ONE- PARTY DOMINANCE AND DIVERSIFICATION OF INTERESTS

A Study of the Congress System and BJP Dominant System

Jahnvi Jangra, Khushi Barman, Ritikanksha Soni

Abstract (Khushi Barman)

This paper attempts to examine the status of representation and inclusion of varied interests under
the Congress and the BJP’s one-party dominance. To do so, religious and caste representation in
Lok Sabhas as well as power-sharing dynamics at the Centre are examined under both the party
systems using various data sets. Beyond descriptive representation, Congress’ umbrella coalition is
looked at through the lense of the theory of ‘Consociationalism’ and testing it against its context.
Finally, Muslim marginality is qualitatively examined by studying the impact of dominant political
discourses on it. Case studies of Uttar Pradesh present fascinatingly enduring insights. The
introduction captures,briefly, key ideas relevant to our analysis propounded by Rajni Kothari,
Yogendra Yadav, Suhas Palshikar, Christophe Jaffrelot and Zoya Hasan.

More than 50% of the Lok Sabha was Upper Caste dominated from 1952-67, SC representation
stood at about 15% till about 1971 and that of STs hovered at 5-7%. Muslim representation was less
than 10% for most of this phase. Other religious minorities were rather abysmally represented. In
the first three cabinets, the % of Upper Caste Hindus increased continuously while that of Muslims
declined progressively. No STs were part of the cabinets in consideration. Uttar Pradesh did not see
any substantial decline in Upper Caste over-represenation till 1969 while OBCs were
disproportionately represented. The grand coalition that was Congress was dominated by Upper
caste elites and the internal struggle for power was not necessarily helpful. Co-optation of interests
was gradual and a struggle between the traditionalists and modernists within the party- ongoing.
Post establishing the BJP’s remarkable increment in voter bases and explaining social engineering
dynamics, we investigate whether the BJP is as representative as is claimed and if it is indeed
plebianising Indian politics.

We find a nearly stagnant % of Upper Caste and OBC MPs in both the 16th and 17th Lok Sabhas ;
the backward classes’ representation being highly disproportionate to both their population and their
share of BJP vote. A phenomenon of Upper Caste resurgence is observed as the trend of
increasingly lowering gap between the Upper Caste MPs and OBC MPs from the Hindi Belt in Lok
Sabha, reverses sharply in 2009 and is now more or less consolidated, akin to the pre-Mandal

 scenario of 1989.The religious profile of BJP MPs is overwhelmingly Hindu with the Congress
being not so far back, although faring better in terms of the representation of religious minorities.
Notably, the SC/ST representation is the highest ever in the present Council of Ministers (in
%).Ministers from backward classes and SCs belong to a wide spectrum of non-dominant sub-
castes within these groups but skewed power-sharing dynamics persist in terms of portfolio
allocations. A study of UP presents a somewhat identical picture with BJP MLAs having the most
diversified caste composition and Vidhan Sabha having a substantial no. of OBCs but a closer look
suggests that most important ministerial berths are held by Upper Castes and the massive Muslim
underrepresentation warrants serious attention. A brazenly majoritarian political discourse alters
notions about the bases of representations itself apart from impacting parties’ ticket-distribution,
manifestos and not the least the lives of many a Muslims. In the final analysis, contingent optics and
tentative accommodation seem to overpower substantive inclusion despite some marked shifts.

Keywords: One- party dominance, diversification of interests, Congress system, BJP dominant
system
Research Methodology (Jahnvi Jangra)
We have used a quantitative and qualitative approach to study the relation between one party
dominance and diversification in the Indian Politics. We used a deductive approach while trying to
test our observations of representation in the Lok Sabha on the composition of the Uttar Pradesh
State Assembly. Further, we tried to examine the relevance of the theory of consociationalism by
Lijphart on the trend of diversification under the Congress system. Under our examination of the
quantitative aspects of representation of castes and religions, we tried to make use of tools such as
graphs and charts, based on different published sources. Besides, taking the case study of Uttar
Pradesh Legislative Assembly, published research as well as newspaper- based reports were also
considered. While examining the qualitative trends under both the systems, we used interviews and
works by different theorists and scholars.

ONE- PARTY DOMINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION (Ritikanksha)

