Contents

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes viii

List of Contributors ix
Preface and Acknowledgements xvi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xx

1 Introduction: The Challenge of Nanotechnologies 1

Geoffrey Hunt and Michael D. Mehta

Part One Introducing Nanotechnology

2 Nanotechnology: From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’? 13

Kristen Kulinowski

3 Nanotechnology: From Feynman to Funding 25

K. Eric Drexler

4 Microsystems and Nanoscience for Biomedical

Applications: A View to the Future 35
Linda M. Pilarski, Michael D. Mehta, Timothy Caulfield,
Karan V. I. S. Kaler and Christopher J. Backhouse

5 Nanotechnoscience and Complex Systems: The Case for

Nanology 43
Geoffrey Hunt

Part Two Regional Developments

6 Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan 59

Matsuda Masami, Geoffrey Hunt and Obayashi Masayuki

7 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 74

Kirsty Mills

8 Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe 92

Geoffrey Hunt
vi Nanotechnology

9 Nanotechnologies and Society in Canada 105

Linda Goldenberg

Part Three Benefits and Risks

10 From Biotechnology to Nanotechnology: What Can We

Learn from Earlier Technologies? 121
Michael D. Mehta

11 Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time 130

John Balbus, Richard Denison, Karen Florini and Scott Walsh

12 Risk Management and Regulation in an Emerging

Technology 140
Roland Clift

13 Nanotechnology and Nanoparticle Toxicity: A Case

for Precaution 154
C. Vyvyan Howard and December S. K. Ikah

14 The Future of Nanotechnology in Food Science and

Nutrition: Can Science Predict its Safety? 167
Árpád Pusztai and Susan Bardocz

Part Four Ethics and Public Understanding

15 The Global Ethics of Nanotechnology 183

Geoffrey Hunt

16 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understanding

of Nanotechnologies 196
Julie Barnett, Anna Carr and Roland Clift

17 Dwarfing the Social? Nanotechnology Lessons from

the Biotechnology Front 213
Edna F. Einsiedel and Linda Goldenberg

Part Five Law and Regulation

18 Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision

Course 225
Siva Vaidhyanathan

19 Nanotechnologies and Civil Liability 237

Alan Hannah and Geoffrey Hunt
 Contents vii

20 Nanotechnologies and the Ethical Conduct of Research

Involving Human Subjects 247
Lorraine Sheremeta

21 Nanotechnologies and Corporate Criminal Liability 259

Celia Wells and Juanita Elias

Part Six Conclusion

22 What Makes Nanotechnologies Special? 273

Michael D. Mehta and Geoffrey Hunt

Appendix: Measurement Scales and Glossary 282

Index 289
 List of Figures, Tables and Boxes

Figures
2.1 Objects of approximate size from 103 m to 10
9 m 14
13.1 PM10 and daily mortality from cities around the world.
Expressed as a percentage change in daily mortality associated
with a 10mg m
3 increase in PM10 161
13.2 Effects of ultrafine particles (UP) and fine particles (PM2:5 ) on
mortality for prevalent diseases (total, cardiovascular,
respiratory, others) 162

Tables
7.1 NNI budget breakdowns by agency (dollars in millions) 78
8.1 2004 EU Consultation outcomes in health, environment etc 99
9.1 Government of Canada recommended domains for
nanotechnology R&D 106
9.2 Government of Canada conceptualization of nanotechnology
R&D stages 108
9.3 Enabling technologies funded by Technology Partnerships
Canada 113
12.1 Some possible applications of nanotechnology 142
12.2 The elements of current risk assessment 144
13.1 Classification of respirable particles 155

Boxes
6.1 Japanese attitude survey 69
 List of Contributors

Christopher J. Backhouse is professor at the University of Alberta in the

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering. Before joining the Univer-
sity of Alberta in 1999, he gained extensive industrial experience. His research
involves microfabrication, miniaturized instrumentation and the application of
micro/nanobiotechnologies. His research group spans engineering, nanoscience
and medicine, and has developed a range of instruments, techniques and
microfabricated devices implementing nanobiotechnology applications on
microfabricated devices.

John Balbus MD MPH directs the Health programme at the non-profit

Environmental Defense in Washington DC. Prior to joining Environmental
Defense in 2002, he spent seven years at George Washington University,
where he was founding director of the Center for Risk Science and Public
Health and served as acting chairman of the Department of Environmental
and Occupational Health. Dr Balbus’ background combines training and
experience in clinical medicine with expertise in epidemiology, toxicology
and risk sciences; he is Board-certified in both internal medicine and in occu-
pational and environmental medicine. He currently serves as a member of
the US National Academy of Sciences Board on Environmental Studies and
Toxicology; the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Children’s
Health Protection Advisory Committee; and the US National Academy of
Sciences panel on ‘Applications of Toxicogenomic Technologies to Predictive
Toxicology’.

Susan Bardocz is an internationally respected scientist who was a part of the

research team on genetically modified (GM)-potato work and is now also a
collaborator in the Tromso research project on the safety of GM foods.

Julie Barnett obtained her PhD in 1998, and is now senior research fellow in
the Psychology Department of the University of Surrey, UK. Julie’s main
research interests lie in the fields of risk perception and risk communication,
and in the contribution that social psychology can make to greater under-
standing and improved practice in these areas. Current research projects
are exploring public understandings of precaution in relation to mobile
x Nanotechnology

telecommunications, the use of lay knowledge in industry and public attitudes

to genomics.

Anna Carr is an inter-disciplinary scholar whose research interests lie in the

relationship between local places, knowledge practices and scientific truth
claims. Her intellectual agenda is to increase community engagement with
(professional) environmental science. She is currently based in Sydney,
Australia working for the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural
Resources and holds a visiting fellowship at the University of Surrey, UK.

Timothy Caulfield is a professor in the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of

Medicine and Dentistry, and is the research director of the Health Law Insti-
tute at the University of Alberta. In 2002, he received a Canada research chair
in Health Law and Policy. His research has focused on two general areas: (1)
genetics, ethics and the law and (2) the legal implications of health care
reform in Canada.

Roland Clift CBE FREng FIChemE HonFCIWEM is distinguished professor

of Environmental Technology and founding director of the Centre for Environ-
mental Strategy, University of Surrey, UK. He is a member of the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution, of the International Expert Group
on application of Life Cycle Assessment to waste management, and has been
awarded the Sir Frank Whittle medal by the Royal Academy of Engineering
for his leading role in developing the holistic life cycle assessment of products.
He was a member of the 2004 Working Group on Nanotechnology of the
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering.

Richard Denison PhD is a senior scientist at Environmental Defense in

Washington DC. Prior to joining Environmental Defense in 1987, he served
as analyst and assistant project director for the US Office of Technology
Assessment. He specializes in nanotechnology and chemical hazard assessment,
and serves on the National Pollution Prevention and Toxics Advisory
Committee to the US EPA and is on the Steering Group for Nanotechnology
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

K. Eric Drexler presented the basic concepts of molecular manufacturing in

a scientific article (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1981),
and wrote Engines of Creation (1986) to introduce a broad audience to the
prospect of advanced nanotechnologies, and Nanosystems (AAP, 1992, Most
Outstanding Computer Science Book) to provide a graduate-level introduction
to the field. His research in nanotechnology ranges from computational model-
ling of molecular machines to engineering analysis of molecular manufacturing
systems and their potential products. In support of US federal policy develop-
ment, he has provided presentations and briefings to (among others) the Senate
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space; the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy; and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
 List of Contributors xi

Staff. He is a founder and current chairman of the Foresight Institute, a non-

profit educational organization established to help prepare for advanced
technologies.

Edna F. Einsiedel is a professor of communication studies at the University of

Calgary. She is a principal investigator on a genomics, economic, ethical,
environmental, legal and social studies project funded by Genome Canada.

Juanita Elias is a lecturer in international politics at the University of

Adelaide, Australia. She is the author of Fashioning Inequality: The Multi-
national Corporation and Gendered Employment in a Globalising World,
(Ashgate, 2004) and has also published articles in New Political Economy and
International Feminist Journal of Politics. Her research interests include
employment practices in multinational corporations, the regulation of
corporations and corporate codes of conduct, International Political Economy
(IPE) and gender perspectives in political economy. She has worked previously
as a lecturer at the University of Manchester and as a researcher at the
Economic and Social Research Council Centre for Business Relationships,
Accountability, Sustainability and Society (BRASS), at Cardiff University.

Karen Florini JD is a senior attorney at Environmental Defense in

Washington DC. She focuses on nanotechnology, toxic chemicals, antibiotic
resistance and other environmental health issues, and has participated in
numerous federal advisory committees on topics such as lead poisoning, hazar-
dous waste management and children’s environmental health.

Linda Goldenberg is completing her PhD at the University of Calgary,

Faculty of Communication and Culture, where she is applying her expertise
in science, nanotechnology and ethics to the area of national security, critical
infrastructure protection and emergency management. Her current research
focus is intelligent technologies, such as public warning systems, in the national
security context. Linda’s expertise includes research in broadband technology,
scientific imaging and complex systems analysis. She is a contributor to the
recent US National Science Foundation report ‘Nanotechnology: Societal
Implications – Maximizing Benefits for Humanity’.

Alan Hannah is a solicitor advocate and is an employment law partner in

Brachers solicitors, Maidstone and London. Additionally he used to practise
in the field of medical negligence and was a member of the Maidstone Health
Authority Ethics Committee for many years. He is currently a member of the
Ethics Committee of the British Association of Paediatric Surgeons. He is a
former part-time Employment Tribunal chairman. His work now includes
corporate advice and general strategy in employment related business matters.
He advises and acts for a number of NHS Trusts and commercial concerns.
Alan retains an interest in the law relating to liability for tortious acts and
omissions.
xii Nanotechnology

C. Vyvyan Howard MB ChB PhD FRCPath is a medically qualified toxico-

pathologist who has specialized in low dose developmental toxicology. He is
currently professor of bioimaging at the Universty of Ulster, Northern Ireland
and editor in chief of Nanotoxicology, a new peer reviewed journal in the field of
nanotechnology. He is a past president of the Royal Microscopical Society and
has served on two European Union (EU) expert groups addressing the toxicity
of nanoparticles. He co-edited the book Particulate Matter: Properties and
Effects Upon Health, Springer-Verlag Telos, 1999.

Geoffrey Hunt BSc(Hons) MLitt PhD is full professor of ethics and global
policies at the University of Surrey (European Institute of Health and Medical
Sciences), and a member of the university’s Nanotechnology Forum. As an
ethics specialist he has published books and papers on public accountability,
professional and healthcare ethics, and public interest disclosure. He has
been a consultant to various professional bodies. As a philosopher he has
published in philosophy of medicine and healthcare, and political philosophy.
He lectured in Africa for 12 years, and in 2001 he was British Visiting Professor
in healthcare ethics at the Medical School of Kagawa University, Japan. He has
lectured on ‘nanotechnology and society’ in several universities and research
institutes in Japan and the UK. He is the founder of the public accountability
non-governmental organization (NGO) ‘Freedom to Care’.

December S. K. Ikah MB BS is in the Developmental Toxico-Pathology

Group, Department of Human Anatomy and Cell Biology, University of
Liverpool, UK. Dr Ikah trained in medicine in Nigeria. Currently he is
researching the toxicology of nano-particles at the University of Liverpool.
He is specializing, in particular, in the effects of particle size and surface
chemistry on the developing nervous system.

Karan V. I. S. Kaler, professor of electrical and computer engineering at

the University of Calgary, has more than 70 refereed publications and 3
patents. He is the director of the BioMEMS and the Bioelectrics Laboratories
at the University of Calgary. He developed the first automated instrument
capable of non-invasive interrogation and quantification of the electrical
properties of individual cells and the first micromachined dielectrophoresis
filter for the separation of viable from non-viable mammalian cells in commer-
cial scale bioreactors.

Kristen Kulinowski is a faculty fellow in the Department of Chemistry and

executive director for education and public policy of the Center for Biological
and Environmental Nanotechnology at Rice University in Houston, Texas.
Her research interests include policy of emerging technologies and science
education.

Matsuda Masami is a professor in the Graduate division of the Faculty of

Nursing, University of Shizuoka, Japan. His interests are in health care
 List of Contributors xiii

systems, primary health care, public health and global health. He is an adviser
in health and welfare for the Shizuoka City Mayor, and has advised authorities
of other cities, prefectures, national government and patient groups in Japan.
He has been an expert in Thailand, Yemen and Honduras. He is a board
member of the Japanese Society of Health and Welfare Policy, and of the
Japanese Society of International Health Cooperation. He is also on the
editorial board of the international academic journal Nursing Ethics (Arnold).

Michael Mehta is professor of sociology and chair, Sociology of Biotech-

nology Program, University of Saskatchewan, Canada. He specializes in
science, technology and society. Interests include risk perception and commu-
nication on biotechnology, nuclear safety, blood safety, endocrine modulators
and nanotechnology. His academic background includes a BA in psychology,
a Masters in environmental studies, a PhD in sociology and post-doctoral
training in policy studies. He has held academic appointments at York Univer-
sity (Faculty of Environmental Studies) and Queen’s University (School of
Policy Studies and School of Environmental Studies), and has taught graduate
and undergraduate students for more than 15 years. He is a co-founder of the
Environmental Studies Association of Canada (ESAC).

Kirsty Mills received her BSc in electrical engineering in 1974, and her PhD
in 1979, both from the University of Nottingham in the UK. She developed
III–V devices and integrated circuits at Plessey Research (UK) from 1979 to
1980, Thomson CSF (France) from 1980 to 1986 and General Electric
(Syracuse) from 1986 to 1991. A professor in the Electrical and Computer
Engineering Department at the University of New Mexico, she is professor
and the associate director of the Center for High Technology Materials. In
response to the increasing need for interdisciplinary function, she initiated
and leads the University of New Mexico’s ‘Science and Society Dialogue’
project, embraced by a wide range of university departments, schools and
institutes. As well as teaching engineering ethics, Dr Mills offers seminars
and workshops to a range of stakeholder groups.

Obayashi Masayuki is professor of bioethics, Kyoto Institute of Technology,

Japan. His specialty is history and philosophy of science, especially history
and methodology of molecular biology. He has taught bioethics and Science,
Technology and Society (STS) at some universities and medical schools He
is now interested in ethical problems of genetics and the professional ethics
of physicians, scientists and engineers.

Linda M. Pilarski, professor of oncology at the University of Alberta

and senior scientist of the Alberta Cancer Board, has more than 150 articles
and 3 patents. Her research focuses on blood cancers, molecular biology
and cancer profiling on microfluidics platforms. She is on the board of the
Microsystems Technology Research Institute and on the scientific advisory
boards for the Multiple Myeloma Research Foundation (US), the International
xiv Nanotechnology

Myeloma Foundation (US) and the Research Fund for macroglobulinaemia

Waldenstrom’s (US).

Árpád Pusztai MSc PhD FRSE is a consultant to the Norwegian Institute of

Gene Ecology (GenOk), Tromso, Norway; formerly Rowett Research Insti-
tute, Aberdeen, UK. He was born in Budapest (Hungary) in 1930 and qualified
in Chemistry. He received his PhD in biochemistry and physiology from the
University of London; did postdoctoral studies at the Lister Institute of
Preventive Medicine in London, and then joined the protein chemistry
department at the Rowett Research Institute, Aberdeen, Scotland in 1963.
He worked at the Rowett until his ‘official’ retirement as a senior scientist in
1990. From 1990 to end of 1998 he was engaged in research as a senior research
fellow of the Rowett at the request of the Institute’s director and coordinated
six major research programmes, and several national and European research
programmes until, as a result of his disclosures on our GM-potato work,
his contract was prematurely terminated and not renewed for 1999. From
2001 he has been collaborating in a Norwegian Research Council-funded
GM food research programme at the Norwegian Institute of Gene Ecology,
University of Tromso.

Lori Sheremeta is a lawyer and research associate at the Health Law Institute
at the Faculty of Law at the University of Alberta, and is cross-appointed to
the National Institute for Nanotechnology. Lori’s academic interests focus
on the legal, ethical and social issues implicated in new technologies including
genetics, genomics, regenerative medicine and nanotechnology. She is particu-
larly interested in the commercialization of research, the translation of research
findings to society and the role of intellectual property in this process. Lori is a
member of the Genome Prairie GE3 LS research team, the Stem Cell Network,
the Advanced Food and Materials Network and the Canadian Biotechnology
Secretariat International Public Opinion Research Team. She has written
numerous scoping papers for various federal government departments and
agencies, including Health Canada (intellectual property, nanotechnology),
the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (biobanking), the Inter-
agency Panel on Research Ethics (nanotechnology and human subject research)
and Genome Canada (Canada’s GE3 LS research capacity). Through the Office
of the National Science Advisor, Lori was recently appointed to a Canadian
Expert Panel on nanotechnology.

Siva Vaidhyanathan is a cultural historian and media scholar, is the author

of Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How it
Threatens Creativity (New York University Press, 2001) and The Anarchist
in the Library (Basic Books, 2004). Vaidhyanathan has written for many
periodicals, including The Chronicle of Higher Education, The New York
Times Magazine, MSNBC.COM, Salon.com, openDemocracy.net, and The
Nation. After five years as a professional journalist, Siva earned a PhD in
American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. He has taught at
 List of Contributors xv

Wesleyan University and the University of Wisconsin at Madison. He is

currently professor and director of the undergraduate programme in Com-
munication Studies in Culture and Communication at New York University.
He lives in Greenwich Village, US. He writes a regular column, ‘Remote
Control: Life in America’, at www.opendemocracy.net.

Scott Walsh MBA is a project manager at Environmental Defense in

Washington, DC. He manages partnerships with leading companies to create
environmental improvements that make business sense, and is currently
leading corporate partnership efforts to ensure the safe development of
nanotechnology. He is also participating in projects addressing sustainable
seafood, antibiotic resistance and vehicle-fleet management. Prior to joining
Environmental Defense, he served as a business strategy consultant with
Boston Consulting Group and as an environmental policy consultant with
Jellinek, Schwartz and Connolly.

Celia Wells is professor and deputy head of the Law School, Cardiff Univer-
sity. She is involved in the university’s Economic and Social Research Council
Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society.
Her research is mainly in criminal law and corporate criminal liability. She is
author of Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2nd edition OUP, 2001)
and Reconstructing Criminal Law (with Nicola Lacey and Oliver Quick, 3rd
edition, Cambridge University Press, 2003). Recent work includes ‘The
Impact of Feminist Thinking on Criminal Law’ (2004 Criminal Law Review)
and an essay on corporate complicity in human rights violations in Alston
(ed) Non State Actors in International Law (OUP, 2005).
 Preface and Acknowledgements

Until very recently most people associated nanotechnology with science fiction-
based accounts that tended to focus on fantastical devices and applications.
With recent developments in nanoscience (for example greater control over
atomic structure due in part to the atomic force microscope), nanotechnology
has entered the commercial realm, and has simultaneously begun the journey
of finding its space within the social imaginary. This book represents a leg of
this journey. By exploring the risks and benefits of nano-derived processes
and products, Nanotechnology: Risk, Ethics and Law considers the shifting
social space that this technology currently occupies. By examining how nano-
technology has been introduced to a range of actors, this book explores how
different governments in Europe, Japan, the US and Canada have responded
to the nanotechnology revolution. Additionally, this book considers how
experience with other technologies (for example biotechnology) may influence
how the general public, non-governmental organizations, scientists, regulators
and legal communities around the world are likely to frame nanotechnology.
Lastly, this book provides readers with a unique opportunity to think about
the ethical and conceptual issues raised by the introduction and dissemination
of this nanotechnology. In short, it provides a platform for readers to concep-
tualize the multifaceted impacts of nanotechnology by pointing out several of
the gaps in our collective understanding of how this transformative technology
is shaping the topography of the 21st century.
Geoffrey Hunt first developed an interest in nanotechnology in late 2002
when planning a visit to Japan to discuss the ethical implications of techno-
logical futures, and he put forward a tentative overview of nanotechnological
possibilities in a presentation at the Seizon Institute, Tokyo in 2003. Hunt
reciprocated with an invitation to Japanese colleagues and others the following
year to a small international workshop that he organized on the subject at
St Mary’s College (a college of the University of Surrey), in Twickenham,
UK. It was on that occasion in April 2004 that Hunt and Mehta first met,
and they formed the idea of this collection while taking a break along the
river Thames at Teddington Lock. Dr Arthur Naylor, Principal of St Mary’s
was most generous in his support for this workshop. Rev. Michael Hayes and
Dr David Jones of the college are to be warmly thanked for possessing the
boldness and curiosity to support what at the time might have seemed to
 Preface and Acknowledgements xvii

many others a rather peculiar and unlikely interest. The Wellcome Trust made
the meeting financially possible, and we are deeply thankful for that. Taking
what we thought might be the risk of a multidisciplinary Tower of Babel we
were not only relieved but heartened by the efforts that contributors made to
understand each other’s disciplinary perspectives on and questions about a
new field.
At the Twickenham meeting we were fortunate to have contributions from
Professor Johnjoe McFadden (cell biology), Professor John Hay (chemistry),
Dr Michael Hughes (biomechanics), and Dr Anna Carr (psychology), all
from the University of Surrey. Professor Matsuda Masami (public health),
Professor Morishita Naoki (philosophy) and Professor Obayashi Masayuki
(history of science) provided insights from Japanese technological, public
health and cultural perspectives. Other contributors were Professor Richard
Strohman (molecular biology), Dr Árpád Pusztai (gut biology), Mr Alan
Hannah (legal practice), Dr Harold Hillman (cell biology), Dr Susan Bardocz
(biology), Mr Roger Higman (environmental protection), Hunt (philosophy)
and Mehta (sociology), and there were theological and ethical perspectives
from Rev. Hayes and Dr Jones. Although only some of the original workshop
participants appear in this volume all of them provided novel ideas and insights.
Thanks to a travel grant from the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, Hunt
had visited Japan in October 2004 and spoke on the subject at the Kyoto Insti-
tute of Technology, at Tokyo University and at the National Institute of
Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), in the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry, Tokyo at the invitation of Dr Ata Masafumi,
senior researcher in nanotechnology strategy. This meeting, one in an ongoing
series, attracted over 50 representatives from government, industry and busi-
ness, and was reported in Nikkei Nanotechnology. Such was the interest in
the social and ethical dimension of nanotechnology that Hunt returned to
Japan in March 2005, with a travel grant from the University of Surrey, and
spoke on the subject at two more universities and at the Tsukuba branch of
AIST at the invitation of Dr Abe Shuji, deputy director of the Nanotechnology
Research Institute. The unswerving support and kindness of Professor
Matsuda Masami has made these busy itineraries in Japan run smoothly,
with a little help from the speed and precision of the shinkansen (bullet train).
Subsequent brief joint articles by Matsuda and Hunt in three Japanese journals
introduced some specific questions regarding the social implications and risks
of nanotechnology to the scientific and professional community in Japan.
(Note that in this book, for Japanese names we have followed the Japanese
convention of placing the family name first.)
Hunt also wishes to record the support of his colleagues in the Nanotech-
nology Forum at the University of Surrey, especially Professor Gary Stevens
(polymer science), Professor Ugur Tüzün (process engineering), and Professor
Roland Clift CBE, pioneer of the life cycle approach to environmental manage-
ment. Professor Robin Attfield (environmental philosophy) and Professor
Steven Norris (cultural studies) provided opportunities for challenging
questions at a Cardiff University seminar led by Hunt in November 2003.
xviii Nanotechnology

Michael Mehta’s interest in nanotechnology began in 2001 upon being

approached by an undergraduate student at the University of Saskatchewan
named Crystal Wallin. Wallin encouraged Mehta to consider the links between
nanotechnology and biotechnology and to eventually put together a grant
application to fund research on how developments in nanotechnology were
unfolding within Canada. This grant application was rejected by social science
peer reviewers from one of Canada’s major federal granting agencies with the
observation that one cannot study nanotechnology since it is nothing more
than ‘science fiction’. This spurred Mehta to develop an active programme of
research on the social impacts of nanotechnology.
Mehta is one of the few academics in Canada to explore the social and ethical
dimensions of nanotechnology. He has presented his work in this area in many
parts of the world: Canada, the US, the UK, Germany, Spain, Iceland and
Singapore. His presentations have been on a wide array of topics including
expanding the research base on risk perception and risk communication to
incorporate nanotechnology, the impact of nanotechnology on the enterprise
of science, the role of technological convergence as a driver of regulatory
reform, nanoethics, nanomedicine and its ethical and social challenges, nano-
technology and surveillance, nanotechnology and its anticipated economic
impacts, and the lessons that can be learned from biotechnology and nuclear
technology to assist in predicting the challenges posed by nanotechnology.
With Dr Linda Pilarski from the University of Alberta and others, Mehta
shares a CAD$1.5 million grant (2003–2008) from the Canadian Institutes of
Health Research (CIHR) to explore the social, ethical and legal issues related
to the development and use of microfluidic devices for genetic analysis. The
objective of this project is to develop microfluidics-based platforms having
photolithographically defined networks of microchannels whose versatility
has led to terms such as ‘lab on a chip’. These platforms are able to sort cells
and analyse their genomic profiles, individual genes, chromosomes and mito-
chondrial DNA, thereby bringing the benefits of the genomics and proteomics
revolutions to the clinic. These novel, integrated microfluidic platforms will
implement microsystems and nanoscience to develop automated, real time
multiplex cell manipulation and genetic analysis. Mehta’s role in this project
is to: (1) assess how Canadians understand issues related to health information,
genetic testing and privacy; (2) assess how medical practitioners (oncologists) in
Canada perceive the use of microfluidic platform technologies for clinical
applications; and (3) to hold consensus conferences on the risks and benefits
associated with the use of microfluidic platform technologies for non-clinical
purposes. In all likelihood this innovation will be the first available consumer
application of a medical device that incorporates nanotechnology.
Mehta wishes to thank Zaheer Baber, Timothy Caulfield, Abdallah Daar,
Edna Einsiedel, Linda Goldenberg, Jose Lopez, Chris MacDonald, Lori
Sheremeta, Peter Singer, Crystal Wallin and Gregor Wolbring for the intellec-
tual stimulation and debate over the years. Together we are the nanotechnology
and society cohort that has helped make Canada a significant player in this
field of inquiry. Mehta also wishes to thank his spouse Kathy Edwards for
 Preface and Acknowledgements xix

her assistance with this book. Kathy did much of the original formatting to get
the manuscript ready for peer review.
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 10 and 17 come from a special issue on nanotechnology of
the Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society (February 2004). That issue of
the journal, co-edited by Michael Mehta and Zaheer Baber, included several
other contributions that add to a slowly accumulating literature in nano-
technology within the Science, Technology and Society field. Chapter 20 by
Lori Sheremeta is drawn from a special issue on nanotechnology of the
Health Law Review (autumn 2004). Chapter 11, John Balbus et al, ‘Getting
Nanotechnology Right the First Time’, is reprinted with permission from
Issues in Science and Technology, summer 2005, pp65–71, copyright 2005 by
the University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, US. All remaining contributions
in this volume have been originally commissioned for this book.
Responsibility for the views expressed in this volume lies only with the co-
editors and the individual contributors.

Geoffrey Hunt, Guildford, UK

Michael Mehta, Saskatoon, Canada
28th November 2005
 1

Introduction:
The Challenge of Nanotechnologies

Geoffrey Hunt and Michael D. Mehta

Nanotechnologies are making the leap from science fiction to science reality.
The overwhelming majority of people have not yet noticed this transition,
but the technology of the vanishingly small will be expansively influential in
the next couple of decades. For it is not just a new range of technologies but
a new social force: a driver of techno-socio-cultural change. Like any other
family of radical technologies ‘nanotechnology’ is not just a set of techniques
that have appeared independently of society and about which we can now
make application-based decisions. It is emerging within an existing nexus of
decisions, relationships and values. It is not as though it is now a new subject
of completely free choice for the human race: it is emerging within a network
of relationships and processes that manifest the choices we have already
made over history and are currently living with, for better or worse. The
family of nanoscale technologies we call ‘nanotechnology’, like several other
critical issues of our time, stands at a juncture between choices for human
survival and betterment, and clinging to our global inheritance – not just
material inheritance but a largely outdated intellectual and attitudinal inheri-
tance. Which way, nanotechnology?

History
The concept of a nanoscale technology begins with the boldly speculative 1959
article ‘There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom’ by Nobel Prize winning theore-
tical physicist Richard Feynman (Feynman, 1959). In it he said he was not
afraid to consider the question whether ‘ultimately – in the great future – we
can arrange the atoms the way we want; the very atoms, all the way down!’.
The word ‘nanotechnology’ was actually first coined by Japanese scientist
Taniguchi Nori in 1974, but in the much narrower context of ultrafine
2 Nanotechnology

machining (see Chapter 6). A futuristic envisioning of the Feynman hypothesis

as a socially transforming technology had to await Eric Drexler’s 1986 book
Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology (Drexler, 1986). In a
1990 ‘Afterword’ he re-states his vision: ‘we are moving towards assemblers,
toward an era of molecular manufacturing giving thorough and inexpensive
control of the structure of matter’ (Drexler, 1990, p240). His central idea, of
using nanoscale mechanisms of assembling molecules to manufacture any
substances useful to humans, was technically elaborated in his 1995 work
entitled Nanosystems (Drexler, 1992). Meanwhile the instruments and tech-
niques of nanotechnology have brought the vision closer. The atomic force
microscope, the scanning tunnelling microscope, magnetic force microscopy,
advanced spectroscopy and electrochemistry, nanoscale lithography, molecular
self-assembly techniques and others are being perfected and new ones are
proliferating.1
In Chapter 3 of this book, Drexler complains that whereas ‘nanotech-
nology’, from his starting point, had meant nanomachines of some sort that
would be able to build desired entities atom-by-atom (molecular manufacture),
it has now shifted to mean any technology involving nanoscale processes and
products, and this has ‘obscured the Feynman vision’. He emphasizes that
the criticism that nanoreplicators are impossible misses the mark, for molecular
manufacture requires no such thing. He explains that it is chemical self-
assembly that is the fundamental manufacturing process. ‘It is time for the
nanotechnology community to reclaim the Feynman vision in its grand and
unsettling entirety’, he declares. Even on, or especially on, the basis of this
core concept many social and ethical issues arise. Some of the most important
are examined by the Centre for Responsible Nanotechnology (CRN).2
Nanotechnology, then, can be more broadly viewed as the contemporary
result of a natural ‘downsizing’ progression in nearly all the sciences and
their techniques, whether chemistry, materials science, physics, biology, indus-
trial processes, pharmacology, genetic engineering, electronic engineering,
neuropsychology and so on. ‘Nanotechnologies’, in the plural, is a more helpful
label. There is an inclination, in universities for example, to re-brand almost
everything as ‘nanotechnology’ to attract funding and prestige. Of course, if
this thing called ‘nanotechnology’ takes on a negative image in the mind of
the public, we may see a rapid re-re-branding, with the ‘nano’ being dropped
again. This will not alter the fact that a radical change is in fact running through
advanced technologies, even if mere size (the nanoscale) is not always sufficient
to capture what this change really amounts to. In Chapter 5, Hunt urges that a
complex systems approach is necessary for a better understanding of develop-
ments in nanotechnoscience.
In this book we do not focus on molecular manufacture, but take a broad
view of technologies working at the nanoscale. In fact, quite a lot of emphasis
here is on nanoparticles in materials, and in the short term this seems an
appropriate focus, partly because of issues of safety. We think that our
general approach reflects the current state of thinking around nanotechno-
logical developments.
 Introduction: The Challenge of Nanotechnologies 3

The nanoscale
Taking a lead from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),
the defining features of nanotechnological scale relate to structures, devices and
systems that have novel properties and functions because of their size, with a
length of scale of approximately 1–100 nanometre (nm) range, in at least one
dimension. Among other things, the USPTO, states: ‘Nanotechnology
research and development includes manipulation, processing, and fabrication
under control of the nanoscale structures and their integration into larger
material components, systems and architectures. Within these larger-scale
assemblies, the control and construction of their structures and components
remains at the nanometre scale.’3
One nanometre is one billionth of a metre, and to give this some reality it may
help to think, roughly, of the scale of viruses (see the Appendix for examples).
One billionth of a metre is approximately ten hydrogen atoms side by side, or
about one thousandth of the length of a typical bacterium. Since a single
human hair is around 80,000nm in width, objects measured in a few hundred
nanometres are invisible to the human eye.4 At this scale nanotechnology is
operating at the border between classical and quantum physics. As explained
in this book, nanoscale particles and other entities often have quite novel, and
even unexpected, properties compared with properties of the corresponding
bulk substances. It is this novelty – and the uncertainties that go with it – that
is both the source of excitement and benefits and of concern and risks. Nanotech-
nology is such that we cannot even be sure, taken a longer view, that the benefits
and risks are like anything we have previously known. New concepts (see the
Glossary in the Appendix) and revised standards of hazard and risk assessment
seem to be inevitable. General areas of application are as follows:

. manufacturing and industrial processes (catalysts, filters, and so on);

. transport, aeronautical and space engineering;
. biomedicine, pharmaceuticals, targeted drug delivery;
. imaging, sensors, monitoring;
. environmental management;
. food technology, additives, packaging;
. materials, surfaces, textiles, fabrics;
. sports and entertainment technology;
. cosmetics, fragrances, toiletries;
. Information and Communications Technology (ICT);
. intelligence, surveillance and defence.

Examples of specific products containing engineered nanoparticles (such as

carbon nanotubes) that are already on the consumer market are: textiles,
sportswear, golf balls, tennis rackets, plastic mouldings in vehicles and scratch
resistant paint, car tyres, sunscreen and certain electronic consumer goods.
Many other products, including nano-catalysts and nano-filters, are available
to manufacturers.
4 Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology in society
Anyone coming to nanotechnology for the first time may experience mixed feel-
ings: perhaps excitement tinged with anxiety. Kulinowski warns in Chapter 2
that Wow! (wonderful) could easily turn to Yuck! (horrible) in the public
mind, depending on several factors not necessarily under the control of
scientists, technologists, researchers, corporations and government depart-
ments and agencies. ‘Nanotechnology’ as a conception will be nurtured
within pre-existing popular mindsets; and the media and popular art forms
(films, novels and so on) will have an impact on those mindsets and should
not be underestimated. Nanotechnology is as much a public issue as it is an
expert issue, and as much a social science subject as a natural science subject.
Kulinowski points out that, despite this latent instability in perception,
there remains a significant disparity between the research effort that is going
into applications and the scant attention given to the whole range of social
implications of nanotechnology. Here we could include public understanding,
media reception, cultural and religious issues, ethical and legal dimensions, the
globalizing context, governance and accountability, disruptive impact on other
technologies and on economies, and political and military implications.
Of course, it is not just a case of either a Wow! or a Yuck! response, but
one of choices and tensions between human welfare benefits and hazards and
risks to human health and the environment. The most important questions
about nanotechnologies may not be posed, or not posed sufficiently quickly,
systematically and deeply, if it is left to the powerful forces of commerce and
competition. In the context of the latter the benefits may be stressed and the
questions skewed towards issues of sufficiency of investment, profitability,
receptivity of markets, intellectual property, speed of innovation and
application (Mehta, 2002), the necessary economic infrastructures, funding
of research and development, commercial confidentiality and the like. These
are all important questions, but they belong to a discourse that may overlap
with, but is not the same as, the human welfare discourse. This book makes
forays into both discourses, paying more attention to the latter to help achieve
an overall balance, and emerges with concerns as well as hopes.

Regional economic forces

In Part Two it is shown that almost every region of the world that has sufficient
material and financial resources is investing in nanotechnology: in research and
development, in applications, in conferencing, advertising and public relations,
in new infrastructure, institutions and networks, in commercialization, and in
educational initiatives. For the time being, the poorer regions, such as Africa
and parts of Asia and Latin America, can only stand on the sidelines.
Japan was, and still is, a principal conceptual originator of nanotechnology,
especially in materials and electronics, and investments are significant. As
Matsuda, Hunt and Obayashi point out in Chapter 6, innovations are moving
 Introduction: The Challenge of Nanotechnologies 5

ahead quickly both in the laboratories of corporations and in those of well-

resourced government bodies such as the National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and Technology (AIST). The historically strategic position
of nanotechnology in Japan is still not clear. The country is only now
recognizing the importance of sustainability and corporate responsibility and,
albeit rather more slowly than Europe, implementing the necessary changes.
The precautionary principle (a ‘better safe than sorry’ approach; see Chapter
10) is still regarded with suspicion for the most part, but significant actors
and agencies are waking up to the potential of nanotechnology in new market
demands for the innovative tools and processes needed for sustainable produc-
tion. Tense regional geopolitics (especially its future relations with China), the
slow pace of internal economic reforms, and a political divide between nation-
alists and ‘pacifists’, will also shape the role of nanotechnology in Japan.
There is no doubt that the US is leading nanotechnology as a commercial
enterprise, in terms of investments, patents, research and military applications.
Like Japan, and unlike Europe, the American research and business establish-
ment can count, for the most part, on popular support for science and technology.
In Chapter 7 Mills explains the enthusiastic coordinated effort being made
through directed investments and new institutional means. Research into the
social implications is not being neglected, but as Mills asks, since such research
is mainly federally funded and carried out by the nanotechnology community
itself, ‘who will guard the guardians?’ Non-governmental organization
(NGO) awareness of nanotechnology in Japan may still be at a low level, but
this is not so in the US. In the latter, NGOs were invited, but refused to join
a centre funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to examine the
impacts of nanotechnology on society. In Chapter 11 four experts with the
American NGO Environmental Defense examine nanotechnology and argue
that on this occasion we have an opportunity to get it right the first time, but
new approaches and cooperation are urgently required.
In the current climate, the precautionary principle – which admittedly has
some conceptual and implementation difficulties – is viewed with even more
suspicion in the US than it is in Japan. A nodal point of controversy for
nanotechnology is already growing around a precautionary-based reform of the
chemicals regulatory regime, with the European Union (EU) taking a lead
which is not very welcome elsewhere (Chapter 8). Mills suggests that ‘Europe
and the US are at very different stages in the process of moving from the era of
risk-taking . . . to an era of risk-prevention’. It seems that the tensions over nano-
technology between business and some NGOs, and between different approaches
to regulation, can only become deeper in the near future. Certainly in the 25
countries of the EU there appears to be what Hunt calls a ‘dual tension’ (Chapter
8). These are the opposing pressures often created (but not necessarily) by a drive
for increased global competitiveness at the same time as moves for sustainable
production and consumption, and between the diversity and participatory
democracy cherished by many Europeans and the drive towards ‘integration’
on all levels. In some ways the place of nanotechnologies in these European
dilemmas is a microcosm of its place in the political economy of the world at large.
6 Nanotechnology

Other parts of the world have a stake in nanotechnological development,

including China, Korea, some non-EU European nations, Taiwan, Australia,
India and, importantly, Canada. In Chapter 9 Goldenberg points out some-
thing that may be distinctive about the Canadian approach which the rest of
the world should heed. It is ‘inextricably linked to social policy and goals’
rather than being driven by a commercial or economic agenda. Canada,
unlike Japan, the US and the EU, currently has no national nanotechnology
strategy, so nanotechnology is positioned within wider goals including health
care and security. While this may have its strengths in terms of social welfare,
Goldenberg suggests it may engender an insular kind of ‘complacency’.

Ethical? Yes, no and perhaps

Complacency cannot be afforded from an ethical point of view. Parts Three and
Four of this book delineate some general ethical concerns, and investigates
potential hazards, risks and benefits expected to flow from advances in
nanotechnology. Looking at the ethical question globally in Chapter 15,
Hunt claims that in order to bring our collective power into harmony with an
understanding of the unintended global threats that arise from the application
of that power, we need a new sense of human responsibility. Economic injustice,
war, environmental degradation and over-consumption (consumerism) are four
global human facts that provided the actual context for nanotechnological
developments. He attempts to outline the stresses between our inheritance
and the prospects of survival and enhanced human welfare. Who will benefit?
Will a continuing unequal distribution of benefits, deepened by nano-
technology, destabilize the world. Global attitudes, outlooks and ways of
thinking are desperately needed.
Contributors question in Chapters 4 and 10 how much we have really
learned from the adverse consequences of the hasty introduction of previous
technologies such as nuclear technology, ICT and biotechnology. The nuclear
power and genetically modified (GM) food industries have already experienced
serious setbacks, whether justifiably or not. Nanotechnology (and stem cell
technology) stands on the threshold of similar difficulties unless, as Mehta
emphasizes in Chapter 10, the public is consulted and involved early
enough and often enough. For Mehta, new ways of thinking would include
challenges to the notion of ‘substantial equivalence’ (that underpinned GMF
development), empowering product labelling policies and thinking through
precautionary approaches ‘for addressing uncertainty and heightened under-
standing of how risks and benefits should be balanced’. New approaches will
also eventually be needed to issues of confidentiality and privacy when one
confronts the convergence and medicalizing consequences of biomedical
applications of nanotechnology, as described by Pilarski et al in Chapter 4.
What the hazards and risks of nanotechnologies might be are outlined by
Clift – a well-known proponent of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) in environ-
mental management (Chapter 12) – and these are concretely illustrated in the
 Introduction: The Challenge of Nanotechnologies 7

contributions by Howard and Pusztai (Chapters 13 and 14). Clift takes his cue
from the influential 2004 report on nanotechnologies from the UK’s Royal
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, which proposes treating engi-
neered nanoparticles as new chemicals. (Clift was a member of the working
group that produced the report.) This is a sound example of the kind of new
thinking that all stakeholders, including the public, needs to discuss. Clift
speaks of a possible ‘paradigm shift’, but also notes that at this time ‘No
systematic Life Cycle Assessment of representative nanotechnology products
or applications appears to have been reported’.
A close reading of the chapters by Howard and Pusztai would lead many to the
conclusion that such a LCA is of increasing urgency. Recognizing the paucity of
research studies into the possible toxic and other harmful effects of certain nano-
particles, they both show some courage in delineating what the hazards and risks,
on a precautionary basis, might be. Howard draws mainly on the existing literature
on the known harmful effects of ultra-fine particles of waste and combustion
processes (non-engineered nanoparticles) and asks us creatively and cautiously
to draw parallels with the possible passage of nanoparticles through the respira-
tory route. Pusztai speculates within the bounds of his scientific speciality
about possible ingestion routes for nanoparticles and the attendant risks on the
basis of previous and related findings in his field.
If Howard and Pusztai show us one thing it is that a precautionary approach
requires thinking laterally, analogically, holistically and making the connections
which the narrow view may miss. If it is not only acceptable, but welcome for
Feynman, Drexler and others to speculate about what science can do, should
do and what benefits it may bring, then it is surely also acceptable and welcome
for others to speculate about what science cannot do, should not do and what
risks it may bring. Pusztai is no stranger to controversy since his 1999 publication
in The Lancet on the relationship between GM potatoes and certain changes in the
gut wall of laboratory rats (Stanley and Pusztai, 1999; Horton, 1999). Let us see
whether a greater degree of maturity will be reflected by all stakeholders in the
case of forthcoming nanotechnology disagreements, with a willingness to respond
to new ideas and tentative findings with open-mindedness, subduing of sectarian
interests, and constructive suggestions and inquisitiveness. Situations of exag-
geration, demeaning misrepresentation, ‘whistleblowing’ and secrecy (Hunt,
1998) do not serve the ethical ends of nanotechnology’s potential service to
human welfare. The contributions of Howard and Pusztai at the very least raise
research questions of great relevance, and even suggest specific and independent
research programmes and testing protocols.

Public involvement and legal constraints

Open-mindedness and public involvement are in many ways the ethical keys to
the future of nanotechnology (Mehta, 2005). In Chapter 16 Barnett, Carr and
Clift observe that ‘trust – or more precisely, a lack of trust – is a core issue
around risk governance’. In the UK, for example, the fudged handling of the
8 Nanotechnology

crisis over bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and its relation to a new
variant of Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (vCJD) in humans revealed a lack of
public accountability and undermined trust in food science and technology
(Hunt, 1996). Carr and colleagues consider how openness about uncertainty
and dialogue with the public over nanotechnology may rebuild public trust.
The early development of social tools for the sustainable development of
nanotechnologies could play a vital part in recuperating and re-generating
trust, as pointed out by Einsiedel and Goldenberg in Chapter 17. In a good
example of lateral thinking these contributors suggest that lessons can be
learned from the case of recombinant bovine somatotropine (rBST) to boost
milk production. The risk to human health was considered insignificant but
negative impacts on animal health were deemed important enough to reject
use of this hormone in Canada. One cannot generally predict what the public
will think about an emerging technology – one has to inform them, to ask
their views, listen to their questions and involve them, and as early as possible.
As Einsiedel and Goldenberg write, ‘Increasing public awareness and engaging
in public education initiatives are important tools but are self-defeating when
done with the sole intent of getting the public on board and on side.’
The law too, in relation to nanotechnology, will not be a detached area of
human endeavour, but will reflect the struggle between our inheritance and
our future. We may be witnessing in the legal arena in general a movement
of the boundary that exists between narrower interests (corporate, national)
and the general protection of human welfare towards the latter. At the heart
of the commercial and industrial pursuit of nanotechnologies is the patent, a
legal instrument now under considerable stress and strain, as Vaidhyanathan
shows us in Chapter 18. This contributor suggests that nanotechnology may
at last explode the inadequacies of the current system. The patenting of what
used to be regarded as ‘basic research’ and the overstretching of patenting
into such a fundamental level of knowledge and know-how may endanger
both socially beneficial nanotechnology and patenting as we know it. Vaidhya-
nathan suggests that ‘Perhaps there should be a global nanotechnology patent
database run through the United Nations’.
One example of the nanotechnological impacts, which will create new legal
and ethical concerns, is biomedical research. In Chapter 20 Sheremeta takes the
case of a Canadian quasi-legal instrument, concerning the ethical treatment of
research on human subjects, to illustrate these concerns. At the same time,
Sheremeta is among the first to address ethical concerns in relation to specific
nanomedical innovations.
In the gradual long-term shift towards law as a function of global welfare
protection, we may find that corporations, entrepreneurs, suppliers, govern-
ment agencies, and research bodies will have to expand their conception of
nanotechnology as a commercial entity to one that promotes sustainable
development and enhances human life on a global scale. In Chapter 19,
practising UK lawyer Hannah foreshadows the expanding margin of civil
liability, with reference to asbestosis, and in Chapter 21 Wells and Elias do
the same for corporate criminal liability. One area of interest is liability for
 Introduction: The Challenge of Nanotechnologies 9

harms to future generations. And as Wells and Elias point out, ‘events such as
pharmaceutical harms, environmental damage, transport disasters, and chemical
plant explosions have led to calls for those enterprises to be prosecuted for
manslaughter’. On the legal horizon, certainly no further away than the promises
of a nanotechnological revolution, are the prospects of holding businesses
accountable for human rights violations. We are not just moving into a new
technological world, but a new legal, ethical, economic, social, cultural and
political one too. Those who promote only the benefits of nanotechnology
might do well to remember this point.
In closing, nanotechnologies are already embedded in existing socio-
economic relations and are formed by them, and in a multiplicity of feedback
loops will also have their impact in changing those relations for or against a
sustainable future. Transdisciplinary thinking is vital, discomfiting as it will
be for those embedded in their separate expert discourses. We hope this
book makes a small start by pointing out some important directions for fresh
thinking and truly global ethical concern.

Notes
1 For popular introductions to the basics of nanotechnology, and its promises,
see Ratner, M. and Ratner, D. (2003) Nanotechnology: A Gentle Introduc-
tion to the Next Big Idea, New Jersey, Pearson Education (Prentice Hall);
The Editors of Scientific American (2002) Understanding Nanotechnology,
New York, Warner Books; Mulhall, D. (2002) Our Molecular Future,
New York, Prometheus Books.
2 Centre for Responsible Nanotechnology (www.crnano.org/studies.htm),
led by Chris Phoenix and Mike Treder, proposes 30 essential nanotech-
nology studies, besides providing an overview of benefits and dangers of
molecular manufacturing.
3 For the precisely worded and detailed definition go to the classification on the
USPTO website at: www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc977/defs977.htm.
4 In terms of standard measurement the nanoscale is anything at or above 1nm
but less than 1mm (micron or micrometre or one millionth of a metre). One
nanometre (1nm) ¼ 1 billionth ¼ 0.000000001 metre (m) ¼ 10
9 m. See the
Appendix: Measurement scales and Glossary.

References
Drexler, K. E. (1986) Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology, New
York, Random House
Drexler, K. E. (1990) Engines of Creation, 2nd edition, New York, Random House
(Anchor), Afterword, pp240–242
Drexler, K. E. (1992) Nanosystems: Molecular Machinery, Manufacturing, and Compu-
tation, Chichester, Wiley
10 Nanotechnology

Feynman, R. P. (1959) ‘Plenty of room at the bottom’, www.its.caltech.edu/~feynman

Horton, R. (1999) ‘Genetically modified foods: absurd concern or welcome dialogue’,
The Lancet, vol 354 (9187), p1312
Hunt, G. (1998) ‘Whistleblowing’, in Chadwick, R. (ed) Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics,
California, Academic Press
Hunt, G. (1996) ‘Some ethical ground rules for BSE and other public health threats’,
Nursing Ethics, vol 3, no 3, pp263–265
Mehta, M. D. (2005) ‘Regulating biotechnology and nanotechnology in Canada: A post-
normal science approach for inclusion of the fourth helix’, International Journal of
Contemporary Sociology, vol 42, no 1, pp107–120
Mehta, M. D. (2002) ‘Nanoscience and nanotechnology: Assessing the nature of
innovation in these fields’, Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, vol 22, no 4,
pp269–273
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (2004) Nanoscience and Nano-
technologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties. London, The Royal Society and
The Royal Academy of Engineering
Stanley, W. B. and Pusztai, A. (1999) ‘Effects of diets containing genetically modified
potatoes expressing Galanthis rivalis lectin on rat small intestine’, The Lancet,
vol 354, no 9187, p1353
 Part One
Introducing Nanotechnology
 2

Nanotechnology:
From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’?

Kristen Kulinowski

Nanotechnology is science and engineering resulting from the manipulation of

matter’s most basic building blocks: atoms and molecules. As such, nano-
technology promises unprecedented control over both the materials we use
and the means of their production. Such control could revolutionize nearly
every sector of our economy, including medicine, defence and energy. Despite
the relatively recent emergence of this field, it already enjoys generous
federal funding and enthusiastic media coverage. The tenor of discourse on
nanotechnology is changing, however, as the voices of critics begin to sound
about a host of concerns ranging from the societal impacts of improving
human performance to the spectre of environmental devastation and human
disease.

Introduction
If one were to ask people at random to identify the most pressing present and
future global challenges with potential technological fixes, the list might
include cheap and clean energy, increased demand for potable water, reduced
environmental pollution, near-term expiration of Moore’s Law of computing
power (an impending crisis for Silicon Valley, anyway), world hunger, national
security and cures for diseases such as cancer.
Ask those same people what nanotechnology is and you are likely to get
one of two responses: ‘Huh?’ (by far the most common) or ‘I think it has
something to do with tiny little machines that . . . uh . . . swim through your
body and fix things?’ (Foresight and Governance Project, 2003). This is
likely to change in the next few years, because only one field of technical
research promises to develop solutions for all the aforementioned challenges.
That field is nanotechnology.
14 Nanotechnology

This might sound like the kind of breathless pronouncement that seems
to trumpet the arrival of every new technology. Surely, the news can’t be
that good. And how often has yesterday’s ‘best thing since sliced bread’
turned into today’s Superfund site (Environmental Protection Agency,
2003)? Emergent technologies often attract the attention of both hypesters
and fear-mongers. For example, genetically modified (GM) foods are both
hailed as the solution to world hunger and assailed as destroyers of the natural
order. Depending on your perspective, gene therapies will either cure intract-
able hereditary diseases such as haemophilia and Huntington’s disease or will
allow modern Dr Frankensteins to create a new race of superhumans. Nano-
technology is no different in this regard to its predecessors; it will either end
material need or end the reign of humanity on Earth. Given this potential
impact on society, and the growing public debate over nanotechnology’s bene-
fits and risks, both scientists and the public alike should have at least a passing
understanding of what nanotechnology is. This young field can also serve as an
illustrative example of how society grapples with any emergent technology,
including those yet to come.
The ‘nano’ in nanotechnology comes from the Greek word nanos, which
means dwarf. Scientists use this prefix to indicate 10
9 or one billionth.
Thus a nanosecond is one billionth of one second; a nanometre (nm) is one
billionth of one metre, and so on. Objects that can be classified as having some-
thing to do with nanotechnology are larger than atoms but much smaller than
we can perceive directly with our senses. One way to look at this size scale is that
one nanometre is about 100,000 times smaller than the diameter of a single
human hair. The following figure may also help to put this size scale in context.
Why a particular size scale should be the basis for so much federal funding,
research activity and media attention will become apparent soon.
The concept of controlling matter at the atomic level – which is at the heart
of nanotechnology’s promise – was first publicly articulated in 1959 by physi-
cist Richard Feynman in a speech given at Caltech entitled, ‘There’s Plenty of
Room at the Bottom’ (Feynman, 1959). Despite this history, it isn’t too
surprising that nanotechnology is not yet a household word given that it has
only been around in the research lab for the past 15 years or so. While the
term ‘nanotechnology’ was coined in 1974 by Japanese researcher Norio
Taniguchi to refer to engineering at length scales less than a micrometre,
futurist K. Eric Drexler is widely credited with popularizing the term in the
mainstream. In his 1986 book, Engines of Creation, Drexler envisioned a
world in which tiny machines or ‘assemblers’ are able to build other structures

Mountain Child Ant Bacterium Sugar molecule

(45 atoms)

1 kilometre 1 metre 1 millimetre 1 micrometre 1 nanometre

(1000m) (1m) (0.001m) (0.000001m) (0.000000001m)
Figure 2.1 Objects of approximate size from 103 m to 10
9 m
 Nanotechnology: From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’? 15

with exquisite precision by physically manipulating individual atoms (Drexler,

1986). If such control were technically achievable, then atom by atom construc-
tion of larger objects would be a whole new way of making materials and could
usher in a second Industrial Revolution with even more profound societal
impacts than the first one.
Until recently, nanotechnology remained the province of futurists and
visionaries because researchers lacked even rudimentary tools to observe
and manipulate individual atoms. This changed in the early 1980s with the
invention by International Business Machines (IBM) researchers of a new
tool called scanning tunnelling microscopy (STM) that allowed one not only
to ‘see’ individual atoms but to push them around, albeit painstakingly.1 The
potential value and importance of this new tool were immediately recognized
and earned its inventors the 1986 Nobel Prize for Physics (Nobel Foundation).
This technique and others that followed shortly thereafter allowed nanotech-
nology to move forward at a greatly accelerated pace. Within a few years, the
field had built up enough momentum to attract the Federal Government’s
attention.
On 21 January 2000, President Clinton chose Caltech – the site of the
historic Feynman speech – as the venue to announce the creation of the
National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), a coordinated Federal programme
to fund nanotechnology research and development:

My budget supports a major new National Nanotechnology Initiative, worth

US$500 million. . . Imagine the possibilities: materials with ten times the
strength of steel and only a small fraction of the weight – shrinking all the
information housed at the Library of Congress into a device the size of a
sugar cube – detecting cancerous tumors when they are only a few cells in size.
Some of our research goals may take 20 or more years to achieve, but that is
precisely why there is an important role for the federal government. (Clinton,
2000)

The creation and generous funding of the NNI signalled a serious and long
term commitment by the Federal Government to this new area of discovery.
This commitment continues in the current administration: President Bush’s
Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 budget request funds the NNI at a whopping US$847
million (FY 2004 Budget Request). This massive investment is justified by
pointing towards the positive benefits society will reap through nanotech-
nology. These are posited as a set of ‘Grand Challenges’ that, if realized,
‘could provide major broad based economic benefits to the United States as
well as improve the quality of life for its citizens dramatically’. These potential
benefits include (National Science and Technology Council, 2000):

. containing the entire contents of the Library of Congress in a device the size
of a sugar cube;
. making materials and products from the bottom up, that is, by building them
up from atoms and molecules. Bottom up manufacturing should require less
material and create less pollution;
16 Nanotechnology

. developing materials that are ten times stronger than steel, but a fraction of
the weight for making all kinds of land, sea, air and space vehicles lighter and
more fuel efficient;
. improving the computer speed and efficiency of minuscule transistors and
memory chips by factors of millions making today’s Pentium IIIs seem slow;
. detecting cancerous tumours that are only a few cells in size using nano-
engineered contrast agents;
. removing the finest contaminants from water and air, promoting a cleaner
environment and potable water at an affordable cost;
. Doubling the energy efficiency of solar cells.

A little bit of science

To better understand how nanotechnology could revolutionize such diverse
areas as, say, medicine and computing, we need to review a bit of fundamental
physics. Two sets of theories relate to this discussion: classical mechanics,
which governs the world of our direct perception (apple falling from tree to
hit Newton on the head) and quantum mechanics, which governs the world
of atoms and molecules (electrons tunnelling through seemingly impenetrable
barriers). Given enough information about the initial position of an object and
the forces acting upon it, classical mechanics allows one to determine with
certainty where that object was at some time in the past and where it will be
at some time in the future. This is useful because it allows one to, for example,
track a baseball from the crack of the bat to where it will drop in centre field or
to successfully sink the eight ball with a bank shot off the side wall of a pool
table (at least in theory). Quantum mechanics does not provide such comforting
predictability but does a far better job explaining the strange behaviour of
atoms and molecules and allows us to make (at best) probabilistic assessments
of where an electron is and what it might do if we poke it with a light probe. The
classical world and the quantum world seem miles apart. However, as we move
along the scale in Figure 2.1 from the large to the small, the classical rules even-
tually give way to the quantum rules. The murky, middle ground in between
the two domains is the province of nanotechnology.
In this transitional regime, a material often exhibits different behaviour
than it does either in the bulk, where it is governed by classical mechanics, or
as a single atom, where quantum mechanics dominates. To demonstrate the
changes that occur to a material when it is ‘nano-ized’ let’s consider the element
gold (Ratner and Ratner, 2003). We are familiar with gold as a shiny yellow
metal that can be worked into a variety of shapes for our adornment. If you
cut a piece of gold in half, each of the halves retains the properties of the
whole, except that each piece has half the mass and half the volume of the
original. (And even these sum to the mass and volume of the original uncut
piece.) Cut each half in half again and anyone would still recognize the pieces
as gold. And so on. You can keep doing this down to a certain size and then
the properties of the pieces begin to change. One of these may be the apparent
 Nanotechnology: From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’? 17

colour of the material. When gold is nanoscopic, that is, clusters of gold atoms
measuring 1nm across, the particles appear red.2 And if we change the size of
the clusters just a little bit, their colour changes yet again. That is only one
example of a material behaving according to scaling laws, that is, a smooth vari-
ation in a property that scales with the size of the object. Most of this variability
doesn’t begin to manifest until you get to the nanoscopic level. Therefore, if we
can control the processes that make a nanoscopic material, then we can control
the material’s properties. Chemists have long been able to design materials with
useful properties (for example polymers); what’s new is the unprecedented
degree of control over materials at the molecular level. This may not capture
the imagination as much as a tiny machine that precisely assembles materials
atom by atom, but it is an extraordinarily interesting and useful phenomenon
and is, ultimately, why nanotechnology is causing such a fuss.

Present and future applications of nanotechnology

Nanotechnology is expected to have a significant impact on just about every
sector of the economy through the use of nanostructured materials in medicine,
the production of clean energy and reduction in energy consumption, the crea-
tion of nanoscopic sensors, new materials for optics and photonics, and ultra
small magnets, the development of new techniques for the fabrication of
large-scale structures, the replacement of silicon based technology for electro-
nics and computing, and the enhancement of consumer products. A few of the
many applications will be highlighted within; for a more thorough review the
reader is directed to two published surveys of nanotechnology (Wilson et al,
2002; Ratner and Ratner, 2003).

Consumer products
While much of nanotechnology’s potential has yet to be realized, products that
incorporate nanomaterials are already in the marketplace. The Wilson Double
CoreTM tennis ball, the official ball of the Davis Cup tournament, has clay
nanoparticles embedded in the polymer lining of its inner wall, which slows
the escape of air from the ball making it last twice as long. Nano-CareTM
fabrics, sold in Eddie Bauer chinos and other clothing since November 2001,
incorporate ‘nano-whiskers’ into the fabric to make it stain resistant to water-
based liquids such as coffee and wine. PPG Industries produces SunCleanTM
self cleaning glass, which harnesses the sun’s energy to break down dirt and
spreads water smoothly over the surface to rinse the dirt away without beading
or streaking. Various sunscreens (Wild Child, Wet Dreams and Bare Zone)
incorporate ZinClearTM , a transparent suspension of nanoscopic zinc oxide
particles that are too small to scatter visible light as do products containing
microscopic particles. Nanotechnology has added value to these products
through a variety of properties – impermeability to gas, water repellency and
transparency – that manifest only or optimally at the nanoscale.
18 Nanotechnology

Military applications
Nanotechnology would probably not be worth US$847 million of federal
funding if it only made incremental improvements in consumer products.
Many of the high impact applications are in the areas of defence/national
security, medicine and energy. In FY 2003, the Department of Defense
(DOD) surpassed all other Federal agencies with a US$243 million investment
in nanotechnology research and development (FY 2003 Budget Request).3
DOD is interested in using nanotechnology to advance both offensive and
defensive military objectives. DOD’s primary areas of interest are information
acquisition, processing, storage and display (nanoelectronics); materials
performance and affordability (nanomaterials); and chemical and biological
warfare defence (nanosensors). The integration of several of these functional-
ities into a single technology is the ultimate goal of the Institute for Soldier
Nanotechnologies, an interdepartmental research centre established in 2002
by the US Army at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Its website
says:
Imagine a bullet proof jumpsuit, no thicker than spandex that monitors health,
eases injuries, communicates automatically, and maybe even lends superhuman
abilities. It’s a long range vision for how technology can make soldiers less
vulnerable to enemy and environmental threats.

The ultimate objective of this five-year, US$50 million effort is to create a

battle-suit that better protects the soldier in the battlefield.

Medical applications
No one has yet invented a little machine that will swim through your body and
mechanically strip away plaque from your inner arterial walls; nonetheless,
nanotechnology is poised to have an enormous impact on the diagnosis and
treatment of disease. Recall that one of the Grand Challenges of the NNI is
the ability to detect cancerous tumours that are only a few cells in size. Medical
imaging could be vastly improved by using nanoparticle-based materials to
enhance the optical contrast between healthy tissue and diseased tissue.
Diabetes treatment could be improved by injecting a nanoparticle into the
blood that automatically delivered a dose of insulin upon sensing an imbalance
in blood glucose level. Cancer may be treated someday soon with an injection of
nanoparticles that latch onto cancerous tissue and cook it to death upon external
application of a light source that poses no threat to healthy tissue.

Controversies: the ‘wow’ to ‘yuck’ trajectory

That’s the good news. New developments in technology usually start out
with strong public support, as the potential benefits to the economy, human
health or quality of life are touted.4 Let us call this the ‘wow index’. Genetic
 Nanotechnology: From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’? 19

engineering promised a revolution in medical care, including the ability to cure

or prevent diseases with a genetic basis such as Huntington’s disease, haemo-
philia, cystic fibrosis and some breast cancers. Manipulation of plant genomes
promised a revolution in how food is produced, by engineering crops with
increased yield, nutritional content and shelf life. At present, nanotechnology
has a very high wow index. For the past decade, nanotechnologists have
wowed the public with our ability to manipulate matter at the atomic level
and with grand visions of how we might use this ability. The good news has
given nanotechnology a strong start with extraordinary levels of focused
government funding, which is starting to reap tangible benefits to society.
Any technology that promises so much change is bound to generate contro-
versy, because with such awesome power comes the capacity to push beyond
boundaries that society has deemed acceptable. Put another way, societal and
ethical concerns can rapidly turn ‘wow!’ into ‘yuck’. These concerns are
often centered on fundamental moral and social perceptions of the nature of
the human as well as humanity’s relationship with the natural world. The
proponents of the NNI were not insensitive to the possibility that nanotech-
nology could push some of these buttons. In September 2000, the National
Science Foundation organized a workshop on societal implications of nano-
technology. The report from this workshop incorporates the viewpoints of a
diverse group of people from government, academia and industry on subjects
ranging from public involvement in decision making, education of future nano-
technologists, economics, politics, medicine and national security (Roco and
Bainbridge, 2001).
The debates surrounding many of the emergent technologies that preceded
nanotechnology can help us predict a likely trajectory for the controversy
surrounding this new field. One such example is provided by the debate over
GM foods. The genetic manipulation of crops grown for human consumption
spawned a host of ethical concerns about the advisability of tinkering with the
natural order. A perusal of anti-GM literature reveals a profound discomfort
with human attempts to outsmart Mother Nature by incorporating genetic
material from one species into another. The greater the difference of these
species in the natural world, the more profound seems to be the anxiety over
their mixing. Thus, incorporation of a cold-water fish gene into a tomato to
increase the fruit’s resistance to frost damage is higher on the ‘yuck index’
than incorporation of genetic material from one species of plant into another.
The public backlash against GM foods, which detractors labelled ‘Franken-
foods’, crippled the industry, especially in Europe, and ultimately cost billions
in lost global revenues. In a sense, this industry went from ‘wow’ to ‘yuck’ to
nearly ‘bankrupt’.
Nanotechnology’s ‘yuck index’ is rising in part because of the recent
publication of Michael Crichton’s novel Prey (Crichton, 2002). The author
of Jurassic Park (Crichton, 1990) and other techno-horror stories describes a
chilling scenario in which swarms of nano-robots – equipped with memory,
solar power generators, and powerful software – begin preying on living
creatures and reproducing. Like the fictive dinosaurs of Crichton’s earlier
20 Nanotechnology

work, the nanobots surprise and overwhelm their creators when they rapidly
evolve beyond the scientists’ capacity to predict or control them. Or, in the
words of Prey’s protagonist, ‘Things never turn out the way you think they
will.’ In the introduction to the book Crichton credits Eric Drexler’s ‘grey
goo’ scenario with inspiring the premise of his story. In brief, the grey goo
scenario is the destruction of humankind by ‘omnivorous’ nanomachines that
‘spread like blowing pollen, replicate swiftly, and reduce the biosphere to
dust in a matter of days’ (Drexler, 1986). This fear was echoed in an influential
essay entitled, ‘Why the future doesn’t need us’, in which Sun Microsystems
chief executive officer (CEO) Bill Joy warns that the convergence of nanotech-
nology, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology could pose a mortal threat to
humanity (Joy, 2000).
The concept of convergence, or the synergistic combination of multiple tech-
nologies, is of growing interest to government funding agencies and researchers
who seek to leverage the capabilities of each field to achieve something greater
than what each could do on its own. Within the science and technology commu-
nity, convergence is generally understood these days to involve some combination
of nanoscience, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science
(NBIC). Convergence is relevant to this discussion not because nanoscience is
one of the fields in the acronym but because the nanoscale is the regime within
which convergent technologies will operate. A joint National Science Founda-
tion/Department of Energy report explains the fundamental concept:

Convergence of diverse technologies is based on material unity at the nanoscale

and on technology integration from that scale. . . Revolutionary advances at the
interfaces between previously separate fields of science and technology are ready
to create key transforming tools for NBIC technologies. Developments in
systems approaches, mathematics and computation in conjunction with NBIC
allow us for the first time to understand the natural world, human society,
and scientific research as closely coupled complex, hierarchical systems.
(NSF/DOE, 2002)

This particular report explores the potential impact of convergent technologies

on human performance enhancement, including ‘highly effective communica-
tion techniques including brain to brain interaction, perfecting human machine
interfaces including neuromorphic engineering, . . . [and] enhancing human
capabilities for defence purposes.’ Wow. Or, yuck. It is hard to remain neutral
about such claims. Whether these outcomes are perceived to be beneficial or
detrimental is very much dependent on one’s perspective. In seeking to blur
the boundaries between human and machine, it was perhaps inevitable that
NBIC convergence would push the buttons of some of the same people who
are uncomfortable with the blurring of human–animal (pig liver transplants
into humans) and animal–plant (fish gene in tomato) boundaries.
One such group is a small but vocal organization known as the ETC Group:
the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration. Formerly
known as the Rural Advancement Foundation International, the ETC Group
says on its website that it is,
 Nanotechnology: From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’? 21

. . . dedicated to the conservation and sustainable advancement of cultural

and ecological diversity and human rights. To this end, ETC group supports
socially responsible developments of technologies useful to the poor and
marginalized and it addresses international governance issues and corporate
power.
Its technology interests include biotechnology, biological warfare and human
genomics with a special emphasis on genetically modified organisms such as
the so-called Terminator seed. This Monsanto product is engineered to
produce sterile plants, thus ensuring yearly repeat sales to farmers who
would otherwise harvest the fertile seeds for subsequent plantings. ETC
Group’s interest in nanotechnology dates back to early 2001 with the publica-
tion of a report that lays out the perils of advancing technologies such as
biotechnology and nanotechnology. The objections of this group to emerging
technologies seem to be based less in concerns about technology gone awry,
for example the grey goo scenario, than in the technologies’ capacity to increase
the gap between rich and poor, and developed and developing nations, through
control over the means of production and distribution of the technologies
(Mooney, 2001). This type of criticism is not levelled exclusively at nanotech-
nology but seems broadly applicable to any new technology.
Members of the ETC Group are not the only ones whose criticism of nano-
technology is more social than technical. Gregor Wolbring, a research scientist
at the University of Calgary, founder of the International Network on Bioethics
and Disability and self-proclaimed ‘thalidomider’, critiques technologies that
aim to enhance human performance or remediate or prevent disabilities. He
envisions a scenario in which nanotechnology could be used not only to further
marginalize the disabled but to coerce the healthy into improving themselves
and their offspring (Wolbring, 2002). This outcome could be dubbed the
‘nano-GATTACA’ scenario, after the 1997 film,5 which is set in a future
where genetic engineering allows all children to be born with physical and
mental enhancements. In the film, a two-tier society results in which the geneti-
cally enhanced oppress those non-elite people whose rebellious parents have
chosen to produce them the ‘natural’ way (Niccol, 1997). Wolbring warns
that nanotechnology has the same capacity as genetic engineering to be misused
as a potential instrument of coercion. Michael Mehta, a sociology professor at
the University of Saskatchewan, is concerned about the failure of the ‘triple
helix’ of State, university and industry to include the fourth helix, the
public, when making decisions about the regulation of emergent technologies
such as nanotechnology and biotechnology (Mehta, 2005). Mehta is also
concerned about the prospect of ‘nano-panopticism’, or a world in which all
citizens are subject to gross invasions of privacy through the misuse of nano-
scopic surveillance technology, increased computing power and storage, and
lab-on-a-nanochip technology for acquiring genetic information without
knowledge or consent (Mehta, 2002).6
Not all potential impacts of nanotechnology will be social in nature. The
technology is, after all, based on the production and use of materials. As
such, issues of environmental and toxicological effects must also be addressed.
22 Nanotechnology

History is replete with examples of technologies or materials that were

enthusiastically embraced by society, and then found years later to cause
environmental contamination or disease. The chemical dichloro-diphenyl-
trichloroethane (DDT) killed disease bearing mosquitoes, thus allowing areas
with tropical and sub tropical climates to be more safely populated and
developed, yet was ultimately banned in the US after it was linked to destruc-
tion of animal life. Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)-based refrigerants allowed for
affordable air conditioning, yet were ultimately banned after they were linked
to destruction of the ozone hole. Asbestos was used as a fire retardant and
insulator in many buildings until it was found to cause a deadly lung disease.
Some materials, such as semiconductors, are not in themselves known to be
harmful but are produced though environmentally burdensome processes.
Nanotechnology has tremendous potential to improve human health and
the environment; however, it could also have unintended impacts. The ability
of nanoparticles ability to penetrate into living cells could be exploited to
produce a new drug, or it could result in toxicity. Nanomaterials could be
used to produce cheap, energy efficient filters that improve drinking water
quality, or they could become environmental contaminants. Given the breadth
of materials and devices that fall under the broad umbrella of nanotechnology,
all of these outcomes may result to one extent or another. Despite the massive
amount of money that supports nanotechnology research and development, for
example the development of new applications, little research has been done on
potential implications. The National Science Foundation signalled its support
of implications research in 2001 by funding the Center for Biological and
Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN) at Rice University, whose mission
is to develop sustainable nanotechnologies that improve human health and
the environment. CBEN’s research portfolio includes basic research and
applications development in addition to implications research. Other agencies
and companies interested in incorporating nanomaterials into new products
have also begun to study the health effects and data should start to appear in
the technical literature within the next year. The Environmental Protection
Agency’s 2003 request for proposals on ‘Impacts of Manufactured Nano-
materials on Human Health and the Environment’ will accelerate the collection
and analysis of health and environmental impact data (Environmental Protec-
tion Agency).

Summary
As nanotechnology’s ‘yuck’ factor continues to rise, one would expect more
implications research to be funded, if only to address the concerns of the
public. The technical community is beginning to realize that public acceptance
of nanotechnology is vital to the continued support of their work and that they
ignore public concerns at their own peril. No nanotechnologist wants the field
to go the way of GM foods, which are largely viewed as the poster child of
misguided public policy. With sound technical data about the health and
 Nanotechnology: From ‘Wow’ to ‘Yuck’? 23

environmental impacts of nanomaterials and a commitment to open dialogue

about potential social and ethical implications with all stakeholders, nano-
technology could avoid travelling along the wow-to-yuck trajectory.

Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges Professor Vicki Colvin, Dr Kevin Ausman and the
Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology. This work was
partly supported by Nanoscale Science and Engineering Initiative of the
National Science Foundation under NSF Award Number EEC-0118007.

