Beaufort Matters

1. INTRODUCTION
The story of the manufacture of the Bristol Beaufort aircraft in Australia is one of triumph
over the many obstacles that were encountered. It was a magnificent achievement given
Australia’s low industrial capacity and lack of experience in aircraft construction, the
limited pool of technicians and skilled labour that were available, and that there were no
facilities for producing machine tools. It involved not only the formation of an
organisation capable of mass producing an all-metal, mid-wing monoplane with stressed
skin but the establishment and development of a large group of technically complex
industries. An indication of the magnitude of the problems faced by the project was
expressed by Sir John Storey, Director of the Beaufort Division, Department of Aircraft
Production, in 1943 when he stated:
“Looking back from this point, I think I can say that it was fortunate that we had not the
slightest appreciation of the difficulties with which we would be confronted. Had we
had any conception of those difficulties, I feel that we would have recommended the
abandonment of the project’.

This article provides information which hopefully answers a number of questions about
the Australian Beaufort program and details some new and surprising facts. Several
very good books and articles have dealt with the lead up to, and the manufacture of, the
Beaufort and its engines in Australia. Rather than use any of this information, the
following notes are sourced only from official records in the National Archives of Australia
and a small number from the National Library of Australia and the National Archives of
the United Kingdom. The information is fully referenced so that the reader can research
the relevant records and files.

Material in this article pre-dates the introduction of metric measurements and decimal
currency and the Imperial forms have been retained. Similarly, location names are those
used at the relevant time.

2. ORDERS FOR BRISTOL AIRCRAFT

Purchase of the Bristol Blenheim I (Bristol 142M)?

There is no primary evidence to date that the RAAF had ordered the Bristol Blenheim I,
no Air Board Agendum nor an Overseas Indent. The Air Ministry file RAAF Estimated
Aircraft Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 contains no
reference either. However, a minute in that file dated 22 April 1936 states that the
Australian Liaison Officer in London had been provided with information on the Blenheim
and the modified Bristol 142M, by that time known as the Bristol 149, and acknowledged
by the RAF to be the type really wanted by Australia.1 By June, the Air Ministry was
referring to the Bristol 149 as the Blenheim (so this may be where some confusion in
nomenclature has arisen).2

Other secondary evidence dates from May 1936 and these secondary sources are set
out in the end note.3. But perhaps the most interesting indication from this evidence is
an Air Board Minute dated 4 February 1938 where Chief of Air Staff (CAS) AVM Richard
Williams states:
“You will remember that some time ago we placed an order for 40 ‘Blenheim’ twin-
engined landplanes and were promised certain deliveries.
“Later Air Ministry advised that there (sic) were improving on the ‘Blenheim’ which, as
you know, was developed as a civil machine in the first place, with the idea of

1
 incorporating more of the requirements of the service and that this new type would be
known as the ‘Bolingbroke’.
“We thought it would be advisable to take it in preference to the ‘Blenheim’ especially
as the deliveries offered were only a few months later than those of the Blenheim.”4

However, the Australian Liaison Officer in London was advised in May 1936, that the Air
Board had determined two general reconnaissance squadrons were to be re-equipped
with the 40 modified Blenheims on order, 24 for initial equipment, 12 for reserve and 4
for wastage.5 Despite Williams 1938 Minute it would seem that there was no serious
attempt for Australia to purchase the Bristol 142M.

Bristol Blenheim I (Bristol 142M) [BAE Systems]

Purchase of the Bristol Bolingbroke (Bristol 149/Blenheim IV)

In August 1936, the Australian Liaison Officer in London advised the Air Board of
potential replacement aircraft for the Avro Anson and Hawker Demon and supplied
details of the Bristol 149 to replace the Anson; the 149 being described as an interim
general reconnaissance aircraft. This same advice also alluded to a potential
replacement aircraft for the Bristol 149 already under consideration and combining the
general reconnaissance, torpedo bombing and general purpose functions in one aircraft6
(this was Specification 10/36 and both the Blackburn Botha (B-26) and the Bristol
Beaufort (Bristol 152) were eventually built to this specification).

The RAAF showed an interest in all three Bristol aircraft, the Blenheim I (Bristol 142M),
the Bristol 149 (Bolingbroke) and the Bristol 152 (Beaufort), although the aircraft that
would become the Beaufort was still only in the early design stage. Based on the above
advice, the Air Board decided that the Bristol 149 was more appropriate to, and better
suited, Australia’s needs than the Blenheim I.7 The Australian Liaison Officer in London
was instructed in November 1936 to assure the Air Ministry that an order for 40 of the
Bristol 149 aircraft was forthcoming, thereby allowing the RAAF’s requirements to be
fulfilled in the first production run. By now officially referred to as the Bolingbroke in
correspondence (retrospectively changed by the Air Ministry to Blenheim Mk IV), these
aircraft were destined to equip Nos. 2 and 4 Squadrons in lieu of Avro Ansons.8 The
Overseas Indent 550 (overseas order) was not placed until February 1937 and provided
for these aircraft to have the serial numbers A9-1 to A9-40.9 A further order for an

2
additional 10 Bristol Bolingbroke aircraft to equip half of 6 Squadron was placed in
November 1937.10

In June 1936, the Air Ministry questioned whether the 40 Bristol 149s required for
Australia could be spared from RAF requirements as production could not be
increased.11 By the following month the delivery of the 40 Bristol 149s to Australia was
expected between July and November 193712 but a few weeks later this was extended to
between October 1937 and March 1938 because of a three month delay in production
due to modifications needed to the cowlings to correct engine overheating13 (all of these
delivery dates proved to be optimistic as the first flight of the Bristol 149/Bolingbroke was
not until September 1937).

By the end of August 1936, Viscount Swinton, Secretary of State for Air, became
involved in setting aircraft delivery priorities. In addition to RAF and RAAF deliveries,
Finland and Turkey were also seeking aircraft from Bristols. Swinton decided not to
prejudice the RAF expansion scheme and wanted to help Turkey more than anyone –
much more than the Finns and would not attempt to meet Australian requirements until
Australia had made a decision on the Empire Air Mail Scheme. This decision had been
held up for a year and, as such, he felt very little obligation to Australia.14

Meanwhile, in May 1937 25 members of the RAAF had been sent to Britain, together
with representatives of the other two services, to participate in the Coronation of King
George VI as part of the 1937 Australian Coronation Contingent. All musterings were
represented and the Air Board took the initiative to attach them for training to RAF units
and British aircraft factories at the conclusion of the coronation ceremonies. In
anticipation of soon receiving Bolingbrokes, seven members were attached for various
periods, lasting up to five months, to either the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton or to
RAF stations that were equipped with Blenheims (albeit the Blenheim I). At Bristols, they
studied the production of spare parts, engine and airframe systems for the Blenheim and
worked in the engine assembling and erecting shop.15

Bristol Bolingbroke – Blenheim IV (Bristol 149) [BAE Systems]

Change to the Bristol Beaufort

Although two orders had been issued for a total of 50 Bristol Bolingbroke aircraft, in early
January 1938 the Air Board was already considering replacing the Bolingbroke in these
orders with the Beaufort.16 This was because further advice had been received from the
Air Ministry that due to development problems with the Bolingbroke, the RAF had

3
decided not to proceed with that aircraft but would be placing production orders “off the
drawing board” for the Beaufort (Bristols did sort out the problems with the Bolingbroke/
Blenheim IV and a total of 3,307 were eventually manufactured). It was forecast that
deliveries of the Beaufort could be expected in early 1939. The Air Board considered the
Beaufort to be a further improvement over the Bolingbroke and approval for the orders
for 50 Bolingbroke aircraft to be changed to the Beaufort were forwarded to London on 3
March 1938.17 Just a week later the Air Board advised the Australian Liaison Officer in
London that approval was being sought for an additional 83 Beauforts18, later reduced to
about 4519. During the 12 months until the Beauforts could be delivered, the RAAF
would use the Avro Anson and additional Ansons had been contracted to fill the gap.20

In May 1938 the Air Board was informed by the Air Ministry that none of the service
equipment ordered for the Bolingbroke could be used in the Beaufort so new equipment
was required. This enquiry had resulted from a report by Squadron Leader Leon Lachal
RAAF in September 1937, following his attachment to Bristols and on completion of his
duties as Commanding Officer of the RAAF Component of the Australian Coronation
Contingent.21 Some of this service equipment for the Bolingbroke had already been
delivered to Australia as the majority of parts had been expected useable in the
Beaufort.22

By 23 August 1938 the Air Board noted that 50 Beaufort aircraft were on order but an
additional 87 Beauforts were needed to complete the rearmament program. The Board
recommended that an order be placed with Bristols for 40 Beaufort aircraft with Taurus
engines, 12 spare engines and spare parts (only 40 aircraft could be ordered at this time
due to a lack of funds). This would therefore leave a balance of 47 to complete reserves
at a later date when a more definitive cost of the aircraft would be known and additional
funds made available. This was approved by the Minister for Air on 31 August 1938.23

It is interesting to note that these 90 aircraft were to be fitted with the RAF Mk IV
autopilot and on 28 November 1938 the Air Board placed an order for the supply of
automatic pilot controls and spare parts as these would be the first RAAF aircraft so
fitted24 (however, it eventuated that RAAF Beaufort aircraft were not equipped with
automatic pilots).

Bristol Beaufort I (Bristol 152) [BAE Systems]

4
Air Board Foresight
While this series of events to supply Bristol twin-engined aircraft has been well
documented previously25, not so well known is the fact that contracts for the Bolingbroke
and Beaufort, plus the Avro Anson, included a clause covering, for the Bolingbroke, the
manufacture of the airframe only in Australia, for the Beaufort and Anson, the
manufacture of both the airframe and engines.26

Some idea of the Air Board’s foresight in this matter is a Minute from the Board dated 3
May 1938. The Air Board noted that the Beaufort was still to prove itself a success,
particularly with the untried sleeve-valve Taurus engines. It was also concerned that
should an emergency arise in Europe, the possibility of the supply of aircraft from the UK
to Australia would become extremely uncertain. The Board recommended steps be
taken to guard against a breakdown in the supply of the Beaufort by providing for their
local manufacture and thereby complement that underway by the Commonwealth
Aircraft Corporation (CAC) for single-engined aircraft; an alternative was to review what
was available from the United States. Because a British Mission to the United States
was evaluating various aircraft in the USA at that time, the Board recommended that any
decision should be deferred until after the Mission’s findings were known. But the Board
did suggest that an approach be made to the Air Ministry for one or two Beauforts to be
made available earlier so that service personnel could become acquainted with the
aircraft.27

Promise of Early Beaufort Deliveries from the UK

Initial advice from the Air Ministry in August 1937 was that the production of the Beaufort
was estimated to commence about June/July 1938 but much depended on prototype
trials that September. Production output at that time was not known and the Air Ministry
had not yet determined the allocation of deliveries between the RAF and the RAAF.28

As happened for the Bolingbroke, the projected delivery date for the Beaufort was
extremely optimistic. Just one month later on 17 March 1938, the Air Ministry advised
that no Beauforts could be released for any overseas RAF squadrons or for Australia
before May 1940 and then only at a rate that might be in the order of 12 per month.29
CAS Williams was rightly taken aback at this advice and sent a signal back in effect
threatening to involve Prime Minister Lyons in the matter or proceed with the alternative
of seeking American aircraft.30 The prime ministers of both countries did become
involved and as a result, the Air Ministry promised that the second 50 Beauforts
manufactured would be allocated to Australia and deliveries could be expected about
August to October 1939.31

Then in June 1938 the Air Ministry advised that the delivery of the first 50 Beauforts
could be expected in July 1939 and two Beauforts would be released about two or three
months earlier than that. However, the second order for the additional 40 Beauforts
could not be supplied until August or September 1940 following the completion of the
RAF’s order for 350.32 The supply of the first 50 Beauforts was confirmed on 14 July
1938 whereby the Air Ministry had allocated Beauforts 28, 29 and 49 to 98 on the
production line for Australia.33 This was later amended, following the increase in the
order to 90 Beauforts, to production line Nos. 17 – 26 (10), Nos. 31 – 70 (40) and Nos.
250 – 289 (40) (these last 40 amended later still to Nos. 401 – 440 (40)).34 Shipments
were expected as 1 in September, 9 in October, 9 in November, 25 in December in 1939
and 6 in January 1940.35

Although the Air Ministry placed its order for 78 Beauforts on 22 August 1936, the first
flight of the aircraft from Bristols at Filton did not occur until 19 October 1938. By early
February 1939, Squadron Leader Sims RAAF, who was undertaking a tour of the UK
and North America to assess various aircraft of interest to the RAAF, had flown in the

5
 Beaufort and was favourably impressed with its performance. This was followed in
March by Group Captain McNamara (RAAF Liaison Officer with the Air Ministry) also
flying in the Beaufort36.

Following the British Mission to the United States, by November 1938 the UK
Government had taken all of Lockheed’s capacity to produce the Hudson General
Reconnaissance aircraft and advised the Air Board that it would first equip one RAF
squadron with the Beaufort to sort out any problems with introducing it to service and, as
stated, would release earlier production line aircraft to the RAAF for delivery between
July and October 193937. In August 1939 the planned re-equipment of squadrons with
Beauforts from the UK was determined to be as follows38:

Squadron Location No. of Re-equipment Date

Aircraft
No. 2 (General Reconnaissance) Laverton 12 November 1939
No. 6 (Bomber) Richmond 12 January 1940
No. 1 (Bomber) Laverton 12 February 1940
No. 25 (General Purpose) Pearce 4 March 1940
No. 14 (General Reconnaissance) Pearce 12 September 1940
No. 21 (General Purpose) Laverton 4 October 1940

By 30 September 1939 no Beauforts had been shipped to Australia even though the
Australian Liaison Officer advised that no decision had been made to alter the allocation
of Beauforts. This was because the Air Board had now been advised that no Beauforts
were to leave the UK before certain tests of the engines had been completed and this
would not likely be until March 1940. In addition, the UK Government now seemed to
have put a proviso on whether the Beauforts were to be eventually sent to Australia at
all; matters such as what contribution Australia was prepared to make to British fighting
forces during war.39 A previous proposal for RAAF personnel to fly UK manufactured
Beauforts to Australia was refused by the Air Board, as the personnel necessary to move
such a large number of aircraft were not available. 40

3. AUSTRALIAN BEAUFORT MANUFACTURE

Early Proposals to Manufacture British Aircraft for the RAAF in Australia

During the 1920s and into the early 1930s, small numbers of aircraft were manufactured
in Australia for the RAAF, such as the Avro 504 and DH60 Moth.41 Also in the early
1930s the Air Board was developing a policy for the payment of royalties on British
designed aircraft, spare parts and equipment manufactured in Australia. This would
allow future contracts for purchase of aircraft to include clauses for local manufacturing
rights and allow for royalty payments should they be invoked. Royalties had already
been determined for the manufacture of the DH60 Moth and it had been hoped that a
pre-determined policy would shorten future contract negotiations.42

In January 1937 the Minister for Defence, Archdale Parkhill, delivered a statement on the
manufacture of aircraft in Australia and noted that for several years British aviation
companies had been open to set up in Australia but no proposal had been forthcoming
that in any way offered the advantages comparable with those subsequently offered from
CAC.43

During the negotiations with British manufacturers in 1935 for the purchase of the new
aircraft, obtaining the rights to locally manufacture these aircraft was discussed and
general terms agreed to under which these manufacturers were prepared to grant such
rights. The proposed payments for the right to manufacture in Australia were negotiated

6
with Hawker Aircraft Company for the Demon, Vickers Supermarine Ltd for the Seagull
V, Rolls Royce for the Kestrel engine and Bristol Aeroplane Company for the Pegasus
engine.44 Later in 1935, when ordering the Avro 643 Cadet, agreement was also
reached for the possible future manufacture of this aircraft in Australia. 45

The first indication that the RAAF was taking a serious interest in the manufacture in
Australia of a Bristol twin-engined aircraft was in August 1936 during discussions as to
whether the Australian Aircraft Syndicate (soon to form CAC) should be approved to
manufacture the NA-16/33 as the Wirraway. CAS Williams stated that he considered the
Bristol Blenheim would meet the future needs of the RAAF for a twin-engined aircraft but
acknowledged that this was a time of rapid technological change. Nevertheless, he
sought comment from the Syndicate as to whether the aircraft factories proposed to be
built would be capable of switching over, at a later date, to the production of the Bristol
Blenheim and the Bristol Aquila engine, both at that time under development in the UK.46
The Syndicate replied on 3 September that the Blenheim and Aquila engine could be
considered for manufacture once the industry had established and gained experience
with building types of simpler construction.47 Six months later, Williams was still hoping
that CAC would be able to manufacture the Bristol 149 or its development, the Bristol
152).48

First Indication of Beaufort Manufacture in Australia

On 5 May 1938 the Air Board gave its first indication that the 45 to 50 Beauforts which
were proposed to be ordered and were additional to the first 50 on order may be
manufactured in Australia.49 The Government was already considering the manufacture
of the Beaufort in Australia at this time when it asked the UK Government to ship one or
two Beauforts to Australia as early as practicable given possible local production.50 The
Air Board was further advised in June 1938 that the decision regarding Australian
manufacturing rights would be available shortly. By 23 August 1938 the Air Board
reported that the local manufacture of the Beaufort was being further considered.
However, with no firm commitment for local manufacture, the order for the additional 40
Beaufort aircraft to be manufactured in the UK was therefore placed.51

Lead Up to United Kingdom Government Air Mission

In November 1938, Australian High Commissioner Bruce sent a long cablegram to Prime
Minister Lyons stating that he had given a great deal of thought to the question of
aeroplane construction in Australia (presumably based on advancing the proposal
conveyed to him in May). He considered that from the point of view of Australian and
Empire defence it was imperative to create at the earliest possible moment a potential
capacity to construct aeroplanes in Australia in substantial numbers and to ensure the
cooperation of the British Government. He had discussed formulating a practical
scheme with the Secretary of State for Air and officials of the Air Ministry, who
considered such a scheme would probably be possible.

The following broad outline was put forward:

Objective – potential for output of 1,000 planes per annum. The peacetime output
necessary to enable war potential to be rapidly realised was 300 planes per annum. The
time taken to reach this peacetime figure of 300 was likely to be 3 to 4 years.
Method – construction of a large number of a proved and approved type of machine, for
example the Beaufort (although ordered by the RAF in August 1936 the Beaufort only
flew for the first time one month prior to this cable, so it could hardly be considered
“proved”).
Method of disposal of production – Australian Government to have priority for the
number required for Australian defence; United Kingdom Government to take balance for
points between Egypt and the Far East.

7
Method of organisation for production – sub-contracting with engineering firms and other
suitable establishments for production of parts with two assembling points, one of which
would be the existing installation in Melbourne and a further one to be created in Sydney.
These assembling points would also be in a position to supplement deficiencies caused
by failures on the part of sub-contractors.
The method of control – one control for all construction in Australia, presumably by CAC.
All information, drawings, etc, to be supplied from the UK and if necessary any jigs and
tools required to supplement those produced in Australia.
Designing and experimental work in Australia – as prototype construction in respect of
new designs was done by hand, this work could go forward to such an extent as was
considered desirable, side by side with the organisation of Australia’s production
capacity. Any production capacity would be available for other machines.

Bruce went on to state that the governing factor in creating an Australian aeroplane
construction potential must be the capacity to dispose of what was produced. The only
practical method in framing a scheme whereby such disposal could be assured was in
cooperation with the UK Government, although the possibility of enabling a portion of the
output to be disposed to other dominion governments or even foreign governments could
not be overlooked.

The system of sub-contracting which was contemplated would have the advantage that
while affording a stimulus to industry generally it could also reduce should there be a
lessening of demand consequent upon an improvement in the international situation.
Bruce proposed that if the scheme was approved in broad outline by the UK and
Australian Governments, the proposed procedure would be for the United Kingdom to
immediately send a representative to Australia to agree to a definite scheme and discuss
the method whereby it could be put into operation at the earliest possible date. 52

Visit of United Kingdom Government Air Mission and Aftermath

On 9 December 1938 Lyons responded to Bruce agreeing that the best course of action
would be for experts to come to Australia to discuss the scheme. Meanwhile, a
preliminary survey of the Australian position was prepared for their study in advance.
This would cover the supply of skilled labour, industry organisation and the capacity of
industries which would be called upon to cooperate. The Government considered that a
scheme of this nature was an important gesture at that time, particularly in view of
prominence given in the press to the favourable conditions under which similar factories
were apparently (at that time) being established in Canada.53

Much has already been written on the visit of the United Kingdom Government Air
Mission to Australia which followed on from a similar mission sent to Canada in the
middle of 1938. The Air Mission made its report in March 1939 (a copy of the Report of
the United Kingdom Air Mission to Australia 1939 can be found in Aircraft -
Manufacturing of in Australia Air Mission Papers, NAA: M276, 4).

The recommendations of that report were as follows:

Matters of Primary Urgency:
1. That immediate orders should be placed in Australia for 180 Beaufort airframes of
standard design, with spares, 90 of these airframes to be delivered to the United
Kingdom Government and 90 to the Commonwealth Government – the costs of the
manufacture of these to be divided in equal proportions.
2. That production should be planned to secure the delivery of the first of these
machines during 1940 and to attain a delivery rate of 20 airframes per month by the
middle of 1941.
3. That for this purpose a central organisation be established and a manager with the
highest possible qualifications be engaged under the Commonwealth Government to

8
 erect and manage central erection shops at Melbourne and Sydney to supervise and
control the main assembly and subcontracting arrangement necessary for carrying
out this order.
4. That in the execution of this plan regard should be paid to the importance of providing
for immediate acceleration and expansion under war time conditions if hostilities
should break out.
5. That immediate orders for the supply of 250 Taurus engines, to be delivered in
Australia in advance of the delivery of the airframes, be placed in England.
6. That drawings, jigs and tools now being prepared by the Bristols in anticipation of
Australian requirements, together with the materials for the first batch of airframes,
and such other requirements as may be necessary to ensure initial progress, be
dispatched from England as soon as possible, and that materials, special parts,
instruments, etc, be made available from England until such time as local supplies
conforming to agreed standard specifications can be produced.

Matters of Less Immediate Urgency:

Consideration should be given to the following matters to further the expeditious
execution of the orders proposed above and to foster the long range development of
aircraft production in Australia.
1. That use should be made of the railway organisations in the States of New South
Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia for the purpose of main assembly
work and for sub-contracting to the engineering industry to the maximum extent the
manufacture of components and subassemblies.
2. That the Commonwealth Government should build erection units at the Mascot and
Fishermen’s Bend aerodromes.
3. That a central committee should be established to supervise generally the policy
governing the distribution of assembly work, subcontracting and the creation of
manufacturing potential.
4. That based on the unforeseen aircraft needs of the RAAF, a review should be
undertaken of the production at the CAC factory at Melbourne and that endeavour
should be made to ensure that these works are kept occupied on a long term
program, whether by full scale manufacture of types other than the Beaufort or by the
supply of parts of the latter to the central organisation.
5. That manufacture at the CAC factory of Gipsy engines for elementary trainers should
be considered.
6. That careful investigations be made into the possibilities of a progressive changeover
at the CAC factory to the Bristol sleeve valve type of engine and that the question of
establishing reserves of engines or parts in Australia be coupled with this
investigation.
7. That every encouragement should be given to technical associations between
established British undertakings engaged on the production of materials, instruments,
etc, and suitable Australian organisations with a view to production in Australia.

This report received the approval of the Cabinet at the end of the same month54 but
Australia was not advised until 27 May 1939 that the UK Government had accepted the
report subject to the reservation for further consideration on the possibility of using an
American engine.55

The Beaufort Scheme

The Beaufort scheme was based upon the importance of securing output at the earliest
possible date and the desirability of minimising capital expenditure by the utilisation of
the existing railway organisations and floor space in the main railway workshops in
several states, the erection of two large factories at Melbourne and Sydney for the
assembly and fitting out of the aircraft and the setting up of a central organisation to
control and manage the undertaking. Within the first 12 months following the approval of

9
the scheme all local arrangements had been carried out to schedule. A large main store
had been built at Spotswood (Vic) and was in operation before the end of 1939. The
sections of the railway workshops in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia
allotted to the construction of the airframe components, sub-assemblies and details had
been prepared for the installation of jigs and tools. The two main assembly workshops at
Fishermen’s Bend (Vic) and Mascot (NSW) had been completed ahead of
requirements.56

Initially Queensland was included in the scheme. At the meeting of railway officers of the
several states it was reported that the Queensland Railways could make available
50,000 square feet of space. Queensland later asserted that this space could only be
made available if the Commonwealth Government constructed new buildings for that
purpose. Following further consideration, it was determined that not more than 30,000
square feet would be necessary at Ipswich. Queensland then advised that only 10,000
square feet would be available and the extra 20,000 square feet could not be provided
unless the Commonwealth Government agreed to the cost of constructing new
workshops. The Commonwealth then advised that Queensland’s contribution would
have to be reduced to conform to the available capacity. 57

Fuel tanks being manufactured at GMH Woodville [State Library SA]

Based on the available engineering technical staff, the actual floor space, suitable labour
trades and the suitability of existing technical organisations to take on the additional work
with the minimum of additional staff, the proportion of work was allocated staffing
requirements of 1,000 in New South Wales, 1,000 in Victoria, 1,800 in South Australia
and 500 in Queensland.58

A necessary precondition to production was, however, the procurement of thousands of

jigs, tools and fixtures, many of an intricate design. The original arrangement provided
for all of these jigs, tools and fixtures, totalling some 33,000, to have been supplied from
the UK. Bristols, whose responsibility it was to supply these tools, ended up failing in
this undertaking. Consequently it was necessary to undertake the manufacture in

10
Australia of not less than 26,000 of the 33,000 tools required. Furthermore, Bristols was
to ship to Australia before 31 December, 1939, 10 sets of fabricated parts and 10 sets of
raw materials and the equipment necessary for the construction of the first 20 airframes.
These deliveries were seriously delayed and not completed due to the confusion and
disorganisation which occurred as a result of the outbreak of war, when thousands of
inexperienced workers had to be employed to increase production. Moreover, the data
supplied by Bristols contained so many errors and so much misinformation as to
necessitate a complete revision of the planning and manufacturing programs and a vast
amount of checking and rechecking in Australia.59 The central administration was
engaged in an examination of all this data and in the detailed planning of the work so as
to ensure that production would proceed concurrently in the sub-assembly and main
assembly workshops.60 In December 1939, the then chief engineer, Fred Shea was sent
to England in order to strengthen the liaison with the Air Ministry and Bristols. 61

The initial production timetable for the scheme provided for the following:
 Drawings to arrive in Australia by 30 June, 1939.
 20 sets of materials to arrive in Australia by 31 August, 1939.
 Two complete aeroplanes to arrive in Australia by 31 October, 1939.
 Jigs and tools to arrive in Australia by 31 December, 1939.62
 180 airframes manufactured in Australia beginning July 1940 and ending October
1941.63

On 27 March 1939, although it had not been consulted by the United Kingdom
Government Air Mission, the Air Board recommended that in accepting its proposals, the
Government should approve a policy of aiming to secure complete self-sufficiency in the
manufacture of airframes and engines in Australia at the earliest practicable date. The
Air Mission’s proposal was for 90 Beauforts for the RAAF but the Government had
already placed orders for 90 Beauforts with Bristols, deliveries of which, as recorded
above) were expected as 50 in July to October 1939 and 40 during 1940. The Board
assumed (but did not know) that there was no intention of transferring this order of 90
now placed overseas to local manufacture. The Air Board could in no circumstances
recommend this owing to the international situation and also to the uncertainty of
deliveries from the local industry. The 90 aircraft proposed to be ordered from local
manufacture would therefore have to meet requirements for the years succeeding 1940
to 1941. Requirements after this date were 25 per annum earmarked for two financial
years following 1940 to 1941, leaving a surplus of 40 aircraft above immediate
requirements. The Board considered that these 40 surplus aircraft would have to be
stored as reserves and therefore storage facilities would have to be built to
accommodate them.64

Then on 1 May 1939, the Air Board stated that full use should be made of CAC’s
production facilities even to the extent of bringing it further into the proposed Beaufort
scheme than was contemplated and this was discussed with representatives of Bristols
on 4 April. Even before the United Kingdom Government Air Mission was conceived, the
RAAF had a requirement for an annual supply of twin engined general reconnaissance
aircraft and had proposed that CAC manufacture such a suitable aircraft.65

Australian Beaufort Manufacture

Following the approval of the Report of the United Kingdom Air Mission, it was necessary
for legislation to be enacted setting up the new Department of Supply and Development,
of which aircraft construction was constituted a branch. It was not until 1 July, 1939 that
the Aircraft Construction Branch began to function.66 On 21 March, 1940 the Aircraft
Construction Branch was reconstituted as the Aircraft Production Commission (APC),
still having direct responsibility to the Minister of Supply and Development. On the

11
establishment of the Department of Munitions in June 1940, the Commission became a
section of that Department. Only 12 months later, the APC became a Commonwealth
department known as the Department of Aircraft Production (DAP) responsible to the
Minister for Aircraft Production. As of 6 January, 1942 the Commission itself was
abolished and enlarged powers given to the Department.

