Critical Raw Materials For Strategic Technologies and Sectors in The EU

Critical Raw Materials for
Strategic Technologies and Sectors

in the EU
A Foresight Study
Renewables
e-mobility
Defence &
Space
RAW MATERIALS
Main authors (European Commission, Joint Research Centre) by alphabetical order:
Bobba, S., Carrara, S., Huisman, J. (co-lead), Mathieux, F., Pavel, C. (co-lead).
Acknowledgements
Authors of the report would like to thank colleagues from GROW, especially
Constanze Veeh, Milan Grohol, George Mörsdorf and Tatu Liimatainen, for their trust
and guidance during the preparation of this report.
The inputs of the following JRC colleagues is also acknowledged: Fulvio Ardente,
Darina Blagoeva, Gian Andrea Blengini, Konstantinos Georgitzikis, Thibaut Maury,
Beatrice Plazzotta and Sara Andre.
Comments, questions and input can be sent by email to GROW-C2@ec.europa.eu
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of the
following information.
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020
© European Union, 2020
Reuse is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Citation as "European Commission, Critical materials for strategic technologies and sectors in the EU - a foresight study, 2020"
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print: ISBN 978-92-76-15337-5 doi: 10.2873/865242 ET-04-20-034-EN-C

pdf: ISBN 978-92-76-15336-8 doi: 10.2873/58081 ET-04-20-034-EN-N
Critical Raw Materials for
Strategic Technologies and Sectors
in the EU
A Foresight Study
Contents
Executive Summary 7
1 Introduction 14
2 Critical raw materials in strategic technologies 18

2.1 Advanced (Li-ion) battery technology 19
2.2 Fuel cells 24
2.3 Wind turbine generators 29
2.4 Traction motors (permanent magnets) 34
2.5 Photovoltaics 38
2.6 Robotics 43
2.7 Drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or UAV) 47
2.8 3D printing (Additive manufacturing) 51
2.9 Digital technologies 55
3 Critical raw materials for strategic sectors 59

3.1 Renewable energy 60
3.2 E-mobility 65
3.3 Defence and aerospace 69
3.4 Sectorial competition and securing future raw materials supply 76
4 Conclusions and Recommendations 78
Bibliography 83
Glossary 85
Annexes 86
Annex 1 – Methodological notes 87
Annex 2 – Data tables 92
5
Executive Summary
Executive summary
This study looks at the supply chains of the nine technologies
below used in the three strategic sectors renewable energy, knowledge and models, to where future challenges lie and
e-mobility, defence and aerospace. how competition for resources may evolve.
Li-ion battery technology is rapid- Fuel cells (FCs) are an important en- Wind energy is already one of the
ly being deployed for both e-mobility ergy conversion technology, which to-
and energy storage for intermittent technologies for climate-change miti-
electricity generation. The technology a high potential for decarbonisation of gation and will remain a growing sector
is increasingly relevant for defence ap- the energy system and e-mobility in in the EU industrial base;
plications; the future, although large-scale de-
ployment has not yet taken place;
Electric traction motors are central Photovoltaic (PV) technology to- Robotics is an emerging technol-
components in e-vehicles. Permanent gether with wind energy will lead in the ogy with an increasing role in fu-
magnet motors containing rare earth el- transformation of the global electricity ture manufacturing, including de-
- sector; PV panels are also relevant for fence and aerospace, as well as
tractive for current and future e-mobility space applications; energy technologies and automotive
applications. applications;
Drones (Unmanned aerial vehicles 3D Printing (3DP, Additive manufac- Digital technologies sustain the enor-
or UAV) are increasingly deployed for turing or AM) will rapidly reshape tra- mous digital sector enabling all tech-
both civil and various defence applica- ditional supply chains and replace con- nologies evaluated in this study.
tions; ventional manufacturing, in particular
in defence and aerospace. It will lead
types of raw materials and processed

materials consumed;
8
Foresight
Using the mid-century models and scenarios of the EU’s The realisation of a climate-neutral, digital economy, and ‘a
-
to a climate-neutral economy through the deployment of re- sponsibly sourced raw materials.
newable energy generation and e-mobility solutions into raw
high growth rate, as seen in Figure 1 does not directly convert
ambition from high to low deployment of these technologies to a future raw materials supply bottleneck. This depends on
the overall supply–demand balance. High demand may raise
be seen rather as a range than actual values. -
The analysis in this study predates the Covid-19 crisis. Its im- ects as well as substitution and recycling commercially more
pact on supply and demand, as well as on deployment of
climate-neutral solutions are likely long-term. The current some materials may make investment in future capacity less
models do not take this development into account, but future attractive, considering that those investments require a high
capital investment over a long period. The technical possibil-
The current Commission places emphasis on foresight as a
dimension of evidence-based policy-making and will continue a role, as does the legal framework for mining activities. All
this work.
Figure 1.
Additional material consumption batteries, fuel cells, wind turbines and photovoltaics in
renewables and e-mobility only
in 2030/2050 compared to current EU consumption* of the material in all applications
Lithium** Graphite*** Cobalt
60 15 15
40 10 10
x times more
x times more
x times more
20 5 5
1x = 1x = 1x =
6 kt 250 kt 30 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Dysprosium Neodymium Nickel

15 10 5
8 4
10
6 3
x times more
x times more
x times more
4 2
5
2 1
1x = 1x = 1x =
0,2 kt 4 kt 500 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Praseodymium
5
* See the methodological notes in Annex 1 and all data in
4 Annex 2
3 High Demand Scenario

x times more
2
+
Medium Demand Scenario
1 selenium, silicon metal, terbium, tellurium, silver, steel and
+
1x =
Low Demand Scenario
1 kt
2030 2050
9
Batteries not only power electric vehicles but also store en- structural change in the nickel market faces severe tech-
ergy generated from variable sources such as sun and wind. nological challenges, geological resource availability issues
They use the raw materials cobalt, lithium, graphite and and trade barriers.
nickel. Dysprosium, Neodymium and Praseodymium are rare
For rare earths (REEs), China’s dominance in the market
earth elements (REEs) that are vital in building motors for
renders the value chains extremely vulnerable. For the indi-
electric vehicles and wind generators. (most relevant materi-
vidual rare earths, dysprosium is at a higher supply risk due
als, see Annex 1 – Methodological notes and Annex 2 – Data
to the higher rate of demand growth and lower proportion
tables for more information)
in rare earth ores.
-
tors only, additional demand can be expected from other sec- For lithium, despite the highest growth factor, the short-
tors, including defence and aerospace and digitalisation. For term prospects are less of a concern compared to nickel
example, handheld devices use batteries, sensors and motors; and rare earths. However, in the medium-term, large in-
data is stored on drives containing permanent magnets.
beyond 2025.
concerns for future supply: For cobalt, the concentration of supply in the Democratic
The multiplication factor for nickel in Figure 1 is in com- Republic of the Congo will continuously remain a concern
parison to the total EU consumption of all nickel of any due to the country’s large share in global extraction.
quality. However, in order to meet the rising demand for For natural graphite, China is dominant in spherical graph-
batteries, all of the additional demand and thus the newly ite production. However, when prices become high, syn-
thetic graphite can become a substitute.
Figure 2.
Renewables
e-mobility
Defence &
Space
10
To arrive at any estimation on future demand and competi- Digital technologies and PV are in competition for some ma-
tion, raw materials, technologies and sectors have to be con- terials like germanium, indium, gallium and silicon metal;
sidered together, as several technologies and sectors are in
Multiple sectors are competing for base metals like copper,
competition for the same materials (see Figure 2):
aluminium, magnesium, nickel, iron ore and their alloying
Wind energy and traction motors compete both for various elements like tungsten, vanadium, manganese and chro-
REEs, as well as for borates; robotics and drones also use mium;
motors;
All sectors are increasingly in need of more mature and
Fuel cells and digital technologies require a large amount
of platinum group metals (PGMs); These materials used in e.g. super-alloys include niobium,
The demand for battery raw materials cobalt, lithium, natu- scandium, hafnium and zirconium all with a very limited
ral graphite and nickel originates both from e-mobility and and, or a highly concentrated supply base.
from intermittent power generation from PV and wind gen- Forecasts for the individual technologies and sectors are in
erators and charging stations for electric vehicles; the respective chapters.
Bottleneck Analysis
- technology, except for ICT, which was not analysed in the
quent stages of processed materials, components and as- same level of detail.
semblies. The results are displayed in Figure 3 for each
Bottlenecks for the EU are in the raw materials The EU contribution is marginal in each step of the
stages and the Li-ion cells production: China, to- -
gether with Africa and Latin America, provides nologies beside silicon-based panels results in a
74% of all battery raw materials. By itself China high number of suppliers for raw materials, with
China representing half of the market. China’s role
the EU provides less than 1% of Li-batteries. becomes quasi-monopolistic at the components
stage, resulting in a high supply risk. The EU only
The fuel cell industry relies heavily on plati-
provides 1% of silicon-based PV assemblies
num-based catalysts, with platinum making up
about half of the cost of a fuel cell stack. South 44 raw materials are relevant to robotics, of which
Africa is by far the largest producer of platinum in -
the world, followed by Russia and Zimbabwe. De- plier of raw materials for robotics with 52%, fol-
spite the high supply risk associated with all raw lowed by South Africa (15%) and Russia (9%).
materials in fuel cells, the highest supply vulner- Similar potential bottlenecks could also occur in
ability regards the assembly step, where the USA the supply of robotics components. On the other
plus Canada (48%) and Japan plus South Korea -
(51%) dominate production. Currently, the EU pro- rials and assemblies of robotics with respectively
vides less than 1% of fuel cells. 21% and 41% of global supply.
Within the supply chain for wind generators, the The EU is highly dependent on external suppliers
highest risks exist at the raw materials stage. The for raw materials and components as well as for
EU only provides 1% of the raw materials for wind UAV assemblies. Overall, China delivers more than
one third of the raw materials, followed by South
rare earths for the production of permanent mag- Africa (7 %) and Russia (6 %). More than 50 % of
nets –– key components for the wind turbine gen- the raw materials come from numerous smaller
erator –– for which China plays a quasi-monop- supplier countries, providing good opportunities
assembly stage, where its share is above 50%. drones production, and increasingly the profes-
sional drones sector, while the USA and Israel
Rare earths and borates contained in permanent
dominate military drone production.
magnets are crucial raw materials. The supply
risks related to extraction and processing of rare
earths are the main concern: China increasingly
dominates the supply of these raw materials. Ja-
pan is a key player for the manufacturing of trac-
tion motors (60% of the market). The EU provides
only 8% of traction motors:
11
3D Printing rapidly disrupts traditional supply Almost the entire periodic system of elements can
chains and conventional manufacturing technolo- be found in digital technologies, with a particular
gies. Besides the carrier materials aluminium, mag- high share in consumption of elements like cop-
nesium,nickel titanium, the most relevant critical per, gallium, germanium, gold, indium, PGMs, rare
raw materials for metal-based 3DP are cobalt, haf- earths and tantalum. China (41%) and African
nium, niobium, scandium, silicon metal, tungsten countries (30%) are dominant suppliers. Europe is
and vanadium. The raw materials stage is the main largely dependent on other countries (mainly from
bottleneck: China provides 35% of the raw mate- South-East Asia) for high-tech components and
rials, while the EU only provides 9%. In processed assemblies.
materials however, the EU covers over half of the
supply. For metal-based 3DP systems, the EU pro-
vides 34% of the global supply
Figure 3.
Very low Low Moderate High Very high
Technologies Raw materials Processed Components Assemblies

materials
1% 8% 9% 0%
5% 40% 25% 1%
0% 12% 20% 58%
1% 7% 8%
6% 5% 0% 1%
2% 21% 4% 41%
13% 27% 13% 9%
9% 54% 34%
12
Recommendations
The EU needs to develop manufacturing opportunities to maintain a minimum of
capabilities:
For batteries, increasing EU raw materials production and processing and assem-
bly capacities will require investments to reduce the dependency on the Asian
market;
of the solar PV value chain in the EU. Therefore, domestic manufacturing oppor-
tunities need to be improved;
For UAV, the EU faces a serious risk of missing the opportunity to catch up with
these global leaders on this key technology, which is decisive to integrate compre-
hensive real-time geo-referenced intelligence;
For digital technologies, technological sovereignty requires that the EU secures
access to key raw materials and processed materials and redevelops manufactur-
ing opportunities for key digital components and assemblies to the EU.
Maintaining leadership in value chains where Europe is currently strong, requires
For fuel cells, the main course of action is to improve reliability and reducing the
catalysts;
For wind, a more secure supply of rare earths, possibly via recycling, could also
contribute to preserving EU capability in magnet manufacturing;
For robotics, securing access to raw materials and improving the capacity for com-
ponents as well as providing a skilled work force will allow the EU to maintain a
competitive position on the global market;
key to maintaining EU competitiveness. Therefore, diversifying materials supply
13
1 Introduction
1.1 Context and objectives -
tial supply risk of material resources for a set of nine value
Raw materials are key enablers for all sectors of the EU
chains. It estimates, where data and models are available,
economy. Some of the raw materials, in particular those as-
the future demand for raw materials needed in selected stra-
sessed as critical raw materials (CRMs) (European Commis-
tegic technologies, based on the long-term decarbonisation
sion, 2020), are essential prerequisites for the development
scenarios. The same analysis is carried out for the strategic
of strategic sectors such as renewable energy, electric mobil-
sectors relying on these technologies. A systematic analysis
ity, defence and aerospace, and digital technologies.
of supply chain dependencies was conducted for Li-ion bat-
Currently, EU industry is largely dependent on imports for teries, fuel cells (FC), wind turbines, electric traction motors,
many raw materials and in some cases is highly exposed to photovoltaics (PV), robotics, drones (UAV), 3D Printing (3DP,
vulnerabilities along the supply chain. Following the global additive manufacturing or AM) and digital technologies. An
energy transition, the consumption of metallic raw materials overview of the technologies and sectors addressed in this
necessary for the manufacture of wind turbines, PV panels, study is visualised in Figure 4.
batteries and hydrogen production and storage, and other
Each of these nine technologies are analysed in Chapter 2 in
terms of (i) current supply bottlenecks along the value chain,
require batteries, fuel cells and lightweight traction motors
(ii) future demand perspectives for raw materials and (iii) key
not only for cars but also for e-bikes, scooters and heavy duty
observations and recommendations. Chapter 3 looks at the
transport. Defence and aerospace have always been strate-
interdependency between various technologies and raw ma-
gically important, and remain at the forefront of technologi-
terials in the three sectors of renewable energy, e-mobility,
cal developments; they deploy almost all of the technologies
and defence and aerospace.
analysed in this report.
Figure 4. Strategic technologies and sectors for the EU economy and their interlinkages
Renewables Photovoltaics Wind Generators Robotics
e-mobility Batteries Traction Motors Fuel Cells
Defence &
Space Drones (UAV) 3D Printing ICT
used by sector used by other technology (icon)
15
1 Introduction
1.2 Approach motors and solar (PV). For robotics, drones (unmanned aeri-
al vehicles), 3D printing (additive manufacturing) and digital
This study is conducted in collaboration with DG Internal
technologies, as well as for the defence and aerospace sec-
Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, taking stock of
tor, the quantitative assessment presents partial information
available information from existing studies carried out by JRC
on market uptake, where available.
and other organisations. It integrates new analysis on (criti-
cal) raw materials for strategic technologies and sectors. This The materials demand calculations consider four factors
study follows previous JRC reports including: assessment of including installed capacity, plant lifetime, sub-technology
potential bottlenecks along the materials supply chain for market share and materials intensity. Combinations of high
both low-carbon energy, transport technologies (JRC, 2016a) and low contributions of these four factors allow the devel-
and defence sector (JRC, 2016b; JRC, 2019a) and CRMs and opment of a quantitative assessment. This is based on three
Circular Economy (JRC, 2017a) and the future materials de-
mand for wind and solar PV technologies (JRC, 2020a). medium-demand scenario (MDS) and high-demand scenar-
io (HDS). MDS is characterised by average assumptions on
For each technology, the current supply bottlenecks are
the sensitivity factors and depicts the most likely scenario in
assessed according to the approach used by the JRC in its
the light of current technology and market trends. LDS and
recent study ‘Materials dependencies for dual-use technolo-
HDS are developed through the combination of the lowest
gies relevant to Europe’s defence sector’ (JRC, 2019a). More
and highest values of the sensitivity factors, respectively.
materials, processed materials, components and assemblies.

ambition of GHG reduction, resulting in low deployment of
A set of parameters as described in Annex 1 are used to qual- technologies and consequently low demand for raw materi-
ify the potential bottlenecks in the supply chains of the tech-
nologies, which can result in a very low supply risk and very GHG reduction resulting in high deployment of technologies
high supply risk (Figure 5). and consequently high demand for raw materials.
Based on various long-term decarbonisation scenarios by More information about the calculation of supply bottle-
2050, material demand trends can be quantitatively as- necks and demand scenarios is presented in Annex 1 –
sessed for Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, wind turbines, traction Methodological notes.
Supply
Figure Risk risk indication
5. Supply
very low low moderate high very high
1.3 Scope and limitations Although the work includes a considerable number of tech-
nologies (9) and sectors (3) , many relevant others (e.g. la-
This foresight study is based on available data for the select-
sers, semi-conductors, satellites) have not been taken into
ed nine strategic technologies and three sectors. It highlights
account due to limited information available on the types
knowledge gaps and provides recommendations on how to
of materials and their use especially in the space applica-
develop more in-depth and quantitative information for the
tions.
future. The selection of technologies is non-exhaustive and
takes into account anticipated growth rates leading to a no- Although the demand scenarios used for the material
table increase in consumption of raw materials (e.g. wind and amount calculations cover a wide range of policy-relevant
solar PV technologies), their relevance for strategic sectors carbon mitigation futures, they inevitably show some mis-
such as defence or aerospace (e.g. 3D printing and drones) alignments in the modelling assumptions. Recent COVID-19
or importance across new emerging sectors (e.g. FC, robotics,
digital technologies). The geographical and temporal scope of
There are several options for the baseline for comparison
the study is on current and 2030 versus 2050 EU consump-
with current demand for raw materials. In this report we
tion. This study faces some general limitations:
chose to use 22% of global demand for each material, re-
The analysis of bottlenecks for each technology and de-
termining of shares from countries is based on key market approach for all materials.
research reports and publicly available information. As far
as possible, company headquarters are used instead of See Annex 1 – Methodological notes, for more elaborate lim-
production locations. However, this distinction is not always itations and assumptions.
this. Some technologies like 3DP are undergoing substan-

tial change in a short period, which may outdate the infor-
mation relatively quickly.
16
Figure 6.
Supply Risk Material
LREEs
HREEs
Magnesium
Niobium
Germanium
Borates
Scandium
Strontium
Cobalt
PGMs
Natural graphite
Indium
Vanadium
Lithium
Tungsten
Titanium
Gallium
Silicon metal
Hafnium
Manganese
Chromium
Zirconium
Silver
Tellurium
Nickel
Copper
Materials in red are critical raw materials.
17
2 Critical raw materials in strategic technologies
2.1 Advanced (Li-ion) battery technology
Li-ion battery technology is becoming a mature technology anodes (including lithium metal, silicon metal, titanium and
niobium), coating materials (including niobium and titanium),
power and energy performance compared to the currently new cathodes (including niobium (CBMM, 2018)) and clos-
used lead–acid batteries. While Li-ion batteries are crucial for er packing (less electrolyte, thinner separators and thinner
defence applications, their development and future uptake
are primarily driven by the civilian demand for portable elec- energy to lower weight and volume while maintaining pow-
tronic devices, stationary energy storage and electric vehi- er capabilities to reduce charging times, depending on the
applications. For cost-saving reasons, changing the cathode
metals, such as nickel, cobalt, aluminium and manganese. chemistry mix decreases the overall proportion of cobalt in
There are tens of individual materials possibly present in the favour of other materials such as nickel and/or aluminium. As
cell anodes, cathodes, electrolytes and separators. Figure 7 a result, this potentially reduces safety and durability which
lists the most common raw materials used (and forecasted) becomes increasingly important. Hence, research focuses on
in batteries and their functionality.
the use of ceramic separators, ceramic coating of electrodes
of Li-ion batteries. Recent battery research focuses on new and solid-state batteries.
Figure 7. Raw materials used in batteries. See the Glossary for the acronyms used.
Copper: as current collector foil at Co Cobalt: in cathode materials in

Cu LCO, NCA and NMC batteries
anode side, in wires and other
conductive parts
Graphite: natural or synthetic Li Lithium: as lithium-cobalt oxide

C (cathode) and as salt (electrolyte) in
high-grade purity in anode electrode
in all Li-ion battery types Li-ion battery
Mn Manganese: in cathode materials