Notes
1 Technically, the STM and its offspring are not true microscopes in that
they do not directly image objects. Rather they convert into images the
variations in properties such as electric field, magnetism and force that
are measured across a surface by a probe tip.
2 A single gold nanoparticle cannot be seen with the unaided eye but a spec-
trophotometer can be used to measure its ‘redness’.
3 The National Science Foundation, which funds a broader research port-
folio, was a close second with US$221million. In FY 2004, NSF requested
US$247 million to DOD’s US$222 million.
4 Portions of this section are taken from the text of Professor Vicki L.
Colvin’s testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee
on Science, which held a hearing on societal and ethical implications of
nanotechnology on 9 April 2003. This testimony was co-written by Kristen
Kulinowski and Vicki Colvin.
5 The name of the fictive Gattaca corporation, the primary setting of the film,
is composed solely of letters used to label the nucleotide bases of DNA:
guanine, adenine, cytosine and thymine.
6 This is also reminiscent of a scene in Gattaca, in which a woman surrepti-
tiously gathers skin cells sloughed off by her lover to determine by genetic
analysis whether he would be a good mate.

References
Clinton, W. J. (2000) Presidential address at the California Institute of Technology,
20 January 2000, www.columbia.edu/cu/osi/nanopotusspeech.html
Crichton, M. (1990) Jurassic Park, New York, Knopf
Crichton, M. (2002) Prey, New York, HarperCollins
Drexler, K. E. (1986) Engines of Creation, New York, Anchor
Environmental Protection Agency http://es.epa.gov/ncer/rfa/current/2003_nano.html
Feynman, R. P. (1959) ‘There’s plenty of room at the bottom’, www.its.caltech.edu/
~feynman/plenty.html
24 Nanotechnology

Foresight and Governance Project (2003) Public Attitudes of Nanotechnology (film of

interviews with random people on the Mall), Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars
FY 2003 Budget Request http://nano.gov/2003budget.html
FY 2004 Budget Request http://nano.gov/fy2004_budget_ostp03_0204.pdf
Joy, B. (2000) ‘Why the future doesn’t need us’, Wired Magazine, vol 8, pp238–262,
www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html
Mehta, M. D. (2002) ‘Privacy vs. surveillance: How to avoid a nano-panoptic future’,
Canadian Chemical News, November/December, pp31–33
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normal science approach for inclusion of the fourth helix’, International Journal of
Contemporary Sociology, vol 42, no 1, pp107–120
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corporate concentration in the 21st century’, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation,
Uppsala, Sweden
National Science and Technology Council (2000) National Nanotechnology Initiative:
The initiative and its implementation plan, NSTC
Gattaca (1997), Directed by Andrew Niccol, Sony Pictures
Nobel Foundation www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/1986/press.html
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technology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science, Arlington,
VA, NSF/DOE
Ratner, M. and Ratner, D. (2003) Nanotechnology: A Gentle Introduction to the Next Big
Idea, New Jersey, Prentice Hall Professional Technical Reference
Roco, M. C. and Bainbridge, W. S. (eds) (2001) Societal Implications of Nanoscience and
Nanotechnology, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA
Wilson, M., Kannangara, K., Smith, G. Simmons, M. (eds), Chapman & Hall/CRC
Press, Boca Raton, FL
Wolbring, G. (2002) ‘Science and technology and the triple D (Disease, Disability,
Defect)’ in Roco, M. C. and Bainbridge, W. S. (eds) Converging Technologies
for Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information
Technology and Cognitive Science, Arlington, VA, National Science Foundation,
pp232–243
 3

Nanotechnology:
From Feynman to Funding

K. Eric Drexler

The revolutionary Feynman vision of a powerful and general nanotechnology –

based on nanomachines that build with atom-by-atom control – promises great
opportunities and, if abused, great dangers. This vision made ‘nanotechnology’
a buzzword and launched the global nanotechnology race. Along the way,
however, the meaning of the word had shifted. A vastly broadened definition
of ‘nanotechnology’ (including any technology with nanoscale features) enabled
specialists from diverse fields to infuse unrelated research with the Feynman
mystique. The resulting nanoscale-technology funding coalition has obscured
the Feynman vision, misunderstanding its basis, distrusting its promise, and
fearing that public concern regarding its dangers might interfere with research
funding. In response, leaders of a funding coalition have attempted to narrow
‘nanotechnology’ to exclude one area of nanoscale technology – the Feynman
vision itself. Their misdirected arguments against the Feynman vision have
needlessly confused public discussion of the objectives and consequences of
nanotechnology research.

Introduction
Debate regarding nanotechnology and its prospects has been muddied by
multiple definitions of the term, and by controversy about the technical feasi-
bility of basic long-term objectives. This chapter traces the history of ideas
and terminology, showing how a deep polarization has developed in the
community, generating confused language and misdirected arguments that
hinder public discussion both of current research objectives and of long-term
benefits and risks.
Although now used more broadly, the term ‘nanotechnology’ has been used
since the mid-1980s to label a vision first described by Richard Feynman in his
26 Nanotechnology

classic talk, ‘There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom’ (Feynman, 1959). The
Feynman vision projects the development of nanomachines able to build nano-
machines and other products with atom by atom control (a process termed
‘molecular manufacturing’). This vision generalizes the nanomachinery of
living systems, promising a technology of unprecedented power, with commen-
surate dangers and opportunities.
The Feynman vision (and rhetoric echoing it) motivated the US National
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). An early NNI document (NSTC,
2000) states under ‘Definition of Nanotechnology’ that ‘The essence of
nanotechnology is the ability to work at the molecular level, atom-by-atom,
to create large structures with fundamentally new molecular organization.’
An NNI promotional brochure (NSTC, 1999) speaks of ‘Feynman’s
vision of total nanoscale control’, calling it ‘the original nanotechnology
vision’.
In his speech proposing the NNI on 21 January 2000, President Clinton
invoked this vision on Feynman’s home ground: ‘My budget supports a
major new National Nanotechnology Initiative, worth US$500 million. Caltech
is no stranger to the idea of nanotechnology – the ability to manipulate matter at
the atomic and molecular level. Over 40 years ago, Caltech’s own Richard
Feynman asked, ‘‘What would happen if we could arrange the atoms one by
one the way we want them?’’ . . .’ (Clinton, 2000).

The Feynman vision and its implications

Feynman looked far beyond the laboratory accomplishments of his day
(Feynman, 1959). He suggested that miniature manufacturing systems could
build yet more manufacturing systems: ‘. . . I want to build a billion tiny
factories, models of each other, which are manufacturing simultaneously,
drilling holes, stamping parts, and so on.’ Working on a small enough scale,
these could build with ultimate precision: ‘[I]f we go down far enough, all of
our devices can be mass produced so that they are absolutely perfect [that
is, atomically precise] copies of one another.’ He asked ‘What would the prop-
erties of materials be if we could really arrange the atoms the way we want
them?’ He suggested that nanomachines could achieve this key objective,
building things with atom-by-atom control: ‘[I]t would be, in principle,
possible (I think) for a physicist to synthesize any chemical substance that
the chemist writes down . . . Put the atoms down where the chemist says, and
so you make the substance.’
The idea that nanomachines (picture nanoscale assembly-line robots) can
build with atom-by-atom control is the foundation of the Feynman vision of
nanotechnology: call it the Feynman thesis. This thesis has several obvious
implications, some suggested by biological parallels. As Nobel Prize winning
chemist Richard Smalley1 observed in 1999, ‘Every living thing is made of
cells that are chock full of nanomachines. . . Each one is perfect right down to
the last atom.’ (Smalley, 1999). Since cells build more cells, biology shows
 Nanotechnology: From Feynman to Funding 27

that nanomachine systems can build more nanomachine systems. And indeed,
he states that ‘it has become popular to imagine tiny robots (sometimes called
assemblers) that can manipulate and build things atom by atom. . . If
the nanobot could really build anything, it could certainly build another
copy of itself. It could therefore self replicate, much as biological cells do’
(Smalley, 2001).
Thus, the Feynman thesis implies the feasibility of nanoreplicators. As we
shall see, it is apparently this consequence that led Smalley to become the chief
advocate of the view that the Feynman thesis itself is false.

Following Feynman
The Feynman vision motivates research on assemblers and molecular manu-
facturing, and has generated a substantial technical literature (Bauschlicher
et al, 1997; Cavalcanti and Freitas, 2002; Drexler, 1981, 1987, 1987a, 1990,
1991, 1991a, 1992, 1992a, 1994, 1995, 1999; Freitas, 1998, 1999, 2002;
Globus, 1998; Merkle, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1997a, 1997b,
1997c, 1999, 1999a, 2000, Merkle and Freitas 2003; Musgrave et al, 1991;
Requicha, 2003; Skidmore et al, 2001; Walch and Merkle, 1998). The first of
these papers (Drexler 1981) proposes protein engineering as a path to nano-
machine development, and is cited as seminal in the field of computational
protein engineering (Pabo, 1986; Hellinga, 1998), which is indeed seen as
enabling nanomachines (Steipe, 1998).
In 1996, the Foresight Institute established the US$250,000 Feynman
Grand Prize in Nanotechnology. Carl Feynman, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT)-trained computer scientist and son of Richard, authorized
and participated in defining the conditions (Feynman, 1996), which require
building a 100nm-scale robotic arm ‘demonstrating the controlled motions
needed to manipulate and assemble individual atoms or molecules into larger
structures, with atomic precision’ (Foresight Institute, 1996). That is to say,
winning the Feynman Grand Prize requires building the core mechanism of
an assembler.
One would expect that the NNI, funded through appeals to the Feynman
vision, would focus on research supporting this strategic goal. The goal of
atom-by-atom control would motivate studies of nanomachines able to guide
molecular assembly. Leading scientists advising the NNI would examine
assemblers and competing approaches to their design and implementation,
generating road maps and milestones. In the course of a broad marshalling of
resources, at least one NNI-sponsored meeting would have invited at least
one talk on prospects for implementing the Feynman vision.
The actual situation has been quite different. No NNI-sponsored meeting
has yet included a talk on implementing the Feynman vision, and the most
prominent scientist advising the NNI has (sometimes) declared the Feynman
thesis to be false (Smalley, 2001). Understanding this perverse situation
requires a brief review of history, ideas and fears.
28 Nanotechnology

Vision obscured
The problem started with the word. In labelling the Feynman vision ‘nanotech-
nology’ (Drexler, 1986), the author chose a word with roots that let it fit any
nanoscale technology, no matter how old or mundane. The excitement of the
Feynman vision attached itself to the word, tempting specialists to re-label
their nanoscale research as ‘nanotechnology’. The trend began in the late
1980s, and by 2000 the prestige of the term was enormous: ‘The combination
of high tech gee whiz, high social impact, and economic good sense gives the
dream of nanotechnology the ability to inspire our nation’s youth toward
science unlike any event since Sputnik’ (Smalley, 2000).
This expansive, scale-defined nanotechnology includes what had been
termed thin films, fine fibres, colloidal particles, large molecules, fine-grained
materials, submicron lithography, and so on. In a presentation to the
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 3 March 2003,
Dr Samuel I. Stupp of Northwestern University gave as examples of nano-
technologies ‘pigments in paints; cutting tools and wear resistant coatings;
pharmaceuticals and drugs; nanoscale particles and thin films in electronic
devices; jewelry, optical and semiconductor wafer polishing.’ Any connection
between this miscellany of technologies and a research programme inspired
by the Feynman vision is almost imperceptible.
Why did many nanoscale technologists become hostile to the Feynman vision?
To begin with, most were from unrelated fields; they had no professional reason to
understand the concept, and most did not. Then, having labelled their work
‘nanotechnology’, they found that the term carried awkward baggage.
On the awkwardly positive side, work based on the Feynman vision had
promised more than anyone could soon deliver – computers smaller than a
bacterium, cheap and clean desktop manufacturing systems, medical devices
able to repair human cells, and more (Drexler, 1986, 1992; Freitas, 1999). Nano-
fibre reseachers found that the public expected them to deliver nano-robots. What
nanoscale technologist would want the burden of such expectations?
On the awkwardly negative side, consequences of the Feynman vision gave
‘nanotechnology’ a sense of enormous danger: ‘Self-replicating nanobots [of
the wrong sort] would be the equivalent of a new parasitic life-form, and
there might be no way to keep them from expanding indefinitely until every-
thing on earth became an undifferentiated mass of gray goo’ (Smalley, 2001).
What nanoscale technologist would want the burden of such fears?
For nanoscale technologists to unburden ‘nanotechnology’ while claiming
its prestige, the Feynman vision had to be accepted as a slogan but rejected
as a present goal and a future reality. And indeed, an Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)-sponsored evaluation of the NNI states
that ‘The notion of the self-replicating assembler has become the defining
characteristic of the split in an otherwise unified nanotechnology community.
There are those who believe in the possibility of self-replicating nanosystems,
and those who, at least for the moment, refuse even to consider discussing
possible means of achieving such a goal’ (Horek, 2000).
 Nanotechnology: From Feynman to Funding 29

Vision denied
President Clinton proposed the NNI in January 2000, launching a political
process that led to its funding by Congress late that year. In April – early in
this delicate interval – Wired published Bill Joy’s influential article, ‘Why the
Future Doesn’t Need Us’ (Joy, 2000), which referenced warnings regarding
nanoreplicators (Drexler, 1986) and called for the suppression of nanotech-
nology research.
The nanoscale research community reacted with horror to this threat to
funding. For a September workshop Richard Smalley (conflating several
ideas) wrote that ‘the principal fear is that it may be possible to create a new
life form, a self-replicating nanoscale robot, a ‘nanobot’ . . . these nanobots
are both enabling fantasy and dark nightmare in the popularized conception
of nanotechnology. . . We should not let this fuzzy-minded nightmare dream
scare us away from nanotechnology . . . The NNI should go forward . . .’
(Smalley, 2000). For the same workshop, another contributor (also seemingly
ignorant of the relevant literature), declared that ‘Without any scientific
bases, dire predictions of self-replicating species cause fear . . .’ (Tolles,
2000).
As we shall see, Smalley has attempted to dismiss the ‘fuzzy-minded night-
mare dream’ of nanoreplicators. Since he acknowledges that nanomachines able
to build with atom-by-atom control can serve as a basis for nanoreplicators
(Smalley, 2001), he proceeded by attempting to refute the Feynman thesis
itself.
Before turning to Smalley’s argument, consider how organic, biological and
assembler-based chemistry work: In organic chemistry, reactive molecules
move randomly in a solvent, colliding and sometimes reacting in ways that
form new molecules by making and breaking chemical bonds. The art of the
organic chemist is to select molecules and conditions that yield desired
products. In biological chemistry, reactive molecules are often brought
together with special-purpose nanomachines (enzymes, ribosomes) that align
them to facilitate specific reactions. Compared to organic chemistry, this
specialized control enables biology to build specialized structures (for example
proteins) that are more complex. In assembler-based chemistry, nanomachines
will bring molecules together to react only when and where they are wanted.
Compared with biological chemistry, this strong control will enable assemblers
to build structures of both greater complexity and generality. In organic, biolo-
gical and assembler-based chemistry, the fundamental chemical processes are
similar.
Smalley, however, asserted that assemblers must do something quite
different from what anyone has suggested – that they must somehow separately
grab and guide each individual atom in the region where the reaction
occurs. Based on this, he set up and knocked down a straw-man ‘assembler’
having many tiny fingers, one per moving atom, and declared the Feynman
thesis false because ‘There just isn’t enough room in the nanometer-size
reaction region to accommodate all the fingers of all the manipulators necessary
30 Nanotechnology

to have complete control of the chemistry. In a famous 1959 talk that has
inspired nanotechnologists everywhere, Nobel physicist Richard Feynman
memorably noted, ‘‘There’s plenty of room at the bottom.’’ But there’s not
that much room.’
But Feynman does not ask that we separately grab and guide many
neighbouring atoms simultaneously. Chemistry (assembler-based or otherwise)
does not require this: as molecules come together and react, their atoms remain
bonded to neighbors and need no separate fingers to move them. ‘Smalley
fingers’ solve no problems and thus appear in no proposals: their impossibility
is simply irrelevant. Smalley has offered no scientific criticism that addresses
the actual concept. The Feynman thesis stands.

Vision returning
Smalley himself invoked the Feynman thesis before the US Senate, stating that
we will ‘learn to build things at the ultimate level of control, one atom at a time’
(Smalley 1999), then rejected it when dismissing risks in the pages of Scientific
American, stating that ‘Self-replicating, mechanical nanobots are simply not
possible in our world. To put every atom in its place – the vision articulated
by some nanotechnologists – would require magic fingers’ (Smalley 2001),
yet reverses himself to invoke it again before the President’s Council of Advi-
sors on Science and Technology, stating that ‘The ultimate nanotechnology
builds at the ultimate level of finesse one atom at a time, and does it with
molecular perfection’ (Smalley 2003). Thus it seems that he has abandoned
the argument in Smalley (2001) and returned to endorsing the Feynman
thesis, at least as promotional rhetoric. Denial of the Feynman thesis has
failed, but the community has yet to fully embrace its consequences.
Research in nanoscale technologies is growing worldwide. Despite a lack of
strategic focus in the US, several subfields are extending the human ability to
build structures with atomic precision. These include advances in organic
synthesis, molecular self-assembly, and even direct atom-by-atom construction
using scanning probe microscopes. Some areas of nanoparticle and nanofibre
research create atomically precise structures that could serve as building
blocks for molecular machine systems. This rising tide of technology lifts
human abilities ever closer to actualizing the abilities Feynman anticipated –
and decades ago described as ‘a development which I think cannot be avoided’
(Feynman, 1959).
Molecular manufacturing will emerge more swiftly in the hands of those
pursuing better focused development efforts. It will yield revolutionary
improvements in computers (portable machines with a billion processors),
medicine (devices able to find and destroy cancer cells), the environment
(zero emission industrial production), and arms (ultra-smart non-lethal
weapons). Because its powers will be so broad, attempts to suppress molecular
manufacturing research in open, democratic societies would amount to
unilateral disarmament.
 Nanotechnology: From Feynman to Funding 31

Risks are becoming a public issue (ETC Group, 2003). Nanoreplicators

are feasible and their control is thus a legitimate concern. The Foresight
Guidelines on Molecular Nanotechnology show how runaway nanoreplication
accidents (‘grey goo’) can be avoided (Foresight/IMM, 2000). Deliberate
development of nanoweapon systems, however, presents a threat that is
both less remote and more challenging. The US Nanotech R&D Act of 2003
(HR 766) draws on the language of the Foresight Guidelines in calling
for the US National Academy of Sciences to study both ‘molecular manu-
facturing development’ and ‘the possible regulation of self-replicating
nanomachines’.
Continued attempts to calm public fears by denying the feasibility of
molecular manufacturing and nanoreplicators would inevitably fail, placing
the entire field calling itself ‘nanotechnology’ at risk of a destructive
backlash. A better course would be to show that these developments are
manageable and still distant. Current research is in fact of low risk, and the
economic, environmental, medical and military arguments for continued
vigorous pursuit of nanotechnologies are strong. In an open discussion, I
believe that these arguments will prevail. It is time for the nanotechnology
community to reclaim the Feynman vision in its grand and unsettling
entirety.

Note: nanoterms and nanosystems

The terms ‘nanoreplicator’, ‘nanobot’, ‘assembler’, and ‘molecular manufac-
turing’ are often used in confusing ways. As used here, an ‘assembler’ is a
mechanism for guiding chemical reactions by positioning reactive molecular
tools, moving its tool-holding end in three dimensions like an industrial
robot arm. A generic ‘nanobot’, then, may be an assembler or some other
sort of nanoscale robotic mechanism. ‘Molecular manufacturing’ is a process
of construction based on atom-by-atom control of product structures, which
may use assemblers (or more specialized mechanisms) to guide a sequence of
chemical reactions. If an assembler were packaged together with all of the
machinery needed to power it, direct it, and prepare its reactive molecular
tools – and with all of the instructions needed to guide the construction of
another identical microscopic package – it would then form the heart of (one
kind of ) a ‘nanoreplicator’.
A nanoreplicator is thus a complex and specialized sort of nanomachine. A
molecular manufacturing technology base is potentially self-replicating, but
that potential can be harnessed in various ways – for example, to build
desktop-scale ‘nanofactories’ pre-programmed to produce a wide range of
macroscopic products (including, on demand, parts for more nanofactories)
(Drexler, 1992). These contain no autonomous mobile robots.
The term ‘nanotechnology’ itself now embraces a broad range of science and
technology working at a length scale of approximately 1–100 nanometres,
including the more specific goal it originally denoted.
32 Nanotechnology

Notes
1 Richard Smalley, who shared the Nobel Prize in 1996 for discovering the
C60 Buckminsterfullerene, died in late 2005 in Houston, Texas, aged 62.
See obituary by Professor Harry Kroto in The Guardian, London, 9
November 2005, p36.

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 4

Microsystems and Nanoscience

for Biomedical Applications:
A View to the Future

Linda M. Pilarski, Michael D. Mehta, Timothy Caulfield,

Karan V. I. S. Kaler and Christopher J. Backhouse

At present there is an enormous discrepancy between our nanotechnological

capabilities, particularly our nanobiotechnologies, our social wisdom and
consensus on how to apply them. To date, cost considerations have greatly
constrained our application of nanotechnologies. However, novel advances
in microsystem platform technologies are about to greatly diminish that
economic constraint while developing new industries. Properly used in a
solid legal and ethical framework, within an educated population, these
advances will vastly enrich our quality of life without being intrusive. Impro-
perly used, these technologies could lead to a modern-day Luddism, social
turmoil or possibly even to emulating those societies described in the darkest
of novels. These technologies must be developed in tandem with the social
and legal frameworks needed to ensure that they improve both individuals
and our society. To ensure that this occurs we need to have the ethical,
legal, scientific and engineering experts working together, and with the
public.

Introduction
Nanotechnology is a very rapidly expanding field that generates enormous
excitement within specialized scientific communities. However, for the
public it is at best largely unknown and at worst is the focus of alarmist science
fiction. The applications of nanotechnology, particularly in the biomedical
arena, involves a postulated trillion dollar new economy with otherwise
undreamed of benefits for health care, public safety, environmental monitoring
36 Nanotechnology

and forensics. For example, nanoscale manipulations may enable tissue

regeneration, in vivo medical monitoring by nanoscale robots, precise and
convenient drug delivery, novel drug formulations, real-time molecular
pathology, affordable testing at diagnosis and monitoring of a wide variety of
diseases and sophisticated health care in remote locations. The development
of portable handheld devices implementing nanoscale molecular manipulations
is likely to facilitate accurate, sensitive and fast monitoring of air and water
quality ‘in the field,’ to determine environmental safety, identify environmental
pollutants and inform cleanup efforts. Similar devices could rapidly identify
potential threats to public safety through sensitive detection and identification
of infectious agents. For many of the anticipated benefits of the nanotechnology
‘revolution’, microsystems will provide essential interfaces between the macro
world of human beings and the nano world of molecules. Microsystems
implementing micro- and nano-fluidics to establish molecular connections
and disconnections will likely provide the enabling technologies for these
nanoscale molecular interactions.
Expected front-line innovations using microsystems are likely to provide
demonstrable economic benefits to health care systems in developed and
undeveloped countries, benefits to industry, and perhaps most importantly,
improvements in the quality and accessibility of sophisticated health care
diagnosis and monitoring. By optimizing medical interventions through more
precise and faster medical testing, high quality health care becomes more
affordable, providing significant economic benefits while maintaining social
values. Automating technically complex tests using platforms that incorporate
microfluidics and molecular manipulations has a high probability of improving
health care delivery by lowering the costs of analysis, and increasing the
availability of testing, enabling risk-adapted tailoring of treatment customized
for each patient, earlier detection of disease and the potential for preventive
strategies.
Much of the impact of the microelectronics revolution was brought about
by the simple fact that microelectronics became vastly cheaper. Among other
things, microelectronics has made computation, data storage and video
surveillance inexpensive and this in itself has brought about major changes.
In concert with other technological changes our society’s concept and practice
of privacy has been radically altered. It is becoming feasible to perform
surreptitious biometric analyses (for example identification based on facial
features and walking gait). It is becoming increasingly possible to track our
conversations, movements and personal information, and increasingly
difficult to protect that information. Our social awareness, legal and ethical
framework has lagged behind our technology as society has drifted into
changes that would have seemed unthinkable in the past. Yet these substan-
tial changes were brought about simply because it was cost effective and
convenient to institute them. Present and future microsystems technology
will implement nanotechnologies that will offer compelling arguments in
favour of their adoption but which could have a significantly greater impact
upon our society.
 Microsystems and Nanoscience for Biomedical Applications: A View to the Future 37

Microsystems
Microfluidic devices are the result of applying microelectronic fabrication
technologies to produce, instead of microconductor networks in silicon and
metal, microchannel networks in glass. Within these microchannels, reagents
can be manipulated by applying electric fields and results detected by optical
means. Microsystems provide high-resolution molecular separations, and can
combine multiple functions on a single chip (for example cell selection and
extensive genetic analysis). Microsystems lend themselves to the analysis of
individual cells, which may lead to a greatly improved understanding of
many diseases, particularly cancer where the cells comprising a tumour mass
are often quite heterogeneous.
There is an enormous disconnect between the generation of new biomedical
knowledge, particularly genomics and proteomics, and the ability to usefully
apply it in the community. Disease profiling offers the promise of more effective
treatment but clinical laboratories lack the required expertise to perform such
testing and health care systems throughout the developed world cannot afford
it. In the developing world, these issues are not even being considered. The
potential ability of automated chip platforms to perform many of the tasks
normally performed by technologists and/or by multiple large and expensive
pieces of equipment is enormous. Microsystems with nanoscale molecular
manipulations will enable more specific disease classification based on
predicted response to treatment, thereby allowing more directed clinical deci-
sion making for appropriate patient management. Cost-effective pre-screening
strategies that could monitor patients over time would enable identification of
high-risk genetic profiles as soon as they arise. The development of a suitable
integrated platform that is versatile, reliable, multifunctional and socially
acceptable requires intensive interactions among multiple sectors of the
scientific community, the social sciences, government and the general public.

Cancer detection and treatment

Cancer is a highly diverse family of diseases. A significant clinical problem is that
the characteristics of one form of cancer may be radically different from those of
another form, or even of another phase of development of the same cancer. A
non-invasive, inexpensive and multifunctional characterization tool would
enable widespread pre-screening, providing better diagnosis, and more effective
monitoring. With the large volume of genetic information so far accumulated, it
becomes increasingly important to consider the logistics of performing these tests.
Microsystems are capable of testing cell populations from blood, bone
marrow or other tissues for indications of cancer-related anomalies, and
performing many tests for genetic sequences of interest. The end result
would be to assemble a detailed cancer signature for each patient. Microsystems
hosting nanoscience molecular manipulations to detect cancer signatures could
enable non-invasive early detection of rare aggressive variants, detection of
38 Nanotechnology

residual tumour cells, or metastatic cells at distant sites after the removal and
treatment of an existing tumour. They will facilitate targeted intervention
delivery, and monitoring of intervention, as well as analysis of tumour hetero-
geneity with the possibility for real time assessment and tailoring of therapy for
each patient.

Polygenics, Pharmacogenomics and Data Banks

With few exceptions, most diseases are polygenic, that is they involve far more
than one gene. As such, we know how to test for only the relatively few known,
simpler diseases, such as those associated with diseases such as haemochroma-
tosis and cystic fibrosis, diseases which are associated with mutations in a few
known regions of the genome. Haemochromatosis is a common disease that
can lead to organ failure and death. Yet this is a disease that can be cured by
information – once the condition is known lifestyle changes can prevent
damage. Perhaps if we knew more, we would find many more examples that
could be cured with knowledge alone. To understand the more complex ‘poly-
genic’ diseases, we will likely need vastly more data. Public participation will,
for example, require protection for participating individuals against being
denied insurance by virtue of having been discovered to be a high risk for
some potential future medical condition.
Similarly, many drugs have a therapeutic effect on a large portion of the
population, but in a relatively small proportion of the population has unacceptable
side effects. In future, much of our health care may be individually tailored. This
may provide us with more options in terms of drugs, but will require that our
health care providers know much about our individual genomes. In an age in
which medical information is being collected in databases that are increasingly
accessible to any health care provider, this will present a dangerous situation in
which very sensitive information is widely available while being very valuable
to insurance companies and others. Large databases of personal information are
likely to be accumulated in future. Who will mind the store?

Microsystems, social values and public trust

Because the availability of fast, accurate and sensitive genetic analysis has
significant potential for misuse, an extensive public consultation process is
needed to educate and then consult with end users, the medical community,
governmental regulators and the general public to determine societal priorities
and the level of risk. This will need to be in terms of social impact of fast,
accurate genetic testing that is considered to be an acceptable ‘tradeoff’ to
gain the benefits of on-chip analysis in the clinic.
In general, literature on the social implications of the revolution in
genomics is growing rapidly, and is demonstrating the value of taking a multi-
disciplinary approach. Scholars in medicine, law and the social sciences have
 Microsystems and Nanoscience for Biomedical Applications: A View to the Future 39

examined genetic privacy, counseling, and intellectual property rights (Lemmens

and Austin, 2001). The convergence of genomics, information technology and
microfluidics has created a need for broader and deeper multidisciplinary
analysis. The development and use of microfluidic platform technologies for
genetic analysis will pose unique challenges and opportunities for medical
practitioners, engineers and scientists, governments, courts of law, patient
advocacy groups, and the private sector.
By its very nature, genetic testing is a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, the identification of genetic markers has revolutionized our under-
standing of human genetic variation. For instance, the Human Genome Project
has helped coordinate international efforts to identify specific genetic mutations
by mapping and sequencing the human genome, and opens the door to earlier
and more accurate diagnosis, susceptibility testing, carrier testing and pharma-
cogenomics. On the other hand, genetic testing raises concerns about privacy
(Nissenbaum, 1998) and ownership of our genome, the ascendancy of genetic
determinism as an ideology and practice which may narrow our understanding
of the parameters of health (Keller, 2001; Morange, 2001), widen the gaps in
health care by increasing medicalization in public health spending, defined as
a process whereby a condition comes to be defined and understood as an illness
and is thereby moved into the sphere of the medical profession.
While a comprehensive analysis and critique of the many social concerns
associated with genetic technologies is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
worth noting that there is a rich literature that is highly relevant in this context
(for example Buchanan et al, 2000; Tri-Council, 1998). Because microsystems
will allow for fast, accurate and sensitive genetic analysis, they have the
potential to intensify many of the issues that have been identified with, for
example, the introduction of genetic testing technologies.
Currently, many clinical practitioners lack the appropriate knowledge base
to advise patients on the use of genetic services (Hunter et al, 1998). Obtaining
meaningful consent thus becomes difficult, and may intensify the possibility of
‘genetic malpractice’ lawsuits, particularly given the complex, risk based,
nature of much of the relevant information (Caulfield, 1999). In addition, the
speed of microsystem testing will amplify many of the challenges associated
with genetic counselling. Which tests require formal counselling? Who will
provide the information? Will the speed and ease of the test increase pressure
to be tested?
The problems associated with ‘genetic discrimination’ will also need to be
considered. This is particularly so given that the development and use of
portable, rapid, low-cost, easy-to-use microfluidic platform technologies for
genetic analysis creates the potential for a wide-range of non-clinical uses by
insurance companies, employers and even by individual consumers. Though
not all commentators agree that genetic information is significantly different
from other forms of health information (Wertz, 1997), the idea of genetic
discrimination continues to be a policy concern (Lemmens et al, 2001). In
fact, rightly or not, survey research has consistently shown that the public
views genetic information as fundamentally special and the rules governing
40 Nanotechnology

access should be more strict than for other forms of personal information.
Moreover, when combined with information technology, this revolution in
genetic analysis will provide the ability to shift information from its original
context to a different context, and may open up new avenues for monitoring
individuals (Mehta, 2002). This seems likely to create an impetus for stronger
and more uniform privacy laws, and require improvements in genetic counsel-
ling and informed consent processes.
Commercialization pressures may also create unique social issues (Caulfield
and Williams-Jones, 1999). First, there are those who believe that the marketing
of genetic technologies will lead to their overuse. For example, Biesecker and
Marteau (1999) note: ‘In a milieu in which marketing materials promote testing
and providers have incentives to encourage patients to undergo testing,
non-coercive, personal decision making about genetic testing may well be
compromised.’ Second, commercialization pressure may skew the social defini-
tion of disease and normalcy. For example, some are concerned that genetic
testing may pathologize a wide-range of conditions that may have only a
weak genetic link and could fuel social Darwinism, refashioning what is thought
of as ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ (Vandelac and Lippman, 1992). This may put
additional resource pressures on an already strained health care system.
Given the wide range of uses for microsystem testing, the concerns about
marketing and implementation seem particularly relevant. Indeed, to reap
the benefits of this emerging technology government will need to devise
strategies to mitigate the social concerns, including the development of
appropriate regulatory safeguards. As suggested by Francis Collins and Alan
Guttmacher (2001): ‘Before moving such diagnostic tests into mainstream
medicine, it is critical to collect data about their clinical validity and utility.
Premature introduction of predictive tests, before the value of the information
has been established, actually could be quite harmful.’ Finally, policy makers
will need to develop frameworks for deciding which new technologies should
be covered by health care systems (Kristoffersson, 2001). In addition, it is
essential that the public be consulted in the assessment of the benefits and
risks before the introduction of such technologies. To most effectively gain
public confidence and respect for the benefits of microsystem interfaces and
emerging nanotechologies, this public consultation process must occur
‘upfront’ as the technologies develop.
Multiple studies suggest that trust in science and technology has been on the
decline for several decades. Notable technological failures such as Chernobyl,
Seveso and Bhopal illustrate how complex interactions of technology and
human error can sometimes lead to catastrophe, and erode public trust. More
recently, public concerns have focussed on the risks posed by tainted blood
and genetically engineered foods. To build/rebuild trust, and to assess the
social acceptability of new technologies, many countries are seeking to improve
their consultation with the public. In Europe, consensus conferencing is
becoming common. In Canada, public consultation has been done on nuclear
waste disposal, xenotransplantation and genetically modified foods. With
advances in nanoscience, and the upcoming availability of microsystems that
 Microsystems and Nanoscience for Biomedical Applications: A View to the Future 41

enable widespread applications of modern molecular biological testing, public

consultation becomes even more critical. Since science produces technological
applications that affect human health and environment, greater effort must be
made to negotiate these impacts with the public at the onset. Microsystem-
based platforms will likely be the first of a new wave of health-related tech-
nologies to reach the public that incorporate nanointerfaces and nanosciences.
As such, the new diagnostic/therapeutic tools have the potential to intensify
existing legal and ethical dilemmas and create new social concerns. For
example, the speed and precision of microsystem-based nanotechnologies
will make the development of thoughtful genetic information policies all the
more essential. As policy makers continue to struggle with defining the clinical
utility of existing genetic profiling procedures, nanotechnologies will likely
allow for the collecting, storing and sharing of even more information more
quickly. Issues will include acceptable use of information, clinical and social
utility, use/distribution of ‘genetic risk’ information, and identification of
needed consent, privacy, research and health information policies. In addition,
basic legal concepts, such as the notion of ‘property’, will be challenged by both
the potential dynamic and adaptive nature of nanodevices and the possible
melding of living and non-living things onto microsystems and their nano-
interfaces. Further, nanotechnology may strain existing principles of
intellectual property – an area of inquiry that will become more essential as
researchers seek to commercialize ‘nanoinventions’ (Chapter 18).
Overall, if development of prototypes and commercialization are done
within the context of public perceptions and social values, the benefits of micro-
system applications are likely to greatly outweigh the potential disadvantages.
They could significantly contribute to alleviating heath care crises in the
developing world by providing affordable, automated devices that yield stan-
dardized outputs even when wielded by unskilled operators. In the developed
world, homebound patients and the elderly would have access to sophisticated
diagnosis, monitoring and drug delivery through microsystems technology
within their own homes, facilitated by web-based transmission of medical
parameters to distant health care professionals. Individuals in remote wilder-
ness locations could carry microsystems-based emergency health care kits.
Microsystem-based early warning devices would alert the world to emerging
infectious agents or toxic pollutants. Finally, in a future that holds travel
through space, microsystems coupled to advanced information systems tech-
nology may enable the same high standard of medical care in the distant reaches
of space as in the most highly skilled Earth-based research hospitals.

References
Biesecker, B. and Marteau, T. (1999) ‘The future of genetic counselling: an international
perspective’, Nature Genetics, vol 22, p133
Buchanan, A., Brock, D., Daniels, N. and Wikler, D. (2000) From Chance to Choice:
Genetics and Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
42 Nanotechnology

Caulfield, T. (1999) ‘Gene testing in the biotech century: Are physicians ready?’
Canadian Medical Association Journal, vol 161, pp1122–1124
Caulfield, T. and Williams-Jones, B. (1999) The Commercialization of Genetic Research:
Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues, New York, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishing
Collins, F. and Guttmacher, A. (2001) ‘Genetics moves into the medical mainstream’,
Journal of the American Medical Association, vol 2322, pp2322–2324
Hunter, A., Wright, P., Cappelli, M., Kasaboski, A. and Surh, L. (1998) ‘Physician
knowledge and attitudes towards molecular genetic (DNA) testing of their patients’,
Clinical Genetics, vol 53, pp447–455
Keller, E. F. (2001) The Century of the Gene, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press
Kristoffersson, U. (2001) ‘The challenge of validating genetic testing’. Community
Genetics, vol 170, pp170–174
Lemmens, T. and Austin, L. (2001) ‘The challenge of regulating the use of genetic
information’, Isuma [on-line], www.isuma.net/v02n03/index_e/shtml
Mehta, M. (2002) ‘Privacy vs. surveillance: How to avoid a nano-panoptic future’,
Canadian Chemical News, November/December, pp31–33
Morange, M. (2001) The Misunderstood Gene, translated by Matthew Cobb, Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press
Nissenbaum, H. (1998) ‘Protecting privacy in an information age: The problem of
privacy in public’, Law and Philosophy, vol 17, pp559–596
Tri-Council (1998) Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research
Involving Humans. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council, Medical Research Council, Ottawa,
Public Works and Government Services Canada, www.nserc.ca/programs/ethics/
english/index.htm
Vandelac, L. and Lippman, A. (1992) ‘Questions d’éthique et d’évaluation sociale des
technologies’ in Melancon, M. and Lambert, R. (eds) Le Ge´nome Humain Une
Responsabilite´ Scientifique et Sociale, Sainte-Foy, Les Presses de l’Université Laval
Wertz, D. (1997) ‘Society and the not-so-new genetics: what are we afraid of ? Some
future predictions from a social scientist’ Journal of Contemporary Health Law and
Policy, vol 13, pp299–345
 5

Nanotechnoscience and Complex

Systems: The Case for Nanology

Geoffrey Hunt

Introduction: more of the same?

In this chapter I begin by pointing out an inconsistency that runs through the
very idea of nanotechnology, and I broaden this in terms of the possibility of a
wider study of complex systems within the context of developing responsible
nanotechnoscience, a study that I call ‘nanology’.
Nanotechnologies are often presented as the culmination of the great ideas
and applications that first came upon us at the turn of the 20th century and
continued throughout that century: the structure of the atom, relativity,
quantum mechanics, electronic engineering, the DNA double helix, molecular
biology, nuclear energy, biomedical and genetic engineering and so on. Yet,
telephones, radios and televisions, X-ray and scanning machines, moon and
Mars landings, and biomedicine have surprised us and in some instances
have changed lifestyles, but have not quite changed our world in a fundamental
way. However, the question arises whether nanotechnology (and other
‘advanced’ or ‘convergent’ technologies) is more of the same, or something
significantly different.
Nanotechnoscience is from one point of view nothing but an across-the-
board down-sizing of the science and technology we already have. Chemistry,
physics, biology, materials science, medicine, engineering and communications
all involve more intensive investigative activity, discoveries and applications at
the nanoscale – the boundary between classical and quantum physics – and thus
fuel new and highly suggestive cross-connections and synergies. From this
perspective it would be true to say that nanotechnoscience is just more of the
same, an extrapolation of existing paradigms and trends, but at a smaller
scale. However, even this simple fact has a crucial implication. One may
immediately infer that, in a sense, there is no such thing as ‘nanotechnology’
(or even ‘nanotechnologies’) since we must be speaking of a sea change that
44 Nanotechnology

is spreading through the whole of science and technology. We are simply

speaking of leading-edge and near-future science, or enabling technologies.
For precedents we would have to look at similar historical episodes, such
as the Aristotelian revolution, the Cartesian–Newtonian revolution, and
the Einsteinian and nuclear revolutions. Are we at the cusp of a scientific
paradigm-shift of the kind described (controversially) by Thomas Kuhn
(1970) in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions?
No sooner does my mind go in this enticing and ‘progressive’ direction than
it is thwarted by a series of doubts; and not just because the idea of such a
revolution may be inflated, but because we are not grasping its far deeper
implications. While I think it is useful to regard recent developments as a
fundamental down-sizing in the scientific enterprise, with wide and largely
unpredictable consequences, the authentic question is whether this revolution
is up against limits that no previous revolution has faced. The question arises
for me whether what is emerging is a revolution of revolutions, a kind of
meta-revolution, which not only pushes against the boundary but in doing so
shows us that some boundaries cannot really be pushed too hard, or not without
enormous caution and new ways of thinking. One might speculate that it is not a
‘forward revolution’ but a kind of ‘rebound revolution’, one that throws us back
onto a consideration of the nature of the human enterprise we call science and
technology. What grounds are there for such a question, and for the doubt and
precaution that may follow? Logically, I argue, nanotechnoscience should be
preceded by a survey in developments in terms of complexity science
(Lewin, 1992; Science, 1999), let us call it ‘nanology’, or a study of the very
possibility of nanotechnoscience.

Determinism and reductionism

Engineered nanostructures are only of interest to technology and commerce
because they have properties that are not apparent at bulk level. In fact, as
indicated throughout this book, nanotechnology is often defined in terms of
these novel properties. To put it the other way around, the characteristics of
matter at the bulk level, which present our familiar everyday universe, are
characterized as emergent properties of matter at the nanoscale. Nanomaterials
possess properties (mechanical, chemical, electrical, optical, magnetic,
biological, environmental, ecological), which make them desirable for techno-
logical applications, and such applications may be highly profitable. However,
(as has been explained elsewhere in this book) these same properties potentially
will lead to nanoscale-dependent biological activity and interactions that are
different from, and unpredictable compared with, the emergent bulk properties
of the chemical substances involved. The very idea of nanotechnology is riven
by an inconsistency between on the one hand, emergent unpredictability and
indeterminacy and on the other, reductionist and deterministic control.
Nanotechnoscientific reductionism really begins with Feynman, who said,
‘But I am not afraid to consider the final question as to whether, ultimately –
 Nanotechnoscience and Complex Systems: The Case for Nanology 45

in the great future – we can arrange the atoms the way we want; the very atoms,
all the way down!’ (Feynman, 1959). Drexler takes this up, and believes that
‘Our ability to arrange atoms lies at the foundation of technology’ (Drexler,
1986 p3).
While these writers see only advantage in working at a scale of 1–100nm, at
the same scale as some viruses, and with mitochondria (larger than many
engineered nanoparticles) and DNA (2nm wide), they almost entirely miss
the intrinsic hazards and unknown risks that go with a technology with
structures that can penetrate and interact in unpredictable ways with such
subcellular structures of life. Popular books on nanotechnology are rife with
reductionist phrases, such as the assurance that nanotechnologies will work
well because life is already nanotechnological, life processes are ‘tiny machines’,
and mitochondria are really just ‘molecular machines’. Richard Smalley said in
1999, ‘Every living thing is made of cells that are chock full of nanomachines –
proteins, DNA, RNA, etc. . .’ (Smalley, 1999). ‘Biomimetics’ is announced as a
new reductionist science.
Textbooks of reductionist nanotechnoscience are now appearing for the
next generation of students. For example, Goodsell (2004) has written a text-
book around the idea that life is already nanotechnological, about ‘the natural
nanomachinery that is available for our use’. ‘Natural nanomachines’ include
DNA, monoclonal antibodies and higher proteins. He states that: ‘By surveying
what is known about biological molecules, we can isolate the general principles
of structure and function that are used to construct nanomachines’ (Goodsell,
2004, p xi). Having written a book on the conceptual premises that perpetuate a
simplistic reductionist misconception, he concludes with the final thought that
‘we must temper this excitement with careful thought’ (Goodsell, 2004, p311).
He does not say what this entails.
The ‘all life is nanotechnology’ position is ideological, in the sense that
instead of treating the theoretical approaches used in nanotechnoscience as
no more than models with specific and limited applications, they generalize
them into a universal conception of life itself. They do this instead of keeping
an open mind about what life has to show us about its characteristics. In doing
this they promote a notion of the technological control of ‘nature’ which is
increasingly questionable, and leaving it in the hands of the powers that be.
It is like the man who takes a tree, makes a chair and a table, and then declares
‘life is nothing but carpentry’. Understandably, the King of Carpentry might
find that this declaration suits his continuing rule very nicely.
The more-of-the-same view of nanotechnoscience is comforting, perhaps
dangerously so, because it requires no fundamental shift in the way we conceive
specific nanotechnologies arising out of familiar chemistry, physics, materials
science, and so on, and therefore no fundamental shift in the way we envision
the conceptual, environmental, ecological, public health, regulatory, social, and
political implications. Furthermore, such a view discourages critical examina-
tion of the organizational changes that have occurred in industries, universities
and governments to make nanotechnology possible in the first place. The
nanological approach I am advocating here, in rather preliminary and ad hoc
46 Nanotechnology

fashion, entails a systematic focus on the parameters of such a fundamental

shift.
In this chapter, then, I try to shift our gaze in the direction of the holistic
principles of complex systems, in contradistinction to reductionism.

Nanomaterials, nanology and fundamentality

When we speak of ‘nanoparticles’ or ‘nanomaterials’ we are not speaking of one
kind of thing, but of a class of engineered entities having only scale in common.
The most commonly experimented with at the moment are carbon based
particles, metal and metal oxide particles, quantum dots, and polymer nano-
particles. Some are simple (one element), some are core-shell structures and
the like, and some are multi-functional nanoparticles. There are also nanoma-
terials and nanostructured particles that may be much larger than the maximum
100nm to qualify as nano-entities in themselves. For example, aggregates
(agglomerates) of titanium dioxide nanoparticles that are much larger than
100nm in diameter may have a kind of biological activity that is determined
by their nanoscale sub-structure. Many nanoparticles will be harmless (for
example biodegradable), or harmless in certain forms or environments.
There is little question about that. I am not dealing in this chapter with what
is or may be harmless but with opening our minds to a radical uncertainty
about what may be harmful or very (occasionally even irreversibly) harmful.
The range and diversity of nanoparticles, nanomaterials and nanodevices is
part of the hazard assessment problem. There are plans to nano-size every
common element of the periodic table, and lots more chemical compounds
besides. There will be very diverse, and currently unknown and in fact
unpredictable differences in properties, and therefore very diverse, unknown
and unpredictable biological, genetic and ecological responses to these
properties. Hazards only become risks when there is exposure, and then one
has make some calculation of dose, route of exposure, probability of exposure
and so on. The parameters involved are extremely complex, especially when
one factors in the life cycle of various products containing nanomaterials,
from manufacture, use, re-use, recycling through to disposal. Possible inter-
actions are incalculable. (There may be some lessons to be learned from the
ways in which probabilities of exposure to radioactive materials were calculated
in the beginning, and later proved deficient. In most respects, of course, nuclear
materials and nanomaterials are quite different.)
Other chapters in this book (notably those on risks, in Part 3) have referred
to the accumulating literature on specific hazards and risks of nanomaterials,
and I will not try to run through these here. My hypothesis is the general
one that because of a fundamental conceptual misunderstanding (which
perseveres owing to collective psychological attitudes that have little or nothing
to do with scientific rationality) the technologization of this sub-emergent scale
of matter could, despite its many possible piecemeal benefits, have widespread
and unpredictable hazards. In fact, it also throws into question the validity of
 Nanotechnoscience and Complex Systems: The Case for Nanology 47

current hazard and risk-assessment approaches including, and perhaps

especially, toxicology (see below).
One reason for this, insufficient in itself, is that this sub-emergent level is at
a significantly more fundamental physical level than previous technologies,
which had descended to the less problematic micro level (1 micron, or micro-
metre ¼ 1000 nanometres). One rather obvious sign of this is that since the
biological interactivity of particles increases as the particle size decreases the
biokinetics of engineered nanostructures will be extremely complex, and in
an unprecedented fashion. My argument is that as we approach the nanoscale
and smaller, this interactivity becomes critical in a novel way. At this scale a
complex systems approach is vital. It may be legitimate for all parties involved
to raise the question of whether the hazards are too complex and unpredictable
to be manageable at certain points, and therefore whether market-driven
technologization should be subdued by domestic and international regulation.
Just as nuclear technology has posed regulatory challenges because of
unprecedented long-term hazards and risks, as well as actual large-scale
harms, owing in part to the physical fundamentality at which it operates, so
too nanotechnology, squeezed in between the nuclear and the micro-levels
may force us to re-think our understanding of the implications of all nanoscale
technologies. Nuclear technology is a very crude technology that is not based
like nanotechnology on the manipulation or self-assembly of atoms and
molecules, and is not comparable in every feature, but there are sufficient
comparable features in terms of scale, uncertainty of hazards and risks, long-
term implications and so on for some fruitful comparisons to be made.
Of course, not even a nanotechnoscience revolution will revolutionize
‘everything’ in particular any more than nuclear technology ‘revolutionized’
carpentry. However, it will revolutionize ‘everything’ in general insofar as
our science, technology and view of ‘nature’ and international regulatory
regimes may have to change.

Some nanology principles: CHISEL

I now propose to open a door on a possible nanology by exploring the grounds
for my question in a wider conceptual context than fundamentality alone. What
I propose, at this stage, is a sketch of the general programmatic framework for
considering ‘advanced technologies’ such as nanotechnology, biotechnology
(genetic engineering) and related technologies such as stem cell therapy. I
shall begin with six principles: criticality, holism, interaction, self-organization,
emergence and long-termism. It will be convenient to use the acronym
CHISEL for these.
I should say at once that this is not intended as an ontological thesis, one
about the ‘ultimate nature of reality’. It is meant as a framework of program-
matic principles, a plea for a suspension of traditional deterministic and
reductionist assumptions about nature. I suggest nanology as a questioning
frame of mind concerning the nature of what it is that a nanotechnoscience is
48 Nanotechnology

in fact manipulating for the production of even more gadgets, comforts and
utilities. Nanology is meant to loosen up our attachment to the obstructive
assumptions embedded in our programmes of scientific and technological
research. CHISEL is in fact a rudimentary framework composed of guiding
principles that the past 20 years or so of scientific theories and findings both
suggest and increasingly demand.
I now define the six terms involved, not always consistent with current
literature in ‘complexity science’.

Interactivity
Interactivity is the capacity or potential of any one event to have an effect on
another, and that one on another, and so on, in series and loops, with no
built-in assumption about a terminus. This principle is programmatic in the
sense that in making any particular investigation into a natural phenomenon
we neither assume that any event must have an effect on another nor that it
cannot have an effect on another or that an effect must terminate at some
other particular event. In other words, it is an assumption of open-endedness
and open-mindedness; it counteracts obstructive assumptions about the way
the world works. For example, in medicine and pharmacy it is well known
that care must be taken in mixing medicines, because some interact in different
ways (sometimes beneficially, sometimes harmfully). When we turn to the
interactions of nanoparticles we may consider whether, among other things,
they are carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, recombinogenic, or clastogenic.
It is important to remember that the new nanomaterials will be entering life
systems in the context of an existing situation of tens of thousands of industrial
and other chemicals in the global environment (WWF, 2003). Toxicology and
related disciplines already have to struggle theoretically and practically with the
issue of ‘complex chemical mixtures’ and possible synergistic effects. In such a
mixture the composition is not fully known, and the interactions with each
other and with life systems is, I would guess, now almost certainly beyond
estimation, although specialists are doing their best (see, for example, Feron
et al, 1998; Jonker et al, 2004).
Of course, non-interaction is as important as interaction. Both depend on
specific conditions. I have heard it said in many research circles that since
nanoparticles are often bonded or aggregative there is no need for such concern.
But this is based on another assumption that needs to be challenged on the basis
of CHISEL. While an aggregate of nanoparticles or bonded nanomaterials may
be held together in a variety of ways, involving for example van der Waals and
electrostatic forces, the more important question is disaggregation. Aggregation
and disaggregation are just further kinds of interaction among many that
are possible. That is, under what specific physical, chemical, electrical and
biological conditions do different types of bonded or aggregated nanoparticle
partly or completely fall apart, and what would that entail for hazards and
risks to humans, animals and plants? Another series of complexities arises, to
which no one currently knows the answer.
 Nanotechnoscience and Complex Systems: The Case for Nanology 49

Emergence
Emergence is the tendency for new properties to appear from the combinations
of many simple interactions (Holland, 1998; Morowitz, 2002). This principle is
programmatic because we do not assume that an interactive combination
(system) will retain the familiar properties that its simple constituent events
have. In other words, it is a preparedness for the possibility at any point in
the interactive combination of events of the appearance of emergent properties:
that is, new and perhaps surprising properties (which may be ‘good’ or ‘bad’
from a human perspective). It is a readiness for an unpredictable shift in the
field under observation.
Emergence may also be regarded as the formation, transformation or
destruction of higher-level patterns or systems or orders; this may be a
temporal/dynamic process (for example evolution of crystalline structures
from specific molecules accumulating under certain conditions) or a spatial/
scale shift (for example specific texture of a surface emerging from but not
predicted by the properties of the molecules involved).
For example, the laws of classical physics emerge as a limiting case from the
rules of quantum physics applied to large enough masses. Nanotechnoscience
operates at close to the interface between these two levels. Familiar and
harmless emergent bulk properties may disappear at the nanoscale, where
unfamiliar, unpredicted and harmful properties may appear. Gold, which
emerges as yellow and inert at bulk scale, is red and toxic at the nanoscale
(Goodman et al, 2004). Aluminium, which emerges from its molecular
structure as a bulk substance harmless to plants, appears according to early
indications to be phytotoxic at the nanoscale. Aluminium nanoparticles are
one of the US market leaders for nano-sized chemicals, yet at a certain concen-
tration and size may cause inhibition of root growth in five species of plant (see
Yang et al, 2005). There is growing evidence that nanoparticles interfere in
protein expression and gene expression. (Oberdörster et al, 2005, section 3.0).
The six aspects of CHISEL are no doubt conceptually related, although it is
not very clear at present how or why. Thus it is not clear what precisely the
difference is between self-organization and emergence, and specialists are
researching such questions (for example the Santa Fe Institute). One can say
perhaps, in very general terms, that all six appear to be aspects of the part–
whole relationship.
Interaction and emergence are connected as the number of interactions
between events in a system increases combinatorially with the number of
events, creating the possibility of new properties. This is very important in
nanotechnologies because the possible interactions between engineered nano-
entities and between these and other molecular-scale entities grows enormously
with the numbers involved. For a system involving only a few dozen molecules
even an advanced computer would have difficulty counting the number of
possible interactions. This might raise questions about the limitations of
using, for example, computational toxicology for realistic hazard assessment
of new nanoparticles.
50 Nanotechnology

A large number of interactions may create the ground for emergence, but
does not entail it. A large number of interactions may cancel out each other,
raising the theoretical possibility of cancelling out familiar and even life-
dependent emergents, or generating a large amount of noise (or ‘chaos’ in the
ordinary sense) in which existing emergent properties and ‘signals’ may
drown. The release of fundamental-level events with new interactive properties
into relatively stable systems and systems of systems may, I speculate, cause
destructive cancellations and/or noise to the particular emergent-property
systems we call ‘life’.
As we descend to the nanoscale, properties of chemical elements and
compounds emerge that we consider ‘good’ from the standpoint of the current
values that are dominant in our society. The fact that good emergent properties
will certainly carry with them indifferent, bad and disastrous properties may
escape our notice for attitudinal reasons (personal and group attachment to
the usual, and perfectly understandable attractions of success, power, fear,
money, fame, comfort, long life, and so on). Useful, pleasurable and saleable
emergent property novelties which appear in isolation in the nanotechnology
laboratory may not retain such properties (or not indefinitely) in contact with
a changed environment (for example nano-textured surfaces or fabrics on
damaged skin, in a landfill, or in a washing machine or at a drycleaner). Further,
they may engage in novel interactions in environmental, ecological, genetic,
evolutionary and individual organism life-systems in ways that disrupt,
drown or critically shift existing systems at any level.

Holism
Holism is the tendency for systems to manifest properties that cannot be
predicted or explained from the sum of the parts (for example events) of the
system. This principle is programmatic because in making any particular
investigation into a natural system (interactive combination) we do not
assume that the mere addition of its parts will generate all properties of the
system, or conversely that all properties of the system can be simply reduced
(reductionism) to the properties of its parts. The relation between system
and component cannot be assumed to be that of sum and parts (addition).
This is an assumption that an examination of a whole (system) may reveal
properties (‘good’ or ‘bad’) that are not revealed in the parts or subsets of
parts, and that the behaviour of a whole (system) may not adequately (for
example for safe use) be reconstructed from the behaviour of a part, or parts
or sub-system of parts. As systems biologist Richard Strohman, of the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley, pointed out at the Twickenham ‘nanotechnology
and society’ workshop in 2004 (see Preface) ‘genetic determinism, the major
component of biological reductionism, is increasingly unable to contend with
newer findings of biological complexity and that a new and more holistic
scientific theory of living systems is required’.
While we should not assume that every event will have some significant
impact on every other event (probably absurd), we should not presuppose
 Nanotechnoscience and Complex Systems: The Case for Nanology 51

without qualification that any event cannot possibly be connected with appar-
ently (that is, within the current known context) ‘distant’ or ‘unlikely’ events.
We should also not assume that interacting events will only give rise to what
is known, unsurprising and manageable. Interaction is the cause–effect relation
between two or more events. Holistic interaction is this relation conceived as
open-ended, meaning that how many events are involved is indeterminate,
and it could be very many or even infinite. Moreover, we should not assume
that the effect that one event has on another is necessarily of a ‘direct hit’
nature; for a change may be subtle in enabling or facilitating other events to
occur, in creating a ‘space’ in which new events could occur under certain
conditions, or in putting new limits on certain key events.
Life is now being revealed as a regulatory web of regulatory webs, in which
defects and mutations naturally cause changes from the insignificant and wholly
absorbed to the system-critical. Nanoscale interventions will intervene in a
more or less random, increasing and possibly cumulative manner. Nanology
would explore these morphological possibilities in a more systematic way,
informing new approaches to specific tools of hazard and risk assessment.

Criticality
Criticality is the point in a changing system (process) at which there is a sudden
change in the properties of the system, which may be predictable (within a
probability) or unpredictable. This principle is programmatic because in
making any particular investigation into a changing natural system (interactive
combination) of which we have little knowledge, we do not assume that the
system cannot possibly be critical in some important respect. The less we
know, the more important is this programmatic assumption. An example
from physics is, under certain conditions, a subtle change in the size or shape
of nuclear fissile material will result in an explosion. (It so happens that a
subtle change in the size or shape of a nanoparticle can also be critical – even
if not explosive.) To give an example:
‘Thus a single molecule of carcinogen might, theoretically, be sufficient to
interact with DNA and cause a permanent change in the genome of a single
cell which could then lead to the development of a tumour’. (Timbrell, 2000,
p20)

‘Theoretically’, of course, for there are many uncertainties, and buffers (see
below).
A critical event resulting in a supernova is too far away to be of concern,
serves no purpose and is beyond human control. However, novel technologies
involve engineered events, not too far away, serve purposes (wise or foolish)
and are not entirely beyond our control (at least we have a choice of desisting).
Some of these may be critical events.
Recently a genetically modified (weevil-resistant) pea plant has been shown
to cause inflammation in animals. Here was an emergent characteristic – one
potentially ‘bad’ for people. When the relevant protein is expressed in the
52 Nanotechnology

pea, its structure is unexpectedly different to the original in the bean, and this
subtle property probably caused the unexpected immune effects (New
Scientist, 2005). Whether such an event is deemed bad or disastrous from
the human point of view depends on the extent and manageability of the
consequences.
Concerning criticality, a systemic change does not have to involve criticality
for it to be harmful. But criticality is a more important working assumption
when we are dealing with fundamental-level mass production such as nuclear
energy, genetically modified (GM) foods and manufactured nanoparticles
such as carbon nanotubes.

Self-organization
Self-organization is a changing system (process) in which the internal organi-
zation proceeds on the basis of its own internal principles without external
‘guidance’. This principle may be taken as a warning that we cannot assume
that any change we make in a system deliberately, accidentally or ignorantly
will not cascade through that system and possibly through interconnected
related systems. Furthermore, in self-organized criticality the emergence of
novel complexity (‘good’ or ‘bad’) from simple localized interactions is
spontaneous (Bak, 1996). Self-organizing systems very often manifest
emergence, and depend on feedback (positive and negative) in a multiplicity
of interactions.
Criticality is not necessarily involved in every self-organizing system, but
do we know which ones in advance? An example of self-organization is the
snowflake, or more germane to this book is chemical self-assembly, a notion
central to advanced nanotechnology (molecular manufacture). Examples from
biology are the spontaneous folding of proteins and, at a higher emergent
level, the development of the embryo (Kauffman, 1993).
To return to the pea example, and if I may conduct a thought-experiment: if
the emergent property of inflammatoriness had become embedded in the
human genome and passed on in an irreversible or largely irreversible way
through generations of human beings it would undoubtedly be regarded as a
disaster. Some disasters, probably a small class, are terminal for a species.

Long-termism
Long-termism is the extended duration (for example longer than an average
human individual’s lifetime) under which manifestations of interactivity, or
emergence, holism, self-organization and criticality appear that may not
appear in a shorter time span. This is the programmatic principle that one
cannot assume that the (even subtle) effects of changes to a system will not
have long-term effects, just because they do not have short-term ones. This
entails a precautionary view of hazard and risk assessment. For example, the
changes in biological species and in global climate patterns are ‘normally’
long term.
 Nanotechnoscience and Complex Systems: The Case for Nanology 53

Although there can be no doubt that a new conceptual framework that takes
account of CHISEL is needed for the safe and responsible development of
nanotechnologies, there are dangers of being misunderstood. Thus to assume
that in the light of CHISEL any engineered nanoscale intervention must be
regarded as causing a cascade of other changes, or a progressive collapse at
some level, would in itself be reductionist thinking and quite unhelpful.
There is a balance of assumptions here. The CHISEL approach is meant to
warn against thinking there must be and that there cannot be. Taking account
of CHISEL, particularly emergence, entails an evaluation of the buffering
that is evident between levels, and what this implies for creating robust
systems.
It would appear that we live in a world that is full of ‘poised systems’,
shifting balances between stability and instability (Kauffman, 1993, pp xiii–
xviii). All kinds of insults can be flung at some systems, and still they survive,
or change to accommodate the insults. Others do collapse with an apparently
trivial modification. But these are generalizations, and need testing in specific
situations. When nanoscale interventions are made, usually under the pressure
of competition, do we know which interventions are critical and which are not,
and can we be patient enough and do we care enough to find out before going to
the stage of application? One can neither assume robustness nor assume
instability. What we need to know for any nanoscale intervention is how
buffering works here in this case: how ‘close to the edge of chaos’ is this
particular system, and in what ways? In relation to long-termism, we need to
know more about how cumulative small effects that are absorbed or buffered
in the short term, may have quite different effects in the longer term. The
collapse of coral reefs may be a case in point.

A note on nanology and toxicology

A recent proposal for hazard screening of nanoparticles recognizes some of the
difficulties with traditional approaches to hazard assessment:

As new nanotechnology-based materials begin to emerge, it will be essential to

have a framework in place within which their potential toxicity can be
evaluated, particularly as indicators suggest traditional screening approaches
may not be responsive to the nanostructured related biological activity of
these materials.
Because of the wide differences in properties among nanomaterials, each of
these types of nanoparticles can elicit its own unique biological or ecological
responses. As a result, different types of nanomaterials must be categorized,
characterized, and studied separately, although certain concepts of nanotoxi-
cology based on the small size, likely apply to all nanomaterials. (Oberdo¨rster
et al, 2005, sections 1.0, 3.0)

It then goes to draft a preliminary framework which, while being very compre-
hensive, is composed of entirely conventional components: physico-chemical
54 Nanotechnology

characterization, in vitro assays (cellular and non-cellular), and in vivo assays.

With nanomaterials, characterization is problematic from the standpoint of the
traditional approach, and the authors make the choice of narrowing it down
somewhat arbitrarily to ‘the context under which characterization takes place
and the minimum set of characterization parameters we consider essential
within that context’ [section 4.1.1].
Still, the authors are aware of the complexity involved and among their
recommendations are: ‘Multidisciplinary collaborations between research and
analysis groups offering state of the art nanomaterial characterization capa-
bilities’ (section 4.1.8). It remains to be seen whether such multidisciplinary
collaborations can and will re-contextualize the toxicological problem within
a complex systems framework circumscribed by the demands of a responsible
nanotechnoscience. Such a context will have to go beyond the idea that testing
even an extended list of properties in cells, tissues and laboratory animals
isolated from their living webs is adequate for a nanoscale technoscience that
meets reasonable criteria of safety from genetic, ecological, environmental
and public health perspectives.
Of course, in addition to hazards, there are matters such as the probability of
exposure and the associated risks, and the difficulties these present in the light
of complexity, difficulties that should be confronted openly and cooperatively.
Recently some distinctions have been drawn by toxicologists that sit quite
well with a possible nanology. Guzelian et al (2005) use the term ‘nomological
possibilities’ for ‘all predictions of harm that are known not to be physically or
logically impossible’, and of these only those known to be causal are termed
‘epistemic’ (risks in a narrow sense), while those remaining are called ‘uncer-
tainties’. While these authors are making a case for an evidence-based
approach, this is at least a step in the direction of a complex systems toxicology,
since ‘nomological possibilities’ and ‘uncertainties’ are a start in creating
theoretical spaces for making new connections.
Meanwhile, Waters and Fostel (2004) envisage a toxicogenomics ‘gradually
evolving into a systems toxicology that will eventually allow us to describe all
the toxicological interactions that occur within a living system under stress
and use our knowledge of toxicogenomic responses in one species to predict
the modes-of-action of similar agents in other species’. However, unless such
an enterprise takes on board the full implications of CHISEL, including
emergence and self-organizing criticality, such a systems toxicology will be
another advanced technology that will fall short in terms of global ethics and
responsibility.

Conclusion
This rather crude presentation of six programmatic principles, CHISEL, does
not amount to the strict claim that they are conditions all of which have to be
met without limitation for a nanotechnological intervention to have been
explored responsibly. They are certainly not a claim that any engineered
 Nanotechnoscience and Complex Systems: The Case for Nanology 55

nano-intervention that ignores these principles will necessarily cause harm.

They do not, of course, entail a demand for the immediate abolition of
nanotechnology, which would be pointless in any case. They are rather
reminders and mind-openers for an internationally cooperative precautionary
approach, in which nanology is formative.
Science is now so specialized that even people working in the same general
field (say, genetics or materials science) cannot always understand each other’s
work. This situation means that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for scien-
tists to have a general view of the development of their scientific discipline, let
alone science in general, let alone technology in general, let alone technology in
relation to global human problems. For the most part scientists (and there are
notable exceptions, but far too few) just have nothing stimulating to say about
globalized technology and human ends and purposes.
On the other hand, generalists, such as myself – and all those interested in
the question of science and technology in the context of human values, needs
and purposes – are equally handicapped. It seems that to make definitive state-
ments about science and technology we are expected by some members of the
scientific mainstream to have the kind of overview that in truth no one can any
longer achieve, including mainstream members themselves. The situation is
made far worse when we consider that scientists, technologists, researchers
and technicians are for the most part materially supported by large organiza-
tions (corporations, government agencies), of limited public accountability,
who are inducted at an early age into the ideology of these organizations (as
well as the general 19th century ideology of never-ending material progress),
and almost by ‘instinct’ react to whatever they perceive as an attack on their
interests with claims that no non-scientist (or non-specialist) could possibly
have anything authoritative or serious to say about ‘their’ work.
So there is the danger of a dialogue of the deaf, in which specialists defend
their specialisms against general critique, and generalists feel too unsure of the
validity of their questions and warnings and thus too vulnerable to engage with
scientists and researchers in any really fruitful discussion. It is perhaps time for
both sides to put the survival and welfare of the human race first and make the
effort to talk patiently to each other rather than ignore or reject.
Has science and technology gone beyond a certain boundary of complexity
and uncertainty where we can no longer feel confident that we actually know
what it is that we have a technology of ? If it is the case that we need the kind
of complexity principles outlined above for adequate hazard and risk evalua-
tion, then we should proceed in a cautious piecemeal fashion. The complexities
of interaction, emergence, and self-organizing criticality rule out a rapid,
comprehensive and random competition based approach. We need to deploy
nanological principles through the social relations of nanotechnoscience if it
is to develop in a responsible manner. Given that nanotechnologies are (as
argued in the Introductory chapter and Chapter 15 on global ethics) embedded
in existing inegalitarian and competitive (globalizing) social relations, we need
urgent international political and legal action in adopting a cooperative precau-
tionary framework.
56 Nanotechnology

References
Bak, P. (1996) How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality, New York,
Copernicus
Drexler, K. E. (1986) Engines of Creation, New York, Random House
Feron, V. J., Groten, J. P., van Bladeren, P. J. (1998) ‘Exposure of humans to complex
chemical mixtures: hazard identification and risk assessment’, Archives of Toxicology
(Supplement), vol 20, pp363–373
Feynman, R. P. (1959) Plenty of Room at the Bottom, www.//its.caltech.edu/~feynman
Goodman, C. M., McCusker C. D. et al (2004) ‘Toxicity of gold nanoparticles
functionalized with cationic and anionic side chains’, Bioconjugate Chemistry, vol
15, pp897–900
Goodsell, D. S. (2004) Bionanotechnology: Lessons from Nature, New Jersey, Wiley-Liss
Guzelian, P. S., Victoroff, M. S. et al (2005) ‘Evidence-based toxicology: a com-
prehensive framework for causation’, Human and Experimental Toxicology, vol 24,
pp161–201
Holland, J. H. (1998) Emergence: From Chaos to Order. Oxford, Oxford University Press
Jonker, D., Freidig, A. P. et al (2004) ‘Safety evaluation of chemical mixtures and
combinations of chemical and non-chemical stressors’, Reviews in Environmental
Health, vol 19, pp83–139
Kauffman, S. A. (1993) The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in
Evolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press
Lewin, R. (1992) Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press
Morowitz, H. J. (2002) The Emergence of Everything, Oxford, Oxford University Press
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ns?id=dn8347
Oberdörster, G., Maynard, A., Donaldson, K. et al (2005) ‘A report from the ILSI
Research Foundation/Risk Science Institute Nanomaterial Toxicity Screening
Working Group: Principles for characterizing the potential human health effects
from exposure to nanomaterials – elements of a screening strategy’, Particle and
Fibre Toxicology, vol 2, open access: www.particleandfibretoxicology.com/content/
2/1/8
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sciencemag.org
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Material of R. E. Smalley’, House Committee on Science, Washington DC, www.house.
gov/science/smalley_062299.htm accessed in 1st June 2004
Timbrell, J. (2000) Principles of Biochemical Toxicology, 3rd edn, London, Taylor &
Francis, p20
Waters, M. D. and Fostel, J. M. (2004) ‘Toxicogenomics and systems toxicology: aims
and prospects’, Nature Reviews Genetics vol 5, pp936–948
WWF (2003) The Social Cost of Chemicals (A Report for WWF-UK by David Pearce
and Phoebe Koundouri, London, World Wildlife Fund
Yang, L. and Watts D. J. (2005) ‘Particle surface characteristics may play an
important role in phytotoxicity of alumina nanoparticles’, Toxicology Letters,
vol 158, pp122–132
 Part Two
Regional Developments
 6

Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan

Matsuda Masami, Geoffrey Hunt

and Obayashi Masayuki1

In a world facing crisis on several levels Japan must be, and must be recognized
as, an environmentally responsible nation with responsible and sustainable
policies of industrial technology. Increasingly, it will have to make a choice
between allowing its highly creative nanotechnological innovations to be
drawn into a deepening of geopolitical tensions and conflict or instead directing
them into a global movement for cooperation, peace and environmental
sustainability. To do this it will have to take much further its recent strides
in breaking out of regional insularity, develop an understanding of civil society
and promote the freedom of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
communities in contradistinction to the state, and adjust its intellectual and
ethical framework to accommodate a grasp of new technologies that is
beyond the merely technical and market-driven.

