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VOLUME XXX OCTOBER 1950 NUMBER 7

> 1
Editor in Chief
COLONEL
IL R. EbIEEY ‘

North American Edition 1!

Editor: LT. COL.A. E. CONN,Assi8tantEditor: CAPT.K. SHERMAN
.
.Spaniah-Amem”can Edition
LT. COL.GIMENEZ-DE
Editor: LA ROSA:Assistant Editors: MAJ. J. A. ANDINO,
CAPT.J. VAIZGAS
MATA,%WWianA,7W, LT. L. A. ~ONSERRAT% wO~G A. Z.4YAS

Brazilian Edition
Editor: MM. 11”.F. BOWAS.Bro:ilinn.4rwJ
Assistant Editor: MAJ. V-P. D. COUTINXO, Brazilian Army

Administrative 0f7icer Production Manager

CAPT. J. S. ~DGAX CAPT.R. U. WINNINGIIMI

Ii

II
CONTENTS
,:
Ecoso>rlcWAnFArtE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Dr. $B. H. Williams 3
POIITS
ANOA-BOMBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Col. J. W. Davis, Art~ 9 ,,
LOCM.RF,SOURCES-THEIt PKOCUnEIIENT m AX OVERSEAS THEATE~ ----­ .--Mai. W. L. Spaulding,QMC 18
OXEMORE RIVER.----. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-. --.. -.-----------------------Lt. Co]. L. W. Merriam.1%? 24
TKEG-2 ANDHIS COMMANDER - . . . . . . . . ..-- . . . . . . . . ..- . . . . ..-.. -. . . . ..Col. T. F. Van Natta, Awnor 35 i!

FEC.ALANDFIXAXCEFUNDAMENTALS . . . . . . . . . ..---­ . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. Lt. Cal.J. IL Wiechmann,PC 3S

INTBRX.&L
SECURITYIN A COMMUNIkAT1ONS ZONE. . . . . ..- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Maj. J. S. KiOou~h,
MPC 47
PRWMLATICIKANOCONDUCT OFFIELDEXEFtCIS~S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- . . . . . ..-Lt.
Co!. L. J. O’Neil, Inf
*laj. Ii. Ii Steck, l,tf 66 t
MILII’ARY
NOTESAROUND THEWORLD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
FOR~~CNMILITARY DIGESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
73 I
Rueeia—Substance or SiLadOw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- .. . . . .. .. . . . . 73
Denmarlc and tlLe Atlantic Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
St$ategic Bombing in Modern War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..sL------ 81
Tile Field Armies of E,whmd, the United States, and R~lssia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
French Air Power and the Defense of western EtlroPe .... ....... ..... ..... .... ....... 89
Ptiaolte?% of War ------------------------------------------------------------------- 96
The Role of Medicineiu il~cRed AT*W ---------------------------------------------- Joo
The Battle of Medenine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..>...... 101

Developments in Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..- 104

The Meaning of Sea Pow.* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Boo s FOR THE MILITARY READER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

111.IT’ARYREVIEW—Publishedmonthlyby the command and General Staff college at Fort Leavenworth,

ansas,i“ tbe English, Spanish, and Portugueselanmmge+.F.nteredas second-crawmatterAugust31, 1934,at tbe
fisto w at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas,underthe Act of March 3, 1879. Subscriptionrates: ‘33.50 (U.S. cur­
!ncy),wr year in tbe TJ”itedStatesand other eo”ntries of the Western Hemisphere:$4.50 a year in all other
,Untri Reprints are authorized,provided credit is =iventbe “MILITARY REVIEW,” C6zGSC,Fort Leaven­
ortb,;{a”sas.
 Dr. Benjamin H. ‘Williams, member of Colonel Thomas F. Van Natta, formerly
the faculty of the Industrial College of an instructor at the C&GSC, and now as­
the Armed Forces since 1945, wrote “The signed to the 2d Armored Division, Fort
Importance of Research and Development Hood, Texas, has been a frequent con­
to National Security” which appeared in tributor to the MILITARY REVIEW. His
the February 1950 issue of the MILITARY n? st recent article “The Commander and
REVIEW. A detailed bio~raphieal sketch ! G-2” appeared in the August 1950
His
of him appeared in that issue. issue. A biographical sketch of Colonel
Va~ Natta appeared in the REVIEW of
Colonel John W. Davis served in the August 1949.
European Theater from 1942 to 1946
as Operations Officer, AAA Section, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Wiech­
ETOUSA, and later, AAA Officer, 12th mann served from 1942 to 1945 as Finance
Army Group. From 1946 to 1948, he was Officer, 6th Armored Division. Subsequent
with the plans Section, OCAFF. Gradu­ to that assignment, he served in the Con­
ated from the National War College in trol Division, Hq ASF, and in the office
1949, he was assigned to the Department of the Chief of Finance. He was assigned
of Logistics, C&GSC. He is now an in­ as an instructor in the C&GSC from 1947
structor in the Army War College. to 1950, when he was ordered to FEC.

Major Walter L. Spaulding has been an Major James S. Killough’s duties dur­
instructor at the C&GSC since 1949. Dur­ ing WW H included service as a Military
ing World War II, he was engaged in Government Staff Officer, G-1 Section, Hq
QM activities in the MTOUSA and 10th Army and Military Mayor ,of Seoul,
ETOUSA, where, among other assign­ Korea. In 1946, he was assigned as an in­
ments, he serv,:d as Class III Otlicer and structor in the C&GSC. In 1950, he was
Depot Commal.d..,, Delta Base Section. On ordered to the Strident Detachment,
his return to the United States, he was as. Armed Forces Staff College.
signed to the Fiscal Division, OQMG.
Lientenant Colonel Larry J. O’Neil, now
Lieutenant Colonel Lauren W. Merriam, assigned to the Student Detachment,
an instructor at the C&GSC since 1948, Armed Forces Staff College, has been an
has been assigned to the Student Detach­ instructor at the C&GSC since 1948. A
ment, Armed Forces Sta@ College. He biographical sketch of him appeared in the
served in ETOUSA in WW II, as a mem­ September 1950 issue of the REVIEW.
ber of the G-3 Section of both Hq
ETO~SA and the Normandy Base Sec­ Major Ernest E. Steck has been an in­
tion; Executive Officer, 109tb Infantry, structor at the C&GSC since 1949. Part I
28th Infantry Division; and Division. G-1. of his article, and a biographical sketch
From 1945 to 194’7 he was assigned to appeared in the September 1960 issue of
Hq EUCOM, the REvIEw.
 ECONOMIC WARFARE

/
Dr. Benjamin H. Williams

Member of the Faculty, Industrial College of the Armed Forces

T HE growth in importance of economic

resources in war has been an outstanding
economy. In this article, economic warfare
will be given a broad definition to include
military development of the twentieth cen­ both economic and military methods of
tury. The use of the term “total war,” injuring or destroying the enemy’s eco­
which’ assumes the ability to mobilize all nomic support of his war effort as ‘well
national assets for war purposes, may, iti as peacetime policies for preventing the
strict logic, imply an overestimate of what flow, of militarily important resources to
is possible. For even in major wars, any a potential enemy.
nation will divert some of its food, ma­
terials, and labor to keep alive infants, Revolution in American Policy
invalids, and extremely old people who are The emergence of the United States
unable to render any service in the war from isolation into the harsh rivalry of
effort. In the grimness of international power politics has brought about great
conflict, however, many unessential activi­ changes in the American attitude toward
ties are being squeezed out, and the in­ economic warfare. Until 1917, our tradi­
dicator is rising toward that unattainable tional point of view was that of the neu­
100. percent of effort signified in the ex­ tral, based on. the expectation that we
pression “total war.” would not participate in the wars of
If economic mobilization is coming to Europe. In this period the United States
have a greater part in war, the opposite argued the case for neutral rights in in­
program of injuring the enemy’s economy ternational discussions; and, in wartime,
is Iikewise growing in ‘importance. This so long as we remained a neutral, we re­
is economic warfare. There is no accepted sisted those measures of economic war­
definition of the term. Agencies in Wash- fare which interfered with our commerce.
ingt,in which deal with it are apt to ex­ During the earlier years of the Napo­
pand or contract it to increase their juris­ leonic Wars, for example, the efforts of
diction or to eliminate portions of the the British and the French to strike at
subject matter with which they are not each other’s imports interfered with the
in a position to deal. The central principle prosperous war-created commerce of the
is the intent to strike at the enemy’s United States. The American merchant

Economicwarfare inciudes economic and mi!iiary methods against an

em my’s econ”omicsupport in wartime, as well as measures to prevent
a potential enemy f rotn obtaining military resources in peacetime
4 MILITARY REVIEW

marine tripled in tonnage. The value of our sources toward the one and away from the
trade and public revenues was multiplied other. This is revolutionary in the eccs­
four times, until the embargo imposed by nomic” foreign policy as well as in the
the United States had its adverse effects general diplomacy of the United States.
late in 1807. Speaking for the right to In looking for fundamental ]easons for
conduct neutral trade, Secretary of State such a revolution, the change appears to
Thomas Jefferson said in 1793: be related to a phase in the development
. . . when two nationsgo to war, those who choose of western culture. As a civilization, ad­
to live in peace retain their natural right to pursue
their agriculture, manufactures, and other ordi­ vances, the capacity of individuals for
nary vocations;to carry the produceof their indus­ co-operation increases, and larger projects
try, for exchange, to all nations, belligerent or of unified administration become possible.
neutral, as usual, to go and come freely, without
injury or molestation;and, in short, that the war This is shown in industry, for example, by
among others shall be, for them, as if it did not the growth of the typical iron-producing
exist.
establishment from the simple forge at
In all our contentions on behalf of the edge of the forest in the tenth century
neutral trade, this country recognized two to the vast steel mill, employing thousands
belligerent rights, those of blockade and of workers, in the twentieth century. It
contraband. But American statesmen is possible to administer vastly greater
usually attempted to keep these concepts numbers of workers in one project than
within the limits ‘of strict interpretation. was possible in the feudal period, and
,We were a natural and influential advocate also the efforts of each modern worker
of the rights of the neutral. Almost a are magnified many times by mechanically
century and a quarter after Jefferson’s powered, materials-moving apparatus and
remarks, an American Secretary of State other mechanisms of mass production.
in 1916 protested regarding the British The growth in size of the effective in­
blacklist as applied to American mer­ dustrial unit is paralleled in politics by
chants: the development of huge nation-states,
It is manifestlyout of the questionthat the Gov­ built on almost continental proportions,
ernment of the United States should acquiesce in
such methods or application of punishmentto its possessing larger populations and far
citizens. greater power of unified action than did
And then the whole system of fo~eign the Roman Empire. Such a state can now
strike with devastating effect around the
policy based on the prospect of isolation
world. No area is beyond its radius of
a]ld neutrality fell like a house of cards.
military action. Under these circum­
We became a belligerent in World Wars I
stances, there is no probability of normal
and II and, since 1945, an expectant bel­
isolation or neutrality in world conflict on
ligerent in any future major war. During
the part of a major country. The United
World Wars I and II, this country turned States, as a participant in these events,
its thoughts to suppressing any neutral must face the prospect of involvement as
activity favorable to the enemy. And we a belligerent in any general war, while
have gone further than that. Our peace­ in peacetime it must continuously be
time economic foreign policy, once exer­ sensitive to the existence of potential
cised for economic objectives and with a friends and potential enemies. Our eco­
high degree of equality to all, is ‘being nomic policies, once devoted to the proj­
shaped for purposes ‘of ‘national security. ects of peace, have been strikingly affected
A differential policy is set up which dis­ by tbe pressures of force politics which
tinguishes possible friends from possible have set the twentieth century off so de­
enemies and turns the benefit of our re­ cidedly from the nineteenth.
 ECONOMICWARFARE 5

Wartime Methods Navy land-based planes, carrier-based

When the United States entered World planes, mines, and surface craft. A re­
War I, we” embraced practically the entire markable change in attack method was
British program of economic warfare and shown by the fact that surface gunfire
co-operated with Great Britain in apply­ accounted for less than 1 percent of the
ing it. This co-operation was renewed total destruction.
after the American entry into Woz-ld War Aem”aj Bombing of Industrial Targefs.
H. The methods worked out during the two ‘During World War II, the attack upon the
Wars may be briefl”y described as follows: enemy’s economy shifted in large part to
Co?!tYol ot Neutral Trade. The restric­ the air. The destruction of the enemy in­
tion of neutral exports to the enemy, dustry involved over-all decisions regard­
which was once a naval function, became, ing types of planes to be produced and
to a considerable extent, a diplomatic the designations of kinds of economic
task. War trade agreements were made targets which were of sufficient importance,
with neutrals to reduce or stop their ship­ to be bombed. The intent was the pro­
ments to Germany. In the drafting of gressive destruction and dislocation of the
these agreements, success depended on the German military, industrial, and economic
progress of the A Ilied effort in the War, system. Classes of targets selected were
for the neutrals were reluctant to agree to oil installations, aircraft factories, trans­
restrict trade with the enemy while that portation facilities, and ball bearing
enemy was still likely to win the victory. factories. For many months, the bombing
When they sat down to draft the agree­ showed little effect in the total statistics
ments, however, British and American rep­ of German output, but some months after
resentatives offered to the neutral country D-day the production figures showed a
such values as essential supplies, loans, rapid decline. And a major reason for
and shipping facilities. In turn, the neu­ this decrease was aerial bombardment
tral was asked to stop its exports to the which in the early months ‘of 1945 reached
enemy or to restrict them according t~ z a crescendo of 170,000 tons of bombs per
definite schedule. Imports of the neutral month.
were allowed to pass through the blockade ~xport Contvots. To plug up holes in the
on a rationed basis. The method of ad­ blockade, the belligerents placed controls
ministering the rationing system was on their own exports. In this country, the
through the issuance by Great Britain and controls were established more than a
the United States of such documents as year before Pearl Harbor, and the pur­
navicerts (navy certificates) which au­ poses were two: to retain within the
thorized the passing of the particular com­ L’nited States scarce materials needed in
modit.y through the blockade. our own rearmament, and to prevent our
Tlrc Capture OYSinking of Enemy Skip­ goods from getting into unfriendly hands.
piuy. The stoppage of trade carried to PMc12/siw 13uyinv, In World War II,
the ,nerny in enemy ships could not, of the United States and Great Britain at.
course, be accomplish by diplomacy, but tempted to prevent certain important sup­
requ1red naval and al$ f Orces. In world plies in neutral countries from being
Way 11, almost 9 million tons of Japanese shipped to the enemy by sending in agents
mer,:!]ant shipping were sunk or damaged with funds to buy the commodities regard­
fOr ihe duration of the War. The sub- less of price. Action of this kind took
mar j]e was the principal weapon used; place in the case of wolfram in Portugal
but, in addition, the following instruments and Spain, and ball bearings in Sweden.
wew employed: Army Air Forces planes, 131acklisting. Residents of neutral coun­
6 MILITARY REVIEW

tries who were suspected of aiding the ers, shippers, investors, and, in some
enemy commercially, financially, or ideo­ cases, importers determined our policy.
logically were placed on blacklists and Some security co~iderations were kept in
denied certain economic benefits, such as mind in such situ tions, for example, as
the right to obtain export licenses for our dollar diplom t cy in the Oaribbean.
products in the United States, the right But in general, the aim was economic.
to use assets located in this country, and Europeans sometimes remarked upon the
the use of shipping facilities. favorable position of the United States, a
Foreign Funds and Prope~,ty Contv@. country which was still able to devote
The United States had been a refuge for itself to programs of profits and economic
foreign capital previous to our entry into benefits. Our situation contrasted strik­
World War II, and large amounts were ingly with that of major European na­
located here in the names of persons ;e­ tions which, in dread of impending conflict,
siding in enemy-occupied countries, enemy were forced to warp and twist their eco­
countries, or countries from which these nomic policies to meet the needs of the
assets might be manipulated for the bene­ balance of power.
fit ,of the Axis. The assets were in the ‘ As this country found itself drawn
form of bank deposits, gold, businesses, closer to the wars of Europe, it began to
and investments, and amounted to some­ take note of the effects of its own com­
thing like 9 billion dollars. To have per­ merce upon the struggles in Europe and
mitted these funds and properties to be Asia, and tke dangers which it was creat­
used freely would have placed in Axis ing for itself by a willingness to deal
hands great quantities of much-needed freely with prospective enemies. The tra­
dollars. Previous to Pearl Harbor, these ditional policies aimed at economic ad­
assets were frozen, and no transactions in­ vancement, appropriate to the days of iso­
volving them were permitted without lation, began to appear inapplicable and
license from the Treasury. Titles to assets hazardous in the years immediately pre­
which needed active management were, ceding Pearl Harbor. The best economic
after our entry into the War, vested in policy, it had been previously thought, was
the Alien Property Custodian. that of dealing equally with all nations.
The effect of these various methods of Under that pcdicy, we found our re­
attacking the enemy economy and of shut­ sources flowing to the aggressor’ Japan in
ting off supplies from abroad in World the form of materials and equipment for
War 11 was cumulative and became im­ war. While the American exports to
portant toward the end of the conflict. Japan had averaged 15’7 million dol­
Since large and vulnerable economic op­ lars per year for the period 1931-1936,
erations have become so essential in they rose after large-scale operations were
modern war, economic warfare will with­ begun by the Japanese in China to 247
out much doubt. be employed by all major million dollars per year for the period
belligerents should another war occur. 1937-1940. The exports included large
shipments of such important war supplies
Peacetime Policies as petroleum and petroleum products,
During most of the nineteenth century metals, machinery, and vehicles. This
and the earlier decades of the twentieth commerce caused uneasiness in the United
century the economic diplomacy of the States. Not only were we helping to de­
United States was conducted without ref­ stroy China, a friendly nation, but we
erence to the force politics of Europe. could reasonably expect that some of the
The economic benefits to American export­ scrap iron and steel exported to Japan
 ECONOMICWARFARE. 7

would return to us in the form ‘of bullets and potential enemies arose again. At the
and projectiles aimed at American soldiers end of the War, the rehabilitation’ ,of lib­ ,
and sailor;. We were preparing serious erated areas occupied the attention of the
injury for ourselves. democracies, and aid was apportioned to
The situation, in Europe caused even the areas in accordance with need through
greater uneasiness as tbe German forces an international organization, the United
swept through Poland, Norway, Denmark, Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad­
The Netherlands, Belgium, and France. ministration ( UNRRA ). The receipts of
While our trade with Germany had been UNRRA came from the western democra­
cut off, the~e were large financial resources cies,, more than 70 percent from the
in the United States which could still be United States. Half of the materials dis­
drawn upon by the Nazis if a tradition­ tributed went to countries behind the Iron
ally neutral policy were to be followed by Curtain. Relations between Russia and
the American government. the West soon became tense, and UNRRA
American policy shifted during this soon expired. Then the United States
period from equal treatment of all bellig­ established its own plans for rehabilita­
erents to one which discriminated against tion. Under the Economic Cooperation Ad­
our potential enemies and in favor of our ministration ( ECA ), many billions have
friends. In other words, national security been spent, mostly on Western Europe.
in the power struggle became a dominant Countries behind tbe Iron Curtain have
motive. The methods used can only be been excluded from tbe benefits of the
briefly listed, and to some extent they program.
parallel those already described. Moral The preferential system of rehabilita­
embargoes were imposed against coun­ tion has been accompanied by an export
tries which bombed +vilian populations policy designed to keep commodities in­
(meaning the Axis, and Russia, after the volving national security ,from reaching
USSR attacked Finland). Exports were li­ potential enemies. The Export Control
censed, and certain important commodities, Act of 1949 gave the Department of Com­
such as scrap steel and aviation gasoline, merce power to control exports from the
were denied to our potential opponents. United States for three purposes: (1) con­
Assets in the United States belong­ servation of scarce materials, (2) fur­
ing to persons in Axis Countries, Axis- therance of the foreign policy ~of the
occupied countries, and countries which United States, and (3) the safeguarding
might provide bases for the financial of national security. The third purpose,
operations of the Axis, were frozen. A safeguarding national security, has be­
blacklist was applied against persons and come the most important objective in ex­
firms which wire supporting the Axis port control. In the operation of the act, ,
from neutral ground in Latin America. exports of a strategic character to poten­
.poaiti~e aid was given to the opponents tial enemy countries have been drastically
of th,, Axis by the repeal of the arms cut.
embnrgo and tbe extension of financial Perhaps the most important end that
assisl:Ince, particularly through the Lend- can be accomplished by export control is
Lease .4ct. All of these measures were the prevention or retardation of the spread
used !~bfore pearl Harbor, and they shat­ of American technology to unfriendly
tered +he traditional policies developed in countries. One of the greatest security
limes .Jf isolation and expectant neutrality. assets enjoyed by this country is a su­
Fol;.>wing World War II, the issue of periority in research and development
prefe,wntial treatment between friends facilities resulting in a considerable tech­
8 MILITARY REVIEW

nological margin over potential enemies. of being” activated by the desire for
From the standpoint of riational defense, private profits, economic benefits, and in.
this margin should not only be main­ clividual welfare, will be controlled largely
tained; it should be increased. Such a for purposes of force politics.
result would require not only that research We have for decades seen in)the USSR
and development be prosecuted with an example of a politically operated eeon.
greater energy, but also that the results of omy directed largely for considerations
this work in its critical security aspects of military combat, either defensive or
should be kept, so far as possible, from offensive. Welfare objectives in the vari­
such areas as those behind the Iron ous 5-year plans have been subordinated
Curtain. The export of the most advanced to national power. Consumer goods pro­
devices to Russia and her affiliates would duction has come second to the creation of
place valuable equipment in unfriendly armaments and militarily important
hands, but it would do much more than heavy industries. During the 1930s, the
that. It would provide those peoples with German economy was reshaped for pur­
prototypes which could be used to set up poses of guns rather than butter. Our
their own production. The stoppage of own economy is still relatively free,
such exports may thus prevent the work creating from profit motives a vast wealth
of, American research and development and variety of consumer goods and serv­
from being used against us, ices. The effect of our emergence into
Some political philosophers, peering power politics, however, is shown in the
into the dark prospects of the latter twen­ way our economic foreign policy has heen
tieth century, have predicted that in the readjusted to enlarge the motives of se­
clash of unprecedented international curity and to decrease those of economic
forces the nature of the world’s economies benefit. This is one of the unanticipated
will be altered. Economic systems, instead results of our egress from isolation.

The Army has been assigned a role in the defense plans of our Nation
that requires it to be ready at all times to move to meet aggression by the
fastest means and with the greatest fire power—and by its readiness to do
this, to help prevent aggression from taking place. Of course, the Army role
must be correlated with the role-s of tbe other services and must be imple­
mented to the end that the maximum in security may be obtained within the
necessary ceilings of a national defense budget.
General J. Lawton Collins
 . .

- Ports and A-Bombs ‘ .‘

Colonel John W. Davis, Artillery

Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this article World War II, we find that the plans for
a~e the author’s and not necessarily major amphibious operations provided for
those of the Department of the Army the early capture of ports in order that
or the Command and ~General Staf more extensive land and air operations
College.—The Editor, could be logistically supported. For ex.
ample, Operation Torch provided for the

P C)RTS, those links between land and

sea where vessels discharge and load their
early capture of Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers. Operation Overlord called for the
capture of Cherbourg by D plus 8, the
cargoes, have had military significance subsequent early seizure of Morlaix, Brest,
since antiqnit y. and Lorient, and the possible development
Turning back the pages of history to of Quiberon Bay. Plans for taking Kyushu
the period of the Crusades, it is inter­ included the early capture and develop­
esting to read of the importance attached ment of Kagoshima. It is understating the
to the port of Acre by both Christians and situation, to say the least, when the final
Saracens. Captured by the Christians report of the Army S’ervice Forces,
during the Third Crusade, Acre became Logktics in World War II, states: “Ade­
the principal port where men and supplies quate oversea port facilities were indis­
were landed for the support of operations pensable to military operations.”
in the Holy Land. Significantly, the end Through the years, ships have increased
of th~ Crusacles is marked by the fall of their speed, size, and draft. This latter
Acre in 1291 to the Saracen leader, Khali. development has steadily reduced the
Another example, centuries later, is an number of ports which ships can enter.
expedition of 3S ships and 6,000 men sent, Many flourishing ports of the sixteenth
by Cromwell to capture a port in the West century are now suitable for only fishing
Indies as a base for more extensive opera­ craft or shallow-draft coasters. a’
tions :1.gainst the Spaniards. This expedi­ The ship of today plies its routes swiftly
tion resulted in the capture of Jamaica, with large pay loads and is capable of
since xetained as a colony by the British. berthing at comparatively few places. At
most of these locations, mechanized devices
Ports in World War II facilitate discharging and loading of
Skipping many pages of history to cargo. Rail and highway systems radiate

Ports have had military significance since antiquity. But in the

rrtomicage, major ports with their crowded activity may have to give
10 MILITARY REVIEW

from these ports to carry passengers and flow of supplies through enemy ports, 01
cargo inland. to stop sea raiders from leaving from
The modern deep-water port, therefore, them, has led nations to subject ports to
comes closer to meeting the needs of war every weapon at their disposal. Ports have
than do beaches or shallow ports. In the been bombarded from the ~ea, bombed
latter,, there are few, if any, means of from the air, and attacked from the land;
handling the heavier items of equipment blockships have been sunk in port en.
and inadequate transportation facilities trances and mines dropped in harbors and
to carry inland great streams of cargo. channels.
Consequently, the armies in World War II Taking a brief glance across the his.
tied themselves closely to such ports, com­ torical horizon, we see the British in 1694
monly termed maj?r ports, The allied bombarding the channel ports of Dieppe,
forces fought for and avidly seized major Calais, Le Havre, and Dunkirk, in an
ports to” handle an ever-increasing flow effort to deter French privateers fron
of supplies and to shorten lines of com­ preying on British commerce. A British
munications. expedition was dispatched in 1809 to Wal.
The European Theater of Operations ‘cheron to destroy the port and arsenal
gives us an excellent example of the pro­ at Flushing and to destroy the dockyards
gressive development and utilization of at Antwerp. The Union fleet blockaded
ports by advancing land armies. Cher­ Confederate ports during the American
bourg was cleared of the enemy by D plus Civil War. The British blocked Zeebrugge
19, with another 19 days being required to during World War I. In World War II,
clear and open the port. In July 1944, 90 British ports were bombed by the Lu/t­
percent of American tonnage came in over waffe, and Allied air forces bombed Bre.
Omaha and Utah Beaches, with Cherbourg men, Bremerhaven, Wilhemshaven, and
and minor Normandy ports handling the other German ports. The Germans carried
remaining 10 percent. During the next 2 out demolitions at Naples, Marseille,
months, landings were made in Southern Cherbourg, and Le Havre, and attacked
France; Marseille was captured. Le Havre Antwerp with V-1 and V-2 bombs.
and Ronen were captured and cleared as As might be expected, these, different
the Allies pushed across France. forms of attack met with varying degrees
In October 1944, more than a million of success. Blockades have been quite
long tons of supplies were poured into effective, ashavemines dropped or planted
France, with the ports of Cherbourg, Le in channels and harbors. As a result of
Havre, Rouen, and Marseille handling 88 German demolitions at Naples, Marseille,
percent. Of the remainder, the minor Cherbourg, and Le Havre, from 17 to 31
ports of Normandy and Brittany handled days of intensive work was required be­
11 percent and the beaches 1 percent. By fore the first vessels could be brought into
December 1944, 95 percent of tonnage was harbor for wharfside discharge of cargo,
passing through five major ports with In many cases, severe losses were in.
Antwerp and Marseille handling 60 per­ flitted by bombing. An example is the
cent of the total. Through the few square ,Luftwafle raid on Bari, Italy, on 2 De.
miles of five major ports poured the life cember 1943. Sixteen ships loaded with
blood of men and supplies necessary to valuable cargo were sunk and considerable
support the field armies. damage inflicted on port installations
Incidentally, this particular attack 00
Attacks on Ports curredat a time when we-.had “overwhelm.
The urgent need to stop or hinder the ing air superiority.” In fact, Air Man
 PORTS AND A-BOMBS 11

ihd Sir Arthur Coningham, the day be: The Effects of A-Bombs
fore the attack, stated at a press con­ These questions immediately ~rise:
ference: “I ‘would regard it as a personaI “What will that newest and most devastat­
affront and insult if the Luftr.oafle should ing of weapons, tlie A-bomb, accomplish if
attempt any significant action in this employed against ports ?“ “What can we
area.” do about it?” .­
Of the V-1 and V-2 attacks on Antwerp, >The general eff,~cts of an atomic ex­
Logistics in World War II has this to say: plosion are well’ known and publicized.
The Hiroshima’ A-bomb explosion, an air
“Early in September, ‘ Allied troops
burst, destroyed 4.4 square miles of the
captured- Antwerp with iti port installa­
city, either by blast o? subsequent fire.
tions, intact. German troops were not
Only the heav~t walls of steel and con-~
driven from the approaches to Antwerp,
mete construction were left upright. Road
however, until the middle of November,
surfaces and ground flooring showed little
and the port was not opened until Decem­
effect from the explosion. Within this 4.4
ber. Ii that one month, service troops
square mile area, 40 percent of the people
unloaded 420,000 long tons at Antwerp. It
were killed and 40 percent injured. Re­
took only one-fourth as much effort to
sidual radiation was nOt great; in so far
supply one division from Antwerp as from
as radiation effects were concerned, the af­
Cherbourg. Capacity at Cherbourg was
fected area could be safely entered shortly
sufficientto supply a maximum of only 13 after the explosion.
divisions. Antwerp could supply 50. . . . Test “Able,” the air burst at Bikini,
For a time in January and February, the adds little information beyond the fact
Germans succeeded in seriously interfer­ that five ships were sunk. Test “Baker,”
ing with port operations by using the the Bikini underwater explosion, did
V-2 bombs. Antwerp unloaded only 74,000 somewhat better in ship ,sinkings, the
tons of supplies in the third week of Janu­ score being nine ships, including the bat­
ary By the middle of February, however, tleship Arkansas and the aircraft carrier
the disruption had lessened, and the Samtoga.’ Others were severely damaged.
weekly tonnage was up to 134,000.” In this latter explosion, there was residual
radiation, caused by the base surge and
This quotation from the report of the
water column from the explosion. All ships
Army Service Forces strikingly illustrates
within 2,000 yards, an area of 5 square
the sensitivity of supply lines. to enemy
miles, were contaminated to some degree,
action. Unpleasant as it must have been
some dangerously so, and for an extended
to thos,: who had to sit and listen to the
period.
bombs fall, the statistics relative to the By superimposing these destruction pat­
numbc, and accuracy of V-1 and V~2 mis­ terns over a port area, it should be pos­
siles a w not particularly impressive. Ap­ sible to obtain an approximate picture of
proxin, ,tely 300 V-1 missiles and 1,700 the effects of an A-bomb explosion.
V-2 n?i:siles fell on the city and environs
Consider first an airburst. In order to
durin~ the 4 or 5 month period that the obtain maximum destruction of shipping,
city WIS under attack. Dispersion was . port installations, supplies, mat6riel, and
great. The peak effort was 87 missiles in port operating personnel, the burst will
one d:,::—something less than 87 tons of be placed as nearly as possible over the
explosies, well distributed over the city. most active portion of the water front.
Dama$:? to port installations and ships Clusters of shipping or large vessels may
12 IwILITARY REVIEW

Examples of the congestion that existed in major ports in World War II are illustrated
in these photographs. Above, the harbor of Manila, P. I. crowded with Allied shipping.
Below, the port of Antwerp, Belgium, showing supplies being off-loaded directly from
ships to train to save time and eliminate congestion.—US Army photos.
 PORTS AND A-BOMBS 13

One of the ways to provide less lucrative targets against possible A-bomb attack is
dispersion. Even though the port of Cherbourg, France, above, was a congested area, a
certain amount of dispersion was achieved. An even better example of dk,persion was when
troops and supplies were unloaded in Leyte Gulf, P. L, below.—US Army photos.
~14 MILITARY REVIEW

target area. A 1%-to 2-mile strip of port’ Bikini. The average depth of water in.
installations will be destroyed or severely the Bikini lagoon is 175 feet,’ while the
damaged, as well as the port city within water depth in most deep-water harbors
a mile radius of the burst. Warehouses will will seldom excedd 35 or 40 feet.
be razed. Fires will break out. Some ships ‘Nevertheless, an A-bomb expl~ded in
will probably be sunk at their berths: even 35 or 40 feet of water will create
About 80 percent of ships’ crews, port op­ a mighty spIash and will contaminate all
erating personnel, and inhabitants within ships, wharfs, quays, and structures with
a mile radius of-the burst will be casual­ which the base surge and water column
ties. Residual radiation will not be dan­ come into contact. The area affected
gerous. Salvage and rehabilitation meas­ would probably be less than the 5 square
ures may be sta~ted at once. Rai]roads miles at Bikini, but it is likely that some
and highways bill not be seriously darn- , dock areas and shipping would be danger­
:.
agecf “and niay be used as soon as deb”ri< ously contaminated for a prolonged period.
and wrecked rail transportation is re­ Harbors’ waters would be contaminated
moved. Wharfs, qnays, and piers, shonld immediately after the explosion, but nor­
not be seriously damaged, with the ex­ mal tidal or river flow should reduce this
ception that wooden wharfs and piers may hazard in a few days.
be dqmaged by secondary fires. The underwater shock wave would be
The explosion will be a staggering blow severe; in all probability, shipping losses
to the port city. Days and perhaps weeks would be higher than from an air burst
will be requi~ed to extricate the injurecl occurring over the same point. Wharfs,
and dead. Utilities will be severely af­ quays, piers, and lock gates also may be
fected. Casualties among civilian’ “port severely damaged. The extent of casualties
laborers will be heavy. Replacement and is entirely unpredictable. Loss of life
resumption of work by civilian laborers would be heavy if the base surge or fall­
will be slow, due to reluctance to work in out from the water column sweeps over
areas likely to be subjected to atomic populated areas.
No defense system offers promise of pro­
attack. The latter situation may be par­
viding an effective bar to the delivery of
ticularly serious. At Antwerp alone,
the A-bomb. Harbor protective measures
25,000 civilians were employed in port
may make its delivery by surface or sub­
operations. On a conservative estimate,
surface craft a most difficult undertaking.
port operations in the affected area will
But even this comforting ttiought is
be at a complete standstill for 4 to 8
largely nullified if technical developments
days, and 3 to 4 weeks will be required to permit air drop with underwater detona­
re-establish operating conditions ap­ tion.
proaching normal. Air defense measures do not offer the
same degree of success. Even the attain­
Underwater Burst
ment of that nebulous goal, popularly
The effects on port installations of an termed “overwhelming. air superiority,”
.4-bomb detonated below,, the harbor sur­ does not guarantee immunity. It may be
face cannot be pred~cted generally. Har­ recalled that during World War II both
bor depth and configuration, wind direc­ the Germans and Japanese sometimes
tion and speed, are important factors. rather pointedly ignored our assumptions
Most harbors do not have sufficient water of air superiority. The best thing that a
in them to create a base surge and water strong air defense system can offer is
column equal to that of test “Baker” at probability of a high “kill” percentage.
 PORTS AND A-BOMBS ., 15