Silicon: in (future) anodes to Si for NMC and LMO batteries
enhance energy density Al Aluminium: for battery
packaging or as current collector
foil (cathode), in NCA batteries Ni Nickel: as hydroxide or intermetallic
Titanium: in future anode materials Ti compounds in NMC, NCA batteries
and coatings, in LTO, for battery
Nb Niobium: in future anode and
packaging
cathode material (coatings) to
improve stability and energy density Critical Raw Material
2.1.1 Current supply bottlenecks along the value chain
Of all materials currently used in battery manufacturing, co-

balt, natural graphite, and lithium are critical in the 2020 list lithium capacity from brine operations (EC, 2019). Despite the
of CRMs. Research is looking at silicon metal, titanium and recent fears of shortages and price spikes, the supply of lithi-
niobium to improve energy density, durability, and safety in
future Li-ion battery types. Figure 8 shows the key players in chain in the short or medium term. Nevertheless, according to
the Li-ion cell supply chain. (Roskill, 2018) an increase from current low prices is deemed
The EU produces only 1% of all battery raw materials overall. necessary to support the development of new production ca-
Individual materials also warrant a closer look: 54% of global pacity for the long-term.
cobalt mine production originated from the Democratic Re- Not all nickel in the global supply chain is suited for Li-ion
public of the Congo, followed by China (8%), Canada (6%), battery production. High-grade nickel products are depen-
- dent on the production of nickel sulphate, which is a principal
duction comes from China (46%), Finland (13%), Canada and ingredient in NMC (Nickel Manganese Cobalt oxide) and NCA
Belgium (both 6%). (Nickel Cobalt Aluminium oxide) batteries. Due to past price
Around 90% of global lithium mine output is produced in
Chile (40%), Australia (29%) and Argentina (16%), mostly been low, threatening the requested supply of nickel class I
from brine and spodumene sources. China (45%) hosts the (with a purity above 99.8%) in particular (EC, 2019).
19
2 Critical raw materials for strategic technologies
Figure 8. -
Raw materials Processed Components Assemblies

materials
Co, Li, Cathode materials, Cathodes Li-ion cells

C (graphite), Nb, Ni, (NCA, NMC, LCO), Anodes
Mn, Si, Cu, Ti, Iron ore, Anode materials Electrolytes
Al, P, (processed Separators
, Sn
graphite)
Critical Raw Material
EU27 1% 8% 9%
Rest of Europe 3%
China 32% 52% 52% 66%
Japan 1% 31% 31%
Russia 3%
USA 1% 13%
Africa 21%
Rest of Asia 11% 1% 1% 13%
Latin America 21%
Others 1% 8% 7% 8%
For natural graphite there are existing requirements related The EU is fully dependent on imports of battery cells, expos-
- ing the industry to supply uncertainties and potential high
66% of global cell production. The EU has very marginal pro-

of spherical graphite. How much of global supply is suitable duction (0.2% of Li-ion cells). Other suppliers provide around
for the production of spherical graphite requires further anal- 8% of the global supply, hence the current margin for supply
ysis. -
vesting in the battery value chain. The EU capacity expected
NMC (Nickel Manganese Cobalt oxide) and LCO (Lithium Co- to be available in 2021-2023 will increase to 40 GWh, from
baltoxide) processed materials, while Japan is the key sup- 3 GWh currently in place. Several of these production facili-
plier of NCA cathode material. The EU is fully dependent on ties are Asian investments. These European capacities com-
anode materials and NCA cathode material supply, and deliv-
ers around 18% of NMC materials and 15% of LCO materials. (JRC, 2018a). Simultaneously, a large step-up in production
capacity of Li-ion cells will be realised by Chinese companies,
A critical aspect for the EU is that these volumes are not
which will guarantee the dominance of China in the battery
enough to satisfy the European demand for Li-ion batteries.
market. Original equipment manufacturers, cell manufactur-
Asia, represented by China, Japan and South Korea, delivers
ers and suppliers will likely compete globally with each other
86% of the processed materials and components for Li-ion
to secure their battery supply chains and to secure access
batteries globally. The EU27, with 8%, has a relatively small
share of the supply. Other countries deliver only 8%, which
nickel, graphite and manganese.
2.1.2 2030/2050 perspectives of raw materials demand
Batteries for e-mobility
of full EVs and PHEV are considered as transition technol-
Section 1.2 (see the Glossary for all abbreviations). The LDS
scenario considers a reasonably quick uptake of EVs in gen- by an extremely quick uptake of full EVs, with PHEV uptake
starting its decline already from 2024.
20
nual consumption of materials in batteries of EVs in 2030
EU market is derived and the subsequent EU annual demand and 2050, along with the current demand, is presented in
of various raw materials is assessed. See Annex 1 of the Figure 10.
methodological notes and assumptions. Forecasted EU an-
Figure 9.
EU – Electric Vehicle/Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Fleet

HDS
200
MDS
Fleet [million vehicles]
LDS
100
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Figure 10.
Additional material consumption for batteries in e-mobility only in 2030/2050

compared to current EU consumption* of the material in all applications

50 10 10
40 8 8
x times more
x times more
x times more
30 6 6
20 4 4
10 2 2
1x = 1x = 1x =
6 kt 250 kt 30 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Nickel Manganese
* See the methodological notes in Annex 1 and all
5 0,10 data in Annex 2
4 0,08 *** increase in demand of all

natural
x times more
x times more
3 0,06
High Demand Scenario
2 0,04 +
1 0,02 +
Low Demand Scenario
1x = 1x =
500 kt 4000 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050
21
Batteries for energy storage systems (ESS)

Li-ion batteries are already widely deployed technologies for Annex 1. In Figure 11 for the HDS and in the MDS scenarios
Energy Storage System (ESS) and they will continue to de- important capacities of hydrogen storage will be deployed,
velop. The storage capacity is derived for the LDS, MDS and
the Li-ion battery storage capacity in the MDS is assumed
all abbreviations). More methodological notes are available in lower than the capacity in the LDS.
Figure 11. EU battery storage capacity according to the three explored scenarios
EU – Capacity of energy storage systems (ESS) HDS

800
Battery storage capacity [GWh]
LDS
400
MDS
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Figure 12.
Additional material consumption for batteries in renewables only in 2030/2050


20 10 5
8 4
15
x times more
x times more
x times more
6 3
10
LDS LDS
4 LDS 2
5
2 1
1x = 1x = 1x =
6 kt 250 kt 30 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
MDS values are < LDS due more fuel cells and less
Nickel Manganese batteries in this scenario.
1,0 0,05 data in Annex 2
0,8 0,04 *** increase in demand of all

natural
x times more
x times more
0,6 0,03
0,4 0,02 +
LDS LDS
0,2 0,01 +
Low Demand Scenario
1x = 1x =
500 kt 4000 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050
22
Figure 12 presents the forecast of EU annual consumption of Section 3.4 discusses the combined results for raw materi-
materials in ESS batteries in 2030 and 2050. Lower quanti- als for batteries for e-mobility and energy storage together.
ties of battery raw materials are required for the MDS scenar-
io compared to LDS due to the large share of FCs in energy
storage, as described above.
2.1.3 Key observations and recommendations
They are emerging as an important technology across a wide range of civil and defence applications. As a result of
the increasing introduction of EVs (EV), mobile electrical appliances (3C) and stationary decentralised energy storage
systems (ESS), demand for lithium-ion batteries is expected to skyrocket yearly (> 30%) for the next 10 years.
The last step of the supply chain, Li-ion cells production, is carrying a very high supply risk for the EU. A high risk is
components.
Various estimates suggest that the civilian industry in the EU requires up to 30% of battery cells produced worldwide.
This means that cell production capacity needs to be built up in the EU to reduce dependency on the Asian market.
Analysis of the civil market shows that the necessary quantities in the EU cannot be serviced in the coming years even
by combining the capacities of Asian and European cell manufacturers.
The Strategic Action Plan on Batteries lies down a comprehensive strategy to enhance the EU battery value chain stages. Nev-
ertheless, the EU position could be further strengthened by:
Diversifying the materials supply: Secure trade agreements Promoting R & D investments, development skills and
with third countries and employ economic diplomacy for competences: Further analysis is recommended on the
cobalt, lithium, natural graphite and nickel class-I to reduce (economic) mechanisms enabling improved social and en-
supply risks. vironmental standards, without causing competitive dis-
advantage for European companies involved compared to
Improving manufacturing opportunities in the EU: Increase
-
-
als and processed materials. It is important to create an at-
es, geology and metallurgical studies are recommended.
for batteries manufacturing where a range of companies Fostering international collaboration and standardisation
activities: Ecodesign requirements are essential for foster-
Simultaneously, attracting foreign investments of electron- ing higher levels of reuse, remanufacturing and recycling,
ics, automobile and battery manufacturing companies can including the increased use of recycled content in new
directly support higher environmental and social standards products to lower both environmental and raw material
compared to activities elsewhere in the world. footprints
Recycling and reuse, substitution: Boosting recycling activ-
ities in the EU is a no-regret solution that allows key ma-
terials such as cobalt, lithium, manganese and nickel to be
recovered and reused in the production of new batteries.
23
2.2 Fuel cells

In the medium to long-term, fuel cells (FCs) together with hy- Several FC types are today available (Figure 13), capable of
-
fuel, operation temperature and the type of electrolyte such
and secure energy supply systems. The technology connects as:
two basic future energy carriers: electricity and hydrogen. Polymer Electrolyte Membrane FC (PEM FC)
FCs are electrochemical devices that convert fuel such as hy-
Phosphoric Acid F (PA FC)
drogen directly to electricity without combustion. Hydrogen
reacts with oxygen in the FCs to form water and releases Alkaline FC (A FC)
electrons producing an electric current through an external
Molten Carbonate FC (MC FC)
circuit. Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell (PEM FC)
technology is the most popular type of FC. FCs are highly Solid Oxide FC (SO FC)
Direct-Methanol FC (DM FC)
and are capable of running on fuels produced from renewable
resources.
Figure 13. Overview of various fuel cell types and operation conditions.
Unconverted combustion Load

and reaction gases
CO2
H2O SOFC Nitrogen,
900-1000°C CO O2 unconverted
O2-
CO2 H2
oxygen
H2O MCFC
600-650°C CO2
CO CO2- O2
H2 3
H2O
AFC
60-120°C H2 O2
OH-
H2O
160-220°C PAFC
20-120°C H2 O2
H+
H2O
160-220°C PEMFC
20-120°C H2 O2
H+
Fuel Electrolyte Nitrogen,
unconverted
Anode Cathode oxygen
Source: adapted from Ginley & Cahen, 2012
Figure: Overview of various FC types and operation conditions
Source: Ginley & Cahen, 2012
PEM FC has a high power density and operates at relative- generation (<1%). The FCs market for the automotive industry
ly low temperatures compared to other FC types, making it
demand for FCs is also expected in material-handling vehi-
primary systems, data centres and backup power systems. cles, light-duty vehicles, buses, and the aerospace sector.
Although FC technology has come a long way in technology FCs use catalysts, commonly made from platinum or plati-
maturity, large-scale deployment in domestic and industrial num-group metals (PGMs), for the fuel to power conversion.
segments has not yet taken place. Today, the FCs are used Current research focuses on reducing or eliminating these
in three main areas: stationary power generation (ca. 67% expensive metals from catalysts, and on increased activity
market share), transportation (ca. 32%), and portable power
24
separated by an ion-conducting electrolyte. The heart of a
PGM intensities in PEM FCs fell by 80% since 2005 (Lead- PEM FC is the membrane electrode assembly (MEA), which
er, Gaustad, and Babbitt, 2019). According to the European
the amount of platinum in the next generation of FC vehicles (GDLs) one for each electrode.
will reach similar levels to that used in the catalytic convert- On overview of the raw materials adopted in FCs is shown
ers of diesel vehicles, which corresponds to 3-7 grams (Re- in Figure 14. The materials and components related to the
hydrogen production and storage were also considered in this
large-scale commercialisation of FC-powered vehicles. analysis.
Most FCs have a standard design in which two electrodes are
Figure 14.
Cobalt: as catalyst replacing the Co Cu Copper: in alloys with Ni for anode

more expensive platinum in PEM catalyst (SOFC), in wires and
fuel cell conductive parts
Palladium: as catalyst replacing Ni Nickel: for coating the bipolar

Pd plates, in the composition of
part of Pt (e.g. as Pt-Pd alloy)
stainless steel or as anode
Platinum Pt Al Aluminium: for thermal Strontium: in the composition of
electrocatalyst for both the cathode
management of the stack and as Sr
and anode anode (together with Ti) in SOFC
base plate material
Graphite: leading material for Titanium: for metallic bipolar plate
C Ti
construction of bipolar plates and as anode composition of SOFC
Around 30 raw materials are needed for producing FCs and tion), followed by Russia (16%) and Zimbabwe (6%). The oth-
hydrogen storage technologies. Of these materials, 13 mate- er PGMs, namely palladium, rhodium and ruthenium are also
rials namely cobalt, magnesium, REEs, platinum, palladium, supplied predominantly by three key suppliers: Russia, South
borates, silicon metal, rhodium, ruthenium, graphite, lithium, Africa and Zimbabwe.
titanium and vanadium are deemed critical for the EU econ- With regard to the next step in the supply chain, 12 processed
omy according to the 2020 CRM list. Materials and compo- -
nents along the supply chain are presented in Figure 15. terials for FC and hydrogen storage/production technologies,
The unique chemical and physical properties make PGMs ex- namely porous carbon, yttria stabilised zirconia, polymers
cellent catalysts for the automotive industry. Today, platinum
other end-use applications. However, a FC vehicle needs 10

times more than the PGM loading of an average gasoline or cloth/paper, polyamide ultramid and metal hydrides. For the
diesel vehicle (Hao et al., 2019). electrodes, several types of carbon or carbon-based materi-
als have been developed, including mesoporous carbon and
faced by the FC producers; platinum represents about 50% carbon nanomaterials. Around 40% of processed materials
of the cost of a FC stack. Hence, researchers are continuous- and 25% of FC components are supplied by European com-
ly trying to reduce the need for platinum in FCs. The sup- panies.
with more than half of the materials coming from a variety

of suppliers, each with a small supply share of less than 7%. in various types of FC, including PEM, DM FC and PA FC stacks.
Bipolar plates are multi-functional components within the
raw materials, followed by South Africa and Russia. Platinum PEM FC stack. The materials used for bi-polar plates include
is produced mainly in South Africa (71% of global produc- graphite and stainless steel. However, stainless steel for bi-
25
polar plates has to be coated to increase functionality and brane electrode assembly (MEA). Manufacturers must align
increase lifetime. Typical examples of coating materials with precisely the repeating components (e.g. MEAs, bipolar plates
excellent properties are gold and other noble metals. Due to and seals) and non-repeating components (e.g. end plates,
tie rods, compression load system, and external manifolds) to
coating materials. maintain stack durability and performance.
The key players involved in the FC supply chain are displayed
Korea) and North America (Canada and USA). The last step in Figure 15. The country shares take into account also the
of the FC supply chain is the assembly of cell components materials used in hydrogen production (Step 1) and hydrogen
storage (Steps 1, 2 and 3). The bottleneck assessment shows
design and cell assembly are very important parameters that a potential very high supply risk for the assembled FCs. High
- -
ply chain - raw materials. No supply issues are expected for
the contact behaviour of the bipolar plates with the mem- the other two supply chain steps.
Figure 15.
chain.

materials
Ag, Al, Au, B, C (graphite), Porous carbon, polymers Membrane Electrode Fuel cells
Co, Cu, Cr, Fe, Li, Mg, Mn, (PFSA), yttria stabilised Assembly (MEA),
Mo, Ni, Pt, Pd, Ru, Rh, REEs, zirconia, carbon cloth/paper, catalyst, membrane,
Si, Sr, Ti, V, Zr, limestone polyamide ultramid, carbon
(Ca), feldspar, kaolin, soda (GDL), bipolar plates,
ash (Na), potash (K) H2 vessel
mica, stainless steel, boron
nitride powder, metal
hydride, nano materials &
carbon nanotubes
EU27 5% 8% 40% 25% 1%

Rest of Europe 2%
China 17% 10%
Japan 7%
Russia 8%
USA 1% 28% 44% 48%
Africa 48%
Rest of Asia 7% 31% 51%
Latin America 5%
Others 6% 15%
26
FC are used in both the automotive sector and for energy FC can also be deployed for stationary ESS. Figure 17 pres-
storage, therefore the raw materials demand in both tech- ents the 2030 and 2050 EU demand for platinum contained
nologies is estimated. Among the CRMs embedded in FCs, in FCEVs plus FC ESS, expressed in relative terms in respect
the current analysis focuses only on the platinum content, to current EU supply. The estimated demand of platinum for
aligned with the available literature and the above consid- both FCEVs and FCs in ESSs is presented in Figure 17. From
erations, e.g. Månberger and Stenqvist (2018) and Sun et al. the invidual values provided in Annex 2 - Data tables, it is
observed that the amount of platinum for FC ESS is much
scenarios are presented in Figure 16. higher than the demand for FCEV. The data tables in Annex 2
provide the individual amounts in both applications.
-
ical notes for a further explanation.
Figure 16.
EU – Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Fleet

HDS
40
MDS
20
LDS
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Figure 17.
Additional material consumption for fuel cells in e-mobility and renewables

only in 2030/2050
Platinum**
2,0
data in Annex 2
1,5
x times more
1,0 High Demand Scenario
+
0,5
+
Low Demand Scenario
1x =
39t
2030 2050
27
Although FC development and deployment has grown during the last 10 years, it is still uncertain when this will reach
full mass commercialisation. FC manufacturers remain largely dependent on public funding in order to support deploy-
ment activities of large-scale stationary FCs, whether through technology push or market pull measures. The main
barriers at this stage are the reliability (availability and lifetime) and cost of the FCs.
Diversifying the materials supply: As for Li-ion batteries, ongoing, it is expected that the concept of a private-public
more than half of the raw materials for FCs are procured by partnership will remain basically the same. The FCH JU is
numerous smaller supplier countries. also developing training and educational tools to increase
Improve manufacturing opportunities in the EU: Steam re-
develop a skilled European workforce capable of operating
forming of natural gas is the currently preferred option for
FC systems.
hydrogen production and can either take place on a very
large scale at source, or even locally at the point of use by Foster international collaboration and standardisation ac-
small reformers integrated with the FC. tivities: -
ternational approach to the development of the required
Recycling and reuse, substitution: Though recycling of FCs
infrastructure, of a global market for great quantities of
and hydrogen technologies can be regulated by legislation
hydrogen and of global regulations enabling their safe
that addresses aspects such as design, material selection
adoption in all parts of the world. Pre-normative research
and end-of-life, the recycling of FCs is a new business for
results are also shared internationally in the framework
recyclers and a potential topic for research. Finding an al-
-
ternative for platinum will avoid the immediate problem of
istence of performance, safety and permitting standards
and technical regulations is considered one of the enablers
platinum with non-precious metal catalysts there has been
for a successful development and deployment of new
technologies. The development of industrial standards en-
level of activity. An alternative solution is to replace plat-
abling component compatibility and inter-operability can
inum with other precious metals such as palladium or ru-
contribute to reducing costs and increasing the availability
of components.
Promote R&D, develop skills and competences: Promoting
-
tive opportunities for the EU. To this end, the most import-
ant partner would be the FCH JU. Although the design of
the next European research framework programme is still
28
2.3 Wind turbine generators
A key component of a wind turbine is the generator, which
for climate-change mitigation and is a growing sector in the converts the mechanical energy to electrical energy. There
EU industrial base. Further penetration of wind technology in are three main types of wind turbine generators: direct cur-
the EU and global markets is dependent on its techno-eco- rent, alternative current synchronous and asynchronous.
nomic characteristics alongside regulatory frameworks and -
geous to operate the generators at variable speed to reduce
by the stability of material supply and evolution of material the mechanical stress on the turbine blades and drive train.
prices. Permanent magnet (PM) generators have been introduced in
Today, a mix of wind turbine types is used to meet the various the recent decades in wind turbines applications due to their
high power density and low mass. In particular, the Direct
Direct drive EESG (electrically excited synchronous
weight, dimension and maintenance. However, this type of
generator);
turbine is associated with a high demand for REEs.
Direct drive PMSG (permanent magnet synchronous The blade is another key component of a wind turbine. It al-
generator); lows loads to withstand the continuously varying wind speeds.
Gear-box PMSG (permanent magnet synchronous These loading conditions, in combination with the low gravi-
generator); tational forces required, lead to a selection of materials that
-
Gear-box DFIG (double-fed induction generator);
Gear-box SCIG (squirrel cage induction generator). -
sent the next standard in wind turbine reinforcement.
All these technologies are suitable for both onshore and
The REEs, i.e. neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium, are
key ingredients in the most powerful magnet material, namely
neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB). This magnet is used to man-
drive HTS (high-temperature superconductors) is a promising ufacture permanent magnet synchronous generators (PMSG),
technology currently at an early stage of research.
most relevant materials required in wind power generation
-
and the main components of a wind turbine are listed in
formance in terms of energy production, reliability, operation,
Figure 18.
maintenance, capital cost and transportation. Modern wind
turbines integrate a series of highly optimised components
such as generator, drive train, rotor and blade to produce the
lowest possible energy costs.
Figure 18. Raw materials used in wind turbines

Iron: as cast iron or in steel Boron: in composition of
Fe B neodymium–iron–boron (NdFeB)
composition for tower, nacelle,
rotor and foundation; in NdFeB magnets or as lubricant
permanent magnets
Dy Dysprosium: important additive of
Chromium: essential for stainless Cr neodymium–iron– boron (NdFeB)
steel and other alloys in rotor and permanent magnets
blades
Manganese: essential for steel Nd Neodymium: in NdFeB permanent

Mn magnets for electricity generation
production used for many parts of
a turbine
Pr Praseodymium: together with
Al Aluminium: as lightweight neodymium in permanent magnets
Molybdenum: in stainless steel Mo material in nacelle equipment,
composition for many components blades, etc.
of the turbine
Nickel: in alloys and stainless steel Cu Copper: widely used in generator