The home of nanotechnology

Japan has had a long history of ‘small technologies’, and many of its industries
have worked at the microscale for decades. So it is quite natural for its scientific
and technological community to have gradually moved into the nanoscale.
Indeed, it was a Japanese scientist, Taniguchi Nori, who in 1974 coined the
word ‘nanotechnology’ for machining with a tolerance less than micrometre
(one millionth of a metre).
The Japanese people perhaps first became aware of the possibility of nano-
technology when Esaki Reona received the Nobel Prize in 1973. He had been
working for Sony Corporation when he discovered the tunnel effect of diodes
in 1957; he later moved to IBM in the USA. The full discovery of carbon nano-
tubes and its significance is due to Iijima Sumio of the Nihon Electric Company
(NEC), Tsukuba, Japan, in 1991. He was awarded the Benjamin Franklin
Medal in Physics in 2002, ‘for the discovery and elucidation of the atomic
60 Nanotechnology

structure and helical character of multi-wall and single-wall carbon nanotubes,

which have had an enormous impact on the rapidly growing condensed matter
and materials science field of nanoscale science and electronics’. He has recently
been working on nanohorns at NEC. Another pioneer, Endo Morinobu of
Shinshu University (Dresselhaus and Endo, 2001), has recently invented the
catalytic chemical vapour deposition method for the large-scale production of
carbon nanotubes.
Japanese scientists continue to make technical progress in the field almost
weekly. For example, a team of Japanese scientists has made gels from
single-walled carbon nanotubes mixed with ionic liquids. The research team
hopes this is the first practicable method for the processing of carbon nano-
tubes. Also, researchers have discovered a new nanoparticle method to
strengthen steel. Kota Sawada and colleagues at the National Institute for
Materials Science in Tsukuba have made steel that is 100 times stronger than
the strongest ‘creep-resistant’ steel previously available. The method could
lead to the economical manufacture of large-scale steel components for high-
temperature applications.
Meanwhile, applications are proliferating, too many to mention. Most large
companies, such as NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Matsushita, Oki Denki
and Sanyo, are involved in nanoelectronic and nanomaterials applications of
nanoscience. Mitsui Corporation is using a novel nanoporous membrane to
filter and separate water molecules in the low energy production of biomass
ethanol for blending with gasoline for a less harmful vehicle fuel. Work is
progressing fast on nanohorns, hooking them together to form electrodes for
fuel cells and nanoelectronic applications. Companies such as the Mitsubishi
Electric Corporation are making progress on energy-saving flat panels, using
double-wall nanotubes, for computer displays and televisions. NEC and
Hitachi are working on nanotube transistors for superchips that do not over-
heat, and Fujitsu Ltd and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
(NTT) are also devising nano-circuitry (Kunii, 2003).
The production of nanoparticles for materials is racing ahead, with Mitsui
having produced about 120 tonnes of nanotube material in 2004 and Mitsubishi
expanding its fullerene production. These particles are finding ready applica-
tions in vehicle manufacture, for example. Sony is substituting graphite
materials in electrodes with nanotubes to increase battery life, and Toyota is
adding a carbon nanotube composite to its plastic car bumpers and door
panels to make them stronger, lighter and electrically conductive for paint
spraying.
There is, then, no doubt about the leading edge technical creativity and
industrial commitment of Japan in the field of nanotechnology.

Government action on nanotechnology and society

As the country that first brought the carbon nanotube to the attention of the
world, it is perhaps not surprising that the investment and business community
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan 61

also has a high level of confidence in the development of nanotechnology. As

early as July 2000, Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation) proposed ‘N-
plan 21’, a future society shaped by nanotechnology. In 2003–2004 Japan’s
research and development in the field was 73 per cent funded by the private
sector, compared with the European Union’s (EU’s) 56 per cent and the
USA’s 66 per cent (EC, 2003). But this does not mean that the government
is unsupportive, quite the contrary. In 2001 the government’s General Council
of Science and Technology acknowledged nanotechnology and materials
science as one of its priorities (the other three being life sciences, information
and telecommunications, and environmental sciences). Public funding levels
doubled within two years and continue to rise. On a per capita basis, and as a
proportion of GDP, Japanese public investment in nanotechnology is in
advance of both the USA and the EU. Investment in technological education
continues to be high, and there are more active researchers as a proportion of
active persons in Japan than in the USA (and more in the USA than in
Europe) (EC, 2003).
Six different government departments are involved in policy discussions
about nanotechnology: education and science, economy and trade, home affairs,
health, agriculture and environment. At the time of writing there seems to be
little agreement, or even systematic communication, between them on the
subject of nanotechnology, let alone nanotechnology and society. Administered
under the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), the National
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), had about
2,400 research scientists (at April 2003), and has taken a special interest in
the area. Within AIST is the Nanotechnology Research Institute (NRI),
which describes its mission largely, but not exclusively, in terms of a long-
term fundamental and integrative impact on materials engineering that will
drive a socio-economic transformation (AIST, 2003).
The NRI embraces research groups in such nanotechnology fields as
nanoclusters, molecular nano-assembly, supramolecular chemistry, molecular
nanophysics and bio-nanomaterials and surface interactions. In the context of
AIST there is growing awareness of issues of sustainability, so that, for example
there is intense research activity in the area of environmental management
technology and green technologies, and this is resonating with nanotechnology
as an ‘infrastructural technology for enriching society’ (AIST, 2003, p4).
In the 2003 budget the ministries of education and economy received most
of the nanotechnology funding, although there were no projects specifically
concerned with social implications. This appears set to change in the 2005–
06 budget, as there is a growing recognition of a need for social, ethical, legal
and regulatory research. In any case, AIST took the initiative of arranging a
first forum on nanotechnology and society in Tokyo on 1 February 2005. A
wide variety of stakeholders, including business interests, were present.
While some felt that a balanced approached to benefits and risks must be
taken at an early stage, others present were of the opinion that the precautionary
approach is a dogma, and that one should not take seriously NGO groups such
as ETC of Canada, which has called for a moratorium on nanotechnological
62 Nanotechnology

developments. AIST has also helped promote a network of industrial, business

and commercial interests for the coordinated exploitation of nanotechnology.
AIST aspires to develop a new vision of the role of science and technology
in society. It conceives itself as a ‘full research organization’. By ‘full research’
is meant comprehensive research embracing and inter-relating fundamental
and applied research programmes, with full interdisciplinary research going
on in each of AIST’s units (AIST, 2003, p2). The idea is that even the funda-
mental research must be informed and activated by questions from applied
research, and in a way that releases the autonomy and curiosity of researchers
rather than hindering them. It is recognized that this requires that the research
organization itself be structured in an open way that frees up creativity and
synergies. On the premise that ‘industry must change’ and radically, the presi-
dent of AIST has spoken of an integrated approach to research for a new indus-
trial technology that will be consonant with sustainable development and
human welfare. He adds:
This means that we can no longer limit the execution and evaluation of our
research to a closed community of researchers but must open it up to society as
a whole. (Yoshikawa, 2004, pp2–3)

An understanding of the precautionary approach is only in very recent times

filtering into policy discussions and decision making in Japan (see Chapter
6). Compared with some other major industrial countries official embracing
of the approach has been slow, to say the least. The Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) held a meeting on 25 January 2005 to examine
relevant EU regulations, and it appears lessons are being learned from the
Restriction of Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment
Directive (RoHS) restrictions (see below) since it affects Japan’s electronics
exports.
AIST has also been leading the nanotechnology programme within another
agency, the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organiza-
tion (NEDO). NEDO has an awareness of safety issues. In 2004 it conducted
a preliminary survey of safety aspects of nanoparticles and met some inter-
national specialists in the field. Its September 2004 report concluded that
there is no definitive scientific data, and it awaits the results of research on
nano-toxicity being undertaken in the USA and Europe. NEDO has also
sought out any relevant domestic research on health and safety, and has
stated its recognition that the ethical, legal and social dimensions of nanotech-
nology are important (NEDO, 2005).

Environment and public health

Some NGOs are afraid that Japan will continue to fall below the level of other
major industrial countries in its preparedness to act on environmental and
public health precaution. For example, questions may be asked about the
environmental fate and long term ecological impact of the carbon nanoparticles
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan 63

that Japanese vehicle makers are putting into tires and plastic mouldings
(Matsuda and Hunt, 2005; Matsuda et al, 2005).
Six Japanese NGOs met in Tokyo in November 2004 to defend the new
European chemicals regulations, REACH (see Chapter 8), against what they
perceived as ‘interference’ by the American government, and complicity in
this by the Japanese government. They issued the ‘Tokyo Declaration for a
Toxics Free Earth’, which states that ‘the Japanese government is not only
making no attempt to revise existing policies through initiatives similar to the
EU’s REACH, but is in fact joining hands with America in an effort to
weaken REACH’.2 The Declaration asks the Japanese government to
implement a regulatory regime similar to REACH, embracing ‘precautionary
principles’ and ‘strengthening of the principle of producer liability’.
At the same time some, such as Takami Sachiko of the NGO The Natural
Step International (Japan), are concerned that while Japan’s recycling policies
may filter out many harmful substances, Japanese products will be exported
to countries where recycling is poor or even non-existent. In such countries
the capacity to assess the safety of imported products may be weak, and the
environmental and human health standards generally lower.
Japan has, like other parts of the industrial world, a record of environmental
and public health damage; it is important to keep this in mind for the future of
nanotechnology. Here are a few examples. It had the first disease to be
recognized (in 1956) as caused by industrial pollution of seawater: the so-
called ‘Minamata disease’ caused by an organo-mercury chemical in wastes
discharged by industry and entering the food chain. It was the worldwide
public reaction to this event that stimulated the appearance of environmental
protection movements. In 1968, polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) poisoning
occurred in an area around Kitakyushu when rice oil became contaminated.
About 59,000 tonnes of PCBs were produced in Japan from 1954 to 1972, wide-
spread public harms resulted, and government action to control PCBs came
late. Then, in September 1999, over 100 workers were exposed to uranium
radiation in a plant preparing fuel for an experimental reactor.
Asbestos nanoparticles (free ultrafine particulates) have killed many in
Japan, as in other parts of the world (Furuya et al, 2003, p260; see also Chapter
19 in this book). Asbestos imports reached a peak of 352,110 tonnes in 1974. In
2003 about 18,000 pneumoconiosis cases were receiving statutory com-
pensation, and these include asbestosis cases (since there are no separate
figures for the latter). Taking into account the 30–50 year disease latency
period, the number of male deaths due to malignant pleural mesothelioma in
Japan could reach over 50,000 in the next 30 years, and over 100,000 in the
next 40 years (Furuya et al, 2003, p262). Even though this is lower than
some Western countries, these figures came as a great shock to the public.
After years of an ineffective policy of ‘controlled use’, a ban was officially
announced in 2002. This happened only because of the efforts of NGOs,
such as the Japan Occupational Safety and Health Resource Center
(JOSHRC) and the Ban Asbestos Network Japan (BANJAN), union demands
and media exposure.
64 Nanotechnology

An outright ban was not implemented, however. Instead, from 1 October

2004, only ten kinds of asbestos product, of the many available, were banned
and even those are not banned if the percentage of asbestos is at or below one
per cent by weight. This has not satisfied the NGOs. The citizen’s group
‘Let’s Think about Asbestos’ stated in December 2004:

Although asbestos issue concerns the whole nation, the decision on asbestos ban
was decided in a small and closed world along with only perfunctory democratic
procedure. It is necessary for us to require for opening the closed society
and adjust the lack of transparency during the whole procedures. It would be
important to realize total ban on asbestos in Japan. (Ouchi, 2004)

Without this pressure it is unlikely that industry or government would have

acted on asbestos. What then can we expect of the attitude towards the new
nanoparticles of carbon, silicon and other elements? It is too early to say
whether a lesson has been learned from asbestos or not. Certainly carbon and
other nanoparticles may be different in many respects from asbestos nano-
particles, and from a consumer safety point of view will mostly be embedded
in other materials such as steel or plastic, but without precautionary restrictions
and research into their potential health impacts we will not know unless, or
until, public health damage has occurred.
These public health scenarios, and many more, have involved expensive legal
action and compensation and sensitized the Japanese public to the deficiencies of
industrial policy. In many cases there were early warnings, but very late action
that allowed matters to become worse. Certainly, novel chemical substances
and new industrial processes, including those involving nanoengineering, require
a precautionary attitude and rigorous testing if nanoparticle health problems
are to be avoided. We now need in Japan an interdisciplinary approach to the
risk management of nanotechnological developments on the basis of the
precautionary approach. The fragmentation of scientific knowledge, of tech-
nical applications and government departments is not helpful. In 2005 some
positive signs are appearing, with more open discussion of environmental
and public health issues than in the past and more receptive government.

A new direction in industrial policy?

Japan has a great wealth of hard-won industrial experience that it could draw
upon in reforming its industrial policy. There are some signs that reforms are
afoot. AIST is genuinely grappling with the sustainability model, environmental
protection initiatives such as consumer products recycling have taken off, and
corporate social responsibility is finding its way into the boardroom (see below).

Investigating the ultimate functionality of materials in the nanometre scale,

researchers are able to discover ways to achieve maximum functions with
minimum energy and resource input. Nanotechnology is a 21st century technology
to pave the way to a truly sustainable high-tech society. (AIST, 2003, p8)
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan 65

Examples are given of efficient ‘on demand’ super inkjet technology, magnetic
memory (which does not need constant power consumption), ultra low power
liquid crystal displays (LCDs), organic (lipid) nanotubes with potential
environmental uses, and energy-conserving industrial nano-catalysts. Highly
innovative nanotechnology research work is also being done on inherently
cleaner manufacturing processes and on the monitoring and measuring tech-
nologies essential to less harmful industrial waste disposal and emissions.
New photocatalytic techniques are being developed to break down at room
temperature polluting solvents and cleaning agents. AIST then, in particular,
understands the need for a nanotechnological revolution of the industrial and
manufacturing system to reduce dramatically energy inputs and environmen-
tally damaging outputs.
But there are difficulties of political culture to overcome. With its strong
faith in a rather post-war notion of ‘industrial technology’ as the driver of
its economic ambitions, there is little welcome in some areas of Japan’s
political–industrial elite for precautionary criticism of nanotechnology. With
only a weak perception of any divide between state and civil society or between
business and politics, and lacking a strong tradition of dissent and social
criticism, any questioning of fundamental national policy always runs the
risk of being perceived, or presented, as a kind of disloyalty. It appears that
the elite may increasingly be losing touch with a new groundswell of dis-
enchantment with (and even from within) the political and business elite, and
there are the beginnings of a search for different paths into the future. For
the most part, it is a more health and environmentally conscious outside
world, and a Japanese fear of losing markets, that will force Japan’s politicians
and industrialists to revise their environmental and public health thinking
about industry.
For example, one newspaper carried a special report entitled ‘Choosing the
Future: Goodbye to Consumer Society’ (Yamaguchi, 2005). It suggests that
the ‘Sony-shock’ which occurred in October 2002, was a turning point for
Japanese corporations, presenting an opportunity to change towards a more
positive environmental attitude. The Netherlands had stopped imports of a
Sony game console, the PS-One, because its cadmium levels exceeded limits.
Sony had to withdraw its product and make many changes, which cost it a
great deal of money. After this episode Sony’s environmental management
team spent 18 months establishing a new Sony standard, which lists over 100
restricted or banned chemical items, based on international regulations
(Sony, 2004). Other corporations, such as Toyota and Matsushita, are taking
similar actions in response to the EU’s Restriction of Hazardous Substances in
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive (RoHS) (European Parliament
and Council, 2003).3
If Japan lags behind in re-orienting itself to socially responsible techno-
logical development then as a country that depends heavily on export of the
products of these technologies, it might one day find itself re-branded: no
longer the country of ‘smart technology’, but one of ‘harmful technology’.
This will do nothing for its exports.
66 Nanotechnology

Industrial policy will also need to take account of the socio-economic

disruption that could be caused by nanotechnologies entering into almost
every aspect of manufacturing, communications, and distribution and having
knock-on effects on finance and the service sectors. While nanotechnology is
currently promoted as an engine of ‘economic propagation’ (AIST, 2003,
pp24–25), which it almost certainly will be in some ways, more attention
needs to be given to the potential for economic dislocation. The growing
need for future scientific and technical personnel in a demographically
shrinking economy is just one aspect. While Japan has the capital assets and
the centralized administration to facilitate rapid change, it also has to deal
with issues of bureaucratic delay and incompetence, corruption in political
life, a weak civil society, an ageing workforce and low birth rate, an inflexible
financial system and widespread ecological damage; and all this in the context
of increased regional competitiveness.

Corporate social responsibility

One manager with the Mitsui Corporation has spoken of Japan’s economy
being ‘faced with the need for radical reforms of truly seismic impact’
(Mitsui, 2005). Indeed, Mitsui is so concerned about this that it has created
its own interdisciplinary research think-tank XNRI, which does some work
with AIST. Mitsui may be one of a new generation of Japanese corporations
that is thinking and acting more holistically and responsibly (Hawken, 1994),
and this is a good sign for nanotechnological development. It is among those
that now issue annual corporate social responsibility (CSR) Reports. Mitsui
has been a member of the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment (WBCSD) since the Council was established in 1995, engaging now
with some 160 companies from 30 or so different countries on issues of
sustainable development.
It is generally thought that Japan is lagging behind in promoting and
implementing structures of corporate governance and CSR. This is less true
in 2005 than it was only five years earlier, as shown by a Royal Institute
of International Affairs report (Zaman, 2003). Not only is Japan now taking
a lead in environmental reporting, but it has been successfully launching
ethical investment products, reforming corporate governance and taking
greater cognisance of shifts in international risks due to changes in public
perception.
Besides Mitsui, other companies such as Toyota and Sony are active
members of the Keidanren’s Corporate Citizenship Council. Keidanren has
its own ‘Charter of Corporate Behaviour’ which seeks, among other things:
Consumer confidence: The development and provision of socially beneficial
goods and services in a safe and responsible manner shall strive to earn the
confidence of their consumers and clients.
Disclosure: The active and fair disclosure of corporate information, not only
to shareholders but also to members of society at large. (Keidanren, 2004)
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan 67

Since its 2002 crisis, mentioned above, Sony has shifted its attitudes consider-
ably. For example, its CSR report 2004 expresses the intention to move its
occupational health and safety standards beyond ‘what the laws require’ and
has also introduced a standardized ‘Online System for Chemical Hazardous
Evaluation and Inspection’ (Sony, 2004, p29). It says of its chemical substance
management standards:

Management standards must be clearly established in order to thoroughly

manage chemical substances in parts and materials. Because Sony’s markets
and supply chains are spread over all areas of the world, we have established
uniform global control standards that take into account applicable laws and
regulations around the world and the opinions of various stakeholders. (Sony,
2004, p39)

Hopefully, this will put Sony in a good position to respond to concerns about
any nanotechnological risks involved in its product development plans and
contribute to the development of international standards that will take account
of the hazard peculiarities of nanoscale innovations. While some other
corporate giants like Matsushita (Panasonic) have also made clear commitments
to sustainability and environmental protection, the environmental policies of a
few other corporations are not quite so clear (Matsushita, 2005).
Mitsubishi, with net sales in 2005 of US$4.61 billion, is a global economic
force to reckon with. Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Chemical created
Frontier Carbon in 2001 to manufacture fullerene nanoparticles. In late 2004
Frontier was producing only a few kilograms for its 400 or so Japanese custo-
mers, but by then it already claimed a capacity to produce 40 metric tonnes of
fullerenes a year, and could even think about expanding to 1,500 metric tonnes
per year (Frontier Carbon, 2002). Since the corporation holds the patents and
licences for fullerenes and is keen to exploit a global nanotechnological market
potential, it decided to go beyond the production capacity of its plant in
Kitakyushu, Japan, by opening a US plant in March 2005. Frontier Carbon
Corporation America (FCCA) was launched in December 2004 to start produc-
tion of fullerene materials in the United States in March 2005 in cooperation
with TDA Research, Inc. Products will carry the brand name ‘Nanom’, with
a product range including pure C60 , mixed C60 and C70 , and chemically
functionalized fullerenes.
Since, at the time of writing, there is a significant ‘early warning’ of the
toxicity of fullerenes (and some research which shows such toxicity could be
minimized by molecular surface modifications), it remains to be seen whether
Mitsubishi will take voluntary precautions or wait for stricter government
and international regulation. Will it, commensurate with its economic power,
conduct its own rigorous environmental, health and safety research, within
regulations which currently are too weak to contain this new hazard? Already
on the Japanese market are consumer products containing fullerenic materials,
such as fibre-reinforced composites for badminton rackets, tennis rackets, and
golf club shafts, coatings for bowling balls, lubricants for car air conditioners
and coatings for glass.
68 Nanotechnology

Following some expressions of concern, Murayama Hideki, vice president

and general manager of the Frontier’s research and development centre in
Japan, is reported in January 2005 as saying:

We know about the health and environmental concerns. . . We very much want
to address these concerns in a collaborative way so that everybody can see that
we take them very seriously and aren’t trying to hide what we know and don’t
know about them. (Herrera, 2005)

Ethics
Murayama’s statement is welcome. Openness may well be a key concept in
the ethics of nanotechnology. The Japanese Government recognizes nanotech-
nology as a promising post-human genome project, but still in early 2005 there
has been very little media attention to, or public discussion about, the realities
of nanotechnologies. The government and scientists are certainly eager to
recover from the discouraging situation of genomics by driving forward
nanotechnology. Since bioethics discussion was not built into genomics and
biotechnology developments in Japan, there is no existing ethics model or
parameters to form a basis for nanotechnology ethics. The few magazine
articles and new books that have recently appeared about nanotechnology are
futuristic and entirely optimistic and raise no concerns in a balanced way. It
is seen as simply more clever technical gadgetry that citizens can enjoy and
foreign countries will buy. We think, however, that it should be one of the
most important social issues of technology in Japan.
A discussion about nanotechnology must be promoted in an ethical,
interdisciplinary and international context if nanotechnology is to be a sound
technology of the future. In Japan the ethics discussions that we have had so
far have been restricted to a narrow academic arena, and have been informed
by science and Western bioethics concepts which are not entirely appropriate
to our history and culture. Most bioethics academics were trained in the
USA, and there has been no attention to our own cultural values derived
from Buddhism, Shinto and Confucianism, although they are still deeply
rooted in the popular mind and social practices and entail a rather different
kind of approach to nature and the environment.
In Japan science education is still perceived as ‘factually straightforward’;
science is conceived as neutral and not informed by values and culture.
Therefore it is hard to find a Japanese scientist who has concern for ethical,
cultural and philosophical aspects of any technology. Most Japanese think it
is perfectly acceptable to use technology to produce whatever they need or
want. Technology is largely regarded as being in itself devoid of human values.
We should be aware of the shortcomings of a reductionist approach
(Chapter 5), as we have seen in the case of the human genome project. The
top-down approach works from a function to a sequence of genes, but it
proves harder to work from a sequence to a function. In nanotechnology the
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan 69

theoretical structure is often unknown or unpredicted, so we cannot be sure

of functions. We have to recognize emergent properties, and ethics has to
work from such considerations in order to have a rational view of the possible
consequences of action.
The public in Japan is becoming increasingly concerned about the ethical
aspects of industrial policy because of public health related problems created
by the chemical, consumer goods, and drug industries One legislative response
of the Japanese Government has been the passing of the law on product liability
in 1995. Before the law, and even after, there have been many cases of public
health problems created by new industrial substances in Japan’s consumer
products. But public opinion is ambivalent, because at the same time it has
great confidence in the country’s technological prowess (see Box 6.1). Few
people are making any connection between the social form of technology and
the environmental and health impact.

Box 6.1 Japanese Attitude Survey

Here are some findings of a questionnaire survey to gauge the public’s perception
of nanotechnology in Japan. This survey, designed by AIST’s Nanotechnology
Research Institute, and conducted from 26 November to 14 December 2004,
was based on 1011 samples obtained from men and women aged 20 and older
living within a 30km range of Metropolitan Tokyo. The samples were collected
by area sampling and by the household drop-off method.
The first question was about the likely effect of nine technologies including
nanotechnology. The respondents were asked, ‘Do you think it will improve our
daily life in the next 20 years?’, adopting the same question that was posed in a
European survey (Eurobarometer, 1991–2003). Nearly half (49.2 per cent) of
the respondents answered ‘nanotechnology would improve our way of life’. The
others replied with ‘no effect’ (4.5 per cent), ‘make things worse’ (2.9 per cent)
and ‘don’t know’ (43 per cent). This shows that people are quite optimistic
about nanotechnology, while the large percentage of ‘don’t know’ responses
suggests that many people are unfamiliar with nanotechnology.
To the question about awareness of nanotechnology, over half of the respon-
dents (55.2 per cent) indicated that they have ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ heard about
‘nanotechnology’. Moreover, 36.8 percent of them answered that they could
also give some explanation of nanotechnology. After the respondents were
provided with a definition of nanotechnology, eight applications of it were
presented and several questions were asked based on it. The eight examples
were: drug delivery systems, environmental sensors, implantable chips, flavouring
nanoparticles, perfect prostheses, self-cleaning fabric, computers one billion
times faster than today’s supercomputers, and molecular assemblers. Then the
respondents were asked about the assessment of usefulness, risk, moral contro-
versy, and the promotion of each application. The results show that people
70 Nanotechnology

could distinguish between different applications, and the most negative attitude was
expressed towards implantable chips.
The respondents were also asked, ‘Do you think nanotechnology will do good for
society?’ and ‘Do you have concerns about the development of nanotechnology?’ To
the former, 36.7 per cent of those surveyed answered that ‘nanotechnology will do
much good’, 51.3 per cent said ‘it will do some good’. To the latter question, 5.4 per
cent said that they were very concerned and 49.1 per cent said that they were
somewhat concerned. Concerning preferred fields of application, many respondents
cited ‘new ways to detect and treat human disease’ (86 per cent) and ‘solutions to
environmental problems’ (80 per cent) (multiple answers allowed). For reasons of
concern, 79 per cent of the respondents also chose the response, ‘it is likely that
there will be unexpected impacts’ (Fujita and Abe, 2005).

Nanotechnology and Japan’s regional and

international role
Japan has an important economic and political role in the whole East Asian
region, almost all of which is investing heavily in nanotechnologies. South
Korea has launched a ten year programme with around US$2 billion of
public funding while Taiwan has committed over US$600 million of public
funding over six years from 2002, and Thailand and Singapore are also inter-
ested. East Asian regional cooperation is generally weak, despite numerous
forums, and one may only speculate whether nanotechnology developments
will see increasing industrial and economic cooperation in the area.
China is devoting increasing resources to nanotechnology, possibly over half
a billion US dollars from central and local governments in the five year period
2001–2005. The National Centre for Nanoscience and Technology (NCNST)
of China was founded in March 2003 by the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(with Peking University and Tsinghua University as its initiators) and the
Ministry of Education (ChinaNano). Its stated objective is to build a public
state-of-the-art technological platform and research base open to both domestic
and international users, deploying state-of-the-art laboratories for nano-proces-
sing and nano-devices, nano-materials and nano-structures, nano-medicine and
nano-bio-biotech, nano-structure characterization and testing, and coordination
and database facilities.
China’s share of worldwide publications in the field is increasing rapidly
and is catching up with the EU and the USA. China will reap nanotechnology
know-how from Japan. Toyota, Sony and Mitsui have deepened their invest-
ments in China since October 2002. In April 2003 Sony announced that it
will shift all production of the PlayStation 2 game console to China in the
next fiscal year. Toyota, which is aiming for 20 per cent of China’s passenger
car market by 2010, will produce luxury car engines and large trucks in
China, giving it a full line of vehicle offerings there.
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Japan 71

China’s stake in nanotechnology may be seen as particularly significant in

relation to the possibility or otherwise of global sustainable development,
when we take into account its potential purchasing and manufacturing power,
and its geopolitical position. Japan may find itself caught between the USA
and China over cooperation on nanotechnology that has strategic economic or
military implications. On the one hand, Japan’s nationalist politicians, seeking
changes to the ‘pacifist’ constitution, may welcome re-militarization with US
support, and the USA military nanotechnology programme may become Japan’s
too. Already Japan is accepting missiles from USA for a supposed threat from
North Korea, yet it is China that provides North Korea with energy and has
the political leverage that could benefit Japan. Chinese–Japanese competition
for regional political, economic and industrial hegemony could be destabilizing.
As Tamamoto points out, Japan could instead put past Sino-Japanese hosti-
lity behind it and build good will and cooperation with China, to benefit both
countries and promoting a less unbalanced geopolitical situation (Tamamoto,
2005). Cooperation between China and Japan in nanotechnology may help tip
the balance towards greater sustainability and peace. ‘By far the most important
contribution Japan can make towards international peace is the establishment of
a solid and peaceful relationship with China’ (Tamamoto, 2005, p16).
Furthermore, Japan must be drawn into a prominent role in the United
Nations (UN). It is a fact that Japan pays nearly 20 per cent of the UN
budget, has massive investments in the West, and must assume a UN role
proportional to its achievements and power. The Security Council should be
reformed and Japan should be a permanent member. Japan has already
served as a non-permanent member of the Council eight times, more frequently
than any member nation. This issue is not unconnected with nanotechnology,
because there is no doubt that Japan’s influence will increase as it maintains an
economic lead in many areas through nanotechnological developments.

Acknowledgments
This paper is an expanded and updated version of our presentation at the 1st
International Symposium on Nanotechnology and Society, St Mary’s College
(a college of the University of Surrey), held on 2–3 April 2004, at Twickenham,
Middlesex, UK, kindly supported by the Wellcome Trust.

Notes
1 We use the Japanese language convention of putting the family name first.
2 This Tokyo Declaration was launched at the ‘REACH Seminar for Toxics
Free Earth’ held on 23 November 2004 in Tokyo, Japan, with some 160
participants organized by the following NGOs: Citizens against Chemicals
Pollution, Greenpeace Japan, Japan Occupational Safety and Health
Resource Centre (JOSHRC), People’s Association on Countermeasures of
Dioxin and Endocrine Disruptors, Toxic Watch Network, WWF Japan.
72 Nanotechnology

3 The RoHS of the 27 January 2003 prohibits the use of certain chemicals in
new electrical and electronic equipment put on the market from 1 July 2006
(the Annex lists certain exceptions). The chemicals include lead, mercury,
cadmium, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs) or
polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs). Furthermore, the WEEE direc-
tive 2002/96/EC (and the amending directive 2003/108/EC) is also aimed at
the waste electrical and electronic equipment; encouraging recycling, reuse
and recovery. Recovery targets vary throughout the product categories,
which are to be achieved by 31 June 2006.

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 7

Nanotechnologies and Society

in the USA

Kirsty Mills

The social, legal and ethical implications of nanotechnology are not unique to
any one country – but perhaps the way in which they are handled is unique. In
the highly entrepreneurial environment of America, the precautionary
approach figures less than it does in Europe – conceivably given the relative
absence in America of episodes such as BSE (mad cow disease). A recent
study (Gaskell et al, 2005) shows almost a mirror image in reactions to nano-
technology in Europe and in America, with 50 per cent of Americans versus
29 per cent of Europeans saying nanotechnology will improve our way of life,
and 35 per cent of Americans versus 53 per cent of Europeans saying they do
not know what it will bring. It would seem that the American culture is more
likely to take a positive view of technological innovation. A National Science
Foundation survey similarly showed that in America there is a high degree of
public confidence in science. This confidence does not, however, correlate
with scientific understanding – indeed it coexists with a high degree of belief
in astrology, extra-sensory perception and alien abductions. What appears to
shape a positive attitude to emerging technology is a belief in the benefits of
progress, and that this progress is not necessarily seen as a threat to nature –
a value orientation more commonly met with in America.
This difference in public opinion is likely to be reinforced since the Amer-
ican media, too, are more likely to report on the benefits of nanotechnology than
are their European colleagues. To some degree, however, America benefits
from what is essentially a blind trust on the part of its population. If nanotech-
nology in America is to maximize its potential it must be careful not to lose this
trust; it must not only act as a ‘good citizen’ – it must be seen to be a good
citizen. If it is to be beneficially integrated into society, all parties involved
must be brought together to address the issues of health (including nano-
medicine), safety, the environment, equity (especially the avoidance of a
‘nano-divide’), legislation, regulation and insurance, privacy, education, and
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 75

public perception. Consequently, accompanying America’s drive to achieve

the benefits of nanotechnology is a parallel effort to grapple with the societal
implications.

The rise of nanotechnology in the United States

President Bill Clinton, in a speech at Caltech on 21 January 2000, announced
the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), a federal research and develop-
ment (R&D) programme created to coordinate nanotechnology activities across
eighteen participating federal agencies (ten with an R&D budget).

My budget supports a major new national nanotechnology initiative worth

US$500 million . . . Just imagine, materials with 10 times the strength of
steel and only a fraction of the weight; shrinking all the information at the
Library of Congress into a device the size of a sugar cube; detecting cancerous
tumors that are only a few cells in size. Some of these research goals will take
20 or more years to achieve. But that is why . . . there is such a critical role
for the federal government. (Clinton, 2000)

Research into the ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI) of nanotech-
nology form a significant part of this initiative. The Human Genome Project
had already set a new paradigm by allocating 5 per cent of its funding to
ELSI. It had been clear from the early days of biotechnology, which poses
some parallel societal questions to nanotechnology, that it presented significant
potential hazards, and that a ‘wait and see’ approach would be unacceptable.
Further evidence – if any were needed – that any emerging technology
needed to pay serious attention to its societal context was provided by
genetically modified (GM) foods, which served as a lurid warning of how
things can go wrong. Since 1983, when Monsanto created the first genetically
modified plant, biotech had attracted a degree of public opposition. In 1993,
however, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) pronounced GM food to
be ‘not inherently dangerous’, and the ‘Flavr Savr’ tomato reached the
supermarkets and helped convince American consumers to accept GM foods.
In attempting to break into European markets, however, biotech companies
encountered far more significant opposition. In Europe, embodying the already
mentioned greater degree of caution there towards scientific innovation, protest
groups were particularly active and effective. Japan, too, is similarly reluctant
to accept GM products.
This international variation in attitude has had repercussions in America. In
2004 Monsanto shelved plans to sell genetically modified wheat in the US, since
farmers in America and Canada risk the loss of their export markets if their
wheat has even slight levels of GM contamination. Consumer backlash carries
real economic impact. A crucial factor in the acceptance of a new technology is
that the public is convinced of its safety, and that it is beneficial to them. Many
of the benefits of the new GM products went to the companies, through
increased productivity and hence increased profit. (In comparison, mobile
76 Nanotechnology

phones won ready acceptance because of their evident benefits to consumers,

despite various health and safety questions.) Biotech provides an excellent
example of technological hubris for nanotechnology to avoid, and reveals that
national opinions can carry international repercussions.
America does not have an undisputed lead in nanotechnology – an unusual
state of affairs for a scientific community used to leading the world in tech-
nology. Of worldwide investment in nanotechnology of some US$10.4 billion
in 2004, the US and Europe each invested some US$3.1 billion, Japan some
US$1.9 billion, and US$1.8 billion elsewhere. Worldwide publications in
nanotechnology from 1997–1999 show a similar division – 28 per cent
coming from the USA and Canada, 34 per cent from the EU and EFTA, and
25 per cent from Asia (European Commission, 2003, 2005). There is a strong
knowledge base in Europe and Asia, receiving significant financial support.
Achieving dominance in nanotechnology is an important US national goal,
and ELSI activities have a major role in removing barriers to the com-
mercialization of nanotechnology. In a speech to the NNI 2004 Conference
Association, in April 2004, Phillip J. Bond, the Under Secretary of Commerce
for Technology in the United States Department of Commerce, said:

The only question is this: to whom will these benefits [of nanotechnology] flow,
first and foremost. If we expect them to accrue first and foremost to the United
States – which is the fundamental argument behind our substantial Federal
investments in nanotechnology, our forward-looking technology transfer laws,
and our innovation-friendly policies – then we must identify and remove barriers
to the development of these technologies, and conduct R&D in a manner that
is responsible: socially responsible, ethically responsible, environmentally
responsible, and economically responsible. (Bond, 2004)

Environmental and health implications are, as indicated, also receiving

serious attention. Most ELSI activity is government funded, with the National
Science Foundation (NSF) being the major driver. All NSF nanotechnology
programmes are required to have an ELSI component, although in practice
this does not always receive the attention it should.
Individual federal agencies had been supporting work in nanotechnology
since the 1980s, but a coherent national strategy was lacking. The NNI had
its origins in a series of meetings, beginning in November 1996, in which the
NSF’s Dr Mihail Roco and members of several other federal agencies discussed
their plans in nanoscale science and technology. The success of the effort to
persuade the US Government to support this emerging technology can be
judged by the fact that federal funding for nanotechnology R&D has increased
from US$116 million in 1997 to an estimated US$961 million in 2004, with
US$982 million requested for NNI in 2005. Although some two thirds of
that goes towards academic research, funding also supports technology transfer
between researchers and industry. This is to encourage the commercialization
which is seen as a major driver of nanotechnology. The NNI funds more
than 100 nanoscience and technology centres and networks of excellence for
individuals and institutions.
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 77

In 2002, the NNI devoted US$80 million of a US$700 million total, or

some 11 per cent, to the ethical, legal, and societal implications and to
environmentally linked R&D. The first research and education programme
on environmental and societal implications was issued by NSF in July 2000.
Many more have followed. In September 2000, the report on ‘Societal
Implications of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology’ (NSF, 2000) was issued,
the first of an ongoing series of meetings on this topic. Its recommendations
included building ‘openness, disclosure and public participation’ into nano-
technology research; informing, educating and involving the public; educating
scientists and workers for the nanotechnology industry; including societal
implications and ethical sensitivity in their training; and encouraging profes-
sional societies to develop forums to inform professionals of this area.
Two federally supported user networks, the NSF-funded National Nano-
fabrication Infrastructure Network (NNIN) and the Department of Energy’s
(DOE) Nanoscale Science Research Centers (NSRCs), are a large presence
on the nanotechnology scene, and each have a significant commitment to
ELSI. These user networks address the major barrier to the development of
nanotechnology of its high entry cost; nanotechnology instrumentation,
equipment and facilities can be prohibitively expensive for researchers, small
businesses and academic institutions.
The NNIN, established in 2004, is a partnership of 13 universities which
provides users across the nation, in academia, small and large industry, and
government, with open, fee-based access, both on-site and remotely, to nanotech-
nology fabrication and characterization facilities. The NNIN ELSI component
(which the NNIN calls its social and ethical issues (SEI) component), distributed
across the 13 nodes, provides an infrastructure for education, research, and
outreach on social and ethical issues associated with nanoscience and technology.
ELSI research projects focus on the organizational and workforce change due to,
and necessary for, the implementation of nanotechnology; public perception of
nanotechnology; and the effect of both business organization and of economic,
regulatory and legal mechanisms on the diffusion of nanotechnology.
The NSRC network consists of five facilities, now under construction at the
five DOE National Laboratories – Argonne, Brookhaven, Los Alamos, Oak
Ridge and Sandia. These facilities will focus on the synthesis, processing and
fabrication of nanoscale materials. Whereas access to NNIN facilities is based
upon feasibility and scope of a users’ project, and payment of user fees, access
to the NSRCs is by external peer review of proposals, and is free. These facilities
will contribute to understanding the fundamental science of nanomaterials.
Here, too, emphasis is being given to the ELSI implications, particularly to
the environmental, health and safety issues associated with nanoparticles. The
National Laboratories are no strangers to adverse public reaction to their
atomic and nuclear weapons work, and are attempting to open the NSRCs to
the public to develop an informed perception of nanotechnology.
NSF proposes a multi-institution centre to address the societal, ethical,
environmental, educational, legal, and workforce implications of nanotech-
nology. This is a specific requirement of the 21st Century Nanotechnology
78 Nanotechnology

Table 7.1 NNI budget breakdowns by agency (million dollars). Source: NSF

Agency 2003 2004 2005

(Actual) (Estimate) (Proposed)
National Science Foundation (NSF) 221 254 305
Department of Defense (DOD) 322 315 276
Department of Energy (DOE) 134 203 211
Health and Human Services HHS (National 78 80 89
Institutes of Health, NIH)
Department of Commerce DOC (National 64 63 53
Institute of Standards and Technology NIST)
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space 36 37 35
Administration)
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 0 1 5
5 5 5
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 1 1 1
(Transportation Security Administration TSA)
Department of Justice (DOJ) 1 2 2
Total 862 961 982

Research and Development Act of 3 December 2003, which authorizes funding

for the NNI, and which also calls for examination of the topics of self-
replicating nanoscale machines or devices and their release into the environ-
ment, encryption, defensive technologies, and the use of nanotechnology in
the enhancement of human intelligence and in developing artificial intelligence.
Industry investment in research is comparable to that of the NNI, with
most major companies having groups working in nanotechnology. Intel, for
example, has reported US$20 billion revenues from nanotechnology in 2003,
and nanotechnology venture capital investment continues to increase.
The spectrum of scientific opinion on the consequences of nanotechnology
in America can perhaps be best represented by introducing two men, Eric
Drexler and Richard Smalley (see Chapter 3). Eric Drexler’s (1986) book
Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology expounded the possibi-
lities of this technology, and included lengthy discussions of self-replicating
molecular assemblers, nano-machines able to build anything. The originator
of the ‘grey goo’ vision of nanotechnology, he saw the consequences as so far
reaching that he urged society to consider how this technology should be
managed to ensure socially responsible implementation. Drexler, who received
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 79

a Ph.D. in molecular nanotechnology from MIT in 1991, is the cofounder of

the Foresight Institute, an organization dedicated to helping ‘prepare society
for anticipated advanced technologies’. A great proponent of nanotechnology,
he nonetheless believes that there could be serious adverse consequences. His
book was the inspiration for Michael Crichton’s book Prey, a sci-fi thriller of
a world melting into ‘grey goo’, which indirectly influenced Prince Charles’
remarks on nanotechnology (Guedes, 2003).
Richard Smalley, a professor of chemistry, physics and astronomy at Rice
University before he died in 2005, and who won the 1996 Nobel Prize in
Chemistry for the discovery of fullerenes, also considered that nanotechnology
offers enormous benefits. On 12 May 1999, in hearings before the Senate
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space that were the forerunner
to the establishment of the NNI, he testified: ‘We are about to be able to
build things that work on the smallest possible length scales. It is in our
Nation’s best interest to move boldly into this new field.’ He took issue with
Drexler, however, over the scientific basis of self-replicators. Smalley fears
that speculation over dramatic dangers could jeopardize public support for
the technology.
Smalley’s was the view that currently holds sway; nanotechnology must be
implemented responsibly – addressing societal fears and other issues can help
prevent sudden disruptions of the nanotechnology revolution. Although
Drexler now says the notion of self-replicators is not necessary for ‘molecular
manufacturing’ (Chapter 3), and has muted his more alarmist warnings, he
has essentially been tangential to the march of nanotechnology in the USA
(Phoenix and Drexler, 2004). A visionary, without a background in an estab-
lished discipline, and without sponsorship within the academic sphere, he
has received no federal funding to research his ideas. Although excluded
from the NNI, he must nevertheless be given great credit for being the first
person to speak of the societal implications of nanotechnology.
Most ELSI-related effort in America is federally funded, and performed by
the nanotechnology community itself. Which leads us to the question of quis
custodiet ipsos custodies? Who then will guard the guardians? Civil society
and environmental groups include the Colorado-based Meridian Institute
and the Foresight and Governance Project led by David Rejeski at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC, the Canadian
ETC group (globally, one of the more vocal critics of nanotechnology), the
National Resources Defense Council, and Environmental Defense (see Chapter
11). The emphasis of civil society efforts is somewhat different to the NNI
goal of nanotechnology success, and has significantly less funding. Their
concern is with the effect of a rapidly developing technology on society as a
whole, and how public policy can address the potential problems. The
Meridian Institute’s Global Dialogue on Nanotechnology and the Poor, for
example, examines the role of nanotechnology in developing countries
(Meridian Institute, 2004). Rapid technological change can affect the structure
and economy of communities, and the sense of stability and meaning that
contributes to their individuals’ well-being (Crow and Sarewitz, 2000;
80 Nanotechnology

Williams and Kuekes, 2000). These individuals will very often not have chosen
to participate in a technical revolution, and although many of them will profit
from nanotechnology, some will not. These are areas that are subject to opinion
and extremely difficult to quantify, but nonetheless of vital societal importance.
Nanotechnology can be seen as a large-scale social experiment – the changes
envisaged will alter the human condition. These questions are receiving scant
attention.
The issue remains of how to achieve a fruitful cooperation between those in
the nanotechnology community and civil society groups. In October 2004 the
Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN) formed
the International Council on Nanotechnology (ICON), a ‘collaboration
among academic, industry, regulatory and non-governmental interest groups
that will work to assess, communicate, and reduce potential environmental
and health risks associated with nanotechnology’. The National Resources
Defense Council, the ETC group, and Environmental Defense (Chapter 11)
refused to join, suggesting that the Council was ‘more interested in easing
public jitters that in actually doing something about the risks of nanotech-
nology’ (Mindfully, 2004). If we are to achieve a truly responsible path forward
for nanotechnology, all of these players will need to be involved. Building a
synthesis between diverse goals, and developing the mutual trust that will
allow this to happen, will be a slow, but very necessary, process. This also
needs to be extended to reach areas of concern that are currently largely
being ignored in America.

Environment, health and safety

Currently, up to 2 million US workers are exposed to ultra-fine materials in
their jobs; an estimated one million more Americans could be exposed through
work in nanotechnology-based industries in the next decade. When looking for
regulations that apply, the first thing that one notices is the number of agencies
involved. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has
yet to issue any specific guidelines related to nanotechnology. The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) are developing ‘best
practices’ guidelines for the handling of nanomaterials (Weiss, 2004). The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA) have yet to issue toxicology guidelines for nanomaterials in
the US. Although regulations exist for exposure to ultrafine materials, as yet
the toxicology information specific to nanomaterials is lacking, as is the ability
to provide the metrology necessary for meaningful regulation – both in the
sense of instituting international measurement standards, and the ability to
take these measurements. A further complication is that nanoparticles will
eventually be regulated on the basis of their use. So, for example, a nanoparticle
used in sunscreen will fall under different regulations to one used for targeted
drug delivery. Developing consistent guidelines will be a significant challenge.
In August 2004, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) established
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 81

the ANSI Nanotechnology Standards Panel (ANSI-NSP) to provide an

infrastructure to establish standards and a common nomenclature for
nanotechnology.
The immediate task is to convey the need to fabricate nanomaterials in a way
that recognizes the potential for unknown hazards, and that protects workers,
the public health, and the environment. In 2004, some US$106 million was
directed to research in the US on health and environmental aspects of nanoscale
materials. The goals are to understand the interactions of nanoscale materials at
the molecular and cellular level, to understand how these materials interact
with, diffuse through, and are transformed by, the environment and to identify
issues of exposure, toxicity and safety for those coming into contact with these
materials. In parallel, the potential for nanotechnology in human health and in
environmental remediation – for instance improved detection and treatment of
disease and disability and improved protection of the environment through
innovations in pollution-sensing and remediation technologies – are also
under investigation.
A few examples perhaps convey the range of activity. The NSF-funded
Center for Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN) at Rice
University, directed by Vickie Colvin, is focused on dry–wet interfaces and
biological impact of nanostructures released in the environment. The Center
for High-Rate Nanomanufacturing (CHN) at Northeastern University has an
emphasis on environmentally benign process and products. Their societal
impact and outreach component is creating mechanisms to inform policy-
makers and create public dialogue during process development. Many other,
smaller, programmes support research into – for example – translocation of
nanoparticles into the brain (University of Rochester); reverse engineering of
cellular pathways from human cells exposed to nanomaterials (Medical
Center in Houston); the role of nanoparticles in pollutant formation (Louisiana
State University), the response of micro-organisms to carbon-based manu-
factured nanoparticles (Purdue University), and social and ethical research
and education in agrifood nanotechnology (Michigan State University).
The National Toxicology Program, which exists within the Department of
Health and Human Services to provide information on toxic chemicals, is
studying the potential toxicity of nanomaterials, beginning with the trans-
dermal absorption of titanium dioxide, fullerenes and quantum dots. The
National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health (NIOSH) is also funding
work to assess the consequences of inhalation exposure of carbon nanotubes,
and the toxicity of ultrafine and nanoparticles. The Department of Defense is
supporting Dr Gunter Oberdörster’s team at the University of Rochester to
correlate the physico-chemical characteristics of nanomaterials and their
toxicological properties, with the aim of creating a model that will predict
effects based on the features of the nanomaterial. The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency is funding research to examine the toxicity of manufactured
nanomaterials such as quantum dots, carbon nanotubes, and titanium dioxide.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is developing measure-
ment tools and methods to allow accurate measurement and characterization
82 Nanotechnology

of nanoscale particles, a prerequisite for establishing and regulating

exposure. This group is also working toward ‘best practices’ information for
industry on appropriate workplace precautions when working with nanoscale
materials.
Given the scope of nanotechnology, the task of developing an under-
standing of the long-term health and environmental impacts of nanomaterials
can seem overwhelming. Researchers created many new materials before the
advent of nanotechnology, however, and regulations and best-practice
methodologies have been developed to handle small particles. Many of these
will apply to nanomaterials. Where we need to exercise caution is in the area
where ‘small is different’: carbon nanotubes, for instance, which require
precautions beyond those needed for carbon in other forms. The key is
global cooperation between industry, federal and university laboratories to
share the science of nanomaterial health impacts, handling policies and
education. Business leaders, however, are remaining largely mute in this area
– liability is a serious concern in this litigious culture. At the Nanobusiness
2004 conference, a widely expressed concern was that fears over health and
environmental effects would stunt the developing nanotechnology industry.
The area of environmental health and safety is one that highlights the
trans-Atlantic divergence in attitude to the precautionary principle already
referred to above. In November 2002 the EU Commission adopted the use of
the precautionary principle in technology innovation and product development
(Chapter 8). This philosophy is at the heart of the EU’s REACH regulations
(Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restrictions of Chemicals) –
which the US government has characterized as ‘an administratively burden-
some regulatory regime’ which ‘places all SMEs at a distinct disadvantage
because most do not have the resources or the capital to meet REACH’s
administrative requirements’. It suggests that the regulations will apply to
thousands of chemicals ‘that are unlikely to pose any significant risk to health
or the environment’ (US Mission to the European Union, 2004). It appears
that the Bush administration worked with the chemical industry to undercut
these regulations, even deploying Secretary of State Colin Powell in the
effort (DiGangi, 2004). A ‘non-paper’ – an undated publication with no
letterhead, which no agency admitted to writing, but which was used in official
State Department communications – essentially mirrored the position of the
US chemical industry, and attacked the Precautionary Principle, describing
it as a way to ‘provide cover for politically motivated bans and other severe
restrictions’ (Environmental Science and Technology, 2005).
Europe and the US are at very different stages in the process of moving from
the era of risk-taking, which characterized the industrial revolution and much
of the modern scientific age, to an era of risk-prevention. The global nature of
risk, and of its consequences, makes this disparity problematic. The key to
resolving international disagreements over specific legislation will be to foster
an ongoing debate that brings to light these underlying philosophical questions.
Public policy has a role to play here in encouraging openness, and defusing a
potentially adversarial stance.
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 83

Public policy
The regulatory infrastructure of nanotechnology is still in its infancy in the
US. In 2004, the journal Nanotechnology Law & Business began publication,
covering the legal, business and policy aspects of nanotechnology. The title
itself indicates how the drive to examine and create public policy is driven by
the potential for commercialization.
Central to this commercialization is the protection of intellectual property.
Although still largely at the stage of nanoscience, rather than nanotechnology,
it is the patenting of this knowledge that will bring nanotech into the real
world. Recent Congressional testimony suggests that negotiations regarding
intellectual property ownership have become a significant impediment to
business and university collaboration. The US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) is receiving a flood of patent applications in nanotechnology
(Chapter 18). In 1990 the level trickle of patents in nanotechnology took off,
climbing to almost 400 a year in 2000. There can be problems associated
with establishing a valid patent claim in this area. First, a size differential
does not, in general, give patentability. Once the internal combustion engine
is patented, for example, a smaller version is still covered by the same patent.
In nanotechnology, however, small really can be functionally different.
Another issue is the science-fiction nature of some nano-inventions. The
carbon nanotube space elevator, or nano-replicators, might well be rejected
as being too far-fetched. But the rate of advance is such that the incredible
might actually be realizable, requiring a fine sense of judgment on the part
of the USPTO. Organization also poses a challenge: the USPTO has several
‘art units’, people specialized in specific technical areas such as semiconductors
or biotech. Nanotechnology was not an art unit until 2004; nanotech patent
applications were therefore examined in different units, perhaps inconsis-
tently. There is also the question of how broad a patent should be granted.
An early, broad nanotech patent can prevent the entry of later start-ups,
unable to patent their own intellectual property. It is possible to challenge a
broad patent, but small start-ups are unlikely to be able to meet the legal
costs. The alternative is either to license the technology, the costs of which
might make the start-up less attractive to venture capital, or to design
around the patent.
This area is being explored by Marie Thursby of the Georgia Institute of
Technology, under the ELSI component of the National Nanotechnology
Infrastructure Network. Her team is studying the commercialization of
research across disciplines, and between industry and academe, investigating
the effect of factors such as economic, regulatory, and legal mechanisms on
the development and diffusion of nanotechnology. This work is linked to
Lynne Zucker’s NanoBank project at the California Nanosystems Institute at
University of California, Santa Barbara, which is creating an integrated
database providing an economic view of nanotechnology. It will be available
as a public resource, collecting and collating information on nano-related
articles, patents, companies, universities and groups, as well as data on
84 Nanotechnology

authors, inventors and products. As well as functioning as a resource for the

nano-community, the NanoBank will make it possible to study effects of
policy, and technology transfer to industry.
Current public policy in America – in the broader sense of US Admini-
stration policy – is also presenting a challenge to nanotechnology. The
combination of a record deficit, an expensive war in Iraq and ‘homeland
security’ implementation has resulted in a difficult funding climate for research.
The NSF budget for 2005 is facing a 3.5 per cent cut, with further cuts
expected in 2006. Elsewhere funds are being diverted, and scavenged. Foreign
students, a significant element of the graduate student research workforce, are
not only having a harder time gaining entry to the country, but also showing
themselves more reluctant to come to America (Swanson, 2004). This is, of
course, in part due to their having a wider range of options than in former
times, with graduate schools in other parts of the world becoming competitive
with the American educational experience. Nationwide, a survey suggests that
60 per cent of university and college enrolment management report a drop of up
to 30 per cent in foreign graduate student applications for doctoral programmes
(ACE, 2004). The significant proportion of students from foreign countries
enrolled at the graduate level (largely from India and China) creates an
export of scientific expertise to competing economies, and is itself a long-
term threat to America’s scientific and economic standing.

Education
Nanotechnology education has two thrusts – those of educating a workforce,
and of creating an informed public.
The multidisciplinary nature of nanotechnology poses an immediate
challenge for workforce development. It poses the scientist with a choice –
either stay within the traditional confines of your discipline and certainly
become isolated, or tackle the challenges of learning new terms, new principles
and paradigms and new laboratory techniques. Scientists are thus forced to
adopt – and to adapt to – concepts from other disciplines. They are faced,
too, with the need to go outside their laboratories and engage with society,
in a two-way dialogue where the scientist can learn as much as the layman,
and in which the public and its representatives are active partners of technolo-
gists. This new, proactive paradigm for technology implementation accepts
uncertainty and complexity, and creates an iterative flexibility in technological
development.
Interdisciplinary teams are a growing part of academic and professional
endeavours (Kanfer et al, 2000). Effective interaction between these multi-
disciplinary teams, with different goals, criteria, ‘languages’, location and so
on, can be very difficult to achieve (Younglove-Webb et al, 1999). Although
‘interdisciplinarity’ is a term much used in nanotechnology-related funding
solicitations, and the proposals generated in response to these, it is rarely
achieved in practice. Do we educate specialists in each particular discipline,
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 85

and train them to collaborate, or do we educate generalists who evolve through

their work experience? Polymaths – people expert in more than one area – are
rare beings, and it would be unrealistic to expect that we can create an entire
scientific generation of polymaths. Since no individual can be expert across
the whole range of nanotechnology, technologists must develop an ability to
move comfortably across disciplines – in much the same way that baby-
boomers have become avid world travellers, enriching their own culture with
borrowings from foreign environments. Traditionally, depth in a discipline is
respected and rewarded; the interdisciplinary challenge may require that we
learn to give equal respect to synthesists, or brokers – people able to bridge
disciplines, and engender successful interactions. In America, these transitions
will take place within a workforce that is already experiencing significant
demographic change in ethnicity and gender, which will also factor in to the
ability to transcend boundaries and hierarchies.
These non-traditional aspects of nanotechnology’s educational demands
will in turn require institutional change in academia. Students are currently
compartmentalized by discipline – as, to a large extent, are faculty. Future
needs could perhaps best be met by a core curriculum, which maintains a
focus on physics, chemistry, mathematics and biology, supplemented by
courses that develop this knowledge in pure or applied directions. This has
implications, too, for the development of a technician workforce, since it
suggests a need for two year colleges to have enhanced laboratory facilities to
expose their students to fabrication technology, both top-down and bottom-
up. The nature of academe in America will make this kind of institutional
flexibility hard to achieve. One might speculate that the most effective training
might in effect be almost a high-level apprentice scheme, where a student
creates an educational path by attaching themselves to one or several professors
whose work is of interest to them.
All major science and engineering colleges in US have introduced courses
related to nanoscale science and engineering in recent years (Younglove-
Webb et al, 1999; Cornell University, University of Washington, 2005). The
first PhD programme in nanotechnology was offered by the University of
Washington. Another will be offered by the University of New Mexico,
beginning in the autumn of 2005. There are relatively few examples at the
university level of societal and ethical issues being taught with specific refer-
ence to nanotechnology. Examples of this are the courses in ‘Societal and
Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology’ at the University of New Mexico,
‘Societal Impact of Microsystems’ at the University of Michigan, and the
development of ‘Bodyworks’, a course that includes the implications of nano-
technology for medicine and human enhancement at Duke University, as
well as the University of South Carolina’s classes in ‘Nano Philosophy’ and
the ‘Societal Implication of Nanotechnology’ (Nanocourse, 2005; NIRT,
2004; NSF Award; Calvin, 2004). Events such as Cornell University’s panel
discussion ‘Social and Ethical Issues in Nanoscience and Engineering: What
are They?’ supplement this effort, and have the added benefit of reaching a
wider audience (Panel, 2004).
86 Nanotechnology

A concern is the low interest level of US students in nanotechnology-related

programmes. The numbers of US high-school graduates choosing to study
technology in higher education is declining (Fonash, 2001). Although children
are expert at manipulating hi-tech products – their computers, mobile phones,
DVD players – they are often ignorant of what makes them work. In America,
as in the EU, programmes are being implemented to attract children to careers
in science. As a result, the introduction of nanotechnology is occurring earlier
and earlier in a child’s education. Given the less than satisfactory communica-
tion skills of the average student, during the early years the money may well be
better spent on more fundamental skills.
In 2002, NSF announced their nanotechnology undergraduate education
programme, and in 2003, the nanotechnology high school education programme.
This is being continued so that eventually children from kindergarten onwards
will encounter the concepts and language of nanotechnology. Science museums
and other non-traditional methods are being recruited to help in this task.
Professor James Gimzewski of the University of California (Los Angeles) has
played a leading role in projects making nanotechnology accessible to the general
public, including the very successful ‘nano’ exhibition that ran for 10 months at
the Los Angeles County Museum (Gimzewski, 2004). It attracted over 200,000
visitors, as well as strong media attention, with its nine interconnected installa-
tions; the specially designed architecture featured a camera swarm, an interactive
buckyball and hexagonal floor, buckyball shadows, a nano-mandala, a quantum
tunnel, a feeling table, an atomic manipulation table and more.
Such non-traditional methods of disseminating information and conveying
complex scientific concepts are not just clever ways of ‘getting the idea across’.
Over the past century or so, the interactions between social, political, economic
and technical dynamics have become increasingly complex. ‘Multi-tasking’, for
instance, was not common in the early 20th century. In response to this
increasing complexity, scholars and analysts have come to adopt a systems
approach to understanding the consequences of change, developing formidable
(though imperfect) arrays of analytical tools for the purpose. Underlying the
‘nano’ exhibit, and similar endeavours, is the belief that humanity will need
to take a similar quantum leap in conceptual ability to master the complexity
and rate of change that characterizes a society shaped by nanotechnology.
The unique use of art is intended to both convey information and simulta-
neously develop cognitive ability.
Education is the key to the success of nanotechnology, not simply for work-
force development, but also to create public awareness and acceptance, and a
sound legislative and regulatory environment. This is why nanotechnology
education cannot be limited to creating a highly trained technical community,
but must extend to all stakeholders – judges, lawyers, journalists, legislators,
children, and the general public as a whole. This will require a whole gamut
of approaches – courses, workshops, books, articles, web-based information,
videos, documentaries, and more – aimed at both specialists and the public.
This approach was used very successfully by the Human Genome Project,
but is still at a very early stage for nanotechnology.
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 87

Public perception
In 2004, 80 per cent of those Americans polled knew little or nothing of nano-
technology (Cobb and Macoubrie, 2004). Nevertheless, only 22 per cent felt the
risks would outweigh the benefits – and the greater the individual’s knowledge
of nanotechnology, the more likely they were to have a positive perception. In
particular, they hoped for ‘new and better ways to detect and treat human
disease’. Their greatest concerns were with possible loss of privacy, and the
potential for a nanotechnological arms race. In this author’s experience, it is
rare to give a talk on nanotechnology to the public without being asked about
Michael Crichton’s book Prey, and this poll revealed that it did indeed influ-
ence public perceptions. This negative effect may be due to readers not
having access to balanced information – in groups presented with the relevant
scientific material in an accessible form, the Prey effect was mitigated.
The potential effect of news media on public opinion of nanotechnology has
already been mentioned. The entertainment media will have a similar effect.
20th Century Fox has bought the film rights to Prey, and rogue nanotechnol-
ogists have already appeared in movies such as Superman 2, and Agent Cody
Banks. A more thoughtful treatment is in Spielberg’s Minority Report,
where digital newspapers had headlines ‘Mechanical nanodevice triumph’
and ‘Molecular nanotechnology?’, and where nano-reconstructors performed
eye surgery (Fried, 2002). Business leaders at the Nanobusiness 2004 con-
ference were seriously concerned about the effect of such depictions (Mason,
2004). The degree to which the public can distinguish between real life, and
Hollywood-like depictions of technology for entertainment value, would
seem to be dependent on the level of knowledge informing this judgment.
Openly presenting the science behind critical issues will prevent a rise of
negative opinion based on a lack of information or even misinformation.
(Informed negative opinions are, of course, well worth listening to.) An
example of this type of activity is Professor Davis Baird’s Science and
Technology Studies Consortium at the University of South Carolina. This
NSF-funded team contributes to nanotechnology education; conducts research
which ranges from the visual and philosophical perception of the nanoscale, to
models of nanotechnology risk assessment, to integration of nanotechnology into
the public sphere; and maintains an outreach programme with elements such as
the South Carolina Citizen’s School of Nanotechnology, which informs the
public of the region about nanotechnology, and allows them a voice in its conduct.

Hype or a reaction to complexity?

Is nanotechnology a discipline that will emerge in its own right? Is nano-
technology a brilliant sales pitch developed by NSF’s Mihail Roco to gain
funding for scientific research? Is nanotechnology another dot.com event?
Will nanotechnology create a radically different future? Who is right – the
visionaries or the skeptics? No hard answers exist.
88 Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology is still largely at the stage of being nanoscience. What drives

this science – what attracts venture capitalists and federal funding – is the prospect
of future products. The most dramatic of these, those that capture the imagina-
tion, are furthest away from realization. Also, the ability of nanotechnology to
attract funding has caused some to apply the label where it is not really justified.
‘Nanotechnology’ is functioning as an umbrella term. The saving grace, however,
is that nanotechnology is largely focused on ‘business-to-business’ applications,
where consumer-driven hype has little effect. Nanotechnology companies will
not survive if they cannot provide a functional product.
The investment picture offers a view of how nanotechnology is seen by
those who have to ‘put their money where their mouth is!’. In 2003, US venture
capital funding for nanotechnology was at US$305M, a 42 per cent increase
over 2002 (Multimedia Research Group, 2004). Similarly, in 2003 nanotech-
nology represented 3 per cent of the total venture capital investment, compared
with 2 per cent in 2002. The nature of this funding is evolving. In 2001, 75 per
cent of funding was to startups and early stage rounds (in which business plans
are matured, and the company formed). By 2003, 60 per cent was to expansion
and late stage rounds (in which products are being developed).
Two recent financial events – the introduction of the Nanotech Index, and the
abortive Nanosys IPO – mirror American opinion that nanotechnology promises
significant opportunities – and reluctance to bet on when those promises will
reach fruition. In April 2004, Merrill Lynch introduced the Merrill Lynch
Nanotech Index, quoted on the American Stock Exchange (MLNI, 2004).
This consists of 22 small to medium-sized companies that are significantly
based on nanotechnology. Companies whose value is not determined by their
nanotechnology activities – giants such as GE, or Intel – are not included. This
announcement of the Index was followed in short order by a complaint to the
New York Attorney General, to the effect that some of the companies included
were not, in fact, based in nanotechnology. The Index was overhauled. Towards
the end of 2004 it was down 25 per cent from its launch.
In April 2004, Nanosys, Inc., a California-based start-up declared its
intention of going public – making an IPO (initial public offering) of its shares
on the New York Stock Exchange. This, even though it admitted products
were at least several years in the future. They were banking on licensing their
nanotechnology patents, most of them related to nanowires, for eventual use in
displays, logic circuits and lasers. In effect, they were hoping investors would
bet on a big nanotechnology future, and create a climate where maturing start-
ups could raise money by going public. And indeed their intended IPO did
create great excitement, with Nanosys being seen as a bellwether for this new
industry. In August 2004, however, this was withdrawn. In a cautious market,
the future of nanotechnology was simply too unpredictable.
Clearly, nanotechnology is grounded in scientific reality. Its products range
from the banal to the astonishing – from paint (which has long-contained
nanoparticles, certainly long before we coined the term) to nanotechnology
treatments for breast cancer (curing cancer is an NNI ‘challenge goal’)
(Hiemstra, 2003). These products, some in a hypothetical future, penetrate
 Nanotechnologies and Society in the USA 89

every facet of human activity. Certainly this enormous scope of nanotechnology

offers equal scope to ‘talk big’. (The ‘snake oil salesman’ had his origin in
America, and the breed is not entirely extinct.) The hype associated with the
dot.com bubble was due to the overselling of a relatively specific idea. Some
nanotechnology products can indeed be oversold – but their individual value
will eventually become clear, however great the hype.
In my opinion, the term ‘hype’ is frequently misapplied to nanotechnology.
Its use, I believe, is sometimes a reaction to the scope and complexity of the
technology. Jean-Pierre Dupuy of the École Polytechnique, Paris, has
described nanotechnology as a system whose complexity is such that it
cannot be modelled – or rather it can only be modelled by experiencing it, by
running the system in actuality (Dupuy, 2004). This can have a disorientating
effect, creating an uncertainty that, for the first time, is likely to become a
permanent condition. Our adaptation to this novel situation – learning to be
comfortable when we do not have definite boundaries, when we do not have
our ‘feet on the ground’, is perhaps the greatest challenge posed by this new
technology. This uncertainty is different to that of the deliberate overselling
of hype – it is due to the vastness of the system.
The motto of the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair was ‘Science finds, technology
applies, man conforms’. I believe the way forward is to reverse this determinist
ethos, and instead to envision the society we want to achieve. Measuring
technological implementation against this standard – involving all members
of society, laymen as well as scientists – offers a guide through this complexity.
This model of technological implementation will maximize the benefits of
nanotechnology, and avoid the pitfalls encountered with previous disruptive
technologies.

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 8

Nanotechnologies and Society

in Europe

Geoffrey Hunt

Introduction
European Union (EU) policy development in nanotechnology over the past
five years shows an uneasy relation between the demands of politics and
business and a commitment to a sustainable and responsible approach, with
its characteristic emphasis on precaution. Strong in creative technical ideas
and in public awareness of environmental and public health issues, and lacking
either the kind of integrated mobilization of resources for nanotechnology we
find in the USA or the more centralized approach of Japan, European Union
(EU) policy finds itself hampered by problems of political, infrastructural
and financial integration. In the EU (which now comprises 25 nations) the
contradictions between high technological development and public concern,
especially over chemicals, are perhaps more keenly felt than anywhere on the
planet (Friends of the Earth, 2000, 2002; WWF, 2003). For those concerned
about global sustainability this is fortunate; for the business, commercial and
industrial sector it is a frustrating fact that encourages them to place (or just
threaten to place) their investments outside of Europe. This dual-tension of
sustainability–competition and integration–diversity, which is certainly not as
acutely felt in the USA and Japan, is the background against which EU nano-
technologies are emerging.
The EU has made a commitment, albeit a fragile one, to sustainability defined
as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland, 1987). The
basis for this is the Council of the EU’s qualified acceptance in Gothenburg
2001 of the EU Commission’s proposal on sustainable development (European
Commission, 2001), which came in preparation for the EU’s contribution to
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Despite the fact that
the Council has not accepted all aspects of the Commission’s proposal, the
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe 93

environmental dimension of sustainable development now has equal status with

economic and social development. What this means for nanotechnology generally
is that it should not develop in an unsustainable way, or in a way that undermines
sustainability, and that it should be encouraged to develop in a way that pro-
actively facilitates and supports sustainability. It invites industry to participate
in generating new environmentally friendly technologies, in which nanoscale
research and applications can play a significant role.
The EU’s Gothenburg Council considered the crucial issues of climate
change, sustainable transport, public health and natural resources, but did
not accept all of the Commission’s recommendations. However, it did endorse
the Commission’s view that sustainability requires policy development in a
much more integrated and coordinated manner, and recognized the importance
of economically internalizing environmental and other ‘externalities’, the global
character of the need for sustainability, and the potential leadership role of the
EU. The Commission now includes mechanisms for a sustainability impact
assessment of all major policy proposals.

A policy of sustainability and responsibility?

The European idea of an ‘integrated and responsible’ approach to nanotech-
nology, in the context of sustainability, emerged most clearly perhaps from
the EuroNanoForum 2003 meeting that took place in Trieste, Italy, with
over 1,000 participants (EuroNanoForum, 2003).1 Annual EuroNanoForum
conferences, supported by the EU, but not reflecting its official position,
continue to be an innovative and democratic melting point of stakeholder
debate and viewpoints, and their reports have a considerable influence on
policy makers and policy critics. Embedded in prior EU technology strategy
initiatives and agreements2 on creating a knowledge-based society, sustainable
development, a 3 per cent of GDP research funding target (the so-called
‘Barcelona objective’), and an integrated research area, EU policy formation
quickly moved into debates about risk. Already by March 2004 the Health
and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European Commission
issued a preliminary analysis (European Commission, 2004a) and investigative
research projects were funded immediately.
There followed a communication on strategy that was set out for open
consultation in May 2004 (European Commission, 2004b) (hereafter the
‘2004 Strategy’). This emphasized continuity with existing EU technology
strategy and its themes of sustainability, area integration, educational and
research interdisciplinarity, upstreaming of the social considerations (including
risks), increased public investment, creation of industry/research ‘poles of
excellence’, technology transfer, and international cooperation. The 2004
EuroNanoForum reported on a wide range of opinions on benefits, risks,
ethical and legal aspects drawing on research groups, funding programmes,
projects and networks, NGO positions, industrial associations and political
parties, acutely pointing up the contradictions in an open spirit. Then, on
94 Nanotechnology

the political level, the EU Council’s September 2004 ‘Competitiveness state-

ment’ accepted the strategy, saying ‘it is important to continue to generate
scientific and technological knowledge in nanotechnology and to encourage
its use in industrial applications’. On public engagement it is emphatic:
[T]here is a need for a sustainable and responsible development of nanotech-
nology, addressing its health, environmental, societal, industrial and economic
aspects at the earliest possible stage in order to respond to the justified expectations
and concerns of European citizens. (Council of the European Union, 2004)

It concluded by welcoming the Commission’s intention ‘to draw up an Action

Plan for nanotechnology during the first quarter of 2005, after having launched
a wide-ranging stakeholder debate’.
Three months later there appeared the ‘Outcome of the Open Consultation
on the European Strategy for Nanotechnology’ that provided an analysis of the
online questionnaire available on the EuroNanoForum website between
August and October 2004 (EuroNanoForum, 2004). This questionnaire was
in direct response to the ‘2004 Strategy’ document.3

Public funding
Public funding has continued to be a strong demand since it emerged as a
prominent theme at the 2003 EuroNanoForum meeting. That meeting
identified the following as ways of providing such publicly funded support:
funding of nanotechnology research that has an ‘application potential’;
research institutes to help bridge the gap between basic research findings
and preparing for production; reduction of financial risk for entrepreneurs;
support for education of technologists in finance and marketing; support for
international ‘critical mass’ networking and to prevent a ‘knowledge apartheid’,
and education of the public on benefits and risks (EuroNanoForum, 2003).
While business and academic sector demands for increased public funding
have continued since that time, the EU would like to see the private sector
contribution to research and development (R&D) increase. It is of some
concern to it that in 2003-2004 with 56 per cent of EU R&D coming from
the private sector, ‘the EU lags behind the USA and Japan with 66 per cent
and 73 per cent respectively’ (European Commission, 2004b, section 2.0).
It is entirely reasonable that a private sector that is more closely regulated
than that in Japan or USA, and is officially expected to play its part in
sustainability, should expect greater financial support. The linkage between
precautionary/sustainability style regulations and public funding of R&D and
infrastructural development may well prove to be a pressing political and
social issue in the latter two countries too, sooner or later (see Chapters 6
and 7). Public funding for nanotechnology may ethically be seen as requiring
public understanding of nanotechnology and some consensus about the balance
of benefits and risks. Thus the need for public acceptance is currently more
deeply felt in Europe than elsewhere.
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe 95

Research
An EU programme of research to begin to answer the environmental and
public health concerns is now under way, albeit not as comprehensive and
coordinated as the hazards actually merit, in my opinion (European Commis-
sion, 2005). The EU began early on to fund some projects to improve the
understanding of risks. Thus under FP5 (1997–2001) there was the NANO-
SAFE project for Risk assessment in production and use of nanoparticles
with development of preventive measures and practice codes. This is
followed by the Integrated Project NANOSAFE2, which ‘intends to treat
thoroughly a limited number of reference particles and situations in order
to bring the first effective industrial solutions’. The project has ambitious
goals over a 4 year period, including the development of new techniques
for detecting, tracing and characterization of engineered nanoparticles, the
creation of a toxicology database, development of means of limiting exposure
and leaks, and the evaluation of social and environmental impacts, all feeding
into new standards and legislation. Other major projects are NANO-
PATHOLOGY and NANODERM. The former is investigating the role of
micro and nanoparticles in biomaterial-induced pathology; and the latter
has been investigating the percutaneous uptake of ultra-fine particles. FP6
includes a STREP on the ‘interaction of engineered particles with the
environment and the living world’ and NANOTOX is supporting the an
examination of the toxicological impact of nanoparticles on human health
and the environment.

