defense Plan (United States)
Defence and Military Cooperation Electronic Warfare Directorate (Russia) 47
agreement (Colombia/Brazil) 361 184
Defence Equipment and Support (United El Salvador 361, 364, 389 G
Kingdom) 82 Embraer 366, 367, 369 Gabon 435
Defence Policy Guidelines (Germany) 79, Embraer Defesa e Segurança 369 Gadhafi, Muammar 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17,
80 Equateur (DRC) 415 19, 20, 303
Defence Reform Review (United Kingdom) Equatorial Guinea 433 Gambia 436
82, 86 Eritrea 411, 414, 415, 433 Gates, Robert 16, 17, 39, 40, 41, 45, 47, 73,
Defence White Papers Estonia 76, 107 74, 212, 308, 315
Australia 207 Ethiopia 411, 414, 415, 419, 434 Gaza 10, 26, 305
China 211, 213 Eurocopter 367 Gbagbo, Laurent 78
France 76, 78 Europe 12, 17, 18, 23, 24, 40, 47, 50, 71–87, GCHQ (United Kingdom) 81
Japan 205, 220, 222 184, 205, 363, 418 General Authority for Civil Aviation (Saudi
Defense Planning Guidance (United States) European Commission 75, 76 Arabia) 311
43 European Defence Agency 71, 76 General Staff (Russia) 183, 184, 185, 187
Defense Security Cooperation Agency European Union 71, 73, 76, 414, 417 Georgia 19, 25, 116, 183, 188
(United States) 304 Exercises Germany 13, 23, 24, 71, 73, 74, 76, 79–81,
Deficit Reduction Action Plan (Canada) 49 Anatolian Express 313 117, 188, 208, 315
Deir el-Zour (Syria) 304 Centre 2011 183 Ghana 413, 419, 437
de Maizière, Thomas 79, 80, 81, 188 Flandres 2011 78 Global Positioning System (United States)
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Mission Action 213 214
Congo 415 Red Alligator 313 Golan Heights 10
Index 501
Gulf of Guinea 413 222, 306, 308–310, 311, 326 Krauss-Maffei Wegmann 81, 366
Gulf War 307, 312 Iraqi Federal Police 309, 310 Kunduz (Afghanistan) 27
Guyana 363, 391 Iraq Training and Advisory Mission Kurdistan Democratic Party (Iraq) 308, 310
(United States) 308 Kurds 304, 310
H Ireland 73, 126 Kuwait 46, 305, 307, 312, 333
Hainan Island (China) 207 Irving Shipbuilding Inc. 49 Kyrgyzstan 208, 209, 262
Haiti 363, 392 Israel 10, 26, 77, 206, 304, 305, 315, 328, 366,
Hamas 10 414, 416 L
Hama (Syria) 304 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 72 Labour Party (United Kingdom) 84
Hammond, Philip 82 Itaguaí (Brazil) 366 Lanzhou military region (China) 213
Hanshin-Awaji earthquake 222 Italy 21, 23, 73, 74, 76, 127, 305, 366, 416 Laos 263
Haqqani Network 28, 30 Ivanov, Oleg 184 Larissa (Greece) 305
Harper, Stephen 49 Ivanov, Sergey 189 Larsen & Toubro 220
Harpia 369 Iveco 366 Lashkar Gah (Afghanistan) 27, 28
Hashemites 10 Latin America 361–369
Hashid tribal confederation (Yemen) 304 J Lattaqiyah (Syria) 304
Hayden, Michael 214 Jalalabad (Afghanistan) 28 Latvia 76, 131
Helibras 367 Jamaica 365, 393 Lavrov, Sergey 363
Helmand (Afghanistan) 27, 28, 83 Japan 23, 39, 43, 205, 208, 210, 212, Lebanon 10, 304, 336
Heluin, Bruno 76 220–224, 251 Lehman Brothers 214
Herat (Afghanistan) 27, 50 Japan Air Self-Defense Force 224 Le Nen, Nicolas 76
Hindustan Aeronautics 219 Japan Coast Guard 220 Leslie, Andrew 49
Hizbullah 10, 26, 305 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 222, Lesotho 417, 440
‘Homeland Guard’ (Brazil) 366 224 Lord Levene 82
Homs (Syria) 304 Japan Self-Defense Forces 220, 222, 223 Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 223
Honduras 361, 364, 392 JD-3.4.4 Contre-Insurrection 76 Liberia 411, 441