Ni windings, cables, inverters, control
turbine systems
Niobium: a microalloying element Nb Pb Lead: for soldering or cable

in high strength structural steel for sheathing in electricity transmission
towers of a turbine Critical Raw Material
29
The bottleneck assessment performed for the wind turbines

particular in the case of those turbines using generators con- shows that the risk to the supply of raw materials is the high-
taining REEs. Concerns that the supply of REEs may not be est along the supply chain. This risk diminishes downstream
- through a medium risk for the supply of processed materials
tion to a sustainable energy future have grown considerably and component, until an undetectable risk for assemblies. In-
since the REEs ‘crunch’ in 2011 when near-monopolistic China deed, the European share increases from 1% for the raw ma-
imposed export restrictions. terials, to 12% for processed materials, 18% for components,
until 58% for assemblies (Figure 19).
Figure 19.

materials
Al, B, Cr, Cu, Dy, Iron NdFeB magnets, Nacelles Wind turbines
ore, Pb, Mn, Mo, Nd, copper wire, Blades
Ni, Nb, Pr aluminium, steel,
EU27 12% 20% 58%

Rest of Europe 1%
China 54% 41% 56% 23%
Japan 1% 6%
Russia
USA 3% 9% 11%
Africa 2%
Rest of Asia 6% 2%
Latin America 29%
Others 3% 32% 11% 19%
30
Figure 20.
EU – Onshore Wind Capacity
HDS HDS
1 600
400
MDS
800 MDS
200
LDS
LDS
0 0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Wind Capacity [GW]
Figure 21.
EU – Onshore Wind Annual Installed Capacity
40
100
20
50
0 0
2018 2026 2034 2042 2050 2018 2026 2034 2042 2050
HDS MDS LDS Annual installed capacity [GW]
Figure 20 reports the capacity scenarios for onshore and carbon composites, aluminium, chromium, copper, iron, man-
- ganese, molybdenum, nickel and zinc. A more marked ma-
scribed in Section 1.2. The average lifetime of a wind turbine
is assumed to be 25 years for onshore wind and 30 years for essentially used in permanent magnets: borates, dysprosi-
um, neodymium, praseodymium and terbium. Although with
some exception, these materials are common across the
information see Annex 1 – Methodological notes, and Garrett considered technologies. Further details are available in An-
and Rønde (2017) and JRC (2019). The combination of these nex 1 – Methodological notes.
lifetime values with the capacity scenarios allows calculat- Results are presented aggregately for wind onshore and wind
- -
ure 21), which is the driver of materials demand. mand in 2030 and 2050 for the three scenarios, expressed in
LDS, MDS and HDS Scenarios for the market shares are de- relative terms to the current EU consumption.
-
ators. A moderate material intensity reduction is considered
for the general materials, i.e. concrete, steel, plastic, glass/
31
Figure 22.
Additional material consumption for wind turbine in renewables only in 2030/2050

Dysprosium Neodymium Praseodymium

10 5 5
8 4 4
x times more
x times more
x times more
6 3 3
4 2 2
2 1 1
1x = 1x = 1x =
0,2 kt 4 kt 1 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Zinc Molybdenum Nickel

0,5 0,5 0,20
0,4 0,4
0,15
x times more
x times more
x times more
0,3 0,3
0,10
0,2 0,2
0,05
0,1 0,1
1x = 1x = 1x =
3000 kt 60,5 kt 500 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050

data in Annex 2
+
+
Low Demand Scenario
32
The supply risk of the REEs in permanent magnets (PM) generators for wind turbines is one of the most concerning fea-
ture of wind industry related to raw materials. Despite the price of REEs fell back to almost pre-2011 crisis level, their
the single-market dependency (China has near monopoly on the production of not only REEs but also PMs manufactur-
-
alternatively, the wind systems can employ magnet-free induction machines for power generation.
Opportunities to improve the materials impact on the competitiveness of the EU’s wind power industry (JRC, 2017b):
Diversifying the materials supply: It is essential for the EU recycling will not meet the primary demand in a growing
to diversify the REEs supply via partnerships and partici- -
tent, to secure the magnet-producing industries in EU in the
at a global scale. Several mines and processing facilities short term, whilst in the long-term primary mined sources
could be developed. Finding alternative technologies can
long delays. Good potential for REE mining also exists in drastically change the long-term picture. New advanced
Europe, as for example in Sweden, Finland, Germany, Spain, technologies will come with new material requirements
Norway and Greenland. and new suppliers. For instance, when iron-nitride PM tech-
nology is proved and commercialised in the coming years
Improve manufacturing opportunities in the EU: Besides
secure access to REEs, their processing and PM manufac-
China for wind and EV materials since this new magnet re-
turing facilities are important assets for the EU wind indus-
lies on more abundant and cheaper materials.
try. Besides mining, the processing of REEs is a critical step
due to its high environmental impact. Therefore, securing Promote R&D, develop skills and competences: The devel-
a sustainable supply of primary and secondary raw ma-
terials can also boost companies producing sintered neo- and recycling methods may alleviate the supply risk for
dymium-based magnets, which are now disappearing from some CRMs, especially REEs. Recycling technologies for
the EU. Monitoring innovation and new developments (e.g. REEs are still in the early stages of development and face
iron-nitride PMs) and being able to initiate production or
timely secure contracts with producing countries are other one gram of valuable REEs; the product design is unfriendly
opportunities for improving the sector’s competitiveness in and not suitable for the easy separation of components,
the long-term which makes the recycling process expensive. In addition,
-
Recycling and reuse, substitution: One feasible way to se-
ferent products.
cure future EU access to the REEs needed for wind turbines,
EV motors and other high-tech applications is to ensure a
Adequate collection and recycling capacity should be es-

tablished in the EU as soon as possible to deal with the in-
-
tion and the introduction of a labelling system indicating
the type of PMs will facilitate the recycling process and
33
2.4 Traction motors (permanent magnets)

Figure 23. Raw materials in traction motors
Boron: in composition of B Al Aluminium: in casings and as
neodymium–iron–boron (NdFeB) lightweight material in other
magnets metallic parts
Dysprosium: important additive of Dy Cu Copper: widely used in windings,

neodymium–iron– boron (NdFeB) cables, inverters, control systems
permanent magnets
Iron: as cast iron or in steel Cr Chromium: in the composition of
Fe stainless steel and alloys resistant
Neodymium: in NdFeB permanent Nd composition for casings and in
magnets in the motor’s rotor for NdFeB magnets to corrosion in various motor
components
Si Silicon: Electronics grade silicon in
semiconductors, control electronics; Mo Molybdenum: in the composition of
Praseodymium: together with Pr alloying element in Al-alloys and stainless steel and alloys for electric
neodymium in permanent magnets
silicon steel
There are today about 8 billion electric motors in use in the EU, In the future, NdFeB magnet technology is expected to dom-
consuming nearly 50% of the electricity EU produces. These inate the market: it is expected that by 2025, between 90%
motors are used in a large range of applications from small- and 100% of hybrid and EVs could be based on synchronous
sized electronic products to e-bikes to large motors found in
electric drivetrains in vehicles and heavy transport. The num- component substitution is possible: induction and wound
future, in particular through the broad deployment of trac-

tions motors in EVs. Electrical motors for e-mobility require of raw materials used in traction motors in the future. For
high performances such as high torque densities, lightweight PMs, current research focuses mostly on reducing the REEs’
-
Most hybrid and EVs use synchronous motors with NdFeB duction and by optimising the motor design, enabling high
magnets. NdFeB alloys are the strongest magnets and have technical performance while using less NdFeB magnet. A rise
the largest sales share. The family of NdFeB magnets con-
tains REEs such as neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosi- up to 30% from 2015 to 2030 in a PM of equal magnetic
um. Dysprosium is used as an additive to improve the magnet strength and cost is expected. Similarly, dysprosium content
coercivity at high temperatures. The compact size and high -
performance of permanent magnets (PMs) makes it the fa- -
voured technology for hybrid cars: manufacturers have to searches concern replacement of rare earth magnets by other
cope with space restrictions due to the need to integrate two magnetic materials. For example, “low cost magnets” made
drive trains into the car (the electric engine and the combus- of ferrite (iron oxide combined with the metals strontium, bar-
tion engine) (Pavel et al., (2017), JRC, (2017a)). Most hybrid ium or cobalt) or aluminium nickel cobalt (AlNiCo) could be an
and EVs use synchronous motors with NdFeB magnets. option although their coercivity need to be strongly improved.
Samarium cobalt (SmCo) magnets, developed in the 1970s
Alternatives to PMs synchronous-traction motors exist: for
and frequently used in aerospace applications are attractive
example, induction motors adopted by several EV manufac-
as they can withstand higher temperatures than NdFeB but
turers. These do not contain any permanent magnetic ma-
they are rather expensive for the moment. Moreover, both
terials and instead operate by inducing electrical currents in
conductors in the motor’s rotor. Such motors contain higher
raw materials of electronic motors and their functionality are
quantities of copper. Similarly, other manufacturers have cho-
shown in Figure 23.
sen wound rotor motors that, in place of PMs on the rotor, use
large quantities of copper in windings. Electric motors also
(including a large share of electrical steel that contain up to

6.5% of silicon), copper and aluminium (Hernandez et al., 2017).
34
Around 10 raw materials are relevant for the production of in the EU and the USA. Recently, manufacture of NdFeB mag-
processed materials. Of these, four CRMs are included being nets have been continuing to move to China where access
borates, dysprosium, neodymium and praseodymium. PMs to REEs remains cheapest and more secure. A few European
-
terised by very high supply concentration in China as well as including a few alloys makers and magnets manufacturers in
concerns related to environmental and social performances the EU that operate mainly from imported processed mate-
along the supply chain. The supply risk value for dysprosi- rials. In addition, electrical steel with special magnetic prop-
um, neodymium and praseodymium are the highest of all the erties is the core material for every electrical motor today.
materials evaluated in the 2020 CRM list, with a 100% EU Electrical steel production is rather well distributed globally
import reliance and high concentration of supply. In addition, in particular in Asia, USA and the EU. Production of fully as-
wind energy and other motors compete for these materials. sembled electric motors is dominated by Asian companies, in
Figure 24 displays materials and components for traction particular from Japan.
motors along the supply chain. It shows that today China -
dominates the production of NdFeB magnets by 85–90%, als, while a medium level of risk is estimated for the supply of
the rest being produced in Japan (10%) and in other countries processed materials and components.
Figure 24.

materials
Al, B, Cr, Cu, Dy, Fe, NdFeB alloy, wire, Electric motor not assessed
Mo, Nd, Ni, Pr, Si Al casings, steel casings,
Si-metal
EU27 1% 7% 8%
Rest of Europe 1%
China 65% 55% 15%
Japan 1% 4% 62%
Russia 1% 3%
USA 5% 4% 10%
Africa 4%
Rest of Asia 8%
Latin America 11% 4%
Others 2% 23% 5%

might increase by a factor of 15 and hence reach the cur-
motors (i.e. EVs and FCs, see Figure 25), it is possible to derive rent EU consumptions for all applications. The future needs
the number of electric motors put on the market and hence to for borates will increase similarly although it might be less
derive EU annual demand of various raw materials contained problematic for the technology because the market supply
in traction motors. Data for current composition of electric many other applications and because of their lower supply
motors as well as forecasts for 2030 and 2050 have been concentration.
derived from JRC, (2016a); JRC, (2017a) and Hernandez et al. It should be noted that these trends considers e-mobility only
(2017). For more information see Annex 1 – Methodological through EVs and do not consider e-bikes. E-bikes represent
notes.
Forecasts of raw materials consumption for traction mo-
growth rates for e-bikes are registered in the recent years
in Figure 26. For example, in the worst scenario, neodymi- globally and they are likely to be maintained high in the next
um EU annual consumption for electric motors in 2050 decades.
35
Figure 25. Fleet of vehicles using electric motors according to the three explored scenarios.
EU – Electric Vehicles/Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle/Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Fleet

300
HDS
MDS

200
LDS
100
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Figure 26.
Additional material consumption for traction motors in e-mobility only in 2030/2050

Dysprosium Praseodymium Neodymium

10 2,0 2,0
8
1,5 1,5
x times more
x times more
x times more
6
1,0 1,0
4
0,5 0,5
2
1x = 1x = 1x =
0,2 kt 1 kt 4 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Borates** * See the methodological notes in Annex 1 and all

data in Annex 2
0,020
0,015
x times more

0,010
+
0,005
+
Low Demand Scenario
1x =
36 kt
2030 2050
36
Electric drivetrains for vehicle and heavy transport are now driving the market development of electric motors; the
compact size and high performance of permanent magnets (PMs) makes it the favoured technology for traction motors;
Like for wind industry, the supply risks related to the REEs in PMs are the most concerning for traction motors. This
also concerns the manufacturing of PMs that is increasingly being concentrated in China. This is particularly worrisome
because PM technology is expected to largely dominate the exploding market in the future and is determinant to the
design of motors (and hence of vehicles). The EU still keeps some capacity on other processed materials (e.g. electric
steel) of the value chains.
Diversifying the materials supply: Via partnerships and Promote R&D investments, develop skills and compe-
participation in various ongoing and future exploration tences: -
- cessing, separation and recycling methods for REEs could
cessing facilities for REEs are now slowly ramping up their improve supply security for the EU. Further research into
substitutes and “low cost magnets” is recommended.
also exists in the EU.
Foster international collaboration and standardisation
Improve manufacturing opportunities in the EU: develop- activities: Ecodesign requirements are essential for foster-
ing a capacity on processing of REEs and manufacturing of ing higher levels of reuse, remanufacturing and recycling,
PMs will be important for the EU since these stages might including the increased use of recycled content in new
products to lower environmental and raw material foot-
vehicle design); prints.
Recycling and reuse, substitution: ensuring a sustainable
-
tribute to improve the future EU access to the REEs. The
collection, dismantling and reuse of materials from smaller
electric motors can be enhanced since currently the ma-
lifetime of motors and changing chemistry might be a bar-

rier to an increased recycling input rate. Because of high
reliability, traction motors can be kept longer in use and
37
2.5 Photovoltaics
Photovoltaic (PV) technology is used to convert solar ener- In addition to the commercial technologies, a vast array
gy to electricity and together with wind energy expected to of new PV technologies is currently being developed, e.g.
lead in the transformation of the global electricity sector.
Thanks to technological innovation, economies of scale and or hybrid devices at the nanoscale level. These new concepts
manufacturing experience the cost of PV energy has declined
over the years leading to an enormous deployment increase and/or reductions in cost through improvements in device ar-
around the world. chitecture and material functionality.
Commercial PV technologies include wafer-based crystal- Beside the semiconductor materials, other materials are
line silicon (c-Si) (either mono-crystalline or multi-crystal- needed in PV systems such as silver (used as paste to collect,
transmit electrons and create an electric current), silica (for
copper-indium-gallium-diselenide-disulphide (CIGS) or cad- high transmittance and resistant glass in PV modules), alu-
mium-telluride (CdTe). Crystalline silicon solar panels is the minium (for making the frames around the solar panels) and
dominant technology accounting for about 95% of global copper (as conductor material in cabling, earthing, inverter,
installed PV capacity (Fraunhofer ISI, 2019). CdTe and CGIS transformers and PV cell ribbons). An overview of the most
common raw materials used in solar PV technology and their
suitable for building-integrated or other unconventional functionality is listed in Figure 27.
PV applications. Amorphous silicon cells are mostly used in
Figure 27. Raw materials used in solar PV technologies
Aluminium: in panel frames and Al

inverters or in alloys for construc- (CIGS) or indium-tin-oxide (ITO)
tion and support Copper: highly used for wires,
Cu
cables, inverters, also in CIGS
Iron Fe technology
installations Boron: as dopant (p-type) in crystal Ga Gallium: as dopant in semiconduc-

B tors or in CIGS technology
lattice of the silicon-based wafers
Lead: in alloys with tin (Sn) as Pb
solder for electric circuits and Germanium: as semiconductor In Indium: as ITO conductive layer or
interconnectors
Ge in CIGS technology
materials for multi-junction solar
cells
Nickel: in electroplating or in Mo Molybdenum: as back contact for
Ni Silicon: as semiconductor CIGS or in stainless steel frames
stainless steel frames, fasteners Si
and connectors materials in crystalline or
amorphous solar cells Se Selenium
cell
Zinc: as transparent conductive Zn
oxide in the front contact of solar Ag Silver: as conductive paste on
Sn Tin: in combination with lead for
cells front and back side of the
soldering or with indium in
crystalline solar cells
conductive layers (ITO)
Ca Cadmium Te Tellurium
telluride (CdTe) photovoltaic telluride (CdTe) photovoltaic
Critical Raw Material technology technology
38
its price volatility (in fact, the price of polysilicon spiked 35%
-
covers about 70% of the global production capacity of poly-
PV cells in the laboratory indicates the potential to increase silicon with an annual production of 388 kilotonnes (Research
and Markets, 2019).
(2007-2008), the rapid growth of the PV industry led to an in- The most vulnerable step along the supply chain of PV tech-
nology is at the component level, for which China dominate
the supply market with about 89%. Actually, China dominates
and market dynamics forced manufacturers to explore the nearly all aspects of solar PV manufacturing and use. This
reduction of silicon and other materials in the production pro- dominance started ironically in the late 1990s as response
cess. The supply risk and key country players are presented to the increasing demand for solar panel generated by Ger-
in Figure 28.
The rapid deployment of renewable energy in the EU and China’s solar manufacturing capacity grew further in the
worldwide will put some pressure on the supply of certain rel- years following the 2008 economic crisis when the Chinese
evant raw materials used in PV systems/ Some of them have
PV. In 2019, the list of top 10 companies in terms of crys-
as silicon metal, indium, gallium, germanium and borates. On talline silicon cells include eight from China, one from South
the other side, other raw materials such as copper, cadmium, Korea (Hanwha Q Cells) and one from Canada (Canadian
selenium, silver and tellurium have lower supply risk. The EU Solar), (BloombergNEF, 2020). Most manufacturing plants
supplies 6% of the raw materials used in PV systems. Many of crystalline silicon cells are displaced in China, but also in
countries contribute to the supply of raw materials and there- Malaysia, India, Taiwan, Vietnam and South Korea. According
fore the supply risk at this step is considered as medium. to Bloomberg, the EU manufacturing capacity for crystalline
A similar medium supply risk is expected for the processed silicon cells in accounted for only 0.3% in 2019, particularly
materials. Among all the materials used in the PV cells, silicon in Italy, Germany and France (BloombergNEF, 2020). A slight-
is the most common one. In the past, there were some issues ly higher proportion (about 1.5%) of solar modules based on
of silicon availability because of the lack of development of
- main production is located in Asia.
tures still fear about potential shortages of polysilicon and
Figure 28.

materials
Al, B, Cd, Cu, Ga, Si-metal, polysilicon, Crystalline / Si modules,

Ge, In, Fe, Pb, Mo, amorphous Si cells,
Ni, Se, Si, Ag, Te, Wafer modules
Sn, Zn
EU27 6% 5% 1%
Rest of Europe 3%
China 53% 50% 89% 70%
Japan 4%
Russia 5%
USA 7% 6%
Africa 13%
Latin America 4%
Others 3% 38% 9% 21%
39
Figure 29. Solar PV total installed capacity in the three explored scenarios.
EU – Solar Photovoltaic Capacity

3 000
HDS
2 000
Capacity [GW]
MDS
1 000
LDS
0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Figure 29 reports the capacity scenarios for PVs according to

the framework described in Section 1. See Annex 1 – Meth-
odological notes for more information.
The operational range of solar panels is normally 20-30 Concrete, steel, plastic, glass, aluminium, and copper are ad-
years, with a central value of 25 years (Fraunhofer ISI, 2019). ditionally considered for all technologies, as they are used
Therefore the same lifetime assumptions as for onshore wind in the structural and electric components, similarly to wind.
have been chosen: 30 years for LDS, 25 years for MDS and For all conversion and assumptions, see Annex 1 – Method-
20 years for HDS. The resulting annual installed capacity is ological notes for more details. The values adopted in this
shown in Figure 30. work are mostly based on Nassar et al., (2016). The annual
demand for the considered materials in the years 2030 and
The analysis considers the commercial technologies listed in
2050 is reported in Figure 31. Tellurium, germanium, and in-
the introduction to this section. The materials adopted in the
dium how the most critical demand-to-supply ratio.
production of solar cells are:
Figure 30. PV annually installed capacity in the three explored scenarios.
EU – Solar Photovoltaic Annual Installed Capacity

HDS MDS LDS
Annual installed capacity [GW]
160
80
0
2018 2026 2034 2042 2050
40
Figure 31.
Additional material consumption for photovoltaics in renewables only in 2030/2050

Tellurium** Germanium** Indium**

10 5 1,0
8 4 0,8
x times more
x times more
x times more
6 3 0,6
4 2 0,4
2 1 0,2
1x = 1x = 1x =
0,1 kt 0,03 kt 0,2 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Gallium** Silicon metal** Selenium**

