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 - ~

OAST ARTILLERY
J JOURNAL
FOUNDED IN 1892 AS THE JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERY

,l VOLUME LXXXVIII SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1945 NUMBER 5

I
,
I

CONTENTS
{;:r' .
l~
~,
!~OVER:The Jap Surrmder Delegation aboard the Missouri.
Nal!y Photo .• '
iANTWERP X. By Captain A. R. Dallmeyer, Jr 2
'GROUND DEFENSE PLAN: AntwerpX. By Captain W'illiam Edgar! Jr .' 8
!~OMESIDE~IGHTS ON ANTWERP X. By Brigadier Gmeral George M. Badger 11
I~ROM
, THE FIGHTING FRONTS:
ANTIAIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE CBI THEATER.
By Lieutenant Colonel George A. Meigs 14
WEATHER vs.SUPPLY LINES 19
HC" BATTERY FIGHTS TO THE LAST GUN. By Lieutmant Comad M. Fredin 21
, GROUND FIRE MISSION WITH TASK FORCE "D." By Lieutenant Frank E. Solomol1 27
TRIPLE-THREAT TROOPS. By Captaill A. E. Martin 29
AAA W'ITH THE 4thARMORED DIVISION. By Lieutenant Paul JI7. Sheldol1 32
~!!,',I
90MM GUNS AT BALETE PASS. By Lieutenant Perry R. McMahoJl 34
!. Bo.MBARDMENT OF JAPAN. By Colonel Theodore J. Dayharsh 39

t CO~~,AZ;~~l~l~~O~:;:~ii~~~;d
~~Eg~an~~~~~.S.~, 40
~ FROM CONNECTICUT TO THE PHILIPPINES. By Captain Welles Eddy 41
I~ECRETPHASE OF THE FLYING BOMB. By Major E. S. Watkins 43
: AA vs.LUFTWAFFE: 1 January1945 47

t
, HE 105thAAA BATTALION
AA PLANNING FOR WATERBORNE INVASION. By Colonel A1. R. Thompsol1
50
51

:~::
:;r?'~~~,~:~:~~,~,:~~~~~~~: I~OUTHERNFRA~CE .••••.••••••••••••••.••••••
:tOMBINED CORRECTION CHART. By Lielltmant Colonel Leonard M. Orman
:

69
tOAST ARTILLERY CITATIONS AND COMMENDATIONS 72
lCOAST ARTILLERY BOARD NOTES 76
EWS AND COMMENT ' 78
TEWS LETTERS 84
OOK REVIEWS 88

PUBLICATION DATE: October1,1945

~Ub1ished bimonthly by the United States Coast Artillery Association. Editorial and executive ollice.,631 Penn.ylvania Avenue, N.W .•
&shington 4. D. C. Terms: $4.00 per year. (Coast Artillery Association members, $3.00 per year.) Single copies, 75c. Entered as
~nd'c]ass matter at Washington, D. C.; additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Copyright, 1945, by the
OltedStates Coast ArtilleryAssociation.
 THE SECRET C
THE ALLIES' NU
By I
Captain A. R. Dallmeyer, J,.'
Coast Artillery Corps
The inhabitants of the tiny village of Vie<seldijk,
gium, startled into wakefulness by four 90mm guns go~
J
into action, looked from their windows just in time to
the blinding Bash of an enormous explosion as the 6
of Hitler's Bying bombs-one of the vaunted V-l's-inten
"Target.I" for Antwerp was exploded harmlessly in mid-air. The roc
Sensitive fire-control instruments showed a tiny pip tiles rattled and the neat little houses along the AI~
thousands of vards out to the southeast. Canal shook.
Alerted by 'the siren from an M-4 tractor, men jumped Their surprise tripled when the same performance \\.
to their posts as the whining remote control swung the heavy repeated only three minutes later.
guns. Ammunition was uncovered, breechblocks tried. Then darkness and silence. In the gunpits and comput~
Out of the darkness and the lowering skies toward the members of Captain Bing Kleinhesselink's Battery D, 126!
southeast, toward Germany, came a peculiar roar and an in- AAA Gun Battalion, whooped with glee and congratulat~
finitely small yellow, Bame, moving rapidly across the each other. Two "Category A's"-"exploded in the air"
heavens. on the first two Bying bombs they engaged in Belgiuml
Second Lieutenant \Villiam M. Coppola watched the Those successes were scored 'at 0430 and 0433 on tll
progress of the marks on the plotting board as they traced the morning of the 27th of October, 1944. They were the hli
path of the first threat of a new German attempt to destroy of 2,183 Bying bombs destroyed in saving the Allies' nun
the most important (to us) port in the world. Twenty-five ber one supply port, Antwerp. From that time until tll
tho'usand yards, twenty thousand yards, fifteen. 30th of March of this year, five months and five days late
Tensely, but confidently he waited. Then. , ..• one of the most dramatic secret operations of the war wasc~
"Commence firing!" ducted, the defense of the vital port facilities of AntweJ
by the antiaircraft artillery of "Antwerp x." In meeti~
these Bying bomb attacks, the first directed at a stric?
military target, an all-out onslaught by 4,88) V-I 's, l~

N(JVj()
TILBURG

tV

8TURNHOUT

"ALlNES~
 British units from Brussels were brought to Antwerp and
reasing the number of batteries engaging increased the
deployed, to bring up the diminished strength of the de-
gnees of a kill. The high speed of the target (300 to 450
fenses. Handicapped by lack of familiarity with both the
ph) prevented any adjustment of fire. Automatic weapons particular target and the American fire-control equipment
d been removed to the rear, in a third belt. Note on the
furnished them, they had an uphill fight-and they won.
r3phs the increase in the attacks as the first supply ships
Antwerp X had been under orders not to fire on ordinary
Olered the harbor on November 28th. Sinking of one of enemy planes, but those orders were modified as the
nose ships might' have disabled a large part of the harbor, Luftwaffe made its famous January first effort and the de-
j ul no such damage was permitted.
fenders shot down eight planes in one day. Simultaneously,
• An ominous lull came during the period just before the the seven battalions which had been sent to the break-
ge, as the launching sites gained strength to support the
through area were proving the power of their training and
ulge and as the German supply routes were apparently experience by shooting down commendable numbers of
1 use to get up troops for their "Operation Greif." Then piloted aircraft.
~lh the old and entirely new sites in the northeast leaped By the eleventh of January returning units permitted the
oto action as Rundstedt's men started moving on the 16th.
defenses to be reestablished in somewhat greater strength.
~ote the "Direction of Attack" graph. The defenses were The accompanying diagram shows .the change effected.
uickly shifted on the basis of previously- made plans. The Note the graph of the attacks. As the Bulge petered out, so
-utheast launching sites turned their attentions to Liege did the attacks, to a certain extent. It now seems that their

t nd thereafter the attack from the southeast, never more

han about 50% accurate in aim, was spasmodic. About a
)~ourthof all the bombs came from this quarter, however.
usefulness in support of Rundstedt was lessening and the
Germans were marshalling their forces for another and
greater V-bomb attempt.
The new nort.hea st sites offered the greatest threat, for Toward the last of December the exceptionally fine warn-
ut half of the 4,883 V-l's detected by the far-Hung warn- ing services, principally British feeding through two Ameri-
~gservices came from this area, with 75% accuracy in be- can operations rooms, detected a single V-I bearing down
~
.lilg headed for the eight-mile target area. They continued on Antwerp from due north. Nothing more developed at
ll1 operation right up to the very last, apparently because that time, however, although close watch was maintained
q hey were the easiest to supply. The chart of December and plans were made to counter any further threat from
, 18thshows how the new attacks were met with strong de- this quarter. The single V-I may have been plane-launched,
enses. But these defenses didn't last long. Two days later, as many of those which reached London during this time
IS shown on the next deployment chart, the number of bat- were. But the north did contain a threat which materialized
I lions was sharply reduced as seven out of fifteen Ameri-
on January 27th, a month later.
n battalions moved to counter the German threat in the At 2354 on that evening, a second Hying bomb was spotted
I rdennes.

()f dl
V)
80
ctJ
~
70
~
~
60
~
~ 50
).....
-...J

l~l~ 40

30

(~ 2e

~~

l~
10

0
1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1
25 30 20 15 20 15 20 10 15 20

OCT. I NOV. DEC. JAN. I. FEB. MAR.

"-
J1S
.)rl~
- SOI'THEAST - -
NORTHEAST NORTH
 8TURNHOUT

coming in fr~m the north. Between then and morning, eight

. 1
fourth set of 90mm gun barrels when the launching site~
more streaked down the same path, with deadly accuracy. were finally overrun. The whole shipment of 90mm tubet
Now the German strategy was clear. Defeated on the for the entire ETO was given to Antwerp X when tbe
ground and with its piloted aircraft, the Germans were re- volume of its firing was wearing out the guns. Breec~
doubling their V-I efforts. The graph shows exactly what mechanisms which normally would never require replace.
developed. The V-bombs were the only method the Nazis ment were worn out and Ordnance maintenance personne
now had for crippling the most important port in the world. performed remarkable feats in keeping the equipmen~
l\.nd they used them, from three different launching areas operating, even though the conditions were often far from
simultaneously. The rapid drive north probably made the optimum. Signal and Ordnance teams both were faced with
Germans think that the portion of Holland directly north of an enormous job in keeping the delicate and sensitive equip
Antwerp would be cut off. Thus, their first launching sites ment of this modern AA functioning at its peak. Nothin{l
were situated back toward Germany. But as the Rhine and less than peak efficiency would do, for close misses produce~
Maas Rivers and the flooded area' prevented our moving no results and absolute accuracy was needed. The mud 0\
farther up, the Germans found themselves in possession of the Low Countries and the freezing weather of the winter-
an area only forty-five to sixty-five miles north of their objec- long fight afforded special problems both in maintenanc~
tive from which it was possible to hit the bull's-eye with and in normal operation. The "Category B's"-"caused t
better than 90% accuracy. Of the total attacks, some 25% crash"-meant grief and injuries for the crews that sh
came from these northern sites. them down, too-32 were killed and 282 injured, behind
The answer was obvious and the defenders aoain t:>
found the lines, in areas where normally AA troops suffer no
themselves on the move. The result of this redeployment casualties.
is shown on the chart for January 31st. But the defenses succeeded, setting AA records which
The presence of airfield "B79" prevented deployment may well never be surpassed. Of the 4,883 flying bombs
of the forces in the proper tactics to meet the new attac~. known to have been launched, only 211 hit within tb
Firing was not permitted over the field, either. One of t'tie vital 8-mile area General Armstrong was instructed to de
l
largest air bases in the area, with four wings of Spitfires, fend. Of these, only 156 managed to get through tbe de
B79 was no easy thing to move. But it was moved and the fenses, although they were fired upon. The rest could not be
heavy guns went into position right across the fi~ld as shown successfully engaged because of firing restrictions, friendly
on the deployment chart for February 28th. Except for rela- planes in the field of fire and so on. However, it should be
tively minor changes, the defenses remained as shown up pointed out that thousands of Allied bombers passed ovel
to the end of the attacks, which came on i\hrch 30th, with and through the defenses during the five months of attack
wspurt as the enemy launched his last stocks of V-I' s. hundreds of fighte!s operated in the area and it was gel1
The graphs show the fury of the attacks during February erally a scene,of cOllsiderable aerial activity. In spite of this
- and March. There were nights on which guns were firing the guns of Antwerp X never fired on any plane withoU
in one belt or another all night long. There were two fifteen- authority. Many stories of close liaison between air forces
thousand-round nights. The heaviest twenty-four-hour and AA will com2 from this war, but fe\\' will equal the
period ended at 0600 on February 16th; during this time, record of the men concerned with the air over Belgium and
the Germans launched 160 flying bombs at Antwerp. Cer- southern Holland. ~
~i[1~atteries fired so many rounds th_atthey were usi':K the It is a dram:>': - --,"v,the src:..... f)f Antwerr,X. In the 15
 ts of tack, not one day of \york was lost by the service
2 will be stuOled in detail as military leaders plan tor d1lngs
ps and the civilian laborers unloading ships in the port sure to come.
Antwerp. 1\ lillions of tons of supplies were brought in, Recognition has already come to General Annstrong and
~htthrough the height of the attack, and those supplies- the officers and men of Antwerp X in a letter dated 12 April
hich went to six field armies-enabled us to beat the Ger- from Field Marshal Montgomery, commander in chief of
ans in the spring of 1945. Had the Germans succeeded the 2ist Army Group, which supervised the defense:
o their determined plan to destroy Antwerp, the result is 'The weight of the enemy attack, and the outstanding
'JOojectural.Certainly our supply ports of last fall were success you have had in combating it, have to remain an
jpadequate and overtaxed. Had we been unable to utilize official ~ecret for the time being. But this success, which has
}otwerp, our entire effort might have met failure when kept in full operation the main supply base of both 12 and
ItItahand Omaha Beaches were knocked out by the winter 21 Army Groups, has profoundly influenced the present
-hannel storms. The Bulge might hare swamped forces less battle and made the success of the present operations ad-
lI'ellsupplied. And it seems certain that the war in Europe ministratively possible.
buld not have been won until much later. "You have been responsible for the complete integration
As it was expressed in a letter to General Armstrong by of an American and British team of gunners. Under your
BritishMajor General \t\!. R. Revell-Smith, who succeeded command they have during the last three months raised the
BrigadierCalvert-Jones in command of GHQ AA Troops, percentage of 'kills' from 65% to over 97%. This is consid-
~d under whose command the defense of Antwerp was erably higher than has been achieved ever before.
:onducted: "This is a great victory; perhaps not heralded or "These results have been achieved only by continuous
Joderstood by the world at large in the same way as they day and night firing and unceasing movement of units, with
~'ouldappreciate a victory by other arms. The victories of its consequent mental and physical fatigue. It has meant
~lherarms have territorial gains to show. You have not, but hard thinking and hard fighting.
'e\'ertheless this does not make it less important than any "I wish to congratulate you, and all ranks under your
'ther form of major military success in its effect on the final command, upon the success of a major operation of this
outcomeof the war." campaign."
I No, Antwerp X cannot show territorial gains, except to