This figure may be high, but it will not will vary with configuration of the coast
reach 100 percent. line and the coastal inhabitants. In, Arctic
regions and other, sparsely inhabited areas,
Minimizing the Effect
there may be no ports of any kind for
Since we do not have the means of st~p­
hundreds of miles. But. where a coast is
ping the delivery of the A-bomb, what can
thickly inhabited by a highly civilized
we do to minimize its effect? This question
~eople, there ,will normally be a well-
has been asked before, and the answer is
developed fishing industry, as well as
always the same—disperse, spread out
so that a bite of 4 square miles will not coa$tal shipping.
knock us out or prevent our carrying out Through the years, many small ports
planned operations. AS far as a port is have been developed to provide haven for
concerfied, this is a big order. We utilize fishing craft and facilities for shallow-
what nature gives us., In some cases, draft coasters. Many of them have few
nature has provided large sheltered. ex­ facilities, are small, shallow, and seldom
panses .of deep water, where we can dis­ capable of handling a vessel as large as a
perse our installations to the extent that
Liberty ship. Ocean shipping to transfer
four, five, or six or more A-bombs would
cargo to shore must utilize lighters,
be required to disable a port. Unfortu.
DUKWS, or other shallow-draft craft.
nately, there are few such places, and
This is a particularly awkward procedure
these are not always where we would like
for heavy mat%riel, such as locomotives,
to have them. More often than not, ports,
even major ones, are small and cramped. tanks, and heavy guns. However, sur­
prisingly large tonnages of general cargo
Turning to Europe for examples, we note
may be handled. Following D-day, a num­
that at Marseille, where such large ton­
nages were handled in 1944 and 1945, the ber of minor ports in Normandy and
main port area @ just under 600 acres in Brittany were, utilized, such as, St. Vaast,
extent. Le Havre and ‘Cherbourg are Isigny, Port-en-B essin, Gra ‘dcamp, Gran-r
scarcely as large. Even Antwerp, upon vine, and St. Male. Daily ton,
1 ages handled
which we depended so much in the past, is at each range from 500 to 3~000 long tons.
vulnerable. The main port area is less It is estimated that six to ten of these
than 3 square miles, with gates necessary run-of-the-mill minor ports could have
to maintain the water at navigable depth. equaled the capacity of Cherbourg.
There are, in addition, 3% miles of quays On the other hand, the extensive use of
along the Scheldt, but these could be well
minor ports has serious disadvantages.
blanketed by two A-bombs.
Cargo discharge, by means of lighter, is
Minor Pjmts inefficient compared to wharfside dis­
let us turn to another often suggested charge. At least 30 to 50 percent more
SOIution-dispersion through the exten­ time is required for lighter discharge,
si~c use of minor ports, undeveloped bays, providing there are plenty of lighters ankf
an:l beaches. tugs. Consequently, ocean s,hipping is de­
For every major port there are many
layed. More cargo-handling personnel is
m;i,or ones.* Their number and frequency
required. Civilian labor is not likely to be
-— —
as plentiful as in the vicinity of a major
port. Rail and highway facilities for
clearing the port of cargo may be entirely
inadequate.
16- MILITARY REVIEW

Bays and Beaches will be beyond the capacity of any heli­

Undeveloped bays have most of the dis­ copter under development. Nevertheless,
advantages of a small port, and perhaps the helicopter does present interesting
a few more. Cargo must be discharged by possibilities.
lighter or DUKW. Shore facilities for Again, should we not conside~ the de­
handling cargo are entirely lacking. It velopment of a fast shallow-draft ship—
is unlikely that rail and highway will be one capable of utilizing shallow beaches
adequate for clearance of cargo from the and bays ? Such a vessel must be capable
harbor area. Yet an undeveloped bay” may of ramp unloading and preferably not over
offer mafiy advantages. Its location may a 6-foot draft. Conventional ship propel­
favor projected land operations. Communi­ lers might be difficult, but perhaps other
cation lines may be shortened. The bay more recently developed means of propul­
selected may provide a bigger and better sion could be used. The ideal would be a
anchorage for ships than many minoi vessel of these characteristics capable of
ports, or even some major ones. It is note­ long ocean voyages, so that cargo could
worthy that early plans for Operation be delivered to destination directly from
Overlord included the possible develop­ home ports. This may not be practical
ment of Quiberon Bay to handle 7,000 long for a number of reasons, but the develop­
tons daily by, D plus 90. Unpredicted tac­ ment of a ship with an operating radius
tical’ developments rendered this unneces­ of 600 to 800 miles does not seem to pre­
sary. sent insurmountable difficulties. A cargo
Beaches may be developed to handle very vessel of this type would increase by
large tonnages. Omaha and Utah Beaches, many times the places where cargo could
during peak periods, reached 20,000 tons a be unloaded.
day. On other days, cargo discharge was In the paragraphs above, we have dis­
nil due to weather. Unless a beach is lo­ cussed debarkation dispersion by use of
cated in a sheltered bay, a storm can minor ports, beaches, and undeveloped
stop cargo discharge as effectively as an bays with the possible employment of heli­
-A-bomb and sometimes inflict as much, if copters and shallow-draft cargo ships to
not more, damage. Further, not every facilitate the process. There are very few
beach is suitable for operations of this parts of the world where one or more of
magnitude. Cargo discharge is severely these means are not practicable: However,
handicapped if beaches are too shallow, this is a problem that requires the most
if the gradient too steep, if there are careful planning to reduce the penalty in
heavy swells, or if reefs block the ap­ personnel, handling equipment, and land
proaches. transportation. Dispersion we must have,
Looking into the future, there is at but the degree of dispersion must be
least one development which may offer a weighed carefully against the Cost—from
partial solution to the bridging of that that will evolve the answer.
vital gap between ship and shore. Tre­
mendous strides are being made in heli­ Conclusions
copter development. May it not be prac­ Present air defenses do not offer a
tical to inload cargo from ship to shqre reasonable degree of security from A-bomb
by helicopter? The advantages are obvious. attack.
Ships may be dispersed along the coast Typical major ports with their concen­
line. Cargo may be dropped at rail or trations of shipping and port instal­
truck head for shipment inland. Of course, lations are likely A-bomb targets. Such
many of the heavier items of equipment attacks will inflict severe damage and
-
PORTS AND A-BOMBS 17

casualties and may paralyze port opera- Debarkation of personnel and supplies
tions for an indeterminate period. can be dispersed totheextent that A-bomb
A concept that large-scale land opera- attacks become unprofitable. Such dis­
tions may be logistically supported persion is exper+sive in port operating
through one or a few major ports is un- personnel and equipment and land -trans­
sound. portation.

From the Air Force standpoint, the National Atomic-Energy-Program

comprises three distinct areas of interest andrespo~sibility. The first of these
areas might be termed atomic energy for nonmilitary pnrposes and would in­
clude such subdivisions as the performance of basic research, the production
of fissile material, the use of atomic energy for power, and the use of radio­
active isotopes. The second area is that of atomic weapons. The third area
contains the field of atomic warfare and embraces the development of strate­
gies? tactics, techniques, and logistics to assure the most effective combat
employment of atomic weapons in the national interest.
General Hoyt S. Vamlenberg

q
Theatom bomb isadmittedly aweaponof great power. But You don’t use
a sledge hammer to drive a nail. Nor do you deliberately destroy yourself
in order to destroy your enemy.
Liez(tettant Ge?zeral Ray??zo?td S.&IcLain

“,
 Local Resources
Their Procurement in an Overseas Theater

Major Walter L. Spaulding, Quarte*ntaste~ Corps

Instructor, Command and General Staff College

s INCE earliest times, armies have lived

off the land they occupied. Ancient
to be foodstuffs, forests, mines, and manu.
facturing plants. However, a little thought.
armies were small, and their require­ will produce many more.
ments were simple. These armies needed Land itself is a resource. If it is
food, shelter, a few horses, and a few clbared, it may be used for storage’ areas,
simple arms. Sufficient quantities of these truck and vehicle parks, sites for build­
items could be expected to exist wherever ings and camps, or gardens for raising
such armies might go, foodstuffs. If land ~as not been cleared,
This situation existed to a large extent it may furnish wood for heating purposes;
through Napoleonic times. The chief rea­ if cleared in the process of obtaining wood,
son for Napoleon’s defeat in Rnssia was it will furnish services mentioned above.
his inability to live off the scorched Rus­ Sand, gravel, and rock for road building
sian earth. Since these early days, how­ and other uses may be obtained from land.
ever, two things have changed. First, the A country may have resources in the
size of modern armies has increased from form of minerals which have not been ex­
thousands to millions of men. Second, the ploited. It will often be to our advantage
requirements of modern armies are no to develop and exploit such minerals, re­
longer simple. Technical advancement in turn them to the United States in, empty
weapons has necessitated a complicated shipping, and use them to augment our
supply system from the Zone of Interior own supply. If there has been extensive
to front lines to support the modern exploitation of available minerals, stocks
soldier. which are excess to immediate local needs
Thus, we see that the armies of today may be available. These can be used by the
cannot count on finding enough supplies military or returned to the Zone of In­
in a theater of operations to allow them terior to augment #ockpiles there. In
to live completely off the land. However, addition, extensive exploitation of min­
resources indigenous to the area in which erals means that n$ines and machinery
modern armies operate are important, and used for this explo~tation are available.
full use must be made of them. Thus, assuming it proves advisable to
accomplish necessary rehabilitation of
Local Resourcqs these facilities, we can continue to obtain
As’ discussed here, local j resources’ are the minerals in question, or the machinery
those assets of a locality ,Iavailable and can be turned to other uses more prac­
useful to the armed forces. ticable from our point of view.
Local resources cover a large number of Industrial plants “are important re­
things. Normally, resources are considered sources of vital interest to military forces
20 MILITARY REVIEW

ing it whenever possible, to the fullest illustrate clearly how the “exploitation of
extent. local resources resulted in savings for
We’ have discussed some resources that
United States production. First Army
may be found in an area where our armed
placed into operation the Ha ir Steel
forces may operate, either as an occupy­ Mills in Luxembourg. These alills pro­
ing or a liberating force. The complexity
duced 54,000 tons of structural steel for
of present and future warfare brings the
our use from October 1944 to May 1945.
importance of such local resources more
In addition, these mills produced quanti­
clearly into focus,
ties of 60- and 81-mm mortars and re­
placement parts, plus miscellaneous items.
Using Local Resources Considering only steel produced for our
The most important reason for our forces during this 8-month period, the
studying and using indigenous resources following benefits accrued to United
is to reduce demands upon the economy of States economy:
the United States. Any warring nation 1. In effect, steel production in the
“must limit the scale of its operations to United States was increased by 54,000
its ability to provide required logistical tons.
support to its armed forces. It is often 2. The 771 flatcars of largest size that
assumed. that the production capacity of would have been required to move this
the United States is virtually unlimited. steel to United States ports were saved
This is not true, although it has appeared for other purposes.
to be so in the past. World War II 3. The six Liberty ships required to
brought to light many weaknesses in our transport this steel were available for
highly developed industrial system. These other uses.
showed that there are distinct limits to our 4. The 135 trains, each of 8 war-flats,
productive capacity. To quote Howard a total of 1080 rail cars, which would have
Bruce, Director of Material, Army Service had to carry this steel from the ports of
Forces, during World War II: debarkation to the front could be used to
“The demands of World War II brought move other supplies,
us to the very limit of many resources. These benefits do not include savings
Throughout the entire War, there was no in labor required for handling and trans­
period in which there were not limitations porting this steel if it had been produced
on the production of some essential item in the United States. In another instance,
of munitions.” parts for 4.2-in mortars were manufac­
Thus, it follows that any needed sup­ tured in Italy at a cost of $3,250, as com­
plies which may be obtained within a pared to a manufactured cost in the
theater, increase, by that much, the pro- United States of $25,675. Thus, $22,000
du~.tion and transportation capacity of the was saved, not counting cost of transpor­
Umted States. What has been said about tation.
th; United States applies also to our Another reason for the use of local re­
Allies. Since it is probable that productive sources by our forces is one that is too
capacity of the United States will be often overlooked. The use of local agri­
greater than that of any potential ally, it culture, industry, buildings, and the like
will be even more important, by the use of helps to re-establish, sooner than might
local resources, to save the production of otherwise be expected, the economy of the
that ally for the satisfaction of his own country in which we are operating.
needs. Normally, when a country has been a
A few examples from World War II will battleground, the populace is displaced.
 LOCAL RESOURCES. . . 21­

Homes, factories, public utilities, farm armies which, having occupied or con­
land, and other factors whkh go to make quered an area, sacked and pillaged it.
up local . economy are disrupted or de­ This was considered to be th~r right
stroyed. The people, suffering from mass and privilege. However, in modern times,
hysteria or shock, are apt to wander aim­ these rights have been curtailed. The
lessly, existing as best they can by stealing Geneva and Hague Conventions put cer­
and robbing from themselves or the” mili­ tain limitations on the rights of conquer­
tary force. They are a hazard to military ‘ ing armies. Most civilized countries have
operations from the points of view of recognized these limitations. During
sabotage and health. A people living in World War II, German, Soviet, and Jap­
this manner are subject to all sorts of anese.arznies did not consider themselves
diseases which can easily spread to the bound bythpse conventions. However, the
troops. Western Allies did bind themselves by
If the local economy can be re-estab­ the Hague and Geneva Conventions and
lished, the people will have a raison d’eh-e.
They will settle down and begin to live
GENERALPROCUREMENT
normal productive lives. Use by the ORGANIZATIONS IN
armed forces of agricultural and indus­ THEATERSOF OPERATIONS

trial products, public utilities, and other

goods and services of the local economy
will force re-establishment of a normal
economic life more rapidly than would
otherwise be the case. The military forces
should push this establishment, even
though they may not be in a position to
use local production, or even if local pro­
duction turns out only enough to sustain
the indigenous population.
The United States and its Allies have
established the policy in recent wars of not
lEEalEalziiaEiE
allowing native populations to starve to
governed .their procurement of, local re­
death., Until the people can support them­
sclves, support must come from resourcessources accordingly.
of the United States and her Allies. The There are five common methods used for
exploitation. of local resources, not in­
sooner native populations are able to sus­
tain themselves, the sooner this added cluding lend-lease:
drain on United States economy can be 1. Purchase is the preferred anethod of
stopped. A stabilized population and a procurement, even in enemy territory. ,
working economy means easier control by Purchase at the market price is usually
cheaper than cost plus transportation
the local government and by military gov­
ernment. The number of military person­ from the Zone of Interior. This method of
nel devoted to thk purpose procurement improves relationships with
may be
~e~uced. the local population, brings hoarded or
hidden assets into the market, and en­
Procurement courages production on the part of local
Over the years, armies have not wor­ inhabitants.
?~ed about the means of prOCUI@ 10CSil 2. Requisition is normally n?+ed when
resources. History has many examples of purchase does not produce desired results.
22 MILITARY REVIEW

Requisitions are usuaIly presented to the Rent was to .he paid for mat6riel leased;
head of the local government. Requisi­ mat6riel loaned was to be returned at the
tioning differs from purchasing in that end of the War or upon demand of the
the price is set and the seller has no United States. Reverse lend-lease was a
choice. A requisition is an order for de­ method whereby our forces obta}ned neces­
livery of a certain quantity of supplies or sary supplies and services from our Allies,
a certain article at a certain time and the’ cost of these services being charged
place. A fair price should be paid in cash off against their lend-lease account.
at the time of delivery, or a receipt. given
and a date and place of payment specified. Medium of Exchange
Services of inhabitants may be requisi­ Consideration must” be given to mediums
tioned to perform such work as may be of exchange to obtain local resources. In
necessary for ordinary purposes of gov­ well-established, friendly areas of the
ernment. Services may also be requisi­ world, United States or local currency
tioned for such work as does not directly may be used. In the invasion of an enemy
influence operations of war against the country, a “Spearhead Currency,” such
inhabitants’ own country. as United States gold seal dollars, might
3. Contributions are always in form of be used as a temporary medium of ex­
money. They are a levy, in excess of taxes, change. Later, occupational currency may
made upon the local population. Under be used, such as the Allied Military Au­
the Hague Convention, contributions may thority Lira used in Italy. Occupational
be levied only upon written order of the currency must be redeemed eventually by
commander in chief and in accordance more adequate currency. In some of the
with assessment and tax rolls in force. les~er developed parts of the world, as in
Funds collected in this manner can only the Pacific Theater in World War II, or in
be used for military necessity or adminis­ Africa, barter goods were more effective
t~ation of the occupied territories. than money in dealing with natives. Cloth,
4. Billeting is the assignment of troops food, and medical supplies were taken into
for shelter in public or private buildings. North Africa for this purpose in the fall
It has a number of obvious advantages. of 1942.
Public buildings should be used when pos­
sible, and if private dwellings are used Organization for Procurement
the families should be moved out. As is the case with every function car­
5. Confiscation is used when all other ried out on a large scale, an organiza­
methods fail or are unsatisfactory. This tion suitable for the needs of the func­
is an extreme measure and usually creates tion must be developed. For procurement
a hostile attitude on the part of the local of supplies and services on a large scale,
inhabitants. It also may result in the the organization during World War 11 was
hiding of large quantities of supplies. known as the General Procurement Board.
When this method of procurement is used, The accompanying chart shows the or­
payment is made at the end of the war. ganization of the Board and its relation
Confiscation of private property is for­ to. the theater commander, communica­
bidden. tions zone, lend-lease mission, and tech­
Lend-1ease was a special method of pro­ nical services.
curement developed prior to our entry into This Board, headed by a general pur­
World War II to aid countries fighting chasing agent, was set up in most theaters
Germany and Italy. Lend-lease was a sys­ as suggeeted by War
randu-rn 5-11-43, dated
De~artment Memo-
26-June 1943. The
1
I
tem for loaning and leasing war mat6riel.
 I.OCALRESOURGES . , . 23

General Procurement Board received its 4. Emergency procurement (with as­

authority from the theater commander sistance, if necessary, of the general pur­
and operated through the theater supply chasing agent).
agency’. The Board has four branches: Thus, we see that technical services
Procurements; Resources and Planning; made contacts and dld neces ry ground
Accounting; and Contracts and Adjust­ work incident to the procurement of sup­
ment. Most theaters were too large for a plies and services. When this work was
single office to control properly these ac­ ‘completed, the desires of the technical serv­
tivities throughout the theater, so branch ice,s were made known to the general
offices were established in principal cities. purchasing agent and procurement took
Liaison offices in adjoining theaters were place. The responsibility for the actual ,
maintained by each General Procurement procurement of the supplies and for their
Board. These liaison offices functioned as delivery had to be left to the technical
co-ordinating agencies of the various Gen­ services.
eral Procurement Boards between thea­ The organization for over-all control of

ters. They submitted requirements to fill

procurement which was used in World

shortages of one theater against surplus

War II has not been discussed with the

production of another theater.

idea of teaching history. It has been done

The function of the General Procure­

to point out the necessity for some such

ment Board was one of co-ordination and

form of over-all control. In any future

control. Technical services retained basic

responsibilities for procurement of needed war, a General Procurement Board may

services and supplies. These were: be called by another name, but such an

L Preparation of long-range require­ over-all procurement agency will be estab­

ments and requisitions. lished. The competition between the vari­
2. Preliminary exploration of sources ous military services, allies, local popula­
of supply. tion, and others for supplies locally

3. Technical negotiations with govern­ available makes co-ordinated control of

ment officials and commercial suppliers. procurement at theater level a necessity.

\
.

The proposal that we furnish military aid to western Europe derives from
the United States policy of responsible leadership among free nations. It has
given rise in the past to our aid to Greece and Turkey, our share in the
Marshall Plan and our support of regional and collective self-defense: agree­
ments.
Major General 7Villiam R. Schmidt
 ONE MORE RIVER

Lieutenant Colonel Lauren W. Merriam, Infantry

Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College

I N MILITARY operations, rivers con­

stitute obstacles of varying degrees of’
training nor is there any reinforcement by
higher headquarters.
importance depending Upori their individ­ Third, if the enemy holds the river line
ual characteristics. To the defender, if in strength and conditions are not favor­
properly used in the planned organization abld for outflanking his position or effect­
of the defense, they provide a natural ing a hasty crossing, a deliberate crossing
means of strengthening his position. To must be made. In a deliberate crossing,
the attacker, when situated across the additional personnel and equipment are
axis of advance, they present obstacles provided the unit making the crossing;
which may seriously impede the progress systematic preparations are made in the
of the advance unless special preparations concentration of troops and river crossing
are made to overcome them. material; special training is conducted,
From the point of view of the attacker, and when possible, the forthcoming opera­
the river crossing operation is, therefore, tion is rehearsed.
not the end sought but merely the means In view of the special preparations
to the end. The attacker seeks to cross as necessary for a river crossing, plans are
quickly as possible, with the least effort, initiated well in advance by corps and
to seize a bridgehead which will protect higher headquarters based on long-range
the crossing of the remaining forces. intelligence. Initially, each contemplated
The crossing of a river may be accom­ croesing may be planned as a deliberate
plished in several ways. one. Then, depending on conditions as
they exist at the time, these plans may
First, if the enemy does not already
be scrapped and a hasty crossing con­
hold the river line, the attacker may em­
ducted; or, if this is not feasible, the de­
ploy strong mobile forces to seize the de­
liberate crossing may proceed as planned.
sired crossing points and protect the
The illustrative example which follows
crossing of follow-up forces.
develops the principles and techniques
Second, if the enemy does hold the river involved in the conduct of a deliberate
line, his defensive position may be such crossing by an infantry division which is
that it can be outflanked, or, failing this, a part of a corps.
a hasty crossing may be effected by rapid
,and audacious action. This latter type GENERAL SITUATION
of action implies the rapid crossing of a 1. Min.—Sketch Map 1.
river and eeizure of a bridgehead by a 2. ARMY.—a. Red.—Early in 1953, Red
force utilizing the means immediately invaded Blue territory driving toward tbe
available; there is no delay for special northeast with the object of seizing the
 .,
ONE MORE RIVER 25

important Blue industrial area 200 miles division commander, 1st Infantry Divi­
NEof QU~NCY. Late in May the Reclad­ sion, made the following notes: .
vance was stopped by superior concentra­ a. I Corpe attacks at 150300 July, two
tion of Blue forces. A Blue offensive divisions abreast, with the 1st Infantry
launched early in June forced Red to with­ Division on the north (right) and the 2d
draw to the southwest. Infantry Division on the south (left), ‘
b. Blue.—(l) Having completed con­ ‘seizes crossings over the SOUTH River,
centration late in May, Blue stopped the and seizes line establishing a bridgehead
Red advance along the line: MANSVILLE to facilitate further operations to the
QUINCY—ALMON. On 10 June Blue First southwest.
Army, composed of the I, II, and III Corps,
b. The 1st Infantry Division crosses

launched an offensive on the’ axis:

in zoue, seizes objective A (Sketch Map

CHARLESTOWN—ROWLEY—RIVEBTONwith
3) and prepares to continue attack to the

the mission of seizing the FOUNTAIN—

southwest,

FORTNEY area and cutting Red lateral

communications along the SOUTH River c. Assault divisions begin training in

valley. the EM River training area immediately

(2) By 30 June, Blue I Corps, com­ (Sketch Map 2).

posed of the lst, 2d, and 3d Infantry Di­ d. The 501st Engineer Combat Group

visions and the 5th Armored Division, had will b: attached to the 1st Infantry Divi-’

closed on the SOUTH River in the vicinity sion and is now available to move as di-

In preparing for a river crossing, a division commander must consider

bridgehead objectives, assault crossing sites, formafion and scheme
of maneuver, fire supporf, fhe confrol of the movemenf, and fraining
of RIVERTON. I Corps, under instructions rected by the division. This group is
from First Army has been preparing capable of supporting the crossing of
plans for an assault crossing of the SOUTH four assault battalions.
River in the vicinity of RIVERTON wit!l e. Corps artillery wiR reinforce the
the mission of securing a bridgehead to fires of the 1st Infantry Division Artil­
facilitate further operations by First lery with two medium battalions.
Ar121yto the southwest. 4. The corps plan of maneuver and
3. AIR FORcE.—Blue has regained air known enemy defensive positions, in so
superiority. Army estimates the maximum far as they apply to the 1st Infantry Di­
vision,. are shown on Sketch Map %
striking force of enemy planes capable of
operating in the area of projected opera­ DIVISION PLAN
tions to be 15 bombers and 15 fighters.
1. Having been informed of the corps
SPECIAL SITUATION commander’s concept of the crossing op­
eration, the Commanding General, 1st In­
?. MAxw.—Sketch Maps 2 and 3. fantry Division, formulates his’ estimate
-“. On 30 June, the 1st Infantry Divi­ based on information obtained from corps,
sion is in an assembly area in the vicinity augmented by that obtained through per­
of JACKSON (Sketch Map 2). sonal reconnaissance and reconnaissances
:;. At a briefing on 30 June, at which conducted by division staff officers. To ‘
ti],ie the Corps Commander announced the enable staff officers and subordinate com­
de(.ision and concept of the operation, the manders to proceed with their detailed
26 MILIT.AIZYREVIEW

planning, the division commander must 2. BRIDGEHEADObjectives.—Based on

reach a decision as to the: the final bridgehead objective which has
a. Obj&tives on the far side of the been designated by corps (Sketch Map 3),
river. the Commanding General, 1st Infantry.
b. (h-ossing sites to be used. Division, is required to submit ~is recom­
c. Formation of crossing and mis­ mendations for intermediate objecti~es.
sions of subordinate units. These will be co-ordinated by corps wi%
The division commander finds it con- those recommended by the Commanding

CHARLESTOWN

Ii

)
f’
SKETCHMAP 1

‘~

venient to ulan back from the final bridge­ General, Zd Infantry Division, in his zone.
head objec~ive assigned by corps. From The division commander bears in mind
this, he determines the intermediate ob­ that the assault crossing is normally con-
jectives to be seized, the most advanta­ s’idered in terms of three successive objec­
geous krossing sites, and the formation for tives that will, in turn:
crossing and scheme of maneuver. With a. Eliminate effective direct fire from
these decisions, necessary plans can be
the crossing sites.
developed for fire snpport, control of
movement, allocation of crossing means, .b. Eliminate ground observed artil­
_a_n_d the co-ordination of training. lery fire from the crossing sites.
1
28 MILITARY REVIEW

meet possible enemy counterattacks. enitable sites as a means of obtaining

Should the enemy resistance be light, the surprise.
assault force may be ordered to proceed As a result of the reconnaissances con­
beyond their assigned objectives. Their ducted by the division commandey’ and his
advance itself will then protect the cross­ staff, it is determined that the best assault
ing of the remainder of the force. crossing sites, each suitable for one bat­
3. SELECTION OF ASSAULT CROSSING talion, are at 1, 2, 5, and 7 (Sketch Map
SITES.—Before the division commander 4). A detailed analysis of the various
can arrive at a definite decision as to the sites reveals that:
formation for crossing and the scheme of a. Site 1 has fair approaches, good
maneuver, he must know which croseing cover and concealment on the near bank,
sites in the “division sector are most suit­ good exits on the far bank, and a stretch
able for use. To this end, he requires that of river unobstructed by obstacles.
a study be made of all probable sites b. Site 2 has good approaches, good
based on information obtained from higher cover and concealment on the near bank,
he~dquarters and units holding the near go,od exits on the far bank and no obstruc­
bank, supplemented by that gained tions in the water area.
through reconnaissance conducted by mem­ c. Site 3, although having good ap­
bers of the division staff. Both the tech­ proaches and exits, plus a water area free
nical and tactical requirements are care­ from obstacles, is eliminated because of
fully considered in determining the the strong enemy defenses on Hill 97
relative desirability of each site. (Sketch Map 3) and the lack of conceal­
Technical considerations are concerned ment on the near side of the river.
primarily with the condition of the river d. Site 4 has fair cover on the near
and approaches at the crossing points. side of the river but approaches are poor
Ideal conditions demand: (1) a moderate and obstacles exist in this particular por­
current; (2) a water area unobstructed tion of the river. Site 4 is therefore elim­
by natural or artificial obstacles such as inated.
islands, bars, floating mines, or barriers; e. Site 5 has fair cover and c~nceal­
(3) suitable banks with good approaches ment, approaches are fair, exits on the
and easy access to existing road nets. To far bank are good, and tberd are no ob­
be suitable from a tactical point of view, structions in the river.
crossing sites should possess the follow­ f. Site 6 has good approaches and ex­
ing characteristics: (1) concealment for its, good cover and concealment in the
assembly areas in rear of crossing points; built-up areas; however, the obstructions
(2) concealed routes of approach to the in the river resulting from the blown
river; (3) undefended crossing points bridge and the island make this site un­
with good avenues of advance to objec­ suitable.
tives on the far bank; (4) dominating ter­ g. Site 7 has fair cover and conceal­
rain on the near bank to permit support ment, fair approaches, good exits, and
of the attack by overhead fire, and to pro­ ni obstructions in the river.
vide observation.
Site 6, although not suitable for an
‘The combination of the above require­ assault crossing, may be used as a bridge
ments which best fit the situation con­ site. The road nets on both the near and
fronting the division indicate sites that far banks favor the location of a bridge
may be used. It is well to consider also at this noint, Further, the ~iers and
the possibility of using apparently un­ abutment; of the former bridg-e may be
 ONE MORE RIVER 29 I
,
expected to assist materially in the con­ bringing the mass of his fire on few cross- I
struction of the new bridge. ing points. Through the ability, of the .’
The Ri%erton salient %ers a distinct enemy to thus mass his, fires and’ employ
advantage to the division attack in this the bulk of his:reserve against the main
situation, particularly as suitable criss­ crossing, the success of the operation is
ing sites are available on both flanks. endangered.
Situated as it is, toward the attacker, it ~ An assault crossing on a broad front,
permits the concentration of combat on the other hand, lessens the vulnera­
power and flanking fire on enemy forces bility ‘of the attacking troops to enemy
defending in the salient. The assault fire, since the bulk of the fire can” be
units, by forcing crossings at 5 and 7, can
rest their,flanks on the river in attacking
out of the salient to the south. While con­
sidering the advantages afforded by the
salient in his zone, the division commander
also realizes that it is possible for the
@E_l[ LEGEND
~nemy to organize a strong defense across
the base of the salient, making it necessary
to launch a strong co-ordinated attack to
effect abreakout to the south.
4. FORMATION AND SC~ENIE OF MA-
NEuvER.—The division commander is now
considering the formation for the attack
and’ scheme of maneuver. He knows that
the crossing sites available will permit
crossings along the entire front of his
zone. Further, he knows that he has ade­
quate engineer support, in both personnel
and equipment, to support the crossing of
four battalions in the assault. His first
decision must be whether to cross on a
narrow or broad front. In arriving at his
decision, the division commander weighs
the advantages and disadvantages of both
courses of action,
He realizes that by ~rossing on a nar­
row front he can concentrate his force
alld make a strong main effort in any por­ massed on only one crossing point. As
tion of his zone. Maximum concentration the enemy is not able to determine early
of fires of all weapons may be achieved to the exact location of the main effort,, it
support the assault, and it may thereby may be expected that he will delay the
be possible to overwhelm the enemy de­ use of his reserves in the counterattack.
fenses at one given fioint. Moreover, the Even then, the enemy’s main counterat­
P~obl’em of tactical control is greatly tack can be launched against only one of
simplified. The disadvantages to this the crossings. This course of action has
C(wrse of action,’ the division commander an added advantage in that an attack on
feels, lie in the ability of ‘the enemy to a wide front may disclose a weak point in
give all his attention to a small area, the enemy defense system favorable for
 —
-q