1,0 1,0 0,5
0,8 0,8 0,4

x times more
x times more
x times more
0,6 0,6 0,3
0,4 0,4 0,2
0,2 0,2 0,1
1x = 1x = 1x =
0,05 kt 500 kt 0,7 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050

data in Annex 2 High Demand Scenario
+
+
Low Demand Scenario
41
China is the leader in the supply in all four steps of the supply chain of solar PV technology. The maximum share esti-
mated for the EU is 6% for raw materials and 5% for the processed materials step, while it lacks almost completely of
production for solar cells and modules.
Opportunities to improve the materials impact on the competitiveness of the EU’s solar PV industry:
Diversifying the materials supply: A medium supply risk tions account for only 2% of silicon metal end uses. There-
is associated with raw materials used in PV technologies.
Since crystalline silicon technologies dominate the glob- industry is the industry itself. Including a recycling strategy
al production of solar panels, special attention should be in the manufacturing process for PV modules is important
payed to silicon. The EU is a net importer of silicon as do-
mestic production cannot satisfy domestic demand. The -
reliance of the EU on imports of silicon metal is estimated over, recycled silicon metal is less energy intensive than
to be 64%. It is challenging for the EU to be competitive the primary form. The early adoption of recycling targets,
in the global production of the silicon metal in particular
because the processing of silicon is an energy- and car- -
bon-intensive process. However, the EU renewable sector cation of waste streams from PV panels across the EU is
should remain resilient in the long-term in order to meet highly desirable.
the decarbonisation targets and increase installation of PV
Promote R&D, develop skills and competences: Research
capacity. Therefore, the EU will need to secure access to
silicon metal from countries as the USA, Brazil and Norway.
-
Improve manufacturing opportunities in the EU: Consider- vation is a valuable asset also for the mining industry in the
ing that the EU has only minimal solar cell production, it is EU, addressing the challenge to mine deeper, recover more
extremely important that the EU reduces its dependency from the less available and less concentrated resources
on PV cells and modules, although it will be challenging
for the EU to compete with China. The EU has capacity to waste) to recover materials. The development of innova-
tive recycling methods for PV modules will allow the recov-
manufacturing capacity of solar cells, which appears to ery of a larger amount of materials, reducing the demand
be the weakest link of the solar PV value chain in the EU. for primary materials and thus lessening the EU’s reliance
Entering to the market with EU cells and modules is dif-
needs also to consider the improvement of perovskite solar
there is potential to expand the market segment of tailored cells or other compounds as substitutes for silicon in solar
PV products because of relatively good market prospects cells and bringing these concepts to higher technology read-
compared to competing world regions and customer prox- iness levels.
imity.
Recycling and reuse, substitution: Recycling and reuse of
solar panels are only beginning since the volume of end-of-
life products is still low. Silicon metal is currently not recov-
ered from post-consumer waste. There is some potential
for recycling silicon metal from scrap in the PV industry.
Most silicon scrap generated during crystal ingot and wafer
production for electronic applications can be used in the
PV industry due to the higher quality (purity) of the silicon
metal. Yet this potential is rather limited; electronic applica-
42
2.6 Robotics
Robotics is an emerging technology with enormous potential -
er sources (batteries, FCs or other energy sources) and electric
transportation, social services, the military, space exploration
and undersea operations. Based on the function and area of alloys, such as titanium, magnesium and aluminium alloys,
applications, the market for robots is categorised into two normally used in partnership with composites (CFCs, Kevlar,
polymer–metal composites, etc.) are of particular interest for
80% of the current market) and service robots (20% of the robotics due to their favourable strength-to-weight ratios.
current market, with almost half being robots for logistics). It Other innovative materials such as metallic glass, printed
is expected that service robotics will displace industrial ro- liquid metals and liquid silicone rubber are seen as potential
botics in terms of sales and market value over the next two
decades. Exoskeletons (or wearable robotics) are also of in- New materials and advances in making electronic skin for
creasing importance gaining market share in the future for interactive robots are under development. Flexible (stretch-
both civil healthcare and defence applications. able) electronics are realised via the synthesis of novel ma-
the ability to perform more and more intelligent tasks by us- as serpentine-like structures for interconnects or wires. One
of the main challenges facing electronic skin development
challenges, continued developments in design at both the is the ability of the material to withstand mechanical strain
system (robot) and the component level are necessary. Main and maintain sensing ability or electronic properties, including
components such as gears, motors, power units, etc. need to the fragility of sensors, the recovery time of sensors, repeat-
become lighter and smaller, especially for exoskeletons. ability, overcoming mechanical strain and long-term stability.
Smaller, more powerful, high-speed and precision electronics -
is another challenge for exoskeletons. Sensors are a critical als, integrating processes such as sensing, movement, energy
and key component of robots. harvesting and energy storage. Such materials can change
Novel materials allow components to become smaller and over time to adapt or heal. Recyclability and self-healing
lighter. For instance, the development of innovative materi- properties are therefore critical in the future design of new
als (e.g. vanadium-based materials) could contribute to the electronic skins.
Figure 32. Relevant raw materials in robotics
Beryllium: in alloys, electro- Be Fe Iron: as cast iron or in steel alloys

optical systems and robotic for various components
surgical devices
Boron: in neodymium–iron–boron
Gallium: for communication, Ga B (NdFeB) permanent magnets or as
electro-optical and power systems
lubricant
Indium: in compounds for In
electro-optical systems, sensors and Dysprosium: important additive of
stretcher skin
Dy
NdFeB permanent magnets
Aluminium: as lightweight and Al Mo Molybdenum: in stainless steel
high-performance alloy in various alloys for many components of a
components robot Nd Neodymium: in NdFeB permanent
magnets for electricity generation
Chromium: essential for stainless Cr Ni Nickel: in electroplating or in
steel and other alloys in robots stainless steel frames, fasteners
and connectors Pr Praseodymium: together with
neodymium in permanent magnets
Copper: widely used in wire or Cu Nb Niobium: a microalloying element
axles, or in corrosion resistant alloys in high strength structural steel
Manganese: essential in steel Mn Ti Titanium: in alloys and high

alloys used for many parts of a strength structural steel for
robot actuators and robots arms Critical Raw Material
43
Figure 33.

materials
Al, B, C (graphite), Co, Al alloys, Ni/Ni (Ti) alloys, Mg Gears, actuators, Industrial & service
Cr, Cu, Fe, Ga, In, Li, alloys, steel 1018/4310/Aer- sensors, magnets, robots
Mg, Mn, Mo, Nb, Ni, Met100, semiconductors, microprocessors,
PGMs, REEs, Sb, Si, Sr, processed materials for graphical processing
Ta, Te, Ti, V, W, Zn, Zr magnets, polymers, carbon units, Li-ion batteries,
fuel cells
Li-ion batteries processed
materials, advanced ceramics
& glasses, fuel cells
processed materials,
nanomaterials & carbon
nanotubes
EU27 2% 21% 4% 41%

Rest of Europe 2%
China 52% 21% 20%
Japan 3% 18%
Russia 9%
USA 2% 23% 39% 11%
Africa 15%
Latin America 4%
Others 2% 22% 19% 1%
The materials functionality in robotics is shown in Figure 32, The EU is among the largest producers of processed materials
while Figure 33 gives an overview of raw materials, processed (>20% production share), along with the USA and China There
materials and components required in robotics, the key sup- are also possibilities to diversify the supply of the processed
ply countries and the supply risk along the value chain. materials. However, it should be noted, that the EU is fully de-
The risk to the supply of raw materials and components is pendent on the supply of several processed materials used in
potentially high, and there is a medium risk in relation to the
supply of processed materials and assemblies. In total, 44 -
raw materials are relevant to robotics. The EU is fully depen- ium alloys) are key suppliers. Moreover, potential bottlenecks
dent on the supply of 33 materials from outside. China is the -
botics, along with processed materials for Li-ion batteries.
by South Africa and Russia. The EU produces only 2% of the The largest manufacturer and supplier of components is the
USA, followed by China and Japan. The EU, with a marginal
as critical to the EU economy, namely tantalum, tungsten, production share of 4%, is vulnerable in relation to the supply
of components. The EU is particularly dependent on the sup-
borates, palladium, platinum, REEs, bismuth, antimony, vana- ply of six key components, namely microprocessors, gears,
dium, magnesium, natural graphite, silicon metal and cobalt. graphics processing units (GPUs), magnets, Li-ion batteries
Almost 25% of the materials for robotics are supplied by nu- -
lers (microprocessors) and GPUs, and one of the key suppliers
of sensors and FCs. Japan is the key supplier of gears, sen-
44
and magnets. Other key suppliers are Israel (actuators), South tons, followed by the USA (27%), Japan (11%) and numerous
Korea (microprocessors and FCs) and Canada (FCs). The EU smaller players. The main application for exoskeletons is cur-
rently the medical sector, followed by the industrial sector.
The EU is strongly positioned in the last step of robotics sup-
ply chain, i.e. the supply of industrial and service robots. Asia, and service robots, the highly concentrated supply and the
mainly represented by Japan, leads the industrial robotics expected rapid growth in demand are factors contributing
market with 47% production share followed by the EU (41%), to the medium supply risk assessed for the last step of the
while North America (mainly the USA) is better positioned in supply chain. Moreover, the lack of raw materials and compo-
non-industrial robots. The USA also has the biggest number
of highly innovative robotics companies. the increasing competition from China (acquisition of leading
European robotics companies by Chinese companies) are ad-
market of service robots followed by North America and Asia ditional factors that may challenge the competitive position
(Figure 34). The EU is leading the market for civil exoskele- of the EU on the global market.
Figure 34.
Service Robots Exoskeletons
35% Others
8%
16%
42% Industrial 21%
27%
36%
55% Medical
18%
11%
7%
5% 5% 5% 5%
4%
EU North Asia Others EU USA Japan Canada South China Israel Others
America Korea
Figure: Country production share of service robots and exoskeletons

An overall increase of about 10% Compound Annual Growth According to robotics industry representatives, there is huge
- potential for growth in the service robots market, in contrast
ics market in general, and a moderate growth of <8% CAGR with to the more mature industrial robots industry, which has
is expected in the industrial robotics sector (Statista, 2016).
The most rapidly growing robotic sectors will be consumer margins.
The large-scale uptake of robotics will depend to a certain
- extent on the further development of new advanced materi-
ed. The global robotics market is expected to reach circa USD -
126 million (more than 3 million units to be sold) by 2025 and als demand in the future as there are too many variables that
USD 494.7 billion by 2040, accounting for more than 28 mil-
lion units (The Business Research Company, 2018). Although adopting robots, the evolution of design and advanced ma-
the market for industrial robots is expected to experience terials, etc.
slower growth in the automobile industry, the rising demand
for automation in other manufacturing industries is creating
a strong push for industrial robot manufacturers to diversify
their portfolio further.
45
research is needed.
supplier of CRMs for robotics, delivering more than 40% of CRMs, followed by South Africa (10%) and Russia (9%).
highest growth is expected in the service sectors – e.g. logistics robots - but a lower growth rate of between 10% and
also used across various sectors, are even more optimistic, forecasting a CAGR of up to 40-50% in the next few years.
At the level of raw materials, it is important to secure access and diversify the supply for those materials used in ro-
botics and for which the EU has no or very low domestic production such as chromium, cobalt, molybdenum, natural
graphite, nickel, magnesium, vanadium, copper, tin, antimony and bismuth.
Several actions are needed regarding the robotics supply chain such as:
Diversifying the materials supply: - market. Great emphasis should be put on SMEs as a growth
plier of more than one third of the raw materials required strategy of the European civil and defence robotics market.
in robotics. Other suppliers are South Africa (7%) and Rus- With regards to robotic components, it is necessary to further
sia (6%) with many small suppliers having less than 6% develop smaller, more powerful, high-speed and precision
market share, which gives vast opportunities for supply electronics including the cyber physical security of electron-
ics systems (such as controllers). This last aspect is a key is-
sue as robotics systems develop increasing levels of autono-
Improve manufacturing opportunities in the EU: The domi-
-
el components that are expected to be key components for
critical infrastructure against cyber supply-chain attacks will
future technological development (e.g. GPUs), is seen as a
-
threat by the robotics industry. Strengthening and investing
in the local components manufacturing industry would be
movements, vital-sign- and stress monitoring technologies,
-
visual augmentation systems/operators, automated remote
tion in the EU and prevent companies from setting up man-
sensors for increasing situation awareness, reducing the sur-
ufacturing plants in Asia. In addition, this would establish a
veillance, and improving communications connectivity.
new revenue stream for the EU through selling technologi-
cally advanced robotic components to robot manufacturers
in other countries. The European Commission could invite maintain robotics technical expertise: Robotics companies
- in the EU already perceive this as being a big potential
ing local robotic-components-related companies to invest bottleneck for the future development of this sector in the
in the EU, and support the development of new businesses. EU. Companies are interested in hiring enough high-level
-
The main competition in skilled work force is expected to
Member State level. come from China and India. Therefore, both companies and
academia should be encouraged to identify skills gaps and
Recycling and reuse, substitution: The eco-design of robotic
skills shortages for the robotics sectors. Tailored retrain-
ing and skill-raising programmes can be an important fol-
use of materials and energy as well as easy disassembly
low-up, which the European Commission can support. It is
also up to stakeholders (industry, academia, etc.) to take
recycling, including exoskeletons (or wearable robotics).
advantage of relevant EU funding, such as Erasmus and
Promote R&D, develop skills and competences: Develop- European Structural and Investment Funds.
ment of advanced light and high-strength structural and
functional materials is the main research line for robotics.
Promising materials appear to be magnesium, alumini-
reinforced), including combined polymer–metal compos-

ites. Providing funds for robotics research in terms of size,
46
2.7 Drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or UAV))
decades. The defence industry has in recent years witnessed
carry a human operator, use aerodynamic forces to provide a growth in the application of other types of drones and cy-
bersecurity. C4ISR (command, control, communications, com-
known as drones). Starting from the 1970s, the civil appli- puters, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), cyber
cations of drones gained ground, and civil drones are clearly security, embedded computing and UVs are key applications
dominating the market regarding the number of units, with with potential growing markets. Figure 36 depicts an over-
- view of the raw materials adopted in drones.
tion such as agriculture, provision of data for science, logistics
and commerce. However, the market size in terms of value is
still dominated by military applications, followed by commer- hundred individual parts. As drones can basically be consid-
cial and hobby applications (Statista, 2019). ered a special type of robot, the composition and compo-
Drones are used for various civil and commercial applications. nents are similar. Typical robot assemblies are motors, power
These comprise remote sensing for aerial monitoring and in- units and conductors, controllers, electronics, wheels, axles,
vestigation for agriculture, infrastructure inspection, border supporting structures, etc., while drones have certain addi-
monitoring and surveillance, research and development, and
other data-collection processes, along with the transport components necessary for aerial navigation. The main as-
of goods, for example parcels in the logistics sector (JRC, semblies are the airframe, propulsion systems, actuators,
2019a). A chart with an overview of drone applications is pro- avionics, connectors, weapon systems (defence) and surveil-
vided in Figure 35 based on EPRS (European Parliamentary
Research Service, 2019). general functionalities rely on the same components for both
The defence market is today dominated by large UAVs, and civil and military use.
it is expected that this will remain the case for the next two
Figure 35. Drones applications
Defense Civil
Dual Use Recreational imaging
Surveillance, target
acquisition, reconnaissance
Aerial land &
Aerialsurveillance
maritime land & maritime surveillanceEntertainment
Delivery & transportation of services and goods
combat missions Terrestrial imagery & mapping
Environmental
services and goods& humanitarian crisesPhotography &
Communication relay Inspection & monitoring
missions Search & rescue
Terrestrial imagery & mapping
Environmental & humanitarian crises Public health

Military cargo transport
Inspection & monitoring

Precision strikes construction
Search & rescue
Precision agriculture &
Figure: Drones applications

Source: Adapted from (EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019).
Source: adapted from European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), 2019
47
Figure 36.
Beryllium: in alloys, communica- Be REE Rare Earth Elements: Nd, Pr and

tion equipment and integrated Dy are used in (small) electric
wire networks, electro-optical motors with electronic speed
systems, landing gears control (ESC)
Copper: alloying element in Cu

super-alloys and CuBe alloys,
communication equipment Ni Nickel: for Ni and NiTi alloys
(Hastelloy series), ductile and
Gallium: for communication and corrosion resistant, in turbine and
Ga engine parts
GaN, 5N), also in electro- Al Aluminium: lightweight and
optical systems high-performance alloys used for Niobium: ferroniobium used for
airframes, gear bodies, avionics Nb
microalloying in high strength
Germanium: on-board electronics, structural steel
Ge Hafnium: Ni-based super-alloys,
inertial navigation systems (5N) Hf
high strength-high temperature Sc Scandium: in AlSc alloys
equipment applications for lightweight - high strength
Fe Iron: used in special steels in

Indium: in compounds for In structural and engine parts
Ti Titanium: main alloys family,
electro-optical systems
lighter than Al-Mg alloys, high
Magnesium: in high- strength, for armour, airframes and
Mg wings, fans & compressors
performance Al-Mg alloys
the materials used in robotics Critical Raw Material
An overview of raw materials, processed materials and compo- and FCs are also considered in the ‘processed materials’ sup-
nents required for this technology, the key supply countries and ply-chain step.
the supply risk along the value chain is presented in Figure 37. Compared to the other parts of the UAV supply chain, the
The dimensions, technologies and materials used in larger EU is well positioned with regard to the supply of processed
materials, with a share of more than 27%. Other countries
their complex systems, a wide range of materials are relevant provide the remaining shares of the processed materials. For
seven of the relevant processed materials, the EU share in
as relevant. The EU is fully dependent on the supply of 40 of global production is above 30%, and for certain alloys the EU
these. The materials of particular importance are REEs, mag- even dominates the global supply (aluminium-magnesium
nesium, bismuth, and tungsten, for which the dominant sup- alloys, titanium alloys, high-performance alloys). However, for
plier is China, and niobium, for which the dominant supplier is the remaining materials, Europe’s share of global production
Brazil. 15 materials, namely cobalt, lithium, titanium, silicon, is below 20%, implying a potential need to diversify the sup-
natural graphite, magnesium, vanadium, antimony, bismuth, ply sources. For certain processed materials, the EU shows a
borates, indium, gallium, tungsten tantalum, niobium, berylli-
um and hafnium as well as the materials groups of the REEs
- (Kevlar) and ferroniobium. For these, potential supply bottle-
an Commission, 2020). China is the predominant supplier of necks could occur.
most of the CRMs for UVs, providing more than 39%. South The most important supplier by far of components for drones
is the USA (42%). The picture for the EU is very heteroge-
13% and an 6% share of global production respectively. The
supply of CRMs from European countries is 13%. EU holds a solid share of global Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU) production, navigation and control systems, and sen-
namely: aluminium alloys, aluminium-magnesium alloys, sors (all >20%), and even dominates the global production of
magnesium alloys, nickel alloys, nickel-titanium alloys, tita- communications systems. For actuators, the EU has a market
nium alloys, speciality steels, high-performance alloys, re- share of at least 11%.
semiconductors, ferroniobium and magnetic alloys. Similarly a very high degree on foreign production. Japan is the key
to robotics, processed materials for lithium batteries, motors supplier of gears, sensors and FCs. China is the main supplier
48
Figure 37.

materials
Al, Au, B, Be, C Semiconductors, Al alloys, Navigation and control Unmanned Aerial
(graphite), Cu, Co, Cr, Al-Mg alloys, Ni alloys, Ni-Ti systems, Inertial Vehicles
Fe, Ga, Hf, Li, Mg, Nb, alloys, Mg alloys, Ti alloys, Measurement Units, (Drones)
Ni, PGMs, Si, Ta, Ti, V, High performance alloys, Graphical Processing
W, REE specialty steels, refractory Units, Communications
metal powders, processed Systems, Microprocessors,
materials for magnets, Sensors, Actuators,
Composites (CFC), Kevlar, Magnets, Gears, Li
polymer batteries, fuel
Processed materials for cells
batteries and fuel cells
EU27 13% 27% 13% 9%

Rest of Europe 2%
China 39% 22% 14% 77%
Japan 2% 14%
Russia 6%
USA 11% 17% 42% 5%
Africa 13%
Rest of Asia 5% 8%
Latin America 7%
Others 3% 26% 17% 9%
of lithium polymer batteries and a key supplier of sensors. microprocessors and actuators. In particular, GPU production
Other key suppliers are Israel (actuators), South Korea (mi- shows an extraordinary high concentration in the USA (95%).
croprocessors and FCs) and Canada (FCs, IMUs, navigation As for the manufacturing of civil drones, China is the mar-
and control systems). Potential supply bottlenecks concern in ket leader by far, with a global market share above 75%. Far
particular components for which global production is concen- behind, the EU is the second-largest supplier of civil drones
trated in only a few countries. This applies to GPUs, gears, (9%), followed by the USA (5%) and Israel (3%).
Small drones will dominate the civil and commercial sub- Based on the developments in the drones market for defence
sectors until 2035. However, by 2050, larger civil drones can applications, it can be predicted that the impact of drones
start to make an important impact on the market (more than
20%), because mobility applications will rise exponentially -
(reaching circa 20% of the total professional market). These itary operations within the 2021-2040 time frame, at both
types of UAV, for applications such as urban air mobility (ae- the global scale and the national scale.
drones will stay behind in terms of unit numbers (15 000 ver-
sus 400 000).
49
Figure 38. Forecast number of drones per type of activity.