y that it helped the field armies in full measure. But its

t'ictoryis in exact conformity with one test: It met the enemy

orces and defeated them, And it has cast a mold for the
future. The tactics, the lessons of the battle to save Antwerp
~~~.

1BJ 28 W

.
o
'"

l)rURNHour

"ALINfS~
KEERBERGEN.
 Ground Defense Plan
Antwerp X
By Captain William Edgar, Jr. J
Coast Artillery Corps f
During the Battle of the Bulge when Von R:ndstedt was many infantry companies as there were AAA Gun B1
pushing back the \iVestern Allies, the US antiaircraft de- talions in the Group, plus a heavy weapons company p
fenses of Antwerp offered ground support to Headquarters combat team drawn from A\V Battalions, and finally, eac
Port Area No.3 in event of a break-through by the Ger- AAA Gun Battery formed a platoon of 35 men, as shown ir
mans. It was generally believed that one of the prime aims of Chart No.1. The chart typically depicts the regimental or-
the German counteroffensive was to isolate and then destroy ganization, whose strength varied with the strength of An~
the Port of Antwerp. werp X Command.
The Commanding General, 50th AAA Brigade, heading The regiment's foreknowledge of enemy attack-its ill
the American AA defenses of Antwerp, formulated a plan telligence sources-was drawn from the Antiaircraft Earli
by which his AA troops could be utilized as Field Artillery \i\Tarning System, plus-GHQ AA Tps of 21st Army GrouE
and Infantry, in emergency and for a short time, as well as and the British 7 Base Sub Area in Antwerp. Information
continuing their job as Antiaircraftsmen. from the American Port Area No. 3's G-2 Section was als~
The purpose of this far-sighted and most ambitious plan available. These sources, as well as the Command's compli
was to delay, harass, or deny enemy troop movement by cated system of interlocking AAOR's, AAIS and mobil
gunfire in the area occupied by AA troops and further, to visual OP's, organized for the purpose, assured immediat
meet the enemy as infantry using artillerymen, where they
could be spared, cooks, bakers, clerks, and other non-killers
24 hours a day to maintain a holding action until relief
in the form of a British or American mobile reserve could
be committed from elsewhere along the front.
In order to accomplish a ground defense of the ap-
proaches to Antwerp, a document known as the "Ground
D=-fense Plan, Antwerp X Command" was drawn up by
the staff of the 50th AAA Brigade Hq. It included down to
the last detail the manner in which the defense would be
carried out, at the same time permitting continul;>Usopera-
tion of the Command against its primary target, the Pilotless
Aircraft, without interruption.
At once two main divisions of the General Plan were ap-
parent-the first, Plan A, was a method of bringing fire to
bear from antiaircraft 'tactical positions on road junctions,
crossroads, bridges, defiles and various critical points. The
second division-Plan B-called for the organization of task
forces capable of meeting any threats by formations of
enemy troops against the vital installations of the area~The
same troops could not be used in both Plan A and Plan B
because it was most likely that both plans would have to be
used simultaneously under the title of Plan AB.
In gen~ral, Plan A necessitated no change in the normal
control or organization. No movement of 90mm or 40mm
guns was contemplated, as fire was to be brought to bear
from the normal tactical qisposition. However, Plan B ob-
viously called for the reorganization of the AA personnel
into infantry formations. A provisional regiment was set up
consisting of as many combat teams as there were AAA
Groups in the Command. Each combat team consisted of as
 GROLIND DEFENSE PLAN: ANTWERP X 9

j Company A Hq Section
( 15 AAA Gun Bn Bn Hq

787 AAA AW Bn

Room was set up to function as a fire-control center. Bat-

talions had their choice of operating Fire-Direction Centers
or having ~their batteries prepare gridded fire-control maps
and precalculate firing data to critical points within range
of their guns.
Each battalion would receive its firing mission from the
150th AAA Opns. Room through normal early warning
channels. So that firing could be "seen," each battalion or-
ganized a mobile spotting team equipped with a two-way
radio to insure the battalion Fire-Direction Center knew
how accurate was the fire.
A list of points to be brought under bombardment was
given the battery, enabling the computation of data for all
such points within range of the guns. Howeyer, only one
primary target was assigned per battalion in order to bring
the greatest amount of fire t? bear on the most important
places. See chart on page 8.
Upon reception of the alert, "registration" and "zero
height of burst" fire problems were to be initiated, using
the mobile spotting teams for sensings. l\lleteorological con-
ditions for computation in these problems were to be sent
to battalions through the ,AAA Opns Room from the Ant-
werp X Meteorological Section.
Further, Plan A called for each battalion to set up and
defend a road block at a given point (see chart, page 8)
utilizing sufficient bazookas, J\llolotov cocktails, machine
guns and small arms, to do the job. Road block detachments
were to be composed of squads generally organized as typi-
cal infantry squads. Battalion commanders fixed the num-
ber of squads in their detachments according to the number
10 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-Oct

of men and weapons needed to adequately defend the ob- Hun could throw at it. Personnel were drawn from twel
stacle. AAA Gun battalions and two AAA A\\1 battalions, besi
Plans for the demolition of bridges, et aI., were prepared the two brigades and three group headquarters mention I

from a list of critical points selected by Headquarters, Ant- above. They were organized in such a manner that private
werp X, but, only Hq, Antwerp X could authorize actual served under their own NeO's and both served under thei
demolition. own officers, thus obviating the confusion inherent in a
The next and more difficult job to be undertaken was new organization.
Plan B-a straight infantry role for the artillerymen. From the chart, it is apparent that the lettered companie~
were designed to perform a straight infantry role, suppl
PLAxB mented by a heavy weapons company equipped with am
The Provisional Regimental Hq personnel headed by aircraft weapons, the 40mm Bofors automatic cannon anc.
Colonel Harold P. Hennessy, Chief of Staff, Antwerp X the M51 quadruple .50.cal. machine-gun mount, capable oU
Command, were drawn from the 50th AAA Brigade, Com- giving them more than adequate support by infantry standi!
bat Team Hq personnel from the three Groups, and the ards.
Command Posts set up at Brigade and Group Headquarters. Because of the inherent strength of the regiment, its nH~
Neither the personnel nor installations of Hq 56th AAA sions might have been legion and therefore, during tll
Brigade were committed to any specific job, so that there training drills many different problems were presented it.
was this complete establishment held in reserve for use, as However, the most probable one in which the regiment4
necessary, In any emergency. would be employed was defense of the Port of Antwerp~
Each combat team, organized under a provisional Table against paratroop or airborne attack.
of Organization and Equipment, was to be assigned one of The regimental staff went through this problem of de
several rendezvous points previously reconnoitered by the fense. Troops arrived at the assigned rendezvous poine
combat team commander, depending on the direction and Road blocks were set up as scheduled; coordination of in
type of enemy attack. The companies of combat teams were fan try deployment with artillery fire on critical points was
oroanized
o
as shown in the chart. practiced; mobile spotting teams took up their positions
Ultimately, the regiment was composed of 119 officers routes of probable enemy approach were reconnoitered.
and 2,081 enlisted men, a force sufficiently large and well
armed to give a good account of itself against anything the
time and space problems were solved-Antwerp
readv.
X \\'a.-
t

1119•lIlm, 208 mon I

Regimer"ltol Hqs
5 office" 13 me"
Regimental
11 officers
Reserve
121 men
1
Combat Team Combat Team
33 ofl;cers625 me", 33 officers 625 men
,

2nd Platoon
oft 30 men

2 Pistols 2 Pistols 1 Rocket 2 Carbines 5 Carbines 4 40mm Guns 6 Multiple

3 Carbines a Carbines launcher 28 Rifles, M-l 11 Rifles, M-l 2 Carbines MG Mounts,
3SMG 3 Carbines 3 Rifles, 1 SCR 543 1 SMG M.51 124 MG'sl
3 SMG
10 Rifles, M-l 18 Rifles, M-l 4 Rifles, M-l Grenade 3 Trucks 32 Rifles, M-l 2 Carbines
2 SCR 543 1 SCR 543 3SMG launchlng 2 SCR 593 1 SMG
6 Trucks 4 Trucks 1 SCR 543 3SMG 4 Trucks 28 Rifles
5 Trucks 9 Molotov 2 SCR 593
Cocktails 6 Truck.
50 Hand
Grenades
 "ERE ,-

orne Sidelights on Antwerp X

By Brigadier General George M. Badger, US~
J~lroR'S NOTE: The extracts beloll' are from an article plainly hear diver twenty-three puttering out its uncanny
Gelleral Badger submitted to tile JOUR~AL whicll dllpli- sound. The exhaust from its jet was sending out long
.. t cated portions of the story by Captain Dal/meyer. It is flames in rapid succession and the noise resembled a loud.
'II/elielled that additional light will be thrown on tile op- fast outboard motor, strangely traveling in the sky. It was
eration at Amwerp by General Badger's comments. Dur- coming nearer and nearer. Not only did the sound of the
illg the operation General Badger comlllmlded the 56th onrushing flying bomb come closer, but also the explosions
(, AAA Brigade which c01/Sisted at differe'nt times of from of the projectiles were getting louder and louder as they
~ tll'O to tllree Groups of eiglJt to ten battalions. Tilis chased their elusive target through the sky. vVould the
Brigade covered the sector of the defenses Oller whicll the two ever meet in the thick wet fog that enshrouded every-
greatest Illllilber of pilotless aircraft approaclled Antwerp. thing?
Then, suddenly, a huge explosion. The building rocked
it was during a night in late November 1944. A heavy upon its foundation; windows flew open; the bed lurched
f. anket of fog enveloped the flat countryside of northern violentlv. There could be no mistake. Diver twentv-three
,t Igium. I was billeted on the second floor of an old had be~n killed in its tracks. Sounds of a few m~re ex-
r ateau, or castle, as it is called bv the natives. The build- ploding projectiles that were on the way before the target
g had formerly been occupied b)' German troops who had had been hit, and then deathly silence again. This time it
d before the British some two months previous. It was was more omnipotent than ever before. After this strange
c worse for wear. Downstairs was the AAOR furnishing and unreal battle between a pilotless aircraft and American
, rly warning for the firing batteries which were deployed antiaircraft gunners, it is little wonder that,the new silence
n a belt for the protection of Antwerp against the robot took on added power and authority. J\llodern warfare knows
t mb. no limit to the ingenuity of the human mind. The human
:~ 1\ly bed was a sleeping bag thrown upon a wooden bed- mind knows no limit in devising machines that will cause
cad which was in the room when the Americans had oc- death and destruction. The American soldier and the excel-
,upied the building. I awoke about three o'clock in the lent American equipment had answered the V-I-Hitler's
orning after rolling and tossing in my bed. It was deathly overestimated secret weapon.
quiet outside. A chill and dampness permeated the atmos- I turned over and went back to sleep.
phere, lending an eerie feeling to the surroundings. ". ". ".

A clear strong voice broke the silence: "Diver two three

The 80th British AA Brigade, commanded by Brigadier
dogtwo six able-Diver two three dog two six able."
Deacon, first set up the defenses of Antwerp X; it had a
Silence again reigned, only now it was emphasized.
light and two heavy regiments in position when the Ameri-
Nothing for perhaps thirty seconds, then "Diver two three
cans first arrived in October. The 30th AAA Group, com-
charlie nine eight x-ray-Diver two three charlie nine eight
manded by Colonel Ralph \\'. Russell, arrived in the Ant-
x-rav."
werp area on 23 October. At about ~he same time, the
There was. no question about it. A robot bomb, flying
407th, 740th, 125th and the 126th AAA Gun Battalions
on its deadly course, had been located by the early warning
also arrived. The 56th AAA Brigade which I commanded
lsources. Its location had been phoned to the plotters man-
was ordered to the Antwerp X defenses and arrived on
,ning the operations board. vVithout a second's delay the
' 28 October, relieving the 80th British AA Brigade. Dur-
inFormation was announced by the teller to the firing bat-
ing the next two weeks, the following American units
I teries who were on twenty-four hour alert. It was the arrived and were deployed: The 45th AAA Group, com-
I teller's voice which I had heard.
manded bv Colonel Ovid T. Forman; the 17th AAA
: As I lay there, now fully awake and slightly tense, many
Group, co~manded by Colonel Carl R. Adams; the 22d
thoughts raced through my mind. \Vould the batteries be
AAA Group, commanded by Colonel Harold C. Mab-
r1ert? \Vould the horrible weather conditions interfere
bott; the 405th, 494th, 184th, 601st, 136th, 495th, 605th
with the accuracv of fire? vVhere was the infernal machine
and 519th AAA Gun Battalions; and the 787th, 788th and
headed? If we 'missed, what untold miserv and damage
789th AAA Automatic \;\,leapons Battalions. On 10 No-
would the missile cause? These questions, a~d many mo(e,
vember, the 50th AAA Brigade, commanded by Brigadier
raced through my mind. The waiting seemed eternity. The
General Clare H. Armstrong, arrived in the Antwerp area
eerie silence was perforated only by the clear steady voice
and assumed command of Antwerp X.
of the teller announcing the flying bomb's onrushing
". ". ".
Course.
Suddenly a terrific roar burst forth. The angry guns The supply of ammunition proved quite a problem at
Were barking a challenge at the clever ingenuity of the times. Due to the large amounts expended, 6,400 rounds
Germans. Seconds later the bursting projectiles cracked daily average for February, it was difficult to keep the proper
loudly in the night air. Several batteries had now taken level on hand. On some occasions the supply ran danger-
up the challenge and the ground and air shook in unison ously low. Mixed lot numbers were another handicap.
From the e,:plosions. Beyond the din of firing I could One battery commander once reported that he had fifty-six
 12 _E COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

A V-I, captured intact by AA gunners.

IX Air Delense comm .. J
different lot numbers on hand. During February there stratosphere rockets (V-2's) frequently fell near by. Un-
was considerable old-type ammunition issued. This had a fortunately, there were some fatal casualties as the result
very great Rash and loud report which interfered with the of these missiles, and many Purple Hearts were awarded
service of the piece .. Men were blinded by the Rash and It was necessary for each battery constantly to man th~
several eardrums were ruptured due to the concussion of equipment twenty-four hours each day, except for two
the blast. hours allowed for maintenance. This required each battery
to divide its personnel into reliefs which usually went on
Th'e diver proved to be a worthy target for the antiair- duty for twelve hours and off duty for twelve hours. The
craft gunners. Its ruggedness, small size, high speed and men at the guns remained in ready huts at the emplace-
low altitude called for expert gunnery of the highest order. ments, subject to a moment's call. Even those who were off
Its speed averaged about 350 miles per hour and the alti- duty in their tents did not get much sleep, as the divers came
tude averaged..J.OOO f~t, although some came over below over at any time, day or night. The constant roar of the guns
1,000. One was recorded at 14,000 feet, but it obviously plus the danger of the falling bombs; did not create a situa
had gone out of control. Many peculiar things happened tion that induced or promoted sleep. However, throughout
when they were damaged. One was seen to circle four times the entire period morale was very high, practically no
before crashing. One had one-third of its wing torn off, but A\VOL's, very few disciplinary cases, and a very low
proceeded on its course. One was seen to turn almost venereal rate.
over, after a projectile had burst under it, and then right Mention should be made of the personnel other than the
itself and continue on. Several made the wildest gyrations antiaircraft men who were employed in Antwerp X. The
after being hit-diving, banking and climbing before finally medical detachments did exceptionally fine work in taking
crashing to earth. Of course, danger always lurked when care of the health of the command. The sick rate was very
one was being engaged, as it was difficult to tell just where low, notwithstanding the severe winter conditions. Not only
it would come down if it did not burst in the air. did the medics look after the sick and wounded military
The American antiaircraft units, as well as the British, personnel, but they aided the wounded and badly. mangled
stood up well during the gruelling test of five winter months civilian population whenever a bomb dropped into a near-b~
of snow, ice, and mud, and under constant bombardment community. The 274th and 280th AA Ordnance Mainte-
of Hitler's long-range vengeance weapons. Not only did the nance Companies did splendid work in keeping all ord
wounded fly bombs' fall in close proximity to the firing bat- nance materiel in an operating condition. They were con
teries and various headquarters, but also the long-range siderably handicapped at times because of the scarcity
 Jvl\lt:. SIDELIGHTS ON ANTWERP X 13

re parts and quantity of work for the means available. The story of Antwerp X would not be complete without
owe,'er, all the Ordnance personnel worked cheerfully mentioning the excellent spirit of coOperation and team-
uring long hours in order to keep the guns firing. Other work between the British and Americans. Frequently units
rsonnel, such as the postal service, finance section, and of the two nations worked side by side. The British were
detachment of the 32d Special Service Company.of en- most helpful in assisting the Americans in every way pos-
ertainers did well under the constant bombardment. The sible. Only the best of relations existed between the two
ldier and officer knew that he had an important job to do, armies during the entire period.
d he did it well. Each member of the command of Ant- It may be of interest to record a few lessons learned dur-
-erpX deserves the highest praise for his courage, fortitude ing deployment of antidiver defense of Antwerp X.
nd unceasing efforts to get the job done. 1. Best form of defense is concentric belts about fifteen
Not only did the stamina of the personnel get a thorough thousand yards apart.
ting, but also the equipment received a thorough work- 2. Gun batteries should be about one thousand yards
ut. It was necessary to put a fourth set of tubes on some of apart on these arcs.
e guns. No set number of rounds was taken as a criterion 3. Guns should not engage until target has a present posi-
pr changing the tubes. Generally the lands near the tion of 10,000 yards, thus giving a flak free zone and allow-
arcing cone started to deteriorate between 1,500 and 2,000 ing computer output data to smooth before engaging.
unds. YVhen this occurred the tubes were promptly 4. Visual direction and angular height with radar slant
hanged. Six breech rings blew off during this period. This range is the most accurate method of fire control, if visibility
ually occurred after about 100 rounds had been fired permits ..
am a new tube. Considerable difficulty was e};perienced 5. Volley fire (often erroneously referred to as salvo
. maintenance of the M-7 power plants. This was par-' fire) proved more effective because of the elimination of
'cularly true until white gasoline was supplied. The fuse dead time errors and helped eliminate personnel errors on
tters often wore loose and were difficult to keep in ad- fuse setting.
ustment. Difficulty was e:-..'perienced with some of the 6. All fuses should be precut to three or five seconds to
coil systems after approximately 3,000 rounds had been prevent ground bursts of improperly cut fuses.
red from a mount . . 7. Revetments saved many lives from explosion of
All batteries were equipped with the M-9 directors. All bursting bombs.
f these were modified with proper potentiometer cards to I 8. At least four batteries on each belt should engage a\
provide the ballistic corrections as shown in IT 90AA-B-3. [single target. I
I Somedifficulty was experienced in adjusting the computer Many more pages could be written on the experiences
in a few cases after this modification was made. encountered in Antwerp X, but space in this article forbids.
The ordnance maintenance was of the highest order. The antiaircraft troops received very little publicity (be-
All of the equipment held up well under the severe test of cause of security reasons) during the actual battle, but the
• constant use and unfavorable weather conditions. It is be- port personnel and the people of the city of Antwerp knew
~Iieved the American gun equipment is superior to any well the work they were doing. It is an important fact that
~antiaircraft equipment in the world. all during this long-range bombardment not once did the
If The battery CP was usually set up near the computer. port close because of the diver attack. It was only the anti-
I Future fuse range was taken from the computer. Thus the aircraft artillery that kept off the By bomb, as there were no
fighter planes nor balloons used in the defenses. The men
I courseof the target could be plotted and a decision made as
to its engagement if it were approaching the vital area.
and the guns were there and they performed their mission
well. All praise to General Clare H. Armstrong and his
\
Antwerp X.
 Antiaircraft Operations in the
. ~

CSf Theater
By Lieutenant Colonel George ~. Meigs, Coast ~rtillery Corps
EDITOR'S NOTE: Colonel Meigs was AA Offzcer mId relatively dry, chill and dusty, with a northwest wind that
Ground Defense Coordinator in the Upper Assam Val- whoops down off the Himalayas. The eternal prickly heat
ley during operations from fall of 1942 to June, 1944, and malarial fevers give way to goose pimples and head
mId Inter commanding offzcer of an airborne machine- colds. Instead of oceans of mud, your vehicles grind
gun battalion during operations ..in Burma. He returned through chuck holes feet deep in dust, and a convoy is
to this country in October orlast year. This article is visible for miles in the clouds of dust it raises. Dust is
drawn from his personal experience mId from operation everywhere, on the dried-out rice paddies, on the jungle
reports. growth lining the roads, in your eyes, your mouth, yoU
food. And sometimes you wish the monsoon would come
The Japs have had three excellent reasons for fighting in again.
Burma: the country is a rich source of loot, it makes a good But when the country dries out, and the everlasting battle
staging area for an invasion of India, and as long as they of road blocks and broken bridges and air raids flares up
controlled Burma they could keep us from using the only again, each side trying to capture or wreck the communica-
prac;tical supply route to China. Allied activity in the thea- tion lines of the other, then life becomes mon; interesting.
ter has centered around one tremendous project: to get You feel that at last you are accomplishing something.
supplies to China, whether by air or road. It may be that this year the Japs will be expelled from
The result has been a strange and intermittent war, Burma. Recentlv North Burma has been cleared of them.
shaped by weather and the terrain. During the large and the Ledo Road been pushed through to a junction
monsoon, from July to October, the country is a tropical with the old Burma Road, the route aptly rechristened
mush. The "small" monsoon, April to June, is only after General Stilwell. Supplies are once more Rowing to
slightly less torrential. Believe it or not, in a few areas' of China by truck convoy, as well as over the Hump by air.
Assam and Burma, they get 600 inches of rain a year. In The job is better than half done.
the Naga Hills, 250 inches is common. In. most of the It has taken three long and arduous years to accomplish
operational areas, 125 inches fell until we got down around this, for the initial successes were all Japanese. In these
Mvitkvina where 80 inches was the rule. Farther south, operations American antiaircraft units have played a con-
ho~\'e\:er, a 6oo-inch area occurs again in the mountains siderable part. It is their story which I propose to tell.
around Tiddim.
"Crazy" is the only word to describe CBI weather. Dur- THE ASSAl\l PHASE

ing the monsoon season railroads are washed out, roads dis- April of 1942 had seen the triumph of Jap ground forces
appear, your one pair of good shoes sprout long green in North Burma, and the famous fighting retreat of the
whiskers and vour tent rots over vour head to let cascades Allies into Assam and India. It was realized that if we were
of water thro~gh. The winters,' on the other hand, are to continue furnishing any of the sinews of war to China
 .. "
ile the Japs were astride the Burma Road, it would have
be by air. A construction program to provide the needed
which had become operational, in conjunction with British
3.7's and Bofors. Two other batteries were retained in
~fJnSportairfields and fighter strips was inaugurated in the India. By spring many fighter strips and Air Transport
pper
Assam Valley, and these installations, of course, Command bases were operating in the Upper Assam \1al-

! equiredantiaircraft protection.
Britishforces in India originally had agreed to provide AA
d ground defenses for all airfields in India, wherever they
'ere threatened. However, there was a definite need for
ley, and all had AA protection, some of it exclusively British.
l\leanwhile, the Ledo Road had been begun about Janu-
ary, 1943, by one battalion of U. S. aviation engineers and
a combat engineer regiment. The whole year, in fact, was
1\£\ machine guns, and it proved desirable to bring in our one of preparation for the return to Burma. The Chinese-
m AA to provide further protection for U. S. installations. American force (Merrill's Marauders being the American
, In the summer of 1942, five airborne machine-gun bat- contingent) went into training in India in 1943. The Brit-
~
ries, trained at Fort Bliss, Texas, arrived in India and ish Fourteenth Army was being reorganized for the drive

t 'ereassigned to Ground Forces, cm. Two of them were

nt on to Assam under the Tenth Air Force to bolster de-
enses
of the two airfields then in operation. At the outset
into Burma from the west.
Our own units were undergoing continual training. One
officer per battery attended the British jungle warfare

l he AA defenses of each of these fields consisted of four

ritish 3.7-inch guns, six British Bofors and the twelve cali-
.\er .50 machine guns of one American airborne battery.
tround defenses of air installations throughout Assam,
schools. Practical demonstrations of scouting and patrol-
ling were conducted in jungle areas surrounding airfields,
together with instruction in infantry combat tactics. British
officers who had had experience with General vVingate in
~neidentally,were under American command. Burma gave lectures. \Ve knew what lay ahead of us in
.lap air activity up to the middle of September had been Burma.
~e1dto North Burma. At about that time, the first recon- Upper Assam made a good training ground. \Vhile not
naissanceflights came over Assam, and intelligence warned as wild as North Burma-being moderately populated with
of possible attacks on the two operational fielps. The other tea gardens and rice paddies scattered up and down the
~hreeMG batteries were ordered up by air. However, they valley-it is a remote part of the world. Lhasa, the Forbid-
t:..erenot yet in position when the first attacks came on den City of Tibet, lies among the Himalayas only 300 miles
retober 24, 25 and 27. away. As a further indication of Assam's nature, a British
The enemy came in with bombers at 1,800 feet and fight- tea planter once ~ffered us the use of a piece of countryside
lersas top cover at 5,000. At this time there were few Allied for an airfield, adding as an afterthought that it had one
I6ghters in the vicinity, and the local Tenth Air Force unit possible drawback-we \~ould have to look out for the wild
lhadonly two pursuit planes in the air during these attacks. elephants when taking off or landing.
IButthe AA did very well. The two American MG batteries
laecounted for seven Japs destroyed and eleven damaged.
Wrecks of seventeen enemy aircraft were later found in the
l:.JagaI-Hils, the work of British and American AA together.
In the first raid, three Zeros attacked one MG position
,with three different MG crews working on them. The
three enemy fighters were down with an expenditure of .
five chests of caliber .50 ammunition. All later attacks on
airfields in Assam were from heights of never less than
'20,000 feet. The Japs remembered their lesson.
Following this series of attacks, the Air Force units re-
ceived additional PAO's which had been held at main base
in India. Thus our fighter pilots and the British 3.7's had
all the sport when the Japs did come over to bomb desultorily
and not too effectively. However, we knew perfectly well
that the only deterrent to a more active prosecution of the
air war on their part was the presence of our weapons
around each of the Assam airdromes as they were put into
service. In Februarv, 1943, four additional airborne MG Signal Corps
batteries arrived in 'Assam, and were used to cover fields Fighting in Myitkyina.
 16 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-Octo

took off across country and outRanked i\Iyitkyina-and t

hard fighting really began.
The Ledo Road kept pace with the advance toward t
planned junctions with the Burma Road, and in the wak
of the. road-building battalions came the airfield construc.
tion crews, hacking out strips which were islands of offen
in the Bu£.mese jungles. It is in this operation that Amen
car: _ ook part .
. .... lere was another, too. In October of 1943, we ha
own two MG batteries into \Vest China to cover th
Mekong River area. These were used in 1944 for the Sal.
ween action, in which the Chinese drove south alono o
th
Burma Road from Yunnan Province, clearing ojlt isolate
Jap garrisons there. But we shall come to their activiti
later.
Actually, we have to go back into the fall of 1943 to ge
the full picture of AA in the Ledo River campaign, be-
cause the second American ground force combat troops in
Burma behind the engineers but ahead of Merrill's Maraud.,
ers, were men from an AA.automatic weapons battalion.
By October, two semimobile A\71/ battalions had arrived
in Assam. One was used to cover the larger, more esta~
Living conditions were not much better than those en-
countered later in Burma. As our tents rotted away in a
matter of weeks and the ones we got from the British lasted
lished airfields and release MG batteries badly needed for
the lower 'dromes. The other battalion was stationed in the 1
Ledo area covering concentrations of supplies along the road I'
hardly any longer, though three times as heavy, we early between rVlargherita and Lekhapani, a distance of fifteen
resorted to bashas. These were affairs made of bamboo, put miles. This huge supply area boasted a' thin defense of
together with reed lashings and thatched with buffalo grass. British 3.7's as well. At this time, the Japs were hardly
Inside they \vere lined with hessian cloth (burlap, to be 100 miles away across the Naga Hills, and a successful raid
less polite), and this kept many of the insects out. However, could have wreaked irreparable damage. But they were at
it was necessary to sleep under mosquito netting the year the end of their supply line as we were at the end of ours.
round. Assam and Burma are among the worst malarial and there was little either of us could do, metaphorically
regions in the world. speaking, but sit there and glare at each other.
The temperature ranges from 31 in winter to 125 in
0 0
In November, a provisional MG battery of twelve guns \
summer, with the humidity high at all times. Prickly heat was organized from personnel of this second A\\1 battalion. ~
is a curse, some cases becoming infected and requiring The battery moved by truck to a point just inside the j
hospitalization, or turning into impetigo. The natives know Burma border and walked down the Ledo Road to a point 1
nothing of sanitation and seem to care less, thus all drink- near Talang Ga, where it was thought we could establish I
ing water is chlorinated whether pronounced good or not an airdrome. This did not prove feasible, as the situation
-and frequently boiled as well. was still too Ruid for anything of the sort, so t~e provisional I
There wasn't any question about the men being tough battery walked back to an airfield under construction near '1
enough to take the rigors of the coming Burma campaign. the Jap lines. The minimum of equipment was dropped
They had had to be tough to survive Assam thus far. to them by parachute.
Christmas Day, 1943, one of the regularly constituted
THE NORTH BURMA PHASE
.MG batteries .departed by air from Assam for relief of the
As 1944 approached the Allies knew the victory-Rushed provisional battery. The airfield had been opened only
Japs, who thought themselves secure in North Burma, two or three days previously, and no one knew what diffi- I
would almost certainly attempt to invade India. A dual culties might be experienced in landing. However, all the
operation was planned to meet the Jap attack, and to capture C-47's got down without accident. This marked the be- '
the IVlogaung-Myitkyina line and exploit south and east to ginning of AA support of offensive ground .operations in
reopen the Burma Road. North Burma.
The Japs started their drive as expected, up the Chind- In general, the AA mission there has been the protection
win Valley to cut the railroad to Ledo at Dimapur. They of AAF airdromes and vital points along the Ledo Road.
by-passed Imphal and got up to the Kohima area before the principally the fighter strips. Often Jap ground troops were
British Fourteenth Army sent them staggering back into to be encountered just beyond the perimeter of an AA de-
Burma with 50,000 dead and four divisions smashed or fense, and there have been numerous brushes with snipers
badly mauled. and patrols. Units from rear installations in Assam were
In the north, meanwhile, with General Stilwell person- leap-frogged to advanced airfields in Burma as they were
ally forcing the offensive, the Chinese and Merrill's Ma- needed, weapons and men usually being transported by air.
rauders were walking down the Ledo Road ahead of the vehicles and heavy equipment following down the Ledo
engineers, subduing Jap strongholds one by one. Then they Road.
 FROl\l THE FIGHTING FRONTS 17

I Signal Corps
Myitkyina airstrip.

t t\s typical an action as any occurred on the capture of

~lyitkyina Airfield in May, 1944. The fighting for this
caliber .50 fire, evidently quite a surprise to them. Two of
the attacking planes were shot down, and the third was
strategic communications center had been particularly bit- smoking heavily as it left. \Ve lost one transport caught in
(ter, and the Japs were hanging onto the field itself with landing approaches and set on fire, and three of the twenty-
,\grimdetermination. However, we had to have it in order odd planes on the field were damaged somewhat by enemy
that Allied ground forces operating in the northern Irra- machine-gun fire. AA casualties or damage: none. Am-
(waddy Valley could be adequately supplied by air-drop, as munition expenditure: 1,500 rounds.
IreII as to force contact with the Burma Road beyond, and Subsequently, the Japs were considerably more circum-
finallywe took it. . spect in their air attacks on J\1 yitkyina. As additional strips
Allied headquarters announced the capture of the air- went into operation, more AA came in, and the heavy and
fieldat 1500 hours. In accordance with prearranged plans accurate fire finally forced them to deliver most of the at-
~themovement of airborne engineers and antiaircraft troops tacks at night, the favorite hours being predawn. These at-
~\\'asbegun immediately, and by 2015 the last plane load of tacks were much less effective. A raid in November, 1944;
,AA machine guns, men and light equipment had arrived. is reported in which no damage was done except to some
The first plane, carrying the battery commander, four ma- telephone lines, a 40mm revetment and an air mattress be-
chine gunners, two guns, ammunition and extra gasoline for longing to an Engineer officer, while we made claims of
I
I

thejeep, overshot the runway and crashed in a gulley about two planes damaged by 40mm fire and two by l\IIG fire.
I 400 yards off the end of the field. No one was hurt, nor About five enemy aircraft were involved.
\\'asany of the antiaircraft equipment damaged, but it was Administration was always a difficult problem, even in
I difficult to move it back onto the runway. Assam. The AA officer for the operational area was in
f That was only one of the problems, however. No pre- charge of tactical disposition of all the widely scattered units
rious ground reconnaissance had been possible, all opera- and was held responsible for all functions, with additional
tions were carried out in darkness, there was but the one AA continuing to come into the theater from time to time.
jeep with a trailer to shuttle the men and equipment to posi- This condition eventuallv became entirely too clumsv, and
; tions, and the field was still under fire from enemy snipers in June, 1944, an AAA Group was activ~ted, its per~onnel
f and mortars. Yet as 0100 hours all guns were emplaced and coming from two deactivated MG batteries and an A\V
'readY for action. After digging foxholes, the men not on battalion. The remaining l\IIG batteries were formed into
guard attempted to get some rest. airborne battalions of varying size, the composition of a
l Then, very early in the morning, the enemy broke
I battalion being determined by geographical location of its
. through the perimeter defense and attacked the field. In batteries. Seldom did a battalion have more than one of the
the ensuing fight, one gun was damaged and put out of batteries deployed within easy administrative reach, but at
commission, with three men killed, and two members of least the situation was not impossible.
the crew of another gun were wounded. So the AA defense At the time of the reorganization Group headquarters
Wasminus one weapon before the air attacks started. No was in Assam, headquarters and the four batteries of one
more men had been brought than were absolutely necessary A\\T battalion were all in Assam, and headquarters and the
for the operation. four MG batteries of one of the airborne battalions were all
. Three enemy fighters launched a dive-bombing and straf- in India. However, another A\V battalion had one batten'
ing attack in the afternoon. A fourth stayed high for top on the Burma Road at the Salween River in China, whil~
_cover. They were greeted with a heavy concentration of headquarters and the other three batteries were in Assam;
18 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-Octob
that steps were cut into the hillside for 70 per cent of t
trail. To make matters worse, it had been raining in tvpi
monsoon fashion for five days and the mud was ankle 'deep.
However, the shooting was pretty good when they gOtu
there-except when the clouds were so thick that they had
to fire at shadows of Jap transports air-dropping suppli
through the swirling mists to their besieged troops.
Another time, on another hill, it required sixty hors
a~d mules an~ thirty cooli:s to pack up six guns, and sup
plIes and eqUIpment for eIghteen men. The trail was fi
only for mountain goats, and to add to the discomfort the
Chinese guided some of the men in the wrong direction
But they got there eventually, despite the constant rain
and exhausted gun crews.
In August and September, 1944, one MG battery in
particular was kept. busy in the Sungshan campaign, help-
mg to clear the Burma Road of Jap resistance from the
China side down as far as Lungling, so that supplies t
Sil'nal Corps
the Ghinese Xl Group Army might be moved by truck.
British troops man a Bofors at a drop near the Ch:nawin.
On numerous instances their caliber .50's supported charges
an airborne battalion had headquarters and four l\lG bat- by the Chinese troops, or repulsed Jap counterattacks.
teries in Burma with one left behind in Assam; two batteries YVhen weather permitted, various Jap installations were
of still another were on the Bunna Road in China, while "strafed" by the machine guns.
headquarters and the other batteries were in Assam, and YVith the aid of a 19~-power telescope, accurate fire con.
so forth. Thus it will be seen that an ideal solution was not trol could be obtained by observing armor-piercing hits
practicable. and/or incendiary bursts. Using this method, guns on the
In subsequent operations every effort has been made to Kun Lung Po hills destroyed a combination rice depot and
keep the battalions as nearly consolidated as possible, so that ammunition dump, and one other ammunition dump wast
each battalion commander can visit his units frequently blown up. On another occasion, harassing fire at 3,1001
with a minimum expenditure of time and gasoline, and so yards range was placed on a Jap-occupied village with good
that radio communication will be as dependable as possible, effect.
but battalion control is occasionally difficult. On the afternoon of 7 September, the curtain fell on a
complete Chinese victory in the Sungshan. Outside of
THE CHINA PHASE twenty-five Japs who escaped, the entire garrison of over
This assignment, in support of "Y"* Forces in YVest 2,000 was either dead or prisoner. The MG batterv then set l
China, was very nearly the most rugged of the lot. The cli- up to protect a Salween River bridge crossing. '
mate wasn't quite as foul as the. Assam variety, but the Spread-beam searchlights have been used in conjunction
terrain was like something out of a bad dream. Once a unit with the automatic weapons in the interior of China. The
went into YVest China, it was cut off from normal contact lights have been valuable as homing beacons for lost pilots.
with the rest of the world. All supplies had to be flown in, also.
then trucked for the two days from the depot to the troops; EARLY \iV ARNING IN THE CEl
all communications were by radio. And as radio perform- Like Topsy, the warning system in the theater "just
ance anywhere in the region can only be t1escribed as grew." The original stations, scattered in the Naga Hilh
freakish, communications were hardly dependable. between Assam and Burma, were laid out for the protec-
YVe had both 40mm guns and MG's with "Y" Forces. tion of the first Assam airfields by the fighter control squad-
Both were used as ground support weapons, as well as AA. ron in the area. The stations were accessible by mountain
Possibly the adventures of the J'viG batteries were the most trails only. Coolies were used to carry in the radio equip-
outlandish, if only for the reason that they could be lugged ment. Supply was by parachute, and you only had to make
up and down mountains where it was impossible to take a one trip up to them to see why.
forty ..
Early in 1943, Signal Corps personnel took over opera-
Never did airborne AA feel more completely grounded.
tion of the stations. As the number of fields to be protected
For moves, pack animals were employed as much as pos-
increased, the system was naturally amplified. But not
sible, but just as often shank's mare was called into play.
until November of that year were the signal units able to
On one occasion it took a day and a half to get four 1\11G's,
function with proper equipment. Yet the system was very
their crews and the necessary equipment up on top of a
efficient, even in the early days. Those boys were definitely
1,500-foot "hill." Chinese soldiers provided the muscle to
on the ball.
move the guns up. The trail appeared to climb the side of
the hill at an angle of 90 degrees. So steep was the ascent Several factors precluded the establishment and opera-
tion of our own AAAIS. The peculiarities of the terrain
*Now called the "Chinese Combat Command." It was a Chinese force. in which we had to operate, the great distances involved
trained by Americans; it was used in the offensive against North Burma
from the China side. lack of equipment and sufficient personnel enforced de-
 FRO~l THE FIGHTING FRONTS 19

ndence on Air Forces facilities. However, radio nets Assam installations were at first hard pressed to keep up
anating from the net control stations give adequate maintenance of planes and rolling stock. In 1943 ~upplies
arning to all U. S. and British AA units, fifty minutes from the Zone of the Interior began to come up in larger
w as compared to fourteen minutes in the earlier days of quantities. Current conditions in the various classes are
'fefense. Very close liaison is maintained with fighter in- improved, though Class II supplies are always scarce and
'allations. difficult to get.
The area of operations of the Tenth Air Force is divided Airborne units under limited T /E's are most seriously
10 air defense, iones. For each of these .zones, Signal handicapped, though all units suffer from lack of auto-
,orpsAircraft \Varning Battalions operate a filter room, motive and ordnance replacement parts. Gun parts for
m which the fighter controller can direct the interceptors. MG's are scarce, and for 40mm nonexistent. Each 40mm
~ neach room an AA officer and one enlisted man are always battalion was sent over with one extra gun which could
~ duty, the man being placed on a dais overlooking the be cannibalized, but that was the end of spare parts.
~rd where all hostile or unidentified plane movements Organizational personnel must perform all echelons of
pre plotted. He has telephone lines to such AA units as maintenance possible with such facilities as are at hand, for
prewithin a few miles of the filter room, and an SCR-543 lack of flaintenance units. Sandbags were generally avail-
~r SCR-188, over which the plotted positions are trans- able in desired quantities, but other Class IV supplies were
~itted simultaneously direct to each battery in the air de- hardly to be had. Ammunition supply was satisfactory,
fensezone. though storage was difficult. Great care must be taken to
Each battery is also provided with an SCR-543, and keep caliber .50 ammunition chests dry; 40mm was kept in
Iwith telephone lines from 'the location of this receiver to Navy chests which could be sealed with screwed locks.
\each gun position. These radios are also used for adminis- The supply problem will always be critical in the CBI. It
ative purposes, permission first being obtained from the must be remembered that Burma is 13,000 airline miles

tnet control station to leave the net temporarily. Such

messagesare transmitted, of course, only during daylight
hours when the threat of an air attack is practically nil.
from New York. Most supplies must come more than half-
way around the world by. boat, be freighted up the
Brahmaputra River on barges or come up by rail from Cal-
I As mentioned before, radi? communication is definitely cutta to Ledo, and from there be trucked or Bown to the
(reakish. Quite good service has been obtained with the using units. Otherwise it's air transport all the way.
\ .
~CR-543 over airline distances (includi.ng mountain
HISTORY To DATE
Iranges)up to 450 miles. However, it is of interest to note
that in one location, communication between two batteries Recent events in the CBI are too well known to require
withSCR-543 was limited to fourteen miles, while by con- detailed repetition here. The fighting for the Ledo-Burma,
trastanother battery about three miles beyond one of these or Stilwell Road system is actually over. In January the first
just mentioned was able to communicate with units in wheeled traffic in two and one-half years began moving
China some 270 miles distant. Once a contact was made overland from Assam through to China.
lbetween an airborne battalion headquarters with an SCR- Now the British have taken Mandalay and are driving
284 and Group headquarters with an SCR-543 over a dis- on south, and the Allied air forces (who have had complete
tanceof 388 miles. air superiority for more than a year) are making life exceed-
ingly uncomfortable for the enemy all the way to Rangoon.
SUPPLY Rangoon will be taken by the time this article is published.
Supply conditions have been variable, ranging from fair In any case, it is certain that the Jap "",ill never again be
tobad. Short of supplies of every kind and description, the able to mount any sort of offensive in Burma.

Weather us. Supply lines.

'This is the ONE island in the Aleutians where the trace of civilization-each island is as bad as the next one.
\rind blows harder, the weather is colder, roads worse, sol- The "\Villiwaw," that sudden wind of hurricane intensity
diering is tougher, the snow drifts higher, and the sleet which is caused by the hot winds of the Japanese current
lashes more viciously than anywhere in the world." Every meeting the cold blasts from the Bering Sea, stuns a man
soldier who has served in the Alaskan Command, out in at first, and it never becomes an accepted condition. Some-
those bleak and barren Aleutian Islands, windswept and times this wind reaches a sustained velocity of 100 miles
lonely, treeless and fog-soaked, will invariably claim that per hour, and many storms have tom away wind indicators
the island on which he was stationed was the toughest spot which stopped registering at 150 miles per hour! Snow and
along the "Chain." sleet are accepted as a matter of course; but if the sun ap-
Although you hesitate to argue with men who have lived pears, men blink and rub their eyes and look in wonder at
that lonely life for months and months without seeing any sun-cast shadows.
Probably the loneliest men in the Aleutians were the
....Prepared by G-2 Section, AA Command. searchlight sections, scattered in out-of-the-way locations,
20 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
atop mountains out on the narrow strips of land jutting would e\'entually break through, with mail, and rations a
into the Bering Sea, or on small islands, scattered all up supplies.
and down the Aleutian chain. Supplying these sections was The searchlight positions on the smaller islands, isolat
a difficult task when mere distance and transportation ques- from their friends on the mainland sections, faced quit
tions were involved; but when the weather turned bad, another situation. They depended on small Army boats Ie
delivering rations and mail to these lonely men, and gas ferry their mail, rations and supplies to them; and if drivin
and oil and materiel for their lights, was a major problem. a tractor or truck through the snows and sleets and sudde
Supplies were delivered, depending upon weather condi- storms and perpetual fogs seems a difficult assignment, thei
tions, by truck. bv boat. bv tractor when the snow was too job was easy compared to the task facing the "Searchlioh
heavy f~r the t~u~ks to bre~k through-and on foot. Navy." Some of. these islands were a full day's trip fr~r,
The roads near the camps were built of a fine volcanic the main supply depots; and the \"eather can change 6ft\
ash, which made a good roadbed in summer, but which times a day, with each change usually for the worse! Th'
deteriorated rapidly from snow and freezing during the rest supply boats ranged in size from thirty-foot open dories wit
of the year. Many of the searchlight positions were from little cover to lOO-foot barges and lighters; but the Aleutia
twenty-five to fifty miles from the main camps; and as they weather had little respect for size, and the shores along the
lay in different directions, it was impossible to have a regu- Chain are littered with the skeletons of large and small crar
lar "ration route." Each position had to have a separate ra- which were trying to get mail and supplies through to SOlhe
tion truck. These trucks made a run from the Supply Sec- isolated position.
tion to the Searchlight Section and back about twice a week; For the most part, all of these craft were watched OWr
and when the weather turned "bad," and trucks could not by the ~\'orrying eye of the Navy; but when the weather
get through, then. the slow and grinding journey was turned bad, and fog closed in, and the \Villiwaw came
attempted by snow-plow tractor. \Vhen the tractors could screaming to life, all the Navy could do was to pray, an '
not get through-which was often during the winter months send out searching parties after the storm. If one of these
-the searchlight sections had to depend upon their reserve ships were wrecked, the personnel and supplies were usually
rations to keep them going, but there was a limit, too, to never seen again, for there are few beaches along the
the reserve rations, so every effort was made to sustain some Chain, and jagged volcanic formations, rising sharply from
sort of a regular schedule. -' the sea, offer little comfort to shipwrecked men, particu-
Imagine, if you can, taking a two-and-one-half-ton truck, larly when they are being lashed by snow and sleet and a
loaded with rations, out across the volcanic roads and at \Villiwaw. On occasion, a barge would break away, and be
the end of these roads (which usually stopped about a mile presumed lost, only to be found several weeks later, and its
out of camp) making your way across a. bleak white night- crew intact and living a very comfortable life in some inlet
mare of tundra, with sudden snowstorms and clouds of fog, or harbor. One supply barge which broke loose grounded
with blasting sleetstorms and bitter cold all along the way. in a small harbor, hidden away near an abandoned Aleut
Imagine potholes in the tundra which would drop your village; and when the crew were finally rescued, several
truck down upon its axles and leave you stranded perhaps weeks later, they resented their rescue! They had taken~
thirty or forty miles from the nearest outpost-and you have over the village, constructed a fine barracks for the six-man I
some idea of the transportation problems involved insofar crew, and were living on caribou and the supplies which 1