30 MILITARY REVIEW

exploitation by the attacker. The prin­ is held to the minimum consistent with
cipal disadvantages in crossing on a the retention of proper control and co­
broad front are the increased difficulty of ordination. Since greater enemy resistance
maintaining tactical control and provid­ may be expected in advancing $rom the
ing effective fire support. first to second objective, it may be neces­
Based. on his analysis of the two courses sary to employ fresh troops from units
of action, tbe division commander decides initially in reserve to maintain the mo­
to cross on a wide front. He feels that mentum of the attack. Armor and sup­
the ~advantages of this course of action porting artillery are crossed as soon after
outweigh those of a crossing on a narrow the initial assault as possible to be
front; further, he feels that its disad­ available for antitank defense in the
vantages may be minimized through care­ bridgehead and to provide support for
ful and thorough planning. As he plans the attack on the third objective. As each
to cross on a broad front, the division successive objective is seized, the position
commander decides to employ the 1st and is consolidated to secure the bridgehead
2d Infantry in the assault (boundary be­ agqinst expected enemy cotinterattacks.
tween regiments is. shown on Sketch Map 5. FIRE SUPPolzl’.-The division com­
4), retaining the 3d Infantry in reserve. mander feels that the effectiveness of sup­
Since the means are available, it is con­ porting fires will be a deciding factor in
templated that both of the assault regi­ the assault crossing of SOUTH River. He
ments will attack with two battalions therefore ensures, through his division
abreast, retaining the third battalion in artillery commander, that detailed fire
reserve. This formation for the attack plans are prepared providing for the em­
provides an adequate reserve force in each ployment and co-ordination of the fires of
echelon. all supporting weapons and arms.
Orders assigning missions to subordi­ One of the first decisions to be made is
nate commanders are such as to allow them whether or not to recommend that a prep­
considerable freedom of action. This is aration be fired. Considering the informa­
desirable to enable subordinate command­ tion presently available, the division com­
ers to exploit successes that occur during mander decides to recommend against
the execution of the operation. Alternate firing a preparation since: ,
plans are prepared by both division and a. The time of attack is tentatively
reginlents for the exploitation of success at set at 0300, there is a possibility of gain­
any crossing point. ing surprise.
b. Little is known of the enemy dis­
It is visualized that as soon as the
positions, and few profitable targets have
initial assault waves have reached the far
been located.
shore they will advance rapidly to gain
the first objective. Mopping up operations c. There are no reports which indi­
will proceed concurrently with the ad­ cate that the enemy is making special
vance to reduce the possibility of by­ preparations to meet the attack. Despite
passed enemy strong points interfering this decision, fire plans will include pro­
. ..
with work on crossing sites and the cross­ vlslon for a preparation, and when it is
ing of follow-up troops. The keynote bf evident that surprise has been lost, fire
success in the early stages of the assault will be opened, as planned, on order of
the division conlmander.
is the speed with which the attack pro­
gresses. Therefore, once the first objec­ The fire plans of subordinate units
tive has been seized, delay for reorganiza­ ~orm the basis for the division plan. Sub­
tion for the attack on the second objective ordinate unit plans which co-ordinate the
 ONE MORE RIVER si

tires of all weapons available to the regi­ to be airborne in the immediate vicinity
ments, including those of the direct sup­ of the bridgehead area, available to attack
port artillery, are further co-ordinated at suitable targets. Specific targeis which
division level. The division . fire plan may be attacke’d are known troop concen­
integrates the fires of the general support trations, (particularly armor), communi­
artillery into the regimental plans, and cation centers, command posts, and artil­
provides for the use and co-ordination of lery position areas. As bridge and %ridge
available tactical air support. traffic are profitable targets for enemy
It is decided that the artillery will be air attack, local air superiority is highly
maintained under centralized control to important to the success of the crossing
permit massing of fires. The organization operation. The air alert mission will pro­
of the artillery, approved by the division vide protection to the bridgehead area
commander, is similar to that for other from attacks by enemy air, contributing
operations with one light battalion in di­ to the maintenance of local air superiority.
rect support of each assault regiment. The The assignment of missions to support­
third light battalion is initially in general ing units and their proposed employment,
support with the mission of reinforcing the as set forth in the fire support plans, are
fires of the battalion supporting the 2d guided by the desire to provide continuous
Infantry Regiment. The organic medium effective support for the assault. The
battalion and the reinforcing battalions division commander feels that the attack­
from corps are to be used on general sup­ ing units will be most vulnerable to
port missions. counterattack during the advance to and
The division tank battalion and the immediately after the seizure of the sec­
regimental tank companies will be sited ond objective. He, therefore, considers it
‘to permit direct fire on the landing front. necessary for the light artillery, at least,
When the artillery fires lift, the fires of the to be able to support thq attack on objec­
armor will be employed to cover the as­ tive 2 from the near side of the river. To
sault and protect the flanks. One battery deliver the required supporting fires, posi­
of antiaircraft artillery is to be attached tion areas for the artillery and other
to each assault regiment to furnish direct support weapons will be located well for­
tire on ground targets in support of the ward. Immediately after the capture of
assault crossing and thereafter to provide the first objective, the 1st and, 2d Field
antiaircraft defense of the crossing sites. Artillery Battalions, in direct support of
The remainder of the organic antiaircraft the two assault regiments, are to be pre­
artillery will be used to provide antiair­ pared to displace forward and provide
craft defense of the division zone. the close support so vital to the continua­
(Since the division antiaircraft units tion of the advance. Following t’hese units,
al,e to be used on other missions, addi­ the 3d Field Artillery Battalion, if it has ‘
ti,~nal units will be required either under not already crossed to support the 3d
divisional or corps control to furnish anti- Infantry, and the 4th Field Artillery Bat­
a~mraf t protection for the bridge sites. talion will move forward. During the for­
The antiaircraft defense of the entire ward displacement of the division artil­
cl)rps zone will be co-ordinated by the lery, it is planned that reinforcing corps
c ]rps antiaircraft t officer. ) artillery will take over some of the sup­
Tactical air support being available for port missions.
: t]e crossing operation, it is planned to 6. CONTROLOF MOVEMENT.—TO prevent

] uquest preplanned air and ground alert congestion at bridge and ferry sites and

Hissions. The missions on air alert are to make maximum efficient use of cross;

 1
32 MILITARY REVIEW

ing means, it will be necessary to exercise crossing priorities, thereby minimizing

close control of movement across the riyer. congestion on roads to crossing points.
The, traffic regulation and control plan Holding areas are to” be established at
prepared by the G-4, 1st Infantry Divi­ the bridge site and the princi~al ferry
sion, prescribes the measures to be taken site on both the near and far bank. Should
for controlling the movement of follow-up the use of the bridg~ or ferry be inter­
units of the division. The G-4’s plan for rupted, or should any ~change of plans re­
the coming operation (Sketch Map 5) quire a change in priorities of vehicles
gives among other items: waiting to cross, vehicles and convoys will
a. Priority lists of personnel and be moved off the road into holding areas.
vehicles. Congestion of traffic will thereby be elim­
b. Location of staging and holding inated on the roads in the immediate vi­
areas. cinity of crossing pointe.
c. Location of traffic control posts. Traffic control posts are to be estab­
Provision is also made in the plan for lished as indicated by the division military
a communication system connecting stag­ police company. The functions performed
ing areas, holding areas, bridge sites, and by the traffic control post personnel in
critical traffic control posts. In estab­ this operation are the same as for any
lishing the priorities for the crossing other operation.
of vehicles and personnel, G-4 works 7. TRAINING.—AS the corps commander
closely with the division G-3. Priorities has prescribed that the assault divisions
are then assigned considering the divi­ will train for the coming operation in the
sion mission and. scheme of manenver and EM River training area, the division com­
the needs of the assault echelons for mander directs his G-3 to prepare a train­
vehicles by type. After the crossing of the ing program as a guide for subordinate
artillery and armor, high priority for units. Since all previous river crossing
crossing is assigned to ammunition ve­ operations in which the division has par­
hicles, ambulances, and special engineer ticipated were hasty crossings, the G-3
equipment. During the period that the Ist must first decide what special trainipg the
Division will control the bridge, all traffic units must have to prepare them for cross­
will be one-way forward, except for ing SOUTH River. G-3 determines the
returning ambulances carrying critically training objective for the period to be:
wounded. These ambulances will be per­
u. To train assault battalions in
mitted to return individually under con­
crossing a river.
trol of military police stationed at each
end of the bridge. Certain ferries are to b. To familiarize vehicle drivers with
be designated for other return traffic stream crossing meanw
which is expected to be light during the c. To train selected individuals and
early phases of the operation. units in special operations.
The main staging area is to be located Special teams of infantry and engineers
at a distance from the river to take ad­ will be organized for the assault. These
vantage of alternate routes to bridge and teams will be organized and train together
ferry sites. This location will permit ‘di­ during the training period, using the type
version of vehicles from one crossing site of equipment that will be used during the
to another should it become necessary.’ actual operation. Vehicle operators of
Vehicles and convoys are to move from the all units will receive training in loadlng,
main staging area to forward holding crossing, and unloading, using infantry
areas in accordance with their assigned support rafts and M4A2 rafts. Engineers
 ONV MORE RIVER 33

‘will receive special training in the use of bridges intact and the forcing of cross­
improvised road mats and will develop ings by bold aggressive action, Should
loads foi the hand carrying of essential this method fail, or be impractical, the
tools. Medical personnel must be pre­ commander must resort to the deliberate
pared, through training, to meet special crossing which requires detailed planning,
problems in evacuation likely to be met in special training, and special equipment.
the operation. The final phase of training, Planning by higher headquarters must,
will consist of a rehearsal for assault bat­ be initiated early, as soon as the need for

.F.
talions to test the plan of attack. the river crossing operation is foreseen,
In preparing the training program, the to allow subordinate units sufficient time to
G-3 bears in mind that it is desirable that
‘the engineers who areto bring the assault
SKETCHMAP 5 xx /
troops across train with the troops they 1.

0
Ixx

A“

are to cross. The 501st Engineer Combat ­

MILES
Group, which is to be attached to the 1st 11, ,

Infantry for the operation, must be made MAIN . h

STAGING AREA-
availkble to train with the division. Time
must be allowed for movement of equip­ 2
4 3
ment to the training site and for the train­
ing of engineers who are to conduct in­
struction for other units. G-3 plans to
use only minimum equipment during train­
ing, to minimize loss of ,equipment and to
reduce the amount that will have to be
moved forward for the operation.
G-3 notes that the EM River training
area, selected by higher headquarters,
possesses certain desirable characteristics
which it would be well to mention. It is
located well to the rear, which aids in
maintaining security of the projected
plans. The EM River at this particular
point closely approximates that portion of
Y’#w%k?iw u\
SOUTHRiver where the division is to cross.
This will contribute much to the training
“o’ ‘0s’5
(6 ) H \\
of the assault units as conditions are conduct their detailed planning and train- .,
sin}ilar to those that will be encountered
ing.
in the actual operation. .
Plans are based on the division of the
X. SuMMARY.—l’he purpose of all river operation into three successive phases
crossing operations is to move the at­ to aid in maintaining control. The scheme
tacking force across the water obstacle
of maneuver adopted is dependent upon
as rapidly and as economically as pos­
“the number and location of suitable cross­
sible: Commanders must think of a river ing sites, plus the engineer troops and
a! merely another obstacle to be overcome; equipment available to permit the use of
vtct.ory lies beyond, not at the river.
these sites. With adequate crossing sites
Generally, the most economical method and engineer means available, the plan
o!’ crossing a river is the rapid seizure of of crossinfl should provide for striking
34 MILITARY REVIEW

the enemy on a broad front and at the Necessary” controls are established by the ~
same time allow for the retention of re­ traffic regulation and control plan pre- ~
serve forces to exploit success. pared by the unit G-4.
The close co-ordination and control of Another important step in p~eparatiou
all arms participating in the river cross­ for the deliberate crossing is the determi.
ing operation are essential. The fire of all nation of the amount and type of special
weapons available, to include tactical air, training necessary. As special teams of
must be planned to gise continuous effec­ infantry and engineers will be organized
tive support for, the assault. Plans must for the assault, it is’ important that these
provide for ga]n]ng and maintaining local
elements train together, using the types
air superiority in the area of operations
of equipment to be used in the assault.
to allow etikient use of crossing means.
Training areas should be located well to
The most efficient use of crossing means
the rear for security reasons, and condi­
still cannot be obtained without control
tions should approximate the conditions
of movement into and out of the bridg-e­
head. The problem of control of movement, expected to be encountered in the area of
olie of the major logistical t~~slis, must be operations as closely as possible. Finally,
solved by thorough planning and sched­ dependent upon the time and equipment
uling of troop movdments and convoys, available, a rehearsal should be held to
and the enforcement of traffic regulations. test the assault plans.

The attack across unfoldable rivers requires special preparations, both

technical and tactical, proportionate to the size of the river and the relative
strength of the opposing forces.
FM 100-5, Field Servicp Regulations, Operations, para 752.
.
 The G-2 and His Commander

Colonel T. F. ~an Natta, A r~)~or

Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College

T HE MILITARY REVIEW, in its August

issue, carried an article on the reverse of
First point: Know yotIr job.
This advice may seem obviously silly,
this subject: THE COMMANDERAND HIS but it is probably the major reason for
G.2. It is hoped that all commanders, lack of confidence in a G-2.
present and future, will accept and learn Check yourself.
the principles expressed—if not from the Agencies.—Do you know mxny agencty
artifle itself, from any of our many mili­ that you have under you or near you, that
tary sources of learning, especially from you can use to further your job? Do you
the G-2 himself. know the methods and purpose of each
Too many G-2s, from ignorance, lazi­ agency? Do you know all its capabilities
ness, or lack of initiative, permit them­ and limitations? If you do, you are off
selves to be misused, and consequently to an excellent start, for with this knowl­
they permit their commanders to continue edge alone a more than passable job can
in their ignorance. If it is inexcusable for be done.
a co~nrnander not to know his business, it Aids.-Do you know every type of
is jtist as inexcusable for any staff officer map that is available to you? Do you
not to help his commander learn his busi­ know where and how to get terrain models?
ness. (Either antecedent for the last “his” Do you know what intelligence reports are
will do. ) available to you, from every headquarters
“SO,” says a G-2, “1 should get up and in the chain of command above you, right
tell my old man he doesn’t know what he’s up to the Department of the Army? Do
doing? Thanks.” you know what air photos are available,
That isn’t exactly the method advo­ and do you know how to get new ones? Are
cal cd, but it is the general idea that must you familiar with the long list of gadgets
be put across, gently, if the old man that can be used to “pretty up’i a map or
do~,sn’t know what he is doing. chart, and do you know how to get them ,
The previous article gave the command- and use them?
e~. three points to consider in handling If you are still giving otily affirmative
their G-25. It is not unreasonable to offer answers you can produce much better than
this same quantity of advice—three average results.
p[,ints—to the G-27 Doctrine.—Do you really understand

TJIe success that a. G-2 has in performing his job and iri arousing
the interest of his commander depends directly on how well the G-2
k~ows his job, how well he does it, and how well he sells his work
 ,. ‘1
36 MILITARY REVIEW

the “capabilities” method ? The principles of the command, but an estimate will al­
of dissemination? AR 380-5? Have you ways be required.
read anything ,by Chandler and Robb? This is where too many G-2s fail to do
Davidson and Glass? Kent? If you are in their job. Fearing the responsi~ility that
tbe ZI, have you read your Army Area’s a clear cut estimate places on their shoul­
Intelligence Guide? Have you read one ders, they attempt to avoid it by writing
from another army area? an estimate that will be generally correct
If you are still batting a thousand, you no matter what happens. Whether you
have all the equipment to produce unfail­ fool your commander or not, the results
ingly superior work. are much the same: if the timid G-2 fails
to fool his commander, he “is relieved and
It is apparent, of course, that all the
given another job; if he does fool his com­
foregoing is merely background, and no
mander it will be because the latter doesn’t
matter how well a G-2 is equipped, sonle­
understand intelligence; and not under­
thing more must be done. Under no cir­
standing intelligence, the commander will
cumstances, however, can th]s background
probably load the G-2 up with other jobs.
be,, neglected. No matter how well a G-2
shines in other matters, unless he really ‘ Another field in which many G-2s fail
knows his job his case is hopeless. from lack of courage ie that of security.
With this in mind, we can go on to the The safe thing to do. is to recommend that
next point, every possible security measure be
adopted, no matter how much it hampers
Second point: Do your job.
the command. Never forget that security
Don’t wait for someone to tell you what measures operate directly against ease
to do. You know what to do, and how to and efficiency of operation.
do it, so go ahead. Especially, if your com­
Paint out vehicle bumper markings and
mander is not too well grounded iu intelli­
the MP traffic problem is tripled. Silence
gence, you must take the initiative in de­
the radios and a move can be a nightmare.
livering to your commander what he may
Lock up our information and no one can
not know enough to ask for.
do his job.
A G-2 has only himself to blame if he A staff officer must advise his com­
fails to take this initiative, sits around mander, and the recitation of a complete
waiting to be told what to do, and winds lilt of security measures isn’t advice. It
up with a frustrating mess of odd j ohs. If isn’t even an interesting elocutionary
you wait for your commauder to tell you
effort, and most commanders won’t listen
what he wants, he may or, may not give
to it more than twice.
you intelligence requirements. But it is
dead certain that if he finds you are not A timid or an inefficient G-2 may try
producing anything constructive he will to hide behind security. Possible critics,
promptly give you the first batch of odd people who might complain to the old man
jobs that come along. if they knew how little the G-2 is produc­
ing, are denied any peeks at the vacuum
In doing your job, too, be sure you do
by pretending that it is too highly classi­
it accurately and courageously. The final
fied.
culmination of all intelligence, and ~the
hi’ghest art of the G-2, is a good estimate. Security is to protect the command from
This is just as true in the communications the enemy; it is not to protect the G-2
zone and the 21 as it is in the combat from justifiable criticism.
zone; as true in peace as it is in war. The Do your job properly, though, and you
 THE G-2 AND HIS COMMANDER 37

the contrary, you will probably be quite self, who is going to point out your weak­
ready to accept the next point. nesses to you?
Third point: Sell gour job. The business of interesting subject mat­
This is the easiest to say, but probably ter is like a snowball. One good briefing
the hardest to do. It presupposes a diffi­ on an interesting subject paves the way
cult situation, for there’ is no need to use and builds up interest for other subjects
salesmanship on the commander who un­ that would not have been of much interest
derstands intelligence. at the start.
An interest rouser that has never failed An example. To start off with a socio­
is a, briefing. Humans are curious, and logical study of country X would probably
they like to know something about every­ have negative, if not unfortunate, results.
thing, but most of us are lazy readers. We But some highlights of current events in
will look, listen, and discuss, but we hate country X ,will lead to an interest in the
to apply ,the eyes to a printed page and background of country X, which will lead
hold them there for any length of time. to an interest in the sociology of country X.
So give the old man a briefing, preferably Another example. Nothing could be
leading off with some aspect of the cur­ much duller than a discussion of the
rent situation. You can be absolutely T/O&E of Counter Intelligence Corps de­
certain that a good briefing will be well tachments as an opener. But a good
received and will beget a demand for an­ presentation of some horrible examples of
other. And as long as the briefings are security mistakes will lead to another dis­
good, the demand will continue. cussion on how to prevent these mistakes,
What is a good briefing? First of all, to a briefing on the tools we have to help
from the title itself, it must be brief. Any­ us avoid these mistakes, and here we offer
thing over a half hour becomes a lecture. a brief glance at the T/O&E of a sample
Second, it must be presented so that it CIC detachment.
can be understood. This involves a logical A word of caution ‘on this selling,
order of ideas, a clear delivery, a pace that though. It has been deliberately put in
is slow enough to follow but not so slow third positign because it is absolutely
as to drag, and adequate supporting aids. essential that we must know our job and
Third, it must be about a subject that do our job before we ever attempt to sell
interests the audience. our job. In fact, only disaster will result
The brevity we specify must apply not if we try to sell something we haven’t got,
only to time, but to scope as well. An at­ whether it is intelligence or oil stock.
tempt to cover too much in a short time These three points are not everything
usually results in a simple (and boring) that goes to make an efficient G-2. All the
recital of facts that no one will remember. qualities that apply to any good officer
Don’t attempt to cover too much ground must be just as evident here, with perhaps
in one session. an extra measure of tact and patience.
In the presentation, watch the old ego. The results a commander’ gets from his
Before you give the briefing yourself, G-2 will vary directly with the intetest
make veW sure that you have perfected he devotes to his G-2 and his work. At
y[ur delivery. An advantage in having the same time, the interest a G-2 rouses
one of your assistants (if you have any) in his commander will depend directly
do the talking is that you can train him ,upon how well the G-2 knows his job, does
tc speak properly; if you give it your­ his job, and sells his job.
 Fiscal and Finance

Fundamentals

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Wiechmann, Finance Co~ps

Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College

M OST of the tools needed by military

commanders in accomplishing both peaee­
Function of Command
Fundamentally, the commander is con­
time and wartime missions can be bought cerned with the answers to the following
with money. Even men, ideas, and ingenu-’ three questions about fiscal and finance
ity, although generally regarded as price­ matters:
less can be materially influenced by
1. How do I obtain authority to obligate
money. It follows that advanced military
government funds ?
studies by commanders and general staff
officers must include fundamentals about 2. Howcan Iensure prompt payulent of
the management of fiscal and finance such obligations and of all amounts due
matters. Such studies must include enough personnel of my command and their de­
about fiscal and finance duties so that pendents ?
commanders and general staff officers will 3. Wha~ additional financial services
know what they must do to ensure maxi­ are authorized and needed in my command,
mum progress with the amount of money and how do I cause such services to be
available. performed?
Fiscal duties are mainly those related to The first of these questions relates to
budgeting and authorizations to obligate fiscal work within the command, qnd the
money. Finance duties are mainly those question can be stated in another way as
relating to actual disbursements (or col­ follows : “What fiscal controls and what
lections) in currency, checks, or other ne­ fiscal work are necessary in my compxmd,
gotiable media. While most of the detailed and to whom do I assign these controls
work pertaining to fiscal and finance serv­ and this work?” The second question re­
ices is performed by personnel of the lates to finance duties and it can be stated
Finance Corps who are in finance as follows: “What finance disbursing units
units or members of a commander’s staff, and staff finance personnel do I need in
the responsibility for over-all direction, my command in order to get the finance
performance, and supervision of fiscal and disbursing work done?” The third question
finance services is a command responsi­ is primarily concerned with finance duties
bility. Since the commander is responsible, related to disbursing, but may involve
it follows that his general staff officers additional fiscal duties. When these ques­
must give due consideration to fiscal ‘and tions are answered in terms of appropriate
finance matters when they prepare esti­ assignment of functions, procurement of
mates, plans, and orders for the com­ competent personnel and units, and pro­
mander, and when they co-ordinate and vision for supervision of fiscal and finance
supervise the execution of orders. functions, the initial steps in the perform­
-
FISCAL AND FINANCE FuNDAMENTALS 39

ante of the commander’s responsibilities 5. How the obligation of funds within

in these matters have been taken. the command will be scheduled and con­
While fiscal functions and finance func­ trolled so as to obtain the maximum re-
tions are d%tinct from each other and are suit for each do}lar obligated.
discussed separately below, they are In order to furnish commanders and
closely related and may all be assigned staff officers the necessary information on
to the same staff section when the com­ which to base fiscal decisions, it is neces­
mander desires to do so. For example, a sary, of course, to maintain detailed fiscal
post fiscal officer may be, charged with records. These records will show at all
the additional duty of staff-supervising times:
finance functions; but he must not be as­
1. The amounts of appropriated money ~
sumed to have this additional duty unless which have been suballotted to the com­
the post commander specifically assigns mand, identified according to purpose and
it to him. In theaters of operations dur­
project numbers.
ing World War II, finance functions, as
well as fiscal functions and some other 2. The amounts which have been obli­
gated to date, including amounts which
related, functions, were generally as­
subordinate commanders have been au­
signed to the theater fiscal officer or fiscal
thorized to obligate.
director.
3. The amounts which have actually
Fiscal Functions been paid out as a result of obligations
The fiscal functions in a command in­ within the command.

While most of the work pertaining to fiscal and finance services is

performed by Finance Corps personnel, the over-all direction,
performance, and supervision is a responsibility of thd commander

elude primarily the necessary esihmating, Since the funds allotted to a commander
budgeting, accounting, reporting, and fi­ often have an important effect on his
nancial administration and control over ability to perform his missions, suballot­
the use of all appropriated funds avail­ ments and matters pertaining to them
able to the command. They do not include must follow the command channel.
the physical handling of currency and Other fiscal functions are:
checlis or the accomplishment of payments. 1. Obtaining necessary information and
These latter operations are finance func­ rendering necessary reports in connection
tiol]s and are largely of a routine nature. with cost accounting. .
However, fiscal functions are closely re- 2. Auditing nonappropriated funds -as ‘‘
lat~d to vital command decisions on such required.
ma~,ters as: 3. Supervising the performance of re­
:. The purposes and projects for which quired accounting relative to transactions
au! hority to obligate appropriated funds involving reimbursement between appro­
wi i; be requested, priations or reinbursement of amounts
:. The amounts which will be requested. due the United States.
‘. The extent to which authorizations 4. Examining commercial vouchers re­
to obligate funds will be suballotted. lating to obligations against funds avail­
!. To whom authority to obligate funds able to the command, to determine whether
wi ~1 be delegated. available balances are sufficient to cover
40 MILITARY REVIEW

them and whether they represent proper obligate government funds. Assume that,
charges against the appropriations and the commander of a division planning, a
projects cited thereon; certifying vouchers 2-day motor march to a training area
if they are found correct; and forwarding away from the division’s home station de­
them to disbursing officers for payment. sires to bivouac overnight at a )camp site
A fiscal officer charged with perform­ which is not government property and
ing these tasks must be designated by which will require the payment of a rental
each commander to whom appropriated fee estimated to be not in excess of $100.00.
funds are made available for ohligation. Approval by the next higher commander of
When the amount of fiscal work in a corn. a training program in which such a march
mand is small and does not require the is scheduled does not by itself constitute
full time of the fiscal officer, the staff an authorization to obligate $100.00 of
finance officer or another staff officer may appropriated funds. Such plans must be
be designated as fiscal officer in addition to co-ordinated with the fiscal officer in
his other duties. In a command in which order to ascertain the availability of
a comptroller is designated, the fiscal funds. Unless the need was foreseen
duties are usually assigned to the comp­ w$en budget estimates for the current
troller. The fiscal officer or comptroller is fiscal year were submitted, it is likely
responsible to his commander, and the that no such funds are available to the
commander is responsible to the next division commander. It will be possible
higher commander, that the obligation of to obtain the desired funds only if tbe
government funds is not authorized with­ need was foreseen by a higher commander
out first ascertaining that: and if the funds were made available to
, 1. The proposed obligations will not re­ him,
sult in unauthorized, excessive, or other­ Assuming that all necessary supplies
wise ill-considered use of appropriated for the march and at the training area
funds. are. within routine training allowances
2. The proposed ob~igations are neces­ and are furnished by supply services at
sary for the proper performance of the the home station, but that no specific
mission and efficient operation of the authorization to obligat~ funds for rental
command. of a camp site has been received by the
3. The best interests of the United division commander, the following steps
States will be served by the proposed are required:
obligation and expenditure. 1. The division commander (or his fis­
Ordinarily, a commander also appoints cal officer) must request from his next
purchasing and contracting officers wh6 higher commander a suballotment of funds
are required to enter into agreements as in the amount of $100.00 for the rental
prescribed by law covering the terms un­ of the camp site. What he requests is not
der which individuals, firms, or corpora­ $100.00 in cash, nor a check of $100.00.
tions contract to furnish needed supplies It is simpl,y an authorization to enter into
am? ser%t%s. % ?36 %s$?$%sb ?@& %GW3& an agreement wh<cb wfii obfi~ate %5c
twiness wwtiw, fkesil ofieers and g~.wrnmenk to WY an amount aizmed
finance disbursing officers are not eligible Upoh, not in excess of $100.00.
for ,appointment as purchasing and con­ 2. Assuming that the higher commander
tracting oficers. has currently available to him a suballot­
The following is a simple illustration ment of funds which enables him to grant
of the steps which must be taken if a the division commander’s request, and
commander desires to obtain authority to that he desires to grant it, he (or his
 BUDGET CYCLE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

‘iscal
{ear
telationc ’16 + +
n Months

:alendar Jan Mar June Jul)’ 15.30 Sep Jan June July July to July to
kfonths Feb Apr Aug Ott Feb to June
May 1-14 sep Nov Mar June
Dec Apr
May
1

‘base of Prepare Formulation and Review Rericw Presents. Presents. Funding Allocation, Ltquidalion of
Work in Review and Presentations of and and lion of tion of and Pro- Obligation, obligations incul
? regress fssue Army Estimates of Re\ isicm Revision Army Army EsIi. and Expendi­ red during appl!
Programs Funds Required of of Estimate male and ture of funds cable fiscal year
and Policies and Justilica. Estimates Estimates and Justi. Justifica.
and Budget lions . Iication to tion to the
D]rective ffureau of Congress
the Budget

Responsi­ Budget Ad. Major Army Corn. Budget Ad- Joint Army Chief Army Cbiel Budget Bud@ Otli. Chief of Financ
bility visory mands and Chiefs visory Chiefs of of Siam of Staff Officer cer and Chief and Budget
Co-tee of Technical and Committee SkiiT and (Delegated (Delegated Review by of Finance Olficer
made up of Admi”islrative (Sclecled As*isinnls to Rudget to Budget Budget Ad. Review by
selected Ser~ices. These, members of to Secre- Olficer, ORicer, visory Budget Advi­
members of in turn, require A rnly tary of Department Deparlmenl Commil(ce sory Committee
the Depart­ estimates and General Defense oi Ihe Army] of the
ment of the justifications staff) Army)
Armv from subordinate
fkird commands
StaIT

Approved Chief of I Commanders and Chief of Joint President’s Congress Chief of Major changes Audit by
BY Staff and Chiefs of Tech- Staff and Chiefs of Bureau of Slaff by Chief of Comptroller
Secretary nical and Admin. Secretary Staff and the Etudget Staff, Bureau General of the
of the Army istrative 6 Of the Secretary and lhe of the Budget us.
ScrYices Army of Defense President and the Chair.
man, House.
Armed Services
Committee
.
42 MILITARY REVIEW

fiscal officer) issues the necessary authori. quarter or during an entire year on one
zation. paper.
3. The division fiscal officer records the The Budget Cycle
amount suballotted.
The federal budget cycle, sho d n graph­
4. The division commander (or’ his pur­ ically in the accompanying chart, explains
chasing and contracting officer) then this procedure. Federal government de­
enters into the rental agreement, advises partments ordinarily make their requests
the division fiscaI officer of the terms {by for funds to the President, who requests
sending him a copy of the purchase order them from the Congress annually. Conse­
or contract), and advises the owner of, quently, field commanders in the Depart­
the camp site to present his bill to tbc ment of the Army are directed to estimate
division fiscal otiicer. their needs and to justify them in detail
5. The division fiscal officer records tl-ie annually. At the beginning of a fiscal
amount obligated, and when he receives year, if money has been appropriated by
the bill he verifies it. If correct, he trans­ the Congress, allocations of amounts suffi­
mits it to an appropriate disbursing cient for the first quarter of the fiscal
officer for payment, (Note: Steps 4 and 5 year are usually made to the principal
can be expedited by the appointment of operating agencies and commands, and
one ‘of the officers in the division as a class additional allocations are made quarterly
A agent finance oficer to make immediate and as needed. The amounts allocated are
payment to the owner of the camp site, then allotted and suballotted to subordin­
obtaining appropriate signatures on the ate commands, also on a quarterly basis.
voucher and submitting the paid voucher Reports from all commands showing
to the disbursing officer.) amounts obligated and expended as well
6. The disbursing officer pays the bill as unobligated balances are required at
and advises the division fiscal officer when least quarterly, and more frequently when
payment has been made, usually by send­ desired. Correct interpretation of the
ing him an annotated copy of the voucher. chart requires that the following facts be
7. The division fiscal officer records understood:
the amount actually expended. 1. The federal fiscal year begins on 1
8. To close this matter, the division July and ends on 30 June. For example,
commander (or his fiscal officer ) is re­ the federal fiscal year 1951 begins 1 July
1950 and ends 30 June 1951. The fiscal
quired to report the exact amount obli­
gated and expended to the higher com­ year to which the budget shown in the ac­
companying chart pertains is represented
mander.
by the column from O to 12 months.
Obviously, a prohibitive amount of pa­
2. Except where specifically provided
perwork results in a command where many
otherwise, an appropriation is available
amounts of money for various purposes
for obligation only during the fiscal year
are required if the entire cycle described
to which it pertains; that is, during the
in the preceding paragraphs must be fol­
period represented by the column from O
lowed for each individual transaction.
to 12 months in the chart.
The paperwork is ordinarily reduced by
placing requests for funds, suballotments, 3. Work on the budget for any par $}cu­
and reports of obligations and unobligated lar fiscal year must begin about 18 months
balances on a periodic basis, thus combin­ prior to the date on which that fiscal year
ing the requests, suballotments, and re­ begins.
ports of obligations during an entire 4. After the close of the fiscal year to
 FIscAL AND FINANCE FuNDAMENTALS 43

which a budget pertains, no further obli­ intermediate headquarters. In addition,

gations against that budget may ordinar­ paid vouchers, accounting papefs, and
ily be incurred, but the money not yet routine correspondence pertaining to the
paid out remains available for expenditure accountability of disbursing officers are
for 2 more years to liquidate proper obli­ sent directly to designated accounting and
gations which were acttially incurred dur­ auditing offices by disbursing officers.
ing the applicable fiscal year. ‘ In a division, the staff finance officer is
usually the accountable disbursing officer.
Finance Fnnctions When the appointment of a fiscal officer
Finance functions consist primarily of is required, the division finance officer may I
executing money transactions involving also be appointed division fiscal officer
app~opriated funds. They require the if the commander so desires, since
physical handling of, and accounting for, tables of organization and equipment for
cash and negotiable instruments. They do divisions do not include a fiscal officer.
not include the estimating, justifying, re­ Division finance personnel that are re­
questing, suballoting, obligating, report­ quired, with suitable military occupational
ing, and maintenance of fiscal records specialty numbers, are included in the di­
described under the hea,ding Fiscal Func­ vision headquarters table of organization
tions, nor C1Othey include the functions and equipment for an infantry division, as
of purchasing and contracting officers. well as for an armored division and an
,However, they do include collection of airborne division.
amounts due the government as well as At a post, camp, or station, the finance
disbursement of gove~nment money due disbursing officer is also a member of the
individuals or contrac~ors. They also in­ commander’s staff. The finance personnel
clude many incidental functions requir­ required must be provided in the table of
ing physical hanclling~of cash and nego­ distribution and other ‘ organizational
tiable instruments. Some examples are: directives ~vhich prescribe the staffing and
1. Exchange of United States currency manning of the headquarters.
for scrip or for foreign currency. In a command larger than a division or
2. Receipt of soldiers’ deposits, collec­ post, the finance disbursing duties are
tion of allotments to dependents, and col­ usually performed by stationary-type
lection of insurance premiums. finance offices located at suitable’ places
“ Other financial services to individuals within the command, or by mobile finance
su~~] as safe-keeping or transmittal of units which can be moved readily from one
personal funds, when such services are location to another as the situation de­
.,
absolutely necessary and specifically mands.
autIhorized. An important point which commanders ‘
Technical information is often furnished and general staff officers must emphasize
to finance disbursing officers directly by in order to keep from overlooking it in
the Chief of Finance and by theater Army planning an administrative or tactica)
or army finance officers, but such informa­ movement is that a mobile finance unit’s
tion, is designed to assist, not to substitute ability to perform services is interrupted
for command responsibility for direction while it is preparing to move, while
am~ supervision of finance services. Simi­ moving, and while establishing itself in
larly, the normal command channel is not a new location. If finance services for
necessarily followed in the transmittal of a large number of troops are required
currency and other negotiable media immediately prior to departure, entrain­
whenever it is more practical to by-pass ment, or embarkation of the main body,
—
44 MILITARY REVIEW

arrangements must be made either to ob­ financial services which are authorized
tain these Services from stationary finance and required.
offices in the vicinity or to move the mobile When the required size of the pay and
finance units which provide these’ services allowances unit has been deter ined, it
in a later echelon, Similarly, if’ finance is always necessary to add a hea r quarters
services are required immediately upon unit and an accounting unit. Both of these
debarkation, detainment, or arrival at a units are essential in every finance dis­
new location, arrangements m’ust be made bursing office. They perform functions
either to obtain these services from sta­ which are incidental and supplemental to
tionary finance offices at the destination the operations of the pay and allowances
or to include the mobile finance units unit. In determining the size of the head­
which are to provide these services in an quarters unit and of the accounting unit,
advance echelon. it is necessary to consider the aggregate
size of the pay and allowances unit and
Personnel Requirements commercial accounts unit combined. Other
In determining approximate finance factors are: the amount of work involved
personnel requirements in any command, in’ authorized and required special finan­
the: best guide available to commanders cial services; the total volume of cash
and, staff officers is the description and transactions; the total number of vouchers
statement of capabilities of cellular paid per month; the total number of
finance units in Department of the Army checks issued per month; the work re­
T/O&E 14-500, dated 17 March 1949. The quired in connection with special reports
approximate total finance strength needed and analyses; any additional duties as­
in a theater of operations or in a subordi­ signed to the finance officer; and the
nate command within a theater can also housekeeping arrangements which can be
be determined roughly by allowing one made for the unit.
finance man for each 750 individuals in A commercial accounts unit is required
the command, provided that normal only when a substantial number of pay­
finance services are expected and working ments must be made for supplies and
conditions are average. However, this rule services purchased from commercial con­
of thumb is no guide to proper military cerns. The size of the commercial accounts
occupational specialties and correct or­ unit is independent of the size ‘of the pay
ganization, so T/O&E 14-500 is a more and allowance unit and is determined en­
complete guide. tirely by the amount of work required in
Ordinarily, the size of the pay and al­ examining and preparing commercial
lowances unit has the most influence on accounts for payment.
the over-all size of a finance disbursing While one of the goals of finance train­
office. The size of the pay and allowances ing is to prepare individuals in each type
unit needed is dependent not only on the of cellular unit for all the duties normally
number of individuals to be paid, but also found in a finance disbursing office, it is
on the percentages which are officers, en­ unsound to assume that a well-rounded
listed men, and civilians. Other factors disbursing office can always be established
are: the working conditions which can be immediately by obtaining, for example,
provided for finance personnel; the a PaY and allowances unit of adequate
amount of time required for tactical or size to offset the absence of a headquar­
administrative movements; the propor­ ters unit, accounting unit, and commer­
tion of payments w~lch are made by class cial accounts unit. To ensure maximum
B agent officers; and the amount of special efficiency, the correct combination of the
 FISCAL AND FINANcE FUNDAMENTALS 45

necessary cellular units, as well as of in­ an accounta, le disbursing office advisable.