Half a century ago, the late political theorist, Rajni Kothari, began decoding the Indian political
system terming it One-Party Dominance (OPD) or the Congress system.Despite hiccups in the late
1960s, and in the second half of the 1970s, Congress’ stranglehold on the political system
continued. This hegemonic system provided political stability in a very diverse country because it

 mirrored the complexities of India.Yogendra Yadav and Palshikar, among others, provided a more
modest assessment of the Congress System, criticizing its upper-caste dominated, elite character.
Zoya Hasan's ideas on the politics of inclusion and marginality and need also to be considered. Her
work on Uttar Pradesh politics is full of enduring insights particularly in the politics of mobilization
and representation in the state.Christophe Jaffrelot's insights on Hindutva politics and BJP's social
engineering are taken into account while Palshikar's crucial insights both on this ODP's nature and
its distinctiveness serves as a crucial source to build any analysis.
The processes of compromise, mediation and arbitration within and outside the folds of a party play
a fundamental role in party dynamics as well as in the design and formulation of policies. We need
to analyse this in the light of “one party dominant systems” as Rajni Kothari put it, “where
competing parties play a rather dissimilar role”.
Such an examination of the polity, through the lens of the two OPDs is both necessary and
fascinating. Given the umbrella-like nature and continued reign of dominant parties, faced with
tremendous tasks of nation-building and effective functioning of democratic institutions the
dynamics relating to participation, representation, accommodation and inclusion have severe
implications on the society and polity. How do they match up to the task is too broad a question so
caste and religious representation offer a useful way to look at the 'diversification of interests'
within these party systems.The paper goes beyond examining socio-electoral bases and descriptive
representation to include qualitative assessments of democracy and diversity within the Congress
System by focusing on 'consociationalism' and on Muslim marginality through the lens of dominant
discourses.
We have, in a sense, come full circle from one party dominating the national arena to fragmentation
of political choices and a new hegemonic politico-cultural system driven by the BJP.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Did the accommodative nature of the Indian National Congress and its nature as an umbrella
organisation make it more representative of the diverse caste and religious communities of
the Indian democratic system?
2. Did the INC operate to democratise the functioning of the country and diversify the opinions
of the citizens of Indian democracy?
3. Is the BJP as socially representative as it claims, is it plebianising politics?
4. How do discourses and political narrative affect Muslim marginality?

HYPOTHESIS
Religious and caste- based representation in a one- party dominant system leads to
diversification of interests and democracy. (Jahnvi Jangra)

Whether one party dominance system leads to a greater diversification of interests in a democracy
can be viewed through a lens of analysing the system of diversification. In a one- party dominant
system, a commonly held belief is that the nature of the dominant party is such that it is able to take
into its fold diverse views from different sections and groups in the society. However, what is not
considered is how this is actually substantiated on the ground- if there is really a diversification or is
an impetus given to the democratic institutions or not.

This can be looked through regional representation during the one- party dominance system in
India. When the representation of members from different regions of the country is considered, it
can be noted that although the representation of people from North and Central India remains
sufficient, a huge disparity exists when the representation from the southern and north eastern states
is considered. (V A Pai Panandiker 1996) This disparity nonetheless decreases when there is a
multi- party or coalition government. It was quite evident when we look at the composition of
cabinet during the coalition era as compared to when there was a one- party dominant system- the
Congress system and the emerging BJP system, respectively. The change from a one- party
dominant system to multi-party system increased the regional representation particularly from the
States from south and west. (Wilkinson 2000)

Similarly, the level of internal democracy in a dominant party should be taken into account when
looking at the level of diversification of interests in a one- party dominant system. Hence, the level
of group representation in both the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) must be
examined. The Congress party during the Congress system consisted of different groups to advocate
the views of different communities, for instance, All- India Adivasi Congress Samiti. Similarly,
according to BJP’s internal reports, the party claims to channel the interests of SCs, STs, OBCs and
religious minorities too through the formation of various ‘morchas’. However, these groups do not
wield any power in party policy making or selection of candidates for elections or other positions of
power. (K Adeney 2019) This can be studied through the working of the Congress Working
Committee or the BJP Parliamentary panel.

 In the Congress working Committee, in terms of religious representation, although the Christians
and Sikhs remained well represented, the representation of the larger minority of Muslims within
the key decision- making body remained patchier. Similarly, in the BJP’s national executive too,
there remains a huge underrepresentation of different communities, Muslims and Christians in
particular.

According to Arend Lijphart, ‘not only should all significant segment be represented in decision-
making organs, but they should also be represented proportionally.’ (Lijphart 1969) However, the
representation under both the Congress and BJP of various groups remained disproportionate as
compared to their population. Mostly the representation that was given to different groups was
tokenistic, as we have also examined in the following sections. Steven Ian Wilkinson has also
pointed out that the accommodation in the Congress party has not been much inclusive. A 1957
internal investigation into the party’s treatment of minorities found out that the Congress Working
Committee recommendations on minority proportionality were being flaunted at every level of
government from district boards to the national Parliament. (Wilkinson 2000)

CASTE AND RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATION UNDER THE CONGRESS SYSTEM

(Jahnvi)

The Congress system, according to the political scientist Rajni Kothari, was “one of the most
successful party systems” that operated during the 1960s. The Congress system as a political
umbrella accommodated various opinions from around the country and boosted the democratic
nature of the government. And this has been the popular conception around the nature of the
Congress party that prevailed till almost two decades after independence. As Kothari put it, the
party’s ability to welcome the views and interests even from the opposition, enabled it to function as
a ‘thermostat’. (Kothari 1964)

However, how the party represented these ideas and voiced the conflicting opinions has not always
been clear enough. To study the reality of the representation of various interests by the Congress, it
is very important to study the composition of people from the top echelons of the party as well as of
the government. Here, we try to bring out the composition of the members who represented the
Congress in the Lok Sabha during the Congress system, looking at it through four general elections
that happened in 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967 and 1971.