Hong Kong 208 Jebel Nafusa (Libya) 12, 13, 16 Libya 9ff, 12–17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 39ff,
Horizon project 21 Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) 308 50, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 82, 83, 85, 212,
House of Commons Defence Committee Jinan Military Region (China) 213 303, 304, 306, 337
(United Kingdom) 83 Jobim, Nelson 366 Libya Contact Group 12
House of Commons Liaison Committee Joint Forces Command (United Kingdom) Libyan Army 14
(United Kingdom) 83 82 Line of Actual Control (India/China) 216
Houthi militias (Yemen/Saudi Arabia) 304, Joint Forces Command (United States) 39, Lithuania 132
312, 313 43, 45 Lipetsk (Russia) 186
Humala, Ollanta 362 Joint Logistics Departments (China) 213 Lisbon (Portugal) 71
Hungary 73, 74, 124 Joint Select Committee on Deficit Lisbon Treaty 76
Hussein, Saddam 310 Reduction (United States) 39, 44 Litani River 305
Jones, James 39 Lockheed Martin 22, 24, 214, 224, 309, 315
I Jonglei (South Sudan) 414 Lord’s Resistance Army 415, 416
Iceland 125 Jordan 10, 11, 13, 72, 331 Luxembourg 133
Independent Commission of Inquiry Lynn, William J., III 39, 46
(Bahrain) 12 K
India 19, 22, 24, 25, 81, 191, 205, 208, 209, Kabul (Afghanistan) 27, 28, 30, 50 M
210, 213, 216–220, 243, 313, 416 Kaliningrad (Russia) 186 MacArthur, Douglas 40
Indian Navy 216 KamAZ 190 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic
Indian Ocean 76, 208, 212, 216, 222, 413 Kandahar (Afghanistan) 27, 28, 49 134
Indonesia 22, 23, 25, 42, 206, 209, 248 Karzai, Ahmed Wali 28 MacKay, Peter 49
Integrated Border Monitoring System Karzai, Hamid 27, 28 Madagascar 442
(SISFRON) (Brazil) 367, 369 Kazakhstan 208, 209, 255 Maehara, Seiji 223, 224
InterContinental Hotel (Kabul, Kenya 413, 414, 415, 416, 439 Mai-Mai (Uganda) 415
Afghanistan) 28 Kerala (India) 216 Main Operations Directorate (Russia) 184
502 The Military Balance 2012
Major Projects Review Board (United Moscow (Russia) 184, 186 Nigeria 414, 447
Kingdom) 87 Movement for Democracy and Noda, Yoshihiko 223
Makarov, Nikolay 183, 184, 187 Development (Chad) 416 North Africa 191, 303–315
Malawi 442 Movement for Democracy and Justice in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (South Sudan) 414
Malaysia 23, 42, 206, 207, 208, 209, 264 Chad 416 Northern Command (United States) 43
Mali 413, 414, 443 Mozambique 417, 444 Northern Fleet (Russia) 187
al-Maliki, Nuri 308, 310 Mubarak, Hosni 9, 11, 42, 304 ‘Northern Shield’ (Argentina) 362
Malta 135 Mullen, Michael 30, 39, 42, 45, 46, 308 North Korea 42, 47, 205, 206, 208, 213,
MAN Military Vehicles 81 Munich (Germany) 80 222, 256
Marine Corps (United States) 16, 44, 47 Murmansk (Russia) 187 North Waziristan (Pakistan) 30
Maritime Safety Administration (China) Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Norway 13, 76, 141
207 (United States/Saudi Arabia) 312 Nova Scotia (Canada) 49
Mauritania 338 Myanmar 207, 268
Mauritius 444 O
Mazar-e Sharif (Afghanistan) 27, 50 N Obama, Barack 12, 17, 27, 40, 41, 43, 308,
McCain, John 41, 366 Namibia 416, 417, 445 362, 366
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:27 13 March 2012
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Iraq) 308, 310 Royal Navy (United Kingdom) 21, 22, South African Air Force 418, 419