?
dividuals. with the military occupational Class B agent offices are sometimes estab-

specialties indicated in T/O&E 14-5oo, is Iished at general hospitals. In other cases,

required. cellular finance units of appropriate sizes

When finance disbursing units are made ar:l sometimes placed on duty at places

up by putting cellular finance units to­ such as general hospitals or rehabilita­

gether, how large must the resulting unit ‘ tion centers for the purposes of bringing
be in order to obtain maximum efficiency? financial records up-to-date and preparing
As a guide, the size of a division finance documents which must be submitted to a
section (aggregate strength 22) may be disbursing officer before he can settle the
used as the criterion of minimum dis­ pay accounts of patients. By establishing
bursing unit strength. a class B agent who makes his returns to
There is a substantial amount of ad­ the nearest accountable disbursing officer,
ministrative work involved in opening and the administrative overhead is somewhat
maintaining a disbursing account, e~en less than if an additional accountable dis­
when tbe volume of operations is small. bursing office were established. However,
Consequently, it is not efficient to estab­ in a fluid situation such as must be ex­
lish a very large number of small dis­ pected in the combat zone and in some
bursing units. If factors other than size parts of the communications zone, the use
are equal, the smallest units are the least of many class B agents is impracticable.
efficient. As the size of the unit increases, Payments to troops as well as exchanges

the total useful ontput per individual in­ involving foreign currencies or scrip are

creases, at least up to approximately tbe ordinarily made through class A agent offi­
strength of a‘ division finance section. cers. This is because it is physically im­
Beyond that strength, there is little possible for the accoun~able disbursing
chance that a significant increase in effi­ officer to make as large a number of pay­
ciency will result from increased size ments or exchanges in person as must be
alone. accomplished. Class A agent finance offi.
At an army, communications zone, or cers differ from class B agents in that
theater Army headquarters, or wherever class B agents operate continuously until
more than 20,000 troops have easy access their appointment is terminated by orders,
to one location, efficiency can sometimes whereas, class A agents are appointed for
be increased further by increasing the a specific purpose or occasion such as
aggregate strength of a disbursing unit “paying the Military Pay Roll Money List
considerably above 22. However, forward of Co. A, 1st Inf for Jan 1950.” Officers
of a field army headquarters, the disper­ selected for duty as class B ageflt finance
sio:f- of troops makes the establishment of officers should have adequate finance train- ‘
very large disbursing units impracticable. ing before appointment to such duty when
practicable. Class A agent finance officers
Class A and B Agents do not need finance training, but experi­
In the Zone of Interior, or in a rela­ ence in handling large amounts of money is
tively stable communications zone area, helpful. Both class A and class B agent
it is sometimes desirable to establish class J
officers must be app mted by official orders
B agent finance offices instead of small which designate by name not only the
accountable disbursing o’ffices at isolated agent but also tbe accountable officer for
pkmes where continuous finance ,service is whom the agent is to act.
required but where the volume of business Where must finance disbursing officers

is too small to make the establishment of be located in order to provide the best

46 MILITARY REVIEW

service? In tactical situations, mobile Summary

finance units can be located in tents in Although they are closely related, fiscal
bivouac areas when necessary, but when duties and finance duties are separate and
they are so located their capabilities are distinct from each other. Co~manders
reduced by 25 percent to 50 percent, de- and general staff officers must p$ovide for
pending on the weather. Accessibility to the efficient performance and supervision
troops served, and suitability of accomnlo­ of both types of duties within their com­
dations to permit the maximum volume mands. Estimates, plans, and operations
must reflect a realistic appraisal of funds
of work, are the most important consid­
available and must include provisions for
erations in deciding the location of finance
controlling the obligation of funds as well
sections. In the combat zone and com­ as for ensuring the proper physical
munications zone, the space requirements
handling and safeguarding of cash and
of finance units must be weighed against negotiable mediums. In preparing troop
the requirements of other services. Since bases or troop lists, the appropriate
suitable facilities for safekeeping of funds finance disbursing units must be included,
must be provided, especially in crowded and they must be augmented by appoint­
population center:, structures such as ment of class .4 and class B agent finance
bank buildings which have adequate officers as required. Finance and fiscal
bmlt-in facilities for safekeeping of serv~ces, including the provision of per­
money are often mOst useful if assigned som%el necessary to accomplish them, are
to finance clisbursing offices. command responsibilities.

In the last analysis, ho~vever competent its leadership, however sturdy its
ranks, the usefulness of any American service as an effective instrument of
defense is dictated by the adequacy of funds appropriated for its operation.
principles, policies, developments, reforms---all Must be adjusted to the tax­
payer’s dollar which is the master of them all. This purse string control of
Department of Defense operations is just and necessary for absolute civilian
control of the country’s military instrument.
General Joseplt T. MchTawtey
 Internal Security ,
in a
Communications Zone
Major James S. Killough, Militrwy Potice Corps

Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College

T HE duties and functions of ~ ~om.

munications zone G-2 strongly emphasize
officer charged with the duty of planning,—.
co-ordinating, and supervising counterin­
counterintelligence, and consist in great telligence operations which will provide
part of planning and co-ordinating in­ adequately for such secw-ity. The fol­
temai security measures. lowing are the normal responsibilities of
Internal security then, is a part of the G-2 of a communications zone as re­
counterintelligence. It consists of a care­ gards counterintelligence.
fully planned network of controls, restric­ 1. To prepare the counterintelligence
tions, and obstacles designed to preserve plan and to supervise counterintelligence
secrecy, detect covert hostile elements activities.
within the military and civil populations 2. To co-ordinate theater counterintelli­
in the communications zone, and to pre­ gence policies with all agencies within
vent any overt or clandestine activity the zone, as directed by the theater Army
helpful to the enemy. Internal security commander.
measures that should be planned for and 3. To collect, collate, evaluate, and in­
carried out will differ according to the terpret counterintelligence information,
size, Iocatilon, nature, and mission of the and to disseminate the resulting intelli­
conununicatixons zone, and the amount of gence.
responsibility in such matters delegated by 4. To issue operational instructions
the theater Army commander. However, (after co-ordination with military gov­
experience gained in World War II has ernment) pertaining to relations between
shown that certain internal security counterintelligence personnel and mili­
measures should be implemented in prac­ tary government detachments, indigenous
“,
tically all communications zones. These police, and others.
are the measures that are discussed here. 5. To supervise interrogation of civilian
suspects, refugees. and others.
Responsibility 6. To seize and dispose of known and
Internal security in the communications suspect enemy agents.
ZOhc is, as in all echelons, a command re­ 7. To organize and supervise the op­
sponsibility. However, the G-2 is the staff erations of clandestine systems for the

internal security is a part of counterintelligence, consisting of a

planned network of contro!s, restrictions and obstacles to preserve
secrecy, detect hostile elements, and prevent clandestine activity
48 MILITARY REVIEW

purpose of obtaining information of a They are: military security; civil security;

counterintelligence nature. port, frontier, and travel security, and
8. To ascertain civilian attitudes and special operations.
political activities.
9. To’ conduct security investigations of Military Security ‘/
civilians prior to their employment by the Military security is at all times the re­
United States Government. sponsibility of unit and installation com­
10. To co-ordinate dispersion, conceal­ manders in the communications zone.
ment, camouflage, and blackout plans for Measures taken to instire military security
areas within the communications zone. are largely standing operating procedure,
11. To establish plans and policies re­ but the following points require special
garding assignment and transfer of “all attention:
counterintelligence personnel within the 1. The observance of strict security
communications zone. discipline in offices and with respect to
12. To recommend training of Counter maps and documents.
Intelligence Corps personnel within the 2. The security of signal communica­
communications zone. tions.
13. To co-ordinate with the communica­ 3. The proper observance of all censor­
tions zone G-3 and service troop com­ ship regulations.
manders on physical security of installa­ 4. The security discipline of all troop
tions and facilities in the communications movements into and out of the communi­
zone. cations zone.
5. The denial to unauthorized press cor­
Organization respondents and photographers of access
In communications zones normally con­ to troops and to vital or restricted installa­
taining large cities and thickly populated tions and areas.
regions most of the internal security 6. The importance of publicizing any
measures will apply directly to the punishment awarded for security infringe­
civilian population. Internal security ments.
should be controlled at the communica­ 7. The investigation of cases of, espio­
tions zone headquarters because of its nage, sabotage, or disaffection among the
effect on the civilian population, including armed forces.
friendly neutrals and Allied nationals. 8. Camouflage and concealment includ­
There are no tables or organization for ing blackout and air raid precautions.
a communications zone headquarters be­ 9. A countemeconnaissance screen,
cause each communications zone will differ largely air, to prevent enemy air recon­
in size and character and the require­ naissance of our vital installations and
ments will differ in each case. Internal the parachuting of enemy agents into the
security is planned, administered, and communications zone.
directed by the counterintelligence branch
of the G-2 section in communications zone Civil Security
headquarters. The accompanying chart is The object of security control of the
a typical functional break-down of such a civilian population is to detect, expose,
counterintelligence branch. and cause the arrest of enemy agents and
Regardless of the organization of the subversive bodies by limiting their move­
counterintelligence branch, it must be de­ ments, communications, and other activi­
signed to perform functions pertaining to ties, and to facilitate counterintelligence
four major fields of security operations. operations by rendering conspicuous any
 FUNCTIONAL CHART
, TYPE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH, G-2 SECTION, COMMUNICATIONS ZONE HEADQUARTERS

CHIEF OF BRANCH

T
r ------ 1
, ASSOCIATED UNITED ,
STATES AGENCIES

L ----- “ -f

r
M

I 1
1,1 MILITARY
SECURITY
1’1

CIVIL
SECURITY
PORT, FRONTIER AND

[
SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

Produces policy, effects co.

ordination, and is responsi­
ble for all military
rity.
secu­
Controls issue of all
Produces policy, co-ordi­
nates, and is responsible
for all cOunterinteIligence
activities affecting tbe civil
All maaaurea relating to
security control of sea.
ports and frontiers Op-
eration of the military
Message center, top se-

cret control system. Reg-

istry and
Transportation.
records.

Typist

&l INTERROGATION
CENTERS

Directs and controk of.

code words. Maintains population. Close liaison travel permit system, as pool. Supplies. Person.
fensive %ounterintelli.
close liaison with signal of: with civil affairs/military directed by the theater nel. Interpreters. Repro-
gence operational and
fleer on all signal security government officer. Secu. commander. Visa, and duction. Couriers. Tele­ conducts special coun.
and with G-3 on security of rily central of refugees and passport control of mer. type messages.
tereapirmage and coun.
installation, troop mOve­ displaced persons.’& All chant seamen. Close Iiai.
teraabotage activities, as
ments. Guidance 10 public counterintel Iigence liaison son with Air Force and
directed by the tbeatet
information officer on with civilian authorities Navy counterintelli.
commander.
press matters, Responsible except on censorship. Con­ eence.

for fmlicy on security tr015 all countekelli. -

within communications gence aspects of civilian

zone headquarters. Pro. internment enclosures. m ,-;

duces policy and gives ad­ Plans and. policy on DI$SEMINAIION

vice on count eri”te] Iige”ce training and maignment

measures. of all counterintelli. ReceivS collates, eval.
uate% and disseminate
counterintelligence in
formation.
card record system cov
‘+] - ‘2;:;
eri.g al k~~t::
Execution of all internal ‘ promotion, discipline,

security activitisa within suspect hostile groups

and counterintelligence

communications zone head. SUPPIY (credentials, spe.

and individuals of coun
quarters. cial equipment).
terintelligence i“(erest,
 ,,. MILITARY REVIEW
50

person behaving in an unusual manner. These check poin”ts are manned by Counter
The internal political affairs of the civil Intelligence Corps personnel and by mili­
population are not, of counterintelligence tary and civilian poIice. Suspect enemy
interest unless they constitute a threat agents and escaped enemy p.~isoners of
to the security of our troops and installa. war may be apprehended by thd syM,em of
tions. checking on the identification and move­
The security control of the civilian ment of individuals.
population in the communications zone is 2. Movement.—Public transport serv­
a command responsibility. The G-2, com­ ices, should be resumed as soon as normal
munications zone, is responsible for for­ conditions are restored and the situation
mulating the security plans and recom­ permits. The use of civilian wheeled
mending the policies which must be transportation should be limited to that
co-ordinated with the military government necessary for maintaining essential serv.
officer and the provost marshal. Th’ese ices.
latter agencies are responsible for imple­ A curfew will normally be imposed to
menting security policies through military prevent movement by , civilians during
government detachments and the civil au­ hours of darkness.
thorities, including civilian police. 3. Communications.-As soon as civil
Proclamations which indicate the prin­ communications can be restored, the G-2,
ciples upon which civil government will communications zone, should consult with
be carried on, will be published by the the military government, Navy, and Air
theater commander. Security restrictions Force representatives, in order to de­
on the civil population will then be an­ termine the conditions under which postal,
nounced by ordinances issued by the com­ telephone, and telegraph service will be
munications zone commander. The draft­ made ‘available progressively for civil
ing of ordinances is a responsibility of the officials and private traffic. The renewal
military government officer, communica­ of’ civil communications is an essential
tions zone, who will incorporate the neces­ stage in the restoration of normal condi­
sary security restrictions recommended tions, especially law and order. The res­
by the G-2. toration of communications will, depend
The following are general indications largely on personnel and facilities avail­
of the security restrictions that may be able to the G-2 for censorship. Often, it
imposed. may be found advisable to operate a lim­
1. Ident itv.—It is to be expected that ited postal service under control, to avoid
a large number of civilians will be with­ the development of clandestine communi:
out proper identification documents. When cations. Radio transmission by the civil­
military government officers have restored ian population should be entirely for­
the civil police services, the communica­ bidden, except when directly controlled
tions zone G-2 should request that the by communications zone headquarters,
police be directed to organize a system of Rail, coastwise, and river traffic and
registration of civilians, and to require services normally operated by the Coast
all civilians to carry prescribed identifica­ Guard must be operated exclusively by
tion papers at all times. our own or Allied military or naval
Check points and road blocks should personnel.
be established throughout the communi­ 4. Contraband.-Civilians should be re­
cations zone at key points on all main quired to register or surrender posses­
routes of travel for the purpose of check­ sion of articles such as arms, explosives,
ing individuals for proper identification. radios, and carrier pigeons.
-
TNrEENAL SECURITY IN A COMMUNICATIONS,ZONE 51

5. Passes and perwtits.-Passes and Civilians should not be employed in

permits . should be issued to selected headquarters or other places where they
civilians in order to allow access to pro­ will have access to classified information,
tected premises or to grant exemptions or in vulnerable installations, until a
from restrictions. Theater headquarters complete check is made on them by the
will normally issue a single form of pass Counter Intelligence Corps personnel
and. permit t,o be used for all purposes ‘ operating in the area where the head­
throughout the theater. Its validity quarters or installation is located. Civil­
should .be limited by endorsement so that ians should then be emp]oyed only when.
it can be used only for the purpose and absolutely necessary.
period fo~ which granted.
Military government officers are nor­ Port, Frontier, and ‘l’ravel Security
mally responsible for issue of passes and In addition to military and civil se­
permits to civilians but the G-2, communic­ curity, special counterintelligence and
ations zone, must insure by co-ordination security measures are necessary at water
with the military government officer, com­ ports, airports, frontier crossing points
munications zone, that the conditions of and in connection with travel into and
issue of permits and passes meet all out of the theater of operations. The term
security requirements. Povt Counterintelligence Office~, as used
6. Security checking of civilian labor.— in the discussion of port, fr~ntier, and
,
Secuiity checking of all civilian labor travel security, includes all officers in
employed by the armed forces in the com­ charge of counterintelligence personnel
munications zone is impracticable. The stationed at seaports, airports, and fron­ ‘
records available to Counter Intelligence tier crossing points who deal with travel
Corps personnel will never be sufficient control and other security measures.
to provide more than a partial check. In Water ports of entry attd exit and fron­
cases of particular importance, the tier crossing points in the communications
Counter Intelligence Corps will conduct zone are operated by the Army. Airports
complete investigations. The Counter In­ of exit and entry are operated by the Air
telligence Corps recommends establish­ Force.
ment of criteria as to who will be checked.
For exampIe: common labor working Port Security
under supervision—no check; clerks work­ The port area is designated by the
ing under supervision—partial screening; theater commander and may be increased
clerks working with classified material— by him beyond the limits of the port if
full check; and officials and other civilians deemed necessary for security reasons
in important positions under the military and if such action is recommended by the ,
government-full check. communications zone commander. The
The security of information and in­ port commander is responsitile for the se­
stallations where civilian labor is em­ curity of military installations, the dock
ployed must depend, fi~st, upon measures area (including exit and entry), and
taken by the employing agency to have civil security concerning the local static
employees screened by the Counter Intelli­ population, including all necessary in­
gence Corps and to deprive workers of the vestigations into cases of espionage, sabo­
opportunitY for sabotage or espionage; ‘tage, and subversive activities.
al: d, second, upon exercising great care The port counterintelligence officer is
io the choice of foremen and other civil­ responsible to the port commander for the
ians in responsible positions. following:
 .
52”” MILITARY REVIEW

1. Planning and supervising the con­ all United States and Allied naval ships
trol of entry to and exit from the dock and craft in pozt are the responsibility of
area, from the landward side and from the Navy officer in charge. The Navy’
ship-to-shore. officer in charge, with the advice of the
2. Recommending measures for the pro­ port counterintelligence officer, is respon­
tection of installations and ships from sible for issuing instructions governing
sabotage. harbor craft and fishing veseels, manned
3, Establishing the necessary security by local civilian crews. He is also respon­
check and control of civilian labor and sible that masters of merchant vessels con­
personnel, and. persons with business in form to security regulations of the port
the port, to whom passes are issued for and mount adequate eentries and guards.
entry into the dock area. In all counterintelligence matters, Air
4. Checking crew lists of merchant ships Force personnel stationed at water ports
and advising on security measures relat­ or frontiers will normally operate under
ing to crews, including shore leave. the direction of the Army port counter­
5, Searching any small craft of foreign intelligence officer. The United States
regi+ry for intelligence purposes. Air Force is charged with implementing
6. The security control of all civilian travel security measuree, in accordance
travel through the port. with theater policy, at all airports of entry
71 Orientation and briefing of all in­ and exit. Counter Intelligence Corps
coming troops on theater and communica­ teams are assigned or attached to each
tions zone counterintelligence and security airport of entry and exit for travel con­
measures and regulations. trol and airport security functions. Close
8. The investigation of and reporting liaison should be maintained between G-2,
upon all euspected cases of espionage, communications zone, and commanders of
sabotage, and leakage of information. Air Force installations located in the
9. Such immediate action in regard to communications zone to insure maximum
suspects, including arrest, as may seem co-ordination of all travel control and se­
expedient; or that, after reference, as may ,curity measures,
be ordered by G-2, communications zone. Normally all security measures of land,
10. Advising the port commander on sea, or airports are co-ordinated by the
security measures to be imposed on the port counterintelligence officer. He also
civilian population in the area. acts as advisor to other armed forces and
11. Liaison with local police and any civil authorities in the port area.
civil port authority on security matters.
Frontier Security
In all matters relating to civil author­
ity, the port counterintelligence officer The following special security measures
maintains close liaison with the appropri­ are necessary along frontiers:
ate miIitary government detachment. L Guard to preve%t unauthorized cross­
Military government etaffs are respon­ ing of fro?dier.-Fixed guard stations,
sible for the preparation of passes for mobile ground patrols, air patrols, and
issue ,to civilians allowed to enter port mined and wired areae are employed to
areas,. but regulation governing their prevent unauthorized crossing of frontier.
issue are formulated by the port coun~er­ 2. Frontier crosm”ng pointe.—Frontier
intelligence officer. crossing points are located on the bound­
Navy activities ashore are directly in­ aries between neutral countries and the
tegrated into the port security program. theater of operations. All authorized
The counterintelligence precautions for crossings muet be made at these points.
 INTERNAL SECURITY IN A COMMUNICATIONSZONE ~ 53
,
Frontier crossing ,points are held to a or exit and such other endorsement as may
minimum to reduce the number of skilled be necessary. ‘
intelligence and counterintelligence per­ The port counterintelligence “officer is
sonnel needed for their operation, and for informed in advance of the expected
more etlicient guarding and patrol of the arrival of civilians, their names, and
border. pertinent information concerning their
3. Frontier crossers.-Persons residing. background and reasons for travel.
in the immediate vicinity of the frontier Policy is established and travel per­
whose business, occupation, or mode of mits issued by theater headquarters.
living require them to cross the border Communications zone is responsible for
at frequent intervals are knoti as fron­ control operations within the security
tier crossers and are given frontier framework thus established.
passes. They are carefully screened by
Special Operations
tbe Counter Intelligence Corps before
The G-2, communications zone, is re­
being given passes and are checked on
sponsible for co-ordinating or directing
from time to time. Frontier crossers are
certain special counterintelligence and
not required to have theater travel
security operations within the communica­
permits.
tions zone. These are:
4. Control of commerce.—Shipments are 1. Radar surveillance against para­
stopped at the border and personnel with chutists and other clandestine landings.
the shipment are turned back. Personnel 2. Signal intelligence and monitoring
under control of civil affairs or military operations.
government or who have been cleared by 3. Intelligence security.
the Counter Intelligence Corps are put in
4. Deployment and operation of special
charge of the shipments to take them to
counterintelligence units,
their destination within the theater.
5. Control of refugees and displaced Countersabotage
persons.—Refugees and displaced persons The protection of all stores, equipment,
are segregated at the border and placed and installations in the communications
in nearby camps until cleared by the zone against sabotage is a responsibility
Counter Intelligence Corps to return to of the unit commander. Tbe C9unter In­
their homes in the communications zone. telligence Corps personnel on duty
throughout the communications zone can
Travel Security render valuable assistance by conducting
All civilians traveling into or out of surveys and inspections of v;tal points
the theater of operations by land, sea, or and recommending protective measures. ,
air, must have travel permits or orders Vital civilian installations such as power
issued by theater headquarters or the plants, water works, and government
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Passport Con­ buildings, are protected by local military
trol Office, United States Department of and civilian police. Here again the G-2,
State, which maintains close liaison with communications zone, co-ordinates with
the travel control section, theater G-2 G-3, the military government officer, and
division, issues passports to civilians. the provost marshal, as adequate protec­
The’ poti counte~intelligence officer k re­ tion of vital civilian installations is an
sponsible for indorsing the permits of all integral part of internal security.
visitors at the port of entry or exit, The investigation of all cases of sus­
usually with the date and place of entry pected sabotage is a responsibility of the
’54 MILITARY REVIEW

Counter Intelligence Corps in the com­ erriment officials, police, and firemen.
munications zone, and all suspected cases Close co-ordination and liaison is main­
should be reported to the nearest Counter tained” with military government by all
Intelligence Corps detachment without counterintelligence and security agencies
delay. Liaison is maintained between the of G-2, communications zone, I“J matters
Counter Intelligence Corps and bomb dis­ of countersabotage, censorship, air raid
posal units for the ,necessary assistance precautions, blackouts, curfew, circula­
in connection with sabotage equipment. tion, labor, espionage, and civilian com­
When disarmed, the sabotage equipment munications,
is turned over to Counter Intelligence 2. Navy and Air Force seczwity az{tho~i­
Corps agents for proper processing. ties.—G-2, communications zone, through
his counterintelligence branch, maintains
Prisoners of War close liaison with all Navy and Air Force
Prisoner of war mail is censored at all security authorities in the communica­
enclosures as a counterintelligence and tions zone on such matters as port
security measure. The G-2, communica­ security, securi~y of air fields, and travel
tions zone, issues directives and imple­ control. 1
ments theater policy on censorship of 3. Special cotlnte~i?ltelligelzee wlits.­
prisoner of war mail. These units specialize in the study of
The G-2 must plan for the complete and sabotage and espionage and assist Coun­
detailed interrogation of prisoners of war ter Intelligence Corps personnel in ques­
in communications zone enclosures. Much tioning and handling captured enemy
counterintelligence information of value espionage and sabotage agents.
to the G-2 can be elicited by such inter­ 4. Mobile ~adio detectio?z wnits.-These
rogation. units operate throughout the communica­
The security control of prisoner of war tions zone to locate illicit radio transmit­
labor poses a major problem. The G-2 ters’ by direction finding, thus detecting’
should issue instructions and directives hostile underground organizations and
restricting the employment of prisoner of enemy agents.
war labor in certain vital installations 5. Countevintelligenee elements of Al­
where sabotage is difficult to guard lied intelligence wzissions.—These Allied
against, or where access might be gained counterintelligence units assist our coun­
to classified material. terintelligence personnel in the communi­
cations zone in the ‘examination and
Implementing Inpl Security disposal of miscellaneous suspects and
There are many m ans available to the suspect refugees, and in the collection of
1.
G-2 for carrying oqt internal security counterintelligence information.
measures in a commmiications zone. How­ 6, Censomhip staffs.-Censorship staffs
ever, they will vary a~cording to the size, are provided by counterintelligence per­
character, and mission of the communica­ sonnel with a “watch list” containing the
tions zone. names and addresses of persons and or­
The following means for implementing ganizations over whom special censor­
internal security measures will normally ship supervision is desired. In this way
be pfesent in any communications zone: maximum counterintelligence information
1. Military govenwsent.—Military gov­ is obtained.
ernment has charge of all matters relat­ ‘7. Installations and troops located i~t
ing to the civil population, to include gov­ the ~ conmm-irzications zone.—-unit com­
 INTERNAL SECURITY IN A COMMUNICATIONSZONE 55

manders are responsible for internal se­ tions zone. the G-2 will find that careful
curity i.? the area of their units in accord­ attention must be paid to the Preventive
ance with the communications zone coun­ and routine aspects of the subject. Some
terintelligence plan. of these are: enforcement of military
8. Counter Intelligence Corps.—Coun­ security nteasures (largely SOP) ; con­
ter Intelligence Corps personnel are trol of civilian travel and communications;
located throughout the communications, civilian security restrictions such as
zone, and are charged with the duty of blackout, curfew, registration, identifica­
apprehending persons engaged in esPio­ tion papers, the security checking of labor,
nage, sabotage, or subversive activities. and the surrender of contraband; and the
9. General sta,# co-ordination.—Co-or­ establishment of road blocks and check
dination with the general and special points.
staff in the communications zone head­ These security measures, plus the
quarters must be effected on practically proper employment of the Counter In­
all internal security measures; and for telligence Corps and other special coun­
assistance in formulating and implement­ terintelligence personnel to guard against
ing a communications zone counterin­ espionage, sabotage, and subversive activi­
telligence and security plan. ties, are elements of the foundation and
In planning for and carrying out in­ the strength of an internal security
ternal security measures in a communica­ system in a communications zone.

With simultaneous regard for our national economy and to the threats
facing us, the United States must be armed so strongly and we must assist
our potential allies so to arm themselves,: that the potential violence of our
immediate counterattack will deter any aggressor from starting a war. ‘ Our
ability to retaliate is important to the smaller countries as well as to us,
because it offers them promise of effective assistance
under circumstances
where local direct resistance might be slower in materializing. .

Admiral Fo~rest P. Sherman

 Preparation and. Conduct
of
Field Exercises )
‘$p)
Lieutenant Colonel Larry J. O’Neil, ZnfantW
Former Instructor, Command and General Staff College, and
Major E. E. Steck, Infantry
Instructor, Command and General Staff College “

Th~s is the second of a series of ercise of this nature is better broken into
two articles on the preparation and phases, such as:
conduct ‘of field exercises. The first Phase one—An approach march.
of the series, covering the preparation Phase two-A meeting engagement in-
of field exercises, appeared in the Sep- volving leading elements only.
tember 1950 issue.—The Editor. Phase tkree—Issuance of unit opera­
tions orders.
Part II—Conduct Phase four—Administrative movement
II N AN academic consideration of the
preparation and the conduct of field ex-
to attack or assembly positions.
Phase jive-Execution of unit attacks
ercises as co-related actions, it is impos- in compliance with unit operations or­
sible to assign a greater degree of im- ders.
portance to either. Obviously, a carefully The end of each phase is announced by
prepared field exercise warrants equal the chief umpire over the unit command
care in the details of its conduct. A per- radio net and amplified by appropriate
fectly prepared exercise can be nullified means. Advantage is taken of intervals
by inadequate attention to the problems to explain the progress of the exercise
incident to its conduct. to the troops. A series of phases nor­
.,
mally should, in exercises involving ~ bat-
Phases talion or a larger unit, take up $0 two or
Although the staff of all headquarters more day’s time. This period is not un-
and the communication system should duly fatiguing to the troops, but it does
train the command and staff echelons in
function continuously duriug a field exer­
continuous operations. The training value
cise, just as in combat, combat features of
of the exercise is enhanced by carrying the
the exercise are ordinarily played in
exercise through to a logical conclusion.
phases. Each phase consists only of an
action which can be effectively controlled Realism
by umpires and realistically depicted to Realism must he created whenever pos­
participants. For example, an approach sible during the conduct of the exercise.
march to contact, followed by au advance The play of the exercise normally is be-
guard meeting engagement and subsequent gun in pursuance of the orders issued as
deployment of the entire force, is very a result of the first requirement imposed
difficult to present realistically in terms upon the commander of the participating
of enemy fires and enemy movement if unit. Information of the enemy will be
the action flows continuously. A field ex- the commander’s first need to further op­
1
 ,.
58 MILITARY REVIEW

tion are employed to co-ordinate and con­ ticularly for the larger exercises, pre­
trol the exercise. The control plan must be sents a problem for the commander order­
prepared well in advance of the exercise ing the exercise. An exercise for a divi­
to assure that personnel, transportation, sion, for example, requires approximately
and communication will be available to 130 officer umpires and 300 enlisted as­
implernent the plan. sistants such as flag orderlies, drivers,
Succe’ss in the conduct of a field exer­ communication personnel, administrative
. cise depends largely upon the initiative, assistants, and so on. In addition, more
enthusiasm, energy, and ingenuity dis­ officers and men are required to outline
played by the umpires. The umpires se­ the Aggressor force, as well as to act as
lected may come either from the unit par­ umpires for that force. The number of
ticipating in the exercise or from other personnel, commissioned and enlisted, re-
units. If umpires are taken from the unit quired to umpire and to portray the part

l—Umpire Control @l I@ @l
‘2—COA Umpire @ Z@ @2
3—CO B Umpire o 3@ @3

‘ 4-CO C Umpire @ 4@) @4

5—CO D Umpire @ 6@ 06

RECEIVER RECEIVER
6—Bn Command @ A m B @6
7—Fire direction (Arty) — @ I@ a?
8—Tank Plateon Command @ 8@ 08
9-Aggressor Unit Command —~ 9@ @9
10—Commrmchannel @ I@ 010

Figure 1.
I 1

participating, there will be vacancies of A~sressor

.­ in a division field exercise
which will have to be occupied by junior ~yill total almost a thousand.
personnel. This is desirable, at times, This requirement for control personnel
particularly in the later phases of train­ may require that a corps commander wish­
ing. At other times, however, it is more ing to inspect or test his divisions by
desirable to have the unit at full strength means of field exercises choose between
with all personnel occupying their current a few large exercises .or a number of
assignments. This is particularly true smaller ones. The former choice would
when the exercise is the subject for a require extensive terrain, a large number
training inspection or test. When all per- of supervisory personqel, and a great deal
sonnel of a unit occupy their regularly of extra communication and transpori-a­
assigned positions, umpires must, of ne- tion equipment. But it would require rela­
cessity, he obtained elsewhere. tively little time. Small exercises could
Thus, the procurement of umpires, par­ be conducted on limited terrain with
 PREPARATION AND CONDUCTOF FIELD EXERCISES 59

fewer . personnel and pieces of communi-. will present aproblem fortheeomrnander,

cation and transportation equipment, but Comparable to the problem of securing
-would require a longer period to test all adequate personnel. If the exercise is a
troops. In making his choice, the com­ large one, a great deal of equipment must
mander must remember that training is be procured from other sources for a
of primary importance, and that inspec­ short time. A series of smaller exercises
tions and tests must be accomplished with ,will recmire much less equipment. but a
a minimum loss of training time. longer period of use.
Umpire Communications Directors of large exercises are usually
Gmpires ,cannot co-ordinate or control provided wire communication with the 1

UMPERE CONTROL RADIO NET

FIELD EXERCISE, REINFORCED INFANTRY BAITALION
(Apoaaible wl.tionj ~,,, l,ethrOuKh

TO AgRres.,o, SCR 5W SCR 508

- 0-0-0-0-0 A8uremor Commander Ch,e[ Ilnuure
mmrn, nd “ct. (if Pres,”l) sch. , and f,

t?:K-[-’-~g:­

SM m!d HeadqukksCom. SCR 5118 To command

van, Umpires work Ibmwh DePul> L’h,,f GIW.,W .11

,r, d,m of D,Duty Chief Um. (. CCOI”II.!”KS Battalion -o O- 00-00 ­

we or Chief. dw+ndlrw won Comm.. der) Teslcd

“ho mcwnptinks L1.t(.li,a. ChS 1 and 6 B.tlelm”

Cmmmnd,r.
a~ ~ . . ~

/ / \ \
.~
w“iJ:”%4-4-%­
‘“o’ ‘“” ‘ ‘ ~e.ler

5 [ ‘“s ‘ ‘“”f I ISA@ ~.