as supplying these searchlight sections. Add to these diffi- had landed with them, and were quite satisfied to remain
culties the ever-presen t chance tha t the \Villiwaw would
strike, blind you with its intensity, drive your truck from
there indefinitely!
The men who operated this complex supply line from the
I
the road, possibly turning it over, or at best stopping all very end of the Aleutians on down to the Alaskan main-J
movement, blast away your tarpaulins, and leave you shiver- land were a faithful group who did their jobs well, and who ~
ing in your sleeping bag for three or four days waiting for lived a lifetime of experiences in their few months of work. ,
the storm to subside, and it can be understood wh" some and faced all emergencies with fortitude and common sense. I
men who have lived under these conditions shudder' when- The searchlight positions which could not be reached by
ever anyone mentions "The Aleutians." road or path or water-and there were many of them-had
Trucks have been lost for four and five days before tractor to depend on pack parties, which fought their way through I
crews could finally reach -them. These truck drivers were storms, and up the sides of bleak and forbidding volcanic
a rugged group of men, though; and when they were finally mountains, where the wind never died away completelY'1
discovered, they usually had the situation well under con- night or day, winter or summer, and where a misstep from
trol, and followed the tractor along to their eventual desti- what trails as did exist meant at best a bad fall, or the pos-
nation. One truck wandered away from the road during a sibility of disappearing forever into the white hell of
\Villiwaw and was found bv Nav" search aircraft several mountain crevices and caves.
davs later, fortv miles from the nea;est road, with the driver Gas and oil were carried on backboard packs in 5-gallon
and assistant 'driver living very comfortably. They had containers, and other supplies, rations, mail were carried in I
found a frozen caribou, built a fire, made a tent from a small 35- and 50-pound packs. The roads reached as far as
tarpaulin, and were living on caribou steaks and catching possible toward the foot of these mountains, and roads did
up on their sleep while waiting for a break in the weather. exist farther on up; but since these roads were always snow
So the searchlight sections on the larger islands had the covered, winter and summer, their use was naturall" lim-
comforting thought that no matter how bad the weather ited, and "foot parties" were the accepted rule. -
came, either the truck or the tractors assigned to their section' Each set of supplies ,,\hich came in on foot was im-
 FRO~l THE FIGHTING FRONTS 2]

tant. and quanuues were kept to a mmmmm to saye \ Vhile a halt is made for lun' . 'ou gel your answer
boc but carrying up the bare necessities for operations about the weather; for it is SOP that rain comes with lunch.
5 a full-time job, and virtually each man in the section By this time every man in the climbing party is soaked to
d a self-taught course in mountain climbing. the skin, both from exertion and the weather, and is won-
:\gain the weather proved the greatest threat to the lives dering whether supply and rations are worth the effort.
these men, and to the equipment they had to carry. On It is axiomatic that a 5-gallon can of gasoline increases
six-hourclimb, for example, one might start at 0900 with in weight h\'(:~pounds per minute of climbing. After six
glimpse of the sun, and a warm breeze. Fine-but at hour of progress, the weight can be estimated roughly as
Ij a shrieking wind will flatten all the men against the several tons per can-according to the reports of the "Moun-
arest prot('ction. Ropes are hurriedly strung and what- tain Goat" detachment. At any rate, of all the methods of
'er shelter there is at hand gets immediate attention, for getting supplies and rations to these isolated searchlight po-
ce O\'er the edge of, the path, or separated from the rest sitions, the most difficult was the climbing on foot, and
f [he group, a man meets disaster. The snow and wind these "Mountain Goats" were held in high esteem and
ight cease at 1000, and prehaps a heavy fog will creep in affection by their luckier, if less rugged, companions at the
rom the sea, shrouding everything from sight, including top of the hill.
path
e at times. The snow turns to sleet, and backloads The matter of supplying isolated searchlight positions

I
.et heavier and heavier with each passing minute. Ropes is, of course, of universal importance, for there are search-
8restill used, for now the footing is treacherous and the lights scattered on all the battle(ronts whel~ there are U. S.
20ingis tough. \ Army troops; but while there may be positions just as diffi-
At 1030 you break through the fog, and the slush starts to cult to supply, and sections just as isolated as those in the
r.eeze. Perhaps the sun will break through for a few mo- Aleutians, there are none anywhere in the world which
. ents, just to give a sense of false encouragement-for ten have climatic conditions such' as those found on this iso-
lated and barren chain of ,'oleanic islands pointing toward
~minuteslater the winds start to blow again. Up, up, up-
IOU climb, wondering what the next weather will be. Japan ..

Battery Fights to the

~~C"
Last Gun
By lieutenant Conrad M. Fredin, Coast ~rtillery Corps
. The 143d AAA Gun Battalion, assigned to European a quarter of a mile. After an appraisal of this terrain feature,
ITheater of Operations, United States Army, had remained Lt. McGuire ordered his gun into a position north of the
in the Communications Zone until 18 December, 1944, road, commanding both the approach and detour of this
I
.I\'henit was attached to the First U. S. Army, and although vulnerable traffic channel.
ItheBattalion was slated to move forward into Army Area, In proceeding to position, the 1"1-4tractor and gun be-
the plans were changed because on ]6 December, the Ger- came mired in the ditch just above the bend in the road,
Iman counteroffensive broke into the Ardennes. The Bat- and to retrieve the gun the M-4 was detached and placed a
talion was ordered to an intermediate position southeast of short distance up the side of the ditch, where the gun could
iAywdille, Belgium, and directed to go into antitank role on be winched to it. At this time, small-arms hre which had
the evening of ]8 December. been heard in the distance, began to whistle around the
The following is the story of Battery C, of the 143d AAA men at work.
Sun Battalion. It is to be remembered that none of the They had never been under fire before, and were largely
personnel had previously been in a combat zone. This unbriefed on anything but the seriousness of the situation.
firsthand account shows that during the initial heat of Van In the excitement caused by the closeness of their hrst
Rundstedt's December drive to form the "Belgian Bulge" enemy hre, the crew neglected to disconnect the winch
officersand men of C Battery demonstrated their toughness power take-off, and the gun was pulled up so tightly under
and efficiency by knocking out hve of the enemy's heaviest the tractor that the two could not be separated.
tanks, and constructing a vital road block to Spa and Liege. Lieut. McGuire immediatelv ordered the tractor from
During the last light of 18 December, Lt. Donald J\11c. Gun No. 2 to the assistance of Gun No.1, ",ith instruc-
Guire reconnoitered a suitable antitank position for Gun tions that regardless of the condition of Gun No.1, the
~o. 1. The main road from LaGleize through Stoument rescue tractor was to return by 0600 the morning of the 19th
rUnsalmost due East-\Vest, and as the road approaches the of December.
[own it makes a turn to the North, which brings it directly Before the tractor from Gun No.2 arrived it became
into Stoument. On the turn it dips through a cut fOf about clear that Gun No. 1 could not be separated without
 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

A Panther, taken at Grandmenil.

resorting to cutting or other special tools, and the tractor east of where it swing north into Stoument, and Pvt. GeisJ
was returned to its gun, while the personnel of Gun No. 1 inger, an AA outpost man near this mined area, heard some-
took up defensive positions to return enemy fire. Increas- thing coming up the road-in his opinion, a German \'e
ingly heavy German fire hit both entangled tractor and hicle. This vehicle struck a mine within twenty-five yards
Gun No.1, setting the M-4 tractor on fire. The crew com- of Pvt. Geisinger, and although it burned with a brilliant I

pleted the destruction of their gun and set up infantry de- glare, the light penetrated the darkness but little, showing
fense near Gun No.2, about 400 yards to the \Vest. through the fog merely as a dull glow at 250 yards, and
At 0700, 19 December, the situation and weather were invisible from Gun No.2,
beclouded', It remained cold and visibility was very poor. At this time, both the infantry and the AA perceived
It was still dark, and there was some fire to the southeast men working in the predawn darkness with flashlights on
and west of them. Throughout the night the men had the main road, ostensibly clearing a lane through the
heard the roaring of motors and the movement of vehicles, mines. Although small-arms fire continued to come toward
and comparing these noises with the sounds of American them from the direction of the working men, they wer(1
vehicles, they soon learned to identify German vehicles. allowed to complete their job, as it was known that some oi
"It's easy," Pfc, Seamon said. "The German tank motors our Sherman tanks were in Stoument, and it was assumec
-just like the Kraut airplane motors-run slower than ours, the flashlight workers were American Engineers clearing
I

and they run kind of in spurts, the motor racing a while the way for our own attack. .
and then coasting along. \Vhile the tank's coasting you can By 0700 the men of Gun No.2 realized that a mistake
really tell which is which; the Germans use metal tracks had been made. German ta~ks drove up the road past the
in which the blocks are bigger than they are in ours, big mine field and began moving about the crossroads ar4
enough so they hit the road individually with a clanking at the southern outskirts of Stoument. If these tanks re-
'boxey' sound. I don't think any of our tanks make this mained on the road, some of them must have come within
kind of noise." fifty yards of the gun, undiscovered because of the fCf
The early morning darkness and fog was intense, and the and darkness.
crew of Gun No. 2 were almost entirely 'isolated by it Gun No.2 was located about fifty yards from the junC'
from sight and sounds of near-by occurrences, The main tion of the main road where it swung northward with a sub-
road in the cut had been mined at a point about 300 yards sidiarv north-south road. 3etween this AA oun and th
 FROid THE FIGHTING FRONTS

crion, a towed 3-inch AT gun had been emplaced to the fog, safely to the corner stronghold. So far, so good.
er the junction, and in the triangle where the roads Inside the strong point house Seamon and Darago
t there was another 3-inch AT gun. At the crossroads found they were in the company of at least ten infantry-
')C Infantry had made a large square house on the south men. Although this discovery was a surprise to the AA
e of the main road its strong point. Two ]\11-51'sof Bat- men, due to the nature of their mission, the simplest con-
e were scheduled to be emplaced, but had not yet clusion to reach was that their general antitank assignment
\ed. Some engineers had occupied dug-in positions peculiarly fitted them, in the mind of the Infantry lieu-
r the road junction, but during the n!ght they were tenant, for this particular knockout job, and he proceeded
nt to another area. to e:\:plain to them that against a tank such as the Tiger
I In this situation, Gunner Cpl. Humphry organized his Royal, it would do no good to strike with a bazooka any-
e\\'and prepared to fire Gun No.2 at 0700 against a tank where but in the rear through the engine compartment.
entified as German by its characteristic boxey, clanking Handing the two tubes ready for action to Seamon and
und, which had left the crossroads and was idling across Darago, he told them tersely to "Go get the bastard."
he fifty-yard stretch toward him. The tank opened fire \Vith this short orientation, Seamon and Darago left the
rst,using both its machine gun and artillery pieces. The house to meet with a line of machine-gun fire that zipped
en in the gun pit were unable to determine the tank's and \,'histled on all sides.
rget, and not until daylight did they find it-by the holes The diagram below helps to explain their position.
their M-4 tractor.
Lt. McGuire, listening to the sound of the tank's firing,
ncluded that it was probably a Mark IV or other light
nk, for the gun sounded as though it were a 75mm.
~hen thiS.tank changed its direction to come directly toward
~e 3-inch gun between Gun No.2 and the road junction.
The 3-incher engaged the tank, which returned fire with
1(11 its weapons, driving the crew from their piece.
Only when this heavy action took place did Lt. Mc-
Guireand
I the AA gun crew realize that the enemy was not Ammo H-T
In shed
light Mark IV, but a Mark VI Tiger, which apparently
nO o / .0"I
/" ;r r----
AT Gun ~
!~ 'as undamaged by opposing fire, and came to within fif-. G~Z
" -
!eenfeet of the AT gun to destroy it by point-blank action.
1JH'~ c
In re-emphasizing the unfavorable conditions for AT Route 01 lC

Seamon (Darogo/
action, it must be pointed out that although this vigo~ous
firetook place within thirty yards of Gun No.2, because of )(

the fog and darkness, exact information had to be relayed

~o the gun pit from outpost men much closer to the scene. They left the house (1\), turned left, and crawling,
For some reason still unkn'own, whether it was in search circled under the thin fence (B) and up to the hedge-
(oftime out, breakfast, or just waiting instructions, the Ger- row. They saw what Darago called, "One helluva sight!"
ImanMark VI Tiger, after its destruction of _the AT guns, Confronting them was no single German tank, but four
-and all big ones-two Tiger Royals and two Mark V's.
I movedoff farther into the fog, and remained stationary for
twenty-five to thirty minutes. During this interval, Gun
~Commander Sgt. Sarnowski and his crew strained their
The one farthest on the left (No.1) faced north up the
main road. The two tanks immediately to their front, Nos.
I eyesto make out the outlines of the target. Knowing their 2 and 3, Mark V's, faced east directly away from them. The
one on their right, No.4 tank, faced north~est, its 12-foot
enemy was a Tiger, they wanted to be reasonably sure of a
killing shot before revealing their position to his murderous gun pointing straight toward them. Tanks Nos. 2 and 3
return fire. However, before visibility improved, the tank presented their broad rear ends to Seamon and Darago
Imoved on, and they had missed their chance. about 15 to 20 feet away, with the others lying 15 to 20
I Shortly after the Mark VI had pulled away, an Infantry yards distant.
lofficercame down to the gun pit, and began talking to Sgt. Faced with this bulk of armament, Seamon and Darago
lSarnowski about a volunteer to knock out a tank. All that held a conference. vVhat to do? Go ahead and fire, and
Pfc. Roland Seamon heard of the conversation was the word draw the return fire of ta~k No.4, which they could never
I "\,olunteer." "But" as Seamon said, "it sounded like some knock out with a frontal shot, or go back and get some help?
I action, so I said I'd volunteer to go with him." They were afraid their targets would move away while
~ It developed that the lieutenant wanted two men as voI- they crawled around gathering support, so they agreed to
runteers, and Pvt. Albert Darago put in his bid to go with fire at onee and take the consequences .
..Seamo~. The officer explained to the two that there was a Darago said he'd take tank No.2; Seamon took No.3,
German tank sitting at the road junction just a few yards so poking the bazooka snouts through the hedgerow, they
from the square house which he had made a strong point. aimed for the center of the engine compartments, and fired.
He wanted this tank knocked out with bazookas, and al. "Biggest goddam noise I ever heard," Seamon said. "Fire
though neither of his volunteers had ever even held such a burst out in the rear of both tanks."
weapon before, they said they were willing to try. They A moment later, tank No. 4 opened fire with its ma-
moved under small-arms fire coming their way, and through chine gun aimed at the smoke of the rocket propellant, but
 Septelllber-Oct
j\ leanwhile things were getting hot around Gun :'-:0
\ Vhile Seamon and Darago were out after what
Sarnowski thought was a single tank, the infantry
moving back to the rear of their position ..
"\Vhat are you planning to do?" Lt. McGuire asked a
Infantry lieutenant.
"j\ 1/ orders are to hold," the lieutenant said, "but l'
damn well going to have to pull back and reorganize'
order to do it.'"
Visibility steadily improved as the morning lengthenc
and there seemed to be a chance of getting a shot at a tan
as the road junction was now seen from the gun positio
\\lith one man killed, and one wounded up to this tim
Lt. McGuire placed his one "gunless crew" around th
emplacement of Gun No.2, intending to hold until h
position was wholly untenable.
At about 0735 the outpost near the corner house call
back that a tank was moving out onto the road; this tan
probably being the one referred to as the "No. I tank" d
scribed in Seamon and Darago's assault, which supposed
moved down the road when thev fired their second round
into tanks Nos. 2 and 3. '
j While the outpost was still yelling information to th
gun pit of the 90rnm AA piece, the 3-inch AT gun em
placed south of the road junction opened fire, sending l~!
four or five rounds before being silenced by one shot fro (
Signal Corps a Tiger 88. Later inspections showed that the 3-inch shell
A Tiger Royal, stopped at Sterpigny. scooped fist-sized chunks out of the Tiger's frontal annor .
but failed to penetrate. I
the two men were out of the area and crawling back to the Straining to see clearly, Sgt. Sarnowski watched first the
house-fast! Neither was hit, but both could think of a lot muzzle brake, then the gun barrel, and finally the body 0
of places they had much rather be in. As an added spur to a Tiger Royal emerge from behind the corner house. The
thoughts of other places, mortar shells began falling in the trm;erse and elevation men took careful aim .... Gun No
field as they went into the building comprising the Infantr)~ 2 opened fire.
stronghold. The first round seemed to hit the tank well forward, il
Back inside, and feelinoo safe for the moment, thev, were the general area of the left-front sprocket. The second
told to reload and return to make sure of the kill. Seamon round, a lucky shot, hit the barrel of the Royal's 88 about
and Darago took this order with a terrific lack of enthusiasm, a yard out along its length from the mantlet. The 90mm
but said okay, they would go again ... both feeling like shell CAP l\,lI-82), sheared the tube at this point and threw
the man who poked his head in the buzz saw to see how the remaining eight to ten feet of the barrel into a ditch.
he'd just lost a finger there. Four more rounds were fired as rapidly as possible. (
Back at their slots in the hedgerow they found their two 'The escape hatches on the Royal flew open," Cpl.
victims burni~g pleasantly, and obediently put another Humphry said, "and the crew just boiled out of that tank.
round in each. German fire was directed toward them with The first man out, a little guy in black uniform and beret.
doubled intensity the moment they fired, rattling in from got away from us and ducked into the brush, but the out-
straight ahead, and from both flanks. Clearing out hastily post men around the gun killed the rest as. they spilled
again, they managed to get halfway back to starting point out." ~
without incident, when Seamon caught his pants on the "\Vhile they were jumping out to get shot," continued
barbed-wire fence. Tearing himself loose, and perforce Humphry, "we fired one more round into the center of the~
abandoning the cumbersome bazookas, Seamon crawled tank. \Ve figured it was already knocked out, but what thel
with Darago over to the doorway of the "house" and an- hell-one more for good measure." (Later examination I

nounced two Mark V's definitely destroyed. showed that while the sprocket was bent, the track broken.
The two men continued their crawling along the entirely and the gun sheared off by 90mm fire, the only hole through!
realistic "infiltration course" back to Gun No.2, where they the armor of the beaten tank was made in the center by thi
were pinned down about halfway across by enemy fire. 7th, the "what the hell," round.)
Their tight pin-down was broken by covering small-arms As soon as Gun No.2 had disposed of the enemy Tiger
fire over their heads from their gun section, toward the Royal, First Sgt. John Davis left the emplacement position
enemy, and a hand grenade thrown by Darago which sil- and made his way to the "square house," the centrally
enced fire from the direction of the hedgerow, enabling located structure that figures prominently in these en-
them to scramble as far as the 3-inch AT gun knocked out counters. His intention was to make a general reconnais-
at.0700. sance of the area, spotting further hidden tank approach~
 FRO'" 1 THE FIGHTING FRONTS

Signal Corp~
A Mark IV, La Gleize.

possible. This trip he negotiated safely despite small-arms three men to leave the spot in search of cover. They stopped
reo for a moment en route.
I It seems pertinent to mention here that the numerous "I don't think we can reach him now," Davis said looking
r parently casual references to "small-arms fire" in this his- back in the direction of the wounded officer.
Jr\' must not be minimized. The numbers of AA and in- Harris arose to try, but drew such a hail of fire he had to
ea~trymen killed by such fire were such as to make small- flatten immediately ~
s fire anything but a minor nuisance, but since none of l\Ioore said nothing, but he looked steadily toward the
ese men played a commanding part in the primary AT man he had just aided, and turned o\'er a few estimations
etion, their names and deeds are omitted. in his mind. Now, he noted, they seemed to be drawing
Special emphasis is placed on the fact that during these fire from three directions, the heaviest from the same hedge-
T actions fire from several directions indicated that the row that Seamon and Darago had used as a screen from
r1,~ermanswere steadily drawing closer in an encircling which to discharge bazookas.
o\'ement, and yet these untried men continued work in The officer groaned and tried to roll over. This was too
eir first ground action, setting an example under harassing much for j\'Ioore .. Ignoring both the injunctions of Sgt.
re that any battle-hardened troops would have been proud Davis and enemy fire, he crawled through a genuine "pin-
oemulate. down" hail to the officer, gave him an injection of morphine,
( Before Sgt. Davis completed his trip to the "house," and slipped a new bandage over his stomach wound. Roll-
nder
enemy small-arms fire, he was subjected to fire from ing the man over on his side, Moore slipped in beside him

I . S.. 30 caliber machine guns across the road, manned by so his patient's stomach was against the small of his back .
ermans. At the same time, further action interrupted his Then, rolling back to a face-clown position he was able t9
rogress when the Tiger Royal tank designated as No. 4 crawl with the lieutenant toward a point of safety.
the sketch, fired one round of artillery into the house, As he painstakingly inched his wounded burden toward
I~d followed with a long burst of machine-gun fire. Those Gun No.2 position, enemy slugs struck the ground directly
~side came out on the double, and ran west past Gun No. in front of him, and his position was unenviable at best.
~.while the tank turned and cut across an adjacent field. However, with the help of a near-bv infantrvman who
Inside the battered house Sgt. Davis found a medic switched targets and lined his fire on 'the Ger~ans trying
kyond help and dying, and an Infantry officer who had to get Moore, besides the cover offered by I-Iarris, who
been severely wounded in the abdomen. I-Ie walked to the threw a hand grenade at the hedgerow, and Davis, who
loor and yelled for T /5 Kenenth Moore, a Battery medic, opened up with an M-I toward the square house, the medic
~ come and help him. Moore and T /5 Jerry Harris crawled managed to move his man to Gun No.2. There, Harris
~ him from near the gun position, and as Moore and Davis found a jeep in which he carried the wounded man out of
pulled the wounded man out of the house, Harris stood Stoument to the north.
readv to cover their removal. Moore and Davis stayed at their gun position, where Lt.
Moore sprinkled sulfa powder throughout the wounded McGuire was, as he described it, "in a steadily worsening
lrea and wrapped a bandage around the officer's waist and position." The Infantry was outnumbered and outgunned,
lips to keep his intestines from falling out. Almost before and would have to fall back to better defenses. To heighten
\Ioore's first-aid work was finished, intense fire forced the the "worsening" of events, aU. S. ammo-carrying half-track
 26 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOLIRNAL September-Oc

parked only twenty feet from the gun pit had received a from inside the building, and on investigating found a
direct hit from a mortar shell, and the bursting ammo in the basement who had been wounded in the hip, thi
threatened at any minute to blow up his own ammo stored and forearm. The victim was an Infantry officer, and
in the pit. Learning that Lt. Kent, Battery Commander of was in severe pain.
e Battery, had just come into Stoument, Lt. IvlcGuire went "Can YOU walk?" .Moore asked him.
out to give him the situation report. ''I'm ;fraid not," the lieutenant said. "I tried but j
Amidst all this pandemonium, Sgt. Sarnowski and Cpl. couldn't make it."
Humphry rallied their crew into the gun pit and prepared "Okay, sir," IVloore said, "take it easy and I'll see what
to fire on German tanks coming up the road. Others tried can do for you."
to extinguish the blazing half-track, which the Germans He bandaged the wounds and carried the lieutenant u:
seemed to be using for an aiming point, but were driven the stairs. \\Then he reached the ground Boor, Moore hea
back. a grinding crash from a point just outside the house. A s
Several rounds of 90mm ammo in the gun pit were ig- ond later there came a terrific blast as an 88 shell blew
nited, but by some miracle no one was hurt. Sgt. Sarnowski the side of the building.
soon decided, however, that it was foolish to attempt a Moore was knocked flat, but recovered in a moment a p
holding action with the added danger of a burning ammo looked to see if his crippled patient was all right. TH
pyre, so he destroyed his gun by rifle grenade and had the lieutenant had gone.
crew take up positions with the Infantry. In proof of his "Damndest thing ever," Moore said later. "He said
good and timely judgment, the ammunition in the gun pit couldn't walk at all, but a second after that shell hit he w
blew up shortly after they had vacated .. tearing down the stree't so fast I never did catch him
Meanwhile Lt. McGuire had located Battery Com- Moore had tried, too. He chased his charge vigorously f
mander Kent and had given him a report of the situation. about a hundred yards, but \Vasclearly outclassed.
Lt. K'ent instructed Lt. McGuire to continue his Infantry By now, the enemy was obviously taking possession
defense, and he, in turn, left immediately for Halt, six miles Stoument, and the main road o,ut of town to Stoument St
up the road, to bring another 90mm gun into Stoument. tion was under fire. Two men of C Battery were wound I
\\Tith their small-arms ammunition running low, the trying to move down this road, so most of the two gu
AA personnel took up positions between K and L com- crews, led by Lt. rVlcGuire, and some individually, move
panies of the 119th Infantry and delivered fire against the north behind a protecting ridge before going on west t
enemy whenever they saw him. The battalion commander ward Stoument Station.
of the Infantry in the area cited the fighting example of vVhile the men of the destroyed Guns Nos. 1 and
these men as an inspiration to his own troops. were trying to get out of Stoument, Lt. Kent, Battery Corn
Shortly after the AA men had taken up their Infantry mander, was trying to get into the town with another 90m
defense positions, a Tiger Royal tank was observed moving gun which he had found at Halt, and had march order
up along their right Bank. The tank was firing a round of six miles to Stoument. Lt. Kent met such a hail of fire a
88 and a burst of machine-gun fire into each house as it the northern end of the town that he turned his gun aroun
moved up the road. and emplaced it back up the road at Stoument Station. J.

Lt. McGuire helplessly watched the tank moving up. The gun was emplaced and outposts manned and at lOll
Even if he had the bazookas left behind near the square hours, the situation was roughly as shown in the accom
house at the road junction, there was no ammunition for panying sketch:
them. Receiving news that there was a Sherman tank in
the graveyard at the southern end of the town, his investiga-
tion of this report in hope of obtaining support fire revealed
the supposed Sherman was another Tiger moving against
them!
Seeking feverishly for yet another means of heavy assault
fire, Lt. McGuire, with the aid of Sgt. Davis, Cpl. Guigar,
2 TOf/ks
and Pfc. Fidram, found an abandoned German 76mm gun, k.nocked our
which they attempted to man, but before they could get the .,
GUI)

piece in operation, were driven off by enemy machine-gun

hre which splattered off the piece as they worked.
From a safer vantage point the three watched as the
Tiger, coming at them from the east, smashed through a
<:owshed and fired point-blank into a brick farmhouse.
Smoke and dust billowed from every room in the building,
.and Sgt. Davis said he didn't see how anyone in the place
,could remain alive.
Just prior to this incident, Sgt. Davis had become sepa- Lt. Kent's new gun was placed close to the northwest
rated from Moore, the medic, and found out later that he corner of the railroad station building, so sited as to cover
had been in the brick farmhouse shattered by the Tiger a bend in the road about 450'yards to the east of the sratioll
Royal. Just around this road bend, someone had hastilv laid a striJ1
Moore had heard someone call out that he was wounded of mines, of which the gun crew was unaware: .
 FHO~1 THE fiGHTING rHON 1S .!../

At 1045 an American Shennan tank came up the road, the crew. The machine-gun Ere from the heights was a
irted the road corner wide to avoid the mines, and pulled more serious matter, and it was fortunate that this Ere was
to position, with its gun facing the turn)n the road. The delivered with more fury than accuracy. The 1'v1-4tractor
w arrival was decidedly unwelcome because the com- behind the gun was struck several times with little damage,
'onanderchose to park it 'about twenty feet ahead of Lt. and the station building spouted dust from many places,
'cnt'SGun No.4, almost obscuring the field of fire. but gun crew and outposts were unharmed.
,-\bout 800 yards behind the Sherman in space and two The gun crew was about to turn its attention to the hill-
t ninutes behind it in time, a German Tiger Royal tank top enemy when a second Tiger Royal tank came around
ameto the fateful road bend. Like the Sherman, this tank the corner in the road where the Erst had been stopped. It
\l I'ung knowingly wide around the corner to avoid the was engaged immediately and had no chance to return Ere.
lines. Eight rounds were fired, some knocking off the tread, and
Gun No.4 fired one round just as the tank came around others penetrating the lower frontal armor. The crew of the
. he corner. Almost immediately after this round had left tank was killed, some in the tank, and others as they tried
\he muzzle of the 90mm, the Sherman parked to its front, to escape.
fulled out to the left, necessitating the holding of No. 4's The destruction of this second German tank occurred at
h rewhile the tank turned on the road to get out of the way. an extremely fortunate spot. The road through the cut at

'
The German, under no such disadvantage, opened fire this point was flanked by heavy woods on both sides, forc-
~[once with two rounds directed at Gun No.4. The first ing any.vehicle the size of a Tiger to move straight up the
passedwithin whispering distance close over the heads of road. The Erst tank Gun No. 4 had demolished, blocked
(hecrew. The second hit the corner of the station building the right-hand side of the road, and the second was hit just

I
~boutfive feet from the gun and threw masonry and dust as it maneuvered around the first. The two big tanks
rer both gun and crew. lying, knocked out and dormant, side by side, formed a
As soon as the obstacle of the Sherman was removed, road block as effective as though carefully planned and exe-
Gun No. 4 Ered nine more rounds-a total of ten-at this cuted. No other German tanks penetrated beyond this
rank. One round (probably the Erst) missed. One hit the point, blessed for the AA men by a remarkable combina-
jutting "V" at the exact point where the upper and lower tion of skill and luck.
frontal plates joined, and penetrated to the inside. Three During the gun crew's engagement with the German
rounds hit the upper frontal plate and dug through 3lh or tanks, enemy Ere from across the Ambleve River had grown
4 inches of armor, an excellent job of digging, but inef- so heavy that Lt. Kent decided to withdraw his men from
fective since the upper frontal was seven inches thick. the gun to better infantry positions. The gun was demol-
The rounds that hit the lower frontal plate did the ~shed, the crew evacuating up the road via M-4 tractor and
job. They went through the armor and splattered through- Jeep.
out the interior compartment, killing all the crew but one, C Battery, after his road block action, was reduced to a
who was later killed by an outpost as he tried to leave his one-gun outEt, but they had done rheir job well. In the first
rehicle. ground action of their unit they knocked out Eve of the
The men servicing Gun No.4 were so busy with their enemy's heaviest tanks, and killed many of the enemy.
job of knocking out their German tank that they failed to None of the men had shirked his duty, and several had
(
_note two other dangers threatening them. A German half- conducted themselves with conspicu~)Usbravery and ingenu-
track was moving up along the railroad tracks toward the ity.
station building to outflank them, and on the heights across Instructed to hold, the men of C Battery had held, using
1 every means and ruse at their disposal, and Eghting down
the Ambleve River, unoccupied by the enemy at 1015,
machine guns were now set up, spraying the station area. to their last gun, had played a vital part in stopping what
Alert outposts spotted the half-track, engaged it with easily might have been a successful penetration to important
riReand machine-gun fire, stopped it and killed or dispersed communications a~d supply centers.

-
Ground Fire Mission with
I.

T ask Force ttD"*

By Lieutenant Frank E. Solomon, Coast ~rtillery Corps
Task Force "0" started to roll at dawn 15 March 1945, gun Ere from prepared trenches running parallel to the road
and had proceeded approximately 2,500 yards south to the between Ober-Zerf, Germany. (See Sketch 1.)
edge of a woods where it encountered enemy machine- The trenches were approximately twenty-Eve yards from
the road. They were dug in a zigzag manner for approxi-
*From an officialreport to the CO., 390th AM AW Bn. mately 100 yards. The platoon commander ordered another
 11-1l: CUAS 1 ARllLLERY JUURNAL

SKETCH No. J
f]
SI<ETCH No.'2.

]\,116 half-track. that had been in reserve about 100 vards Fragments were very deadly as the rounds were bursting
north in the edge of the woods to come into line and begin approximately head high.
firing. TIle first M 16 withdrew into the woods as the sec- Our Infantry' officers reported the automatic weapons
ond 1\'116 began firing. After approximately 800 rounds, fire to be the most demoralizing upon the enemy.
cease fire was given and the Gernlans were ordered to sur- The only enemy fire encountered from these positions
render. Approximately fifteen did surrender. The enemy was several rounds of AT fire that had no effect. Approxi-
that had not surrendered were seen in the trenches and mately 3,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and sixty
the platoon commander,gave the order to fire again. This rounds of 37mm was expended in this action. ~
time approximately 500 rounds were expended and when
the order to surrender was given again, twelve more pris- .GROUND FIRING AT 1900, 16 MARCH 1945 {
oners came forth. tit 1800 hotm, 16 Ma"h 1945T"k Fo,," "D" "os 1
Upon inspection of the trench it was found that four of
the enemy had been killed by our fire, and three were
wounded.
The only enemy fire encountered was small-arms fire
from the right and to the north.

GROUND FIRING AT 0820, 16 MARCH 1945

At 0820 hours, 16 March 1945 three sections of AA half-

tracks alternatelv fired into the woods north of Britton,
Germany. (See'Sketch 2.) The fire was delivered from
approximately 1,200 yards range and in preparation of the
infantry attack on the town of Britton. One half-track sec-
tion, consisting of one MIS and one J\n 6, was always in
position firing. \\Then a section had fired approximately
1,000 rounds another section was ordered up to the line to
relieve that section. In this manner a continuous stream of
fire was always going into the woods. Prior to firing, visual
and map reconnaissance was made by the platoon leader.
The effects of the fire were very good, and the advancing
Infantry of the Task Force captured about 300 Germans
and approximately lOp were counted dead. It may be 51< ETCH No.3
noted that the fire of the 37mm guns was almost as effective.
 FROr.l THE FIGHTING FRONTS 29
Id up by intensive small-arms and AT fire. (See Sketch tion and twentv rounds of 37mm. All fire was controlled
_.) Several enemy prisoners were interrogated and it was by the pl~toon- commander, in the lead vehicle, an 1\116
arned that several enemy field pieces and machine guns equipped with SCR-528. All firing was delivered while
lI"erelocated in the woods to the south of Bachem, Ger- on the move in convoy. No enemv fire was encountered
manY,the Task Force's next objective. \Vith two sections by the Task Force.' .I "

of t\A leading, the Task Force made a dash for Bachem. . Later intelligence proved that the AA fire had killed six
On the highway running southeast into Bachem the two of the enemy and approximately the same number were
~ectionsof AA opened fire on the woods to the right ex- wounded. Also twenty-five prisoners were taken from the
pending approximately 1,500 rounds of .50 caliber ammuni- area fired upon by the AA half-tracks.

Triple- Threat Troops

By Captain A. E. Martin, Coast Artillery Corps
l Adaptable, versatile and useful, partly describe the self- DEFICIENCIESOF AA HALF-TRACKEQUIPMENTFOR
~propelled automatic weapons and their steadfast gun crews GROUNDFIRE MISSIONS
of the U. S. Third Infantry Division's supporting antiair- Experience of more than a year of campaigning through
( craft battalion, the 441 st AAA A\V Bn. In addition to the Sicily, Italy and Southern France had taught the drivers
primary mission of antiaircraft protection, two new jobs the limitations of the AA half-tracks. Mud and swampy
received much of this battalion's attention during the
Ilast quarter of 1944. These activities consist ,of super-
light artillery for harassing and interdictory missions and
ground have proved more of a handicap for them than for
some of the other Army vehicles. This was due to the
weight of the AA half-tracks, nine to eleven tons, without
close up direct fire support for the front-line Infantry. gun crews.
[ Thereby AA troops have developed a three-phase threat to Shell fragments had often penetrated the lA-inch armor
the enemy. plate and the high silhouette, about 8~ feet, certainly pre-
Such a variety of tasks for any single unit has not been sented difficulties for camouflaging, therefore the AA half-
heard of frequently and was probably omitted intentionally track was recognized as extremely vulnerable.
from the manuals on training and tactics, because it sounds There had been no sighting device issued as part of the
4 screwy. Yet it works! half-track equipment that could be used for measuring of

I REASONSFORBROADENING
THETACTICALFIELD
angles of azimuth or elevation.
,-ADOPTINGTHE SET-UP TO l\/IAKE THE CHANGE
For several months the Luftwaffe had almost failed to put
in an appearance anywhere within range of the automatic At Remiremont, in the foothills of the Vosges Moun-

iI
weapons in the Third Division Sector and the antiaircraft tains, in Eastern France, on October 1, 1944, Major Gen-
gun crews wearied of continuous alert and watchfulness eral "Snapper Jack" ODaniel put into effect with his 3d
with no chance to shoot save an occasional few rounds for Division RCT's, the plan that had been developed by his
the test firing of their weapons. The Third Infantry Division AAA battalion. (The 441 st has been identified with the
Artillery with attached Field Artillery Battalions was getting boys of the "Blue and "Vhite" patch since Salerno.) The
AA protection and many bridges and other vital points system provided for one AA battery to support each RCT
within the Division Area were defended, but mostly against and the fourth battery to protect the medium F.A. Bn. and
a Luftwaffe threat that was not even the least bit interesting. the Division Artillery Airstrip (Cub Field). In each Regi-
Now you don't need to be strong in arithmetic to figure mental Combat Team the AA battery c.P. with 10 half-

I
out that a weapon such as an 1\11-16 half-track mounting tracks remained in the ack-ack role with the 105mm F.A.
quadruple .50 Cal. ivl.Gs. has tremendous' fire power as Bn., and one gun section supported each Infantry Battalion
well as good mobility. That is also true of the M-15, the for such ground missions as might be presented by the
half-track that looks like an overgrown coal truck, but car- enemy. An M Officer in charge of each gun section (one
\ ries a 37mm automatic cannon and twin M.Gs. Cal. .50 in M-15 and OI~eM-16), supporting each Infantry battalion,
its thinly armored turret. \Vhy should 64 such, weapons was given the responsibility for the commitment of the AA
be idle? \Vhy should 500 well trained gunners watch weapons on the ground missions.
faithfully and hopefully for weeks on end with nothing to Infantry Officers immediately recognized the fire power
fire upon? True enough, the antiaircraft battalion was of the M~16 with its four .50 Cal. M.Gs. because on several
doing what it was supposed to do, yet these vehicles con- occasions they had been subjected to similar fire from enemy
sumed thousands of gallons of gasoline and these men ate weapons called "Flak-\Vaglms." Because of the vulner-
thousands of rations each month with no Kraut losses to ability of both M-16's and M-15's, constant caution and
balance the ledger. caref~l judgment in their use and movement had to be
 30 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Septe III ber-Oc
exercised in the areas of the Infantry front lines. The AA the target in daylight, or if a masked target, by map da
officers maintained close liaison with all parts Qf the sup- was put into use. Range tables gave fairly accurate Q
ported Infantry battalions including the Tank and TD and since the best effect with .50 caI. M.G. fire for inter
platoons, AT elements, company outposts and patrols. This diction or harassing the enemy was obtained by spraying 01
was important at all times, but especially when ground fire "hosing" an area, the azimuth angle did not need to be:
missions were in the offing. especially accurate. The 37mm H.E. gave good effect in
For special missions such as convoying truck marches o~ timber or brush covered areas when the range was not ill
the Infantry or when added fire power might be needed to excess of 3,500 yards (the normal range for self-destructioli
provide cover for a river crossing, or ,in certain defensive of this ammunition). Armor-piercing 37mm shells wen
missions, the AA Officer with the Infantry Battalion re- occasionally mixed in the clips at a ratio of 1 to 3 if it \Va
quested additional half-tracks from his Battery Commander learned that enemy vehicles were probably parked in tht
or through AA battalion headquarters when more than one wooded area that was selected for a target.
RCT was affected. The AA Officer with each gun section had a jeep with,
Normally the AA battery received rations and gasoline radio of the same breed as that mounted on each of his half
through the F.A. battalion to which it was attached and tracks. Frequently it was possible to direct fire by radi(
made distribution to the forward sections with its own from the jeep, on targets that could not be seen from thl
transportation. Sometimes, due to tactical circu~stances, guns. Bursts of 37mm were easily visible at night. Tht
it was necessary for the forward units to be supplied with .50 caI. incendiary bullets looked like Bashlights Bicking or
these items through the Infantry channels. The AA Bat- at the instant of impact on any hard surface such as trees
talion ammunition detail stripped the tracer rounds from buildings or rocky ground. Thus fire adjustment of the .5C
the .50 caI. belts for weapons firing ground missions. This cal. machine guns was possible in darkness without the US
procedure was necessary for two reasons; 1) tracers dis- of tracers.
closed firing positions and; 2) tracer rounds fell short after In the crossing of the Meurthe River, just north of St
the burn-out point and endangered friendly troops. The Die, France, on 20 November 1944, six half-tracks of E
ammo was delivered to the forward units by the AA battery .Battery supporting the 7th Infantry with cover fire, ex
concerned. pended 12,800 rounds of .50 caI. and 160 rounds of 37mm
ammunition. This fire helped in the rapid overrunning 01
How AA WEAPONS \VERE USED
the enemy-held positions on the east bank of the river
During the last three months of 1944 tbe Infantry-sup- Before the river crossing, the weapons of both C and D
porting half-tracks fired, on the average, slightly more than Batteries had done an excellent job of helping the troop~
one ground mission per day. In addition they reinforced of their Infantry regiments to clear the Germans from thE
many road blocks, protected the Banks of spearhead com- heavily wooded mountains between Bruyeres and St. Die
panies, or served as strong points in a defensive line when In this area miles of corduroy roads were constructed b)
no firing was done. Casualties for this period were few the Engineers and many times an AA half-track, with 2
and slight; one M-15 was damaged when an enemy mortar squad of doughboys, served as a road block on the small
round landed squarely in the cab and one M-16 was sal- trails where enemy infiltration was possible.
vaged after hitting a ramp mine. One mission of special interest from the standpoint 01
\Vhen AA weapons were in the forward Infantry area, super-light artillery was fired early in October 1944, b)
their usefulness as AA defense was practically non-existent. the gU,n section of D Battery, supervised by Lt. Loui~
Essential concealment and removal of tracer rounds from the \Viseman, supporting a battalion of the 30th Inf. Regt.
ammo belts were important factors. Double security guard The target was a road net around and including the villagi
and the fact that most all movements as well as indirect of Le Tholy, France. The Germans had made this town
fire missions were accomplished during the hours of dark- a strong point and it also served as a distribution center
ness, made daylight rest for the crews necessary. However, for supplies to several of their strongly held road block~
on one occasion the forward crews gave a radio Bash warn- and near-by defended terrain features. At that time, am
ing that helped gunners with the FA. Bn. bring down an munition for artillery and mortars was under strict ration
M £-109 in the area between St. Die and Bruyeres, France. and at a low daily allowance. From a range of 5,800 yard~
To make a success of close Infantry support the AA of- with the advantage of observation at a point less than
ficers had to find work for their weapons. Perhaps more 2,000 yards from Le Tholy, for five straight nights thE
crews and vehicles could have been supervised by one .50 caI. IVI.Gs. sputtered in short bursts to hose the area.
officer, but to date experience has indicated little need for The firing lasted less than a minute each time and wa5
more than six half-tracks per regiment. Reconnaissance of scheduled at irregular intervals of three to fifteen minutes,
roads and firing positions, the concealment of men and \Vith the expenditure of about 30,000 rounds of .50 caI.
equipment, the close liaison with each Infantry battalion ammo, the enemy was denied full use of his supply road
and study of the local situation kept these AA Officers net during the hours of darkness and the heavier ammu'
plenty busy, with only the two half-tracks for each officer nition was conserved for use against observed targets.
to supervise. On the drive from the Meurthe River to Strasbourg, t~
Light 'Ack-Ack weapons were not equipped with sights gun section supervised by Lt. Ben Fisler of B Battery, SUI
that were adaptable for laying guns in either azimuth or porting a battalion of the 7th Inf. Regt., shot it out wit
elevation. The old method of compass and gunner's quad- two German flak-wagons. This action took place whi
rant with improvised luminous aiming stakes lined up with moving forward with a spearhead company into the villar
 Launois on 21 November 1944. i\lachine-gun and about it as to time, firing position and target area, to avoid
JaIl-arms fire coming from the buildings had stopped our being fired upon by friendly troops.
lIoopsapproaching from the south, but the enemy's right 2. Practice fire over our own troops with automatic weap-
Bank was not well protected. Lt. Fisler's M-15 moved ons in mock operations in both daylight and darkness gives
into position near a church wall and after locating what them knowledge of the sound of the AA weapons and
was thought to be an enemy machine-gun position in a confidence in the gun crews.
house, opened fire with the 37mm gun .. A mixture of 3. Knowledge of positions and movements of friendly
A.P. and H.E. shell was used and after about fifteen sec- troops, enemy-occupied positions or possible routes of ap-
onds of firing the enemy machine gun was silent. It was proach of enemy patrols or counterattacks, gives the AA
later learned that the machine-gun fire had come from a officer an opportunity to plan missions for his weapons.
'flak-wagon parked close to the house. This enemy vehicle Aggressiveness in developing missions promotes a good
was knocked out by the 37mm gun, expending about 30 working relationship with the supported Infantry unit, and
rounds of ammunition. prevents assignments of jobs for which AA weapons are
At about the time Lt. Fisler's 1\/1-15was working over not adapted.
the flak-wagon behind the house, the M-16 had moved 4. Camouflage nets are of no use in forward areas. Nat-
into the edge of town along with a tank-TD team. All ural cover is preferred because it can be left behind when
three weapons opened fire on another unfortunate flak- a quick move is necessary and is more adaptable to each
wagon that was attempting to pull out., This flak-wagon location. Use screening brush or limbs when in a wooded
was destroyed and none of the enemy personnel escaped. area; boards, rubble or dead brush from a fuel pile will
In a fast-moving situation, ground missions were found break outline when the half-tracks are shielded from enemy
for the Ack-Ackers with the F.A. Bns. An example of this observation by buildings. '
occurred at Dampvalley, France, 13 Sept. 1944. Sniper 5. vVhen moving forward use only "swept" roads or
fire from a wooded area had injured two artillerymen as trails and follow the armor whenever possible as an extra
one battery of a 105mm F.A. Bn. was moving into position. precaution against mines. Road reconnaissance to new
Lt. vVilliam Canty ordered one of the M-16s of C Battery location either on foot or by jeep is important as movement
of the AA Bn. to follow and support him in eliminating is usually done at night. A road clear of traffic enables the
the snipers. Proceeding up the draw a short distance; half-tracks to get to their new positions quickly and de-
one of the enemy was spotted and killed by rifle fire. Soon creases the time of exposure to enemy interdictory fire.
a large group of Germans was observed approaching through Noise of movement can be concealed if the move is accom-
the woods and when the half-track's machine guns opened plished during either friendly or enemy artillery barrages.
up on the enemy, they surrendered without a fight, but
6. Selection and reconnaissance of firing positions is by
eight had been killed and four wounded. This action netted
far the most important and most dangerous single job that
30 POvV's and three light machine guns in addition to the
AA officers are required to do in Infantry support. Fire
enemy killed and wounded. These enemy troops had been
usually draws fire, especially from a sensitive enemy and
by-passed by our Infantry in their rapid advance, but the
the firing positions should be sufficiently far from friendly
Germans did not know their situation.
troops to avoid drawing enemy fire upon the friendly posi,
Enemy air activity is apt to come at any time. This
tions. Usually half-tracks should be backed into firing posi
proved true on the rainy afternoon of 7 December 1944 tion so that when the mission is finished a quick withdrawal
when 10 or 12 single-engine fighter-bombers of the Luft-
may be made.
waffe came over Field Artillery positions around Strasbourg
in flights of two, three or four planes at very low alti- 7. In mountainous terrain the firing on enemy position!
tude. Just to prove that the AA gunners had not lost "the on lower ground may be accomplished if the front wheel:
touch" in eighteen months overseas, they accounted for of the half-track are run uphill away from the enemy, off
one FVV 190 and two ME 109's destroyed and three others setting the limitation of the M-15 to normal horizontal fire