Lok Sabha Composition during the Congress System

The focus in this section would be on the representation of Congress Members in the first, second,
third, fourth and fifth Lok Sabhas’ composition. The first Lok Sabha elections took place in 1952,
where out of 489, the Indian National Congress won 364 seats, which is about 74.4% of the total
seats. In the second Lok Sabha, that was conducted in 1957, the INC won 371 seats that accounted
for 75.1% of the total 494 seats. Similarly, in the third and fourth Lok Sabha elections held in 1962
and 1971 elections respectively, the Congress accounted for about 73% and 54.42% of the total
number of seats in the Lower House of the Parliament. Further, during the mid- term elections of
1971, the Congress won a huge majority of 352 seats out of 518. It accounted for 67.9% of the total
seats of Lok Sabha. As is clear from the above-mentioned data, the Indian National Congress
comprised a sizeable majority in the Lok Sabha. Hence, to analyse the composition of Members of
Parliament from the Congress, we look at the data of the total strength of the Lok Sabha.

As seen in Fig.1, more than 50 per cent of the Lok Sabha was dominated by the Brahmins and the
other upper castes from 1952 to 1971, the time period which was the epitome of the one-party
dominance by the Congress party in India. This signifies that despite the Congress trying to project
its image as a representative of all the communities of India, the representatives of people from the
party were mostly the ‘traditional’ elites who had for centuries oppressed the lower castes. If we
look at the trend, it is very clear that there was visibly no attempt by the party leadership to put the
demands of various sections of society through their representatives. Instead, we see a huge increase
in the representation of upper castes (excluding Brahmins) in 1967 elections and then again,
resurgence in the representation of Brahmins in the Lok Sabha constituted in 1971. (Antony 2018)

40

30
Brahmins
Other upper castes (excludin
OBCs
Muslims
20 Dalits
Adivasis

10

0
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971

Fig.1 (Source: CSDS)

Caste and religious composition in Lok Sabha (1952-71)

However, we notice a positive trend in the representation of the Other Backward Classes in the Lok
Sabha from 1952 to 1967 as it almost progressively increases. But the significant decline of the
OBC representation in 1971 is worth noticing. The percentage of their representation has been
highly disproportionate to their population.

To consider the representation of Dalits or Scheduled Castes, it must be taken into account that
about 15 per cent of the total Lok Sabha seats were reserved for the STs in the Lok Sabha,
according to the Constitution of India. The corresponding representation of the SCs in the Lok
Sabha at about 15 per cent till 1971 explains the role of a constitutional provision in projecting
leadership from a community. The SC representation remained almost the same in the five general
elections which shows the reluctance of the Congress in promoting any kind of impetus to the
members of the Dalit community, apart from the Constitutional mandate. The same stands true for
the Adivasi or Scheduled Tribe population, which remained fairly stagnant at the constitutionally
mandated reserved seats for the community. (Wilkinson 2000)

The largest religious minority of India, Muslims despite the abolition of separate electorates
managed to gain some representation in the Lok Sabha. However, the representation of the Muslims
in the Lok Sabha remained abysmal. Compared to their population of 12.5 per cent in independent
India, the Muslims constituted less than 10 per cent of the entire Lok Sabha. Here, we find a lack of

 willingness in the Congress Party to recognise the marginalised communities and provide them
adequate representation. Since most of the candidates belonged to the Indian National Congress, it
would be appropriate to say that the Congress party largely gave representation to mostly the upper
castes, which dominated the whole of the Indian Society.

Caste and Religious Representation in the Central Cabinet

Since the composition of the Cabinet is determined by various political and socio- economic
factors, it may be pertinent to consider the caste and religious composition of the members of the
central cabinet during the Congress system. The cabinets from independence to 1971, at maximum
consisted of 25 members. Hence, it becomes highly important to provide at least a semblance of
representation to members from various caste and religious communities in the cabinet. In this
section, we try to see the composition of the cabinet ministers under the first three Prime Ministers,
Jawaharlal Nehru (1952, 1957 and 1962), Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964) and Indira Gandhi (1967 and
1971).

Jawaharlal Nehru's Cabinet

90

76

67.5
1952
1957
1962
45

22.5
12
8
4
0
0
Upper middle class hindus Non- Muslim Minori es Scheduled Tribes

Fig.2 (Source: Mint research based on data compiled by Gilles Verniers at Ashoka University)

ti

 Fig.2 shows the composition of the first three cabinets composed under the leadership of PM
Jawaharlal Nehru. It has been clearly depicted that in the first three cabinets, the percentage of
upper middle-class Hindus increased continuously, while the percentage of Muslims in the Cabinet
decreased progressively. Even the representation of the non-Muslim minority and the Scheduled
Castes remained miniscule. It must also be noted that not a single member from the Scheduled
Tribes remained in the Cabinet to represent the community at one of the highest levels of decision
making of the country.