Rear fuselage manufacture ready for skinning at Newport [National Archives Australia]

Major components were to be manufactured in the following workshops for the Beaufort:
Chullora, (NSW): front fuselage, stern frame, undercarriage and engine nacelle.
Newport, (Vic): rear fuselage and tail assemblies (tail plane, rudder, fin and elevators).
Islington, (SA): centre plane and wings.
Queensland’s contribution had now been cancelled.

Training of Workforce
A critical part of the scheme was the need to train staff in the manufacture of this type of
aircraft. Specialist tradesmen and foremen needed to be trained at Bristols. Altogether
the proposal was for 80 to be trained there, 23 each from Melbourne and Sydney, 25
from Adelaide and 9 from Brisbane. The specialist tradesmen were those working in the
Machine Shop, Press Shop, Spars and Rolling Mill, Sheet Metal and Fitting Shop,
Tinsmiths and Coppersmiths, Heat Treatment Shop, Planning and Progress, Stores, and
Inspection Areas and Sub Assembly and Main Assembly Halls. 67 It was arranged that
four groups of trainees would leave Australia, one each in August, September, October
and November 1939 for a period of 3 months.68 In fact the first group left Australia at the
end of July 1939 and was followed by subsequent groups at intervals of between five
and six weeks, and the last of the trainees arrived back in Australia in March 1940.69

Trainees for work in aircraft factories were drawn from all walks of life and to give these
people the necessary theoretical and practical training in aircraft construction, specialist
training schools were established in the various states to supply personnel for the aircraft

12
servicing contractors. Special schools were also conducted to train personnel for the
Beaufort production and assembly workshops. Dedicated classes were established at
technical schools in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia for the training of
process workers and aircraft assemblers. Hundreds of personnel received this training
and a large number of the foreman and leading hands graduated from classes
established at the various scheme’s plants.70

To assist in the training of workers at Islington (SA) where wings and centre sections
were to be manufactured, Bristols dispatched one sample centre section to Australia
which arrived in Adelaide on the SS Corinda in early December 1939. This was sent for
general instruction purposes and the packing case was to be used as a template for
when centre sections manufactured at Islington needed to be packed and transported to
Melbourne or Sydney.71 However, the case had been transported incorrectly and both
the case and centre section had been damaged requiring a check on the assembly jigs
to ensure there had been no major damage.72

Workers Leaving Islington Workshops 15 December 1943 [National Archives Australia]

In addition to the above training requirements, in May 1939 the Air Board realised that
the adoption of the scheme would require the establishment of an Aeronautical
Inspection Directorate (AID) to inspect the aircraft prior to delivery to both air forces.
Based on the scheme as originally proposed, it was estimated that the Directorate would
require some 100 inspectors of various grades. It was also therefore necessary for
some 12 to 15 inspectors to be sent to England before production began to obtain first-
hand experience at Bristols.73

Selected workers at the Mascot Assembly Plant were sent to Fishermen’s Bend in May
1941 where four aircraft were in the process of being assembled. The Mascot workers
assembled one of these aircraft so as to gain experience in the assembly operations and
thereby ensure they would be competent to undertake similar work at Mascot.74

13
 Further Assistance from Bristols
To assist with establishing the Australian Beaufort Manufacturing Organisation,
arrangements were made in the middle of 1939 for Bristols to send a technical
representative to Australia for two years and that a number of suitably qualified technical
subordinates be loaned for a period of six months.75 In fact, three engineers from
Bristols were seconded to Australia to assist – Technical Officer Latham, sub-contract
expert Perman and Inspector Croome.76

Also at that time, Bristols offered to send one of its fully qualified pilots to Australia to
supervise the testing and instruction of pilots on the Beaufort. No RAAF pilots with
relevant experience were available nor were there any RAAF pilots in the UK who could
be made available to gain the requisite flying experience. It was estimated that a period
of two months duration would be adequate for the initial testing and instruction. 77 It
transpired that it would be almost another 2 years before the first flight but the search for
a suitable test pilot commenced in April 1940.

The Air Ministry had considered that flight testing of the Beaufort in Australia should be
undertaken by a test pilot trained at Bristols and suggested that the Air Board dispatch a
pilot to the UK for the necessary instruction.78 Bristol’s chief test pilot had suggested
Flight Lieutenant Paddy Heffernan be sent knowing that he already had considerable
experience of flying twins in the UK.79 On 23 May 1940 the APC was advised that
Heffernan was not available but suggested there be an exchange of one RAF officer to
travel to Australia to flight test the Taurus engined Beaufort while one RAAF officer
would travel to Bristols to be trained on the Beaufort being modified there to take the
Wasp engine. Once trained, the RAAF officer would return in time to test fly the Wasp
engined Beaufort.80 In June 1940 it had been confirmed that no Taurus engines were
now available and all Beauforts were to be Wasp engined and in August the APC noted
the exchange was no longer necessary and assumed that the RAAF would provide an
officer.81 This was confirmed that month.82

But by the end of November 1940, the APC wanted to secure a test pilot from the UK
who was fully experienced in handling the Beaufort83 and the Air Board soon agreed.84
In January 1941 the Commission was seeking a test pilot from the Air Ministry who
would reach Australia within eight weeks.85 This initial proposal, supported by the Air
Ministry, would be for the duration of the war.86 The Ministry of Aircraft Production was
unable to find an available test pilot but the Air Ministry offered to train and second a
RAF officer.87 But the Air Ministry was also having difficulty and finally in February chose
Flight Lieutenant (later Squadron Leader) Lumsden, who had long experience and who
would undertake two weeks special training and then be available to test initial aircraft
and train Australian test pilots.88 Squadron Leader Lumsden was seconded for a period
of only six months from 25 February 194189; he departed the UK by ship on 23 March
194190 and arrived in Melbourne on 19 April having travelled via Canada and the USA.91

3. WHICH ENGINE?
The story of the supply and manufacture of the Taurus and twin-row Wasp engines, both
from overseas and in Australia, is complicated and intertwined. Therefore this section is
generally provided in chronological order. In addition, further information on engine
production for the Beaufort is provided in Australian-Built Aircraft and the Industry:
Volume 2 – Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation by Keith Meggs.

1938
In May 1938 CAS Williams was expressing his concern to RAF CAS Air Chief Marshal
Sir Cyril Newall that the Taurus engine may not be a success and, if there was an
emergency or war, then the Beauforts on order, spares and support may not be available

14
for Australia. As such, Williams considered it essential that Australia had its own aircraft
manufacturing capacity.92

1939
At a Cabinet meeting on 27 March 1939 where the Report of the United Kingdom Air
Mission to Australia was approved, Cabinet also made additional decisions on the
engine to be manufactured. Cabinet recognised that the basis and origin of the
Mission’s visit was that Australia, in addition to improving her own position in regard to
the supply of aircraft, would be a source of supply for British requirements in the East. It
was therefore necessary, if Australia was to take advantage of the proposal, for the
Commonwealth to produce an engine of the type required by the UK, ie the Taurus.
Interestingly Cabinet approved that:
 CAC be authorised to proceed with the development and tooling up for the twin-row
Wasp engine as an insurance against the non-supply of Taurus engines from the UK.
 That concurrently CAC be authorised to proceed with the development and tooling up
for the Taurus engine.93

The schedule at the end of March 1939 for the engine delivery program for the Bristol
Taurus II engine was:
 Supply of 250 engines by Bristols beginning March 1940 and ending April 1941;
 Supply of 110 engines manufactured in Australia beginning September 1940 and
ending July 1941.94

On 4 April 1939 CAC advised that the dates for tooling up for the Taurus engine would
not be completed until December 1940 and production would commence in March 1941.
In the nine months from March 1941, 110 engines could be delivered at the rate of the
three per week for installation in the final 55 Beaufort airframes. In addition, the
Corporation advised that tooling up for the twin-row Wasp engine would not interfere with
the tooling up for the Taurus engine and its work on the single row Wasp engine. The
Corporation estimated it was approximately 50 percent on the way towards the
production of the twin-row Wasp engine.95

CAC’s estimate was very optimistic while the Air Board was much more pragmatic. On
11 May 1939 the Board was advised that Taurus engine production in Australia would
involve the doubling of CAC’s engine workshops, machine tools and processing
equipment costing some £300,000. Added to this was additional tooling, training of
personnel (including at Bristols plant in England and importation of some technical staff
from Bristols), licences, raw materials and a testing plant would bring the total to
£637,000. Engines could not be expected from the plant for at least 2½ years from the
date when the project was authorised. This also assumed that skilled personnel were
available.96

On 15 May 1939 Cabinet again considered the manufacture of engines and decided that:
 CAC be authorised to proceed immediately with tooling up for the twin-row Wasp
engines;
 Arrangements be made through the Air Ministry with Bristols for the redesign of the
Beaufort airframe to permit twin-row Wasp engines being used and that on
completion of the redesign the aircraft be tested for performance and other
characteristics when fitted with these engines;
 A further 110 Taurus engines be ordered by the Air Ministry from Bristols with a
break clause providing that if the engines were available from Australian sources, the
110 would not be delivered to Australia but the Air Ministry would arrange for their
use elsewhere;

15
 Action regarding the tooling up for the Taurus engine be deferred until the Air Board’s
recommendation was received and the matter again examined.97

With the Government deciding to proceed in this direction, the UK High Commissioner
Sir Geoffrey Whiskard intervened and on 20 May 1939 wrote direct to the Minister for
Supply and Development Casey. Whiskard stated bluntly that there was no doubt as to
the very strong opinion held by the United Kingdom Government Air Mission and the UK
Government of the desirability of an English rather than American engine being
manufactured in Australia. Quite apart from the fact that the Beaufort would have to be
adapted to take the twin-row Wasp engine, and that this adaption would require a whole
series of further trails and tests, the UK Government was anxious to decentralise aircraft
manufacture as much as possible and a great deal of the value of that decentralisation
would be lost if the type to be manufactured in Australia was dissimilar to the type
manufactured in the UK.98

While Whiskard was pushing in Australia, the UK Government was pressing High
Commissioner Bruce on the same matter over the concern that an American engine
might be selected in place of the Taurus engine. Bruce was reminded that any Beauforts
made for the RAF in Australia needed to be fitted with the Taurus engine and it would not
be economical for Australia to produce such a small number as 180 Beauforts with two
different types of engine.99 Bruce advised that Australia recognised it was desirable, if
possible, to construct an engine which would be acceptable to the UK Government but
the Taurus engine was not yet proved and until it was he could not expect Australia to
take on the construction of that engine. It was made quite clear that the Air Ministry
intent was for Australia to construct these engines so that Bristols did not have to.100

Following a Cabinet meeting where the manufacture of engines was again considered,
Casey wrote a long letter to Harold Darling, Chairman of CAC on 24 May 1939. Casey
stated that Cabinet had discussed the merits of CAC manufacturing the twin-row Wasp
and/or the Taurus or other Bristol sleeve valve engine and decided to take immediate
steps for CAC to manufacture the Bristol sleeve valve engines, not to engage in the
manufacture of the twin-row Wasp but, if necessary, import those engines and spares as
may be required for Hudson aircraft. In addition, this could also involve the possibility of
importing all the Taurus engines necessary for the 180 Beauforts on order if CAC was
not in a position to deliver Taurus engines on time. The principal reason for taking this
decision was the statement of Government policy in January 1937 that:
“The desirability of standardising equipment with the RAF has not been overlooked,
and it is hoped with the experience to be gained over a period of two years in the
production of the NA16 type, the local industry will be in a position to undertake the
manufacture of what will be the principal type required for Air Force use in Australia,
namely the twin engine monoplane, with a crew of three or four. The plant to be
installed by the Company for the initial order will be suitable to manufacture the
aircraft of this type which is now being developed in England.”

The Government considered that the engine, manufactured as early as possible, should
conform to British practice. The longer an American aircraft was made the more difficult
it would be to translate to a British type. The Government was obliged to follow the
principles laid down by the Imperial Conference in 1937:
“That there should be developed in time of peace in different parts of the Empire,
resources for the manufacture of munitions, as well as for the supply of raw material,
with the following objects in view-
1. A reduction of the existing dependence of all parts of the Commonwealth on the
munitions produced in the UK;

16
 2. The avoidance as far as possible of over-concentration of resources for
manufacture and supply in any area especially liable to attack;
3. The possibility of a development and extension of such resources in time of
emergency.
That, with regard to manufacturing facilities, subject to any arrangements that may be
made between them for combining facilities in peace, Governments should aim in the
first instance at becoming self-supporting so far as possible in the matter of
armaments and munitions of war.”

Casey stated that the adoption of the Report of the United Kingdom Government Air
Mission was a major step to give effect to these principles. In this scheme, Australia had
the opportunity to become the principal British centre of certain important armaments
east of Suez. In order to live up to the opportunities and responsibilities arising from the
aircraft scheme, it was incumbent on Australia to be in a position to produce complete
aircraft of a type that Britain required for strategic points outside of Australia, thereby
securing the advantages of large scale production with lower costs. The UK and
Australia would equip their squadrons with the same type. This uniformity in type
included the manufacture of the Bristol Taurus engines and possibly later, other and
larger types of sleeve valve engines. It would be too much to simultaneously tool up for
Taurus and twin-row Wasp engines to fit with the timetable. In view of assurances given
by UK Government and Bristols for full and complete cooperation there was no reason to
continue with the earlier proposal to tool up for the twin-row Wasp should the Taurus not
be forthcoming.101

On 29 May 1939 Darling replied to Casey assuring the Government that CAC would
assist in every way in the manufacture of aircraft and engines, which included the
manufacture of the sleeve valved engine in Australia. He suggested, though, that since
the principle of manufacture of the sleeve valved engine had been accepted then
consideration should be given to a higher powered engine, namely the Hercules rather
than the Taurus.102 The change in engine was also under consideration by the
Department of Defence103, presumably both organisations believing the Beaufort could
be powered by the Hercules rather than the Taurus. Undated and unauthored notes at
about this time in the file on Beaufort Early Papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77 provided for the
following:
Twin-row Wasp: tool up December 1939 with output by June 1940.
Taurus: tool up September 1940 with output by June 1941.
Possible manufacture the Hercules engine in lieu of the Taurus104

Again the Air Board was thinking ahead and also on 24 May 1939 recommended to the
Secretary of the Department of Defence that, as CAC was not now tooling up for the
twin-row Wasp engine and in order to provide against a war emergency arising within the
next two years, half of the 250 engines proposed to be imported for the locally
manufactured Beauforts should be brought to Australia early in 1940 and stored. They
would then be available as a war reserve if so required, pending the delivery of locally
produced Taurus engines.105

In response to a request for a recommendation, on 14 June 1939 the Air Board advised
of its unanimous view that Taurus engines should be manufactured in Australia. The
Board considered it essential that the engine to be manufactured should be of a type
suitable for installation in the airframe for which it was designed. It acknowledged that
should the Hercules be put into production it would be necessary to design or obtain the
right to manufacture an aircraft suitable to take it. A changeover to the Hercules or
similar type might be necessary some years later but this would be a natural
development following Taurus production.106

17
Given the decision to only manufacture the Taurus, on 15 June 1939 Cabinet decided to
send an officer from CAC to Bristols to make a thorough examination of the costs in
connection with tooling up for production and the costs associated with the production of
the sleeve valve engine.107

On 27 June 1939 the Air Board advised the Secretary, Department of Defence that its
intention was, beginning with either portion of the second Beaufort order or with normal
replacement aircraft in 1941, for CAC to undertake local manufacture of twin engine
general reconnaissance aircraft. The Board also considered that should CAC not be in a
position to begin with a portion of the second Beaufort order and should the Air Mission
scheme go no further than the 180 aircraft on order, then it would be necessary for CAC
to be given a contract for some 30 Beauforts complete, in addition to those required by
the Air Mission scheme, in order to take up their existing capacity when the Wirraway
contract slowed down. This would also lay the foundation for further twin engine general
reconnaissance aircraft manufacture.108

Two days later the Board also advised its annual requirements of the Taurus engine in
peace time was 50 and in time of war would be 220 in the first year and 100 in
subsequent years. Therefore the manufacturing capacity for Taurus engines should be
established on the basis of five per week in time of war but the initial output should be
planned on the basis of 2½ engines per week.109

Even given the above decisions by Cabinet, the Air Ministry was concerned by the
beginning of August 1939 of the urgent need to avoid any opening for the Australian
Government to sidestep a decision to introduce the Taurus as the engine type to be
manufactured in Australia. This was because of the still unresolved problems with the
engine.110 Towards the end of that month, the Australian Liaison Officer signalled that
the cooling problems with the Taurus engine had now been satisfactory resolved but
crankshaft and piston weaknesses would likely delay clearance of the Taurus for
overseas service until March 1940.111 The Air Board replied immediately as this delay
seriously affected the RAAF and was seeking whether the Air Ministry was able to
charter or sell any other twin-engined types for immediate delivery or, failing that, any
single-engined aircraft suitable for general purpose operations.112 In addition, given the
possibility of an outbreak of war, the practicality of proceeding with the Beaufort scheme
was reviewed, and advice was sought from the UK Government whether to proceed and,
if so, whether under war conditions the necessary supplies and engines could be
shipped.113

By the end of August 1939, the Air Council considered that the best course of action was
to continue planning for the production of airframes in Australia and the problems with
the Taurus engine would soon be resolved. The Council also stated that, in the event of
war, every effort would still be made to carry through arrangements for the supply and
shipment of the requisite material to enable the airframe and engine manufacturing
program to proceed.114

But the outbreak of war did change the situation and on 13 September 1939 Bristols
advised the Under Secretary of State for Air that it was unable to assist in the
construction and operation of two proposed engine factories, one proposed to be located
in Turkey and the other in Australia, and a decision should be taken immediately as to
whether either of these two factories should proceed. It noted that the Australian factory
would involve much less work than the Turkish factory and if the Australian factory was
to proceed, Bristols would provide the necessary priority for the delivery of machine
tools, plant and equipment.115

18
This issue was considered by the Supply Committee to the Air Council on 18 September
1939 which recommended that, to minimise Bristol resources, new factories in Turkey
and Australia for the manufacture of Bristol engines should not proceed. The
Committee’s proposal was that all Taurus engines should be supplied from the UK for
those Beauforts to be produced in Australia.116

However, 10 days later the Air Council decided that the Bristol factory in Turkey must
proceed and Australia would no longer manufacture the Taurus but the twin-row Wasp.
The Air Council also decided that Bristols would install a twin-row Wasp engine in a
Beaufort at the earliest possible opportunity so that the necessary instructions and
drawings could be sent to Australia. The Council guaranteed that the UK would supply
Taurus engines until twin-row Wasps were available.117 But Bristols were not happy with
this decision. On 19 December 1939, despite this decision by the Air Council, Bristols
wrote to Under Secretary of State for Air to complain that it was not able to introduce the
construction of British aero engines in Australia, which had now been lost to American
interests. Bristols further advised it would take at least six months before the installation
of the twin-row Wasp installation was likely to be approved for production.118

By the end of September, the Air Ministry advised that it was satisfied Bristols had
overcome the troubles with the Taurus engine and 100 would be available in Australia by
the time the first 50 airframes were completed but were unable to supply these engines
for the balance of the airframes on order. However, now the Air Ministry would be willing
to accept twin-row Wasp engines for completion of the RAF Beaufort order.119

This advice led Australia to immediately request Bristols to install twin-row Wasp engines
in the Beaufort and forward the details of airframe and any other modifications
necessary. In addition, Australia no longer considered it wise to manufacture either the
Taurus or twin-row Wasp engines but asked the Air Ministry to commence enquiries in
the United States for the supply of the latter engines.120 The Air Ministry quickly replied
asking the Australian Government to review its decision to not manufacture the twin-row
Wasp engines as to proceed with their manufacture would be an invaluable
contribution.121 This was completely opposite to its advice of the previous month!

Yet only a couple of weeks later, on 3 November 1939, the Minister for Supply and
Development Casey, who was in the UK, met with senior representatives of the Air
Ministry and Bristols to discuss the supply of Taurus engines. From these talks Casey
was now able to advise that Taurus engines would be available for all 180 Beauforts to
be built in Australia and it seemed that local aircraft engine manufacture was no longer
necessary. However, the trial installation of twin-row Wasp engines would continue as
an assurance against any successful air attacks on Bristol’s engine factory.122

But Cabinet had already acted on the request to proceed with the manufacture the twin-
row Wasp engines in Australia and had forwarded a cable to the UK Government
confirming the decision to proceed prior to it receiving the above cable from Casey.123
With this decision made, the Government was anxious for Bristols to urgently complete
the work necessary to modify the Beaufort to take the American engine. This was still
estimated to take six months124 and greatly concerned the RAAF. Casey explained that
the change of engine introduced extensive modifications to the airframe and the layout of
ancillary equipment and instruments. A hand written note on an extract of Casey’s
cablegram states that Essington Lewis had assured Prime Minister Menzies that CAC
could design the necessary modifications if the Air Ministry continued to raise
difficulties.125

Even by 19 November, Casey was trying to stop engine manufacture in Australia,

reiterating Bristol’s assurance that they could supply all the Taurus engines required for

19
the Beaufort program.126 But Cabinet’s decision stood and on 26 October 1939 the
Department of Supply and Development convened a high level meeting to discuss the
manufacture of twin-row Wasp engines. The conclusions of the meeting were:
 That the Pratt and Whitney twin-row Wasp engine could be produced in Australia in
the requisite quantities within the required time.
 That it was desirable to produce large modern aeroplane engines in Australia.
 That all Beauforts for the RAAF should be equipped with Pratt and Whitney twin-row
Wasp engines.127

At this meeting, the RAAF now supported the manufacture of the twin-row Wasp engines
as 100 Hudsons were on order powered by these engines and local manufacture would
assist in the maintenance and repair of the engines on these aircraft. In addition, the
installation of twin-row Wasps in the Beaufort would also lead to the standardisation of
one type of engine. It was also noted that the Air Board still had 30 Beauforts on order
from the UK and these were to be fitted with the Taurus engines. If the manufacture of
the twin-row Wasp was to be undertaken in Australia it would be preferable for
standardisation if the 30 UK-built Beauforts were to be fitted with Wasp engines in lieu of
the Taurus.128 In addition, CAC was confident it could manufacture the twin-row Wasp
engines but not at Fishermen’s Bend, suggesting a purpose built factory in Sydney as
the alternative, based on its greater pool of industry and labour. Ordering the twin-row
Wasp engines from the USA for the Beaufort program until locally manufactured engines
were available was also considered possible. 129

Based on the advice from this meeting, on 31 October, 1939 Cabinet agreed that:
 The manufacture of the twin-row Wasp engines in Australia be authorised;
 The manufacture of these engines be entrusted to CAC;
 That authority be given for CAC to dispatch at once three officers to the USA, two to
examine manufacturing processes and the third to procure necessary machine
tools.130

The manufacture of the twin-row Wasp engines had been entrusted to CAC because it
was engaged in the manufacture of single row Wasp engines and consequently had the
technical and manufacturing experience necessary to undertake the production with
many parts being similar. CAC accepted the project on 21 November, 1939 and enacted
a licence with the United Aircraft Corporation on 29 January, 1940 with the right to
manufacture the twin-row Wasp series C engines for a term of five years renewable for a
further period not exceeding five years.131

The type of engine selected for manufacture was the 1830 series S1C3G with the
propeller ratio of 3:2 but discussions in the UK disclosed that a 3:2 ratio engine could not
be used in the Beaufort airframe due to its lower efficiency and excessive noise and a
ratio of 16:9 was required. When the S1C3G engine was selected, the two stage S3C4G
engine had not been developed. When the 4G engines became available later, it was
neither practical nor desirable to change over production to the higher powered engine
having regard to the delay this would entail.132

1940
By January 1940, Bristols were having difficulties in obtaining all the required engine
accessories to begin the modifications for the twin-row Wasp and considered the design
changes and testing would not be completed until October 1940. The suggestion to
source additional Taurus engines instead was not supported. 133 Meanwhile
arrangements were in hand to order 60 twin-row Wasp engines from the USA.134 But it
was not until 17 February 1940 that instructions were formally issued to Bristols to
modify a Beaufort to take the twin-row Wasp engines.135

20
 On 7 March 1940 the APC required that the Air Ministry ship the Taurus engines as set
out in the agreed schedule, June 1940 through to May 1941, with half of the engines
consigned to Melbourne and half to Sydney.136 By July 1940 the Air Board was
enquiring whether the Air Ministry intended to fit twin-row Wasp engines to the UK built
Beaufort137. The August reply to this message stated that the installation of the Wasp
engine was expected to be completed shortly and, if satisfactory, would be installed in 50
aircraft138.