which probably crashed in Germany, across the Rhine 8. AA self-propelled weapons are not intended to takl
River. the place of armor, but like armor, cannot operate in for
LESSONS LEARNED IN COMBAT ward areas without ground protection against infiltratiOl
All the training that could have been given AA Troops or surprise by the enemy. Usually in road-block position
and officers would not have fully prepared them to meet or when fulfilling the mission of a front-line strong poinl
situations which arose and were surmounted by good co- both half-tracks of a gun section work together or in sUf
operation, reasonable caution and sound judgment in the port of heavier weapons and with the protection of dougl
job of close support for the Infantry. After questioning boys,
out to the flanks. .
both officers and enlisted men, the following points are 9. \\Then supporting the Infantry, only.a bedroll fe
listed: .each man on the gun crew can be carried on the half-track:
1. Close liaison with all elements of friendly troops, A bi-weekly rotation system between the weapons u
1 such as patrols, AT squads, Tank and TD platoons must
forward and those protecting the Field Artillery battalio
c: be maintained. The local situatio'n and any tactical plans enables the men to get clean clothing from their barracl
s\must be known and understood by the AA Officer and his bags which are carried in one-ton trailers. This changin
tI'pun crews. If a ground fire mission is planned for the AA of gun sections gives all men of the battery the same e:
b,weapons, all other elements in the vicinity must kno\v perience and when the crews bring their weapons back I
 - J Ht l.,U[\.) J A.H. JJLLtH.) .lUll KL\:,\L ~e ptelJ/ ber-Uctob

the Field Artillery positions they have a better opportunity CONCLUSION

for necessary maintenance work on their guns and vehicles. In summarization, it may be said that ground action has
FUTURE USES improved an already strong position which the 441s1

I
AAA AvV Bn. has been able to maintain with the hard ..
Occasionally, for short duration, the Third Infantry Di-
fighting Third Division. Infantrymen like to have the"
\'ision has had a garrison or police job in a city of size and
added fire power of the half-tracks up forward and the
importance such as Rome, Italy, or Strasbourg, France.
~ lobile fire power with some protection for gunners is very
desirable in such police duty. It is anticipated that 1v!-16's
t\ck-Ackers gain a feeling that they are contributing more
toward winning the victory. The success of this program is
largely attributed to the work of the AA officers in findinQ
I
can be used in conjunction with the Infantry to ver)' good
proper missions and in maintaining liaison with the Infan~
ad\'antage in any such future assignments that the Third trv. 1
Division may get.
, Certainly it is 1I0t recommended that such operations be ,
In as much as all half-tracks have direct radio com-
attempted by units that have had 110 combat experience,
munication to their Battery C.P's. which are usually located
because noncommissioned officers are often called upon to
near the Field Artillerv Battalion's Fire Direction Center,
carry out the duties of a platoon officer and control of a
auxiliary communicati~n for firing the F.A guns can be
battalion scattered all over a division sector becomes a
provided by telephone relays. It is also expected that AA
matter of almost individual gun section control. Such
Officers and NCO's will be instructed in firing orders and
artillery sensings so that adjustment of fire onto targets may deployment is possible only with tried and tested troops. A
be made by AA personnel directly from the half-tracks full knowledge of the communication nets, for both wire
which are in forward positions. This would be especially and radio in the division, is essential and familiarity with
helpful in breaking up enemy attacks which might not be ~he channels of supply make this great variety of operations
observed by the regular artillery Forward Observers. possible for antiaircraft troops.

AAA With the 4th Armored

Dioision-
By lieutenant Paul W. Sheldon, Cavalry
It was late in the afternoon at the little valley carved planes had frantically tried to destroy these important
out of the hillside by the swift-flowing, narrow \\1erra bridges, for the vVerra was the last terrain barrier to the
River. Combat Engineers labored to complete their ponton Thuringian Plain and the cities of Gotha, Weimar, and
bridges at Spichra and Creuzburg that were to allow the Jena. Time after time they had tried, and time after time
tanks and infantry of the 4th Armored Division to drive they had been sent limping home by the gunners of the
deeper into Germany's vitals. 489th on their M-15's and M-16's.
All was quiet. It seemed rather absurd. This was the "The Krauts tried everything that day," said First lieu-
deepest penetration onto German soil since Napoleon, and tenant Claude A Morrison. "They would send two ships
yet it was quiet. Then, with a deafening roar, eight FYV from one direction, just to try to throw our gunners off
190's and ME 109's roared down out of the fleecy white balance, and then a whole slew of them would come in
clouds. Gunners of B Batten' of the 489th AAA Battalion from the other way."
immediately picked out the' diving, banking planes and Out of the eighty-five planes the Luftwaffe managed to
tracked them with their sights. The sharp staccato of the put in the sky that April 2, the 489th sent thirty-four
50's and the dull thud of the 37's shattered the calm. The spiralling down in flames. In addition, the gunners prob-
glowing tracers of the 50's searched the air like a man ably destroyed six more for a batting average of almost
groping in the dark with a flashlight. Then, the 37's brack- .500% . For this forty-plane. penalty paid by Jerry, he
eted their targets, the 50's no longer searched aimlessly. punctured four pontons on one bridge and slightly wounded
\\That had a moment before been a fast-flying German three men of the 489th.
fighter was a mass of flame. To the left another Kraut Nor were the gunners the only ones that were busy that
started smoking. The remaining six planes took one look, day. Captain Levi Day, bawilion S-4, was faced with the
I banked sharply, and he~ded for home. task of supplying ammunilon for these fast-firing gunners.
This marked the end of a busy day-probably the busiest Three thousand seven hundred sixty-five rounds of 37mm
any single antiaircraft battalion had ever known-for the ammunition and 94,640 rounds of fifty caliber were ex-

I smoking guns of B Battery had just destroyed the battalion's

I thirty-fourth plane that day. From dawn to dusk German
pended. The men had to discard personal equipment to
make room in their half-tracks for ammunition.
 45 FROlvI THE FIGHTING FRONTS 33

---- Fewer enemy planes attacked the Fourth Armored back

in France, but those that came up were plenty tough. As
Corporal John S. Kovach put it, "You couldn't scare them
then, but now they fly high and scare easily. Just give them
to>
a couple of bursts and they break up and head for home."
Although shooting airplanes down is really their spe-
cialty, this 489th crew is a pretty versatile lot and are
proud of capturing more than 1,000 Germans. They have
found that the 1\'1-16 with the multiple 50's discourages
ground troops as much as airplanes. 1\ lore than once they
have had the opportunity to depress their muzzles and blast
away at ground targets.
At Avranches, a gun section commanded by Sergeant
r ~ John lIsuka was completely cut off from the rest of their
battery. After four hours their battery commander finally

l .1h5e 489,h gunne" h,d ,Iso been busy be£o,e. On

('larCh 17, 1945, the Krauts tried to knock out another
contacted the section by radio. He told Usuka that he had
been cut off and ordered him to attempt to break through
to the Batter" CP which was located near the French vil-
bridge. The span was across the Nahe River near the fa- lage of Le P~nt Gilbert. LInder heavy artillery and small-
mous spa city of Bad Kreuznach, and the bridge had been arms fire, LIsuka climbed in his M-16 and with all ouns C>

captured intact by ,the swift-moving 4th Armored Divi- blazing led his second half-track, an M-15 across a bridge
sion. The Jerries risked thirty-nine planes that day and onto the road heading north into Avranches. So tre-

t men of A and B Batteries allowed nineteen to return home

intact. Twelve German planes were destroyed and eight
probably destroyed. Among them were jet-propelled ME
mendous was the volume of fire put out by L1suka and his
crew that they literally had to push the enemy dead and
destroved vehicles aside with their half-tracks.
262's. Two were destroyed and two more were probables. Aft~r clearing the bridge, LIsuka's- track tipped over on
Once again a batting average of .500%. Again on March an enemy road block, so L1suka protected the withdrawal
WI 20 the Luftwaffe attacked in force. This time the multiple- of his squad with an M-l rifle and a submachine gun. He
mount gunners kept fourteen after school and sent the fired two bandoliers of .30-caliber ammunition and finally,
t remainder of the thirty-odd scurrying for home. \\'hen his ammunition was exhausted, engaged three Ger-
The 489th had come a long way since that first day- mans in hand-to-hand combat and succeeded in taking care
July 13, 1944, \vhen they had landed on the Normandy of all three of them. As the other track made its wav
beach and were attached to the 4th Armored Division. through the wreckage, LIsuka and his squad climbed o~
"\Ve've learned a lot," said Lieutenant Colonel Allen M. and made their way back to the Battery CPo
~Iurphy, battalion commander. "For example, back in the No one will ever know just how much enemy equip-
I States we learned to camouflage our vehicles. Over here we ment was destroyed in this ground action, but it is known
, never do that. Vie like to have Jerry come down low and that a bulldozer had to be called to clear the road before
lookus over so we can shoot the hell out of him." Murphy, it could be used by vehicles. For this action Usuka received
the Silver Star Medal and the French Croix de Guerre.
I a robust Southerner with sharp, twinkling eyes, and a keen
sense of humor also had another combat slant about the On April I, 1945, B Battery was in column with the
i employment of antiaircraft. "vVe were also taught to dig our Fourth Armored Division's Combat Command B. The
rehicles in," Colonel Murphy continued, "but we've found leading elements of the column spotted a Jerry airfield
that to be impracticable. \Ve move so darn fast that digging near Eisenach, Germany, where Kraut pilots were fran-
in is out of the question. If the Krauts start shelling us, tically trying to get their ships off the ground before the
I\'e just pick up and move to another position and go on tanks overran their field. Captain John J. Sibert called one
about our business." of his M-15's to come to the head of the column and pointed
~ The 489th destroyed their first plane, a ME 109, on
j July 19, 1944. During the battle for France they swelled
I their total to 26h planes destroyed. Since entering Ger-
manv, thev have more than doubled and redoubled that
nu~ber. The grand. total, as it stood April 20, 1945, was
128h destroyed and forty-one probably destroyed. Virtually
. every type of German plane has fallen to the guns of the
~ 489th including: sixty-eight ME 109's destroyed and prob-
ably destroyed, seventy-eight FW' 190's definites and prob-
ables, one ME 410 destroyed, two HE Ill's destroyed,
one J LI 87 destroyed, half credit' for the destruction of a
JlI 52. eleven ME 262's (jet-propelled) destroyed and
probably destroyed, four Arado trainers destroyed and
probably destroyed. and three observation biplanes de-
stroyed.
34 THE COAST ARTILLEHY JOLlHNAL
out the lucrative target. The gunner coolly laid his sights l\Iurphy put it, "It's seldom that you'll see one of t
on the airdrome and with thirty-eight rounds from his so-and-sos on a clear day unless it's at first light or just a,
37mm smashed three F\V 190's before they could take off. dusK." Asked about warning systems, Colonel 1'Iurph
The fire power of the antiaircraft has also been used to snorted and said, "My men don't need to be warned, they'r~
shield tanks from enemy infantry at close quarters. Two always ready for Jerry. I don't know of a single instance
1'1-16's were sent with lioht
o tanks in a task force to clean when an advance warning has helped us down a Kraut
out two German villages near the city of Limbach. After SI . "
11p, .l-

one light tank was hit, and the 489th platoon leader was Records in this fast-mo\'ing war are difficult- to ascertain.
killed, Staff Sergeant Delmar Yount reorganized the small For that reason the 489th claims no records, but it is proud
force. LInder his direction the 37's and 50's levelled the of its one-day total of thirty-four planes, and its grand total
towns. of 128Vl destroyed and forty-one probables. As Corporal
An attached antiaircraft battalion must be highly mobile Honald Slack puts it, "So maybe they're not records, but
and flexible when operating with an armored division. that's a hell of a lot of planes in anybody's war."
Usually one battery of the 489th moves with each of the The battalion also has its share of decorations. Seven
two fighting combat commands, while one battery is de- Silver Star Medals, sixty-three Bronze Star i\'ledals, two
tailed to protect the vulnerable division trains. One platoon Soldier's Medals, two Croix de Guerre, seventy Fourth
usually goes with division headquarters and another with Armored Division Certificates of Merit, and .forty-five
the division's reserve command. However, this system is Purple Heart Medals are displayed by men of the 489th.!
always subject to quick change. One combat command Every officer and man in the battalion wears on his right
may need more antiaircraft protection, so the antiaircraft breast the blue rectangle with the gold border signifying thel
battalion commander supplies it as he sees fit. Usually that's coveted Presidential Unit Citation.
quite, a job when miles separate the combat commands The 489th AAA AVv Bn (SP) was activated Februaf\'
-miles that stretch over "Indian Country" that has never 10, 1943 at Ft. Bliss under the present CO, Colonell'lu;.,
been cleared by American troops. phy. In December of '43 they participated in the Louisi. \
Colonel l\/lurphy and his men have noted few unusual ana maneuvers and in March of '44 they landed in Eng- [
tactics on the part of the German air force. The Luftwaffe land. The battalion trained in vVrexham, vVales, and until •
has a healthy respect for the men and guns of the 489th they joined the Third U. S. Army and the 4th Armored
and like outfits. Gennan pilots like a low-lyino , 0
cloud Division on July 13, provided antiaircraft protection for
bank from which they can dart in and out. As Colonel English airfields.

90mm Guns at Balete Pass

By Lieutenant Perry R. McMahon, AUS
Antiaircraft Artillery used for Infantry Battalion support of the north-unmapped, mountainous, and in the end a
has proved highly successful in some of the toughest fight- possible escape route back to the homeland of Japan.
ing on Luzon: the Battle for Balete Pass and the Victory As in all campaigns, time was the essence on Luzon. '
of Villa Verde Trail. \Vould the Jap be defeated before the long rainy season set
In the Battle for Balete Pass the 90mm AA gun came into in, and would the passes north be cleared before mud on
its own-praises were sung by the Infantry all the way down the newlv bulldozed roads, which would have to be con-
the line from the colonels commanding regiments to the structed, 'make movement practically impossible?
doughboys who watched the shells bursting in Jap caves The northern mountains of Luzon rise above the clouds.
no more than thirty yards in front of them. They are 'rugged and there are no main all-weather roads \
On the ViIla Verde Trail, where Bofors 40mm and except two-National Highway No. 5 which goes through J
multiple .50 caliber machine guns were used mounted, the Balete Pass, and National Highway No.3 which leads to
Infantry was equally as enthusiastic-but this action will be Baguio, both cliff-clinging affairs. Both could easily be de-
discussed in a later article. fended by the enemy, he thought, until hell froze over.
The battles were fought over the worst terrain possible. These roads lead to Aparri, that port in Northern Luzon
During the latter stages the rains came and added to the' where the Jap had landed Dec. 12, 1941, just five days after l
difficulties, but before the way was cleared a total of 16,100 Pearl Harbor. 1
Jap dead was counted. How many additional hundreds lie Probably the most important of these escape routes mili-
dead, sealed to their doom in the vast caves, or how many tarily was Balete Pass, gateway to the Cagayan Valley. This
were wounded and dragged back can only be conjecture- valley has an. average width of forty miles and extends for
the Jap does not announce his losses. 200 miles. Mounted troop movement would be easy for the
Early intelligence in the Luzon campaign indicated that Japs on his side of the barrier back and forth from his
General Yamashita's final opposition would be in the wilds stronghold at Aparri. Approaches to the valley from the
 KONTS

SCAL(;.r=8' (ApPROX)
r AR~A. K&MBU PLATfAU
DATE-' 6 MAY '45 -
I NOTE:-
~
DeNOTE TUNNEL 4'1-1161-1
I
COMMUNICATION TRENCJ.I
t
0 ----- - TRAIL TJ.lRU DRAW TO JlOSPIT4L

!
" s\ FIRING POSITIONS

- sr;CTORS OF FIRE
f
'<J
The "fortified zone" on the knoll before Kembu Plateau.

south are hampered by the surrounding mountain masses Every stretch of strategic ground was pock-marked by
10n three sides, restricted by the few roads, while air ap- Jap holes and gun emplacements. They mounted guns in
proaches are similiarly impeded by the mountain peaks, sheer cliff-sides,on the reverse slopes, in the ravines, and
allwere well camouflaged as only the Jap knows how to use
t ~hich in some cases exceed 8,000 feet. this technique after a dozen years of continuous war.
It is true there are several trailsand traces through these
mountains, beaten out by the bare feet of the natives in their Batterv A of the 161 st AAA Gun Battalion came into the
hundreds of years of peregrinations. Among these are the Luzon Campaign on S-Day, landing at H-Hour plus 3 and
1
Villa Verde Trail and the Old Spanish Trail, as well as a set up antiaircraftgun defenses in the Lingayen Gulf area.
Negrita Trail running from Gaziguran Bay on the east to The Battalion is commanded by Lt. Col. I-larryC. Bailey.
the north of Mt. Anacuac, in Nueva Vizcaya province. As it turned out most of the Jap air arm allotted to the
The Japs had also constructed a track from a point ten Ph~lippines had been destroyed on Leyte, or caught on the
miles south of Echague to the Casiguran Bay area, which ground in Luzon, and expected air attacks were negligible.
was once the goal of their attempted escape from Central On 6 April, two months later,the battle for the gateway
~ Luzon. It was primitive in nature, and like the others would to Northern Luzon was begun. The Pass had to be forced
I take no vehicular traffic. and the Japs were dug in and waiting.
So from the above, itisapparent that the Balete Pass was Our artillerydid a magnificent job. They stood off in
the Japs' primary escape route, particularly if he were to at- the lowlands and threw 105's and 155's high explosive and
tempt to salvage some of the materiel he brought with him white phosphorus. The guns were moved up almost impass-
I when his dream of a Greater East Asian Empire was at its able roads-roads bulldozed by our Engineers against moun-
"
zenith. Conversely, itwould become the attack route of the tainsides which had supported only footpaths before. Our
Americans when they began the clean-up of Northern heavy 4.2 inch chemical mortars were carried close and
t Luzon. sent shells into the Jap positions.
[ Indications are that even before the battle for Luzon was But the Japs withdrew within their mountainside caves
r begun the Japs had been building defenses for Balete Pass; pulling their guns in with them during the barrages and
certainly by February they had plans drawn for artillery then wheeled them out to fireagain.
emplacements in the Pass, and continued tunneling their High artillerytrajectoriesnecessary to get over the ridges
underground redoubts up until the time the Americans had made .closing of these underground fortresses difficult.
fought their way to the other side. The Infantry could do the job only by crawling through
 JU 1111::. Lvr\~ I Ali. IILLtti.l JUll li.l'\r\L

the firing. During his visit thirty Japs tried a suicidal .

filtration attack. \Vith 25-pound demolition charges strap
to themselves they climbed to within 100 yards of the
sition.
The area had been booby-trapped, and a contingent u
Infantry was there. It was getting dusk and the fighting Con
tinued until long after dark before all Japs were killed Cr
driven off.
Captain \Ve]ford A. Sherman, Jr. was commanding of
ficer of the 161st 1\A Gun Detachmen t. as the four OUn
t:>
were known when they were pulled out of Ordnance an
personnel selected from the 161st 1\1\A Gun Battalion.
Neither he nor any other of the 1\AA personnel wil
boast of what they did. They suggested going to the In.
fantry for the story of the AAA in Balete Pass.
The Division making the drive credited the four guns
with knocking out or materially aiding in destroying ap:'
proximately 300 pillboxes, caves. machine-gun nests andl
gun emp]acemen ts.
No one will ever know how many Japs the guns killed.,
Before the infantry had cleared the area a total of nearh'!
8,000 dead Japs was counted. In a wild wooded mountain-!
ous terrain such as this it is impossible to estimate how'
Once Kembu Plateau was reduced, the Americans pushed on
with the bulldozed Engineer Road. The 90's went forward (see
many Japs crawled off to die. I
emplacement top center) until the junction of Villa Verde As the 35th Infantry advanced they dug out two can's
Trail and Balete Pass was open to direct fire. Tojo's Bowling which had been sealed by the AAA, and in each of these
Alley was to the left of Kembu Plateau. \\!inch Hill (not caves were eighteen dead Japs sprawled out about 47mm
shown) was on the next ridge. guns, their favorite mountain weapon, a high-velocity piece.
Apparently they had suffocated. Another cave opened by
the Jap mortar and m~chine-gun fire close enough to blast the 16lst Infantry resulted in the finding of forty-nine
him out by bazooka or Rame thrower-and this at a great Japs-that is just an example.
loss of life-a practice not condoned in General \Valter "God only knows how many we killed firing direct fire,"
Krueger's Sixth Army. said Capt. Sherman.
Something had to be done. Something else was needed. At one point advancing Infantry ran into a heavy concen-
At Sixth Army Headquarters there had been discussion of tration of dug-in Japs. TIley set up a perimeter and called
the possibilities of using the 90mm antiaircraft gun in' direct for support. TIlis spot, known as the "Bamboo Concentra-_
fire. Colonels yV. L. ;'vlcNamee and Frank T. Osten berg tion," was about 100 by 50 yards in area.
01' the Army's Antiaircraft Section believed it could be done. "\Ve started at the far edge of the patch and brought it
Result was four guns were sent into the approaches 01' in," said Major yVilcox. "TIle Infantry laid low as we
the Pass for trial. Hoads were bulldozed for them up the fired not more than fifty feet over their heads. The Infantry
steep mountainsides as far as possible to afford direct fire. said bring it closer. yVe moved it in ten yards, we were hit.
The Japs long before had secured all favorable terrain and tin a not more than thirty yards in front of them. 'You better
left only what wou]d seem impossible for the Americans. I:> d
move it back five yards, we are getting frags an concussion.
.
l1ley had planned without knowing the potentiality of radioed the Infantry.
our Engineers. Through the huge rain forests of the moun- "At first we questioned bringing the fire so close," added
tainsides the engineers cut their road, flanking Highway 5 the major, "but the Infantry said, 'we have confidence in
to the left and mounting higher and higher. you.' This was satisfaction, because when we were bringing
Some grades were better than 100 per cen t. Reach ing a the gun up the Infantry had kidded us, saying, 'hurry up
point so steep no vehicle could travel, a caterpillar's crew with the gun so we can take the Pass.' I admit I was skepti-
strung cable and the cat was winched up. It in turn rai~c.! ca], but results have been far above expectations.
the necessary materia] and an emplacement was dug, the "Each time the Infantry moved up we were called upon
gun dragged up and revetted in with sandbags. The position to spray the area we]1. One morning we thought we had
was so high the silhouette could be seen for miles-if th~ cleared an area, but as the Infantry advanced they Rushed
Japs had known where to look-but American ingenuity out three Japs who ran off against the grassy crest of a ridge.
again was apparent as the mask of trees was not removed By radio the Infantry asked if we cou]d see them. We
until the gun was emplaced and camouRaged with a net and c~uld ..
the raw earth screened with vegetation. Then the trees in 'They are very close to your own troops, but if you want
front of the piece were blasted away and the gun began we will fire," radioed back the OP.
sending high-velocity shells into Jap caves 4,000 ymds " "\Ve want it,' replied the Infantry commander. So we
distant. Some rounds went directly into the openings. gave them what they wanted and where they wanted it,"
Major J. Neil V/ilcox, Batta]ion S-3, came up to watch the major concluded.
 FR'" 37
FHO~l THE FIGHTING FRONTS

Sut. \Valter J. Bosak was 0uun commander. "Tlie round fire on the Americans with comparati\'e safety, hidden
~
landed right where we wanted it," he recalled. 'Then we among the clouds.
!!Ota call that two machine-gun nests had been spotted. \Ve One of the incidents in the Battle for the Pass brouoht o
~nt over eight rounds, four in each pillbox opening, and fame to the AAA for accuracy._ Firino0 from "Banzai Hidge"
the Infantry radioed back-'it is as exciting as a football (the soldiers soon had appropriate place names for each
game. the boys are jumping up and down in excitement. we area). observers for the 90's could watch Japs traversing a
h3\'C never seen so much machine-gun nest in the air at one bend in the Highway some 3,000 yards from the guns. The
time before.''' OP from where Sgt. Raymond Obertino and Sgt. Jesse
"Several times," said Major \Vilcox, "the infantry told Reynolds were watching was only 200 yards from the Japs.
~s after we had sprayed an area, that they had taken their The Japs were in what the doughboys had named "Tojo's
objective without a casualty. It was so exciting firing direct Bowling Alley," because of the thunder-like reverberations
that radio procedure was often forgotten. firing of artillery caused in the mountains.
"As an example, Co!. Stanley H. Larson, commander of "\Ve picked off a dozen or so Japs," said Sgt. Obertino,
the 35th Regiment, was directing fire one afternoon. He "but every evening as regular as clockwork they still came
~houted into the microphone ,'see that area up there by the around that bend. vVe thought they must have a head-
trest?' 'Yes,' replied the gun commander. quarters somewhere below and they were going in for chow.
"'\Vell, sweep that area up and down with time anJ One night as usual three had just come around the bend and
point detonator fuses,' and as that was done, he was asked, we put in a round and they disappeared with the explosion.
'how's that?' "\Ve noticed two more Japs. They had halted where the
" 'Do it again for good measure,' commanded the colone!." shoulder of the cliff met the roadway and peeped around
\\Then the Infantrv reached the area the next dw, fortv- the ledge. They pondered and talked to themselves like the\'
seren dead Japs and ~ighteen new graves were count~d. TI~e were arguing. They looked all around because you can't tell
A[\1\ knocked out several 47's in this area, no one knows where shots are coming from in the mountains, then tlw)'
how many and probably never will-when they saw Hashes ran for it.
at night, they replied. It was a long drag through Balete "I yelled, 'they are running down the road!' and Captain
Pass, the road was up and up and up, and was often obscured Sherman. commander of the Detachment, said, 'oive
C>
her
by clouds . five mils right and fire.' vVe put that round right between
. Frequently the Japs would wait until the clouds closed them. the fifteen-yard lead was just right. I guess they
in before opening their barrages on the Americans; having must have been hungry. \Ve were using those 90's like an
previously prepared firing data on the terrain, they could 1\1-1 rifle."

This 90 position was dug in under the road, the only place where space could be found.
38 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

of Jap dead were scattered over the ground where Bal

Pass and Villa Verde Trail joined.
"I reckon I can throw some rounds in there in a f
seconds if any more Japs pass that point," said Gun Seroea
\Valter J. Bosak, "and we figure they will start thr~uo
about dusk. Last night we fired seventy-one rounds::'
harassing fire along the road just to let them know we We
here."
Lt. Col. Stanley R. i\lcNatt commands the 1st Ba
talion, 161st Infantry, and is plain-spoken. He endorsed tru
use of the 90's without reserve. "I know damn well thjJ
are good guns," he said. "Before we advanced it afford.
excellent preparation. The guns closed or knocked out i
numerable pillboxes, machine-gun nests, and heavier gu
emplacements.
"In our advance on Chicken's Head Hill, two of the 90'~
were set up on the 161st's supply road in the rear of Norton'l
Knoll, and two on Banzai Ridge, and we will never knOl
Interior view of the 90 position under the road. how many Japs they killed.
"At one point near Kapintalan bridge," the colonel con
Once, when firing from what naturally enough soon b~- tinued, "before we really got into the Pass, the 90's fired at
came known as "\Vinch Hill," Major General \ViIliam F. guns the Japs would run out on the road, and the wholl
l'darquat, Commanding General 14th AA Command; Brig. section was covered. Once when the Infantry opened 3
General Charles A French, and Brig. General Evans R. cave sealed by 90 fire-it was a big room dug into rock abeul
Crowell came to visit the position. They were loaded in ten by ten feet, extending back into the mountainside som
the ammo trailer which was winched up the hill. forty feet-it was discovered a direct hit had destroyed the
On another occasion an AAA officer was called and told gun and crew completely.
that he was forthwith in charge of seeing that General "From the very first the guns gave us the closest support:
\Valter Krueger got through to the gun positions. The roads continued Col. McNatt. "As we advanced for Objective No,
were rough, in some places impassable; the mud was deep. I, a hill some 1,000 yards west of Digdig, the guns were
~eneral Krueger sa.w the area, but only after much walk- sometimes firing not more than fifty feet over our heads. In
mg. this instance, to my personal knowledge they knocked ou
Once in the action below Banzai Ridge, where the ammo three machine-gun pillboxes and one cave. I don't knO\
had to be carried to the guns round by round, officers and how many Japs were neutralized in Foxholes besides this.
men of the 161st Infantry's cannon company pitched in "\Vhen we advanced to the knoll before Kembu Plateau
and lugged it up to the 90. Later Chinese guerrillas carried later renamed Devin's Ridge, in honor of one of our dead
ammo, and spread out in a perimeter about the guns at night the 90's did a magnificent job.
to guard against Japanese suicide attacks. It was a veritable fortified zone (see sketch) and can
Finally after more than a month of fighting, our forces tained the bulk of a battalion, reinforced with a signal
began to see daylight through the other side of the pass. outfit and hospital unit.
The Japs had been pressed back. The 90's were carried
"\Ve had only one approach-straight up the face of the
forward and a new position dug into OP Hill, an eminence
ridge, which was completely covered by Jap fire. The 90'!
rising on the left flank side of Highway 5, affording a close-
ranged in and peeled those workings back like a big shove
up view of the highway winding pretzel-like down into the
stripping coal. ~Te spent two days probmg through thost
Cagayan Valley which opens northward from Santa Fe.
positions, and on the morning of the third day we sent D
Here from the observation post could be seen the intersection
Company with its mortars straight ahead, A Company wa
of the Villa Verde Trail. Over on the right the 25th Infan-
advanced on the left, and B Company on the right, makinl
try was cleaning up the slopes down into the Valley, the
an advance of 2,000 yards, with very Few casualties."
161st was on the left, and immediately in front doing the
Lt. Robert \Y. \\Tilman, of Jackson, Mich., of the Is!
same, and farther to the left, northward, the guns of the
Battalion, also had praise for the 90's.
32nd Division, "The Terribles" could be heard booming.
The Jap was being flanked and had to withdraw, and the "Taking of Kembu Plateau was the key to the Pass. I
only road out was under the direct fire of the 90 on OP allowed us to flank the Japs' remaining positions, and t(
Hill. The AA 90's had been given orders to move up to the establish our own positions commanding the northen
Pass on 5 April. This was 25 May. entrance to both Balete Pass and the Villa Verde Trail.
Some 2,000 yards down the hill northeastward a long "I have seen the effect, I have directed their fire a
Jap gun had been firing at night. Its flashes had been times, and I saw a 90 pick off a Jap at 3,000 yards range aD(
marked, and Major \Vilcox had a crew out cutting mask blow him to bits-that's pretty accurate shooting for ill)
away so the 90 could be traversed and fire opened with money," Lt. \Vilman said.
point detonator fuse. "In viewing the effect of caves sealed with 90 fire, afw
Some 6,000 yards down the valley a few crumpled figures seeing the Jap guns destroyed, the dead crews sprawled
 FRO~l THE FIGHTING FRONTS

t it, I think it is the ideal support weapon when the Col. Johnson also wanted to get AA searchlights for his
of fire is direct." Infantry. "There is a definite need for searchlights in night
Asimilar endorsement was given by Col. Victor Johnson, fighting against the Japanese," he said. "Such lights would
manding the 161st Infantry, who said: prove invaluable aids against the JaJ? tendency to infiltrate
~"There were positions we couldn't have taken without at night, and would be a big morale factor for the boys."
pportfrom the 90's. Our artillery fire was 200 and 100 After direct fire from the 90's had made such an impres-

!
fdsin front of us but the 90 was hitting only 30 yards in sion in Balete Pass, four more guns were brought up for
nt. Once, firing at a single Jap, they moved the fire two indirect fire. The task was assigned to A Battery of the 161st
rdsright and two down and hit him amidships. \"hy not AAA Gun Battalion, and while not so exciting, the crews
, eludea battery of 90's with every infantry battalion?" Col. shelled at extreme range on the old Spanish Trail some
I nSonasked. 18,000 yards distance.

Bombardment. of Japan
By Colonel Theodore J. Dayharsh, Coast Artillery Corps
~
iPresent-day bombardment
.
of coastal objectives presents The exact composition of the bombardment force cannot
~constantly changing picture as new and improved tech- be given. It included fast battleships, cruisers and destroy-
.que is put into effect. Since Coast Artillerymen are ers and was a well balanced force. Commanded by Rear
harged with combating enemy bombardment efforts, a Admiral Badger, it was composed of units drawn from
scription of a recent bombardment of Japan by our own Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet. The Fast Carrier Force, less
~la\'al forces may prove of interest and, insofar as security the bombardment units, scheduled air strikes for 15 July
1onditionspermit, present facts that might influence deploy- and provided continuous combat air patrols over the bom-
~ent and employment of our own seacoast weapons to meet bardment forces to destroy expected enemy air opposition.
milarconditions. Airborne spotters were provided over the target-a necessity
The city of ivluroran lies in southwestern Hokkaido. because of the mask afforded by a'rugged, hilly coast line
~anking as one of the principal commercial ports (1940 sheltering the targets from direct observation by the bom-
pulation 107,628) of Hokkaido, it is the site of one of the bardment force. Target maps had been prepared based on
rgest steel and iron works in Japan. Prior to the war the best information available, but were sketchy in nature.
turoran handled nearly one-half of the total exports of The run-in was started in darkness but completed in day-
~ okkaido; it has increased greatly in size and importance light with initial salvo time of 0936 Item. The coast of
~incethat date. Honshu first became visible on the port side; then Hokkaido
! When the Commander of the Third Fleet reached the coast line showed dimly through a light haze to the starboard.
~ecisionto bombard Muroran to destroy the steel and iron Speed considerably in excess of 20 knots was maintained;
~\'orksthere, it was realized that existing (15 July) condi- the initial disposition was one best suited for antiaircraft
r,ionswere far from ideal. Available information of the defense; the whole project seemed unpleasantly akin to
~orthern Honshu-Hokkaido area was mostly prewar and closely inspecting a lion's jaws to see if he had sharp teeth.
rery sketchy. Photographic coverage had been very lim- Almost unbelievably the skie.s remained free of Japanese
ited. Most of the area required for the approach and bom- planes. At 0936 at a range in excess of 30,000 yards the nine
bardment was considered mineable, and the existence of 16-inch guns of the leading battleship belched forth the
coastal defense guns was believed probable, although the initial salvo, followed immediately by salvos from the accom-
caliber and location was unknown. Enemy airfields on panying battleships. Spotting planes in spite of low ceil-
northern Honshu and Hokkaido were numerous and pre- ing over the target area sent in prompt spots-to nearest
sented an impossible problem for neutralization by carrier 200 yards in range and the nearest 100 yards in deflection.
air strikes because of the prevailing poor weather. Rapid fire was maintained but necessary time taken for
The decision to send a bombardment force in under these spotting and adjustment; a rate of fire of a round per gun
conditions would appear foolhardy unless considered in the every two minutes was averaged. A leisurf:ly bombardment
light of preceding events. Heavy carrier-air attacks on the speed of 15 knots was set on a straight course; lack of air
Tokyo area, 10 July, had aroused no Nipponese reaction
or shore artillery opposition made maneuvering, higher
and carrier-air strikes against Northern Honshu and Hok-
speed or counterbattery unnecessary.
kaido, and bombardment of Kamaishi in Northern Honshu,
14 July, likewise failed to meet opposition other than Aak. One hour later the bombardment had been completed.
It was necessary to find the amount of punishment the Over a thousand tons of steel and explosive had been
enemy would accept without attempting retaliation, and to poured into J\lluroran; plane reports and later photographic
reap the rich rewards of his inexplicable passive defense. coverage confirmed severe damage to the assigned targets.
-tv l Mt \...-Ur\;:)1 r\h llLLth \ JUUhl"r\L ;:)epttl7llver-Uct

Retirement was at high speed, with a friendly CAP still pro- b. Major caliber seacoast guns must cover vital
viding air coverage, but Japanese reaction remained nega- proaches. The Japanese may ha,'e had some coastal defen
tive. A daring foray into enemy inner waters had been but the bombardment ships at 30,000 yards were beyo
completed without damage to our forces. their reach.
The following points are listed as noteworthy: c. Bombardment accompanied by air strikes and corer
a. 1\ lineable waters will not deter a determined force. by combat air patrols is very difficult to counter-the cnem
Extensive mine fields must be established to den\' vital made no attempt to do so.
water areas. d. A passive defense is excellent-for the attacker.

Combating the Universal

r ,

Enemy Disease
By Lieutenant Colonel leonard M. Orman, Coast Artillery Corps l
..,
\Ve began our sanitary preventive measures before we in the lO-in-1 rations proved its worth. All men had brough!
left our staging area. First we inaugurated a thorough train- toilet paper which lasted until we could get at the suppl~'(
ing schedule on field sanitation measures. vVe drilled home in the 10-in-1 or unpack our own.
1
again and again the danger of the mosquito, the fly and the IVlosquito bars, insect repellent and Hy traps were un. 1
rat. Every means available was used to make sanitation im- packed and put into immediate use. )\'len were required t(
portant to every officer and enlisted man. \Ve used FM's, be completely clothed during the hours from dusk to dawn. J
training films and talks by men who had returned from The rainy season was going strong when we landed. Living.
similar areas. \Ve made certain that mess sergeants were conditions were not ideal. The filthy water buffaloes wan. 1
familiar with all methods of waste disposal and actually dered around our camp bringing Hies with them.
knew by practical demonstration how to construct grease Soon we moved into better camp sites. vVe picked hills,
traps. \Ve were lucky in one respect. A near-by Seabee with an unobstructed breeze. This aided materially in cut.
battalion had the best exhibit that I have ever seen of all ting down the Hies. In one area cutting of the knee-high
types of field latrines, showers, garbage racks, incinerators grass around the area for 100 yards materially decreaSed(
and methods of water purification, all from improvised ma- the flies.
terials. \Ve took every officer and EM on a tour through this
Now. that the rainy season has ended and we have alii
exhibit anel explained in detail the methods of construction.
te~ts, .mess halls andlatrine~ scree~ed and use ae:osol bombs
\Ve prefabricated fly traps and latrine seats and had them
daIly In mess halls and latnnes, HIes and mosqmtoes are no
ready to assemble on debarkation.
longer a menace. Still we take the precaution of putting oi~
O'n the trip down on a crowded transport we had the
on fire barrels, promptly disposing of .beer bottles and cans,
usual inconveniences of having to bathe and wash mess kits
and of stacking 55-gallon drums on their sides rather than
in salt water. \Ve had the foresight to secure salt-water soap
on ends to eliminate all possible breeding places. \Ve put
but we found later that the soap included in the lO-in-1
plenty of urinals around the areas so that even the laziest
rations was much better for the purpose. On the mess kit
man will not be tempted to contaminate the ground.
washing we had to compromise with Army Regulations.
)\ less kits washed in salt water have to be elried or else a film Rats were and continue to be a problem but constantly;}
is left on them which even dipping in hot salty water before smaller one. \Ve are carrying out a vigorous method of
eating does not remove. By daily inspections we managed poisoned-oats baiting stations with as many as a hundred
to keep the crowded living quarters clean and had but a cans in a single battery area. Permanent measures of control
small sick list during the voyage. that are being taken include the filling in of all of the porous
Our first camp was on the beach in an area vacated by an coral rock area and elevation of all tent Hoorsto eliminate all
Infantry company the day before. As they had done a good possible breecling places.
job of marking latrines and garbage pits they were a goocl Our Sanitary Officer visits even the most distant installai
example to our men. vVater had to be hauled. Mos- tion frequently and makes recommendations for improve-
quitoes were bad and flies were worse. Since we were eating ment in writing to the Commanding Officer weekly. These
C-rations and 10-in-l the mess was of little problem. V/e are vigorously followecl up.
got out our burners and set up hot water for dipping mess Deep-pit latrines are now being used. Frequent applica-
gear before eating and the usual three mess washing cans tions of PDB make them odorless as well as sanitary. Fifty-
for after eating. \Ve washed in the ocean and here the soap five-gallon drums, four-high per seat, are used at one battery
 FROJ\I THE FIGHTI:\lG FRONTS 41

:re ,'olcanic rock made diooino

00 0
of a conventional pit im- breeze are all that is needed. Breezes are usually blowing.
-ible. Grease traps of this type have been constructed Salt tablets are used by those whose work entails physical
proven most effective. labor. The tablets make manv ill and these men must resort
Urinals consist of a pipe with a helmet or cone welded on to a tablespoonful of salt in a ~anteen cup of water.
end. The open end is screened. The pipe is stuck in This sanitary consciousness has paid dividends. Although
ground with a two-foot cube of coral fill. An air pipe we've been bivouacked in unsanitarv conditions, have weath-
rl~tkeeps it odorless. ered a rainy season and have been' near the native villages
The Quartermaster laundry units wash some of our with all of their endemic diseases our sick list from all causes
Iothesbut not enough. These windmill washers help fill including accidents and a large percentage of chronic ail-
gap. They are easily constructed-some scrap and a ments has never exceeded three per cent.

l From Connecticut to the

•
Philippines
By Captain Welles Eddy, Coast ~rtillery Corps
nl
"\triginally
The 21lth Antiaircraft Automatic \Veapons Battalion,
the automatic weapons battalion of a Connecti-
able, training in these new weapons was largely of our own
designing. Gun mechanics worked closely with Ordnance
1 t National Guard Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment, was companies, which kept one jump ahead of the using arm.
( ducted into Federal service in January 1941. At the time This training proved invaluable later at remote jungle strips
I. f this writing the battalion has completed three years of and ports where replacement parts and ordnance detach-
g rerseas service, having participated in the East Indies, ments were not available.
,-Papuan, New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago and Philip-
pine campaigns. For the part they played at Papua they In October 1942, two batteries of the battalion moved
5 recei\'edthe Presidential Unit Citation. with their new guns to Port Moresby. Although no low-
The battalion climaxed its lengthy tour in Australia, flying targets presented themselves, the men learned how
.1 Ie\\' Guinea and the Admiralty Islands by shooting down to live in the tropics, with its poor sanitation and its health
, record-breaking number of enemy planes upon reaching proble-ms-to say nothing of maintaining morale under such
the Philippines. During the two-month period following difficult conditions.
he landing on Leyte the total confirmed score was: forty- Toward the close of the Papuan campaign, the remainder
'our planes destroyed, thirteen probably destroyed, twenty- of the battalion made its way up the jungle-fringed northern
ight damaged. The number of planes engaged totaled shore of New Guinea to the secret unloading point at Oro
~340. Bay. Battery "A" was the first AA unit to land at Oro Bay.
At the outbreak of war the battalion had been given only Battery "B" soon followed, with Battery "D" remaining at
one towed-target practice, and that with 37mm guns. As Port Moresby. On this fever-ridden coast the men manned
thefirst month of the war came to a close they were assigned their guns and helped unload supplies for the infantry at
the defense of Boston harbor installations, which included Buna and Sananda Point.
the Fore River Ship Yards and \Vatertown Arsenal. This Jap dive bombers and strafers were engaged with good
~~xperience in cold weather operations was short-lived, and results. In April 1943, a one-hundred-plane raid was over-
~as not been repeated since. whelmed by U. S. fighter planes. Thereafter, daylight
New Year's Eve 1941 brought news of our battalion targets became less frequent.
being alerted for foreign service, and by February we were Not until February of 1944 were all batteries again
\rell on our way toward the South Pacific. \Vhile the brought together under battalion headquarters. In the
r original destination was the East Indies, the rapid Japanese
[advance there brought the voyage to an end in Australia.
meantime, Battery "C" had made several airborne missions
to hastily constructed jungle air strips in the Markham Val-
r The initial over~eas assignment given us was the defense ley. They eventually reached the coast at Finschhafen and
of a Northern Australia fort and airdrome with our twelve joined the rest of the battalion. A few enemy planes were
I \rater-cooled guns per battery, plus a few 37mm guns. shot down by Battery "C" during these movements.
While here we experienced the first of countless high-level In February 1944, the battalion was alerted for the Ad-
bombing attacks in which the men were unable to fire a miralty Islands campaign and was attached to the 1st Cav-
shot. The batt.alion's fire power was increased by the arrival alry Division. Our first experience in landing guns from
of 40mm guns with M6 directors and M3 remote control invasion craft was made in the face of enemy fire. Once
systems. Since field and technical manuals were not avail- again a few low-flying targets came over the defended area.
42 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOUR0JAL Septe1l1ber-Oc
It was here that Battery "A" helped disperse a moonlight men of our battalion performed double duties by helpi
Banzai charge by the Japs along the J\lonote air strip. The reann such planes as were able to return to action.
multiple .50 caliber machine gun J\15 I proved excellent During these three days, seventy-three enemy planes
for this type of target. Our 49mm guns engaged with good various types were engaged, with fourteen definiteh-
results enemy field artillery pieces being brought to bear stroyed, fourteen probably destroyed, and at least' r
on our positions from across the small harbor. damaged. Naval aircraft destroyed many planes ber
During the following six months, the battalion, although they reached their target. I~

in tactical position, conducted training. Arrangements were For the next two weeks targets appeared in a cominu~
made with the Navy for towed-target practice-our first since stream. During this period a method of fire control was e Jl1
leaving the States. Guns fired about ten rounds per course ployed which differed from that previously practiced. Due .
at the rate of one shot per second. Corrections in range were the large number of guns firing on the same target, sensin pi
made by sensing and line shots. The employment in combat of line shots from individual guns were impossible to obta' ('!
of this method was tested in the Leyte campaign, where real Range estimation became the sole reliance by the direct, d,
targets were plentiful, and was found impractical for reasons crews. All firing was done at the normal rate of one rou n
discussed later. Meanwhile, furloughs to Australia were per second. As sensing could not be obtained from in \
granted to a few of the men, some having served twenty vidual rounds it has been concluded that the maximum ra \
consecutive months in New Guinea. of fire should be employed because of the greater pro
The battalion's two and one-half years experience in bility of hits.
Australia, New Guinea and the Admiralty Islands well Targets were initially engaged at an estimated 2,5
qualified it for the long-projected return to the Philippines. yards, with range set at 1,500 yards. On an incoming COUfS(:
T raining and morale were at a peak when loading was be- when the target was estimated to have passed through th
gun on AKA's:AP A's, LST's and LSiWs for the 2,000-mil I ,5OO-yard point, the range setting was reduced three hand
trip to San Pedro Bay. wheel turns (to 875 yards). This setting was held until th
After an intense five-hour naval barrage, the 1st Cavalry target passed beyond a range of 875 yards on the recedin
Division spearheaded the landing, at Leyte, and approxi- leg, at which time the range setting was increased by tIn
mately half of our gun sections were put ashore the same handwheel turns. Cross courses were attacked by the sam
day. The remainder of the battalion was unloaded on A method, but range setting was reduced by two handwhee
plus I. All fire units were immediately placed in firing po- turns (to 1,125 yards) and held there through mid-pain
sition and moved into permanent positions as the situation until the target had passed beyond a range of I, 125 yards 0
developed.
Despite the tremendous number of troops and equipment
the receding leg. The range setting was then increased
handwheel turns.
twl
unloaded on the narrow beach in a few hours, there was
Barrage fire was occasionally resorted to at night, with n
little delay' or confusion, although barriers, 102:s and the d fi f fi bId E
~ e nite pattern or cone 0 re eing emp oye . ~stimatio
craters of 16-inch shells hidden under the murky water f h d d f
O. t e target's present position an course was ma e rom its
proved a hindrance to some guns. Barges occasionally were sound, and fire was directed along this course. The converg>
grounded 100 yards offshore in shoulder-deep water. Guns f h d h d be 1
. ding 0 t e tracer streams sometimes assiste t e sprea - arr
1 d d 1 f 1
were un oa e wit 1 a variety 0 ot 1er eqUIpment an searchli2:hts to pick up the tar2:et. One Boat plane was de-
sometimes came ashore more than a mile from the desired ~ ~
stroyed by barrage fire, and numerous other planes turned
location. Some difficult), was encountered in securing ~ bull- f rom th e target. Of ten t h e ex I1aust 0f t.e
hi' pane s motor gave
dozers from engineer units to tow fire units onto the beach. away its position. An enemy transport plane, carrying sui-
Over half of the Bofors guns were pulled ashore through cide parachute troops, was destroyed over the strip because'
two to four feet of water, and damage to the electrical of the telltale sign.
systems resulted. In a few instances, Bofors were stranded
The citations and awards received by the personnel of