Under the leadership of PM Lal Bahadur Shastri, the composition of the cabinet remained
dominated by the upper middle-class Hindus. Similarly, the cabinet consisted of a smaller number
of Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and other religious communities; sometimes completely invisible
from the cabinet. In 1964 also, no ST representative was able to get elevated to the position of a
cabinet minister.

1964- Lal Bahadur Shastri's Cabinet

90
81.5

67.5
1964

45

22.5
7.4 7.4
3.7
0
0
Upper middle class hindus Non- Muslim Minori es Scheduled Tribes

Fig.3 (Source: Mint research based on data compiled by Gilles Verniers at Ashoka University)

Fig.4 (Source: Mint research based on data compiled by Gilles Verniers at Ashoka University)

ti

 Indira Gandhi's Cabinet

80
74

60
1966
1967
1971
40

20
12
8 6
0
0
Upper middle class hindus Non- Muslim Minori es Scheduled Tribes

The lack of willingness in the Congress Part to voice out opinions of various marginalised groups
under the prime ministership of Indira Gandhi too. The numbers of the upper middle-class Hindus
remained disproportionately high. While, there was no significant increase in the number of cabinet
ministers from the Muslim, Non- Muslim minorities and the Scheduled Castes. Further, no
Scheduled Tribe Member found a place in the list of Cabinet Ministers.

We find that the upper middle-class Hindus enjoyed a prominent position in the cabinet and their
representation remained almost the same over the years. The problem here seemed to be the
Congress giving less representation to the most marginalized sections of society, such that there was
no ST representation in the cabinet. The dominance of the upper castes and other influential groups
was evident in the composition of the central cabinet of the country after independence.

Representation of caste and religious groups in Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly: A Case Study

In this section we look at the composition of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly during the
Congress system as it was dominated by the Congress largely. The Congress dominated the Uttar
Pradesh Legislative assembly till 1967, when for the first time a non – Congress government headed
by Charan Singh of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal came to power. However, the Congress party managed
to regain its hold in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly in 1969 till about mid 1970s. (Jaffrelot
2012)

ti

 60

45

Upper Castes
OBCs
30 Muslims
SCs

15

0
1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1974

Fig.5 (Source: Gilles Verniers. Uttar Pradesh State Assembly Legislators’ dataset. Adapted from
Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009) “The Rise of Plebians”).

Caste and Religious Composition in UP Vidhan Sabha (1952- 1974)

The above given graph shows the composition of MLAs in the UP legislative assembly on the basis
of caste and religious groups. The upper caste representation remained very high during the first
three Vidhan Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh. For the first time, the upper caste representation
dropped when the Charan Singh government came to power. However, there was no substantial
decline in the upper caste representation after the Congress came to power in 1969.

Similarly, the Other Backward Classes or OBCs remained disproportionately represented in the
Vidhan Sabha till 1962. The high representation of the OBCs in 1967 was the time when the
government changed, although it can be said to be more of a political and social strategy to provide
a larger representation to the OBCs rather than a sincere attempt to voice out the opinions of
marginalised groups. When we look at the Muslim representation in the state legislative assembly, it
is abysmally low till mid 1970s. There was no attempt to increase the representation of Muslims in
the Vidhan Sabha, despite Uttar Pradesh being a state with one of the largest Muslim populations in
the country. Even the representation of Scheduled Caste MLAs in the UP Vidhan Sabha remained
stagnant.

This reveals the fact that even in Uttar Pradesh, one of the most diverse states in India, the
legislative assembly remained dominated by the upper caste Hindus only. Hence, the trend shown
through the representation in the Uttar Pradesh state Assembly also signifies the Congress’ inability
to put forth the views and interests of various marginalised communities in both the central and
state legislatures, which is shown through a lack of representation of different groups and
communities both in the Parliament as well as in the state legislatures.

Therefore, when looking at the quantitative trends of representation throughout the period of
Congress dominance, we find that there was no accommodation in the form of representation in the
Parliament, the cabinet as well as the state legislative assemblies.

DIVERSIFICATION OF INTERESTS UNDER CONGRESS SYSTEM (Ritikaksha)

In order to analyse the degree to which the Congress party served as a diversifier of democracy, we,
in this section, attempt to link it to Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism. Lijphart’s theory
of consociationalism explains how different societies with entrenched social cleavages. manage to
maintain democratic structures. According to this theory, deeply fragmented and diverse societies
can survive as democracy only when there is an existence of the following four features in the
society: powers sharing though a grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and minority
veto. In our view, consociationalism is directly linked to diversification of democracy because it is
possible to accommodate the differences of various communities in a democratic way when the
above- mentioned features are present in a society.