2025 2035 2050
~3
• Drones, mostly small/tactical units, represent almost 10% of military
aviation assets today ~2
Military • ~1
•
drones ~
• Growth already rapid with VLOS missions for mining, entertainment,

Government utility inspections as driving forces
~395 ~415
& • Rapid growth extends to 2035 given high unit potential in areas of
agriculture, delivery, and public safety ~200
Commercial
• “Pooled” assets for public safety & security authorities
• Gradual evolution in unmanned aviation expected
~7000 ~7000 ~7000

• Rapid drone growth on same trajectory as GoPro cameras
• Expect 2-5 more years of continued growth before market matures at
Leisure over a million units annually
• Total units in circulation grows from just over 1 million to in excess of
5 million before 2020
active drones (in k)
Source: adapted
Figure: Forecast from
number (SESAR
of drones Joint
per type Undertaking, 2016).
of activity
Source: SESAR Joint Undertaking, 2016
China dominates the civil drones sector, and increasingly the share of professional drones, while the USA and Israel
dominate the military drones sector. The EU faces a serious risk of missing the opportunity to catch up with these
global leaders on this key technology, which will be decisive for integrating comprehensive real-time geo-referenced
intelligence into professional (civil) as well as military applications. The EU is highly dependent on external suppliers
Downstream, the market is increasingly competitive, with the USA strongly dominating certain components (e.g. IMU,
GPU and microprocessors) and drones with advanced capabilities in the military sector.
Of the 48 raw materials, 15 materials, namely cobalt, lithium, titanium, silicon, natural graphite, magnesium, vanadium,
antimony, bismuth, borates, indium, gallium, tungsten tantalum, niobium, beryllium and hafnium as well as the mate-
of CRMs for drones, delivering more than 40% of CRMs.
The following recommendations are made:

Diversifying the materials supply: It should be noted that
more than 50% of the raw materials are supplied by nu- skills also need to be supported and strategic alliance(s)
merous smaller supplier countries, providing good opportu- should be considered.
Foster international collaboration and standardisation
Promote R &D, develop skills and competences: The Materi- activities: Advancements in EU regulation and standardi-
als for Dual-Use report (Blagoeva et al., 2019; JRC, 2019b)
leading supplier of drones globally.
key strategic components, assemblies, and on certain larg-
er military UAVs to reduce the EU’s dependence on imports,
as well as the streamlining of military procurement in the
50
2.8 3D printing (Additive manufacturing)
3D printing (3DP) is a new technology that disrupts traditional For metal-based 3DP the main technologies are powder
supply chains and replaces conventional manufacturing tech- bed fusion (PBF) using lasers (SLM, SLS, DMLS, see glossa-
nologies. 3DP is an umbrella for a wide variety of technologies ry), direct energy deposition (DED) technologies (LPD, LENS,
such as electron beam and laser melting based systems as
- and droplet deposition) and electron beam manufacturing
ders, wire and arc additive manufacturing (cladding) using (EBM) technologies (LBM, EBM, WAAM, see glossary). When
metal wire and various laser polymerisation and other tech- excluding 3DP of polymers and their related technologies,
niques covering the production of polymer based parts. 3DP
has a high potential to reduce supply risk for high performance, developed, the main advantage of metal wire products is a
lightweight components and assemblies (JRC, 2019a). more homogenous distribution of alloying elements and the
possibility to create customised alloys by means of dual-wire
and design freedom, substantial weight reductions via opti- feeding systems. The most common alloy families used are
mised designs and more complex geometries and it enables powders of aluminium-magnesium, titanium, nickel, stainless
customisation to be integrated in serialised production. In ad-
- quantities of additional alloying elements providing various
ible decentralised production. In various manufacturing sec- material properties. The most relevant alloying elements
for 3DP are subsequently cobalt, hafnium, niobium, magne-
manufacturing stages by the new technology. The weight sium, scandium, titanium, vanadium, tungsten and zirconium.
saving potential in aerospace is already maturing fast and in Various titanium alloys are used for high strength and light-
the case of defence, the production of highly tailored parts weight applications.
- An overview of the raw materials used for 3DP is reported in
Figure 39.
lowering production cost and consistency in production in par-
Figure 39.
Aluminium: main alloy family Al Nb Niobium: in super-alloys, Ti-Al-Nb

alloys, in engines, blades, valves,
rotors
Iron: main alloy family of stainless Fe Scandium: for lightweight - high

steels in structural and engine Sc
strength non-structural parts and
parts
Nickel: for Ni and Ni-Ti alloys Ni
(Hastelloy series), ductile and Si Silicon: as alloying element in
corrosion resistant, in turbine and light-weight Al-Mg alloys
engine parts
Cu Copper: alloying element in Ni and
Tungsten: in various heat resistant
Titanium: main alloys family, Ti super-alloys W super-alloys, in stainless and
lighter than Al-Mg alloys, high
hardens tool steels, turbine blades
strength, for aerospace and medical Hafnium: Ni-based super-
Hf and vanes
alloys, high strength-high temp.
Magnesium: in high- Mg applications Vanadium: alloying element in
performance Al-Mg alloys V
Manganese: as alloying element in various Ti-Al alloys
Mn
Chromium: corrosion resistant in various Ni-alloys
Cr Zirconium: element in Ti-alloys, in
CoCr alloys, gas-turbines, engines, Zr
dental and medical Bulk Metallic Glass, sprockets,
springs, gears, sensors
Cobalt: in various super-alloys, Mo Molybdenum: Alloying element in
Co various Ti-alloys, adds strength
CoCr, in gas-turbines, engine,
dental and medical Critical Raw Material
51
Figure 40.

materials
Al, Co, Cr, Cu, Fe, Hf, Mg, Al alloys, Ti alloys, Ni alloys, not assessed PBF, DED, EBM,
Mn, Mo, Nb, Ni, Sc, Si, Ti, V, Stainless steels, special 3DP, WAARC, etc
W, Zr alloys
EU27 9% 8% 54% 34%

Rest of Europe 4%
China 35% 23%
Japan 2% 3% 6%
Russia 12%
USA 9% 30% 24%
Africa 9%
Rest of Asia 5%
Latin America 7%
Others 8% 13% 13%
An overview of raw materials, processed materials and com- small number of metal powder suppliers globally. Any supply
ponents required for this technology and the respective key disruptions in one of these early material production stages
supply countries is presented in Figure 40. are likely to have immediate and severe impacts on the avail-
- ability of a wide range of components.
rials required in 3DP and the largest supplier for 7 out of 16 The supply of components and assemblies is marked by a
high level of concentration around key OEMs. For example, for
according to the EU 2017 CRM list, come from China (magne- the aerospace sector, 3DP suppliers and integrators such as
sium, vanadium, tungsten, scandium). Other key suppliers of Boeing and GE (US) are known for vertically steering and tak-
CRMs are South Africa and Brazil. The supply of 3DP relevant ing the lead on key developments. In the EU, Airbus is steering
CRMs from European countries is negligible (1%). Supply risks its supply chain more horizontally.
are particularly high for titanium, cobalt, magnesium, vanadi- Historically, the EU is relatively well represented with about
- one third of the number of 3D printing system providers, in-
cant risks for scandium, hafnium and zirconium for example cluding polymer systems. The EU has about 20% of market
in super-alloys for space applications. share for all commercial printer systems and the US and Is-
The EU has strong metallurgical capabilities to deliver pro- rael represent over 71% of the supply. For manufacturers of
cessed materials. This counts in particular for nickel alloys, metal 3DP machines only, the EU is well represented as il-
stainless steels and special alloys. However, there is only a
52
China is much higher, thus threatening the innovative status as well as in 3DP systems, further technology development
of the EU whilst the technology is maturing very fast. directly depends on having access to quality raw materials.
The main concern about the supply chain is the fact that most Here, mastering the most optimal combinations of processed
of the commercially used 3DP technologies are rigid in terms
to innovation. In other words: any raw material supply disrup-
powder compositions according to the end user needs. Lack of tions would immediately limit 3DP innovations in which the
EU has a strong position.
costs as well as quality and consistency of parts produced.
Despite the strong position of the EU in processed materials
At present, it is not possible to quantify the current and future and Boston Consulting Group (BCG, 2018). The BCG forecast
demand for raw and processed materials on a quantitative is displayed in Figure 41. It shows an impressive growth rate
basis. The only perspectives possible are based on econom- with a Compoung Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of well over
ic market development sources like Statista (Statista, 2018) 20%.
Figure 41.
>$13T ~$15T ~$17T >$23T
>$350B
$182B (size of total Additive Manufacturing (AM) market)
$27B
$10B
2016 2020 2025 2035
Polymer Metal AM and other AM
Source: adapted
Figure: AM take from (BCG,of2018).
rate forecast total addressable manufacturing market
Source: adapted from BCG, 2018
53
The main advantages of 3D printing for various sectors are possibilities for reduction, substitution, recycling and miti-
gation in the use of raw materials and traditionally manufactured components. The additive manufacturing market is
expected to grow substantially, with a CAGR of between 15% and more than 30% in the next few years. The aerospace,
automotive, and medical industries will account for 51% of the 3D printing market by 2025. 3D printing in medical de-
vices is expected to grow by 23% between 2015 and 2025, while for the aerospace and defence industries an annual
growth rate of around 26% is expected.
54% supply share. It is followed by the USA (30%), Canada (9%), Japan (3%) and other smaller suppliers delivering the
remaining 4%.
The bottleneck assessment shows a potential high risk to supply for one step of the supply chain: raw materials. No sig-
to other technologies in this report. The EU has a relatively strong position in 3D printing, and especially in metal-based
additive manufacturing for aerospace applications. At the same time, a high raw materials dependency exists, in par-
ticular for titanium and strategic minor elements used in special alloys, like scandium and niobium.
competitiveness. It is recommended to organise a more centralised, strategic and comprehensive discussion on the role
of the EU metal 3DP sector for Industry 4.0 development in relation to smart factories, robotics and other modernisation
trends in manufacturing.
The following recommendations are made:
Diversifying the materials supply: Promote R&D, develop skills and competences: Further
and trade agreements is supporting a strong EU additive
towards aluminium – magnesium and titanium alloys
supply of titanium and strategic minor elements used in where the EU is relatively weak. It is important for develop-
special alloys, like scandium and niobium deserves further
attention. to master the relation between processed materials (metal
powder recipes) and the various 3DP technologies.
Improve manufacturing opportunities in the EU: The EU de-
pendency on raw materials goes beyond physical access to Foster international collaboration and standardisation ac-
the individual minerals. It is recommended to further anal- tivities: There is a clear need for standardisation of metal
- AM powders and metal wire on the one hand, and the qual-
tions, ownership, trade restrictions, environmental permit- ity and reproducibility of parts on the other. This applies to
ting and other uneven conditions. Industries outside the EU aerospace in particular, with strict safety and performance
are for example less concerned with responsible sourcing,
- powders and wire recipes for 3DP, which would aid EU com-
mining social and environmental conditions in developing panies in particular, considering that EU companies, and
countries. Securing sustainable access to the right quantity SMEs in particular, are relatively well positioned to produce
and quality of raw materials will be key for future responsi- high-quality components (Duchêne et al., 2016).
ble EU industry developments. Targeted investment in 3DP
-
ability, repair and maintenance. More investment is needed
to keep up with the pace of development in the USA and
China.
Recycling and reuse, substitution: It is advised to further
analyse the possibilities for recycling of 3DP components
as well as the recycling of powders not consumed in man-
ufacturing. In particular the presence of more exotic com-
ponents requires attention.
54
2.9 Digital technologies
2.9.1 Current supply issues along the value chain and future trends
Digital technologies are transforming the world at an un- that are produced each year suggest that even incremental
precedented speed, and they have changed how we com- uses in certain elements can amount to meaningful volumes
municate, live and work. The EU will strive to achieve the of material relative to current supply. Third, the speed of tech-
technological sovereignty in some critical digital technol- nology introduction cycles can be faster than the time scales
ogy areas (e.g. blockchain, quantum computing and data associated with other aspects of the supply chain.
sharing). Digitisation and digitalisation will transversally Other raw materials that are not used in ICT equipment are
equally relevant to ensure its proper functioning and may be-
come critical for the deployment of next generation comput-
ing. For example, helium is used to create the low operating
product portfolios (EC, 2017). Through “Internet of Things” temperature close to absolute zero that is needed for quan-
(IoT), connected robots, autonomous vehicles and sensors tum computing technologies, supra- and semiconductors.
will be more and more integrated in industrial processes,
One of the main consequence of digitalization will be the
common goods and services, across the value chains (see
enormous amount of data produced and stored in data cen-
Figure 42).
tres, enterprise infrastructures and endpoints (such as PCs,
Whereas the criticality of materials applies to the wider Eu- smart phones, and IoT devices). The summation of all these
ropean industry landscape, many CRMs are particularly es- data is called the “global datasphere” and is experiencing tre-
sential for information and communication technology (ICT) mendous growth. The International Data Corporation predicts
devices and advanced electronics. Europe’s reliance on for- that the global datasphere will grow from 33 Zettabytes (ZB)
eign digital components and technology is increasing as it
falls behind on the production of key digital technologies. In The increased data need will have a big impact on technologies
for data storage, including the additional demand of materials
and products stood at €23 billion – largely due to sizeable for memories production (see Figure 43). Based on (Ku, 2018), it
Chinese imports (European Political Strategy Centre, 2019). can be estimated that the storage of the expected 2025 global
From the raw material perspective, the digital ICT industry datasphere would require up to 80 kilotonnes of neodymium,
has three main features (Ku, 2018). First, it uses a wide and about 120 times the current yearly EU demand of this material.
increasing range of elements to enable the desired electronic, Using instead emerging technologies such as ferroelectric RAM
magnetic, optical, or mechanical properties needed for chips would require up to 40 kilotonnes of platinum, which is about
and devices. Second, the large number of chips and devices 600 times the currently yearly demand of the EU.
Figure 42. Digitalisation and sustainable production and consumption.

Advanced materials
Synthetic biology • Graphene appliciations

• Synthetic proteins from stem cells
• Bioplastics
Blockchain
• Supply chain monitoring and origin
tracing
Internet of Things
• Active tracking and optimisation of
industrial machinery Sustainable
• Product web-identity and supply production and Virtual and Augmented Reality
chain tracking consumption • Supply chain monitoring
• Virtual learning experiences
• Virtual shopping
Autonomous vehicles
• Autonomous vehicles in industry
• Drones for high-resolution real-time aerial data 3D printing
• Locally produced 3D printed products
Robots
• Optimised product design
• Optimised manufacturing processes
• Intelligent packaging aerial data
• Precision strength capabilities
• Eliminated product waste
• Preventing pollution and emissions
Source: adapted (PwC, 2017a).
Figure: Digitalisation and sustainable production and consumption
Source: adapted from PwC, 2017a
55
Figure 43. -
byte.
Flash Memory 3D-Crosspoint

Si: 0.02 Ta: 0.6 Ge: 0.1-0.3
Magnetic RAM Phase-change memory

Al: 0.1 Ta: 7.7 Ge: 0.05 In: 0.004
Co: 0.5–0.6 Ir: 0.9–2.7 Sb: 0.08 Se: 0.002-0.1
Ni: 2.6 Mn: 3.5–10.8 Te: 0.21 As: 0.02-0.08
W: 7.7
Hard Disk Drive

Resistive RAM (ReRAM) Co: 0.34-1.0 Cr: 0.03-0.09
Hf: 3.3 Pt: 0.18-0.55 Ru: 0.3-0.4
Nd: 342-480
Ferroelectric RAM
Ir: 49-246 Pt: 47-236
Zr: 14-54
Source: adapted from (Ku, 2018).

Source: adapted from KU, 2018
The global expansion of digital networks and services implies screens) has boosted the consumption of indium used in indi-
that more people have access to the internet, thus fuelling
1993 and 2013 (Tercero, 2019). Indium is among the ele-

for future trends include miniaturization of components, ments capturing a growing consideration due to its relatively
measures against planned obsolescence and restrictions on high economic importance, lack of substitutes, extraction as
exports of e-waste. In addition, the search for more perfor-
mant and cheaper materials or components of electronic ap- of processing, and non-existent recycling at end of life (Ciacci
pliances fosters substitution, making future demands more et al, 2019).
unpredictable in the sector. The demand of CRMs in this Trends presented above consider a rather conservative and
technology-constant approach of digitalisation. Other au-
- thors argue that a much larger increase of consumption of
those materials in the future is to be expected due to upgrade
Digitalisation will be also accompanied by the progression in of production infrastructure and large consumption of new
sales of ICT devices, mainly smartphones, which are expected devices, including sensors and actuators (Bonilla et al, 2018).
to grow steadily from 130 million units sold in 2018 up to Supply risks might also be impacted by the fact that recycling
- potential of CRMs from ICT technologies will be largely limit-
top and desktop computers sales are estimated to remain ed or not feasible in the near future (Marscheider-Weidemann
roughly constant. Table 2 shows the content of some CRMs et al, 2016).
in ICT devices and how these quantities are expected to grow
in future: the table also includes the ratio of CRMs used for use of scarce metals, e.g. supporting the management and
ICT devices (in 2015 and 2035) compared to the current EU monitoring of increasingly complex (reverse-)supply chains
(e.g. improving traceability) and as new technologies in sup-
-
sales for some electronic devices, the expected use of related opment of the digitalisation can disclose novel security risks.
CRMs would either stagnate or rise in relatively limited pro- In a world with ubiquitous connectivity between all things,
portions (palladium, gallium, dysprosium, neodymium). The vulnerabilities will increase exponentially. As sensors, algo-
case of tantalum for which electronics is currently the main
application is interesting: tantalum’s use in electronic appli- citizens’ distrust in technologies stems overwhelmingly from
cations alone could outpace the current use of this material, security concerns (European Political Strategy Centre, 2019).
all applications factored together. Such data privacy and security issues could have in future an
Similarly, development of digital technologies and in partic-
56
Figure 44 summarises the main raw materials adopted for
products (Polverini et al., 2018), hence preventing the develop- digital technologies and their functionality, while an overview
of key players is presented in Figure 45.
Table 2.
CRM A. Use in B. EU apparent % C. Use in % Notes
2015 (t) consumption (t) (A/B) 2035 (t) (C/B)
Pd 7 60 12% 10 17% The use of palladium in electronics is related to the pro-
duction of some printed circuit boards and in multi-lay-
ered ceramic capacitators (in mobile phones)
Ga 4 80 5% 5 6% The main use of gallium in electronics is in semicon-
ductors for Integrated Circuits. In particular, Ga is used
signals, both voice and data. The more advanced the

generation used (3G, 4G, 5G), the more PAs needed.
Ta 80 100 80% 110 110% The main application of tantalum is in special capacita-
tors, characterised by high capacitance, small size and
high performance. Thin layers of tantalum are also used
in integrated circuits.
Nd 90 1 000 9% 120 12% The main application of neodymium is for NdFeB per-
manent magnets used in hard drives
Dy 9 180 5% 12 7% The main use of dysprosium is in NdFeB permanent
magnets to increase the resistance of the magnet to
high temperatures
Figure 44. Raw materials in digital technologies.
Boron: in semi-conductors and HDD Chromium: in stainless steels, for

permanent magnets
B Cr
plating and coatings of electronic
components, pigments
Cobalt: in HDDs, semi-conductors Co
and integrated circuits C Graphite: for production of
graphene, electrically and thermally
Gallium: in GaAs for semiconduc- Ga conductive material destined for
tors, LEDs, GaN semiconductors for many applications
blu-ray, mobile phones, etc.
In Indium: in screens as indium-tin-
Germanium oxide
cables, infrared optics (night-vision),
Ge
Copper: main conductor in Mg Magnesium: in high-
in semiconductors Cu performance Al-Mg alloys
electronics, connectors, printed
Silicon: electronics grade silicon in Si circuits, wiring, contacts, ICs,
semiconductors, SSDs and semi-conductors, etc. Nickel: in stainless steels, for
microelectronics
Ni
plating and anticorrosive coatings
Au Gold: connectors, switches, relay
contacts, solder joints, connection
REE Rare Earth Elements: many
Lithium: primary batteries Li wires and strips, memory chips and
LREEs and HREEs in various
circuit boards
applications, incl. magnets, HDDs,
displays, LED, lasers, circuit boards,
Manganese: in memory storage Mn Ag Silver: soldering and brazing alloys,
memories.
technologies and batteries electrical contacts and printed
circuit boards Tungsten: heat resistant in ICs,
W dielectric materials and transistors.
PGM PGMs: Pd for multi-layer ceramic
In light bulbs and vacuum tube
capacitors, ICs and circuit boards.
Pt and other PGMs are in glass for
Critical Raw Material displays and memories
57
Figure 45.

materials
Ag, Au, B, C (graphite), not assessed not assessed not assessed

Co, Cr, Cu, Fe, Ga, Ge,
In, Li, Mg, Mn, Ni, Pb,
PGMs, REE, Si, Sn, Sr,
Ti, W
EU27 4%
Rest of Europe 3%
China 41%
Japan 1%
Russia 4%
USA 2%
Africa 30%
Rest of Asia 5%
Latin America 6%
Others 4%
Digital technologies are strategic technologies that do not only sustain the enormous digital sector but are also en-
abling technologies for all the sectors and technologies discussed in this study;
Developing quantitative forecasts for future development of these digital technologies and contained raw materials
was beyond the scope of this study and will require further work. However, semi-quantitative analysis shows that in-
creased EU consumption of some CRMs (e.g. palladium, gallium, dysprosium and neodymium) for these technologies
is likely to happen;
It is premature to establish detailed observations and recommendations in the absence of a structured bottlenecks
analysis, like for the other technologies. Still, the EU appears to be largely dependent on other countries (mainly South-
technological sovereignty in some critical technology areas, it will have to strongly develop manufacturing opportuni-
ties for components and assemblies. A prerequisite for this digital re-industrialisation will be to secure the access to key
raw materials that are essential to these technologies (for example REEs, gallium, germanium and PGMs) and develop
capabilities on processed materials;
The leading role of the EU concerning collection and management of Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment and in
risk of raw materials for digital technologies.
58
3 Critical raw materials for strategic sectors
3.1 Renewable energy