. . 0,, = C%”.,{,
%Riii?$

‘m
,ndic., e, ,,,, .im/,ar t. I*., ., c. A.

t The
Awr.mr kwnmmd<r c.nfm!. hz. .m.t wifh a mnnmd
net HOW.,,.,, .,.,, A Lwr<.m, o+w,.fe. vnd<, the control
.( (A. umpire WIstot. pr..i.ion mud be nude to p.ooide
frqi,mwo [or Amrraw within that WSIWII. Thu., 101.1
fmwmcia rewired for the umpire w.km, including Am
Ure...r z 6.

a fi[ld exercise without being able to com- chief air a“nd ground umpires, and with
mu~licate with the chief umpire, with the the chief umpires of opposing, forces. Ad-
participating units, and with each other. ditional wire communication may be pro-
Prompt dissemination of decisions, both vided in the field for use of unit umpires
tO ~he units involved in the tactical situa- in report@g decisions to chief umpires.
tio~, and to all umpires concerned, is es- Generally, however, more satisfactory re­
sen: ial to effective control and realism. sults are obtained by the use of radio for
S iuie all organic communication equip- this purpose.
ment of the participating units will be Radio nets link all major umpire head-
used by those units, provision for com- quarters. Special nets are sometimes re­
munications facilities for umpires also quired in particular tactical situations, for
’60 MILITARY REVIEW

example, control of mass armored attacks. whether the mis;ion was approved, or
In addition, special nets are required for when it wiil be fired,
use of artillery unit umpires and fire um­ The participating battalion may use
pires, and between US forces and Aggres­ radios which will not “net with the SCR
sor force umpires and their subordinates. 500-series. Under these conditio~s, special
The SCR 508 (two-receiver radio) is arrangement must be made, such as
particularly adapted to this use. mounting an infantry radio on the vehicles
of the umpiies concerned. However, if
Figure 1 represents an SCR 508 setup
the newer AN/GRC eeries is available for
for use of umpires conducting a field exer­
use, there is no problem.
cise involving a reinforced infantry bat­
talion. Figure 2 is a diagrammatic rep­ It is desirable in all types of exercises,
resentation of possible umpire control nets and particularly so in those involving
utilizing such a setup. large units, that umpire radio communica­
tion be made secure. In an armored divi­
The SCR 508 has 10 push-buttons on the
sion, for example, use of the SCR 600­
transmitter and 10 on each of the two re­
series radios by umpires permits use of
ceivers. The 10 channels to be used may
channels not available to assault units.
be selected from more than 80 crystals,
Provision should be made for monitoring
which are installed in the set by a techni­
cian prior to the operation. Usually, the command nets to check on use of informa­
tion which could come to troops only by
same channels are used on the receiver
intercepting umpire nets. In addition,
and on the transmitter, but on occasion it
umpires should be drilled in the use of
is advantageous to replace certain chan­
simple voice codes and of coded maps.
nels used on the A-receiver with additional
channels placed on the B-receiver, if it is It should be understood, however, that
desired to listen in on other nets. the possibility of intercepting umpire nets
on the part of participating troops is not
Each receiver is tuned to listen to the
an all-important consideration. An oc­
nets usually used, simply by pushing the
casional intercept would parallel combat
appropriate button. For example, the
conditions. Ordinarily, information re­
chief umpire is concerned mainly with his
ceived by intercept will not be received
own umpire control net and with the com­
soon enough to be used by troo’ps, and
mand net of the battalion participating.
attempts to use such information might
He therefore uses Channel No. 1 on the A-
actually be detrimental to the success of a
receiver and Channel No. 6 on the B-re­ commander’s plan.
ceiver. Each company umpire will gener­
Visual or aural communications are prO­
ally use his A-receiver on Channel No. 1
vided to accomplish the following:
and hk B-receiver on the umpire net of
the company he is umpiring (that is, Indicate air attacks.
Channel No. 4 for the Company C umpire). Mark cessation of air attacks.
Mark artillery and mortar fire.
Any umpire may find occasion to shift
Indicate positions of weapons.
to another set. .For example, the com­
Indicate fire superiority, or the lack of
mander of Company B hae asked for artil­
i%,,
lery fire and can get no response. The
Company B umpire may determine *hat Indicate chemical concentrations.
has happened by pushing the No. 7 button Indicate vehicles and weapons out of
(artillery fire direction net), listening for actilon.
a lull in traffic, and then, by transmitting Among the visual control aids available
on the No. 7 button of the transmitter, ask to umpires, the most widely used are signal
62 MILITARY REVIEW

considerations in the preparation and con­ pires must be permitted sufficient time to
duct of field exercises. . study the situation and the terrain before
A major unit should not attempt a field the exercise. They should conduct a war ,
exercise until the training of its coul­ game of the exercise and participate in
ponent elements has reached a s~ate of the rehearsals conducted by the troops
proficiency which will permit them to de­ representing the enemy forces.
rive reaI and constructive benefit from the Mobility and continuity are given to
exercise. Ehnall unit field exercises and the exercise through the chief umpire, his
major unit molile command post exercises assistants, and the Aggressor force.
are properly held during all phases of the Through consultation with the G-2 and the
training cycle, with small unit eomhat G-3, tbe chief umpire obtains an under­
drills serving as preparatory exercises. standing of the manner in which it is de­
Commanders and staffs of units under­ sired that the exercise progress. By use of
taking field exercises must be trained in the umpire net, the chief umpire intro­
their respective duties prior to the exercise duces factors to speed or slow tbe elements
with troops. of the command in order to conform to
The field exercise selected for a par­ the pattern required.
ticular unit must accomplish a definite The critique is an integral part of a
training objective. The tactical situation field exercise. A full, free, and construc­
should be drzwn to illustrate the principles tive critique of the salient points held upon
it is desired to eove~ and to tit the exer­ the completion of the exercise allows an
cise to the force involved and the terrain opportunity to review the tactical doc­
available. trines employed during the exercise, to
The most capable officers available point out the deficiencies noted, and to.
should be detailed as umpires. The um­ emphasize the lessons learned.

There are many features of maneuver training that can be obtained by no

other means. Realism of training, the introduction of non-combatant functions,
the test of our combat doctrine and the development of new doctrine-in vary­
ing degrees each large-scale exercise offers all of these. In addition each pro­
vides opportunities for testing our equipment, our defenses and the results
of our previous training.
General Mark W. Clark
 I MILITARY NOTES

UNITED STATES

Radio Interceptor Sniperscopes

The, Air Force proposes to build three The “night eyes” of the rifleman, the
ultra long-range radio listening posts to electronic sniperscope that is credited
detect an enemy’s battle orders to his own with causing 30 percent of all enemy cas­
fwces thousands of miles away. ualties in the Okinawa campaign, is being
Although the intended location is not dis­ made a standard item of Army equipment.
closed, the 2,000-mile range of these “in­ Army sources disclosed recently that
terceptor stations” suggests they could be the field forces were so impressed with
sl>otted in the Far North to bring Soviet the efficacy of the auxiliary weapon that
military command cehters, and forces on enables the infantryman to “see” the
the move inside Russia, within heafing enemy through darkness, that units in all
distance. the Army’s 10 divisions would be equipped
So used, they would be a vital part of with the device.
the polar defense system, which includes Included in the Army’s budget requests
radar warning systems and radio networks is an $8,654,418 item for the purchase of
to keep contact with and direct the Arctic 6,918 sniperscopes at the cost of $1,251
operations of American air units. ‘“ each. How many of the devices are al­
Some indications of the new polar de­ ready in use is classified information.,
fense planning came to light recently in The sniperscope consists of an e’lec­
documents made public by the House tronic telescope that is mountetl on the
Anneal Services Committee. Among other .30-caliber carbine. Wiring runs from a
things, the documents said: portable power pack carried in a har­
Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks, nessed knapsack on the soldier’s back.
Alaska, lacks enough facilities for use as Operating under cover of darkness, the
a take-off point for any large number of rifleman points the sniperscope and his
B-:i6s, B-50s, or B-29s. gun sights toward a spot whence a sound
The Air Force plans to expand some of has come. By switching on an infra-red
tht ~b~se facilities to allow a small increase spotlight, he makes rays scan the terri­
in the number of B-36s operating in tory. These are reflected from the target,
Al:,ska. No regular force of B-36s is sta­ picked up by the telescope and transformed
tiwted in Alaska” permanently.—2Vze New into an image across the sights of the
Y(;).k Times. rifleman.-The New York Times.
.
64 MILITARY REVIEW

Arctic Survival Army Reorganization

A way to keep alive longer under coid The President recently signed into law
conditions, with. potential importance in a bill abolishing the Iong-horseless horse
the event of an Arctic war, has been dis­ troops and creating a new branch known
covered by a team of Army and civilian’ a? Armor to take care of their mecha­
researchers at Fort Knox, Kentucky and ,mzed descendants.
New York City. The bill makes permanent a wartime
streamlining of Army organization. In
Doses of thyroid extract would be the
addition to consigning the cavalry to his­
method, these researchers show.
tory, it merges coast and field artilleries
Survival time was increased 54 percent into a single branch, the Artillery.
by the proper dosage of a thyroid com­ The law also puts a 4-year limit on the
pound, called endothyrin, given to a group time any Army man can command a
of experimental animals. Not only wer,e Washington desk. It limits the total of
the animals able to survive the cold longer, such desk-sitters to 3,000, except when the
but more of them survived. President decrees more are needed .—The
When the activity of the thyroid gland Ne,w York Ti?rnes.
was suppressed by. doses of another chem­
ical, thiouracil, more animals &led and Del@ratecl Soup
died’ sooner on exposure to the cold. A new type of dehydrated soup for
The thyroid dosage had to be carefully Army use that requires no cooking and
regulated, to avoid causing thyrotoxicosis, may be easily prepared by individual
a dangerous condition of poisoning from soldiers separated from their commands
too much thyroid material in the body. has been developed by the Army Quarter­
master Corps.
Chief practicaI drawback to the use of
Thenewsoup, processed from peas, can
thyroid for men potentially threatened
he poured into hot water, stirred for a
with prolonged exposure to cold is a time
fewmoments, andisthen ready to eat. In
lag. When the thyroid extract doses were
laboratory tests, it has been found that
given by mouth, it took 4 or 5 days to pro­
the dehydrated soup compares in flavor,
duce the cold-resisting effect. Men able to
consistency, and texture with pea’ soup
survive that long would probably survive
prepared by long cooking.
without the aid of the medicine. Given by
The peas are precooked, then dehydrated
injection, the thyroid compound took effect
to an extremely low moisture level, after
within 8 hours, but in a military situati?n
which fats and seasonings are blended
medicine that can he given by mouth is
into the product. Development is going
preferred.—Scienca News Letter.
forward on other types of dehydrated
soups.
Jet, Fuel
It is pointed out by the Quartermaster
Addition of small amounts of thiophene, food technicians that dehydrated soups
a liquid compound found in coal-tar and currently on the market require 6 to 10
also made synthetically, to standard types minutes cooking. This would largely pre-
of hydrocarbon fuels derived from pe­ ch-ide their use by troops separated from
troleum, is said to make an effective fuel their unit kitchens because of the unavail­
for jet-propulsion airplanes. The thio­ ability of cooking equipment. The new type
phene prevents the formation of soot-like can be prepared by heating water in a can­
deposits within the engine combustion teen cup and stirring the dehydrated soup
chambers.—The New York Times. in the water.—Department of the Army.
 MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 65

Pack Plane
The Fairchild XC-120 Pack Hane-a tached, and be ready to take off to pick up
military ‘transport plane that leaves its another fuselage within a matter of min­
ftiselage behind—was completed by the utes. In addition to providing greater
Fairchild Aircraft Corporation recently utility of the ~plane itself, this reduced
and is ready for US Air Force testing. , ground time hmits the potential damage
Built under an Air Force experimental ‘ in case of wartime attack to the relatively
contract, the XC-120 (MILITARY REVIEW, inexpensive fuselage compartments.
July 1948, p. 70) pioneers an entirely new Powered by two 3,250-horsepower Pratt
concept of air transportation and is ex­ & Whitney engines, the” XC-120 will have
pected to offer the first real answer to basically the same operating character­
many of the most pressing problems of istics as the Fairchild C-l 19. Its detach­
military—and, later, commercial—logis­ able cargo compartment has a 2,700 cubic
tics. foot capacity and can carry up to 20,000
Fairchild’s Pack Plane in effect carries pounds of cargo. Fully loaded; the entire

The Fairchild XC-120 Pack Pfane, revolutionary new military cargo plane which features
a detachable fuselage, is now ready for US Air Force testing.

the trailer-truck principle over to the air- plane weighs about 64,000 pounds and
plane. In appearance, it resembles the carries a crew of five.
C-119 Packet—except that its fuselage is Because of the revolutionary character
detachable from the remainder of the of the new plane, a number of unusual ,
plane. The plane itself—engines, cockpit, design and production problems were
booms ‘and tail surfaces—is able to fly faced and solved in obtaining the desired
without the fuselage, much as the cab of performance. So that the “pod” can be
a trailer truck is driven minus its trailer. loaded or rolled away from either end, a
Thus, the chief advantage of the Pack landing gear different from conventional
plane is that it eliminates the long, ex- models was needed. The XC-120 is the
pensive periods on the ground while cargo first plane ever to have a quadricycle gear.
is being unloaded, or loaded, as is neces- The plane itself rolls on four dual-wheeled
sary with present-day transport planes. main gears, two on either side, both of
A Pack Plane can fly into a field, have its which are retractable.—Fairchild Air-
fuselage, or “podfl almost instantly de- craft Corporation.
66 MILITARY REVIEW

Attack Plane

Designated the XA2D, this powerful new US Navy carrier-type attack plane combines
the high speed of jet propulsion with the fast take-off performance of propeller-driven
aircraft. The plane is powered by a T-40 twin turboprop engine developing 5,500 hp. It can
cruise on only one of the tnrbines.—Department of Defense photo.

Allied Training
The United States Army in Germany The European officers and men will live
will train more than 1,600 officers and men at the US Army centers for periods vary-
of the armed forces of seven European ing from 1 to 10 weeks. They will use
nations receiving military equipment un- actual equipment or mock-ups’ in courses
der the Mutual Defense Assistance Pro- of instruction based on standard training
gram. given the US troops in Germany.
The announcement by the Commander in
A program has been prepared for bil-
Chief of the European Command said the
leting and instructing in the United States
training program was being undertaken
Army training centers in Germany spe­
at the request of the recipient nations.
cially selected units from France, Italy,
Britain was not ineluded, it was explained,
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Nor-
because that country received only air
way, and Luxembourg.
force equipment.

The men of these units will be taught

, It was also pointed out” that Western
how to operate, maintain, and repair the Allied nations during the War sent troops
tanks, tractors, cannon, and other ‘arms to the United States for training with
and munitions being sent by the United American weapons. During the past wiu-
States to Western Europe under the North ter, Greek, Italian, and Turkish troops
Atlantic Treaty to support resistance to have received training in Western Ger­
communist aggression. many.—The New York Times.
 MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 67

Tesf Chamber
A scientific roughhouse in which mili- one purpose—to see if it can destroy or
tary weapons such as mines, torpedces, damage the products of other labs.
and depth charges are to be dropped, The weapon-crusher technicians will
bounced, and otherwise systematically seek to discover how ordnance equipment
mauled to expose their weaknesses was , is affected by shipping, climate, altitudes,

The pressure tank, above, is part of the Navy’s newest testing laboratory. Underwater
pressures 2,300 ft. down can be created.—Department of Defense photo.
opened’ at W bite Oaks, Maryland, recently manual handling, and the general wear
by i he Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance. and tear experienced from the time it
L.nown formally as an “environmental leaves the manufacturer until the moment
laboratory,” the $4,000,000 new section of it is used against enemy targets.—Z’ke
 68 .’ MILITARY REVIEW

Airborne ‘Ear’ Iodine Compound

The airborne magnetometer, an instru­ The military use of standard iodine
ment developed during the War for de­ compound for individual disinfection of
tecting submarines under the sea, has been drinking water in canteen quar$kies has
perfected so that it can be” used to make been recommended as the result of a re­
a new magnetic map of the world. cent joint Army-Navy research project at
It was devised originally to detect slight Majura Atoll in the Marshall islands.
changes in magnetism, such as would be Medical research officers found that com­
caused by a submarine at sea or a con­ pounds releasing free iodine in concentra­
siderable iron deposit on land. However, tions of eight parts per 1,000,000 were
it did not indicate the north-south or up- highly effective disinfecting agents and
down direction of the compass needle. produced no ill effects among personnel
With the i~provements announced by using water thus treated.—Amned Forces
scientists of i the Naval Ordnance Lab­ Chemical News.
oratory ‘at White Oaks, Maryland, it de­
ter~ines both of these accuratel~. High-Speed Targef
It is known thdt from year to year there The US Navy has a new target designed
are extensive changes in the earth’s mag­ to be towed behind airplanes at speeds
netic field. The last accurate measure­ up to 450 miles an hour. It’s good at any
ments carried out on a large scale were altitude, as far up as the tow-plane can
by the crew of the non-magnetic ship go.
Carnegie, operated by the Terrestrial Mag­
This target differs greatly from the
netism Department of the Carnegie Insti­
fabric sleeve-type target well known in
tution of Washington. This ship was lost military flying. It looks like an airplane,
20 years ago, and it has been impossible is made of metal, and has wings with a
to repeat its observations.
span of 24 feet. Metal construction makes
With the new airborne magnetometer,
the target good for radar tracking and
it will be possible to cover in a few hours
provides strength for high-speed flight.
areas that would have required weeks on
‘ board the Carnegie. The Bureau of Aeronautics approved
Among the most notable fields in which the target for use after 3 years of ex­
the magnetometer—described as “start­ perimentation and tests. Since the orig­
ing where radar leaves off ’’-has proved of inal contract was awarded in 1946, 45
value is oil prospecting. It helps find oil units have been flight tested and evaluated
deposits.—The New York Times. at the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent
River, Maryland. The winged targets have
‘Throwaway’ Extinguisher
been towed at more than 450 miles an
A one-pound fire extinguisher which hour and at altitudes above 36,000 feet.
can be scrapped after only one use is under
consideration by personnel of the Army The target can be taken into flight by
Engineer Research and Development Lab­ normal drag take-off or by “snatch pick­
oratories, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. up.” Sufficient strength is built into the
Features of the extinguisher include a device to sustain the shock of a snatch
tight metal container., value head, and pickup. A parachute is carried in the
frangible disc release, The disposable item, target’s tail. This is released when the
equipped with a plastic horn, will carry flying target touches the runway upon
a three-pound charge of extinguishing landing, and brings the target to a stop
agent.—Armed Fo~ce. within 200 f eet.—A 11Hands.
 MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 69

[ink Trainer
Jet piiots will do their first flying of resembles a DieseI locomotive than the
high-speed aircraft on the ground in-the sleek airborne craft it simulates. It pro-
future. The, new training is made pos- vides space for both trainee and instructor
sible by a Link Trainer, especially de- in one integral unit.
,signed to simulate jet aircraft flight which “ All of the controls, instruments, and in­
combinee training in flight, engine, and dications of a high speed aircraft are in-

This device is the latest trainer for jet pilots. Its equipment provides indoctrination in
thenewest instrument sand radio systems.—Air Mat6riel Command photo:
radio navigation, all in one complete eluded in the new trainer, and they func­
package. tion just as they would in actual flight.
Popularly dubbed the “~inktronic,” the Rates of roll, climb, and acceler~tion are
device is manufactured by Link Aviat~on, faithfully duplicated, and the controls are ,
makers of the wartime Link Trainers. loaded so that pressures vary with a.ir-
Squat “and stubby, it much more nearly speed.—Air Mat6riel Command.

Map SUppiy >.

Flying pressee will be able to suPply The new press is both smaller and
troops at the front with maps at the rate lighter than the “Big Chief” press used
of 5,000 sheets an hour. in World War II.
A pilot model of a new light-weight, Military maps, charte, line and halftone
airborne, offset lithographic press has work in eingle or multicolor (by succes­
bee~idesigned atthe Army’s Engineer Re- sive printings) in hair line register are
search and Development Laboratories in possible with the new preee.---Science
70 MILITARY REVIEW

AUSTRALIA WESTERN EUROPE

Army’ Reorganization Pilot Training
Reorganization” of Australian military Flight training of Air Force pilots of
commands to enable each military district four of the five Brussels alliancf countries
to function independently as a separate will be standardized and improved, the
entity was announced recently, by the Brussels Treaty office announced recently.
Minister for Defence. The four countries are Britain, France,
The changes affect the military districts Belgium, and the Netherlands, The fifth
formerly constituted within the Southern member, Luxembourg, has no air force.
Command. Fourth Military District, The announcement described the new
South Australia, is raised to the equivalent system as “the first completely integrated
status of other commands of the Com­ international defense unit to be estab­
monwealth. lished in peacetime.”
The newly established Central Com­ The new organization is an “examining
mand gains in importance, and the com­ squadron” to make identical tests of train-
manding general is given wider scope on i,ng in the four air forces “to find a com­
matters of local importance previously re­ mon level of proficiency and lay down a
ferred for clirection to Southern Command. common doctrine in all flying techniques.”
Central Command now comes under the —The New Yo VICTimes.
direct control of Army Headquarters, Mel­
bourne, thus ensuring greater efficiency CZECHOSLOVAKIA
and speedier administration within the Air Force
area.—Ausfmlian Dcfc~zce. and Services The Czech Air Force maintains a mili­
Newsletter. tary air academy in Hradee, several flying
schools, a radio school in Hrudin, a me­
chanics school and, in Olmiitz, a school for
CANADA
training instructors. In addition to
Machines vs. Men
Biiclce?--Jtt?tg??zeiste?. planes, Czech train­
Increased mechanization will eliminate ing planes, as well as former German
manpower from the battlefields of World Messenchmidt 109 G’s—with Daimler-
War III just as horsepower was elimi­ Benz or Junker motor—and English Spit­
nated by tanks and trucks in World War fire fighter planes are employed. Before
II, Dr. O. M. Solandt, chairman of the 1948, Czech air officers could still be sent
Canadian Defence Research Board, pre­ to England and France. A Czech Air
dicted recently. Force commission is now located perma­
Push-button warfare will enable men to nently in Moscow.-AUgewzeine Schwei­
send machines out to fight for them, Dr. ze~ische Militiivzeitschri ft, Switzerland.
Solandt told a meeting of the Association
of Professional Engineers of Ontario. THE NETHERLANDS
He added, however, that manpower Gef US Ships
would be needed behind the lines to devise, The Department of Defense announced
build, control, and repair the machines. recently that it would turn over to the
“Navigation, both in the air and on the Netherlands Royal Navy, under the Mu­
sea, will require little human interven­ tual Defense Assistance Pact, two de­
tion,” he said. stroyer escorts refitted in J30ston.
“The guided missiles of the future will Netherlands Navy crewmen for the
be launched and controlled by machines.” ships were trained in Boston.—The New
—The, New Yo>.k Times. York Times.
-,
MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 71

GREAT BRITAIN
Dogs of War \
I
Just what canine, sense comes into play started with the burial of the mines in
in the unerring detection of buried ob- the presence of the spectators, and then
jects is not known, nor is the sense pe- the dogs came along with their handlers,
culiar to any particular breed, though the ‘ walking over the mine field with obvious
dogs that are quickest at it usually have eagerness. Now and then one of the dogs

llinedetection with dogs is being practiced successfully in Great Britain. Above, adetec­
tion teamat work. Thedogin the foreground has just sat down, a signal for the handler
to place a mine marker between his forepaws. Below, left, a team in action with dog,
probe, and white tape; below, right, dogs being ledto a minefield.

an element of the retriever in their blood. would sit down abruptly. A handler
It is certainly not essentially a thorough- would place a marker between the dog’s
bre,l trait, for the dogs which took part forepaws and, when the dog was led
in ?,.recent display of mine-detection were forward, the mine would be retrieved.—
of mixed origin. The demonstration The Spheve, Great Britain.
72 MILITARY M?.VIEW

NORWAY USSR
Defense Reorganization Satellite Armies
A.comprehensive plan for the reorgani­ One of the most significant recent ‘de­
zation of Norwegian defense, worked out velopments in the “people’s democracies”
by an all-party Commission of the Stort­ is the manner in which their ~rmies not
irsg, was published in Oslo recently. Ex­ only are being organized on the Soviet
cept for the communist mem”ber, the Corn. model but also are being trtinsformed from
mission, which also included Service ex­ defensive into purely offensive instru­
perts, unanimously agreed on ‘all the prin­ ments.
cipal questions, Step by step with the efforts of the
The proposed plan provides for a nor­ United States and Western Europe to in­
mal defense budget over the next 6 years tegrate their military potential for de­
of 300,000,000 kroners ($42,000,000) an­ fense, the Soviet Union is reforming the
nually, an increase of 50 percent. There armies of its satellites into units that
will be nonrecurrent expenditures over could be fitted easily into a plan to send
this period of 700,000,000 kroners on armed men sweeping across Europe.
equipment and supplies, and of 240,000,000 , This process has been most noticeable
kroners for defense construction, making in Czechoslovakia. Emanuel Winkler, a
a total of 2,740,000,000 kroners ($383, ­ military expert, recently complained in
600,000) during the 6 years. Of the or­ Tvorba, organ of the central committee
dinary annual expenditure, 70,000,000 is of the Czechoslovak communist party,
for the Navy, ~10,000,000 for the Army, that the 1948 communist coup had been
90,000,000 for the Air Force (including trained partly on European lines.
18,500,000 for antiaircraft defenses), and “The Army’s fighting strength’ was
30,000,000 for “joint organizations” in­ threatened by reactionary officers who had
cluding the Home Guard. been trained by French military instruc­
The Commission’s report, the basic con­ to~s and tried to proclaim specifically a
clusions of which had been reached be­ Czechoslovak military doctrine that would
fore Norway’s adherence to the North At-’ combine the experience of the Red Army
lantic Treaty, was submitted to the civil with French military theory,” is the way
and military authorities and ether inter­ M. Winkler put it. m
ested bodies for comment. One of the results of this thinking was
On 21 February, unanimous approval that the Czechoslo~ak Army was organ­
was given by the Storting to the Arms Aid ized as a defensive force. The creation
Agreement between Norway and the of tank units was neglected and the air­
United States.—Journal of the Royal force was restricted to pursuit planes.
United Service Institution, Great Britain. Soon after the coup, communist organi­
zations were created in the Army, com­
1
HUNGARY munist political commissary appointed,
Aflilitary Service and the Army organized on new lines.
{ A Decree issued in Budapest recently Soviet specialists were imported for this
extends compulsory military service from purpose.
2 to 3 years. All men now will be liable ‘ All iron curtain country armies are
to service on reaching the age of 20~ and being taught Russian methods even to
will complete their period of service on 1 their manner of marching and saluting,
December of the year in which they reach and all have instituted political commis­
their 22nd year.—Journal of the Royal sary. All’ have been inundated by @oviet
United Service Znst{tution, Great Britain. specialists.—The New York Times.
 Russia—Substance or Shadow
..
Digested by Lhe MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Flight Lieutenant J. J.
ffarding in the “RoYal Air Force Quarterly,> (Great Britain) January 19so,