in deep water for an hour an d a 11aIf w 11Cn th e towing truc k'S
were drowned out. our battalion include two Soldier's Medals, fourteen Bronze
The battalion occupied positions on "vVhite" beach, Stars, three Silver Stars, and one citation for gallantry in
which was one of the beachheads along a twenty-mile front, action. 4

the newly won Tacloban air strip, and around the docks in The unit has suffered few casualties. Fourteen men and
Tacloban itself. Due to the complete neutralization of one officer have been killed' in action, and sixty-six men
enemy airfields by the naval air arm, few targets appeared and officers have been wounded.
for two days. Fighter cover was provided entirely by naval Despite the inroads made by tropical diseases, rotation 01
planes operating from carriers offshore. A plus 4, 5 and 6 personnel and transfers to O.C.S., over half of the members
brought the Second Naval Battle of the Philippines. Sev- of the original unit are still present. Officer changes are
eral of our carriers were sunk or damaged, and the enemy more apparent, but the most recent arrivals are graduates
attempted neutralization of the Tacloban strip by heavy from our own unit of O.C.S. in Australia, being men whe
air attacks .. sailed with us on the original task force. This long associ
Built on 'a narrow, swampy peninsula, the strip was only ation plays a large part in the character and unity of thE
partially completed and provided no dispersal area. Hell- battalion.
cats, vVildcats and torpedo bombers Bocked down in This ~rtic1e is dedicated to 1st Lt. Newell E. Gillette ane
emergency landings for repairs and servicing. i\r!any -of the the fourteen enlisted men who were killed in action.
~ecretPhase of the ""yit19 Bomb
By Major E. S. Watkins, British Army
Phase One of tlw Gying bomb attack on London is now In the last week of the final attack, in March, 1945, the
history,and well known history at that. It begins with the percentage had mounted to 85 per cent. They were the
Ro\"aIAir Force raid on Peenemunde on August 17, 1943, same guns throughout. Skill, training, mounting experience
an'event that set back the menace by some months. The and new fire control instruments changed those figures.
menacerevived again in the autumn of 1943, when the Su- Preparations to meet Phase Two began some time before
?remeCommand knew that an attack was now being mount- the attacks from the Pas de Calais finished. It became
NIbut did not know exactly when it would start. There were known that the Germans were experimenting with the
daysof tension as the preparations for Operation Overlord launching of Bying bombs from an aircraft already airborne
nearedtheir climax. vVould the attack precede the invasion? and it was expected that this line of attack would obviously
Would it be launched at the same moment as the invasion? be used, if and when the ground launching sites were
\Vould the Germans fail to complete their preparations in overrun and lost. That, in fact, is what happened.
time? Each supposition demanded different deployment of There are certain advantages in launching the Hying
thedefenses. Each was answered on June 13, 1944, when bomb in the air and certain disadvantages. The first ad-
thefirst three bombs fell in London. Now Britain, and the vantage is that your base can be put farther back. The
world,would see what, if any, was the answer to V-I. R.A.F. attacks on the sites in Northern France did not
Then followed three months of concentrated attack. knock them all out but they certainly handicapped their
Sometimes a hundred a day were launched, all through the use, partly by the damage to the site and apparatus, partly
iummer weather, and London and Southern England con- by the dislocation caused to the supply routine. To be in
tinued to work and wait and listen for that all too familiar a position where you need not carry your bomb farther for-
roarthat mounted so fast, and for that sudden silence as the ward than a German airfield had big advantages, even at
motorcut out. They listened, too, through that interminable that stage of the defeat of the Luftwaffe.
Dauseof five seconds or so before the crash of the explosion. \iVe do not know enough yet to be able to dogmatize on
[hen you knew if it had come for you or not, but you did whether a launching from the air is technically easier than
not know, just then, if it had taken your family, your home a ground launching. It looks as though it should be. For
:>rfriends. one thing, the bomb has Bying speed at the moment of re-
But after two months of this the line in France began to lease. Nor are you so dependent on the very complicated
move. The Seine was reached and crossed. Paris fell, and, mechanism required for the ground launching. Accounts
while Londoners kept an appreciative eye on the advance to
the east they followed with even greater personal interest
the advance up the Channel coast. Beauvais was taken and /
the Somme reached. The armies were getting nearer to the /
launching sites in Pas de Calais now. vVould the Germans /
fight to hold them, just for the sadistic pleasure of killing a
few more civilians, or were they really and truly thrashed in ./
/ . $"""""""-

France? The tide could not be held and by the end of the /' ~
first week in September you could no longer look across the ~v
Channel from Dover at hostile territory. The Germans had <0
gone. And so, to the layman, did it seem that the menace of
the Hying bomb had gone, too. Now perhaps you could
sleep, and breathe again.
In fact, the position was quite different. London and
Southern England had two further trials through which to
pass. Phase One of the Hying bomb was over. Phase Two
about to begin. There was still V-2, the rocket, to come.
And, finally, in March, 1945, came Phase Three of the '.-.".

Hying bomb attack. It is just as well that we did not know . '".
it at the time. ..
V-2 is a different story and has rather overshadowed that
of the Hying bomb. Phases Two and Three are worth de-
scribing, for it is a success story, a story of ordinary gunners,
of the men and women, who manned the antiaircraft guns
of Britain under Antiaircraft Command. It is this kind of
success story. In the first week of Phase One, in June,
1944, the gunners shot down 17 per cent of the bombs that
were possible ttirgets. In the seventh week of the attack
from t~ ';~si::1their percentage had mounted to 74 per cent.
 1 Ht:.l..UA~ 1 AI{ 11LLI::.KY .I0LIR).':\L September-Oct
from the French ci,'ilians living in the neighborhood of the an illuminated target to the next light farther inland Un
launching sites show that guite a high proportion of those the night fighter can bring off a kill.
launched there failed from the start and crashed within a In short, at the end of August, as the French launchin
mile or so of the site. sites were being overr~n A.t\. Command had already begu~ t
But the disadvantages are considerable. If a launching to work out the countermeasures necessary to defeat anI" :0
site on the ground is vulnerable to air attack, a launching resumed attack from any other guarter farther to the eait 'leI
~ircraft, by day, is infinitely more so. The German air in- and they had begun already to deploy their resources to n
feriority by September, 1944, was already such that they meet it. .u
,,'ere compelled to limit their launchings to the hours of Look at the map of the southern half of the North Sea.l:i
darkness and to the one day when the weather was bad The first thing that strikes you is the gulf made by the l.e,
enough to give them cover over the North Sea but not so bad Thames Estuary. It is like a dagger pointed at London. A
that flying was impossible. Night flying has another adverse well-aimed flying bomb could get to within 30 miles of the
effect. It complicates the problem of aiming. The flying fringes of London before it came within range of a land gun
bomb is constructed to fly on a constant course for a fixed and a flying bomb travelling at 400 m.p.h. would do that Vt
period of time. Neither can be altered once the bomb is 30 miles in just over four minutes. That does not give Yen'
released, Conseguently the pilot must know exactly where much chance to a gun. The Thames Estuary is an area i~
he is when he releases his bomb. His machine must be a which you need considerable concentration of guns.
definite distance from the target and the nose of his aircraft A.t\. Command were compelled to provide such a Con-
must be sighted on the target, allowing for any drift caused centration. \"'hen Phase Two began they had already de. a
by meteorological conditions. That reguires very good navi- ployed 136 3.7" mm guns (I-Ieavy Antiaircraft guns) in t
gation indeed, for all these launchings were to be made over that area. Some of these guns were part of the normal de.
the North Sea, where there would be no possibilitv of a fenses, the remainder were mobile guns sent in to thicken ~'
ground fix on the position of the aircraft. . the defenses. In addition there were 210 Bofors 4001111 I
Still, if the target was to be London, there was one guns and an even greater number of 20mm guns, mainly I

important benefit to be gained by the air launch. Look at supplied by the R.A.F. Regiment (normally used for the
the map of northwest Europe and compare the area of what close defense of airfields) and by the Royal Navy. The
was then German-occupiedland with the area of water over Thames Estuarv was known as the "Box." J
which German aircraft could, with some deoree of safety, The defense~ were not all on shore. They included theeI'
still fly by night. The greater the number °01' alternati~e guns of the IVlaunsell forts'" in the Thames. The j\llaunsell 1
positions for your launching instrument the'more you com- fOlt is a wartime innovation. It consists of seven steel towers \
pel the ground defenses to disperse themselves. SUlik in shallow water and mounting four heavy antiaircraft
TI le fi rst 0b jective 0f t Ile d e f ense was to shoot the bomb guns, one light
~ ~ antiaircraft gun for close defense, and a
~
d f fl I h d bl searchlight. In short it is a composite antiaircraft site at sea.
own as soon a ter its ig It a started as possi e. particu- These forts were established to meet the menace of the
lady as this would almost certainly mean that the bomb .\
would then be over the sea. So the outer defense consisted mine-laying aircraft. In the heyday of the Luftwaffe, in .,
of aircraft. Next, position your guns as close to the sea as ] 940 and 1941, mine laying in the Thames Estuary was a
possi bl e. Th en t h ose targets t Iley Ilit as soon as t Iley . open common and remunerative occupation for them. The Maun-
fire will also fall into the sea. Those hit later will fall on the sell fort was one of the answers to that type of attack. Now
relatively thinly populated areas of the coastal belt. it had a second phase of usefulness, in meeting the flying ,1
bomb on what can only, if paradoxically, be described as
The next lesson, an old one, was that it is advisable to the most suitable ground-namely water.
concentrate your guns. To do so simplifies control and short- The second step taken before the start of the attack was
ens the communications on which control must depend. to put in hand the work of converting the sites used by the J

Control is important. The bombs had usually been dis- mobile guns in the Box to static sites, suitable for taking
charoed in salvoes and if ten cross the one section of coast
o static guns.
line at the same moment it is important to insure that each British heavy antiaircraft defense has been built around
one is engaged by at least one gun. vVithout control, and a the 3.7" gun. 'It is a gun that corresponds roughly to the
good system of drill, all your guns might concentrate on one well-known German 88mm gun, but, while heavier, has a
or two of the salvo, with the result that the other eight or rather better performance. By 1944 it was usually found
nine streak past unengaged. in one of two different types of mounting. For use in the
Finally, leave the country behind the guns to the fighters field it was mounted on a four-wheeled trailer platform capa-
19ain. Give them as much distance as possible in which to ble of being towed by any heavy truck and so fully mobile.
:werhaul and shoot down the bomb. They will need it. In that state it is used with its own portable instruments and
It is in this area that you position your searchlights. By i5 manually operated. \\Then used as a static gun it is
:light it is difficult for the defending aircraft to make con- eguipped with an improved counterbalance, and an auto-
:act with either the flying bomb or its carrier aircraft over matic fuse-setting machine is inounted on a solid base and
he sea. But, once either is over land, a good searchlight can be power-operated from the instruments direct. This in-
:rew at once can pick up and illuminate the target and so creases the accuracy of the laying of the gun and the rate of
~normously ease the task of the aircraft pilot. Conse- fire, and a battery of static guns can give a more accurate and
luently, while your guns must be concentrated, your
ights should be spaced out, so that one light can pass on *See "Secrets of the Sea FOlts," COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL, March-
April, 1945. :-..
>
:>".
r
5 SECHET PHASE OF THE FLYING BOi\lB 45

Inuch greater volume of fire than can a mobile battery. slabs, 30,000 tons of hard core and the construction of road.
Further, the static batteries are what are known as mixed That in its turn required the employment of 1,500 skilled
~~I1eries; that is, thev are manned bv teams of men and men and 3,500 unskilled. No civil labor could be spared, so
1 omen-gunners and'members of the' Auxiliary Territorial A.A Command had to find them all.
I' Service. The men load and operate the gun in the gunpit. These men themselves needed tents and cookhouses,
t The \\'omen lay and operate the instruments that put the fourteen railheads for the stores and material (at which 300
) £unson the target. A good mixed battery is a combination freight cars were cleared daily) and an average of 900
l~ffast and accurate work by both men and women in their 3-ton trucks each day for a month.
~t\.espectivejobs, and by quite a high percentage of profes- So much for the basic requirements. The men and women
. ional gunners it is considered to be better than an all-male of the batteries had to be fed and the guns had to be sup-
batteryusing the same equipment. plied with ammunition (in four months just over 50,000
Until the Hying bomb attacks began, a static gun was rounds of 3.7" ammunition were fired). Nor could the men
rerystatic indeed. It implied the building of a concrete em- and women there be left with nothing but the site and ordi-
placement and base for the gun and the provision of hutted nary rations. The ration scale was augmented, to provide
\Jccommodation for the personnel of the battery. The Hying an additional hot supper at night (the batteries were nor-
~mb changed all that. The personnel went into tents and mally in action at night only) and for hot drinks throughout
thegun went on to a new design in platforms. This, known the day and night.
asa "mattress," consisted of two sets of railway lines bolted By way of amenities, 20,000 woollen garments were sent,
to sleepers and laid in the form of a cross. A steel frame was 5,000 books, 1,000 upholstered chairs, 1,000 canvas chairs.
bolted on to the central intersection of the lines and this Fifteen 16mm and one 35mm mobile movie projectors were
,en'ed as a base plate for the gun. The mattress could be sent on tour in the area. Rest hostels were opened in the
bid on any sort of ground capable of being levelled. The nearest towns and transport for short periods of leave pro-
I tWOsets of rails and the base plate travelled separately, and
the whole was finished by bedding the sleepers, when laid
vided.
That was one problem. The next was the coordination

I down, with hard core. "Static" in At\. Command became

J relative term.

.• Early in September, 1944, ten Hying bombs crossed the

of ground and air defenses.
The fundamental difficulty was that that area of Britain
lies along the fringe of the biggest concentration of bomber
7 East Coast of England Hying west toward London. That airfields in the world. Before dawn the heavv bombers of
I wasthe.start of Phase Two of the operation. the U.S.AAF. would leave, to return by midday or early
It was immediately decided to retain the Box and to' push afternoon. In the dusk they \\'ould be followed by the heavy
on with the plans for manning it with static guns. All AA bombers of the R.AF., which would return during the
Batteries along the South Coast were warned that they must early hours of the following morning. And, since the Ger-
j be prepared for a move northward. Then followed an II-day
lull.
mans knew everything about those bombing Heets by the
time they were on their homeward way, what would be
On the night of September 14 there was a further attack. 'simpler than to mix up Hying bombs with the returning
. This time the Hying bombs crossed the coast to the north of aircraft?
the Box. As a result of the attack the Box was supplemented It is no easy problem to solve. There is nothing an R.AF.
( by the Strip, and the Strip was nothing less than a line of Controller hates more than the chance that ground gunners
guns extending along the East Coast from the existing de- will fire into his Heets of returning aircraft, many possibly
fenses in the Box, on the north of the Thames Estuary, to damaged and in difficulties and all with tired crews. And
the existing defenses around Lowestoft and Yarmouth. yet if a bomb slips by with those aircraft it may be the
~
N The establishment of the Strip was a considerable task. families of those verv crews who are killed by that bomb
I The over-all plan was for a belt of guns 5,000 yards deep because the guns ha~e been interdicted from 'firing at the

l with guns spaced 2,000 yards apart and as near the sea as moment when it passes.
possible. It meant the immediate move of 34 heavy bat- That complication was solved, largely by regulating the
' teries and 36 light, with all their arms and equipment. Of height at which friendly aircraft would Hy and by close
the heavy batteries 12 were static, which meant the pro- liaison between the R.AF. Controllers and the gunners
) vision of transportation for their mattresses and guns. who manned the operation rooms of the Strip.
;\Tinety-sixgun-towing vehicles and their transporters were The final problem was peculiar to AA Command at that
I required at once. particular time. It was the problem of manpower and the
\ Further, sites for all these gun positions had to be found. comb-out.
~ But that part of the English coast is Hat, marshy and in l\Ianpower is a question with which Britain has wrestled
, many places accessible only by rough cart tracks. Roads had since 1940. It has a thousand ingredients, from the decision
to be made, bridges built or strengthened. This is what the to build the present Heet of heavy bombers to the hope that
Strip involved in the end. it we put everything we had into the force that invaded
Accommodation was built for some 50,000 men and 10,- Normandv the war could be finished in the autumn of 1944.
000 women, in the winter months and on land liable to The war did not finish that year and the armies in the field
Hooding and in some cases below sea level. still needed reinforcements~ AA Command had to be
That meant the provision of 3,500 huts (the majority dis- combed again, as it had been on various occasions before,
mantled from unused sites all over Britain and shipped to to find men for overseas. This time everv A 1 man of 35
the East Coast), 150,000 concrete blocks, 373,000 concrete and under had to be drafted away. In all 'there were 5,203
 46 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL septe1llber-octl
of them, of whom 15% were N .C.O's. That comb-out had tary objecti\'e. It was on a moderate scale and yet so
been deferred during Phase One of the flying bomb attack. persed that flying bombs dropped as far apart as Durh
Now AA Command agreed that they would not be justi- an~ S~roI?shi.re,over 100 miles distant from each other.
fied in asking for any further retention. They would have majorIty fell In open country and the damage they did, e\"e~
to get along without these men and train others to replace to property, was superficial. The worst incident was a
them. Oldham, in Lancashire, where a bomb fell in a crowd
The defense against the Hying bomb was a partnership area, demolished 30 houses completely and seriously dam
between guns and searchlights, Army units under AA aged another 39. It killed 21 people, seriously wounded
Command, and night fighter aircraft of the RAF. Fighter another 37, slightly wounded 27 and there were 8 missinJ..ph
Command. The major work fell to the guns, because the in addition. lpa
attacks were night attacks and the hours of darkness were But as a threat it was much more formidable. If the Get wi
long, but the searchlights and the aircraft developed a re- mans were to abandon London as the main target and begin as
markable combination. One point of difficulty was that the haphazard attacks over the length of England and Scotlancl is
bombs were coming in much lower than they had when then the problem would become infinitely more seriOU~fC
ground-launched. The average height was 1,000 feet in- The Strip, or line of guns, would have to be extended fro
stead of 3,000 feet. 100 miles to at least four times as long. Preliminary step F
This not only increases the difficulty of both the gunnery were taken. The permanent defenses outside the ambit OJ 1
and the searchlight problem in that the time during which the Strip were regrouped and plans were made for furthe [I
the target can be engaged is shortened; so far as the attack- deployments if the threat became an actual menace. Fortu.
ing aircraft is concerned, it also increases the risk of a crash. nately it did not. The attack was something of a last kid
If an aircraft dives to overtake a fast-moving low target, at by that section of the Luftwaffe engaged on this job .. 1
night, with the ground invisible, the risk of diving too far Phase Three of the attack was the second period of land.
and of crashing is very real. This is particularly so when a launched flying bombs, this time originating in Holland. I
searchlight is operating as, if the pilot flies into or near the The Germans had wasted no time in setting up sites in
beam, he will be momentarily blinded. Holland after their loss of Northern France, but, at first.
The R.A.F. Squadron assigned to this task engaged 136 had used them solely for shorter ranged attacks on Antwerp,
out of the 177 targets through their area and shot down, Liege and Brussels, all in Belgium. The delay in the atta<f)
by night, just under 51 %. Throughout the winter they were on London was almost certainly imposed by the need to1
grounded by weather on only four nights. vVith e),periment redesign the bomb to give it sufficient range to reach.London\
and experience a drill was found for exposing and ex- from the sites in Holland. The German war machine was
tinguishing the searchlights with which they worked that already hard-pressed. There was not time enough to irn-
very much reduced the risk of dazzle for the pilot. prove the major components of the bomb. All that could be
Phase Two of the Hying bomb attack was the period dur- done was to increase its fuel tanks within the limits of the
ing which the bombs were air-launched. It lasted from the existing fuselage and to lighten the whole assembly, where
beginning of September, 1944 until the middle of the fol-' possible, to increase its range by reducing fuel can sump-
lowing January. It was far from successful from the Ger- tion. Incidentally, a higher speed was also obtained, another
man point of view. The launching air force was estimated handicap to both air and ground defense.
never to have exceeded 100 at anyone time, and of the The attack opened on the early morning of March 3, be-
495 bombs that could be considered as possible targets for tween 2: 30 a.m. and 5 a.m. Twelve bombs were recorded'l
AA. gunners, the gunners shot down no less than 320. No of which seven were possible targets for the guns, and of
substantial damage was inflicted on London, of the kind that these seven, six were shot down. The attack continued on
had resulted from the summer attack. the following night and on 19 other days in that month.
Not that London escaped. Seven killed at Hackney in In the month 108 bombs reached the English coast. Eighty-
October when an ambulance station was hit, 15 killed at a seven were shot down by gunfire and only 13 reached \
Surrev hotel in the same month, 13 killed in North London London.
in De'cember and 14 at Lambert in January, these are speci- By the end of March the German strength was begin- ~
mens of typical incidents; not very serious in totals, but still ning to fail, for the simple reason that the Allied Armies in
• enough to keep death in the forefront of the Londoner's France had crossed the Rhine and were working their way I
mind. steadily across the lines of supply into Holland. The flying
For A.A. Command it was a period of intense activity, bomb attack was being strangled before it could be born. I
in the completion of permanent hutting on the isolated sites, The final score for the attack is impressive. During the
in the training of further batteries in the technique of de- period from September, 1944 to the end of IVlarch, 1945, I
feating this type of attack and in the replacement of the 1,170 flying bombs were launched, over 90% directed
trained men withdrawn. There were attacks on 60 of the against the London area. Six hundred of them came within I
nights in this period. Shooting improved so much that for range of the guns and the gunners destroyed 407;..2 (the
e\'ery 156 rounds of 3.7" ammunition a flying bomb was half being a victory shared with the RA.F.). In addition
shot down. 76Y2 were destroyed by the RA.F. and 13 by fire from ships
Nor did the tactical situation remain unchanged. There of the Navy. Only 79 reached London.
was the curious and isolated attack on the northern Mid- But those that could not be engaged, or which escaped all
lands on a night in December. attack, killed nearly 550 people and seriously injured an-
The attack cannot possibly have been aimed at any mili- other 800.
r AAA Vs. Luftwaffe*
I January 1945
~ details; routes of approach were selected to take advantaoe
~ Considerable publicity has been given to the ground role
Illi~ played by AAA in the Ardennes break-through. And that of terrain features. Navigation was by dead reckoning, wi~h
part of the story of the Battle of the Bulge is indeed studded special pathfinder Ju 88's leading some formations, and
~r ,rith gallant exploits. AA units fought as Tank Destroyers, some smoke bombs were used to mark changes in direction

J
in as Fie~d Artillery, as lnf~ntrr. Howeve~, n~ less ~ote\V~rthy
ld isthe Job done by AAA m the nonnal role, m plam straIght-
:s.1forward antiaircraft firing.
of flight. Planes flew on the deck, and strict radio silence was
observed prior to the attack. Radio discipline was so good
that approximately 100 planes were able to form in the half-
my For the German counterattack launched on the \Vestern light of early morning and approach our lines undetected
)s) Front, beginning 17 December 1944, was accompanied by
until they were picked up by visual observation posts.
)f the greatest show of air power by the Luftwaffe subsequent Two factors prevented the attack from being successful:
~r to the Allied punch out of the Normandy peninsula and the inability of the pilots to fly straight to the airfields they
]_ the hot contest over the Avranches bottleneck. To get the were to attack, and the accurate fire of AAA units. Either
k full picture, let's go back to that chapter of Luftwaffe his- because they had insufficient training, or because the GAF
conservation policy had kept their best pilots on the ground
'" tory ..
I. The GAF took a beating at Avranches. Then, when too long, many of the planes lost their way and were forced
I. General Patton started driving west and north around Paris, to attack targets of opportunity. In doing so, they ran into
it was faced with the prospect of having its forward air a hornet's nest of AA guns. Another indication of poor fly-
bases overrun. A move to the rear was begun which con- ing ability was the poor type of evasive action taken by
tinued until it was established on a series of air bases east pilots in the face of AA fire. Some pilots, in turning away
~ of the Rhine. At the same time, foreseeing the character of from one gun, flew into the fire of another.
11
the fighting to come, the Germans swung the emphasis in The main attack of the morning was preceded by harass-
1 l
production of aircraft and crew build-up training entirely ing raids on New Year's Eve. These raids, apparently de-
signed to decrease the efficiency of ground units against the
to fighter and fighter-bomber types, including jet-propelled,
to the exclusion of heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe was pur- big raid to come, continued most of the night and consisted
suing a policy whereby it could, at some early date, challenge mostly of bombing and strafing by single planes.
our o\vn air force over the \Vestern Front and, in addition, The first elements of the morning raid appeared about
0900 hours. From then until 1030 the air was full of small
serve its part in an over-all ground operation.
The German High Command evidently decided that all formations of German planes, operating at very low alti-
factors, ground and air, were ready about the middle of De- tudes. Many of our fighter aircraft were on missions in the
cember. Accordingly, the Battle of the Bulge began. The area of the German ground offensive. These planes returned
Lufhvaffe, after months of comparative inactivity, came to in time to chase the fleeing Germans back to their lines, but
life and operated in strength whenever flying conditions the brunt of the defense fell on the antiaircraft artillery.
permitted. The effort initially was devoted to troop and Lack of space and definite data prevents our telling the
supply dropping, to close ground support of the advancing full story, but AAA units all up and down the \\7estem
enemy spearheads, and to an attempt to disrupt Allied sup- Front had the shooting of a lifetime. vVe will select a few
ply routes feeding the fighting zone. The Allied tactical air incidents for illustrative purposes. One of the most notable
of the morning's actions occurred in the j\/Ietz-Bouzonville
forces were countered if they met in the air.
However, after the first few days the Luftwaffe began to sector of the Third U. S. Army.
include, in ground objectives, airfields basing our tactical The AAA defense of the Metz area comprised two bat
aircraft. It had become apparent to the Germans that Allied teries of 90mm guns, the four batteries of a self-propellee:
air power could and would seriously impede their ground AvV battalion and one battery of another, and a semi-mo
effort if not stopped. At the same time Luftwaffe losses, bile battalion of 40mm guns. The area included an im
both to our AAA and air, were considerable. Before the portant airfield.
Gennan air strength should ebb lower, it was decided to The AAA defense of the Bouzonville area consisted 0
employ it against our tactical air force in one smashing, one mobile battalion of 40mm guns, with one battery 0
powerful blow that would wipe opposition out. This was at- another battalion attached. The entire battalion was em,
tempted on 1 January 1945. ployed in defense of the Corps artillery.
According to an analysis by the AAA Section, Ninth The first extended engagement came at Bouzonvill~
Army, the enormous Luftwaffe effort of New Year's Day when a battery of 40's engaged eight planes out of a fligh
was brilliantly planned-if not so brilliantly executed. It is of twenty. The flight consisted of Ju 88's, l\IIe 109's an.
estimated that at least 600 aircraft took part in the raids on Me 110's and approached at 200 feet altitude, not in fo]
American sectors. The plan was worked out to minute mation but strung out to cover the general area. The plane
strafed Field Artillery and AAA positions, with the appa]
*Extracted from AAA Notes, Hq ETOU5A, in Ot'erseas Information ent mission of working everything over. Due to the low alt
Dit'ision. AA Command.
 ,U I i-If-COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL SePte1l1her-Octo~
tude of approach, no early warning had been received. In control of the 12th AAA Group, numbered one 90
mm
the action a personal duel developed between one of the battalion, two mobile 40mm battalions and one self-pro-
~le 109's and the gun section engaging it. After the first pelled A\V battalion attached to Corps, three mobile 40m
m
strafing run the plane circled and came back for the second, battalions attached to Infantry divisions, and one platoon of
but was promptly brought down 200 yards from the gun AA searchlights ..
position. Out of this scrap, the battery claimed four Cat. 1's The action commenced early, when shortly after the old
and three Cat. II's. year had been rung out (or, more appropriately, shot OUt)
The next attack, one of the most savage, occurred over the several of the searchlights employed in an AA illumination
Metz Airfield and installations within the town. \Vithout role picked up a He Ill. The 90mm guns promptly en-
warning, twenty-five Me 109's came hedgehopping over the gaged it and brought it down in flames.
crest of the thickly wooded hills that defiladed the airfield New Year's Day dawned bright, clear and cold. At about
from the northeast. From 0920 to 0940 hours, the German 0900, hostile planes began to appear over the Corps area at
aircraft made four distinct strafing runs on the airfield and altitudes varying from 200 to 2,000 feet. The attacking
the gun positions of four automatic weapons batteries de- planes consisted primarily of long-nosed F\V 190 D-9's and
fending it. The planes attacked from all directions with a ~le 109's which strafed and bombed ground installations.
suicidal fanaticism and an utter disregard of the tremendous During the ensuing thirty minutes practically every AAA
volume of AA fire directed at them. Altitudes varied from automatic weapon in the Corps went into action, causing the
near ground level to 1,500 feet, the range of engagements attackers to take violent evasive action.
from point-blank to 5,000 yards, and the speed of the air- Planes were crashing left and right. At one time five
craft varied from 250 to 300 miles per hour. The main ob- columns of smoke, indicating crashed aircraft, were ob-
jectives of the attack were closely packed PA7's in the dis- served in the vicinity of Hiirtgen Forest from a high point
persal areas that surrounded the field. The a,ttacks upon the near the Corps CPo 1\llostof the day's action took place dur-
gun positions were incidental to the attack on the grounded ing this intense half-hour, though engagements with smaller
Allied planes. numbers of aircraft continued throughout the afternoon.
As a result of this action, which lasted only twenty Perhaps the most phenomenal piece of shooting was
minutes, AAA claimed fourteen Cat. 1's and four Cat. II's. achieved by a 40mm gun located in a small clearing of the
Of these claims, the carcasses of ten German planes were I-1iirtgen Forest. Because of tree masks, the gun was able
found in the immediate vicinity of the airfield shortly after to fire only one round at a F\V 190, but the round burst
the fight. Two 40mm batteries, using forward area sights, squarely under the fuselage, setting the plane on fire and
were credited with eight of the Cat. I claims. causing it to crash in flames less than a mile a,vay.
The third. engagement, comparable to the l\rletz action in A strip map, taken from the pilot of a crash-landed FW
intensity, occurred in the Bouzonville area. This time 190, showed the courses which the German planes were to
mother battery bore the brunt of it, fighting off approxi- have taken to American and British airports in Belgium.
mately twenty-five FVV 190's and Me 109's from 0930 to The map indicated that the aircraft which came over the
)950. The planes flew in no definite formation, but attacked Corps zone were well off course, resulting in disaster to a
Field Artillery and AA positions from all directions with majority of the attackers .
.ockets and 20mm cannon. No material damage was caused, . After filtering and careful examination of claims, AAA
Jut three members of an M51 crew (trailer-mounted quad- units of XIX Corps were officially credited with destroying
~uple MG turret) were wounded when their section was at- thirty-two of the sixty-four planes over the area, and probably
acked from the rear while they were engaging another destroying an additional thirteen planes. Except for seven
Jlane in the opposite field of fire. One Me 109 was forced to crashes which fell in the I-hirtgen Forest or across the enemy
Tash-Iand after its motor was hit by caliber .50 fire. The lines, every crash was visited and identified on the ground
lilGt was unhurt and attempted to escape to some near-by by officers from 12th AAA Group headquarters. It was im-
voods, when a gun section near the crash scene fired two possible to reach the scene of these seven crashes because of
ounds of 40mm ammunition just ahead of him. At sight of extensive mine fields 1\1 the dense forest or proximity to the
he tracers the pilot promptly stopped and sat down to await front lines, though numerous witnesses testified to the pillars
Liscaptors. Two more Me 109's came down to investigate of black smoke from the crash sites.
his crash landing and were shot down as they buzzed the The commanding officer of the 12th AAA Group attri-
rea. The crashed plane suffered little damage, and upon butes the day's successes to three factors: the good fortune
:westigation it was found that its guns had not been fired. in having so many planes over the area during daylight at
'he battery claimed ten Cat. 1's, of which seven were found a low altitude; excellent gunnery on the part of gun crews,
n the ground shortly after the engagement. most of whom had had considerable battle experience; and
In addition to this last action, the battalion at Bouzon- the area defense disposition of weapons, by means of which
iIIe had sporadic engagements throughout the morning. a uniform volume of fire was brought to bear on all the
'otal claims for the morning by this battalion amounted to enemy aircraft, regardless of the evasive action taken.
7 Cat. 1's and five Cat. II's. On-carriage sight fire control It was certainly a sad day for the Luftwaffe.
'as used exclusively. On another sector of the front an action occurred which
The Lufhvaffe played no favorites on New Year's Day. was equally grim for the Germans and furnishes an instance
ew MA units along the attacked front had any better of practically perfect coordination between MA and Air
unting than those of the XIX Corps operating in the Ninth Forces. This was at an American fighter base defended by
'.S. Army. These units, deployed in an area defense under two batteries of 40mm guns.
 AAA VS. LUFf\VAFFE: 1 JANUARY 1945 49
At 0900 on 1 January 1945 a flash was received from the \Vhen the action was over and all the enemy who could
'facticalAir Command early warning broadcast that a large still fly had left the area, an inventory was taken of damage
up of enemy planes was heading in the direction of the inflicted on us and damage by us to them. The airfield had

r
~ea in which the airfield was located. From the plot it was one C-47 strafed on the ground and badly shot up, and one
n that the hostiles were about five minutes flying time P-47 hit twice in the motor while parked in a dispersal bay.
away. No damage was reported by our AA units as a result of the
The next warning was flashed by the antiaircraft Op's enemy strafing. Several gun revetments were struck by
ituated in a ring around the field from three to five miles 13mm and 20mm projectiles, but no one was hurt.
ut. A single Ju 88 was approaching with a large number The GAF, however, suffered the loss of a good part of the
f FW 190's and Me 109's some distance behind. attacking force. The Air Force units of the field claimed
At this particular time the airfield had two of its squad- thirty-five enemy shot down, two probables and seven
~ronsairborne in the area, returning from missions. These damaged. Our AA units claimed seven Cat. I's and four
IRightswere notified of the hostiles and directed to intercept . Cat. II's. This out of a total attacking force of fifty-plus!
'~e field commander directed that the planes on the ground . A careful check revealed that in no case did our AA en-
scrambled as soon as posible. Some additional aircraft gage a friendly fighter during the attack. "Cease fire" was
rere warmed up and succeeded in taking off shortly after ordered several times by section chiefs at guns because
theenemy reached the field. friendly fighters were approaching hostiles being engaged
The friendly flights already in the air attacked the Ger- by AA. At no time did the Air Force commander order a
mansseveral miles from the field and succeeded in breaking "Hold fire." After the action he was asked if he considered
up their formations. Some of the enemy turned north to at- a "Hold fire" would have given greater freedom to his
rackanother field, but the bulk of them proceeded to come planes. H~ replied that it was not necessary as he had com-
,downin groups of two and three to altitudes of 100-200 plete faith in the ability and skill of the AA defending his
feet from the approach altitude of 2,000 feet. They came field, so that his planes would not be fired on mistakenly.
o\'erthe field very low and fast, and strafed AA positions on To cite an example of the cooperation existing at this
thefirst pass. But from this time on for the next thirty min- field, when AA machine guns are in action against attack-
utes there were no more concerted attacks on the field, as ing enemy aircraft, selected Air Force ordnance personnel go
el'ery attempt by the enemy to bunch up was immediately . to designated machine-gun sites and augment the AA crews
~roken up by our fighters. by acting as ammunition men. It is certain that mutual
Most of the dogfighting took place away from the field understanding of each other's problems was a large factor.
proper, so the air above the field was clear of large groups in the efficient defense of the field on New Year's Day.
ofaircraft much of the time. Enemy planes breaking away The final figures on this greatest antiaircraft field day of
fromour fighters and making strafing attempts at the field the war are now in. It has been estimated by the Air De-
lI'ereengagtd and driven off by the waiting AAA. At least fense Division of SHAEF that between 790 and 870 Ger-
fourof the enemy were destroyed in this way. man aircraft took part in eight major raids over the vVestern
As the action continued our fighters began to run out of Front, in both American and British sectors.
ammunition and gasoline and had to land to rearm and re- Total confirmed claims of aircraft destroyed by American
fuel. On several such occasions, as a fighter came in for a AA fire are 320 Cat. I's and 102 Cat. II's. At this juncture,
landing, several enemy would dive down to pounce on it. it may be well to remember that while Category II claims
The 40mm guns promptly engaged the attackers directly are not aircraft actually seen to crash, they must be so badly
behind the helpless fighter and either drove them off or damaged that they cannot reach base.
shot them down. One of our pilots, landing safely after From what data we have available the score of enemy
having had a FW 190 driven off his tail by AA fire, leaped planes shot down in the air by American fighters reached a
out of his plane and came over to the gun responsible and total of 160. British fighters and antiaircraft were active also,
personally thanked the section chief. ~ and raised the score still more.
In some cases AA fire was able to break up formations of But in any case, 582 kills out of a possible 870 is, to our
enemy fighters attacking our planes, while in other cases the mind, not at all bad. vVould it be too immodest to state that
M tracers pointed out low-flying enemy aircraft so that our we sort of dished it out and the Luftwaffe took it on the chin
fighters could pick them off. -on 1 January 1945? .

Do you take advantage of all JOURNAL services?

Books? Other magazines? Engraving?
 The l05th AAA Battaliotl
The 105th AAA Battalion was dug in in deep slush and pit against infantry elements 400 yards away while COYer
mud along a high Apennine slope in Northern Italy when ing the withdrawal of other sections, In the preceding fire
it celebrated its 700th day of combat. days, men of the battalion had shot down 14 enemy aircraft,
These veteran ack-ack men can look back on one of the scored 9 "prQbables," For the week's work they were Com-
outstanding service records among antiaircraft units in this mended in a special order by General George'S, Patton
\\'ar. They have supported eleven different divisions through then their corps commander.
fi~'e major campaigns, including three amphibious assaults, Through the weeks that followed, the battalion moved
1hey, have fou,ght off ov::. 1,000 Junker.s and l\les:er- forward in support of infantry troops and was on duty at
schmldts, shootmg down /), almost certamly destroymg Bizerte at the end of the Tunisian campaign, Later the
46 others and h!tting_~nd d~maging sev~ral h~ndre~ ~ore, unit trekked 900 miles back to Oran, where it aCqUirej
They have receIved )) specIal aw~rds, mcludl,ng 3/ SIlver new, self-propelled, antiaircraft guns and began preparation
Stars for gallantry, and 139 men m the battalIon wear the for the invasion of Sicilv,
Purple Heart for wounds received in action-nearly all of For that operation s~ctions of the battalion were set
the~, as a result of bombing and strafing attacks on their on the decks of assa~lt LSTs carrying elements of the ~~
pOSItIO~s. Infantry Division, Coming in at Gela on D-dav, the"
TheIr first 700 days at ,the guns may or m~y not prove to quickly set up defenses over the beaches and fro:n earl).
be the hardest, bu~ they re, pre,tty sure, the~ II nev~r le~rn morning threw flak at raiding planes in almost hourly at-'
so much so fast agam. Landmg m Algena WIth the mvaSIOn tacks. On D-3 the Jerries struck back with a venoence J
forces in ~ovember, 1942, th~ batt~lion was im~nediately bombing a plat~n of the 105th just coming onto the °beach\
strung out m detachments at v.Ital pomts, ~ strate~1Cpat~ern and causing 27 casualties. As the 1st Division moved for-
followe,d throughout the Afncan campaIgn: FIfSt ~sslgn- ward, the battalion took up the role of protection for the \
ments mcluded, the b~aches. at Arzew, p~rt mstallatIOns at division's artillery, and supported their batteries in all I
Oran, and nelghbonng aIrfields" all I~nportant enemy phases of that strenuous 38-day campaign. ~
targets.
• ,
In a few weeks ,the entIre UnIt moved .
to the \:\11 h
i\ len tel
F'f t h A ' d d I
rmy mva e ta y, t le 1 1 105 h ..
t partlcl'l
TUnISIan front, two machme gun platoons bemg rushed .. ,
b.vall' to ta k'e up pOSItIOnS
.. F 'd P d TI I ' pated m the landmgs at Paestum and m the first stages of
at;aI ass an le epte alr- , '1' ,, h h
" ., ... the campaIgn supported four mfantrv e IVlSIOns-t e 45t .
port, at that tlIne the foremost aIrfield m TUnIsIa, whIle 36 I 3d d 34 h \:\1' h I 34 I' h b I' b .
'f' 1 d .. f . f' t 1, an t. i\ It t le t 1, t e atta Ion egan
at IleI' UnIts urnIs le antlalrcra t protectIon or aIrports h I b' 1' h A . F k k '
'l' '11 t e ong, Itter e nve u.p t e pennmes. or ac -ac men 1l
an d e1ock. areas a 1ono tIle coast to Ph I IppevI e. f d dl f f
0, means months 0 ea y monotony- requent moves rom
On 6 December, thev bagged theIr first German plane, 1 1 dd h'll I "d" ." d j
,,', . 1 b " one one y mu y I range to anot leI' Iggmg m ap
a Junkers 87- and that s when our hIstory rea ly egan. , '. '
'ddl f J ' 1 k d I
Bv th e ml e 0 anuarv, It 00 'e as t lOug 1 practIce la I 'I d after...day of 24-hour gun guard out m all kmds of weather,! I k I
ma, d e perect.
f T en JU'88- s ral'd ed Th e 1epte c.ne.ld Th e. pullmg out and startmg all over agam. Yet round d the
r.
c oc',
"10- " ' . 1P 40 " d' hi' h the gun sectIOns must be on the alert, rea y to me at a
)s went mto actIon; severa - s Jome m to e p WIt 1" .. d' d
, secone s notIce as COOl'mate teams,
the cnpples and between them they got every Jerry plane .. "
In the Tunisian campaign, 105th gunners set up an un- The 105th contm~ed WIth the 34t? across the Volturno
usual record for other ack-ack outfits to shoot at: they and up Italy to the \ enafro ~nd.Cassmo sectors, where the
knocked out just over 12% of all enemy aircraft engaged battalIon suffered ~1 casualtIes m on~ attack by the Luft-
with an average of only III rounds of ammo per plane. waffe. A~ter a bnef, rest, the, batt~hon retu~ned to the
On two different occasions back in Tunisia 105th ack- front agam for the FIfth Army s spnng offensIve, support-
ack men turned infantrymen, At Kasserine Pass in lat; ing t~e ~ewly arrived ~5th Infantry Divisi~n during ,the
I Februarv and aoain in March forward sections of the bat- remamder of the campaIgn through Rome. Smce that tIme
talion \\:ere ove~run in Germa~ counterattacks, In the first it has worked with the 88th, 91st and 34th Divisions in
six machine gun crews and additional antiaircraft me~ the long ~ush across the Arno river and through the Gothic
I with ]\/1 Is converted their gun pits into foxholes and fought defenses mto northern Italy,
it out until three of their men were captured by the nu- Activated as an antiaircraft unit at Camp Hulen, Texas,
merically superior German infantry. At one point, the in January, 1941, the 105th trained at Camp Young, Cali-
Krauts were throwing hand grenades into the gun em- fornia, before sailing for Scotland and England, in August
placements-a little maneuver the fellows were never told of 1942. There it received intensive amphibious training
about back at Indio, California! which it was to use three times in the next year. Originally,
In March, a German Panzer attack in their region sent the entire battalion came from National Guard cavalry
I seven Mark VIs and 50 light tanks within 800 yards of the ~nits in the vicinity of New Orleans, Louisi~na, but ~ow
battalion's advanced sections, First Lieutenant Carl J. \-Vit- mcludes ack-ack men from nearly every state m the UnIon.
I kop of Lansing, Michigan, and Corporal Vincent Marca- It is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Barkley of
rello of vVarren, Ohio, won Silver Stars as they held one New Orleans.
 AAA Planning for Waterborne
.r Invasion
By Colonel M. R. Thompson, Coast Artillery Corps
The third time I was fortunate enough to get in on a the necessity for information and planning requires that I
full-scale waterborne invasion I determined to keep notes m~r_eand more individuals be brought into the picture. I
on all the steps taken in the AA planning, hoping such Ihe first step in an amphibious operation as in any opera-
notes might serve as a guide for someone else. But as the tion is the determination and assignment of a mission by I
planning, which started about 6 January, did not culminate higher authority. On the Army level, the mission will be
~ in a D Day until 15 August, the chronological record is more in general terms, somewhat as follows: "Effect a landing in
confusing than instructive and I have reorganized the ma- the general area 'A,' establish a beachhead and secure a
terial into what I hope is a more intelligible sequence. finn base for future operations." I
Early in the war there seemed to be a tendency in the Frequently the nature of the future operations will be
U. S. to accept as gospel the words written baCk or brought indicated, but this will not always be the case, since those I
back by officers overseas, without the realization that any operations may depend, not only on the success of the beach-
one officer's conclusions are colored, indeed created by his head but also on unpredictable circumstances obtaining else- I
particular and limited experiences. These experiences are where at the time.
r certain to include items of climate, terrain, tactics, and even
materiel peculiar to the theater he was in or the enemy he
In general the vVar Department or the Theater Com- I
mander will indicate the approximate size (in Divisions)
I fought. That I recognize this does not mean that I am
immune to the same influences. All that follows, therefore,
of the forces to be available or a decision on this matter will
be made after preliminary studies.
bears the stamp of such special circumstances as obtained At this point or earlier, the Force Commander should
in the invasions of Sicily and 'Southern France, in the assemble a complete staff, including planning sections of
1 planning of which I had a hand, as well as the invasion the Navy and Air Force, in an appropriate area, preferably
of French Morocco, where I was in on the execution only. under one roof or in adjacent buildings, under appropriate
One more word of caution: \Vatch out for rules. The use conditions of secrecy. The process of planning consists
of specific rules as a guide is excellent. Any attempts to thenceforth of a series of trial and error planning, by each
substitute them blindly for judgment may be fatal. I have section, based on the information currently available.
" some confidence in my judgment in the AAA planning of
'{
r an amphibious operation. I take a dim view of rules, includ-
ORGANIZATION OF THE ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

109 my own. The organization of AAA with an Arn1Y' Corps or Divi-

sion has not been fully determined. For a Task Force the
PRELIMINARIES question must be determined by the organization of the
I The planning of a full-scale waterborne,invasion of hos- Task Force, the mission, the probable amount of AM in-
( tile shores is alwavs listed as one of the most difficult tasks volved in each echelon, and such considerations of experi-
that can confront; Staff. Repetition improves the perform- ence of units, width of the assault area, and subsequent
ance but multiplies the details, because more is learned at operations as will affect the subject.
each repetition. For a major operation involving two or more The set-up should satisfy the following requirements:
corps, considerable time must be available. Once the plan- a. Flexibility. Since, in the initial phases, action will be
ning commences, time will pass with increasing rapidity, under sub-Task Force Commanders, usually Divisions, re-
and the things that must be done pile higher and higher. sponsibility for AA Defense must be vested in the sub-Ta~k