In this section, we rely on the critique of Lijphart’s claim of India being a consociation by Steven
Ian Wilkinson. (Wilkinson 2000) Here we will further analyse the claim of Lijphart’s idea of India
being an “impressive case of consociationalism”. (Lijphart 1996)For Indian democracy to be
consociationalism, it has to exhibit four defining characteristics/criteria of power sharing mentioned
as follows- Grand Coalition, cultural autonomy, proportionality and minority veto.

If we look at grand coalition, we find that although the Congress was widely accepted to be a grand
coalition or an umbrella party, in reality, its leadership consisted of mostly the upper caste elites.
The prerequisite for forming a grand coalition is giving over-representation to those groups which
are numerically small within the country so that their concerns are adequately heard. But since the
congress system, Hindus have been exponentially represented in cabinets despite making up the
majority of the population.

Cabinet ministers are an integral part of the Indian polity as they form the collective decision-
making body of the government of India. In reality, if we check the law-making power in the
system, we will realize it is actually in the hands of the cabinet rather than the Indian parliament. It
has been noticed by scholars that even if some selected minorities were bestowed upon ministerial
appointments, they were usually kept away from the crucial portfolios like finance, foreign affairs
and home. If we analyse the data available on various ministries, it comes to the notice that the
finance portfolio has been held by only one Christian under the prime ministership of Jawaharlal
Nehru during the Congress system. Similarly, Muslims in the central cabinets under congress
system held less important portfolios such as education.

Furthermore, if we look at the proportionality of representation of Congress candidates in the Lok

Sabha, we find that there is an over representation of the Hindu and Forward Castes during the
Congress system. Since the system of separate electorates for Muslims was abolished after
independence, many have argued that this has resulted in a progressive underrepresentation of the
community (Khalidi 1993, Sachar 2006). Of all the religious minority religious communities in
India, Muslims have been the most underrepresented.

Additionally, the diversification through the Congress party in essentially a one- party dominant
system, can also be looked upon from the perspective of a tussle between the traditional and
modernist forces in the Congress that emerged after independence. The difference of opinions in the
westernised elites of the party and the regional and local led to the fight between two opposing
forces, which resulted in low voicing out of opinions of various sections of the society.

It is also to be noted that the dynamics of the struggle for power in the Congress party intensified
casteism in the party rather than using it to democratise the process. The dominant castes were well
represented in the Congress party and controlled political power at the state level and even more
generally at the lower levels. C N Bhalerao in a paper on ‘The Developing Pattern of the Congress
Party’ stated that

It is clear that while the Congress Party has attempted to modernise and democratise the country,
the politics of the party is directed more to the need for capturing power and strengthening it than
to establishing a democratic and open society based in the freedom of the individual and effective
popular participation in politics. The almost totalitarian control of the party on politics and society
leads to increasing powers of the executive and frustrates individual freedom and popular
participation in politics.

Therefore, we see that although the Congress party reflected its inclusivity, the real dynamics
differed to a great extent, where the party was able to mobilise the demands of only a handful of
elites from the society. Besides, if the co-optation of various interests is considered, it can be said
that this was a gradual attempt to dissimilate the interests of different communities by incorporating
even the local leaders within its larger fold.

Changing orthodoxies and a politico-cultural project (Khushi)

PB Mehta, in the context of 2022 Assembly Elections, observed “Social engineering or mere
descriptive representation makes politics sound trivial, it seems to rob voters of their agency and
they respond with revulsion...The sense that BJP has a deep social base, especially amongst women
and lower castes, and a spectacular geographic reach as Manipur has demonstrated, completely
belies the identity determinism that has for long characterized Indian politics. To continue to think
that people simply voted their caste or that the BJP represented upper caste hegemony was to take a
starting point that was at best a product of selection bias, at worst a refusal to acknowledge voters
driven by the spell of an idea (Mehta 2022).’’
Identity politics, as we knew it- narrow electoral calculus and representation of the upwardly mobile
class within the downtrodden has been challenged by a mix of policy change and strategic social
consolidation.
Post-Mandal, the BJP’s attempt to build electoral alliances constituting Upper Castes and non-
dominant OBCs is a strategy it used across North India to prevent the formation of a large coalition
of “backwards” (Verniers 2019). Mid 1990s onwards, BJP distributed more tickets to non-Yadav
OBCs in Bihar to counter the Janata Dal and the RJD. In UP, it prompted Kalyan Singh (as an OBC

figure) to expand BJP’s vote base among non-Yadav OBCs while also co-opting leaders of non-
dominant Dalit Jatis, including Valmikis (Extremely Backward Classes) who resented the way
Jatavs had cornered reservation and the Jatav Party that the BSP had become. In MP too, it
promoted Lodhs (eg-Uma Bharti) and Kirars (eg- Shivraj Singh Chauhan)