The transition towards a low-carbon society will come with a duced in the EU is expected to come from renewable energy
large-scale deployment of renewable technologies such as
wind and solar PV. By 2050, more than 80% of electricity pro- demand in the EU, see Figure 46 (EC, 2018).
Figure 46. Gross inland consumption of energy in the EU for various timelines and scenarios
1628 Mtoe 1395 Mtoe 1255 Mtoe 1178 Mtoe 1239 Mtoe 1192 Mtoe
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2015 2030 Baseline Average o Intermediary level Average o
"well below 2°C” o ambition "1.5°C"
scenario scenarios
2050
non-energy ossil uels use solids ossil liquids natural gas nuclear e-liquids e-gas renewables
Figure: Gross inland consumption of energy in the EU for various timelines and scenarios
Source: adapted from EC, 2018
3.1.1 Relevant technologies
Many technologies are used to convert the renewable rely, green hydrogen will have to be produced from renewable
sources into electricity (e.g. wind turbines and solar panels), energy; today it is produced from natural gas.
store this energy (e.g. in rechargeable batteries), improve the Digitalisation, innovation in robotics and additive manufac-
manufacturing processes (e.g. through robotics and 3DP) and turing will contribute to the acceleration of the renewable
facilitate the conversion and transmission of the electricity energy sector. Digitalisation is key enabler of the transition to
via smart grids (e.g. using digital technologies). clean energy through improving the safety, productivity, ac-
Wind power is one of the fastest growing renewable technol- cessibility and sustainability of energy systems, for instance
ogies and together with solar PV has the potential to provide by facilitating grid management and operation. Robots and
- automation are expected to increase their share in the pro-
panies are expected to invest in solar and wind farms, includ- duction of renewable energy generators, enabling industry to
save time, increase productivity and optimise performance.
Considering the ‘intermittent’ characteristic of wind and sun For example, robotic automation is already used in solar sys-
as energy sources, storage technologies, such as the newer tems for manufacturing silicon ingot, silicon modules, solar
large-scale Li-ion batteries and fuel cells, are critical compo- cells and silicon wafer and in wind turbines for welding certain
nents for creating a low-carbon electricity system. They allow structural components, in sharpening the edges of gears and
the production of low carbon electricity when possible and handling the turbine blades. Despite still higher manufactur-
save it for later use. ing costs than for the conventional ways, 3D printing has al-
Hydrogen can be an important part of the clean energy mix,
energy products, e.g. by creating large components for the
boosting renewable electricity market growth and broadening
the reach of renewable solutions. Although a hydrogen-based
energy transition will not happen overnight, it is essential that Figure 47 shows the relevant raw materials and technologies
for the renewable sector.
-
60
Figure 47. Materials and technologies relevant to the renewable energy sector
Renewables
3.1.2 Raw materials relevant to renewable energy sector and supply bottlenecks
solar PV, robotics and digital technologies. Batteries employ

changes in the raw materials requirements, due to the de- CRMs such as cobalt and natural graphite, which are also re-
ployment of the technologies described above. For example, quired in 3DP and digital technologies. Platinum is used as
some critical REEs such as neodymium, dysprosium and pra- a catalyst in FCs and in digital applications, for example for
seodymium, are key ingredients of permanent magnets used hard disk drives. Overall, the renewable sector requires many
in high-performance wind turbines. CRMs such as borates, raw materials ranging from very high to low supply risk with
gallium, germanium, indium and silicon metal are needed in the split among technologies as shown in Figure 47.
Figure 48.
Natural graphite
Silicon metal
Germanium
Manganese
Magnesium
Chromium
Vanadium
Scandium
Strontium
Zirconium
Tellurium
Tungsten
Titanium
Hafnium
Niobium
Borates
Gallium
Lithium
Copper
Indium
Cobalt
HREEs
LREEs
Nickel
PGMs
Silver
61
The potential supply bottlenecks of materials use in technol- and FCs – are very vulnerable at the stage of assembly. The
ogies relevant to the renewable energy sector are presented most vulnerable step at the level of components is for solar
in Figure 49. The raw materials stage is a concern for all tech- power.
nologies, except for solar PV. Technologies for ESS – batteries
Figure 49. Supply bottlenecks for seven technologies relevant to the renewable sector

materials
Renewable Energy Generation
Energy Storage
Enabling Technologies
62
3.1.3 Projection of future materials demand
- Wind and PV have a common group of general materials ad-

pansion of wind and PV power plants. For both of them, the opted for construction and electric connections. These are
EU installed capacity in 2050 is in the order of 500 GW in essentially concrete, steel, plastics, glass, aluminium, and
LDS, 1 000 GW in MDS, and 2 000-2 500 GW in HDS. As the copper. Wind turbines are bigger and heavier than PV pan-
els, hence they require massive foundations, which results in
have a slightly longer lifetime than onshore turbines and PV higher concrete demand. In particular, one MW of wind re-
panels), which implies similar annual replacement rates, the quires in between 250 to 400 tonnes of concrete, while no
more than 60 tonnes are needed for each megawatt of solar
intensity. PV. Wind demand is also higher for steel (some 100 t/MW
Figure 50.
Additional material consumption for batteries, fuel cells, wind turbine and photovoltaics in
renewables only in 2030/2050
Lithium** Dysprosium** Cobalt

20 10 5
8 4
15
x times more
x times more
x times more
6 3
10
LDS LDS
4 2
5
2 1
1x = 1x = 1x =
6 kt 0,2 kt 30 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Neodymium Graphite*** Nickel

5 10 1,0
4 8 0,8
x times more
x times more
x times more
3 6 0,6
2 4 LDS 0,4
LDS
1 2 0,2
1x = 1x = 1x =
4 kt 250 kt 500 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
cells and less batteries in this scenario.

* See the methodological notes in Annex 1 and all data in Annex 2 High Demand Scenario
+
+
Low Demand Scenario
63
against 70 t/MW in the case of PV panels). Material inten- um, gallium, germanium, indium, selenium, silicon metal and
sity is instead higher for PV as far as glass (some 50 t/MW tellurium used for solar PV panels. Other general construction
against 8 t/MW) and aluminium (8 t/MW against 1 t/MW) are materials are chromium, iron (cast), manganese, nickel and
concerned. Finally, plastics (5-6 t/MW) and copper (5 t/MW) zinc, which are relevant for wind only. Figure 50 shows the
show similar intensity. relative demand increase in 2030 and 2050 for selected ma-
- terials compared to current EU consumption.
bium and yttrium for wind (mostly used in PMs) and cadmi-
storage, new infrastructure, automation and smart/digital technologies.

The EU is dependent on imports of many of the raw materials used in these technologies and is susceptible to supply
interruption for materials characterised by high and very high supply risk such as REEs, magnesium, niobium, germani-
um, borates and scandium. For some of these raw materials the EU lacks domestic primary production.
Based on the long-term decarbonisation scenarios for the scale-up production of the renewable generation technol-
the the raw materials used in wind turbines, in particular REEs in PMs, is expected to increase by up to six times in 2030
and up to 15 times in 2050 in addition to current EU consumption in the most severe scenario.
When looking at the supply chain, the raw materials step is the most vulnerable for most technologies used in renew-
able sector, in particular for energy storage and enabling technologies (e.g. robotics and 3DP). This is followed by the
assembly step, in particular for the energy storage technologies, and the components step. The EU appears less sus-
materials used in battery applications.
Several mitigation measures should be put forward by the

EU to improving the materials supply chain and the EU’s in- -
dustrial competitiveness of renewable technologies such as: mand of the sector. The EU should hence make use of its
diversifying the materials supply, promoting research and in- mineral reserves and look at technological solutions for de-
novation, sustaining the long-term investments for new min- veloping a primary sourcing while tackling the social and en-
vironmental hurdles.
strengthening downstream manufacturing in the EU. Among
industry to produce and store more renewable energy with less
will be necessary in the sector to enhance reuse of compo-

nents and improve collection and recycling of technologies to
produce high quality secondary raw materials.
64
3.2 E-mobility
The increasing role of e-mobility in the future of road trans- -
port in the EU requires the deployment of multiple new tech- -
nologies. According to JRC (2019b) ‘a storm of new technol- trates the evolution of vehicles technologies forecasted from
ogies and business models is transforming everything about 2015 until 2050 (Hill et al., 2019). The uncertainty of the de-
how we get around and how we live our lives’. Figure 51 below velopment of new technologies in the e-mobility sector is still
illustrates the evolution of vehicles technologies forecasted very high. For example for FCEVs, several scenarios co-exist
from 2015 until 2050 (Hill et al,, 2019). The uncertainty of
the development of new technologies in the e-mobility sec-
tor is still very high. For example for FCEVs, several scenarios to a much higher uptake of FCEVs.
Figure 51.
New Registrations Vehicle Parc
100%
80%
e memory
n: 0.004 60%
Se: 0.002-0.1
As: 0.02-0.08 40%
20% 14%
5%
0%
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Gasoline (incl. Diesel (incl. Hybrid EV Hybrid EV Plug-in Hybrid Plug-in Hybrid Electric Fuel Cell Liquid Condensed xEV
mild hybrid) mild hybrid) Gasoline Diesel EV Gasoline EV Diesel Vehicles (EV) EV Petroleum Natural (any EV)
Gas (LPG) Gas (CNG)
Source: (Hill et al., 2019).
Source: adapted from Hill et al., 2019

3.2.1 Relevant technologies
To enable the change to cleaner, automated, connected and well. Improvements in (manufacturing) robotics as well as 3D
low-carbon mobility, a large range of technologies is to be printing of lightweight and high-strength components drive
further developed: batteries, fuel cells, traction motors and the evolutions. Both developments are potentially altering
ICT technologies will feed the deployment of e-mobility to- the traditional manufacturing base in a disruptive way. In
wards 2050 (Figure 52). At the same time, substantial chang- addition, digital technologies play a crucial role in increasing
es in underlying manufacturing processes are foreseen as
Figure 52. Relevant materials and technologies to the e-mobility sector
e-mobility
65
3.2.2 Raw materials in e-mobility and supply bottlenecks
The deployment of many technologies supporting the e-mo- more electronic, they will consume gallium, germanium and
bility sector will greatly impact the demand for materials in indium in for example sensors, displays, circuitry, etc. Other
the future. In particular, REEs (neodymium, dysprosium and alloying elements like chromium, tungsten and vanadium are
in demand by almost all technologies (Figure 53).
of motors in EVs. Mobile energy storage will require CRMs such Further upstream in the supply chains, other bottlenecks are
as lithium, cobalt and natural graphite in Li-ion batteries and
platinum in FCs. Structural parts and lightweight structure of materials step for all technologies is a concern. The most
vehicles will require materials such as magnesium, niobium, acute bottlenecks concern once again the assembly step for
silicon metal and titanium. As vehicles become increasingly Li-ion batteries and FCs.
Figure 53.
Silicon metal
Germanium
Manganese
Magnesium
Chromium
Vanadium
Scandium
Strontium
Zirconium
Tellurium
Tungsten
Titanium
Hafnium
Graphite
Niobium
Borates
Gallium
Lithium
Copper
Indium
Cobalt
HREEs
LREEs
Nickel
PGMs
Silver
Figure 54. Potential supply risks in the value chains of emerging technologies relevant to the EU e-mobility sector: Li-ion

materials
Power Traction
Energy Storage
Enabling Technologies
66
3.2.3 Projection of future materials demand
- Note that platinum is embedded both in FCEVs and in cata-

ing full, hybrid and FCEVs) in the EU were computed. In 2050, lytic converters of conventional vehicles and PHEVs. Interest-
ingly, considering a decrease of conventional vehicles in all
and MDS and 150 million vehicles in LDS. Figure 55 presents the considered scenarios, platinum demand in 2050 in cata-
EU annual consumption of materials for e-mobility sector lytic converters will occur only for the LDS scenario, as for the
other two scenarios there will be no PHEVs and conventional
and rare earths elements will increase dramatically.
Figure 55.
Additional material consumption for batteries, traction motors and fuel cells in e-mobility only

50 10
10
40 8
8
30 6
x times more
x times more
x times more
6
20 4 4
10 2 2
1x = 1x = 1x =
6 kt 250 kt 30 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Dysprosium Nickel Praseodymium

10 10 2,0
8 8
1,5
6 6
x times more
x times more
x times more
1,0
4 4
0,5
2 2
1x = 1x = 1x =
0,2 kt 500 kt 1 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Neodymium
2,0
1,5
x times more
Annex 2
1,0
+
0,5
metal, and steel have a negligible additional demand +
1x = Low Demand Scenario
4 kt
2030 2050
67
Technologies for e-mobility are currently under development, and their demand is expected to continue growing until
2050, with a consequent increase of the demand of typical (critical) raw materials and key components. For instance,
in 2050, the EU demand for lithium will be 10-50 times higher than the EU 2018 demand in all applications, depending
on the considered uptake of EVs and FCEVs. Similarly, the EU REEs demand in 2050 is expected to be 5-10 times higher
than their demand in 2018.
The EU is highly dependent on imports of several raw materials that are keys for the development of e-mobility, and
some of these materials have a very high and high supply risk (e.g. REEs, PGMs, cobalt and natural graphite).
Focusing on the supply chain, the most vulnerable steps are the raw materials and the assembly stages. China, Africa
-
plier of batteries components (i.e. cathode, anode, Li-ion cells) and, together with Japan, dominates the production of
permanent magnets and traction motors. In addition, fuel cells are mainly imported from the US and Asia. The EU is
less vulnerable for processing materials, e.g. platinum for FCEVs.
Although end-of-life collection of vehicles is rather well or-

ganised in the EU, recycling as source of secondary materials in domestic production of key components for e-mobility
at industrial level is not yet developed enough to consistently (e.g. European Battery Alliance), improvement of end-of-life
in the area, also to avoid collection and recycling leakages. design, the extension the lifetime of key components (such
Even though mitigation measures to increase EU indepen- as traction motors). Overall, circular strategies allow boosting
dence should be strengthened, the EU has already adopted
value chain.
in various steps of the value chains (e.g. mining of REEs, diver-
68
3.3 Defence and aerospace
3.3.1 Military applications and emerging technologies relevant to the European defence sector
The EU defence industry comprises a large number of origi- ket in terms of innovation and cost. The defence sector may
nal equipment manufacturers (OEMs), also known as prima-
ry contractors, system builders, equipment suppliers and a likely invest more readily in research than industry. Its de-
complex network of suppliers. These European OEMs produce mand for raw materials, which is low in terms of volume, may
many defence applications, which are divided into six sectors: also be much less elastic than the civil sector’s, which means
air, naval, land, space, electronic and missile (JRC, 2016b). that they may acquire raw materials at a higher price than the
New technologies will contribute to the development of
even more performant defence applications. Of the emerg- -
ing technologies assessed in this report, seven are consid- plications as being ‘strategic’, meaning that they are not
ered important to Europe’s defence: advanced batteries, FCs, -
photovoltaics, robotics, unmanned vehicles, 3DP and ICT. As
these are also extensively used in the civil sectors (dual-use), strategic or critical, is of great importance for the EU defence
- and aerospace industry.
Figure 56. Relevant materials and technologies to the defence and aerospace sectors
Defence &
Space
3.3.2 Raw and processed materials in the European defence and aerospace sectors
Raw materials used in the defence sector

As with many other economic sectors, the EU defence indus- super-alloys. These properties make them indispensable in
try relies on the use of a wide range of materials with unique aeronautic applications. Beryllium is used as a lightweight
properties that make them essential for the manufacture of
components used in military applications because the use lighter and stronger than steel, and thus enables reducing
of substitutes does not always guarantee the same perfor- weight and improving speed and manoeuvrability. Beryllium
mance. For example, REEs are indispensable in remotely pi-
-
sers and satellite communications. Rare earths are produced
almost exclusively in China, which raises concerns not only missiles and satellites thanks to their superior stability, low
on potential supply disruptions but also on strategic security. -
High-performing alloys that are used, for instance, in fuselag- ness, low density and high abrasion resistance.
The raw materials and processed materials used in the pro-
niobium, vanadium or molybdenum. Other alloys are based on duction of relevant European defence applications are iden-
69
defence applications from the land, air, naval, space, elec- the manufacture of defence-related subsystems and com-
tronic and missile sectors are disaggregated into subsystems ponents. Based on their chemical structure and properties,
and components. these raw materials are grouped into four categories: metals,
When looking at the raw materials as the constituents of precious metals, REEs and non-metals (Figure 57). Of these
39 raw materials, 22 are critical for the EU economy based on
as mostly necessary for their production, and therefore for the latest 2020 assessment.
Figure 57. Relevant raw materials used in defence applications.

Source: adapted from KU, 2018
39 raw materials
28 ‘basic’ metals 3 precious metals 2 non-metals 6 rare earths
Aluminium Cadmium Chromium Copper Gold Selenium
Iron Lead Manganese Molybdenum Silver
Nickel Rhenium Thorium Tin Dysprosium
Boron Samarium
Zinc Zirconium Platinum
Cobalt Neodymium
Barium Beryllium Yttrium
Praseodymium
Indium Lithium Magnesium Niobium Other REE*
Tantalum Titanium Tungsten Vanadium 22 critical raw materials
*a group of other 11 REEs
47 main processed materials

Figure: Relevant raw materials used in defence applications
Although the demand for raw materials used in the produc- molybdenum, neodymium, niobium, praseodymium, samari-
tion of defence applications is relatively low in volume, some um, tantalum, titanium, yttrium and other REEs). Overall, for
- more than two thirds of those raw materials, the share of
ply. A particular challenge of the European defence industry imports exceeds 50% (Figure 58).
is related to the downstream supply of processed materials, Based on the criticality rating assigned to these 22 CRMs and
including materials processing know-how and transformation -
capabilities. The EU is a large manufacturer of alloys and ics are the most vulnerable to potential materials supply con-
special steel, but has limited production capacities for spe- straints. In view of the strategic importance of the defence
ciality composite materials and their precursors. and aerospace sector for Europe’s security and competitive-
Many defence applications require the same materials that ness, it is imperative that the related manufacturing indus-
are also used in the civil sector. However, in some cases the tries operate under uninterrupted conditions. Therefore, the
- European defence industry needs to secure the supply of a
ence with ‘civil’ materials is that the defence applications re- number of raw materials from international sources, maintain
quire higher purity or special composition of the alloys. its global leadership in the manufacture of high-performance
The EU is fully dependent on imports of 13 of the 39 raw ma- alloys and special steel, and further develop capabilities for
terials (i.e. boron (as borates), dysprosium, gold, magnesium, the production of speciality composite materials.
70
Figure 58. Use in defence applications and supply risk of raw materials used by the EU defence industry.
Supply Risk Material Aeronautics Naval Land Space Electronics Missiles