Commercialization
In the above-mentioned survey, Europe is rated relatively poorly for nano-
technology transfer. This is perhaps an indication that the ‘European
paradox’, where excellence in R&D is not ‘sufficiently’ translated into
wealth generating products and processes, may also unfold in the case of nano-
technology, partly in the context of the uncertainties exposed by this dual
tension (EuroNanoForum, 2004). The USA is already the world leader in
nanotechnology research publications and, more significantly from a com-
mercial point of view, it is also the leader in patents. Hundreds of start-up
companies, often set up by researchers with a patentable idea, are appearing
worldwide. Japan and China, are also notable in following the USA with a
rapid increase in publishing and patenting. Yet the tension emerges when
the ‘2004 Strategy’ shows awareness of another ethical question: ‘Due to its
strong emphasis on knowledge, nanotechnology is raising fundamental ques-
tions as to what should, and should not, be patentable (for example on the
level of individual molecules)’ (European Commission, 2004, section 3.4.3),
(and see Chapter 18).
The ‘2004 Strategy’ points out: ‘Taking into account that SMEs [small and
medium enterprises] account for around two-thirds of employment in Europe,
96 Nanotechnology

it is evident that more effort is needed to encourage the creation of new and
innovative enterprises.’ It recognizes the technical and marketing risks,
especially where there is a possible perception of ‘negative ethical, health or
environmental consequences’ (European Commission, 2004, section 3.4.2).
Europeans do not have the kind of aggressive commercial culture and
entrepreneurship one finds in the USA and Japan, so researchers and the
business community do not necessarily think so readily in terms of patents
and business start-ups. Unlike Japan, thinking tends to be short-term rather
than medium to long-term. Furthermore, credit rather than risk capital may
be what is available.
A whole range of remedies is being discussed and slowly implemented for
the benefit of entrepreneurs: support, training, financing, taxation adjustments,
support for women and ethnic minorities, trade expansion, and lightening of
administrative and regulatory burdens. And here the unresolved tension
reappears – to regulate for sustainability or to deregulate for entrepreneurship
(European Commission, 2004). Certainly some suggestions appear to be sound.
The ‘2004 Strategy’ recognizes that the European Investment Bank (EIB)
could help provide loans, for example. Then there is the promotion of technical
‘poles of excellence’, and the creation and improvement of the necessary
infrastructures to encourage business and collaboration with business.
Commercialization may gain from greater confidence as the globalization of
nanotechnologies settles into various niches around the nano-techniques
deployed in biomedicine and pharmaceuticals, materials and chemicals,
manufacturing processes, electronics, and so on. Already the ‘2004 Strategy’
aspired to an R&D ‘focus upon the most challenging aspects’ (section 3.1.1).
Pointing in the opposite direction from nanotechnological specialization and
niches is the aspiration for ‘convergence.’ General levels of application
mentioned are knowledge-based industrial innovation, for example nanomanu-
facturing, integration at the macro-micro-nano interfaces and interdisciplinary
or convergence programmes. Following America’s NBIC lead (see Chapter 7),
the EU has created an expert group for ‘Foresighting the new technology
wave: Converging nano-, bio- and info-technologies and their social and
competitive impact on Europe’ (European Commission, 2004c). However,
the gap between such foresighting and commercialization in Europe could
hardly be larger.

Integration
EU ‘integration’ is a much wider arena of tensions and conflicts than the
constitutional and political. It raises a panoply of issues around cultural and
environmental diversity, the level of development of regulatory and legal
frameworks and implementation, technical standardization, and the infra-
structures of economy, administration, research, industry, professionalism
and education. There is no common understanding among people in the EU
countries as to how far the EU’s regimes should descend into civil, cultural
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe 97

and political life. Whether this diversity is a good thing or a bad thing depends,
from one perspective, on whether one perceives a gain from larger scale R&D,
industry and markets, or not. What kind of gain are we talking about? If the
gain is greater global competitiveness, then arguments will favour integration
at many levels. But there may be a resultant loss in local democracy, and the
weight attached to local knowledge, participation, control and creativity
under the heavy (if somewhat uncoordinated, and sometimes wasteful or
even corrupt) hand of bureaucracy.
It might also be argued that if nanotechnology is going to race ahead in the
USA, Japan and other parts of the world, then it is better from a global point of
view if a distinctively European sustainable and precautionary approach can
make itself felt (European Commission, 2000). What this boils down to is the
question: what kind of integration is the EU really seeking? One which works
against sustainability, or one which promotes it? The struggle over the EU’s
new Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH)
regulations, and which should be of great importance for the development of
nanotechnologies, is a whirlpool of the tensions and contradictions of EU
industrial technology policy. A compromise version was approved by the
European Parliament in November 2005.
The ‘2004 Strategy’ noted that, ‘One of the crucial differences between the
EU and our main competitors is that the landscape of European R&D in nano-
technology risks becoming relatively fragmented with a disparate range of
rapidly evolving programmes and funding sources’ (European Commission,
2004b, section 2.2). And the report on the outcome of the strategy consultation
observes: ‘ [According to respondents] Europe appears to be lacking a coherent
system of infrastructure and the need for a critical mass was identified as the
most critical issue (90 per cent) . . . Consensus [85 per cent] emerged that the
EU needs an integrated strategy to be competitive in relation to other countries’
(EuroNanoForum, 2004). The Council of the EU concluded ‘that intra-
sectoral and cross-sectoral structural change is needed to boost European
competitiveness and productivity growth’ (Council of the European Union,
2004).

Upstreaming public engagement

The EU appears to have accepted the principle of ‘upstreaming’, for example
engaging with the public about nanotechnology, its risks as well as benefits,
as early in its development as possible. ‘Upstream’, because the engagement
is not put off until later down the stream of development by which time
there may well be social rejection. This perhaps is a lesson learned from
public reactions to nuclear energy, biotechnology and genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) (see Chapters 4 and 10).
One would like to think that this is not just a concern about public relations,
selling to the public what will go ahead anyway, but rather about the democra-
tization of science and technology – allowing and supporting an informed
98 Nanotechnology

public participation in its developments, non-developments and changes of

direction (see Chapter 16). Even though the outcome of the 2004 strategy
survey may have been skewed towards those with a vested interest in nanotech-
nology, still a high level of social responsibility emerged. Three-quarters of
respondents agreed that the EU must take early account of risks and social
impacts in a dialogue with the public through the Commission, national
governments, and the media.
Dialogue and engagement between companies engaged in nanotechnologies
and the pubic is equally important. In many ways Europe is already the leader
in corporate responsibility initiatives. For large European companies with
nanotechnology programmes, such as BASF, which do have such initiatives
in some shape or form, the peculiar risks and uncertainties of nanotechnologies
may prove to be a test of their commitment to such responsibility. Very few
companies involved in nanotechnology have anything specific to say about
their responsibilities in this new area. However, one may note that the Dutch
company DSM, which is developing various nanotechnologies, such as nanofil-
lers, catalysts, a nano-structured anti-reflective coating, and nano-sized iron
oxide particles for thermal ablation of cancer cells, publishes an annual
Triple P Report (People, Planet and Profit), and in 2004 was put at the top
of the chemicals sector of the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI
World).

Attitudes to environmental and public health risks

It is clear that some major forces of influence within the EU have so far shown a
responsible recognition of possible environmental and public health risks. As
nanotechnological competition inevitably intensifies in the 2005–2015 time-
frame, one should not lose sight of earlier concerns expressed and commitments
made. The ‘2004 Strategy’ made a clear statement of balanced awareness of the
possibly harmful side of nanotechnologies:

It is essential that the aspects of risk are addressed upfront as an integral part of
the development of these technologies from conception and R&D through to
commercial exploitation, in order to ensure the safe development, production,
use and disposal of products from nanotechnology. Nanotechnologies present
new challenges also for the assessment and management of risks. It is therefore
important that, in parallel with technological development, appropriate R&D
is undertaken to provide quantitative data on toxicology and ecotoxicology
(including human and environmental dose response and exposure data) to
perform risk assessments and, where necessary, to enable risk assessment
procedures to be adjusted. (European Commission, 2004b, section 1.3)

The statement also mentions the need for a life-cycle approach to nanotechno-
logical impacts, and the advantage of pooling knowledge on an international
level (ibid, sec. 4). In the subsequent consultation, over 75 per cent of
respondents agreed that risk assessment must be integrated as early as possible
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe 99

Table 8.1 2004 EU Consultation outcomes in health, environment, and so on

Health, Safety, Environmental and Societal Issues Number of responses

Interaction of nanotechnology with living organisms 498
Public understanding of nanotechnology 428
Risk assessment of nanotechnology 420
Interaction of nanotechnology with the environment 415
Societal impact of nanotechnology 253
Ethical aspects of nanotechnology 235
Governance of nanotechnology 202

in R&D and 61 per cent thought such assessments should be carried out at the
EU level (EuroNanoForum, 2004).
In 2004 the European Commission’s Risk Assessment Unit, Public
Health and Risk Assessment Directorate (Health and Consumer Protection
Directorate-General) issued a report on the workshop entitled ‘Mapping out
Nano Risks,’ which it says is a ‘modest first step’ towards ‘analysing the
potential risks of nanotechnologies and what they may imply’ (European
Commission, 2004a). The report is a summary of an expert discussion and
does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission itself, but clearly the
Commission thinks that the early analysis of risk is of vital importance. (Dr
Vyvyan Howard, who provided Chapter 13 of this book, was a member of
this expert group.)
The specific kinds of risks, and the relative weight attached to them, in the
relevant EU circles is steadily becoming focussed. The 2004 consultation
revealed that the priority of respondents was for more R&D to address knowl-
edge gaps, including the understanding of the behaviour of free manufactured
nanoparticles. Human exposure to these was most important (72 per cent),
followed by environmental release (56 per cent), and many pointed out that
nanoparticles are already widespread through, for example, high-temperature
combustion processes. As an R&D priority, health, safety, environmental and
social issues received about 12 per cent of the votes, about the same as R&D
for sensor applications, and R&D for information processing, storage and
transmission. These were the three most highly rated of eight main areas of
R&D proposed by the questionnaire. The breakdown of responses, showing
most research-worthy subjects within that 12 per cent, is shown in Table 8.1.
In this general area of issues the respondents specifically asked for more
R&D attention to the measurement of physico-chemical properties contri-
buting to both hazard assessment and environmental fate modelling; novel
toxicology methods; environmental exposure monitoring in support of risk
assessment and management; nanotechnology for environmental remediation;
100 Nanotechnology

and the analysis of the life cycle of nanotechnology-based products, among

other things.
Perhaps the most important point to emerge from the above-mentioned
expert workshop is that conventional technology’s unintentionally produced
and released waste (nonengineered) nanoscale particles are already of serious
concern, and that some nanoengineered particles ‘may have the potential to
pose serious concerns – the most significant ones relating to nanotechnologies
within the next 3–5 years – and require further studies’. The workshop high-
lighted uncertainty and ignorance, especially of two kinds: that ‘the adverse
effects of nanoparticles cannot be predicted (or derived) from the known
toxicity of bulk material’, and there are ‘limits that preclude a complete risk
assessment today, in particular, the present scarcity of dose-response and
exposure data’. Workshop participants thought that, from the point of view
of risk analysis, it was crucial to distinguish between free and fixed nano-
particles. Among the recommendations of the expert workshop were the
development of a nomenclature and registration numbering for engineered
nanoparticles; of appropriate risk assessment methods; of guidelines and
standards; and the containment of free nanoparticles and the ‘elimination
whenever possible, and otherwise minimizing, the production and uninten-
tional release of waste nanosized particles’ (European Commission, 2004a).

Attitudes to regulation
Business leaders in Europe are perhaps in something of a cleft stick. Business
generally regards regulation as a constraint, and wishes to minimize it.
However, public perceptions (as we saw in the case of GMOs) can undermine
their financial ambitions, so it is increasingly in the interests of business to be
(or be seen to be) public-spirited and socially responsible. With the growing
power of consumers, civil society movements and NGOs, often reflecting
public concern about the damage done by old technologies and the moral
uncertainties of the new ones, the reception of nanotechnology is currently in
the balance. Timely, open, innovative and balanced regulation may make all
the difference. Politicians in a democracy worthy of the name cannot but act
to some extent based on public attitudes. Where public accountability of
government is weak, and democracy rather shallow, politicians and policy-
makers need not worry so much about public opinion. Pluralistic Europe
leans more towards negotiated regulation and welfare-statism than either the
populist plutocracy of the USA or somewhat statist Japan (Chapter 6).
Nearly a quarter of the ‘2004 Strategy’ document was devoted to issues of
regulation, responsible development, public understanding and health, safety
and the environment. It states categorically: ‘Ethical principles must be
respected and, where appropriate, enforced through regulation . . . An open,
traceable and verifiable development of nanotechnology, according to
democratic principles, is indispensable’ (European Commission, 2004b, section
3.5.1). These principles are to be found in a bewildering range of statements
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe 101

ranging from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to

Ethical Rules of the Sixth Framework Programme to statements of the European
Group on Ethics4 .
The 2004 consultation (93 per cent European-based respondents) is a good
indication of the attitude of EU nanotechnology stakeholders to regulation.
Nearly half of the respondents agreed with the statement that, ‘To ensure
confidence from investors and consumers, regulation of nanotechnology is
needed’, and about one third of respondents believed that this should come
from the EU, while another one third thought international regulation would
be better (EuroNanoForum, 2004).
The EU Commissions’ proposal on sustainability had already indirectly set
ethical parameters for regulatory frameworks, and among its objectives is this
one: ‘By 2020, ensure that chemicals are only produced and used in ways
that do not pose significant threats to human health and the environment’
(European Commission, 2001). The EU’s Registration, Evaluation, and
Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) regulations, and the controversy
around them, are perhaps the most important manifestation of a sustain-
ability-style regulatory framework. It is in the design and application of
regulatory frameworks and specific regulations to nanotechnology that the
real difficulties begin, and difficulties on all levels – from the scientific and
technical to the economic and political.
Currently, nanotechnology is in the precarious position that manufacturers
are already using certain nanoparticles in products and laboratories at the
very time that members of the scientific community are releasing more and
more data that indicate specific risks to the environment and public health.
How much damage will be done before adequate regulation is drafted,
implemented and complied with?
Nanotechnologies will certainly bring about specific modifications to
existing regulations, and may one day either necessitate a new regulatory
framework or even bring about a sea-change over the whole regulatory philo-
sophy of chemicals production and use. One can readily see that nanoscience’s
fundamental and enabling character may well impact on a wide range of
regulations in Europe, including health and safety, environment, medicines
and medical devices, cosmetics and consumer goods, animal testing, design
and disposal, the handling of accidents, consumer liability, labelling and
so on.

Conclusion: the EU and global welfare

Both the benefits and the risks presented by nanotechnologies are of global
concern. Globally, economic and social forces may pull nanotechnologies in
different, and even opposing, directions. While the scientifically fundamental
nature of nanotechnology and the issues of safety would appear to necessitate
international cooperation, at the same time national and regional competition
may obstruct or undermine this. Europe may fear that some nanotechnology
102 Nanotechnology

industries will gain a competitive advantage in areas such as China and India.
Certainly, agreements now exist between the EU and the National Science
Foundation (USA) and between the EC and the Chinese Ministry of Science
and Technology (MOST). There is also a high-level centre for industrial
cooperation between the European Commission and Japan’s Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry, which will hopefully draw responsible nano-
technology into its discussions at some point5 .
It is not clear now whether the emerging international cooperation
agreements include research into toxicological and other risks, nor is it clear
how global civil society – in the form of NGOs – is to be drawn into such
cooperation. What is needed is a global framework for responsible nanotechno-
logical development in which there is some basic agreement about what is most
important for human welfare given current environmental and ecological
conditions. A global code of conduct might be a way to start the kind of
international sustainability framework needed. In the 2004 European strategy
consultation (mentioned above) over 60 per cent of respondents agreed with
such an idea (EuroNanoForum, 2004). The EU has perhaps, more than
anywhere on the planet, a potential for leading such an initiative.
The dual tension need not be seen as a weakness of the EU, but a strength.
For such a tension and the question of how to resolve it lies in the future
for USA, Japan, Canada, China and indeed the world taken as a whole, as
the issue of sustainability inevitably becomes the defining feature of this
century.

Notes
1 EuroNanoforum is a thematic network and information base funded by
the European Commission, aiming to promote and raise the standard of
nanotechnology activities throughout Europe. It involves a consortium
of leading European nanotechnology organizations led by the Institute of
Nanotechnology (UK) and VDI Technologiezentrum (Germany), CEA-
LETI (France), CMP Cientifica (Spain), Nordic Nanotech (Denmark)
and Malsch TechnoValuation (The Netherlands).
2 See the European Councils of Lisbon, of Gothenburg, of Barcelona and
the European Research Area (ERA) initiative, at http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/
eurocouncil/index.htm and the EU document ‘The European Research
Area’ COM (2002) 565.
3 The total number of responses was 749, including representative views of
about a hundred organizations, with 93 per cent based in Europe (one
third from UK and Germany). It included a few East Asian responses:
one from Japan, one from Singapore, one from South Korea, and three
from Taiwan. The EuroNanoforum website ‘aims to provide a linking
framework for all nanotechnology activity within the European Commu-
nity. It will serve as a central location from which to gain access to and
information about research programmes, technological developments,
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Europe 103

funding opportunities and future activities in nanotechnology within the

community’ (see www.nanoforum.org).
4 For an online index and access to most of these statements go to: http://
europa.eu.int/comm/research/science-society/ethics/legislation_en.html; for
the Charter go to www.europarl.eu.int/charter/default_en.htm; and for
more on the European Ethics Group go to http://europa.eu.int/comm/
european_group_ethics/index_en.htm.
5 The EU–Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation is a joint venture of the
European Commission’s Directorate General for Enterprise & Industry
and Japan’s METI, with the objective of promoting industrial cooperation
between European and Japanese companies, with management training
programmes, business information exchange and an annual roundtable. It
also manages an Alternative Energy Programme. See www.eujapan.com/
europe.centre.html.

References
BASF (2005) Shaping the Future: Corporate Report 2004, Ludwigshafen, BASF
Brundtland, G. H. (1987) World Commission on Environment and Development: Our
Common Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Council of the European Union (2004) Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry and
Research), Press Release, 2605th Council Meeting. Brussels, 24 September, 12487/04
(Presse 269)
European Commission (2000) Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000)
1 final. Brussels. At http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0001en01.
pdf
European Commission (2001). A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European
Union Strategy for Sustainable Development (Commission’s proposal to the
Gothenburg European Council), Brussels, COM(2001)264
European Commission (2004) Action Plan: The European agenda for Entrepreneurship,
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
COM(2004)70, Brussels
European Commission (2004a) Nanotechnologies: A Preliminary Risk Analysis,
Brussels, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate General of the European
Commission
European Commission (2004b) Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology,
Communication from the Commission, COM(2004)338 final, Brussels
European Commission (2004c) Foresighting the New Technology Wave: Converging
Technologies – Shaping the Future of European Societies; State of the Art Reviews
and Related Papers, Brussels, Expert Group
European Commission (2005) Research needs on nanoparticles. Proceedings of the
workshop held in Brussels, 25–26 January 2005, Luxembourg, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities
EuroNanoForum (2003) Proceedings of EuroNanoForum 2003: European and International
Forum on Nanotechnology, www.euronanoforum2003.org/ENF2003proceedings/index.
htm
104 Nanotechnology

EuroNanoForum (2004) Outcome of the Open Consultation on the European Strategy for
Nanotechnology, compiled by Ineke Malsch and Mireille Oud, December,
2004.www.nanoforum.org
Friends of the Earth (2000, 2002) Crisis in Chemicals, May 2000; Crisis in Chemicals
Update, March 2002, London, Friends of the Earth, www.foe.co.uk
WWF (2003) The Social Cost of Chemicals, Godalming, Surrey, UK, WWF
 9

Nanotechnologies and Society

in Canada

Linda Goldenberg

Nanotechnology is viewed by many as a technological revolution that will

transform the world. Canada has joined the global nanotechnology community,
and has made significant strides in laying the foundation for research and
development, particularly in the life sciences, information and communication
technologies (ICTs), and materials and composites sectors.
Three notable features appear when scanning the Canadian nanotechnology
research and development (R&D) landscape. The first is that the social
imagination for nanotechnology has not run wild with promises and dreams.
Second is that notwithstanding the absence of an integrated national nano-
technology strategy, the Government of Canada is still the dominant force.
Third is that R&D is inextricably linked to social policy and goals. While
the Government of Canada recognizes the immense economic potential of
nanotechnology, R&D is not driven by a commercial or economic agenda but
rather by social agendas, and is emerging within the context of overall Canadian
science and technology, health care, and most recently, national security
policies. Canada is in the early stages of a dynamic convergence of science,
policy and innovation, and the result is an R&D approach to this emerging
new science that is uniquely aligned with Canadian values.
In this chapter I survey the broad landscape of nanotechnology R&D
in Canada and identify the major development vectors and underlying
influences shaping the contours. I start with a definition of nanotechnology,
outline general development vectors discernible at this time, situate
them within Canadian science and technology (S&T) and social policy
frameworks, then focus more closely on them. The three main vectors are
life sciences, ICT, and materials and composites, and I discuss how they are
developing in service of particular social agendas. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of an undeveloped area; namely, social, ethical and legal
implications.
106 Nanotechnology

Defining Nanotechnology R&D in Canada

Ambiguities surround the term ‘nanotechnology’, and encompass a vast array
of definitions and activities:
Nanotechnology refers to research, technology development and eventually the
production of products which use materials engineered at the atomic, molecular
or macromolecular levels, in the length scale of approximately 1–10 nanometre
range. Nanoscience refers to the fundamental understanding of phenomena
and materials at the nanoscale. On a larger scale, nanotechnology research and
development includes controlled manipulation of nanoscale structures and their
integration into larger material components, systems and architectures. Some
specific topics included in the discussion of nanotechnology are: nano-sensors,
semiconductors, materials, micro-electro-mechanical systems, lab-on-a-chip, and
nanomedicine. (Bouchard, 2003, p21)
Nanotechnology R&D is not one activity, but a wide range of activities that
occur daily in laboratories all across Canada. Creating a Canadian definition
and assessing the scope of activities calls for a comprehensive organizational
framework, standards and terms of reference, which has not been formally
established in Canada to date.

Current Canadian nanotechnology R&D vectors

Although Canada lacks a national strategy, there is an overall alignment
between an industry perspective and Government of Canada R&D activities.

Table 9.1 Government of Canada Recommended Domains for Nanotechnology

R&D (Government of Canada, 2002, p3)

Domain Recommended R&D Focus

Manufacturing . ultra-fine powders for electronics and metal composites industries
. corrosion and wear resistant coatings
. petrochemical and fuel cell catalysts
. new materials with environmental benefits
. ultra-high performance materials
Information and . continuation of conventional microelectronics electronic devices
communication with 10 nanometre dimensions, single molecule switches,
technologies quantum effect devices, and photonic switches
Biotechnology . single biological molecule detection and integration with
microelectronics (to provide a basis for high throughput gene and
protein sequencing systems for future biological applications)
. biocompatible materials for hard and soft tissue replacements
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Canada 107

A Government of Canada report entitled National Consultation on the Nano-

technology Industry in Canada, synthesizes information gathered from industry
roundtables held in Edmonton and Boucherville in the spring of 2002, and
suggests focusing nanotechnology R&D in the three domains outlined in
Table 9.1.
These domains are emerging within the context of S&T and social
policy, and form general R&D vectors. While Canada does not have a
national nanotechnology strategy, federal trends and industry suggestions are
similar.

Stages of nanotechnology R&D

Nanotechnology R&D activities have fundamental distinctions. Although
considering them in detail is beyond the scope of this chapter, for practical
purposes I make several observations. For example, it is useful to distinguish
between research and development; between physical infrastructure require-
ments (buildings and tools/instruments, albeit the latter is the focus of some
research activity) and research; between nanoscience and nanotechnology,
and between commercialization and industrialization. Other useful distinctions
are between ‘basic’ and ‘applied’ research, and research activity announced
directly as nanotechnology v. research into the nanoscale. These and other
distinctions provide clarity and insight into R&D within Canada.
Making distinctions and segmenting nanotechnology R&D into stages or
phases recognizes different requirements at different stages, and unique strategic
planning and preparation requirements. Initially, physical infrastructure is
required to support research activities, and ultimately a product is required to
move to commercialization and industrialization. Two staging schemes illustrate
the possibilities.
Table 9.2 outlines three stages to nanotechnology R&D, conceptualized in
terms of characteristics and challenges. Each stage has its own challenges.

Physical infrastructure accomplishments

The first requirement for nanotechnology R&D is physical infrastructure.
Canada has made substantial progress in meeting infrastructure requirements
for nanoscale research; namely buildings, tools and instruments. The flagship
is the National Institute for Nanotechnology (NINT), established in 2001
and located in Edmonton, Alberta. NINT operates as a partnership between
the National Research Council (NRC) and the University of Alberta, and
receives CAD$120 million joint funding from the Government of Canada,
the Government of Alberta and the university. NINT is located on the Univer-
sity of Alberta campus in Edmonton, and upon completion of its 15,000m2
building will be one of the world’s most technologically advanced research
facilities, and houses the quietest laboratory space in Canada. By 2006 NINT
108 Nanotechnology

Table 9.2 Government of Canada Conceptualization of Nanotechnology R&D

Stages (Government of Canada, 2002, p3)

Stage Characteristics and Challenges

Stage 1: Discovery . the current stage of Canadian nanotechnology
. a need for Government leadership in setting national
direction
. a need to maintain investment in research infrastructure
. a need to create a distributed network of research
institutes
. a need to expand efforts to promote public awareness
Stage 2: Discovery to . currently some early stage products in the marketplace,
Innovation but most firms are years away from success
. venture capital funding is typically unavailable (particularly
in Alberta)
. industry perception of Canadian environment as unfriendly
to start-up firms and new technologies
. markets may not exist or the business model for new
markets are poorly understood
. stronger competitive intelligence capabilities needed
. a need to link knowledge creation to innovation
Stage 3: Innovation to . need to put in place elements for larger industrial
Commercialization infrastructure
. need nanometre reference standards to sustain future
nano-manufacturing
. need key nanotechnology tools to be available and
strategically located in incubation facilities to facilitate the
move from innovation to commercialization

will have installed a unique suite of chemical and structural analysis equipment
costing CAD$40 million.1
Canada has also made substantial infrastructure investment through the
Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI). A National Science & Engineering
Research Council (NSERC) report entitled A Study of Canadian Academic
Nanoscience Funding: Review and Recommendations, states that Canada’s
nanoscience infrastructure investment through CFI has an accumulated
value of new infrastructure related to nanoscience in excess of CAD$280
million (CFI, 2004).
A further illustration of Canada’s progress in creating physical infra-
structure is the development of a framework for funding ‘big science’ projects,
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Canada 109

through NSERC and NRC. One project relevant to nanotechnology R&D is

the Canadian Light Source (CLS), a CAD$174 million state-of-the-art
synchrotron research facility at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon.
The synchrotron facility is a partnership among the Government of Canada,
provincial governments, numerous universities and private and public sector
organizations, with capital contributions from a variety of sources.2
It is a major accomplishment to create the conditions necessary for the
creation of a new industry. Unlike a resource-based economy, a knowledge-
based economy requires the knowledge-to-product links to be created first.
Nanotechnology requires costly buildings, tools and instruments to accomplish
this.

Institutional infrastructure: NRC cluster strategy

and NINT
In Canada, the NRC cluster strategy is an integral part of moving R&D to
innovation and commercialization, and operates at the level of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). Clustering describes the growth of a concentra-
tion of companies around the nucleus of an R&D facility, which acts as a
magnet and draws expertise and capital. NRC considers community involve-
ment to be an essential ingredient of success, as well as incubators, mentors,
and access to capital and financing. A cluster is both an R&D facility with a
particular mandate, and an opportunity for local community and economic
development. NRC has twenty research institutes,3 each with a specific
mandate. The addition of NINT reveals the NRC’s long-term research focus
as:

To achieve a successful combination of synthetic and biological materials in

devices that are ‘smart’ – meaning that they are self-assembled, powered by
their chemical surroundings, can be programmed for specific functions and are
able to sense and respond to changes in their physical environments. (NRC,
2005, p14)

Nanotechnology R&D occurs at other NRC clusters, and NINT is slated to be

the catalyst for developing horizontal research programs across them, and initi-
ating multi-disciplinary research, developing partnerships, and establishing
networks between the federal government, industry and national and interna-
tional research institutes. These activities will contribute substantially to
creating a research network.

Canada’s S&T and social policy backdrops

I have outlined the general R&D vectors discernible at this time to be
manufacturing (materials and composites), ICT, and biotechnology. They
110 Nanotechnology

are emerging within S&T, social and innovation policies, and in the service of
social goals, which creates a complex web of institutional and agency linkages
throughout the structural and functional framework of the Government of
Canada. Today S&T policy remains inextricably tied to social goals. The
historical roots of this linkage date back to the late 1980s, when the Govern-
ment of Canada prioritized aligning S&T goals to quality of life in Canada,
and this theme continues to be evident as exemplified in reports such as Federal
Science and Technology: The Pursuit of Excellence, A Report on Federal Science
and Technology – 2003 (Government of Canada, 2003).
S&T and social agendas are also tightly linked to innovation, with the
overall goal to improve life for Canadians. In 1987 Industry Canada emerged
from the restructuring of several federal departments and parliamentary
committees, and today states its mandate as:

Industry Canada’s mandate is to help make Canadians more productive and

competitive in the knowledge-based economy, thus improving the standard of
living and quality of life in Canada. (Industry Canada, 2005)

The linkage of S&T, social goals and innovation formally came together and is
clearly articulated in the 1996 Government of Canada’s first science and tech-
nology policy entitled Science and Technology for the New Century: A Federal
Strategy, accompanied by an action plan Highlights of Departmental S&T
Action Plans (Government of Canada, 1996a, 1996b). The policy and action
plan linked the components most influential in shaping nanotechnology
R&D today, notably science and technology, research and development, and
innovation and social goals. The core federal activities stated in the policy
and action plan are funding and performing scientific research to support
federal department and agencies mandates, and supporting private sector
R&D. The mandate continues to operate through a variety of programs and
initiatives, for example Technology Partnerships Canada and Canada’s Innova-
tion Strategy, launched in 2002 (Government of Canada, 2002a). The late
1980s linkage of S&T, social goals and innovation continues, and subsumes
nanotechnology R&D.

Federal beacons for nanotechnology R&D: S&T,

health, and national security
Within this overarching social policy, three principal interrelated federal
agendas stand out as beacons, being S&T, health care and national security.
Each is associated with a particular funding agency and mandate, and positions
nanotechnology within larger institutional agendas. Basic and applied research
occurs as a distinctly pronounced activity and focus, as an extension of existing
discipline specific research into the nanoscale but not necessarily called ‘nano-
technology’, and in special programs targeted to pursue specific strategic goals
such as national security.
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Canada 111

Research announced as nanotechnology: S&T and NINT

The principal beacon for research directly announced as nanotechnology is the
NRC and NSERC S&T agenda setting out funding priorities. These are embo-
died in NINT and other NRC institutions researching at the nanoscale. Basic
nanoscale research is conducted for the main purpose of exploring the quantum
regime and discovering the unique chemical, mechanical, electrical and optical
properties at the nanoscale. Once discovered, research will focus on exploiting
these properties into technologies and applications.

Extending existing research into the nanoscale: health care and

the life sciences
A high visibility and principal beacon in extending traditional and discipline-
specific research into the nanoscale are the health and life sciences, which
targets the majority of basic and applied R&D with specific health-related
goals. Because of its central role in nanotechnology R&D, and the value Cana-
dians place on health care, I present it in some detail. It is also a well-developed
and organized area, and exemplifies the benefit of a strategic approach in an
applied context.
The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR)4 is the principal
funding agency for health research, established in June 2000 under the
Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act, and replacing the former Medical
Research Council of Canada. It reports to Parliament through the Minister of
Health. CIHR is a collaborative network comprising 13 virtual institutes5
that focus on identifying research needs and priorities for specific health
areas or populations, and develops strategic initiatives to address them.
CIHR takes a problem-based and multidisciplinary approach to health
challenges in four areas, being biomedical, clinical, health systems and services,
and population and public health. Until 2004 CIHR did not have any specific
nanotechnology programs. Now several broad research areas come together
under the broad rubric of ‘regenerative medicine’ and ‘nanomedicine’ which
CIHR defines as:

The design, synthesis, or application of materials, devices, or technologies in

the nanometer-scale for the basic understanding, diagnosis, and/or treatment
of disease. Key to this definition is that phenomena and materials at the
nanometer-scale are known to have properties that are uniquely attributable
to that scale length . . . Many current research initiatives in the development
of novel techniques and methodologies relevant to biomedical research and
clinical practice do not necessarily fit within this strict definition. However,
these various microscale technologies are still relevant for nanomedicine, and
are included within the scope of this announcement. Some examples could
include, but are not limited to: cellular imaging, biophotonics, drug delivery
and targeting, and molecular characterization of cellular processes. (CIHR,
2004)
112 Nanotechnology

This broad definition encompasses specific research areas such as gene therapy
(correcting gene expression responsible for disease development), stem cell
research (including pluripotent embryonic stem cells and post-natal adult
stem cells), tissue engineering (stimulating the renewal of body tissues or
restoration of function through the use of natural or bioengineered materials),
and rehabilitative science (functional restoration of processes or plasticity of the
brain, spinal cord, peripheral nerves and muscles). These and other activities
focus on applications in numerous areas, including cancer and promoting
recovery after stroke, injury or disease.

Special programmes
Nanotechnology serves Canada’s national security agenda articulated in the
national security policy Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security
Policy (Government of Canada, 2001) in part through CRTI (Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Research & Technology Initiative).6
CRTI, established in 2001 with an initial five year funding envelope valued
at CAD$165M, is an ongoing program mandated to create a national network
of Lab Clusters and fund science and technology projects related to Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) response and preparedness.
Many projects funded involve microfluidic, imaging and testing devices at
the nanoscale. National security research priorities include biosecurity (plant
and animal heath, food, water and crops), lab cluster management; collective
command, control, communications, coordination and information (C4I)
capabilities for CBRN planning and response; prevention, surveillance and
alert capabilities; immediate reaction and near-term consequence management
capabilities; longer-term consequence management issues; criminal investiga-
tion capabilities, S&T dimensions of risk assessment; and public confidence
and psycho-social factors. Other dimensions of national security include
border security and critical infrastructure protection, which have roles for
advanced technologies based on nanotechnologies.
These and other R&D activities occur within a variety of institutional
settings and in accordance with an array of funding and policy agendas. The
determining features in naming R&D activities as ‘nanotechnology’ lie in
institutional frameworks, not the actual science itself.

ICT: enabling technologies and convergence

A main development vector for basic and applied R&D is ICT (information
and communication technology), in areas with applications in new telecom-
munication and data storage devices, imaging technologies, and MEMS
(micro-electro-mechanical systems). Other applications include intelligent
sensory networks, microsystems, all-optical networks, and implantable sensors
and drug delivery devices. The primary institutions for ICT research are
NRC’s Institute for Microstrucural Sciences and Institute for Information
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Canada 113

Table 9.3 Enabling Technologies Funded by Technology Partnerships Canada7

Technology Application
Advanced materials processes . Innovations in ceramics, plastics, metals and metal
and applications alloys used in the design and development of new
materials or improved materials
Advanced manufacturing and . Laser applications, vision systems, advanced
processing technologies manufacturing technologies including computer-
assisted design and engineering and other
innovative automation systems
Applications of biotechnology . Agriculture and food, aquaculture, mining and
energy, forestry, and health care
Applications of selected . The fastest growing sector, accounting for more
information technologies than one-third of Canada’s industrial R&D
expenditures
. Include access technologies such as health and
diagnostic imaging
. advanced software technologies such as electronic
commerce and internet software, microelectronic
and optical technologies

Technology, where basic and applied research spans a wide scope of activities
ultimately leading to enabling technologies.
Enabling technologies draw together various R&D components into
common applications that ‘enable’ or accelerate each other, and provide new
capabilities. They have the potential to significantly improve performance and
productivity in a wide range of industries and research settings. Technology
Partnerships Canada (TCP), an agency of Industry Canada, funds four kinds
of enabling technologies.
It is notable that enabling technologies funded by TCP underlie all tools
and instruments in nanotechnology R&D and nanoscale research. Accelerated
and new capabilities raise potential for social, ethical and legal impacts,
particularly when they emerge in innovation processes of commercialization
and industrialization. These could include surveillance, privacy, and genetic
testing and profiling. Enabling technologies have strategic application in
achieving social and policy goals in areas such as health care and national
security, and call for social impact research.
In 2004 the Government of Canada released a report entitled ICT/Life
Sciences Converging Technologies Cluster Study, a comparative qualitative
analysis of the ICT, life sciences and their converging next-generation tech-
nology clusters in Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa (Government
of Canada, 2004a). Two special features of ICT stand out. One is that ICT
is a mature industry dominated by a few large multinational corporations. It
114 Nanotechnology

is reasonable to suggest significant R&D occurs in the industry and out of the
public eye. The second is the importance of ICT as an enabler of broad
economic development that has surpassed ICT as an economic sector in its
own right. The report also signals a clear recognition of convergence of the
life sciences and ICT, and recommends that future policy discussions
regarding converging technologies include nanotechnology.

Canada’s innovation strategy

Canada has two main vehicles for innovation, Canada’s Innovation Strategy
(Government of Canada, 2002a), and the NRC Cluster strategy, which will
form the innovation framework until and unless a separate innovation strategy
is developed. As previously noted, nanotechnology R&D is in the early stages,
with innovation processes some time away. Canada’s Innovation Strategy is the
current overarching policy backdrop for nanotechnology innovation and is
a two-part strategy in two separate documents outlining key features of
innovation in a knowledge-based economy. One document is entitled Achieving
Excellence: Investing in People, Knowledge and Opportunity, which articulates
the essential need to recognize knowledge as a strategic national asset and
focuses on processes to strengthen S&T and R&D capacity to ensure knowl-
edge contributes to building an innovative economy that benefits Canadians.
It is another instance of the historical Canadian tradition of putting S&T and
R&D in service of social goals. The second document is entitled Knowledge
Matters: Skills and Learning for Canadians. It recognizes the greatest resource
in a knowledge-based economy is its people, and focuses on strategies to
develop talent and strengthen learning. New skills in the new economy is a
recurring theme also identified in National Consultation on the Nanotechnology
Industry in Canada (Government of Canada, 2002) and other documents. All
point to developing people to build national capacity. This requires an increase
in base funding for universities to develop nanotechnology programs that
includes new skill sets.
The main vehicle for nanotechnology innovation at the level of industry is
Industry Canada. The Minister of Industry is responsible for the economic
elements of Canada’s Innovation Strategy, and has jurisdiction over policy
issues regarding industry, trade and commerce, science, consumer affairs,
corporations and corporate securities, competition and restraint of trade,
including mergers and monopolies; bankruptcy and insolvency, intellectual
property; telecommunications, investment, small business, and regional
economic development across Canada.8
A key strategic vehicle for nanotechnology innovation at the level of small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) is the NRC cluster strategy previously
mentioned. NRC is committed to facilitating the growth of a concentration
of innovative companies around a nucleus of R&D facilities such as those
provided by universities or leading edge government laboratories. NRC
believes the success of one company attracts another, as well as skilled people
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Canada 115

and expertise, and capital.9 As an NRC cluster, NINT will enjoy the benefits of
the cluster strategy as nanotechnology matures to the innovation stage.

The social framework

As a transformative technology, nanotechnology will impact and transform
many dimensions of society. This brings challenges and opportunities, and it
is essential to understand both the technologies and their impacts to manage
them and the issues they create. Societal impacts of nanotechnology, such as
the ethical, legal and regulatory dimensions, currently lack adequate research
activity. A notable exception is the Health Law Institute at the University of
Alberta, which is proactively examining a range of potential impacts associated
with life sciences and health care. Its Fall 2004 issue of Health Law Review is
a special issue devoted to societal impacts of nanotechnology and extends
the scope of issues to feature a range of articles including economic impacts
(Mehta, 2004), convergence (Wolbring, 2004), challenges (Einseidel and
McMullen, 2004) and publicly funded impacts research (Sheremeta and
Daar, 2004). Strategic social planning is essential in areas such as education
and public consultation on potential risk issues. Some advances in areas
such as nanobiotechnology (the integration of the biological and engineered),
will raise issues around convergence, normalization and social equity not
yet encountered. Issues will also arise associated with advances in ICT,
for example intelligent systems and increased data capabilities, as well as
environmental concerns associated with new materials and composites. Each
case requires risk and impact research on policy, regulatory, legal and ethical
issues.
The unique feature of Canada’s emerging nanotechnology R&D, that of it
being tied to the overall social and policy agendas, has it emerging incremen-
tally in solid structures within well-defined Canadian values and social agendas.
This suggests existing frameworks can encompass ethical, legal and regulatory
issues, and raises the possibility of complacency because R&D has not entered
contentious and controversial areas. As a global phenomena spanning and
crossing national borders, Canada must be concerned not only about its own
domestic situation, but prepare for social impacts originating outside the
Canadian framework. As such, this points to a real and pressing need to system-
atically research the socially transformative dimension of nanotechnology, and
to understand Canada’s position in the world.

Notes
1 The equipment consists of a one-of-a-kind transmission electron micro-
scope (TEM), the Hitachi HF 3300 TEM equipped with a cold field
emission gun, the first instrument of its kind in the world. Other instru-
ments include a scanning tunneling microscope, two scanning electron
116 Nanotechnology

microscopes and several atomic force microscopes. Source: NINT in the

News, ‘One-of-a-kind electron microscope coming to nanotechnology
institute’. Available at: www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/nint/nav02.cfm?nav02¼
32064&nav01¼12234
2 Source: NSERC announcement: ‘The Government of Canada Announces
New Funding for the Canadian Light Source’, www.nserc.gc.ca/news/
2004/p040406.htm
3 A full list of NRC (National Research Council) Institutes: www.nrc-cnrc.
gc.ca/institutes/index_e.html
4 CIHR background, funding and research priority information: www.cihr-
irsc.gc.ca/
5 Information on the 13 CIHR virtual institutes is available at: www.cihr-
irsc.gc.ca/e/9466.html
6 CRTI background, funding and research priority information: www.crti.
drdc-rddc.gc.ca/home_e.html
7 Source: Technology Partnerships Canada (TPC), Enabling Technologies, avail-
able at: http://tpc-ptc.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/intpc-ptc.nsf/en/h_hb00363e.
html
8 Industry Canada – Department Structure. Available at: www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/
welcomeeic.nsf/ICPages/DepartmentStructure
9 NRC – Building Technology Clusters Across Canada, www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/
aboutUs/corporatereports/fact_sheets/factsheet-canada-e.html

References
Bouchard, R. (2003). Bio-Systemics Synthesis, STFPP Research Report, no. 4,
A Research Report of the Science and Technology Foresight Pilot Project: A
Partnership of Federal S&T Organizations, Canada
CFI (2004) A Study of Canadian Academic Nanoscience Funding: Review & Recommen-
dations, June, p1, NSERC Nano Innovation Platform, 2004, www.physics.mcgill.ca/
NSERCnanoIP/f/Canada_Nano_Funding.pdf
CIHR (2004) Regenerative Medicine and Nanomedicine: Innovative Approaches in Health
Research, Canadian Institutes of Health Research, www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/22842.
html#4
Einseidel, E. and McMullen, G. (2004). ‘Stakeholders and technology: challenges for
nanotechnology’, Health Law Review, vol 12(3), pp5–9
Government of Canada (1996a) Science and Technology for the New Century: A Federal
Strategy, Government of Canada, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/te/e-summ.pdf
Government of Canada (1996b) Highlights of Departmental S&T Action Plans,
Government of Canada, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inrti-rti.nsf/vwapj/
e-highlt.pdf/$FILE/e-highlt.pdf
Government of Canada (2001) Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security
Policy, Government of Canada, www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/
natsecurnat_e.pdf
Government of Canada (2002)Submission: National Consultation on the Nanotechnology
Industry in Canada, Government of Canada report, www.innovation.gc.ca/gol/
innovation/site.nsf/en/in02362.html
 Nanotechnologies and Society in Canada 117

Government of Canada (2002a) Canada’s Innovation Strategy, http://innovation.gc.ca/

gol/innovation/site.nsf/en/in04135.html (includes Achieving Excellence: Investing in
People, Knowledge and Opportunity, Government of Canada, Knowledge Matters:
Skills and Learning for Canadians, Government of Canada)
Government of Canada (2003) Federal Science and Technology: The Pursuit of
Excellence, A Report on Federal Science and Technology – 2003. Government of
Canada, www.innovation.gc.ca/gol/innovation/site.nsf/en/in04824.html
Government of Canada (2004a) ICT/Life Sciences Converging Technologies Cluster
Study, Government of Canada, http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inict-tic.nsf/en/
it07730e.html
Industry Canada (2005) ‘Mandate’, www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/
Mehta, M. (2004) ‘Some thoughts on the economic impacts of assembler-era nanotech-
nology’, Health Law Review, vol 12(3), pp16–18
NRC (2005) NRC Report on Plans and Priorities 2004–2005, National Research Council
Canada, www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20042005/NRC-CNRC/NRC-CNRCr45_e.asp
Sheremeta, L. and Daar, A. S. (2004) ‘The case for publicly funded research on the
ethical, environmental, economical, legal and social issues raised by nanoscience
and nanotechnology’, Health Law Review, vol 12, pp74–77
Wolbring, G. (2004) ‘Solutions follow perceptions: NBIC and the concept of health,
medicine and disease (Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology
and Cognitive Science)’, Health Law Review, vol 12, pp41–46
 Part Three
Benefits and Risks
 10

From Biotechnology
To Nanotechnology: What Can
We Learn From Earlier Technologies?

Michael D. Mehta

Using Canada as a case study, this chapter argues that regulating biotech-
nology and nanotechnology is made unnecessarily complex and inherently
unstable due to a failure to consult the public early and often enough.
Furthermore, it is argued that future regulators (and promoters) of nanotech-
nology may learn valuable lessons from the mistakes made in regulating
biotechnology.

Introduction
Many developed countries are now investing heavily in a transformative
technology known as nanotechnology. Nanotechnology involves creating
and manipulating organic and inorganic matter at the nanoscale. Nano-
scientists are developing techniques for atom-by-atom construction of objects
that have potential applications in medicine, electronics, information tech-
nology, environmental monitoring and remediation, military equipment and
weapons, and so on. Proponents of nanotechnology suggest that the world’s
needs could be met by utilizing a limitless supply of atoms to manufacture
valuable molecules (Duell, 1999). The potential range of applications is
staggering and the cost of basic nanoscience research high. As with bio-
technology, several actors are committed to developing innovations resulting
from discoveries in nanoscience (Mehta, 2002). Can lessons be learned
from our experiences with biotechnology? Do new technologies like nano-
technology require a different way of understanding risks and benefits, the
roles of regulation, and the changing nature of science–technology–society
interactions?
122 Nanotechnology

Lesson one: substantial equivalence

In Canada, Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)
share joint responsibility for regulating novel plants. Plants with novel traits
(PNTs) are defined as:

[P]lant varieties/genotypes that are not considered substantially equivalent, in

terms of their specific use and safety both for environment and for human health,
to plants of the same species in Canada, having regard to weediness potential,
gene flow, plant pest potential, impact on non-target organisms and impact on
biodiversity. PNTs may be produced by conventional breeding, mutagenesis,
or more commonly, by recombinant DNA techniques. Safety assessments are
required for all PNTs intended for importation and for environmental release
in Canada.1

Novel foods do not have a history of safe human consumption and are produced
by techniques that have not been used previously. Before reaching the market-
place, all novel plants and plant products are assessed for environmental,
animal and human health safety. Health Canada considers how novel foods
compare to traditional counterparts, examines nutritional characteristics,
checks for the presence of toxins or anti-nutrients, and looks for potential
allergens.2 The CFIA’s role is to assess potential environmental risks associated
with introducing novel crops and to oversee confined trials, unconfined release
and variety registration. The CFIA is also involved in regulating products of
biotechnology for animal feeds, fertilizers and veterinary biologics.
In spite of the efforts made by Health Canada and the CFIA to ensure the
safety of novel foods, considerable debate over the use of substantial equiva-
lence as a comparative approach exists. A recent report by the Royal Society
of Canada (2001) entitled Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the
Regulation of Food Biotechnology in Canada concludes that substantial equiva-
lence should not be used as a decision threshold for determining whether or not
genetically modified (GM)-products should undergo rigorous scientific
assessment. In section 8.1 of the report, members of the expert panel note:
In general, those who are responsible for the regulation of new technologies
should not presume its safety unless there is reliable scientific basis for con-
sidering it safe. This approach is especially appropriate for those who are
responsible for the protection of health and environment on behalf of the
Canadian public.
Additionally, the expert panel rejected the use of substantial equivalence as
a decision threshold because this approach is inconsistent with a precautionary
approach for comparing new genetically modified products with existing
products, and since an assessment based on ‘superficial similarities’ does not
satisfy the burden of proof for safety.3
The concept of substantial equivalence implies that novel products (for
example genetically modified foods) can be compared systematically to
counterparts that have a history of safe usage. For example, corn with a Bt
gene for insect resistance can be compared metabolically, nutritionally, and
 From Biotechnology To Nanotechnology 123

so on to other kinds of corn. With the exception of the Bt event, it is assumed

that Bt corn and non-Bt corn are highly similar. Although regulators consider
data on how these modifications are made, assessing the safety of novel foods is
based on ‘the product and not the process used to develop it’ (Health Canada,
1994, p4). The use of substantial equivalence and a process-product model for
regulating products of biotechnology is likely to find acceptance among future
regulators of nanotechnology.
In Canada, no regulatory agency has jurisdiction presently over products of
nanotechnology (Chapter 9). Although Canada is investing heavily in nano-
technology (for example in 2001, the National Research Council provided
funding for the National Institute for Nanotechnology), little work on assessing
the regulatory or social impacts of nanotechnology is being funded. Like with
many new scientific and technological applications (for example the internet),
regulation seems to occur as an afterthought or stems from concerns raised
by a range of actors (for example NGOs) (Mehta, 1998). In Canada, it is
likely that existing regulatory authorities will share responsibility for regulating
the environmental and human health impacts resulting from nano products.
Additionally, it is likely that nanotechnology will converge with other technol-
ogies like biotechnology.4 In this instance, the split of responsibility between
Health Canada and the CFIA is likely to be maintained for nanotechnology.
An examination of the literature reveals David Forrest (1989) to be one of the
earliest writers on the challenges of regulating nanotechnology. Forrest suggests
that regulation of this technology should occur in four distinct phases based on
the development of assemblers. Assemblers are machines that manufacture
objects on an atom-by-atom or molecule-by-molecule basis. The development
of assemblers will accelerate bottom-up, rather than top-down, approaches to
manufacturing and machining. Top-down refers to precision machining that
strips away material from the macroscopic to the nanoscopic level. Bottom-up
approaches use synthetic chemistry, bioengineering tools, and devices like the
‘nanohand’ to physically place individual molecules into a predetermined
location.5 Forrest believes that the development of assembler technology, and
different levels of containment for pre- and post-release of nanoassembling
devices, is key to understanding how best to regulate this technology. He
suggests the following phases for regulating nanotechnology:

1 Pre-assembler: regulators should assist in writing standards for developers

and stimulate critical public debate about nanotechnology.
2 Post-assembler, pre-assembler lab: once assemblers are developed, regula-
tors should help developers create safe ways to contain this technology. At
this stage, the use of assemblers is confined to laboratory conditions.
3 Post-assembler lab, Pre-active shield: when sealed assembler labs become
available, scientists can begin developing advanced assemblers and new
materials. At this stage, assemblers are still used for experiments and
development work, and have limited commercial application.
4 Post-active shield: assemblers can now be used in a wide range of applications
and settings. Malfunctioning nanomachines can be monitored, contained or
124 Nanotechnology

decommissioned. In theory, measures should be in place to prevent runaway

replication and the uncontrolled release of nanomachines that could damage
ecosystems and human health.

There are several similarities, and notable differences, between Forrest’s set of
regulatory phases for nanotechnology and how Canada regulates genetically
modified organisms. The development of nanoassembler technology is akin to
developments in recombinant DNA technology. Once recombinant DNA tech-
nology became possible, developers used isolation and sterilization techniques to
ensure that newly developed organisms were contained. The development and
refinement of agronomic traits in genetically modified plants (for example
herbicide resistance) led to commercial applications for this technology.
Regulators assess the safety of these new organisms prior to release into the
environment and marketplace. However, unlike Forrest’s phases, little or no
public consultation occurred in any of these phases for genetically modified
foods. Additionally, genetically modified plants have been released into the
environment with few existing safeguards in place for monitoring, containing
or neutralizing plants that may harm non-target insects and other organisms,
facilitate the development of ‘superweeds’ through pollen flow, and potentially
damage the viability and marketability of organic farming.
With biotechnology, the use of substantial equivalence and reliance upon an
artificial distinction between product and process has fostered a regulatory
approach that excludes the public from participating in a meaningful way. If
future regulators of nanotechnology adopt this approach, the public is likely
to be excluded systematically under the guise of ‘science-based assessment.’

Lesson two: labelling

The issue of labelling genetically modified foods has become complex and
divisive. In the past several years, many countries around the world have
moved towards either voluntary or mandatory labelling regimes. In general,
countries of the European Union (EU) and several countries in Asia and Oceania
have adopted mandatory labelling laws. Although there are differences (for
example per cent of genetically modified ingredients, store-bought versus restau-
rant food, finished products like oils, and so on) in the application of these laws,
many of these countries have responded to consumer concerns about the safety of
genetically modified foods, ethical and religious concerns, and consumer rights
and sovereignty arguments by requiring some form of labelling. By contrast,
two of the world’s largest producers of genetically modified foods (for example
Canada and the United States) have adopted voluntary guidelines for labelling.
In Canada, very few products are actually labelled in a positive (for example
this product contains genetically modified ingredients) or negative (for example
this product does not contain genetically modified ingredients) way. In fact,
strong pressure from food processors and retailers to pull from grocery shelves
products with any reference to genetic modification exists.6
 From Biotechnology To Nanotechnology 125

A range of consultative exercises has taken place in Canada to address some

aspects of this debate. The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee
(CBAC) was created by the Canadian government to provide independent
advice to the seven ministers of the Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating
Committee on a wide range of social, ethical and economic dimensions
associated with developments in biotechnology. In 2002, CBAC published a
paper dealing with the topic of labelling. In this paper, CBAC explains how
they are balancing the different issues associated with adopting a mandatory
versus voluntary system in Canada.
After examining economic issues (for example costs of labelling, segrega-
tion, identity preservation and the need to comply with international trading
agreements), CBAC concluded that not enough support in Canada exists to
recommend either a mandatory or voluntary labelling system at this time.
Since other bodies including the Canadian General Standards Council and
Codex Alimentarius Commission are currently working on this issue, CBAC
concluded that adopting a mandatory labelling system is premature.7 To wit,
science-based assessment has deemed these products safe. Anyone who asks
for mandatory labelling must be opposed to science-based assessment, and
therefore be responding illogically and irrationally to science and technology.
One of the main arguments given for not requiring mandatory labelling of
genetically modified foods is based on the process versus product distinction
referred to in the discussion on substantial equivalence. In Canada, approxi-
mately 50 novel foods have been approved by Health Canada and the CFIA.
To date, all plants produced through recombinant DNA technology have
been defined as plants with novel traits. The CFIA asserts that ‘[all PNTs]
have undergone a full, comprehensive, and rigorous safety assessment prior
to release into the environment’.8 Once approved, PNTs may be sold as
food. If the novel food does not contain any allergens, no labelling is required.
Presumably, if a novel food contains a protein known to trigger allergic reac-
tions in some individuals (for example nuts, gluten, dairy), labelling for the
allergen is required but not for the process by which the food was produced.9
In other words, Canadian regulators prohibit labelling which gives consumers
an opportunity to discriminate against approved foods based on process rather
than product distinctions. In reality, many consumers see process and product
as important to decisions they make on a wide range of items.10
The lesson for future technologies like nanotechnology is that labelling is
likely to be a complex regulatory and public relations nightmare. It is likely
that debates over mandatory and voluntary labelling and process versus
product will emerge when consumers are exposed to more products produced
by nanotechnology.

Lesson three: precautionary principle

In recent years, the precautionary principle, also known as precautionary
approach, has become a central feature of many national and international
126 Nanotechnology

laws and treaties. Various articulations of this principle can be found in Prin-
ciple 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United
Nations 1992), Maastricht Treaty (European Union 1992), Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety (United Nations 2000), and at least ten other environmental
treaties. Principle 15 defines the precautionary principle as:

. . .in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be

widely applied by States according to their capability. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.

Known as a ‘better safe than sorry’ approach, the precautionary principle is

playing a strong role in debates on nuclear safety, greenhouse gas emissions
and global climate change, and the safety of genetically modified organisms.
It is likely that proponents and regulators of nanotechnology will have to
deal with the precautionary principle in explicit ways. The social and scientific
uncertainty resulting from innovations in nanotechnology will be significant,
and identifying lessons from how the precautionary principle is being applied
to biotechnology, may be valuable.

In Canada, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (1999) mandates use

of a precautionary approach. Chapter 33 of the Act states: ‘Whereas the
Government of Canada recognizes the integral role of science . . . social,
economic and technical matters are to be included in that [assessment]
process.’ From the perspective of regulators like Health Canada, application
of the precautionary principle is a distinctive part of science-based risk
management. In other words, risk assessment is done first and the pre-
cautionary principle is applied later when developing options that are guided
by values and priorities.11 The Royal Society of Canada’s report (2001) on
the regulation of food biotechnology also refers to the importance of using
a precautionary approach for assessing the safety of genetically modified
organisms. The expert panel recommends that more attention be paid to the
reproductive biology of modified plants, their toxicological properties, and
potential impacts on ecosystems.
Some organizations like the Canadian Chamber of Commerce have been
quite critical of the use of a precautionary approach by the Government of
Canada. The Chamber is a national and international advocacy group repre-
senting the interests of business. With respect to the precautionary principle,
the Chamber states:

There has been an apparent shift in certain parts of the federal government,
particularly Health Canada and Environment Canada, away from risk-
based assessment of environmental and health risks which considered many
factors to a more hazard-based approach where, in cases where the science is
not sufficiently strong to be indicative of action, the precautionary principle is
invoked and precipitous and costly action is called for.12
 From Biotechnology To Nanotechnology 127

The Chamber also recommends that precautionary measures be cost-effective

and based on risk management principles and current science, and that the
use of socio-economic modelling tools for comparing non-market benefits
with ‘real dollar’ costs be discontinued. In other words, science-based assess-
ment should be used exclusively in the regulation of products that may generate
environmental and human health risks. If science fails to demonstrate signifi-
cant risk, and risk management can be used to control exposure to hazards,
then application of the precautionary principle is unfounded.
If a precautionary approach is used as a risk management tool, then how do
regulators of biotechnology assess complex and uncertain topics like allergenicity
and toxicity? Health Canada applies a ‘weight of evidence’ approach which is
based on experimentally generated data. In the case of allergens in food, Health
Canada compares characteristics of proteins from novel foods with known aller-
gens. The molecular weight, rate of digestion and amino acid sequence are used to
predict allergenicity. A weight of evidence approach also considers consistency of
the data, biological plausibility and overall strength of evidence.13
It is likely that developments in nanotechnology will require new
approaches for addressing uncertainty and heightened understanding of how
risks and benefits should be balanced. Strong application of the precautionary
principle during early stages of risk management may negate the benefits of
pursuing this kind of science. Conversely, not recognizing and curtailing
serious risks (for example runaway replication) comes with serious costs too.

Conclusion
Examples of how Canada has failed to include the public in discussions on how
to regulate biotechnology are instrumental for understanding the possible
pitfalls associated with future regulation of nanotechnology. Confusion over
the use of substantial equivalence, a failure to put in place mandatory labelling
laws for genetically modified foods, and re-conceptualization of the ‘spirit’ of
the precautionary principle, erodes trust and makes governance more complex.

Notes
1 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Plant Biosafety Office www.inspection.
gc.ca/english/plaveg/bio/pbobbve.shtml, downloaded 25 March 2002,
paragraph 1.
2 Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Frequently Asked Questions. www.
inspection.gc.ca/english/index/faqe.shtml, downoaded 25 March 2002.
3 On 23 November 2001, several governmental agencies including Health
Canada, CFIA, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and Department of
Fisheries and Ocean released an action plan for addressing the conclusions
of the Royal Society of Canada report. In this plan, these agencies indicate
that substantial equivalence represents a safety standard approach and not a
decision threshold.
128 Nanotechnology

4 A typical strand of DNA is only two nanometres wide. Nanotechnology

could be used for building DNA one base pair at a time. Additionally,
nanoassemblers could be used for placing or repositioning pre-constructed
segments of DNA. Source: ‘Building DNA with the nanoassembler’, down-
loaded 29 March 2002 from: www.techtv.com/screensavers/showtell/jump/
0,24331,3320067,00.html.
5 Scientists at Denmark Technical University are working on the nanohand.
The nanohand uses a microcantilever system for manipulating nanostruc-
tures. See www.mic.dtu.dk/research/Nanohand/Nanohand.htm#about.
6 In August 2001, a large Canadian grocery chain known as Loblaws, pulled
products from their shelves with GE-free labels. This outraged many
Canadians and prompted groups like the Council of Canadians to picket
and boycott their stores. Incidentally, the Food and Drugs Act (1985)
explicitly allows positive and negative labelling, like GE-free labels, as
long as such labels are truthful (Section 5.1) and do not promise unsubstan-
tiated health benefits (Section 3.1). Source: www.canadians.org/campaigns/
campaigns-genfoodmedia010830.html.
7 Codex develops voluntary food standards for protecting health and
promoting fair practices in the international trade of food. Canada chairs
the Committee on Food Labelling.
8 Source: www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/biotech/reg/equive.shtml, para-
graph 5.
9 Some Canadian organizations like the Consumers Association of Canada
(CAC) believe that it is inappropriate to distinguish with labelling between
different kinds of food modifications. For instance, the CAC point out that
novel foods have been made over the years with advanced hydridization and
accelerated mutagenesis. Like with recombinant DNA technology, these
techniques produce plants with characteristics that are unlikely to occur
naturally.
10 Consumers have boycotted products manufactured by non-unionized
workers, child labourers, and those made with questionable environmental
practices. An increase in the sale of organic produce illustrates that
distinguishing between process and product is untenable.
11 Source: www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/protection/precaution.html.
12 Canadian Chamber of Commerce, ‘Science, the precautionary principle and
public policy development.’ Downloaded on 29 March 2002 from
www.chamber.ca/newpages/polP8.html#Anchor4, paragraph 1.
13 See www.emcom.ca for a discussion on how a weight of evidence approach
can be used for assessing the risks of endocrine modulating substances.

References
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (2002) Improving the regulation of geneti-
cally modified foods and other novel foods in Canada, Ottawa, Canada, Report to the
Government of Canada, Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating Committee
 From Biotechnology To Nanotechnology 129

Duell, C. H. (1999) ‘Technological transformation: The increase in power and

complexity is coming just as the ‘raw materials’ are eroding’, Development Dialogue,
vol 1–2, pp25–73
European Union (1992) The Maastricht Treaty: Treaty on European Union
Forrest, D. (1989) Regulating Nanotechnology Development, www.foresight.com/
NanoRev/Forrest1989.html, accessed 5 March 2002
Health Canada (1994) Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods. Food
Directorate, Health Protection Branch, Volume 2: Genetically Modified Micro-
organisms and Plants. Ottawa, Canada: Food Directorate, Health Protection
Branch, Health Canada
Mehta, M. D. (2002) ‘Nanoscience and nanotechnology: Assessing the nature of innova-
tion in these fields’, Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, vol 22, pp269–273
Mehta, M. D. (1998) ‘Sex on the net: regulation and control of pornography in the new
wired world’, in Pal, L. and Alexander, C. (eds) Digital Democracy: Politics and
Policy in the Wired World, Toronto, Oxford University Press, pp164–179
Royal Society of Canada (2001) Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the
regulation of food biotechnology in Canada, Ottawa, Canada, The Royal Society of
Canada
United Nations (1992) Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
United Nations (2000) Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety. Convention of Biological
Diversity
 11

Getting Nanotechnology Right

the First Time

John Balbus, Richard Denison, Karen Florini

and Scott Walsh

Nanotechnology – the design and manipulation of materials at the molecular

and atomic scale – has great potential to deliver environmental as well as
other benefits. The novel properties that emerge as materials reach the
nanoscale (changes in surface chemistry, reactivity, electrical conductivity,
and other properties) open the door to innovations in cleaner energy produc-
tion, energy efficiency, water treatment, environmental remediation, and ‘light-
weighting’ of materials, among other applications, that provide direct
environmental improvements.
At the same time, these novel properties may pose new risks to workers,
consumers, the public and the environment. The few data now available give
cause for concern: Some nanomaterials appear to have the potential to
damage skin, brain and lung tissue, to be mobile or persistent in the environ-
ment, or to kill micro-organisms (potentially including ones that constitute
the base of the food web). This trickle of data only highlights how little is
known about the environmental and health effects of engineered nanomaterials.
As illustrated by the problems caused by asbestos (Chapter 19), chloro-
fluorocarbons, dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT), leaded gasoline,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and numerous other substances, the fact
that a product is useful does not ensure that it is benign to health or the
environment. And if the danger becomes known after the product is widely
used, the consequences can go beyond human suffering and environmental
harm to include lengthy regulatory battles, costly cleanup efforts, expensive
litigation quagmires, and painful public-relations debacles. So far, rapid devel-
opment and commercial introduction of nanomaterials in varied applications
are outpacing efforts to understand their implications, let alone ensure their
safety. Fortunately, nanotechnology development and commercialization are
still at an early stage, so it is not too late to begin managing this process wisely.
 Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time 131

Nanotechnology offers an important opportunity to apply the lessons from

prior mistakes by identifying risks up front, taking the necessary steps to
address them, and meaningfully engaging stakeholders to help shape this
technology’s trajectory (Chapter 16). There is an opportunity to get nano-
technology right the first time.

Reason for concern

Nanoparticles can be naturally occurring or generated as by-products of
chemical reactions such as combustion. But attention now is focusing on the
large number of engineered nanomaterials – fullerenes (also known as bucky-
balls), carbon nanotubes, quantum dots, and nanoscale metal oxides, among
others – that are beginning to reach the market in growing quantities and in
a wide variety of applications. Studies performed to date are inadequate to
provide a full picture of the risks of these engineered nanomaterials and leave
open even more questions about other variants and types of engineered nano-
materials. Even so, they offer reason for concern. Studies have demonstrated
that some nanomaterials can be mobile or persist in the environment and can
be toxic to animals as diverse as fish and rats. A recent Rice University study
of buckyballs found that although individual buckyballs do not dissolve well
in water, they have a tendency to form aggregates that are both very water
soluble and bactericidal, a property that raises strong concerns about ecosystem
impacts, because bacteria constitute the bottom of the food chain in many
ecosystems. In addition, nanoparticles are deposited throughout the respiratory
tract when inhaled. Some of the particles settle in the nasal passages, where they
have been shown to be taken up by the olfactory nerves and carried past the
blood-brain barrier directly into brain cells. Nanoparticles in the 30–50
nanometer range (see Appendix) have been shown to penetrate deeply into
the lungs, where they readily cross through lung tissue and enter the systemic
circulation. This potential for rapid and widespread distribution within the
body offers promise of a new array of diagnostic and therapeutic applications
for these substances, but it also heightens the importance of having a full under-
standing of their toxicity.
A variety of nanomaterials has the capacity to cause tissue and cellular
damage by causing oxidative stress (the same type of damage that people take
antioxidant pills to protect against). Buckyballs caused oxidative damage to
brain and liver cells in a study in largemouth bass; other nanoparticles have
also been shown to cause oxidative stress in skin cells and in the liver. Most
research has used prototypical or ‘plain’ nanoparticles, such as uncoated bucky-
balls and carbon nanotubes. The few studies that have looked at the effects of
variations and coatings have shown that these changes modify the toxicity of
the original particle, further complicating the picture and raising the question
of how these coatings may degrade over time within the body or in the
environment. Oxidative stress may also be part of the mechanism behind the
damage to lung tissue that has been observed in several studies of carbon
132 Nanotechnology

nanotubes. Carbon nanotubes instilled into the lungs of rats and mice have
caused unusual localized immune lesions (granulomas) within 30 days, and a
separate aspiration study noted this effect as well as dose-dependent lung
fibrosis throughout the lung tissue. These and other studies suggest that
some nanomaterials can evade the lung’s normal clearance and defence
mechanisms.
Although the doses and methods of administration used in these studies
may not perfectly mirror likely exposure scenarios, these studies strongly
suggest the potential for some nanomaterials to pose significant risks.

Urgent need for action

These initial studies highlight how little is known about the health and environ-
mental effects of engineered nanomaterials. Thousands of tons of nanomaterials
are already being produced each year, and hundreds of products incorporating
nanomaterials are reportedly already on the market. The global market for
nanotechnology products is expected to reach at least $1 trillion over the next
decade. Given the length of time it will take to develop an adequate under-
standing of the potential risks posed by a wide variety of nanomaterials and
to apply this knowledge to inform appropriate regulation, it is imperative to
take action now.
Both the public and private sectors’ best interests are served by an invest-
ment to identify and manage potential risks from nanomaterials now, rather
than waiting until problems arise and then struggling to remediate or otherwise
cope with them. History demonstrates that embracing a technology without a
careful assessment and control of its risks can be extremely costly from both
human and financial perspectives.
The failure to sufficiently consider the adverse effects of using lead in paint,
plumbing and gasoline has resulted in widespread health problems that
continue to this day and burden us with extremely high cleanup costs. Asbestos
is another example where enormous sums of money are being spent by private
companies for remediation, litigation, and compensation, even beyond that
spent by the public sector to alleviate harm to human health and the environ-
ment. Standard & Poor’s has estimated that the total cost of liability for
asbestos-related losses could reach $200 billion (Chapter 19).
The risks at issue here are not only those related to health and the environ-
ment but also risks to the very success of this promising set of technologies. If
the public is not convinced that nanomaterials are being developed in a way
that identifies and minimizes negative consequences to human health and the
environment, a backlash could develop that delays, reduces or even prevents
the realization of many of the potential benefits of nanotechnology.
As demonstrated with genetically modified organisms just a few years ago
(Chapter 10), rapid commercialization combined with a failure to address
risks early on can lead to product bans and closed markets, resulting in that
case in hundreds of millions of dollars in annual export losses for US farmers
 Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time 133

and companies. Timely implementation of the following four actions will allow
for the most efficient and safest use of nanotechnology.

Increase risk research

The US government, as the largest single investor in nanotechnology research
and development (R&D), needs to spend more to assess the health and environ-
mental implications of nanotechnology and ensure that the critical research
needed to identify potential risks is done, and done expeditiously. Of the
roughly $1 billion that the federal government spends annually on nanotech-
nology, spending for environmental and health implications research accounted
for only $8.5 million (less than 1 per cent) in fiscal year (FY) 2004 and is
proposed to increase to only $38.5 million (less than 4 per cent) for FY 2006
(Chapter 7).
The non-profit Environmental Defense1 has called on the US government
to increase federal funding for nanomaterial risk research under the National
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to at least $100 million annually for the
next several years (Environmental Defense). Although an annual expenditure
of $100 million is a significant increase over current levels, it is still a small frac-
tion of the overall federal budget for nanotechnology development. Moreover,
it is a modest investment compared to the potential benefits of risk avoidance
and to the $1 trillion or more that nanotechnology is projected to provide to
the world economy by 2015. Given the complexity of the task, the scope of
the necessary research, and available benchmarks for comparison, $100 million
per year is a reasonable lower-bound estimate of what is needed.
Broad agreement exists among stakeholders that addressing the potential
risks of nanotechnology will be an unusually complex task. Nanotechnology
is a potentially limitless collection of technologies and associated materials.
The sheer diversity of potential materials and applications, which is a source
of nanotechnology’s enormous promise, also poses major challenges with
respect to characterizing potential risks. Nanotechnology entails many funda-
mentally different types of materials (and hundreds or thousands of potential
variants of each); many novel properties that are potentially relevant to risk;
many potential types of application; and multiple sources and routes of and
exposure over the full life cycle of a given material or application.
Even before the research is done that will allow hazards and exposures to be
evaluated in detail, a number of more fundamental needs must be addressed. At
present, even a basic understanding of which specific properties determine
nanomaterials’ risk potential is lacking. Many of the methods, protocols, and
tools needed to characterize nanomaterials or to detect and measure their
presence in a variety of settings, including the workplace environment, the
human body, and environmental media, are still in a very early stage of
development (Chapters 11–14).
Nor is it clear the extent to which existing knowledge about conventional
chemicals can be used to predict risks of nanomaterials. The defining character
134 Nanotechnology

of nanotechnology – the emergence of novel properties when materials are

reduced to or assembled at the nanoscale – carries with it the potential for
novel risks and even novel mechanisms of toxicity that cannot be predicted
from the properties and behaviour of their bulk counterparts (Chapter 5).
Risk research is needed to understand nanomaterial characterization, biological
and environmental fate and transport, and acute and chronic toxicity.
In each of these areas, existing testing and assessment methods and
protocols need to be re-examined to determine the extent to which they can
be modified to account for nanomaterials’ novel characteristics or need to be
supplemented with new methods. Similar challenges will arise with respect
to methods and technologies for sampling, analysis and monitoring, all of
which will be needed to detect nanomaterials and their transformation products
in living systems and in various environmental media.
The view that significantly more money needs to be spent on nanotechnology
risk research is further supported by experts’ assessments, known testing costs
associated with hazard characterization programmes for conventional chemicals,
and the research budgets for a roughly analogous risk-characterization effort,
namely the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) research on risks of
airborne particulate matter (PM).