1941 – 42
With 10 Beauforts delivered before the end of 1941, the engine supply position was
reviewed on 13 January, 1942. There were 128 S3C4G engines received in Australia
and 304 additional engines of this type had been allocated for shipment. In addition
there were 65 S3CG engines which had been purchased in USA as an insurance against
delay in setting up local production. CAC was first authorised to order materials for 150
engines. Later materials were placed on order for the manufacture of 450 engines and
in February 1942 authority was given to order the necessary materials for 420 additional
engines making a total of 870 plus spares, the equivalent of 1,000 engines.139

With the intended cessation of Wirraway construction, it was proposed that the CAC
factory at Fishermen’s Bend would manufacture the twin-row Wasp engine and that
machine tools be obtained, from overseas and locally, for this expansion so as to allow
Lidcombe and Fishermen’s Bend to each produce 48 engines per month. On 27
January, 1942 the US Lend Lease Mission to Australia approved the requisition for
machine tools required for this expansion to allow production of 96 engines per month.140

The previously mentioned examination of the engine position in February 1942 expected
there to be a shortfall of 805 twin-row Wasp engines as at 31 December, 1943. A major
decision therefore needed to be made as to whether it was desirable to continue the
production of the Beaufort and the proposed CAC Woomera with the twin-row Wasp
engines during the whole of 1943 or whether to obtain from abroad higher powered
engines such as the Wright 1,600 horsepower for installation in either the Beaufort or
Woomera or both. It was noted that consideration had been given by the UK
Government to a Beaufort development aircraft with higher powered engines. On 17
February, 1942, it was decided to request the supply of 400 twin-row Wasp engines to
allow for production until 30 June, 1943.141

On 7 July, 1942 the manufacture of the 4G engine was again considered. It was decided
that to effect this change was unnecessary as it would involve the manufacture of a large
amount of tooling and in any case the necessary tool making capacity was not available.
It was conceded that the production of 4G engines could not be achieved until after June
1943.142 Engine manufacture in Australia was not helped by the fact that in October
1942 there were technical difficulties experienced at the Lidcombe Factory in producing
bevel gears and the output of the S1C3G engines had fallen behind schedule and a
serious shortage developed. However the USA was able to provide 260 engines and
quick shipment was secured.143

4. BEAUFORT PRODUCTION ISSUES

Sets of Fabricated and Unfabricated Parts (Raw Materials)

On 20 September 1939 the Department of Supply and Development issued an indent for
jigs and tools, materials, sample components, drawings and special equipment for the
Beaufort. This order covered arrangements previously made whereby the Air Ministry
had issued a contract (Instruction to Proceed) to Bristols on 26 January 1939 for most of
these jigs, tools and materials (this being about the time the Air Mission arrived in
Australia). This indent required Bristols to ship the bulk of the first five sets of fabricated

21
parts as soon as practicable after 25 July 1939 (retrospective) and the balance to be
ready for shipment by the end of August 1939. The 10 sets of unfabricated materials
were to be shipped during the period September to December 1939.144 By July 1939
Bristols confirmed it would supply the 20 sets of materials as requested145 and on 25 July
the bulk of the first of five sets of fabricated parts were shipped on the SS Clan
McDougall.146

By November 1939, Australia was seeking for Bristols to supply 60 additional sets of raw
materials147 but Bristols had previously stated it would prefer not to undertake
responsibility for the supply of further requirements and suggested that a government
purchasing officer be based under the control of Australia House and/or the Air
Ministry.148 However, the Australian Government considered it was vitally important to
maintain close ties with Bristols thereby ensuring the priority of supplies to maintain the
program.149 The order for 60 sets of unfabricated parts was placed in December.150
However, Bristols did agree to supply 100 sets of fully fabricated engine mounts for the
first 50 Taurus engined Beauforts as it would be uneconomical for Australia to
manufacture such a small number.151 Bristols also agreed to supply oleo legs to meet
the complete program including five spare sets.152

By January 1940 both Bristols and the Air Ministry had recommended to have 200 sets
of unfabricated parts to cover the 180 aircraft on order so as to allow for wastage, loss,
damage and spoilage. High Commissioner Bruce was seeking approval to order a total
of 180 additional sets of raw materials. 153 This was approved on 26 January because
the Government considered it desirable to manufacture the forgings, die castings and
sand castings in Australia and that raw materials should be supplied instead of the
finished parts.154

By the end of February 1940 the Air Ministry stated that 35% of both fabricated and
unfabricated parts necessary for the first 20 Beauforts had already been shipped and
that the balance of requirements for the first 20 would be shipped by the end of March.155
This was far below what had been promised and following a conference on 11 March
with Aircraft Production officials in London, Sir Wilfrid Freeman (Air Member for
Development and Production) had issued instructions to give Australia’s requirements
first priority over all Beaufort supplies.156 At the end of March the Air Council confirmed
this and issued instructions to Bristols to give Australian Beaufort requirements priority
even to the extent of reducing Bristols output of Beaufort aircraft. Bristols were very
unhappy with this instruction as it caused considerable difficulties; a reduction in output
would result in a workforce reduction (albeit temporary). 157

It was obvious that Bristols ignored the Air Council instruction. By the middle of May
1940 the Australian Liaison Officer in London reported on his investigation into progress
made with shipping the 10 sets of parts. 9,247 items per aircraft were required and
6,128 had been shipped leaving 3,119 outstanding. He reported that the handling of this
order by Bristols left much to be desired. Australia’s order for 10 sets of parts was
simply added to the number of parts required from each department at Bristols and there
was never a firm order for 10 sets to be delivered by any specific date. Material was the
only drawn when a surplus permitted it. 158

Australia’s aircraft production representative in London, Fred Shea, took the matter up
with the Air Ministry. The reply that Bristols had done very well in shipping fabricated
parts and raw materials to Australia had Shea responding with outspoken criticism of
Bristols for their failure to supply what was contracted. The original instructions issued to
Bristols by the Air Ministry covering the supply of tools, jigs, and technical data in
addition to the fabricated parts and raw materials were dated 26 January 1939 and were
revised in July 1939. Bristols were aware of what was required of them for the previous

22
15 months but shipment did not commence until August 1939 and up until the end of
April 1940 only 67% of the fabricated parts had been dispatched. He stated that such a
comparatively small order of 10 sets of fabricated parts in a period of nine months could
not be regarded as a satisfactory achievement. The position in respect of the 10 sets of
raw materials was even worse since only 60% of these had been shipped in nine
months.159 In addition, some of the fabricated parts, when delivered, were rejected
because they were either corroded or damaged or rejected on quality grounds.160

Following the period of embargo of aircraft and equipment, in July 1940 Bristols was able
to advise that approval had been received from the Ministry of Aircraft Production to
supply all outstanding material to enable the first 20 sets to be completed. However, no
material in addition to the 20 sets was to be sanctioned for dispatch to Australia including
the remaining 160 sets.161

It was not until November 1940 that Australia’s aircraft production representative, now
Arthur Hyland, was able to advise that large shipments, almost completing the first 10
sets, were ready with the balance anticipated to leave on 20 November, with the
exception of those items affected by the engine installation change. The remainder of
the second 10 sets were expected to be complete and ready for shipment by the end of
that month. 20 additional tailwheel struts would also be supplied, making 40 with those
included in the first 20 sets.162

Delivery Schedules
The delivery schedule as initially set out in the Report of the United Kingdom
Government Air Mission to Australia 1939 was for the first airframe to be produced in
1940 working up to an output of 20 per month by September 1941 with all 180 completed
by March 1942.163 By February 1941 it was estimated that the first production aircraft
would be completed in June 1941 with 70 by end December 1941 and 180 completed by
May 1942.164

By May 1941 four aircraft were under assembly at Fishermen’s Bend and the first 16
aircraft were due for completion by the first week in October.165 By August it was still
considered that 10 aircraft could be delivered by the end of October but after that
delivery could not be forecast owing mainly to the supply of raw materials and some
equipment being behind schedule. It was estimated that a 3 or 4 month delay would
occur after completion of aircraft 10.166

In the middle of October 1941 the estimate was that by 1 January 1942 11 Beauforts
would have been delivered to Singapore and the full 90 not before July 1942. One
option proposed to expedite production was to take skilled workers from Wirraway
production.167 By the end of that month this estimate had again changed so that 11
aircraft would be delivered by end of December 1941 and the first 180 by the middle of
November 1942. By 8 November 1941 there would be 40 sets of raw materials,
standard parts, forgings, castings and service equipment followed by 24 sets per
month.168

With the Japanese attack on 8 December 1941, arrangements were made to possibly
forward four additional aircraft to Singapore by 18 December but one aircraft T9548 was
at that time undergoing armament trials, which would have to be suspended. No further
deliveries could be expected before January 1942.169 The table below provides the
delivery schedules for the manufacture of the Beaufort (excluding L4448) at five different
stages pre-production and compares it to the actual for the period ending 31 December
1942.

23
 13 July 10 Jul 5 Feb 27 Oct Jan Actual175
1939170 1940171 1941172 1941173 1942174
Oct 1940 1
Nov 1940 1
Dec 1940 2
Jan 1941 4
Feb 1941 6 1
Mar 1941 6 4
Apr 1941 8 5
May 1941 12 8
Jun 1941 16 12 1
Jul 1941 20 16 2
Aug 1941 20 20 5 1 1 1
Sept 1941 20 24 6 2 2 1
Oct 1941 20 24 12 3 3 3
Nov 1941 20 24 20 4 2 2
Dec 1941 20 24 24 1 3 3
Jan 1942 4 18 24 4 3 4
Feb 1942 24 8 6 6
Mar 1942 24 12 8 8
Apr 1942 24 16 10 12
May 1942 14 20 12 16
Jun 1942 20 14 20
Jul 1942 20 16 13
Aug 1942 20 20 17
Sep 1942 20 20 24
Oct 1942 20 20 29
Nov 1942 20 20 25
Dec 1942 20 20 24
Total 180 180 180 211 180 208

Supply of Parts from UK

As stated, the first consignment of jigs, tools, etc was arranged to leave the UK about 25
July, 1939. But the Australian Government was confident that a portion of the jigs and
tools could be made in Australia with an advantage to Australian engineering. AF
Bennell of Bristols, who was about to arrive in Australia, would determine what portion of
jigs and tools could be made in Australia.176 This was supported by the UK
Government.177

By December 1939, the Aircraft Production Branch had asked Bristols to defer shipping
the second sample airframe pending the final design for cabin heating, anti-icing
equipment and latest modifications178 and by the end of January 1940 High
Commissioner Bruce was able to advise that the second sample airframe (airframe 100
on the Bristol production line) was to be shipped by the end of March with a dummy
engine and the latest design of cowling.179 However, the second sample airframe was
not completed until the middle of May thereby being caught in the embargo and could
not be released180.

By the beginning of March 1940, the Air Ministry had agreed to supply to the Aircraft
Production Branch all of the necessary equipment to outfit the Beauforts being
manufactured in Australia for the RAF181. During that month, the Aircraft Production
Branch was also seeking Bristols to immediately supply one complete airframe against
the RAAF’s outstanding order for 14 UK manufactured Beauforts.182

24
But in May 1940 the UK Government was obliged to prohibit the export of aircraft
materials or equipment of any kind. Within three months of the prohibition having been
imposed however it had been relaxed so that Bristols was permitted to complete
outstanding requirements for the first 20 Beaufort aircraft sets. Then gun turrets were
released, and shortly afterwards undercarriages were made available and by January
1941 agreement was given to supply all outstanding equipment for the 180 aircraft. 183

In August 1941 RAAF CAS Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett was seeking
agreement from RAF CAS Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal to immediately supply 50
Beaufort airframes to Australia to be modified here to accept twin-row Wasp engines and
therefore expedite delivery to Singapore. Engines were available but construction
materials were still outstanding and delaying production.184 Portal responded on 11
September 1941 that the UK was unable to supply the 50 requested airframes owing to
limited shipping space and because airframe production was only sufficient to meet UK
needs. However, he did agree to try and speed up supplies of outstanding materials
from the USA.185

Effect on Production Due to Delay in Supply of Materials from Overseas

On 28 January 1940, the Aircraft Production Branch had notified High Commissioner
Bruce that the dispatch of tooling required for the manufacture of Beauforts in Australia
was seriously delayed by the Air Ministry requirement for strict AID inspection. This was
considered unusual as AID normally only inspected aircraft parts produced from fixtures
and the Branch was seeking to have the AID inspection confined to sub-assembly and
assembly jigs with tools inspected by the normal tool room inspector.186 In March 1940,
the Aircraft Production Branch was seeking to confirm that assembly and sub-assembly
tooling would still be shipped by the end of April and detailed tooling at the end of May,
recognising that even this schedule would result in a delay to the program of four
months.187

On 1 August 1940, Prime Minister Menzies issued a press release on progress with the
scheme. Menzies stated that Bristols had found it impossible to provide the tooling it
undertook to furnish as a result of which Australia had to manufacture 26,000 of the
33,000 jigs and tools necessary for production purposes. The embargo on the shipment
of further aircraft materials resulted in the necessity to source raw materials and
equipment from the USA and the final success of the scheme was dependent on the
arrival of these materials. The adoption of the twin-row Wasp engine in lieu of the
Taurus necessitated modifications to the airframe; some drawings had been received but
additional work was required in Australia and this was not contemplated in the original
scheme.188

By February 1941, it was obvious that great difficulties were being experienced in
obtaining the necessary supplies from both the UK and USA. The initial program was
based on raw materials for the entire program being delivered by April 1941 in sets
having relation to the number of aircraft to be manufactured. However, shipments had
been received in bulk quantities unrelated to units of production, which then had to be
sorted. Final delivery was not expected until July 1941. Shipping space had also
delayed deliveries and some losses were experienced due to enemy action. Airscrews
from the USA delayed the first flight of L4448 and two auxiliary drive shafts required for
this aircraft were lost at sea and arrangements had to be made for their replacement by
airfreight. Parts outstanding for production aircraft at this time included:
 Lockheed cowlings, gills, etc; one set had been received and a further 63 sets would
not be completed until September at which time local manufacture was to be in
place. Even so, these needed to be modified at Bristols, the first trial installation
being with the 3G engine and further changes were needed for the 4G installation.

25
 Auxiliary gear boxes from the UK – 40 sets were to be supplied from Bristols before
local manufacture commenced but this supply was delayed due to the engine
change. 10 incomplete sets had been shipped and another 120 were waiting
shipment.
 Elevator and rudder spar tubes were to have been shipped from the UK but the
embargo stopped this and arrangements were made for these to be supplied from
the USA but those received had to be inspected.
 For the service equipment for the first 90 aircraft (those for the RAF) most of that
necessary for the first 20 sets had been received but no delivery date had been
advised for the remaining 70 sets. The equipment for the remaining 90 RAAF aircraft
needed to be sourced partially from overseas but mainly from local manufacture.
 50 sets of oleo legs and tailwheel struts were being supplied from the UK with 20
sets shipped but only six sets had been received. The remaining 30 sets were
expected at the rate of 10 sets per month. An additional 100 sets were on order from
the USA and these were expected to be delivered by October 1941. A further 180
sets had to be manufactured locally.
 Engines – of the 228 S3C4G engines required for the first of the RAF Beauforts (180
for the 90 aircraft and 48 as spares) only 61 had been received with a further 67
shipped but no date was available for the remaining 100. For the 216 S1C3G
engines for the 90 RAAF Beauforts (36 spares), 65 had been received and it was
considered that the remaining 151 would be manufactured in Australia. 189

Transporting centre sections and outer wings from Islington to the railway yards
[National Archives Australia]

In May 1941 the experimental Beaufort aircraft L4448 had been flight tested and four
aircraft were under assembly at Fishermen’s Bend. All material requirements were on
hand or on route except for the Lockheed engine assemblies. Only one set had been
received and that was used on L4448. One set was in transit and 15 others shipped with
the remainder to be shipped by the end of that month. The supply of service equipment
was uncertain and there continued to be shortages. The Air Ministry was to supply this
equipment for all 180 aircraft on order and even though 700 cases had been received, a

26
number of items were still outstanding. However, it was considered that the first 16
aircraft could be delivered on schedule. Delays in production for aircraft 17 and onwards
was forecast due to shortages of some light alloy forging stock, ball bearings, tubing,
strip, bar, sheet and extrusion.190

Loading a completed rear fuselage section into a transport box at Newport [National
Archives Australia]

But in July 1941, quantity production of Beauforts was being seriously handicapped by
delay in the supply of materials from the USA. CAS Burnett was being urged by the APC
to instruct the British Purchasing Commission to give increased priority to the Australian
requirements.191

On 6 August 1941, John Storey (soon to be confirmed as Director of the Beaufort

Division, Department of Aircraft Production) briefed the Advisory War Council on
problems that had resulted in delayed production. The supply of duralumin tubing had
been critical. Firstly, the Reynolds Company in the USA failed to supply the quantity
ordered. A Canadian company with whom the new order had been placed had had 80%
rejections in June 1941. However, delivery was expected by October which would be
sufficient for the 180 aircraft. There would be a slight delay in production between the
10th and 11th machine due to waiting for parts. Turrets, guns and oleo legs were being
obtained from overseas and arrangements had been made for local gun turret and oleo
leg manufacture. The RAF in Singapore were storing some service equipment there. It
had taken considerable time to get the necessary equipment and parts from the UK and
during the course of delivery there had been many changes in them. Storey was of the
opinion that it would have been better to have done without them. Following the
embargo by the UK Government in 1940 many parts had to be manufactured in Australia
and the task of sorting out the situation was considerable. Later shipment of parts from
the UK had improved the position. There was no shortage of engines for the first 90

27
aircraft. He advised that it took Canada 3 years to manufacture the Blenheim/
Bolingbroke, CAC 2 years and 10 months for the Wirraway and it was about 2 years and
3 months for the Beaufort. It is also interesting to note that at this meeting he advised
that discussions were underway with the UK Government to manufacture the Beaufighter
in Australia, of which over 70% of parts were interchangeable with the Beaufort.192

Based on Storey’s briefing, the following day a cable was sent to Prime Minister Churchill
stating that the UK Government had failed to supply to date the materials necessary for
the production of the first 20 Beauforts which had necessitated seeking supply from the
USA. However, there were now sufficient parts in Australia for 10 Beauforts for the RAF.
There were not sufficient parts for anything further although a promise had been made
from the USA for delivery during the next three months. As such, this would delay
Beaufort production until February 1942.193

Centre sections from Islington being transported to an Assembly Plant after off-loading
from a train [National Archives Australia]

Three days later Prime Minister Menzies personally appealed to both the US and UK
Governments to enable the expedition of Beaufort deliveries to Singapore. The
production program provided for the delivery of 70 aircraft by the end of December 1941,
which was based on material delivery promises which had not been fulfilled.
Outstanding materials were urgently required to complete the first 20 aircraft as this
would enable one squadron to be sent to Singapore. Failure to deliver would further
greatly delay production.194

By the end of November 1941 the main items still awaited from overseas were:
 Lockheed assemblies: these assemblies constituted the engine cowlings, controllable
gills and exhaust systems. 20 complete aircraft sets had been received. Sufficient
parts to complete 64 sets were expected to be received by mid-January 1942 and an
additional 36 sets by the end of February 1942. However, these 36 sets were to be

28
 diverted from a British shipment and there was no guarantee that these would be
complete.
 Electric cables: the items required to complete 90 aircraft would not be received until
mid-January 1942 and the remaining 90 by end of February 1942.
 Proprietary items: items such as ball bearings, Duroflex hose, Breeze controls,
tachometers, etc were still required for aircraft 20 onwards. Some of these items
were to come by airfreight.
 Service equipment: all 90 sets had been received for the RAF Beauforts.195

Beaufort Turret Manufacture

The 10 sets of fabricated parts and 10 sets of unfabricated materials included the parts
necessary for the Beaufort turrets196 and on 18 December 1939 an order was placed for
a further order for 185 gun turrets.197

Mk VE gun turret on test stand at Fairfield [National Archives Australia]

But by 19 January 1940, Fred Shea, Australian aircraft manufacturing representative in

London, advised that only one gas operated Vickers gun with magazine feed was being
fitted to Beaufort turrets and a modification for fitting two gas operated guns was under
trial. The fitting of Browning guns in Beaufort turrets had not been considered and was
not recommended by Bristols as a variation to the feed equipment would cause difficulty.
It was suggested that Australia retain the Vickers gas operated gun in turrets as
modifications would cause delays and the Air Ministry would probably not agree to any
alteration on their aircraft which would involve variation between British and Australian
production.198 But by October Bristols proposed otherwise and would dispatch six single
gun Vickers turrets for alteration in Australia to Browning twin guns.199

When the embargo was placed upon the exportation of aircraft and equipment from the
UK in May 1940, Australia was informed that two gun turrets only could be provided.
However in August 1940 further advice was received that 20 gun turrets could be made
available. This inability to obtain adequate supplies of gun turrets from the UK

29
necessitated arrangements being made for the manufacture of those turrets in
Australia.200 In April 1941 Hyland in London reported that the delay in the production of
Beaufort gun turrets was in part caused by heavy damage from enemy action to the mill
organisation. However, Bristols was working on the adaptation of the Blenheim turret for
the Beaufort as there were existing stocks available. 201

On 3 June 1941 the APC was seeking from the RAAF a Blenheim turret to ascertain
whether it could be adapted to the Beaufort without too much difficulty. This was based
on APC’s understanding that 32 Bristol Blenheim Mark III gun turrets were in RAAF
stores202 (these were probably delivered as part of those initial deliveries of parts for the
Bolingbroke, retained because at that time the majority of parts were expected to be
applicable to the Beaufort).203

Because turrets were still not available, by August 1941 agreement was reached to
manufacture those turrets in Australia. Advice was subsequently received from the UK
of a change of policy from the original Beaufort gun turrets to converted Blenheim turrets
and clarification was sought from the UK as to whether Australia should also changeover
and manufacture the Blenheim type. A cable was received from the UK on 14 August
giving formal approval for the fitment of the type B1 Mk V Blenheim gun turret in the
Beaufort. To assist, the UK Government shipped a total of 102 turrets, 62 of the
Beaufort type and 40 of the Blenheim type, enough to cover the 90 RAF aircraft. The
decision as to which type of turret to manufacture in Australia was left to the RAAF.
However, tests were being conducted in the UK on a Blenheim type four gun turret and,
if these proved satisfactory, the Air Ministry would require this type of turret to be fitted to
its aircraft. Due to the urgency though, the APC could not wait and production
arrangements had already been put in place for building the Beaufort twin Browning
turret204 (later altered to the Blenheim turret after 150 had been manufactured).

Production Delays in 1940

On 13 June 1940 High Commissioner Bruce was advised that the unavoidable delay in
the delivery of jigs, tools, raw materials, equipment and the non-supply of engines had
rendered it impossible to carry out the scheme for the construction of the 180 Beauforts
in the manner originally planned. The Beaufort project had advanced to the stage where
every possible expediency had been adopted but the failure of Bristols to deliver to
schedule the jigs, tools and fabricated parts and raw materials for the first 20 airframes in
accordance with the contract had caused delay in commencing production. Australia
now proposed to obtain from the USA raw materials and equipment that was to have
been supplied from the UK. Australia would complete modifications to the airframe
necessitated by the change in type of engine, this having been commenced by Bristols
and would complete the trial installation with sample airframe, engines and propellers
recently obtained.205

Hyland in London advised Commissioner Clapp on 17 October 1940 that intensive

enemy action in early September had retarded production and further interfered with ship
sailings and the accumulation and dispatch of remaining materials for the first 20 sets.
Bristols had already started the layout and compilation of drawings for the installation of
S3C4G engines in place of S1C3G, the original type allotted for fitment and these
drawings would be available in approximately seven weeks time and forwarded as they
were prepared. As a result, the following components were considerably affected and
required redesign: engine mountings, engine controls, air intake fairings, fuel and oil
systems, fire extinguisher system, engine speed indicators, generators, airscrews and
de-icing pipe runs. Additional components included the two speed blower control. In
addition, Bristols advised that the diameter of the airscrew required was 11ft 6in and
provided Curtiss airscrew hubs were interchangeable with Hamilton airscrew hubs, they
should be satisfactory.206

30
Beaufort Production Situation 1941
A report to War Cabinet on progress with aircraft production to the end of July 1941
showed that there were existing orders of 180 Beauforts for the RAF and 90 Beauforts
for the RAAF. The first production aircraft was to be completed during the week ending
4 August 1941 with seven aircraft under final assembly at Fishermen’s Bend and two at
Mascot.207 A further report to War Cabinet for production to the end of December 1941
showed that total deliveries to the end of that month were 10 aircraft.208

Also by the end of December, Prime Minister Curtin stated that every endeavour had to
be made to expand aircraft production in Australia to the greatest extent possible. 128
engines were delivered from the USA and a further 100 were promised for delivery in
November and December 1941 and January 1942 but these had been withdrawn and
further deliveries were uncertain due to diversions to Russian needs. Russian
requirements also interfered with shipment of materials from the UK. Owing to the non-
delivery of engines from the USA, the changeover to the S1C3G was required at the 51 st
aircraft rather than the 91st as originally planned. The manufacture of the complete line
of instruments had been established, while annexes for airscrew and undercarriages and
a drop forge annex was in operation. However, it was noted that an increase in 300lb
weight for additional armour would affect the performance of the aircraft. 209

Late 1941/Early 1942 Production Delays

On 15 November 1941 Essington Lewis of the APC stated that five Beauforts had been
delivered with five more by the end of November but owing to the development of stern
frame cracks, as had occurred in the UK, the strengthening modifications necessary
would put the delivery of the first 10 back to early December. Two weeks would be
necessary to modify the aircraft already produced. This modification had been
introduced after aircraft 21 on the production line.210

Components ready for assembly, location uncertain but probably Fishermens Bend
[National Archives Australia]

31
 With the start of the war against Japan in December 1941, the British Chiefs of Staff
Committee were paying renewed interest in Beaufort production for the reinforcement of
Singapore and on 2 January 1942 noted that 128 S3C4G engines were now in Australia
and negotiations were underway for the remaining 304. All British equipment required
for the first 90 RAF aircraft should have now been received in Australia.211 This was
followed by further consideration on 26 January 1942. The Committee noted that
production of Beauforts in Australia had been delayed by the shortage of engines, mainly
supplied from the USA, and of certain tools and accessories supplied from the UK. As a
result, although production began in October, only 10 Beauforts had been produced by
31 December, 1941. It was now estimated that, provided the necessary requirements
were met, 270 Beauforts could be produced by the end of 1942. Accordingly, the
following action had been taken to ensure that those requirements were met:
 128 engines were already in Australia and another 94 were due by the end of that
month. The UK had obtained a guarantee from the USA for engine deliveries
sufficient to meet Australian requirements for at least the whole of 1942.
 The UK had undertaken to supply all materials, fabricated parts, accessories etc.
required to complete the 270 Beauforts.
 Action had been taken in the USA to speed up the delivery of certain machine tools
to enable Australia to expand Beaufort production.212