6,20 Dysprosium
6,12 Samarium
6,07 Neodymium
5,67 Other REEs
5,49 Praseodymium
4,20 Yttrium
3,91 Magnesium
3,90 Niobium
3,89 Germanium
3,19 Borates
2,54 Cobalt
2,22 Beryllium
1,84 Platinum
1,79 Indium
1,69 Vanadium
1,64 Lithium
1,61 Tungsten
1,36 Tantalum
1,26 Titanium
1,26 Baryte
1,26 Gallium
1,12 Hafnium
0,94 Molybdenum
0,93 Manganese
0,90 Tin
0,86 Chromium
0,83 Zirconium
0,68 Silver
0,59 Aluminium
0,49 Nickel
0,46 Iron ore
0,45 Rhenium
0,41 Selenium
0,34 Cadmium
0,34 Zinc
0,32 Copper
0,19 Gold
0,09 Lead
71
Materials used in aeronautic defence applications materials, providing greater resistance and less weight. In the
The defence industry’s aeronautics sub-sector is facing the defence industry, this translates into higher manoeuvrability
biggest challenges, as it requires a large number of very spe- and long-distance independency (low fuel consumption) of
cialised, innovative and complex materials, such as compos-
The materials used in aeronautic applications are also de- in Figure 60.
noted as ‘aerospace materials’ and the most relevant are Europe’s alloy industry is represented by companies along
the following: aluminium alloys, steel alloys, titanium alloys, the entire value chain of materials. These companies are en-
super-alloys, composite materials and other materials such gaged in the production, processing and supply of specialised
as ceramics, GLARE – glass laminate aluminium reinforced high-performance alloys covering a wide area of end-users,
epoxy, magnesium and special alloys. including the defence industry sector. However, the EU lacks
With the evolution of the aeronautics industry, traditionally
used materials such as metals and metal-based alloys are their precursors, e.g. polyacrylonitrile (PAN), which are needed
constantly being replaced by new lightweight materials such for composite materials and are currently mainly produced in
as titanium alloys, composite materials, especially those Japan and the USA. In spite of the limited production within
- the EU of all materials used in defence applications, at the
present time there is a potential low-to-moderate supply
use up to 50% composites (Figure 59). These materials of- -
fer greater strength characteristics compared with traditional ished materials used by EU defence industries.
Figure 59. Estimated composites loading in various defence aeronautic applications
EU producers
50%
EU+other producers
USA producers 38%
33%
30%
24% 25%
21%
10%
7% 8%
1% 1% 2% 2% 2%
Gripen
Euro ghter
F-15
F-16
F-22
F-35
C-17
Ra ale
C-27J
F A-18E
C-130J
F A-18C
CN-235
A-400M
Mirage-2000
Figure: Estimated composites loading (percentage) in various defence aeronautic applications
Materials used in space applications have an impact on the availability of certain advanced mate-
Although the space sector is a high-end niche that represents
few revenues compared to its associated services market
such as the global telecommunications sector, its growth has
constantly outperformed worldwide economic growth over satellites or launch systems. Sometimes, the limitations in
the last decade (Oleson, 2016). The space industry today is materials properties and availability shape the design of the
space product. For example, the design of the Space Shut-
the ‘democratisation’ and ‘industrialisation’ of space (OECD, tle systems encountered many material challenges, such as
2016). The deployment of mega-constellation systems today weight savings, reusability, and operating in the space en-
is a reality while more and more private actors are involved in
space activities. An important growth of the launch rates and with two Space Shuttle accidents caused by materials fail-
thus satellites population is expected in the next decades ures (Challenger and Columbia).
(Muelhaupt et al., 2019). This new international trend could
72
Figure 60.
WINGS: ENGINE:
SYSTEMS: Carbon Epoxy Nickel
Cadmium composites Cobalt
Tellurium Titanium Chromium
Mercury Aluminium Molybdenum
Germanium Vanadium Aluminium
Neodymium Copper Titanium
Yttrium Magnesium Hafnium
Aluminium Manganese Vanadium
Copper Tantalum
Beryllium Tungsten
Indium CANOPY:
Spacial Glass
Tantalum TAIL:
Cobalt Carbon Epoxy
NOZZLE &
NOSE:
Kevlar
COMBUSTION:
SENSORS & Carbon Carbon
ELECTRONICS: FUSELAGE: composite
Gallium Carbon Epoxy
Cadmium composite FLAPS:
Tellurium Aluminium LANDING Iron
Mercury Zinc GEAR: Chromium
Rare earths Magnesium Carbon Epoxy Nickel
Beryllium Copper composite Molybdenum
Silver Zirconium Aluminium Aluminium
Titanium
raw materials critical raw materials
The literature lacks of comprehensive overviews of raw and Titanium is readily available, however the origin is not pos-
advanced materials needed in the space sector. The Europe- sible to trace in the global market.
an Space Agency (ESA) released some information during a
-
past workshop, including:
plications. They need to operate in extreme conditions and
Typically, the quantity of materials for satellites is small environments and thus require particular properties control
depending on the type of satellite. Launchers however use
larger volumes (the Vega launcher weighs 137 t); and ma- to comply with the space industry standards (ESA, 2020).
Consequently, the substitution of materials and processes
lifetime of a launcher is about 20 years); aiming to decrease the supply risk in the space sector is not
straightforward.
composites of high modulus of elasticity for space appli- In parallel, the end-of-life recycling appears challenging. The
cations. There is only one Japanese manufacturer and the use of recycled germanium has been considered for solar ar-
European industry has potential access only to a fraction of
-
can market; space applications (that use pristine materials exclusively).
Apart from the reuse of the launcher lower stages, the re-
There is limited European production capability for resins
covery of materials at the end of the mission is not realistic.
(1-2 companies). The performance of ‘no-name’ resins
It comes from the current design of space missions: a sys-
from Asia is untested;
tematic dissipation of the materials occurs in the outer space
There are some concerns regarding the availability of high environment or during the atmospheric re-entry.
strength aluminium alloys (7075 series) because of the
small quantities needed by the market;
73
Supply chain bottlenecks for emerging technologies relevant to the defence sector
Like for the two other sectors, the weakest steps in the supply duction, supplying around more than half of the raw materi-
chain of the seven selected technologies are the supply of als. The other half of the raw materials is produced by numer-
- ous small suppliers with minor shares of global production. At
lar for Li-ion batteries and FCs, but also to a lesser extent the components level, though some supply risks are detected
to drones. The dependence of the EU on the supply of raw for Li-ion batteries and drones, solar PV and robotics seems
materials for these emerging technologies is extremely high to be the most vulnerable of the technologies. The supply
(Figure 61). The EU produces on average around 3% of the of processed materials is shown to be particularly critical for
overall raw materials required in these technologies (without Li-ion batteries.
considering digital technologies). China dominates global pro-
Figure 61. Potential supply risks in the value chains and key suppliers of emerging technologies relevant to the European
defence sector

materials
Defence and Aerospace
74
The defence and aerospace sector’s materials supply chain is a complex multi-level network of material suppliers,
-
is essential for the overall growth and competitiveness of the European defence and aerospace industry. In the case
of European sector, the ESA promotes the geographic return rules, which increases the number of suppliers throughout
The space sector is a technological enabling sector. Its most important role is not transmitting data or imagery through
hybrid systems merging terrestrial and space system activities could de-compartmentalise the sector during the next
decade. For instance, drone or airborne imagery integrated into high-resolution satellite remote sensing, or hybrid-tele-
communication/internet system (e.g. for 5G application) could be envisaged (Marchese et al., 2019).
The supply risk of raw materials produced in this country is considered high and it may be interrupted (e.g. by imposing
export restriction and taxes). Among these 39 raw materials, the EU is the largest global supplier for hafnium only.
Figure 62. Key players in the supply of raw materials used in defence sector
58%
24%
8% 8%
2%
China South A rica Chile United States Others
A number of actions need to be taken for better understand- Regarding the materials supply risk for emerging technolo-
ing of and improving the security of supply of raw and pro- gies relevant to the defence and aerospace sector, it is im-
portant that the EU reduces its dependency and increases
and aerospace industry, including:
components. Besides increasing domestic production, other
tech and advanced materials; strategies include the substitution of critical materials, recy-
Strengthening the downstream segment of its materials one of the options to mitigate short- to medium-term supply
supply chain and, in particular, materials processing know- disruptions in the event of a crisis.
how and materials transformation capabilities;
Improving the knowledge base for the materials used, for
example by promoting information sharing between all rel-
evant stakeholders.
75
3.4 Sectorial competition and securing future raw materials supply

Sectorial competition for raw materials reliant on imports for some of them (e.g. for niobium, chromi-
Many critical materials have a range of applications in various um, tantalum), their availability to the EU might become even
industrial sectors, including renewable energy, e-mobility, de- more demanding. Competition between world regions for the
fence and aerospace and digital sectors, as well as medical, access to raw materials will become more acute as a result of
chemical and petrochemical sectors. There will be an increas- the transition towards a low-carbon economy and based on
ing competition between all sectors for the same raw materi- new industrial strategies.
als, processed materials as well as components. This applies Figure 63 shows the future cumulative EU annual material
for example to critical raw materials such as borates, gallium, demand for the e-mobility plus renewables sector (no quan-
indium, rare earths, cobalt, niobium and silicon metal. As the titative data is available for defence and aerospace sectors).
mineral commodities are traded on international markets, (See Annex 1 – Methodological notes and Annex 2 – Data
and as other key countries such as the USA and China are tables for more information)
Figure 63.
Additional material consumption batteries, fuel cells, wind turbines and photovoltaics in
renewables and e-mobility only
60 15 15
40 10 10
x times more
x times more
x times more
20 5 5
1x = 1x = 1x =
6 kt 250 kt 30 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Dysprosium Neodymium Nickel

15 10 5
8 4
10
6 3
x times more
x times more
x times more
4 2
5
2 1
1x = 1x = 1x =
0,2 kt 4 kt 500 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Praseodymium
5
4 Annex 2
3 High Demand Scenario

x times more
2
+
1 selenium, silicon metal, terbium, tellurium, silver, steel and
+
1x =
Low Demand Scenario
1 kt
2030 2050
76
The security of supply with regard to material dependence need to work together to ensure access to up-to-date reliable
should therefore be regarded through a supply chain ap- information for the Member States and stakeholders (e.g. as
proach, taking into account the linkages between various done in the Raw Materials Information System) in relation to
supply chain steps, and even various regions of the world. A the most critical CRMs. The exchange of data and information
permanent monitoring of raw materials markets and (strate- and international cooperation, should be supported in an in-
gic) supply chains is necessary and industry and policymakers tegrated manner at EU, Member State and corporate levels.
Many factors come into play when the supply–demand bal- times to bring new capacity online, as well as resource na-
ance would become tight in the future: the defence sector tionalism (e.g. export ban imposed by top-producer Indone-
for example will not accept production stops and will most -
probably have precedence in acquiring the necessary raw ma- ance.
terials for itscomparatively small demand. For lithium, the market is currently in surplus due to recent
A high growth rate as displayed in Figure 63 does not directly
convert to a raw material supply bottleneck in the future. This -
depends on the overall supply–demand balance. For the raw ever, further and large investments are needed at the global
material supply part of this balance, the combination of raw level to meet the fast-growing demand in the medium term,
material prices linked to mining investments and technical and from 2024-2025 the market is expected to start mov-
growth in demand, physical lithium shortages are not expect-

ed in the long term given the high amount of global resources
The main concerns about the ultimate future supply capac-
ities for selected material are the following. For REEs (dys-
prosium, neodymium and praseodymium), end-users outside -
of China will remain vulnerable on China’s dominance of the curity of supply is the high supply concentration. Democratic
global rare earth value chain (mining, oxides, metals, alloys Republic of the Congo currently holds about 60% of the glob-
and magnets) in the foreseeable future. The rising annual
- output. With substantial reserves, Democratic Republic of the
Congo will also drive the required additional mine supply to
depletion of historically accumulated reserves, shortages are the market in the future. However, low governance and high
foreseen in case additional sources of supply are not devel- instability, in combination with the high proportion (10-20%)
oped (Adamas Intelligence, 2019). Dysprosium is more vul- of artisanal and small-scale mining in the country’s output
- -
portion in most REE ores. pending on the prevailing battery chemistries and despite
A structural change in supply is expected for the already
onwards.
towards nickel class-1. High-purity class-1 nickel (cathodes,
carbonyl nickel, briquettes, powders, etc.) is used in a wide For graphite, the outlook for natural graphite mine supply
range of applications, including special steel and batteries, is positive as several companies continue to develop new
and accounted for 43 % of global nickel output in 2018 (Nick-
el Institute, 2018). Class-2 nickel is used for stainless steel in China for spherical graphite used in battery anodes might
production and accounted for 57% of world nickel produc- pose a challenge for the future. Since synthetic graphite is
tion in 2018. Ramping up supply to avoid a shortfall in the a potential substitute for natural graphite, growing demand
for battery-grade spherical graphite can be met by increasing
- the production of synthetic graphite.
pacity. Technological challenges, lack of investments in nickel
77
4 Conclusions and Recommendations
The novelty of this foresight study lies in the systematic and als are the basis for all industrial value chains and ultimately
homogeneous description of supply chain dependencies contribute to societal well-being. This study contributes to
ranging from raw materials, processed materials, compo- various actions listed in the Communication “Critical Raw Ma-
terials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security
sectors. Individual technologies and sectors compete for the and Sustainability” (European Commission, 2020) to secure
same raw materials and processed materials. These materi- current and future supply of materials:
Build and use knowledge and intelligence Economic diplomacy

-
of current situation and foresights for a selection of key tech-
nologies and sectors. The analysis conducted can act as a components and assemblies for each industrial supply chain
template for follow-up research and deepened analyses for is a crucial starting point. Figure 65 reports the main coun-
individual materials, technologies and sectors towards a more
complete foresight of raw materials needs for the future as technology evaluated.
well as to a more permanent and structural monitoring of raw -
material markets. macy, sustainable sourcing and use of EU domestic potential,
It is recommended to: more precise and comprehensive information is needed on
Improve and harmonise data for the technologies evaluat- the current state of play.
ed in this study. Supplement the analysis of technologies It is recommended to:
analysed only qualitatively so far: This counts for robotics, Investigate new (material) innovation partnerships with
drones and 3DP technologies and digital technologies and material suppliers in the EU as well as in third countries to
the defence sector. Further assessment of additional rele- enhance cooperation; improve raw material and processed
vant technologies and sectors is advised. materials quality as well as availability for high-tech appli-
Improve the foresight methodology applied, originally de- cations to secure future supply of raw materials for strate-
veloped for the Materials for Dual Use report (JRC, 2019a). gic value chains;
Consistency can be improved by removing overlaps in cur- Besides attention to the physical origins of materials, com-
rent indicators and by including more recent information ponents and assembly, protection of valuable intellectual
and data. property should also get attention. Although not explicitly
For certain materials, the actual EU consumption numbers mentioned so far, in many cases in this analysis, concerns
are rather incomplete or highly uncertain due to their pres- are raised by experts regarding IPR protection of innova-
- tions originating from the EU ((JRC, 2019a).
cult to extract from trade data. It is advised to further the The Screening of Foreign Direct Investments regulation
Material System Analyses. Additionally, the current focus in
demand and supply is on the EU. Obviously, trends in the supply and raw materials in Article 4 to detect whether
rest of the world need to be considered.
the regulation also mentions access to sensitive informa-
for minerals production are needed in order to construct tion as a factor to be taken into consideration (e.g. Horizon
more insight in the overall supply–demand balances for 2020 is mentioned in this context). As such, we recommend
the most relevant raw materials. that the risk created by inward FDIs in the selected val-
ue chains should be assessed on all relevant EU assets,
Strengthen resilience of industrial ecosystems
This foresight study provides a starting point for industry and by an analysis of European outward Direct Investments in
governments in decision-making, for example for formulating the respective global supply and value chains to assess EU
leadership and whether there are restrictions – a non-level
of both the EU, member states and companies. The outcomes
point to directly to the most relevant materials and/or supply
chain stages with the highest supply risk for each sector.
It is recommended to:
Regularly update and deepen this analysis to more value
defence and space applications and other new manufac-

turing technologies.
79
4 Conclusion and Recommendations
Better use of domestic potential, circular economy and Develop innovation and skills for the digital age
sustainable sourcing
Skills, educational capacities for a range of relevant disci-
Potential cross-sectoral cooperation and alliances to secure plines are required for the envisaged transition to a low-car-
access to raw materials requires cross-sectoral understand- bon economy. Due to mobilisation of research and interna-
ing of competition for the same materials supply. It is import-
ant to identify overlaps in new material demands to explore to realise dematerialisation by means of substitution.
synergies in creating stable markets for the respective ma- It is recommended to:
Give further attention to research and innovation in materi-
the same materials expected to see a high demand increase
al sciences, geosciences and metallurgy to remain interna-
in the future as illustrated in this study.Synergies can be ex-
-
plored for materials present in one sector that could become
tion strategies, skills and innovation are a core ingredient to
available via reuse, refurbishing and recycling for other sec-
tors at a later stage.
It is recommended to: strategies.
Analyse the impact of low-carbon technologies on the en-
Develop technical capabilities related to processing of a
vironmental footprint related to related greenhouse gas
range of metals like niobium, hafnium, zirconium and scan-
emissions embedded in raw material imports and the so-
dium: Their availability enables innovations in advanced
materials properties like weight reduction, high strength
-
and corrosion resistance for a wide range of technologies
tion outside the EU to realise sustainable sourcing;
and value chains;
Extend the current analysis per technology to quantify the
A comprehensive list of 42 materials evaluated in this study
potential role of recycling, reuse and remanufacturing to
on their use in strategic technologies is provided in Figure 64.
reduce dependencies, which was not included in the scope
It can be used when further evaluating and quantifying the
of this study.
amounts of the most relevant materials in individual tech-
nologies.
Figure 65 shows the main locations of raw materials produc-
tion, processed materials, components and assembly man-
ufacturing, respectively, aggregated for all assessed tech-
nologies. It shows that the main concerns relate to the raw
materials stage, with roughly 3 % of the origin related to EU
from China.
80
Figure 64.
Supply Risk Material

5,98 LREEs
5,63 HREEs
3,91 Magnesium
3,90 Niobium
3,89 Germanium
3,55 Phosphorus
3,19 Borates
3,09 Scandium
2,57 Strontium
2,54 Cobalt
2,38 PGMs
2,29 Beryllium
2,27 Natural graphite
2,22 Bismuth
2,01 Antimony
1,79 Indium
1,69 Vanadium
1,64 Lithium
1,61 Tungsten
1,36 Tantalum
1,15 Fluorspar
1,26 Titanium
1,26 Gallium
1,19 Arsenic
1,18 Silicon metal
1,12 Hafnium
0,94 Molybdenum
0,93 Manganese
0,90 Tin
0,86 Chromium
0,83 Zirconium
0,68 Silver
0,59 Aluminium
0,51 Tellurium
0,49 Nickel
0,46 Iron Ore
0,41 Selenium
0,34 Zinc
0,34 Cadmium
0,32 Copper
0,19 Gold
0,09 Lead
Materials in red are critical raw materials.
81
Figure 65.
total represented as country shares
Batteries Fuel cells Motors Wind PV Robotics Drones 3D printing ICT
40 %
Raw materials
30 %
20 %
10 %
40 %
Processed materials
30 %
20 %
10 %
40 %
Components
30 %
20 %
10 %
40 %
Assemblies
30 %
20 %
10 %
27
ina
ia
ia
ca
rs
rop
pa
ric
US
ss
As
he
eri
EU
Ch
Af
Ja
Ru
Ot
Eu
Am
of
of
st
tin
Re
st
La
Re
82
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85
Annexes
Additional
Additional material consumption for batteries in e-mobility only in 2030/2050 material consumption for
compared to current EU consumptio
Executive summary and all 2030 and 2050 raw materials demand visualisations
50 10 10 Lithium**
visualised in the chart on the right is based on three scenar-
ios: the baseline scenario (medium demand scenario, MDS), 50 10
40 the raw materials consumption ‘optimistic’ 8 scenario (‘low-de- 8
mand – high substitution’ scenario, LDS), and the materials
x times more
x times more
x times more
consumption ‘pessimistic’ scenario (‘high demand – low sub-
30 6
stitution’ scenario, HDS). MDS is characterised by average as- 40 6 8
sumptions on the sensitivity drivers, and it depicts the most
x times more
x times more
20 likely and credible scenario in the light of4current technology 4
and market trends. LDS and HDS are conceived to include 30 6
simultaneously all more radical assumptions for the sensitiv-
10 2 2
ity drivers. These scenarios should not be considered as like-
ly or realistic, but rather as the reasonable higher and lower
1x =
20 1x =
4
1x =
boundaries of future materials demand. 250 kt 30 kt
6 kt
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
Capacity trends combined with the assumptions on lifetime
allow calculating the annually deployed capacity, expressed 10 2
Nickel of vehicles. Market shares determine
in GW or number Manganese
how
5 0,10 1x =
- 1x = data in Annex 2
terial intensity indicates the quantity of material per unit of 6 kt 250 kt

4 capacity or per technology. 0,08 2030
*** increase in demand of all
2050 2
natural
Capacity scenarios are common for renewables and vehicles,
x times more
x times more
3 -
0,06
sumptions apply to the other sensitivity drivers, as described
Nickel
in Section 2 for each individual technology. 0,10
2 0,04 5 +
The future capacities of renewables and vehicles derive from
policy-relevant scenarios. LDS and MDS are derived from the
1 EU Long-Term Strategy (LTS) – A Clean0,02Planet for All and the
4 + 0,08
third one is a JRC-TIMES scenario developed for the Low Car- Low Demand Scenario
1x = 1x =
4000 kt
x times more
x times more
500 kt
2030 2050graphs? 2030 2050 3
How to interpret the 0,06
The vertical axis of the 2030/2050 graphs displays the addi-
tional material demand for the selected application/technol-
ogy or sector only, in comparison to the average total EU con- 2 0,04
sumption derived from the assessment for the 2020 list of
are possible. In the next data tables in Annex 2, also alterna-
tive values are presented, based on two other main sources:
and harmonised baseline, the average of the global material 1 0,02
supply is used as a starting point since this is the best docu- The average EU consumption determined in the 2020 CRM
mented value available for all materials. In order to make a
fair analysis, the increase in EU consumption is compared to 1x = - 1x =
the EU share of this global supply, estimated via the econom- 500 kt 4000 kt
ic share, being 22 % of GDP. Since the data from 2020 list of
2030 2050 2
The second alternative is the EU production data, where
CRMs is based on the 5-year average for 2012-2016, the ‘1x’ available. Obviously, the EU is a net importer, therefore for
reference point in the graph equals this value (i.e. 22 % of the most materials the ‘x times extra’ values will be dramat-
global supply). ically higher in this case. The values however provide an
The values presented are additional demand, meaning that
when a value of 1 is presented, this means for example an to the estimated future demand for raw materials.
increase in total consumption of this material with 6 000 t,
The reference values for the baseline are listed in the next
in addition to the 2015 total consumption. A value less than
table
1 does not mean a reduction, e.g. 0.50 means 50% more
materials or 1.5 times the current demand.
87
Annexes
Reference values for the baseline
Average of 2012-2017 global Selected

supply x 22% EU share of stage for the EU consumption in tonnes EU domestic
Material global GDP in tonnes analysis (less reliable for some materials) production in tonnes
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Aluminium NA 12 000 000 NA 5 000 000 NA 2 000 000
Borate 200 000 40 000 20 000 40 000 NA NA
Cadmium NA 5 000 NA 700 NA 2 000
Chromium 2 000 000 1 000 000 400 000 800 000 300 000 300 000
Cobalt 30 000 20 000 1 (ores) 10 000 20 000 2 000 10 000
Copper 4 000 000 5 000 000 1 (ores) 1 000 000 3 000 000 790 000 3 000 000
Dysprosium 200 NA 1 (ores) 10 5 NA NA
Gallium NA 50 NA 30 NA 20
Germanium NA 30 NA 20 NA 10
Indium NA 200 NA 60 NA 70
Iron ore 449 000 000 357 000 000 1 (ores) 128 000 000 164 000 000 36 000 000 156 000 000
Lithium 7 000 6 000 1 000 2 000 100 NA
Manganese 4 000 000 3 000 000 1 (ores) 300 000 500 000 32 000 400 000
Molybdenum 60 000 NA 1 (ores) 30 000 30 000 NA 4 000
Natural 300 000 NA 1 (ores) 90 000 NA 2 100 NA
graphite
Neodymium 4 000 NA 1 (ores) 60 40 NA NA
Nickel 500 000 400 000 1 (ores) 60 000 400 000 46 800 100 000
Platinum NA 40 NA 50 NA 1
Praseodymium 1 000 NA 1 (ores) 20 20 NA NA
Selenium NA 700 NA 1 000 NA 1 000
Silicon metal NA 600 000 NA 400 000 NA 200 000
Silver 6 000 7 000 1 (ores) 3 000 800 2 000 4 000
Tellurium NA 80 NA 30 NA 30
Terbium 50 NA 1 (ores) 20 5 NA NA
Zinc 3 000 000 3 000 000 1 (ores) 2 000 000 2 000 000 725 500 2 000 000
*NA = Not available data.
The 2020 CRM assessment of supply risk per material is ei- applied for this report. All materials where stage 2 is selected
ther based on the global ore supply (stage 1) or global supply are marked in the legend.
Executive summary – Supply risk and raw material technology, based on the current and future scenarios pre-
occurrences Sankey diagrams sented in Chapter 2. The multiplication of the occurrence of
each raw material with these percentages determines the
(Figure 2, Figure 47, Figure 48, Figure 52, Figure 53, Figure 57
-
and Figure 58). The Sankey diagram of Figure 2 represents
proach is applied for the share of each technology feeding
into the three sectors visualised on the right
-
es). For each material evaluated, a substantiated estimate is
made by the authors on the share of material used in each
88
Figure A1. Overview of the parameters used in assessing the supply bottlenecks along the value chain.
materials
1. Global Supply Risk 1. Global Supply Risk