Experts’ assessments
Experts from a variety of fields have declared that the NNI’s current funding
for nanotechnology risk research needs to be significantly increased. Invited
government, industry, and academic experts at a September 2004 workshop
sponsored by the NNI called for at least a tenfold increase in federal spending
on nanotechnology risk related research, relative to the approximately $10
million spent in fiscal year 2004. The United Kingdom’s Royal Society and
Royal Academy of Engineering called for the UK government to devote £5
million to £6 million ($9 million to $11 million) per year for 10 years just to
do its part to develop the methodologies and instrumentation needed to set
the stage for actual testing of nanomaterials. The chemical industry’s ‘nano-
technology development roadmap’, requested by the NNI, indicates that the
assessment of hazards to human health and the environment will require a
level of cumulative R&D investment that is among the highest of any assigned
to the industry’s priority research requirements. President Bush’s science
advisor John H. Marburger III noted that the current toxicity studies now
under way through the NNI are ‘a drop in the bucket compared to what
needs to be done’.

Hazard endpoint testing costs

Several estimates available from chemical hazard assessment programmes can
be used to provide at least a lower bound on the costs of testing a nanomaterial
 Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time 135

for hazardous properties. These costs are for the testing of a conventional
chemical for an assortment of hazard endpoints of concern (toxicity plus
environmental fate); notably, they do not include costs associated with
assessing exposure, which is also needed to assess risk.
Generating the Screening Information Data Set, a basic set of hazard
information designed to screen chemicals only in order to set priorities for
further scrutiny, is estimated to cost roughly $250,000 per chemical. Estimates
for filling the more extensive data requirements applicable to high-volume
chemicals under the European Union’s proposed Registration, Evaluation,
and Authorization of Chemicals programme exceed $2 million per chemical.
The test battery required to register a pesticide under US law can reportedly
cost as much as $10 million per pesticide.

EPA research budgets for risks of airborne PM

In response to recommendations from the National Research Council, the EPA
spent $40 million to $60 million annually for the first 6 years of a multiyear
research programme on risks posed by airborne PM. The scope of needed
research on nanomaterials is considerably broader and thus likely to cost
much more than for airborne PM. This is because airborne PM is a relatively
well-studied mixture of chemicals to which exposure arises from a discrete
(though highly diffuse) set of sources and through a single route: inhalation.
In contrast, nanomaterials

. are composed of many entirely novel, often poorly characterized classes of

materials;
. will be applied and used in ways that will create the potential for release and
exposure through many more pathways, including breathing, ingesting
drinking water, and skin absorption;
. may be present in wastes, water discharges, and a wide array of products;
. may result in the exposure of consumers, as well as the general public and
workers, through in-corporation into products;
. pose potential environmental as well as human health risks that need to be
considered.

Hence, regardless of the ultimate magnitude of risk identified, the research

needed to assess the risks is likely to be considerably more involved and
costly for nanomaterials than for airborne PM.
The President’s Subcommittee on Nanoscale Science, Engineering and
Technology already plays a role in coordinating and exchanging information
on federal R&D spending for nanotechnology. That coordinating role needs
to be enhanced to include the ability to shape and direct the overall federal
risk research agenda across agencies to ensure that all critical needs are being
addressed, as well as the responsibility and authority to ensure that individual
agencies have sufficient resources to conduct the needed research in their areas.
136 Nanotechnology

In light of the rapidity with which nanomaterials are reaching the market, this
added authority is essential to ensure that the right questions are asked and
answered on a timely basis.
This is not to say that the US government should be the sole, or even the
principal, funder of nanomaterial risk research. Other governments are also
spending heavily to promote nanotechnology R&D, and they too should
allocate some portion of their spending to address nanotechnology risks. And
although government risk research has a critical role to play in developing
the infrastructure needed to characterize and assess the risks of nanomaterials,
private industry should fund most of the research and testing on the products
they are planning to bring to market. Clearly, all parties will benefit if govern-
ments and industry coordinate their research to avoid redundancy and optimize
efficiency.

Improve regulatory policy

Although the United States has many regulatory programmes in place to
address environmental and health risks, those programmes are neither com-
prehensive in their design nor without flaws in their implementation. As a
result, some substances can fall through regulatory cracks and go unregulated
or under-regulated, posing risks that are not discovered until adverse effects
are widespread. There are signs that some nanomaterials may be poised to
fall between those cracks. Consider a few examples:

. For many substances and products, there is little or no governmental review

before they are marketed; regulation occurs only after a problem has arisen.
. Other programmes are triggered only if a substance is considered ‘new’. Yet
at least some nanomaterial producers are apparently proceeding on the
assumption that their products are not new despite their novel properties,
and government agencies have not clarified the regulatory status of these
materials. As a result, nanomaterials with novel properties are entering
commerce without the scrutiny of potential health and environmental effects
they warrant.
. Some programmes for ‘new’ substances have historically required very
limited data to be submitted by producers, relying instead on extrapolation
from information on existing chemicals, an approach that is highly question-
able for nanomaterials, given how few hazard data now exist.
. Under many regulatory programmes, coverage is triggered by mass-based
thresholds or standards. Yet because of their high surface-area-to-mass
ratios or other properties, nanomaterials often exhibit dramatically increased
potency or other activity relative to their bulk counterparts, a distinction not
reflected in existing mass-based measures.
. Some potential nanotechnology applications may fall through the cracks
between the jurisdictions of multiple regulatory programmes. For example,
sunscreens using nanoparticles of titanium dioxide were reviewed by the
 Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time 137

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for potential immediate health effects
on consumers, but neither the FDA nor the EPA reviewed how titanium
dioxide nanoparticles may affect aquatic ecosystems when these sunscreens
wash off.

At this point, federal agencies need to vigorously use their existing statutory
authorities to address potential nanomaterial risks as effectively as possible.
Regrettably, there are few signs of action on this score. For example, the
EPA has been conspicuously silent regarding the extent to which nanomaterials
are ‘new’ or ‘existing’ chemical substances for purposes of the Toxic Substances
Control Act 1976, an important distinction because only new chemicals trigger
pre-manufacture notification and review requirements (Nabholz, 1991).2 The
EPA can and should clarify the principle that nanomaterials are new unless
they demonstrably lack novel properties as compared to a conventional counter-
part. Further, the EPA should clarify that nanomaterials do not automatically
qualify for the exemptions from pre-manufacture notice provisions that are
allowed for materials produced in low volumes or thought to result in low
exposure, at least until appropriate nanomaterial specific definitions of ‘low
volume’ and ‘low exposure’ can be set. Likewise, before assuming that the
existing exemption of polymers from the pre-manufacture notification
programme applies to nanomaterials, the EPA needs to determine whether
nanomaterials meet the rationale for the exemption; namely, that the molecules
are too large to be biologically available and that they degrade only into
substances that have already been evaluated. The EPA should also state
publicly that it is unlikely to approve the commercial manufacture of a nano-
material in the absence of hazard and exposure data sufficient to characterize
its potential risks.
As agencies apply their existing authorities (or fail to do so), the need for
further steps may well become evident. A comprehensive and independent
process that identifies deficiencies as well as steps to address them will be vital.

Develop corporate standards of care

Even under the most optimistic scenario, it appears unlikely that federal agen-
cies will put into place adequate provisions for nanomaterials quickly enough
to address the materials now entering or poised to enter the market. Out of
enlightened self-interest (Chapters 19 and 21), industry must take the lead
in evaluating and managing nanomaterial risks for the near term, working
with other stakeholders to quickly establish and implement life cycle based
‘standards of care’ for nanomaterials.
These standards should include a framework and a process by which to
identify and manage nanomaterials’ risks across a product’s full life cycle,
taking into account worker safety, manufacturing releases and wastes, product
use, and product disposal. Standards of care should also include and be respon-
sive to feedback mechanisms, including environmental and health monitoring
138 Nanotechnology

programmes to check the accuracy of the assumptions about a material’s risks

and the effectiveness of risk management practices. Such standards should be
developed and implemented in a transparent and accountable manner,
including by publicly disclosing the assumptions, processes and results of the
risk identification and risk management systems.
Ideally, such standards of care would help provide a model for sensible
regulatory policies as they emerge. This would assure the public that all com-
panies, not just those who participate in voluntary programmes, are taking the
steps needed to safely manage nanomaterials. This would also set a level playing
field for companies, so that responsible companies are not at a disadvantage
relative to those that cut corners.

Engage a diverse range of stakeholders

To date, neither government nor industry has sufficiently engaged the wide
array of stakeholders – including labour groups, health organizations,
consumer advocates, community groups, and environmental organizations –
whose constituencies both stand to benefit from this technology and are most
likely to bear any risks that arise (Chapter 16). Government and industry
need to engage these various stakeholders and consider their views in deciding
how to develop and manage this promising technology in a way that maximizes
its benefits and minimizes its risks.
All too often, ‘stakeholder involvement’ translates in practice into either
communicating the end result of a process to those who have been excluded
(whether intentionally or by default) from participating in it, or seeking to
‘educate’ the public in order to promote a technology and allay concerns that
the technology’s proponents believe to be unfounded. Engagement is not
simply top-down communication. It means involving stakeholders from the
outset in helping to identify expectations and concerns, and providing a role
for them in helping to set priorities for research and action. And many of
these stakeholders not only have a stake or interest in nanotechnology, they
also have relevant perspective, experience, and expertise to offer.
Here again, there is an opportunity to get this right the first time. The
potential payoff in terms of reduced risks and increased market and public
acceptance will almost certainly greatly exceed the investment necessary to
draw these important voices into the discussion.
The rapid commercialization of nanotechnology, coupled with the potential
risks from at least certain nanomaterials as demonstrated in initial studies, lend
urgency to the need for government and industry to direct more of their invest-
ments in nanotechnology development toward identifying the potential risks
and addressing them. Government and industry have done a great job so far
in accentuating nanotechnology’s potential up sides and in accelerating its
development, but they have yet to come to terms with their equally critical
roles in identifying and avoiding the down sides. A far better balance between
these two roles must be struck if nanotechnology is to deliver on its promise
 Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time 139

without delivering unintended adverse consequences. With the right mix of

increased risk research, improved regulatory oversight, self initiated corporate
standards, and inclusive stakeholder engagement, we have the opportunity to
get nanotechnology right the first time.

Notes
1 Environmental Defense: this is an American national nonprofit organization
representing more than 400,000 members. Since 1967 it has worked
towards innovative, equitable and cost-effective solutions to society’s
most urgent environmental problems. A bibliography of references and
abstracts of risk-related research studies on nanomaterials is available at
www.environmentaldefense.org/go/nano.
2 Nabholz, J. V. (1991) ‘Environmental hazard and risk assessment under the
United States Toxic Substances Control Act’, Science of the Total Environ-
ment, vol 109–110, pp649–665. The Toxic Substances Control Act 1976
is summarized at www.epa.gov/region5/defs/html/tsca.htm. TSCA was
enacted by US Congress to give EPA the ability to track the 75,000
industrial chemicals currently produced or imported into the United
States. EPA repeatedly screens these chemicals and can require reporting
or testing of those that may pose an environmental or human-health
hazard. EPA can ban the manufacture and import of those chemicals that
pose an unreasonable risk (see also Chapter 12).
 12

Risk Management and Regulation

in an Emerging Technology

Roland Clift

Nanotechnology – the use of particulate material at such a small scale that

its properties are determined by size and surface condition as well as bulk
properties – has been heralded as offering the potential to revolutionize many
industrial sectors and medical practices. Nanotechnology also presents
problems in managing risks to human health and the environment which are
explored here, drawing on the report of a Working Group set up by the
Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, in the UK. Taking an
anticipatory approach to assessing the benefits and regulating the risks from
an emerging technology is itself novel (European Commission, 2004b). Very
little is known about the risks to human health and the environment from
nanomaterials, so that a precautionary approach is advocated. Stopping short
of the moratorium on production and use of nanomaterials advocated by
some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), restrictions on the technology
are recommended including regulating nanomaterials as new chemicals,
planning end-of-life management of products containing nanomaterials and a
presumption against release of manufactured nanomaterials into the environ-
ment. The UK Government’s response lacks detail, but appears to have
accepted most of the key recommendations. Based on this experience, conclu-
sions are drawn for the regulation of other emerging technologies in future.

Introduction – technology and risk management

It is now accepted that ‘the conventional separation (in engineering decisions
involving risk) between the technical (the province of engineers) and the social
(the province of managers, politicians and the public) cannot survive scrutiny’
(Royal Academy of Engineering, 2002). Failure to recognize the need to
manage all aspects of risk including the societal aspects has led to obvious
 Risk Management and Regulation in an Emerging Technology 141

‘difficulties’ for certain technologies. The nuclear industry is well-known

example, as are some forms of biotechnology including attempts to introduce
genetically modified (GM) crops. Independently of the question of whether
these technologies should have achieved public acceptance, it is clear that failure
to engage in broad-based debate has introduced problems in achieving satisfac-
tory regulatory bases for the introduction of new technologies, and that once
opposition develops it is difficult to overcome (Mayer, 2002) (Chapter 10).
Once a climate of suspicion starts to develop it may be amplified, for example
by media reporting, into a ‘crisis of trust’ (O’Neill, 2002). The Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution has gone so far as to advocate a deliberative approach
to involve public values in setting environmental standards, proposed a model for
the kind of process needed (RCEP, 1998) and discussed how the approach might
be applied specifically to regulating chemicals in products (RCEP, 2003).
It is probably fair to say that, while ‘deliberative stakeholder engagement’ is
widely advocated, experience has not shown that any particular type of process
is especially effective. In particular, it is not clear how a successful public
debate can be conducted over an emerging technology, to develop an anticipa-
tory approach to assessing its likely benefits and regulating its possible risks.
Nanotechnology is an example for which such an approach is needed, given
the emergence of public concerns ahead of widespread introduction of the
technology.
In June 2003, the UK Government commissioned the two principal
academies of science and engineering, the Royal Society and the Royal
Academy of Engineering, to carry out an ‘independent study into current
and future developments in nanoscience and nanotechnologies and their
impacts’. However, the study was carried out independently of Government,
by a Working Group whose 14 members included engineers and scientists, a
philosopher, a social scientist, a consumer champion and an environmentalist.
The terms of reference included to ‘identify what environmental, health and
safety, ethical or societal implications or uncertainties may arise from the use
of the technology, both current and future and to identify areas where regula-
tion needs to be considered’. The Report of the Working Group was published
in July 2004 (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004). This
paper draws largely on the Report of the Working Group, of which the
author was a member, concentrating on the risk management aspects covered
under the above two terms of reference quoted here.
Although embodying current thinking in risk management, this approach
to examining and planning to manage the risks associated with an emerging
technology is itself new. The Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering
study has been hailed (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004) as ‘a change in the scientific
community’s approach to the risks, uncertainties and wider social implications
of new and emerging technologies – in many ways, it redefines the genre’. The
present author is as sceptical of this enthusiasm as of the promises made for
nanotechnology. However, the questions of whether nanotechnology and the
prospective approach to risk management will turn out to be paradigm shifts
provide the context for this paper.
142 Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology: hopes, doubts and fears

The Royal Society report defines nanoscience as ‘the study of phenomena and
manipulation of materials at atomic, molecular and macromolecular scales,
where properties differ significantly from those at a larger scale.’ Nanotechnol-
ogies are ‘the design, characterization, production and application of
structures, devices and systems by controlling shape and size at nanometre
scale’. In essence, nanotechnology is an emerging technology based on solid
particles in the size range where their properties are determined by size and
surface condition as well as bulk properties.1 The principal dimension of a
nanoparticle – the diameter in the case of a fibre – is typically a few tens of
nanometres; an order of magnitude larger than a DNA strand but of the
same order as the smaller viruses.
Recognition of the potential for using nanoscale materials and operations is
usually dated to a lecture by Richard Feynman (1959) while the term ‘nano-
technology’ was coined later (Taniguchi, 1974) to describe precision engineer-
ing of materials at the nanometre scale. Nanomaterials are already in use in
some consumer products, specifically cosmetics and sun-screens. But nano-
technology has been held up as offering the potential to revolutionize a wide
range of economic activities; see Table 12.1. Several of the more immediate
possible applications lie in the process and energy sectors. The potential
developments in manufacturing arise from the convergence of top-down
processes such as ultra-precision machining and lithography with bottom-up
processes based on chemicals and biochemicals (Whatmore, 2001); for example
through a materials revolution combining synthesis and smart fabrication. In
the longer term, many of the more interesting possible applications lie in bio-
nanotechnology and nanomedicine: implants and prosthetics, improved
diagnostics, targeted drug delivery and radiological treatment.
Other claims for nanotechnology are more fanciful. A report by the US
National Science Foundation and Department of Commerce (NSF, 2003) is

Table 12.1: Some possible applications of nanotechnology

Evolutionary catalysts and separation membranes

batteries and fuel cells
paints and coatings
electronics and displays
‘smart’ packaging and labelling
environmental clean-up

Longer term composites

lubricants
components and prosthetics
diagnosis and targeted drug delivery
environmental monitoring
 Risk Management and Regulation in an Emerging Technology 143

cited in the Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering report as ‘a very good

example of the difficulty some commentators find in drawing an appropriate
line between hope and hype’. In support of the US National Nanotechnology
Initiative, Roco (2004) has claimed ‘it is conceivable that by 2015, our ability
to detect and treat tumours in their first year of occurrence might totally elim-
inate suffering and death from cancer’. The Royal Society/Royal Academy of
Engineering Working Group considered that ‘such a claim demonstrates an
over-simplistic view of the detection and treatment of cancer’ (p23). Concern
over damage rather than benefit has been raised by the idea of molecular
assemblers, nanoscale machines or ‘nanobots’ able to select and position
atoms to assemble an object and thus to replicate themselves. Uncontrolled
self-replication, leading to massive pollution of the biosphere by ‘grey goo’,
has been the subject of novelistic interest (and statements by certain public
figures). The Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering study considered
self-replicating devices to be too fanciful to merit immediate attention. Even
Eric Drexler, who originated the idea of nano-scale machines, has since
changed his position (Phoenix and Drexler, 2004) (but see Chapter 3).
Effective selling of the potential developments has led to major R and D
investment in the USA in particular (Roco, 2004) and somewhat lower activity
in Japan and Europe (European Commission, 2004a). UK Government interest
has been criticized as ‘too little, too late’ (House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee, 2004).
Among the many questions over the realism of the claims made for nano-
technology is whether the benefits from using nanomaterials are really much
larger than the resource use and environmental impacts associated with
producing nanomaterials. To address this question requires an application of
life cycle assessment, a well-established tool to evaluate the environmental
impacts of the complete supply chain leading up to delivery of a product or
service (Baumann and Tillman, 2004). More generally, ‘life cycle thinking’
refers to the approach of assessing the complete system supplying a product,
using it and managing (for example recovering and recycling) the product after
use. Life cycle thinking has become a central element of environmental manage-
ment in the European Union (EU), embedded for example in Integrated Product
Policy (CEC, 2003). No systematic life cycle assessment of representative nano-
technology products or applications appears to have been reported. The Royal
Society/Royal Academy of Engineering Working Group recognized this as a
clear research need.
Distinct from alarmism over ‘grey goo’, the public view of nanotechnology
appears to be undeveloped. A web-based survey in the USA (Bainbridge, 2002)
found that most respondents were favourably disposed towards the potential
of nanotechnology, but the value and representativeness of such samples is
questionable (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004). A
survey promoted by the Working Group found, not surprisingly, widespread
ignorance of nanotechnology in the public in the UK (also see Japanese
survey, Chapter 6). This can be interpreted to mean that the time is good to
promote public debate on the development and regulation of nanotechnology;
144 Nanotechnology

the Working Group made specific recommendations on how a dialogue should

be taken forward. However, because of the very considerable uncertainty over
human and environmental risks posed by nanomaterials, discussed below, some
NGOs have argued for a precautionary moratorium. The Canadian NGO ETC
(2003) has called for a complete moratorium on the production and use of
synthetic nanoparticles. Greenpeace (2004) has called for a moratorium on
release of nanoparticles into the environment. The Working Group did not
consider a complete moratorium to be justified; their analysis of the risks and
the appropriate regulatory approach is discussed in the following sections of
this paper.
At a different level, concerns have also been expressed over the possible
social impacts of nanotechnology (NSF, 2001; Wood et al, 2003): whether
it could constitute a ‘disruptive’ technology, causing the demise or total
restructuring of existing industries; whether by ‘convergence’ with other new
technologies, nanotechnology could have major social impacts (for example
enabling increased surveillance, and widening the disparity between privileged
and relatively deprived individuals, groups and countries).2 Such concerns, of
course, arise over any nascent technology. The Royal Society/Royal Academy
of Engineering report recommends establishment of a group to identify
potential ‘health, safety, environmental, social, ethical and regulatory issues’
raised by new technologies. However, the issue of social impacts is not explored
further in this chapter (see inter alia Chapter 15).

Environmental and health hazards and risks

The current approach to risk assessment contains the scientific elements
summarized in Table 12.2; note that this assessment should form only part
of the process of risk management which must incorporate public values (see

Table 12.2 The elements of current risk assessment. After Worth and Balls
(2002) and RCEP (2003)

Hazard assessment Hazard identification: identification of the inherent capacity of a

substance to cause adverse effects, without regard to the
likelihood or severity of such effects.
Hazard characterization: quantitative evaluation of adverse
effects following exposure to a chemical.

Exposure assessment Quantitative evaluation of the likely exposure of humans and

the environment to the substance.

Risk characterization Quantitative estimation of the probability that an adverse

effect will occur, and of its severity and duration under
defined exposure conditions.
 Risk Management and Regulation in an Emerging Technology 145

Introduction). The hazard posed by a substance depends on its inherent

properties, while risk assessment also accounts for the probability of exposure
of humans and non-human beings to a hazardous substance. The discussion
here follows the stages in Table 12.2.
Humans and other beings are routinely exposed to nanoparticles, par-
ticularly in the atmosphere originating from natural events (such as volcanic
eruptions) and from anthropic activities (particularly combustion processes,
including vehicle engines). To some extent, living organisms have developed
defences against such particles (including viruses). However, particles can
still penetrate into the body. For humans, the principle entry routes are via
the lungs by respiration, through the skin by dermal exposure and via the
gut by ingestion of food and drink. There is some evidence that exposure to
nano-sized particles can cause human health impacts, particularly by
respiration. The principal evidence derives from epidemiological studies that
have indicated an association between particulate air pollution and health,
particularly cardiovascular and respiratory disorders (Brook et al, 2004).
Largely by analogy with the known effects of asbestos fibres, monofibres are
particularly implicated as health hazards. However, their impact will depend
at least on their dimensions (including surface area) and on their surface
composition and reactivity – for example on their properties as nanomaterials
– so that the analogy with asbestos may not be sound. This underlines the
conclusion that the health impacts of nanomaterials, along with the other
properties that define them as nanomaterials, depend on their size and surface
condition.
People using skin preparations such as cosmetics and sun-screens are
subject to dermal exposure. Some sun-screens contain titanium dioxide nano-
particles. It is by no means firmly established that they do reduce risks of skin
cancer. Furthermore, while there is evidence that nanoparticles cannot
penetrate healthy skin, it is not certain that they cannot penetrate lesions
(such as areas of skin already damaged by sunburn). The likely impact of
ingested nanomaterials is unknown (Chapter 14), but is likely to be less serious
than respiratory exposure and is probably less of a concern than dermal
exposure. Once in the body, it is possible that nanoparticles could cause
damage at the neural and cellular level, possibly even penetrating into the
brain (see Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004) although
the implications of this penetration are unknown.
Impacts of nanomaterials on the environment and non-human species is
even more uncertain. The conventional toxicological approach to assessing
ecotoxicity involves exposing organisms – usually daphnia, fish and rats – to
the substance in question and observing the dose or concentration at which
measurable morbidity results. The results from such tests are then scaled up
to give a rough prediction of human toxicity. For nanomaterials, no way of
adapting animal exposure tests to show the effect of particle dimensions has
been proposed, beyond the obvious approach of testing with particles of
different sizes and thereby multiplying the number of tests needed. Only one
study appears to have been reported, on the effect of carbon-60 particles on a
146 Nanotechnology

species of fish (Oberdörster, 2004), and that study is limited and unsatisfactory.
An alternative approach, still at an explanatory stage, is to observe the effect of a
pollutant on cells in culture. Such in vitro tests do not appear to have been
performed for nanomaterials, and no protocol has been proposed to examine
the effect of particle dimensions. A further approach, sometimes known as in
silico testing, aims to assess the toxicological potential of chemicals by computer
calculation of quantitative structure–activity relationships (QSARs). QSARs are
central to the US approach to risk assessment of chemicals (see below), but the
approach does not appear yet to have been developed for nanomaterials
although in principle it might be possible to adapt QSAR calculations to
allow for particle dimensions. Despite the general level of ignorance, there
are reasons to expect that nanoparticles could interfere with the metabolism
of micro-organisms, including those in soils.
In the presence of this level of uncertainty, chemical pollutants are con-
ventionally classified according to their persistence in the environment and
their propensity to bioaccumulate and hence affect creatures, such as
humans, in the higher levels of the food chain (see RCEP, 2003). The simple
chemical tests conventionally applied do not immediately apply to nano-
materials. Given that their properties depend on their surface condition, it is
likely that nanomaterials will have limited persistence but this inference
remains speculative.

Precautionary risk management and regulation

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the current state of under-
standing of the risks to human health and the environment from nanomaterials
is one of almost complete ignorance: there are reasons to think that there could
be harmful impacts, but the nature and extent of the hazards and risks are
essentially unknown. Nanomaterials therefore present a case for application
of the Precautionary Principle. Among the many statements of this principle
(see Perdan, 2004), that in the Rio Declaration (UN, 1992) is relatively soft:
lack of ‘full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. In this
context, ‘environmental degradation’ can be taken to include human health
impacts.
As for conventional chemicals, the objective of risk management and regu-
lation is to eliminate risks to humans and the environment or at least to reduce
them to ‘acceptable levels’.3 Risk results from possible exposure to a hazard
(see Table 12.2). If the hazards associated with exposure and the exposure
pathways are unknown for nanoparticles, then risk can only be confined if
release is avoided. For regulatory purposes, this places nanomaterials into
essentially the same category as new chemicals. In the EU, new chemicals
are at present covered by regulations on the Notification of New Substances
(NONS), which require provision of a base data set from which a substance
is assigned to a category determining its permitted use before it can be
 Risk Management and Regulation in an Emerging Technology 147

‘placed on the market’; for example traded or incorporated into products. The
data set is placed on a register maintained by the European Chemicals Bureau.
Full risk assessment can be required for chemicals identified as priorities from
the base data, but fewer than 30 complete risk assessments have yet been
published. Partly in an attempt to improve the rate at which new chemicals
are given full assessment, a new approach to Registration, Evaluation and
Authorisation of CHemicals (REACH) has been designed (European Commis-
sion, 2001). However, REACH has been widely criticized, inter alia for being
too cumbersome, and the version finally approved by European Parliament in
2005 is a compromise (Chapter 8). An approach broadly similar to NONS is
followed in Japan, although the classification is made before the substance
can be manufactured. The US Toxic Substances Control Act requires the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to keep an inventory of all
substances regulated under the act, and requires new substances to be notified
to the EPA before manufacture or importation. However, by contrast with
the EU and Japan, the Act does not specify a base data set, and leaves the
EPA with the responsibility of demonstrating that a chemical may pose an
unreasonable risk; the US General Audit Office has criticized this approach
as leaving too severe a burden of proof on the EPA (Chapter 11). The US
approach also ensures confidentiality on the intended uses of a substance;
the American Chamber of Commerce objected to proposals on data sharing
under REACH, arguing a right to confidentiality of business information.
A more complete summary and comparison of different regulatory regimes
has been given by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
(RCEP, 2003).
Existing substances produced as nanoparticles are not currently defined as
new chemicals. The Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering Working
Group recommended that ‘nanoparticles or nanotubes be treated as new
substances’. However, two differences from conventional chemicals were high-
lighted. One concerns the requirement, noted above, to include the effect of
particle size in hazard assessment. The other concerns the ‘triggers’ applied
to determine the need for and extent of testing. At present the triggers are
determined by the mass of a new substance produced. It was recommended
that the relevant regulatory bodies should consider ‘trigger levels’ based on
some property which reflects particle size.
The precautionary approach implies that nanomaterials should be placed in
the highest hazard category unless sufficient information is available to justify a
lower level of risk management. The Working Group recommended ‘that
factories and research laboratories treat manufactured nanoparticles and nano-
tubes as if they were hazardous and seek to reduce or remove them from waste
streams’ and that ‘as an integral part of the innovation and design process of
products and materials containing nanoparticles or nanotubes, industry
should assess the risk of release of these components throughout the life
cycle of the product and make this information available to the relevant
regulatory authorities’. Taken together, these recommendations would cover
regulation of the supply chain and require protection from exposure to
148 Nanotechnology

nanomaterials in the workplace. The pressure to avoid risk of releases would

have a further implication: it would favour production of nanomaterials at
the point where they are incorporated into a finished material or product.
This would represent amplification of pressures that are already changing the
structure of the chemical industry, away from bulk chemicals towards small-
scale distributed production of high value chemicals and materials.
The explicit mention of the life cycle also leads to the important conclusion
that products containing nanomaterials must be managed after use to ensure
that none of these materials can escape into the environment. The specific
recommendation is that ‘manufacturers of products that incorporate nano-
particles and nanotubes and which fall under extended producer responsibility
regimes such as end-of-life regulations be required to publish procedures
outlining how these materials will be managed to minimize human and environ-
mental exposure’. This recommendation represents an extension of one of the
stated objectives of ‘take back’ legislation such as the EU Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) Directives: to
require manufacturers to design systems for recovery and management of
products at the end of their service lives. It has been argued that the way
these Directives have been implemented has failed to have this effect (see, for
example, Castell et al, 2004). Thus, if the recommendation is implemented
seriously, it could actually improve management of material cycles and promote
the development of industrial ecology.
Other recommendations were seen as likely to be more contentious.
With products such as cosmetics, sun screens and food additives in mind,
the Working Group recommended that ‘ingredients in the form of nano-
particles undergo a full safety assessment . . . before they are permitted for
use in products; that manufacturers publish details of the methodologies . . .
used in assessing the safety of . . . products containing nanoparticles;
and that the ingredients lists of consumer products should identify the
fact that manufactured nanoparticulate material has been added’. This
obviously supports the EU’s general approach to regulation and disclosure
rather than that used in the USA, but it would go further and put regulation
of cosmetics containing nanomaterials on a basis approaching that applied to
pharmaceuticals.
Pursuing the logic further, the Working Group recommended that ‘until
more is known about environmental impacts of nanoparticles and nanotubes
. . . release of manufactured nanoparticles and nanotubes into the environment
be avoided as far as possible’. If implemented, this recommendation would
immediately prevent any activity which deliberately involves unconfined
release of nanomaterials, including the use of nanoparticles to improve
combustion of hydrocarbons in engines and of iron nanoparticles for soil
remediation by injecting them into groundwater (Zhang, 2003). It was
specifically recommended that ‘the use of free manufactured nanoparticles in
environmental applications such as remediation be prohibited until
appropriate research has been undertaken and it can be demonstrated
that the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks’. This conclusion
 Risk Management and Regulation in an Emerging Technology 149

stops short of the complete moratorium advocated by ETC (2003) but is

essentially the same as the precautionary restrictions advocated by Greenpeace
(2004).

The UK Government response

Her Majesty’s Government’s response to the Royal Society/Royal Academy of
Engineering report was published early in 2005. Most of the recommendations
were endorsed and accepted, albeit with little specific detail. ‘A thorough
independent study will be initiated . . . into the implications of nanotech-
nologies on environmental regulation, and the outcome of this study will be
published during 2005’ (HM Government 2005, paragraph 49). The recom-
mendations that nanoparticles should be eliminated from waste streams and
that the use of free nanoparticles be banned are accepted (paragraphs 20, 44
and 46). Specifically, the Government ‘accepts the recommendation that a
precautionary approach should be taken, and . . . will work . . . with the industry
to prevent the deliberate release of manufactured nanoparticles until there is
sufficient evidence that the benefits out weigh any adverse effects’ (paragraph
46). There is agreement that ‘ingredients in the form of manufactured free
nanoparticles should undergo a full safety assessment . . . before they are used
in consumer products (paragraph 62) and the feasibility of labelling needs to
be fully investigated’ (paragraph 64).
It is accepted that ‘a chemical in the form of nanoparticles or nanotubes
may exhibit different properties to the bulk form’ (paragraph 53). However,
there is no clear response to the recommendation that nanoparticles be
treated as new substances beyond the statement that ‘sector specific regula-
tions will be needed to ensure that. . . nanoparticles are appropriately
regulated’ (paragraph 56) with recognition that ‘any new regulations could
be implemented independently of REACH and would require agreement at
European level’ (paragraph 54).
The need for stakeholder and public dialogue is endorsed: the UK Govern-
ment ‘believes that it is important to have a good understanding of public
attitudes to nanotechnologies (paragraph 79) and supports the aim for public
dialogue. . . to elicit and understand people’s aspirations and concerns around
the development of these technologies’. Quite what use will be made of this
understanding is less clear.
Curiously, the UK Government’s response is not particularly supportive
of the need for life cycle assessments to evaluate claims for the benefits of
nanotechnologies. In spite of the existence of international standards on life
cycle assessment (ISO 14040–14043), the response considered that ‘life cycle
assessment is itself inherently difficult and methodologies are not fully standar-
dized’ (paragraph 30). Notwithstanding the fact that the EU has adopted life
cycle assessment as the basis for improving the sustainability of products
under Integrated Product Policy (CEC, 2003), the response goes on to say
that ‘discussions and debates over the merits . . . of emerging technologies
150 Nanotechnology

should be . . . informed not only by life cycle assessments but by other

important considerations’ (which are not identified). The response does at
least note (paragraph 31) that ‘it would be advantageous to pool systematically
knowledge on life cycle assessment at an international level’ (as if that were
not already happening in professional circles, aided by EU and UNEP
programmes). One of the advantages of such pooling might be to raise aware-
ness and use of life cycle approaches by UK Government to the level obtaining
in other European countries and many industries.
Despite the recognition that ‘there is a need for research to better under-
stand the risks posed by nanoparticles and nanotubes’ (paragraph 37) and
assertions that ‘the Government is strongly committed to filling these gaps
in knowledge through research’ (para. 43), no new money appears to be avail-
able for the research that will be needed to underpin regulation. On 30
November 2005 the UK Government published its research agenda for
assessing the potential risks posed by nano-products. The report was drafted
by a consortium of government departments, agencies and research councils,
coordinated by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA, 2005).

Uncertainty and aspiration

Both technologies using nanoscale materials and the anticipatory approach to
assessing the benefits and regulating the risks from an emerging technology
are at an early stage: nanotechnology has yet to make a serious economic
impact outside the research and development (R&D) community, and the
Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering report should be only the
starting point for a wider public debate. It is therefore important to avoid
the uncritical over-enthusiasm that has characterized some of the advocates
of nanotechnology. However, the need to manage and regulate risks in the
face of almost complete uncertainty is a generic problem. New technologies
involving new materials will continue to present the kind of difficulty raised
by nanoscale materials: lack of epidemiological evidence, lack of systematic
toxicological evidence and possibly lack of suitable testing protocols. The
precautionary approach is intended to avoid the impacts on human health
and the environment which epidemiology studies, so that effective regulation
should ensure that epidemiological evidence never does become available.
Risk management will therefore increasingly depend on limiting exposure
rather than substituting materials with lower inherent hazards. It remains
to be seen whether the kinds of general measures recommended by the
Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering Working Group will be
implemented strictly and will succeed in preventing impacts on humans and
the environment.
It also remains to be seen whether the experiment of adopting an anticipa-
tory approach to risk management represented by the Royal Society/Royal
Academy of Engineering study really proves to be a paradigm shift. In
 Risk Management and Regulation in an Emerging Technology 151

commenting on the report of the Working group, Wilsdon and Willis (2004)
argue that R&D companies should open up their innovations to public
debate at an early stage; that NGOs should engage in debate early in
development of a new technology rather than campaigning later; and that the
media should concentrate on the ‘public interest’ in reporting on science and
technology. It remains to be seen whether these hopes are as fanciful as some
of the claims made for nanotechnology.

Notes
1 Some Applications may also use the properties of nanopores in materials of
larger scale (Zhao et al, 2004). However, the focus of this paper is nano-
particles rather than nanopores.
2 The author raised, but the Working Group did not address, the question of
whether ‘smart labelling’ using nanotechnology could show the existence or
otherwise of Weapons of Mass Destruction, thereby obviating the need to
invade a country to establish their absence.
3 The concept of ‘acceptable risk’ is embedded in risk management and
regulation but is being questioned (RCEP, 2005). Acceptable to whom?
On the basis of what kind of evidence and assessment?

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 13

Nanotechnology and Nanoparticle

Toxicity: A Case for Precaution

C. Vyvyan Howard and December S. K. Ikah

Introduction
The term ‘nanotechnology’ is a catch-all for a large array of enabling technol-
ogies. Many of the activities in the nanotechnology industry do not pose a direct
threat to human or environmental health, for example the nanostructuring of
surfaces of large objects such as window glass. There is little doubt that nano-
technology presents possibilities for many benefits. Some future developments,
for example in the nano-bio-technology arena, have the potential to impact
upon human and environmental health, and this may emerge in the not too
distant future. However, there is at least one current aspect of activity in the
nanotechnology industry that is potentially hazardous: the production of very
small particles that are free in the environment. There is a considerable existing
scientific literature that highlights the potential of small particles to cause harm.
The industry is now moving into the phase of bulk production of certain types
of novel nanoparticles and therefore, if regulators are to have the chance to
interact meaningfully with producers, to protect human health, there is a
certain urgency required. The signs are that decision-makers have realized
the problems that exist and are starting to formulate strategies (EU, 2004;
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004). The purpose of
this chapter is to review the latest state of scientific knowledge of the potential
effects of particle exposure on health and the current state of knowledge on
nanoparticle toxicology.

Health effects of respirable aerosols

Much of what is known about the health impacts of particles comes from
epidemiological studies on highly exposed workforces and populations.
 Nanotechnology and Nanoparticle Toxicity: A Case for Precaution 155

Table 13.1 Classification of respirable particles

Coarse PM10 The mass of particles per cubic metre which pass through a
size-selective inlet with a 50 per cent efficiency cut-off at 10mm
aerodynamic diameter.
Fine PM2:5 As for PM10 but with a 2.5mm cut-off.
Ultrafine PM0:1 As for PM10 but with a 100nm cut-off, for example up to
0.1mm.

Before considering the potential impacts of engineered nanoparticles, a review

of what has been learned from aerosol scientists is illuminating.
Aerosol scientists classify the respirable fraction of particles found in air
into size bands. They are generally defined in Table 13.1. The term ‘ultrafine’
particle is now becoming synonymous with ‘nanoparticle’ because they have
the same definition, a size range of between 1 and 100 nanometres (nm). In
this text the terms should be considered interchangeable.
Consideration of the types of particle that our ancestors were exposed to
throughout human history is illuminating. These mainly consisted of
suspended sand and soil particles and biological products such as pollens.
Most of these are relatively coarse and become trapped before getting deep
into the lung. There have always been ultrafine particles in our environment,
mainly consisting of minute crystals of salt, which become airborne through
the action of the waves of the sea (Eakins and Lally, 1984), and viruses. The
former are not normally toxic, as they either consist predominantly of soluble
salts or are biodegradable. Clearly, there were few airborne particles of signifi-
cance to our health smaller than 70nm in diameter throughout our prehistory,
until we harnessed fire. The defence mechanisms that have evolved to protect
us from inhaled particles have come about as a result of the challenges set by the
environment during that evolutionary process. These do not automatically
confer protection when the environment changes.
It has been recognized for many hundreds of years that exposure to high
levels of dust can lead to ill health and particularly lung disease. Silicosis was
described by Agricola in the 16th century (Agricola, 1556). As the Industrial
Revolution progressed, it became clear that workers involved in mining,
foundry work and stone grinding were particularly at risk of developing
silicosis. However, this is a ‘high dose’ disease, requiring prolonged exposure
to high levels of dust before the defence mechanisms in the lungs are totally
overwhelmed. There are now a number of diffuse fibrotic conditions of the
lung associated with industrial exposure to particles including; pneumoconiosis
in miners, bissinosis in cotton workers and asbestosis amongst laggers and
associated trades. The first indication that serious pathology could arise from
low-dose exposure to particles came with the recognition that asbestos fibres
could cause the tumour pleural mesothelioma, previously rare. In general,
the particles required to cause this type of disease are less than 10 micrometres
156 Nanotechnology

(mm) average diameter for roughly spherical particles and less than 3mm in
length for fibres.
Epidemiological evidence of the effect of air pollution on mortality had been
noted since the mid-18th century, but it was the London ‘smog’ of 1952, with
which the deaths of over 4,000 people were associated (Ministry of Health,
1954), that accelerated the introduction of controls for smoke emissions in
urban areas in the UK and across Europe and North America.

Sources and composition of ambient

particulate aerosols
The size distribution of particles in the atmosphere is not uniform but tends to
be tri-modal (Harrison, 1999). This is associated with their mode of formation.

. Nucleation mode particles are generally less than 100nm diameter and are
mainly the result of primary combustion particle production such as from
vehicular fumes. They are not particularly long-lived in the atmosphere in
their initial form because of agglomeration and condensation mechanisms.
. Accumulation mode particles are typically found between 100nm up to 2.5mm
and arise because of the growth of nucleation mode particles. They tend to
consist of secondary particles predominantly sulphate nitrates of ammo-
nium. Their lifetime in the atmosphere is longer than for nucleation mode
particles and can typically last for over one week. They are thus likely to
undergo long-range transport.
. Coarse particles are the result of grinding mechanical processes and re-
suspension processes from the surface of the land or sea. Their size is in
general more that 2.5mm.

The ultrafine range of atmospheric particles varies considerably from location

to location. Urban ultrafine composition has been addressed by Cass et al
(2000). The average chemical composition of ultrafine particles in Southern
California was found to be 50 per cent organic compounds, 14 per cent trace
metal oxides, 8.7 per cent elemental carbon, 8.2 per cent sulphate, 6.8 per
cent nitrate, 3.7 per cent ammonium ion, 0.6 per cent sodium and 0.5 per
cent chloride. Mobile or stationary fuel combustion sources predominated,
with an estimated consistency of 65 per cent organic compounds, 7 per cent
elemental carbon, 7 per cent sulphate and 4 per cent trace elements.

The respiratory system and its natural

defence mechanisms
The airways of the respiratory system are lined with a pseudostratified
columnar ciliated epithelium from the nose downwards to the respiratory
 Nanotechnology and Nanoparticle Toxicity: A Case for Precaution 157

bronchioles, except for a part of the lower pharynx and upper larynx, which
have a stratified squamous epithelium. The surfaces of the epithelia are kept
moist by secretions of mucus from goblet cells. The lining of the major airways
of the trachea and bronchi are covered with a ‘mucociliary escalator’. The cilia
beneath the carpet of mucus beat upwards towards the larynx and moves it
slowly upwards where the mucus is finally swallowed and ingested. Beyond
the respiratory bronchioles is the alveolar air space, which has a simple epithe-
lium with no cilia, onto which a surfactant is secreted. The alveolar surface is
patrolled by alveolar macrophages, living within the layer of surfactant,
which engulf foreign matter arriving at the alveolar surface. It is of interest
to note that alveolar macrophages have difficulty in recognizing particles of
less than 65nm diameter as being ‘foreign’ and that, for such very small
ultrafine particles, the engulfing mechanism tends not to be activated. This
doubtless is connected in some way with our evolutionary history.
There are three mechanisms by which particle deposition may occur,
namely: sedimentation, inertial impaction and diffusion (or Brownian motion).

. Sedimentation occurs under the influence of gravity and tends to increase

with increasing particle size.
. Inertial impaction occurs when a particle is being carried in air and the direc-
tion of the air changes, the momentum of the particle carrying it forward in
its initial path. There is a tendency for particles to impact at bifurcations in
the bronchial tree. Deposition is usually determined by the momentum
(weight and speed) of the particle. Increased flow tends to increase impac-
tion, especially of larger particles. This turbulent impaction is more
common in the upper, larger airways and predominantly affects particles
greater than 1mm in diameter.
. Diffusion occurs with very small particles, as a result of being bombarded by
other molecules, similar to the behaviour of gas molecules. Movement of
these particles is completely random. Therefore, if they are close to a wet
mucosa they are likely to deposit. Re-suspension does not happen subse-
quently. Diffusion is the method of deposition for the smaller ultrafine
particles with a diameter less than 10nm and happens predominantly in
the nasal and upper pharyngeal parts of the respiratory tract.

The relative deposition of particles varies according to their size. The very
smallest particles tend to deposit in the upper airways by diffusion, while the
bulk of the ultrafine particles deposit predominantly in the alveolar region of
the lung by impaction. Other particles that deposit on the lining of the trachea
and bronchi are usually ingested.

Particle size and toxicity

When bulk materials are made into particles, the surface to volume ratio of the
material increases. When this process reaches the nanoscale, the proportion of
158 Nanotechnology

‘surface’ atoms in the material increases exponentially and the surface chem-
istry changes, with the material tending to become more chemically reactive.
This is the basis for the production of heterogeneous catalysts in the chemical
industry. Platinum in the bulk state is a noble metal and particularly chemically
unreactive. In the form of ultrafine particles, it can facilitate several chemical
reactions. Jefferson and Tilley (1999) demonstrated that nanoscale particles
take on crystalline forms with facets and isolated atoms at vertices and discuss
the implications of this morphology for the surface chemistry.
The toxicity and the ability of ultrafine particles to cause inflammation
increase as the mean particle size becomes smaller. This has been shown by a
series of experiments with laboratory rodents; by Oberdörster G (2000) using
ultrafine particle inhalation; and by Donaldson et al (1999, 2000) using UFP
instillation. For example, Donaldson et al (1999) showed that 14nm carbon
black was roughly three times more toxic than 50nm carbon black and ten
times more toxic than 250nm carbon black. Other experiments (Donaldson
et al, 2000) showed that materials as dissimilar as titanium dioxide and latex
demonstrate similar levels of toxicity dependent on size rather than composi-
tion. The experiments of Oberdörster G. (2000) with exposure to PTFE
fumes showed genuinely low-dose toxicity (50mg m
3 for 15 minutes led to
very high mortality). However, the instillation experiments must be considered
as having been conducted at high dose, compared with the levels of particles
normally present in ambient air.
More recently there have been some in vivo investigations into the effects of
engineered nanoparticles. Lam et al (2004) instilled nanotubes into the tracheas
of mice and found resulting pathological changes persisting up to 90 days post-
exposure. Oberdörster E. (2004) has demonstrated the effects of buckminster-
fullerene in causing oxidative stress in fish.
It has been hypothesized (Seaton et al, 1995) that the chronic inhalation of
particles can set up a low-grade inflammatory process that can damage the
lining of the blood vessels, leading to arterial disease. This theory would
certainly be supported by observations on the effect of tobacco smoking.
While some smokers will develop cancer, nearly all will cause damage to the
lining of their arteries (Auerbach et al, 1965).
In vitro studies on living cells have confirmed the increased ability of ultra-
fine particles to produce free radicals, which then cause cellular damage
(Rahman et al, 2002; Uchino et al, 2002; Li et al, 2003). This damage can be
manifested in different ways, including genotoxicity (Rahman et al, 2002)
and altered rates of cell death, including apoptosis (Afaq et al, 1998; Kim
et al, 1999; Rahman et al, 2002; Uchino et al, 2002).
A recent development in nanotechnology has been the discovery of
buckminsterfullerene, a 60þ atom form of carbon in the shape of a geodesic
sphere, hence the nickname, ‘buckyball’. These objects are very small, being
about 1nm in diameter and are therefore likely to be extremely mobile in
biological systems. Kamat et al (2000) demonstrated the ability of fullerenes
to induce the production of reactive oxygen species and cause lipid peroxida-
tion. However, Sayes et al (2004) have demonstrated that the cytotoxic
 Nanotechnology and Nanoparticle Toxicity: A Case for Precaution 159

potential of fullerenes can be altered by over seven orders of magnitude by

changing their surface properties.
Another emerging concern with respect to nanoparticles is their potential to
interfere with the way in which proteins fold into their final shape. This is
termed a ‘chaperone’ effect. Throughout evolution, as we have evolved macro-
molecules such as proteins, we have also co-evolved chaperone molecules
whose purpose is to ‘assist’ in the correct folding of polypeptide chains into
the final three-dimensional configuration required for a protein. This is
important because, in the brain, there are some diseases associated with protein
misfolding, such as BSE (so-called ‘mad cow’ disease) and Alzheimer’s disease.
Billsten et al (1997) showed that 9nm silica particles could alter the configura-
tion of the enzyme human carbonic anhydrase II. Akiyoshe et al (1999) have
demonstrated a chaperone-like activity of nanoparticles with the beneficial
effect of facilitating the thermal stabilization with refolding of carbonic
anhydrase B. Ishii et al (2003) have shown that semiconductor nanoparticles
can be stabilized by chaperonin molecules and then their release can be
mediated by ATP. This is presented as a possible basis for bio-mediated
devices in the future.
The fact that some engineered nanoparticles are of the same size range as
several intracellular organelles and/or macromolecules is noted. We should
therefore anticipate interactions. Regulatory bodies will have to take these
into account when developing protocols for screening nanoparticle products
to exclude adverse interactions.

Particle mobility in the body

There appears to be a natural ‘passageway’ for nanoparticles to translocate
through the body. This is through the ‘caveolar’ openings in the natural
membranes which separate body compartments. These openings are between
40 and 100nm in size and are thought to be involved in the transport of
‘macromolecules’ such as proteins, including, on occasion, viruses. They also
happen to be about the right size for transporting ultrafine particles. Most of
the research on that, to date, has been performed by the pharmaceutical
industry, which is interested in finding ways of improving drug delivery to
target organs. This is particularly so for the brain, protected by the ‘blood-
brain barrier’, which can be very restrictive. This topic has been reviewed by
Gumbleton (2001). In essence, it appears that chemists are able to design
ultrafine particles that can translocate through certain membranes, allowing
‘piggybacking’ of novel chemicals across membranes, which are normally
impervious. For example, Kreuter et al (2001, 2002) have shown that polybutyl
cyanoacrylate nanoparticles precoated with polysorbate 80 can be used to
enhance the delivery of apolipoproteins to the brain. Alyaudtin et al (2001)
have demonstrated similar UFPs mediate delivery of [3H]-dalargin to the
brain. Foley et al (2002) have demonstrated that fullerenes can cross the cell
membranes of living cells and accumulate preferentially in the mitochondria.
160 Nanotechnology

Although there are clear advantages to the intentional and controlled

targeting of ‘difficult’ organs, such as the brain, by using nanoparticles to
increase drug delivery, the other implications need to be considered. When
environmental ultrafine particles (such as from traffic pollution) gain uninten-
tional entry to the body, it appears that there may be a pre-existing mechanism
which can deliver them to vital organs (Gumbleton, 2001). The body would
then be ‘wide open’ to any toxic effects that they can exert. The probable
reason that we have not built up any defences is that any such environmental
toxic ultrafine particles were not part of the prehistoric environment in
which we evolved and therefore there was no requirement to develop such
defensive mechanisms. There is considerable evidence to show that inhaled
ultrafine particles can gain access to the blood stream and are then distributed
to other organs in the body (Kreyling et al, 2002; Oberdörster et al, 2002).
Another possible portal of entry into the body is via the skin. A number of
sunscreen preparations are now available which incorporate nanoparticle
titanium dioxide (TiO2 ). Recent studies (Tinkle et al, 2003) have shown that
particles of up to 1mm in diameter (for example within the category of ‘fine’
particles) can get deep enough into the skin to be taken up into the lymphatic
system, while particles larger than that do not. The lymphatics are a system of
blind capillary vessels which drain the spaces between cells of interstitial fluid
and then drain into bigger vessels eventually returning the lymph to the general
circulation. The implication is that ultrafine particles can and will be assimilated
into the body through the skin. The exact proportion of those deposited which
will be absorbed remains unknown. Tinkle et al (2003) have studied the penetra-
tion of dextran beads into postmortem human skin and demonstrated that 0.5mm
and 1mm beads can penetrate the stratum corneum of skin being flexed. This
process affected over 50 per cent of samples if the process continued for one
hour. In a small proportion of cases the beads got as far as the dermis.

Epidemiological evidence for the health effects

of particle aerosols
There are two approaches to the investigation of negative health effects
associated with exposure to particles by inhalation. First, to investigate the
long-term influence of habitual inhalation of poor quality air on morbidity
and mortality. Second, to examine the short-term sequelae of exposure to
high particulate aerosol loading in poor air.
Most epidemiological studies that have been performed on large popula-
tions have used PM10 as the index of exposure. There is now widely accepted
evidence that chronic exposure to typical urban levels of PM10 damages
health. Studies which have examined the prevalence or incidence of disease,
in relation to the levels of particulate pollution, while controlling for
confounding factors, have shown associations between exposure and increased
premature mortality, chronic respiratory disease and reduced lung function
 Nanotechnology and Nanoparticle Toxicity: A Case for Precaution 161

(Dockery et al, 1989, 1993; Abbey et al, 1995; Pope et al, 1995; Raizenne et al,
1996; Ackermann-Liebriche et al, 1997; Kunzli et al, 2000). The ‘six city study’
in the USA found a differential mortality between the most and the least
polluted cities of approximately 15 per cent, after controlling for confounding
factors. The study concluded that around 3 per cent of all deaths in the USA
were associated with inhalation of particles. The study by Kunzli et al (2000)
concluded that up to 6 per cent of all deaths, in the parts of Europe included
in the study, could be associated with particle inhalation. The pathogenic
mechanism is not clear, but a large proportion of the increase in pathology in
the populations studied is associated with cardiovascular disease, which is
similar to the pattern of disease in tobacco smokers and suggests that there
may be a common aetiology. The observations of Seaton et al (1995) may be
of considerable relevance.
With respect to acute mortality and exposure to particulate aerosols, there
is another body of evidence which supports the hypothesis that they can be
the cause of ‘deaths brought forward’. Figure 13.1 shows the results of

Differential epidemiology of ambient aerosols

London, UK
Aphea (8 cities)
Los Angeles, CA
Chicago, IL
Erfurt, Germany
Santiago, Chile
Amsterdam, NL
Steubenville, OH
Santa Clara, CA
Brisbane
Athens, Greece
Detroit, MI
Birmingham, AL
Cincinnati, OH
Philadelphia, PA
Sau Paulo, Brazil
Utah Valley, UT
St Louis, MO
Kingston, TN

–2 –1 0 1 2 3 4
% increase in mortality
Figure 13.1 PM10 and daily mortality from cities around the world. Expressed as
a percentage change in daily mortality associated with a 10
m
3 increase in PM10
(Anderson, 2000).
162 Nanotechnology

UP ‘PM2.5’
1.22

1.11

1.00

4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1
0.90
total cv re other total cv re other
Figure 13.2 Effects of ultrafine particles (UFP) and fine particles (PM2:5 ) on
mortality for prevalent diseases (total, cardiovascular, respiratory, others). Best
day-lag model. There seems to be a stronger immediate effect (lag 0 or 1 day) on
respiratory causes and a stronger delayed effect (lag 4 or 5 days) on cardiovascular
causes (Wichman and Peters, 2000).

studies on daily mortality performed in 19 cities around the globe. The

percent increase in mortality for an associated increase of 10mm
3 in PM10
is shown. Although not all the studies reached statistical significance, they
do all point in the same direction. This is strongly indicative of a causal
relationship.
The increase in mortality is expressed through respiratory failure and
cardiovascular events, such as myocardial infarctions and strokes. In general,
the temporal trend is predicable, the respiratory deaths occurring within the
first 24 hours after the onset of poor air quality, while some studies show
that the cardiovascular events peak with a lag of about 4 days after the onset
of poor air quality. This is indicated in Figure 13.2.

Discussion
While acknowledging the potential benefits of nanotechnology, the main aspect
of concern in the immediate future is the manufacture and release into the
environment of free nanoparticles in the size range 1–100nm. The literature
that exists on the health effects of nanoparticles indicates that a precautionary
stance should be adopted, particularly because the relevant risk assessments
have not yet been completed and the hazard characterizations have yet to
 Nanotechnology and Nanoparticle Toxicity: A Case for Precaution 163

reach consensus. Direct research on nanoparticles, though still relatively

scarce, supports such a cautious approach. Most of our current knowledge on
the effects of nanoparticles on humans has come from the study of ambient
aerosols of pollutants.
Populations living in urban locations are routinely exposed to ambient
levels of particulate aerosols that did not exist throughout evolution. There is
strong evidence that our respiratory systems are not well adapted to cope
with the smaller size fractions such as aerosols. In particular, the ultrafine
fraction tends to be preferentially deposited in the alveolar portion of the
lung, beyond the mucociliary escalator. In the alveolar region the alveolar
macrophages, the final defence mechanism before particle internalization
occurs, have difficulty recognizing the smallest particles and in addition they
are easily overloaded by the numbers of particles arriving. Once internalized,
insoluble particles appear to have the ability to translocate to other body
compartments.
The influence of the size of particles on their toxicity is currently the subject
of increasing research. The indication from current research is that there is a
general tendency for acute toxicity, expressed through an ability to induce
inflammation, to increase as the particle size decreases, particularly below
100nm diameter. The precise mechanism of this effect remains unknown but
there are indications that it is associated with changes in the surface chemistry,
possibly through an ability to produce free radicals. There are parallels with the
action of heterogeneous catalysts.
Although many countries continue to use PM10 as the standard metric for
assessing particle exposure, some countries are changing to the use of PM2:5 .
There is a debate within the scientific community concerning which fraction
of PM10 is responsible for its toxicity. CAFÉ, a European scientific committee
studying the effects of air pollution on health has recently recommended that
the EU adopt a PM2:5 regulatory standard.
What appears to be beyond dispute is that health effects at the population
level have been associated with both chronic and acute particulate aerosol
exposure. The science is widely accepted and recognized to be of a high
standard, despite some reservations from certain industries (HEI, 2000).
The positive aspect of this problem is that particulate aerosols are
short lived and, unlike some other forms of pollution, do not persist in the
environment. The associated health problems are therefore open to remedia-
tion. It is simply a matter of political willpower being sufficient for policy
implementation to take place.
The negative aspect is that the ultrafine fraction of particulate aerosols,
arguably the most hazardous part, is the most stubbornly resistant to abatement
through regulation (Wichmann and Peters, 2000). Additionally, the major
source of particulate emissions in cities is vehicular traffic. Exclusion of vehicles
from areas of high population density is currently a difficult political problem.
However, reduction in particulate aerosol concentrations would definitely lead
to tangible health benefits in the relatively short term, and therefore should be
actively pursued.
164 Nanotechnology

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 14

The Future of Nanotechnology in

Food Science and Nutrition:
Can Science Predict its Safety?

Árpád Pusztai and Susan Bardocz

Introduction
Although practically all major food corporations have already developed or
are in the process of developing programmes for possible nanotechnology
applications in food processing and manufacturing, they are rather cautious
in introducing products based on nanotechnology into the food chain. Because
of the major problems that biotechnology companies had with the public’s
reluctance to accept genetically modified foods, food companies are apparently
rather reluctant to openly push forward with the commercialization of new
foods based on nanotechnology.
Some of the applications at present, such as packaging, tagging and moni-
toring of foods using nanotechnology processes, have relatively little nutritional
relevance, providing that they are used extraneously and do not leave residues
for ingestion in the food. Similarly, the use of nanoscale forms of food additives
and nutrients that are either soluble (lycopene, carotenoids, and so on) or
become molecularly dispersed after digestion in the gastrointestinal tract will
probably present little health problem that is additional to the possible negative
health effects they have anyway. This is because the gut will deal with them the
same way as it would do with macronutrients. These applications will therefore
not be dealt with in this work.
However, insoluble nanoscale food additives (such as titanium dioxide,
silicates, nanocapsules, and so on), or residues of nanoformulated pesticides
and herbicides on plants used in foods or orally taken pharmaceuticals, particu-
larly those in insoluble nanocapsular form, can raise legitimate nutritional and
health concerns and safety problems. Unfortunately, as there are few papers
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals on the possible interactions
168 Nanotechnology

between nanoparticles and cells of the gastrointestinal epithelium and their

systemic consequences, and even fewer on whether such interactions could
present any health risks for humans ingesting them, these concerns are very
real and worrying. In contrast, the possible interactions between aerial nano-
particles and the surface cells of the respiratory tract, the olfactory system
and lung tissues, both in vivo and in vitro, have been quite extensively
researched and the results published in peer-reviewed journals. Fortunately,
the similarities between the mucosa of the respiratory system and the gastroin-
testinal tract are more than superficial. Indeed, some of the epithelial cell types
of these two tissues have a common origin and, of course, these two tissues
share a common mucosal immune system. Moreover, by particle trafficking
between organs of the body, nanoparticles can be transported into the gastro-
intestinal tract regardless of the site of their entry. Accordingly, we can
expect studies on the effects of nanoparticulate matter on the respiratory
tract and the pulmonary toxicity of ultrafine particles to give us an indication
of the physiological and possibly harmful effects of nanoparticles on the alimen-
tary tract, which could reasonably be expected to occur if ingredients manufac-
tured using nanotechnology were to be included in our food. Though some of
these projections and extrapolations are likely to be rather speculative, it is
hoped that they may stimulate or provoke actual in vivo experimental safety
work on the effects of nanoparticles on the mammalian gastrointestinal tract.
In the next section the results of some selected in vitro studies will first be
described in which the effects of nanoparticles on isolated and cultured cells
were investigated. This will be followed by an overview of some of the
major published human and animal studies on the in vivo interactions between
nanoparticles and tissues of the respiratory system and their physiological
consequences, particularly when these can have possible relevance for the
digestive system. This section will complement Chapter 13. In a final section
the possible dangers of using nanoparticles in food will be speculated on and
our recommendations for possible testing protocols will be given. We also
have to mention that although the use of some nanoparticles in cosmetics
carries well-known risks, this subject will not be dealt with in this chapter.

Interactions of nanoparticles with isolated cells

Clearly, the use of nanoparticles can offer new and potentially exciting avenues
in biological research and possibly in medical applications, providing that most
of the legitimate concerns about the toxicity of their uses could be allayed by
further research.
There are some particularly interesting examples of the proposed nanopar-
ticle applications, such as the use of organically modified silica nanoparticles
that can be optically tracked and used for non-viral gene delivery (Roy et al,
2005). This should circumvent one of the major objections to genetic modifica-
tion, for example the use of viral promoters. Although this appears to be
promising even in a possible oral application, the lack of suitable means to
 The Future of Nanotechnology in Food Science and Nutrition 169

target the particles to particular cells considerably lessens its potential useful-
ness. It has also been proposed that three-dimensional networks of multi-
walled carbon nanotubes (MWCNTs) as scaffolds could serve as biocompatible
matrices in restoring, maintaining or reinforcing weakened or damaged tissues
by promoting cell seeding and growth in a biocompatible way (Correa-Duarte
et al, 2004). However, the lack of bioresorption on which the suggested
increased biocompatibility is based is unlikely to be fulfilled under in vivo
conditions because most cells have a capacity to internalize nanoparticles. In
some instances these particles capable of emitting fluorescence signals may be
used in tracking the trafficking of the nanoparticles in biological systems
(Cherukuri et al, 2004).
However, to capitalize on this advantage it is essential to show by more than a
simple criterion that this internalization has no toxic consequences for the cell,
something that is not always done convincingly. Because of the generally
perceived huge and potent biological activity of ultrafine nanoparticles (less
than 100nm in size), and because the results of several experimental studies
indicate their possible toxicity, influential voices in the scientific community
and society are advising caution before the wholesale introduction of nanoparti-
cles that can come into contact with humans is allowed (European Commission
Workshop, 2004; Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004).
Therefore hazard/risk assessment studies performed before allowing commercia-
lization of the products of nanotechnology are of paramount importance.
In some instances, as will be described in this chapter, there is undoubted
experimental evidence to show that the nanoparticles are cytotoxic. However,
as some of the potent biological responses of cells to nanoparticles or even
their cytotoxicity may in part, or in some cases fully, originate from their
surface chemistry, it is hoped that by coating them with inert substances the
nanoparticles can be rendered more biocompatible. Thus, the possible removal
of the cytotoxic properties of semiconductor quantum dots with bright photo-
stable fluorescence, which show promise in their use as alternatives to organic
dyes for biological labelling, would extend their possible uses in biological
systems. Even the highly toxic cadmium selenide quantum dots can be
rendered non-toxic by appropriate coating of the cadmium selenide (CdSe)
core (Derfus et al, 2004). Moreover, surface modification of nanocrystal
quantum dots not only changes their physico-chemical properties but also
their cytotoxicity (Hoshino et al, 2004). Surface derivatization by the attach-
ment of appropriate peptide-, lectin-, metabolism-specific and other ligands
and probes to the surface of soluble and insoluble quantum dots can con-
siderably extend their usefulness, particularly as research tools in cell biology
(Michalet et al, 2005) and microbiology (Kloepfer et al, 2003). By utilizing
their bright, long-lasting and probe-specific near-infrared fluorescence, quantum
dots have a great potential in studies to map intracellular processes even at the
single molecule level, or to establish cell trafficking pathways and targeting and
provide the basis for high-resolution cellular imaging.
With appropriate coatings, quantum nanodots can be made to escape endo-
somal clearance in the cell and possibly reach the nucleus or other intracellular
170 Nanotechnology

targets. However, their possible use as diagnostic (or other) tools in vivo in
human therapeutics requires caution and more research work: there is evidence
to show that despite their coating, once the quantum dots are internalized, the
cells can extract some of their toxic chemical content. Thus, bacteria could
extract Cd or Se from the CdSe quantum dots (Kloepfer et al, 2003). This
may also happen with other cells (Derfus et al, 2004). It therefore remains to
be seen whether the optimism is justified that it may be possible to find low
enough concentrations at which the cytotoxicity of the quantum dots is negli-
gible but their advantageous properties are still displayed (Michalet et al, 2005).
Similar to other nanoparticles, the cytoxicity of water-soluble fullerenes
(carbon buckyballs, buckminsterfullerenes) is a sensitive function of surface
derivatization. In two different human cell lines, the lethal dose of the fuller-
enes changed over seven orders of magnitude with relatively minor alterations
in their structure. Highly aggregated forms made by generating superoxide
anionic radicals were substantially more toxic than soluble derivatives and
could damage cell membranes, leading to cell death. It may therefore be
possible to establish strategies for enhancing the toxicity of fullerenes in
cancer therapeutical or bactericidal uses but it may also be possible to reduce
undesirable biological effects by appropriate surface derivatization (Sayes
et al, 2004).
In addition to their many non-biological applications, the potential biologi-
cally to use carbon nanotubes with a diameter as little as a few nanometres and a
length of thousands of nanometres, and which can be filled with pharmaceutical
and other desirable materials for delivery to bodily tissues, is regarded by many
as a major technological development. However, it appears that these insoluble
carbon nanotubes can also present major risks in biological applications. There
is in fact a substantial body of experimental evidence to suggest that exposure to
nanotubes may be harmful even for some cultured cells. Thus, the formation of
free radicals, the accumulation of peroxidative products, antioxidant depletion
and the loss of cell viability due to major ultrastructural and morphological
changes in cultured human keratinocyte cells resulting from their interaction
with unrefined single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWCNTs) indicate that
these SWCNTs possess strong cytotoxicity, even though this may in reality be
due to embedded iron catalyst particles in the nanotubes (Shedova and Castra-
nova, 2003). Furthermore, it was also shown that SWCNTs are able to inhibit
the proliferation of cells, such as human HEK293 cells by inducing apoptosis
and decreasing their adhesive capacity by secreting small ‘isolation’ proteins
(Cui et al, 2005). Although undoubtedly the promised advantages of the use of
carbon nanotubes are huge, the results of these in vitro studies should caution
us against their premature introduction into human medicine or the food chain.
A major component in some of the reactions and responses to nanoparticles
is the activation of the immune system. In some instances this can include the
activation of the alternative complement system. Some features of these in vitro
reactions may also be relevant in vivo. Thus, it was shown that in serum
exposed to nanoparticle carbon black, the alternative complement pathway
became activated and chemotactic factors were generated by a mechanism
 The Future of Nanotechnology in Food Science and Nutrition 171

that involved reactive oxygen species (Barlow et al, 2005). Complement activa-
tion and macrophage migration induced by carbon nanoparticle-exposed serum
has also been suggested as being involved in lung inflammation in vivo. The
generation of chemotactic factors in serum, however, not only occurs with
carbon nanoparticles, as ultrafine crystalline silica could similarly generate
chemotactic serum factors (Governa et al, 2002).
This short overview of the studies with nanoparticles in in vitro systems
with cultured cells demonstrates that their possible cytotoxicity is an obstacle
to their potential in vivo uses that would have to be overcome. However, it
may yet be possible to use the advantageous properties of some of the nanopar-
ticles in biological applications, particularly some carbon-based particles, if the
relation between their surface chemistry and their striking cellular activities
were better understood. However, even then chemical purity may not be
easily achieved. Moreover, there is an obvious limit to the progress in our
understanding of the biological responses to nanoparticles and their possible
cytotoxicity and genotoxicity if safety studies are only done with cultured
cells in in vitro systems. Indeed, from in vitro studies it is difficult, and in
some cases impossible, to predict whether these particles would be safe in
vivo and would not display the same and significant toxicity that has been
observed in vitro. The results obtained in in vivo studies described below
warn us that each single potential application of the nanoparticles in complex
biological systems needs to be thoroughly investigated before these highly
potent bioactive particles can be safely used, particularly in humans.