In 2014, the BJP won more than half the seats in Parliament with less than 1/3rd of the votes cast.
This electoral success and expanded dominance hinged on its ability to win voters from disparate
caste groups, demographic groups, geographic areas and ideological adherents that were not
previously its solid votaries. According to India’s latest census (2011), SCs form 16.6% of the
population, STs-8.6%, Muslims –14% with other religious minorities accounting for the rest.No
official figures exist for the OBCs and the Upper Castes but these are generally understood to
comprise between 40-50% and around 10% of the population respectively.In 2014, the BJP got its
highest ever vote share among Dalits, the first time in a national election that more Dalits voted BJP
than the Congress. The other major shift was the OBC support that it methodically built up; they
voted in record numbers for the BJP. It understood the subtleties of caste heterogeneity and
basically succeeded in creating a wedge between dominant sub-castes under the SC and OBC
umbrellas to appeal to sub-castes who perceived they had fallen behind. In some states, in fact,
studies have found greater difference between Jati categories than broader caste categories (Joshi
2018). While local constituency-level factors played a role in bringing some of these groups into the
party’s fold, an overarching theme was the consolidation of Hindu castes under a muscular
majoritarian appeal and Pan-Hindu overtures rooted in a grand politico-cultural project of Hindutva
alongside targeted and sustained outreach to the most marginalized.

Rahul Verma and Pradeep Chhibber argued that the immediate context of 2019 elections (expansive
welfare policies, heightened nationalistic sentiments, a form of ‘ethno-populist’ majoritarianism,
PM’s popularity) plus a profound ideological shift in Indian politics lay at the heart of BJP’s
comprehensive success. It’s also suggested that the BJP can no longer be called a ‘Brahmin-Bania’
outfit with more OBCs than ever before in its organizational structures, cadre base and
governments.

 FIG. 6 FIG. 7

Fig. 6 indicates that BJP increased its vote share most among the poorest in 2019, a jump of 12
percentage points (36% in 2019 from 24% in 2014). It enjoyed considerable support among
economically weaker sections ,although among the middle class and richer voters, support for the
BJP (44%) is still much higher.
As depicted in Fig 7, the BJP in 2019 made the biggest gains among rural voters, a 7.3% jump from
2014.

FIG. 8

Fig. 8 indicates that the party registered a 10% increase in Dalit vote from 2014 with 1/3rd Dalits
voting it and a 6% increase in tribal vote. Also, the difference in support for BJP among the upper



 and lower OBCs came down by 7 percentage
points in 2019 from 2014. Muslim vote for the
party remained almost the same.
11% Sikhs voted BJP in 2019 against 16% in 2014
and Christian vote for the party increased
marginally by 1% (15 to 16% in 2019) (Lokniti-
CSDS 2019).
Two recent studies have shown that riots are
associated with a higher BJP vote share in the
subsequent election, basically suggesting that post-
riot, ethno-religious polarization implies a consolidation of Hindu votes in favor of BJP, including
groups who may not have all traditionally voted for the BJP (Gareth Nellis 2016) .Rohit Ticku, for
instance, found that the BJP tended to expand its vote share (by nearly 3-4.5 percent) following riots
that took place within half a year of an election (Ticku 2017). If this is the case, it could partly
explain BJP’s new social coalitions.
How long and effectively could the BJP sustain these incrementally adding social coalitions and
geographical frontiers is contingent on many factors but the question we attempt to address is
whether this diversification of the party’s social/electoral base and aggressive outreach to varied
communities can be understood to mean a diversification of interests within our democracy.

Is the BJP as socially representative as is claimed, is it plebianising politics?

Four charts depict key aspects of Lok Sabhas’ landscape in this newly entrenched, one party-
dominant system-

FIG. 9
FIG. 10

 FIG.11 FIG. 12

Fig. 9 indicates that 28.5% of all Lok Sabha MPs in both 2014, 2019 are Upper Castes. OBC
representation remained almost the same at around 22% in both Lok Sabhas, highly
disproportionate to their actual population and to their vote percentage for the BJP. SCs formed 16%
of all MPs and STs- 9% in both Lok Sabhas.
BJP’s appeal to non-dominant OBCs runs parallel to a resurgence of Upper Castes in the Hindi Belt.
The 1990s saw the percentage of OBC MPs doubling – from 11% to 22% – at the expense of upper
castes, largely because of the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party, but also because of the
nomination of lower caste candidates by Congress and the BJP. As shown in Fig. 10, 2004 saw the
gap between the no. of UC and OBC candidates lower the most, ever (at 14% points) with Upper
Castes constituting 32% of all MPs from the Hindi Belt. However, the last decade saw a return of
the savarna and the erosion of OBC representation – alongside a rise of the BJP. This trend started
2009 in the Hindi Belt in Lok Sabha and remains more or less intact. In 2019, 39% of all MPs from
the Hindi Belt were from the upper castes against the 42% in 2014 and 2009 - a marginal decrease,
but is still more than the pre-Mandal scenario, when in 1989, for instance, 38% of all the Hindi Belt
Lok Sabha MPs were upper caste. So, it is not the case that BJP is exclusively contributing to some
sort of upper-caste dominance nor has there been a marked shift in representation dynamics in Lok
Sabha towards any plebianisation, so to say.