From the date th~ major forces for the invasion are deter- Force Commanders, and they must be given adequate AAA
mined, not less than 90 days should elapse before the Force Headquarters for control. Subsequently, with the arrival of
sails for its destination. During that period the assault ele- Corps Headquarters and the joining of the separate assaults,
ments must receive amphibious training and special train- Corps will take over control of at least the AA defense in
ing based on the climate, terrain and defenses to be en- rear of division boundaries, and of airfields, and Corps Artil-
countered; they must be checked as to equipment and per- lery positions within Division areas. Corps may take con-
sonnel, must be moved to embarkation points and mounted. trol of all AAA, placing certain units in direct support of
All follow-ups must be trained and equipped where neces- each Division. Later, with the arrival of Army Headquar-
sary, and phased to move to points of embarkation. Simul- ters, the latter will take over all AA defense of vulnerable
taneously, all plans for the operation must be perfected, points in rear of Corps boundaries and of certain points as
alternate plans devised, Naval and Air action coordinated, Airfields and Army installations within Corps areas. Finally,
and an increasingly large number of officers made cognizant with the advance of the forces from the shoreline, the de-
of portions or all of the details. Security of the plans neces- fense of areas in rear of the Armv and of some, as airfields,
sitates this number being kept to the minimum at all stages; within Army boundaries will be'taken over by an Air De-
52 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL sePtember-oct~
fense Command, a theater or communications zone com- (2) \\lith the.arrival of the Army Hq, with an.~nny
mand or other rear area headquarters. The organization of AAA Bngade and probably some additional
the AM must permit these changes to take place with a AM, the normal forward area situation will be'f
minimum of movement, messages and changes. brought into operation. The Beach and small
b. Unity of Command. It is a recognized principle with port de~enses will be generall): taken ove~ more
the Navy and the Ground Forces, that the officer responsible or less mtact by the Anny Bngade, as \\'Ill the •
for an operation should command all elements that are defenses of airfields and, probably, bridges and
recIuired for its success. At each phase this requires the defiles behind or near Corps rear boundaries.
AAA to be under the command of the senior commander in
the area concerned. Final Phase: \Vhen it becomes possible to draw a rear
boundary behind the Army, the Army should be relieved of
c. Suppl)' and Administration. Until AAA Groups andj bI bel b d h
AA responsi i ities lind that oun ary. l' e minimum
or Bri$!ade Hq are given personnel to perform administra- h f f I I h f h h
~ ~
tive and supply functions these must receive special thought
siting 0 units at t lis p lase, as at eac 0 t e ot er phases,
is desirable. Most of the necessary shifts should have been 1
since supply agencies will rarely deal with Divisions on one made gradually and prior to the date of changing the respon-
hand and Battalions on the other. It is usually preferable to bI h I I bI
si i ity. T is involves, in genera, rep acing mo i e and .,l
require the AAA Group and Bri$!ade Hc} to perform a large d h bI
~ experience units in rear areas wit semimo i e and less
Part of these functions. This reduces somewhat the number d
experience ones.
of battalions each can handle efficiently. \Vhile the Task Force has been indicated as an Army,
d. Antiaircraft Intelligence Service (AAA1S). In the because of m)' experience with that particular size of unit.
combat zone, coordination of the AAAIS and contact with
A\,VS are extremely difficult problems. They are further similar principles will apply to any size invasion Force.
complicated in an amphibious assault. Only Brigades are DETERl\IINATION OFAAA REQUIREMENTS
provided (in this Theater) with the AA Operations Detach- The final determination of AAA forces required for an
ments, who have adequate personnel and equipment for operation cannot be made until the'plans for the operation
such coordination. are firm and nearly complete. But it will be essential to
\Vhatever organization is evolved must then, have an estimate of these requirements at the earliest possi-
(I) Provide flexibility in Operation, ble date, both for the sections concerned with supply and •
(2) Observe unitv of Command, for higher authority to plan for making such units available.
(3) Handle Adn.;'inistrative and Supply problems, and The following method will give an approximate answer,
(4) Insure adequate warning of approach of hostile air- taking final fractions as unity.
craft. a. For Gun Bns-Multiply the number of Divisions by
e. Following is a solution: two. (60% mobile.)
b. For A'vV Bns-Multiply the number of Divisions by
For the assault phase: three. (75% mobile.)
(l) An AA Section is formed for the Task Force of c. For SjL Bns-l1lis involves several considerations, all
about nine o£licers and 18 to 20 EM. of which depend on the Air Force or Navy. Normally lift
(2) All antiaircraft is assigned to the Army. will not be available for SjL's in the early stages. Two gun
(3) It is then attached to subordinate units as follows Bns with SCR-584's can be brought in the same vehicle lift
for the assault: as one SjL Bn with -268's. But if Air fie Ids are to h ave
(a) To Divisions. So much AAA as is needed for A\V jSL defense, figure 12 SjL's per field. If ports are to
defense of the Division, plus that for its as- have SjL's the size of the ports will determine the number
sault beaches, or small ports and any air- of Bns, but take not less than one Bn per port if used at all.
fields that will be captured and placed in If Fighter-Searchlight teams are to be formed each will re-
operation prior to arrival of Corps AAA. One quire about four Battalions of SjL's (and 1,500 miles of
Group Hq per Division is included, and wire).
should be with the Division for all planning. d. Barrage Balloons. Multiply the number of RCT
(b) To Corps. So much AAA as, when added to beaches, if known, by 15. If not known, provide one VLA
that with Divisions, will cover all require- BIn Bar Btf)' per Division. Check that Navy will supply
ments until arrival of Army AAA. One Bri- balloons for all Naval ships and craft to include LST's, and
gade Hq and, perhaps, one Group Hq per that the \Var Shipping Board will equip all merchant ships
Corps is included. The Brigade Hq should with balloons.
join the Corps when Corps planning begins. e. Brigade Headquarters and AAOD's-One per Corps
Subsequent to assault phase: plus one per Army plus one for Ports and rear areas.
(1) \Vith arrival of Corps Hq, with its AAA Brigade f. Group Headquarters-Two per Corps plus two per
and probably additional AAA, the Corps Brigade Army plus two (or more) for rear areas.
takes over all AM, placing, normally, one A\~l g. Ordnance Maintenance Companies (AA)-One per
or SP Bn in direct support of each Division. One AAA Brigade.
Group Hq will normally command this Divisional h. Signal Radar i\'laintenance Units-One per three Gun
AAA for all the Divisions, the remainder of the Bns plus one per SjL Bn.
Corps AM being divided as dictated by circum- i. Renshaw Teams-One or two per Army if Brigades
stances. cia not have teams.
 AAA PLANNING FOR \V ATERBORNE INVASIOK 53

.\11the above will be influenced by so many factors, prin- All AAA that'will be required to land over beaches must
'pallythe expected enemy air effort in the target area, that be given amphibious training to include waterproofing of
~ If should be used with caution. It was a sound basis in the equipment, loading on appropriate craft (do not confine
''l{lediterranean Theater in early 1944. this to one type), unloading under various conditions, firing
The final requirements must be found by more detailed from craft (AA and shoreward), Field Artillerv and assault
IOrestigation. The operation must be projected ahead and firings, emergency expedients for every probabl~ emergency,
<hepeak requirement for AAA determined. This analysis and as much AA firing practice at aerial targets as circum-
ofthe probable progress of the operation is also essential to stances permit. The firing, although listed last, must not
detem1ineproper phasing of AAA into the target area. The be neglected.
allowing are the items that must be considered, more or less A successful assault consists of fittino tooether thousands
inorder of priority. of details, none of which should be negle~ed, not because
(a) Ports, anchorages, and assault and supply beaches. the details will all click as planned, but to have so many that
(b) Divisions. enough will click to insure success.
(c) Field Artillery (nondivisional) \Vhile the assault AAA will, in general, train with units
1(d) Bulk gasoline unloading point.
.5 (e) Airfields.
it will support in the attack, none of the appropriate items
of training listed for subsequent AAA should be neglected
(f) Bridges and other defiles. bv the assault units.
(g) Beach and other supply dumps .• AAA subsequent to the assault. Much of the AAA com-
(h) Railheads. ing into the target area subsequent to the assault may land
(i) Communications centers. over the beaches and will require waterproofing training.
(j) Critical power plants and dams. Some of it will come in with follow-up divisions and corps
(k) Certain manufacturing centers. and should train with those units. The following items of
(I) Higher command posts. training should be covered for all follow-up AAA to the
extent considered necessary and permissible by time and
One peak requirement will come after the capture of the facilities.
first port or ports, when there will be shipping lying off (1) Recognition of Aircraft.
!;the beaches as well as in the ports. It is desirable that the (2) Recognition of tanks, SP artillery, enemy ships and
~heaviest possible defense be present in the port for the first craft.
enemy raid. Other peak requirements will occur when air- 0) Firing; AA, AT, FA, Waterborne.
field construction permits bringing in medium bombers, (4) Maintenance, and Field expedients.
Jnd subsequently, perhaps, heavy bombers. Other peaks (5) Supply, as handled by Army and Base.
maybe discovered as the operation is projected forward. An (6) Administration, as laid down by Army.
experienced officer must supervise carefully this projection (7) AvVS-AAAIS and communications as planned in
t of the operation and consultation with G-3 and Air as to
SOL and A\VS-AAAIS instructions.
robable eventualities must be continuous. (8) Field problems to include night preparation and
The final requirements having been determined, close , occupation of positions.
~ liaisonwith the next higher headquarters AA Section must (9) Mines and booby traps; mine detectors.
be maintained to obtain the best units available and to ar-
range for their being made available in time to permit neces- Emphasis must be placed on different phases of training

I
~ ary training, and, if necessary, their employment in con- for different units, based on their previous experience and
ccntration and embarkation areas, prior to their own em- contemplated employment. Careful analysis is necessary in
, barkation. each case, but if time permits, flexibility in employment is
TRAINING
gained by uniformity of training. This training should be

l
intensive, vigorous and as practical as possible.
For the assault elements.
THE PLANNING
. The Divisions making the assault will undergo certain
)special training. For any part of this training that involves Continuous contact must be maintained, bv the AA Sec-
I :\AA, the latter should participate. This is especially true tion, with the Air Forces, the Navy, the G-2: and G-3 Sec-
of amphibious training. The planning at each echelon will tions of the Force, and with the AA Section of the next
be going on at the same time as the training, especially near higher Headquarters in particular, as well as with the other
l the end, and the Corps Brigade Hq and the Division Group
~Hq should be with their respective Corps and Divisions
.during the training and planning phase. Since more AAA
staff sections in the Force Headquarters.
The G-2 will obtain information on the following items
of particular interest to the AA: Terrain and climate;
will be attached initially to each assault Division and prob- beaches; ports; airfields and enemy air dispositions; and
[ ably to the assault Corps than they normally employ, not enemy capabilities. G-2 also coordinates map and air photo-
I all of it can usually be attached during the entire training graph requirements, and obtains interpreters, if necessary.
period. For preliminary training for RCT's in a Division a The G-3 Section will work out various plans with various
hattery of A\V or SP per RCT will suffice. For Division schemes of maneuver, and with various forces in the assault
training the SP or A\\' Bn and the Gun Bn should be avail- and separate follow-ups. Of these, all must be analyzed for
able per Division. For the rehearsals, all AAA involved in AA defense but of those under consideration, the one re-
the phase being rehearsed should take part. quiring the most AA defense will be used as a planning
54 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOllRNAL Septem ber-Octob
basis for determining AAA reqUirements until the final de- (2) Passive air defense measures for troops.
cision is made and one of the plans is finally selected by the e. Artillerv Section.
Force Commander. This decision may not be made for two (1) A~ount of Field Arty in Div., Corps and Force
to four weeks. \\lith the G-3 Section also must be worked by type and number of Bns. "(
out 1\1\A rate of build-up. All orders and reports of a tac- (2) Organization of all Field Arty in the assault and
tical or training nature and details of training, moving and for subsequent operations.
Ulounting the Force are cleared through G-3. (3) Coordination of maps to be used for ground nres.
The AA Section of higher Headquarters will provide in- (4) Arrangements for land firing techniques by AAA,
formation on available AAA for the operation, on its status both antitank and fixed target fires. l
as to organization, employment, equipment, training, and
possible dates it can be released. From that section will come
f. Adjutant General.
Arran~ements for publication of all orders, plans, in-
f
information on curre.nt enemy air tactics and AM tactics. structIOns, etc.
\\lith this section, also, must be worked out the details of g. Ordnance.
1\AA troop movements, of responsibility and coordination (l) Checking size and number of units of fire pro-I
of I\AA defenses of training, concentration and mounting vided. (Normal and for assault.)
areas, and of special training and equipment. (2) Priorities on re-equipping units. j
From the Air Force must be obtained more detailed in- (3) Provision of materiel replacements, for all types
formation on enemy air capabilities, on air support for the of Ordnance materiel.
operation, on airfields to be used in the captured area, on (4) Provision for Ordnance equipment over T JBA.
rate of build-up, on the establishment of areas restricted to (5) Provision of adequate Ordnance (AA) mainte.
Hying and precise rules of AAA fire for all areas. By co- nance compames.
ordination with the Air Force, details of aircraft recognition (6) Determining amounts and proportions of each)
signals, Air \\larning Service plans and coordination of type of ammunition for each type weapon. \
Controllers with AADC's, provision of liaison officers in h. Signal Corps.
operations rooms, and elimination of interference by Air (1) Priorities on re-equipping units.
Force GCI sets and AAA Radars must be worked out. The (2) Provision of civilian and Signal Corps lines for
possibility of setting up fighter SjL belts must be exami~ed. AAAIS and for sending AvVS from Controllers i;
SOP on air warnings to civilian communities must be (SOR) to AAOR's. J
settled. (3) Radar and Radio spare parts, radar maintenance
The Navy will provide information on their Air vVarning units, and replacements.
which must be coordinated with the Air Force A\\7S, on (4) Allotment of adequate radio frequencies as re-
such naval air support as they expect to provide, on their quired. These must fit available radios.
requirements for protection" of roadsteads adjacent to (5) Signal Corps equipment in excess of T JBA.
beaches and ports, on whether they have available or will I. Engineer.
(1) Map scales. ~
require from the Army balloons for all ships in the opera-
tion, on enemy naval capabilities for attacks on shore in-
stallations and probable requirements for Coast Defense,
(2) SjL repair detachments.
(3) Spare parts and replacements for SjL's and bal-
1
on any Naval shore installations requiring AAA or Coast loons. I
Defense. Arrange also with the Navy for balloon servicing (4) Special arrangements for movements of hydrogen
of their ships in ports and of Army balloons in assault area. generators. \
Contacts being maintained with the other sections of the
THE PLAN
Army Hq are essential for the following details, among
others. The AAA plan does not and cannot spring full blown
a. CvVS. from the typewriter but must be evolved slowly and labori-
(I) Amount of smoke equipment. ously by assembling all the innumerable details that go to
(2) Type of smoke equipment at various phases. make it up, checking each detail with all other sections,
(3) Control of smoke units. Arms and Services concerned, until it can be labeled "firm"
( 4) Coordination of instructions to subordinate units and then keeping a check on subsequent changes that might
on use of smoke on beaches, in ports, and for river affect it.
crossmgs. Outlines of plans given in the annexes to various neld
b. G-l. manuals are valuable guides. But they do not normally con-
(1) Personnel replacements. template the detail that must be included in an amphibious
(2) Policies during planning and operations phases as plan, nor does the standard form lend itself readily to their
to promotion, transfers, reorganizations. inclusion. A plan for an amphibious operation covers more
c. G-4. time and more contingencies than are usually found in a
(1) General policies on Supply. five-paragraph order. The form can, by proper modifica-
(2) Approval of equipment in excess of TBA. tions, be made to include them if that form must be fol-
(3) Details of supply will be worked out with Special lowed. Certain paragraphs, as the friendly and enemy air
Staff Sections, Ord, Sig, CvVS, Engr, etc. situation, can best be covered by references to other parts of
d. G-5 (Civil Affairs) and Passive Air Defense Section. the combined plan. Some such items must be covered in
(l) Plans for SOP on air alerts in cities. summary, at least, since the AAA plan may receive inde-
P;;.f5 AAA PLANc.JING FOR \VATERBORNE INVI\SION 55

pendent circulation. Certain paragraphs will be long and airborne forces and the Force AM units. Indi-
detailed to insure coordination; the extent of this detail will cate on whose order these will chanoe under what
appear later. conditions, and what changes are "contemplated.
'
l The fonn that follows is patterned on the five-paragraph Subheadings for each successive phase may be
form. In all honesty I must admit that I have never used it used.
for various reasons; but I am not convinced that I used a b. Scales of defense at each phase, in detail for the
better one. It should be remembered throughout that only assault, in general for subsequent phases.
the AAA will give careful study to this plan. Other ele- c. Passive Air Defense. Refer to PAD plan, or if
ments will have voluminous instructions of their own to this is an AA responsibility in your Hq, include
read, therefore be sure to have points of interest to them in- instructions to all units, or preferably, publisl
eluded in other plans where they will be seen by those in- separately.
valved. This applies especially to Navy and Air Forces. It d. Rules for AA fire and restrictions to aircrafl
is difficult to include in this form the successive phases of (agreed, of course with Air, Navy and G-3)
the operation, yet it is desirable that as complete a picture Refer to separate publication or, I if short or nOl
as possible be given since subordinate units can then plan separately issued, include here.
more intelligently. e. Instruction on employment of AAA 'weapons ir.
"1. a. (l) Enemv Ground Forces-Refer to G-2 Esti- Seacoast, Antitank and Field Artillery roles.
mate 'and current G-2 reports. Give brief 4. Refer to Administrative Orders. Give' summary oj
essential items as ammunition and rations to be car.
summary.
(2) Enemy Naval Forces-Refer to N-2 Estimate ried, etc. Show breakdown of battalions into assaull
and current G-2 and N-2 reports. Give brief and follow-up echelons.
summary. 5. Refer to Signal Annex and SOL Give details 01
(3) Enemy Air Forces-Refer to A-2 estimate of AAAIS and A\VS coordination and operation. Sho\\
supporting Tactical Air Command. Sum- frequencies allotted where these are not part of lowel
marize essential information under enemy air echelon block. Show proposed CP locations aRoa'
capabilities, probable reaction to the opera- and, if known, ashore."
tion and probable maximum and sustained INSTRUCTIONS
efforts.
\~lith the plan form used above it is not convenient t<
b. (l) Brief statement of support by any adjacent
include all the detailed instructions that are necessary te
Ground or Naval Forces not in the operation
insure complete coordination. Accordingly, Operations o~
(or give reference). Special detail on AAA
other memoranda will be issued on at least the followinr
if it affects this operation.
subjects: '
(2) Plan of support by Air Forces other than by
that directly supporting the operation. Give a. Rules for AA fire.
all available useful details. (l) Restrictions on Aircraft, Army and Navy.
2. a. Mission of this Force. (2) Restrictions on AAA, Army and Navy.
b. Organization of the Force to include Divisions (3) Special rules for ports, airfields, etc.
and any smaller units making separate landings b. Preinvasion Training.
as Rangers, Airborne Troops and Raiding Parties. c. Consolidated list of excess equipment authorized t,
Show all AAA as organized for the assault. AAA units.
c. Rate of build-up of Divisions, AAA, and smoke d. Reports required on AAA Activity.
units. THE AFTERMATH
d. Scheme of maneuver of Task Force. Give details
on Airborne elements. After all the hectic planning you will climb on a boat ani
e. Air Support Plan. Refer to plan of Air Com- fine day, and find your work is mostly finished. You'll thinl,
mander and summarize principal points. Show of a dozen details that might go wrong. It is unlikely you'll
rate of build-up including airfields and dates. be able to do anything about them en route. But it is we~
Give details on AVVS. to devote a lot of thought to the subject, not worry, but con,
f. Naval Plan. Give reference and essential details,' structive thinking. Because some things will go wrong ane
as Ship Signals for alerts, responsibilities for coast they can each be improved if not remedied after landing i
defense, balloon servicing, etc. forethought has been devoted to them. Try to arrange te
g. Smoke Plan. Refer. to Chemical \Varfare Plan. have a jeep with you when you debark or you'll have troubl4
Give details on smoke. getting around. You'll get little information initially unles
3. a. Assign responsibilities for M defense to each you go after it. Keep your thinking fluid and avoid ru~
subordinate unit, i.e., Corps, separate Divisions, And may you have successful if not happy landings.

•
AAA Planning for the Inoasion1
of Southern France '
By lieutenant Colonel S. S. Gregory, Jr., Coast Artillery Corps
ORGANIZATION OF THE SEVENTH Am.IY AAA SECTION a. VI US Corps composed of:
On 2 January 1944 the Commanding General Seventh 3d US Inf Division; 36th US lnf Division; 45th
Annv assembled his staff in the advance CP at Palermo, US Inf Division; 1st US Special Senrice Force;
Sicily and said, "vVe are gonna start killing those SOB's French Groupe de Commandos (2 Bns); Combat
again. Colonel Hawkins, Deputy Chief of Staff, will give Command, 1st French Armored Division; SuppOrt-
vou additional instructions." ing Troops.
• The Army executive planning staff was selected and we b. French Armee "B" composed of:
were told to pack and be at the local airfield by 0800 hours Two French Corps; Five French Inf Divisions;
3 January. The following morning we left Palermo by air T \vo French Armored Divisions; Supporting
and arrived at Algiers, Algeria, North Africa that afternoon Troops.
and then proceeded to Allied Force Hqs. There we were in- c. 1st Airborne Task Forces composed of:
structed to establish a planning CP along with the US One British Parachute Brigade; One French Para-
Navy and Air Force, French Army, Navy and Air Force chute Regt; One US Parachute Regt; Two US
and British Navy and Air Force in an old college building Parachute Bns; One US Glider Bn .•
located about five miles from town. 2. The main assault was assigned to the VI US Corps as
Several days later Seventh A.rmy was designated as shown in paragraph I, 2 a above, supported by Air and
Force 163 by AFHQ and given the mission of planning Navy.
and executing operation Dragoon.
II Army Antiaircraft Plan
1 Army Plan
I. After a careful study of the Army plan, Air plan,
1. Operation DRAGOON-to establish a beachhead in Navy plan, and enemy air capabilities, the following scales
Southern France to use as a base for capturing the ports of of AA defense were selected:
Toulon and l\tlarseilles and subsequently to exploit north Gun Bns Alr/Bm SP Bns SIL Bns BB Bt,ys
towards Lyon and Vichy. Minor Ports I 1 1/3
2. The Seventh U.S. Army, to be supported by Med. Major Ports 3 2 I
Allied Air Forces (MAAF) and Allied Navies and com- Airfields 1/2 1/2
posed of the following units was assigned the mission of Bridges 1/4 1/6
planning and executing Operation "DRAGOON" subse- Divisions
quent to Operation "OVERLORD" (Northern France): Corps 2 2

Brig. Gen. P. B. Kelly

AAA Officer

CoJ. M. R. Thompson
Ex Officer

I I I I
Capt. C. Baer l\laj.J. C. Dobbin Lt. CoJ. S. S. Gregory, Jr. Maj. T. Hamilton Maj. P. R. Smith
Personnel Intelligence Plans & Operations Supply" Radar & Comms
 45 AAA PLANNING FOR THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRAi:, -. 57

r: Based on the above scales, the total AA requirements

were:

l Brigade Hq & AAAOR

f Group Hq
I Gun Bns
I
4
12
17
us
0
0
7
4
12
24
FRENCH TOTAL
167
215
406
409
410
Lt
Lt
Lt
Lt
Col
Col
Col
Col
Lt Col
J\lurrin
J\load"
Baruhan
Batson
Watson

:\W Bns 20 20 40 SP BIIS CO

SP Bns 3 0 3 106 Lt Col Arnold
S/L Bns 2 0 2 HI Lt Col Leary
) BB Btries 3 0 3 443 Lt Col Lars~n
)
Brigades- AlFB1JS(Mobile) co
a. One with VI US Corps. 107 Lt Col Pope
b. One with French Armee "B." 431 Lt Col Davis
c. Two with Seventh Army to command all AAA in 433 Lt Col Thompson
rear of the rear boundaries of VI Corps and 436 Lt Col Schultz
Armee "B." 437 Lt Col Mayden
439 Lt Col Bowers
SP & A\\1 Bns-Each US Inf Division has one SP Bn and
451 Lt Col Synder
each French Division has one Organic A\\' Bn.
533 Lt Col Dance
French-The French do not have any Brigades or Groups
534 Lt Col Donigan
but each Division and Corps does have an AA
536 Lt Col Brubaker
Special Staff Section which commands all AA as-
893 Lt Col Utke
signed or attached to that formation.
894 Lt Col Chandler
2. After many conferences with the AA Officer of 895 Lt Col \Volf
AFHQ, the following American AAA units were assigned 898 Lt Col Kress
to Seventh Army for Operation "DRAGOON";
AlF Bns (SAI) co
Brigades CG
20 I Lt Col Sherfesse
31 Brig Gen Chapin 400 Lt Col Hempstcad
34 Brig Gen Robinson 454 Lt Col Shaver
35 Brig Gen Townsend 638 Lt Col Hocker
44 Brig Gen Tobin 896 Lt Col Anderson
Groups CO 899 Lt Col Smith
1 Colonel vVilliamson S/L Bns CO
5 Colonel Henegan
331 Lt Col Armstrong
9 Colonel Lavery
68 Colonel French
353 Lt Col Courtcnay
74 Colonel Bender BB Blrys (VLA) co
80 Colonel Cole 102 i'v1ajorFlente
91 Colonel Hafer 103 l\llajor Jones
105 Colonel Turnbull I04 Major Kohlcr
106 Colonel I-Iartman
209 Colonel Townson CO
213 Colonel Goodman 31 lVlajor vVitt
505 Colonel Roy 34 Major Higginbothan1
35 Major Jakobowsky
GUll Bns (Mobile) CO
44 Major Brown
62 Lt Col Buynoski
67 Lt Col Ea;le III Preparation a1ld Orga1lization of Assault AAA
68 Lt Col Bates I. All the AA units selected to accompany the assault
72 Lt Col Dowd forces and initial follow-up wcre relieved of opcrational mis-
108 Lt Col Anderson sions in Italv and Sicily and movcd to the Salerno Invasion
214 Lt Col Kietzman Training C~nt~r for a 'short period of intensive amphibiou~
216 Lt Col Hammond
training with divisions and re-equipping prior to actual
403 Lt Col Campbell
embarkation from Naples and Taranto.
Gun Bns (SM) co The organization of AA for thc assault was:
73 Lt Col Rinker
74 Lt Col Dicter VI Corps - D Day
87 Lt Col Orrick 35 AM Brigade 433 AM AvV Bn
112 Lt Col Eubank 108 AAA Gun Bn 451 AAA AvV Bn
 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOllRNAL Septem her-October

3d Inf Division D-Day 36th Iuf Division D-Day 62AAA Gun Bn

5 AAA Group 68 AAA Group 893 AM A\V Bn
-H1 AM A\V Bn (SP) 443 AAA A\V Bn (SP) 21 AAA A\V Bn (French Div Organic)
72 AAA Gun Bn 68 AAA Gun Bn 37 AAA A\~J Bn (French Oiv Organic)
534 AAA AV/ Bn 895 AAA A\V Bn
104 AAA BB Btr)' 102 AAA BB Btr)'
V Build-liP of AA to D + 10
1. After the assault lift the build-up was as follows:
45th Iuf Division D-Day 213 AM Group D + 8
l~
D + 10

I
105 AAA Group 216 AAA Gun Bn 31 AAA Brigade
106 AAA A\V Bn (SP) 107 AAA A\V Bn 112 AAA Gun Bn D + 10
103 AAA BB Btry 36 AAA AW Bn (French) 0 + 10
2. Due to limited shipping, two Corps A\V Batteries 11 AAA Gun Bn (French) 0 + 10
and the A\V Bn with the 45th Division were not loaded BvO + 10 the following AA had landed:
I
/
on the assault convoy.
u.s. Frel/ch TOlal
3. In order to provide Armee "B" with command eche- \
Brigade Hqs 3 0 3
lons and to supplement their AA, the following US units
Group Hqs 5 0 5
were attached and arrived in the target area over secured
Gun Bns 6 1 7
beaches on 0 + 1:
A\V Bns ) 3 8
34 AAA Brigade 62 AAA Gun Bn Sp Bns 3 0 3
80 AAA Group 893 AAA AW Bn BB Btries 3 0 3
4. All AA follow-ups to the assault area other than that VI Clwllge ill Responsibilities
listed in Paragraphs 2 and 4 above were mounted from
Due to the rapid advance inland it was necessary to re-
Italy, Africa, Corsica and Sardinia.
lieve the CG VI Corps from AA defense of the beaches,
lV Assault Phase minor ports and airfields on D + 5. The 68 and 105 AM
Groups with the required units were relieved from attached
1. The AA with each division went ashore in the fol-
to VI Corps on 0 + 5, placed directly under Army for
lowing order of priority: (H-I-Iour was 0800 15 August
operational control and assigned the mission of AA defense
1944)
of all vulnerable points in rear of the rear boundary of VI
a. SP Bn-one battery with each RCT a~d one with Corps and Armee "B." On D + 10 the 31 st 1\AA Brigade
Oiv Reserve. All SP's initially went into position arrived and was assigned the AA defense responsibility of
on the beaches. all beaches and ports and bridges in rear areas and of all
b. BB Btry-one platoon (15 balloons) with each airfields vice the 68 and 105 AAA Groups relieved.
RCT. The inflated balloons with hand winches
were walked ashore from LCT's by three men VII Radar
each. 1. Planning Stage:
c. Group Hqs-Coordination of all AA in the Di~ision a. Because of the excellent state of training and combat
Sector. efficiency of Radar personnel in Gun Bns consid-
d. Gun Bn-Each battery proceeded to pre-selected ered for the assault, efforts of the planning section
positions based on study of maps, aerial photo- were directed largely towards equipping all units
graphs and models, thus giving a coordinated gun with the fifth SCR-584 and a full complement of
defense coverage of the entire Corps assault area. RC-184's, attachment and supply of Signal Radar
e. A\V Bns-General beach defense in order to relieve l\tlaintenance Teams, and providing Battalions with
the SP's to move forward with Division artillery. at least a thirty-day supply of all maintenance
and Infantry elements. items. Radar operational plans were left to the dis-
cretion of AAA Brigades because of their past ex-
-I 2. The Gun Bn and two A\V Bns operating directly perience, but all plans were carefully coordinated .
.lnder VI Corps were divided over the entire Corps sector
2. Remarks:
n order to thicken the initial defense and also add to the a. SCR-584's and -545's landed during the assault
:lepth. phase again proved their value as easily handled,
3. By the night of 0 Day the following AA was in po-
dependable equipment. They were moved into
';ition and operational: position; and, have since D + I, operated continu-
I 12 SP Batteries 14 A\V Batteries ously without unforeseen maintenance difficulties.
14 Gun Batteries 90 Barrage Balloons No critical items of supply have developed due to
the completeness of the Battalion Maintenance
4. On D + 1 French Armee "B" began unloading the Kit, ME-104, carried in the assault by all Gun
,:ollowing AA over newly secured beaches west of the as- Bns. The fifth SCR-584, authorized for Hq Btrys
I;ault area: of AAA Gun Bns, proved of great value as an early
I 34 AAA Brigade warning set when units became widely separated.
80 AAA Group Signal Radar Maintenance Teams were attached
 45 AM PLANNING FOR THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN FHANCE 59

to Brigade 'Headquarters and functioned under operate improvised GOH's during the initial stage of the
the Brigade Radar Officer, they were, in general, assault.
landed with the first echelon of the AAOD. 3. In case of the tactical situation becoming highly fluid,
1 Changes in priority caused some teams to be lifted thus necessitating frequent moves, it is very desirable that
GOR's be mounted in vans (One Brigade has found a very
with follow-up echelons. The use of IIF became
confusing as the operation pr~gressed due to many satisfactory solution by converting a former civilian bus to
elements of the AAF removing Transponders from a mobile GOR).
various types of Aj8. 4. Each AAA Brigade should have a permanently at-
tached Ordnance Maintenance Company and a small de-
VIII Early \Vanzillg tachment should accompany the Brigade on the initial lift.
1. Planning Stage: 5. All radio equipment must be accurately calibrated
a. The Early \i\Tarning System planned for the assault prior to embarkation.
phase of operation "DHAGOON" was divided 6. Personnel and materiel should be loaded together in
roughly into three parts: the time immediately be- order to reduce the time required for the unit to become
fore and during the assault, D Day to D + 2 and operational upon unloading.
D + 2 onward. 7. Briefing of AA personnel should include missions of
b. For the assault period, a fighter director ship, and adjacent and supporting units.
one alternate, was organized to act as an SOH. 8. Rubber mat terrain models are invaluable during the
afloat. AA Liaison Officers were to pass Early planning phase and should be made available for study
Warning direct to gun and A\V Batteries and $.P. down to and including battery commanders.
sites in "CHATTER" broadcast form (i.e. Target 9. The maximum number of A\Vs should be deck-loaded
locations \\,/reference to known points, broadcast and in firing position to supplement the AA fire of crafts
in the clear in very much the s~me way that foot- and ships.
ball play by play broadcasts are made). 10. 90mm guns and 584's should be operational by
c. For the D to D + 2 phase the F.D. ship was to night of D Day since attacks can nearly always be expected
switch to l\,IAFOG (Mediterranean Fighter Op- at dark of the first day.
erations Grid) coordinates and pass Early \Varn- 11. AA units must be distributed over a number of craft
ing to. AAOR's expected to be in operation by to insu~e AA defense in case of shipping losses or change
dusk of D-Dav. in plans.
d.- For the last p~riod, the F.D. ships were to be re- 12. 90mm Gun Bns should be prepared to assume a FA
placed by SOH's ashore which would carry on the role in case of une},.'pected ground opposition and heavy
normal Early Warning functions. SOR's were to counterattacks.
be operational by D + 2. 13. Inflated balloons with hand winches can be walked
2. Remarks: ashore from LCT's by three men, thus saving carrying hy-
a. The "CHATTER" broadcast system of Early Warn- drogen cylinders to the beach and also reducing the time
ing was found to be very satisfactory and was kept normally required to establish a barrage.
in use after AAOR's were operational because not 14. Radios must be depended upon for complete com-
all units could join AAOR nets due to the distances munication, both tactical and administrative, during the
involved. early phase of an amphibious operation.
b. The SOR's afloat were kept in operation longer 15. Each battalion and battery should appoint one of-
than was expected because of technical difficulties ficer to act as TQivl and placed in complete charge of load-
involved in setting up the SOR ashore. SOH ashore ing both personnel and equipment.
did not become operational until D + 8. X Lessons learned in Operation "DRAGOON"
c. Brigade and Group radio equipment was found to
be inadequate for the large areas involved. 1. Dewaterproofing of AA units should be done at the
AA position if they are within a reasonable distance of the
IX Fonner lessons leanzed in this Theater which proved beach and not in general de\'vaterproofing assembly areas.
sound and paid dividends in Operation "DRAGOON" 2. Brigade and Group Headquarters should be shipped
1. Except when there is an acute shortage of LST's and intact and not divided into an assault echelon and a follow-
LCT's, 90mm guns, SCR-584's and prime movers partici- up echelon. In order to make this possible, these units must
pating in the assault should not be loaded in Liberty or cargo be made completely mobile for waterborne invasions.
ships due to the time required and extreme difficulty in un-
XI Summary
loading ..
2. In view of terrain and atmospheric conditions which In conclusion the Seventh Armv AAA, which hac
might possibly be encountered that will interfere with learned the hard way in Africa, Sicily: and Italy, is withoUi
normal radio communications, Groups and Gun Battalion doubt the world's finest. l\ilore need not be said, the recorc
Headquart.ers Batteries should be prepared to establish and speaks for itself.
 AAA Notes No. 22, ET
EDITOR'S NOTE: These extracts from Antiaircraft Notes approach and on the bomb run. Thereafter, planes Con-
Number 22, Headquarters, European Theater of Opera- tinued to operate over the bridgehead and to make attacks
tions, were written in March, 1945. More extracts from singly or in groups up to five, with attempts at high-Ie\'el
AAA Notes, ETO, will be published in the JOURNAL in bombing, low-level bombing and dive-bombing. Eight air-
a form as complete as possible, consistent with the dictates craft attacked the bridge at night at heights varying from
of military security, space requirements in the JOURNAL 5,000 to 8,500 feet but no damage resulted.
and timeliness.
e. Jet aircraft are appearing in sufficient numbers as to
lose their novelty, but without appreciable improvement in
3. Subject: Resume of Activity for Period 8-15 1\'larch. the efficiencv
. . or success of enemv. attacks.
1945.
Source: AA Section, Headquarters, Twelfth Army ~. Subjecr, Wlc<ilS of T:'al F:<e, • ~
Group.
Source: SHAEF, Air Defense Division; office of Thea- \
a. The emphasis of enemy activity during the week end- tre AAAO, Hq., ETO.
ing 150600 March was directed against the Remagen bridge A. Extract from Air Defense Rel'iell' No.5, SHAEF,
and bridgehead. Of the total of 447 enemy planes over our 22 December 1944:
area, 380 were over the vital bridgehead. Two other areas a. The flying bomb has much to answer for, but on the ..
receiving considerable enemy attention were the area north other hand it has caused certain beneficial results. Not the 4
of the Moselle River where Third U.S. Anny armored units least of these was the closer understanding it promoted be-
were pushing rapidly forward to the Rhine and the area in tween the British and American AA Gunners. This was
the \'icinity of Krefeld. A very few isolated planes operated made possible by virtue of the fact that during the flying
over other scattered areas, presumably on reconnaissance. bomb deployment in the United Kingdoms, British and
Enemy aircraft operated during every day of the week, in
numbers from nineteen to a high 112 on one day. Single
planes or groups up to four were again the common sighting.
American units often ocqlpied adjacent sites. The prob- ~
lems of .one were the problerns of the other, and as a result,
there ensued an exchange of ideas which contributed not a
I
AAA units enjoyed a highly successful week claiming 139 little toward the success which was eventually achieved.
enemy aircraft destroyed and 54 probably destroyed. b. The nature of the Bying bomb target is sueh that only
b. F\V 190's and Me 109's consti1Uted 81 % of the air- a kill will prevent the robot from completing its mission;
craft recognized, with Ju 87's contributing 15% more. Only deterrent fire can achieve no useful purpose. Fire must be
six J'v1e262's were sighted during the first six days of the accurate, especially in view of the small vulnerable area pre-
week but on the last day 80% of the ninety-four aircraft sented by the target. It was natural, therefore, during the ~
over the Remagen bridgehead were jets. Other planes, in Diver deployment in the United Kingdom, that the atten- I

small numbers were He Ill's, AR 234's, and Me IIO's. tion of British AA gunners should be once again drawn to
c. The bulk of the enemy activity occurred during the the American practice of conducting trial fire, of which the
afternoon hours. Attacks were mainly during these hours express purpose is the improvement of accuracy and eradica-
but one group of eight aircraft attacked the bridgehead in tion of any errors due to false meteorological information or
the hours 2000-0 130. undiscovered materiel deficiencies.
d. Enemy tactics were about as expected. Full advan- c. The British practice has been to prepare for action by
tage was taken of cloud cover and almost all operations were orienting their instruments, synchronizing their data trans-
at 3,000 feet or under. Enemy aircraft continued to operate mission systems, and applying corrections for nonstandard
singly or in small groups. In the Third U.S. Army area or nonrange table conditions. Beyond this they have not
strafing and bombing attacks were made against spearhead gone, providing, of course, the equipment fulfills certain
columns moving forward while planes on reconnaissance silent tests to which it is subjected. On the other hand, the
operated over the areas of advance, notably the triangle American system incorporated Trial Fire on top of all the
northwest of Coblenz. At the Remagen bridge the first other procedures which have been mentioned above.
enemy aircraft to attack were a group of three Stukas and \Vhereas the British have been satisfied with dial readings
one Me 109. These came in to bomb singly from a height the Americans have rC(juired corroboration of their prepara-
of 3,000 feet and all four were shot down by AAA. The tions from the positions of bursts in the sky. It will be ap-
next eight planes to attack were Stukas and they approached preciated that any such check as this must be of consider-
the bridge from the south along the river. The planes came able value in ensuring the accuracy of fire, providing any
into attack from a height of 3,000 feet. AAA fire destroyed errors revealed by the check can be easily eradicated.
all eight of these planes. In these first two raids on the d. Now the absence of Trial Fire from the British pro-
bridge, the enemy aircraft attempted to press the attacks and cedure has not been due to ignorance of it, but for very
accordingly took no evasive action on the bomb run. How- definite reasons. The first of these was the nature of the
ever, after the disastrous results of the first attempts which deployment of heavy AA guns in the United Kingdom
failed to hit the bridge, following attacks were not pressed prior to the period of Diver activity. They were sited to
so determinedly and evasive action was taken both on(the defend certain large towns and ports, and the layout was
 AAA 1'\'0 ES No. 22, 61

h. From National Defense Research Committee, Ap-

plied Mathematics Panel Report 22-IR "Analysis of Trial
Fire Methods" dated November 1944, the following recom-
mendations as to a lower and an upper limit for the devia-
tion of the center of burst (CB) from the trial shot point
(TSP) within which Trial Fire might be expected to im-
prove accuracy is given for information:
(1) The premise is made that the lower limit is based on
the consideration that Trial Fire is not warranted if acci-
dental errors are likely to be large enough to overshadow
those caused by faulty ballistic data. The upper limit is an
estimate for the greatest deviation which could be reason-
ably expected from faulty ballistic data, gun dispersion, etc.,
so that any larger error observed should probably be attrib-
uted to faulty setting of the gun and orientation.
(2) The recommended limits based on firing four shots
at a single TSP are as follows:
(n) No trial fire corrections are warranted if the ob-
served CB differs from the TSP bv less than 60 yards. in
GROU"lD ACTION AT RO(R RiVeR
slant range, 2 mils in elevation, an~1 1 mil in azim~th.
_ UC.[NO-
.~ - -
Sco/~ ",
Y,;;'d5
~====-l
~~ ~ .... "'All. AW BN (MJ

(b) If the observed CB differs from the TSP by more

~ fIG. I than 275 yards, in slant range, 7 mils in elevation, or 10
mils in azimuth, the set up of the gun and fire control
such d;at it was impossible for the guns to fire over any- equipment should be checked for serious errors before at-
r thing but relatively densely populated areas. England is a tempting to make Trial Fire corrections.

l small country with a large population. It has a negligible

amount of open country in the American sense of the term.
i Naturally, during a raid the danger to the civilian popula-
5. Subject: 90mm Batteries in a Dual Role
Source: Headquarters, Seventh Army Antiaircraft Artil-
lery
tion from falling shell splinters was acceptable, but it was
a. Ninety millimeter batteries firing on ground targets
r quite another matter to fire trial rounds when no raid was
in progress and when, by virtue of the density of popula- has become SOP in all battalions in forward areas, but some-
tion, lives might be endangered, whatever the line of fire. times the nature of the action is such that it is of a peculiar
I The second contributory factor to the non adoption of Trial interest. Such was the case of the 62d AAA Gun Bn com-
, Fire by th~ British, was their contention that the use of a manded by Lt. Colonel Adam S. Buynoski, in the tactical
~ Rank spotting station to observe errors of trial rounds in positions occupied along the Rhine River when the Ger-
(range would be impracticable under combat conditions. mans crossed the Rhine and established the Gambsheim
. Finally visibility is often very poor in the United Kingdom, Bridgehead north of Strasbourg. The front along the Rhine
and this proved a further argument against !he adoption of was very lightly held at the time and the prompt and
I a system which relied on good weather conditions for effective fire of the 90mm guns was largely instrumental
recording results. in the bridgehead being contained.
~ e. During the flying bomb deployment on the south b. Following is the battalion commander's narrative re-
I coast of England, the British were firing their guns over port of the action: "At about 1030A hours on 5 January
other than densely populated areas. This, coupled with the 1945, Battalion Headquarters of this unit was advised by
alternative method of measuring range to burst which had the 59th Armored FA Battalion that a 40-man German
been developed wiped out the two main objections to Trial patrol had penetrated into the Gambsheim area and was
Fire which the British had previously entertained. It was then somewhere on the road to \Veyersheim, where Bat-
natural, therefore, that the possibilities of its use should tery A of this battalion was sited. Later reports, however,
be reinvestigated. located the Germans as still in the vicinity of Gambsheim,
f. Today heavy Antiaircraft gunnery is an exact science. b!lt in considerably more strength than was originally re-
Nothing must be left to chance, and least of all the prepara- ported.
tions made before "fire for effect" is opened. In future, trial "This unit, which had been maintaining wire communi-
fire will have a place in the British as well as American pro- cation with the FA, notified the 33d FA Brigade that we
! cedurcs, or, at least, the means of conducting it and cor- had two AA batteries so sited that the entire bridgehead
recting as a result of it made available. This demands the area was within their fire possibility area.
inclusion of "spot controls" in any future development of "'At about 1300A hours the FA notified this battalion
fire control equipment. that a cub plane would be made available to us for adjust-
B. Comments of Theater Antiaircraft Officer: ment of fire on a woods N\V of Gambsheim where a con-
g. It has been observed that Trial Fire has not been siderable number of Germans had been reported. The FA
utilized to the maximum extent possible by U.S. AAA units requested that 100 rounds be placed in the woods.
now engaged in operations. Unit commanders must be con- "Battery B was assigned the mission. Range was about
tinually alert to use the advantages afforded by Trial Fire. 13,000 yards. The battery was instructed to fire all rounds
- .
62 rHE COAST AHTILLERY JOUHNAL Septelllber-Oc
with PD fuze set at superquick. This was done because it provide a ground defense for possible infantry attacks fr
was believed that the resulting tree bursts would cause the the north, east and south. Positions were rapidly select
most destructive fire against the personnel who had not, it and the weapons moved into them. Darkness and Un
was believed, had time to dig themselves into the frozen familiarity of the area made the initial disposition extremeh.
ground. difficult. '
"The observer (Air OP) called for one battery volley. b. At daybreak Corporal Peruchena, commanding half-
Battery B complied and placed all four rounds in the woods. track No. 232 (M-16 Quad Mount), observed some enemr
The observer then, with a succession of battery volleys, pro- infantry approaching from the southwest. He immediatel;
ceeded to sweep the entire woods with fire by moving the ordered his half-track, manned by T /5 Robert E. Lee, for-
bursts methodically back and forth over the target area. w~rd to a positio~ wh~re the Germans could be engaged 1
\Vhen 50 rounds had been thus fired the observer directed Without endangenng fnendly personnel. At the same time
that the remaining 50 rounds allotted for the mission be he instructed the balance of his crew to take up positions
fired at maximum rate at the center of the woods. as infantry and be prepared to deliver small-arms fire at the
"The observer when he saw the bursts was under the approaching German infantry.
impression the Battery was placing Time' fire in the woods. c. Simultaneous with Corporal Peruchena's discovery of
He reported that the bursts were occurring at treetop level, the Germans, Corporal Ladner, commanding track No.
and made involuntary exclamations such as That sure looks 242 (M-15 Mount) sighted another German infantry col-
wicked down there,' during the course of the shooting. umn approaching his position from the west. Track No.
"The following day this unit received a report from the 242 was in a favorable position for engagement of the
59th AFA Bn which confirmed the destructiveness of the enemy, and Corporal Ladner instructed T /5 Teddy W.
fire on the woods. It was reported that as a result of this Martin and T /5 Cleo R. Allen to man the weapon and
shoot (Battery B's fire was the only fire placed in the woods fire only the dual-mounted machine guns. He then ordered'
up to this time) the Infantry was able to move into the the balance of the crew to deploy as infantry.
woods unopposed. It was further reported that about 25 d. Both German columns were of company strength of
German dead were found there by the Infantry who felt approximately 70-75 men. As the enemy came into range.
there were that many more not immediately in evidence. both half-tracks opened fire, supported by the small-arms
These casualties were later confirmed by a member of the fire from the other crew members. The actions took place I
Infantry unit wpich moved into the woods .. simultaneously less than 200 yards apart. The engagement 1
"During the succeeding three days Batteries A and B lasted less than five minutes and when completed, the area
were assigned missions in all parts of the bridgehead area immediately in front of the half-tracks was littered with
and on the roads and concentration areas on the Gennan enemy dead. Corporal Ladner's track, No. 242, took forty
side of the Rhine. During a period of 41 hours Batteries
A and B expended 2,093 rounds; Battery B in one stretch
of one hour fired 200 rounds. N

"During the latter part of the period they were in action,

Batteries A and B were subjected to counterbattery fire by
the Germans. Battery B received only heavy long-range
shells at first (BC reports everyone had time enough to
grab a helmet, light a cigarette, and sit down below
ground level between the time the Heightfinder observer To £1:HltI~' ...

saw the gunAash, reported 'Round on the way' and the

arrival of the shell), but just prior to the time it was ordered
to withdraw it received high-velocity shells in the battery
area. "
6. Subject: Ground action of Battery A, 195th AAA A\"/
Bn (SP)
Source: AA Section, Headquarters, Twelfth Army
Group
a. The recent rapid advance to the Rhine by the XIX
Corps of the Ninth U.S. Army was spearheaded by the 2d
- LEGEND-
U.S. Armored Division. The 195th AAA AvV Bn (SP) at-
ROAOS
tached to this division, had occasion to utilize its fite power RIVERS
40"'-'" GUN
in stopping a local enemy infantry counterattack. Battery A
of this battalion was protecting the 65th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion during the advance. On 2 l\larch, the
65th Field Artillery, together with its attached AAA, GROUND ACTION AT ROER RIVER
found itself well forward of the Infantrv in an area between W[I$W[JLER
459T" AAA AW BN (M)

Schiefbahn and \Villich. At 1245 hou~s the Field Artillery o, zooo ~ooo
"
""00 .000
,

Sco/~ ", Yard.

Battalion was alerted for a possible German counter at-
tack and requested that AAA unit to dispose its weapons to FIG. 2.