In vivo (human and animal) reactivity of nanoparticles

for the respiratory system and systemic consequences
From the results of extensive in vivo experimental investigations that have been
performed to date involving the respiratory system of humans and animals,
there is a general recognition that some of the toxic effects of the nanoparticles
observed in vitro were more than duplicated under in vivo conditions.
Moreover, because nanoparticles are highly mobile and can easily penetrate
through cellular membranes, they do not only affect the original entry site
but, through the complex interrelationships and connections between the
different organs and tissues of the body, nanoparticles can and do also reach
distant sites and affect their functions. In the following, a brief overview of
some of the major current papers on the in vivo physiological effects of
bioactive nanoparticles is presented, with a particular emphasis on studies
that significantly contributed to our understanding of the possible dangers of
this new technology.
In a series of most influential papers published by a group headed by
Oberdörster, the fate and progress of inhaled ultrafine particles was not only
tracked to airway and lung tissues, but also to the most of the major organs
of the body, including the gastrointestinal tract, the central nervous system
172 Nanotechnology

and the brain (Oberdörster, 2000; Oberdörster et al, 2002, 2004). Thus, inhaled
ultrafine carbon or TiO2 particles were deposited on tissue surfaces of the
airway passages and caused lung inflammation. Moreover, the deposited
particles were also translocated to epithelial, endothelial and interstitial sites
from where they were quickly distributed to extrapulmonary tissues, such as
the liver. The route from interstitial site to the blood circulation was probably
via the lymphatic channels or directly via the endothelium. In addition to the
clearance pathway from the alveolar region, the ultrafine particles could also
be cleared from the tracheobronchial region through the mucociliary escalator
into the gastrointestinal tract. The possibility thus exists that the ultrafine
particles found in the liver, at least in part, were derived from the gastro-
intestinal tract, a finding that may have a major bearing on the subject matter
of this chapter. This finding also has some experimental supporting evidence
from studies in humans and rats with TiO2 particles (about 150nm or even
larger) that showed that when these particles were ingested with food they
translocated to the blood and were then taken up by the liver and spleen and
other organs (Jani et al, 1994; Böckmann et al, 2000), even though with some
other metal particles this could not be shown to take place to a measurable
extent.
In further studies, one of the most significant findings of the Oberdörster
group was that the inhaled ultrafine carbon particles were also transmitted
through the olfactory mucosa of the nasal region along the olfactory nerve
into the olfactory bulb of the central nervous system (Oberdörster et al,
2004). However, it must also be considered that a fraction of the inhaled nano-
particles is known to be rapidly transported into the gastrointestinal tract and
from there, after transiting the gut wall, to other organs by the blood circula-
tion, where these particles can get coated with lipo/apolipoproteins. It is
therefore possible that the already-suggested route across the blood–brain
barrier by these coated nanoparticles (Kreuter et al, 2002) could have con-
tributed, to some degree, to the total amounts of the carbon nanoparticles
found in brain tissues. Similar observations were made in rats inhaling aerosols
containing the relatively poorly soluble radioactive manganese phosphate
(MnHPO4 ). In addition to its deposition in the lungs, the manganese was trans-
located to the olfactory bulb by the olfactory nerve. Other tissues, such as the
liver, kidneys, pancreas and testes also contained significant amounts of
manganese (Dorman et al, 2002). Although no measurements were made on
gastrointestinal tissues, it can be assumed that, by a similar mechanism to
that observed with carbon nanoparticles, it was through the gastrointestinal
tract that the manganese was distributed to these other organs. The results
also showed that the more soluble the manganese salt was in the experiments
the faster its tissue clearance was.
Even though some of the evidence is contradictory, and dependent on the
chemical nature of the nanoparticle (Brown et al, 2002; Nemmar et al, 2002),
the consensus is that in most instances after the exposure of the aerial passages
the nanoparticles can be relatively quickly distributed throughout the body and
even breach the blood–brain barrier. Most of these studies were not primarily
 The Future of Nanotechnology in Food Science and Nutrition 173

aimed at finding out the mechanisms and physiological and immunological

consequences of the nanoparticle uptake of the organs, apart from the general
observation that lungs will be inflamed owing to the activation of the
immune system. However, there has also been some progress in this respect.
Thus, it was recently shown that polluted air containing ultrafine particles
may increase biomarkers of inflammation in the brain of intranasally, oval-
bumin-sensitized mice (an asthmatic model), such as the proinflammatory
cytokines interleukin 1 alpha and tumour necrosis factor alpha and raise the
levels of immune-related transcription factor NF-B (Campbell et al, 2005;
Calderon-Garciduenas, Azzarelli et al, 2002).
As polluted air contains relatively high levels of nanoparticle metals these
may directly reach the central nervous system through the olfactory route and
there directly induce these inflammatory changes. However, it is also possible
these effects are caused by systemic soluble inflammatory mediators indirectly
after crossing the blood–brain barrier. Ultrafine carbon black particles have
also been shown to enhance respiratory syncytial virus-induced airway reactivity,
pulmonary inflammation and chemokine expression (Lambert et al, 2003); and in
asthmatic patients the harmful effects of exposure to polluted air is also expected
to be increased (Chalupa et al, 2004).
Despite some relatively minor differences in conclusions most studies agree
that one of the main causes of the harmful responses in the presence of ultrafine
particles in the inhaled air is due to the inflammation induced by oxidative
stress (Donaldson et al, 2000). Exposure to insoluble carbon nanoparticles
(fullerenes) causes oxidative stress even in the brain of some fish species,
such as juvenile largemouth bass (Oberdörster, 2004).
Two studies in which SWCNTs, which are probably the most insoluble and
least biodegradable materials, were intratracheally instilled in rats (Warheit et al,
2004) or mice (Lam et al, 2004) revealed that once these fibre-like particles
reached interstitial spaces in the lungs they produced multifocal granulomas.
These were non-dose-dependent in rats but were dose-dependent and
progressively severe with exposure time in mice. The reason for the difference
is probably be due to possible differences in the degree to which the individual
nanotubes can and do aggregate into nanofibres and nanorope-like structures
that have difficulties in tissue penetration. In the work on rats (see Warheit
et al, 2004) it was found that the multifocal granulomas consisted of
macrophage-like multinucleated cells that surrounded a bolus of black carbon
nanotubes. In the study on mice (see Lam et al, 2004) the nanotubes appeared
to be more mobile and from the epithelial tissues macrophages could clear
them through the mucociliatory escalator into the oesophagus and then the
gastrointestinal tract as was also observed with simple carbon black nano-
particles. Thus, these results indicated that even these fine nanotubes have
sufficient mobility to be distributed in the body and raise legitimate health
concerns. However, once they managed to penetrate subepithelial interstitial
spaces they became trapped and were therefore difficult to be removed from
the lungs. Hat-stacked carbon nanofibres behaved somewhat similarly in the
subcutaneous tissue in rats (Yokoyama et al 2005).
174 Nanotechnology

Nanoparticles in foods
Producing foods by ‘molecular manufacturing’, which some enthusiasts in the
food industry regard as the ultimate goal of nanotechnology, is far in the future
and outside of the scope of a science-based review at present. Neither will other
similarly esoteric topics, including the creation of nutrients from the atom up
by robots, be dealt with in this chapter. However, in contrast to carbon-
based nanoparticles whose possible use in food applications may only become
a reality in future, food additives, such as titanium dioxide (TiO2 ) or silicon
dioxide (SiO2 ; silica) nanoparticles, are already being used in foods. These
additives have already been approved as GRAS (generally recognized as safe)
by the FDA (US Food and Drug Administration) regardless of particle size.
According to present (2005) legislation size need not be considered as a risk
factor and up to 1 per cent of TiO2 or up to 2 per cent of silica particles of
whatever particle size can be included in food products as additives, including
in materials used for wrappings or in capsules. This has happened despite the
fact that there is already plenty of strong scientific evidence both from in vitro
studies with cultured cells and in vivo experiments that insoluble nanoscale
microparticles such as TiO2 or silica are cytotoxic (see Rahman et al, 2002).
Regulation that allows them to be incorporated in the human food chain there-
fore needs to be urgently reconsidered.
TiO2 was previously classified as biologically inert but recent investigations
of in vitro cellular studies, epidemiology and animal experimentation revealed
that TiO2 in nanoparticle form possesses potent biological toxicity (as briefly
reviewed by Rahman et al, 2002). It was particularly disturbing to find that
inhaled ultrafine TiO2 caused severe inflammation, impaired macrophage
function, pulmonary damage, fibrosis and lung tumours in rats. The activated
alveolar macrophages produced large amounts of oxygen radicals, growth
regulators and increased levels of interleukin mRNAs and induced micronuclei
formation and cell apoptosis in in vitro studies. Ultrafine TiO2 particles were
also shown to cause chromosomal damage and to be strongly genotoxic
(Rahman et al, 2002). Because of the similarities between the lung and intestinal
epithelial tissues and the sharing of a common mucosal immune system, it may
not be farfetched to propose that, based on the precautionary principle, the use
of insoluble nanoparticles in foods should be suspended, pending further
thorough case-by-case investigation of their safety by both in vitro cell studies
and particularly in vivo animal experimentation before possible approval.
Although there is very little information in the published literature to date
on the effects on the gastrointestinal tract of orally given carbon-based nano-
particles or indeed any ultrafine particles, the few direct oral studies that have
been conducted (Jani et al, 1994; Böckmann et al, 2000) and the supporting
evidence from the results of inhalation studies in which the nanoparticles
were shown to reach the gastrointestinal tract, mainly by the mucociliary
escalator, gives reason to be cautious. It is clear that once the nanoparticles
are in the gastrointestinal tract, regardless of their route of intake into the
body, they are transported to other organs of the body, such as the liver,
 The Future of Nanotechnology in Food Science and Nutrition 175

kidneys, spleen and others. There is little doubt either that the nanoparticles
that were shown to be cytotoxic for cells in cell culture could also exert toxic
effects on the cells of these organs in vivo. However, astonishingly, apart
from some lung tissue microscopy, few if any histopathology investigations
on other organs of the body have ever been carried out to find out whether
their tissues and cells have been damaged or not.
It appears that apart from their surface chemistry, one of the major pre-
requisites of cytotoxicity of the nanoparticles is their insolubility. This could
in fact be a major help in following their effects on the organs of the body by
histology. The results of studies with coated quantum dots (Michalet et al,
2005) and water-soluble fullerenes (Sayes et al, 2004) lend strong support to
this view. It is also known from the limited data in the published literature
that some of the laboratory animals or even some fish (Oberdörster, 2000;
Oberdörster, 2004) lost weight or were killed in the nanoparticle inhalation
studies (Lam et al, 2004) and therefore it is difficult to understand the lack of
systematic studies into the possibly harmful effects of nanoparticle exposure
on animal growth, regardless of the route of exposure.

Possible risk assessment of nanoparticles in food by

nutritional/toxicological testing
In nutritional studies with young and rapidly growing laboratory animals the
growth of the body and the normal development of the internal organs is one
of the earliest and most important indicators of the possible toxicity of the
food consumed. These then can be followed using methods that are more
sophisticated by measuring the metabolic, immune and hormonal status, and
so on, of the animals fed on diets containing the nanoparticle under investiga-
tion. These, with histopathological investigations on the affected organs,
should soon reveal whether the inclusion of nanoparticles in food can adversely
affect the animals or not. As a start, the effects of the already commercialized
TiO2 or silica or other nanoparticles such as those used in capsules ought to
be investigated, in the first place by a simple nutritional protocol similar to
that recommended for the risk assessment of novel foods, including genetically
modified foods (Pusztai, 2002).
In a possible nutritional/toxicological testing protocol diets containing the
nanoparticle at different concentrations are fed to young rapidly growing
laboratory animals in comparison with controls for various lengths of time.
The results should give the first indication whether the nanoparticle can
possibly possess any harmful effects on animal metabolism, the development
of their organs and immune and endocrine functions and gut flora. As these
altogether determine the development of the young animal into healthy
adults, this may also guarantee the short-term safety of the nanoparticle.
It is of paramount importance that the nutritional testing is rigorously
standardized. Thus, all diets must be iso-proteinic, iso-energetic and fully
176 Nanotechnology

supplemented with vitamins and essential minerals. The composition of the

control diet should be similar to that of the test diet; but instead of the
nanoparticle it should contain fine but not nanosize quartz particles or
microcrystalline cellulose or insoluble starch at the same concentration as the
nanoparticle in the test diet.
Groups of young, rapidly growing animals (five or six in each group) closely
matched in weight (less than 2 per cent by weight), housed separately should be
fed these diets in short- and long-term experiments. The progress of the animals
should be closely monitored, urine and faecal samples collected throughout the
experiment, and the nutritional performance of the animals and the nutritional
value of the diets assessed by net protein utilization (NPU), and measurements
made of nitrogen and dry weight balances and feed utilization ratios. The animals
should be weighed daily and any abnormalities observed. Blood samples should
be taken before, during and at the end of the feeding experiments for immune
studies (immune responsiveness assays, Elispot, and so on), hormone assays
(insulin, cholecystokinin [CCK], and so on) and the determination of blood
constituents, including the nanoparticles used in the experiment. At the end
of the experiments the animals are killed, dissected, their gut parts rinsed
and the contents saved for further studies (enzyme contents, nanoparticles,
and so on). Gut sections are taken for histology, the wet and dry (after
freeze-drying) weights of organs recorded, and the organs subjected to compo-
sitional and histological analyses and their nanoparticle content estimated. All
these data can comprehensively characterize the health and metabolic status of
the animals, and the behaviour of the nanoparticle-fed animals can be directly
compared with that of the controls. Assessment of potential deviations in the
normal development of key organs is of great diagnostic value as shown in
our many previous studies, such as that for gut histology (Ewen and Pusztai,
1999). Changes in organ weight could also be useful indicators of metabolic
events in the nanoparticle feeding studies, followed up by histological examina-
tions for the safety assessment of the nanoparticles.
Measurement of immune responsiveness could also be a useful indicator of
potential hazards of the ingestion of the nanoparticles, particularly as this
method is in general clinical use and could therefore be easily performed
with humans. Hormone assays can follow any potential changes in the meta-
bolic status of the animals. Measurements of insulin and other blood hormone
levels after the ingestion of nanoparticles can also be easily done on humans.
With suitable statistical analyses (analysis of variance [ANOVA], multi-
variate analysis, multiple comparisons, and so on) the statistical significance
of any differences between the nanoparticle-containing and control diets
could be established. However, laboratory animal testing is but the first step
in the risk assessment process and the suggested protocol can, and indeed
needs to be, further developed. The long-term studies should in fact also
include the possible effects of nanoparticle exposure on reproduction.
In the next step of the risk assessment procedure if there were no indications
of harm to laboratory animals, the results will have to be validated with human
volunteers in ethically-scrutinized clinical, double-blind, placebo-controlled
 The Future of Nanotechnology in Food Science and Nutrition 177

drug-type tests. However, we must keep it in mind that any harm could be most
acute in the young, the elderly, the sick, particularly those suffering from
immune disorders and with diseases of the alimentary tract.

Conclusion
Unquestionably, nanoparticles possess some of the most potent biological
activities ever described. The potential benefits of nanotechnology are therefore
immense. However, these attributes make it even more obligatory that the risks
inherent in the use of such potent biofactors, particularly in foods, aerosols,
cosmetics and skin lotions/creams, must be rigorously assessed before their
commercialization. Accordingly, and as first step, a nutritional protocol is
presented in this chapter for the safety testing of the nanoparticles that have
already been or are likely to be incorporated in future into human foods even
though, judging by the near absence of published articles in peer-reviewed
journals, this was apparently done without appropriate safety testing.

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 Part Four
Ethics and Public Understanding
 15

The Global Ethics

of Nanotechnology

Geoffrey Hunt

Technology of the smallest, ethics of the largest

If we could adopt something like an astronaut’s or perhaps an archaeologist’s
wide angle view of human life we may perceive that we human beings do not
measure up ethically to the challenges that face us in the 21st century. Living
as we now do in a world in which the consequences of major technological
and economic activities and developments in one locality have an evident
impact on life all over the planet, I think it is appropriate to open the discussion
on the ethics of nanotechnology as a globally situated question.
I sympathize with fellow philosopher Hans Jonas, in his book The Impera-
tive of Responsibility (1984) when he argues that in order to bring our collective
power into harmony with a collective understanding of the unintended global
threats that arise from that power, we need a new sense of human responsibility
(Hunt, 2004). This would be a far greater sense of responsibility for all
humanity than we have at present. This global responsibility would be
collective and long-term, taking into consideration all human beings, not just
our own nationality or ethnic group, class or gender, and including future
generations rather than just our own of the present time.
It is precisely part of our predicament that in the mêlée of international
economic political competition (see Chapters 6–9) all the major socio-economic
forces are largely fixated on responding to economic, technological and political
problems as they arise, tending to blot out from the field of informed debate the
global questions about the value, quality, justice and purposes of human life or
leaving them to organized fundamentalist perceptions that are dislocated from
modern realities. Taking a global ethics approach to nanotechnology, I shall
briefly consider four major themes, and how actually developing nanotech-
nology may at once manifest and react upon this ethical state of affairs.
Economic injustice, war, environmental degradation and over-consumption
184 Nanotechnology

(consumerism) are four global human facts, and it seems to me much more
fruitful to pose the question of nanotechnology within the context of these
contemporary facts than to attempt abstract analyses from the standpoint of
moral theory or principles or a standard list of ‘ethical aspects’.
Ethical disagreement and debate over global issues will heighten as an
expression of and a formative influence on the structural constraints of global
economic growth: the separation of human beings from the control of food
and other survival-necessary production, the self-expanding and autonomous
exploitation of nature under the compulsion of competition, and the continuing
over-concentration of capital resources (Hunt, 1992). Lester R. Brown has
pointed out three principal weaknesses of the market system, from the point
of view of global human welfare: ‘its failure to incorporate the indirect costs
[externalities] of providing goods and services into prices; its inability to
value nature’s services properly; and its lack of respect for the sustainable-
yield thresholds of natural systems such as fisheries, forests, rangelands and
aquifers’ (Brown et al, 2003, p75 et seq). The ethics of nanotechnology
should be treated, in my view, as another angle on the question of sustainable
development. Recently, thinkers such as Hawken have given vivid expression
to the possibilities of adjusting and reconciling the demands of business and
the environment (Hawken, 2003; Hawken et al, 1999). Although I do not
address this matter directly here I set myself the modest task of making some
vital connections between ethics, the global economy and nanotechnology.

Global injustice or justice?

The philosopher Robert E. Goodin, presents a convincing case for principles of
justice properly being seen as ‘global in scope’ (Goodin, 2003, p89). Indeed,
from an ethical point of view the continuation of mass starvation, malnutrition
and preventable disease in the human race may now be regarded as an injustice
which is a failure to identify with the suffering of others. Even when such an
identification emerges, and it does so increasingly in civil society, for example
in the form of large-scale charitable aid, there needs be a political will to change
the situation. Here one is up against a wall of divisive assumptions about human
beings in which are embedded the historically consolidated institutions of
nation, ethnicity, gender, religion, economy and international relations.
Global justice requires no less than the dissolution of such harmful divisiveness
while, equally importantly, fully respecting non-harmful diversity. Goodin has
also suggested new international treaty regimes, transnational networks and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international transfers and
taxes such as the ‘Tobin Tax’1 as means of working towards global justice
(Ibid, pp81–88). But where will nanotechnology fit into this struggle between
the inertia of continuing global injustice and the growing will to end it?
First, a few salient reminders about the facts. The gap between the wealthy
and the poor on the planet continues to increase. Roughly speaking, in the top
one third of the wealthiest countries per capita income grew at almost three
 The Global Ethics of Nanotechnology 185

times the rate of the middle third, while the bottom third showed no increase
(Scott, 2001). Despite global economic growth, poverty persists, with two
fifths of humanity living on less than US$2 per day, the minimum for meeting
basic needs. Healthy life expectancy (not just ‘life expectancy’) in Zimbabwe is
33.6 years, in Zambia 34.9 years and Afghanistan 35.5 years, whereas it is 75
years in Japan, 73.3 in Sweden and 72 years in Canada and in France. About
2.3 million people, mostly in the developing countries, die from eight diseases
that could be prevented by vaccination (Pirages, 2005, pp46, 50).
Whatever optimistic dreams we may have for nanotechnology, and what-
ever dire warnings may be issued by the pessimistic, the structural economic
parameters of global injustice are in fact already shaping and will continue to
shape its trajectory. The same goes for the current realities of conflict and
war, environmental damage, and overconsumption. A handle on understanding
the reasons for the persistence of global injustice is obtained in the analysis of
the structure of global economic relations, most particularly the ‘developing’
regions’ experience of deteriorating terms of trade in relation to the ‘developed’
regions (Hunt, 1992; Adams, 1993). Under the weight of this process many
nanotechnological products, including those involved in any stage of pharma-
ceutical production, will not be affordable in developing regions, and therefore
many that are needed will not even be conceived or produced.
Let us begin by considering disease. In the ‘developed world’ there is still the
perception that infectious diseases are ‘their problem’ in the ‘developing world’.
This is a misconceived and divisive idea, for in fact infectious disease is a global
issue, as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis C, severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS), avian flu and tuberculosis (TB) have recently reminded
us. Global warming could eventually spread West Nile virus, cholera, yellow
fever and malaria into the temperate zones of the industrialized world. Inequality
is not just a threat to ‘them’, but a threat to all of us, to humanity. Yet, out of 1233
drugs on the global market in the period 1975 to 1997, only 13 were applicable to
the tropical diseases causing the most infectious disease deaths (Pirages, 2005,
p46). On this basis it seems unlikely that nanobiomedicine (including nano
innovations in pharmaceuticals) will be directed to the suffering of the poor
parts of the world, primarily because only wealthy markets will be targeted to
recuperate the high nanobiomedical development costs. We have already seen
in the case of HIV medications conflicts over patenting and pricing between
corporations, on the one hand, and poor countries and patient groups on the
other. Nanobiomedicine will graft itself onto this divisive assumption, and
profit-seeking pharmaceutical companies will seek nanoscale drug delivery
systems as a new approach to ‘our’ (developed world) diseases rather than
‘theirs’. ‘Our’ diseases are to a large extent the result of overconsumption and
industrial damage to the eco-environment. Will, for example, cancers triggered
by industrial waste nanoparticles be cured by new engineered nanoparticles of
medicine (Hunt, 2004a)?
The iatrogenic harms caused by modern medicines and the growth of anti-
microbial drugs resistance may not inspire great confidence in the benefits
promised by pharmaceutical corporations’ development of nanomedicines and
186 Nanotechnology

treatments. Annually, about 40,000 people die of antibiotic-resistant microbes in

the USA and about 5000 in the U.K., and worldwide resistance is growing to
antimicrobials aimed at chest infections, TB and other diseases (Pirages, 2005,
p48). The fact that the United States has the highest per capita medical
expenditure in the world but ranks 28th on the healthy life expectancy scale,
shows us that wealth and technology are in themselves no guarantee of a healthy
population (WHO, 2001, table 3-2). Will nanobiomedicine simply put up the
health bill for the wealthy, and perpetuate the neglect of the poor?
On the positive side, nanotechnology will or could have a counteracting
impact on forcing adjustments, compromises and accommodations by the
existing forces of global injustice and inequality. If nanotechnologies will
enhance the communications and information systems necessary for vital
global surveillance and data-sharing on new disease outbreaks, and the
changing conditions (such as increases in regional temperature) which prefigure
such outbreaks, that will be a plus. If nanotechnologies, through NGO
programmes and fair forms of international aid, can play a part in rapidly
raising the living standards of people in the poorest countries this will also
help to slow down the population growth that is contributing to unsustainable
resource consumption. Alternative energy (instead of wood-burning), clean
water and information technology (IT)-accessible information (weather, loca-
tion of basic resources, market demands, and so on) for the poor would be
two obvious areas to consider for aid-assisted nanotechnology transfer that
might involve the incorporation of nanotechnological innovations (electronic
components, filters, sensors, strong-lightweight materials, and so on), in so
far as they do not interfere with the gains made by intermediate technology
and local empowerment but blend in with them.

Conflict or peace?
From an ethical point of view the continuation of conflict, war and terrorism
may be regarded as a failure to identify within the human make-up what is
necessary to live in peace with each other. Here the lost virtues2 of respect,
patience and humility towards those perceived as ‘different’ may come to
mind with a new global urgency.
It has been estimated that all the wars of the 20th century killed 111 million
people, both combatants and civilians (Pirages, 2005, p43). Although this is a
tiny fraction of the number of people killed by communicable diseases, it is
chastening to think that this is what human beings chose to do to each other.
When one adds the numbers that war has injured and psychologically damaged,
tortured and bereaved and then adds the victims of other kinds of conflict less
than war, the ethical condition of humanity has a painful clarity. Mass destruc-
tion weapons, the product of the nuclear technological wave, are still an
enormous threat to human life. One may better understand the ethical blockage
to progress on nuclear non-proliferation when the parties with large nuclear
weapons arsenals (USA, UK, France and others) insist on small countries not
 The Global Ethics of Nanotechnology 187

developing such weapons while at the same time they are unprepared to give up
their own (Hunt, 1986) This does not augur well for nanotechnological
weaponry.
A large proportion of nanotechnology development funding in the USA in
particular goes to military applications. Allies of the USA may benefit from
nano-weaponry, but other countries such as China and India will seek to
‘catch up’. One should certainly not underestimate the rate at which nanotech-
nological advances in materials and electronics and other areas are being
applied in many military areas such as toughened armour, tiny surveillance
devices, enhanced battleground management, sensors for defence against bio-
logical and chemical weapons, enhanced interfacing and targetting for soldiers
and fighter/bomber pilots (Altmann and Gubrud, 2004; Altmann, 2004). A
leading analyst of military nanotechnology has called for a moratorium on
non-medical body implants which could be used for military applications
(cyber-soldiers), and more generally proposed that the USA should slow
down research on military applications of nanotechnology to give time for a
global debate about legal limits to the technology (Altmann, 2006).
A heightened climate of fear will drive nano-developments said to be purely
‘defensive’. While it may be seen as a positive development that new ultra-
sensitive nano-biosensors will detect terrorist biological and chemical agents
rapidly, cheaply and extensively, there may be a downside. Such developments
may also bring invasions of privacy, harms caused by security alert false posi-
tives, and spin-off into new nano-bio-chemical weapons of war. There is often a
thin line between a defence technology and an offence technology. Fear of
terrorism may be used to justify nanotechnology for new weapons of war.
The nanotechnological counteraction or pre-emption of biological and
chemical weapons may shut out some threats, but open doors on new ones.
For example, the resources and cleverness that have to go into nano-designing
an anti-missile missile also creates a superior missile technology. There is no
end to this way of pre-emptive militaristic thinking. We should be thinking
about the ethics of military nanotechnology before it develops, not afterwards.
Not only may nanotechnologies, especially in materials, electronics and
applied cognitive science, directly enhance existing military powers they may
indirectly, by trickling significant efficiency gains into the intensification of
non-sustainable socio-economic relations, push the world into more
resource-driven conflict and war over shrinking supplies of oil, water, arable
land and minerals. There is every reason to believe that nanotechnology is
emerging in a world in which concentrated human will (in the form of govern-
ments and political parties) will direct resources towards generating new
suffering in war rather than ameliorating the old suffering of infectious disease.
To take a case in point, a fraction of what was spent on the recent war in Iraq
would have saved millions through public health measures (Pirages, 2005, p43).
On the positive side, nanotechnology will, or could, have an impact on
forcing adjustments, compromises and accommodations in the existing balance
of military power that may contain war and large scale destruction. There is
growing evidence that many major wars are either driven by conflicts over
188 Nanotechnology

resources or by the political need (perceived) to support dictatorial or violent

regimes that control oil reserves (Prugh et al, 2005, p110). There is an ethical
case that nanotechnological development efforts should be focussed on
sustainably enhancing the efficiency of alternative and diversified sources of
energy, especially wind and solar, as a way of minimizing conflict potential.
If some proposal can actually be adopted on an international level to slow
down research on military applications of nanotechnology to give time for a
global debate about legal limits to the technology, this may be a positive
outcome, leading to greater understanding and balance about the perceived
‘need’ for further military developments. We have the lesson of history in the
military application of nuclear technology that we can learn from.

Environmental degradation or sustainability?

Identifying with ‘nature’ is a millennial challenge for the human race. To put it
somewhat metaphysically, we are not only in nature but of nature, and nature is
not only in us but of us. You might also say that since the nuclear age opened,
nature has shown that the more we try to control it the more it boomerangs back
at us. It is time to work on nature’s own terms. Sustainability is a socio-
economic state in which the human demands placed upon the environment
are met without reducing the capacity of the environment to provide for
future generations (Dalal-Clayton and Bass, 2002). Will nanotechnology
continue to develop on the premise of manipulating ‘nature’ to serve our
illusions of perpetual comfort? Or will the surprising and unpredictable
nature of nanoscience teach us the caution and sense of limits required in inter-
vening in the very conditions of our own existence, and lend itself to a new
understanding and accommodation?
Currently little impact is being made on reducing global warming, as
emissions of the principal greenhouse gas CO2 continue to rise. The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has projected an average
global temperature change of 1.4–5.8 degrees Celsius by the end of this century.
It may be higher, even much higher. Ice shelves and glaciers are now melting,
major storms and floods are increasing, and sea levels are rising. About 42 per
cent of carbon emissions are from electricity generation, 24 per cent from trans-
portation, 20 per cent from industrial processes and 14 per cent from residential
and commercial activities (Brown et al, 2003, pp59–68, 114).
Human and livestock pressure on the land has created worsening desertifi-
cation in China, land of 1.3 billion people, and soil erosion is reducing arable
land and affecting water supplies in many other areas of the world. About
one third of the world’s population lives in nations experiencing water
shortages, and the proportion is rising. The recent intensive and comprehen-
sive Millennium Ecosystem Assessment concludes that about 60 per cent of
the planet’s ‘ecosystem services’ are being degraded or used unsustainably. It
catalogues a destabilizing loss of fish-stocks, forests, mangroves, coral reefs,
natural water cycles and so on (Graham-Rowe and Holmes, 2005). The general
 The Global Ethics of Nanotechnology 189

question for us is whether nanotechnology will worsen or help slow down and
reverse this situation, and the realistic answer is probably both at the same time,
in different ways.
On the negative side, nanotechnology will cumulatively be appropriated by
the existing forces of consumer production, advertising and marketing. Unless
there is coordinated scrutiny and regulation, nanotechnologies may be intro-
duced with the old mistake of ignoring or neglecting any potential external
costs they may have. They may also be promoted as high technological alterna-
tives to nature’s services in cases where the latter are actually cheaper when all
externalities are taken into account. Thus, hypothetically, a nanotechnology-
based system for water-purification may be promoted as a hi-tech (and
profitable) solution when in fact better overall use of existing water resources
(for example water-shed adjustment) may be less expensive when one puts
into the cost–benefit pricing the energy requirements, potential health effects,
and so on of the hi-tech solution. In other words, generally speaking, nano-
technologies are only likely in most cases to be a human welfare benefit if the
traditional social and economic assumptions are challenged. Grafted uncritically
onto old ways of thinking and doing things they may simply intensify, through
greater input-output efficiency, the sustainability problems we have already.
On the positive side, the cleaner energy technologies of wind and solar
power are now taking off, and well-directed nanotechnology research and
development programmes could speed up the transfer to such energy technol-
ogies. Nanoengineered materials, making use of the extraordinary properties of
nanoparticles such as carbon nanotubes, could play their part in very strong but
lightweight blades and other moving parts of wind turbines, eventually
bringing down their overall size (aesthetically important), noise impact and
manufacturing cost, increasing their generating efficiency. The current increase
of solar cell sales at the rate of about 21 per cent a year could be boosted to much
higher levels once nanotechnological breakthroughs are incorporated into novel
and even more efficient solar energy devices.
At the moment it is a matter of giving environmental solutions far more
nanotechnological attention, rather than feeding further consumerist overcon-
sumption. Surprising possibilities may appear. One thought is this: how could
nanoengineered materials and systems improve the prospects for geothermal
energy tapping or the development of airship transport? Has anyone thought
about it? Meanwhile, thousands of highly specialist electronics engineers
worldwide are involved in applying nanotechnological innovations to the
enhancement of violent computer games and the entertainment value of
mobile phones. But instead of following the consumerist path of combustion
engine car production, for example, rapidly developing countries like China
and India could be assisted by Western and Japanese industrialists and govern-
ments to move quickly to a hydrogen-powered mass transit systems and wind
turbine energy production, embodying the best of safe nanotechnologies.
Apparently, China could double its current electricity generation from wind
alone (Brown, 2003, p72). Nanotechnological modifications should also be
sustainability-assessed as an interim means of reducing the ‘external costs’
190 Nanotechnology

(environmental and public health damage, and so on) of existing technologies,

taking into account any new externalities that they may introduce.
Carbon capture and storage techniques may well be greatly improved by a
range of nano-efficiencies, if only governments and industries will focus their
attention in this direction (Benson, 2005). Nanotechnological enhancement of
computing power also gives us a way of generating much more accurate, and
therefore generally persuasive, forecasting models for environmental damage
scenarios, as in the case of recent supercomputer modelling of climate
change. As human responsibility for the global environment grows the need
for accurate facts about its condition will become essential for predictive,
behaviour-change and remediation purposes.

Over-consumption or moderation?
From an ethical point of view the continuation of consumerist over-consump-
tion may be regarded as a human failure to resist taking advantage of, and
submitting to, craving and greed. Here the virtues of self-understanding,
self-discipline and altruism may come to mind, among others. Every world
religion and moral outlook has a central place for acknowledging and subduing
greed and promoting a sharing attitude. Yet there is perhaps an increasing
perception that greed is no longer just an incidental and personal vice, but is
the basic value of the modern unsustainable economy.
Unsustainable consumption, and its global consequences, is most clear in
the case of oil. It is not only the most important source of energy, and running
out (Roberts, 2004; Leeb, 2006), but is the main ingredient in hundreds of
consumer products from shampoo and drugs to cars and paint. Oil combustion
accounts for 42 per cent of all emissions of the main human-generated green-
house gas, carbon dioxide (Prugh et al, 2005, p102).
Overconsumption may begin with oil, but does not end with it. In 2000
North America and Western Europe, with 11.6 per cent of the world popula-
tion, accounted for over 62 per cent of the spending on private consumption.
In the USA about 60 per cent of all adults are overweight, and in Europe too
more than half of people in the 35–65 age group are overweight (WHO,
1997). Consumer goods, fruit, vegetables and meat are flown around the
world, because the resultant air pollution and other damaging externalities
are excluded from their prices, making these goods artificially cheap. Straw-
berries, broccoli, carrots and potatoes are brought by air freight into the UK,
although all of these can be grown locally. Bottled water is transported in
large quantities with similar eco-environmental unreality, although poly-
ethylene terephthalate (PET) bottle manufacture produces greenhouse gases,
and more water is consumed in making the bottles than they contain (World-
Watch, 2004, p87). Increasing meat consumption has not only undermined
ecosystems, but under competitive cost-cutting measures that run counter to
ecological sense has generated the new bovine spongiform encephalopathy –
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (BSE–CJD) disease (Hunt, 1996).
 The Global Ethics of Nanotechnology 191

Meanwhile, consumer consumption is globalizing. China, which was once

the land of the ubiquitous bicycle, now has millions of cars, and in 2003
every day another 11,000 joined the traffic, heading towards a predicted 150
million cars by 2015 at current growth rates (WorldWatch, 2004, p3). India,
and other developing countries, are also following the consumerist trajectory.
It is hard to see how world environmental systems could sustain, at today’s
rate of consumption by the wealthy countries, even half of the 9 billion
people predicted to be alive in 2050 (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2004).
On the negative side, nanotechnology will cumulatively be appropriated by
the existing forces of consumer production, advertising and marketing. For
example, if nanotechniques are incorporated into existing built-in obsolescence
(or ‘disposable’) consumer goods, then there is no real advance. Such techni-
ques will simply be grafted onto current consumption patterns, possibly
consolidating and deepening them. Thus major development efforts in nano-
technological applications at the moment (such as nano-encapsulation techni-
ques) include cosmetics, skin creams and perfumes. Here, one may readily
understand the socio-economic context in which nanotechnology is emerging
if one makes some comparisons. Recent reports on annual expenditure on
make-up show that about US$18 billion is being spent, while a reasonable esti-
mate of the cost of eliminating global hunger and malnutrition is about US$19
billion needed in additional annual investment. Similarly, US$15 billion goes
annually on perfumes, while clean drinking water for everyone would require
only US$10 billion in additional annual investment (WorldWatch, 2004,
table p10). Consumer goods producers will make the rational economic
choice of targeting the high spending power of the wealthy and find nano-
technologies useful in creating new lifestyle needs, such as nano-surfaced or
strengthened skiing products, nano-enhanced surgery for cosmetic purposes
or anti-ageing preparations, or new quick-fix solutions to the health problems
created by previous consumer-oriented technologies, such as the promised
nanoscale removal of all bodily toxins.
If nano-innovations allow manufacturing processes to increase efficiency in
so far as they are just less labour-intensive and faster, that will not necessarily
be a plus for sustainability. It may just mean that consumption will increase. If
a car plant puts sophisticated nanoelectronics to use in its robotic production
line it may able to produce twice as many cars or computer chips using the
same number of workers. The reduction in costs will boost sales, leaving
unanswered questions about the overall environmental impact. Then there is
the fact that nanotechnological research, development, and application may
well have enormous investment and disruption costs, which will compel
producers to find more and more customers around the world.
No sooner do we have a global internet based on great technological
advances than it is put to a principal use of disseminating pornography on an
unprecedented scale, firstly because sexual stimulation attracts us and secondly
because some will gain by exploiting that attractiveness to serve their own
craving for financial gain. Thus one craving inflames another. Nanotechnolo-
gical enhancements of information and communications hardware (ICT) will
192 Nanotechnology

intensify cyber-pornography, violent cybergames for children, the use of

mobile phones (in 2002 there were 1.14 billion people owning one) with their
attendant hazards of electromagnetic fields, proliferating transmission masts,
and leaching of lead into landfills (ITU, 2003).
On the positive side, nanotechnology may or could have an impact on
forcing adjustments, compromises and accommodations by the existing
forces driving overconsumption. It requires a rapid growth in a global sense
of responsibility. Gardner and Sampat have reasoned that to meet the demands
both of global justice and environmental protection the wealthier countries may
have to cut their use of materials by as much as 90 per cent (Gardner and
Sampat, 1998). On the face of it this would seem impossible. Yet the ‘cradle-
to-cradle’ theory of production might be brought together with the best
sustainability concepts of nanotechnology application to move steadily towards
such a reduction. In this theory it should be possible to go beyond conventional
recycling to perpetual closed loops in which we produce for our needs, even at a
high level, and yet have no damaging outputs. One can envisage how the
efficiencies of nanotechnologies could be designed into the ‘technical metabo-
lism’ required, such that the high technology entities (nanoparticles, nano-
devices, nanocircuitry, and so on) perpetually circulate in the production and
recovery and re-production process (McDonough and Braungart, 2002).
Certain nanotechnologies are ideally suited for such a futuristic system of
production.
Efficiencies in manufacturing of consumer goods achieved through nano-
innovations in the manufacturing process itself could be positive for
sustainability on the whole, but only if they incorporate ‘green engineering’
innovations (Billatos and Basaly, 1997) and are directed to the reduction of
energy-inputs and harmful external outputs, and are not offset by an over-
whelming increase in gross output of consumer items. In fact, it seems that
what the world will need soon is both a decrease in the gross level of consumer
goods consumption and in the energy which goes in per unit and the harmful
externalities which come out per unit. On the basis of an ethical right to
know, consumer information on any hazards, and the labelling of products
containing nanoparticles (beginning with products designed to come into
contact with food and human skin), could play a significant role (Hunt,
2006). However, that is not the current direction.
Government subsidies and taxes can play a significant role in directing
production and consumption from the more harmful to the less harmful. One
could take as a model perhaps the Japanese cash subsidy to grid-connected
residential systems to switch to solar cells, which drove a large and fast expan-
sion in the market for the cells (Brown et al, 2003, p133).

Conclusion
In a world in which cynicism and fear have become the moral equivalent of
ecosystem collapse, it is no easier to refresh our outlook with hope than it is
 The Global Ethics of Nanotechnology 193

to refresh a poisoned coral reef or a denuded rain forest. And yet without such
an ethical renewal any other kind of renewal is unlikely to succeed. Just as a
failing ecosystem is a system that is losing its inner resource of replenishment,
so a cynical, fearful and defensive outlook is precisely a loss of the inner
resource of responsibility. Without a readiness to identify with the suffering
of others, to let go of the obstacles to peace, and identify with the natural
world (compassion, humility and communion) our fate would be as sealed by
our ethical condition as it would be by global warming. Indeed, even global
warming is not just a problem ‘out there’, it is ours ‘in here’. Can we at last
know ourselves well enough to make an international cooperative effort to
put nanotechnological developments at the service of human and ecological
welfare, or will it be primarily nanotechnology for more over-consumption?
I have posed some uncomfortable questions, but that is ethics. It is not as
though first we shall develop nanotechnology and then decide how to use it.
Nanotechnology is already embedded and taking shape within the socio-
economic life we have chosen for ourselves. How we conceive, prioritize,
design, resource and manage nanotechnological development are decided by
the vision or visions we have of ourselves as human beings. Perhaps it is time
to ask now, as nanotechnologies develop and become pervasive, what visions
of human life we actually have, whether they are adequate to truly human
purposes, and what vision (or visions) would be conducive to the future
global welfare of humanity.

Acknowledgements
This chapter began its life as a seminar paper presented at the Institute of
Seizon and Life Sciences, Tokyo, on 5 July 2003. Subsequently, reflections
on various ethical dimensions of nanotechnology were presented at the
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Japan (at
both Tokyo and Tsukuba branches), Kyoto Institute of Technology, Tokyo
University, the Prefectural University of Shizuoka, National Shizuoka Univer-
sity, and in the UK at Cardiff University, St Mary’s University College and the
University of Surrey. I am grateful for all comment and criticisms received. I
am also grateful to Professor Matsuda Masami, Professor Morishita Naoki and
Professor Obayashi Masayuki in particular for their support, and to the Daiwa
Anglo-Japanese Foundation for its 2004 Small Grant no. 5033-5050.

Notes
1 The ‘Tobin Tax’ is a proposal for stamp duty on international currency
transactions as a means of eradicating poverty; see: www.stampoutpoverty.
org.
2 I do not subscribe philosophically to a ‘virtue theory of morality’, or indeed
to any moral theory, since it is my view that such theory is redundant, largely
194 Nanotechnology

nonsensical and may serve to divert attention from a contextual engagement

with what is patently harmful. I choose to speak in terms of some virtues in
this paper simply as a kind of reminder of a dimension of human life that has
been pushed out, not by science but by the pervasive ideology of science; see
Hunt (1994).

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 16

Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public

Understandings of Nanotechnology

Julie Barnett, Anna Carr and Roland Clift

Introduction
Nanotechnology has been hailed as both the harbinger of the third industrial
revolution and as a potentially disruptive or transformative technology.
There are a plethora of assertions that increasingly highlight either the possible
benefits that nanotechnologies promise or, conversely, draw attention to
possible risks (NSF 2001, 2003).1 The nature of some of these competing
claims is well summarized by Gaskell et al (2005, p82).

With the ability to engineer and control systems at the nanometric scale, the
enthusiasts predict transformative opportunities in areas as diverse as the envir-
onment, medical practice, electronics and novel materials. For the critics, the
quality of life will be threatened by out-of-control self replicating systems,
miniaturized weapons of mass destruction, invisible surveillance techniques
and unknown impacts of nanotubes – scenarios depicted in Crichton’s latest
novel Prey.

Much of the recent debate within the United Kingdom (UK) around both the
possible benefits afforded by nanotechnology and its concomitant risks have
been articulated within an independent report by the Royal Society and
Royal Academy of Engineering (Royal Society and Royal Academy of
Engineering, 2004). This was commissioned by the UK Government in June
2003 and published in July 2004.
The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report identified
three main areas of concern around nanotechnologies (Chapter 12). First,
whether the use of nanotechnology can lead to applications with socially
disruptive impacts. Second, whether the benefits of using nanomaterials, parti-
cularly in applications outside the biomedical area, are real. Third, whether the
 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understandings of Nanotechnology 197

risks (yet to be defined) associated with the use of nanomaterials, raise any
issues that cannot be regulated by established approaches. The report recog-
nized that there is currently little firm evidence about health, safety and
environmental impacts and recommended a variety of ways in which this
should be addressed. The report stopped short of recommending a moratorium
on the development and release to the environment of manufactured nano-
particles, and instead recommended a range of other precautionary actions.
The UK Government response to the report was published in February 2005
(HM Government, 2005) and stated that they are supportive of the recom-
mended precautionary stance and of the specific steps that the report suggested.
A statement issued in turn, by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of
Engineering gave their reaction to the government response. While welcoming
all evidence of Government commitment to acting on the concerns that the
report identifies, it expressed disappointment that no new money was dedicated
to research to underpin regulatory activity.2 The reaction of academics,
politicians and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was similarly muted.3
The approach taken by the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering
report and its recommendations has been broadly welcomed – even in some
perhaps unlikely quarters. One important reason for this is its consideration of
the social dimensions of nanotechnologies. It has been hailed as
A change in the scientific community’s approach to the risks, uncertainties and
wider social implications of new and emerging technologies – in many ways, it
redefines the genre. (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004, p15)

The ETC group (action group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration),

one of the best-known critics of current regimes for regulating nanotechnolo-
gies (ETC, 2004a), was also positive about these aspects of the report, noting
that it considered many broader societal issues, as well as vindicating those
‘who have expressed concerns about the dangers of nanotechnology for
human health and the environment in the absence of regulatory oversight’
(ETC, 2004b). The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report
specifically considered the issue of concern to this chapter – public understand-
ings of nanotechnologies. In the UK context this is not simply a question of
understanding what people think and feel. It is also about how this might
make a difference to how nanotechnologies are developed and regulated. This
chapter will thus present the range of evidence that we have about public
understandings of nanotechnology. It will draw upon analyses of trust and
public engagement in other areas and suggest how these might be useful in
informing dialogue around nanotechnology.
It is important to offer at this point an initial clarification of how the terms,
‘nanotechnology’ and ‘the public’ are being used. It is already becoming
commonplace to point out that nanotechnology is much more usefully thought
about as a ‘multifaceted and malleable group of technologies’ that are difficult to
associate with specific areas of application (Wood et al, 2003). It is possible that
public understandings will be aligned around the applications themselves. The
literature in relation to GM food is suggestive in this regard where it was found
198 Nanotechnology

that ‘moral concerns attach specifically to particular applications and not

necessarily to underlying molecular biology techniques’ (Gaskell et al, 2000;
see Hampel et al, 2000). Much as it is unhelpful to consider nanotechnology
to be a homogenous and coherent endeavour, it is also unhelpful – and
inaccurate – to think of the public in this way. Systematic assessment of
public views is likely to uncover diversity and heterogeneity and a range of
potentially changeable, ambivalent and uncertain opinions. These in turn
may change and be refined and re-constructed when new opportunities for
thought and debate are encountered (Barnes et al, 2003). Commonly a distinc-
tion is also made between the ‘public’ and ‘stakeholders’. This is not to say that
the public are not stakeholders, but that they are generally considered to be less
organized and less able to be defined or identified (Petts, 2004).
We now go on to explore more fully the interface between nanotechnologies
and publics. First we will ask what is known about public understandings of
nanotechnologies. Attention can then turn to some key social issues that are
likely to be pivotal in defining the nature of these understandings in coming
years: knowledge, trust and uncertainty, and finally, engagement between
scientists, policy makers and publics.

What do we know about public understandings

of nanotechnology?
We know little at the present time about public understandings of nanotech-
nology. Arguably the most substantial qualitative data in this area were
collected for the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report
(2004). As far as quantitative data are concerned, there have been one or two
questions embedded in larger surveys that provide some clues to how people
respond to various aspects of nanotechnology in this more de-contextualized
way. Again, the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report has
relevant data here and, more recently, the ‘Science in Society’ report commis-
sioned by the Office of Science and Technology, Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and carried out by MORI (Department of Trade and Industry,
2005) also contained questions about nanotechnology. The other relevant
published work in this area thus far is by Bainbridge (2002) and Gaskell et al
(2005). In sum, this work provides insight into public perspectives on nano-
technologies in the UK and, to a lesser extent, the United States of America.
The combination of quantitative and qualitative work carried out for the
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report aimed at assessing
levels of public awareness of nanotechnology as well as eliciting more detail
about public concerns and the ways in which people evaluate and link nano-
technology with more familiar concepts. The survey results suggested that
awareness was low. In a nationally representative sample of 1005 people,
only 29 per cent said that they had heard of nanotechnology and only 19 per
cent of the sample could offer any definition. Of those that did give a definition
 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understandings of Nanotechnology 199

68 per cent felt it would make life better in the future with 4 per cent saying it
would make life worse. Interestingly, even without the option being explicitly
available, 13 per cent suggested it was the use to which applications were put
that would determine whether it would make life better or worse. The DTI/
MORI survey the following year asked a nationally representative sample of
1831, ‘On the whole, how would you describe your feelings about . . . nanotech-
nology/miniaturisation?’ 30 per cent classified it as ‘a good thing’ and 13 per
cent as a ‘bad thing’. Twenty-eight per cent said that they had no opinion.
The reader will note that there was no initial question here assessing awareness
of nanotechnology.
The survey work by Bainbridge (2002) provides some insight into public
perspectives in the USA and the work of Gaskell et al (2005) mirrors both
these and the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering findings. In
a large survey (n ¼ 3909) in the US (Bainbridge, 2002) 59 per cent of the
sample agreed with the statement, ‘Human beings will benefit greatly from
nanotechnology, which works at the molecular level atom by atom to build
new structures, materials, and machines.’ In contrast only 9 per cent agreed
with the statement that ‘Our most powerful 21st century technologies –
robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology – are threatening to make
humans an endangered species’.4
The Gaskell et al (2005) paper draws on a single item included in the 2002/3
Eurobarometer survey which asked whether nanotechnology will improve our
way of life in the next 20 years. Most of the sample (53 per cent) said ‘don’t
know’, with 29 per cent saying ‘yes’. The profile of American responses to
this item was markedly different with 50 per cent saying yes and 35 per cent
saying don’t know. Arguably, the 53 per cent of don’t knows in the Gaskell
et al study, the 28 per cent who claimed no opinion in the DTI survey and the
71 per cent in the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering study are
indicative of a substantial body of public opinion in the UK that does not feel
able to respond to a single survey question with a rejection or affirmation of
the technology. For the USA, both the Bainbridge and the Gaskell et al studies
are suggestive of much more positive public views than in Europe. Gaskell
summarizes this by saying,
Overall, while more Europeans are likely to suspend judgement about nanotech-
nology and opt for a ‘wait and see’ position, people in the US are more likely to
take an optimistic stance on this, as yet, unknown technology (p84).

In interpreting these differences Gaskell et al suggest that pro-technology

cultural values in the US form a backdrop against which nanotechnology is
evaluated. They contrast this with – in Europe – the presence of less confidence
in regulation and less commitment to economic progress. It is interesting to
compare these results and conclusions with those of the DTI/MORI study,
where 30 per cent of respondents rated nanotechnology as a good thing. This
is perhaps a surprisingly positive result compared with the Royal Society and
Royal Academy of Engineering study, although of course it is very similar to
the 29 per cent in the Gaskell et al study who thought nanotechnologies
200 Nanotechnology

would improve our way of life in the next 20 years. DTI/MORI suggest that
these specific evaluations of a relatively unknown technology may be a reflec-
tion of respondents drawing positive inferences from technology in general.
Bearing in mind the low awareness noted in the Royal Society and Royal
Academy of Engineering study it is clear that at present many people are
likely to be responding to broad connotations of the term and will be highly
sensitive to the survey context in which the question is asked.
Research exploring public understandings of nanotechnology using qualita-
tive, inductive methodologies has also contributed to the knowledge base. Two
workshops in the study commissioned for the Royal Society and Royal
Academy of Engineering report raised the following key areas of debate.
First, people recognized that nanotechnologies are associated with uncer-
tainties, that these can be associated with both positive and negative outcomes
and that they want to be kept informed about ongoing understandings of these
uncertainties. Second, participants have concerns about risk governance both
in relation to whether institutions can be trusted to regulate adequately and
in relation to the roles of both institutions and the public in affecting the
way in which nanotechnology might develop in the future. Third, there was
recognition of the potential benefits of nanotechnology. Finally, participants
highlighted ethical concerns about the possible implications of interfering
with nature. This was often done by making links with previous risk issues.
Public understandings of nanotechnology are not related in a simple way to
the introduction of the technology itself. People draw upon what they know
about other technologies and about the way in which they believe these
might be regulated. In the MORI ‘Science and Society’ report for the
DTI it is noted that nanotechnology was one area where people felt that
there was a lack of sufficient scrutiny of possible impacts prior to implementa-
tion. This was also an area where discussions were couched in qualifications and
parentheses and became more guarded.
Certainly the qualitative work suggests that even at this early stage of public
awareness, there are a wide range of views on nanotechnologies. Alongside the
uncertainty or ambivalence that characterize the survey responses in the UK,
we would suggest that it is too simplistic, and arguably unhelpful, to follow
Schuler (2004) in characterizing public attitudes in terms of technophiles and
supporters versus technophobes or rejecters.
Quite apart from the fact that little research has yet looked at public under-
standings of nanotechnology it is important to note how the meanings of the
data are constrained by the context in which they are obtained. This has
been characterized by Durant et al (1999, p133) as follows,
To take a convenient analogy, we may say that social surveys are good at
providing low resolution portraits of the broad panorama, particularly because
these portraits may compare with one another or change through time, but that
they are bad at picking up subtler details of meaning, the delicate lights and
shades that can be recognized within scenes only by close inspection. However
the panorama of the survey may be elaborated with more detail and meaning
by the concurrent use of contextual information.
 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understandings of Nanotechnology 201

Going further, other commentators (Wynne, 1996) suggest that in the light of
the rich, grounded processes of extracting the multiple meanings so often
evident within qualitative data, surveys present a distorted picture by forcing
people to respond within categories that may be irrelevant to them and that,
even when they are relevant, they do not have the capacity to reflect the
shades of meaning and ambivalence that routinely characterize people’s views.

Learning lessons
One of the clearest discourses around the growth of nanotechnologies is that
lessons should be learnt from what we already know so that mistakes that
have been made in relation to the development of previous technologies and
unnecessary barriers to development are thus avoided, and there is more
ready public acceptance of the technology. The trajectories of public opposition
to genetically modified foods are often cited as an object lesson for those
concerned with the development of nanotechnology. The relationship between
these two particular areas is the focus of Chapter 10 and will not be dealt with in
any detail here. We will simply note that some have highlighted the need for
caution in relation to the current concern to learn lessons from the way in
which publics have responded to other technologies.
Renn (2004) outlines how public perceptions of technological risks are to
some extent explicable in terms of factors such as how much control people
have over the risk, whether risks are ‘natural’ and how much the possible con-
sequences are unknown or dreaded (Slovic, 2000; Sjöberg, 2000). However, he
also notes how,
The social, political and cultural embedding of a new technology is always
contingent on situational, randomly assorted combination of circumstances
that impedes any systematic approach for anticipation.

This makes it clear that there are limits to the lessons that can be learned from
one risk and applied to another. A similar point is made by the authors of a UK
project funded by the ESRC entitled ‘Nanotechnology, Risk and Sustain-
ability: Moving Public Engagement Upstream’ (Grove-White et al, 2004). In
an early report from the project the authors note that the uniqueness of some
elements of the development of nanotechnologies may limit the applicability
of comparisons with, and thus the degree of learning from, previous experience.
In interrogating the comparisons between the genetic modification (GM)
experience and nanotechnology the authors warn against the temptation to
‘fight the last war’ suggesting that,
It cannot be assumed that the conceptualizations and analytical categories
currently available will be able to capture what may prove to be most distinctive
about nanotechnology.

However, bearing this caveat about limits to lesson learning in mind, it can still
be suggested that one clear objective in the current regulatory climate is that
202 Nanotechnology

concerns over risk and doubts over benefits must be addressed honestly and
transparently at an early stage in development. We suggest that this is often
conceived of in at least two areas: increasing trust and engaging with the
public. We will explore each of these in turn and suggest that they are not
unproblematic ways of smoothing the interface of nanotechnologies and
publics. First, however, it can be suggested that there is one lesson that has
been largely discredited in recent years: that there is a public deficit in under-
standing of science and technologies and that, in order to facilitate public
acceptance of technology, this gap in knowledge should be should be filled
with information and education.
The contention that it is the public’s lack of understanding or knowledge
that is responsible for scepticism about new technologies has been the subject
of a sustained challenge from several quarters (Wynne, 1996). Despite this
however, the notion that the public have a deficit of information that needs
to be filled in order for them to appreciate the benefits of technology remains
prevalent in some circles. One aim of a recent National Nanotechnology Initia-
tive project in the United States, for example, is to ‘identify and eradicate
misunderstandings’.5 Alongside the notion that positive evaluations of a tech-
nology will follow from being educated about it, there is often the corollary that
deficits are frequently filled with information drawn from sensationalist media
coverage and that this explains objections to a technology. In this regard early
writing about nanotechnology was concerned that people’s images of nanotech-
nology are a reflection of media and popular literature representations of
‘grey goo.’ For scientists, these fictionalized accounts of nano-bots and grey
goo act as,
An interference between scientific institutions and publics – curtailing,
corrupting or disrupting the smooth flow of knowledge (and scientific literacy)
from the former to the latter. (Michael and Carter, 2001, p12)

However, it is worth noting that in the (admittedly limited) work on public

understandings of nanotechnology conducted thus far, there is little evidence
of these images resonating with the public mood in the UK in the same way
as ‘frankenfoods’ did around the GM food debate. Certainly, the way in
which media coverage links with public perceptions is complex and the role
that they play in risk amplification processes are the subject of ongoing debate
(Kasperson et al, 2004; Murdock et al, 2004). As a counter to the common
sense view that the media produce scares about risk issues it is worth noting
the research of Petts et al (2001, p ix) which noted that,
The media are not transmitters of official information on risk . . . but dynamic
interpreters and mediators who seek to respond to and reflect social preferences
and concerns . . .

Importantly, Petts et al also note that the public are not passive recipients of
media messages; they recognize sensationalism and hype and are very aware
of the different styles of media. Though the media may help to set agendas
for debate, being attuned to publics is one way in which media editors
 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understandings of Nanotechnology 203

choose agendas that resonate with sub-sections of the public that are consumers
of that media (Breakwell and Barnett, 2001).
The focus upon the information deficit has been largely replaced with
consideration of a trust and transparency deficit and a deficit in engaging the
public. The final sections of this chapter will consider the value of increasing
trust and transparency, and of engagement. We will suggest that there is
value in recognizing – in these early stages of the debates around nanotech-
nology – that these processes do not provide an unproblematic panacea to
any public disquiet around the development of nanotechnologies.

Increasing trust
It is now almost a truism to observe that trust – or more precisely, a lack of trust
– is a core issue around risk governance (Cvetkovich and Löfstedt, 1999; House
of Lords 2000; Cabinet Office, 2002). Within the UK, MORI6 have conducted
a series of polls over recent years that ask people how much sixteen different
professions are trusted to tell the truth. Along with journalists, ‘government
ministers’ and ‘politicians in general’ are regularly rated within the last three
places in this trust league table and well below business leaders, scientists
and professors. In the past three years at least 70 per cent of respondents
have indicated that government ministers and politicians would not be trusted
to tell the truth. These conclusions, the product of market research, have also
been drawn on the basis of other survey work.
This apparent ‘crisis of confidence’ was thoroughly explored by the
House of Lords (2000) and at least two key reasons for it were suggested.
First, that public confidence in scientific advice to government had been
undermined by a series of events, most notably the way in which BSE (‘mad
cow disease’) had been managed. This is a clear theme in the trust literature
and a range of highly visible controversies such as Brent Spar (Löfstedt and
Renn, 1997) and the MMR vaccination (Hobson-West, 2003) are seen as
having been instrumental in eroding trust. Undoubtedly though, the BSE
‘fiasco’, as the House of Lords report terms it, is generally considered to be a
watershed,7 heralding a marked diminution in public trust. Second, the
House of Lords (2000) report claimed that there was unease about scientific
advances running ahead of both public awareness and assent. The develop-
ments of modern genetic technologies, particular around GM foods, are
arguably a case in point here. Publics felt left in the dark and left out of
decision making and then felt ignored when the answers that they were
given did not match the questions that they were asking (Grove-White et al,
1997).
Within the academic literature the early work on trust outlined the ways in
which lay perspectives on risks were drawn from assessments of the
trustworthiness of the institutions managing those risks (Wynne, 1980).
Kasperson (1992) note the role that a lack of trust can have in intensifying
risk concerns and triggering secondary impacts. Risk communication
204 Nanotechnology

practitioners recognize the importance of trust in information sources (Bennett

and Calman, 1999).
The House of Lords report addresses two further dimensions of this crisis
in confidence: does it matter and what can be done about it? One of the reasons
given for it mattering is that lack of trust is linked to resistance on the part of the
public and that this may hamper future progress in science and technology.
This link between public confidence and technological progress was also
alluded to by Lord Sainsbury in the area of nanotechnology in setting out
the Government response to the Royal Society and Royal Academy of
Engineering report,
The UK needs safety and regulatory systems that address public aspirations and
concerns and which command public confidence during the development of
nanotechnologies.8

Two main ways have been identified which address this crisis in trust and that
are relevant to our consideration of nanotechnology: first, being open about
uncertainties and second, entering into dialogue with the public. We will
consider each of these in turn.
As noted in the introductory section, there is a range of substantial un-
certainties associated with the development of nanotechnologies. The Royal
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering concluded, and the government
subsequently agreed, that any activities which intentionally release engineered
nanoparticles should be banned, unless and until it is demonstrated that the
material has no significant risks. As toxicological evidence will not be available
for a very long time it is arguable that the use of nanoparticles should be
regulated on a precautionary basis for the foreseeable future (Chapter 10).
Recent years have borne clear testimony to the potential impact of U-turns
necessitated by the inappropriate communication of certainty. Subsequent to
the BSE crisis there has been an increasing requirement for transparency in
risk management (House of Lords, 2000) and the uncertainties inherent in
risk analysis are increasingly the subject of scrutiny (Stirling, 2004; Frewer
et al, 2002). The government responses to the BSE inquiry (HM Government,
2001) noted ‘the need to be open about uncertainty and to make the level of
uncertainty clear when communicating with the public.’
Being clear and open about the nature, degree and implications of existing
uncertainties presents particular challenges in the light of the current low levels
of public awareness about nanotechnologies. Of course the picture becomes
even more complex when we consider that from the point of the view of lay
publics, uncertainties may be generated, not simply through the acknowledge-
ments of expert uncertainty, but may also be inferred from conflict between
experts (Breakwell and Barnett, 2002). In addition to debate within the
scientific community there are a range of other stakeholders that are likely to
contest expert representations and to challenge practice. For example, the
ETC Group have registered their intention to take advantage of the Freedom
of Information legislation that came into force on 1 January 2005 in the UK
and will be asking the Department of Trade and Industry for information on
 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understandings of Nanotechnology 205

precisely which products on sale in Britain contain nanoparticles.9 At the

present time we know little about the extent to which people infer uncertainty
from such challenges to industry practice, how this is likely to impact trust in
those involved in contestation or affect beliefs about the technology itself.
Despite the extensive research and the evidence noted above relating to the
importance of developing trust and the impacts of distrust, recent work by
Pidgeon and colleagues (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003; Walls et al, 2004)
reconceptualizes the notion of trust and, in the light of this suggests that distrust
can be healthy. They present evidence that trust is largely independent of scepti-
cism; that they are not mutually exclusive. The combination of high trust and
low scepticism for example constitutes an uncritical emotional acceptance;
crucially however high trust can also be linked with high scepticism – they
term this ‘critical trust.’ This can be manifest in constructively questioning infor-
mation that is provided. Pootinga and Pidgeon (2003) suggest that this type of
trust may have particular value, that ‘for a functioning society it could well be
more suitable to have critical but involved citizens in many situations’ (p971).

Engaging with the public

Failure to consider the societal aspects of risk have led to obvious problems for a
variety of technologies. There is thus a general government requirement in the
UK for public bodies to modernize the way in which they operate: to increase
openness and widen consultation and participation in decision making. The
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1998) drew attention to the
requirement to develop,
More direct methods to ensure that people’s values, along with lay knowledge
and understanding, are articulated and taken into account alongside technical
and scientific considerations.

This is in line with the Aarhus Convention which involves a commitment for
public ‘access to information, participation in decision-making, and access to
justice on environmental matters’.10 As noted above, the House of Lords
(2000) Science and Technology Committee identified increased public engage-
ment as one of the ways in which the crisis of confidence in governance could be
improved. Specifically, they recommended,
That direct dialogue with the public should move from being an optional add-on
to science-based policy making and to the activities of research organisations and
learned institutions, and should become a normal and integrated part of the
process (paragraph 5.48).

This increased focus on dialogue is evident in the remit of the regulatory bodies
set up in the post-BSE era. Most recently though, and of most direct relevance
to this chapter, are the links made between public understandings of nanotech-
nology and the way in which account should be taken of them. This forms a
core theme of the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report
206 Nanotechnology

(2004). Indeed, perhaps the most radical part of the report is its consideration
of how engagement with publics can be relevant and meaningful when there is
low public awareness of nanotechnologies and many of the significant decisions
and impacts of nanotechnology have yet to occur. Designing relevant dialogue
under these conditions thus constitutes a huge challenge. The report notes that
it is not clear how a successful public debate can be conducted over an emerging
technology or how an anticipatory approach to public engagement will
contribute to assessing the likely benefits and regulating the possible risks of
nanotechnologies. Paradoxically though, it is precisely the upstream nature of
nanotechnology that holds promise of effective engagement – before issues
are framed, conflicts established and decisions are made. Certainly once
opposition develops it is difficult to overcome (Mayer, 2002; Mehta, 2004).
At this point we can return to the question alluded to earlier. Why engage
with publics around nanotechnology? Fiorino (1990) suggests that there are
three types of motivation for engagement. Stirling (2004) neatly summarizes
these:
Under a normative view, participation is just the right thing to do. From an
instrumental perspective, it is a better way to achieve particular ends. In
substantive terms, it leads to better ends (p220).

Let us first explore instrumental motivations to engage. One such motivation

arises where engagement is intended to restore trust and repair crises in
confidence. Such motivations are very clear in the House of Lords report
(2000) in which increasing dialogue is explicitly considered as a way of miti-
gating the crisis of public confidence. A second instrumental motivation
considers engagement as a form of horizon scanning (Stirling, 2004). Public
sensitivities and potential areas of public resistance can thus be identified and
monitored (Grove White et al, 1997, 2000).
Another clear exemplar of instrumental motivations for engagement is
provided in a recent report by the Royal Society (2004) where it was stated that,
Further work on engagement with the general public is required both to increase
the public’s confidence in the science advisory system and to ensure the continua-
tion of science’s licence to practise (p42).

The notion that engagement provides a route to legitimizing expert decision

making is very clear here. Arguably the instrumental value of engagement is
also exemplified in recent calls for research under ‘Sciencewise,’ the new
public engagement grants scheme of the UK government where nanotech-
nology has been identified as a priority area. This aims to fund participation
initiatives that help to achieve greater public confidence in science and
technology.
The normative motivation identified by Fiorino (1990) is simply that parti-
cipation is a basic democratic right. Citizens should be involved in decision
processes as these decisions affect them either directly or indirectly; they may
be consumers of relevant technologies or, if research is publicly funded, be
paying for them through taxation (Stirling, 2004).
 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understandings of Nanotechnology 207

The substantive rationale for public engagement is that it will make for
decisions that are more robust and of better quality. The idea here is that
non-experts can bring new perspectives and information to the attention of
experts and decision makers (Wynne, 1996). The substantive difference that
incorporation of lay knowledge makes has mainly been noted in relation to
the value of local knowledge:

In case after case it has been proposed that discontents with expert knowledge
have arisen when ‘expert’ accounts of physical reality conflict with local people’s
knowledge and that rather than local knowledge being routinely inferior and
defective, it has commonly proven more sensitive to local realities. (Yearley,
2000, p105)

Conceptualizing public understandings as valuable runs counter to the more

traditional view that greater scientific literacy is associated with a greater
potential contribution.
The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report recognizes
the role which these three perspectives have in promoting a wider dialogue.
The UK Government has accepted the recommendations of the Royal Society
and Royal Academy of Engineering report and ‘is committed to promoting
adequately funded public dialogue around nanotechnologies’ (paragraph 80).
The Commission of the European Communities (2004) also notes the value
of a wider dialogue although the following quote leaves the reader wondering
about the exact role and nature of engagement in relation to public acceptance
of nanotechnology and expert risk communication:

It is in the common interest to adopt a proactive stance and fully integrate

societal considerations into the R&D process, exploring its benefits, risks and
deeper implications for society. . . This needs to be carried out as early as possible
and not simply accepted post facto. In this respect, the complex and invisible
nature of nanotechnology presents a challenge for science and risk communica-
tors (p19).

It is important then to articulate and consider the possible areas of difficulty and
opposition that will be encountered in this endeavour.
One of the strongest critiques that questions the value of participation and
engagement comes from Durodié (2003).
To relegate the experienced and considered judgments of science to being just a
sectional interest dilutes the science, denigrates and demoralizes the scientists,
and both patronises the public and panders to the conceit of those who claim
to know or ‘represent’ their ‘values’. . . Of course, science has never been value
free, but maybe it should continuously strive to become so and to preclude,
rather than include, external influence (p395).

Stirling (2004) provides a more considered analysis of the relationship between

expert analysis and participation, which helps to guard against naı̈ve acceptance
of the benefits of public engagement in relation to the development of
nanotechnologies. He shows how the outcomes of both of them are susceptible
208 Nanotechnology

to framing effects. The results of expert analysis are affected for example by
the choice of policy questions and of methodologies and by how proof is consti-
tuted. Participatory processes are also affected by framing effects, for example
through relationships with sponsors, recruitment of participants, and methods
of dissent management. Stirling thus contends that engaging the public does
not automatically constitute an advance on scientific appraisal. He suggests
that the important question is rather to ask whether the processes of appraisal
that are being used have the effect of ‘opening up’ or ‘closing down’ the process
of technology choice. Closing down leads to ‘unitary and prescriptive’ policy
advice; an opening up approach leads to ‘plural and conditional advice’. This
involves presenting a range of courses of action and how they would work in
different contexts – the intention is not to identify a single best way forward.
Although decisions still have to be made, the aim of the ‘opening up’ approach
is to allow consideration of as wide a range of options as possible. The Royal
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report recognizes that opening
up the discussion in this way is particularly valuable in the light of the upstream
nature of current developments in nanotechnologies.
It is also important to note the immediate practical issues that the UK
government faces in considering the practicalities of dialogue around nano-
technologies. The aims of dialogue, who should take part, and how this should
be achieved have yet to be decided. Concerning this, the evaluation of the GM
Nation? initiative in the UK sketches out some provisional ways in which the
nature of the risk issue itself bears upon choices of an appropriate deliberative
method (Horlick-Jones et al, 2004, 2004a). The authors suggest that nano-
technology can be characterized as ‘novel and still ‘‘raw’’ in evidence’. This
may benefit from a process such as a deliberative jury; thus enabling increasing
familiarity with the issue as well as mutual learning. It is also critical to consider
how the results of chosen engagement processes will be used, what the commit-
ments of government to use the outcomes of engagement are (especially if they
may conflict with political or economic aims) and how this will be done.

Conclusion
In conclusion then, our understanding of the public’s understanding of
nanotechnology is limited at this stage, although the data thus far do present
a fairly coherent picture. The survey data suggests that there is generally low
awareness of nanotechnology although there is evidence of some appreciation
of the potential benefits. There is only rudimentary qualitative data at present
and research that addresses this will be important in creating a picture of the
range and the nature of public concerns and imaginings about both positive
and negative possibilities of nanotechnologies.
Arguably the UK government is committed to exploring public under-
standings of nanotechnology through engagement processes at a much earlier
stage than has been the case for other new technologies. This has been reflected
in discussion of the possibilities afforded by upstream engagement; an arena in
 Going Public: Risk, Trust and Public Understandings of Nanotechnology 209

which the insights of social science have become increasingly influential. There
are thus unique challenges to be met in understanding public understandings of
nanotechnology and, in turn, exploring how these can best be brought to bear
upon informing trajectories of nanotechnology development. If allied to critical
reflection there may be considerable benefit in the co-occurrence of nano-
technology – still in its infancy – with the growing insights afforded by the
social sciences.

Notes
1 See too Grey Goo’s Sticky Mess. Analysis, BBC Radio 4, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/programmes/analysis/transcripts/30_12_04.txt.
2 www.royalsoc.ac.uk/news.asp?id¼2976.
3 DTI’s nanotech initiative wins faint praise, Research Fortnight, 23 March
2005, p6.
4 This was a web-based survey and the particular biases that can be intro-
duced through this medium should be taken into account when interpreting
it (Couper, 2000).
5 Social Impact of Nanotechnology Project, www.nsec.northwestern.edu/
SocialImpact.htm.
6 www.mori.co.uk.
7 ‘Firstly, the BSE inquiry impacted upon us. Never again will any scientific
committee say that there is no risk. . .’ Sir William Stewart, Minutes of
Evidence to the House of Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee,
13 March 2001.
8 DTI (national) press release, 25 February 2005. Lord Sainsbury outlines
Government Plans for the Safe and Ethical Development of Nanotechnol-
ogies.
9 Quest for answers, The Guardian, London, 2 February 2005.
10 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, United Nations ECE/CEP/
43, agreed in Aarhus, Denmark, 23–25 June 1998.

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 17

Dwarfing the Social? Nanotechnology

Lessons from the Biotechnology Front

Edna F. Einsiedel and Linda Goldenberg

Biotechnology and nanotechnology are both strategic technologies: the former

provides several lessons that could contribute to more successful embedding
and integration processes for the latter. In this chapter, we identify some of
the key questions emerging from the biotechnology experience and summarize
several lessons learned in the context of constructive technology assessment.
This approach broadens the range of social considerations relevant to the
sustainable development of nanotechnology and emphasizes the need for
developing social tools for nanotechnology innovation while the technology is
in its early stages of design.

Introduction
If the latter part of the 20th century can be described as propelled by advances
in ‘the science of life’, the 21st century is now directed to unraveling the secrets
of matter itself. The recent ability of science to measure, manipulate and
organize matter on the scale of the super small – from 1 to 100 billionths of a
metre – has led to the possibilities of nanotechnology, a word whose root is
derived from the Greek word meaning ‘dwarf’. The potential applications for
nanoscience have been described numerous times, from supertensile materials
to limitless energy stores, from swarms of microdevices that can decimate
diseased cells, military targets, or pollutants to the manipulation of intelligence,
both human and machine (Mehta, 2002a).
Not surprisingly, governments are getting into nanotechnology in a big
way, reminiscent of the identification of biotechnology and information tech-
nology as strategic technologies earlier on. Strategic technologies have been
described as having ‘a firm footing in advanced research and an extremely
wide applicability across industries and sectors. It is characteristic of strategic
214 Nanotechnology

technologies. . . that they transform entire industrial sectors while creating

new ones’ (Langford et al, 2003, p6). In the case of nanotechnology, in 2002
the US set aside US$600 million in public funds while the EU’s funding in
this area was estimated at US$400 million. Japan has similarly allocated
US$750 million (Roco, 2002). All of these investments have been framed in
the context of the promises of this platform technology in such sectors as
health, environment, materials and energy, natural and industrial resources,
and military applications.
Despite its infancy, there have already been calls for a moratorium on
further development (ETC Group, 2003), for more stringent regulation, or
even an outright ban (Joy, 2000). Often, there is a look back to the experiences
of biotechnology, particularly the controversies over genetically modified food
(GMF), as a basis for caution on nanotechnology. The calls for greater vigilance
on the part of nanotechnology scientists and supporters have unfortunately
been couched simplistically in terms of: (1) engaging in public education so a
consumer backlash does not occur; (2) avoiding hype in making claims about
the technology (Knight and Pierce, 2003; Schulz, 2002; Burke, 2003); (3)
being proactive rather than reactive (Burke, 2003); and (4) presenting oppo-
nents as ‘anti-science’ and irrational (Burke, 2003). All of these prescriptions
are clearly designed to win the public relations war. To worry about winning
this public relations war, however, misses the point about what is required to
successfully embed nanotechnology into society in ways that will ensure its
long-term sustainability. It is useful to recall that sustainable development, as
initially conceptualized in the Brundtland Report, is premised on three
domains considered at the same time: the economic, the environmental and
the social.
While there are obvious differences between these strategic technologies,
there are lessons that can be drawn from the biotechnology experience
(Mehta, 2005). Indeed, the GM food experience has been pointed to repeatedly
as a cautionary tale but often, it is the wrong lessons that are identified. Beyond
the public relations lessons, more important ones can be drawn from the
biotechnology experience that could lead to more successful embedding and
integration processes. This paper summarizes several of these lessons as a
way of drawing attention to the challenges for nanotechnology. We discuss
these lessons by way of summarizing some key questions that were raised
around biotechnology and, in turn framing them within the context of
constructive technology assessment.
While traditional innovation studies can be characterized as bringing
together factors for successful technology development that revolve around
economic factors, research and development, management and marketing,
constructive technology assessment, on the other hand, attempts to add the
social dimension, used more broadly to include a range of legal, ethical,
environmental, and economic dimensions. In addition to this broader range
of considerations, the timing of such considerations is important, allowing
the social analyses of technology to occur earlier on in the process even at the
technological design stage rather than post-deployment, as has been the case
 Dwarfing the Social? Nanotechnology Lessons from the Biotechnology Front 215

with traditional technology assessment efforts. Nanotechnology research is, by

all accounts, in its infancy and nanotechnology applications in the embryonic
stage. In this sense, the social tools for nanotechnology innovation and govern-
ance need to be conceptually developed, otherwise the physical research and
development dimension will continue to outpace the social nanotechnology
development.

What risks, what benefits, and for whom?