 Figures 11 and 12 pertaining to religious composition point to a massive 93% and 91% of all MPs
being Hindu in 2014 and 2019 respectively, religious minorities constituting 7 % and 9%. 99% of
all BJP MPs were Hindu against Congress’ 71 and 67% in 2014 and 2019 respectively. Other
religious minorities (Buddhists, Jains, Christians, Sikhs) constituted 1% of all BJP MPs as against
20-25% of Congress MPs.

Power-sharing dynamics at the Centre

FIG. 13
Note : ICs here include middle castes like Patels, Jats, Reddys etc.
Fig 13. depicts – 62% of the entire Council of Ministers is now constituted by non-upper castes or
33% of the Council is upper caste as against 52% in 2014. That’s a considerable decline. In the
Cabinet though, the most powerful portfolios remain with the UC names who form 45% of the
current cabinet, less than their share in the 2014 cabinet. SC and ST representation is the highest
ever, in % terms in the 2019 Council of Ministers. In 2014, SC representation in the Council had
been the highest, only behind 1999 while ST representation had been the highest till then. The
Cabinet reshuffle in July 2021 included the induction of 24 ministers from the backward classes,
drawn from a wide spectrum of sub-castes like the Yadavs, Kurmis, Kolis, Vokkaligas and 12 Dalits
from sub-groups like Pasis, Koris, Mahars, Meghwals, Valmiki and Matuas.While a majority of
them did not get ‘plum portfolios’, it is indeed an impressive line-up.
But if the BJP includes non-dominant sub-castes, it excludes Muslims, which are now entirely
absent from among its MPs, and other religious minorities – nearly absent.

 Case Study: Uttar Pradesh – Exclusionary Inclusion

FIG.14 FIG. 15

BJP MLAs in UP are the most diversified compared to other parties and its own previous record
minus Muslims. 43% of them are from the UCs, 30% OBCs and 27% - SCs/STs. (Kumar 2022)
Although, this came at the cost of Jatav and Yadav representation, BJP MLAs and ministers come
from all kinds of jatis including Pasis, Lodhis, Shakyas,Sainis,
Koris,Nishads,Sohars,Rajbhars,Dhobis,Kushwas etc. These jatis rallied round the BJP not only to
counter the Yadav-oriented SP,Jatav-oriented BSP but also because they appreciated Hindutva and
the Sanskritization ethos (Jaffrelot 2022) besides, of course, the effective welfare delivery and the
‘law and order’ condition. OBCs are now 38% of all MLAs as against 33% UCs (still
disproportionate to their actual population in UP, i.e. 50% but a significant increase.)
The ruling party has not nominated even one Muslim candidate, once again,in 2022. UP’s largest
minority, 1/5th of its population is invisible both among BJP MLAs and in the Yogi cabinet.
Interestingly, this massive underrepresentation is not seen as very problematic as if it is taken for
granted.
Prannav Dhawan and Christophe Jaffrelot show that while the new Council of Ministers has a
substantial no. of OBC Ministers, more than half of them are Ministers of State whereas Upper
Castes occupy most powerful cabinet berths while also dominating the Council of Ministers.

 Keshav Maurya’s(Dy. CM) powerful PWD portfolio is now held by Jitin Prasada .CM Adityanath
holds 34 portfolios including Home. Finance, Health, Urban Development, Higher education,
Agriculture remain upper castes’ bastions while the OBCs hold Labour, Animal Husbandry, Jal
Shakti, Women and Child Welfare, MSMEs etc. Danish Azad Ansari (sole Muslim independent) is
Minister of State, as is the only Sikh MLA Baldev Singh Aulakh.

How do political narratives and discourses affect Muslim marginality? (Khushi)

The notion of representation

Vandita Mishra of the Indian Express, told NDTV Mar 10 2022 ,‘’So at certain points, when I was
travelling and writing about elections, I wondered whether exclamations about improved law and
order, specifically in context of some Muslim mafiosi being put down are a political code for
something that is said very explicitly,actually.. Musalmaan ko dikha diya..It’s a bit of that
surely...This is the most nakedly Hindu election that I've ever seen. I’ve been in 2017, 2019..the kind
of vicious rhetoric I’ve seen and I don’t go to rallies, I am talking of local BJP men.. I’ll give you
just one example, again and again what I heard was- Muslims get the same things- the rashan, the
pension, Ujjawala so where is the bhedbhaav? The corollary to that was, you get all this; do not ask
for rights, for an MLA/MP of your own.. This is a message that has, over 5 years been spread deep
and deeper: they are beneficiary of schemes and that should be enough.’’