Pearl roundabout (Bahrain) 305 312, 313 South African National Defence Force
Peninsula Shield Force 11, 305, 307 Royal Saudi Air Force 311, 312, 315 417, 419
People’s Armed Police (China) 215 Royal Saudi Land Forces 311, 312 South American Defence Council 363
People’s Liberation Army (China) 205, 207, Royal Saudi Navy 312, 313, 315 South Asia 208, 210
211, 212, 213, 214, 363 Royal Thai Air Force 207 South China Sea 205, 207, 208, 213, 216
People’s Liberation Army Navy (China) Russia 19, 22, 24, 25, 72, 78, 183–191, 192, Southeast Asia 206–208, 210
207, 212, 216 206, 208, 212, 216, 217, 315, 362, 363, Southern Africa 416–417
People’s Liberation Army Navy Marines 365, 414, 415, 419 Southern African Development Communit
(China) 213 Russia–Georgia War 18, 183, 188 417
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 416 Russian Federal Service for Military– Southern Command (United States) 362
Perry, Rick 41 Technical Cooperation 191 Southern Cone 362
Persian Gulf 10, 11, 14, 41, 305, 308 Russian Space Agency 190 ‘Southern Cross’ (Argentina/Chile) 363
Peru 361, 362, 363, 364, 399 Rwanda 415, 448 South Kordofan (Sudan) 414
Petén (Guatemala) 361 South Korea 22, 39, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210,
Petraeus, David 27, 39 S 220, 259, 413
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:27 13 March 2012
Philippines 42, 207, 208, 209, 276 Saab 366, 418 South Sudan 414, 454
Pipavav Shipyard 220 al-Sadr, Muqtada 308 South West African Territorial Force
Poland 13, 73, 76, 143, 185 Sahel 411, 413 (Namibia) 416
Policy of Security and Defence for Said, Khaled 12 Soviet Union 22, 188, 189, 190, 191, 208,
Prosperity (Colombia) 362 Saleh, Ahmed 9 212. See also Russia
Popovkin, Vladimir 184, 189 Saleh, Ali Abdullah 9, 11, 303, 304 Space Forces (Russia) 186
Portugal 73, 74, 145 Salman bin Abdulaziz 311 Spain 13, 22, 73, 76, 154, 315, 413, 417
Portuguese Language Community 414 Sana’a (Yemen) 303 Special Police Commandos (Iraq) 310
Prime Minister’s Counter-Terrorism Force San Cristóbal (Venezuela) 362 Sri Lanka 210, 281
(Iraq) 309 Santiago (Chile) 362 Standard & Poor’s 43
Project Salam 315 Santos, Juan Manuel 362 State Defence Order (Russia) 183, 184, 185
‘Protected Amazon’ (Brazil) 366 Sardinia (Italy) 305 State Oceanic Administration (China) 207
Public Accounts Committee (United Sarkozy, Nicolas 77 State Security Investigations Service
Kingdom) 82 Saudi Arabia 10, 11, 42, 81, 303, 304, 305, (Egypt) 12
Puricelli, Arturo 363 307, 311–313, 346 Status of Forces Agreement (United States/
Putin, Vladimir 183, 188 Saudi Arabian National Guard 11, 307, Iraq) 308
311, 312 St Nazaire (France) 78
Q Saudi Arabian Projects Team (United Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 184
Qatar 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 46, 72, 305, 306, Kingdom) 312 Strategic Border Plan (Brazil) 367
307, 344 Saudi–British Defence Cooperation Strategic Concept (NATO) 71, 72, 73
Quadrennial Defense Review (United Programme 312 Strategic Defence and Security Review
States) 41 Schwartz, Norton 48 (United Kingdom) 24, 81, 82, 83, 84
Queensland (Australia) 208 Senate Armed Services Committee (United STX shipyard 78
States) 41, 45 Sudan 414, 416, 455
R Senegal 413, 414, 449 Sudan People’s Liberation Army 414
Rabbani, Burhanuddin 28 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 220 Sukhorukov, Aleksandr 184, 189
Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 71, 72, 74, 75 9/11 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 Sultan bin Abdulaziz 311
Reagan, Ronald 44 Serbia 16, 149 Sunnis 9, 10, 11, 12
Republican Guard (Syria) 304 Serdyukov, Anatoliy 183, 184, 188, 189 Sun Shuxian 207
Republican Guard (Tunisia) 9 Severodvinsk (Russia) 187 Supreme Council for the Armed Forces
Republican Guard (Yemen) 9, 303 Seychelles 450 (Egypt) 12, 304
Republican Party (United States) 41, 43 shabbiha (Syria) 9, 304 Suriname 363, 402
Responsibility to Protect 17, 41 Shangri-La Dialogue 206 Surovikin, Sergei 187
Revolution in Military Affairs 18 Shi’ites 10, 11, 12, 305, 309 Sweden 13, 23, 72, 76, 158
Rheinmetall 81 Sicily (Italy) 50 Switzerland 72, 160, 417
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 366 Siemens 81 Syria 9, 11, 25, 303, 304, 306, 312, 348
Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) 311 Sierra Leone 411, 451
Rogozin, Dmitry 72 Sikorsky 367 T
Romania 75, 76, 147, 305 Sinai 10, 305 Tactical Missile Corporation 186
Romney, Mitt 41 Singapore 23, 42, 47, 206, 208, 278 Taiwan 39, 205, 206, 208, 213, 282
Rosatom 190 Singapore Armed Forces 206 Ta’izz (Yemen) 303
Rosoboronexport 78, 190 Sinikova, Nadezhda 189 Tajikistan 208, 209, 285
Rosoboronpostavka 189 Sirte (Libya) 12, 303 Taliban 19, 27, 28
Rosoboronzakaz 189 Sisulu, Lindiwe 417, 419, 420 Tantawi, Mohammed 304
Rostekhnologii (Russian Technologies) Skokov, Sergei 184 Tanzania 456
corporation 190 Slovakia 73, 76, 152, 416 Tarin Kot (Afghanistan) 28
Roughead, Gary 40 Slovenia 76, 153 Task Force Charlottetown 50
Rousseff, Dilma 366, 367, 368 Social Democratic Party of Japan 224 Task Force Libeccio 50
Royal Air Force (United Kingdom) 16, Somalia 413, 414, 415, 417, 451 Task Force Vancouver 50
24, 83 South Africa 415, 416, 417, 417–418, 418, Tea Party movement (United States) 41
Royal Marines (United Kingdom) 83 419, 420, 452 Tenth Malaysia Plan 206
504 The Military Balance 2012
Territorial Army (United Kingdom) 83 United Aircraft Corporation 190, 219 Vietnam 23, 42, 206, 207, 208, 210, 216, 292
Thailand 23, 42, 206ff, 286 United Arab Emirates 11, 13, 17, 72, 305, Vietnam War 20, 44
Thales 219 307, 352 VSMPO-AVISMA 190
Timor Leste 289 United Kingdom 11, 12, 16, 17, 19ff, 27,
Togo 457 28, 71, 73, 76, 81–87, 168, 208, 312, 315, W
Tohoku earthquake 220 413, 415, 416, 417 Warsaw Pact 185
Transportation Command (United States) United Nations 17, 222, 363, 411, 414ff Wegmann group 81
43 United Nations Security Council 17, 28, 304 West Africa 411–414, 414
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism UNSCR 1973 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 50, 73, 303 West Bank 26
Partnership 414 United Shipbuilding Corporation 187, 190 Western Pacific 212
Tretyak, Andrei 184 United States 10ff, 17, 19, 20, 22ff, 27, 28, West Point (United States) 40, 41
Trinidad and Tobago 402 30, 39–49, 54, 72, 74, 75, 76, 83, 184, Wieker, Volker 79
‘Tripoli Brigade’ (Libya) 14 186, 191, 205, 206, 207, 211, 214, 216, WikiLeaks 313
Tripoli (Libya) 12, 13, 17 219, 220, 304, 305, 307, 308, 309, 312, Willard, Robert 212
Tunisia 9, 10, 12, 303, 351 313, 315, 361, 363, 364, 414, 415, 417, World Bank 415
Turkey 10, 11, 13, 162, 304, 305, 313 418 World Cup (football) 369, 420
Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 02:27 13 March 2012