Here, we point out that risks and benefits are more broadly defined beyond
physical or safety risks; they also incorporate economic and environmental
dimensions, essentially the recipe promoted for sustainable development.
The experience with biotechnology showed much emphasis on benefits
(Gaskell et al, 2001) while attention to risks was not infrequently a reactive
one to controversy.
Already, nanotechnology is showing the same predilection. In attempting to
examine the environmental risk of nanomaterials, Vicki Colvin observed that
‘in a field with more than 12,000 citations a year, we were stunned to discover
no prior research in developing nanomaterials risk assessment models and no
toxicology studies devoted to synthetic nanomaterials’ (Colvin, 2002). Of
US$700 million in funding for the National Nanotechnology Initiative in
fiscal year 2003, less than US$500,000 was allocated to the examination of
environmental impacts (Colvin, 2002).
Environmental, health, or economic impact questions that are essential to
address early in the research and development processes include what impacts
nanoparticles might have in mammalian systems when they are inhaled,
ingested or injected, or even when skin is exposed to these particles. What
are the risks involved when these particles enter and accumulate in the food
chain? In the case of future applications such as targeted drug delivery for
cancer patients, the removal or disposal of a nanotech delivery vehicle may
negate or diminish benefits substantially by triggering other unintended or
dangerous effects, such as blood clotting. The cost–benefit examination of a
nanotechnology application versus alternative approaches for the same function
or need can also be part of this examination.
In addition to assessing this broader range of risks, a strategy for mapping
these risks also needs to be in place. A ‘controlled proliferation’ strategy with
nanotechnology machinery and tools, and products as they roll out, as the
sites for mapping and control, might be appropriate in the case of some appli-
cations because it allows fixing accountability and responsibility for risks.
Several tools already exist for such mapping exercises including licensing,
patenting and certification. These have been applied to a variety of products,
from licensing personal firearms to labelling on pharmaceutical and food
products to be able to track distribution in the event of a risk and a need to
recall products. Some of society’s strategies and tools include and go beyond
mapping and tracking, to actually positioning responsibility and accountability
216 Nanotechnology

in particular identifiable places. In the case of nanotechnology, developing a

strategic framework for control and governance that is flexible and will
remain responsive to nanotechnology’s research and development is appro-
priate at this early stage. At the moment, Colvin and her Center for Biological
and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN) is a rare voice in emphasizing the
necessity to investigate possible risks early on, not just as a way of ensuring
long-term commercial success but to earn public trust (Colvin, 2003).
The question of who is at risk and who benefits is further illustrative of the
expanding range of social values that come into play on these questions.
Drawing from biotechnology, the example of a risk assessment extended to
animal welfare as a basis for recommending rejection in Canada of the use of
recombinant bovine somatotropine to boost milk production illustrates a
consideration where risk to human health was considered insignificant but
negative impacts on animal health were deemed important enough to reject
use of this hormone (Powell and Leiss, 1997).

Who owns and controls these technologies?

While the idea of intellectual property remained relatively uncontested until
the latter half of the 20th century, this has become one of the hotly debated
issues around biotechnology, with questions raised about the morality of
patenting life starting with the first patent on engineered bacteria, to the
morality of patenting higher life forms, or patenting cells or tissues obtained
from individuals to communities (see Boyle, 1996; Gollin, 1999) (Chapter
18). They have also revolved around appropriate sharing of benefits.
In addition to the moral dimensions of ownership, several questions are
raised around public–private ownership and control. Particularly problematic
is the matter of who owns the knowledge derived from collaborative initiatives
involving publicly funded universities and private corporations. Because of the
cost and complexity of nanotechnology research and development, this issue is
bound to increase in importance as time goes on and this type of collaboration
becomes more and more prevalent. Baber (2001) articulates a broader view
of ownership issues by focusing on the commodification of knowledge
arising from the triple helix of state-industry-university relations in Japan
and Singapore. According to Baber, funding conditions have eroded resistance
of academic scientists against directly transforming research knowledge into
monetary value. A significant amount of what is commonly referred to as
‘nanotechnology’ is actually new knowledge about basic science and processes
in the quantum regime, and this raises provocative questions that challenge
society’s existing ownership frameworks.
Issues of the broadness of patents have also been raised with biotechnology.
In the case of nanotechnology, much development is in the hands of the private
sector. Being in the private sector, in turn, limits the consideration of impacts of
patents to economic protection but this has not stopped the challenges mounted
to question the social validity of these patents. In the case of gene use restriction
 Dwarfing the Social? Nanotechnology Lessons from the Biotechnology Front 217

technologies (more popularly known as ‘terminator technology’) as a case in

point, the questions raised over the consequences of these genetically engin-
eered seeds to induce sterility as a patent protection approach revolved
around the negative consequences for traditional farmers used to saving,
sharing and replanting seeds. While their ecological benefits in terms of
preventing unwanted gene flow from transgenic crops via their seeds were
also touted, these were secondary to the intent of protecting patents. The
impact of the international criticisms resulted in the Consultative Group on
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and their 16 affiliated public research centres
agreeing not to use any genetic system designed to prevent germination in any
of their centres (Anonymous, 1998). Similarly, the company Monsanto bowed
to international pressure with its agreement not to develop this technology
further (Shapiro, 1999).
Is it conceivable that these same issues might arise with nanotechnology?
Absolutely (Chapter 18). Patenting, licensing and proprietary rights to
nanoscale fundamental machinery and tools could conceivably take place,
which could lead, in turn, to reducing access and the right to use the tools for
applications, thereby diminishing commercial competition (Peterson, 2003). In
examining the biotechnology patenting patterns, some have argued the nature
of patenting trends could in fact block rather than encourage innovation
(Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). One suggestion to address this problem is to use
open-source intellectual property protection for publicly funded research efforts
(Bruns, 2001). Such open commercial programs are more likely to result in
tougher and more resilient technologies. The example of Linux open source
technology, made more resistant to abuse by critiques from its user communities,
in contrast to the vulnerability of Microsoft products, has often been used as
illustration of the value of openness (see Reynolds, 2001). This would be part
of an arsenal of what Kantrowicz (1990) strikingly called the ‘weapons of open-
ness’. This could also include verification efforts akin to current arms control
verification programs (Drexler and Peterson, 1992).

Education for whom and to what end?

There is a sense that publics are ignorant and incapable of grasping the
complexities and nuances of technologies (Levitt and Gross, 1994). However,
there is considerable experience that has thrown this assumption into disrepute
(see cases in Kleinman, 2000).
Increasing public awareness and engaging in public education initiatives are
important tools but are self-defeating when done with the sole intent of getting
the public on board and on side. Again, evidence from the biotechnology field
suggests that having more information is not at all or only slightly correlated
with support for the technology (see Einsiedel, 2001; Gaskell et al, 2001),
suggesting that a nexus of factors is at work to explain how publics view
technology. From a practical standpoint, people do not need to understand
how their car operates to drive it and know it provides benefits and risks, and
218 Nanotechnology

to make reasonable decisions based on understanding the application. Neither

do people need to understand the science involved in the microchip to effec-
tively use a computer. A shift in focus is required from getting people up to
speed on the details and secrets and mysteries of the science to understanding
that what counts for publics are such elements as the purposes of an application,
how it is to be used, under what conditions, and how its risks and benefits are to
be managed.
Trust is also an important surrogate for information. Efforts to communi-
cate risks and benefits information alone have been found to be insufficient in
gaining public confidence. Rather, efforts to improve the perceived trust-
worthiness of institutions have also been found to be necessary in gaining
public support and acceptance in the biotechnology field (Siegrist, 2000;
Heimer, 2001).

Who governs and how?

Governance asks questions such as who participates in technology decision-
making, are decisions viewed as legitimate, how are the ‘governors’ held
accountable, and how are these decisions made? Many of the most important
technology decisions are made covertly within corporate boardrooms or
government bureaucracies or ‘via the tacit politics of the economic marketplace’
(Sclove, 1995).
Issues of legitimacy, accountability, and trust have been at the heart of
biotechnology controversies. Legitimacy includes such questions as whose
voices are heard at the technology table. In the case of some biotechnology
applications such as xenotransplantation, some scientists have themselves
suggested a moratorium until publics could at least be consulted (Bach et al,
1998). The calls for labelling of GM food and crops are as much a cry for
exercising consumer choice as they are a signal of transparency on the part of
regulators and producers.
Systems of accountability include self-regulation, and insight for nanotech-
nology accountability can be derived from programs such as the Canadian
Chemical Producers’ Association’s ‘Responsible Care’ program. The ‘Respon-
sible Care’ initiative originated from the Bhopal, India chemical disaster at the
Union Carbide Plant in November 1984. Facing international condemnation
and the threat of government regulation, the Canadian Chemical Producers’
Association went farthest among national chemical industries by designing
industry standards with monitoring and enforcement capabilities. The
standards were based on the principle of product stewardship from cradle to
grave, for example from product development to product disposal.
On the part of the ‘governors’, a key challenge remains in addressing the
inherent tensions between the requirements of maintaining public trust and
confidence and meeting the imperatives of economic growth and competitive-
ness. With governments focused on the latter and taking for granted public
concerns and values, the biotechnology regulatory experience has shown a
 Dwarfing the Social? Nanotechnology Lessons from the Biotechnology Front 219

trajectory of regulations that have been incremental and reactive (Gaskell et al,
2001). One of the major lessons has been that scientific authority could not be
the sole arbiter of standards and judgements in the field.

Conclusion
When scientists were able to splice the genes of one species into another
unrelated organism in 1973, a collective shudder about the implications of
their work went through the scientific community whose members then
decided to consider a moratorium on their research in the now famous Asilomar
Conference. The concern then revolved around issues of safety, resulting in the
RAC (Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee of the National Institute of
Health) guidelines to ensure that these biologically engineered organisms
would not ‘escape’ to cause havoc. While this effort has been lauded as an
example of scientists exercising responsible self-regulation, disinterest was
not entirely absent as some expressed concern about government regulation
and interference with scientific autonomy. Also, a concerted effort to bound
discussion within scientific impacts and to keep the social out marked these
discussions (Wright, 2001).
If there is anything that the evolutionary path of biotechnology has taught
us, it is the greater danger of keeping the social at bay when developing or
discussing technology. Colvin has argued that nanotechnology has a unique
opportunity in the history of technology: ‘it could be the first platform tech-
nology that introduces a culture of social sensitivity and environmental aware-
ness early in the lifecycle of technology development’. What we want is not to
tame publics but to make knowledge ‘wild’, that is, to make knowledge that is
reflexive and critical (Wright, 1992). Only by broadening the technological
frame and inviting other voices and perspectives in will we see more viable
opportunities for technology to be truly sustainable.

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 Part Five
Law and Regulation
 18

Nanotechnologies and the Law of

Patents: A Collision Course

Siva Vaidhyanathan

Introduction
Imagine if some firm held a patent on the brick. The patent would be drawn so
broadly as to cover any baked and/or glazed solid building element that would
be used to construct lattice structures for human habitation. That firm would
be able to charge royalties for most of the simple edifices in the world. It
could designate which buildings would go up first and which would have to
wait. There would probably be a rush to invent and patent a substitute for
the patented brick that would be just different enough to preclude a lawsuit,
yet similar enough to work as easily and dependably as a brick. Some buildings
would cost much more than they do now. Others might never get built at all. A
tremendous amount of time and money would be spent trying to negotiate the
brick-patent maze. Our world would certainly look different. As it stands, we
are fortunate that we live in a world in which bricks are in the public
domain. Anyone may make them, sell them, and use them to build their
houses. Building – especially essential, low-cost building – may continue
without concern for technological licenses and penalties.
But at a much smaller scale, we have allowed the brick to be patented. In the
ill-defined world of ‘nanotechnology’, a simple sphericule or rod of carbon – the
‘buckyball’ or ‘nanotube’ – has been patented not once, but more than 250
times in slightly different forms (Westin et al, 2004). The dream of nano-
technology reveals many of the dangers of an overprotective patent system.
Paradoxically, an overprotective patent system threatens the potential benefits
of a fully realized nanotechnology industry. The patent system is supposed to
generate a limited monopoly for a specific invention so that the patent holder
may extract monopoly rents for a limited time. But by its very nature, nano-
technology complicates the assumptions that underlie the principles of
patenting inventions. Nanotechnology bridges the conceptual gaps between
226 Nanotechnology

substance and information, hardware and software, and technology and science
(Fritz and Scientific American, 2002).
This chapter considers the relationship between nanotechnology research
and development and the patent system of the United States of America. It
considers the extent to which recent phenomena that have corrupted the US
patent system threaten to undermine or stifle effective development of useful
nanotechnology innovations. It concludes with a call for reform of both the
nanotechnology industry and the US patent system with an appeal to loosen
up the cultures of creativity in a vast array of fields, including but not limited
to nanotechnology. As an emerging technology blessed with big expectations
and small results so far, nanotechnology serves as an ideal case study to use
to measure whether the US patent system is working as it was intended: to
foster widespread innovation and the free flow of information.1 Nanotech-
nology’s unique attributes and opportunities promise to expose – and perhaps
explode – the problems with the US patent system. The question is: will
nanotechnology change the patent system more than the patent system alters
the course of nanotechnology?

Zeno’s paradox
Each move within the nebulous set of technologies that get labelled ‘nano’ takes
us halfway to the dream. If predictions bear out, we should be able to control
very small objects to deliver drugs into cells efficiently and effectively, thus
limiting side effects. We should be able to repair all sorts of things from the
molecular level up. Semiconductors and information processing equipment
should get smaller, lighter, cooler, and faster so that processing speed increases
at a rate far beyond recent developments. And second-order nanotechnology
should be able to generate ‘microbots’, which would aid in fabrication and
manufacturing with low energy inputs and remarkable purity and precision
(Fritz and Scientific American, 2002).
Of course, none of this has happened yet. And it is impossible to say when it
might. The culture of nanotechnology research is partly to blame. To compete
against more proven areas of research and development such as information
technology and biotechnology for government grants, venture capital, and
investment capital, nanotechnology advocates have had to make big, bold
promises. But unlike the early days of information technology and biotech-
nology, technology is leading science, not the other way around. In other
words, investors are betting on companies based on business plans rather
than bodies of knowledge.
Despite current nanotechnology claims being more relevant to science
fiction than science, billions of dollars have gone into firms – all of which
hope against hope that they will be among first-movers in this field and marshal
the great portion of what some claim will be a ‘US$1 trillion prize’ (Feather-
stone and Specht, 2004). Many billions of investment dollars have come
from states such as Singapore, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
 Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision Course 227

States. The combined annual spending on nanotechnology by Western Europe,

Japan, and the United States (Chapters 6–8) increased from US$678 million in
1997 to more than US$2 billion in 2002. In 2004 the US Congress increased
funding for the National Nanotechnology Initiative by 9.5 percent to
US$847 million (Westin et al, 2004).
Yet billions more have and are destined soon to come from private-sector
investors such as venture-capital firms. But without any real products or
processes to demonstrate yet, the only way a particular firm can assert itself
as a leader in the field and generate sufficient confidence among investors for
an invention that does not yet exist is to mark off as much intellectual territory
as possible (Westin, 2004; Chung, 2004). This is even more important for small
firms than large, established ones. As a result, we have witnessed a mini-
industry of patent lawyers offering advice on how nanotechnology firms can
‘negotiate’ the established patent terrain and generate effective ‘intellectual
property strategies’ that comprise various methods of filing for and enforcing
patents, maintaining trade secrets, and protecting trademarks and copyrights
as well (Featherstone and Specht, 2004; Westin et al, 2004; Miller, 2005;
Troilo, 2005; Voigt, 2005).
Unlike other cutting-edge technologies such as microprocessor-based
computers, software and biotechnology, the earliest discoveries and inventions
of nanotechnology are occurring in an era of a broken, corrupted, counterproduc-
tive US patent system. Those other areas of research and development were able
to proceed without the tax and stress that competing patent claims put on a new
industry. Beginning in the 1980s (but taking off during the 1990s) universities
and firms went on a patent binge while the US patent office and the court that
governs patents lowered the standards for patenting to absurd levels (Jaffe and
Lerner, 2004). As a result, nanotechnology is trying to get started at a time
when knowledge flows less freely than it did during the software revolution. If
basic features of software had been patented back in the 1970s and 1980s,
we might never have seen the widespread culture of entrepreneurship and
innovation that generated so much wealth in the 1990s (Regalado, 2004).
The patent mania of the past two decades has created a ‘tragedy of the
anti-commons’ in various fields (Burk and Lemley, 2003). In nanotechnology
specifically, firms are pushed to claim the broadest possible patent protection
as early as possible out of fear that some other firm or university will do it
instead. As a result, there has been an astounding surge of nanotechnology-
related patents in recent years (Almeling, 2004; Huang, 2003).
From 1997 to 2002, the number of US patents issued that concerned
nanotechnology in some way grew from 3623 to 6425. The most ambitious
and authoritative study of the growth of nanotechnology patents has claimed
that a broad, comprehensive search of patent databases yielded more than
89,000 patents worldwide since 1976. The leading patenting nations are the
United States (with more than 56,000), Japan (more than 7500), France
(more than 2000), the United Kingdom (more than 870), Switzerland (more
than 410), Taiwan (more than 380), Italy (more than 370), South Korea
(more than 360), The Netherlands (more than 300), and Australia (more than
228 Nanotechnology

300). This list is not likely to change significantly in the next few years, and no
state is likely to pass the United States in the number of nanotechnology patents
issued. The fastest growing subgenres of nanotechnology patents are in the
chemical and pharmaceutical fields. Semiconductor research follows closely
behind (Huang, 2003).

An introduction to patents
A patent is a state-granted limited monopoly. Emanating from Article 1,
Section 8 of the US Constitution, the US patent system is intended to create
an incentive to create, invent, and market inventions ‘to promote the sciences
and useful arts’. A patent grants the holder (not always the inventor) the
exclusive right to manufacture, use, sell, or build upon the covered technology.
In the United States, the term of patent protection is currently 20 years,
after which the invention enters the ‘public domain’ where it is free to be
used by anyone. Being in the public domain does not remove a technology
from the market. After all, firms still sell hammers. However, it does remove
the ability to seek rents, charge monopolistic prices, and exclude others from
using the technology. In the public domain, a technology is open to all. In
addition to real-world physical inventions, the US patent system allows
firms to control software, business methods, therapeutic processes, and some
natural phenomena. These have been among the most controversial recent
developments in patent law and policy.
The patent system developed first in 15th century Italy, but it quickly spread
to other European countries over the next century. These patents were generally
royal proclamations of monopoly control, meant to ensure loyalty, curry favour,
or to ensure a cut of revenue for the court. By 1623, King James I of England
had recognized that technological advances could yield military and economic
advantage, so he, at the behest of Parliament, began granting 14-year patents
for inventions and encouraging trade and technological espionage. In the
early days of the United States, the founders remained wary of state-granted
monopolies, so they built limits into the US patent system to capture the
‘balance’ between incentive to invent and the public good (Ben-Atar, 2004).
Patents are one element of a field of law and regulation that we have come to
call ‘intellectual property’ in recent years (Vaidhyanathan, 2001, 2004).
Patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks all regulate the ephemeral
– that for which there is no natural scarcity. For markets to operate efficiently
and predictably and to prevent the price of ephemeral goods from approaching
zero because of rampant replication, wealthy states have in recent years been
hiking the scope, levels and duration of protection of intellectual property.
This process has generated much pain and profit. Like other forms of intellec-
tual property, patent law has been the subject of intense global debate. Because
patent laws govern the ability of pharmaceutical companies to set prices, they
are under scrutiny for keeping essential medications out of the reach of the
poorest, sickest people in the world. Because patents serve to capture natural
 Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision Course 229

biological resources that poor people have exploited for centuries and multi-
national companies have processed and brought to market, they are a contro-
versial element in what critics in the developing world call ‘biopiracy.’ And
because patents on software have the power to limit the use of certain
algorithms, many in the software community have criticized their persistence
in the United States and tried to block their entry in the European patent
system (Correa, 1995, 1997, 2000; Boyle, 1996; Correa and Yusuf, 1998;
Drahos, 2002; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2003; Sell, 2003).
To acquire a patent in the United States, an inventor must file documents
with the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) within a year of bringing
an invention to market. Unlike the rest of the world, the United States grants
patents to the first inventor to market a product rather than the first who files an
application. While reviewing a patent application, inspectors employ three tests
to determine the viability of the invention:

. Is the invention useful? Does it actually do something?

. Is the invention original? Is there ‘prior art’ on record that would show that
someone has already brought such a technology to market?
. Is the invention ‘non-obvious’? Would such a development be beyond the
imagination of every reasonable practitioner of the art or science?

These seem like common-sense standards, but they have been far from simple
to enforce. A patent application can take many months for approval or (in
increasingly rare instances) rejection. Teams of specialized agents work for
the patent office in diverse areas of expertise such as chemistry, pharmaceuti-
cals, metallurgy and software. They are supposed to screen each application
to ensure that the invention meets the above criteria. Much of their work
involves researching previous patent documents for ‘prior art’ that might
show that the application does not meet the standard of originality. Often,
examiners will send the application back to the applicant for revision so that
it does not overlap in scope with ‘prior art’.
Once a patent has been granted, it must be enforced and defended through
the judicial system. In the United States, all patent claims since 1983 have gone
through a specially designated court called the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. This court rules in cases of infringement or overlap. It has generally
broadened and deepened the rights of established patent holders, significantly
lowering the threshold of patentability. As a result, the number of patents
issued in the United States increased at an annual rate of 5.7 per cent since
1982. Previously patents rose at a rate of less than one percent per year from
1930 through 1982 (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).
The owner of a patent has many powers over the technology. The patent may
be sold to others, may be used as collateral for loans, may be licensed in various
ways, and may pass to heirs. In the event of infringement, a court may grant an
injunction against the distribution of the offending invention and issue monetary
damages to be paid to the patent holder. Short of legal recourse, the very
existence of a patent in a certain field can scare away competing inventors.
230 Nanotechnology

Until very recently there was great diversity in how states managed their
patent systems. For instance, the former Soviet states had no patent system
at all. Instead, inventors would receive certificates of appreciation from the
state. Terms of patent duration varied across the capitalist world as well.
Since the mid-1990s states have been compelled to standardize or ‘harmonize’
their patent systems with the strongest systems in the world – those of the
United States and Western Europe – as part of the deal for joining the global
flow of trade and technology. However, efforts toward harmonization are
much older. In 1883 many industrializing states signed the International
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. This treaty gave
reciprocal patent rights among the signatory states. Since 1977 the entire
European Community has shared a common patent office and process. By
1986, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) generated the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS accord binds all nations that are
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to respect each others’
patents and ‘harmonized’ the patent process, setting minimal standards of
protection. Of course, this process of ‘harmonization’ significantly undermined
state sovereignty. Individual states may no longer tailor their patent systems for
their particularly industrial and development needs (Ryan, 1998).
Overall, the US patent system seems to offer much to the nanotechnology
industry. It offers instant global protection for inventions and processes years
before they come to market – exactly the status of nanotechnology today.
There is tremendous potential remuneration for the firm or university that
can exclude others from using an essential development in such a new area.
So being first matters. Patents work in such way that coverage for a rather
basic technology (such as nanotubes) can ‘reach through’ to more complex
uses of that technology, so that revenues could exponentially grow as other
firms build on the original work downstream. The patent system is remarkably
transparent. Filings are public and the knowledge inherent in the work can flow
freely. It might even be applicable to distinct work in other fields. In this way,
patents work towards the public interest in ways quite distinct from trade
secrets. And because patents expire in a reasonable amount of time, currently
20 years, the public domain is constantly enriched. Also, as key patents near
expiration, firms that depend on those revenue streams push to improve or
invent new things and methods. So if the patent system fits the demand of
technology and research, things could move quite nicely and many would
benefit from the work. But do they fit?

What’s special about nanotech?

There is a case to be made that early nanotechnology research could and should
proceed without the protection, taxation, and consternation of the patent
system. After all, right now nanotechnology is more science than technology
(some would argue more science fiction than science). Basic research is
 Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision Course 231

supposed to be exempt from the patent system. Until recently, knowledge and
discoveries were un-patentable, open to all, and subject to scientific scrutiny
and fervent debate. In the absence of patent restrictions (and the temptation
of massive rewards for exploiting knowledge) scientists could work for the
pure satisfaction of discovery. They could act selfishly within an altruistic
system, benefiting from higher cultural and social capital when they succeed.
There might be less hype and more healthy skepticism – more science and
less science fiction – if the patent system were kept at some length from basic
nanotechnology research. The ethics of science would lead the frenetic
demands of technology and commerce.
Perhaps the strongest argument for keeping the patent system away from
basic nanotechnology research is that the public has already paid for it once.
The governments of the world are pouring billions of dollars into basic research
conducted by universities (many of them public), only to ensure that the
beneficiaries of these grants will be able to tax the rest of us once again by
bringing this work to market. Of the ten ‘most important nanotechnology
patents’ issued (as determined by the trade journal Nanotechnology Law and
Business), seven are owned by major research universities in the United
States: Northwestern University, the University of California, Stanford
University (two top-ten patents), Harvard University, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and the California Institute of Technology (Feather-
stone and Specht, 2004). The patent system has the potential to corrupt not
only the process of basic research but the entire academic system as well.
Since 1982 universities in the United States have been encouraged to exploit
the basic research of their faculties to generate revenue from downstream
commercial application. This has generated a new set of incentives within the
academy that favor commercially viable research over more speculative or
esoteric research (Washburn, 2004; Rai and Eisenberg, 2001).
Even within the patent system, nanotechnology presents some special –
perhaps fatal – challenges. First and foremost, nanotechnology is not one
genus or species of technology. It is inherently interdisciplinary. It is marked
by the scale of the work rather than the function or purpose of the invention.
In other words, a technology that would deliver medicine at a cellular level
and one that would create microcircuits for computer memory would both be
considered ‘nanotechnologies’ if they depended on very small things doing
work. They might even depend on the same small things – building blocks.
But the US Patent office is not prepared to train its examiners in every possible
permutation of nanotechnology. Today, applications go to the specialized team
of examiners based on the ultimate function of the claim. There is no unified
nanotechnology team with expertise in the entire field – nor would creating
one be easy. In May 2005 the US Patent Office solicited comments on how
to better review nanotechnology patents. There was widespread concern that
poor examination would generate either overly broad patents that would
unfairly block subsequent innovations or unnecessarily narrow patents that
would fail to generate revenue for the holders. The Patent Office initially
recommended creating a new reference classification for nanotechnology, but
232 Nanotechnology

balked at creating a new art unit. Examiners in the existing unit would have a
combined nanotechnology database to aid their examinations (Crouch, 2005).

The problems with patents

Such a database classification fails to address the serious endemic problems with
the current US patent system. The staff is still too small for the number of
applications it receives. And the office, operating without such centralized infor-
mation, has already approved many thousands of applications that are central to
the development of nanotechnology. Thus overly broad or overlapping patents
are still likely to gum up the system for years to come. Several influential scholars
have diagnosed these serious flaws in the US patent system in recent years. The
incentive structure of the USPTO is structured to encourage application approval
and minimize scrutiny that might yield a rejection. As the range of technologies
flooding the USPTO has grown, the expertise of examiners has not grown as
fast. This has led to poor research on ‘prior art’ that might limit an applications
scope or its very approval. In addition, lack of familiarity with areas such as
software and business methods have lowered the threshold of ‘non-obviousness’
to alarming levels, resulting in the granting of patents for simple ideas such as the
‘one-click’ method of purchase on Amazon.com (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).
On the applicant side, the incentive to file for overbroad, frivolous, and
well-meaning patents has never been higher. There is a pervasive fear that if
one firm does not grab a broad patent for a certain technology some other
firm will and lock the first firm out of the market. Such a pervasive belief has
set off a patenting ‘arms race’ among firms. Patent paranoia has sparked an
alarming increase in the number of patent applications filed per year in the
United States. And the resulting increase in the potential to extract rents for
licensing has led to the creation of a set of firms devoted to nothing more
than harvesting patents for later exploitation. These firms invent nothing yet
issue many cease-and-desist letters to restrict actively innovative firms from
exploiting the techniques that these patent hoarders might control.
Generally, the US patent system is stacked in favour of the established. Too
many frivolous patents get approved. It is too expensive for newer innovators to
navigate the system, and the public does not benefit as much as it should from
the system generally (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). Speculative patents now enclose
too many natural phenomena that should be in the domain of pure science (Rai
and Eisenberg, 2001). It is possible that the US patent system is too broken to
serve new and speculative fields such as nanotechnology without severe costs,
negative externalities and market failures.

Tragedy of the anti-commons

Patenting works with fewer problems for ‘downstream’ innovations than
‘upstream’ discoveries. However, upstream patents are more potentially
 Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision Course 233

lucrative. The big danger of upstream or early patents on basic discoveries or

technologies is that they generate a rush to patent everything around those
early technologies, creating a ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’. Several important
patent scholars have noted the prevalence of ‘anti-commons’ problems in fields
like software and biotechnology. An anti-commons is characterized by a
confusing tangle of proprietary claims. To bring a product to market through
such a tangle requires substantial capital to pay for research, litigation, and
re-engineering. An anti-commons is particularly taxing when certain tech-
nologies are complementary, that is, they fit together in a larger system.
Early, basic, upstream patents tend to be complemented by later, downstream
technologies. The more complementary the technologies are, the harder and
more expensive the system is to navigate. If it gets too frustrating, confusing,
or expensive to navigate, the anti-commons will have a severe chilling effect
on innovation (Burk and Lemley, 2003).
One acutely pernicious form of the anti-commons problem is a ‘patent
thicket’ – overlapping patents cover the same product or process. The best-
documented thicket concerns semiconductors. Semiconductor producers
potentially infringe on hundreds of different patents owned by companies
that only harvest patents. These firms produce no innovation. They merely
seek rents from others who hope to bring technologies to market, thus profiting
mightily from the patent ‘arms race’ (Krimsky, 2003). When information is
incomplete, as within an industry that is inherently multidisciplinary and
requires searches for patents in a variety of areas, the dangers of patent thickets
become even more pronounced.

Avoiding the collision

It is a shame that nanotechnology became defined as technology first rather than
as science. Open science works better. The proprietary and competitive nature of
the current nanotechnology community does not bode well for transparency and
equity. Science, unlike technology, should be open and collaborative. If a spirit
of openness and trust grows within a culture of competitive researchers, labs and
firms then the results would improve. Just as importantly, the transaction costs of
bringing products to market would shrink. The best example of such open
collaboration comes from the sphere of biotechnology research. When too
many firms were patenting basic elements of genetic code without any idea
what they might be used for, many scientists and policy makers grew alarmed
(Sulston and Ferry, 2002). Through a partnership supported by the Wellcome
Trust in the United Kingdom these firms decided to open up the process of
discovering these small bits of genetic information and placing their findings
in an open database. This effort reduced costs for all the firms involved and
generated a useful public database for both academic and private-sector
researchers to exploit. Such consortia, alas, are almost impossible to generate
in the United States, where federal law essentially mandates the privatization
of university-generated technologies (Rai and Eisenberg, 2001).
234 Nanotechnology

It may be far too late to imagine how nanotechnology might flower under a
different regulatory system. Changing or avoiding the patent system now might
be futile and counterproductive. International accords such as TRIPS make it
almost impossible to tailor any state’s patent system for particular needs. So we
may just have to hope that the absurdities likely to come from poorly researched
nanotechnology patents cause such widespread concern that reformers generate
global dissatisfaction with the system. In the mean time, better review
processes are essential. And the Patent Office is aware of that need (Crouch,
2005). Some patent lawyers have recognized the hazards and have concluded
that either the review problems are overstated or they can be dealt with
adequately through the courts. So perhaps it is the wrong time to panic
about the future of either nanotechnology or the patent system (Almeling,
2004).
Regardless, it is worth considering whether a special set of rules should apply
to nanotechnology. Theoretically, the patent system is supposed to be non-
discriminatory. It should operate the same way under the same principles
regardless of the type of technology at hand. However, in practice, different
fields do work differently in the patent system (Burk and Lemley, 2003). Perhaps
nanotechnology would grow more equitably, efficiently, and predictably if its
patents worked for a shorter time, perhaps 10 years instead of 20. Perhaps
there should be a global nanotechnology patent database run through the
United Nations. And perhaps the United Nations should sponsor regular con-
ferences and reports to consider the ethical, economic, and environmental effects
of nanotechnology. The more visible the process the better nanotechnology will
serve the entire planet. There is too much at stake in the nanotechnology field for
business-as-usual to rule.

Notes
1 My analysis is limited to the US patent system because I have no expertise
in other countries’ patent systems, nor do I have sufficient access to data
about nanotechnology research in other countries. This should not be a
fatal flaw because any viable nanotechnology developer would have to
navigate the US patent system to bring an invention or technology to
market fully.

References
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requirement’, Stanford Technology Law Review, vol 4, pp42–48
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Industrial Power, New Haven, Yale University Press
Boyle, J. et al (1996) Law and the Construction of the Information Society, Cambridge,
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Burk, D. L. and Lemley, M. A. (2003) ‘Policy levers in patent law’, Virginia Law
Review, vol 89, p1575
Chung, J. (2004) ‘Panning out’, Technology Review, October 2004, no. 37. p37
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Crouch, D. (2005) ‘PTO moves forward with nanotechnology classification’, http://
patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/05/pto_moves_forwa.html accessed 9 May 2005
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dialogue’, in Drahos, P. and Mayne, R. (eds) Global Intellectual Property Rights,
Knowledge, Access, and Development, New York, Palgrave, pp161–182
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 19

Nanotechnology and Civil Liability

Alan Hannah and Geoffrey Hunt

Introduction
As nanotechnology enterprises grow issues of civil liability will become
increasingly relevant (see Chapter 21 for corporate criminal liability). When
problems arise the client generally has to see the ‘contentious lawyer’, ideally
instructed by the insurance company who has provided the contingency
coverage. But not infrequently, in more complex or expensive matters, the
poor client contests a claim from the injured party, and at the same time has to
litigate with the reluctant insurance company, who having taken the premium
for the coverage, seeks to avoid it. All this is good news for the lawyers, unless
they are also sued if they have been negligent in providing the advice above.
With respect to nanotechnology the relevant areas of law are tortious
liability for personal injury – negligence; contractual liability for personal
injury; liability for damage to property and economic loss directly resulting;
patents, copyright; product liability and professional liability insurance
contracts. Legal claims arising out of nanotechnology may be generated by
personal injury claims, whether arising directly out of, for example, nano-
medical applications, or possibly caused by the toxicity of nanoproducts, for
example nanoparticles in the environment.

Personal injury
The working party of the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering
have considered the use of specific regulations in the field of nanotechnology
which are likely, for the protection of the public, to impose strict duties, the
breach of which could lead to liability without proof of negligence (Royal
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004; UK Government, 2005).
Unlike the right to contract out of property damage, in the UK one cannot
restrict or contractually avoid liability for personal injury one may cause;1
238 Nanotechnology

and there is no ceiling on the damages recoverable. But, subject to some

statutory exceptions, injury does not [yet] automatically give rise to liability.
The claimant still has to prove negligence or a breach of contract, and then
show that negligence or breach caused the damage. Past and future losses are
recoverable, which can include the person’s lifetime future earnings. If the
injury killed the claimant, his/her dependants can bring the action.
We may ask: in the context of nanotechnology, what is negligent? We derive
much of our personal injury case law on negligence from medical mishaps. The
question whether the practitioner’s skill fell into the category of negligence can
be expressed by the following test: ‘ . . . if a respectable number of properly
informed experts, having directed their minds to the comparative risks and
benefits of the exercise in question, conclude it was defensible, a finding of
negligence will be unlikely’.2 This is the test that will be applied to nanotech-
nologists – or will it?
The difficulty for the negligent nanotechnologist (using the term for anyone
who faces a claim in relation to some nanotechnological product or process) is
that the court will strive to compensate the injured victim, knowing the alleged
wrongdoer is likely to have insurance cover. This takes the sting out of having
to do justice equally and fairly between two parties to the litigation. In personal
injury cases it is usually, you might say, the Human claimant v. Faceless insur-
ance company.

Injury without negligence

An untoward but scientifically unexpected event resulting in injury may well be
a true accident or incident without negligence. In one UK case3 the claimant
suffered paralysis from the waist down when a contaminated drug (Nupercaine)
was injected into his spine. The vial containing the drug had been placed in an
ampoule containing phenol which had migrated through the glass into the drug.
This phenomenon was not known to the scientific community at the time. The
glass had molecular flaws.
However, in the nanotechnology field it will not be easy to avoid such
liability for such unexpected consequences. The onus will be on the defendant
nanotechnologist to prove on a balance of probabilities that:

. there was no inkling of the possibility of injury from existing research

available;
. the injury could not be foreseen, deduced or contemplated by the scientist in
the light of [then] knowledge;
. it follows that nanotechnology will have [thanks to the internet] only one bite
of the cherry for that defence.

This raises the ethical responsibility of nanotechnologists to publish as soon as

possible any relevant event for the protection of the public, not least the
industry as a whole.
 Nanotechnology and Civil Liability 239

But there may be another problem for the nanotechnology industry, which
may apply where the new scientific experiments could have unforeseeable con-
sequences. In the Rylands case4 in the UK the defendant F built a reservoir.
The neighbouring land had disused mine shafts. Water from the reservoir
leaked into the mine shafts and flooded the neighbour’s land. Rylands was
entitled to recovery without having to prove negligence because the court held
that a non-natural user of land will be liable for the consequences of unforeseen
events. This was a case involving land and its use in the law of nuisance.
The general point is that if you are embarking on new technological treat-
ments with scientifically unknown risks, the courts may take the approach
that the experimenter, for practical purposes, will be ‘strictly liable’ e.g.
liable without proof of negligence. Will this doctrine be resurrected and
applied? True the trend has been to move away from strict liability to liability
founded on negligence, but if one undertakes novel and potentially dangerous
procedures with uncertain outcomes, that undertaking might itself be classified
as negligent (Bailey and Lattimore, 2004). It is possible that this approach may
creep in by judicial increment under other names. One should be mindful of the
risk of the development of the law in such a direction. It is recognized, on the
other hand that in other ‘non-natural’ procedures such as organ transplantation
and in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment that the general standard of negli-
gence has been applied.
The defence against a claim for personal injury might include the following
arguments:

. the treatment was approved by appropriate ethics committees;

. thorough and scientifically approved trials were held;
. public interest justified the risk (for example, ‘Do not stifle scientific
development’);
. the informed consent of the client/patient;
. the injury was wholly unforeseeable;
. there was an acceptable ratio between risks and possible benefits.

We can look at the pharmaceutical industry, for historic guidance. Actually,

claimants succeed on fairly low levels of negligence, the finding of negligence
being a value judgement of the court.

Informed consent
In the past 20 years or so there has been a very significant shift from the position
of ‘the expert knows best’ to the right of the consumer or patient to be told
truthfully and fully of all the risks. The acceptance by the fully informed
patient of risks, however small, avoids liability for a treatment that has resulted
in injury or failure without negligence. Where the patient has not been fully and
truthfully informed of all the known risks, in cases where injury has occurred
without negligence a claimant can succeed on the basis that had they been
240 Nanotechnology

told of the risks they would not have undergone the procedure, or elected for a
different one.
It has sometimes been observed that standing in the court giving evidence,
just a judicial decision away from a large sum in damages, a claimant sometimes
displays remarkable retrospective judgment and wisdom with the great benefit
of hindsight. In the many sterilization cases, where there was failure without
negligence, the claimants usually succeeded (more than 9 months later) in
convincing the judge of their recollection of the pre-operative discussion that
the risks of failure were not spelt out. It is good practice for the expert to
have a well-worded document describing the risks involved, the failure and
success rates, and likely consequences to give to the client/patient, who
having read it signs a copy confirming he/she has read and understood it.
Even risks of less than 1 per cent should now be disclosed. Nowadays it is
the patient or client, not the expert, who should decide whether to undergo
the procedure – a trend to be welcomed.
Unknown risks of a new technology are by definition unidentified, but a
patient should still be told of the risks of the possibility of unknown untoward
events (see Chapter 20).

To whom is the duty of care owed?

The duty of care is owed to the patient; if the patient dies, to his or her depen-
dants; to a foetus, which in law is not a legal being and has no right of action
until birth (natural or by section) at which time the cause of action crystallizes.5
The UK common law recognizes that a child born with a deformity, because of
a negligent act occurring during the mother’s pregnancy, has a cause of action,
for example after conception.
Under the Congenital Disabilities Act6 liability of a wrongdoer is extended
to give rise to liability where the wrongful act occurred before conception
unless: the parents knew of the risk of their child being born disabled, so
their knowledge of the risk of the disability is a defence; or if the defendant
took reasonable care having due regard to the then received professional
opinion applicable to the particular class of cases; the liability is excluded or
limited by contract made with the parent(s) affected, but to no greater extent
than the law allowed the parent a defence against the child. This means that
the child has no fewer rights than the parent who contracted on his or her
behalf, or put another way no fewer defences than the parent(s) could raise
against the wrongdoer. If the parent could defeat the contractual exemption,
so can the child years later.
Exemption from liability clauses can be envisaged in the in vitro fertilization
cases, or an employer avoiding liability to its nanotechnologists (and their
descendants) for the unknown properties and effects of nanomaterials in the
laboratory. This means that in an action for personal injury by the child, the
wrongdoer could raise the defence of a contractual exemption for personal
injury. But the child, unborn at the time of the tort would have no fewer
 Nanotechnology and Civil Liability 241

legal rights than its parent would have had or has in its action for damages in
combating the wrongdoer’s defence under the exemption clause. Note that a
child could bring an action for injury sustained to a foetus and caused by the
negligence of the parent, for example car crash injury caused by a parent’s
negligent driving.
But to complicate the position in the UK along came the Unfair Contract
Terms Act7 which provides in section 2 that a person cannot by reference to
a contract term exclude or restrict his liability to a person or persons for
death or personal injury resulting from his negligence. Section 1(6) of the
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 seemed to have had a short
effective life. Even if the phrase ‘person or persons’ does not include un-
conceived or ill-conceived descendants, any child could rely (by section 1(6)
of the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act) on the parent’s defence
under Section 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act to defeat an exemption
clause purporting to exclude liability for personal injury.

The UK’s Consumer Protection Act 1987

This Act essentially arises out of the European Union requiring its member
states to enhance consumer protection and the approximation of laws to
permit the proper functioning of the common market (Chapter 8). This Act
could apply to products of nanotechnology.
It provides for strict (or automatic) liability for death or personal injury
caused by a defect in a product, as opposed to injury caused by the intended
use of a product. It is a subtle distinction but the Act renders liable anyone
who produced the product, endorsed it (by putting a name or trademark on
it) or, imported the product from outside the European Commission and
refused to identify the exporter. Here one envisages injury caused by a
design flaw or manufacturing flaw in the nano-product, for example, by the
escape of its inherent toxic materials, or emissions from it. So the nano-product
may achieve its intended purpose but cause injury in doing so.
As liability is strict, informed consent for the possibility of a design flaw or a
defect would not permit a defence as that would offend the Unfair Contract
Terms Act.
Happily for the nanotechnologist there is incorporated into the Consumer
Protection Act the common law ‘Roe v Minister of Health’ defence, which
provides a defence to a claim where: ‘. . . the state of scientific and technical
knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of products of
the same description as the product in question might be expected to have
discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under
his control’.8
The emphasis of the defence against strict liability is on the state of scientific
and technical knowledge at the time, and not on the producer’s capability or
otherwise of detecting the defect. If the producer, with appropriate tests
ought to have identified the flaw before supply with the standard precautions
242 Nanotechnology

of the industry, the injured party can still succeed provided he or she discharges
the evidential burden of proof of negligence. In this respect the claimant can ask
for discovery of all the documents relating to the design and manufacture of the
product. A person who suffers an injury from a nano-product by virtue of his or
her own peculiar anatomical or psychological vulnerability cannot claim the
machine has an inherent defect if the machine is as safe as persons generally
are entitled to expect.
It should be noted that the provisions of the Congenital Disabilities Act are
in part incorporated into the Consumer Protection Act. Section 6 provides that
a child can bring a claim for damages where the parent would have been able to,
had that parent suffered the damage from the defect. So statute law (as of today)
provides strict liability for injury down to the first generation; section 6 says
‘child’, not ‘grandchild’ or ‘great grand-child’.

The eggshell skull rule

The wrongdoer has to take his victim as he finds him. Imagine a victim who has
a pre-malignant type of cancer. The nanotechnologist and his nano-product
cause an unintended internal lesion which causes a fatal cancer to spread, and
the widow sues. The original lesion was avoidable and caused through
negligence, but the fatal consequences were not foreseeable or foreseen. The
test is not whether the nanotechnologist could have foreseen the death, but
whether the wrongdoer could have foreseen the type of injury which did
occur, for example the lesion. However, if the nanoproduct’s function was to
inflict a controlled lesion, then the same unfortunate result would not give
rise to liability.

Remoteness and injury to future generations

If one embarks on genetic manipulation, is not injury to descendants foresee-
able? Let us imagine that a nano-product causes an untoward event by altering
the DNA thus causing injury to a person and his/her descendants?
Imagine a nano-device constructed as an alternative to conventional IVF
treatment. This ‘nano-torpedo’ is designed to capture the liveliest sperm and
transport it to an egg, and ensure the sperm is inserted. But in doing so a
design flaw damages the sperm or the egg with the result that the child is
born with a (congenital) disability. The injury causes disfigurement, social
and physical discomfort, stigma and earning loss. Is there any liability, and if
so, is it to the child or the parent? How long is the liability line?
The general approach to the recovery of damages is to define the boundaries
by reference to the subjective judicial evaluation of the division between
‘proximate’ and ‘remote’. We have so far established that under common law
a foetus has no rights, but a right of action for injury negligently caused
between conception and birth is crystallized on birth; and that statute law
 Nanotechnology and Civil Liability 243

permits a child, but no remoter descendant, to recover where the injury

occurred before conception (unless the parent knew of the risk). But will the
lawyers batter on the door of negligence to include remoter descendants, and
will the lobbyists batter on the doors of Parliament to extend the liability to
second and third generations?
On this point, arguments to extend the current boundary of remoteness
might include the following:

. foreseeability of damage to future generations;

. the parent’s ‘Human Right’ to procreate despite knowing of the risks;
. if genetic damage can be repaired, will refusal to undergo repair to DNA
constitute a failure to mitigate damages and will a parent’s unreasonable
refusal bind future damaged generations?
. if the damage is discovered on the first birth, is the injured child, when
an adult, capable of evaluating the risks of procreation and what about
unintended births attributable wholly or in part to the injured person’s
mental impairment?
. is the wrongdoer in sufficiently close proximity to the second and third
generation of injured descendants to be liable?
. will economic loss be recoverable, to compensate for damage to intellect, and
impairing earning power?

It not unlikely that with the development of nanotechnology and other new
technologies we shall see attempts to extend the present rules.
Traditionally damages were assessed and paid on a one-off capital payment,
which could be invested to take account of future care costs. However, most of
these claimants ran out of money. With the introduction of provisional damages
(payments as and when required for long-term care), insurance companies can
avoid windfall payments. For example, where the claimant dies earlier than
expected, but the companies remain liable for the life of the claimant. This
wait-and-see approach is perhaps a first step towards opening the gates to
second and possibly third generation claims.
We should note that general common law principles would certainly apply
to the potential toxicity of nanoparticles used in construction processes. It is
likely that (with the experience of, for example, asbestos nano-fibres) specific
regulations will be promulgated for the safety of the workforce and the
public for the control of manufacture, recycling and disposal of such material.

A note on asbestos litigation

The human and economic damage done by asbestos particles, which range
through the micro- and nanoscale, is perhaps an early warning that should be
heeded. In the USA, asbestos litigation is now the longest running mass tort
litigation in its history. Asbestos has not only killed and injured hundreds of
thousands of individuals but litigation is causing widespread economic damage
244 Nanotechnology

such as increased burden on public health systems, company bankruptcy,

reduced financial resources for company investment, loss of jobs, very high
legal administration costs and insurance company instability. Over US$54
billion has already been spent on asbestos litigation by companies and insurers
in the USA.
We wish to make two points. Firstly, that although nanoscale asbestos
particles and engineered nanoparticles (ENPs) such as carbon nanotubes,
fullerenes and metallic nanoparticles, are in many ways different from each
other, there are some similarities which should warn us to adopt a pre-
cautionary approach. We invite researchers and their funding bodies to
establish exactly what are the relevant health implication differences and
similarities between asbestos nanoparticles and ENPs. Secondly, if certain
crucial characteristics between asbestos nanoparticles and some engineered
nanoparticles are the same or very similar (as research may one day show)
then it must be acknowledged now that some ENPs may carry the same kind
of hazards, raise the same kinds of questions about exposure, and the same
kind of very long-term risks to worker (and public) health and the economy.
It is well established that asbestos particles cause mesothelioma and other
cancers, and asbestosis and other diseases. Particles in the lungs, which are less
than 1 micrometre in size, will penetrate the alveolus and may be absorbed by
phagocytosis, remaining in the system for a very long time (Timbrell, 2000,
p36). Research on asbestos has shown that the toxicity of the fibres depends on
length and diameter, and on surface reactivity and durability (Wagner et al,
1982). The risk is also related to the dosage of particles in a particular organ. If
this is true of asbestos fibres, which do cause disease, we need to know as soon
as possible whether this is also true of some or all ENPs, and in what dosages.
In the early days, asbestos was believed to be a wonderful substance:
abundant, inexpensive, versatile and fire-proof. Early warnings of its risks
were ignored, and some companies even lobbied against regulation despite
these warnings (Brodeur, 1985). Immense economic damage has been done
by the occupational and public health consequences. In the USA more than
225,000 premature deaths have been estimated for the 1985–2009 period
(Nicholson et al, 1982). Through 2002 about 730,000 individuals have brought
legal claims against approximately 8,400 businesses. Defendants and insurers
have spent a total of US$70 billion on litigation. US asbestos claims are still
increasing, and 75 out of the 83 different kinds of industry are affected. At
least 73 companies are bankrupt as a result (Carroll et al, 2005).
While in Europe asbestos has also done human and economic damage, the
Europeans are now learning the precautionary lesson and have officially
adopted the precautionary principle despite the resistance of some companies
who are attached to competitive short-term thinking (European Commission,
2000). The European Union nanotechnology strategy calls for early hazard
and risk assessment (European Commission, 2004). And in the UK a Royal
Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report on nanotechnology states:
‘Given previous experience with asbestos, we believe that nanotubes deserve
special toxicological attention’ (Royal Society and Royal Academy of
 Nanotechnology and Civil Liability 245

Engineering, 2004, chapter 5, paragraph 27). Among other things, the report
recommends occupational health research into production, use and disposal
to determine the sizes and concentrations of ENPs likely to be present in the
workplace (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004, Box 5.4).

Conclusion
This chapter is relevant to corporations in so far as they may be vicariously liable
for the actions or omissions of their servants or agents employed or engaged by
them in research. Corporate criminal liability law, as pointed out by Wells and
Elias (Chapter 21), is being developed because from a health and safety point of
view it is essential that those who are the ‘directing minds’ of the corporation
should now be held to be criminally liable where their acts or omissions are
negligent, reckless or intentional. Where a corporation or its directors are
criminally liable, it would almost automatically follow that they would be simi-
larly liable for any personal injury and consequent damages.
We hope we have not painted too pessimistic a picture for the industry. We
also hope that we have not been too cynical about the judicial process. Scientific
progress should not be readily obstructed and the risks of new technologies
should be weighed in the balance with the potential benefits to humankind.
As long as safety is not compromised for profit or pride, and as long as research
and tests are performed to the appropriate standards of the industry, the price
of insurance or cost of damages should not impede scientific development.

Legal cases
1 Section 2(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK).
2 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1997] 3 WLR 1151].
3 Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 A.E.R. 131.
4 In Rylands v Fletcher [1868].
5 Burton v Islington H.A. [1992] 3 WLR 637.
6 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976.
7 Consumer Protection Act 1987.
8 Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 A.E.R. 131.

References
Bailey, M. A. and Lattimore, R. G. (2004) ‘Nanotechnology: now is the time to assess
risk’, Occupational Hazards, vol 66(9), pp68–70
Brodeur, P. (1985) Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry On Trial, New York,
Pantheon
Carroll, S. J., Hensler, D. et al (2005) Asbestos Litigation, Santa Monica, CA, RAND
Institute for Civil Justice
246 Nanotechnology

European Commission (2000) Communication on the Precautionary Principle,

COM(2000) 1 final, Brussels, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/
com2000_0001en01.pdf
European Commission (2004) Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology.
Communication from the Commission, COM(2004)338 final, Brussels
Nicholson, W. J., Perkel, G. and Selikoff, I. J. (1982) ‘Occupational exposure to
asbestos: population at risk and projected mortality 1980–2030’, American Journal
of Industrial Medicine, vol 3, pp259–311
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (2004) Nanoscience and Nano-
technologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties, London, The Royal Society and The
Royal Academy of Engineering
Timbrell, J. (2000) Principles of Biochemical Toxicology, 3rd edn, London, Taylor &
Francis
UK Government (2005) Response to the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering
Report, London, UK Government
Wagner, J. C., Pooley, F. D. et al (1982) ‘A pathological and mineralogical study of
asbestos-related deaths in the United Kingdom in 1977’, Annals of Occupational
Hygiene, vol 26, pp423–431
 20

Nanotechnologies and the Ethical

Conduct of Research Involving
Human Subjects

Lorraine Sheremeta

Introduction
The promotion of research that is conducted according to the highest ethical
standards is the purpose of Canada’s Tri-Council Policy Statement on the
Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS). As a condition of
federal funding, researchers who are granted federal funding or who work
within institutions that receive federal funding must comply with the ethical
principles espoused in the articles of the TCPS. The TCPS is not law, nor is
it a set of rigid rules. Rather, it is an ethical framework that is intended to
provide guidance to researchers and the research ethics boards charged with
ethical review of human subject research. From the outset, it was recognized
that ‘considerations around the ethical conduct of human subjects are complex
and continually evolving’ and that ethical principles must be re-evaluated and
adapted to the context in which they are applied. As the scope of nano-
technology has inevitably grown to include the use of human subjects in
research, this chapter is intended to initiate discussion about the potential
impact that nanotechnology may have on human subject research and to
determine whether or how this impact might best be reflected in the TCPS.
This may have implications for ethical frameworks for nanotechnologies
elsewhere in the world.
Respect for human dignity demands that research be done with a view to
morally acceptable ends and that morally acceptable means be used to achieve
those ends. Importantly, to be considered ethical, research must also have
scientific merit.1 It is clear that the welfare and integrity of the individual is
the paramount consideration in research that is ethical from the perspective
of the TCPS. Steps must therefore be taken to ensure that individual research
248 Nanotechnology

subjects are not instrumentalized either during research or as a result of human

subject research.
Additionally, several trans-disciplinary guiding ethical principles have
emerged that express common standards, values and aspirations of researchers.
These principles include:

. respect for free and informed consent;

. respect for vulnerable persons;
. respect for privacy and confidentiality;
. respect for justice and inclusiveness;
. balancing harms and benefits;
. minimizing harm;
. maximizing benefit.

In light of these principles, it is important to consider whether there is anything

unique about nanotechnology that will impact the application of these ethical
principles. To answer this question, and to understand emerging issues, it is
important to first define what nanotechnology is and, second, to identify
specific areas of research where we can reasonably expect nanotechnology to
be used in human subjects.

Technology overview: how will nanotechnology be

used in human subject research?
It has been postulated by the UK Advisory Group on Nanotechnology (2002,
p23) that ‘nanotechnology today is arguably at about the same stage that
information technology occupied in the early 1960s, or biotechnology at the
beginning of the 1980s’.
Society appears poised to engage in a deeply polarized debate over the
benefits and risks of nanotechnology. The ETC Group (an action group on
Erosion, Technology and Concentration – formerly RAFI), for example, has
recommended an immediate moratorium on commercial production of new
nanomaterials and the creation of a global process to evaluate the economic,
health and environmental implications of nanotechnology.2 It recommends
strict adherence to the precautionary principle, which they advocate as being
‘a commonsense approach to Atomtechnology’.
According to Arnall (2003) Greenpeace takes a less radical approach than
the ETC Group. It recognizes that the impact of nanotechnology will be
gradual and limited in the short term and argues that a moratorium would
likely be both impractical and harmful. It strongly advises industry players
to take the issue of public acceptance of nanotechnology seriously. Failure to
do so, they warn, may result in a self-imposed moratorium. Commitment to
developing sound environmental practices and in performing relevant research
to evaluate human safety is urged. This is particularly salient in light of an
 Nanotechnologies and the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects 249

increasing number of reports in the academic literature and in the popular press
that nanoparticles may pose health risks to animals and humans (for example,
Hoet et al, 2004). It has been predicted that failure, by government and
industry, to acknowledge the concerns raised by critics of nanotechnology
may lead to a backlash, similar to that experienced in the context of agricultural
biotechnology (Mehta, 2004; Mnyusiwalla et al, 2003). Early recognition of the
political realities, societal concerns, underlying environmental and human
safety issues and their potential relevance to human subject research is
essential.
Despite these emerging concerns, Canada, like virtually all other developed
countries, is committed to building national capacity in the area of
nanotechnology.3 The National Research Council, the province of Alberta
and the University of Alberta are combining resources to build a national insti-
tute at the University of Alberta. The National Institute for Nanotechnology,
though physically located in Alberta, aspires to attract researchers from across
Canada and around the world and catapult Canada onto the international
nanotechnology stage.
Though nanotechnology is expected to impact most sectors of the economy,
it is expected to have a profound impact on health and health related technol-
ogies. Given that health and healthcare provision are among Canada’s foremost
priorities, the government is eager to find and to adopt more cost effective
methods of healthcare delivery. To the extent that nanotechnology is perceived
able to provide solutions to current healthcare problems, it will inevitably
receive high priority from research funding agencies, including the Canadian
Institutes of Health Research (CIHR). In the medical context, nanoscience is
expected to facilitate the development of, among other things:

. improved pharmaceutical products;

. implantable materials for tissue repair and replacement;
. implantable devices (including sensing devices, implantable medical devices
and sensory aids);
. improved surgical tools;
. improved diagnostic imaging methods; and
. improved genetic testing capabilities.

Each of these applications is described briefly below.

Improved pharmaceutical products

Nanotechnology has the potential to enable a range of new technologies to
facilitate the optimized delivery of pharmaceutical products (Langer, 2003).
Special materials, including nanoscale liposomes, polymers, silica and
hydroxyapatite are being used to encapsulate drugs and protect them from
biological processes in the body. As compared with their microscale counter-
parts, nanoparticle based encapsulation materials tend to have improved
250 Nanotechnology

diffusion and degradation characteristics (Chun et al, 2004). On this basis, it is

expected that nano-materials will facilitate the delivery of drugs through the
blood brain barrier and into the central nervous system. As a result, effective
treatments may be developed for Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease,
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and brain tumours. Similarly nano-encapsulation
materials may prove effective in the delivery of drugs to the retina of the eye
through the blood–retina barrier.

Implantable materials for tissue repair

and replacement
Nanotechnology is facilitating the development of novel materials that can be
used for human tissue repair and replacement (Langer and Tirrell, 2004).
Novel biocompatible materials can be used to make permanent implants or
temporary structures that can be reabsorbed by the body after surgery. For
example, bone and dental implants can be made from biocompatible nano-
materials characterized by their increased surface area and improved adhesion
characteristics. Tissue regeneration scaffolds made from nanomaterials are
being developed to grow a variety of complex human organs. In addition,
bioresorbable polymers can be used to make surgical sutures and orthopedic
fixation devices that are designed to biodegrade at appropriate rates to facilitate
bone healing in a variety of circumstances (Griffith, 2000).
It is envisioned that pharmaceutical-infused nanofibre devices may be
applied directly to affected tissue during surgery. One possible application is
that a mesh device may be infused with antibiotics, painkillers and/or other
medications and implanted around the heart muscle during surgery. The
objective is to provide optimized pharmaceutical effect at the critical time
through a delivery system that is implanted and does not require surgical
removal. Similarly, ‘smart’ nanomaterials may be devised to respond to
physical changes in the environment. For example, a change in temperature
or pH could stimulate a physical or chemical effect mimicking a natural
mechanism. Smart materials may include polymers that can mimic muscle
contraction or hydrogels that dissolve according to body chemistry to deliver
drugs as needed.

Implantable devices (including sensing devices,

implantable medical devices and sensory aids)
Nanotechnology offers the ability to develop a variety of implantable or
wearable sensing technologies and medical devices to facilitate the continuous
collection of highly accurate medical information. Microprocessors and
miniature devices can be paired with sensors to diagnose disease, transmit
information and to administer treatment automatically (and remotely) if
 Nanotechnologies and the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects 251

required. Implantable sensors can be used to detect a vast array of chemical or

physical properties. For example, sub-dermal sensor microchips are being
developed to continuously monitor and transmit data including, heart rate,
body temperature and glucose level. Microsensors are also being developed
to monitor success or failure of surgical procedures through the real-time
assessment of post-surgical tissue circulation. Implantable microelectro-
mechanical (MEMS) devices4 to measure flow rate and acceleration may be
used to assess and optimize treatment for individuals suffering from paralysis.
Implantable sensors can be engineered to work with medical devices to
automatically administer treatments for a variety of conditions. Implantable
microfluidic systems are being developed to dispense drugs on demand. Initial
applications of these systems will likely include delivery of chemotherapy
drugs for oncology patients and the delivery of drug treatments for patients
suffering from a variety of diseases including, autoimmune disorders, human
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS)
and diabetes. Implantable sensors that monitor heart rate can also act as a
defibrillator to regulate irregular rhythms.
Technology used in implantable devices designed to improve visual or aural
perception is currently workable at the microscale. These technologies will, in
all likelihood, be further miniaturized to the nanoscale. Work is being done to
develop retinal implants to restore vision by electronically stimulating func-
tional neurons in the retina. Cochlear implants are being developed to offer
individuals with hearing loss devices that will be more precise and that will
offer much better sound quality than devices currently available.

Improved surgical tools

It is anticipated that nanotechnology will inspire an array of improved surgical
tools that will allow surgeons to operate on human subjects with greater preci-
sion and safety and to monitor patients more accurately. Nanotechnology is
being used in the development of smart instruments and surgical robotics for
use in laparoscopic or ‘minimally invasive’ surgical procedures. Smart instru-
ments can be made with an ability to interpret the in vivo surgical terrain
and assist the surgeon in performing surgical procedures. Robotic systems
are already being used to give surgeons remote control over highly precise
instruments that are inserted into laparoscopic ports in the patient. Specifically,
surgical robotics systems are suited for use in gall bladder, prostate, colorectal,
gynecological, gastric and lung surgeries (Jonietz, 2004).

Medical imaging
Nanotechnology is also spawning a new wave of innovation in the area of
medical imaging. For example, nanoparticle probes are being developed for
use in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Magnetic nanoparticles can be
252 Nanotechnology

simultaneously attached to antibodies that specifically bind to known antigens

on cancer cells (Patri et al, 2002), or other molecules of biological interest (for
example fibrin) and labelled with a dye that can be visualized on MRI images.
Following administration of labeled nanoparticles, images can be taken to
assess a patient’s tumour burden. Cancer therapy can similarly be specifically
targeted to cancer cells in vivo. Magnetic nanoparticles can also be targeted
to proteins or other molecules of biological relevance and used in functional
MRI imaging to gain insight into a variety of human disease processes
(Winter et al, 2001).
A variety of miniaturized wireless medical devices are being developed that
can provide high quality images that are not possible with traditional imaging
devices. Pills are being developed that contain miniature video recording devices.
In this way, the entire digestive system can be imaged and assessed for various
diseases including malignancies and ulcerations. Researchers are attempting to
develop miniature X-ray devices that can be inserted into the human body.
One Israeli company, MediRad, is attempting to make carbon nanotubes into
a needle shaped cold cathode that would emit electrons for imaging or therapy.

Genetic testing methods

In perhaps the most ethically challenging medical application, nanotechnology
has the potential to further revolutionize genetic testing methods. This is
particularly relevant given the simultaneous trend away from linkage analysis
towards large-scale population genetic research and towards individualized
medicine using pharmacogenomics (Marshall, 2003). Standard testing methods
require large sample sizes and long reaction times to amplify the relevant
genetic sequence using polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Microfluidic testing
methods that are rapid and that can be performed on small biologic samples (for
example, a single human cell) are currently being developed.
It is now possible to manufacture and to use microfluidic chips that can
perform PCR and reverse transcription of DNA (Pilarski et al, 2004; Obeid
et al, 2003). Of this work, one author notes that this technology ‘offers a
direct route to . . . the possibility of high-throughput sequence analysis in
many practical applications’ (deMello, 2003). It is also now possible that, on
a single chip, nanolitre volumes can be simultaneously processed to isolate
cells, lyse them and purify their DNA or messenger RNA (mRNA) (Hong
et al, 2004). Nanofluidic ‘nanopore sequencers’ have been described for the
direct reading of the nucleotide sequence of single stranded DNA (Medrum
and Holl, 2002). Benefits of miniaturization include decreased volumes of
samples and reagents are required, faster reaction times, high throughput
and portability of the testing devices.
‘Lab-on-a-chip’ technology is being developed to facilitate the performance
of a variety of tests on a single chip. It entails the combination of nano-
technology and microfluidics to facilitate the integration of mixing, moving,
integration, detection and data processing on small portable devices. This
 Nanotechnologies and the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects 253

combination of arrays and fluidics can be used to optimize the speed, accuracy
and utility of genetic testing as well as other types of testing. This technology is
expected to be useful in quantifying the expression of particular sets of genes
that have been found, through array profiling, to be significant in distin-
guishing specific disease conditions. In time, these technologies are expected
to have a profound impact on clinical medicine.

Other nano-innovations that may impact human

subject research
Importantly, it must be noted that in addition to specific medical applications
nanotechnology is also facilitating the development of unobtrusive surveillance
devices and markedly improved computer storage capacity (Mehta, 2002).
These advances will permit the collection and storage of vast quantities of
many types of human subject data for medical research, social sciences
research, market research and other – as yet unanticipated – uses. Accordingly,
nanotechnology has the potential to profoundly impact the ways that both
observational and quantitative research on human subjects is performed, and
the way in which data is stored, accessed and utilized.

General ethical concerns

The TCPS aims to elucidate the duties owed to research subjects by
researchers, institutions and the research ethics boards (REBs) that are charged
with the review of human subject research. To be considered ethical, research
must be capable of answering the scientific questions posed, must be performed
in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations and must accord with
the ethical principles espoused in the TCPS.
Applications that are enabled by nanotechnology, like all technological
applications, have the potential to be used in ethical and unethical ways.
Although science at the nanoscale is not ethically distinct from science at
the macroscale certain issues become more complex and potentially more
problematic than when the same or similar applications are applied at the
micro scale or larger scales.
General ethical concerns that have been raised in association with bio-
medical nanotech applications include the following:
. Biomedical nanotech applications have the potential to medicalize normal
human conditions and further blur the distinction between ‘health’ and
‘disease’.
. Applications derived from nanotechnology have the potential to further
marginalize those in society who are perceived as disabled.
. Biomedical nanotech applications may be used inappropriately to further
human improvement.
254 Nanotechnology

. Nanotechnology may facilitate the development of a variety of devices that will

enable the surreptitious collection of human subject data. There are profound
privacy and confidentiality issues that arise in light of this possibility.
. Nanotechnology may have the effect of widening the gap between those in
the developed world and those in the developing world, despite the emerging
ethical imperative that the results of human subject research benefit all of
humanity.
. Certain biomedical nanotech applications may confound the conventional
boundary between ‘living’ and ‘non-living’. There are profound conceptual
and philosophical implications that arise from this blurring.
. Biomedical applications derived from nanotechnology are likely to be
disruptive and are expected to have profound impacts in the area of health
service delivery. Which applications will government fund? How will the
technology be assessed? Will applications not funded by government be
made available for individuals who are willing to pay?
. The development of nanotechnology applications (as with the development of
virtually all biotech applications) will depend heavily on private investment
therefore compounding ongoing concerns that the TCPS does not apply
directly to privately funded research that is performed in the private sector.

Specific ethical concerns relevant in the context of

genetic testing
As nanotechnology continues to greatly increase throughput and decrease the cost
of genetic testing methodologies, it also has the potential to magnify a number of
ethical challenges previously identified in the context of human genetics. Mass
testing at low cost coupled with the trend towards large-scale bio-banking and
improved bio-informatics capabilities, will inevitably inspire heightened concerns
over issues of informed consent, genetic privacy and commercialization.
For example, there are several relevant questions that remain unanswered
that relate to a discussion of nanotechnology-enabled genetic, genomic,
proteomic and metabolomic analyses. These include:
. Is it possible for human subjects to consent generally to future research
involving their biological samples or genetic data derived from their biolo-
gical samples regardless of the specifics of the research to be performed?
. Can human subjects delegate consent-granting authority to an REB for
future research that has scientific merit and is deemed ethical?
. Do REBs have sufficient knowledge and experience in dealing with genetic
research and population genetic research to warrant delegation of authority
to them by research subjects?
. How should a subject-centred, autonomy driven model of human subject
research be applied in the context of population genetic research?
. How will the application of nanotechnology in the area of genetic
testing challenge the traditional boundary between the patient-centred
 Nanotechnologies and the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects 255

autonomy-driven individualistic research ethics and communitarian norms

that underpin public health research? How or should the principles under-
lying public health apply in this context?

Law and regulation

In addition to the ethical challenges noted above, nanotechnology applications
will, in all likelihood, prove challenging from a regulatory perspective. Some of
the issues that need to be considered proactively include:

. How will Health Canada and Environment Canada interact to regulate

products that implicate nanotechnology?
. How should human safety be most appropriately measured and monitored in
this context?
. Are the existing environmental standards applicable to particulate pollution
and norms for pre-clinical and clinical testing of drugs and medical devices
appropriate in the context of nanotechnology?
. At the policy level, what steps need to be taken to ensure the safe, ethical and
timely adoption of the products of nanotechnology?
. Are the legal norms governing informed consent in Canada sufficiently
adaptable to permit individuals to consent to present and future (as
yet undefined) genetic research involving their biologic materials or data
derived from their biological samples? How does this vary across provincial
jurisdictions?
. How will nanotechnology challenge the existing federal and provincial
privacy laws governing health information?
. How will concerns over gene patenting and the adverse impact of patents on
the research environment translate into the realm of nanotechnology?

Conclusion
Nanotechnology will have a broad impact on biomedical research generally. At
present, it is clear that specific biomedical applications in the areas of human
genetic research (especially large-scale population genetic research) bio-
informatics and pharmacogenomics are being transformed, to one degree or
another, by nanotechnology. It is inevitable that, despite our best efforts, nano-
technology will spawn an array of novel innovations that are not presently
envisioned. Having said this, it appears that the general principles of the
TCPS are applicable and appropriate to human subject research that implicates
nanotechnology.
The specific sections of the TCPS that concern free and informed consent
(Article 2), privacy and confidentiality (Article 3), human genetic research
(Article 8) and human tissue research (Article 10) should be updated to
better reflect the ethical and legal uncertainty that has emerged with respect
256 Nanotechnology

to the norms of population genetic research. In addition, a new section

specifically addressing the ethical issues arising at the interface of traditional
individualistic, autonomy-driven research ethics and communitarian public
health research ethics would help REBs to perform appropriate ethical
review of research protocols. In addition, nanotechnology’s potential to inspire
unobtrusive surveillance devices and their potential use in biomedical and other
observational research should be addressed within the TCPS.
In summary, the medical technologies that are described in this paper all
fall well within the realm of the real or the possible. It is only a matter of
time before these, and other nanoscience-based innovations are realized. As
the example of agricultural biotechnology reveals, any progress towards
public acceptance and the legitimate introduction of new technologies in
society depends on public engagement and public awareness of the new
technologies. Public acceptance strongly depends on trust in government and
its agencies to oversee the research and development and marketing phases of
the commercial process. Human subject research that is scientifically sound,
ethical and subject to insightful ongoing review by REBs that are well-
equipped to deal with the issues that confront them will go a long way towards
ensuring public trust.

Notes
1 To be ethically sound, biomedical research on human subjects must have
scientific merit. Research Ethics Boards are responsible for ensuring that
scientific merit has been assessed prior to ethics approval, see TCPS, Article
1.5. Before human trials, drugs and medical devices require relevant pre-
clinical research, including animal research to assess toxicity in an animal
species and to predict the safety and efficacy in human subjects. Health
Canada’s Therapeutic Products Directorate is the Canadian federal authority
that regulates pharmaceutical drugs and medical devices for human use.
Before being given market authorization, a manufacturer must present
substantive scientific evidence of a product’s safety, efficacy and quality as
required by the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, and the Food
and Drug Regulations, C.R.C. 870. The Biologics and Genetic Therapies
Directorate is responsible for the regulation of biological and radio-pharma-
ceutical drugs, including blood and blood products, viral and bacterial
vaccines, genetic therapeutic products, tissues, organs and xenografts. This
includes evaluating and monitoring their safety, effectiveness and quality.
2 The stated goal of this report is to ‘translate the complex scientific infor-
mation and to catalyze widespread public debate’ (p6). In conclusion it is
the position of the ETC Group that ‘[g]iven the concerns raised over nano-
particle contamination in living organisms, governments should declare an
immediate moratorium on commercial production of new nanomaterials
and launch a transparent global process for evaluating the socio economic,
health and environmental applications of the technology’ (p25).
 Nanotechnologies and the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects 257

3 See, for example, Speech From the Throne to Open the Third Session of the
Thirty-Seventh Parliament of Canada, 2 February 2004. It is expressly
stated that: ‘We want a Canada that is a world leader in developing and
applying the path-breaking technologies of the 21st Century – biotechnology,
environmental technology, information and communications technologies,
health technologies, and nanotechnology’. Available online at http://www.
pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language¼E&Page¼sftddt&doc¼sftddt2004_1_e.
htm, accessed 18 April 2006.
4 MEMS is an acronym for ‘micro-electromechanical systems’. MEMS
technology embeds mechanical devices such as fluid sensors, mirrors,
actuators, pressure and temperature sensors, vibration sensors and valves
in semiconductor chips. Typical MEMS devices combine sensing, proces-
sing and/or actuating functions to alter the way that the physical world is
perceived and controlled.