 AAA NOTES No. 22, ETa 63

E r.;onersand Corporal Peruchena's track, No. 232, took

'f[\, prisoners. The rest of the Germans were killed, a
n- i of about seventy, and none were believed to have
IYt:3ped. No casualties were sustained by the AAt\ Per-
nel.
C- e. During the action, half-track No. 242 (1\11-15) fired
y pproximately 1,600 rouI?ds of .50 cal. ammunition and
\' balf-track No. 232 (l\l-16) fired approximately 1,800
r- ~ounds. The battalion commander of the 65th Armored
dr ield Artillery .Battali0.n credited t?e two AAA units w~th
e oaringsaved hIS battahon from bemg overrun.
S -. Subject: AAA Ground Support of the Roer River Cross-
e .
mgs.
rI Source: AAA Section, Headquarters, Twelfth Army
, Group.
a. The crossings of the Roer River by the First and Ninth
0. S. Armies were effectively supported by AAA units, 40 MM GUN BLACKOUT DIAL
, someof which rendered a dual support in both the ground BLACKOUT DIAL BEFORE MODIFICATION
role and the normal antiaircraft role. Two interesting A
,ground support missions were performed: the 555th AAA
• A\V Bn (M) in support of the 104th Infantry Division of
\'11Corps, First U. S. Army, and the 459th AAA A\V Bn
(7\1) in support of the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions
and XIX Corps, Ninth U. S. Army. The 555th Bn exe-
cuted its mission under the cover of darkness, using eight
lY-16 half-tracks; the 459th Bn executed its mission during
f daylight hours using eight 40mm Bofors guns.
b. The action of each battalion is given separately, ac-
( companied by a sketch and comments by the two battalion
commanders on their respective actions.
The 555th AAA AW Bn (M) Action:
The mission given to the 555th Bn by the 104th Infantry
Division was
, (1) to provide AAA .protection for bridge sites 1, 2, 3, FIG. 3
and 4 (see figure 1), division trains, and artillery; and
( (2) to render ground support to the 413th and 415th 40 MM GUN BLACKOUT 01AL
Infantry Regiments prior to daylight on "D" day. BLACKOUT DIAL AFTER MODIFICATION

l Based on the above instructions, the battalion decided to

place the four M-16's of Battery A in positions to give
ground support to the 415th Infantry, with four alternate
~

lery observation plane of the target areas assigned to his

positions selected for AAA defense of Bridge sites 1 and 2. battery; the other battery commander made a similar survey
f Likewise Battery D was given the mission of protecting
bridge .site 3 (4 was not to be used), with the four M.16's
of his target area from a high church steeple.
In selecting the sites for the half-tracks, the alternate
of this battery available to the 413th Infantry for supporting AAA positions mentioned above were selected for Battery
I fire prior to H-hour. A and completely prepared for occupation, together with
The 555th Battalion had previously drawn up an SOP the positions from which the ground firing was to be con-
for ground employment of AAA which was disseminated ducted (See Figure 1).
to all elements of the .104th Division. This SOP calls for As both supported combat teams desired fire to be
thorough preparations before commitment to any ground brought on different target areas, the AAA batteries worked
mission. independently of each other directly through the Infantry
In accordance with the SOP, the commanding officers Battalions making the main effort. Each battery commander
of the 415th and 413th Infantry were contacted by the controlled the fire of his own weapons from the CP of the
commanders of Battery A and Battery 0 respectively in infantry battalion which he was supporting.
order to determine the target areas and possible sites for Battery A fired on a schedule from H to H plus 30 min-
the AAA weapons. At the same time the fire plans, which utes, giving 10 minutes of fire to each target area "0," "E,"
included time of firing, rate of fire, communications, and and "F," shown in Figure 1. Immediately upon completion
liaison were worked out. The battalion commander and the of this firing, the tracks took up their. AAA positions at
battery commanders involved made a sand table study of bridges, sites 1 and 2. Battery D fired from H minus 15 to
the area in which the mission was to be performed. One H plus 15 minutes, keeping short bursts of intermittent fire
battery commander made a personal survey from an artiI- on areas "A" and "B" and continual fire on area "C." This
64 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Septe1ll her-Oct
battery was requested to bring fire upon the area in rear at me, and I just stayed right in my
of A and B at 0400 hours, and the mission was effectivelv k~ew your Infantry was closing in."
accomplished. J
As a result of this and a number of previous grou
Both batteries brought cross fire to bear on their respective actions performed by the 555th AAA AW Bn, the battalio
target areas. The guns of each battery were connected by commander, Lt. Colonel Farnum, submits the followin 1
hot loop to the fire control officer, and to the cannon com- comments:
pany of the regiment. The rate of fire used by both bat- "The battalion SOP on ground employment, which w
teries was as follows: each mount fired three-second bursts drawn up from the experience gained in seventeen previau
from all four barrels separated by ten-second intervals for ground missions, has proven highly beneficial.
a period of one minute, the cycle being repeated by each "On most of our previous ground support missions, th
successive mount in turn. A large volume of fire can be Bofors gun was employed in addition to the quadrupl 1

continually maintained by this method, and by alternating mount. \\There the objective is a known pin-point on whie
mounts, the danger of burning out barrels is eliminated. explosive charges are needed, the Bofors can be used to
No counterbattery fire was received during this operation. great advantage.
Approximately 43,000 rounds of caliber .50 ammunition "In our experience, however, the majority of the groun~ \
were fired during this ground support mission in the 2-2-1 support missions do not encompass specific inhabited tar~
ratio (armor piercing, incendiary, tracer). The assault waves gets. Our assignments have been area targets, and the ef-
of the Infantry met very little opposition from the far shore. fort on our part has been to keep the enemy 'buttoned up
After the area fired upon had been cleared of the enemy, during the push-off. Accordingly, we have felt as though:
much evidence of the effectivenes of the firing could be our biggest contribution to the friendly effort has been to
seen. Although the tracer bullets probably contributed least harass the enemy. \Ve have therefore always designed om.
to the actual destruction, statements of prisoners of war in- fire plan to 'worry the Hell out of many Jerries, rather than
dicate that they made the greatest contribution due to the stick to a few buildings and injure or kill only a few.'
resultant "buttoning up" attitude it caused among the "Nevertheless, if we find that, in addition to the primary
enemy. In the words of several prisoners of war taken by harassing goal, we can knock out a few of the enemy in a
the 104th Infantrv Division, "Everv tracer bullet from the specific occupied point (as we did by killing approximately
automatic weapor:s seemed as thou'gh it was coming right thirty in a factory at Lucherberg) we do bring the Bofors~

1
AZIMUTh {P4A1Gf f)/t/;/f

AZIMUTH DRua.\ /(ANGE DR.UM

4.5',' • Drv ...
tll5CR,PT,ON 0" ~C"'LE~
. :2."
l1.ANGE. DRVM-
/
"'''!~ drum ~,,"duol ..d 1/1Y(Jr~s 111' rl1n~e. /'rt,,"
J,,/l!q/5rt1duo lion(150cytJ'.J j 10 """0 yo' 1716rA',I'/te
/~f frrJo'V6f-"" IJ /ccytls. /'ro", "0"t1Y6 ""61' A' Ib r/t,
~ooojltI """I'I< • f~ J'rlro'ut7lit1ns are ~r 2rY6oT. LeT}'
Jitl, cl' drum t'«e y,..oo'.-feol!f-Dm /5cC5/o's 1'0 ~y«r.
11'1;111'Jltle CO,,1'61;'J fll .. 9,-..0'1.1,,1'/0"" /rcm ""Ct1V6" 1'b
~DDC ytis

AZ''''UTH tl .. VM
Az"nutll drlllr1 ~,.odu6Ied Trtl", 0 I'd .Jo3m//s. '/,,"s1'
,yr.-a".f/"" 2",i/ ... RI9Af htl/Tcrdru," liree ,..,.d II,P
.ntl 1..1"1' h,,11' reao'of dDwn.

FIG. 4.
 AAA NOTES No. 22., ETO 65
play. \Ve have always used the twelve-second burn-out high as sixteen per cent of the personnel engaged in the
m shell, having brought it over with us from England, mission. On 18 November 1944, the battalion commander
find it most satisfactory. observed the British 40mm Bofors in a ground mission as
,.we
are convinced that inasmuch as most of our assign- part of the artillery fire plan supporting the British and

l
ntSare for harassing mi.ssions, the firing should take place American attack on the German strong point of Geilen-
I darkness. The demoralizing effect of the tracers at night kirchen. The British were observed to lay their guns in
far greater than in daylight. Usually our missions sup- azimuth and elevation by means of graduated azimuth and
I rt a night attack' (the l04th Division being noted as a range drums installed on the gun, and their fire was directed
jght-fighting division) and our 'buttoning up' efforts are bva forward OP. As a result of these observations, the com-
I ~rdinated with our division artillery. Nevertheless, even ~anding officer of the 459th AAA AW Battalion procured
I iththis help, digging in is a must, and has saved us many some of this equipment from British sources and had it
usualties. installed on the guns of two of his batteries. (See the ac-
o "In spite of every research that we have made, precision companying article in these Notes entitled Azimuth and
rringby the l\11-16has been found to be next to impossible. Elevation Indicators for 40mm Gun for a detailed descrip-
~ren if careful previous adjustment is made with new bar- tion of this equipment. The 459th AAA A\\1 Battalion
;~Is, excellent stops are employed, and ingenious barrel used the same principle as explained in the article referred
:~ling devices are used, accurate impact cannot be achieved to except their equipment has the azimuth drum graduated
nce the barrels have become hot. Tests have been .made in degrees instead of mils, with the least reading equal to
y this battalion on firing ranges, and the results show that ~ degree.)
) e advancing friendly troops must always be led by a The missions assigned to the 459th AAA A\V Battalion
[~ inimum of 300-500 yards. To 'sweep' the ground in. by the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions were:

'
1'lOnt of the infantry as close as 1()(}.250 yards will most
rtainly bring grief, for the present firing tables are ap-
roximationsonly, and cannot give a guarantee for accuracy
1. Harassing fire on sugar factory in Julich for the 29th
Infantrv Division;
2. I-farassing fire on thread factory in Julich for the 29th
multiple-mount precision work. Infantry Division;

f "The SOP that has been set up for the battalion and the
rnissionsthat we have performed have always been accom-
1lished with the previous knowledge (through the medium
3. Neutralizing fire on marshalling yards in Julich for
the 30th Infantry Division; and
4. Harassing fire on Staats Forest near Julich for the
f careful analysis of aerial photographs and of G-2 knowl- 30th Infantry Division. (See Figure 2 for target areas and
ge of enemy artillery capabilities) that the enemy artil- gun dispositions.)
ry would be relatively light. If heavy enemy artillery op- The gun sites were selected behind a ridge running be-
positionwas expected, different tactics would be used; in tween Kirchburg and Altdorf. Two OP's were selected to
fact,I would discourage the use of AAA in a ground role direct fire, one in Kirchburg on the left flank for Battery A,
underthese conditions unless a real exigency existed, and and one in the woods near the river on the right Rank for
'1Jeneed of our weapons was critical. I 'wish to emphasize Batterv B.
at our experience in ground roles has, on the whole, been Th~ guns were surveyed in by a survey patty from the
underconditions of moderate enemy artillery fire. 30th Division Artillery, and aiming stakes were set for the
'The particular ground mission described above was an base gun in each platoon. All missions were to be fired on
eal dual-purpose role, for immediately upon release from call, with fire being shifted from one target to another;
e ground assignment, the two groups of four half-tracks consequently it was necessary to lay wire lines to the 175th
ere moved under cover of darkness to the near-by bridges, Infantry Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, and to the 30th
'hich they defended against an intense attack by German Infantry Division Artillery.
wlanesduring the following hours of the bridge crossings. At 0725 hours, 23 February 1945, 2d Platoon, Battery B,
"\Ve always make it a policy to rotate our 'assault pla- was directed to fire on the thread factory (Target No.2).
lOOns'on these forward front-line roles. In this manner, One adjusting round was fired from the base piece with pre-
rery 'assault platoon' has had an equal share in this type determined data, and fell on the target. This platoon then
f aggressive work. Not only, therefore, are all the platoons fired one round from each of the other three guns. Of the
pable, through actual experience, but none feel that they first four rounds fired, two hit the factory smokestack. The
re being continually 'stuck' with having to face unusual platoon then fired twenty-five rounds per gun on this target.
azards. As a result the 'assault platoon' morale is high." A heavy concentration of bursts was noted on the factory.
The 459th AAA AH! Bn (M) Actions: T.he 1st Platoon of Battery A then adjusted on the mar-
Considerable time and effort has been spent by this or- shalling yards (Target No.3) and placed 100 rounds in this
~anization in trying to find a suitable and effective method area.
fYwhich the fire power of the Bofors gun could be utilized Battery B fired 200 rounds on the sugar factory. The
t. support of Infantry troops. Previous ground support mis- 175th Infantry Regiment then notified the OP's that the
~ons performed by this battalion have been direct fire, with infantry was nearing the target and fire was discontinued.
the guns having to be emplaced on the crest of ridges in On the request of the 30th Infantry Division, 700 addi-
rder for the trackers to lay on the assigned targets. It is the tional rounds were fired on the marshalling yards.
ttalion commander's opinion that these missions were Nine hundred rounds were placed on points from which
ighly unsatisfactory because damage to the enemy ap- our OP's observed German Nebelwerfer rockets being fired,
ared only minor, whereas casualties in the battalion ran as and the rocket fire ceased. U
66 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Sep te III ber-Oc

METHOD OF MOUNTING
o
AZIMUTH AND RANGE DRUMS
AND INDEX POINTER

63~'US AAA AW BN 1M)

FIG. 5

The above firing consumed the allotted ammunition for into account for a successful ground firing mlSSI
I

the mission, and the units were preparing to move to their, a. Because of the tracer element of the 40mm ammu
AAA positions when they received a special request from tion, it would be easily spotted by the enemy if the 40n,
the 30th Division for more fire on the Staats Forest and the guns fired indepen.dent of the other artillery.
marshalling yards. (See Figure 2, Target Nos. 3 and 4.) b. Assurance that our fire is coordinated with the ,
An additional 2,000 rounds of ammunition were obtained vance of the Infantry.
and expended on these two targets with excellent results. c. That missions must be fired during daylight hours,
All firing was adjusted from the OP's by means of an d. Tracers must be observed by the OP.
improvised range fan. "Definite targets should be assigned in advance, wh
As a result of this action Lt. Col. Parrish, commanding permits selection of positions that will provide a SIT'
the 459th AAA A\\1 Battalion has submitted the following amount of defilade suitable for emplacing the guns. I
comments: to the extreme flatness of the trajectory of the Bofors for f

"That 40mm AAA Automatic \Veapons can be used first 1,500 yards, the defilade for this portion of the 1
effectively in a ground support mission by indirect fire. jectory could not be more than three degrees and still all
"That very accurate fire can be delivered on target by for ground bursts. (In this mission the target was thi
indirect methods (evidenced by the fact that a factory meters lower than the guns.) Care must be taken not l

smokestack, 20 feet in diameter at 4,350 vards could be hit build the portion of the revetment toward the target
at will, directed by an OP). • high; the remainder can be built high enough to give'
"That with careful reconnaissance (terrain permitting) gun and crew maximum protection.
ground missions can be fired with a minimum of losses. "During ground support missions the Bofors should :
"It is felt that the following considerations must be taken be expected to carr)' out a normal AM role."
 ~ AAA NOTES No. 22, ETa 67
Subject: Azimuth and E]evation Indicators for 40mm pointers when using director control. (See Figure 3, B.)
Gun. By making one master scale and photostating, a complete
~ Source: AA Section, Headquarters, Twelfth Army battalion can be supplied with the necessary materials with
Group. on]ya few hours work.
(c) To mount the scale, first remove the glass cover and
a. In order to utilize the 40mm gun for unseen fire in h b I
rim of t e lackout dia , being careful not to damage the
groundroles, AAA barrage fire, or to anticipate the direc-
cionof approach of enemy aircraft as reported by early waterproofing jacket. Next, attach the circular scale to the
outer dial with rubber mounting cement. Cut a small refer-
waming, it is necessary to have some means of laying the f
ence pointer rom a piece of light metal, painted black, and
'eapon in true azimuth and elevation. Since directors are h f h ]
att3c to one 0 t e setscrews ho ding the Q:]assin the un-
notnorma ]]y use d b y AAA A\V units wit h corps and d ivi- d ~
erneath side of the lens and rim; the pointer is to remain
sions,other methods must be used to accomplish this. Sev-
stationary in the 12 o'clock position.
era]AAA units of Twe]fth Army Group have devised field
~expedients for this purpose. Cd) In order to orient, boresight the gun on a true north
l b. (1) B]ackout Dia] Azimuth Indicator: (a) A simple
"~ethod of setting the 40mm gun in azimuth by converting
stake, push in the clutch on the instrument, rotate the dial
until the reference pointer reads zero, then release the
,[he b]ack]
'out dia into an azimut h indicating dia ] has b een clutch.
de\'isedby Lt. Col. James D. Caulk, Executive Officer of (e) The blackout dial azimuth scale will indicate azi-
the II th AAA Group. The blackout dial remains in posi- muth accurately to the nearest 20 mils, or approximately one
tionon the gun even though directors are stored, and the degree. This is sufficiently accurate for AAA barrage firing
,addedconversion feature does not interfere with the opera- and early warning purposes, but unsuitable for unseen fire
Itionof the instrument if required later for use with director. at ground targets, which requires greater accuracy. The
(b) Since the outside movable disc in the dial (See Figure principal advantages of this type scale are simplicity of con-
3, A) makes one complete revolution as the gun is traversed struction and noninterference with normal operation of
through 360 true azimuth can be measured by attaching
0
, gun. \Vhen necessary to set an elevation in conjunction
a circular scale, graduated either in mils or degrees, to this with an azimuth, a gunner's quadrant can be used.
'disc. Due to the direction of rotation of the disc, it is neces- (2) Range and Azimuth Drums:
sary to graduate the scale counterclockwise to read azimuth (a) A more precise method of setting azimuth and ele-
from the north. The circular scale can be made of card- vation by means of azimuth and range drums mounted on
board or heavy paper cut to a diameter of approximately the hand operating mechanism sleeves has been devised by
four inches, with the graduations inked on the outer edge. the 635th AAA A\V Bn (M), commanded by Lt. Col. A. J.
Principal compass directions may be added to the scale to \\Tangoman. This method was designed primarily for use
assistin setting OP early warning reports. The center of of the 40mm gun in unseen firing at ground targets. The
the scale should be cut out the size of the inner se]syn drums are constructed from 90mm shell cases, and are at-
discof the blackout dial so as not to interfere with matching tached by two screws to the inner face of the hand operat-
ing mechanism sleeve, with the base of the drum facing
toward the gun. (See Fig\lres 4 and 5.) Two holes are
drilled in the base of the drum to admit two dowels on the
- '1' •
I

.. .
•
1'1
inner face of the hand operating mechanism sleeve. A hole
2.14 inches in diameter is drilled in the center of the drum
base to allow the drum to pass over the driving pinion when
~
::-". - j.

\
mounting. Indices are mounted on the gear housing. (See
~
~
\-
Figure 5.)
•~ (b) For a 40mm gun equipped with high speed tra-
,
versing gears, one revolution of the azimuth hand crank
'-
, , I

,",
1-
causes the gun to turn through 305 mils. By machining
~ the azimuth drum to a diameter of 4.51 inches, the distance
Q- ! t l' t
~ I'
., between 2-mil graduations on the perimeter of the drum
\ , , I
,
,...
, J
Q
\
, I measure 3/32". The azimuth drum is provided with two
, l.
scales: (See Figure 4), one for measuring angles up to
I • 305 mils to the left, the other for angles 305 mils to the
. ," .,
right of normal; angles turned in a clockwise direction are
read on the right, or outer scale, and angles turned in a
counterclockwise direction are read on the left, or inner
scale. To orient and engage the drum, the gun is laid on
! i . I, ' the desired azimuth, and the traversing handwheel is en-
gaged with the zero reading opposite the indicator. By en-
larging the hole used to attach the indicator, it is possible to
T I
1<-
make final adjustments for aligning the indicator exactly on
the zero setting.
FIG.6 (c) The elevation drum is graduated to read directly;
68 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOllRNAL September-Octo
yards of range, based on firing table data for shell HE-T The handwheel is then disengaged, the correct range r
(SE M3AI) ~lk II w/fuze, PD M64 Al (muzzle velocity ing set opposite the indicator, and the handwheel ree
2,700 f/s). An appropriate correction can be made in open- gaged. A collar can be placed on the handwheel to insue
ing range when ammunition of different muzzle velocity is its remaining engaged, thereby maintaining proper orienta
used. Two scales are etched on the perimeter of the range tion. In order to prevent an incorrect range setting duej
drum, graduated from 1,400 to 4,400 yards on the outer being one or more turns off, a reference mark should
scale, and 4,400 to 5,975 yards on the inner scale (See Fig- made on the body elevation plate, indicating the upper a
ure 4). Subdivisions of 50-vard intervals are used from lower range settings on the drum.

l
1,700 to 4,000 yards range, ~nd 25-yard subdivision from (e) A height-of-site graph has been developed to faci!
4,000 to 5,975 yards range. Calibration of the range drum' tate accurate laying of the gun in elevation for the initia
was accomplished in the following manner: using FT round (See Figure 6).
40-AA-A-2, the quadrant elevation for ground ranges from (f) Errors due to backlash in the elevation and azimut
1,500 to 6,000 yards was determined, corrected for type of gears are very small, and can be virtually eliminated b
ammunition. Setting the gun by gunner's quadrant to an "coming into the target" from the same direction each time
elevation corresponding to 1,500 yards range, the 1,50o-yard (g) By use of the azimuth and range drums, it is pos_
graduation was marked on the drum opposite the indicator .. sible to conduct accurate unseen fire by 40mm guns. The
The process was repeated for each 100 yards up to 6,000 initial firing data is determined by map study, and the gu~
yards range, taking care not to overtravel and thereby intro- is laid on target by means of compass, aiming circle, or othd
duce a backlash error. Subdivisions were interpolated onto standard field artillery methods. After the initial round
the scale. Approximately two complete turns of the eleva. corrections in range can be set directly by turning the ele
tion hand crank were required, which necessitated graduat- vation hand crank; deviations in azimuth are translated intc
ing both ~dges of the drum. mils, and set directly on the gun by traversing with the azi
(d) Orient and engage the range drum, the gun is care- muth hand crank, right or left, the required amount. Fire
fully levelled and average range selected, and the gun ele- may be quickly transferred from one target to another within
vated to the correct range by means of a gunner's quadrant. the limitations of the range and azimuth drums.

U. S. Nary Photo
American PO\Vs in the compound at Yokohama shout and
wave at a carrier-based plane.
 ombined Correction Chart
YouLrreI )~)_tsenj'natnhetpCOSOj't'j.oonnsea'SSLj.genOednatordus
~~r EITIPlaCj.nBg M. Orman, Coast Artillery Corps
azimuth of 96° from DP to number four o oun and a dis-
are us a new problem and this is the novel way that it tance of 146 yards. From thiS chart the data appearing in
~assolved. The problem was created by the fact that num- Table I was tabulated. The elevation difference was com-
I' r8M was 146 yards from the DP of the battery, puted for each 1,000 yards of range for each ten degrees
la r ~~ gun. In addition it was forty feet below on of the field of fire. Obviously only 90° of the field of fire
II. n4s necessitated a height of site correction and need actually be tabulated as corrections in all other fields
va~jf..difference correction. The guns were G.P.F.'s are of the same magnitude differing only from each other
ed ~th 1\118 sights. in sign.
e otdiDary elevation difference chart was constructed Secondly, a height of site table was computed using firing
~- )wn m. FM 4-15). In our case the data used was an table 155-u-l, Fuze M51, supercharge for a negative height
Ie
n
CORRECTIONS IN MILS

o
I
....I I
(11
I
Ul
I
•
I
CJ/
I
N o - N CJ/ Ul (11 .... - -
N

,-

()
o
~
(D

Z
IT\
o
.()
o
:::0
:::0
\\ 1\ IT\
()
\ ~I\ -l
\ o
Z
1\ ~~ ()
:r:
\\ \~ l>
:::0

\ \ \ \\~
II -l

J
\ 1\~\\\ \
\ 1\ \ 1 \ ,\

'\ \\~
J \ \ \\~
/
/ \ \ \ \ \\~
/
-
I
\
\ \. \ I\~~
• ....
N
o
CJ/
0 o
Ul
o
(11
o o
QI
o
co
o
N
o
0.'
N
o
N
N
o a
N ~
0
NPO
~~

AZIMUTH IN DEGREE S
70 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-Ocl

TABLE. I TABLE II
Azimuth D.P. to No" 4 Gun Firing Table 155-U-l
960 Shell HE ~IIOI
Azimuth D.P. 'to No.4 Gun Fuze M51
146 yards Super~harge
Height of Site-40 feet
Range ill Site Correcticr.1
Rmlge in
Yards 960 106 0
]]60 1260 1360 1460 1560 1660 Yards
Site ill Mils
in Mils
Toials ii, Mils

3,000 1.7 1.6 1.5 104 1.2 l.l 0.8 0.6 3,000 4.4 .00 4.4
4,000 1.7 1.6 1.5 104 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.6 4,000 3.3 .01 3.31
5,000 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 104 1.0 0.7 5,000 2.7 .01 2.71
6,000 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.1 . 0.8 6,000 2.2 .02 2.22
7,000 2.6 2.5 204 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.3 0.9 7,000 1.9 .02 1.92
8,000 2.9 2.8 2.7 _.~-
')
2.2 1.8 . 1.5 . 1.0 8,000 1.7 .03 1.73
9,000 3.4 3.3 3.2 2.9 . 2.6 2.1 1.7 r.r 9,000 1.5 .03 1.53
10,000 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.3 1.8 . 1.2 10,000 1.3 .04 1.34
11,000' 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.7 . 2.1 1.5 11,000 1.2 .05 1.25
12,000 . 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.2 3.7 3.1 2.5 . 1.6 12,000' l.l ()) 1.15
13,000 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 3.4 2.7 1.8 .13,000 1.0 .06 1.06
14,000 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.1 4.6 3.8 3.0 2.1 14,000 0.95 .07 1.02
15,000 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.7 5.1 4.2 3.3 . 2.3 15,000 .9 .07 .97
16,000 7.2 7.0 6.6 . 6.2 5.6 4.6 3.6 2.5 16,000 .8 .08 .88
17,000 . 7.7 7.5 7.2 6.6 5.9 5.0 3.9 2.6 17,000 .8 .09 .89
18,000 8.6 8.4 8.1 . 7.4 6.6 5.5 4.3 . 3.0 18,000 .7 .11 .81
19,000 . 9.7 9.5 92 8.4 7.5 ().2 4.9 3.4 19.000 .7 .15 .&5
20,000 10.9 10.7 10.3 9.5 8.4 7.1 . 5.5 3.8 2(J,()()0 7 .22 .92
20,100 Il.l 10.9 lOA 9.6 8.5
----
7.2 5J, 3.9
---------
20.100 7 ')J
._J
~~----

TABLE III
Ht. of Site (+) and Elevatiqn.Di

Range in 1660 1760 1860 1960 2060 2160 2260

960 /060 /160 1260 1360 1460 1560
Yards
2.7 + 2.7 + 2.8 + 2.9 + 3.1 + 3.3 + 3.5 + 3.8 + 4.1 + 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.3
3,000 +
4,000 + 1.6 + 1.6 + 1.7 + 1.8 + 2.0 + 2.2 + 2.4 + 2.7 + 3.0 + 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.2
5,000 + 0.7 + 0.7 + 0.8 + l.0 + 1.2 + 1.4 + 1.7 + 2.0 + 2.3 + 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.7
6,000 .1 .1 0.0 + .2 + A + .7 + 1,0 + 1.4 + 1.8 + 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.4
7,000 .6 .5 A .2 0 + .3 + .7 + 1.1+ 1.5 + 2.0 2.5 2.9 3.3
8,000 1.1 1.1 .9 .7 .4 .1 + .3+ .8 + 1.3+ 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.3
9,000 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.0 .6 .1 + .4+ 1.0 + 1.6 2.2 2.8 3.3
2.3 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.0 .4+ :1 + .7 + 1.4 2.1 2.7 3:2
10,000
11,000 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.5 .9 - .2 + .5+ 1.3 2.1 2.8 3.5
3.7 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 1.9 1.3- .5+ .3 + I.2 2.1 2.9 3.7
12,000
13,000 .f,3 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.0 2.4 1.6 - .7 + .2 + 1.1 2.0 2.9 3.8
14.000 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.1 3.5 2.8 1.9 - .9 0+ l.l 2.2 3.1 4.1
f5,000 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.7 4.1 3.2 2.3 - 1.2 - .2 + 1.0 2.2 3.2 4.3
6.3 6.2 5.8 5.3 4.6 3.8 2.8 - 1.6 - .4+ .9 2.2 3.4 4.5
16,000
17,000 6.8 6.7 6.3 5.8 5.0 4.1 2.9 - i,7 - .5 + .9 2.3 3.5 4.7
7.8 7.7 7.3 6.7 5.8 4.7 3.5 - 2.1 ... .7 + .8 2.3 3.7 5.1
18,000
19,000 8.9 8.7 8.3 7.6 6.6 5.4 4.0 - 2.5 - .9 + .8 2.5 4.1 5.6
- 10.0 9.8 9.3 8.5 7.4 6.1 4.5 2.8 - 1.0 -t .9 2.8 4.6 6.3
20,000
20,100 - 10.2 -10.0 9.5 8.7 7.6 6.2 4.6 - 2.9 - 1.0 + .9 2.8 '4.7 6.4

All corrections + unless otherwise ifldicated.

 )
COMBINED CORRECTION CHART 71

tI. site offorty feet for every 1,000 yards of range above in Fig. 1. \Ve used colored-in K's on our chart for the azi-
(he minimum range. This table appears below. Corrections muth lines to facilitate reading. A T-square graduated in
ror nonrigidity of trajectory are included. range aids the operator. Final computations are made to
These two tables were then combined into one with the nearest whole mil.
properregard to sign. In our case the height of site correc- The correction is computed initially and applied directly
tionwas always plus, the elevation difference correction for to the height of site scale of the 1\'1-8sight. From this point
(hequadrant from 166 to 246 ~yas plus, while the eleva-
0 0
identical elevations are sent to all e>auns.
tion difference correction for the quadrant from 96 to 0
Of course by the time we had this nicely solved our po-
166 was negative. The results are shown in Table III.
0 sition was changed and we had to throw it away but it was
Table III was then translated into the chart shown a problem which may face someone else some day.

U. S. Navy Photo
Not much has been written about our submarines in this war, since secrecy is one of the subs' weapons and prote~tive devices,
but now the wraps are off to some extent. This is the TillOsa, returning to the Pearl Harbor sub base after a successful patrol in
which she and eight other subs sank 46 Jap ships in the Sea of Japan, with four "probables."
 CO~ST ~RTILLERY
Citations and Commendations

Distinguished Service Cross and responsible positions of Antiaircraft Officer, General

TO: ALBERTA. ALOP, First Lieut. (then 2nd Lieut.) CAe. Headquarters and Commanding General, 14th Antiaircraft J
Command, Southwest Pacific Area, from April, 1942, to
FOR: Extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy June, 1945. \Vith brilliant technical skill, great resource-
during a severe enemy counterattack at l\Iantes-Gassicourt fulness and able direction, he developed the antiaircraft
in August, 1944. artillery to an unusually high degree of combat efficiency.
Distinguished Service Medal From the time of organization of the Southwest Pacific
Area, through the Papua, New Guinea, Northern Solo-
:"0:FREDERICKL. HAYDEN,Brigadier General (then Colo-
mons, Bismarck Archipelago, Southern Philippines and
nel CAC), U. S. Army. Fort Screven, Georgia.
Luzon campaigns, he directed and supervised its training
:OR: Service from May, 1941, to March, 1944. As Chief and coordinated its employment. By his sound judgment,
of the Enlisted Branch, l\llilitary Personnel Division, and energetic leadership and professional ability he made a ma-
later as Deputy Director of the Military Personnel Division, terial contribution to the successful antiaircraft defense of
Army Service Forces, he, with keen foresight and unusual the Southwest Pacific Area. -1
abilitv established and adhered to the basic theory that the
objective of personnel direction was the conservation of mili- Legion of Merit
tary manpower. He maintained close .liaison with the Se- TO: THOM~S A. TERRY, Major General, U. S. Army,
lective Service System, Army Service Commands, Army Birthplace: Abbeville, Ala.
Ground Forces and Army Air Forces, and efficiently ac- FOR: Service as Commander of the First Coast Artillery
complished the procurement of enlisted men through se- District, subsequently the New England Frontier Defense
lective service and recruiting. His rare abilities contributedSector, during the period November 9, 1940, to April 30,
greatly to the solution of the major military personnel and 1942. Under his supervision the Harbor Defenses of
manpower problems. Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, New Bedford, Narragansett
TO: FRANKJ. MCSHERRY,Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Bay and Long Island Sound were brought from the sta.tus
3232 Garfield St., N.vV., vVashington, D. e. of small caretaking establishments to war strength orgamza-
tions. All assigned units were trained, coordinated and de-
FOR: He served with distinction as Deputy Assistant Chief, veloped to exceptional combat efficiency. By his able direc-
G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedition- tion a large amount of material replacement, particularly
ary Force, from December, 1944, to June, 1945. In this with respect to electrical installations, was accomplished
capacity he played a preeminent role in the dev.elopment ?f and every seacoast battery was placed in good condition.
a system of military government through whIch the WIll capable of delivering effective fire. Through his skillful
of the Supreme Commander could be imposed, firmly ~nd planning, the Harbor Entrance Control Posts were created,
justly, upon the conquered German people. He supervIsed organized and coordinated so that both Army and Navy
the preparation of early instructions and directions designed elements were able to place these Control Posts in continu-
to establish a pattern for the accomplishment of this unpre- ous operation. The centralized preparation of harbor de-
cedented mission. He guided and directed the molding of fense projects under the modernizati~m program were com-
these instructions to meet the requirements of ever chang- pleted through his direction and close supervision. By care-
ing conditions. In this work he spent much time in the ful attention to the problems confronting him and vigorous
field with officers and men of military government detach- execution of plans, he trained and developed his command
ments upon whom fell the responsibility for application of in the minimum of time and placed it in readiness for war
the policies formulated by his staff. His contribution to before December 7, 1941.
the fulfillment of this combined command's mission was of
outstanding .value in prosecuting the war in Europe. TO: HARVEYe. ALLEN, Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Florham Farms, Madison, N. J.
Oak Leaf Cluster to Distinguished Service Medal
FOR: He served the government with conspicuous and
TO: \VILLIAM F. MARQUAT,Major General, U. S. Army, meritorious achievement as Commanding General, A1\tiair-
1132 N. 77th St., Seattle, vVashington. craft Artillery Training Center, Camp Hulen, Texas, from
FOR: He served with distinction in the highly important December, 1941, to September, 1944. Organizing this
 COAST ARTILLERY CITATIONS AND CO~l;\1ENDATIONS

ina center immediateh.• after the outbreak of war, he Service Forces had available a sound Period I procurement
:oJ
. trained scores of antiaircraft units at this camp so that, Proaram
:oJ
well in advance of the defeat of Germam'.• His
hnically, they were able to perform efficiently in combat. shrewd direction of difficult planning, his tenacity, superior
rina this period his command increased from a few units J.udament,
o
foresiaht and devotion to dutv have contributed
0 '
m~ximum strength of over 13,000 when at the height materially to the successful prosecution of the war.
the Army's rapid expansion. The results obtained by
TO: RALPH1. GLASGOW,Colonel, CAC, Omaha, Nebraska .
. through his exceptional qualities of vision, skill in
dership and untiring effort have stamped him as one FOR: Sen'ices as Chief of the Operations Branch, Oversea
the outstanding commanpers of training centers, and are Supply Division, New York Port of Embarkation. He was
eeted in the notable performance of these well trained faced with !he task of preparing instructions and supervising
tiaircraft units in combat. operations relative to the movement of supplies and equip-
ment for shipment to the United States forces bases in the
: CHARLESI. CLARK, Colonel, General Staff Corps European and North African theaters of operations. Neces-
(CAC), 171 ~ Iuirfield Road, Rockville Center, New sary and unexpected changes in supply and movements
York. complicated this task. By his foresight, organizational ability,
R: In the performance of outstanding services in the hiah
o
dearee
0
of initiative and exceptional skill, he contribu-
ee of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, ted in large part toward insuring the timely movement of
ar Department General Staff, during the period March, all classes of supply to these theaters.
41, to September, 1944, he demonstrated a keen under-
anding of the problems of overseas supply logistics, par- TO: \VILLIAM \\T. HICKS, Colonel, CAC, Chattanooga,
lCularlyfrom the standpoint of troop unit planning. He Tennessee.
riginated, developed and supervised the monthly Overseas FOB: Exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance
roopBasis. At the time of its inception this document was of outstandinao service. On 7 December 1941, in addition
heonly reliable basis for overseas supply and was vital not to placing his own command on the alert, by utilizing all
nly to ports of embarkation but throughout the "Var De- members of his Station Complement he was able to rapidly
artment was considered valuable for supply control and emplace and man additional 155mm gun batteries to cover
asa planning tool. His intimate knowledge of troop units twenty miles of beach in the Los Angeles Area, completing
and supply control were of inestimable value to the "Var such installation by the evening of 8 December; by 9 Decem-
Department Special Committee for the Re-Study of Re- ber an emergency fire control system was installed and the
serveson which he served as a member during the last half beach batteries housed in portable buildings secured for the
of1943. The success of his work on this important commit- emergency. Thus the Harbor DeFenses of Los Angeles were
eeean best be measured by the significant savings in mat- prepared to meet the expected Japanese attack of 9 Decem-
lerialand money effected by carrying out the recommenda- ber 1941 which was indicated by intelligence sources as im-
ions of the committee. I-Ie was designated as one of the pending. He also directed the movement into position in the
originalassociate members of the Joint Logistics Plans Com- Harbor Defenses of the leading elements of the 7th and
mitteeand ably represented the Operations Division at the 40th Divisions until the arrival of the higher headquarters.
alnference of Allied leaders in Quebec, August, 1943, on He provided these elements with ammunition, improvised
matters of troop shipping and deployments. His ability in mounts for antiaircraFt machine guns, and motor transpor-
research,his 'unusual faculties for assimilation and analysis, tation until their own material became available. I-Ie se-
and his thoroughness in undertaking the most involved cured civilian trucks, busses and passenger vehicles,
and arduous planning have made his contribution to the enabling these leading elements to function in guaraing the
war effort outstanding. airplane and shipbuilding plants. The resourcefulness,
leadership and exceptional ability displayed by Colonel
TO: LEE A. DENSON, Colonel, CAC, 3900 Cathedral Hicks in this emergency were notable.
Avenue, N."V., \\Tashington, D. C.
FOR: He displayed exceptionally meritorious conduct TO: .. ROBERTN. MACKIN,Colonel, CAC, /
Yorktown, Vir-
in the performance of outstanding service in Headquarters, glOIa.
Army Service Forces, from March 9, 1942, to June 30, FOB: Streamlining the G-2 section of the Africa-Middle
1945. As Deputy Director and Director of the Require- East Theater ... maintaining the utmost security in the
ments Division and as Deputy Director of the Require- movement of PO\V's released from neutral countries,
ments and Stock Control Division, he made exceptional - Colonel Mackin displayed unusual leadership and judg-
contributions to the establishment of the Army Supply Pro- ment in the supervision and expeditious handling of those
gram and to the creation of its successor, the Supply Con- who passed through the theater ... developed and main-
trol System. He established and assigned responsibilities for tained closest cooperation and liaison with the British and
the staff administration of the Army Supply Program, de- other allies. As a result of his series of lectures to the Brit-
termined the bases and policies under which the Procure- ish in this area, Colonel i\hckin was considered one of the
ment Program of 1944, amounting to more than $17,000,- most informed and outstanding lecturers on the subject of
000,000, was computed, and formulated the basic plan for operations in the Far East.
the Supply Control System. As a result of his foresight and
nergetic and effective staff work in computing the supply TO: JOHN E. METZLER,Colonel, CAC; 3153 21st Street,
quirements for a one-front war against Japan, the Army North, Arlington, Virginia.
74 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Septelllber-Octob
FOR: As Chief, European Section, ll1eater Branch, Plan- from their position. In order to create a diversion, Pri\'a
ning Division, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, from First Class Marvin 'V. Orso voluntarily advanced to t
August, 1943, to i\-Iay, 1945, he displayed a measure of mili- cliff and started to climb by means of the clinging vines. j
tary proficiency conspicuously above and beyond the usual. Upon reaching a ledge near the cave he was shot and killed
By tireless energy, great resourcefulness and sound judg- by enemy fire. By his intrepid and gallant conduct at the
ment in handling and solving constantly arising problems cost of his own life, his comrades were able to advance and
he assisted materially in the establishment of procedures and secure higher ground from which the enemy pocket of re-
policies which provided for the expeditious delivery of sup- sistance was eliminated by killing five and capturing three
plies and equipment to the European Theater of Operations. enemy military personnel.
The adequate and timely provision of supplies to meet the
Soldier's Medal tI1
requirements of directed tactical operations was largely a
result of his skillful staff work. His exceptional logistical k
TO: HOWARDL. RIVERS,First Lieutenant, CAC, 309-11It
acumen, forceful personality, professional efficiency and "'est Palmetto St., Florence, S. e. n
devotion to duty enabled him to achieve results of in-
estimable value to the Commanding General, Army Service
Forces.
FOR: At great personal risk and without hesitation he weill 0
to the aid of a drowning soldier two miles offshore in Dela-
ware Bay on June 23, 1945. The soldier, a member of a ~
r
TO: KENNETHG. MERRIAM,Lieutenant Colonel, CAC, near-by working party, having fallen overboard and unable 1
56 Havelock Rd., "'orcester, Mass. to swim, was being swept away by the strong current in the
choppy seas then prevailing. Disregarding the known danger
FOR: Services from September, 1942, to August, 1944. In
Lieutenant Hivers immediately dived from a near-by boat
addition to his regular duties at the Antiaircraft Artillery
and with great effort reached the drowning soldier and
School, Camp Davis, North Carolina, on his own initiative,
despite the latter's struggles kept him afloat until another
he conducted and supervised extensive research which re-
swimmer and a boat came to the rescue. His courageous ac-
sulted in the development of the "Slant plane" concept of
tion reflects great credit upon himself as well as the Armed
automatic weapons control and prepared the studies for its
Forces of the United States.
presentation and solution. He contributed materially to the ,
preparation and revision of the Army Ground Force Auto- Bronze Star Medal
matic \Veapons Tests and with the assistance of other of-
TO: CHARLESE. ATKINSON,Colonel, CAe.
ficers, he perfected and proved to be practical the "Down
Course" spotting system. The accepted concepts of auto- FOR: Meritorious service in connection with military
matic weapons gunnery and fire control doctrine are due in operations 14 July 1944 to 15 January 1945.
great measure to his efforts.
TO: HOBINE. MCCORMICK,Lieut. Col., CAC.
Oak Leaf Cluster to Legion of Merit FOR: (Citation not released.)
TO: WILLARD\V. IRVINE,Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
2841 29th Street, N.vV., \Vashington, D. e. TO: TONY B. LUMPKIN, Captain, CAC, 803 vVoodlawn,
Mexico, Missouri.
FOR: While Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, vVar
Department General Staff, from J\llarch, 1944, to May, FOH: He performed meritorious services while incarcerated
1945, he displayed exceptional leadership and foresight in in a German prison camp at Oflag 64, Schubin, Poland,
effecting needed improvements in the strength accounting from June, 1943 to December, 1944. Conditions were ap-
and reporting system of the Army, and contributed to the palling. A starvation ration, lack of laundry facilities, a
development of plans for postwar training. During the shortage of drinking water, coupled with the degrading and
critical period immediately preceding the Normandy in- harassing tactics presented by the enemy, all contributed to
vasion and while the drive to victory in Europe was in making the conditions more deplorable. He was placed in
progress, his efforts to maintain the flow of replacements charge of receiving and distributing all American food par-
greatly assisted our forces in mounting and sustaining the cels received through the Red Cross. In addition he main-
final offensive against Germany. tained a "tin store" where the prisoners were able to store
their tins of food received in their parcels and prorate. their
Silver Star use over a period of time. Due to his aggressive spirit and
TO: MARVINvV. ORSO, Private First Class, CAe. good, sound judgment, he was able to prevent the Germans
from enforcing any of the harassing restricti~ns which they
FOR: Gallantry in action in connection with military attempted from time to time to place upon the use of this
operations against an armed enemy of the United States on private food. At the risk of his life, he argued daily with
Saipan, Marianas Islands, on 4 July 1945. In the late after- various Germans in an effort to assist the American pris-
noon Private First Class Marvin VV. Orso was a member oners. I-Ie contributed greatly to the morale and health of
of a patrol engaged in clearing remnants of the Japanese his fellow prisoners, giving them aiel and comfort until they
Military Force from caves in the Mt. Tapotchau area. The were finally liberated.
patrol suddenly encountered determined resistance from
the vicinity of a cave. Rifle and machine-gun fire and gre- TO: CLEVELANDHENRIQUEZ,Corporal, CAC, 116 Fitz-
nades were exchanged in a brisk fire fight, and it soon be- patrick Street, Key West, Florida.
came evident that it would be difficult to dislodge the enemy FOR: On April 24, 1942, at Battery Crockett, Fort Mills,
 5 COAST ARTILLERY CITATIONS AND COp.li\lENDATIONS 75

fbtlippine Islands, he was seriously wounded by enemy tinuous probing attacks, this Battalion held its ground
ire. After receiving partial first aid treatment, he voluntarily against great odds without a break. The courage and ag-
~p-awledfrom the battery area under constant enemy artil-
I. gressive fighting spirit displayed by the officers and men of
~~rr fire and bombing and descended a cliff and secured this organization prevented the enemy forces from making
~Iaidfor wounded comrades. His heroic action at great per- further advances in the i\lonschau-Hofen-Kalterherberg
I sonalrisk was an inspiration to those about him. are3, and evidenced a devotion to duty and esprit de corps
in keeping with the finest traditions of the Armed Forces
ITa: BEN P. LEWIS, Sergeant, CAe. of the United States.
'iOR: \Vhile on patrol during mopping-up operations on
theIsland of Saipan, he discovered an obvious enemy trail Commendation for Meritorious Se"rvice
leadingup the side of a hill to a steep cliff that had several TO: The 377th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic \Veapons
leQges,ove above th~ other. Accompanied by three of his Battalion.
men,Sergeant Lewis reached the first ledge where a tree was
FOR: The 377th AAA A\V Battalion was attached to the
noticedthat showed signs of having been used as a means of
4th Infantry Division on 8 March 1944. Since that time, it
'access to the second ledge. With complete disregard for
has been an integral part of the division and shared in all
hisown safety, Sergeant Lewis climbed the tree to a point
of our training and combat experiences. Its standards,
,,'here he observed six Japanese soldiers on the ledge just a
morale and combat efficiency have always been high. The
few feet from his head, and he thereupon fired into the
alertness and attention to duty of gun crews under the
group, wounding one of them. In the face of severe hostile
[ riRe fire and grenades, he jumped from the tree and ad- most difficult weather conditions have been outstanding,
particularly during the Hiirtgen Forest battle, the crossing
,'anced up the slope until in a position to fire onto the ledge.
of the Sauer River and the second attack through the
His example inspired the other three men to follow, and
Schnee Eifel.
from this position they held the enemy under fire until ad-
ditional men from another patrol arrived to assist in cap- During the entire period that the 377th AAA AVJ Bat-
turing nine of the enemy. The devotion to duty, courage, talion was attached to the 4th Infantry Division, it was com-
and leadership displayed by Sergeant Lewis reRect great manded by Lt. Col. George \V. Fisher. The superior accom-
credit upon himself and the military service. plishments of this battalion are due largely to his outstand-
ing leadership.
Brazilian \Var Medal
Commendation
TO: LINsco'IT A. HALL,Colonel, GSC (CAC), 4954 \Vest
Pine St., St. Louis, Mo. THHlI,: Commanding General, Third 1I. S. Army, APO
403, U. S. Army ..
FOR: Citation not released.
TO: Commanding Officer, 115th AAA Group, APO 230,
Cross of Cavalier Officer of the Crown of Italy U. S. Army.
1. The 115th AAA Group was assigned to the V Corps
TO: L. A. ZIMMER, Lt. Col., CAC, 33A Venetian Way,
early in 1944 and served continuously under this command
Miami Beach, Florida.
until 25 May 1945. This period included the preparation
FOR: Services in the final phase of the surrender of the and training phase in the United Kingdom prior to the as-
German Forces in Italy. sault on the beaches of Normandy, as well as the entire
phase of active operations in Northern Europe. The Group
Distinguished Unit Citation served in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxem-
TO: The 863rd Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons bourg, Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Battalion. 2. The high caliber of performance of the 115th AAA
FOR: Extraordinarv heroism in armed conRict with the Group and its attached battalions makes it difficult, in re-
enemy from 16 .De~ember to 23 December 1944. The of- viewing such a long period of service, to single out particu-
ficers and men of this organization rendered outstanding larly outstanding achievements. Among the most note-
services in holding off German counterattacks in the Ar- worthy accomplishments of your command, however, were
dennes sector. At the time when the enemy launched a the high standard of training achieved in a short period
series of vicious and determined attacks against our ground of time, and against numerous obstacles in the preparation
forces in the area south of Monchau, the 863d AAA AW for the invasion; the superior antiaircraft protection af-
Bn. was established behind the front lines to provide de- forded the forces under the command of the V Corps dur-
fensive fire against hostile dive bombers and pilotless air- ing the assault and establishment of the Normandy beach-
craft. \Vhen the enemy penetrated our front-line positions head, and the courageous and effective ground support
this Battalion immediately.assumed the initiative by dis- missions executed by the battalions under your command to
patching provisional batteries to the forward enemy troop check the German counteroffensive in December 1944.
concentration. Despite heavy enemy artillery, mortar, and 3. The program for future military operations has neces-
small-arms fire the members of this organization remained sitated, after such a long period of outstanding service, the
gallantly at their posts and repelled the determined attacks relief of the 115th AAA Group from attachment to this
by air, infantry, and armored infantry of the resurgent command. The V Corps extends to all of you its sincere
enemy. Although widely extended and subjected to con- thanks and best wishes.
 BOARD NOTES
All)' i1ldividllal, whether or 1/.ot he is a II/ember of the service, is il/vited to sllbmit C011str/lctil'e sl/ggesti011S rel<ltillg to
problems NlIder study by tIle Coast ArtiIlery Board, or 10 presellt any 1lell' problem that properly may be c01lsidered