New or Old sands of facts on which to base deduc-

Is THIS the first time in history that tions, policy, and strategy. Ostrich-like,
Russia has cast a shadow? Or is the Iahel we keep our heads in the sand and say we
“communism” being tied to an old specter? are mystified by the Slav.
It is no new thing. The “armed neutral- Summing up all we know, three major
ity” of 1800, the Afghan Wars of 1839- aspects of life inside Russia appear, with
18+9; Canning’s policy in the Morea in obvious bearings on our relationship.
1827, Gladstone’s in Afghanistan in 1885; To begin with, there is squalor in many
Pitt’s and Russell’s concern over Prussia large areas in Russia because of the move
in 1791 and 1853; Britain’s failure to sup- of the population from country to town.
port the Slav freedom movement in the This move is a parallel to the one that
Balkans in 1878; our alliance with Japan gave England her slums in the early nine-
in 1902—all were fumblings for a policy teenth century. These slums are not lightly
to check Russia. And after World War accepted by the r6gime, nor are, they the.
I came perhaps our most pitable fumble, fault of the government, or any reflec­
the campaign in aid of the White Rus- tion upon communism. They are the result
sians. of a mass migration beyond the control of
If a bogy of the night, it has been a any party or faction. The commpnist gov­
curiously long night. Are we guilty of ernment is alive to the situation and in- ,
the contempt which familiarity breeds ? eludes house planning in its over-all
Have we made a habit of fear? We must economy. The slums will go, in time; but
remember: fear is a brother to hate; that for the present they remain, to be ex.
way lies destruction. plained or excused to their occupants.
Then there is the complete ignorance of
Inside Russia the majority of the Russian people of
It seems to be commonly accepted that western lives. The first reaction to this
behind the iron curtain lies a land of is an old one: “Thank Heaven for our
wiiich we know nothing. ‘Count the books, free press !“ But does this ignorance
p~.mphlets, and articles written on the argue a mighty censorship? Beyond the
subject—some people have a lot to say on “almost war-mongering headlines, what
nothing ! The truth is, there are thou- news of inner Russia has our press ever
74 MILITARY REVIEW

carried ? ‘i’rue, the Russians’ ignorance is plement a popular policy, the people have .
not attacked by truth by the communist a tradition of firm central rule never to be
rulers, but there is little need. Our press criticized, much less attacked. There is
would print more news from the steppes if therefore no “underground” in Russia, n’o
it was called for, but in England as every­ anti-communist core of resistant ~ though
where the most-read news is the most- paradoxically the, people would not vote
understood news. That means that happen­ in a communist government if socialist
ings in other lands have to be spectacular, candidates were allowed. They accept from
almost on earthquake level, to make our their rulers the dictation, “We are cleverer,
columns. Now, Russia is not just one na­ more gifted, and experienced than you.
tion and stiate. Sixteen republics go to We have the inclination and ability to rule.
make up that empire. A major domestic So it is obvious that we know best the
event in Azerbaijan may stir the press of policy you should follow. Leave it to us.
Georgia yet be but back-page stuff in the If you don’t, you are foolish children and
Ukraine. The headlines are easily filled, must be disciplined.” At best, the Rus­
eagerly read without much governmental sian probably regards his elections as a
pressure to exclude Western news. Ours waste of time, a compliment to his rulers,
are much the same. What room, then, for bu~ honestly accepts absence of rivals as
full knowledge of England, France, the a clear indication that the weeding out
United States? True, among the intelli­ has been done for him and the best men
gentsia, Shakespeare and Dickens are for ‘the jobs are awaiting his vote.
widely read, but as tidbits of the universal So inside Russia we see a land where:
feast of literature, not to broaden na­ 1. Perfection and paradise have not yet
tional knowledge. arrived, and bad things exist beside ideals
In Russian political life, there is conl­ achieved. Therefore, discontent can also
plete acceptance of communistic rule. It be, to be placated or suppressed as is
is a rule of minority, for only some 6 expedient. And it may be expedient to dis­
millions at most out of an estimated 160 tract attention from failure in internal
millions are members of the party, and ecosiomy by vigorous action abroad.
membership is essential for holding gov­ 2. Ignorance of the outside world is
ernment jobs. The remainder could be no more widespread than in any, other
loosely labelled socialists, with degrees of comparable bloc of nations, but, whereas
truth by our notions. Communism is elsewhere a vigorous curiosity by the few
preached, and the party aims at eventual k encouraged and fed, and in time will
conversion of all the peoples in the Union. be satisfied, in Russia this is not so.
But at present, socialism is the political 3.’ The Russian character will leave the
religion internally. Yet because the party communists in power without resentment
mans the government at all levels, and all the time they are firm, offer progres­
the 16 republics speak by common consent sive plans, and at least appear to be deal­
with one voice, externally Russia is conl­ ing with all obvious evils.
munist. This is accepted, perhaps vaguely
understood, by all within. We could not What is Communism?
accept it nor can we readily grasp the “Communism is a positive creed. It does
mentality that does. But in a land bhat appear to offer relief to a man’s agony
never h’ad a complete revolution, only a of frustrated desire for betterment in his
change from one type of autocracy to an­ time, though he is in his generation in­
other, and where choice of rulers does not capable of using betterment. In this at­
in any sense mean voting for men to im- traction for those who do not fully
 FoREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 75

understand it lies the great danger. one’s enemy .is common sense. But he had
The world over, people no longer accept no idea of a small political pb,rty quite
poverty as inevitable, or misery as their apart from the class they were } to free.
national lot, Frontier-bestriding urges He envisaged a vanguard within that class
blindly seek new life. Only communism who would be victors or martyrs. Lenin,
offers immediate, positilve action. That it prophet number two, developed the idea
is suicidal is not obvious. Unless Chris-’ of a party that might seem for a while
tianit.y realizes that politics today inelude to represent a third class, distinct from
religion, that every step of life from the working class as a whole. To quote
cradle to grave is being made the business from Lenin’s One Step Forward, Two ‘
of. everyone, that people are realizing the Steps Back:
existence of the brotherhood of man in “We are. the party of a class, and . . .
practice or in mystic ideals, and that they in the period of civil war the entire class
need this brotherhood explained else they should act under the leadership of our
get distorted views, then communism’s party, should adhere to our party, as
offer of physical food for spiritual hunger closely as possible. . . . To forget the
will be accepted. And spiritual starva­ distinction between the vanguard and the
tion will go on. whole of the masses which gravitate to­
What are the tenets of this creed? Its wards it, to forget the constant duty of
prophet, Marx, believed, and so do his the vanguard to raise ever wider strata
disciples, that all the means of produc­ to the most advanced level, means surely
tion and wealth of mankind are the yard­ to deceive oneself, to shut one’s eyes to
sticks by which the social structure can the immensity of our tasks, and to narrow
be measured. The tools improve, but the down those tasks.”
state of society lags behind, because those To go farther into the ,vagaries of com­
in power want no change, and at in. munist doctrine is to discover other poor
tervals society is far behind its poten­ logic, like that of preaching a one-class
tial. The difference is unacceptable, and Utopia by a party that is warned not to
there occur from time to time sudden ad­ identify itself with the masses. But SO
justments, violent or quiet, but final, in few go into the creed; they pick out odd
that each one results in the annihila­ phrases for mottoes, like tbe one above:
tion of a class that has held back the “The constant duty of the vanguard.”
progress of humanity. So go out class by Mottoes for a crusade. This new “ism” is
class the enemies of perfection, said Marx, more a religion than a political doctrine.
and now today his followers say there are And religions inspire, even if th~y are not
but two classes—the capitalist and the fully grasped or accepted. Many Muslim
proletariat. And the gap between the fine, fanatics take alcohol, and Lion Heart’s
much-improved means of livelihood grows Crusaders were not all mailed monks.
fast, because science gives out its dis­ Communism has a banner, and so gains
coveries faster with the years. The last followers. It is a minority and therefore
conflict, between the last antagonists, interesting. It is apparently on the side of
mmt come soon or the gap will be too the underdog, and it gives no distinction
wide to bridge. Conflict is inevitable, between the dog knocked down and the
the a~nihilation of capital inevitable too. one who spinelessly lies down.
Tkere can be no compromise or gradual The very subtle but tremendously im­
change. portant difference between the socialist
So much for Marx. He should be read and communist economic theories is easily
and studied, boring as he is, for to know glossed over. Says the eocialiet:.’’From
1
76 .- MILITARY REVIEW
.’
each according to his ability, to each common with all such creeds since time
according to his labor.” The communist began, fishes best in troubled waters.
says: “To each according to his needs;’ When, after any upheaval, humanity
and is easily mistaken for an advanced ceases to cry in crowds and to tend indi­
democrat instead of the bigoted radical vidual hearths, the enthusiasm fo~banners
that he is. The existence in Russia of and marching dies. Though the world is
many “capitalistic” or socialist privi. far from settled, it is less disturbed than
legee-private property and the right to 4 years ago. The conferences—with much
inherit it, high wages in important jobs talk that gets nowhere—have indirectly
(surely “according to them labor”?) — helped. We have marked time to watch
that lead to an aristocracy of money, them; and time heals, for the common
means no stress on this great divergence man, finding nothing but promises outside
of what must not be regarded as two red his own door, tidies and tends his private
flarties: left and extreme left, advanced, wreckage. With a roof and peace, he loses
and very advanced thought. much of his riotous dissatisfaction. Russia,
as we have seen, does notwant war, be­
Conclusion cause it would kill communism.
Clausewitz defined war as the continu­ So the “cold war” is the greatest dis­
ance of a political aim. Since the aims turbing element the Russian politician
of hussia and the Western Powers are dare let the communist use. More would
diverse, and we cannot fall into line with mean real war, less would be peace. Either
her, then war appears to be inevitable, the would mean the end of the party as we
shadow to become substance. know it.
The communist party theory of revolu­ Clausewitz was right: war is a continu­
tion seems tangled inextricably with Rus­ ance of a political aim, but the aim may
eian national policy. be changed.
But there are factors that give grounds A strong defense must be less obviously
for hope, and the first is the one that anti-communist than pro-British, pro-de­
all Russia is not yet converted to com­ cency, pro-common sense. Communism
munism. An experiment is in progress. A breeds in the morass out of which humanity
war must delay success for years, and in must rise. Every effort of each of us must
those yeare the party policy would modify, be to lift our lives upwards fromthe bog.
mellow, and accept compromise. If it did Each and everyone must have honestyin
not, then the failure to provide paradise, every act, every minute. Capital, with
the discipline, and the purgee necessary which we are snpposed to be rotten, can
to keep all members to the purest prac­ be a disease. It can also-be a wonderful
tices would in the end rouse even the means of gaining security, confidence, in­
docile peoples of the eaetern lands to dependence, upright man-to-man thinking,
revolt. Already, Marxism has passed for country and for individuals.
through Leninism and Stalinism, and that Rnssia is no shadow. She is a very
has meant a eoftening inside Russia not tangible community of nations, bound by
seen outeide. Delay the final conversion, copmunism. The shadow is cast by our
and it might well never come. We do not own selfish habits, by our guilty knowl­
wish to fight for this reason; the party edge of the perils theee habits encourage,
leaders dare not. It wotild be useless to thedangers ourslackness makes huge. We
win a war abroad and then have to forego loathe the morass; we must remember
the victo~y at home. that it is like stagnant water, stationary.
A second factor is that communism, in We can m:ve. We must, upward.
 FOREIGNMILITARY DIGESTS ’77

Denmark and the Atlantic Pact ‘ .

. ~.
Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an articIe
by Frode Jakohsen in “NY Militar Tidskrift” (Sweden) No. 11, 1949.

WHEN Norway and Denmark recently interested in Denmark and Norway join-
chose one course of foreign policy and , ing the Pact, because an expansion of
Sweden another, there was no doubt con- area would mean a diminution of effec­
cerning the underlying reason. The desire tiveness. In the first place, it would be
not to hurt Finland weighed heavily in the necessary to depend on America for arms,
balance for Sweden. Yet, there is little and if the latter’s military support and
doubt that the true reason for Sweden’s armament deliveries were spread over a
action was that its experiences as a na- large area,’ there would be less for each
tion had been different. If Sweden had one. The contention that Denmark could
had the experiences of Denmark, she not join company with the other nations
would have adopted the same conrse as was answered with the statement that she
Denmark, and vice versa. There is not could not be excluded. Even if there were
much logic in thie, however. The fact that nations in Europe which desired that fewer
Denmark suffered during World War II, countries be given American aid, they
while Sweden went free, does not effect would not, in every case, be able to win
the probability of Sweden’s suffering the America over to their idea. This way of
same fate next time. Denmark and Nor- thinking would be contrary to the ,idea
way’s fate in World War II should be just that American support was not for pur­
as much of a warning to Sweden as to poses of isolated national defense, but for
Denmark and Norway. That Sweden es- the promotion of the solidarity of Euro­
caped should, logically, kindle just as much pean democracy. Now, if, America we+ a

hope in Denmark as in Sweden. But logic necessary partner, Denmark could dep~nd

is one thing, and psychology is another. on being admitted to the Pact if she per-

One learns better from suffering than sisted. She could not be shut out.

from reading warnings.

The idea of the establishment of a A Northern Alliance

strong defense unit had arisen in the Then came Sweden’s offer of a military
minds of individual Danes at the time the alliance with Norway and Denmark. Thie
Brussels states formed an alliance in the gave rise to a wavering attitude even
spring of 1948. To the author, it still among some of those in Denmark who had
seems as if it would have been advan- decided for the Atlantic Pact. ,,@, was a ‘
tageous if Denmark had joined in this noble-minded offer. Strongly armed
narrower alliance. Even though there was Sweden was offering to share good or bad
no spontaneou~ interest on the part of the fortune with its half-armed brothers. The
Brussels states in admitting Denmark, discussion now became not one of isolation
she probably would have been let in if or the Atlantic Pact, but rath r, the At­
/
a request had been made. But this idea lantic Pact or a Northern Alliance. There

was not widely entertained in Denmark. was a strong deeire that the Northern

The same situation arose again when nations ehould always stand together.

the .4tlantic Pact discussion began about Sweden’s proximity to Norway and Den-

a year later. There were many who said mark, was advanced as an advantage.

that Denmark was not wanted. There are But against this advantage were the

al:;o grounds for believing that there were arguments that Scandinavian eolidaritm.

ho~ever great it might would not be

78 MILITARY REVIEW

adequate in an era of great powers, and sion in Denmark: In Denmark, there

that the difference in the distances be­ prevailed until World War II just as pro­
tween Sweden and Denmark and England nounced a sentiment for neutrality as” in
and Denmark had lost a large part of its Sweden. In contrast with Sweden, Den­
significance in the air age. mark’s neutrality was, in add)iLion, an
The matter was brought to a head at unarmed neutrality. This attitude is still
the meeting in Karlstad on 5 Januaiy deepiy rooted in the Danish people. There
1949. Norway declared itself willing to also existed an inborn distrust of t,he
stay out of tbe Atlantic Union under two policy of the great powers. Opposed to
conditions: that a Scandinavian military this was a deep uncertainty and uneasi­
alliance could be sure of the sympathy of ness at being alone. If the Danish people
the United States, and the promise of had learned nothing else from the War,
arms from America.’ This might have ap­ they did learn, in any case, to be afraid.
peared to be a solution of the Nordic The carefree attitude of the years prior
problem. But the interpretation of theto 1940 was absent.
two concepts—sympathy, and the promise The thing which divided opinion in
of atms—proved different. For Norway, Denmark was which of two dangers was
the generaI assertion that the United considered the greater—the danger of
States naturally would have nothing joining a strong alliance, and being
against a Nordic military alliance was drawn into a war which could have been
not e~ough. It was easy to say such a avoided, or the danger that isolation could
thingz Neither was it enough, that join­ mean an isolated occupation.
ing the Atlantic Union was not a formal The first danger could be dismissed by
requirement for the delivery of arms. those in favor of that course as least
These two presuppositions really meant likely—especially when tbe content of
that we preferred a Nordic alliance and the Atlantic Pact was known. Such myths
sought a place on the list of arms de­ that Denmark, if she entered into this
liveries as high up as the countries of alliance, could be drawn into war because
the Atlantic Union. We could not have of fighting in Indo China, for example,
the latter, because it was in conflict with must be stopped. The Pact’s domain is
the idea of the Atlantic Pact itself—help that of the North American and ,tbe Euro­
to those who would pledge themselves to pean countries which signed it, plus
help “one another. ‘France’s North African possessions. Since
Criticism was heard both in Sweden and it is fantastic to speak of Denmark aid­
in Denmark against both Norway and ing America, Denmark would have obliga­
America. In my opinion, it was unfounded. tions only in the event of an attack on
The Norwegian statesmen had to act in Western Europe,
whatever way seemed best for Norway’s Even if the Pact is a defensive pact,
security, and they had a right to declare there is no reason for hypocrisy with re­
themselves openly. To talk about American spect to whom it is defensive against. If
pressure, as some have done, is unjusti­ such an attack should come, it would, in
fied. The Americans offered help. No one the opinion of most persons, meet with
can reproach them for letting those coun­ initial success. Does anyone believe that
tries have precedence which know how to the Russians would attack and occupy the
stand together, or which will render the Western European Continent, but leave a
most effective aid. weakly protected assembly area 1ying on
W1-iile there was not much delay in Nor­ the upper flank? The conclusion thus
way, the decision rewired low discus­ would be that being outside tbe Atlantilc
1~

FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 79

Pact would not to any great degree in­ situation in the 1930s. If this be true, it is
crease Denmark’s chances of remaining the most dangerous thing that ca~ happen
neutral. to a country to be situated on the outer
As regards the danger that isolation edge of the principal powers. From this
might mean an isolated occupation, point of view, the greatest risk that a
Hitler’s successive attacks for living space , small country is exposed to is that it can
can be considered. Hitler’s policy, of be occupied quietly without leading to a
course, was not designed to start a world major war. If this be , true, then, the
war. He intended to pick off one country greatest security must exist when a po­
after the other, at the same time avoiding tential attacker knows that the country

getting into war with any of them. As re­ cannot be touched without the most far­
gards this, we are inclined to agree with -reaching consequences.
?Vinston Churchill, who called World War It is not enough that we believe that
II the needless war. According to Church- an attack on Denmark, even outside of the
ill. Hitler should have known beforehand, alliance, would compel America to help
that war against a democratic state in us. The thing that is important is that
Europe meant war against the democratic the potential enemy should know it.
world. For one does not begin a war when That is one of the reasons why a mu­
he knows for certain that he will lose it. tual pledge is clearly preferable to a
one-sided guarantee which some have
Today’s Situation wished for. It has been said that the ideal
The situation today is similar to the situation might be a secret and one-sided
80 MILITARY REVIEW

~uarantee from the United States with re­ plan because.’ Norway had not wished to
spect to the Nordic countries. In this collaborate with Britain in time of peace.
way, we should have all of the advantages Military planning is more important
without any of the unpleasant features. than weapons. But the most important
Aside from the fact that nothing indi­ thing about the Atlantic Pact i neither
cates that a one-sided guarantee could be the planning nor the weapons. ~t is the
obtained, I believe that such an idea is moral factor itself, the unity of spirit,
absurd. I do not believe there would he the solidarity which says that an attack
the same security, if the help were a on a democratic country means war
gift, as there would be if we had paid against the democratic world.
our premium. What the enemy knows is
also of importance. Objections to tbe Pact
What is it, then, that Denmark will ob­ A number of objections have been ex­
tain by its membership in the Atlantic pressed against these arguments for the
Union? Various motives have been given. Atlantic Union wkeh I shall not conceal.
Some say, “because it will give us certainty The most general objection, for a long
that Denmark, after an occupation, will time, was that we ought not to bind our­
be liberated again.” This cannot be the selves without knowing all of the details
decisive reason, for we do not know what and stipulations of the Pact. In reply to
will be left, in such a case, to liberate. this, it can be said that if everyone took
Others say, “because it means help in that view of the matter a pact would never
defending ourselves in case of an attack.” be entered into. The objection may appear
But neither can this be the principal shrewd and prudent. But, in my opinion,
reason. We must clearly understand that it betrays a lack of understanding. Natu­
if war comes, Denmark’s situation will rally, an attempt should be made to make
be extremely unfortunate. the terms of the pact as satisfactory as
possible. The decisive matter would not
The principal reason should be that, be the terms of a pact. The thing which
if it is resolutely agreed in advance, all ‘should be decisive should be this: Are we
democratic countries will stand together going to stand alone or together with
and there is reason to believe that no war others? In the event we decide to stand
will occur. The aim of the Atlantic Pact with others, with which of the two
is not to win war, but to avoid it. partners do we wish to cast our lot? This
The main objective of the Atlantic was especially understood by those who
Pact is preventive. How will that be took part in the fighting against the Ger­
achieved? Some say with arms from mans. And this is truly the law in time
America. It is important for Denmark, of war.
whose weapons were seized by the Ger­ Another objection was the lack of
mans, to again receive arms. But Danish strength in Europe on the part of the
arms cannot prevent a war. Atlantic powers. A defense line on the
More important than arms is the joint English Channel or at the Pyrenees Moun­
military planning and general staff deal­ tains has been talked about. Even if the
ings with the countries of the Atlantic defense line should he on the Rhine, what
Union. In 1940, England was Willing to interest would such a defense line have
come to Norway’s assistance. But she for Denmark? The answer may be:
could not. Why? Norway was facing a Where a defense line is laid down in
German attack, planned in great detail for Europe is a matter of strength. The objec­
months. Britain did not have any sort of tive must be to defend the line of demarka­
.
 ,,’

FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 81

kion which is established in’ Europe be­ And, indeed, there is meaning, in the
tween democracy and dictatorship. And concept that we, have achieved increased
the longer this line is held, the better the security without being forced automat­
chances that it will continue to be held. ically to enter a war in which, as a mat­
This does not mean that the Atlantic Pact ter of fact, we could be of no use. The
is of no value to Denmark today. Thus it ,whole thing would be only idle talk if it
can be seen that the objective is not so did not mean that America would come to
much help in time of war, as it is the hope the aid of Europe in case of an attack.
that a war may be prevented. lt cannot be said that it would be idle
A third main objection is that the At­ talk, even if Denmark should not hasten
lantic Pact is not an automatic pact in to the aid of America in case the latter
which an attack on one member forces all were attacked.
others into war. Those individuals are When Denmark finally ’made its decision,
indeed paradoxical who complain that it was done hurriedly. It was of im­
there is not much to such a pact, As a rule, portance to be included in the first arma­
they are the same persons who pointed ment discussion. Furthermore, it was now
out the danger of Denmark being auto­ more dangerous to delay than to hurry. The
matically dragged into’ war in case it most critical period was the interval, be­
signed. We cannot enjoy both these tween the announcement of Denmark’s
things—the advantage of being able to signing and the time when the Pact would
act as we choose and, at the same time, the begin to cover us. If an attempt were to
advantage of the others being bound. The be made to intimidate us, it would have
decisive factor ought to be evident in the to be made during that period. I believe
words of the Pact: “That an armed attack it can be said that signing the Pact has
on one or more of the members shall be resulted in a feeling of increased con­
regarded as an attack on them all.” fidence in Denmark.

–- I )–. l-­
Strategic Bombing in Modern War \­
flj~~~t~d
bythe MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Wing Commander W. P. >
Whitworth in the “RoYal Air Force Quarterly” (Great Britain) October 1949.

Air Superiority the Allied air forces were put out of action
LY MODERN war, a country needs air almost at once, and were kept out of acti@
superiority before it can even begin to by attacks on the aircraft factories, or
wage war successfully, and without air repeat attacks on the air bases.- This
superiority it is useless to consider the method stood Germany in good @cad in all
various forms of warfare that might be her earlier campaigns, notably, in Poland,,
employed against an enemy. This lesson Norway, and Holland. But it did not prove
was demonstrated time and again through­ successful in the Battle of Britain. From
out World War II, first by the Germans that time on, Great Britain was able to
and then by our allies and ourselves. fight for the one thing that could give
The German method of obtaining air final victory—time. With time, the Allies
superiority was to attack’ the Allied air were able, very gradually, to build up and
bases with as much surprise as possible then establish air superiority over the
and with as strong a force of bombers and German air forces.
fighters as could be assembled. In this way, The absolutely essential requirements
82 MILITARY REVIEW

for air superiority, before undertaking see the target, but by night the inaccu­
any major campaign against a modern racies were tremendous. This fact was to
enemy, is the most important lesson that prove a definite disadvantage to us in
can Be drawn from World War II. by far the greater proportio~ of’ our
Whether” the intended campaign is to be bomber operations. Further, owing to fre­
by land, sea, or air forces is of compara­ quent changes in the war situation in the
tively smalt importance. early stages, too many targets were being
attacked with too small a force of bombers.
National War Effort Thus, in July 1940, 31 oil targets were
In the last War, we did not attempt to attacked, 20 of them with less than 20
win with air forces alone, or even with tons of bombs; this was a complete waste
air power as the most important means of of effort, and little or no permanent danl­
defeating the enemy. From 1940 on, the age was done to the selected targets.
British Cabinet certainly did give air­ Not only was our bombing effort being
craft production the highest production dispersed over too many targets, but it
priority. But this did not give a true was also apparent that the effect of a
picture of tbe proportionate distribution given tonnage of our bombs had been over­
of ,the national war effort. In 1940, the rated by the experts concerned. A further
manpower of the Army was about six point was that our standard of navigation
times that of the RAF, while by 1944 the and target recognition at night was so poor
Army still had three times the numbers that it was useless to expect our bombing
of the Air Force. Of the direct war effort, (except by moonlight) to haveany success
the Army accounted for about half, against small targets. This led directly to
whiIe the RAF’s share was nearer one- the selection of larger “area” targets so
third. Again, taking into consideration all that we would have targets capable of
normal factors, the bomber force itself attack by our bombers throughout the
took only about 12 percent at its peak, and hours of darkness.
over the whole War only 7 percent of the The operational necessity for “area”
direct war effort. This shows clearly that bombing was not in itself the only reason
we did not attempt to use the air as the for the adoption of this policy, since it
real war winner, but rather that we re­ was considered by our econom’ic experts
lied on the combined efforts of all the three that the German economy was stretched
services to achieve victory. to its limit and that any general chaos
caused to German industry would also ad­
Bombing Policy versely afFect the direct war industries. It
Early bombing operations against ships was also considered that attacks on the
of the Germau Fleet immediately disclosed urban areas of industrial town5 would not
one very important fact. We found that only render thousands of workers home­
our bombers, unescorted by fighters, could less and lower their morale but would in­
not stand up to the attacks of the German cidentally cause great damage to indus­
fighters. We had concentrated our whole trial plants, power services, and public
fighter production on fighter aircraft for transport. In this way, it was hoped to
home defense, and at that time we had no reduce the total German output of arma­
fighters that were fit “for escort duties. ments by as much as one-third. It is now
This situation forced us to resort to night known that this assessment was wholly in­
bombing and the change in policy seriously accurate, in that the morale of the home­
affected our bombing throughout the War. less workers remained extremely high
By day, pilots and bomb aimers could under the worst possible conditions and
.2
 .
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
83

Prime strategic bombing targets of World War II included transportation facilities and
synthetic oil plants. Above, a bombed-out railroad bridge over the Saar River, Saarlau­
tern, Germany, in the Third Army secto:, March 1945. Below, a wretked synthetic
gasoline and ammonia plant near Dmslaken, Germany.—US Army photos.
84 MILITARY REVIEW

the output of armaments in Germany rOse. necessary to the Germans in the event of
steadily throughout the War until the our invasion. These attacks went on for
latter part of 1944. nearly 3 m-onths (from March 1944, until
The devastation, over a period of more just prior to the invasion) and) in that
than 3 years, of all the major German time they had ac!hieved their object.
cities and industrial areas, on the false At this stage of the War, another Ger­
assessments of economic experts backed man target system, which had been me­
by military leaders, must be classed as thodically analyzed from the start of the
one of the most serious blunders of World War, gave indications that it was vital to
War II. The fundamental error in the Germany’s war effort and was also vulner­
selection of “area” bombing as the role able to our bombing attacks. This was oil;
for our strategic bombers is undeniable. or, more correctly, the synthetic-oil plants.
Germany had exhausted her captured
Concentration on Selected Targets stocks and was relying almost completely
In the early stages of World War II, on the output of her synthetic plants. We
we have seen that the mistake was made therefore undertook the systematic de­
of attacking too many different targets struction of these plants wherever they
with too few aircraft. But by the later could be found. It was a ruthless and con­
stag~s of the War (1943), this mistake tinuous attack, with a single object in
was appreciated and much more detailed view—to deny the enemy the use of an es­
analysis of target systems was undertaken. sential product for continuing the War.
Attacks on the selected targets were much The strategic bombers were concentrated
more concentrated, If this lesson had been on this task, to the exclusion of all but a
learned earlier, it is doubtful if it would few important diversionary attacks, and
have made a great deal of difference to the results were as striking as they bad
the course of the Tt’ar, as in the early been with the attacks on railways in
stages our bomber force was so small that Northern France and Belgium. Germany
it really was not fit to undertake the de­ was starved of her vital supplies of oil,
struction of even a few selected target and there is no doubt that in due course she
systems. . would have been forced to cease faking
Nevertheless, it was an important fac­ part in the War, without regard to the
tor in bombing, and towards the end of the state of her armed forces or of her in­
War we were able to implement this policy ternal economy.
with marked success. By the end of 1943,
Strategic Bombing
a complete analysis had been made of the
Air superiority is an essential factor
effects of our bombing on the main railway
in modern times if a successful war is to
centers in Italy and Sicily. This showed
be waged by land, sea, or air. Therefore,
that a comparatively small number of at­
tac_ks on the vitaI centers had all but whatever part strategic bombing should
play in war, air superiority must be es­
paralyzed the whole rail system. We there­
fore made a similar but much larger plan ta~lished as soon as possible after the
outbreak of hostilities.
for the attack of communications in No;th­
ern France, as a prelude to invasion of In modern war, the aggressor is unlikely
the Continent. Attacks w’ere to be made on to give any warning of his intended at­
all important railway centers (79 of them tack on an enemy, and therefore tbe stra­
in Northern France and Belgium) with the tegic bombing policy of any nation must
object of disrupting and destroying the be determined in peacetime. Further, a
rail communications which would be so bomber force should be held in readiness
~
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ‘85

to implement the poli~y as and when re­ War ehowed that the accuracy obt+ined in
quired. Bbfore the bombing policy can” be these attacks (5,00 to 700 yards average
decided, however, a vast amount of infor­ error from the center of the target)” was
mation is necessary concerning the in­ extremely wasteful against normal tar­
ternak economy of all likely aggressors. gets euch as industrial works or factories.
This information must be studied and an­ , The targets that are selected in this case
alyzed by the most able scientific and may of necessity be small and isolated.
economic experts available, so as to dis­ Therefore, bombing errors should be as
cover a weak spot or flaw in the general small as possible, and in any case not
economy of each aggressor country. This greater than 500 yards from tbe center of
weak spot should preferably be some raw the target. With the modern jet bombers
material or commodity which requires spe­ operating at heights of 40,000 feet or
cialized production in only a few centers, higher, at speeds of 460 mpb or faster,
but which is essential for continuing the everything is against accurate bombing
war. from these bombers in a strategic bomber
If the analysis of every type of indus­ role.
try and activity within a country is based Visual bombing offers the greatest ac­
on reliable and up-to-date information, curacy at present. This type of bomb-
It is almost certain that one weak but vi­ sighting has the inh+rent disadvantage
tal point will be found. Where this is the that it is dependt?rit on the weather,
case, strategic bombing should be used as which, on the average, is suitable only
the main method of defeating that country 4 or 5 days each month. This would be
in war. Where no such vital point can be a most serious handicap to the use of
found in a country’s economic and indus­ any bomber force, and particularly so
trial life, strategic bombing certainly when the greatest urgermy for bombing
should not play a major part in the war operations may well be in the first month
against that country. or two of a war.
The inability to bomb accurately is
Limitations of Bomber Force therefore likely to be one of the most se­
Having found and selected targets rious factors which must be considered
which are vital to the enemy’s war effort, when determining the correct rqle 0$ the
it is necessary for strategic bombers to strategic bomber. If accuracy is better
be able to reach those targets, identify than 500 yards, then it is certainly worth
thcm, and destroy them. The capabilities attacking industrial targets of a reason­
in this respect of bombers of the last War able size. But if accuracy is worse than
arc known; they had a radius of action of 1,000 yards, it is doubtful if any use can ,
less than 1,000 miles with a good bomb be found for a strategic bomber force in
load. Today, the strategic bombers may modern war.
require a radius of action of 2,000 miles
to play their part in modern war. They Atomic Bombs

w.i~l also reauire expert navigation over The effects of conventional bombs are

lor.E distances, an average bombing ac­ well known, but it is possible that stra­
ruIacy which will give them a reasonable tegic bombers will carry atom bombs in­
ch:ince of hitting the target, and they must stead. Atom bombs are, however, ex­
be capable of carrying a bomb load which tremely costly, and unless the stocks of

cau destroy or seriously damage the target atom bombs in reserve or in process of

attacked. manufacture are sufficient to ensure the

Results of “area” bombing in the last complete defeat of the enemy, conven­
 ,. MILITARY REVIEW
86
. .
tional bombs will be required to supple­ above requirements fully. Therefore, un­
ment the atomic attacks. Tbe great differ­ less a country took steps to remedy its
ence in using atom bombs is likely to be shortcomings in this respect, it could not
that colossal damage can be caused in a rely on. strategic bombing as a v)ar-win­
short time. It may therefore be possible ning factor. With modern weapons, a
to paralyze and, defeat an enemy in a well-planned strategic bomber attack of­
matter of days. Otherwise, atom bombs fers the chancd of a quick victory to the
do not alter the role that should be al­ aggressor, as it may well be too late for
lotted to strategic bombers. the country that is attacked to prepare its
own offensive. Therefore, for a country
Chemical and Bacterial Warfare which intends to be aggressive, strategic
A strategic bomber force may be used bombing should play the major part in all
as the means of carrying chemical or bac­ offensive operations.
terial warfare into the heart of the enemy The countries which do not intend ag­
country. Where an aggressor possesses gression” (including most, democracies)
one or more of these types of weapons of are’ not in the same position as those that
mass destruction, and is prepared to use do intend it. The former normally cannot
them, ruthlessly against an enemy, the afford vast expenditure on preparations
strategic bomber force will play the maj­ for war, and their general policy is more
or role in waging this type of warfare. one of defense than offense; thus they
are unlikely to possess an efficient stra­
Conclusions tegic bomber force. This is a most dan­
Strategic bombing, in itself, could be a gerous position for the non-aggressor
decisive winning factor in modern war. countries, and it can be remedied in only
But to achieve this object by means of two ways. Either they must meet the
strategic bombing, any country would have threat of a strategic bomber offensive
to ensure the following: from an aggressor country by building up
1. The establishment and maintenance an efficient bomber force of their own; or
of air superiority over the enemy. they must prepare some other plan of de­
2. The possession of sufficient intelli­ fense against the enemy bombers; and
gence about likely aggressor countries to relegate their bomber force to a minor
enable a vital weak spot to be found in tbe role in this plan. They will be wise to
internal economy of such countries. choose the former alternative, since there
3. The possession of a strategic bomber is no countermeasure which will prevent
force capable of reaching the enemy’s an efficient bomber force from achieving
vital targets, tinding them, and destroying its object.
them. = Strategic bombing is therefore destined
4. The ability to continue attacks to play the most important part in mod­
against the enemy’s vital targets until ern war. It is the mpst devastating form
the enemy ceases to wage war. of aggression and the only real defense to
At the present time, general indica­ it is retaliation on the aggressor by his
tions are that no countries could meet the cwn methods.
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 87

The Field Armies of England, the United States, and Russia

Digested by the MI.LITARY REVIEW from an article by Major S. J. f r+,.
Watson in “The Army Quarterly” (Great Britain) ApriI 1950.

The High Command Russian “Frqnts” of the 1939-1945 war

IN ENGLAND, the Chiefs of Staff of the, roughly corresponded to the American
three services are separately responsible and British Army Groups. AH the above
to the government. In the United States, formations have additional support and
the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff is administrative units incorporated under
respcinsible to the government for all corps or army command. Indications of
three services. the comparative peacetime strengths of
In Russia, the head of the MVS Uni­ the armies of the three nations are given
fied Command of the three services is him. in the following figures quoted from the
self a Minister of State; moreover, under 1949 edition of Whitaker’s Almanac:
him the supply and administrative direc­ England, as of 7 July 1948 .---530,700
torates of all three services are grouped U. S.A., as of 1 June 1948 .._-_ -542,000
in a, single” organization called the “Rear Russia; peacetime annual in­
of the Armed Services.” Thus, instead of take exceeds .-_____ --____ l,250,000
three separate services, each with its own
channels to civil industry and manpower, Divisional Troops
Russia can be said to have integrated her England, the United States,’ and Russia
war effort under two main headings: assess their relative fighting strengths in
1. The” armed forces as one entity. terms of divisions, since tbe division is
2. The rear, which includes the mobili­ the basic formation in which all arms and
zation and direction of civil industry and services are found. Both Russia and the
manpower. United States incorporate organically un­
These are supported on the home front der one command the elements of ma­
by the MVD; and behind the enemy’s front neuver, tire support, and administration
by the Fifth Column, which may also in­ down to regimental level. For example,
clude partisan bands. in tbe US infantry regiment are included
a tank company, heavy mortar company,
Higher Formations and medical company. In British prac­
The field armies of all three nations tice, these elements are grouped sep­
aue flexibly composed of divisions grouped arately and attached in support of units
according to operational requirements. as and when required. SimilarlyJ there is
For example, typical wartime armies no tank component organic to the British
might be composed of the following: infantry division, but an independent
Russian army groupings may be ex- armored brigade is normally available on
p{,cted to be somewhat similar. The a scale of one to each infantry division.