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chain reaction with cycle number selection’, Analytical Chemistry, vol 75, p288
Patri, A. K., Thomas, T., Baker Jr., J. R. and Bander, N. H. (2003) ‘Antibody-
dendrimer conjugates for targeted prostate cancer therapy’, Polymer Materials
Science and Engineering, vol 86, p130
Pilarski, L., Mehta, M. D., Caulfield, T., Kaler, K. V. I. S. and Backhouse, C. J. (2004)
‘Microsystems and nanoscience for biomedical applications: A view to the future’,
Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, vol 24, pp40–45
Winter, P. M., Chen, J., Song, S.-K., Fuhrhop, R. W., Wickline, S. A., Lanza, G. M.
(2001) ‘Relaxivities of paramagnetic nanoparticle contrast agents for targeted
molecular imaging’, Proceedings of the International Society of Magnetic Resonance
Medicine, vol 9, p54
UK Advisory Group on Nanotechnology (2002) New Dimensions for Manufacturing: A
UK Strategy for Nanotechnology, London: Department of Trade and Industry
 21

Nanotechnologies and Corporate

Criminal Liability

Celia Wells and Juanita Elias

Introduction
In this chapter we focus on the potential criminal liability of corporations,
with references to nanotechnology (Wells, 2001; Wells and Elias, 2005). This
contrasts with corporations’ private or civil law liability for personal injury
and with the wider notion of corporate social responsibility. The emerging
debate about corporate criminal responsibility will inevitably have relevance
to the global development of nanotechnology. Events such as pharmaceutical
harms, environmental damage, transport disasters and chemical plant explo-
sions have led to calls for those enterprises to be prosecuted for manslaughter.
Other forces shaping the evolution of legal principles of attribution of
responsibility at state and international levels include the pressure to hold busi-
nesses accountable for human rights violations and the more business focused
drive against corruption by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU).
An outstanding case of poor safety attitudes in Europe occurred when in
1987 a car ferry left the Belgian port of Zeebrugge with its doors open and
capsized with the loss of nearly 200 lives. The subsequent inquiry in England,
where the company P&O Ferries was based, found a history of open-door
sailings, and management disregard of obvious safety measures such as the
installation of a simple system of indicator lights informing the bridge whether
the doors were closed. Although P&O were prosecuted for manslaughter,
which was itself an historically important legal event, it proved impossible to
convict the company because of an inability to meet the English legal require-
ment that the responsible ‘brains’ of the company be identified (see below).
Ironically, it was the very fact that safety was not taken seriously within the
company, that no director had responsibility for safety, which made this
‘identification’ approach inadequate.
260 Nanotechnology

Criminal law: an overview

The same event can give rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Since criminal
law is pre-eminently concerned with standards of behaviour, it is enforced by a
system of state punishment negotiated via standards of fault such as intention,
knowledge and recklessness. Civil law in contrast functions mainly to compen-
sate for harm caused and therefore uses far broader notions of negligence and
strict liability (Chapter 19). Thus the substantive requirements in terms of
what the prosecution (in a criminal case) or the claimant (in a civil case) has
to prove will differ. So for example, it is less difficult to prove a civil case of
negligence than to prosecute manslaughter since that requires proof of gross
negligence. In terms of enforcement, the processes are distinct. In procedural
terms, the standard of proof is also stricter in a criminal case (beyond
reasonable doubt) than in a civil one (on a balance of probabilities). Another
significant difference is that a company or other person can insure against
civil but not against criminal liability. Criminal law is more rooted in national
jurisdictions than are many other areas of law. Its structure and scope varies
considerably between common law states such as England and Wales,
Australia, Canada (Chapter 9), and the United States (Chapter 7) and the
Code jurisdictions of continental Europe (Chapter 8) and Japan (Chapter 6).
But it also differs within states (for example, within the UK, Scotland has its
own system) as do the different US and Australian states and territories. A
final and crucial difference, as this chapter will reveal, is that criminal law
takes a much less straightforward approach to the corporate defendant than
does civil law. Jurisdictions that recognize the concept of corporate criminal
responsibility are often ambivalent about it, treating it as something of an
outcast, to be tolerated rather than encouraged. But globalization has led
both to the proliferation of ‘stateless’ multinational corporations and also to
harmonization through transnational and international law, and this will have
relevance to the international and regional development of nanotechnology.

Corporations and criminal law

Corporations are legally deemed single entities, distinct and separate from all
the individuals who compose them. Legal personality means that corporations
can sue and be sued, hold property and transact, and incur legal liability in their
own name and on their own account. However, criminal liability raises a host of
questions. Common law states have recognized the concept of corporate
liability since the 19th century. Many continental European jurisdictions
have only begun to do so very recently (France and Italy have amended their
Criminal Codes in the past 25 years). Japan, where many nanotechnologies
are being developed, recognizes the concept of corporate criminal liability.
What kinds of offences might a corporation commit? Criminal law in all
jurisdictions covers a huge range of offences. In common law jurisdictions
there are broadly two types of offence: regulatory offences such as those in
 Nanotechnologies and Corporate Criminal Liability 261

the health and safety and environmental protection fields, highly relevant to
nanotechnology, and conventional offences such as assault and manslaughter.
Although regulatory schemes share some characteristics of mainstream crim-
inal law – using criminal courts and fines – they are in other ways quite different
from, and are certainly perceived by the specialist enforcement agencies and
those they regulate as quite distinct from, criminal law. They are created
specifically to regulate and set standards in specialized areas of business
activity. There is often a close relationship between the regulators and the
regulated, standards are set, warnings are issued and formal enforcement
employed as a last resort (Hawkins, 2002). The offences themselves are defined
not in terms of results (such as causing death) but in terms of failure to comply
with risk assessed standards, and often impose strict liability (in other words do
not require proof of fault). Those differences are often reflected in broader rules
of corporate responsibility.
In the code-based jurisdictions of continental Europe, business enterprise is
regulated through administrative law and penalties. While these schemes are
not classified as part of the criminal law system, they are in many ways
conceptual soul mates of the regulatory sub-systems of criminal law that have
developed in common law jurisdictions. Transnational harmonization through
the EU and international harmonization through the OECD and International
Labour Organisation (ILO) also leads to more similarity than difference. Stan-
dard setting, compliance rather than punitive enforcement regimes, backed by
fines or penalties, are some of the common features. Adverse events caused by
nanotechnologies, depending on the type and severity of harm, the offence
structure and enforcement policies and practices in the particular country,
could therefore give rise to several different regulatory, administrative or
conventional offence investigations.

Corporations and responsibility

Corporations were traditionally classified with animals, the children and the
insane as non-accountable. The exclusion of corporations is an accident of
history, culture and language. Criminal law had already absorbed ideas of
individualist rationality and moral autonomy by the time that corporations
became significant social actors. These ideas constrained the terms when
criminal law sought to adapt to these new players on the field. It sounds fanciful
to say that a corporation is just like a human being but that is exactly how criminal
law has tended to conceptualize them. An inevitable tension emerged between the
pragmatism of applying criminal law to corporations, legal persons in their own
right, and the theoretical problem of attributing blame to a collective unit.
Three different principles for attributing blame to corporations have
competed for attention. According to the ‘agency principle’ the company is
vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of all its employees. United States federal
law employs a principle of this type while English law limits the application of
vicarious liability to certain regulatory offences. The ‘identification principle’
262 Nanotechnology

rests on identifying a limited layer of senior officers within the company as its
mind or ‘brains’ and renders the company liable only for their transgressions,
not for those of other workers. The ‘systems principle’ locates corporate blame
in the procedures, operating systems or culture of a company. The first two
principles seek in different ways to equate corporate culpability with that of
individuals and are therefore conceptually derivative forms of liability. The
third principle, on the other hand, exploits the dissimilarities between individual
human beings and group entities. We will now say a little more about when these
principles are applied in selected common law jurisdictions.
While the agency principle is readily accepted in English civil (or private)
law so that an employer or principal is vicariously liable for the acts of any
employee or agent, its application in criminal law is limited to regulatory
offences. However, a full-scale vicarious liability principle is endorsed in the
criminal law of South Africa as well as in the federal law of the United
States, thus confirming that there is no conceptual hurdle to its application
to offences requiring proof of subjective fault. However, in the United States
jurisdiction over many criminal law matters lies at the State level. Some
states follow the Federal rules, while others adopt more closely the English
common law binary scheme under which vicarious principles apply only to
certain regulatory offences. Some commentators make a distinction between
vicarious liability and duty based liability such as that under the Health and
Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK).
Vicarious liability is regarded as too rough and ready for the delicate task of
attributing blame for serious harms. It has been criticized for including too
little in demanding that liability flow through an individual, however great
the fault of the corporation, and for including too much in blaming the
corporation whenever the individual employee is at fault, even in the absence
of corporate fault. But this begs the question: how do we conceptualize
‘corporate’ fault? Vicarious liability attracts criticism as a mechanism for
attributing fault because it is felt that there is some other way of measuring
‘corporate culpability’.
The restrictive identification principle is used for conventional fault based
offences such as fraud, corruption and manslaughter in most common law juris-
dictions. If anything it has become more restrictive in England since the failed
corporate manslaughter prosecution of Great Western Trains in 1999 (Attorney
General’s Reference, 2000). Canada in contrast has followed an expansionist
trend in its 2003 reforms. Liability for a crime will be attributed to a corporation,
either where ‘senior officers’ actually participated in the offence, or where the
actions of one or more ‘representatives’ combines with the intent or negligence
of one or more ‘senior officers’. Both ‘representative’ and ‘senior officer’ cover
broader categories of personnel than the identification principle allows.
The system or company culture principle, that attributes fault to a corpora-
tion on the basis of internal decision-making structures, is attracting growing
attention. Its philosophical heritage is traced to Peter French who identified
three elements in such structures: a responsibility flowchart, procedural rules
and policies. (Later theorists have been less concerned with matching corporate
 Nanotechnologies and Corporate Criminal Liability 263

systems with human intentionality.) A legislative example of this approach can

be found in the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995, which seeks to establish
standard principles for federal offences, eventually extending to similar situa-
tions under state law. Under the Code, intention, knowledge or recklessness
will be attributed to a body corporate whenever it expressly, tacitly or impliedly
authorized or permitted the commission of the offence. Such authorization or
permission may be established, inter alia, where its culture encourages situa-
tions leading to an offence. ‘Corporate culture’ is defined as an attitude,
policy, rule, course of conduct, or practice existing within the body corporate
generally or in the part of the body corporate where the offence occurred.
Thus evidence of tacit authorization or toleration of non-compliance or failure
to create a culture of compliance will be admissible.
It is in the interests of business to exaggerate these conceptual difficulties.
‘The negotiation of meaning is biased in favour of structurally powerful
groups’ (Nelken, 1983, p211), and corporations often have far greater access
to resources than the jurisdictions under whose laws they operate. The various
corporate and individual defendants were able to employ the continuous
services of 14 defence counsel when P&O were prosecuted after the Herald of
Free Enterprise tragedy. Corporations are also able to manipulate the media
to influence public opinion in their favour, both generally and in relation to
specific disasters. The further removed the harms they cause are from the
public experience, the easier this is. It was relatively straightforward for
Union Carbide to give the impression to the American public that the
Bhopal chemical explosion was caused by the local Indian workforce. The
process can be a subtle and long-term one that involves not only corporate
attempts to recover their reputation after a disaster but in more general ways
to give the impression that safety is their foremost concern. Those with any
stake in nanotechnology have much to learn here.

International harmonization and convergence

While legal systems have been reluctant to move from an individualistic criminal
law to one that embraces the business corporation, the pace of change is largely
driven by transnational and international organizations. The Council of Europe
accepted in 1988 the recommendation of its select committee that member states
consider the promotion of corporate liability. Three Council of Europe treaties,
dealing with environmental crimes, cybercrime and corruption, recommend the
introduction of corporate criminal liability, but leave up to the signatory states to
decide whether criminal penalties or other effective measures against legal
entities should be imposed.1 Other than through the Corpus Iuris project,
there has not been a move towards standardization in the EU, despite the
divergent national developments described above.2
In combination, several international instruments have begun to exert
powerful pressure on states to introduce or refine existing corporate liability
provisions. While most code-based continental legal systems long eschewed
264 Nanotechnology

corporate liability (Mueller, 1957), the debate is perhaps no longer whether to

have corporate liability but what form it should take (Coffee, 1999, p9). There
is a new willingness to move towards corporate liability and reflect cultural
shifts in jurisdictions which have until recently been extremely reluctant to
contemplate group liability because of its historical association with repressive
regimes. We have also witnessed cultural changes in perceptions of corporate
responsibility. Because of differences in legal and political background, these
changes have had disparate impacts in individual jurisdictions. Those jurisdic-
tions that have come late to corporate liability are in a position to develop
principles that are less hide-bound than those in the common law countries.
Even if the corporate body is not itself subject to criminal liability, individual
directors might be (as in Spain) or the administrative or civil penalties may
be as, if not more, punitive in impact. This leaves companies exploiting nano-
technologies open to the risk of prosecution for health and safety offences
(which in some circumstances include harm to the public), environment and
pollution offences, as well as manslaughter or equivalent homicide offences
based on criminal negligence.

Globalization, multinational corporations and law

There is now also a growing debate about the applicability of international
(particularly human rights) norms to corporations. Multinational corporations
have been accused both of direct human rights abuses and of colluding in
various ways with repressive states. Because of the normative implications of
this task many writers have drawn on ‘complicity’, a notion widely recognized
in systems of criminal law. Indeed it has been claimed that complicity is ‘an
essential concept in the context of international efforts to ensure a higher
standards [sic] of corporate social responsibility’ (Clapham, 2002, p241). But
international law does not easily recognize non-state actors. However powerful
corporations are, they are not states.
Corporate accountability needs to be considered in the light of the changing
nature of state power and influence in the international system and the rising
power of multinational corporations. States are reluctant to take action against
multinational corporations in order to protect labour standards and human
rights, because of fears of losing much needed foreign investment. Multinational
corporations tend to establish subsidiaries in countries where conditions are
favourable to their business. In their negotiations with the governments of
host countries their ability to pick up and leave provides them with a great
deal of leverage over states dependent upon the jobs that they provide. Develop-
ment strategies by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and
IMF, alongside programmes of deregulation and privatization, render states
even less willing to frighten off foreign investors; they are more dependent
upon them than ever before (see Chapters 6–9).
Some writers speak of the end of the state (Ohmae, 1990, 1996), while others
talk more in terms of the changing role of the state in an era of globalization. It
 Nanotechnologies and Corporate Criminal Liability 265

has been estimated that corporations make up 51 of the 100 world’s largest
economies and that the combined sales of the world’s top 200 corporations
are far greater than a quarter of the world’s economic activity (Anderson and
Cavanagh, 2000). The same researchers also suggest that although there are
now 40,000 corporations in the world whose activities cross national bound-
aries, the top 200 of these firms (largely comprising US and Japanese firms)
account for a huge (and growing) share of the world’s economic activity. In a
globalized economy, firms (especially those in manufacturing) can move
easily across borders and evade boycotts and sanctions (Willetts, p364). This
trans-nationality in itself poses problems for national and international law
(Dubin, 1999). It is in this arena of multinational power and mobility that
nanotechnologies are developing, and it is major multinationals rather than
start-ups that are able to invest the large amounts needed for nanotechnology
research and development (R&D).

Holding corporations to account

Of course it is a mistake to think that multinational corporations are complete
outlaws from the international arena. Aside from anything else they are
proficient at invoking its protection and facilities where it suits them. Many
commentators make the point that the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights applies to organizations as well as states and individuals. In the words
of its Preamble: ‘every individual and every organ of society, keeping this
Declaration in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect
for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and inter-
national, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance’
(UN, 1948). While they do not impose legally binding obligations on corpora-
tions, the ‘UN Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations’ are
an important restatement of existing international human rights law (UN,
2003).
While the most direct legal response would be through a criminal or civil
action in the host country, it is obviously unlikely that a state that itself
abuses human rights would prosecute such cases or be receptive to civil
litigation. This has led to the pursuit of legal redress in the home country of
the multinational corporation complicit in the host state’s human rights
abuses. The main examples include actions based on domestic tort law and
the inventive use of the US federal ‘Alien Tort Claims Act’. A further stage
is the possibility of pursuing multinational corporations in international law.

Punishing corporations
The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
contained in its draft form a clause extending jurisdiction over legal persons.
This clause was lost during the negotiations leading to the Treaty. Given
266 Nanotechnology

that the ICC is concerned with the most egregious of wrongful conduct
(genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression) this omission
might be thought to be fatal to any proposal that corporations be liable in inter-
national law for lesser breaches of human rights. However, as our account
shows, this would be too hasty a conclusion for a number of reasons. Firstly,
there is the trend towards the adoption and extension of corporate liability
for crime. Secondly, the differences between jurisdictions in their institutional
arrangements for regulating corporations are more apparent than real. Thirdly,
it is not such an imaginative leap to conceive a corporation as the subject of
international law. While the mindset of the criminal lawyer is to think about
individuals, that of the international lawyer was until the middle of the last
century, to think about states. Yet the ICC and other war crimes tribunals
finalize the break in that mould by addressing specifically the crimes of
individual human agents. As people become more accustomed to conceiving
of collective entities as wrongdoers, the conceptual gulf may become much
less wide.
Even if the conceptual problems are overcome, awkward questions will be
asked about the efficacy of corporate punishment. Fines are ineffective, it is
said; corporate prosecutions allow guilty individuals to escape penalty and
the target is misdirected because ‘innocent’ shareholders, employees and
consumers bear the real costs. One simple answer to the suggestion that corpo-
rate liability is ineffective is to point to the extraordinary efforts corporations
frequently employ to avoid conviction.
An important question is whether the activities of corporations concern us
sufficiently to impose upon them criminal penalties. The real problem is that, if
a deterrent effect is sought through financial penalties, rather than through
adverse publicity or other remedial measures, the size of the penalty might
have to be so great that the unintended side effects (such as bankruptcy)
would indeed be intolerable. The almost exclusive reliance on fines in some
jurisdictions has contributed to this sense of powerlessness. However, within
some systems there is evidence of more imagination and commitment to over-
come the limitations of financial penalties. It is trite to note that a company
cannot be imprisoned. However, a combination of a fine and the incarceration
of directors may be the most effective punishment. Fines are not the only option
for the company itself. Equity fines (which effectively dilute the value of the
company’s shares), corporate probation, adverse publicity and community
service are all options.
Corporate probation is used in the United States in addition to or as an
alternative to fines. Sanctions are aggravated by factors such as the aggregate
harm or gain from the illegal activity and the involvement or condemnation
by ‘high level personnel’. (Against ‘criminal purpose organizations’ a power
to ‘execute’ – corporate capital punishment – is available.) Sentences are fine-
tuned to reflect culpability. Corporations that have effective programmes to
detect violations, which report them when they occur and accept responsibility,
are rewarded with a lower fine. The guidelines thus seek to ensure that criminal
penalties act as more than externally imposed costs.
 Nanotechnologies and Corporate Criminal Liability 267

Conclusion
The cultural, social and political changes associated with the development of
highly interdependent global economies help to explain the rise in debate
about corporate liability. A pervasively enabling technology such as nanotech-
nology will find itself both generating new legal risks and generating new
responses to them. What form will responses take? It is worth thinking about
the potential benefits and disadvantages of relying on blame and punishment
especially in the safety context. A system of blame may be less effective in
terms of safety delivery than one that encourages prevention through reporting
of near misses for example.
Marc Galanter describes four different types of response to the risks
inherent in our increasing reliance on technology, which would include nano-
technology (Galanter, 1994). First, there are controls intrinsic to technology:
the initial design, safety procedures, worker training and so on. While many
are not specifically legal they are nonetheless regulated through scientific and
technological practice. Secondly, there are administrative controls such as
occupational health regulatory regimes. The third layer consists of the public
institutions for absorbing and spreading losses, health care systems and services
and so on. Private law, compensation through tort and so on, comprises the
fourth layer. Criminal law, and the public institutions of investigation such
as inquiries and inquests, should also be added. The distribution of work
between the different layers of institutional responses affects the balance
between prospective and preventive mechanisms as against retrospective and
remedial controls.
Perhaps health and safety regulation is the way forward? An example from
the rail industry will serve here. In February 1999 in the UK, Balfour Beatty
was fined a record penalty £1.2 million for health and safety offences after
the collapse of tunnels during construction of the Heathrow Express line in
1994. The prosecution claimed that this ‘raises many issues from which lessons
need to be learned. The level of the fines sends a clear message to all in the
industry, including clients, designers, consultants, contractors and sub-
contractors that they must ensure the safety of the public and workers’. But a
month later the same company was fined again, this time £500,000 after a
derailment of a goods train in 1997. At the time this was the highest ever for
a railway accident and it was eclipsed only when the company Great Western
Trains were fined £1.5 million after the Southall rail crash in which seven
people died. The picture is one of a poor safety culture. The trial judge said
of the derailment fine: ‘The importance and gravity of this case cannot be over-
stated . . . A very substantial risk to the public was caused by lack of supervision
of the method of work’. Were it not for the company’s good record the fine
would have been very much higher. The size of these fines alone underlines
the seriousness of Balfour Beatty’s offences. They are in stark contrast with
the average UK fine of £18,000 for health and safety breaches leading to death.
What is certain is that an integrated international regulatory enforcement
strategy is more likely to achieve results than a fragmented and inconsistent
268 Nanotechnology

one. Law does not provide easy answers to the complex and uncertain political
and economic challenges presented by globalization.

Notes
1 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173, in force July 2002.
Neither the Convention on the Protection of Environment through Crim-
inal Law ETS No. 172, (1998, to date one ratification) nor the Convention
on Cybercrime ETS No. 185 (2001), is yet in force.
2 While the status of the project is somewhat in doubt, it is useful as a model
for a pan-European set of principles. Article 13 covers the criminal liability
of organizations. For a useful table on the legal position in the 15 member
states; see Delmas-Marty and Vervaele (2000).

References
Attorney General’s Reference No. 2 of 1999 [2000] 3 All ER 182, CA
Anderson, S. and Cavanagh, J. (2000) Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power,
Corporate Watch, 2000, at www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/top200.htm, accessed
8 August 2002
Clapham, A. (2002) ‘On complicity’, in Henzelin, M. and Roth, R. (eds), Le Droit penal
a l’epreuve de l’internationalisation, Paris/Geneva/Brussels, LGDG, Georg, Bruylant
Coffee, J. (1999) ‘Corporate criminal liability: an introduction and comparative
survey’ in Eser, A., Heine, G. and Huber, B. (eds) Criminal Responsibility of Legal
and Collective Entities, Freiburg, Ius Crim
Council of Europe (1988) Recommendation No. R (88) 18
Delmas-Marty, M. and Vervaele, J. (2000) The Implementation of the Corpus Iuris in the
Member States, at www.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/, Annex II
Dubin, L. (1999) ‘The Direct Application of Human Rights Standards to, and by,
Transnational Corporations’, 61, The Review of the International Commission of
Jurists 35
Galanter, M. (1994) ‘The transnational traffic in legal remedies’ in Jasanoff, S. (ed)
Learning from Disaster: Risk Management after Bhopal, Pennsylvania, University
of Pennsylvania Press
Hawkins, K. (2002) Law as Last Resort, Oxford, Oxford University Press
Mueller, O. (1957) ‘Mens rea and the corporation’, University of Pittsburgh Law Review,
vol 21, pp281–292
Nelken, D. (1983) The Limits of the Legal Process: A Study of Landlords, Law and Crime,
London, Academic Press
Ohmae, K. (1990) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy,
New York, Harper Business
Ohmae, K. (1996) The End of the Nation State, London, Free Press
UN (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), UN Doc.A/810, at 71 (1948)
UN (2003) Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, Doc E/CN.4/Sub2/
2003/12/rev 2
 Nanotechnologies and Corporate Criminal Liability 269

Wells, C. (2001) Corporations and Criminal Responsibility. Oxford, Oxford University

Press
Wells, C. and Elias, J. (2005) ‘Catching the conscience of the king: corporate players on
the international stage’ in Alston, P. (ed), Non State Actors in International Law:
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, vol XIII, pp139–176
Willetts, P. (2001) ‘Transnational actors and international organizations in world
politics’, in Baylis, J and Smith, S (eds) The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press: pp356–383
 Part Six
Conclusion
 22

What Makes Nanotechnologies Special?

Michael D. Mehta and Geoffrey Hunt

As one of the first comprehensive books on the impacts of nanotechnology,

Nanotechnology: Risk, Ethics and Law explores the emergence of nano-
technology in Japan, the United States of America, Europe and Canada to
demonstrate how different regions construct their nano-futures. Since much
of the early discussion on nanotechnology focuses on how to frame benefits
and control risks, chapters in the book examined ethical positions for under-
standing the implications of nanotechnology, and specific challenges arising
from the use of this suite of technologies in medicine, industrial processes
and products, and food. To become a mature and sustainable technology, nano-
technology must have general support by users of nano-based products and by
the public at large. To understand the complexities associated with building
support for nanotechnology, chapters in the book examined public perceptions
of nanotechnology, the role of trust in regulation, and a set of related questions
on how nanotechnology fits within current legal regimes for patenting,
assessing civil and criminal liability. Chapters also examined some conceptual
issues of complexity, and ethical issues both from a global point of view and
about the use of human subjects where nano-based products are involved.
As in the case of previous technologies, nanotechnologies are outpacing our
collective ability to understand and direct their course. If we consider develop-
ments in nuclear technology, information technology, and biotechnology there
appears to be a fairly consistent pattern of development, use, social concern,
regulation and ultimately some form of resolution. All modern technologies,
and perhaps even non-modern ones, move through such a series of stages.

Public engagament
As Kristen Kulinowski indicated in Chapter 2, public support for new technol-
ogies is generally strong at first and tends to decline over time as values get
articulated and risks become the focus of debate. For Kulinowski this pattern
274 Nanotechnology

demonstrates the dynamic nature of public opinion on new technologies and

suggests that various drivers (for example, science fiction depictions of nano-
technology, the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) bring to the
surface debates about the ethical and social impacts of technology. As Julie
Barnett et al discussed in Chapter 16, national differences exist with respect
to how risks and benefits are constructed and interpreted by the public. For
instance, public acceptance of technology in Europe tends to be more cautious
compared with a general optimism observed in the United States of America.
In spite of these differences, the authors of both chapters recognize that
public acceptance of nanotechnology is difficult to build due to deficiencies
that often exclude the public from meaningful participation in discussions
about nanotechnology at a more ‘upstream’ level, and the need to consider
how to incorporate complex social and ethical dimensions into the equation.
This thread is picked up by Geoffrey Hunt in Chapter 15 when he observes
that nanotechnology is emerging into a global system in which new sense of
human responsibility is evolving. For Hunt a critical review of nanotechnology
involves both an understanding of complex systems (Chapter 5) and an
expansion of our understanding of how this new global sensibility generates
questions about the ethics of nanotechnology given a set of observations on
the weaknesses of the market economy and systemic disparities in wealth.
Perhaps a constructive technology assessment approach, as described in
Chapter 17 by Edna Einsiedel and Linda Goldenberg, may be useful for
incorporating social criteria into the mix, and moving the discussion on
nanotechnology away from the usual, narrowly constructed, risk–benefit
dialectic that predominates.
Nanotechnology is at the cusp of a techno-socio-cultural revolution. Since
nanotechnology is a driver of technological convergence, new challenges arise
for those who focus on the kind of questions raised in this book. When we
consider nanotechnology and the type of things that nanotechnology is doing
(or promises to do), it is essential to explore the impact of technological conver-
gence on society and the evolving environments into which nanotechnologies
are being introduced. In Chapter 6, Matsuda Masami et al considered how
nanotechnology is evolving in Japan within the context of a new vision for
science in society that is precautious in nature and sensitive to religious
traditions and cultural values. This new direction in industrial policy within
Japan contrasts with the approach taken in the United States of America, as
discussed by Kirsty Mills in Chapter 7. In the United States the focus of
industrial policy is on nano-materials and the protection of intellectual prop-
erty. Chapter 11 discusses, largely in the American context, the historical
opportunity that now exists for ‘getting nanotechnology right the first time’.
In Chapter 8, Geoffrey Hunt argued that the European approach to nanotech-
nology is based on developing environmentally friendly technology within a
regulatory system built on the precautionary approach. Canada, as discussed
by Linda Goldenberg in Chapter 9, falls somewhere between Japan and the
United States with a conservative approach to nanotechnology that links
research and development to social policy. Although Canada has no national
 What Makes Nanotechnologies Special? 275

nanotechnology strategy it is worth noting that the Canadian approach focuses

on converging technologies by treating nanotechnology as primarily an
enabling technology. In none of these cases do we see policy makers or
politicians willing to look too far forward into the possible future of nanotech-
nology. As Eric Drexler in Chapter 3 proposed, the original vision of Richard
Feynman of directed assembly of nano-scale objects has been lost in high-level
discussions on nanotechnology.
It is worth noting that not all technologies survive these transitions. Some
technologies like civilian nuclear power (especially in the United States,
Canada and the UK) and agricultural biotechnology (so-called genetically
modified (GM) foods) stall in their tracks, and represent case studies for
people in business schools on the topic of commercial failure. With nanotech-
nology, much is at stake. Since nanotechnology crosses over into so many
disciplines, potential and actual business ventures, and is converging strongly
with biotechnology in particular, a range of challenges and opportunities
emerges. Michael Mehta in Chapter 10 examined some of these challenges
by arguing that several lessons can be learned about how some states dealt
with genetically modified food, and how such an approach tended to erode
trust in regulators thereby making good governance more difficult to achieve.
What makes nanotechnology special? Scientists have opened up the ‘black
box’ of nanotechnology and its complexities, and as a result have unleashed a
transformative (or disruptive) suite of technologies on the world. Nano-
technology is disruptive in that it puts pressure on other products or processes
to re-align themselves around its introduction. More importantly, nano-
technology is transformative in the sense that it has the potential, at least in
theory, to transform social relations, labour, international economies, and to
affect a range of institutions. When we opened up this black box, we ushered
in a ‘nanotechnological’ way of seeing the world (Milburn, 2002). Con-
sequently, the very existence of nanotechnology plays a role in shaping how
we understand nature and ultimately affects how we re-design our regulatory,
legal, social and ethical frameworks.

To regulate or not?
There are strong arguments over the question of when and how nano-derived
products should be regulated. Generally, advocates of neo-liberal economics
suggest that regulation of new technologies is undesirable since it typically
places restrictions on the development, commercialization and use of new
products. Such individuals view regulation as a barrier to innovation. They
often believe that, since innovation occurs now within a global context, that
nation-state based regulation creates an uneven playing field where developers
of new technologies can take advantage of different regulatory regimes, and
thus dilute the economic advantages of new technologies (for example intellec-
tual property, new efficiencies, and so on) in those countries that regulate earlier
and/or more forcefully than others.
276 Nanotechnology

The concern with nanotechnology is that regulation will repel investors and
weaken the ability of countries to compete in globally coordinated markets.
Since nanotechnology is viewed by many as the next major wave of transforma-
tive (or disruptive) technologies, and since many military applications can spin
off from them, some fear that regulation will stall the economy and give
competing countries access to new technologies that could work against the
interests of regional economic growth and even national security.
Those who oppose regulation of nanotechnology suggest also that it is such a
wide-open field, with little agreement on what constitutes a nano-derived
product. Since many of the processes of biology and chemistry occur at the
nano-scale, those who oppose regulation of nanotechnology as a distinct field of
regulatory concern believe that such regulation unfairly targets nanotechnology.
Since regulation of new technologies is often science-based, opponents of
nano-regulation point out that little scientific evidence exists on identifiable
risks from nano-sized particles, and therefore regulation of them is premature.
By contrast, Roland Clift in Chapter 12 suggested that lack of scientific
information on the safety of nano-particles means that societies should be
more precautious about their use and that a life-cycle approach should be
adopted. Clift argues that public values should be included in standard-setting
exercises to rebuild the trust that was lost when genetically modified foods were
introduced into various marketplaces. This approach is consistent with Vyvyan
Howard and December Ikah in Chapter 13 where many questions about the
toxicity of nano-particles and concerns about a shortage of relevant risk
assessment data were raised. When we consider the arguments of Árpád Pusztai
and Susan Bardocz in Chapter 14 on the use of nanotechnology to engineer new
food additives and pesticides, a clear consensus from our science contributors
emerges indicating that current risk assessment data on nano-derived products
is inadequate, and that regulation needs to be strengthened in this area.
Proponents of nano-regulation are equally vocal about the need to regulate
products of nanotechnology. Such individuals suggest that regulation is needed
precisely because nanotechnology is being developed in a regulatory vacuum.
In Canada and the United States of America., it seems very likely that existing
agencies such as Health Canada, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
and others will be given pieces of the nanotechnology portfolio as their respon-
sibility. Existing regulations for ultra-fine particles will probably be adjusted to
accommodate concerns about new nanoscale particles, while regulations that
identify how to assess the safety of genetically modified foods (for example
substantial equivalence) will probably apply for products of nanotechnology
meant for human consumption as discussed in Chapter 10 by Michael Mehta.
Those who argue for regulation point out that a precautionary approach
should be used to protect human health and the environment from new tech-
nologies where our experience is limited, and where potential irreversible
harms may flow. In the European Union, Canada and several other countries,
this precautionary approach is enshrined in domestic and international law, and
requires that new technologies like biotechnology (and probably nanotechnology)
fall under this extra level of scrutiny. However, some see this ‘better safe than
 What Makes Nanotechnologies Special? 277

sorry’ approach as dangerous and misguided, because it places new technologies

under extra scrutiny and jeopardizes their commercial advantages.
Chapter 18 by Siva Vaidhyanathan revealed another dimension to the
question of how developments in nanotechnology should be mediated by the
state and other actors. Vaidhyanathan argues that the unique attributes of
nano-scale objects threatens to expose weaknesses in the US patent system
arising from the issuance of overly broad patents that block innovation and
erect patent thickets. However, the legal system can work in other ways too
by exposing the problems (for example, safety issues) associated with new
technologies. Alan Hannah and Geoffrey Hunt discussed in Chapter 19 the
civil liabilities that may accrue to companies that develop nano-based pharma-
ceuticals and other products. In Chapter 21, Celia Wells and Juanita Elias
explored the topic of corporate criminal liability and suggest that a role exists
for an international regulatory enforcement strategy to deal with harms to
human health, environment and property resulting from dangerous nano-
technologies. Lori Sheremeta in Chapter 20 considered the ethical and legal
issues that emerge (for example, informed consent) when nano-medical devices
and therapeutics are tested, and thus complements Chapter 4 by Pilarski et al
on the positive and negative impacts of using nanotechnology to improve the
speed, accuracy and portability of medical diagnostic devices.
When transformative technologies enter the public sphere, two kinds of
general regulatory question usually arise. First, are these technologies signifi-
cantly different from earlier technologies? Second, what is the appropriate
balance between regulating a technology early and aggressively to protect
human health and the environment, or phasing in such regulation slowly to
stimulate innovation? At the moment, no nano-dedicated regulators exist
anywhere in the world. The absence of specific regulations for products of
nanotechnology sends a powerful signal to developers of this technology to
continue with the production of intellectual property (often in the form of
patents). Unfortunately, the absence of specific regulations for nanotechnology
creates some contradictions. One critical contradiction comes from the issue of
novelty. If the products of nanotechnology are no different from other technol-
ogies, just at a smaller scale, why is their development so worthy of pursuit?
Another contradiction arises from the issue of convergence. In the same way
that regulators of telecommunications have had to deal with the convergence
of the Internet with television and radio broadcasting, file sharing, and cellular
telephones that have multiple functions (for example onboard digital cameras,
internet access), regulators will soon have to face the fact that nanotechnology is
converging with biotechnology, and other domains. Nanotechnology will
undoubtedly raise several social and ethical issues that go beyond the mandate,
and core competencies, of regulatory bodies that have traditionally dealt with
agricultural, medical and environmental issues in isolation (and who have
traditionally defined social and ethical issues as non-regulatory).
Regulation is a double-edged sword. Regulation can act as a barrier to parti-
cular kinds of innovation. However, while slowing down specific developments,
regulation can be used also to coordinate the evolution of new technologies in
278 Nanotechnology

socially desirable directions. For example, if we decide to take advantage of the

hydrogen fuel cell (a 19th century discovery, by the way) – instead of the
internal combustion engine for powering our vehicles – we probably would
not have the same concerns that we do about pollution, climate change, and
so on. In this case, the decision is not about abandoning the notion of an
individualized mode of the conveyance (the automobile), but about how we
can achieve this goal with other technologies. With nanotechnology a similar
kind of logic needs to prevail. This will help minimize abuses of the technology
and create a more robust society.

Nanotechnology and society: moving from the very

small to the very large
At this point in time, the risks and benefits associated with developments in
nanotechnology are largely hypothetical and illustrative of grander questions
that accompany new technological developments. An examination of the
challenges following the introduction of genetically modified food (GMF)
into the marketplace provides useful lessons. There are two main reasons
why GMFs failed to capture wide-scale public support in many parts of the
world. First, the benefit-to-risk ratio from innovations in agricultural biotech-
nology is poorly balanced for consumers. Consumers of genetically modified
food have been offered food with traits that confer primarily herbicide-
tolerance and insecticidal properties. The benefits of these technologies flow
primarily to producers rather than consumers. Therefore, it should be of no
surprise that consumers resist food that provides little direct benefit, and
some level of risk (even if theoretical). Second, the public, especially in
European countries where bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) (so-
called ‘mad cow disease’) became a public relations problem, continues to
show a decline in trust in science and in governmental regulation. Trust is
difficult to build and easy to lose. The development of innovations in biotech-
nology has been hampered by this lack of trust due to public concerns about the
adequacy of the regulatory process, its openness and transparency, and
potential conflicts of interest arising from government, industry and university
partnerships. Low levels of trust make technologies inherently unstable from a
social perspective, and often lead to overreaction. For example, the civilian
nuclear industry lost considerable amounts of public support after a minor
accident at Three Mile Island (USA) and a more serious accident at Chernobyl
(Ukraine).
To avoid some of these pitfalls, developers and advocates of nanotechnology
need to consider the following observations. A serious mistake made by many
proponents of biotechnology was a failure to consider risk and benefit simulta-
neously. This mistake is especially prominent among industrial actors who
hyped the benefits of the biotechnology revolution without paying much
heed to potential risks. By ignoring or downplaying the risks, and touting the
 What Makes Nanotechnologies Special? 279

benefits of a technology, much is jeopardized. This strategy creates a risk

information vacuum that can be colonized very effectively by NGOs such as
the ETC Group, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and other actors (Giles,
2003; Powell and Leiss, 1997). Since messages about risk sell more easily
than messages of benefit in the court of public opinion and in the media, this
strategy is ill advised.
As the frontiers of nanotechnology become increasingly delineated and
begin the inevitable process of replacing ‘traditional’ approaches to manufac-
turing, several other kinds of questions are likely to emerge. For example,
how will these new technologies diffuse through the system? It is crucial to
recognize that the success or failure of nanotechnology is contingent on the
degree of support it receives from the public. This support can be nurtured
by a thorough discussion of the risks and benefits, by encouraging the develop-
ment of an appropriately constituted regulatory system that can deal with issues
like convergence and novelty, and by fostering an environment that seeks
public input early and often.

A nano-divide?
Since nanotechnologies are likely to be diverse and their effects manifold,
several decades are required for these effects to be felt fully. Consequently,
nanotechnology will coexist with established technologies rather than suddenly
replace them. Since few have begun to examine the possible impacts of
nanotechnology on society, their insights are often based on experience with
earlier technologies. Understanding how developments in nanoscience – and
applications of nanotechnology – are likely to diffuse is a critical part of
anticipating these kinds of social and economic transformations.
Many technologies suffer from the tendency of promoters (and those
attempting to raise venture capital) to ‘hype’ them. With civilian nuclear
power, promoters of this technology claimed in the early years that nuclear
would produce ‘electricity too cheap to meter’ (Mehta, 2005a). In the early
years of personal computing, many argued that trees would be saved due to
the electronic encoding and storage of data. Printer technology dispelled this
myth quickly as offices around the world now print more material on processed
pulp products than ever before. Those who support developments in agricultural
biotechnology hyped their technology with equal vigour suggesting that biotech-
nology ‘will feed the hungry of world’ (Mehta, 2005b). Now, strong advocates of
nanotechnology claim that it will be ‘greener’ than that which it replaces, will
lead to the ultimate recyclable society, and ensure continued economic growth
and prosperity. We disagree with this assessment on many levels.
Nanotechnology will reinforce global inequalities by fostering a nano-
divide. Countries with nanotechnology are the same countries with access to
other 21st (and even 20th) century technologies. Such countries will be
relatively more successful in an economic sense precisely because they will
continue to gobble up intellectual property, dominate globally coordinated
280 Nanotechnology

marketplaces, and because they will reap military advantages from these
technologies. Although some have suggested that nanotechnology will be
particularly advantageous to the developing world because it can be used in
devices for medical testing and other applications (Salamanca-Buentello et al,
2005), we believe that nanotechnology will work against the interests of the
developing world. For instance, if nanoscientists ever develop a nano-based
substitute for rubber, commodity flows from the developing world where
rubber is grown naturally will be disrupted. There are several other examples
like this that make us concerned. If ‘nano-have’ countries are truly interested in
global equity and benefit sharing, they will have to craft a research and
development strategy that identifies first the potential negative impacts of
nanotechnology on the developing world, and then reconcile these impacts
with any benefits that may be accrued domestically. This requires a significant
shift in how we coordinate technological development. In closing, to make
nanotechnology work for humanity as a whole, effort is needed to understand
these complex issues.
We recommend that the United Nations, or some other similar constituted
body, should convene an international conference with a view to the creation of
a permanent international multi-stakeholder body (for example, International
Nanotechnology Agency) to review, monitor and regulate developments in
nanotechnology. There is as much reason to create such a body now as there
was to create the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957 to promote
‘the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of
nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment
against ionizing radiation’ (IAEA, 2005). Such an agency must not be restricted
to the representatives of governments, corporations and research institutions,
but must involve non-governmental organizations, representatives of major
world religions and members of the public. The Agency will function on the
principles of organizational accountability, ‘a right to know’, a duty to
inform, openness and transparency. Furthermore, such an agency must not
adopt the typical ‘sound science only’ position common amongst regulators
but embrace sustainability and precaution.
As this book has shown, the social and ethical issues surrounding nanotech-
nology are important regulatory issues too. It is now the priority of humanity to
engender, through stakeholder dialogue and multilateral decision making, a
more mature understanding of the role that science and technology play in
society.

References
Giles, J. (2003) ‘What is there to fear from something so small?’ Nature, vol 426, p750
IAEA (2005), http://www.iaea.org/About/mission.html, accessed 21 November 2005
Mehta, M. D. (2005a) Risky Business: Nuclear Power and Public Protest in Canada
Lexington, MD, Lanham
Mehta, M. D. (2005b) (ed) Biotechnology Unglued: Science, Society and Social Cohesion,
Vancouver, UBC Press
 What Makes Nanotechnologies Special? 281

Milburn, C. (2002) ‘Nanotechnology in the age of posthuman engineering: science

fiction as science’, Configurations, vol 10, pp261–295
Powell, D. and Leiss, W. (1997) Mad Cows and Mother’s Milk: The Perils of Poor Risk
Communication, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press
Salamanca-Buentello, F., Persad, D. L., Court, E. B., Martin, D. K., Daar, A. S. and
Singer, P. A. (2005) ‘Nanotechnology and the developing world’, PLoS Medicine,
www.utoronto.ca/jcb/home/news_nano_dev_countries.htm
 Appendix

Measurement Scales and Glossary

Measurements
1,000nm ¼ 1mm 1,000mm ¼ 1mm 1,000,000mm ¼ 1m

Scale of insects
millimetres: one thousandth of a metre ¼ 0.001 metre ¼ 1mm
(1 millimetre) ¼ 10
3

Scale of biological cells

micrometres/microns: one millionth metre ¼ 0.000001 metre ¼ 1mm
(1 micrometre or 1 micron) ¼ 10
6

Scale of atoms and molecules

nanometres: one thousand millionth of a metre ¼ 0.000000001 metre ¼ 1nm
(1 nanometre) ¼ 10
9

Scale of sub-atomic particles/quantum mechanical scale

picometres: one million millionth of a metre ¼ 0.000000000001 metre ¼ 1pm
(1 picometre) ¼ 10
12

Nanoscale objects – examples of approximate sizes

0.1nm (nanometre) ¼ diameter of a hydrogen atom
1nm ¼ ten hydrogen atoms in a row
0.8nm ¼ amino acid
2nm ¼ diameter of a DNA alpha helix
4nm ¼ globular protein
6nm ¼ microfilaments
10nm ¼ thickness of cell membranes
11nm ¼ ribosome
20nm ¼ rhinovirus
25nm ¼ microtubule
50nm ¼ nuclear pore
100nm ¼ large virus
200nm ¼ ebola virus
 Measurement Scales and Glossary 283

500nm ¼ small bacterium

400–900nm ¼ wavelength of visible light

Microscale objects: examples of approximate sizes

1–10mm ¼ the general sizes for prokaryotes
1mm ¼ diameter of human nerve cells
2mm ¼ Escherichia coli – a large bacterium
3mm ¼ mitochondrion
5mm ¼ length of chloroplast
6mm (3–10mm) ¼ cell nucleus
9mm ¼ human red blood cell
20mm wide ¼ approximately the smallest thing visible to healthy young
human eye
10–30mm ¼ most eukaryotic animal cells
20mm ¼ ragweed pollen
50–80mm ¼ diameter of a human hair
90mm ¼ amoeba
100mm ¼ human egg
200mm ¼ dust-mite
2,000mm (2mm) ¼ ant

Vocabulary
Aerosol
A collection of particles that are suspended in a gaseous form.

Atomic force microscope

A novel instrument that can measure the force acting on a microscopic tip as it
moves across a molecular surface, giving a three dimensional image. Similar
instruments can etch surfaces and move molecules.

Bioavailability
Getting a drug to the site in an organism (cell, tissue) where it is needed for the
best effect.

Biomolecules
Molecules of biological origin, such as proteins and enzymes

Biomimetics
The art and science of building devices that mimic nature in some
specific way.

Bionanotechnology
Also nanobiotechnology; the interface between biotechnology and inorganic
nanoengineering.
284 Nanotechnology

Biopiracy
The unauthorized use of biological resources by actors not involved in its
original discovery.

Buckyball (buckminsterfullerene)
A manufactured molecule of carbon with atoms at 60 equivalent vertices.

Converging technology
The convergence of transformative technologies like nanotechnology, bio-
technology, information and communication technology, and others to exploit
novel processes and to create novel products.

Cytotoxic
Chemicals that are harmful to cells; damage a cell’s ability to reproduce or grow.

DNA
Deoxyribonucleic acid. The DNA within chromosomes contains hereditary
information in the form of genes – the ‘‘blueprint’’ for life.

Ecotoxicology
The study of toxic materials through the living environment.

Enabling technology
A key piece of technology; part of a larger technical system that gives a product
crucial functionality.

Epidemiology
The study of how health-related events (disease) are distributed in a population
and determinants.

Fullerene
A class of closed, hollow carbon compounds.

Genomics
The study of the genome of an organism, for example the complete set of the
organism’s genes.

Genotoxic
Chemicals that may causing genetic damage.

GMO or GMF
Genetically modified organism or food.

Hazard
A situation or condition that creates a potential exposure to something
dangerous that may be harmful or injurious.
 Measurement Scales and Glossary 285

Holism
An approach to understanding structures and processes in the context of the
whole interrelated entity rather than in terms of selected constituent parts.

Inhalable
Particles smaller than PM10 are inhalable (see ‘‘particulate monitoring’’). Most
man-made airborne particulates are in 0.1–10mm range. PM2:5 is known to
penetrate deeply into lungs. Particulate pollution of less than PM1 (fine and
ultrafine) is (by definition) at the nanoscale.

In silico
A simulation or modelling exercise performed on a computer.

In vitro
An experimental technique performed outside a whole living organism; in a test
tube.

In vivo
An experiment performed using a living organism.

Lab-on-chip
A microchip with a micro- and nano-fluidic structures and electronics for
automatically performing laboratory tests.

Life-cycle assessment
An approach for examining the environmental effects of manufacturing objects
throughout its lifespan; from cradle to grave.

Mechanicism
An approach to understanding processes and structures on the model of a
machine.

Materials science
The interface between chemistry and engineering that addresses materials
useful to some human purpose, for example transport.

MEMS (micro-electro-mechanical systems)

Small (microscale) mechanical devices that are built onto semiconductor
chips.

Microfluidic platform (MFP)

Platforms having photolithographically defined networks of microchannels
whose versatility has led to terms such as ‘‘lab on a chip’’. These platforms
are able to sort cells and analyze their genomic profiles, individual genes,
chromosomes and mitochondrial DNA.
286 Nanotechnology

Microscale
1mm or more (1,000nm or more), up to 1 mm: scale of integrated circuits
and MEMS devices. The microscale is one thousand times larger than the
nanoscale.

Microsystems
A miniaturized system comprising sensing, processing and actuating function-
ality.

Molecular engineering
The Feynman–Drexler vision of creating any substance or structure by
rearranging molecules or atoms ‘‘from the bottom up’’.

Molecular imaging
The imaging of individual molecules at time scales characteristic of chemical
transformations.

Moore’s Law
A rule-of-thumb in the computer industry about the exponential growth of
computing power.

Nanoscale
Less than 1mm (1–999nm).

Nanoscience
The physical and biological theories applied in nanotechnology, for example
quantum mechanics, genetic theory. The study of molecules and structures
that have at least one dimension roughly between 1 and 100nm.

Nanotechnology
The artificial creation of potentially useful entities, structures and processes
with at least one dimension within the scale 1–100nm. Not necessarily by
means of ‘‘molecular engineering’’ (see above).

Nanoproteomics
Nanoscale manufacturing of specific proteins; proteomic engineering, a branch
of nanobiotechnology.

Nanotube
A novel nanoscale tube of carbon or silicon, or other substance, with remark-
able properties such as great strength.

Neo-viruses
Viruses accidentally or deliberately created and completely new to nature.
 Measurement Scales and Glossary 287

Particulate monitoring
In monitoring of particulate matter (PM) in air pollution the following scale
is used: PM10 ¼ 10mm; PM2:5 ¼ less than 2.5mm (greater than 0.1mm) in
diameter ¼ ‘‘fine particulates’’; PM0:1 ¼ less than 0.1mm in diameter ¼ ‘‘ultra-
fine particulates’’ ¼ 100nm. PM10 has been monitoring standard for many
years, but is now being challenged as too gross a measure.

Patent
A legal instrument for protecting intellectual property rights in some invented,
created or modified entity or process.

Pharmacogenomics
The study of interactions among drugs, the genome (the complete set of genes
in an organism), and the proteome (the complete set of proteins encoded by an
organism’s genome).

Photonic
Reacting to light (photons).

Proteomics
The separation, identification and characterization of the complete set of
proteins present in the various cells of the body.

Quantum dot
A nanostructure that exhibits quantum behaviour useful in medical and other
applications, such as emitting a range of colours.

Quantum mechanics
A description of the behaviour of atomic and subatomic particles (electrons,
protons, and so on), which is quite unlike that of the larger objects of classical
physics.

Reductionism
An approach to understanding structures and processes by reducing them to
nothing but the quantifiable interactions of the identifiable parts involved.
Materialist reductionism treats all life as nothing but matter in motion.

Risk
The probability and consequences from exposure to a hazardous agent or
situation.

Risk assessment
A step in the risk management process for estimating the likelihood and
outcomes from exposure to specified hazards.

Scanning tunnelling microscope

A technique developed for imaging solid surfaces with extremely fine resolution.
288 Nanotechnology

Self-assembly
A technique used by biological systems for assembling molecules. A branch of
nanotechnology where objects assemble themselves with minimal external
direction.

Smart materials
Nanoengineered materials, such as surfaces (paint, tiles, fabrics, and so on) that
will respond to local conditions in a way that is useful to some human purpose,
or entertaining (for example repel bacteria, change colour).

Substantial equivalence
A regulatory approach used in some countries (for example Canada) for making
comparisons between modified and unmodified organisms (often plants) based
on comparing metabolic profiles, nutritional composition, and allergens.

Tort
A civil, not criminal, offence, for example negligence, libel, slander.

Transdermal
The delivery of materials (often drugs) through unbroken skin.

Translocation
The rearrangement of chromosomes or the transport of dissolved materials into
an organism.

Ultrafine particle
Particles with diameters less than 0.1mm; usually airborne.

Upstream (public engagement)

Engaging the public early in debates about new technologies; ideally before
commercialization.

Xenotransplantation
The transplantation of whole organs or other tissues from animals to humans.

Zeolite
A nanoscale ceramic material that has catalytic and filtration properties.
 Index

2002 World Summit on Sustainable Breach of contract 238

Development 92
93 Buckminsterfullerenes 158
159
2004 Strategy 95
96, 98, 100
101
Accountability 218
219, 264
265 Cadmium selenide 169
170
Accumulation, particulate aerosols 156 Canada
Action Group on Erosion, Technology and biotechnology to nanotechnology 121
128
Concentration 20
21, 197, 248 ethical research 247
248, 253, 255
256
Action urgency 132
133 federal agendas 110
Advanced Industrial Science and health care 110, 111
112
Technology (AIST) 61
62, 64
65 ICT 105, 112
114
Aerosols 154
156, 160
162 infrastructure 107
109
Agency principle 261, 262 innovation strategies 114
115
Aggregation interaction 48 institutional infrastructure 109
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of nanotechnology from biotechnology
Intellectual Property Rights 230 121
128
Airborne particulate matter 134, 135
136, national security 110, 112
154
156, 160
162 physical infrastructure 107
109
AIST see Advanced Industrial Science and regional developments 5, 105
116
Technology research 105
116, 247
248, 253, 255
256
Ambient particulate aerosols 156 science and technology 105
116
America see United States of America security 110, 112
American National Standards Institute social policy 109
110, 115
(ANSI) 80
81 society 105
116
Animal studies 168, 171
177 TCPS 247
248, 253, 255
256
ANSI see American National Standards Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI)
Institute 108
Anti-commons problem 232
233 Canada’s Innovation Strategy 114
115
Asbestos 8, 63
64, 243
245 Canadian Biotechnology Advisory
Asia 124 Committee (CBAC) 125
Assemblers 26
27, 29
31 Canadian Chamber of Commerce 126
127
Canadian Environmental Protection Act
Balfour Beatty 267 (1999) 126
Benjamin Franklin Medal in Physics 59
60 Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)
Biological warfare 187 122
124, 127
Biomedical aspects 8, 17, 18, 35
41, Canadian Institutes of Health Research
185
186, 247
257 (CIHR) 111
112, 249
see also Health Canadian Light Source (CLS) 109
Biotechnology 121
128, 213
219 Cancer 18, 37
38
Body compartments 159
160 Carbon-based nanoparticles 174
175
Bond, Phillip J. 76 Carbon capture/storage 190
290 Nanotechnology

Carbon nanotubes 59
60, 83, 170 Classification of aerosols 155

Care Clinton, President Bill 15, 26, 75
corporate standards 137
138 CLS see Canadian Light Source
duty of care 240
241 Cluster strategy 114
115
health care 36, 110, 111
112 Coarse particles 156
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 126 Coatings 169
170
Caveolar openings 159
160 Commercialization 95
96, 132
133
CBAC see Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Company culture principle 262
263
Committee Complexity reactions or hype 87
89
CBEN see Center for Biological and Composites 105
Environmental Nanotechnology Confidence 203
204
Cells 130, 146, 168
177 Congenital Disabilities Act 240
241, 242
Center for Biological and Environmental Consultative Group on Agricultural
Nanotechnology (CBEN) 22
23, 80
81, Research (CGIAR) 217
216 Consumer Protection Act (1987) 241
242
Center for High-Rate Nanomanufacturing Consumers 17, 190
192, 241
242
(CHN) 81 Contracts 238
Central nervous system 172
173 Control issues 216
217
Centre for Responsible Nanotechnology Convergence 20, 112
114, 263
264
(CRN) 2 Corporate Citizenship Council 66
CFC see Chlorofluorocarbons Corporate criminal liability
CFI see Canada Foundation for Innovation accountability 264
265
CFIA see Canadian Food Inspection Agency convergence 263
264
CGIAR see Consultative Group on globalization 264
265
Agricultural Research international harmonization 263
264
Charter of Corporate Behaviour, Japan 66 law 259
268
Chemical pollutants 146 multinationals 264
265
see also Toxicology punishments 265
266
CFCs 22 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 66
68
cytotoxicity 169
170 Corporate standards of care 137
138
European Chemicals Bureau 147 Corpus Iuris project 263
PCBs 63 Corruption 259, 268
REACH 63, 71, 97, 101, 147, 149 Costs 134
135, 265
266
Royal Commission on Environmental Council of Europe treaties 263
Pollution 141, 205 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 229
Chemical warfare 187 Criminal liability 259
268
China 70
71 Criticality 47, 51
52
CHISEL framework 47
55 CRN see Centre for Responsible
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) 22 Nanotechnology
CHN see Center for High-Rate CSR see Corporate social responsibility
Nanomanufacturing Cultured cells 171
177
CIHR see Canadian Institutes of Health Cytotoxicity 169
170
Research
Civil liability 237
245 Data banks 38
asbestos litigation 243
245 DDT see Dichloro-diphenyltrichloroethane
Consumer Protection Act 1987 241
242 Defence mechanisms 156
157
criminal liability 260 Degradation of environment 188
190
duty of care 240
241 Denial (Feynman vision) 29
30
eggshell skull rule 242 Department of Defense 81
informed consent 239
240 Department of Energy (DOE) 77
injury to descendants 242
243 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
negligence 238
239 198
201
personal injury 237
238, 239 Dermal exposure 144
remoteness 242
243 Descendant injuries 242
243
Classical mechanics 16 Desertification 188
189
 Index 291

Determinism 44
46 Ethics 183
194

Dichloro-diphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) biomedical research 8, 247
257
22 civil liability 238
239
Diffusion 157 conflict or peace 186
188
Directives 99, 148 consumption 190
192
Disaggregation 48 environment 188
190
DNA 125, 252 injustice or justice 184
186
DOE see Department of Energy introduction 6
9
Drexler, Eric 2, 78
79 Japan 68
70
Drugs 38, 249
250 over-consumption 190
192
DTI see Department of Trade and Industry research conduct 247
257
Duty of care 240
241 EU see European Union
Eurobarometer survey 199
East Asia 70 EuroNanoforum 102
Economics 70
71, 88, 94, 134
135, Europe
215
216, 265
266 asbestos litigation 244
245
Education 68, 84
86, 217
218 chemical regulations 63, 71
Eggshell skull rule 242 commercialisation 95
96
EIB see European Investment Bank corporate criminal liability 261
ELSI see Ethical, social and legal environmental risks 98
100
implications funding 94
ELV see End-of-Life Vehicles health risks 98
100
Emergence principle 47, 49
50 integration policy 93
94, 96
97
Enabling technologies 112
114 public aspects 94, 97
100
End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive regional developments 5, 92
103
148 research 94
95, 99
100
Endo, Morinobu 60 responsibility policy 93
94
Endpoint testing costs 134
135 risks 98
100
Energy technology 189 society 92
103
Engineered materials 130
139 sustainability policy 93
94
Enhanced human performance 21 European Chemicals Bureau 147
Environmental Defense 133
134, 139 European Investment Bank (EIB) 96
Environmental issues European Union (EU)
biotechnology lessons 215
216 Commission 82
83, 92
94, 99, 101
degradation 188
190 development 92
103
engineered materials 130
139 global welfare 101
102
Europe 98
100 Japan 103
getting it right 130
139 labelling 124
health and safety 82
83, 144
146 welfare 101
102
Japan 62
64 Expert assessments 134
overview 21
22 Exposure assessments 144
146
sustainability 188
190
United States of America 80
82 FDA see Food and Drug Administration
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 80, Feynman, Carl 27
134, 135
136, 137, 147 Feynman Grand Prize in Nanotechnology 27
Epidemiological evidence 160
162 Feynman, Richard 1, 26
31, 44
45
Equity 233
234 Fines 265
266
Erosion, Technology and Concentration Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
(ETC) action group 20
21, 197, 248 75
76, 80, 137
Esaki, Reona 59 Food science 167
177
ETC Group (Erosion, Technology and Foresight and Governance Project 79
Concentration Action Group) 20
21, Foresight Institute 27
197, 248 Forrest, David 123
124
Ethical, social and legal implications (ELSI) Freedom of Information legislation 204
205
75, 76
77, 79
80, 83 Frontier Carbon 67
68
292 Nanotechnology

Fullerenes 130, 158
159 Identification principle 261, 262

Funding 94 IEEE see Institute of Electrical and
Future of nanotechnology 17
18, 167
177 Electronics Engineers
Iijima, Sumio 59
60
Gastrointestinal tract 174
175 Imaging techniques 251
252
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Immune system 170
171, 176
177
(GATT) 230 Implantable devices/materials 250
251
Genetically modified (GM) foods Industrial policy 64
66
American society 75
76 Inertial impaction 157
Canada 122
125 Inflammation 158
159, 173
controversies 19 Information and communication technology
labelling 124
125 (ICT) 105, 112
114
public understanding 197
198, 201, 202 Informed consent 239
240
Genetic technologies 38
40 Infrastructure accomplishments 107
109
Genetic testing 252
253, 254
255 Inhaled particles 172
173
Genomics 38
40 Injury to descendants 242
243
Global aspects 101
102, 183
194, 279
280 Injustice, global 184
186
Globalization 264
265 Innovation 114
115, 214
215
GM see Genetically modified Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Gothenburg Council 93 Engineers (IEEE) 28
Governance 218
219 Institutional infrastructure 109
Government action 60
62, 141
151 Integration policy 93
94, 96
97
Greenpeace 144, 248
249 Intellectual property 83
see also Patents
Haemochromatosis 38 Interactivity 47, 48, 49
50
Health International Business machines 15
see also Risks; Toxicology International Convention for the Protection
aerosols 160
162 of Industrial Property 230
care 36, 110, 111
112 International Council on Nanotechnology
disease prevalence 185
186 (ICON) 80
engineered materials 130
139 International Criminal Court (ICC) 265
getting it right 130
139 International harmonization 263
264
Japan 62
64 International roles 70
71
lessons from biotechnology 215
216 Invention viability 229
particle aerosols 160
162 Investment 88
respirable aerosols 154
156 In vitro investigations 158, 168, 171
177
risks 80
82, 98
100, 144
146, 215
216, In vivo investigations 158
267 Isolated cells 168
171
Health Canada 122
124
Health Law Institute 115 Japan
Historical overviews 1
3, 14, 228
229 Centre for Industrial Cooperation 103
Holism principle 47, 50
51 corporate social responsibility 66
68
Hostility 28 environment 62
64
House of Lords report 203
204 ethics 68
70
Human dignity 247
248 government action 60
62
Human Genome Project 75 health 62
64
Human performance enhancement 21 industrial policy 64
66
Human studies 168, 171
177, 247
257 international roles 70
71
‘Hype’ reactions 87
89 public health 62
64
regional developments 4
5, 59
72
ICC see International Criminal Court regional roles 70
71
ICON see International Council on society 59
72
Nanotechnology Japanese Attitude Survey 69
70
ICT see Information and communication Japanese Business Federation 61
62, 66
technology Justice 184
186
 Index 293

Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation) NanoBank project 83
84

61
62, 66 Nanobots 19
20, 202
Kota, Sawada 60 NANODERM 95
Kroto, Professor Harry 32 Nano-divide 279
280
Nanology 43
55
Labelling 124
125, 151 Nanoparticles 46
55, 168
173, 174
177
Law and regulations NANOPATHOLOGY 95
civil liability 237
245 Nanoreplicators 26
27, 29
31, 83
constraints 7
9 NANOSAFE project for Risk assessment
corporate criminal liability 259
268 95
ELSI 75, 76
77, 79
80, 83 Nanoscale 3, 14
ethical conduct of research 247
257 Nanoscale Science Research Centers
legal constraints 7
9 (NSRC) 77
patents 225
234 Nanoscience 35
41
Lessons 201
203, 213
219 Nanosys IPO 88
Liability 237
245, 262 Nanotech Index 88
Life cycle approach 6
7, 143, 148 Nanotechnology Research Institute (NRI)
Life sciences 105, 111
112 61
62
Long-termism principle 47, 52
53 Nanotechnoscience 43
55
Lung disease 155 NANOTOX 95
National Centre for Nanoscience and
Maastricht Treaty 126 Technology (NCNST) 70
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) National Institute of Advanced Industrial
251
252 Science and Technology 61
62
Manslaughter 259
260, 262 National Institute for Nanotechnology
Mechanics 16 (NINT) 107
108, 109, 111
Medical applications 18, 35
41, 185
186, National Institute for Occupational Safety
247
257 and Health (NIOSH) 80, 81
82
Meridian Institute 79 National Nanofabrication Infrastructure
Merrill Lynch Nanotech Index 88 Network (NNIN) 77
METI see Ministry of Economy Trade and National Nanotechnology Infrastructure
Industry Network 83
84
Microelectronics 36
41 National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI)
Microsystems 35
41 75, 76
79
Military applications 18, 186
188 Clinton, President Bill 15, 75
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 188
189 Feynman, Richard 26, 27
29
Miniaturized wireless medical devices 252 risk research increase 133
134
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry National Research Council (NRC) 107
109,
(METI) 61
62 249
Mitsui Corporation 66, 67 National Science & Engineering Research
Moderation 190
192 Council (NSERC) 108
109
Molecular manufacturing 26
27, 29
30, National Science Foundation (NSF) 20, 22,
174
175 23, 76
78
Monsanto 75
76 National security 110, 112
MORI survey 198
201 National Toxicology Program 81
82
Mortality 161
162 Natural defence mechanisms 156
157
MRI see Magnetic resonance imaging NCNST see National Centre for
Multinationals 264
265 Nanoscience and Technology
see also individual multinationals Negligence 238
239
Multiwalled carbon nanotubes (MWCNT) Nervous system 172
173
169 New Energy and Industrial Technology
Murayama, Hideki 68 Development Organization (NEDO) 62
MWCNT see Multiwalled carbon nanotubes NGOs see Non-governmental organizations
NINT see National Institute for
Nabholz, J. V. 139 Nanotechnology
294 Nanotechnology

NIOSH see National Institute for Zeno’s paradox 226
228

Occupational Safety and Health PCBs see Polychlorinated biphenyls
NNI see National Nanotechnology Initiative Peace ethics 186
188
NNIN see National Nanofabrication Personal injury 237
238, 239
Infrastructure Network Pharmaceutical products 249
250
Nobel Prize 15, 32, 59 Pharmacogenomics 38
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Physical infrastructure accomplishments
61
64, 140 107
109
NONS see Notification of New Substances Physics 16
17
Nori, Taniguchi 1
2 Plant Biosafety Office 127
Notification of New Substances (NONS) Plant labelling 124
125
146
147 Plant regulations 122
124
Novel plants 122
124 Plants with novel traits (PNT) 122
124
NRC see National Research Council PM see Particulate matter
NRI see Nanotechnology Research Institute PNT see Plants with novel traits
NSERC see National Science & Engineering Political culture 65
Research Council Political roles 70
71
NSF see National Science Foundation Pollution 63, 141, 146, 205
NSRC see Nanoscale Science Research see also Chemical pollutants;
Centers Environmental issues
Nucleation 156 Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 63
Nutrition 80, 137, 167
177 Polygenics 38
Precautionary principle 125
127, 146
149,
Oberdorster, Dr Gunter 81 154
163
Occupational Safety and Health Private ownership issues 216
217
Administration (OSHA) 80 Probation 266
Oceania 124 Prosecutions 266
Office of Science and Technology Protein folding 159
198
201 Public aspects
Olfactory nerves 172
173 awareness 69
70, 217
218
Openness 68 education 84
OSHA see Occupational Safety and Health engagement 7
9, 94, 97
98, 205
208,
Administration 273
275
Over-consumption 190
192 funding, Europe 94
Ownership issues see Patents health 62
64, 98
100
Oxidative stress 130
131, 173 opinions 74
75
ownership issues 216
217
P&O Ferries 259 perception 87
Particle aerosols 154
156, 160
162 policy 83
84
Particle mobility 159
160 trust 38
41
Particle size and toxicity 157
158 understanding 196
209
Particulate aerosols 154
156, 160
162 Public Health and Risk Assessment
Particulate matter (PM) 134, 135
136, Directorate 99
154
156, 160
162 Punishments 265
266
Patents
anti-commons 232
233 Quantum dots 169
170
conclusions 277 Quantum mechanics 16
historical overviews 228
229
introduction 228
230 R&D see Research and development
law 225
234 REACH see Registration, Evaluation and
leading nations 227
228 Authorisation of CHemicals
ownership issues 216
217 Reductionism 44
46, 68
69
powers 229
230 Regional developments
problems 232 Canada 6, 105
116
public policy 83 Europe 5, 92
103
 Index 295

Japan 4
5, 59
72 Royal Institute of International Affairs

United States of America 5, 74
89 report 66
Regional roles 70
71 Royal Society/Royal Academy of
Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation Engineering report 196
200
of CHemicals (REACH) 63, 71, 97, 101, asbestos litigation 244
245
147, 149 civil liability 237
238
Regulation 100
101, 122
124, 146
149, public engagement 206
208
275
278 trust 204
see also Law and regulations Working Group 140
151
Regulatory policy improvements 136
137 Rylands case 239
Remoteness 242
243
Research and development (R&D) S&T see Science and technology
airborne particulate matter 135
136 Safety 80
82, 167
177, 259, 267
Canada 105
116 Scanning tunnelling microscopy (STM) 15,
ethical conduct 247
257 23
Europe 94
95, 99
100 ‘Science fiction’ nature 83
Feynman vision 30 Science in Society report 198
201
increase 133
134 Science and technology (S&T) 68, 105
116
National Nanotechnology Initiative 75 Security 110, 112
patents 226 Sedimentation 157
Respirable aerosols 154
156 SEI see Social and ethical issues
Respiratory system 156
157, 171
173 Self-organisation principle 47, 52
Responsibility 93
94, 261
263 Sensing devices 250
251
Restriction of Hazardous Substances in Sensory aids 250
251
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Silicosis 155
Directive (RoHS) 65, 72 Single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWCNT)
Rio Declaration on Environment and 170
Development 126 Size issues 157
158
Risks Smalley, Richard 26
27, 29
31, 32, 78
79
assessments 46
47, 175
177, 215
216 Smart labelling 151
biotechnology experiences 215
216 Social and ethical issues (SEI) 77
conclusions 278 Social policy 109
110, 115
endpoint testing costs 134
135 Social values 38
41
Europe 98
100 Society 4
getting it right 130
139 see also Public aspects
governance 203
208 Canada 105
116
health and safety 82
83, 98
100, 144
146, Europe 92
103
215
216 Japan 59
72
management 140
151 United States of America 74
89
molecular manufacturing 31 Socio
economic disruption 66
public perceptions 196
209 Sony 66
67
risk research 133
134 South Korea 70
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Stakeholders 133, 138
139
Engineering report 196
200 STM see Scanning tunnelling microscopy
screening 53
54 Substantial equivalence 122
124
Rodents 173 Sun screens 160
RoHS see Restriction of Hazardous Surface chemistry 169
170, 171
Substances in Electrical and Electronic Surgical tools 251
Equipment Directive Sustainability 93
94, 188
190
Rome Statute 265 SWCNT see Single-walled carbon
Royal Academy of Engineering see Royal nanotubes
Society/Royal Academy of Engineering Systems principle 262, 263
report
Royal Commission on Environmental Taiwan 70
Pollution 141, 205 Takami, Sachiko 63
296 Nanotechnology

Take back legislation 148 United Kingdom (UK) 141
151, 196
200,

TCP see Technology Partnerships 204, 206
208, 241
242
Canada United Nations (UN) 71
TCPS see Tri-Council Policy Statement United States of America (USA)
Technology Partnerships Canada (TCP) asbestos litigation 243
244
113
114 education 84
86
‘Terminator’ seed 21 environment 80
82
Terrorism 186
188 federal agendas 110
Tests of hazard endpoints 134
135 health and safety 80
82
Thursby, Marie 83
84 hype or complexity reactions 87
89
Tissue damage 130 patents 225
234
Tissue surgery 250 public aspects 5, 74
89, 199
Titanium dioxide 174 regulatory policy improvements
Tokyo Declaration for a Toxics Free Earth 136
137
63, 71 risk research increase 133
134
Toxicology 154
163 safety 80
82
America 80
82 ‘Upstreaming’ public engagement 97
98
environmental hazards and risks Upstream patents 232
233
145
146 Urgent need for action 132
133
introduction 21
22 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
nanology 53
54 on Tariffs and Trade 230
nanoparticles in food 175
177 USA see United States of America
Toxic Substances Control Act 147 US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Toyota 66
67 3, 229, 231
232
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) 230 Vicarious liability 262
Transparency 233
234
Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS) Warfare 18, 186
188
247
248, 253, 255
256 Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
TRIPS see Trade-Related Aspects of (WEEE) 148
Intellectual Property Rights Wireless medical devices 252
Trust Wolbring, Gregor 21
biotechnology experiences 218
219 Workforce education 84
conclusions 278 Working Group 140
151
increasing 203
208 World Summit on Sustainable Development
introduction 7
9 92
93
microsystems 38
41 World Trade Organization (WTO) 230
public education 218 ‘Wow’ factor 17
23
WTO see World Trade Organization
UK see United Kingdom
Ultrafine particles 171
173 ‘Yuck’ factor 17
23
UN see United Nations
Uncertainty 150
151 Zeebrugge 259
Undergraduate education 86 Zeno’s paradox 226
228
Unfair Contract Terms Act 241 Zucker, Lynne 83
84