Beaufort Production to June 1942

On 17 April 1942 High Commissioner Bruce was advised that War Cabinet had approved
an aircraft production plan that included increasing the manufacture of Beauforts from 20
per month to 40 per month as soon as practicable and expansion of the twin-row Wasp
engine from 40 to 96 engines per month. By then practically all difficulties with the
manufacture of the Beaufort in Australia had been overcome. Beaufort production had
now been accorded the highest priority. As at 31 March 1942, 28 Beauforts had been
delivered with scheduled production for April at 10; planned production of 20 per month
to be achieved by August with 40 per month by January 1943. However, no total
quantity had been stipulated beyond the 270 previously approved.213

The manufacturing position at 30 June 1942 was:

 76 Beauforts delivered.
 Major components produced for 124 aircraft.
 Pressed parts and sub-assemblies produced for 230 aircraft.
 Raw materials issued from store to produce the equivalent of 290 sets.214

5. RAF ORDERED BEAUFORTS

Orders for RAF Beauforts

The Report of UK Government Air Mission to Australia 1939 provided for Australia to
order 180 Beauforts, the first 90 for the RAF and second 90 for the RAAF.215

On 25 January 1941 Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham, C-in-C Far East, in cabling the
Air Ministry stated that, following discussions with CAS Burnett, he had agreed to make
the fullest use of aircraft manufactured in Australia. The only aircraft required was the
Beaufort. Advantages of utilising aircraft manufactured in Australia were that the aircraft
could fly to Malaya thereby saving shipping space and avoid losses from possible
sinkings. It was also easier to supply urgent spares and allowed for interchangeability
with Australian squadrons. He hoped that by the end of 1941 there would be six
Beaufort squadrons in Malaya and two more in 1942 with Far East requirements
including reserves of 216 aircraft. He also considered that the Beaufort was suitable to
the end of 1942 but it was desirable to then changeover to a more advanced type which,
from production point of view, should be a Beaufort development with upgraded engines

32
and not a new aircraft. Brooke-Popham recommended that an additional 126 Australian-
manufactured Beauforts be ordered.216

Notice of this intent was conveyed to the APC and the Minister for Munitions was
advised on 13 February 1941 that the UK Government desired to obtain Beaufort aircraft
additional to the 90 already ordered. The first 180 aircraft were due to be delivered by
May 1942 and with an additional 90 aircraft be manufactured for the RAAF, which could
be completed by September 1942; any additional Beauforts for the RAF could be
commenced in October 1942.217 The UK Government authorised the manufacture of 90
additional aircraft for the RAF in April 1941.218

T9541 at Fishermens Bend about late in 1941 [National Archives Australia]

Fitment of Service Equipment to RAF Beauforts

By the end of April 1941, the Ministry of Aircraft Production required all service
equipment to be installed in RAF Beauforts before delivery219 and that all 90 RAF
Beauforts plus spares were to be consigned to RAF Seletar, Singapore. 220 Then in June
the Department of Air advised the APC that all service equipment should be fitted before
aircraft were dispatched to the RAF but it was the responsibility of the RAF to make this
equipment available.221

In June 1941 CAS Burnett wrote to Air HQ Far East recommending that an officer with
the necessary qualifications be sent to Fishermen’s Bend to advise on the fitment of the
necessary service equipment.222 Further, the Air Board queried from Air HQ Far East
whether aircraft should be fully equipped with service equipment in Australia as there
were a great number of items not yet received from the UK, or would this be done in
Singapore. This included guns, bomb sights, rangefinders, sextants, dinghies and
various instruments.223 There was some confusion between London and Melbourne as
Air HQ Far East replied, on advice from the Air Ministry, that all service equipment
specified for Beauforts had been supplied with the exception of turrets and guns. 224

This was followed at the end of July by a meeting between officers from Air HQ Far East,
the RAAF and APC where details of the supply of the Beauforts to Singapore was

33
finalised. Spare parts for twin-row Wasp engines and airscrews were to be forwarded
direct to RAF Seletar from the USA. Aircraft were to be fitted with blind flying equipment
which was being dispatched from the UK, however it was noted that aircraft deliveries
were not to be held up because the equipment had not been received. Four out of the
90 aircraft, and preferably the first four, were to be fitted with dual controls. It was also
unclear what camouflage colour was to be painted on the underservices, aluminium, sky
blue or light green and the decision was made to paint sky blue. The first 20 aircraft
would be delivered without the rearward-facing under defence gun but the mountings
would be fitted retrospectively in Seletar after these were flown there when available. No
drawings had been received from Bristols for the front traversing gun and when received,
would be incorporated as soon as possible.

It was agreed that some of the first aircraft would be delivered minus certain pieces of
service equipment which had still not been received. There was to be no hold up of
delivery of aircraft, fitting of this equipment to be done at Seletar from stocks available
there but the short fitted items would be dispatched when they arrived, as Seletar only
had maintenance stocks. Torpedo sights had not been received and the Air Ministry
would be asked to send these direct to Seletar, otherwise the APC would forward them
on.225

By 4 August 1941 the Air Ministry recognised that there was a shortfall of service
equipment for the Beauforts and although 95% had been dispatched the remainder
would be sent as soon as could be arranged.226 However, in Australia, RAF and RAAF
officers noted that if not received the aircraft would not be able to function on arrival in
Singapore. The minimum requirement considered necessary in regard to fitment of
service equipment was to allow for the aircraft to drop torpedoes and have minimum
defensive armament.227

Given all of the above, on 8 September 1941, the Air Ministry authorised Beauforts to be
delivered to Singapore without some service equipment, namely cabin heating, torpedo
sights, gyro angling, blind approach and airscrew de-icing. However, fixed fittings for
approved modifications were to be incorporated unless this would delay deliveries.228 In
addition, the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Far East was also given authority for the
deletion of equipment not required for operations in that Command.229 A week later the
Air Ministry also advised that the Mark IV auto controls would not be available for
Australian-built Beauforts. The Air Ministry suggested that the Sperry auto-pilot would be
suitable but only after drastic modifications to the instrument panel and flying control
systems but Bristols could not design and flight test a trial installation in under six
months.230

By 8 December 1941 the AOC Far East complained to the Air Ministry (with a copy to the
APC) that no provision had been made by Australia for spares for the RAF Beauforts in
Singapore. The AOC asked for spares to be sent from the UK and the Air Ministry
urgently sought what provisions had been made for spares and asking what type and
quantity was required from the UK.231 A response was forwarded to the Air Ministry on
31 December 1941 refuting the statement that the APC had made no provision for
spares. In fact spares manufacture was in hand with items and quantities in accordance
with the spares assessment agreed in September that year. Production of airframe
spares was already in production. Spares requirements were planned to be forwarded to
Singapore with every 20 aircraft but some items would be difficult to supply, except at the
expense of new aircraft production. A complete survey of the spares position was being
made and this was to be supplied to the Air Ministry, including any spares that should be
supplied from the UK. Complete engines and propellers for spares were being sent
direct from Australia.232

34
Detailed Beaufort Production Information - August 1940 to December 1941
The information below is that applicable to the end of each month mentioned.

August 1940
Salvage work had commenced on the fabricated parts and raw materials received from
the UK which had been damaged in transit and this continued until at least the end of the
month. Beaufort L4448 was being assembled and preliminary work had commenced on
the installation of the twin-row Wasp engines although only some drawings had been
received from Bristols for this. One front fuselage jig had been damaged in transit and
required repair work, 10 front fuselage assembly jigs were assembled although only two
were ready and four stern frame jigs were ready for production.
The lack of drawings from Bristols had delayed the production of many detailed parts
and sub-assemblies. Other delays included fins and rudders awaiting modification
drawings, a shortage of spar tubes for elevators, no interchangeability gauges for the
tailplanes, a lack of the specialised nuts and bolts for the assembly of nose sections and
a large salt bath for the heat treatment of small parts had not been completed. However,
10 completed ailerons and five elevators were ready for covering, four tailplanes had
been completed but were still waiting the interchangeability gauges; skinning had
commenced on four rear fuselages and 13 airscrews had been completed. 233

September 1940
The damaged front fuselage assembly jig had been repaired and reconstructed with one
front fuselage in its assembly jig. However, work was delayed due to a lack of sub-
assemblies. Further delays in production still resulted from a lack of complete sets of
drawings which had been promised by not delivered.234

October 1940
Various jigs had been inspected and passed for centre sections and wings and eight rear
fuselage jigs were now in place. Fin and rudder jigs were still being modified and the
large salt bath for the heat treatment of small parts was now in operation. Delays in
production were caused by the slow delivery of materials, tooling jigs, etc and due to the
training required of personnel for quantity production. For a period, production was
suspended due to the poor quality of local duralumin.
Aileron and elevator production was proceeding satisfactorily with 14 ailerons and four
elevators sent to Victorian and Interstate Airways for covering with fabric, however nine
tailplanes were still waiting the interchangeability gauges. 23 airscrews had been
delivered by early October; seven stern frames had been completed or in production;
one front fuselage had been completed and a further eight were in various stages of
assembly; 11 rear fuselages were in various stages of production and one sample fin
was still being modified.235

November 1940
A further 12 jigs for centre sections and wings were now ready for production including
the final wing assembly jigs. There were delays in the production of some
subassemblies. Wing ribs and flaps were now being produced. Detailed parts were
arriving in reasonable quantities and interchangeability gauges had been received with
work proceeding on 11 tailplanes. Production of front and rear fuselages and ailerons
and elevators was increasing and fin and rudder production had recommenced following
the receipt of the sample assembly. 236

December 1940
An interchangeability gauge for the centre section and port wing was passed and the
centre section main assembly jig was ready for production. The first sets of ailerons and
elevators plus two tailplanes, two fins and one rear fuselage were completed and sent to
the Main Assembly Workshop at Fishermen’s Bend on 2 December.237

35
January 1941
Four further jigs were passed ready for production. Production was delayed due to the
non-availability of certain detail parts. Approximately 10% of all finished detail parts were
being rejected. 11 front fuselages were in the course of production or final fitting out.
Additional ailerons, elevators, tailplanes, fins, rear fuselages and the first rudders were
delivered to the Main Assembly Workshop at Fishermen’s Bend. The first spars for
mainplanes and centre sections were produced. Several thousand parts and sub-
assemblies were forwarded from GMH Woodville to the APC store at Spotswood.238

February 1941
Shortages of rudders and tail wheel assemblies and some detail parts were still delaying
production.
L4448 – assembly was making steady progress but engine mounts and some parts had
still not been delivered.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
Aircraft No. 1 (T9540) – in its assembly jig having the tail unit and rear fuselage
connected to the centre section.
Aircraft No. 2 (T9541) – assembly commenced.
Aircraft No. 3 (T9542) – assembly commenced.
Aircraft No. 4 (T9543) – assembly commenced.239

March 1941
There were major shortages of centre sections, front fuselages, wings and
undercarriages. There were now 70 Pratt and Whitney S3C4G twin-row Wasp engines,
two stern frames, four rear fuselages and six tailplanes in store in addition to those major
components required for the four aircraft being assembled. Two Wasp engines had
been sent to Ford Company at Geelong for fitting of cowlings. Six gun turrets were being
treated to rectify corrosion after being immersed in seawater and the two unaffected
turrets were to be modified. Arrangements had been made for the loan of the Royal
Aircraft Establishment Mk IV auto pilot from the Vickers Wellesley aircraft (presumably
L2639) as a sample for trial installation.
L4448 – awaiting the supply of engine mounts.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
Aircraft No. 1 (T9540) – fuselage and centre section assembly completed, undercarriage
assemblies were being fitted and wings had now arrived.
Aircraft No. 2 (T9541) – mounted in the assembly jig for the connection of the fuselage
and centre section but no wings were available.
Aircraft No. 3 (T9542) – no centre section yet available.
Aircraft No. 4 (T9543) – no centre section yet available. 240

April 1941
Centre sections, front fuselages, wings and undercarriages were still in short supply but
a total of 78 Pratt and Whitney S3C4G twin-row Wasp engines had been received.
L4448 – engines fitted and ground run tested.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
Aircraft No. 1 (T9540) – being fitted out internally but undercarriage and wings still not
fitted.
Aircraft No. 2 (T9541) – fuselage and centre section assembly completed, being fitted
out internally and wings arrived but not fitted.
Aircraft No. 3 (T9542) – rear fuselage and centre section assembly completed, front
fuselage and stern frame in the process of being fitted and wings now arrived.
Aircraft No. 4 (T9543) – centre section mounted in the assembly jig with rear fuselage
being fitted and front fuselage ready.
Aircraft No. 5 (T9544) – awaiting a centre section.241

36
May 1941
Lack of engine mounts delayed the entire production and the unavailability of further
centre sections was delaying the assembly of additional aircraft.
L4448 – first flight on 5 May with aircraft then based at Laverton for service trails.
Engine nacelle doors required modification prior to further flights.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 (aircraft now referred to by their serial numbers) – continuing to be fitted out
internally but engines not fitted due to lack of engine mounts.
T9541 – continuing to be fitted out internally but no engine mounts.
T9542 – removed from assembly jig, wings attached, undercarriage in process of being
fitted and internal fitting out commenced.
T9543 – fuselage and centre section assembly completed, being fitted out internally,
undercarriage in process of being fitted but no wings to fit.
T9544 – fuselage and centre section assembly completed and port undercarriage
attached.242

June 1941
Lack of centre sections was continuing to delay the assembly of further aircraft.
L4448 – new engines installed at Laverton and test flown with these on 12 June. The
aircraft commenced altitude tests.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 – fitted with engines and expected to be completed shortly.
T9541 – wings fitted and in process of being fitted with engine mounts and adaptors.
T9542 – wings fitted and in process of being fitted with engine mounts and adaptors.
T9543 – undercarriage fitted but no wings to fit.
T9544 – undercarriage fitted but no wings to fit.
T9546 – in the assembly jig with rear fuselage fitted to centre section and front fuselage
ready for attachment.
Main Assembly Workshop – Mascot
T9545 – assembly commenced.243

July 1941
L4448 – completed test flights to Sydney and Adelaide and now being prepared for
installation of Lockheed engine mounts.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 – all components assembled and engines installed.
T9541 – all major components assembled, fittings and accessories being attached but
engine mounts not fitted.
T9542 – engine mounts, bulkheads and engines fitted and all other major components
assembled with fitting out proceeding.
T9543 – engines and wings to be fitted.
T9544 – fuselage and undercarriage assembled with preliminary fitting out proceeding.
T9546 – fuselage assembled and undercarriage attached.
T9548 – in the assembly jig with front and rear fuselages and undercarriage in process
of being fitted.
Main Assembly Workshop – Mascot
T9545 – no change.
T9547 – being prepared for assembly.
T9549 – being prepared for assembly.244

August 1941
L4448 – Lockheed engine mounts installed together with locally made adaptor
structures, completed test flight to Queensland, auxiliary fuel tank installed and speed
trials being carried out.

37
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 – first flight conducted on 22 August.
T9541 – all major components assembled, fittings and accessories being attached and
Lockheed engine mounts being fitted.
T9542 – engine mounts replaced with mounts manufactured from T45 tubing and fitting
out proceeding.
T9543 – all major components assembled but engine mounts still not installed.
T9544 – fuselage and undercarriage assembled with fitting out proceeding.
T9546 – fuselage assembled and undercarriage attached.
T9548 – fuselage assembled and undercarriage attached.
Main Assembly Workshop – Mascot
T9545 – no change.
T9547 – being prepared for assembly.
T9549 – being prepared for assembly.245

T9540 at Fishermens Bend 1941 [National Archives Australia]

September 1941
Investigations commenced for the possible fitment of Sperry auto pilots in both RAF and
RAAF Beauforts. Preliminary design work had been initiated on the installation of the
Sperry auto pilot control unit in the pilot’s cockpit and the servo unit in the fuselage. It
was considered unlikely that an experimental installation could be made available for air
testing in under six months. Following a mock-up of the full W/T equipment, it was
realised that the full installation restricted space in the fuselage and an alternative
position for the oxygen bottle storage was being considered.
L4448 – engine mounts changed to T45 tubing and fin area increased. Mainplane
stabilisers removed to ascertain effect of increased fin area. Aircraft flown to Camden on
12 September and Tasmania on 15 September.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 – DTD347 engine mounts and adaptors removed and T45 mounts installed, dual
controls fitted and released to RAAF for type trials and RAF pilot conversion training at
Laverton. At completion of these flights, aircraft to be returned to Fishermen’s Bend for
redesign of auxiliary gear box generator drive, final adjustments of hydraulic turret,
undercarriage doors, wireless gear and inspection for final acceptance.

38
T9541 – all major components assembled, engines installed and in final fitting out stage.
T9542 – in final fitting out stage although starboard generator drive required redesigning.
T9543 – all major components assembled, engine mounts fitted and fitting out
proceeding.
T9544 – all major components assembled and preliminary fitting out proceeding.
T9546 – fuselage assembled and undercarriage attached but still in assembly jig.
T9548 – fuselage assembled and undercarriage attached but still in assembly jig.
Main Assembly Workshop – Mascot
T9545 – all major components assembled and fitting out proceeding.
T9547 – fuselage and undercarriage assembled, engine mounts and turret received but
not yet installed.
T9549 – fuselage and undercarriage assembled.246

Loading outer wings into transport boxes for transport at Islington [National Achieves
Australia]

October 1941
Due to the lower revolutions of the twin-row Wasp engines as compared with the Taurus
engines for which the generators were originally designed, it was proposed to modify the
auxiliary gear box drive in the starboard engine to increase the generator revolutions.
L4448 – flown to Sydney and further trials carried out.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 – continuing type trials at Laverton.
T9541 – completed and first flown on 11 October and aircraft later delivered to
Bankstown.
T9542 – completed and first flown on 26 September but aircraft delivered later to
Bankstown. Starboard wing assembly damaged in accident at Bankstown while being
used for RAF pilot conversion training. Replacement wing used from T9549 and
replacement engine from T9547.
T9543 – completed and first flown on 26 October.

39
T9544 – continuing with fitting out.
T9546 – all major components assembled, including engines, and fitting out continuing.
T9548 – all major components assembled, including bulkheads, and fitting out
continuing.
Main Assembly Workshop – Mascot
T9545 – completed and undergoing contractor’s tests. Aircraft first flew on 22 October
and flown by ACM Brooke-Popham, who was in Sydney.
T9547 – major components assembled except airscrews and fitting out proceeding.
T9549 – airframe assembled except for engine mounts and wings.247

November 1941
The three Beauforts at Bankstown were being returned to Fishermen’s Bend for the final
fitment of equipment prior to delivery to Singapore. Work on the experimental installation
of the Sperry auto pilot was temporarily delayed pending receipt of information to clarify
the supply position of the various types of auto pilots available.
L4448 – fitted with torpedo gear and further trials carried out.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 – completed.
T9541 – completed.
T9542 – completed. Modifications carried out to cam in tail wheel, strengthening of stern
frame, auxiliary fuel tank and starboard wing gun installed.
T9543 – completed. Flight test being carried out as aircraft flies port wing down and
problems with aileron.
T9544 – modifications completed to cam in tail wheel and strengthening of stern frame,
auxiliary fuel tank installed and further test flight carried out on 20 November (first flight
about 12 November).
T9546 – fitting out proceeding.
T9548 – fitting out proceeding.
T9550 – front and rear fuselage attached and fitting out proceeding.
T9552 – front and rear fuselage being prepared for attachment.
Main Assembly Workshop – Mascot
T9545 – completed. Auxiliary fuel tank being fitted and further modifications carried out
at Fishermen’s Bend.
T9547 – modifications being made to strengthen stern frame (first flight about 25
November).
T9549 – airframe assembled except for airscrews but modifications being made to
strengthen stern frame.
T9551 – rear fuselage being assembled to centre section but no wings, rudder and
elevators available.
T9553 – assembly not yet commenced but rear fuselage, stern frame, tailplane and
engines received.248

December 1941
Shortages of wings, engine mounts, elevators, rudders and gun turrets causing delays
together with requirement to strengthen stern frames.
Main Assembly Workshop – Fishermen’s Bend
T9540 – completed. New wing being fitted for gun modification, new engines to be
installed, beam guns being fitting but no under-defence guns available.
T9541 – completed.
T9542 – completed.
T9543 – completed.
T9544 – completed.
T9546 – completed and first flight on 10 December. Dual controls fitted, flight test
carried out and ready for delivery.
T9548 – delivered to service 17 December (first flight about 13 December).

40
T9550 – fitting out proceeding.
T9552 – fitting out proceeding.
T9554 – fuselage completed and fitting out proceeding.
T9556 – front and rear fuselages attached and fitting out proceeding.
T9558 – assembly not yet commenced.
Main Assembly Workshop – Mascot
T9545 – completed.
T9547 – completed.
T9549 – delivered to service 17 December (first flight about 15 December).
T9551 – fuselage assembled, wings and beam guns being fitted.
T9553 – fuselage assembled, engine mounting adaptors and bulkheads fitted. Engines
assembled to mountings and nearly ready for installation. Undercarriage fitted and turret
installed. Fitting out proceeding.
T9555 – fuselage assembled, undercarriage being fitted and stern frame being modified.
T9557 – centre section in assembly jig, rear fuselage being attached, front fuselage
ready for fitment and stern frame being modified.
T9559 – assembly not yet commenced.249

Acceptance of Aircraft by RAF

The following five aircraft were officially accepted by the RAF on the dates shown (other
aircraft acceptance dates unknown):
T9542 accepted on 1 December 1941
T9543 accepted on 1 December 1941
T9544 accepted on 1 December 1941
T9547 accepted on 26 November 1941
T9548 accepted on 15 December 1941250

Beaufort Flight to Singapore

The RAF in Singapore had been waiting some time for the delivery of the Australian-
made Beauforts. This necessitated flying over the Netherlands East Indies with one
refuelling stop required. On 1 October 1941 the British Consul-General in Batavia was
requested to seek permission for three Beauforts to fly through the Netherlands East
Indies, landing at Sourabaya about 13 October.251 However, on 10 October 1941 this
movement was deferred to about the first week in November due to a mishap
(presumably the accident to T9542 at Bankstown).252

The British Consul-General in Batavia was then requested on 8 November 1941 to seek
permission for six Beauforts to fly through and land at Sourabaya about 24 November253
and approval was given on 15 November 1941.254 Then on 24 November 1941 the
British Consul-General was advised that the departure had been delayed a further few
days but all aircraft would proceed Darwin – Sourabaya – Singapore in one day. Transit
visas were also required for 24 members of the RAF, RAAF and APC leaving Melbourne
about 1 December.255 The aircraft and crews were:
T9541, call sign VNZRM2, pilot Wing Commander McKern with Flying Officer Hughes,
Flight Sergeant Whitley and Flight Sergeant Taylor;
T9542, call sign VNZRM4, pilot Squadron Leader Rowland(s) with Flight Sergeant
Bonas, Sergeant Gibson and Sergeant Kinksman;
T9543, call sign VNZRM8, pilot Squadron Leader (Flight Lieutenant) Mitchell with
Sergeant Morgan, Sergeant Brooker and Corporal Britton;
T9544, call sign VNZRM3, pilot Squadron Leader (Flight Lieutenant) Tillott with Pilot
Officer Hood, Sergeant Neighbour and Mr Milnes;
T9545, call sign VNZRM5, pilot Squadron Leader (Flight Lieutenant) Burton with Pilot
Officer Lee, Sergeant Chalmbers and Corporal Seaton; and
T9547, call sign VNZRM6, pilot Captain Young with Flying Officer Gibbs, Sergeant
Drying and Corporal Bondfield. 256

41
The British Consul-General was then asked on 15 December 1941 to seek permission
for two additional Beauforts to fly to Singapore transiting through the Netherlands East
Indies on 17 December. These were
T9546, call sign VNZRM3, pilot Squadron Leader Ingledew with Flying Officer Blanchard,
Sergeant Terry and Sergeant Cross; and
T9549, call sign VNZRM6, pilot Flight Lieutenant Purvis, Flight Lieutenant Hampshire,
Sergeant McMillan and Sergeant Hart.257

However, both these aircraft were to be held at Darwin on 17 December for return to
Melbourne 258 (in fact T9549 fouled a drain and crashed on landing at Batchelor259 on its
way to Darwin). Four Beauforts from Singapore (T9543 had been destroyed at Kota
Bharu on 8 December and T9544 was damaged and returned to Australia on 22
December) were ordered to return to Melbourne but T9541 was badly damaged at
Sourabaya. 260

T9547 after a landing accident at Tenant Creek on return from Singapore in which it
swung off the dirt runway and its port undercarriage collapsed, 21 December 1941
[Kevin Gogler Collection via Bob Wiseman]

Issues with First Beauforts

As a result of the first combat action with the Beaufort (T9543 at Kota Bharu), on 12
December 1941, Air HQ Far East requested urgent modifications to the Beaufort
including doubling the thickness of the armour plate and incorporating a bullet-proof
windscreen for the pilot. Modification sets were to be dispatched urgently for the five
surviving Beauforts in Singapore plus any Beauforts already en-route.261 This was
followed two days later by Milnes, the APC representative in Singapore, providing further
details. He requested that all armour plate as fitted should be increased in thickness
from 4mm to 9mm gauge and supplies for the under defence gun be dispatched
urgently. He also advised that Perspex panels were blowing out and all retaining strips
needed to be widened by 50% and the Perspex to be bolted in place.262 Also requested
to be dispatched to Singapore were all moulded panels for the front fuselage and turret

42
together with tail wheel struts due to failures.263 The APC immediately took action to
improve the panel framing as suggested.264

Meanwhile, Captain Tom Young, the APC’s Chief Test Pilot at Fishermen’s Bend, who
had flown Beaufort T9547 to Singapore, had returned and provided a report on the 15
December 1941. The Air Ministry contract required Australia to provide all airframe
spares for the complete Depot Holding for two squadrons and 17 spare engines while
the USA was to supply one complete Wasp tool kit and the UK to provide the necessary
detailed squadron tool kits. While in Seletar, Young had determined that all the
necessary torpedo carrying gear had arrived in Singapore, four sets of dual controls had
arrived from the UK as well as two sets from Australia. Considerable spares had already
arrived from the UK including main wheels, tyres and tubes, axles, brake gear, tail wheel
forks and a number of smaller items. A considerable tonnage of cases of spares had
also recently arrived from the UK but had not yet been checked.265

By the 22 December 1941 RAAF Headquarters became involved and reminded the APC
that no modifications to the armaments or armour of Beauforts could be incorporated
unless those modifications had been duly authorised by the Air Ministry. The instructions
received from Singapore had given ground for rumours relating to the perceived non
effectiveness of the Beaufort.266 It would seem that the APC agreed with the latter
statement as a week later it appealed to CAS Burnett that there were RAF and RAAF
pilots complaining of defects in Beauforts. Many complaints seemed to be caused by the
improper handling of the aircraft and Burnett was asked to ensure that the RAF and
RAAF pilots were properly trained and all defect reports were sent through the proper
channels.267