A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those who are subject to a policy should
have a voice in its making. In general, Muslims are underrepresented in public institutions and
representative bodies. The ruling party did not nominate any Muslim member to the Rajya Sabha to
make for their absence in the party in Lok Sabha, the BJP also does not have any Muslim MLA in
the states ; this is unprecedented. What is at stake is not the question of Muslim representation alone
but questions about notions of the bases of representation and pluralism in our democracy. Under
circumstances of brazen majoritarian politics, parties that depend on the support of minorities try
also to make them somewhat invisible, electorally inconsequential and irrelevant, to fit into the
dominant scheme of party competition and politics. Most parties then disregard their claims to
tickets fearing their rivals would accuse them of sacrificing majority interests and worse. Hence,
they are reducing the tickets given to Muslims.To be sure, their representation has been miniscule
since independence and ‘secular parties’ don’t voice their national exclusion prominently, but a

rather explicit ethnicization of politics and privileging of communities also sees accommodation as
concessions at their expense. In her book, Politics of Inclusion: Castes, Minorities and Affirmative
Action, Zoya Hasan argues that AA minus reservations in employment, education may address the
deprivation and disadvantage in these communities but laments that even this faces opposition on
grounds that it violates secularism. India has not been alive to discrimination against minorities but
keeps lamenting their backwardness. (Hasan 2009)

A gaushala in every panchayat, a cow sanctuary in the state, commercial production of gau mutra,
building Narmada Parikrama and Ram Van Gaman Path: the items in the Congress’ 2018 manifesto
for MP were seen as its surrender to “politics of Hindutva’’.The chairman of Congress’ manifesto
committee was disarmingly candid in admitting that the party was keen to shed the ‘Muslim party’
tag (Ghatwai 2018) Five years ago, the party devoted a whole section to the “minority community,”
(a reference mainly to Muslims),in which it promised to furnish special economic assistance
for madrasas, a new law to curb communal violence, and the implementation of the Sachar
Committee recommendations.
In terms of ticket distribution, it seems to be fielding few Muslim candidates in elections. In the
2014 general election, it nominated only twenty-seven Muslim candidates for the Lok Sabha
elections, a paltry 5.6 percent of its total candidates. In fact, in UP, together the SP, BSP and INC
nominated 41 Muslim candidates in 2014 which came down to 18 candidates in 2019. Tokenism is
significant in so far it means some acknowledgement of the principle that every community
deserves representation. But when that is all that parties have to offer, it does not bode well for a
pluralist, representative democracy.

Hate speech laws have long stopped protecting Muslims in India. There is a case to be made here.
No other community is consistently subjected to vilification on television every single day.
Spreading prejudice against Muslims unfortunately, seems a reliable tool of political mobilization.
UP CM, for instance, framed the recent UP election ‘80-20’ (the 20 representing supporters of
Muslim Mafias and criminals: a dog-whistle). Prominent campaigners making veiled and unveiled
references to Muslims, invoking mythology and Hindu pride to evoke a sense of victimhood, spates
of untenable executive orders pertaining to their socio-cultural practices et al have become the order
of the day and the role of narratives and discourses in adding to the already dire socio-economic

state of the community across states (Sachar Committee 2006) cannot be overemphasized in also
that the BJP narrative managed to wedge people along religious lines. The concerting vilification of
Tablighi Jamat and outpouring of hateful rhetoric thereafter, translated into an increase in anti-
Muslim discrimination and sporadic violence in some parts of the country during the pandemic is a
case in point. Normalizing hate speech is also linked directly to a rising graph of targeted
communal violence as is amply evidenced.
Substantive representation is linked to descriptive representation with access to institutions being
important to gain the state’s attention and to better represent group interests but the problems of
representation are aggravated by a coarsened discourse.

CONCLUSION
The hypothesis is disapproved basis the main findings of our research. We saw the representation
and diversification under both the Congress and BJP dominant systems. The Congress was
projected as an inclusionary and accommodative party. But, there was miniscule representation of
marginalized communities at the political level. The party’s leadership both at the centre and states
was dominated by upper caste Hindu elites, while the voices of a huge mass of the Indian
population, including the Muslims and the backward castes remained marginal. It can be said that it
did not lead to the diversification of interests in the Indian political scenario.
The BJP’s diversified socio-electoral base and dexterous social engineering have not translated into
substantive representative shifts in our polity. Neither is the party exclusively contributing to some
kind of upper caste resurgence/consolidation nor has it significantly upped the representation of
deprived sections or promoted plebianisation. If anything, the abysmal socio-political status of the
largest religious minority renders claims of substantive inclusion untenable. Considerable
accommodation of varied, small, deprived and hitherto neglected sub-castes warrants attention but
stops short of meaningful articulation and furtherance of their interests.
The relatively more inclusionary and dynamically negotiating character of the hegemonic Congress
was in marked contrast with today’s hyper-polarization. But major parties appear to fail at
adequately accommodating the aspirations of various castes and communities and increasingly,
seem prone to contingent optics and tentative accommodations, driven in large measure by electoral
considerations.
Hence, we negate the hypothesis after careful analysis of both the party systems.

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