No. Of
Nation Corps Corps Cornpoaenk ~ D&&.
——
Britain .......... 3 Three infantry
divisions or two infantry divi-1
sions plus one armored division 9

USA .............. 3 Three infantry divisions plus one armored di-[

vision I 12
r
88 MILITARY REVIEW

The airborne divieions of the three na- visional strength, the order of the three
tions are not here considered in detail, nations ie directly reversed, though there
since they are basically infantry di- is no great disparity between the per-
visions employed in a special role. Men- centages of manpower absorbed i~ forma-
tic)n was made during the last War of tion headquarters. The essential difference
Russian “artillery divisions,” but these in manpower grouping lies therefore in
are merely ad hoc formations of Army the size of the administrative tails.
troops. ,The table, below, summarizes the
In total manpower, the British di- main differences in the allocation of

Item Britain USA Ruas<a

Artillery Preponderance of fifeldartillery. f?reponderance of heavy howitzers and heavy mortars on —

Emphasis on rapid and accu- wheeled mountings.
rate fire of small projectiles. Emphasis on weight of projectiles.
No rockets Mobile rocket launchers.
Antitank tire power rei”lorced All amitank fire provided hy Tank armaments used prima.
by tank armaments. tank armaments. rily against personnel. All
guns can fire in antitank role.
W~: ~ML&,$., hut use 12.7-mm
— .
Tanks, One type of capital tank for
all purposes.
Slower than all US and Rw+
Light tanks for reconnaissance.
I
Medium tanks.
sian tanks. Heavy tanks.
Outgunned by all heavy tanks. All outgunned by Russian Low silhouettes.
heavy tanks. Small reserve of horsepower.

Engineer? Fully equipped and highly trained. Lack of technical training off­
set by skdlful improvisation.
Assault engineers grouped as Assault engineers included in NO sssault engineers as such.
ArmY or GHQ troops. divisions.

Small Arr LMG is basis of small-arms fire power. ,

Only 4 MMG-S per battalion.
Bolt magazine rifle is basic ~er- / Hi~b ~ro~o;tio#$&~.%~~~a&~~%~;%’”as .ersond
sonal tieapon. weag Ins.
No problem in SAA SUPPIY. Numerous types of small arms All soldiers trained to use CaP-
Iiahle to complicate ammu- ttwed enemy weapons if ourn
1 nition‘-” supply. ammunition supply fails.
—1

Signak Large “mnher of wireless sets.

Teletypewriters ~ncluded in Reliance on line communica­
di.nwonal equipment. tions.laid in pre-planmsd
1 arteries.

Vehicles Large numbers of vehicles andlor trailers. Some rifle division transport
horse-drawn.
Limited use qf armored per- Extensive ‘use of armored utility No equivalent to armored per­
sonnel earners. vehicles. No carriers, armed sonn el carriers.
cars, or motorcycles.
Use of jeeps for mobile recon- Use of mo~orcycles for mobile
naissance. recomxmssance.
Most vehicles organic to units. Extensive use o pool transport.

visions are the largest and the Russian di- weapons and equipment to the divisions
visions are the smallest. It was recently of ,the three nations.
disclosed that Russian divisions are It is of interest to note that German
roughly equivalent to enlarged British commanders on the Eastern Front have
brigades; they therefore show their di- testified that Russian tanks, though
rect descent from the towwms of Genghis crudely finished, proved most effective in
Khan, which were self-contained forrua- battle. The famous JS tank has as one
tions of 10,000 men. On the proportional of its features three machine guns, one
basis of fighting troops to the total di- of which fires from the rear of the tur.
A
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 89

ret; but it also has a weakness in the slow semblies rather than repairs to individual
rate of fire of its main 122-mm armament, components.
for which “it carries only 28 rounds. The strength of Russian divisional re­
.
vair nnits is 75,. uercent ereater than that
Administrative Units
of their medical units, whereas the Brit­
Divisional workshops are proportional ish divisional medical strength out­
to the amount of divisional equipment. In numbers the engineer strength. It is not
American divisions, maintenance and re- ‘ surprising that, of the thirteen ration
pair is the responsibility of each service scales adopted in the Soviet Army from
for its own equipment, whereas in British 1941-1945, the highest was for soldiers
divisions the repair effort is concentrated in the f rent lines and the lowest was for
in engineer first-line workshops. This ac­ those in hospitals.
counts for the main difference in the size None of the three nations has produced
of administrative tails. The Russian or­ an administrative vehicle for cross-
ganization is primarily concerned with re­ country. use, though the American “ar­
covery in forward areas; field repairs are mored utility vehicles” come nearest to
mainly the replacement of complete as­ this category.
)’

French Air Power and the Defense of Western Europe

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by General --7 - ,,”
P. Geradot in “Revue de Defense Nationale” (France) October 1949. ~“ ?

IN A recent article, GeneraI L. M. Chas­ wars. The methods of World War II will
sin wrote that in ancient times the Greeks not be repeated. Methods will be trans­
turned to the sea in forcing the Persians formed more and more with the passage of
back into Asia. On land, the Greeks were time and the development of new tech-
unable to gain victory because of nu­ niques.
merical’ inferiority; but on the sea they Second, there are those who think that
\vere superior. France cannot wage modern aerial war-
The present situation of France is quite fare. A future war against France will
comparable to the situation when the not be one based on ground operations.
Greeks were facing the Persians. This All of our defensive measures should take
historical comparison should aid us in account of this. Contrary opinions on this
understanding that France’s only chance score are dangerous, since they serve as
of salvation is not in costly and bloody a basis for the distribution of th~ forces
land battle, where the chances of victory of Western Union in which France would ‘
are against us. It is in aerial warfare furnish the main body of the ground
WII el.e, like the Greeks on the seas, France forces.
may exploit its full capabilities. Ideas minimizing aerial warfare are
When we think of future war, I believe not new. They were proclaimed before
we commit two errors. First, some dwell World War II for the purpose of dimin­
toe]much on World War II. I do not deny ishing the rqle and importanc6 of the air
the value of historical study, but it has arm in French national defense. The
vaiue only when it helps us to understand harm done at that time is well known.
an,d better prepare for a future war. We Again, today, in order tQ minimize the
cannot allow ourselves to imitate past predominance of the aerial factor, the
90’ MILITARY REVIEW

same fallacious arguments are presented guard and to mobilize his defenses,. which
that were raised before 1939. wiI1 have been organized previously in
Efforts to deny the importance of air depth. The resistance also will permit
forces, and to minimize the idea of air the air forces to take defensive measures.
supremacy and of aerial combat, have been Guerrilla operations may be e~ployed
in vain. Those leaders who have remained in the rear areas of the attacking forces
blind have found themselves among the and against the communication lines of
conquered. on the ground, there is-no ef­ the hostile armies.
fective defense (and still less offense) There will also be fortified zones. These
possible witbout previous conquest of the will vary from the simple works manned
air. Failure to understand this fact was by only a few men to large fortified places
at the bottom of the French defeat in manned by fortress units. The latter will
1940. Tomorrow, we shall be beaten again be complemented by regional units of tbe
if, in spite of the development of the air’ Swiss militia type serving as bases for
arm—which has increased 10-fold since armored divisions. The armored units
Hiroshima—we stick to such arguments. will harass the invader on the ground and”
channel his columns into certain routes
Developing a Defense in order to expose them to aerial attacks.
If ,French defense is to be based only Each of these fortified places must have
on ground forces which Wave no reasonable at its disposal one or more airfields capa­
chance of resisting a future enemy from ble of permitting supply by air and the
the east, how will such a defense be de­ employment of air forces.
veloped? Thus, on the ground, the enemy making
– The basic principle which must govern a surprise attack will find himself slowed
the defense of the Rhine zone may be ex­ ciown by demolitions and by fixed or mo­
pressed as. follows: Defensive on the bile fire obstacles, which will be increas­
ground; offensive in the air, ingly formidable the farther he advances
It cannot be emphasized too much that into the interior and the more extended
it will not be a ground force pushing from and precarious his supply lines become.
Brest to Vladivostok that will conquer While the enemy is thus advancing and
Russia. Only air combat and bombing being retarded to the maximum extent,
operations, complemented by limited zone the air battle will begin.
ground operations of parachute or air­
borne troop~ from nearby bases, will Air Superiority
permanently paralyze the power of the The initial air battle will be a battle to
enemy. The situation will probably be gain air superiority. Without a reason­
similar to the war in the Pacific, where able degree of air superiority, no air forw
the victors invaded the enemy after the is able to support ground or naval forces
surrender. effectively and at the same time success­
But how are we to resist the first at­ fully attack an enemy’s war potentiality.
tack, and how are we to stop the enemy’s The stake in this aerial battle is not
columns at the outset? total possession or permanent occupation.
There will be demolition zones wh~ch The battlefield of tbe skies, like that of
the enemy must traverse from the very the seas, is a sort of no-rnan’s-lan[l
outset of his advance, provided the de­ where victory leads to freedom of action
fense has been organized. This initial re­ and the ability to move about at will.
sistance to an enemy thrust will give the This battle will also be profitable f,,r
ground defender time to place himself on the ground forces, since its first resu] 1
“~

FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 91

will be to protect them against enemy front far enough back from the national
air attacks. air area to obtain local air superiority.
While ,these armies will at first engage In the second phase, an effort is made
in delaying action or carry on defensive to push back and extend the air front
operations, the air forces will seek ac­ farther and farther into the interior of
tion for the purpose of carrying on the the enemy territory, in order to acquire
fight which will insure air superiority. , and maintain general air superiority there.
The air battle will be local at first, for Whether it be a question of acquiring
the protection of its bases, and general local or general air superiority, it is in­
afterward, for knocking out the enemy dispensable that Allied aviation shall not
in his own territory. be composed solely of fighters and de­
The combatants may alternately have fensive weapons. It must also have bomb­
the advantage in the air. That was the ers and offensive weapons,
case in the aerial fighting in World War I Just as the battle for local air su­
and during certain periods of World War periority requires the use of all combat
II, particularly in Libya in 1940 to 1942. means of an air force, so the battle for
It is necessary to obtain more complete general air superiority requires the use
air superiority in time and in space be­ of all aerial means not absolutely needed
fore attacking enemy rear areas. This is for other tasks. The experience of the
called general air superiority, and pow­ last War condemned the “small parcels”
erful air forces and decisive air opera­ method, a method which is “worse than
tions are required to attain it, It is nec­ useless.” On the contrary, aviation must
essary to attack an enemy’s depots, always attempt to effect concentrations
Iepair shops, assembly shops, and air­ which shall take maximum advantage of
craft plants in order to destroy the its mobility and flexibility of action. It
sources of his air power or his entire is only after mass engagement for the ac­
industrial power. This battle is first won quisition of air superiority that an air
in laboratories and manufacturing plants. force will be able to effect mass engage­
The battle for local air superiority is ments against ground objectives.
only one of the aspects of the struggle Thns, in the particular case which con­
for general superiority, but it is of prime cerns us—protection of the French base
importance. On its success depends the of air operations—all aerial combat
security of the bases necessary for means will be put in action to protect
achieving general superiority. This gen­ France and to force the aii front deeply
e]al superiority cannot be gained merely into the enemy’s territory. This action
by a rapid series of fighter operations or will attempt to render unten$ble the
bombing attacks on the rear areas of the places from which enemy missiles or air­
eoemy, It requires the employment of craft are launched.
Vmt, new air forces which only an in­ It is possible that urgent assistance
dustry of extraordinary development is will have to be given ground forces at, a
al~le to place in action. time when air superiority is only par­
These concepts of local and general su­ tially achieved, and before the air front
p,qriority are expressed in another form by has been pushed sufficiently deep into the
Genei-al Spaatz when he says that the ob­ enemy’s territory. In such a case, the
jective of the air battle is the movement assistance which the air forces will give
of the air front more and more deeply the ground forces will not be complete;
i]:to the enemy’s territory. In the first it will be proportionate to the degree of
p~lase, it is necessary to push the air air superiority thus far achieved.
 92 MILITARY REVIEW ?,
,,
It may be that the ground forces will At the same time, French ~ir forces, re-
require air support at the very beginning inforced by the Allies, will become more
of hostilities. To grant such sumort. and more effective until the time ‘is
however, would impiy that the air- ~orce ‘ reached when they will be able’)to inter-
possessed sufficient superiority over its yene effectively in the battle on the
adversary to be able to engage in its ground. World War II shows what hap.
two missions, aerial warfare, and ground pens to troops and their morale under
support. This would imply, also, that such conditions.
tine air force had been soundly developed The question will be asked: what will
in time of peace. This is certainly not the happen if the aerial battle, which is so
case in France at the present time. necessary, is lost, or the victory is too
After local air superiority and free. long delayed?
dom of action have been obtained, even If we repeat the errors we committed
though limited in time and space, the air before the last War; if we share the view
force may then intervene effectively to of those who find the appropriations made
the advantage of the ground forces. The to, our air force sufficient; if we per-
sooner the air force obtains local air sist in our present military policy which
superiority, the sooner it will be able to refuses to count on preponderant air
,.
intervene in the interest of the ground power, we grant that the French Air
forces. The more powerful the French Force will not win the air battle. It will
Air Force is in comparison with that of not obtain the air superiority necessary for
an enemy at the opening of hostilities, the freedom of maneuver, and it will not be’
sooner air superiority will be attained. able to come to the assistance of the
While the air force is achieving local ground forces. French forces on the
air superiority, the enemy will be hin- ground, hastily mobilized and constantly
dered in his advance by demolition zones attacked by enemy aircraft, will resist no
and guerrilla operations, channeled by mo,re than they did in 1940—perhaps even
fortified places, and exposed to counter­ less<
attacks, artillery, and missile fire. De- Present Military Policy
.
prived of the support of his air forces, It is indeed impossible to have ‘a mili­
which would not have freedom of action, tary and industrial policy in France caPa­
the enemy will become weaker the farther ble of creating an air force comparable
he penetrates into French territory. His to that of our possible adversary. How-
drive will be stopped by the combined ever, the combined French and British
ground and air action against him. Air Forces will probably be numerically
As soon as local superiority has been superior when one considers that the Rus­
acquired, all aviation that has become eians will be forced to disperse their
available will be able to attack and crush force over vast territories in order to de-
the enemy columns on the ground. fend certain vital regions from the air
Such a system of defense also offers attacks of the Americans. Therefore, the
another advantage.’ It is flexible and it Russians will be able to send only part
has depth, it is not liable to col~pse of their forces against the Western Na­
“ or break down as would a rigid, hnear tions. If these co ditions exist, we may
defense such as that used in 1940. A sys- count on the A ericans passing over
very rapidly to tie + attack of the enemy
tem of defense in depth, based on ‘air
power as we conceive of it, will result in on the ground as coon as they have
the, enemy becoming weaker the farther acquired freedom of maneuver. These a>
he penetrates our increasing resistance. tacks will not be executed in accordance
.­
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 93“

vith the methods of aerial support in of bombs, with excellent results. Not

,ogue in the last War, but they will con- only were German troop movements

ist of missions against the enemy’s rear greatly retarded, but the Frenkh rail­
mess to paralyze and choke his advance. ways were de,prived of Belgian coal.

Rolling stock and railway installations

Lessons From World War II suffered grave damage, and the efficiency

In 1944, the Allies required more than of the entire railway system was reduced

ocal air superiority to carry out a deli- ‘ to 13 percent of normal traffic on the
late and drawn-out ground operation northern network, and to 30 percent over
~hich began with a difficult landing op­ France as a whole. The German general
xation, the eventual success of which staff officer in charge of transportation on ‘
vas doubted by many military leaders in the Western Front said that the required
France. The Allies required general air movement of, 10 to 12 trains per d’ay drop­
mperiority. Four years of fighting in ped to 2 or 3 trains per day,
;he air was required to achieve it. When During the same period, the highway
?.ir superiority was acquired, the Allies network was the object of daily attacks
;hrew all of their available air forces by Allied fighters,
into ‘the task of isolating the future In short, on the eve of the landing,
field of battle by disrupting communica­ the success of the air attacks had con­
tion lines and softeriing up the beaches vinced the Allied High Command that the
where they intended to land. Aware of landing would be made under a sky free
the possibilities of the air forces, the of German planes, and that the Nor­
Allies ~hen proved that air power does mandy field of battle would be isolated
not attain its maximum effectiveness un­ so that German reinforcements could not
less it is employed en masse. The Ameri­ arrive.
can concept of warfare, wrote General Ardennes Counteroffensive
Spaatz, is to concentrate power in space. The relatively weak fo~ces which set
The Allies launched continual fighter foot on the coasts of France in the criti­
sorties against German forces in position cal first hours of the landing were op­
along the coasts of the English Channel posed by forces which were materially
and the North Sea, and against the im­ and morally weakened, and which were
mediate rear areas of the enemy. Re- finally conquered. A few months later,
peated mass flights of heavy bombers, when Marshal von Rundstedt launched
accompanied by long-range fighters, his counteroffensive in the Ardennes
dropped their bombs on the most important with 24 divisions, including 10 Panzer
objectives of the German and occupied divisions and 2,500 modern tanks, the
territories. The result of this unprec­ surprise was complete. The German at- ,
edented aerial campaign was the para­ tack was favored by overcast and foggy
lyzation of the Germans, because all weather, which was very unfavorable
traffic over the railway and highway net­ for the Allied air forces, For a period
works was stopped. Attacks on water­ of 6 days, pianes were not able to con­
ways were regarded as of secondary im­ ducj reconnaissance or to effectively in­
portance during this phase of the War. tervene in the battle.
Particularly, attacks on the railway Enjoying a numerical superiority of 4
network during the 6 weeks preceding the to 1, the German armored columns ad­
landing became the principal objective of vanced rapidly through the Allied defense
the bombers. Eighty-four railway cen­ positions, by-passing the strong points
ters were attacked with some 74,000 tons to which the American forces clung. In a
 94 MILITARY REVIEW

few days, the advance elel;mnts of Rund­ to fly 4,200 sorties and to bring down
stedt’s armies had covered 60 or more more than 200 German planes. “During
miies. But their supply lines also were the following days, the Allied air effort
. extended by the same amount, and they was sustained with from 4,000, to 5,000
had left behind Allied strong points sorties flown daily, which result~d in }he
which menaced their maneuver. South of destruction of more than 1,500 Gernpin
the pocket, an American division, the planes, the destruction of German gaso­
10lst Airborne Division, reinforced with line supplies, and the neutralization of
tanks, held together and resisted at Bas­ German airfields.
togne, immobilizing and wearing down The defeat of the Luftzuafle insured the
three to six German divisions. In the Allies of local air superiority and per­
North, Allied forces of the 7th Armored mitted more effective and direct assist­
Division, surrounded in the Vielsahn ance to the forces on the ground.
area, neutralized the communication Repeated attacks on the German com­
center of Saint-Vith for the first 5 days, munication lines prevented the arrival’ of
thus blocking the German drive and
fuel supplies and replacement parts. .3t­
f:rcing them to suspend the advance and tacks were also made on his armored
return in order tp attack Saint-Vith. forces, which were forced to follow the
Thds, on both sides of the attack front, narrow roads of the Ardennes, thus pre­
the Allied “junctions” resisted success­ senting excellent targets. Both tactical
fully and so well that, thanks to the de­ and strategic aviation attacked the Ger­
termination of the ground forces, the man ground forces, operating together
German offeusive was halted east of the over the field of battle, knocking out
Meuse River. tanks, and paralyzing movements. The
Coincidently with the halt of the at- ground forces were thus helped to resume
tack-—the famous dead center of offensive the, initiative and to drive the Germans
action-the return of more favorable back to their assembly positions. By 30
weather conditions permitted a resump­ January 1945, a month and a half after
tion of aerial activity. The Luftwa.fe the beginning of the German offensive,
bad made a great effort in order to be the battle of the Ardennes was definitely
ready to support Rundstedt’s armies. won, Tactical aviation’ had destroyed
During the first days of the battle, the 6,000, and damaged 7,000 vehicles; it
Lz~ftwa.&e sent out 800 to 1,000 sorties had destroyed 550 locomotives and dam­
per day. Hence the assistance which the aged 600. The Ninth American Air Force
Allied air force gave the friendly forces alone had destroyed 2,580, and damaged
on the ground was at first indirect. It 2,126 vehicles. Once more, aviation’s role
was first necessary to, regain air superior­ had been decisive.
ity above the field of battle by destroy­ Von Rundstedt summarized the opin­
ing the German planes. The aerial bat­ ions of the defeated German commanders
tle attained its climax on 1 January who were asked to draw lessons from the
1945. On that day, the Luftwc@,having German defeat: “It was a matter of ai~
effected a rapid concentration of fighters forces, air forces, always air forces.”
at its airfields in the vicinity of the front,
sent out three waves of ’500 fighters each A Plan for the Future
to attack the Allied airfieids in Belgium Halting of the German offensive before
and Holland. They inflicted heavy losses it reached the Meuse River conforms to
on Anglo-American aviation. But this the plan which we propose today. The
came day, the Allied air forces were able German attack was similar to the series
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 95

of operations which we probably can ex­ crush all the forces that we could keep
pect in the future: A surprise attack, or that we do keep in Berlin and on the
rapid progress at first, then an increas­ Elbe. These armies would pour, like an
ingly effective defense in depth which avalanche into France, across France,
slows down the advance and permits the and on to the coast. Could we stop them
mobilization of the friendly rear areas. with a million men on the Elbe? IS it
During this time, there will be a battle practical for us or our Allies, from’ the
for local air superiority, followed by the political or economic point of view, to
employment of all available aerial means station a million men on the Elbe? As
in assisting the surface forces (mainly we well know, it is not.”
against enemy rear areas) until the situ­ Lord Templewood proposed this solu­
ation has been reestablished and victory tion, which is in agreement with what
won.
has been given above:
To be sure, the Ardennes front was
limited. Roughly, it extended 60 miles, “I envisage an Allied air force des­
tined for operating from the outset of
from Montjoie to Echternach. For this
the war and composed of at least 100
reason, the concentration of air forces
squadrons of jet fighters, 150 squadrons
was more effective. But tomorrow, the
idea of the organization of the defense of the latest model long-range weapons,
50 pilotless rocket units, and 150 trans­
zone with considerable depth, reinforced
port squadrons. With a force of this na­
with modern defense means, and assisted
ture, I am convinced that the Allies could
by greatly augmented air power, may be
stop and disorganize any attempt’ at in­
favorably received.
vasion across the Continent.”
What was possible yesterday will be
possible again’ tomorrow with increased Yesterday, in all probability, Hitler
etliciency. Still more striking results will would not have started the war if the
be achieved if we only stop to consider, Allies had possessed a, powerful fleet
on the authority of General Spaatz, that of bombers. Today, in all probability, the
the revolutionary possibilities of aviation threat of the atomic bomb alone maintains
were not. even entirely understood by the a precarious peace.
men who directed the last War. These Tomorrow, it will not be with ground
possibilities, increased 10-fold by the forces, inferior in number to those of
atomic bomb, will be still more increased the adversary, that we can hope to insure
by advances in technique. t~e safety of Frafice. To continue to de­
The aim of the Americans at the pres­ sire to make ground forces the basis of
eut time is to create a forbidden zone our defense is to accept battle on the
b.lween hostile ground forces to prevent ground where the enemy considers him­
tbtir coming into contact. For example, self, and rightfully so, the strongest; it is
in the Pacific, tbe pov,,er of aviation often to encourage his aggression and compro­
p)cvented opposing naval forces from get- mise on an unstable peace! Tomorrow,
t]~,g into direct contact. our only chance of safety is the existence
These ideas are not revolutionary. In of a powerful French and Allied air force
a recent debate in the House of Lords, which, through dominati~n in quantity
L,rd Trenclard expressed himself as fol­ and quality of the adversary’s aviation,
low ; will be mistress of the skies and break the
“With their enormous army composed offensive of an aggressor, who shonld
of millions of men and masses of mat6riel have realized the uselessness of an at­
a~.d aircraft, they [the Russians] could tempt doomed to failure.
 .
,“

96 MILITARY REVIEW

To believe in this solution of a defense are to engage’ in an all-out manner. It is

by means of aviation is to act in accord­ also the performance of an act of faith
ance with reason. It will spare” French in peace. As Air Marshal Tedder has
blood and will facilitate agreement with said: “Air power tomorrow may be the
oux Allies, who will see in the existence guardian of peace, until that day when
of French air power the stiffening which nations at last will understand that wars
they expect in our will to resist if they do not pay.”

Prisoners of War
\
\>+-’ Digested by tbe MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant Colonel M. E. S. Laws
in the -Jour”aI of the Rc,yal United Setvice Institution” .( Great Britain) February 1950.

ONE of the most distressing aspects of able to remove prisoners away from the
the last two great Wars has been the de­ naval ports on the South coast.
plorable treatment of prisoners of war
, by certain nations, and it is significant Prison Life
that it has recently been found necessary Life in a prisoner of war, camp in Eng­
to hold an international conference to land was undoubtedly hard. The captor
endeavor to obtain agreement among the nation was responsible for providing ac­
powers on this question for future guid­ commodation and rations, while clothing
ance. It is interesting, therefore, to and blankets were supposed to be supplied
recall the treatment of prisoners of war hy the prisoner’s own government. The
during the long war with Revolutionary ratilons were certainly adequate in quan­
and Napoleonic France and to compare tity and up to the contemporary standards
the behavior of captor powers a century of quality, though little attempt seems to
and a half ago with that of recent years. ha~-e been made to allow for national
Soon after war broke out in 1793, idiosyncrasies of diet. Thus, French pris­
Britain began to accumulate French pris­ oners sometimes complained that they got
oners of war—mostly from prizes taken insufficient bread but more than enough
at sea. As there was a lack of suitable ac­ beef, while Britons in French prisons dis­
commodation for them, it was decided to approved of French wine as a beverage
fit out a number of old warships as prison and demanded more meat.
hulks. These were moored in the principal In the early days, no attempt was made
- naval ports, chiefly at Portsmouth, P1y­ to give the prisoue~s any useful occupa­
m“outh, and Chatham. At first, the hulks tion or means of earning money to pur­
were used simply as prisons, being cheap chase small comforts. The result was an
to provide and maintain and easy to outbreak of gambling in food and cloth­
guard. But as the number of captives ing which often led to the losers being
increased, depots had to be formed brought to the point of death by starva­
ashore and the prison ships became more tion or exposure. Later, however, well-be­
and more to be used as collecting camps haved prisoners were encouraged to work
which received prisoners. as they arrived at their trades, and this wise measure ml­
at the naval ports and later passed them doubtedly did much to check riotous con­
to the camps ashore. This process was duct and to improve the prisoners’ lot.
accelerated from about 1800 onwards, Each belligerent appointed an ac­
when the threat of invasion made it desir­ credited agent who was permitted to live
 -1

I
FOREIGN MI;ITARY DIGESTS 97

in the hostile country and to move about British garrison was immediately em­
freely. His duties were to do his best for barked on board French transports and
his nationals and to arrange for the sup­ sent to Gibraltar for onward passage to
ply of their clothing and other necessar­ England. By this eminently sensible and
ies. The agent also arranged for the ex­ humane custom, much misery was avoided
change of prisoners by cartel ships, which without detriment to the interests of the
sailed under a flag of truce and were se­ captors.
cure from molestation by warships of ‘ Officers were always treated with con­
either belligerent. sideration and were often exchanged
A large proportion of soldiers and almost immediately after capture. Some­
sailors actually captured during the early times an officer would be permitted to
days of the war never reached a prison return to his own country in order to
camp at all. By a long standing custom it arrange his own exchange, on the un-

Aerial _ .–.—–.
view of a .–––
rrrisoner —–—
of war cam~ for Germans near Mateur. Tunisia. North Africa.
Where 9,000 prisoners were admitt>d in a single day, 9 May 1943.—US Army photo.
was usual when a fortress or overseas derstanding that if his efforts ‘were un­
colony surrendered by capitulation to in­ successful he would voluntarily return to
clude in the terms an arrangement by captivity. It was very seldo,m that such
which the garrison was shipped to its own undertakings were not scrupulously ob­
country, usually at the expense of the served. In any case, officer prisoners ‘of
captors. Sometimes such repatriation was war were usually permitted to live as pri­
unconditional, but in most cases an un­ vate citizens on giving their parole, though
dertaking was given that the released their place of residence was fixed and their
pe~sonnel should not ser~e again for a movements to some extent restricted.
stated period or until regularly ex­ Despite revolutionary fervor and the
ch:inged. Thus, when Minorca surren­ issue of orders in 1793 that no quarter
dered to the French in 1756, the whole waa to be given to British troops, the
 1
98 MILITARY REVIEW

French government generally observed total than that of British prisoners in

the nozmal customs regarding prisoners French hands. Napoleon at. once began
of war which had gradually developed to make difficulties over exchanges, de­
over a long period prior to 1793. An ex­ mandhg the right to repatria e Hano­
$
ception was made, however, in the case verians and (later) Spaniards against
of French ewi.yris who were captured equivalent numbers of Frenchmen in
under arms and in British pay, Such rm­ England. Negotiations dragged on, but
fortunates were either butchered at the finally broke down in 1804, when it be­
time of capture (as at Nieuport ) or were came obvious that France had no inten­
shot after a swift trial by court martial tion of allowing exchanges except on her
(as at Quiberon in 1795). Exchanges of own terms. Even then, the treatment of
prisoners of war we~e, however, arranged, prisoners in both countries continued to
and cartel ships plied regularly between be reasonably good by contemporary
Morlaix and Plymouth. In neither country standards and were even in some respects
could prisoners eomplaiu of deliberate improved.
bad treatment by the captor government, ln 1803, when Tobago and St. Lucia
though there were a number of cases of capitulated, the Britkh agreed to send the
individual brutality, and the French gen­ surrendered garrisons to France on the
damues appear to have acquired an evil condition that they wo’uld not serve again
reputation in this respect never shared by until regularly exchanged. Napoleon re­
the Army and Navy of the French Re­ fused, however, to ratify the terms or to
public. Some individual cases of ill treat­ return British prisoners in exchange. Six
ment of prisoners also occurred in Eng­ years later, the garrison of Martinique
land and were dealt with by courts-martial. was sent b~ck under similar conditions,
but the terms were again repudiated by
Exchanges the French government and the unfortu­
Though the life of a prisoner of war nate men had to be sent to British prisons.
was undoubtedly hard, there was one tre­ The breakdown of the long-established
mendous consolation—the hope of ex­
system for the exchange of prisoners of
change. Exchanges were indeed regularly
war undoubtedly caused great bitterness
carried out, for all governments much on all sides, and introduced att entirely
preferred to have their own soldiers and new outlook on the whole question. Up till
sai,lors back in service and wished to then, for example, acts of gallantry per­
avoid the considerable expense of feeding, formed by prisoners were normally re­
housing, and guarding alien Prisoners. BY warded by freedom. Thus, a Frenchman,
1804, for example, Britain was paying who dived into Plymouth harbor from a
over 260,000 pounds sterling a year for prison hulk to rescue a British sentry who
her prisoners of war. It was, therefore, had fallen overboard, was immediately
normally in the interests of all parties released and sent back to his own country.
concerned to effect exchanges, and rules Similarly, a party of prisoners who acted
for such transactions had become gen~ most gallantly in fighting a fire at An-
erally accepted by the leading powers. d~ver were all released without exchange.
The eituation altered for the worse very On Christmas Day, 1804, the British sea­
shortly after Napoleon assumed supreme men and marines guarding Dutch pris­
power in France as First Consul in De­ oners at Chathkm voluntarily handed over
cember 1799. ” At that time, Britain held their extra allowance of beef and beer to
300 French officers and 30,265 other ranks their charges as an expression of their
and ratings as prisoners—a far larger appreciation of the humanity and kindness
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 99

shown to the shipwrecked crew of a Brit­ in 1929, another international convention

ish warship lost off the Texel; the Brit­ agreed on new rules. This code was even­
ish officers provided a similar, special din­ tually ratified by 47 countries, and it was
ner for the Dutchmen on New Years Day. hoped that the horrors of World War I
There was indeed very little animosity prison camps would never be repeated,
shown towards prisoners of war by the
inhabitants of any of the European bel­ World War II
ligerent powers. ‘ World War II showed how illusory were
these hopes, for the treatment of prisoners
Agreements reached new depths of brutality and sheer
For almost a century after Waterloo, savagery. Prisoners were openly butch­
there was no major Eurcpean conflict to ered in cold blood; were forced to labor
~aise the prisoner of war problem on a on military works, were deprived of mail
large scale. Nevertheless, attempts “were and Red Cross parcels, and were starved
made by international conventions to ob­ and. tortured in the most revolting fash­
tain some measure of general agreement ion. Only small-scale exchanges of totally
on the treatment of captives in time of unfit men were eventually arranged, and
\var. The agreements finally reached were the protecting power was continually
by no means precise in detail, nor were flouted “in its efforts to obtain better living
they universally accepted in all respects, conditions. It may be noted that the old
but they did consolidate and adapt most custom of recruiting from the prisoner of
of the features which had previously only war camps still persisted, as it had in
been recognized by chivalrous custom. The Napoleonic times, though to Russia fell
accredited agent of 1793 disappeared, to the distinction of introducing the organ­
be replaced as welfare supervisor by the ized political indoctrination of captives
protecting power and by the Red Cross. on a large scale.
The treatment of prisoners in Germany A comparison between ‘ the conditions
during World War I revealed the short­ under which prisoners were held captives
comings of these international agreements. during the Napoleonic Wars and those ob­
Prisoners were often forced to work on taining in Germany, Japan, and Russia
m suitable tasks and were treated with a during the late War reveals a progres­
brlltality which shocked the civilized sive change for the worse, whi’ch runs
world. Rations were totally inadequate, exactly parallel to the progress of dicta­
but the German government took the at­ torship from Napoleon, through Kaiser
titude that, in the face of the Allies’ Wilhelm, to Hitler and Stalin. It would
blockade, prisoners could not expect to also appear that the nearer the dictator
g-e~ better rations than did the captor’s is to being a professional soldier,mthe less
own civilian population. However, after brutal is his treatment of prisoners of
le@,hy discussion, some exchanges were war. Twice have international conven­
ar~anged of prisoners who were incapaci­ tions attempted to codify and enforce a
tated from further military service by reasonable standard of treatment of ,wa’r
ag, or wounds, and eventually food par­ captives, and twice has failure been re­
cel. for prisoners were delivered through corded. It is against this depressing back­
the agency of the Red Cross. ground that yet another attempt is being
‘i%e experiences of that War showed made to ensure that in any future war,
ho\\,much yet remained to be done if rea­ prisoners will be treated at least with no
sonably humane treatment was to be se­ less humanity than they were a century
cured for war prisoners in the future and, and a half ago.
 100 MILITARY REVIEW
,’

The Role of Medicine in the Red Army

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an artieIe by
N@ Marsin in “Revue Militaire ,%isse” (Switzerland) J&aIII=W 1950.