In February 1942, Beaufort T9558 was attached to 7 Squadron RAAF at Laverton so that
CO Wing Commander Sam Balmer could report on the flying abilities of pilots from No
100 Squadron RAF (one of the existing Far East-based RAF squadrons that was poised
to be the beneficiary of the RAF’s Australian Beaufort order). Balmer provided the
following notes on the operation of T9558, which was with the Squadron for a period of
three weeks. During this period it was flown for 12 hours only, as the remainder of the
time it was unserviceable. Although the aircraft had come directly from the APC as a
new aircraft, there were a number of defects, namely:
 Badly fitting windows in the cockpit rendered conversation impossible;
 Badly fitting cowl gills that did not close evenly and when open more than 10 degrees
produced severe buffeting.
 Unequal adjustment of engine controls which had to be set ½in apart to give equal
RPM;
 Incorrect adjustment of oil cooler gills;
 Failure of oil pressure gauge, oil temperature gauge and airscrew control meter.
But Balmer did consider that generally the Beaufort appeared much easier to fly than the
Hudson; any qualified Hudson pilot could fly the Beaufort safely without further dual but
Beaufort pilots who flew the Hudson experienced some difficulty. 268

Training of RAF Pilots in Australia

On 27 May 1941 the APC was asked to supply the Air Board with a forecast of RAF
Beaufort deliveries so that arrangements could be made with the Air Ministry to train
aircraft crews in the flying and operation of the Beaufort. It was acknowledged that
considerable training and instruction of the crews would be necessary before the aircraft
could be delivered.269 This was followed shortly after, seeking clarification on the actual
delivery destination of the aircraft, the method of delivery – by ship or flying – and, if by
flying, the urgent need to commence training of pilots and crews. Three options were
being considered – RAF, RAAF or civil pilots.270 Accordingly by 1 July 1941 the Air

43
Board was seeking confirmation from Air HQ Far East on whether the Beauforts were to
be flown to Singapore and, if so, arrangements should be made for RAF pilots to be sent
to Australia for a short conversion course.271 To assist with these RAF Beauforts,
Squadron Leader Miller RAF, who had operational experience on Beauforts in the UK,
would be sent from Singapore to give advice on defects with the UK aircraft and would
make suggestions on operational requirements.272

Then on 10 August 1941 Air HQ Far East advised that the following provisional
arrangements be agreed to for the collection of the Beauforts; three crews, consisting of
pilot, navigator, wireless operator and Fitter E, plus one spare pilot, would leave
Singapore about 18 August via KNILM and QANTAS. The pilots would have some
Blenheim experience before departure and it was suggested that 10 hours solo in
Australia would be sufficient for those pilots. Further batches of aircraft could be
collected under similar arrangements.273

Following the Japanese attack, Air HQ Far East requested that those pilots flying the
Beauforts up to Singapore be kept and used for operations because of the difficulties of
training pilots in Singapore under the conditions then existing.274 Air HQ Far East then
realised the impracticality of this and advised the Air Board that the RAF was unable to
train crews in Singapore and it was therefore no point sending Beauforts if they could not
be used. The RAAF was asked to train pilots and crews in Australia 275 and agreed this
could be arranged at Laverton and suggested that crews for conversion or further
training be sent.276 The two pilots with Beauforts enroute (at this time – 17 December –
advice had not yet been received that T9549 had crashed at Batchelor) were being
returned (as stated above) to assist with the conversion course. Two further Beauforts
were due to be received from the factory on 22 December and these would also be
retained for the conversion course. If RAF pilots were not available then RAAF trainees
could convert but these would not be trained in general reconnaissance work.277

Following the return of the Beauforts to Australia from Singapore, the Air Board was
advised by Air HQ Far East that personnel sufficient to make up nine complete crews
plus maintenance personnel for one Flight would be dispatched at the first opportunity.
When this Flight was operationally trained it would return to Singapore.278

Following complaints of defects in Beauforts in December 1941 (as mentioned above)

and then again in March 1942, the Minister was advised that the Beauforts returning
from Singapore were doing so in order that crews could be trained at airfields in Australia
as no airfields were available there due to enemy action and all training would now to be
carried out in Australia. This was to dismiss any apprehension that the aircraft were not
up to standard nor were there mechanical issues.279

These complaints resulted in Captain Young, to report on 25 December 1941, that both
RAF and RAAF pilots were not operating the Beaufort in accordance with the Pilots
Operating Notes, particularly in relation to using the carburettor and propeller feathering,
taxying procedure, braking, engine ground running, fuel and oil systems, hydraulic
systems and aircraft handling. He considered the Air Board needed to revise its system
of training if pilots were to handle the Beaufort correctly.280 Young also gave examples
of where problems with the Beaufort had been caused by poor maintenance.281

On 18 February, as stated above, Wing Commander Sam Balmer of 7 Squadron

received instructions from Southern Area to report on the flying abilities of pilots from No
100 Squadron RAF. Wing Commander AW Miller RAF, Flight Lieutenant FD Mitchell
RAF and Pilot Officer FA Hendry RNZAF were attached to 7 Squadron for this purpose
as was Beaufort T9558. Balmer reported on these three officers but considered the
latter two had insufficient experience in the handling of Wasp engines.282

44
By 21 February 1942, the Beaufort flight ex Singapore, now known as 100 Squadron
RAF, had 15 Beauforts with a further two by the end of February and one more in early
March, by which time it would be at full strength. However, the Squadron had only nine
RAF crews plus Wing Commander Miller as CO. RAF ground crew were being
supplemented with RAAF crews and equipment and the American-British-Dutch-
Australian (ABDA) Command was requested to send a further nine crews so the
Squadron could deploy at the end of March.283 But five days later, ABDA Command
advised that in view of the change in situation, (and still only at Flight strength) it was not
now required to move to the ABDA area. The Air Board confirmed it was building the
Flight up to Squadron strength with RAAF personnel and it was proposed to retain it in
Australia for operational duties pending Air Ministry direction.284 Subsequently, a RAAF
order dated 28 February 1942 provided for 100 Squadron RAF to become 100 Squadron
RAAF stationed at RAAF Richmond.

RAF Beauforts Retained by RAAF

On 20 February 1942 first advice was received, through the Department of the Treasury,
that the UK Government would hand over the first 90 Beauforts manufactured in
Australia for the RAF to the RAAF.285 With no confirmation, on 26 March 1942, the
Minister for Air requested that Prime Minister Curtin write to the UK Government
requesting that these first 90 Beauforts be retained by Australia due to the present
Japanese menace, a serious shortage of modern aircraft types, the rapidly increasing
requirement for Beauforts and shipping difficulties. As such, Australia considered it vital
that the first 180 Beauforts be retained for local defence needs. Australia’s requirement
for the Beaufort now stood at 224.286

T9545 at Richmond in 1942 [Kevin Gogler Collection]

The request was sent and the UK Government replied on 20 April 1942 that in view of
inter-allied arrangements for pooling resources and distributing them to meet strategic
needs, the UK Government no longer regarded as binding the arrangement to allocate to
them 90 of the first 180 Beauforts manufactured in Australia. The Air Assignments Sub-
committee had allocated 100% of Australian-manufactured Beauforts to Australia.
However, the UK Government did not officially endorse any proposal which amounted to
withdrawing Australian Beauforts permanently from the general pool. Short of a
considerable change to the strategic situation, practical considerations made it most
unlikely that the UK Government would wish to bid for a share of this Australian
production.287

45
 Reconciling for RAF Aircraft
On 12 December 1945 the Department of the Treasury was seeking to reconcile
outstanding costs for the Beaufort project following a request from UK Government so as
to finalise their interests. The documents note that six aircraft were delivered to RAF in
Malaya, and quoted T9542 to T9547 inclusive (as already stated, this was incorrect –
T9541 flew to Singapore and T9546 did not). In addition, T9550 crashed at Richmond
whilst under command of 100 Squadron RAF. Subsequently, T9542, 44, 45 and 46 were
returned to the RAAF. Treasury proposed that the UK Government should be charged to
settle on the basis of seven Beauforts and spares at £47,000 each, less an appropriate
allowance for the four aircraft returned. Treasury sought the views of the Department of
Air as to the appropriate allowance.288 An undated reply was forwarded stating that the
four aircraft returned had only been retained by the RAF for an average period of 16
days and that a reasonable charge for the use of these aircraft would be £1,500 each.
Therefore the total claim against the UK Government would be three aircraft at £47,000
each and four aircraft at £1,500 each making a total of £147,000.289

6. RAAF ORDERED BEAUFORTS

Early RAAF Beaufort Requirements

On 23 February 1939 the Department of Defence asked the Air Board to provide
information of the prospective requirements for the RAAF over the five years from
1938/39 to 1942/43 for twin-engined general reconnaissance aircraft of the type
proposed to be manufactured in Australia. The minute shows handwritten notations in
answer to the questions asked:290

Number of aircraft required for initial equipment of squadron’s at present 120

formed or contemplated
Number of aircraft required for reserves 60
Number of the aircraft required for replacement through losses 54
Number of the aircraft required for additional squadrons of the RAAF using 36
this type of machine which might possibly be formed after exploration of
present program and which would be required in 1941/42 and 1942/43
Total 270
Less number on order or to be ordered from overseas 184
Total probable requirements to be manufactured in Australia 86

When Beaufort production commenced, the Air Board started to review the requirements
for the Beauforts being manufactured and decided on 5 September 1941 that four
general reconnaissance squadrons were to be formed from the first 90 Beauforts
delivered to the RAAF. One Beaufort general reconnaissance squadron was to be
based at each of the following RAAF stations, Darwin, Richmond, Laverton and Pearce.
Facilities for the operation and maintenance of torpedoes was to be provided at each
RAAF station at which a Beaufort general reconnaissance squadron was located. War
reserves of torpedoes were to be held at each Beaufort general reconnaissance station.
A supply of 360 torpedoes with warheads was being sought from the UK.291

Initial RAAF Beaufort Orders Followed by Reductions

As stated, the Report of UK Government Air Mission to Australia 1939 provided for
Australia to order 180 Beauforts, the first 90 for the RAF and second 90 for the RAAF. 292
However, it was not until 13 July 1940 that the contract was placed with the APC for the
supply of these aircraft, fitted with two twin-row Wasp engines and completely equipped
with all fitment items.293

46
However, by August 1939, the Air Board must have been in a quandary as for over 12
months it still had 80 Beauforts on order from the UK fitted with Taurus engines and now
the Government was committing the RAAF to a further 90 Beauforts but fitted with the
twin-row Wasp engines. There were plenty of aircraft on order but few had materialised
to equip the necessary squadrons. By the end of August, Cabinet was advised that
owing to technical faults arising in the Taurus engine, further considerable delay in the
delivery of Beauforts from the UK would occur with deliveries now unlikely before March,
1940. The Air Board had contacted the Air Ministry to ascertain the possibility of the
immediate delivery of alternative aircraft and also contacted the Lockheed Aircraft
Company to enquire whether additional Hudsons could be purchased; 30 additional
Hudsons would be available for delivery between November and January 1940 but only
if these were ordered immediately.

The Air Board had intended to await the reply from the Air Ministry but considered that a
decision should be made immediately on the offer of these Hudsons. The original
number of Beauforts on order from the UK had totalled 90, the first order of 50 and the
second order of 40 but 10 of the latter were deleted (date unknown) and 10 Beaufighters
substituted (18 Beaufighters were ordered on Indent 712 in June 1939). The first order
of 50 was due for delivery in Australia between October 1939 and February 1940, whilst
the remaining 30 were to come forward between March and June 1940, however now
both much delayed. Further, the Air Board considered the non-delivery of these
Beauforts had not only a serious retarding effect on the development of the RAAF but
would be particularly unfortunate from an operational aspect if war should come (as it did
just a few days later). This resulted in a number of operational units continuing to be
armed with Ansons which, although useful as a stopgap short reconnaissance aircraft
and for training, had a limited value in long-range reconnaissance work and as a
bomber. However, the Lockheed Hudson, of which 50 were at that time on order, with
deliveries expected between September 1939 and January 1940, was also in service
with the RAF.

The Air Board considered that 30 additional Hudsons should be ordered with an option
over a further 20. To provide the necessary funds for the purchase of the 30 additional
Hudsons, it was proposed that these could be substituted for the second order of 30
Beauforts. Should the Government approve the option for an additional 20 Hudsons,
these could be substituted for 20 of the original 50 Beauforts. It was realised though that
any substitution would be subject to the concurrence of the Air Ministry. It was also
recognised that if war was declared it would be extremely doubtful whether the RAAF
would obtain deliveries of any Beauforts at all. 294

The Air Board further considered that if this substitution was agreed to, the Beaufort
order should not be cancelled until such time as the Government was reasonably sure
that the Hudsons would be delivered. Cabinet approved this arrangement and 50
Hudsons were ordered and 50 Beauforts were to be cancelled from the UK deliveries.295
The Australian Liaison Officer in London was advised of this on 5 January 1940 and was
also informed that an additional 16 Beauforts of the second order were cancelled in order
to release funds for the increased costs of the 50 Hudsons ordered. Further, the 14
Beauforts remaining on order were now to be delivered less engines but with
modifications to take the twin-row Wasp engines.296.

By the end of January 1940 the Air Ministry had cancelled Australia’s order for the
Beauforts with Taurus engines but advised that the date of delivery of the 14 remaining
Beauforts would depend on the time taken to finalise the Wasp engine installation.297
But this was not the end of the matter as on 20 March 1940 the Air Board was
considering ordering 26 additional Beaufort airframes for fitting with Wasp engines with
that fitting to be carried out in Australia. 298

47
On 7 April 1940 the Air Board was advised that the 14 Beaufort airframes on order and
to be modified to take the twin-row Wasp engines could not be delivered before early
1941. The Australian Liaison Officer in London was concerned that this date may not be
realistic given the long series on unfulfilled promises over the previous two years and in
particular the delay by the Air Ministry to push through the modifications required to fit
the Wasp engine to the Beaufort.299 Based on these concerns and with Air Board
advice, two weeks later Cabinet decided to cancel these 14 Beauforts and order an
equivalent number of Hudsons.300 At the end of April 1940, following a query from the
Australian Liaison Officer, the Air Board advised not to pursue the 26 additional Beaufort
airframes proposed the previous month.301

On 5 October 1940 the APC sought confirmation of further orders for Beauforts in
addition to the 180 already on order.302 By February 1941, War Cabinet noted that the
manufacture of the Beaufort in Australia was proceeding and the second batch of 90
aircraft, those for the RAAF, were to be delivered by March 1942 but these 90 aircraft
would only be sufficient to equip nine of the 14 general reconnaissance squadrons
required under the approved 32 squadron plan. Due to the delay in receiving any
suitable general reconnaissance type aircraft from overseas, War Cabinet approved the
order of a further 90 Beauforts from the APC, making a total of 270, to commence
immediately following the order for the RAAF’s first 90 aircraft. 303 The 90 RAAF
Beauforts were required for general reconnaissance duties to supplement the 96
Hudsons which were available for the seven squadrons engaged in general
reconnaissance duties. In addition, the aircraft were to establish two additional
squadrons and to provide a wastage reserves of 26 aircraft. 304

Soon after this decision was made it was ascertained that 52 Hudsons could be obtained
from USA earlier than the locally manufactured Beauforts. Under those circumstances,
War Cabinet decided to order the Hudsons and reduce the number of Beauforts to 38.305.
This was because the cost of the 52 Hudsons was £420,000 cheaper than the equivalent
number of Beauforts manufactured in Australia. 306 Then in April 1941, Prime Minister
Menzies received advice that all 146 general reconnaissance aircraft required could be
of the Hudson type and would be received before the remaining 38 Beauforts on order.
Therefore, orders already in place for these 38 Beauforts were also cancelled. 307 The
reduction in Australian requirements for the locally manufactured Beaufort were to be
offset by an increase in the number required by the RAF308, this being authorised by the
UK Government in April 1941 so that the Beaufort order was restored to a total of 270
aircraft.309

Additional Orders for RAAF Beauforts

Of were 270 aircraft authorised for production at the beginning of 1942, 180 were
marked for delivery to the British authorities whereas the rapid advance of the Japanese
made it obvious that Australia required for her own protection the maximum number of
aircraft which Australia factories could produce.310 By 4 July 1942 Cabinet agreed to
order 450 Beauforts plus spares equivalent to an additional 100 aircraft thus increasing
the programme from 270 to 450 aircraft. 311 It was estimated that this would take
production up until July 1943. War Cabinet required that the UK Government was to be
fully informed of the increase in Beaufort requirements for the RAAF so that it could take
over any Beauforts produced in excess of Australia’s actual requirements, should those
requirements fall below 450 aircraft.312 Then on 30 January, 1943 War Cabinet
approved a further extension of the Beaufort program to a total of 700 aircraft plus
spares.313

The Australian Beaufort

Major Australian modifications to the Beaufort were:

48
Engines: – substitution of Pratt and Whitney twin-row Wasp engines in place of Bristol
Taurus engines necessitating redesigning of engine nacelle, cowl and cowling panels,
engine controls, propeller controls, cowl gill controls, engine bulkhead and the
repositioning of the major accessories and fittings.
Propeller: – from Hamilton to Curtiss electric and later to Hamilton full feathering.
Gun turret: – substitution with Australian designed and manufactured gun turret, giving
increased rotation from 180° to 240°.
Armament: – designed installation of 0.5 inch wing guns in place of the former 0.303 inch
guns and rear, nose and upward firing guns.
Armour plate: – installation of armour plate to protect the pilot from rearward and frontal
attacks.
Tail wheel: – a special shimmy damping arrangement, designed in Australia, entirely
eliminated tail wheel shimmy.
Fin: – redesigned fin area increased by approximately 15% to correct yaw. 314

Assembly plant at Fishermens Bend in early 1943 [National Archives Australia]

Beaufort Renaming
On 2 August 1941, the APC considered it essential that the Australian-built Beaufort
should be differentiated from Beauforts manufactured in the UK. This was because
there were numerous changes in the Australian Beaufort and for spare parts practicality,
as there was the potential for confusion unless a definite distinction was made between
the two aircraft. It was suggested to either allot the name Australian Beaufort or rename
the aircraft altogether.315 The Air Board noted 10 days later that a parts list would be
raised for the locally built Beauforts and it was not likely that airframe spares would be
needed to be ordered from overseas. There could be confusion in RAF units operating
Beauforts but the method of distinguishing between UK built aircraft and those built in
Australia was a matter for the Air Ministry. It was decided that the easiest way would be
to allot separate Mark numbers to the Australian-built Beaufort or include an ‘A’ after the
relevant Mark number and there was no justification for coming up with a new name. 316

49
Beaufort Mark Numbers
In response to a request for clarification from the Air Ministry, advice was received on 4
June 1940 that the following Mark numbers had been allotted to Beaufort aircraft:
Airframes fitted with the Taurus II engine would be named the Beaufort Mk. I.
Airframes fitted with the Taurus III engine would be named the Beaufort Mk. II.
Airframes fitted with the Twin-row Wasp engine will be named the Beaufort Mk. III.
As such, all 180 Beauforts on order at that time were to be the Mk. IIIs. 317

As stated, the Air Board acknowledged that Beauforts produced in Australia would differ
in certain details from those made in UK and considered it desirable to assign a Mark
number to the Australian-built Beaufort. The Board sought further advice from the Air
Ministry, especially as the Beaufort built for the RAF would have the Wasp S3C4G
engines and for the RAAF the S1C3G engines. It was suggested this difference could
justify different Mark numbers. .318

The Air Ministry responded in November 1941 that there was not enough difference
between Australian and British built Beauforts with S3C4G engines to warrant separate
Mark numbers and accordingly both would now be changed to Mark II. However,
Beauforts built in Australia and for RAAF with S1C3G engines should be given a
separate Mark number and Mark V was allocated.319 The following month both the
Department of Air and the APC were to correct the Air Ministry and advise that the RAAF
would be using the same engines for their Beauforts, ie S3C4G, plus the S1C3G.320

A9-231 ex 8 Squadron being converted to MkIX A9-727 in 1945 [National Archives

Australia]

The final Marks settled on in 1942 were:321

Mk V A9-1 to A9-50 Standard Australian Beaufort Airframe, S3C4-G
engines with Curtiss Electric Airscrews and Mk IE
turret

50
 Mk. VA A9-151 to A9-180 Standard Australian Beaufort Airframe, S3C4-G
engines with Hamilton constant Speed or DH3E50
Airscrews and Mk IE turret
Mk. VI A9-51 to A9-90 Standard Australian Beaufort Airframe, S1C3-G
engines with Curtiss Electric Airscrews and Mk IE
turret
Mk. VII A9-91 to A9-150 Standard Australian Beaufort Airframe modified to suit
RAAF requirements, S1C3-G engines with DH3E50
Airscrews and Mk IE turret
Mk. VIII A9-180 onwards Standard Australian Beaufort Airframe modified to suit
(to A9-700) RAAF requirements, S3C4-G engines with Curtiss
Electric Airscrews and Blenheim Mk V turret (later
replaced with the DAP turret)

The Beaufort Mk IX or Beaufreighter, a transport version, was developed in 1943 and 43

existing airframes were converted during 1944 and 1945.

Beaufort Serial Numbers for Australian-Built Aircraft

It has already been stated that the first 40 Bristol Bolingbroke aircraft ordered in
February 1937 provided for these aircraft to have the serial numbers A9-1 to A9-40 and
the further 10 ordered in November 1937 would presumably be A9-41 to A9-50. Once
these orders were changed to the Beaufort, and an additional 40 aircraft were ordered,
the serial number sequence would continue to A9-90. By April 1940, with assembly of
the Beaufort imminent, the Aircraft Production Branch was seeking advice as to the
serial numbers and other designations to be allotted to the aircraft supplied to the
RAAF.322 Within two weeks, the Department of Air responded to confirm that the serial
numbers for the Australian Beaufort Aircraft on order from the United Kingdom were A9-
1 to A9-90; however, all but 14 of these had by that time been cancelled and it was likely
that these too would also be cancelled. Should this occur, then the Australian-built
Beauforts for the RAAF would be serialled with these numbers. It was expected that a
decision would be made the following week.323 But again this timeframe was optimistic.
In fact, the APC (now DAP) was not formally advised of the decision to cancel the
remaining 14 Beauforts from the United Kingdom, and to allot the serial numbers A9-1 to
A9-90, until two years later, on 29 April 1942324 even though these 14 were formally
cancelled at the end of April 1940, as stated above.

However, there was to be a further change. In June 1942, the DAP was advised that
those Beauforts previously numbered with RAF serials were to be renumbered as RAAF
aircraft and the serials A9-1 to A9-90 had been allotted to those aircraft. As such those
T-prefixed aircraft already in RAAF service would be renumbered by the units in which
those aircraft were serving; those aircraft still in production would need to be renumbered
on the production line. The second 90 aircraft to be manufactured would now have the
serials A9-91 onwards.325 By this time about 65 aircraft had been delivered but it should
be noted that the Beaufort aircraft status cards did not include RAF serial numbers after
T9625 (A9-58).

For the RAF Beauforts, a similar request for the serial numbers to apply to those aircraft
was forwarded at the end of April 1940.326 A reply was quickly received advising that the
serial numbers for the 90 RAF Beauforts were to be T9540 to T9569, T9583 to T9608
and T9624 to T9657.327

Once production commenced and assembly began at Fishermen’s Bend and Mascot,
the need to allocate blocks of serial numbers to each site was finalised. Fishermen’s
Bend commenced assembly before Mascot and three aircraft (T9540, T9541 and T9542)

51
 were flown at Fishermen’s Bend before the first Mascot aircraft (T9545) flew on 22
October 1941. Two other aircraft were already well advanced on the production line at
Fishermen’s Bend and had serial numbers applied (T9543 and T9544). From this time,
an odds and evens numbering system was introduced for the RAF T numbers with
aircraft from Fishermen’s Bend being even numbers (T9544, T9546, T9548 etc) and odd
numbers from Mascot (T9545, T9547, T9549, etc).328 When the direction was received
to change to the RAAF A9 serials and because the conversion resulted in a T even
number becoming an A9 odd number (ie T9540 to A9-1), numbering on the assembly
line changed so that aircraft from Fishermen’s Bend were serialled with A9 odd numbers
and those from Mascot with even numbers.

Training of RAAF Personnel

To assist with the introduction of the Beaufort into RAAF service, four experienced
airframe and engine fitters sailed from Melbourne to England on 6 May 1939 on SS
Esperance to receive instruction in the construction, operation and maintenance of these
aircraft. It was anticipated that they would remain in England for a few months.329

On 28 January 1942 the Department of Air requested the DAP to provide maintenance
and scheduled servicing for RAF Beauforts T9542 and T9545 recently returned from
Malaya.330 The DAP replied that these two aircraft would be overhauled but that the
RAAF, even though the aircraft were RAF, needed to make arrangements for this
servicing by its own personnel as there was no longer space nor personnel to undertake
this work at either Fishermen’s Bend or Mascot. However, the DAP did make the offer
for RAAF personnel to receive intensive training at both assembly workshops.331

7. OTHER PROPOSED CUSTOMERS FOR AUSTRALIAN BEAUFORTS

Australian-Built Beauforts for Other Forces

The first known indication that Australian-built Beauforts were being considered for other
users was a Minute dated 25 January 1939. The Air Ministry was enquiring whether the
Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) could be equipped with Beauforts instead of the
Vickers Wellingtons previously ordered. This was based on the intention to manufacture
Beauforts in Australia (even though this was before UK Air Mission to Australia). 332 It
was Air Ministry policy that all general reconnaissance and torpedo bomber squadrons in
Far East should only be equipped with Beauforts. In addition, the Air Ministry considered
that squadrons in Malta, Aden and Basrah, as well as the Far East, could later be
replaced with Beauforts manufactured in Australia. 333

In March 1939, Group Captain Ralph Cochrane, who was acting as CAS RNZAF, had
recommended Wellingtons because of their long range striking capacity and reaffirmed
that this decision should stand so the proposal was dropped.334 However, it was
resurrected three years later following a request for additional aircraft from the New
Zealand Government. The Air Ministry hoped that it may later be possible for New
Zealand to have a share of Australian-manufactured Beauforts (but this provided
unnecessary when aircraft were made available from the USA).335

In August 1941, Brooke-Popham advised that the Admiral of the Netherland East Indies
Naval Forces, Lieutenant Admiral Conrad Helfrich, had requested Brooke-Popham use
his influence to secure Australian-made Beauforts for the Dutch forces. Brooke-Popham
made it clear that the Beauforts were earmarked for the RAF in Malaya first, then RAAF
squadrons and because of delays in production it was unlikely any aircraft would be
available for the Dutch forces before the end of 1942.336

Enquiries were also received in 1941 from the Government of India seeking Beauforts
with twin-row Wasp engines.337

52
8. IMPROVING THE AUSTRALIAN BEAUFORT

Beaufort Progressive Improvements

War Cabinet was first advised of moves to improve the Beaufort when agreeing to order
450 Beauforts on 4 July 1942. These improvements were to be introduced progressively
both in the aircraft’s operational performance and the production line. 338 Some
improvements had already been incorporated and the following schedule was attached
for the information of War Cabinet (a number of which did not eventuate or were
delayed):

Incorporated Subsequent to Aircraft 1

Increase in armament from total of 2 to 7 guns.
Modification of fin to overcome longitudinal instability.
Replacement of general purpose wireless with Australia equipment.
Installation of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe).
Modification to enable all-up-weight to be increased to 21,000lbs.
Provision for electrically heated boots and gloves.
Introduction of flexible pipe line between engine and bulkhead.