1. Global Supply Risk 1. Global Supply Risk
2. European domestic supply 2. European domestic supply
2. European domestic supply 2. European domestic supply
3. Demand trends
3. Criticality factor
4. Import Reliance
5. Substitution
6. Recycling
Section 1.2 Approach – Assessment of supply chain Intermediate values, represented by yellow, orange or various
bottlenecks intensities of green, indicate that a potential supply issue/risk
The potential bottlenecks in the supply chains of the strategic
technologies selected for this study were assessed through a
tailored methodology using several parameters for each step each parameter with an equal weight through an arithmetic
of the supply chain (Figure A1). mean before being combined and scaled from 0 to 1.
The potential supply bottlenecks and country supply share The key country producers for raw materials step was cal-
along the value chain for all technologies were assessed culated by using the country share for material. For other
according to the methodology used in the JRC study (JRC,
2019b). approach which takes into account the headquarters location.
However, such an approach could introduce some discrepan-
Six parameters are used to evaluate the potential supply risks
at the level of raw materials, namely: (1) global supply risk; (2)
-
European production (domestic supply); (3) criticality factor
graphical location where actual production takes place.
CRM list); (4) import reliance of Europe for a particular raw
material; (5) substitution; and (6) recycling. For steps 2, 3 and The materials demand estimations are based on three sce-
4 in the supply chain, two parameters are used: (1) global narios: low demand scenario (LDS), medium demand scenario
supply risk; and (2) European production (domestic supply). (MDS) and high demand scenario (HDS) according to a JRC
The global supply risk for all steps has been determined using methodology (JRC, 2020a). MDS is characterised by average
- assumptions on the sensitivity drivers, while LDS and HDS are
tion of supply. The European domestic supply corresponds conceived to include simultaneously all the radical assump-
to the European shares determined during the supply chain tions on the sensitivity drivers. These two scenarios should
analysis. An additional parameter – demand trends – is con- not be considered as likely or realistic, but rather as the rea-
sidered at the last step in the supply chain, indicating demand sonable higher and lower boundaries of materials demand
increases forecast for the future. futures.
The indicators are normalised in the range of 0 to 1; lower The main sensitivity drivers considered in this study are:
values indicate a relatively higher degree of supply risk. The
Size of technology deployment/sectors (e.g. electricity gen-
-
-
trix. The following two marginal cases are distinguished.
bility);
Red area (corresponding to value 0), indicating a very high
supply risk and the presence of substantial supply issues Lifetime of technologies (e.g. of energy plants for renew-
combined with a limited ability to adapt or tackle them due able, of vehicles for e-mobility);
to the nature of the impact/risk. Sub-technology market shares;
Green area (corresponding to value 1), indicating the best Material intensity in technologies.
case scenario, or no detectable supply issues.
89
Annexes
Capacity trends combined with the assumptions on lifetime io developed for the Low Carbon Energy Observatory (LCEO)
allow calculating the annually deployed capacity, expressed
in GW or number of vehicles. Market shares determine how LDS – LTS Baseline: considers the EU legally binding tar-
gets by 2030 and targets a 64 % reduction of GHG emis-
sions by 2050
intensity indicates the quantity of material per unit of capac-
ity or per vehicle. MDS – LTS 1.5°C Technical: considers the EU legally binding
targets by 2030 (hence it is identical to the LTS Baseline
Capacity scenarios are common for renewables and vehicles,
until this date) and targets a 100 % reduction of GHG emis-
-
sions by 2050;
sumptions apply to the other sensitivity drivers, as described
in the relevant sections in Chapter 2. HDS – JRC-TIMES ZeroCarbon: almost complete decarboni-
The future capacities of renewables and vehicles derive from sation by 2050 and stronger decarbonisation in 2030 than
policy-relevant scenarios. LDS and MDS are from the EU
Long-Term Strategy (LTS – A Clean Planet for All) (European Deal (European Commission, 2019).
Commission, 2018) and the third one is a JRC-TIMES scenar-
Section 2.1 Batteries Converting demand scenarios to raw materials amounts for
energy storage systems
Converting demand scenarios to raw materials amounts for
batteries for vehicles The demand of materials for Li-ion batteries in ESS is derived
considering the penetration rate of Li-ion batteries, the vari-
Key underlying parameters used in Section 2.1 include vari-
ation of chemistries and the materials content per chemistry
ations in time of vehicle lifetimes, battery capacities, chem-
along time. Since the Li-ion batteries showed a rapid growth
istries share and material content of various chemistries (ex-
in the last decade (IRENA, 2017; JRC, 2018a), scenarios con-
pressed in kg of materials per KWh). For instance, nickel–rich
sider a linear increase of the penetration rate of Li-ion bat-
battery chemistries with lower cobalt content like NMC 811
teries in ESS from the current 57% to the following levels in
are already available in the market and increasingly replac-
2050: 60% in the LDS, 70% in the MDS and 80% in the HDS
ing NMC 111 (Leader et al., 2019). As far as possible, as-
scenario.
sumptions have been aligned with previous JRC reports like
(JRC, 2018c). Historic time series for all batteries placed on
the market, in stock and as waste generated potential are
provided online for the EU-28 in the JRC-RMIS (JRC, 2020b).
Section 2.2 Fuel cells market and the variation of the platinum content along time
-
About 28 grams of platinum (e.g. 0.25 g/kW of platinum is
narios. For instance, the LDS a reduction of about 50% of
used in the 113 kW FC engine of the Toyota Mirai FCV) used
platinum in 2050 compared to 2030, while the reduction for
as an assumption for all FC vehicles.
the MDS is about 40% and for the HDS, about 20%.
The HDS considers a rapid uptake of FC vehicles in the EU
The estimate of the platinum demand for FCs in storage sys-
starting from 2030 and a saturation of the market in 2040.
tems take into account the variation of the platinum content
The slowest uptake of FCEVs is assumed by the LDS, where
in time: it is assumed 60% (LDS), 33% (MDS) and 20% (HDS)
FCEVs should account for only about one fourth of the full
reductions in 2050 compared to 2030 (Hao et al., 2019).
FCEVs is derived considering the amount of FCEVs placed on
Section 2.3 Wind The combination of these lifetime values with the capacity
scenarios allows calculating the yearly deployed capacity,
Wind capacities and lifetimes
which is the driver of materials demand (Figure 21).
Manufactures normally guarantee a lifetime longer than 20
Materials in wind turbines
years. On the other hand, some turbines have reached an op-
erational lifetime of 30 years. Thus 20 years is assumed to be Low, medium and high demand scenarios for the market
the lifetime in HDS, while 30 years is chosen for LDS. In fact, -
shorter lifetime implies higher replacement rate, hence higher manent magnet generators. In detail, the evolution of mar-
demand, and vice versa (Garrett and Rønde, 2017). ket shares is as follows. An extrapolation based on historical
time series was applied to LDS, also considering the uptake
-
of high-temperature superconductors (HTS) generators. The
erage, hence 35 years have been assumed for LDS, 30 years
same extrapolation as for LDS has been applied to MDS, but
for MDS, and 25 years for HDS (JRC, 2019c).
90
- composites, Al, Cr, Cu, Fe, Mn, Mo, Ni, and Zn. In particular,
rect drive generators with permanent magnets (notably direct values in 2050 are equal to 80%, 90%, and 100% of the
current values in LDS, MDS, and HDS, respectively.
onshore sector. Finally, for HDS mixes of sub-technologies in
future energy scenarios are assumed to match today´s aver- are B, Dy, Nd, Pr, and Tb. Although with some exception, these
materials are common across the considered technologies.
replacement rates are based on historical time series (the For these materials, the following hypotheses on material in-
-
ment of turbines with permanent magnets (again, notably 2%-yearly reduction for MDS, and constant material intensity
direct drive). for HDS.
A moderate material intensity reduction is considered for the
general materials, i.e. concrete, steel, plastic, glass/carbon
Section 2.4 Traction motors and 25% cuts by 2030 and 2050 respectively, except for dys-
prosium (– 33% in 2030 and – 50% in 2050). High demand
Assumptions concerning the reduction of materials in electric
scenarios consider a reduction of consumption of rare earths
per motor with same functionality of 10% in 2030 and 15%
motor design) and possible component substitution (motor
by 2050. For other materials, the following material intensity
without PMs). For example, the low demand scenario consid-
assumptions were used: stability for high demand scenario, –
ers much lower content in rare earths (reduction of 30% in
10%, – 5% by 2030 and – 20% and – 10% by 2050 for low
2030 and of 40% compared to 2015 composition, except for
and medium demand scenarios.
dysprosium that is cut by 66% by 2030 and 75% by 2050).
Moderate demand scenario for rare earths considers 20%
Section 2.5 PV decreasing even in the High Demand Scenario. The values ad-
opted in this work are mostly based on (Nassar et al., 2016).
PV capacities
Materials in PV
The EU import dependence on PV modules as derived from
The most commonly semiconductor materials used in PV sys-
production is estimated between 65% and 80% (Trinomics, tems are silicon and compounds of cadmium telluride (CdTe),
2019). This dependence is expected to increase in the near copper indium gallium selenide (CuInxGa(1-x)Se2 - CIGS), gal-
future due to the growth of the European PV market. lium arsenide (GaAs) and perovskite structure based on hy-
-
LDS, MDS and HDS scenarios for the technology market
sion of solar energy into electricity is the key driver to reduce
-
the cost of the solar energy. Research in understanding the
gies. MDS depicts a substantial conservation of the current
chemistry behind the material growth and the physics behind
-
the device operation led to an unprecedented development of
gies that reach 10% overall in 2050 (4.5% each for CdTe and
PV materials and achievement of high performance and reli-
CIGS, 1% for a-Si). HDS considers an expansion to 10% both
for CdTe and CIGS, and to 3% for a-Si. This means that c-Si
above (silicon, CdTe, CIGS, GaAs and perovskite), which show
technologies are expected to lead the market (77% share in
-
-
ciencies have been developed such as micro/nanocrystalline
stead, LDS considers a further expansion of c-Si, up to 99% in
and amorphous silicon, copper zinc tin sulphide (Cu(Zn,Sn)
(Se,S)2 - CZTS), dye-sensitized TiO2, organic polymer materi-
each for CdTe and CGIS, while a-Si progressively disappears
als and quantum dot solids (Polman et al., 2016). Despite the
from the market.
The same material intensity reduction as for wind energy is solar cells there is much room for improvement of PV mate-
considered for the general materials: 2050 material intensity rials. This improvement will enable PV technology for large-
is 80%, 90%, and 100% of the current values in LDS, MDS, scale applications and power generation for the utility grid
- and its penetration into the energy system.
ed for the material intensity of materials used in solar cell,
and in particular the material intensity is forecasted to be
91
Annexes
2030 and 2050 LDS, MDS and HDS scenarios. Also the application only is listed.
(interpolated) value for 2018 as the most recent year with
Section 2.1 Batteries
Scenario data for vehicles:
Year LDS MDS Year LDS MDS
in million vehicles in million vehicles
2015 - - 10 2031 40 40 70
2016 - - 10 2032 50 50 80
2017 10 10 10 2033 50 60 80
2018 10 10 10 2034 60 70 90
2019 10 10 10 2035 60 80 100
2020 10 10 10 2036 70 90 100
2021 10 10 20 2037 70 100 110
2022 20 20 20 2038 80 100 120
2023 20 20 30 2039 80 110 120
2024 20 20 30 2040 90 120 130
2025 20 20 40 2041 90 130 140
2026 30 30 40 2042 100 140 150
2027 30 30 50 2043 100 150 160
2028 30 30 50 2044 110 160 170
2029 30 30 60 2045 110 160 180
2030 40 40 60 2046 120 170 190
2047 120 180 190
2048 130 190 200
2049 130 200 210
2050 140 210 220
Materials for batteries for e-mobility (see Figure 10):

Assessed material Year LDS [tonnes] MDS [tonnes]
Cobalt 2030 38 000 67 000 120 000
2050 38 000 110 000 290 000
Lithium 2030 32 000 51 000 90 000
2050 48 000 130 000 260 000
Nickel 2030 200 000 280 000 440 000
2050 420 000 1 100 000 1 500 000
Manganese 2030 29 000 63 000 120 000
2050 19 000 83 000 260 000
Graphite 2030 340 000 500 000 820 000
2050 700 000 1 800 000 2 700 000
92
Materials for batteries for renewables (see Figure 12):
Cobalt 2030 13 000 16 000 25 000
2050 63 000 44 000 140 000
Lithium 2030 10 000 10 000 16 000
2050 45 000 28 000 77 000
Nickel 2030 32 000 32 000 51 000
2050 160 000 97 000 270 000
Manganese 2030 32 000 36 000 44 000
2050 59 000 41 000 130 000
Graphite 2030 99 000 110 000 160 000
2050 480 000 290 000 780 000
Historic time series for all batteries placed on the market, in stock and as waste generated potential are provided online for the
EU-28 in the JRC-RMIS (JRC, 2020b).
Section 2.2 Fuel cells

Materials for FCs for e-mobility (see Figure 17):
Platinum 2030 2 10 20
2050 5 30 50
Materials for FCs for renewables (see Figure 17):

Platinum 2030 0 0 1
2050 1 2 10
93
Annexes
Section 2.3 Wind

Materials for wind turbines for renewables (see Figure 22):
Aluminium 2030 18 000 33 000 60 000
2050 22 000 63 000 140 000
Borates 2030 10 50 140
2050 10 80 360
Chromium 2030 8 000 16 000 31 000
2050 10 000 32 000 74 000
Copper 2030 35 000 76 000 150 000
2050 47 000 150 000 350 000
Dysprosium 2030 60 210 540
2050 30 310 1 400
Manganese 2030 12 000 25 000 47 000
2050 15 000 48 000 110 000
Molybdenum 2030 1 700 3 400 6 500
2050 2 100 6 600 15 000
Neodymium 2030 470 1 900 5 000
2050 260 2 900 13 000
Nickel 2030 5 900 11 000 21 000
2050 7 400 21 000 48 000
Praseodymium 2030 80 340 890
2050 40 510 2 300
Steel 2030 300 000 620 000 1 200 000
2050 380 000 1 200 000 2 800 000
Terbium 2030 20 70 180
2050 10 110 450
Zinc 2030 80 000 170 000 330 000
2050 110 000 330 000 760 000
94
Section 2.4 Traction Motors
Materials for traction motors for e-mobility (see Figure 26):
Aluminium 2030 88 000 130 000 190 000
2050 210 000 420 000 510 000
Borates 2030 70 120 180
2050 160 360 440
Copper 2030 55 000 83 000 120 000
2050 130 000 260 000 320 000
Dysprosium 2030 220 410 560
2050 500 1 100 1 400
Neodymium 2030 960 1 300 1 700
2050 2 100 3 300 4 100
Praseodymium 2030 320 430 550
2050 690 1 100 1 400
Silicon metal 2030 28 000 45 000 69 000
2050 64 000 140 000 170 000
Steel 2030 610 000 000 910 000 000 1 300 000 000
2050 1 400 000 000 2 900 000 000 3 500 000 000
Section 2.5 PV
Materials for PVs for renewables (see Figure 31):
Aluminium 2030 83 000 200 000 520 000
2050 110 000 410 000 1 300 000
Cadmium 2030 5 20 220
2050 1 30 600
Copper 2030 51 000 120 000 320 000
2050 68 000 250 000 800 000
Gallium 2030 0 2 20
2050 0 5 40
Germanium 2030 1 5 30
2050 0 10 100
Indium 2030 1 10 60
2050 0 20 170
Selenium 2030 5 20 140
2050 1 30 350
Silicon metal 2030 23 000 71 000 216 000
2050 18 000 109 000 399 000
Silver 2030 50 160 680
2050 20 110 660
Tellurium 2030 5 20 260
2050 1 40 690
95
Annexes
Figures and tables
Figure 1: 9
Figure 2: 10
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Figure 8.
Figure 9.
Figure 10.
Figure 11.
Figure 12.
Figure 13.
Figure 14.
Figure 15.
Figure 16.
Figure 17.
Figure 18.
Figure 19.
Figure 20.
Figure 21.
Figure 22.
Figure 23.
Figure 24.
Figure 25.
Figure 26.
Figure 27.
Figure 28.
Figure 29.
Figure 30.
Figure 31.
Figure 32.
Figure 33.
Figure 34.
Figure 35. Drones applications 47
Figure 36.
Figure 37.
Figure 38.
96
Figure 39.
Figure 40.
Figure 41.
Figure 42.
Figure 43.
Table 2.
Figure 44.
Figure 45.
Figure 46.
Figure 47.
Figure 48.
Figure 49.
Figure 50.
Figure 51.
Figure 52.
Figure 53.
Figure 54.
Figure 55.
Figure 56.
Figure 57.
Figure 58.
Figure 59.
Figure 60.
Figure 61.
Figure 62.
Figure 63.
Figure 64.
Figure 65.
Table 3.
Figure A1.
97
98
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Critical Raw Materials for

Strategic Technologies and Sectors

Comments, questions and input can be sent by email to GROW-C2@ec.europa.eu

print: ISBN 978-92-76-15337-5 doi: 10.2873/865242 ET-04-20-034-EN-C

2 Critical raw materials in strategic technologies 18

3 Critical raw materials for strategic sectors 59

4 Conclusions and Recommendations 78

types of raw materials and processed

Lithium** Graphite*** Cobalt

Dysprosium Neodymium Nickel

3 High Demand Scenario

Very low Low Moderate High Very high

Technologies Raw materials Processed Components Assemblies

0% 12% 20% 58%

13% 27% 13% 9%

Maintaining leadership in value chains where Europe is currently strong, requires

key to maintaining EU competitiveness. Therefore, diversifying materials supply

Renewables Photovoltaics Wind Generators Robotics

e-mobility Batteries Traction Motors Fuel Cells

used by sector used by other technology (icon)

materials, processed materials, components and assemblies.

very low low moderate high very high

this. Some technologies like 3DP are undergoing substan-

Supply Risk Material

Materials in red are critical raw materials.

Copper: as current collector foil at Co Cobalt: in cathode materials in

Graphite: natural or synthetic Li Lithium: as lithium-cobalt oxide

Mn Manganese: in cathode materials

2.1.1 Current supply bottlenecks along the value chain

Of all materials currently used in battery manufacturing, co-

Raw materials Processed Components Assemblies

Co, Li, Cathode materials, Cathodes Li-ion cells

66% of global cell production. The EU has very marginal pro-

2.1.2 2030/2050 perspectives of raw materials demand

Batteries for e-mobility

of full EVs and PHEV are considered as transition technol-

EU – Electric Vehicle/Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Fleet

Additional material consumption for batteries in e-mobility only in 2030/2050

Lithium** Graphite*** Cobalt

4 0,08 *** increase in demand of all

Batteries for energy storage systems (ESS)

EU – Capacity of energy storage systems (ESS) HDS

Additional material consumption for batteries in renewables only in 2030/2050

Lithium** Graphite*** Cobalt

0,8 0,04 *** increase in demand of all

2.1.3 Key observations and recommendations

2.2 Fuel cells

Unconverted combustion Load

Cobalt: as catalyst replacing the Co Cu Copper: in alloys with Ni for anode

Palladium: as catalyst replacing Ni Nickel: for coating the bipolar

2.2.1 Current supply bottlenecks along the value chain

other end-use applications. However, a FC vehicle needs 10

with more than half of the materials coming from a variety

Raw materials Processed Components Assemblies

EU27 5% 8% 40% 25% 1%

EU – Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Fleet

Additional material consumption for fuel cells in e-mobility and renewables

1,0 High Demand Scenario

2.2.3 Key observations and recommendations

Lithium Graphite* Cobalt

Lithium Graphite* Cobalt

Lithium Graphite* Cobalt

Tellurium Germanium Indium**

Gallium Silicon metal Selenium**