THE ties which bing Soviet medicine were called to care for the wo~nded or
with the Soviet Army were manifested sick of the fighting forces. Ninety-six
with particular force during World War and six-tenths percent of the chief sur-
II. Three features characterize the suc- geons had more than 10 years of training
cesses achieved by. the medical men of behind them. More than 75 percent of
the army medical services: the high per- them had advanced scientific degrees.
centage (73 percent) of the wounded In order to insure better treatment of
healed and returned to combat; the few the wounded in the interior of the coun­
cases of mortality (1 percent) in the try, the posts of chief surgeon and chief
hospitals of the rear; and the absence of doctor were established in each hospital.
epidemics in the country, The most eminent specialists filled these
These successes were based on those places.
obtained by the public health services The Military Hospital Committee of the
in the USSR and, in particular, by medi- Medical Council of the Ministrv of Public
cal science. In 1913, there was only one Health co-ordinated and orie~tated the
institute of medical research in Russia, scientific research being conducted in the
In 1940, the USSR possessed 223 of these hospitals. The Councils of the Hospitals
scientific institutes employing 20,000 of the Republics and Regions held peri­
scientists. odic meetings in which experiences were
The policies of Germany and Japan exchanged and decisions of the greatest
forced the public health services to take importance were made “relative to clinical
probIems.
certain defense measures against aggres.
During the War, the institutes of
sion. Many medical men had pursued
scientific research of the Ministries of
courses in the higher ,institutions in order
Public Health of the USSR produced
to acquire a second specialty, particu­
larly that of surgeon. Men and women interesting results.

nurses, in turn, complemented their Among these achievements were the

training in such a way as to be able to work of the academician Burdenko in the
assist the surgeons. During the years field of the diagnosis and treatment of
before the War, the Russian Red Cross wounds and lesions of the central nervous
and Red Crescent organizations trained system; the application of tissue therapy
thousands of men and women stretcher by V. Filatok, member of the Academy
bearers. Because of these measures, the
of Medicine; the study of wounds by I.
USSR possessed sufficient medical per-
Rufanov, member of the Academy of
sonnel at the beginning of the War to Medicine; the new methods of treatment
be able to create a network of special hos­ of frost bite worked out by S. Girgolov;
pitals. Thus, neuro-surgical or urological the original, plastic facial operations by
hospitals were established alongside the
Professors Rauer and N. Miklson; and
surgical and therapeutic hospitals. They
the treatment of pus diseases and wounds
possessed modern facilities and were sup­ by Professor V. Voinoyassenetski. j
plied with adequate stocks of fresh blood Blood transfusions were given on a
plasma, serums, and other medical sup- vast scale. The Central Blood Transfu­
plies. sion Institute, with Bagdassarov at its
The best qualified doctors and nurses head, had perfected a new method which
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 101

permits transfusing not blood, but the serums and of a bacteriophage effective
plasma or serum, a method similar to the against dysentery was considerably in­
American. method. creased. >
Other doctors discovered ve~y efficient
The War also permitted the Soviet
preparations for the treatment and pro­
scientists to continue their study of me­
phylaxis of diseases. V. Klueva, Pro­
tabolism, blood, alkaline reserve, and the
fessor of the Moscow School of Medicine,
proposed combinkd vaccines which are ,central nervoue system under conditions
effective against several diseases at the of low atmospheric pressure. This work
same time. The production of penicillin was of considerable importance with re­
was perfected. Ae compared with the pre­ spect to the health of aviators and sub­
war period, the preparation of antitetanus marine crews.

The Battle of Medenine *“’

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an m%cle by Major O. D.
Jackson in the “Australian Army Journal” December-January 1949-1950.

The Advance into Tunisia The 22d Armored Brigade moved west
WHILE the Eighth Army had crossed to support the 7th Armored Division in an
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the Ameri­ attack on the main Axis outposts position
can and- British forces of First Army had at Ben Gardane. But for 5 days heavy
landed in northwest’ Africa and developed rain fell, turning the desert into a quag­
operations towards Tunis, mire. On 15 February, however, the 7th
On 14 January 1943, command of the Armored Division was able to resume op­
Allied Forces in North Africa was unified. erations and secured Ben’ Gardane.
General Eisenhower became Supreme Al­ In view of increasing enemy resistance
lied Commander and Air Marshal Tedder and the presence of the reinforced 15tlz
assumed command of all the air forces in Panzer Division in the forward area,
the Mediterranean. These new command General Montgomery moved the 51st Divi­
organizations facilitated co-ordination of sion from Tripoli to join the 7th Armored
Allied effort and, in particular, made pos­ Division in successful attacks on the key
sible the concentration of all available air road centers of Medenine and Foum Tata­
resources at any vital point. houine during 17-18 February.
Turning again to the Brjtish Eighth The leading e~ments of the Eighth
Army operations, the 7th Armored Divi­ Army had now se&ured the apprci~ches to
sion advanced west from Tripoli to secure the Mareth Line, and preparations began ‘
El Uotia and force strong German rear- for the main battle.
I
guards out of Zuara on 31 January. As
the Division continued to advance, reports Itommel’s Tactics
were received that the Mareth Line de­ Meanwhile, in western Tunisia, strong
fenses were being hurriedly strengthened. attacks had been launched against the
Once . the Tunisian border had been Americans, and by 20 February Axis
crossed, Axis resistance stiffened, and it forces were threatening to outflank the
\vas apparent that Rommel intended to Allied positions to the north. General
do all in his power to delay the British Montgomery was urged to exert maximum
approach to the Mareth defenses. pressure at Mareth in an attempt to di­
102 MILITARY REVIEW

vert the main enemy effort in the north. of their operations against. the outer de-
From an administrative point of view, fenses of the Mareth Line.
the Eighth Army was not ready to oyerate ~’ BY the last week in February, it was
with major forces in southern Tunisia, clear that the desired results had been
but Rommel had weakened the Mareth achieved. Rommel had broken off) his at-
front in order to strengthen his thrust to tack against the Americans, the 15th Pa?z­
the west, and there was a chance that” a zer Division had reappeared on the Eighth
determined attack by the available forma- Army front, and the 21st Panzer Division
tions of XXX Corps would achieve suc- was reported to be moving to join it.

cess. In any case, it was an occasion when Dangerous Situation

risks had to be taken. On the other hand, it was also apparent
In mid-February, General Leclerc’s that the Eighth Army was now in a dan­
French force of about a strong brigade gerous situation. Only two divisions were
group arrived at Nalat to join the Eighth. forward, the main administrative area was
Army, after a remarkable march across under development at Ben Gardane, and
the desert from Lake Chad (French Equa­ the nearest reserve division (the 2d New
torial Africa). This force was ordered to
Zealand Division) was at Tripoli. It was
threaten the Axis southwestern flank from
known that the Ioth Panzer Division had
Ksar Rhilane (60 miles southwest of Me­
arrived in Tunisia while “Tiger” tanks
denine) while the 7th Armored Division
and the 51st Division increased the tempo had been reported by First Army. Rommel,
T
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 103

herefore, had three armored divieions Comments on the Battle

.vailahl~ with which to attack the leading There is no doubt that the ‘measures
ivisions of XXX Corps. If such an offen­ taken to restore balance in the British
ive were ,mounted, it seemed probable forward area were both timely and effec­
hat the Eighth Army forward area would tive. Once again, excellent control plus
le overwhelmed. a highly organized system of movement
>
and supply had made it possible to carry
General Montgomery. took immediate
out rapid regrcmping.
~ction to restore balance in the British
From the Eighth Army viewpoint, the
‘orces. The 2d yew Zealand Division was battle had been a model defensive engage­
hoved to Medenine while reinforcement ment and a triumph for the infantry and
,anks arriving at Tripoli were moved for­ the antitank gun. No wire or mine fields
vard to build up the 7th Armored Division had been available, but the defenses had
ank strength to some 400 tanks. been based on infantry and on antitank
For 4 days (28 February-3 March) the guns with strong artillery support and
i!ighth Army was unbalanced, but Rommel backed by reserves of armor. The anti­
noved cautiously. Probing attacks were tank guns had been sited, not to defend the
aunched on 3 March and it was not until infantry, but where they cduld kill tanks
at point blank range. Of the 52 German
i March that three Axis columns were re­
tanks destroyed, all but seven had fallen
~orted to be advancing as shown on the
to these guns. Only one squadron of
map. By this time, XXX Corps disposi­
British tanks had been committed to the
tions were complete. The three divisions
fightin~.
were in position, some 400 tanks and more
These operations are remarkably similar
than 500 antitank guns were deployed to the Battle of Alam Halfa, where suc­
mound the communication center of cess in a defensive battle paved the way
Medenine. for the major victory of El Alamein. In
each case, the key to success lay in the
The Battle of Medenine
correct appreciation of vital ground from
When the mists dispersed early in the both our own and enemy points of view
morning of 6 March, the three German (in the first case Alam Half a Ridge, in
rirmored divisions began their attacks the second the Medenine Junction’) and the
with the main thrusts directed on Me­ consequent skillful disposition of forces
ienine. Four major attacks were delivered to meet the attack. Once again, General
during the day, but XXX Corps positions Montgomery kept his aim clearly in view.
Instead of launching immediate but nec­
ivere held intact. Several additional at­
essarily weak, follow-up operations, be re­
tacks were broken up by artillery concen­
turned immediately to the preparations
t~ations before their full strength could
for the major offensive which iri this case
be developed. was designed to break through the Mareth
After dark, the German forces with­ Line and advance into the maritime plain
drew and the battle was over. beyond Gabes.
104 NIILITARY REVIEW ‘ “ :

Developments in Armor
Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article in the
“Australian Army Journal” (Australia) Angust-September 1949.
\
WITH few exceptions, there have always vehicle. Both formations were’ to have
been two types of troops in an army—the light tanks for reconnaissance.
fast-moving troops which were the cavalry
of old, and the slower-moving, hard-hit- World War II
ting assault troops. At the outbreak of war in 1939, the
In the years between the two World British armored division consisted of the
Wars, British opinion about armor crystal- following:
lized around the idea that a different tank 1. Two armored brigades, each of three
was required for each of these types. Ii armored regiments chiefly equipped with
was felt that the mobile troops required cruiser tanks.
a fast, hard-hitting tank whose speed 2. A support group of one field regi­
woidd help to protect it against hostile mpnt, a mixed AA and antitank regiment,
fire. On the other hand, since the tank for and two motor battalions (infantry).
the ,assault body would have to restrict its At the same period, the army tank bri­
rate of movement to the speed of infantry, gade consisted ~ of three battalions of
it would have to be heavily armored and infantry tanks.
car~y a gun capable of dealing with field As a result of experience in battle, a
fortifications and hostile tanks of the same series of modifications was introduced in
type as itself. these formations, the principal ones being
an increase in the proportion of iufantry
Meanwhile, the gun designers had not
and artillery in the armored division, and
been idle. They began to produce weapons
the, addition of armored cars for medium
and projectiles for the express purpose
reconnaissance.
of “killing” tanks by penetrating their
armor. This development led to the reali- During the War, considerable improve­
zation that although tanks had been in- ments were made in the armor, armament,
tended originally to help the infantry, and general mechanical efficiency ‘of the
the presence of relatively small antitank tanks used by all belligerents. The upward
weapons which could be sited in places trend in the power and performance of
inaccessible to even tracked vehicles British tanks is shown in Figure 1. In
would require infantry to help the tanks. this table, only the main armament and
Further, since tanks are not suitable for front armor are shown. The tanks are
holding ground for lengthy periods, it listed in categories in the order in which
became evident that some infantry would they were brought into service. The
be required with the mobile troops to con- present British standard capital tank—
firm and consolidate the gains made. the Centurion—was produced towards the
end of the War, but too late for issue to
As a result of these considerations, two
units in the field.
types of armored formations were evolved
in Great Britain before World War 11— Specialized Armor
the armored division for the mobile role To overcome the numerous obstacles,
and the army tank brigade for the assault. both naturai and artificial, encountered
The former was to be equipped with fast on the battlefield, a range of specialized
“cruiser” tanks, while the latter would armored vehicles waa developed during the)
have a slower, but more heavily armored War. The most important are: I
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 105

The Duplex Drive (DD) Tank. This ve­ Five troops, each of two armored cars”
hicle is a standard tank modified by spe­ and two scout cars.
cial fittirtgs to enable it to swim ashore A heavy troop of two close-supp~rt guns
in amphibious operations, or to swim which may be m’ounted in a heavy armored
across a river. ‘ car (75-mm) or possibly a 95-mm on a
The C~ocodik or flame-throwing tank. tracked chassis.
The Flail tank, for beating paths , A support troop of a command scout car
through mine fields. and three armored personnel carriers
The Kangaroo, for carrying infantry (APC’S). This troop is manned by assault
under fire. troopers and is designed to clear away
Various forms of bridge laying tanks.
minor opposition, particularly from short
War experience proved that British
range antitank weapons ,of the Piat and

— Front Armor
Weight (inches) Range
Tank (Tons) Turret Hull Gun (Miles)
— ——.
Cruiser Tanks
Crusader 20 1.5 1.2 2-pr. 28 200
Cromwell 28 3 2.5 75-mm 35 165
Centurion 44 6 3 17-pr. 21 110

Infantry Tanks
Valentine 17 2.5 2.3 2-pr. 15 100
Matilda 26X 2.9 3.1 2-pr. 15 160
Churchill 37 3.5 3.5 6-pr. 18 127
-
Figure 1.

Ideas about the employment of armor were Panzerfaust types, in enclosed or built-up
basically sound. From this experience, the terrain.
following armored units and formations The armored car regiment possesses
have been evolved: range, speed, and silence, but its sensitiv­
The armored car ~egiment for medium ityy to rough conditions renders ‘it road’­
reconnaissance. bound on unsuitable terrain. Being of
The divisional reconnaissance regiment,, necessity lightly armored, it is unsuitable
for close reconnaissance in front or on for assault except against light opposition.
the flanks of the infantry division. Armored car regiments are allotted on ,
The armored division, whose primary the scale of one to each armored division
role is exploitation. and one to each infantry corps. Their
The independent armored brigade, for primary role is medium recodnaissaance.
the assault of fortified positions in close
The Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment
co-operation with other arms.
Until recently, the divisional recon­
The Armored Car Regiment naissance regiment consisted of:
The, armored car regiment consists of Regimental headquarters.
a regimental headquarters, a headquarters Headquarters squadron, which contained
sqnadron, and four squadrons. a reconnaissance troop of six light tanks
Itach of the four squadrons consists of: and six scout cars.
Squadron headquarters. Three squadrons, each of two tank
106 MILITARY REVIEW

troops and two armored personnel carrier plement of service troops to make it a
troops. self-contained formation.
This organization has been changed. In All guns are self-propelled; conse­
the projected new organization; not yet quently, the divisional a~tillem~ is very
fully implemented, the regiment has no flexible and mobile.
tanks and the reconnaissance troop dis­ The four battalions of the motorized
appears from headquarters squadron. The infantry brigade are similar to standard
establishment of the fighting squadrons infantry battalions. They are trained to
now becomes: fight in the closest co-operation with the
One troop on wheels (four scout ears). armored regiments.
Three reconnaissance troops, tracked. The role of the motor regiment in the
Two APC troops (assault troopers). armored brigade is to provide close in­
One gun troop of four self-propelled fantry support for the tanks. Its chief
guns. characteristics are high mobility, excel­
Much criticism has been levelled at the ient communications, and great fire power.
new organization on the grounds that, It is weak in assaulting power, as it is
through the loss of its tanks, it lacks able to dismount only 350 men.
hitting power. However, it is well fur­ The armored division has 277 capital

HQ
ARMD DIV I
I
I I I I
Armd Car Arrnd Lorried Arty Engrs
Regt Bde Inf Bde (4 Fd Sqns)
(4 Bns)

I I I I I Ill
Armd Armd Armd Ar;d Motor Fd Fd A Tlc LAA
Regt Regt Regt Regt Regt Regt Regt Regt , Regt

Fignre 2.
nished with weapons and fire power. The tanks (Centurions), 24 light tanks, 16
new organization has been framed for the ,tank dozers, and 8 bridge-laying tanks.
express purpose of maintaining the pri- The divisional organization permits group­
mary role of the regiment, which is close ing into armored-infantry-artillery col-
reconnaissance. All other roles are sec- umns as required by the prevailing tac­
ondary. tical situation. These columns can be pro-
The regiment is suitably equipped to vided from divisional resources with a
carry out its role. Provided opposition complement of service troops to make them
is not exceptionally strong, it can execute self-contained. All components are trained
this task without assistance. to work together in the closest co-opera­
tion.
The Armored ,Division It must be emphasized that the armored
The organization of tie armored divi- and motorized infantry brigades do not
sion is shown in Figure 2. In addition to fight in watertight compartments. Success
the units shown in the diagram, the in battle flows from the rapid grouping
armored division has the necessary com- and re-gronping of the armor-infantry
 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 107

team in accordance with the requirements rapidity. Because it fights mounted, it is

of the changing tactical situation. able to exploit its tactical mobility to the
fullest extent.’ ,
Independent Armored Brigade
The disadvantages of armor derive
The independent armored brigade is mainly from the development of short-
similar to. the armored brigade of the range weapons of the Pirzt type and the
a~mored division; but it includes, elements long-range antitank gun. The former
of service troops to make it self-contained. makes the tank sensitive to enclo?ed
It is equipped with Centurion tanks. country, and the latter to very flat open
The primary role of the independent country. Marshes, mountains, and forests ~
armored brigade is the support of infantry restrict free movement, and thus tend to
in attack. Success demands the closest counteract the mobility on which the tank
understanding and co-operation between partly depends for protection. Further,
the two arms. Whenever possible, a re­ tanks cannot themselves hold ground for
hearsal of the projected operation should any length, of time, and then only in day­
be held. light. In the administrative sphere, f~el
Other Roles of Armor and ammunition consumption are likely to
Attack and exploitation are not the be high. Trac,k mileage and engine life
only roles in which tanks may be used. m-e short, and ample time is required for
In defense, armored units may form part maintenance.
of a counterattack force, or may be used Although mountain warfare is not en­
as a mobile reserve of fire power. They tirely suitable for the employment of
may be used in a cqunterpenetration role tanks, they can sometimes be used to sup­
to make good a deficiency in antitank guns port movement from points from which
or artillery. In open country, they may they can overlook the enemy, who is
provide battle ontposts and thus enable naturally very sensitive to treatment of
the infantry to rest. this sort.
In an advance in open country, tanks, In the old days, it used to be said that
h conjunction with elements of the motor there was nothing a cavalryman conld
regiment, can undertake reconnaissance not do. Their successors in the armored
until close contact is made. corps will always be found willing to
In withdrawal,’ their mobility and fire tackle the impossible and, given tiine, they
power enable them to cover effectively the will usually succeed. Nevertheless, every
movement of infantry rear parties. They effort should be made to confine the use of
are often able to impose delay on the armor to the roles in which it is able to
enemy by staging a counterattack. Con­ develop its maximum efficiencfi rather
sideration, however, must be given to the than to fritter its strength away in a ‘
fact that tanks temporarily disabled in multitude of small and uneconomical
an action of this kind are seldom tasks.
recovered. Trends of Development
Summarizing the attributes of armor, it Notwithstanding the many types of
may be said that its principal advantages tanks in use at the present time, and the
de~ive from the facts that its tracks en­ many more that will be developed in the
~ble heavily protected vehicles mounting future, the general trend of tank design
powerful weapons to move quickly across must always be towarda standardization.
country. The flexibility which derives from Germany scored considerably by planning
highly-developed means of inter-communi­ for war on the basis of four types of
caiion enable it to maneuver with great tanks. Of these four, two survived the
10s MILITARY REVIEW

test’ of war, and two new types were The present-day concentration on the
brought into the service of the Reichs­ Centtwion as the standard tank has given
weh-. Although considerable improvements us a really good one.
were made both to armament and armor
Conclusion )
during the War: the soundness of the
In conclusion, emphasis must again be
basic design enabled those models which
ceased to be of value as tanks to be con­ placed on two points brought out in this
verted to effective chassis for self-pro­ discussion. One is that the development of
pelled guns. weaDons desimed wrelv for the destruc­
tion-of tanks}as i~npos~d on the Armored
Our problem is not so different. We
Corps the necessity for evolving new tac­
must design sound and efficient hulk and
tical methods to overcome the menace.
armor ahead of their time. They must be The other is that victory can be won only
capable of adaptation to heavier armor by a true appreciation of the advantages
and bigger. guns if necessary. Standard­ and disadvantages of each arm, and then
ization to a few types with these qualities employing them in a closely-integrated
and capable of being produced in large team in a manner which develops the
quantities, must pay dividends in the long special characteristics of each to the
run. Furthermore, all types should be of maxim m. Victory is not the perquisite
a bei.g-ht suitable for transport overseas, of any Y“one arm, and never can be. It can
and be provided with the fittings which it be won only by weldlng all arms into a
is necessary to incorporate into the hulls confident, understanding team, in which
for the rapid adaptation of flame-throw. the best of one supplements the best of
in.g and other devices. the other.

The Meaning of Sea Power

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by
R. G. Worcester in “The Fleet” (Great Britain) April 195o.

OF ALL the various equipment which democracies deusmd. The South Atlantic
goes to. make up what we ‘call military must be kept open for the supplies of vital
strength, there is (excluding the field of strategic materials such as carnotite for
atomic energy ) only one class in which uranium production and cobalt, which is
the Western Nations can claim a numer­ used in the turbine blades of jet engines.
ical superiority and that is in the size And, of course, the North Atlantic is
of surface fleets. the embodiment of the direct ties between
There is less incentive for Russia to Europe and the New World. There is a
build a surface fleet as it is essentially a real danger of a third underestimation of
land power, and as America and Britain the importance of undersea operations
are sea po~ers, there is less incentive to against nations which depend upon the
build undersea craft. However, the open sea lanes. The Germans in World
essepce of sea power as a way of retain­ War I and again in World War 11 had
ing military strength. in the political Britain by the throat ( Goebbels was, on
struggle is to keep a surface strength that occasion, quite right) with but a few
which will match the size and operations dozen submarines. The Russian fleet Of
of the merchant fleets upon which the submarines is several times larger than
communication between the friendly Germany’s at the beginning of the War,
.
~,’

FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 109

and is probably larger than Germany’s at Sea power at this time, then, means the ‘

the height of the War, and such vessels ability to develop new types of radar, the
are morci difiicult to hit with their introduction of new types of antisubma­
snorkels. It is true that with improved rine aircraft like the FaireV 17 and the
radar equipment, our aircraft can pick up new US Navy version of the Lockheed
the snorkel on the screen, but the ship has .Weptwtie and the use of small agd large

a shorter distance to dive in order to at- /carriers to take these aircraft,

tain protection. But this is not all—sea power can also

Again, it may be claimed that with be interpreted as the, proven ability of
sono buoys tracking the underwater the Royal Navy to work closely with the
course of the submarine, it becomes m_o~e-....~eiich. Dutch, American, Australian,
vulnerable, but on balance the” task of Indian navies, and to show that units of
hunting these prey is probably harder each fleet understand the problems of the ,
than it ever was. The Russians may not other and can take their placee in an
have the engineering refinement. of the emergency side by side. It is evidence
Western Allies, but we can take no com- of the democracies’ ability to work to-
fort from this because even if our equip- gether on military planning and the
ment is just that edge better in per- ability to work as a team.
formance, it ,will not be rewarding when The arrival of the American air rein-
we are faced with an overwhelming pre- forcements of Superfortresses becomes a
ponderance of numbers against us. The matter of headline interest. But true
Russians know enough andhave picked up solidarity is not the spectacular action
enough to turn out war products close but starts in the small ways of collabora­
enough in efficiency to our own, and we tion between men in foreign ports and the
would be very rash to assume any other exchange of ideas and sta~dardization of
conclusion. weapons which has for so long been a
So the problem which faces us is the
feature between, say, the British, French,
oki one of defending our lines of com­ and Dutch ships.

munication against destructive powers The trouble is always to make this show
more cunning and numerous than at any of strength when we are trying at the
time in history. ‘$he atomic bomb is a same time to build up the types of weapons
weapon of great strategic significance but for the future. It is always difficult to
it is not decisive even if sufficient numbers set aside the appropriation which must
of plutonium bombs are now available t~ be an insurance for the future. To do so
justify their use in tactical warfare, leav- without denuding the present strength
ing hydrogen bombs for strategic destruc- requires careful consideration of the time
tion. The war of attrition would still con- the new equipment takes to perfect and
tinue and might successfully beat us to the degree of war potential which exists
our knees after the initial phase of un- in the equipment which is being used in
precedented destruction, But apart from service. So far as aircraft are concerned,
its operationa during a future war, the there is a steady flow of new types of high
Navy is now the bulwark of stolid re- performance machines coming along grad­
sis~ance to aggression and is a way of ually to replace the existing equipment
underlining the resolve to meet any and at the same time radical changes like
further encroachments by Russia with the under-carriageless fighter are beh-ig
fo~ce. This is just the one thing they developed. This shows a healthy service
untlerstand. condition.
 1

GREAT MISTAKES OF THE WAR. BY NATIONAL AIR POWER AND INTER­

Hanson W. Baldwin. 108 Pages. Harper & N.4TIONAL . POLITICS. A Select Bibli­
Brothers, New York. $1.50. ography. By Dr. Eugene M. Emme. 162
Pages. Studies and Research Branch, His­
In this small book, the military editor
torical Division, Department of the Air
of ~he New York Times gathers together
Force L]brary, Maxwell Air Force Base,
and analyses what he considers to be the
Alabama. (No price quoted.)
major mistakes made by the United States
in World War II. Leading the list as the Dr. Emme has prepared a useful list of
basic fallacy is the contention that unclassified sources of information on the
America fought for immediate victory, major aspects of air power in the inter­
not for the ultimate peace. national field. The sources quoted are
“The major American wartime errors
recent books and periodicals.
were all part and parcel of our political WORLD IN TRANSITION. A Guide to the
immaturity,” Baldwin says. To this is Shifting Political and Economic Forces of
attributed most of the postwar difficul­ Our Time. By G. D. H. Cole. 636 Pages.
ties and the lost peace. The invasion of Oxford University Press, New York. $6.00.
Western Europe instead of the Balkans
resulted in the loss of Eastern and Central The approach to this study of current

Europe, Baldwin believes. And at Yalta, world conditions is frankly that of a

unnecessary concessions to the Rnssians socialist of the British Labor party, of

opened the way to far-reaching Soviet in­ which Mr. Cole is a member. In the scope

fluence in Asia. of the areas it covers, Mr. Cole’s book is

suggestive of the works of Johu Gunther,
While Baldwin stresses the political
though the treatment of economic prob­
errors, and blames American leadership
lems is more searching. Several chapters
from President Roosevelt down to the man
are devoted to general problems of mod­
in the street, he has other mistakes on
ern times, such as employment, standards
his list. The policy of unconditional sur­
of living, migration, investment, and eco­
render is one. He blames MacArthur for
nomic collaboration. Among others, chap­
defense errors in the Philippines and for
ters on regional factors take up Germany,
inter-service rivalries. Others are the
the Soviet Union in world affairs, Western
selection of Stilwell for the China mission,
Europe and the Marshall plan, postwar
the acceptance of Chinese communists as
Britain and the Labor Party, the United
“agrarian reformers,” and the und5resti­
States, Latin America and the Caribbean,
matlon of Japanese strength.
the Middle East, the Far East, and South­
JEFFERSON AND MADISON. The Great east Asia. Considerable attention is given
collaboration. By Adrienne Koch. 294 to the United Nations and world govern­
Pages. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. $4.oo. ment.
 BOOKS 113

3YKEWAR. By Daniel Lerner. 463 Pages. MY RETREAT FROM RUSSIA. By

George W. Stewart, Pub., Inc., New York. Vladimir Petrov. Translated b~ David

;5.85. ­ Chevchavadze. 356 Pages. Yale University

This book presents an analysis of the Press,” New Ha~en. $4.00.

psychological warfare operations against This is the story of a former Soviet

Germany with particular reference to citizen who turned Nazi collaborator and
those with which the Psychological War­ ‘ is now an instructor of Slavic languages
fare Division of SHAEF was concerned. in the Uuited States.
The author was a member of that division.
The writer makes some good points. He WHY I ESCAPED. The story of Peter

hints that SHAEF undertook a scope of Pirogov. Translated by Ada SiegeL 336

psychological warfare which might better Pages. DueH, Sloan and Pearce, New York.

have been left to civilian agencies at high $3.50.

government levels. He presents a clear This is the story of one of the two Rus­
analysis of the importance of the strategy sian aviators who fled Russia in 1948.

of truth in psychological warfare. In Born in 1920, Pirogov belongs to the Rus­

sharp contrast to Hanson Baldwin, he,
sian post-revolutionary generation.

mmwhalls the arguments, pro and con, on

the significance of “unconditional sur­ THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADfiRESSES

render.” He sets forth the problems OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. 1941-1945.

which beset a highly specialized staff sec­ Edited by Samuel I. Rosenman. Vol. X,

tiou when it comprises personnel from all 1941—The Call to Battle Statiohs, 632

the armed forces and some of the civil Pages; Vol. XI, 1942-Humanity on the

ageneies of several nations. Defensive, 552 Pages; Vol. XII, 1943—The

The future commander and general staff Tide Turns, 593 Pages; Vol. XIII, 1944-45—

officer probably will gain little of real Victory and the Threshold of Peace, 634

value from the text beyond the points Pages. Harper & Brothers, New York.

mentioned above. The book ignores the $40.00.

vast use made of psychological pressure

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA. The

by field commanders without benefit of

ftevoIt Against Formalism. By Morton G.

psychological warfare specialists or means.

White. 260 Pages. The Viking Preps, New

In fact, there are suspicions of a lofty dis­

York. $3.50.

regard for the field soldier and his ideas

on this subject. , YOUNG AMERICA, 1830-1840. By Robert
volume contains a foreward
‘J’be by E. RiegeL 436 Pages. The University of ,
General R, A. McClure, Chief of PWD, Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla. $5.oO.
SHAEF, and an essay by Richard Cross-
THE WOODEN HORSE. By Eric Williams.

man, one of PWD’S most capable planners.

255 Pages. Harper & Bros., New York.

They contain basic ideas which, except for

$2.75.

General McClure’s highly controversial

observation that psychological warfare This is the story of a British RAF

anti public relations should be combined flier’s imprisonment and escape from a

in one staff section, were thoroughly Germau prisoner of war camp.

established by experience. It is unfor­

tunate’ that Captain Lerner did not de­ CAPT. JOSHUA SLOCUM. The Life and

vel,]p these fundamentals and apply them Voyages of America’s Best-Known Sailor.

to ihe more strictly military aspect of this By Victor SIocum. 384 Pages; Illustrated.

important subject. Sheridan House, New York. $5.00.

112 MILITARY REVIEW

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE UNITED THE EPIC” OF THE CHACO: Marshal

STATES LAND FORCES IN THE WORLD Estigarribia’s Memoirs of the Chaco War,
WAR (1917-1919). Zone of the’ Interior. Vol. 1932-1935. Edited and annotated by Pablo
III (iu two parts). Historical Division, De­ Max Ynsfran. 212 Pages. The Uni ersity of
7
partment of the Army. 1593 Pages. US Texas Press, Austin.
Government Printing Office: Superintend­
The story of the Chaco War between
ent of Documents, Washington, D.C. $6.00.
Paragnay and Bolivia, as told by the com­
The third and final volume of the De­ mander of the Paraguayan forces who
partment of the Army’s World War I !ater became president of paraguay.
order of battle has now been published.
BRASSEY’S NAVAL ANNUAL: 1949.
A compilation of facts covering all
Edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thurstield.
military activities of the War Depart­
306 Pages. The Macmillan Company, New
ment in the Zone of Interior, the book
York. $6.00.
offers aids to historical research relative
to the Army during World War I. The HALF OF ONE WORLD. By Foster
volume also covers the activities of terri­ Hilley. 207 Pages. The Macmillan Com­
torial departments, tactical divisions other pany, New York. $3.00.
than those of the American Expeditionary
A book stressing the importance of
Forces, posts, camps, and stations active
Asia.
dnring World War I, and includes a di­
rectory of all troops. THE STAKES OF DEMOCRACY IN
Publication of tbe volu,rne completes the SOUTHEAST ASIA. ” By H. J. van Mook.
order of battle series for World War 1. 312 Pages. W. W. Norton, New York. $3.75.
Volumes I and II dealt with the AEF in
JAPAN’S ECONOMY IN WAR AND RE­
Europe and were published in 1981 and
CONSTRUCTION. By Jerome B. Cohen.
1937, respectively.
545 Pages. University of Minnesota Press,
The three-volume project was initiated Minneapolis. $7.5o.
in order that significant facts and figures
pertaining to the Army in World War I TRE.4SON: The Story of Disloyalty and
might be collected into a handy reference Betrayal in American History. By Na­
guide, available to the public. Started by thaniel Weyl. 491 Pages. Public AtTairs
the Army War College, the project was Press, Washington, D.C. $4.50.
completed by tbe Army Historical Divi­
sion, which is now preparing a history of THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,
1790-1915: A Definitive History. By Captain
The U.S. Army in Wovld War II.
Stephen B. Evans, USCG. 228 Pages; Illus­
IF YOU WERE BORN IN RUSSIA. By trated. United States N’aval Institute,
Arthur Goodfriend. 192 Pages. Illustrated. .Annapolis. $5.00.
Fakrar, Straus & Co., New York. $5.00.
ROUND-SHOT TO ROCKETS. By Taylor
A description of everyday life in the
I!eck. 267 Pages; Illustrated. United States
Soviet Union.
Naval Institute, Annapolis. $3.00.
EXPERIMENTS ON MASS COMMUNI­ A history of the Naval Gun Factory.
CATION. By Carl I. Hovland, et al. Vol.
} THE RUSSIAN RAILWAYS. By P. IL
III, Studies in Social Psychology in World
War II. 345 Pages. Priuceton University Garbutt. 94 Pages. Sampson Low & Com­
press, Princeton, N. J. $5.00. pany, London. $1.00.