Incorporated Subsequent to Aircraft 50

Change to Australian S1C3G engines.
Change to Australian cowling and gills.
Modification of torpedo gear to use American torpedoes.
Installation of armour plating for dashboard, pilot and wireless operator.
Installation of radio direction finding equipment (radar).

To be Incorporated Subsequent to Aircraft 90

Change to Australian Mk1E gun turret.
Incorporation of twin nose guns increasing guns to 9.
Installation of cabin and suit heating.
Change to low pressure oxygen system.
Rearrangement of electrical system to meet RAAF requirements.
Introduction of shock-proof mounted instrument panel and rearrangement of instruments.
Installation of Vokes Carburettor air cleaner.
Special sound absorption.
Improved draught exclusion.
Introduction of more efficient braking.
Change from Curtiss Electric to Australian-made constant speed airscrews.

To be Incorporated Subsequent to Aircraft 180

Sperry auto pilot.
Introduction of Blenheim type gun turret.
Replacement of .303in wing guns with .5in guns.
Redesigned electrical system introducing “Common Negative” return and incorporation
of plug system on interconnecting components.
Incorporation of dive flaps.
Installation of radio compass.
Replacement of existing direction finding loop with Australian circular type.
Installation of additional hydraulic pump to supplement hydraulic system.

To be Incorporated Subsequent to Aircraft 450

Replacement of Blenheim type turret with Australian-made .5in twin gun turret.
Change to Wright 1700hp engines for increased performance.339

53
Modifications and Improvements to Beaufort Armament
Nose Armament
Following the first actions against the Japanese, the Air Board requested on 19
December 1941 that action be taken to investigate the following forwarded firing guns
and installations on Beaufort Aircraft:
1. Four Browning Mark II guns in each of port and starboard wing.
2. Two front traversing guns in the nose.
3. Four fixed guns firing forward under the nose.
1 and 3 were later restricted to preliminary investigation only. 340

The front traversing twin Vickers GO gun mounting was already under development but
not yet introduced when on 10 February 1942 the Air Staff also asked that an
investigation be made urgently to ascertain whether a 20 millimetre aircraft cannon could
be fitted to the nose gun position of Beauforts as alternative armament.341 Just under a
month later a Hispano 20mm cannon had been delivered to the flight shed at
Fishermen’s Bend for a trial installation. 342 But this installation was deferred owing to
pressure of more urgent developmental work.343

By 19 March 1942 a mock-up of a front traversing gun mounting in the nose had been
completed. It had been decided to adopt the Air Ministry mounting for the sake of
interchangeability and ease of incorporation.344 A further priority was to modify the
mounting to give an increased area of fire.345 By the end of August 1942, the twin nose
gun installation had been incorporated into eight aircraft and the mock-up of the
installation to give an increased area of a fire was almost ready. 346

At this time there was a proposal to install a 0.5in flexible gun in the nose even though
this would result in a considerable weight increase on an already overloaded aircraft.
Weight reduction could only be achieved by more closely defining the operational roles
of the aircraft and only providing such equipment as was necessary for it to successfully
fill one specific role.347 By December 1942 the DAP indicated that the installation of the
0.5in nose gun would not permit the placement of the under defence gun due to space
requirements. However, the Beaufort Division advised there should be no reduction in
the space or forward view as the 0.5in gun was to be mounted underneath the
navigator’s table348 and the Division would be in a position to commence production early
in May 1943.349 The mock-up of the nose 0.5in gun installation was not ready for
inspection until 9 June 1943350 but the following month RAAF Command advised that this
installation was no longer required.351

Wing Armament
About the same time as consideration was being given to a 0.5in gun in the nose, a
proposal to incorporate a 0.5in gun in each wing, in lieu of existing Browning .303in gun,
was progressed so that drawings and a mock-up had been prepared by the Department
of Civil Aviation.352 By September 1942 the Beaufort Division advised that it would not
take any action to incorporate the 0.5in wing guns in production until aircraft number 451
(by this date approximately 210 sets of wings had been completed).353

By 26 October 1942 the Beaufort Division revised its assessment and considered it was
possible to incorporate the 0.5in gun wing installation in Beaufort number 351 but not to
make this installation retrospective. At that time there were sufficient 0.5in Browning
guns for wing installation for only 100 Beauforts.354 However, it was not until July 1943
that firing trials for the 0.5 wing guns had been carried out on a prototype. Each week’s
delay in the approval to proceed with this modification involved the manufacture of seven
aircraft and a further revised assessment was that 0.5 wing guns could not be fitted to
production aircraft until aircraft number 500.355

54
Torpedo Armament
By 19 March 1942 investigations were underway to determine the modifications
necessary for the Beaufort to use the US Mark XIII torpedo.356 This continued into April
with further investigation required to obtain the desired clearance on the tail unit 357 but
was then delayed pending receipt of further information from the USA.358 By the end of
April 1942 advice had been received that an experimental Canadian Beaufort,
investigating this installation, had crashed and the necessary technical data in regard to
the torpedo tail modification and installation was further delayed.359 However the
necessary design work was completed by the middle of June and ready for
manufacture.360

Turret Armament
Bristol Mark I turrets were fitted to aircraft A9-1 to A9-20 and were later modified to Mark
IE. Mark IE turrets were being fitted to all production aircraft up to A9-180. Subsequent
aircraft were to be fitted with Blenheim Mark V turrets. Flight tests were carried out to
determine the aerodynamic qualities of a Blenheim turret elevated an additional 8 inches.
This provided a greatly increase the field of fire. 361 In November 1942 the Department of
Air asked the Beaufort Division to investigate installing a four gun turret in the Beaufort
with information available from the UK where this had already been explored. However,
the Division again expressed concern at the weight increase this would impose on an
aircraft already operating at its all up weight.362

Installation of Mk VE turret in A9-533 in late 1943 showing the increased traverse of the
DAP turret. Note the guide on the starboard beam gun hatch to protect the wing from
‘friendly fire’. [National Archives Australia]

Beam, Vertical and Under Defence Armament

A note in the file on 29 August 1942 confirmed that all Beauforts were fitted with under
defence and beam guns.363 In addition, an experimental installation had been carried out
on a Beaufort at Laverton. Firing trials had been completed but the Beaufort Division

55
determined that this installation was not structurally satisfactory and a suitable
installation was designed. 364

By the end of April 1943 there was a proposal to substitute 0.303in Browning guns in the
beam positions in the Beaufort as a substitute for Vickers GO guns, which were in short
supply at bombing and gunnery schools. The proposal was not pursued as this would
increase the all-up-weight by 30 to 40 pounds and would likely only release 200 Vickers
GO guns.365 A further decision was made on 8 July 1943 that Beauforts from number
351 onwards would not be fitted with an under defence gun, mounting and cupola,
however all aircraft would still be capable of having such a gun fitted if required. 366

General
From February 1942 Beauforts T9542 and T9545 were being used for a trial installation
of bullet proof glass367 and a couple of months later T9589 was being prepared for
armament trials.368

On 12 July 1943 RAAF Northern Command finalised its armament requirements for the
Beaufort based on operational experience and decided, based on weight factors, the
effort involved in the modifications under discussion and the roles of squadrons equipped
with these aircraft, that the installation of 0.5in guns in the wings to replace the existing
0.303 guns was desirable and that this modification should continue but 0.5in guns were
not required in the nose of Beauforts.369

A9-700, the final Beaufort, off Sydney showing to good effect the underwing Yagi radar
aerials and field of fire from the MKVE turret – August 1944 [National Archives Australia]

Beaufort Floatplane
On 22 August 1942 the DAP sought advice on the possibility of fitting floats to Beauforts
in place of landing wheels. In particular the Department was seeking any designs
already available or designs used for the Blenheim.370 By the end of September 1942
Bristols seemed doubtful that this was a viable proposition owing to the length of time
necessary to get this heavy aircraft up on the step and unstuck with its existing power.
Further information was obtained from the Ministry of Aircraft Production stating that it

56
may be a practical proposition. However, this would likely result in the loss of 20 miles
per hour speed and 250 miles range and would also require some weight reduction or
possibly a four-bladed propeller.371

Hyland in London reported on 5 October 1942 that he had spent a day at Shorts,
Rochester. In 1940 Shorts had investigated fitting Taurus engined Beauforts with floats
and produced designs which were considered satisfactory with 18,750 pounds all-up-
weight. Shorts believed it was possible to put Australian Beauforts on floats and Hyland
asked for all necessary drawings and data so these could be forwarded. Shorts was
confident that the proposal could proceed with an all up weight of 23,000 pounds, which
included a full fuel load. However Shorts had asked for the operational requirements
that would be undertaken by a Beaufort on floats. 372

Then in November 1942 the Ministry of Aircraft Production advised that a detailed
investigation had shown the proposed Beaufort float conversion was practicable on both
structural and aerodynamic grounds. The main changes involved the fitting of the floats
and general airframe strengthening, a larger fin would be required to maintain directional
stability and a decrease in dihedral on the outer wings may be necessary. Extra weight
would be about 1,500 pounds with a drag increase of about 30%. This would reduce
range by about 15 per cent and the deterioration of single engine flying characteristics
would necessitate fully feathering propellers. The Ministry would not undertake detailed
design work of the conversion unless there was strong support based on operational
requirements and support from the Australian Government.373 No further action seemed
to have been taken.

Continued Beaufort Production or Changeover to Different Aircraft

By September 1941 the Australian Government was considering the future of aircraft
construction and what types could be manufactured after the Wirraway and Beaufort.
The UK Government proposed that Australia just concentrate on the present type of
aircraft produced, both airframes and engines, and abandon the idea of producing an
aircraft of a new type. This was because:
 The recent excellent performance by the Beaufort in operations had resulted in the
conviction that there was nothing in sight to replace the Beaufort in its class and that
its production was desirable until the end of 1943 if not longer;
 Experience had shown that the Beaufighter was approaching obsolescence and its
place would probably be taken by the Mosquito of which prototype tests (presumably
the fighter variant) had recently been satisfactorily completed;
 It was highly important to avoid interference in production which would result if
Australia was now to plan and tool up for a new type of aircraft. 374

It is hard to see that this advice from the UK was made in good faith. This was because
less than nine months later, in June 1942, RAAF Overseas Headquarters had been
discussing the replacement of the Beaufort with the Air Ministry and the Ministry of
Aircraft Production, both of which now recommended Australia consider manufacturing
the Beaufighter Mk VI.375 Robert Lawson, Director General of Production and Supply at
the Air Board, expressed that it was rather remarkable to now recommend the
Beaufighter for production when Australia had so recently being deterred from such a
course and had been offered the Mosquito instead.376

Redesign and Improvement to Australian-Manufactured Beaufort

Regardless of the UK Government’s advice, by March 1942 the DAP was examining a
possible replacement aircraft to build in Australia following on from the Beaufort and
sought details on the Bristol Buckingham, currently being developed in the UK. This
aircraft was designed on the same principles as the Beaufort but was much larger. It

57
was expected that this aircraft would fly about August 1942.377 By July 1942, CAS Jones
had already taken action to obtain the views of the Air Ministry on a suitable type of
aircraft to replace the Beaufort. The RAAF deliberated on this advice including that from
its own officers and considered the following options:
Bristol Beaufighter Mk VI – questioned whether the Beaufighter was really a type
wanted by the RAAF to be manufactured in Australia because of its operational
limitations.
Bristol Buckingham – this used the Bristol Centaurus engine and would mean that
Australia would depended entirely on the importation of these engines from the UK. It
was noted that the aircraft to be manufactured should be within Australia’s engine
production capacity and that spare parts would be readily available.
North American B-25 Mitchell or Martin B-26 Marauder – these were the only current
American aircraft capable of being both a general reconnaissance and torpedo
bomber type but the Lockheed Ventura could also be considered.
Vultee Vengeance – would take 12 months to get the Vengeance into production.
CA-11 (Woomera) – could be used as a dive bomber.

The DAP considered that a Beaufort improvement would be to install Wright 1,700hp
engines and to be more heavily armed. This would be the most logical development and
should be explored further from an engineering point of view. It was expected that a
larger wing would be required.378 The Department undertook additional work that month
and provided further details on a proposed Beaufort replacement. The proposal was a
development of the Beaufort, designed to perform the same functions but at a
considerably greater speed and with powerful defensive armament more in line with
modern requirements. Being a modified version of a type already in production, it could
be produced much more easily than any other type. The preliminary specifications were
based on the following:

Armament:
Defensive armament consisting of 0.5in calibre machine guns arranged as follows -
One free gun in the nose, with 400 rounds of ammunition;
Two fixed guns in the wings with 235 rounds each;
Two guns in the rear turret with 400 rounds each;
One rear tunnel gun with 400 rounds.
The turret was designed to cover 360° in azimuth, with a maximum of the 85° elevation.
It thus covered practically the whole of the upper hemisphere and was an enormous
improvement on the present Beaufort turret. The ability of this turret to fire forwards, in
conjunction with the free nose gun, was considered to provide adequate defence against
present Japanese methods of attack.

Bomb or Torpedo Load:

This was the same as for the Beaufort. In the bomb well could be carried -
1 x 21 inch torpedo; or
4 x 250 pound bombs; or
2 x 500 pound bombs; or
1 x 2000 pound bomb.
Under each wing could be carried 1 x 250 pound bomb.

Powerplant:
2 x Wright GR2600 B engines of 1,700 HP each;
2 x 3 bladed 12 foot diameter de Havilland hydromatic propellers of Australian
manufacture.

Performance:
Maximum speed 315 mph.

58
Range 1,100 miles at 240 mph with a full military load.

Manoeuvrability:
The fitment of dive breaks would greatly enhance the operational utility as compared with
the Beaufort.

Crew Comfort:
Modifications to increase the comfort of the crew and lessen fatigue included –
Elimination of draughts;
Addition of heating and ventilating systems;
Provision of soundproofing;
Provision of Sperry auto pilot.

Miscellaneous Improvements:
Many improvements and refinements on existing Beaufort practice were to be
incorporated on the replacement machine. Amongst these were –
Flush riveting and general aerodynamic cleaning up to improve performance;
Incorporation of single wire electrical system, permitting the use of the same
generators, etc, as were used on American types;
Much greater breaking capacity on main landing wheels;
Redesigned tail wheel installation, retractable with closing doors;
Better arrangement of the cockpit controls and instruments;
Improved radio DF loop.379

Higher Powered Engines

On 31 October, 1940 Cabinet gave approval in principle for CAC to immediately
negotiate and start tooling for a 1,500 to 2,000 horsepower engine. Following advice
with UK authorities and the Air Board, it was agreed that the Wright R2600 1,600
horsepower engine appeared to be the most suitable type. Approval was later granted to
negotiate a licence agreement.380 However by February 1941, the US Government
indicated that it was averse to Australia swapping from the Pratt and Whitney series to
Curtiss Wright as it would involve extra demands on US productive capacity, such as
machine tools, skilled labour and tool facilities. The UK Trade Minister believed there
was a better chance for Australia to secure a more powerful Pratt and Whitney engine.381

On 17 February, 1942, it was decided to request the supply of 400 twin-row Wasp
engines to allow for production until 30 June, 1943 and, in addition, to order 600 1,600
horsepower Wright engines to meet the prospective requirements in 1943 for an aircraft
of improved performance. On 4 July, 1942 Cabinet was advised of the proposal to
change over from the twin-row Wasp engine to the Wright R2600 engine at Beaufort
aircraft number 451. It was proposed that the Wright engines would be manufactured at
Fishermen’s Bend but it was soon realised that by the time a factory was tooled up to
produce this engine it would be superseded by a higher powered engine, perhaps at
2,000 horsepower, and it would be preferable to plan for the production of such an
engine which might be achieved in January 1944.382

But the whole plan to re-engine the Beaufort or replace it with a revised airframe was
quashed by the end of August 1942. In response to a request made on 5 June, 1942 the
Air Ministry had investigated improving the existing Beaufort by the installation of Wright
R2600 model engines in lieu of the Pratt and Whitney 1830 engines. Preliminary
investigations by the Air Ministry concluded the following:
Total weight 24,000 pounds
Service ceiling 24,500 feet
Maximum speeds 288 mph at 5,000 feet
300 mph at 15,000 feet

59
 Maximum cruise 208 mph at 5,000 feet
Economical cruise 165 mph
Range 1,240 miles
Endurance 7.5 hours
Take off 800 yards over 50ft screen

The Air Ministry also concluded that a complete redesign of the undercarriage and a
general strengthening of the aircraft would be required. It was estimated that
unacceptable instability would be induced if the weight of the aircraft increased to 24,000
pounds. Trials were about to commence in the UK at 22,500 pounds and stability at this
weight was not expected to be satisfactory. Because of the decrease in range and
endurance, increased take off run and probable instability, the Air Ministry believed that
re-engining with the Wright Cyclone was not a viable option and there was considerable
risk of this installation proving unsatisfactory. 383

Therefore in September 1942 options were examined for the production of more
powerful aircraft engines in Australia and these included a turbo super charger for the
1,200hp twin-row Wasp engine. However, the prospects of manufacturing super
chargers in Australia was not considered practical. Investigations were underway at
Lidcombe to increase the horsepower of the twin-row Wasp engine to 1,350hp (from
R1830 to R2000) by incorporating new pistons and cylinder assemblies and several
were built.384

On 27 October 1942 CAC recommended that it should commence to tool up for the
R2800 Pratt and Whitney engine developing 1,850hp. However this proposal did not
proceed at that time as it was rightly decided that a type of engine to be constructed
must relate to the type of aircraft to be built. 385 Similarly, it was also finally acknowledged
that the time taken to change manufacturing over from the 1,200hp twin-row Wasp
engine to the 1,700 Wright engine would be two years and in view of this and no final
decision as to which type of aircraft would replace the Beaufort on the production line,
the project was suspended. At this time, of an order for 130 of the improved 1,700
Wright engines, 10 had been received from USA, a further 10 had been shipped and 75
were expected to be delivered in January 1943.386

If manufacturing the radial type engine in Australia had continued beyond the R1830
twin-row Wasp engine to either the R2800 double row Wasp or 1,700 horsepower Wright
engine, as was contemplated, such production in the light of subsequent developments
would have been useless or would have seriously limited to the types of aircraft that
could have been built in Australia. 387

9. BEAUFORT MANUFACTURING SUMMARY

Beaufort Program Statistics

The Beaufort Division of the DAP managed the following major facilities, contractors and
personnel:
Assembly Plants – Fishermens Bend (Vic) and Mascot (NSW): 700 aircraft assembled
between 1941 and 1944.
Area Workshops – at State Government Railway Workshops at Newport (Vic), Chullora
(NSW) and Islington (SA); to manufacture and assemble certain complete components.
Engine factory – Lidcombe (NSW): this factory was erected by CAC on behalf of the
Government for manufacturing S1C3G type Pratt and Whitney 1,200 horsepower twin-
row Wasp engines for installation in the Beaufort. The Lidcombe factory was designed
for the production of 40 engines per month and the first engine was completed in
October 1941. A total of 870 complete engines and the equivalent of 130 additional

60
engines in unassembled parts were manufactured. The remaining engines and parts
were imported from the USA.
Aircraft Repair and Assembly Centre – Essendon (Vic): established for the re-building
of badly damaged but repairable aircraft, for the introduction of modifications after
delivery to the RAAF and for the salvage of components too badly damaged to be re-
built.

Beaufort spares at the Repair and Assembly Centre – Essendon [National Archives
Australia]

Hydraulic Landing Gear Annex, National Motor Springs – Alexandria (NSW): 763 tail
wheel struts, 657 sets of oleo frames and 770 retracting gear sets.
Aero-electrics Annex, ETC Industries (renamed Tecnico Ltd in December 1942) –
Marrickville (NSW): for the manufacture of electric starters and generators, magnetos
and electrical systems.
Heavy Forge Annex, Australian Aluminium Co – Granville (NSW): for aluminium
sheet, strip and extrusions with the necessary rolling mills and extrusion press imported
from the USA.
Gun Turret and Armament Annex – Fairfield (Vic): Conversion of 90 imported Mark 1
Bristol type single gun turrets into Mark 1E twin gun turrets to increase firepower,
complete manufacture of 150 Mark 1E Bristol type twin gun turrets, dismantling and
reassembling 294 imported Bristol type gun turrets of different Mark numbers to standard
Mark V design, increased the capacity of Mark V and VE/3 turrets from 900 rounds to
3000 rounds, development and manufacture of the 210 Mark VE/3 Australian type gun
turrets with a primary rotation of the 245° as compared to the 120° rotation on the
imported Mark V turret and fitted with an electrical interruption device to protect wing, tail
plane and rudder surfaces, development and manufacture of 521 sets of twin Vickers
nose gun installations and a prototype hydraulically operated 0.5in Browning nose gun.
Airscrew Annex – Granville (NSW): engine crankcases and blade and hub forgings for
complete propellers including 45 Beaufort type for Taurus engines.
Instrument Maintenance Annex – Australian National Airways, Essendon (Vic).

61
 General Motors Holden – Woodville (SA) produced the 13,600 pressed metal detail
parts, 2,800 sub-assemblies and 40 component assemblies for each Beaufort aircraft.
Approximately 9,590,000 parts were manufactured at Woodville and 910 sets of fuel
tanks were manufactured.
Richards Industries – Mile End (SA) manufactured 2,500 oil tanks and 168 auxiliary
fuel tanks for Beauforts.388
Beaufort Training Schools – Sydney (NSW) and Melbourne (Vic): for the training of
process workers, aircraft assemblers, foreman and leading hands.
Storehouses – 28 (Vic), 4 (NSW) and 1 (SA).
Other Contractors – 200 (Vic), 200 (NSW) and 10 (SA).389
Personnel – on 15 February 1943, the number of personnel, excluding those employed
by the contractors, managed by the Beaufort Division was390:
Male Female Total
Administrative 692 681 1,373
Assembly Plant – Fishermens Bend 1,273 135 1,408
Assembly Plant – Mascot 1,015 268 1,283
Area Workshop – Chullora 1,578 562 2,140
Area Workshop – Islington 1,041 398 1,439
Area Workshop – Newport 702 473 1,175
Storehouses 434 227 661
Gun Turret Plant 499 202 701
Training Schools 21 92 113
Hydraulic Landing Gear Annex 277 92 369
Airscrew Annex 840 299 1,139
Heavy Forge Annex 99 - 99
Aero-electrics Annex 67 24 91
Engine Factory 2,334 310 2,644
10,872 3,763 14,635

Acknowledgement: My thanks to David Vincent for his assistance with this paper.

1
Minute to DDOR from Personal Secretary to Air Member for Supply and Organisation dated 1 May
1936 in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791
in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
2
Minute 7 dated 4 June 1936 on Minute Sheet in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements
from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
3
In the Minute “New Bristol Types” dated 28 August 1936 in Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF –
Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213 a hand written note, in response to the proposed ordering of the
Bristol 149 states that “…it is hardly worthwhile proceeding with details of the Blenheim order…”; in
the Cypher Message to Australian Liaison Officer London from Air Board dated 17 March 1938, Ibid,
Williams refers to “…the forty aircraft ordered May 1936 subsequently increased to fifty…”; both the
Melbourne Herald and the Newcastle Sun papers contain an article dated Wednesday 4 November
1936 stating that Bristol Blenheims had been ordered, the Herald expecting them to be delivered
before Christmas and the Sun that they were ordered some six months previous, at the same time as
the Avro Anson. While not necessarily disputing these claims, why was a new Overseas Indent (No.
550) issued and not the order for the Blenheim Is just altered to the Bristol 149 Bolingbroke as was
the case when the Beaufort replaced the Bolingbroke?
4
Minute to Air Board Members from Chief of Air Staff Williams dated 4 February 1938 in Purchase of
Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
5
Copy of Wireless Message to Austair from Air Board dated 12 May 1936 in Co-ordination of Orders
placed in UK, NAA: A1196, 1/501/24

62
6
Minute to Secretary Department of Defence (For Air Board) from Australian Liaison Officer London
dated 25 May 1936 plus attachment in Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA:
A1196, 1/501/213.
7
Minute “New Bristol Types” dated 28 August 1936 in Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy
File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/21. This Minute was written to clarify which type was now being ordered.
See also Air Board Minute dated 4 February 1938 in Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy
File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/21. This latter Minute also provides the history summarised above for the
purchase of the Blenheim I, then Bolingbroke, then Beaufort but dates are lacking.
8
Air Board Agenda 1997 (RAAF) - Supply of Bristol type 149 General Reconnaissance aircraft with
Mercury engines - Air Board Order No. 550 dated 12 February 1937, NAA: A14487, 11/AB/1997.
9
Overseas Indent No 550 dated 12 February 1937 in Overseas Indents 550 and 591 Bristol Beaufort
Aircraft and Taurus Engines, NAA: A705, 9/18/15.
10
Air Board Agenda 2128 (RAAF) - Supply of Bolingbroke aircraft with Mercury VIII engines –
Overseas Indent No. 591, NAA: A14487, 11/AB/2128.
11
Minute 7 dated 4 June 1936 on Minute Sheet in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements
from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
12
Minute 13 dated 2 July 1936 on Minute sheet in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements
from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
13
Copy of Minutes from File No. S.36970 dated 21 August 1936 in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft
Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-
727838660.
14
Copy of Minute to CAS and AMSO from Viscount Swinton Secretary of State for Air dated 28
August 1936 in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR
2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
15
Kevin Gogler, The RAAF in the Australian Coronation Contingents of 1937 and 1953, self-
published, 2018, p28.
16
Minute from Air Board to Australian Liaison Officer London dated 7 January 1938 in Purchase of
Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
17
Air Board Minute dated 4 February 1938 and Cypher Message to Australian Liaison Officer London
from Air Board on 3 March 1938 in Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196,
1/501/213.
18
Cable to the Australian Liaison Officer in London from the Air Board dated 10 March 1938. in
Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
19
Minute to Secretary Department of Defence from Air Board dated 3 May 1938. in Purchase of
Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
20
Minute to Secretary Department of Defence from Air Board dated 3 May 1938. in Purchase of
Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
21
Letter to Secretary Dept of Defence from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 25 May 1938 in
Overseas indents 55-1 & 65-8 - Maintenance spare parts, materials & overhaul equipment etc. for
Beaufort aircraft - Taurus engines called for an overseas indents 550, 591 & 657, NAA: A705, 9/18/1.
22
Minute RAAF Indent 550 for 40 Beauforts to Deputy Director Equipment (A) from Australian Liaison
Officer dated 27 April 1938 in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-
6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
23
Air Board Agenda 2284 (RAAF) - Supply of forty (40) Bristol Beaufort aircraft - Overseas Indent No.
657, NAA: A14487, 12/AB/2284.
24
Air Board Agenda 2348 (RAAF) - Supply of automatic pilot controls and spare parts - Overseas
Indent No. 681 dated 28 November 1938 in NAA: A14487, 12/AB/2348.
25
For example, see David Vincent, Quest for a Bomber: the RAAF's supply problems, 1934-41,
Article in the Journal of the Australian War Memorial: 1986,9, David Vincent, The RAAF Hudson Story
Book 1, self published 1999, Chapter 1 – Policy and Procurement and John McCarthy, Australia and
Imperial Defence 1918 – 1939: A Study in Air and Sea Power, University of Queensland Press, St
Lucia, 1976, Chapter 5 – The United Kingdom and the Formation of the Australia Aircraft Industry
1918-1939.
26
Copy of Wireless Message to Australian Liaison Officer London from Air Board dated 4 March 1937
in Overseas Indents 550 and 591 Bristol Beaufort Aircraft & Taurus Engines, NAA: A705, 9/18/15,
and See and Cypher Message to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 10 July 1938
in Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File NAA: A1196, 1/501/213. For rights to the local
manufacture of Avro Anson airframes and Cheetah engines see Air Board Agenda 1819/1938 New
Aircraft Type – Avro Anson in NAA: A14487, 10/AB/1819.

63
27
Minute to the Secretary of the Department of Defence from the Air Board dated 3 May 1938 in
Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213 and Cablegram to High
Commissioner Bruce from Prime Minister Lyons dated 11 May 1938 in [Personal Papers of Prime
Minister Bruce], NAA: AA1970/559, 35.
28
Copy of Wireless Message to Air Board from RAAF Officer London dated 12 August 1937 in
Overseas Indents 550 & 591 - Bristol Beaufort aircraft & Taurus engines, NAA: A705, 9/18/15.
29
Cypher Message to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 17 March 1938. in
Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
30
Cypher Message to Australian Liaison Officer London from Air Board dated 17 March 1938. in
Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
31
Cable to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 23 April 1938. in Purchase of
Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
32
Cypher Message to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 13 June 1938.
Overseas Indents 550 & 591 - Bristol Beaufort aircraft & Taurus engines, NAA: A705, 9/18/15.
33
Cypher Message to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 14 July 1938.
Overseas Indents 550 & 591 - Bristol Beaufort aircraft & Taurus engines, NAA: A705, 9/18/15.
34
Minute 115 dated 12 January 1939 on Minute Sheet and Minute to Air Member for Supply and
Organisation from Australian Liaison Officer dated 28 September 1939, both in Copy of RAAF
Estimated Aircraft Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA
https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
35
Minute titled New Type Aircraft – Erection and Servicing dated 14 July 1939 in Orders for New
Equipment Bristol 149 and Hudson, NAA: A705 208/7/649.
36
Cypher Messages to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 7 February 1939 and
27 March 1939. in Orders for New Equipment Bristol 149 and Hudson, NAA: A705 208/7/649.
37
Extracts from Signals form Liaison Officer (extract from signal 1 November 1938). in Orders for
New Equipment Bristol 149 and Hudson, NAA: A705 208/7/649. The RAF’s “generosity” could well
have been in response to the news that the RAAF was proceeding with an order for 50 Lockheed
Hudson general reconnaissance aircraft.
38
Minute Rearming Policy (Table A) to CAS from ACAS dated 8 August 1939 in Re-arming Policy -
Operational Units, NAA: A1196, 1/501/308
39
Minute 118 dated 30 September 1939 on Minute sheet Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft
Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-
727838660.
40
Minute Supply of 40 Beauforts to Air Member for Supply and Organisation from Australian Liaison
Officer dated 6 March 1939 in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements from UK 1-7-36 to 30-
6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
41
See Milestones – Important Dates in the Development of Australia’s Aircraft Industry in
Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft production [reports:
aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-45], NAA: MP1472/1,
15 PART 4 and a detailed history of aircraft manufacture for the RAAF is contained in Chapter 9 Local
Development and Production in C.D. Coulthard-Clark, The Third Brother, The Royal Australian Air
Force 1921-39, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991.
42
Air Board Agenda 1571 (RAAF) - Future policy in regard to the payment of royalties on aircraft and
spare parts and equipment built in Australia in NAA: A14487, 9/AB/1571.
43
Ministerial Statement on the Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia by the Minister of Defence dated 23
January 1937 in Australian Aircraft Factory: type of service aircraft to be manufactured 1936-39, PRO
AIR 2/1893 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au:443/tarkine/nla.obj-727838708.
44
Air Board Agenda 1778 (RAAF) - Rights for local manufacture of aircraft - draft agreement in NAA:
A14487, 10/AB/1778.
45
Air Board Agenda 1830 (RAAF) - Agreement for rights of local manufacture - Avro Cadet trainer in
NAA: A14487, 10/AB/1830.
46
Minute from Williams and Recommendation (d) of Air Board Minute to Minister of meeting dated 21
August 1936 in Air Board Agenda 1931 (RAAF) - Aircraft manufacture in Australia, NAA: A14487,
11/AB/1931.
47
Attachment to letter from Syndicate dated 3 September 1936 in Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia,
NAA: A705, 16/1/1.
48
Letter to Chief of Air Staff Newell from CAS Williams dated 4 March 1937 in Copy of Air Liaison
Letters from Australia Part 1, PRO AIR 23/1608 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838563
49
Cypher Message to Australian Liaison Officer London from Air Board dated 5 May 1938 in
Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.

64
50
Cablegram to High Commissioner Bruce from Prime Minister Lyons dated 11 May 1938 in
[Personal Papers of Prime Minister Bruce], NAA: AA1970/559, 35.
51
Air Board Agenda 2284 (RAAF) - Supply of forty (40) Bristol Beaufort aircraft - Overseas Indent No.
657, NAA: A14487, 12/AB/2284.
52
Cablegram to Prime Minister Lyons from High Commissioner Bruce dated 20 November 1938 in
[Personal Papers of Prime Minister Bruce] Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: M104, 6/3.
53
Cablegram to High Commissioner Bruce from Prime Minister Lyons dated 9 December 1938 in
[Personal Papers of Prime Minister Bruce] Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: M104, 6/3.
54
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
55
Copy of Cablegram to Prime Minister from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs dated 27 May
1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
56
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
57
Copy of Letter to Premier of Queensland from the Department of Supply and Development? dated
14 July 1939 in Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
58
Copy of Report on Meeting of Chief Mechanical Engineers of the State Railways and Mr Ord of
United Kingdom Government Air Mission in Sydney from 20 to 23 March 1939 to Secretary Dept of
Defence dated 23 March 1939 in Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
59
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
60
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
61
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
62
Production timetable for Beaufort Airframes undated in Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77
63
Beaufort Aircraft - Engine Delivery Program for Bristol Taurus II dated 28 March 1939 in Beaufort
early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
64
Minute on Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia to Secretary Dept of Defence from Secretary Air
Board dated 27 March 1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
65
Minute on Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia to Secretary Dept of Defence from Secretary Air
Board dated 1 May 1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
66
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
67
Minute of preliminary Allocation of 80 Men Agreed upon to Send to the Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd for
Training in Aircraft - Dispatch of Trainees to England, NAA: D1743 1939/1.
68
Letter to Acting Chief Mechanical Engineer, (SA) Railways from General Manager, Aircraft
Construction Branch dated 31 July 1939 in Aircraft - Dispatch of Trainees to England, NAA: D1743
1939/1.
69
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
70
Aircraft Production in Australia by Dept of Aircraft Production dated 31 August 1945 in
Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft production [reports:
aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-45], NAA: MP1472/1,
15 PART 4.
71
Letter to Acting Chief Mechanical Engineer (SA) Railways from General Manager, Aircraft
Production Branch dated 6 December 1939 in Aircraft - One (1) Beaufort Centre Plane Complete
Forwarded to Islington [by ship case approx 24 ft by 12 ft by 4 inches], NAA: D1743 1939/71.
72
Copy of letter to General Manager, Aircraft Production Branch from Acting Chief Mechanical
Engineer (SA) Railways dated 16 December 1939 in Aircraft - One (1) Beaufort Centre Plane
Complete Forwarded to Islington [by ship case approx 24 ft by 12 ft by 4 inches], NAA: D1743
1939/71.
73
Air Board Agenda 2462 (RAAF) - Manufacture of aircraft in Australia – Inspection, NAA: A14487,
13/AB/2462.
74
Progress Report of the Beaufort Scheme dated 1 May 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United
Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
75
Copy of Report on Meeting of Chief Mechanical Engineers of the State Railways and Mr Ord of
United Kingdom Government Air Mission in Sydney from 20 to 23 March 1939 to Secretary Dept of
Defence dated 23 March 1939 in Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.

65
76
Report titled Aircraft Construction Organisation under Staff Seconded to Australia dated June 1939
in Aircraft – Organisation, NAA: D1743 1939/2.
77
Air Board Agenda No. 2481/1939 – Visit to Australia of a Pilot of the Bristol Aeroplane Company
dated 23 May 1939 in Air Board Agenda 2481 (RAAF) - Visit to Australia of a pilot of the Bristol
Aeroplane Company NAA: A14487, 13/AB/2481.
78
Cablegram from Shea in London dated 30 March 1940 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA:
MP287/1 117.
79
Cablegram to Clapp from Shea in London dated 6 April 1940 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft,
NAA: MP287/1 117.
80
Letter to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Secretary Dept of Air dated 23 May 1940
in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 117.
81
Letter to Secretary Dept of Air from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated 12 August
1940 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 117.
82
Letter to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Secretary Dept of Air dated 24 August
1940 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 117.
83
Memorandum to Secretary Dept of Air from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated 27
November 1940 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 117.
84
Letter to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Secretary Dept of Air dated 11 December
1940 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: in MP287/1 117.
85
Cablegram to Hyland in London from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated 2 January
1941 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 117.
86
Cablegram from Hyland in London dated 8 January 1941 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA:
MP287/1 117.
87
Cablegram from Hyland in London dated 16 January 1941 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft,
NAA: MP287/1 117.
88
Cablegram from Hyland in London dated 27 February 1941 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft,
NAA: MP287/1 117.
89
Cablegram from Hyland in London dated 9 April 1941 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA:
MP287/1 117.
90
Cablegram from Hyland in London dated 7 May 1941 in Flight Testing of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA:
MP287/1 117.
91
Notes Concerning Appointment of S/L Lumsden dated 24 June 1941 in Flight Testing of Beaufort
Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 117.
92
Letter to Chief of Air Staff Newell from CAS Williams dated 25 May 1938 in Copy of Air Liaison
Letters from Australia Part 1, PRO AIR 23/1608 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838563.
93
Cabinet Agendum on Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia – Report by the United Kingdom
Government Air Mission dated 27 March 1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, A816, 6/301/530.
94
Beaufort Aircraft - Engine Delivery Program for Bristol Taurus II dated 28 March 1939 in Beaufort
early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
95
Notes on Conference on 4 April 1939 regarding the manufacture of aircraft and engines as
recommended by the United Kingdom Government Air Mission in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia,
NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
96
Copy of Memorandum to Air Board unauthored dated 11 May 1939 in Production of a/c [aircraft]
during war, NAA: A705, 9/30/8.
97
Copy of Cabinet Agendum on Manufacture of Aircraft and Aero Engines in Australia to dated 15
May 1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
98
Copy of letter to Minister for Supply and Development Casey from UK High Commissioner
Whiskard dated 20 May 1939 in Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia. Correspondence between
Minister of Supply and CAC and Robert Bryce and Co, NAA: A5954, 873/6.
99
Letter to High Commissioner Bruce from Secretary of State for Air Kingsley-Wood dated 9
December 1939 in [Personal Papers of Prime Minister Bruce] Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA:
M104, 6/3.
100
Notes of a Conversation with Secretary of State for Air Kingsley-Wood and High Commissioner
Bruce dated 8 June 1939 in [Personal Papers of Prime Minister Bruce] Aircraft Manufacture in
Australia, NAA: M104, 6/3.
101
Copy of letter to Chairman Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation Darling from Minister for Supply
and Development Casey dated 24 May 1939 in Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia. Correspondence
between Minister of Supply and CAC and Robert Bryce and Co, NAA: A5954, 873/6.

66
102
Copy of letter to Minister for Supply and Development Casey from Chairman Commonwealth
Aircraft Corporation Darling dated 29 May 1939 in Manufacture of Aircraft in Australia,
Correspondence between Minister of Supply and CAC and Robert Bryce and Co, NAA: A5954, 873/6.
103
Minute on Manufacture of Taurus Engines in Australia to Secretary Dept of Defence from Assistant
Secretary dated 6 June 1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
104
Three pages of handwritten notes undated in Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77
105
Copy of Minute to Secretary Dept of Defence from Secretary Air Board dated 24 May 1939 in
Manufacture of Aircraft and Engines in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/502/5.
106
Minute on Local Manufacture of Aero Engines to Secretary Dept of Defence from Secretary Air
Board dated 14 June 1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
107
Memo of Cabinet Discussion on 15 June 1939 on Manufacture of Beaufort Engines by CAC dated
15 June 1939 in [Personal Papers of Prime Minister Holt] Aircraft Manufacture, NAA: B3229, 2.
108
Minute on Programme of Work –CAC to Secretary Dept of Defence from Secretary Air Board
dated 27 June 1939 in Aircraft Manufacture in Australia, NAA: A816, 6/301/530.
109
Minute to Secretary Dept of Defence from Secretary Air Board dated 29 June 1939 in Manufacture
of Aircraft and Engines in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/502/5.
110
Minute 14 dated 2 August 1939 on Minute Sheet in Production of Taurus engines in Australia PRO
AIR 2/3652 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727839045.
111
Cypher Message to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer London dated 25 August 1939 in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
112
Cypher Message to Australian Liaison Officer London from Air Board dated 26 August 1939. in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
113
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin-row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
114
Telegram from High Commissioner London to Prime Minister dated 31 August 1939 in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
115
Letter to Under Secretary of State for Air from Bristol Aeroplane Company dated 13 September
1939 in Production of Taurus engines in Australia PRO AIR 2/3652 in Trove NLA
https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727839045.
116
Minute 24 dated 18 September 1939 on Minute Sheet in Production of Taurus engines in Australia
PRO AIR 2/3652 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727839045.
117
Minute 28 dated 28 September 1939 on Minute Sheet in Production of Taurus engines in Australia
PRO AIR 2/3652 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727839045.
118
Letter to Under Secretary of State for Air from Bristol Aeroplane Company dated 19 December
1939 in Production of Taurus engines in Australia PRO AIR 2/3652 in Trove NLA
https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727839045.
119
Cablegram to Prime Minister from High Commissioner London dated 29 September 1939. in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
120
Copy of Cablegram dispatched to High Commissioner – 2nd October 1939 in Manufacture in
Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA: A705 69/19/22.
121
Cablegram to Prime Minister from High Commissioner London dated 23 October 1939 in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
122
Cablegram to Prime Minister from Richard Casey dated 3 November 1939 in Manufacture in
Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme NAA: A705 69/19/22.
123
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Prime Minister dated 3 November 1939 in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
124
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Prime Minister dated 3 November 1939 in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
125
Extract from Cablegram to Prime Minister from Richard Casey dated 5 November 1939 in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme NAA:
A705 69/19/22.

67
126
Cablegram to Prime Minister from Richard Casey dated 19 November 1939 in Manufacture in
Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA: A705 69/19/22.
127
Notes of Meeting Held at Supply Department on 26 October 1939 Regarding the Manufacture of
Twin Row Wasp Engines in Notes on Beaufort Production 1939 - manufacture of twin row wasp
engines for Beaufort aircraft, NAA: MP450/1, 126A.
128
Extract of Notes of Meeting Held on 26 October 1939 in Notes on Beaufort Production 1939 -
manufacture of twin row wasp engines for Beaufort aircraft, NAA: MP450/1, 126A.
129
Notes of Meeting Held at Supply Department on 26 October 1939 Regarding the Manufacture of
Twin Row Wasp Engines in Manufacture of Beaufort Aircraft Taurus engines in Australia, NAA:
MP450/1, 52.
130
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
131
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
132
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
133
Cablegram from High Commissioner London to Prime Minister dated 31 January 1940 in
Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA:
A705 69/19/22.
134
Cablegrams to Trade Commissioner New York and High Commissioner London from Prime
Minister’s Department dated 27 January 1940 and to High Commissioner London from Prime
Minister’s Department dated 16 February 1940 in Manufacture in Australia of Beaufort and Taurus
engines - whether to proceed with scheme, NAA: A705 69/19/22.
135
Letter to Bristol Aeroplane Company from Director of Contracts dated 17 February 1940 in
Production of Taurus engines in Australia PRO AIR 2/3652 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-
727839045.
136
Cablegram to Shea at High Commissioner’s Office London from Clapp, Chairman Aircraft
Production Commission dated 7 March 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
137
Cypher Message to RAAF Air Liaison Officer London from Air Board dated 29 July 1940 in
Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
138
Cypher Message to Air Board from RAAF Air Liaison Officer London dated 8 August 1940 in
Purchase of Beaufort Aircraft for RAAF – Policy File, NAA: A1196, 1/501/213.
139
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
140
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
141
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
142
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
143
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
144
Copy of Order for Jigs, Tools and Materials for the Beaufort Aeroplane, dated 20 September 1939
in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets unfabricated, indent
SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
145
Cablegram to Prime Minister Menzies from High Commissioner Bruce dated 8 July 1939 in
Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
146
Hand written note undated in Notes on Beaufort Production 1939 - manufacture of twin row wasp
engines for Beaufort aircraft, NAA: MP450/1, 126A.
147
Cablegram to Minister of Supply Casey from Prime Minister Menzies dated 30 November 1939 in
Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.

68
148
Cablegram to Prime Minister Menzies from High Commissioner Bruce dated 8 July 1939 in
Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
149
Cablegram to Minister of Supply Casey from Prime Minister Menzies dated 30 November 1939 in
Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
150
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated
18 December 1939 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
151
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated
20 December 1939 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
152
Cablegram to Clapp, Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Shea at High
Commissioner’s Office London dated 22 February 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705,
9/18/49.
153
Cablegram to Prime Minister’s Dept from High Commissioner London dated 17 January 1940 in
Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
154
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Clapp, Chairman Aircraft Production Commission?
dated 26 January 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
155
Extract from Cable to Prime Minister Menzies from High Commissioner Bruce dated 29 February
1940 in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets unfabricated,
indent SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
156
Cablegram to Clapp, Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Shea at High
Commissioner’s Office London dated 15 March 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705,
9/18/49.
157
Cablegram to Clapp, Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Shea at High
Commissioner’s Office London dated 30 March 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705,
9/18/49.
158
Extract from Report of Australian Liaison Office, Beaufort Scheme dated 16 May 1940 in First 20
sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets unfabricated, indent SD.8 (AC.6),
NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
159
Copy of Letter to Deputy Director-General of Production, Air Ministry from Shea in London dated
14 May 1940 in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets
unfabricated, indent SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
160
Various Minutes in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets
unfabricated, indent SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
161
Extract from letter to Chairman of Aircraft Production Commission Clapp from Hyland in London
dated 24 July 1940 in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets
unfabricated, indent SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
162
Extract from Cablegram to Chairman of Aircraft Production Commission Clapp from Hyland in
London dated 14 November 1940 in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets
fabricated, 10 sets unfabricated, indent SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
163
Report of UK Government Air Mission to Australia 1939 dated 18 March 1939 in Aircraft -
Manufacturing of in Australia Air Mission Papers, NAA: M276 4.
164
Revised Production Schedule, February 1941 undated in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United
Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
165
Progress Report of the Beaufort Scheme dated 1 May 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United
Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
166
Letter to Director of Production from Resident Technical Officer dated 5 August 1941 in Beaufort
Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
167
Copy of Cable to Air Ministry and C-in-C Far East dated 17 October 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft -
Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
168
Master Schedule for Aircraft Production by Aircraft Production Commission dated 27 October 1941
in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
169
Copy of Cable to Far East from Air Board dated 8 December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to
United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
170
War Cabinet Minute No 1503 - Aircraft Construction in Australia in NAA: A2676, 1503.
171
Progress report on the Beaufort Scheme in NAA: A2680, 12/1941.
172
Progress report on the Beaufort Scheme in NAA: A2680, 12/1941.
173
War Cabinet Minute No 1503 - Aircraft Construction in Australia in NAA: A2676, 1503
174
Beaufort Aircraft – Revised Schedule for February 1942 in Department of Aircraft Production
progress reports, NAA: MP450/1, 182.
175
Aircraft Production in Australia by Dept of Aircraft Production dated 31 August 1945 in
Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft production [reports:

69
aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-45], NAA: MP1472/1,
15 PART 4.
176
Copy of Cablegram to High Commissioner Bruce from Prime Minister Menzies dated 22 July 1939
in Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
177
Copy of Cablegram to Prime Minister Menzies from High Commissioner Bruce dated 26 July 1939
in Beaufort early papers, NAA: MP450/1, 77.
178
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated
23 December 1939 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
179
Cablegram to Clapp, Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from High Commissioner London
dated 31 January 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
180
Cables dated 13 and 25 May 1940 in Beaufort Sample Aircraft – Assembly as Experimental
Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 228.
181
Air Board Agenda 2738 (RAAF) - Equipment for fitment to Beaufort aircraft - Overseas Indent No.
754 dated 29 February 1940 in NAA: A14487, 14/AB/2738.
182
Cablegram to Shea at High Commissioner’s Office London from Clapp, Chairman Aircraft
Production Commission dated 21 March 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
183
Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942 in Aircraft
Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
184
Wireless Message to CAS Portal from CAS Burnett dated 20 August 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft –
Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
185
Cypher Message to Air Board from Air Ministry dated 11 September 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft –
Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
186
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Clapp, Chairman Aircraft Production Commission?
dated 28 January 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
187
Cablegram to Shea at High Commissioner’s Office London from Clapp, Chairman Aircraft
Production Commission dated 21 March 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49
188
Press release by the Prime Minister dated 1 August 1940 in Purchase of (Beaufort) Aircraft for
RAAF - Policy file, NAA: A1196 1/501/213.
189
Progress report on the Beaufort Scheme dated 5 February 1941 in NAA: A2680, 12/1941.
190
Progress Report of the Beaufort Scheme dated 1 May 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United
Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
191
Memorandum to CAS Burnett from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated 9 July 1941 in
Production of Aircraft in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/501/364.
192
Advisory War Council Minute dated 6 August 1941 in Meeting with Mr Storey, Aircraft Production
Commission. Production of Beaufort aircraft in Australia, NAA: A2684 947.
193
Notes of Meeting between Chief of Air Staff, Director-General of Supply and Production, Deputy
Chief of Air Staff and Group Captain Walker RAF dated 7 August 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to
United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
194
Cablegram to High Commissioner London and Australian Minister Washington from Prime Minister
dated 10 August 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
195
Memorandum to Minister from Chairman, Aircraft Production Commission dated 28 November
1941 in War Cabinet Minute No 1503 - Aircraft Construction in Australia, NAA: A2676 1503.
196
Copy of Order for Jigs, Tools and Materials for the Beaufort Aeroplane, dated 20 September 1939
in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets unfabricated, indent
SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
197
Cablegram to High Commissioner London from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated
18 December 1939 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
198
Cablegram to Clapp, Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Shea in High Commissioner’s
Office London dated 19 January 1940 in Beaufort - Local manufacture, NAA: A705, 9/18/49.
199
Cablegram to Chairman of Aircraft Production Commission Clapp from Hyland in London dated 17
October 1940 in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets
unfabricated, indent SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
200
Memorandum on Local Manufacture of Gun Turrets to Minister for Aircraft Production from
Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated 11 July 1941 in Gun Turrets for Beaufort Aircraft –
Manufacture in Australia, NAA: MP287/1 924.
201
Cablegram to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Hyland in London dated 25 April
1941 in Gun turrets for Beaufort Aircraft – Manufacture in Australia, NAA: MP287/1 924.
202
Memorandum to Secretary Dept of Air from Commissioner Shea Aircraft Production Commission
dated 3 June 1941 in Gun Turrets for Blenheim Aircraft - Consideration of Adaption for Beaufort
Requirements, NAA: MP287/1 965.

70
203
Minute RAAF Indent 550 for 40 Beauforts to Deputy Director Equipment (A) from Australian
Liaison Officer dated 27 April 1938 in Copy of RAAF Estimated Aircraft Requirements from UK 1-7-36
to 30-6-37, PRO AIR 2/1791 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838660.
204
Minute Local Manufacture of Gun Turrets to FJ Shea from John Storey dated 18 August 1941 in
Gun Turrets for Beaufort Aircraft – Manufacture in Australia, NAA: MP287/1 924.
205
Extract from Cablegram to High Commissioner Bruce from Prime Minister? dated 13 June 1940 in
First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets unfabricated, indent SD.8
(AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
206
Cablegram to Chairman of Aircraft Production Commission Clapp from Hyland in London dated 17
October 1940 in First 20 sets materials [for Beaufort Aeroplane]: 10 sets fabricated, 10 sets
unfabricated, indent SD.8 (AC.6), NAA: MP287/2, B1264.
207
War Cabinet Agendum - No 278/1941 - Report by the Minister for Aircraft Production - July 1941 in
NAA: A2671, 278/1941.
208
War Cabinet Agendum - No 8/1942 - Aircraft production - Progress report for December 1941 in
NAA: A2671, 8/1942.
209
War Cabinet Minute No 1584 - Aircraft production policy and administrative machinery for the
direction of the aircraft industry in NAA: A2676, 1584.
210
Notes for CAS on Delivery of Aircraft Requirements dated 15 November 1941 in unknown NAA
file.
211
Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, Provision of Beauforts for Malaya from Australia – Copy of
letter from Ministry of Aircraft Production dated 6 January 1942 in The National Archives of the UK,
CAB/80/33.
212
Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, Production of Beauforts in Australia – Note by the Vice
Chief of the Air Staff Freeman dated 26 January 1942 in The National Archives of the UK, CAB/80/33.
213
Cablegram to High Commissioner Bruce from Hyland Dept of Aircraft Production dated 17 April
1942 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 257/1942 - Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
214
War Cabinet Agendum 257/1942 dated 4 July 1942 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 257/1942 -
Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
215
Report of UK Government Air Mission to Australia 1939 dated 18 March 1939 in Aircraft -
Manufacturing of in Australia Air Mission Papers, NAA: M276 4.
216
Cypher Cable to Air Ministry from CinC Far East dated 25 January 1941 in Production of Aircraft in
Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/501/364.
217
Memorandum to Minister for Munitions from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated 13
February 1941 in Production of Aircraft in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/501/364.
218
Historical Notes in Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft
production [reports: aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-
45], NAA: MP1472/1, 15 PART 4.
219
Memorandum on Beaufort Aircraft – 90 for RAF to Secretary Dept of Air from Chairman Aircraft
Production Commission dated 28 April 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA:
A705, 9/18/93.
220
Copy of Cablegram to Secretary Dept of Air from High Commissioner’s Office London dated 30
April 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
221
Copy of letter Beaufort Aircraft for RAF to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from
Secretary Dept of Air dated 5 June 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705,
9/18/93.
222
Copy of letter to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Chief of Air Staff dated 23 June
1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
223
Copy of Wireless Message dated 1 July 1941 to Headquarters RAF, Far East from Air Board in
Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
224
Cypher Message to Air Board from Air HQ Far East dated 15 July 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft -
Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
225
Minutes of Meeting between RAF Personnel from Far Eastern Command Seletar and Aircraft
Production Commission and RAAF at Fisherman’s Bend on 31 July and 1 August 1941 in Beaufort
Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
226
Copy of Wireless Message to Air HQ Far East from Air Board dated 4 August 1941 in Beaufort
Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
227
Notes of Meeting between Chief of Air Staff, Director-General of Supply and Production, Deputy
Chief of Air Staff and Group Captain Walker RAF dated 7 August 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to
United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.

71
228
Copy of Cypher Message to Air HQ Far East and Air Board Melbourne from Air Ministry dated 8
September 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
229
Minute to Secretary Aircraft Production Commission from Secretary Dept of Air dated 13
September 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft: delivery of 90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
230
Cable to S/L Miller RAF from Air HQ Far East dated 17 September 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft -
Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
231
Cablegram to Aircraft Production Commission from Australian High Commissioner dated 8
December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
232
Cablegram to Air Ministry through Australian High Commissioner from Aircraft Production
Commission dated 31 December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705,
9/18/93.
233
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 30 to 33 for the
month of August 1940 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
January 1940 - January 1941, NAA: A11252, 5.
234
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 34 to 37 for the
month of September 1940 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
January 1940 - January 1941, NAA: A11252, 5.
235
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 38 to 42 for the
month of October 1940 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
January 1940 - January 1941, NAA: A11252, 5.
236
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 43 to 46 for the
month of November 1940 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
January 1940 - January 1941, NAA: A11252, 5.
237
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 47 to 49 for the
month of December 1940 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
January 1940 - January 1941, NAA: A11252, 5.
238
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 50 and 51 for 2
and 9 January 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) January
1940 - January 1941, NAA: A11252, 5 and Serial Nos. 52 to 54 for 16, 23 and 30 January 1941 in
Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May 1942 (sic) - December
1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
239
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 55 to 58 for the
month of February 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May
1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
240
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 59 to 62 for the
month of March 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May
1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
241
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 63 to 66 for the
month of April 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May
1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
242
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 67 to 70 for the
month of May 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May 1942
(sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
243
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 71 to 74 for the
month of June 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May
1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
244
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 75 to 79 for the
month of July 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May 1942
(sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
245
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 80 to 83 for the
month of August 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May
1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
246
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 84 to 87 for the
month of September 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
May 1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
247
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 88 to 92 for the
month of October 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May
1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.

72
248
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 93 to 96 for the
month of November 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
May 1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
249
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial Nos. 97 to 101 for the
month of December 1941 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on Activities of the Air Force (Weekly)
May 1942 (sic) - December 1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
250
Signed acceptance forms in Beaufort aircraft for RAF - Receipt forms for, NAA: MP287/1, 1252.
251
Cablegram to British Consul General in Batavia from Dept of External Affairs dated 1 October 1941
in War Records - Defence - Singapore: Passages of Service Aircraft through NEI [Netherlands East
Indies] - Individual Cases, NAA: A981, DEF 125.
252
Cablegram to British Consul General in Batavia from Dept of External Affairs dated 10 October
1941 in War Records - Defence - Singapore: Passages of Service Aircraft through NEI [Netherlands
East Indies] - Individual Cases, NAA: A981, DEF 125.
253
Cablegram to British Consul General Batavia from Dept of External Affairs dated 8 November 1941
in War Records - Defence - Singapore: Passages of Service Aircraft through NEI [Netherlands East
Indies] - Individual Cases, NAA: A981, DEF 125.
254
Cablegram to Dept of External Affairs from British Consul General in Batavia dated 15 November
1941 in War Records - Defence - Singapore: Passages of Service Aircraft through NEI [Netherlands
East Indies] - Individual Cases, NAA: A981, DEF 125.
255
Teleprinter Message to Secretary, Dept of External Affairs from Secretary, Dept of Air dated 28
November 1941 in War Records - Defence - Singapore: Passages of Service Aircraft through NEI
[Netherlands East Indies] - Individual Cases, NAA: A981, DEF 125.
256
Cablegram to British Consul General Batavia from Dept of External Affairs dated 24 November
1941 in War Records - Defence - Singapore: Passages of Service Aircraft through NEI [Netherlands
East Indies] - Individual Cases, NAA: A981, DEF 125.
257
Cablegram to British Consul General Batavia from Dept of External Affairs dated 15 December
1941 in War Records - Defence - Singapore: Passages of Service Aircraft through NEI [Netherlands
East Indies] - Individual Cases, NAA: A981, DEF 125.
258
Paraphrase of signal to Air Board from Air Headquarters Far East dated 17 December 1941 in
Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
259
Minute to Harold Clapp from J Johnstone dated 18 December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft: delivery of
90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
260
Cypher message to Aircraft Production Commission from Acting Consul Sourabaya dated 23
December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft: delivery of 90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
261
Cypher Message to Air Board from Air HQ Far East dated 12 December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft -
Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
262
Cypher Message to Clapp Chairman APC from Australian APC Representative in Singapore dated
14 December 1941 in Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
263
Cable to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Australian Representative Singapore
dated 17 December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft: delivery of 90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
264
Cable to Australian Representative Singapore from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission
dated 16 December 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft: delivery of 90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
265
Minute to Commissioner Shea from Captain TR Young dated 15 December 1941 in Beaufort
Aircraft: delivery of 90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
266
Letter to Chairman Aircraft Production Commission from Deputy Chief of the Air Staff undated in
Beaufort Aircraft: delivery of 90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
267
Copy of letter to CAS Burnett from Clapp Chairman APC dated 29 December 1942 (this is should
obviously be 1941) in Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
268
Minute on Report of Pilots of 100 Squadron dated 10 March 1942 in [No 7 Squadron] - Training of
Pilots, NAA: A11281, 8/1/4/AIR.
269
Minute to Secretary Aircraft Production Commission from Resident Technical Officer dated 27 May
1941 in Beaufort Aircraft: delivery of 90 for RAF, NAA: MP287/1, 996.
270
Letter on Delivery of Beaufort Aircraft to RAF to Director of Production from Residential Technical
Officer dated 7 June 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
271
Copy of Wireless Message dated 1 July 1941 to Headquarters RAF, Far East from Air Board in
Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
272
Copy of letter to Secretary of Aircraft Production Commission from Director General, Supply and
Production dated 12 August 1941 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705,
9/18/93.

73
273
Copy of Cypher Message to Air Board from Air HQ Far East dated 10 August 1941 in Beaufort
Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
274
Paraphrase of signal to Air Board from Air Headquarters Far East dated 16 December 1941 in
Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
275
Paraphrase of signal to Air Board from Air Headquarters Far East dated 17 December 1941 in
Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
276
Paraphrase of signal to Air Headquarters Far East from Air Board dated 17 December 1941 in
Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
277
Paraphrase of signal to Air Headquarters Far East from Air Board dated 17 December 1941 in
Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
278
Paraphrase of signal to Air Board from Air Headquarters Far East dated 18 December 1941 in
Training of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
279
Memorandum to Minister for Air from Clapp Chairman APC dated 23 December 1941 and Copy of
Memorandum to Minister for Air from Bladin, Acting Chief of Air Staff dated 8 March 1942 in Training
of RAAF Personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
280
Copy of Minute to Mr Fred Shea from Captain TR Young on Handling Qualities of the Beaufort
dated 25 December 1941 in Training of RAAF personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
281
Copy of Minute to Mr Fred Shea from Captain TR Young on Beaufort Return from Seletar dated 25
December 1941 in Training of RAAF personnel for Beaufort Operation, NAA: A5954, 228/20.
282
Minute on Report of Pilots of 100 Squadron dated 10 March 1942 in [No 7 Squadron] - Training of
Pilots, NAA: A11281, 8/1/4/AIR.
283
Message to ABDA Area from Air Board dated 21 February 1942 in War Cabinet Agendum - No
257/1942 - Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
284
Message to RAAF Liaison Officer London from Air Board dated 26 February 1942 in War Cabinet
Agendum - No 257/1942 - Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
285
Memorandum titled Beaufort Production dated 20 February 1942 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to
United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
286
Letter to Prime Minister from Minister for Air dated 26 March 1942 in War Cabinet Agendum - No
257/1942 - Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
287
Cablegram to Prime Minister from High Commissioner London dated 20 April 1942 in War Cabinet
Agendum - No 257/1942 - Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
288
Memorandum to Secretary, Dept of Air from First Assistant Secretary, Dept of the Treasury dated
12 December 1945 in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
289
Copy of Memorandum to First Assistant Secretary, Dept of the Treasury from Secretary, Dept of
Air undated in Beaufort Aircraft - Supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
290
Minute RAAF Requirements for Australian manufacture of Twin Engined General Reconnaissance
Aircraft to Secretary Air Board from Secretary Dept of Defence dated 23 February 1939 in
Manufacture of Aircraft and Engines in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/502/5.
291
NAA: A14487, 19/AB/3425 Air Board Agenda 3425 (RAAF) - Supply of torpedoes for Beaufort
aircraft - Overseas Indent No. 949.
292
Report of UK Government Air Mission to Australia 1939 dated 18 March 1939 in Aircraft -
Manufacturing of in Australia Air Mission Papers, NAA: M276 4.
293
Air Board Agenda 2928 (RAAF) - Supply of Beaufort aircraft - Demand Aircraft Production
Commission No. 55, NAA: A14487, 15/AB/2928.
294
War Cabinet Agendum - No 3/1939 - Supply of aircraft dated 29 August 1939 in NAA: A2671,
3/1939.
295
Minute to Secretary Dept of Defence from Secretary Air Board dated 29 August 1939 in War
Cabinet Agendum - No 3/1939 - Supply of aircraft, NAA: A2671, 3/1939.
296
Copy of wireless message to Austair from Air Board dated 5 January 1940 in Order for 49 Hudson
Aircraft etc - (Overseas indent 790-1-2) Policy File, NAA: A705, 9/19/177.
297
Copy of secret cypher message to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer dated 31 January
1940 in Order for 49 Hudson Aircraft etc - (Overseas indent 790-1-2) Policy File, NAA: A705,
9/19/177.
298
Copy of wireless message to Australian Liaison Officer from Air Board dated 20 March 1940 in
Order for 49 Hudson Aircraft etc - (Overseas indent 790-1-2) Policy File, NAA: A705, 9/19/177.
299
Copy of cypher to Air Board from Australian Liaison Officer dated 7 April 1940 in Order for 49
Hudson Aircraft etc - (Overseas indent 790-1-2) Policy File, NAA: A705, 9/19/177.
300
Copy of cypher to Australian Liaison Officer from Air Board dated 18 April 1940 in Order for 49
Hudson Aircraft etc - (Overseas indent 790-1-2) Policy File, NAA: A705, 9/19/177.

74
301
Copy of cypher to Australian Liaison Officer from Air Board dated 27 April 1940 in Order for 49
Hudson Aircraft etc - (Overseas indent 790-1-2) Policy File, NAA: A705, 9/19/177.
302
Letter to CAS Burnett from Chairman Aircraft Production Commission dated 5 October 1940 in
Production of Aircraft in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/501/364.
303
Supplement No. 4 to War Cabinet Agendum - No 151/1940 dated 3 February 1941 in War Cabinet
Agendum - No 151/1940 and supplements 1-7 - Expansion of home defence air forces, NAA: A2671
151/1940.
304
Historical Notes in Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft
production [reports: aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-
45], NAA: MP1472/1, 15 PART 4.
305
Supplement No. 5 to War Cabinet Agendum No. 151/1940 dated 16 May 1941 and War Cabinet
Minute dated 20 May 1941 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 151/1940 and supplements 1-7 - Expansion
of Home Defence Air Forces, NAA: A2671, 151/1940.
306
War Cabinet Minute dated 14 February 1941 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 151/1940 and
supplements 1-7 - Expansion of Home Defence Air Forces, NAA: A2671, 151/1940.
307
Supplement No. 5 to War Cabinet Agendum No. 151/1940 dated 16 May 1941 and War Cabinet
Minute dated 20 May 1941 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 151/1940 and supplements 1-7 - Expansion
of Home Defence Air Forces, NAA: A2671, 151/1940.
308
War Cabinet Minute dated 14 February 1941 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 151/1940 and
supplements 1-7 - Expansion of Home Defence Air Forces, NAA: A2671, 151/1940.
309
Historical Notes in Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft
production [reports: aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-
45], NAA: MP1472/1, 15 PART 4.
310
Historical Notes in Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft
production [reports: aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-
45], NAA: MP1472/1, 15 PART 4.
311
War Cabinet Agendum 257/1942 dated 4 July 1942 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 257/1942 -
Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
312
Supplement No. 1 to Air Board Agenda 3954 (RAAF) - Supply of additional 127 Beaufort aircraft
dated 22 September 1942, NAA: A14487, 23/AB/3954.
313
Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia and matters associated therewith -
[Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1,
30.
314
Historical Notes in Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft
production [reports: aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-
45], NAA: MP1472/1, 15 PART 4.
315
Minute dated 2 August 1941 to Director of Production from Resident Technical Officer in
Australian-made Beaufort – Proposed Renaming, NAA: A705, 9/18/108.
316
Minute 2 dated 12 August 1941 on Minute Sheet in Australian-made Beaufort – Proposed
Renaming, NAA: A705, 9/18/108.
317
Letter dated 4 June 1940 to Aircraft Production Commission, Dept of Supply and Development
from Dept of Air in Beaufort serial numbers (RAAF) and RAF, NAA: MP287/2, B1507.
318
Wireless Message dated 14 August 1941? to Air Liaison Officer London from Air Board in
Australian-made Beaufort – Proposed Renaming, NAA: A705, 9/18/108.
319
Copy of Secret Cypher Signal dated 22 November 1941 to Air Board from Air Liaison Officer
London in Beaufort Aircraft - Allocation of Mark Numbers, NAA: MP287/1, 1262.
320
Memoranda dated 19 and 22 December 1941 between Dept of Air and Aircraft Production
Commission in Australian-made Beaufort – Proposed Renaming, NAA: A705, 9/18/108.
321
Beaufort Instruction No. 2 Issue 3 undated in Australian-made Beaufort – Proposed Renaming,
NAA: A705, 9/18/108 and taken from Minutes of Beaufort Local Modifications Committee Meetings
No. 11 of 10 June 1942 and No. 17 of 2 September 1942.
322
Copy of letter dated 3 April 1940 from Aircraft Production Branch, Dept of Supply and
Development to Dept of Air in Beaufort serial numbers (RAAF) and RAF, NAA: MP287/2, B1507.
323
Letter dated 18 April 1940 from Dept of Air to Aircraft Production Branch, Dept of Supply and
Development in Beaufort serial numbers (RAAF) and RAF, NAA: MP287/2, B1507.
324
Letter dated 29 April 1942 from Dept of Air to Aircraft Production Commission, Dept of Supply and
Development in Beaufort serial numbers (RAAF) and RAF, NAA: MP287/2, B1507.
325
Letter dated 12 June 1942 from Dept of Air to Dept of Aircraft Production in Beaufort Aircraft -
Allocation of Mark Numbers, NAA: MP287/1, 1262.

75
326
Extract of cablegram dated 23 April 1940 from Aircraft Production Branch, Dept of Supply and
Development of Air to Shea in London in Beaufort serial numbers (RAAF) and RAF, NAA: MP287/2,
B1507.
327
Extract from Cablegram dated 1 May 1940 from Shea in London to Aircraft Production Branch,
Dept of Supply and Development in Beaufort serial numbers (RAAF) and RAF, NAA: MP287/2,
B1507.
328
See information on Beaufort aircraft in the various Review of Weekly Progress Reports, Supply
and Production Branch to Secretary Dept of Air from Director- General, Supply and Production
Branch in Report by Chief of the Air staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) May 1942 - December
1941, NAA: A11252, 1.
329
Memorandum to Official Secretary, London from Secretary, Dept of Defence dated 31 May 1939 in
Orders for New Equipment Bristol 149 and Hudson, NAA: A705 208/7/649.
330
Letter to Secretary Aircraft Production Commission from Secretary Dept of Air dated 21 January
1942 in Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, High Commissioner for the British Government - Supply of Information
Concerning Materials for the Production of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: MP287/2, B599.
331
Letter to Secretary Dept of Air from Secretary Dept of Aircraft Production dated 28 January 1942 in
Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, High Commissioner for the British Government - Supply of Information
Concerning Materials for the Production of Beaufort Aircraft, NAA: MP287/2, B599.
332
Minute to numerous recipients from Personal Secretary to Chief of Air Staff dated 25 January 1939
in Substitution of Beauforts for present order of Wellingtons for New Zealand, PRO AIR 2/3019 in
Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838781.
333
Minute to Deputy Chief of Air Staff from Deputy Director Operations (O) dated 26 January 1939 in
Substitution of Beauforts for present order of Wellingtons for New Zealand, PRO AIR 2/3019 in Trove
NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838781.
334
Minute 15 dated 14 March 1939 on Minute Sheet in Substitution of Beauforts for present order of
Wellingtons for New Zealand, PRO AIR 2/3019 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727838781.
335
Telegram to New Zealand Govt from Dominions Office dated 31 March 1942 in Supply of aircraft
to New Zealand in PRO AIR 8/675 in Trove NLA https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-727841209.
336
Letter to Air Chief Marshal Burnett from Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham dated 15 August 1945
in Beaufort Aircraft - supply to United Kingdom, NAA: A705, 9/18/93.
337
See details in Government of India - enquiry for Beaufort Aircraft and Twin Row Wasp Engines,
NAA: MP287/1, 780.
338
War Cabinet Agendum 257/1942 dated 4 July 1942 in War Cabinet Agendum - No 257/1942 -
Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
339
Appendix B to War Cabinet Agendum 257/1942 dated 4 July 1942 in War Cabinet Agendum - No
257/1942 - Beaufort production, NAA: A2671 257/1942.
340
Enclosure No. 9A Minute on Beaufort Forward Armament to Chief Engineer from Resident
Technical Officer DAP dated 19 December 1941 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft -
gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
341
Enclosure No. 28A Minute on Beaufort Aircraft – Armament Equipment – Fitment of 20mm Cannon
to Resident Technical Officer DAP from Director of Armament dated 10 February 1942 in Directorate
of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
342
Enclosure No. 35A Minute on Beaufort Armament – Provision of 20mm Cannon to Chief Engineer
from Resident Technical Officer DAP dated 7 March 1942 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort
aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
343
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 112 for the week
ending 19 March 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
344
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 112 for the week
ending 19 March 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
345
Item No. 87 dated 26 October 1942 from Group Captain (DTS) on Minute Sheet in Directorate of
Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
346
Enclosure No. 69A Minute on Beaufort Armament to Director of Armament from Resident
Technical Officer DAP dated 29 August 1942 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery
equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
347
Item No. 87 dated 26 October 1942 from Group Captain (DTS) on Minute Sheet in Directorate of
Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
348
Item No. 108 dated 10 December 1942 from Wing Commander (D.Arm) on Minute Sheet in
Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.

76
349
Enclosure No. 96A Copy of Minute on Beaufort Armament - .5 Nose Guns to Director of Technical
Services T.S.7 from Resident Technical Officer dated 4 December 1942 in Directorate of Armament -
Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
350
Minutes of Local Modifications Committee Meeting No. 31 dated 9 June 1943 in Directorate of
Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
351
Enclosure No. 148 Letter on .5 Gun Installation in Hudson and Beaufort Aircraft to RAAF
Headquarters (Forward Echelon) from Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command dated 12 July 1943
in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
352
Enclosure No. 69A Minute on Beaufort Armament to Director of Armament from Resident
Technical Officer DAP dated 29 August 1942 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery
equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
353
Enclosure No. 74A Copy of Minute on Beaufort .5 Wing Gun Installation to Deputy Director of
Armaments from Squadron Leader T.S.7 dated 10 September 1942 in Directorate of Armament -
Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
354
Item No. 87 dated 26 October 1942 from Group Captain (DTS) on Minute Sheet in Directorate of
Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
355
tem No. 142 dated 12 July 1943 from Wing Commander T.S.7 on Minute Sheet in Directorate of
Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
356
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 112 for the week
ending 19 March 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
357
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 115 for the week
ending 9 April 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
358
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 116 for the week
ending 16 April 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
359
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 117 for the week
ending 23 April 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
360
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 125 for the week
ending 18 June 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
361
Enclosure No. 69A Minute on Beaufort Armament to Director of Armament from Resident
Technical Officer DAP dated 29 August 1942 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery
equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
362
Minutes on Beaufort Rearward Defensive Armament to Secretary Dept of Aircraft Production from
Secretary Dept of Air dated 23 November 1942 in Beaufort Aircraft - 1600 H.P. Engines Production bo
B.D. 43A Aircraft, NAA: MP287/1 1417.
363
Enclosure No. 69A Minute on Beaufort Armament to Director of Armament from Resident
Technical Officer DAP dated 29 August 1942 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery
equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
364
Enclosure No. 69A Minute on Beaufort Armament to Director of Armament from Resident
Technical Officer DAP dated 29 August 1942 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery
equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
365
Item No. 130 dated 28 April 1943 from Squadron Leader (T.S. 1/c) on Minute Sheet in Directorate
of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
366
Enclosure No. 156A Minute of Under Defence Gun on Beaufort Aircraft to RAAF Headquarters
Units from RAAF Headquarters dated 8 July 1943 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft -
gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.
367
Minute Beaufort – Bullet Proof Glass to Commissioner Storey from Resident Technical Officer
dated 15 January 1942 in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA:
A705, 9/18/114.
368
Review of Weekly Progress Report – Supply and Production Branch, Serial No. 118 for the week
ending 30 April 1942 in Report by Chief of the Air Staff on activities of the Air Force (Weekly) March
1942 (sic) - June 1942, NAA: A11252, 12.
369
Enclosure No. 148 Letter on .5 Gun Installation in Hudson and Beaufort Aircraft to RAAF
Headquarters (Forward Echelon) from Air Officer Commanding RAAF Command dated 12 July 1943
in Directorate of Armament - Beaufort aircraft - gunnery equipment, NAA: A705, 9/18/114.

77
370
Cablegram to Fernie at Bristol Aeroplane Company from Latham Dept of Aircraft Production dated
22 August 1942 in Beaufort Aircraft: Proposed fitment of floats to, NAA: MP287/1 2252.
371
Cablegram to Dept of Aircraft Production (?) from Hyland in London dated 29 September 1942 in
Beaufort Aircraft: Proposed fitment of floats to, NAA: MP287/1 2252.
372
Cablegram to Dept of Aircraft Production (?) from Hyland in London dated 6 October 1942 in
Beaufort Aircraft: Proposed fitment of floats to, NAA: MP287/1 2252.
373
Cablegram to Dept of Aircraft Production (?) from Hyland in London dated 9 November 1942 in
Beaufort Aircraft: Proposed fitment of floats to, NAA: MP287/1 2252.
374
Cablegram from High Commissioner Bruce to Acting Prime Minister Fadden dated 16 September
1941 in Prime Minister's Visit Abroad 1941. Australian Aircraft Production Policy. Ministry of Aircraft
Production. 25/1/41 - 3/10/41, NAA: A5954, 617/3.
375
Cypher Message to Air Force Melbourne from Overseas Headquarters dated 20 June 1942 in
NAA: Torpedo Reconnaissance Aircraft (Beaufighter Attack Aircraft), NAA: A1196 1/502/24.
376
Minutes (Enclosure 22A) to Air Member for Supply and Equipment from Lawson dated 24 June
1942 in NAA: Torpedo Reconnaissance Aircraft (Beaufighter Attack Aircraft), NAA: A1196 1/502/24.
377
Cablegram to Dept of Aircraft Production from Hyland in London dated 25 March 1942 in Beaufort
Aircraft - 1600 H.P. Engines Production bo B.D. 43A Air-craft, NAA: MP287/1, 1417.
378
Notes of Conference held with Chief of Air Staff on Beaufort Replacement held on 11 July 1942 in
Beaufort Aircraft - 1600 H.P. Engines Production bo B.D. 43A Air-craft, NAA: MP287/1, 1417.
379
Notes on Proposed Beaufort Replacement undated (but Minute Sheet Encl 34A indicates 24 July
1942) in Torpedo Reconnaissance Aircraft (Beaufighter Attack Aircraft), NAA: A1196, 1/502/24.
380
War Cabinet Agendum 295/1941 Manufacture in Australia of Wright Cyclone R.2600 1600hp
aircraft engine dated 30 August 1941 in Production of Aircraft in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/501/364.
381
Cable to Prime Minister’s Dept from FB Clapp Australian Govt Trade Commissioner New York
dated 27 February 1941 in Production of Aircraft in Australia, NAA: A1196, 1/501/364.
382
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
383
Letter titled Beaufort Replacement to Secretary Dept of Aircraft Production from Secretary Dept of
Air dated 26 August 1942 in Beaufort Aircraft - 1600 H.P. Engines Production bo B.D. 43A Air-craft,
NAA: MP287/1, 1417.
384
Memorandum to Shedden Secretary Dept of Defence from Minister for Air dated 10 September
1942 in Production of aircraft engines (refers to Advisory War Council Minute Nos 1000, 1012 and
1078), NAA: A2680, 44/1942.
385
Report dated 16 August 1943 in Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia
and matters associated therewith - [Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine
production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1, 30.
386
Memorandum to Shedden Secretary Dept of Defence from Minister for Air dated 10 September
1942 in Production of aircraft engines (refers to Advisory War Council Minute Nos 1000, 1012 and
1078), NAA: A2680, 44/1942.
387
Development of the manufacture of aircraft engines in Australia and matters associated therewith -
[Notation by DAP, 16 August 1943, on twin row Wasp engine production, Lidcombe], NAA: MP450/1,
30.
388
Aircraft Production in Australia by Dept of Aircraft Production dated 31 August 1945 in
Miscellaneous reports, minutes of meetings, historical notes dealing with aircraft production [reports:
aircraft production in Australia and aircraft industry history 'plane building' 1939-45], NAA: MP1472/1,
15 PART 4 and Survey of Aircraft Production in Australia including Appendix 1 dated 7 February 1942
in Aircraft Production in Australia, NAA: MP450/1, 4.
389
Beaufort and Beaufighter: Production in Australia: by Beaufort Division, Department of Aircraft
Production, NAA: M3908, 2.
390
War Cabinet Agendum - No 111/1943 - Department of Aircraft Production - Progress report for
February, 1943, in NAA: A2671, 111/1943

78