by ti,e Board. Commllllicmicms sho/lld be addressed to the Presidellt, Coast Artillery Board, Fort llIonroe, Virginia.
Items pertaining to Antiaircraft Artillery should be sent to the Antiaircraft Command. Fort Bliss, Texas.

THE COAST ARTILLERY BOARD

COLONEL R. E. DINGE;\IAN. Presidellt
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ]A;\lES T. BARBER 1\IA]OR ~IYIWN D. LOCKWOOD
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANDREW \-\T. CLE;\lENT 1\IA]OR DALE \-\T. OLSEN
LiEUTENANT COLONEL \VILLIAl\! R. MURRIN CAPTAIN FOSTER A l-hNSHAW. S.c.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HAYWOODD. VEASEY CAPTAIN \V. P. G. HALL
I\'IA]ORAUSTIN E. FRIBANCE CAPTAIN C. \V. ZIEGLER. O.D.

Replacemellt of the SCR-582 by SCR-682-A. time of flight, this hole passes under an electrical COnlan
It now appears that the SCR-582 is to be relegated to the which completes a buzzer circuit. Finally the Board has
obsolete list and its place taken by the SCR-682-A tested a time of flight indicator, similar in many respects to
The SCR-582 was built under a crash procurement pro- the Los Angeles "splash timer" but with additional aut<r
gram to meet pressing military needs. Only 55 of these sets matic features; this indicator was designed and built by a
were built; man\, of them are now out of the service and the member of the Board.
rest are showing marked signs of wear. Since no adeguate The Board found none of these' mechanisms completel~
supply of spare parts was set up it is now most difficult to satisfactory for standardization but recommended to the
keep these sets in operation. The Radio Set SCR-682-A Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, that the Chief
is a major redesign of the SCR-582 and incorporates im- of Ordnance be requested to develop a time of flight indi-
provements found desirable as a result of experience. cator embodying characteristics listed by the Board. Among
It has been recommended that the SCR-582 be replaced other characteristics this indicator should give visual and
by the SCR-682-A because of the following advantages: aural signals for as many as four guns; and the timing
greater range, greater resolution, superior electrical and mechanism is to be started automaticallv bv the recoil of
mechanical design which simplifies maintenance problems, each gun. An adjustable advance war~ini time is to be
and greater immunity to jamming. provided in order to make the operation of the instrument
more flexible.
Time of Flight llldicators.
Neoprene Obturator Pads.
For some years batteries have used a stop-watch operated
The Board recently completed tests on a neoprene ob-
by an additional member of the range section to inform spot-
turator pad for 155mm Guns MI ~IIAI and M2. This pad
ting obsen'ers of the instant when a splash is expected to
is the same size as the prescnt standard obturator pad and is
occur. This method is satisfactory only when single guns
used with the present set of split rings. The neoprene pad
are fired, and when the time of flight is less than the firing
is not easily damaged in handling or shipping and no spe-
interval. Since the standardization of radar with means for
cial precautions have to be taken for its lubrication or preser-
spotting, it has become increasingly desirable to warn the
,'ation. A total of 750 supercharge rounds were fired by the
observer of the time at which the splash will occur, in order
Coast Artillery School and the Board using the subject pad.
to lessen the necessity for close straining scrutiny of the
There was evidence that very slight leakage had started but
scope, and in order to avoid mistaking miscellaneous signals
the pad was still serviceable. The Board's recommendations
for the splash signal. A reguirement for an automatic or
were:
semi-automatic time of flight indicator is thus indicated.
a. The neoprene obturator pads be standardized for use
\Vith a view to investigating means of fulfilling this re- in 155mm Guns, MI, I\IIAI and 1\12 in use by 155mm
guirement, the Coast Artillery Board has tested the British Coast Artillerv units.
Time of Right Indicator Mk IV and the Canadian (Local b. The ba;is of issue be two pads complete with split
Pattern) Time of Flight Indicator Mk 1. It has also rings per 155mm Gun M 1, 1\'I1A 1 and 1\12, issued to Coast
studied a description of a "splash timer" built at the Har- Anillery units.
bor Defenses of Los Angeles, which utilizes a moving paper
tape in which a hole is punched at the time the gun is Rubber Jacketed Submarine Mine Cables.
fired; the punch can be set so that, at the end of the A ten-year test of rubber jacketed submarine mine cable
 COAST ARTILLERY BOARD ):OTES 77

rnished evidence that 0.13. Type I cable can be kept the attention of the Board that the rubber latex that is now
stOrage equally as well as in ,,'et storage. \ \'hile in used for the conductor insulation on these field cables. wilL
stOrage. cable should be protected from sunlight and after exposure to sunlight and weather. become hard and
r. with temperatures maintained belo\\" 100° F. if sun-cracked. This hardening and checking is an undesir-
icable. able characteristic of rubber when used in exposed places.
e reels of test cable are unique in that their \'alues of A remedy that can be suggested in using the present cable
tion resistance are higher at the end of the test period and cable stubs is to protect the exposed rubber latex insu-
they were at the beginning of the test. These results lation on the wires by taping the individual exposed wires
been confirmed bv the manufacturer who was unable with friction tape. This taping will protect the latex from
ke any prediction~ on the basis of chemical and electri- sunlight and prolong the life of the insulation.
ests made this vear. as to which reels of cable had been
in a com'entional manner and which had been stored
It is desired to point out that the majority of subjects
II of the cable under test had been rereeled periodically, handled bv the Board are classified and that inFormation
a reverse bend, with the expectation that such han- pertaining'to them cannot be published in the JOURXAL.
g would cause faults and cracks to show up early in the The following tabulation shows the number of projects
. It now seems reasonable to suppose that the re\'crsal and subjects which were handled by the Board during July
echanical stresses prevented the insulation from acquir- and August:
a "set." Further tests will be required to ascertain the
Number on hand 1 July 51
rlance of cable reeling in the long-time storage of sub-
Received during July and August 100
rine mine cable.

Care of R/lbber Covered Field Cables. TOTAL 151

Recommendations have been made For the issuance of Completed during July and August 109
II amounts of five- and ten-pair rubber-cO\'ered ficld
Ie to 155mm gun batteries and battalions, It has come to Number on hand I September 42

Undeoeloped Film from Ooerseas

Undeveloped film sent by all service personnel overseas to the
United States should be wrapped in a separate package and dis-
tinctly marked "UNDEVELOPED FILl"l" on the outside wrapper.
Packages shipped from overseas are examined by an inspectroscope,
an X-ray-like machine, installed a.t various Ports of Entry to detect
the shipment of stolen Government property.
The rays of the in spectroscope ruin undeveloped film. iVlan)' rolls
of film have been damaged because personnel have not followed
previous instructions. Any effort to label packages "U ndeveloped
Film" which contain contraband items will be easilv detected and of-
fenders will subject themselves to possible court-m;rtial proceedings-.
Thousands of dollars worth of stolen Government property is
being recovered each week by the use of the inspectfoscope.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
1II111111111111111I11I11II11II11I11II11I1111111111111111111111IllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllW11111111111111111111111111111111111111

C9ast Artillery Journal

Fifty-fourth Year of Publication
?1ews and Comment
COLONEL E. B. WALKER, Editor
LT. COL. ARTHUR SYMONS, Associate Editor * 111111111111""1111111111"11111111111"111111111""111"11111111111111111""11111111"11111111111111111""111111""'"111II~mllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

* r
* Group Subscriptions
The end of the actual fighting has brought numerO\t
changes in the military picture, but many officers realize:
that the usefulness of the JOURNALhas not ended becaUl(
the war has stopped. In fact, with the easing of censorshi d
regulations and with the lessening of the pressure on hu a,
The JOURNAL prints articles on subjects of profes- dreds of soldiers who should be authors but never had th .
sional and general interest to officers of all the com-
ponents of the Coast Artillery Corps in order to time, the JOURNALwill be better and more valuable thar,~
stimulate thought and provoke discussion. However, ever.
opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in articles
are in no sense official. They do not reflect the opin- Lieutenant Colonel William H. \-Varrick, for inst~nc n
ions or conclusions of any official or branch of the sent us 83 subscriptions from individuals of his 863d ~
War Department.
A\\1 Battalion. The 56th AAA Brigade, Colonel R. H
The JOURNAL does not carry paid advertising. The Grinder, Executive, reached the 100% group with 20 newra
JOURNAL pays for original articles upon publica- subscriptions. Lieutenant Colonel I-Iarry C. Bailey's 61J'
tion. Manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor.
The JOURNAL is not responsible for manuscripts AAA Gun Battalion sent in seven subscriptions. ~
unaccompanied by return postage.
The larger units, too, are doing their share. Head,~
quarters, Third Army, sent in 255 subscriptions; Four-_
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
teenth AA Command, as part of a continuing effort, ac-a
The United States Coast counted for 85 since the last issue; and the Special Services.
Officer, Panama Coast Artillery Command, ordered 16,
Artillery Association subscriptions.
-( f -(
OFFICERS
Army and Navy Club of Manila
LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEROY LUTES
PRESIDENT
The Army and Navy Club of Manila, fonned more
than forty years ago but quiescent by necessity during the
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN T. LEWIS three years of Japanese occupation of the Philippines, is
VICE PRESIDENT
no,,, being reorganized. ~
Plans are being made to rebuild the club's once-hand-
COLONEL E. B. WALKER some home on Manila Bay, now roofless and badly battered
SECRETARY-TREASURER as a result of the bitter fighting that took place in and
around it last February.
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL The club continued to function after war broke out 7
BRIG. GENERAL EDWARD A. EVANS December 1941, but under blackout conditions. Manila was
BRIG. GENERAL BRYAN L. MILBURN declared an open city 27 .December and the club was
BRIG. GENERAL RUPERT E. STARR closed on New Year's eve 1942. The Japs then took, it over. I
BRIG. GENERAL EDWARD A. STOCKTON, JR. Major General \Villiam F. Marquat, antiaircraft officer of
BRIG. GENERAL LAWRENCE B. WEEKS Anny Forces in the Pacific, has been elected president of
COLONE~ FRANKLIN E. EDGECOMB
the reactivated club. Other officers are: Captain M. L.
COLONEL E. B. WALKER
Hersey, USN, first vice president;J\'lajor General C. L.

x
The purpose of the Association shall be to promote
the efficiency of the Coast Artillery Corps by main-
Sturdevant, second vice president; Colonel Harry Adamson,
secretary-assistant treasurer; and E. B. Ford, civilian mem-
ber, treasurer-assistant secretary.
The Club, a private corporation, has $32,600 on deposit
in three banks in the United States and has in addition
$20,000 which was donated by the Noumea Officers Club,
taining its standards and traditions, by disseminating after SWPA went out of existence.
professional knowledge, by inspiring greater effort The Club held its first meeting since the recapture of
towards the improvement of materiel and methods Manila on 5 August in the Normal School Building, and
of training and by fostering mutual understanding, elected a Board of Directors. The meeting was called by
respect and cooperation among all arms, branches
General Marquat, who was a director at the time the club
and components of the Regular Army, National
Guard, Organized Reserves, and Reserve Officers' had ceased to function after the war began. He said many
Training Corps. requests had been made for prompt reorganization because
there was an apparent need in l\llanila for recreation facili-
ties for officers.
 NE\VS AND COj\ IMENT 79

Eligiblefor membership in the club are Regular Army, follow the Bight of the heaviest shells, and pin-point the
I"Y, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Public Health spot where they fell, so that range corrections could be made
~
ice officers, as well as civilians who were formerly com- instantaneously."
;sioned officers. Plans are being considered to elect Re- Radar's first success at Dover was in 1942, when the
'e and AUS officers to associate membership, without SdzarnllOrst and the Prinz ElIgen dashed through the fog.
yment of entrance fees, General Marquat said. Radar picked them up. Although the Scharnhorst was
28,000 to 30,000 yards away, travelling at 30 knots, Dover's
f f f 9" guns fired 33 rounds in the short time she was in range,
scoring three hits.
~ Radar and the Atomic Bomb
The underground room at Dover Castle contains a large
Some of our readers may wonder why, in this issue, round table, covered with a map broken up into numbered
dar and the atomic bomb are not featured. squares. A.T.S. girls, leaning over a table, wearing ear-

t We assume that our readers are familiar with the tech-

ical details and field applications of radar. Up to 14
l~ugustcensorship regulations forbade the publication of
ything concerning radar. The lifting of the restrictions
phones, with rulers, tapes and pencils in hand, awaited in-
formation from the batteries, which they immediately con-
veyed to the map ..
In one Radar out-post, along the South East coast of
;ulted in the publication, in magazines and newspapers England, the centimetric wave length of the Radar equip-
general circulation, of articles.on the general subject of ment used to control the fire of heavy medium Coast Artil-
dar which in scope and quality of illustrations far sur- lery batteries traces the ship's position and observes the
055 anything that the JOURNALcould afford. The detailed shell splashes, and so can correct the batteries' fire. The
hnical applications of radar, which our readers would equipment is mounted in a concrete building, through the
d desirable, are still classified. roof of which the control gear is taken to a double para-
In general the same remarks apply'to the publication of boloid aerial system. The operator in the building controls

f
etides dealing with the atomic bomb. Recent articles in the aerial rotation, following the target for bearing. Another
he national magazines and syndicated newspaper columns operator follows the target for range. Information is trans-
I'ering the theory of atomic energy, the use of uranium mitted electrically to the fire control instruments, and
~nd its isotopes in making the bomb, the atomic furnace thence to the guns.-British Infomwtionl Services.
andother details, clarified with excellent illustrations, have
f f f
caused the editor to decide to omit such a discussion, at
leastfor the present . . A Fine Outfit Departs
The entire subject as far as can be told at the present time (Editorial in Victory News, 5th Armored Division)
iscarried in the Smyth Report. Anyone interested in the
This week the 387th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic
atomicbomb should obtain a copy (see ~d on cover).
yVeapons) Battalion (Self-Propelled) was relieved from at-
If enough of our readers request articles on these subjects
tachment to this Division and passed to control of )GXlII
tojustify it, the JOURNALwill publish them.
Corps. Except for three days in March (25-28) when the
f' f f 387th was attached to XVIII (Airborne) Corps of the
Second British Army to guard important bridges at yVesel,
Radar and Britain's Coast Artillery the battalion supported the 5th Armored Division continu-
Commanded from a small air-conditioned room under ously from August 1, 1944 to the end of the war and did
Dover Castle, in cliffs honey-combed with passages cut a magnificent job.
when Napoleon threatened England, and guided by Radar Landing in France on June 29, the 387th AAA Battalion
sodelicate it could follow the Bight of a shell, British guns protected Cherbourg harbor and then was attached to the
covering the Straits of Dover fought 70 actions during the Victory Division just prior to its commitment. From August
European war, sinking between 20 to 30 ships and helping untill\/lay, 1945, the multiple .50 caliber machine guns and
to completely shatter the morale of the German Mercantile 37mm automatic weapons kept the Luftwaffe away. Units
~1arine. of the battalion served with Division Field Artillery and
". .'\ccording to Brigadier C. YV. Raw, C.B.E., who com- its half-tracks were frequently in the forefront of battle,
mded Dover's Coastal Artillery throughout the war, lending direct support to infantry, blasting ground targets in
ldar completely changed the work of coastal batteries, .hedgerows, buildings and church towers. At \Vallendorf on
lking it offensive as well as defensive. In fog an~ darkness Sept. 19, men of the 387th recaptured from the Germans a
Idar could pjck out enemy ships with uncanny accuracy. vitally important bridge on the supply route to the men
To achieve these coastal successes 49 batteries, equipped fighting in the Siegfried Line. Even after the Division
th Radar, were strung out from Hastings to Margate. reached the Elbe the "Ack-Ack" men were engaged as
cst, they used 9" and later IS" guns. sporadic enemy aerial raids. They were among the first and
"From Radar reports received every minute the admiral last troops of the Division to see action.
Dover, the Officer Commanding, R.A.F., and myself had The record of 86 enemy aircraft destroyed is a fitting
vhole battle before our eyes," said Raw. "yVhen naval testimonial to the efficiency of this fine outfit. To Lt. Col.
ces were waiting to attack a target, we could decide the Elmer 1. Kenneweg, the officers and enlisted men of the
lct moment to cease fire. Radar told which ships were 387th AAA Battalion go our best wishes and sincere ap-
stile and which friendlv, and we would actuallv see our preciation for a job well done. They added a brilliant chap-
'ht naval forces enQ:agiI![ enemv shipping. y\7e could ter to the history of the Victory Division.
 80 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Septell! ber-Oct
Regular Army Commissions grees.
Dated 10 August 1945, \Var Department Circular 4. My professional or business experience is as folIo
Number 243 provides information for those emergency
officers who desire to obtain commissions in the Regular
5. My military record is as follows: (Indicate source a
Armv. The Circular reads as follows:
date of commission; date of entry on active duty; total y
INTEREST IN COl\lMISSIONS IN THE REGULAR AR;\IY of active duty, separately for enlisted and commissio
service; decorations, etc.)
1. Olltlook for Permanent Commissions ill the Regular
Army. 6.' I desire to add the following information concernin
a. Present indications are that a number of outstanding mvself which I believe would make me valuable as a Re
officers who have proven their capabilities in this emergency lar- Army officer. "
will be needed in the Regular Army peacetime establish- 7. Former immediate (preferably recent) commandi
ment. Until appropriate legislation is enacted the Vlar De- officers from whom an Officer Evaluation Report may
partment cannot announce the conditions which will govern obtained: (List three.)
selection of these officers or the number required. However,
it is desired that officers who have served in the emergency, 1.
whether or not they are still on active duty, be given the 2.
opportunity of indicating their interest in obtaining a Regu- 3.
lar Army commission. An officer making such a statement of (Name) (Rank) (lJast known address) (Dates served unde-r
interest may go off active duty or remain in the service with-
out prejudice to his chances of being tendered a commission (Signed) ------------3
when legislation is enacted. It is the intention of the \Var
Department that the fact that an officer has not remained in • (Permanent Home Mailing Address) . ~

active service will not affect the grade to be offered or the Note: Officers of Arms or Services with the Air Forces wh 'f
position he will occupy on the promotion list. desire such a status may enter their choice in para ~
b. The plan for selecting and integrating officers into the graph 2 thus: Air Corps (Signal Corps) (or othe~
Regular Army officers corps, as well as the size and compo- Arm or Service). •.~
sition of that corps, will finally be determined by Congress. b. Indorsements (
The War Department will recommend that those officers in-
\ (I) First indorsement.- The immediate commanding of.
tegrated into the Regular Army will be of such age and
ficer will indorse each copy of "Statement of Interest" andP
physical condition as will permit them to serve for a reason- will include the following statements: I]
ably long period before being retired. No officer will be ap- I'

pointed in a grade higher than that which he held in war- (a) "I do (or do not) recommend this officer fo~ com.r
time. mission in the Regular Army and consider him of (be-'
c. The content of this circular will be brought to the at- low average, average, a.bove average, or superior) SUit'
tention of every officer at the earliest opportunity. ability." I
(b) "In comparing this officer with other officers of 1

2. Submission of "Statement of Interest" similar grade under my command or personally known

a. Officers interested in being considered for commission to me and whom I would be willing to recommend for
in the Regular Army, following enactment of appropriate permanent commission in the Regular Army, I rank him 1
legislation, will submit a "Statement of Interest," in dupli- No. ---- out of a total of ---- such officers."
cate, to their immediate commanding officer using the fol- (c) "His last five efficiency ratings were: -- __ ."
lowing form:
(d) "I have known this officer for ---- months; he
has served under me ----months."
(Name) (Serial No., Year of Birth, Component, Unit)
Indorsing officers with insufficient personal knowledge for'
(Date) (Present Address)
recommendation will substitute: "Insufficient informatic'.J
for recommendation" in (a) above and will omit (b).
To: The Adjutant General, \Vashington 25, D. C.
Subject: Statement of Interest in Consideration for Com- (2) Second Indorsement.-The next higher headquarter~
mission in the Regular Army. of the officer making the First Indorsement will indorse th~
"Statement of Interest" indicating concurrence or non-coni,
1. I have read the statement concerning the outlook for
currence with the First Indorsement. If commission in thd
the commissioning of present wartime officers in the Regular
Regular Army is recommended, a statement as in (b) of
Army as published in \VD Circular 243.
the first indorsement will be included.
2. I desire to be considered for a commission in the
Regular Army. My first choice is: _ c. Forwarding
(Arm or Senice) Upon completion of the Second Indorsement, the "State-
Second Choice: , ment of Interest" and accompanying papers (see paragraph
(Arm or Service)
4 b below) will be forwarded directly to The Adjutant
3. I have attended the following schools or colleges for General, \Vashington 25, D. c., or through such other
the indicated number of vears and hold the indicated de- channels as local headquarters may direct.
r
NEWS A;\lD COi\II\IENT 81

Army and Navy Club of Manila.

-J
3. Procedure for Offzcers not on Active Ditty. Armv or Service for which first choice is indicated, and re-
-~ Officers and former officers, other than retired, who have turn~d therefrom to The Adjutant General for custody
;ervedsince 7 December 1941 and who have been relieved within 30 days.
I "romactive duty under honorable conditions may submit the 7. Additional Evaluation.
~,hove "Statement of Interest" form to The Adjutant Gen- The Adjutant General will obtain additional Officer
~ral, Washington 25, D. c., directly, Evaluation Reports from listed former immediate superiors
4. Offzc,er Evaluation Report upon request from the interested Major Force. These will
Officer Evaluation Reports (form \VD AGO PRT 461) be disposed of as prescribed in paragraph 6, above.
providea thorough evaluation of individual officers for use 8. Distribution of Offzcer Evaluation Reports .
. inconsideratiqn for commission in the Regular Army. They Officer Evaluation Report forms (\VD AGO PRT 461)
lI'ilI be prepared with extreme care and thoroughness and and instructions for their use. Officer Evaluation Report In-
. mustbe based on adequate personal information. struction Booklets (WD AGO PRT 462), will be dis-
:- a. Each "Statement of Interest" will be accompanied by tributed through channels as soon as available.
'fanOfficer Evaluation Report (form vVD AGO PRT 461)
properly filled out by the immediate commanding officer of
. the interested officer, unless the superior officer has insuf- The New Volunteer Army
ficientknowledge of the interested officer to properly evalu-
The building of a volunteer Army will start immediately.
ate his qualifications. If Officer Evaluation Report forms
hre not available, the report will be prepared and forwarded Enlistments in the Regular Army for a period of three
years will be accepted. Qualified individuals now in the
II'hen they are received.
Army who desire to enlist in the Regular Army will be dis-
b. The next higher headquarters to the rating officer will
indorse the Officer Evaluation Report, either indicating charged and reenlisted. Men who have been honorably dis-
charged from the Army of the United States may be enlisted
Concurrence or non-concurrence with the ratings given in
Sections III, IV, and V of the Officer Evaluation Report and if they apply within three months of the date of their dis-
charge and upon reenlistment will be promoted to the
I orward the file as described in paragraph 2c abO\:e.
grade held at the time of discharge. Individuals without
c. Officer Evaluation Reports upon which accurate rating
prior service and those who have been out of service for
y immediate superiors is impossible because of insufficient
more than three months may enlist by volunteering for in-
'me of observation, will be forwarded as prescribed in para-
duction. Such individuals upon induction will be enlisted
raph 4a above, with Side 1 comp!eted as far as practicable,
ny intermediate headquarters having any officer listed in in the Regular Army.
Men now in the Army who enlist in the Regular Army
paragraph 7 of the "Statement of Interest" under its juris-
diction, will arrange for completion of the report by that of- will be granted furloughs up to 90 days depending upon
ncer. In such cases, the indorsement mentioned in paragraph their length of service. Those overseas qualified for furlough
will be returned to the United States to enable them to
4b above, may be omitted if impracticable to prepare,
spend their furloughs at home.
6. Disposition of Applications and Offzcer Evaluation In addition, those now in the service, upon reenlistment
Reports. become eligible for a reenlistment bonus. The amount of
After processing by The Adjutant General, the "State- the bonus is dependent upon the grade of the individual at
ments of Interest" and Officer Evaluation Reports will be the time of his discharge and upon length of continuous
forwarded for study and appraisal to the Major Force of the servIce.
82 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL S!!ptelllber-Oct
Planning Industrial Mobilization ;34th Captures American Planes
President Harrv S. Truman, as Commander in Chief of \Vhen the 7th U.S. Army overran several Nazi air
the Armv and N~vv, has directed that the Armv and Nan' fields during the last week of war in Europe, members 0
J\ lunitio~s Board t;ke over the important postwar assig~- the 534th AM (A \V) Bn., discovered Allied planes bear.
ment of planning for industrial mobilization in the event of ing Nazi markings. A PA7 was hidden among trees an
a future emergency. was ready for flight. It was taxied to the center of the fiel
This means that the Board will become one of the key and guarded by the 534th ack-ackers. Several P-51's and
agencies in the defense program to be adopted to safeguard Spitfires, painted with Nazi crosses and swastikas, Wer
the security of the United States after the present wartime found hidden in the forest near the airfield at Bad
militarv establishment is demobilized. \Vorishofen, Germanv.
Assignment of the task to the Board is a part of the pro- One P-51 had made a crash landing in the field near
gram of reconversion which is now taking place in the Gov- Fussen, Germany. Under a clump of trees was a battered
ernment preparatory to the liquidation of wartime agencies P-38 with similar markings.
and the shifting of their functions to regular peacetime
organizations. f f f
As a preliminary step in the preparation for assuming its
new task, the Board is at present being reconstituted and . End of Censorship \
strengthened in the light of experiences gained during The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 September ordered the
\Vorld \Var II and the far-reaching changes which seem discontinuance of censorship of mail and telecommunica.
to lie ahead. tions of all members of the U.S. Armed Forces in the
Asiatic-Pacific Theaters and in the ETa. ,
f f f

f f f
Pacific Bases
Plans for the establishment of permanent advanced major No Cutbacks in Army's Athletic Equipment
bases considered necessary in the future because of their Because of the needs of the Army's recreational program.
strategical importance to the Navy have been announced. carried out by the Special Services Division for soldiers sta~
The following bases were mentioned: Kodiak, Adak, tioned in Europe and in the Pacific, no cutbacks in procure-
Hawaii, Balboa, Guam, Saipan, Tinian, Bonins, Hyukyus, ment of athletic equipment can be expected, at least until
Manus, and the Philippines. Action on the Navy recom- the first of the year. \
mendation, of course, is dependent upon Congress, with ap- Already in full swing in Europe, the program has been
proval by the President. greatly expanded since the Japanese surrender to include

Signal Corps Photo

Milling machines in the V-l bomb factory in an iron mine at Thil, France. The capacity of this plant W'lS 200 V-l's dail
 NEWS AND COi\Ii\IENT 83

.,. S. ~aY)' Photo

., The Missouri, with the Iowa astern, steams into Tokyo Bay for the surrender ceremony .

{hePacific Theater. Need for athletic equipment in the has brought up many excellent articles that I have put to
Pacific is even greater than in Europe because of the lack good use here in an Infantry cannon company."
of established resorts and the lack of recreational facilities. LIEUT. RALPH L. HOPKINS.
The Pacific program will include championship <;ontests
uch as are now in progress in Europe. Baseball diamonds,
ootball fields, basketball and tennis courts, and boxing "Sorry to report that since March Capt. Ketter has been
ringsare being built throughout the vast area of the Pacific detailed into the Infantry. More than ever now we will need
Theater. Even on tiny Iwo Jima, a softball field is already the CA JOURNALas it is our only link with our former activi-
inoperation. On Leyte, where 20,000 Navy men are ashore ties.
everyday, there are now ten baseball and softball diamonds, Best wishes for your continued success and a speedy
12 basketball courts, 20 volleyball courts, and 100 horse- Victory."
shoepits, all of which are constantly patronized. i\hs. GEORGE S. KETTER.
~ The Quartermaster Corps is rushing the procurement of
uipment.
"I-lave enjoyed the JOURNAL very much this !Jast year.
f
Keep up the good work."
Army Motors LT. GEORGE \tV. SANDHOCK.
The September issue of Army Motors was its last as a
vemment-financed publication. It is now a commercial
!IIagazine, available to individuals at $3.00 a year. A larger- Age of Military Leaders
~an-usual discount will probably be available to those who The promotion of younger men to positions of high re-
bscribe through the JOURNAL, after arrangements are sponsibility has been common practice in the Army, particu-
lllade with the publishers. larly the Air Forces, during the wartime expansion program.
One brigadier general was appointed at the age of 28,
another at 29; both in the Air Forces. The youngest outside
Quotes from Subscribers of the Air Forces to become a general was 34 at the time of
"I desire that you change my address from that as shown his appointment.
on the statement to the following: ... The average age of the 322 generals in the Army Air
I also desire to thank vou for vour faithful service during Corps on I July was just short of 47 years, or 4Y2 years be-
my time overseas for I h;ven't missed a copy. low the average for the Army as a whole. The fact reflects
i\'lany times articles published in the JOURNAL have pre- itself in the high proportion of Air Corps generals at the
younger ages. \Vhereas the Air Forces had one-fifth of all
I ceded official information .by many months. This rapid dis-
the generals in the Army, they accounted for all five gen-
semination of information has therefore been very helpful."
erals under age 35, and for fully one-half of those at ages
l\IIAJORROBERT F. MEIKLEJOHN.
40 to 44 years. On the other hand, at 50 and over the gen-
erals in the Army Air Corps comprised a little more than
"It is with pleasure t~a~ I settle this debt and look f~rward one-eighth of the total at those ages.
the coming issues of COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL, which -Metropolitan Life 111surmlce Company.
Coast ~rtillery News letter
Orientation has taken on an added significance during
p~st few w~eks ~nd the hours have str~tched much lon~
WIth the discussIOns of postwar planmng and the adju~
ments to be made following return to civilian life. Ea
battery has made special efforts to bring the men out a
have them express their views and judging from the d .
thought that has been evidenced in some of these discou
the G. L's have not just been waiting for release but do'
some fine intelligent thinking.

Harbor'Defenses of The major sport has held the highlight of the outd
season and Fort Ivlonroe's baseball team completed a s
cessful year against other service teams, taking the Ti \.
Chesape~ke Bay 0 ',~
water Virginia championship and playing in the Th'
Service Command finals.
Special schools for off-duty education have been llfI'
BRIGADIERGENERALROLLIN L. TILTON, Commanding progress for some time at Fort Monroe and Fort StOry.~
Fort Monroe a special course in basic radio under the I
By Captain Alonza F. Colonna 1

rection of Staff Sergeant Frederick D. Hackworth \I J

Japan's downfall failed to dampen the enthusiasm conducted for men wishing to enroll in the USAFI coors f
and excellent esprit of striving for perfection in training The class consisted of sixteen enlisted men and fourtee
prevalent in the Harbor Defenses of Chesapeake Bay. of them have already enrolled in the advance course. ~
"Business as usual" was the order of the day. Col. \Vilmer S. Phillips, a former editor of the COASI
In fact it might be said that the promise of early release ARTILLERYJOURNAL,commanding officer of Fort StoryI
and return to civilian life made by the surrender of the last left the command for another assignment and was replacd
of the Axis powers buoyed the spirits of the personnel and by Col. Adam E. Potts.
programs planned long in advance were carried out with a Brig. Gen. Gustavo ~orderio de Farias, Director of MiJi
more vigorous will. tary training in Brazil, accompanied by his aide, Capl
Realizing, however, that the inevitable letdown would Godofredo Rocha, and Major Wallace C. Liberty of the
come, plans were already prepared and the installations of United States Army, paid a visit to Fort Monroe in JU~
the Harbor Defenses of Chesapeake Bay were ready. and inspected the various departments of the Coast Artillc .
Full advantage of the exceptional summer weather has School. vVhile here General Corderio and his party were
been taken and practically all of the target practices required entertained by General Tilton and looked over the Harbor
by training memoranda have been completed. These in. Defense installations.
eluded 40mm seacoast firing, Case II, six-inch firing, and
90mm seacoast and antiaircraft firing. These practices,
always a ~ighlight in the training program of harbor de-
fense units, were up to the usual standard and indicated no
let-up in the caliber of perfection required.
Small-arms firing for personnel at Fort John Custis, Fort
Story, Fort Monroe and the Little Creek Mine Base has
been completed and some exceptional scores marked up by
the men in the batteries.
Interest is running high in the proposed practice of the
16-inch riRes scheduled with in the next ninety days. This
will be the first time the big seacoast guns have been fired
in practice and no doubt men who have spent many long
weary months learning the technique will be glad to see the
firing become a reality.
The past several weeks have not been without color in
these Harbor Defenses, and Retreat parades have been
marked with special ceremonies presenting personnel with
awards. At Fort Monroe, two noncommissioned officers and Brig. Gen. Gustavo Corderio de Farias, Brig. Gen. Lawrence
an officer were given Certificates of Merit, and at Fort Story B. Weeks (Commandant, Coast Artillery School), and Brig.
several reviews were held for visiting dignitaries. Gen. Rollin L. Tilton.
 NE\VS LETTERS 85
line. (Towline in the photo is only a little over 100 yards in
order that the details of the target may be observed.) The
target is of lattice construction mounted on three plank skis.
Screen has been fastened to the lattice work to permit radar
firing by AMTB batteries.
Officers' and noncommissioned officers' schools have been
continued in both harbor defenses. In the HD of the Co-
lumbia an officers' school was held on 2 August during
which practical instruction was given in firing a 75mm gun
at seacoast targets. In the Harbor Defenses of Puget Sound,
an eioht-weeks
o school for enlisted men in the care and
Northwestern Sector preservation, adjustment, operation and firing of automatic
weapons is being conducted at Fort Casey using both radio-
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES H. CUNNINGHAM, Assistant controlled airplane and towed sleeve targets.
Sector Commander for Harbor Defense 1\'Iatters During July and August, personnel from both harbor
defenses were engaged in fighting forest fires. Troops from
~lajor General Henry C. Pratt, Commanding General, the Harbor Defenses of the Columbia aided materially in
IVesternDefense Command, accompanied by the Sector checking the huoe Tillamook forest fire on the Oregon
)Jmmander, made an inspection of both harbor defenses o \ d .
Coast. A forest fire fighting detail of eighty men an four
luring the period 9 to II August. A regular radar practice officers worked for two weeks under the technical super-
vasheld at Fort Ebey and demonstration target practices vision of the State Forestry Officials in an attempt to confine
rere held at Fort \Vorden, and Camp Hayden, where the fire to a 2OG,OOO-acrearea which had been devastated.
:;eneral Pratt had the opportunity of meeting Brigadier The Harbor Defenses of Puget Sound furnished troops to
>reston,1\11. C., Fortress Commander, Esquimalt Fortress combat several smaller fires on \Vhidby and Marrowstone
,nd Brigadier Stewart, CGE, DSO, who had just returned Islands.
romduty in England. An active schedule of outdoor athletics has been con-
Four Canadian Radar Officers from Esquimalt Fortress ducted during the summer in both harbor defenses, cli-
nd Hq. Pacific Command recently visited the Harbor maxed by a three-game baseball series between the two
)efenses of Puget Sound for a three-day inspection and harbor defense teams. The final and deciding game, played
nstruction tour of Harbor Defense Radar Installations at Fort \\1orden on 12 August was won by the HD of the
ncluding an inspection of Navy Airborne Radar Equip- Columbia team by a score of 1-0.
nent at Ault Field.
On II July, the Sector Commander, accompanied by
lrigadier General Cunningham, Major General Worth-
n~ton, CGE, MC, MM, General Officer Commanding In
:hief, Pacific Command, Brigadier Preston and Colonel
~arrington, U. S. Liaison Officer at Vancouver, visited
{orkeIsland, near the northern end of Vancouver Island
nd witnessed a day and night seacoast target practice.
The 63-foot aircraft rescue boats recently received in
10thharbor defenses are being used extensively, especially
or towing high-speed targets as shown in the accompany-
ng photograph taken in Admiralty Inlet, HD of PS. A
.-inchoperated by a small ga~oline motor has been mounted
n the stern of this boat and steel airplane target tow cable is
lsed as towline. A special high speed pyramidal target has
lCenconstructed, which has been towed at speeds as high as
} miles per hour in target practices using 600 yards of tow- The high-speed target at 25 mph.

If you are going to be moving around for a while,

why not have the JOURNAL sent to your home
address?
86 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOLlR:\AL September-O
sored by the ~inth Sen'ice Command, C-olonel Philip
Biehl. post executive and commanding officer. Sla
j~.. \ ~)~ Harbor Defenses complement, 1932 SCLI. welcomed the group.

AI'III: 'I
'f
~_J:I
I I
- 0
f 1\ lore than 600 Harbor Defense enlisted men-ma'
of them veterans of earlier South Pacific campaigns~
Fort Scott in mid-July for various separation centers
'~ ~~'San Francisco, discharge under the point system. It was the first
Army release of San Francisco soldiers who have defen
the city and harbor from possible enemy attack. Pril
First Class Henry Hattal. 25. Philadelphia. Pennsyh.an'
COLO:\'EL \ VILLIA1\l F. LAFRENZ, COllllllll1ldillg
had the high-point total of 141.
The Commanding Officer. Harbor Defenses of San Fran-
cisco. has taken over the activities of the Northern Cali-
fornia Sector. The Sector was inactivated 31 August 45.
,Harbor Defense troops topped all previous \"ar Bond
drives when they reached a total of $106.937, culminating a
three-month effort in the 7th \ Var Loan. Ace contributors
were men of the 174th GA. Bn. mine command who regis- Antiaircraft Replacement
tered an amazing 76 per cent participation total.
Hq. & Hq. Det., I73rd GA. Bn., Fort Baker, won the Training Center
first of a series of four trophies to be awarded by the com-
manding officer for the most unusual, unique and infor- Fort Bliss, Texas
mational orientation display with the HDSF command.
The award to Corporal Jess Haigler, Clemson College, COLO:\'EL E. G SEAl\IAN, Commanding
South Carolina, graduate, originator of the orientation dis- By Major Rex Ragan
play in the detachment dayroom.
Athletics dominated minds of majority of the Coast Artil- Despite the impending approach of V-J Day at th
lerymen in the Harbor Defenses of San Francisco during writing, with its mounting tension among officers and men
the month of August, with the Ninth Service Command alike, training of troops at the Antiaircraft Replacemen
softball finals having been concluded at Fort "'infield Training Center continued without a falter.
Scott August 26 after five days of competition. The AARTC "lost" one of its largest battalions, the 582d
Camp Anza, Arlington, Calif., won the softball title, de- A\-V (Sp) Battalion when the Antiaircraft Artillery Train-
feating Fort Lewis, \Vasll., 1-0, in eleven innings for ing Center reopened late in July and the organization re-
the crown. Other teams in the tournament included Fort turned to its former command, as did several ordnance unitS
\Vinfield Scott; Camp Stoneman, Calif.; Camp George recently attached to the AARTC.
Gordon, Seattle, \Vash.; Dugway Proving Grounds, L1tah; During the shift from training replacements from Euro-
Tooele Ordnance Depot, L1tah; Birmingham General Hos- pean Theater combat to Pacific warfare the tempo has in~
pital, Van Nuys, Calif. creased, and among other features of training, much stres~
Fort \Vinfield Scott won the right to enter the finals has been placed on scouting and patrolling, for which a
(representing eight \-Vestern states comprising the largest desert course has been mapped out northwest of EI Paso.
of all the L1.S. service commands) by defeating Camp along the Rio Grande.
Stoneman in the Central District play-offs earlier in the Trainees, in their fourth week of basic, are run through
month at Fort Scott. the course which is a practical test of their knowledge of
The Fort Scott Gunner baseball team traveled to Camp map-reading, use of the compass, and individual ingenuity.
Stoneman Aug. 29 for the Ninth Service Command finals, Crossing desert terrain, the men negotiate arid lands and
emerging second best. Fort Lewis, \Vash., won the pennant end by fording the sluggish Rio Grande, where they relax
with the coast artillerymen runners-up, losing to the \Var- until a night phase of the problem completes the test. Dur-
riars, 9-6, in the final game. The Fort Scott club was coached ing the hot Texas weather, the river crossing is one of the
by Captain James McDermott and had two soldiers placed most enjoyable parts of the training program.
on the service command "all-star teams"-Sergeant Norman Following action by Congress prohibiting men under 19
Hibbard, first base, and Private Don "Red" \-Veber, pitcher. from going overseas, and into combat, without a required
The Fort Scott \-VAC softball team also went to the minimum of training, one new battery has been formed-,
Ninth Service Command finals, thus giving the Golden the First Provisional Battery-and another in process ot
Gate installation the unique distinction of being the only organization, for giving teen-age youths an additional
post in the Ninth Service Command to put three teams into nine weeks of advanced AA training before being made
the NSC softball and baseball finals. The Fort Scott \Vacs available for shipment. The training for these men closel:,
reached the quarter-finals before being eliminated. parallels the regular AARTC schedule, but is more detailed
More than half a hundred government civilian employees and advanced than the usual I7-week cvcle.
and soldiers from San Francisco to Reno, Nevada, con- Men going on desert field exercise; have been taug
vened at Fort Scott in mid-August for the first of a series of more and more about the realities of war. Besides diggi
twenty scheduled conferences in \Vork Simplification spon- in when on maneuvers. they are acquainted with the i
 87
hoW it feels to be attacked by planes and tanks. Low- Extensive tes,s of the use of searchliohts
o for furnishino0
ng planes from the Deming Air Base at Deming, New "artificial moonlight" in dense jungle terrain have been
exico,demonstrate low-level bombing and strafing tactics, completed at the Pacific Combat Traininoo Center._
simultaneously a light tank, belonging to the AARTC, An antiaircraft gun battalion commanded by Lt. Col.
lulates firing, while throwing colored smoke bombs at \Villiam H. Vail, CAC, for a long time a part of this com-
inees who are taught to seek protective cover while em- mand, has established an enviable record since going into

f
~'ingsmall-arms fire against the ('nemy. action in the Ryukyus. In a single night's action this one
battalion set a new Pacific record when it shot down fifteen
~ enemy planes. During one four-minute period the bat-
talion was credited with a plane a minute. As of 1 August
1945, the battalion was credited with 35 planes destroyed
OJ '" '" '" and 24 probably destroyed. Colonel Vail was recently com-
1 mended by Fleet Admiral Chester \V. Nimitz for the
2273d 7StA7StCommand fine record his battalion has established.
t After a very successful Tennis Tournament conducted
by the AAA Special Service Office, the singles crown W:1S
As the number of days left in the war rapidly became
~\rer and fewer, the Hawaiian Antiaircraft Artillery Com- awarded Pvt. Jack Bodgers, former \Visconsin State Singles
\nand began planning for the postwar period. The problem Champion. Co\. F. T. Folk, Chief of Staff, and Capt. Paul
~fredeployment of many officers and men with long periods S. Burger of the G-3 Section teamed up to win the doubles.
M duty overseas and with high ASR scores was paramount. Rodgers represented the quarter finals. In the CPBC Sum-
ibe establishment of schools and classes under the Infor- mer Baseball League the Command Team finished fourth.
mationand Education program, and widespread recreational This AAA nine was the only team in the league to defeat
activities under the Athletic and Recreation Office were the strong Bellows Field team headed by big league players
oeingplanned. But in the midst of working and planning from the New York Yankees, St. Louis Cardinals, St. Louis
forthe post-V-J Day period, a high degree of combat ef- Browns and the Boston Braves. An AAA team also came
ficiencywas being constantly maintained. away with honors in the CPBC Horseshoe Tournament.
One of the factors contributing to training in this com-
it mand over the last t\VOyears has been the cooperation of

he Navy in a monthly "Joint Army-Navy Exercise." These

/ xerciseswere designed to test all the Air Defense agencies
onOahu. The Navy provided many carefully planned and
, executed saturation attacks utilizing hundreds of carrier-
, typeplanes simulating the enemy. Radio and radar counter-
~neasures were freely employed by the "drill-hostile" forces
'in an effort to confuse the defenders, to protect the attacker:;,
pnd to add realism to the exercise. The defending forces in-
~c1udedall those available to the Air Defense Commander
llinaddition to those strike groups available to the Hawaiian
. SeaFrontier. A monthly night battle practice utilizing four
~r more tow-target planes, both high and low altitudes, was
1held in conjunction with the Joint Army-Navy Exercises.
f~eneral Perkins has said, "The fine spirit of cooperation
. tween the services exhibited in the planning and carry-
I ing out of these exercises is commendable. The training
, received has greatly benefited antiaircraft units." Partici-
-pating navy units have also received much valuable training
'I from the exercises.
Other out-of-the-ordinary training activities engaged in
<by the command included the indoctrination of Navy
c~rrier pilots in low-level night flying in searchlight-d~-
( fended areas. Of great training value to antiaircraft units
engaged in spread-beam defense, these problems trained
'carrler pilots who soon were scheduled to fly against similar
defenses in Japan.
Problems confronting units equipped with 120mm anti-
aircraft guns are constantly being studied by the command.
Current projects include the development of a forwarcl-
area sight for firing against close-in targets by gun com-
manders' action. A study of the rate of wear on the 120mm
tubes and the correspond ng loss of muzzle-velocity has also Sgt. Frank De Luccia, Lt. Co!. William Vail,' and Captain
en undertaken. Robert Cannon discuss action in the Ryukyus.
 l.

The JOURNAL can supply any book in print,

at the usual Association discount.

~~
From the Front Office made mistakes and will make them again, and that absolute p
SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF Army control of the program might be a mistake in itself, but
GEORGE C. MARSHALL. Edited by Major H. A. De- he questions the idea that this is a valid reason for rejecting the m
Weerd. \Vashington: Infantry Journal, 1945. 259 Pages; program-Congress could specify the conditions of the training.l
Index. $2.75. He rejects the idea that young people owe a year of their

Forty-eight speeches by General of the Anny George C.

lives to the government; the thought that a glorified CCC is de.\
sirable also leaves him cold. He does not believe that the year
l'vlarshall appear in this book; they were made in such diverse of training should be anything but training-no garrison dut)',
places as in Congressional hearing rooms, and to nation-wide no occupation duty. He sticks to the premise that we need
radio audiences.
Traditionally, soldiers in the position of General l\'larshall,
trained men in the event of another war, and that the way 1
to get them is to train them. The side issues, one by one, pro .
Chief of Staff of the Army, have either said nothing, or have and con, are analyzed, evaluated, and then filed-we still need I
said things that have caused political and military repercus- a trained reserve and a fair-sized standing army. The most I
sions. General Marshall's speeches, on the other hand, have economical and fairest way to attain this objective is universal s
brought unity and understanding to the country as a whole, military training. I
and to those who shape our policies.
The conscientious objector problem is treated justly and com. "
Qispassionate, with no axe to grind except the welfare of the pletely in this book, as are the problems of the National Guard
United States, the General's speeches and statements have in

!
and countless other issues. Temperateness and cold logic based {
them the quality of simplicity, the germs of time-proved
prophecy, and the calmness born of knowledge and confidence.
on facts and statistics are the outstanding virtues of this volume. !
Nobody, from President Roosevelt to the pacifists, is treated
The speeches are not stuffy-they are too full of meat and too as a sacred cow-the reader is never permitted to forget that
straightforward for any of that.
the objective is important, and that there is one just and certain
Douglas Southall Freeman, the great historian of the South, way to reach it. .
says of this book, "To these papers, when they have read
everything else, students will turn for final explanation and in-
tegration. This volume is a major source book of American
military history." Semper Fide1is
f THE U. S. MARINES ON IWO JIMA. By Five Official Ma-
rine Combat Writers. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1945.
The New Army
312 Pages; Illustrated. 25~ to Members of the Armed
UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING. By Colonel Edward
A. Fitzpatrick. New York: Whittlesey House, 1945. 358
Forces. I
The bloody battles of Guadalcanal and Tarawa, Kwajelein •
Pages; Appendix; Index. $3.00.
and Bougainville, were war enough for any man or group of
The subject of universal military training is one that is men, but Iwo Jima will remain as the toughest of them all. I
guaranteed to touch off acrimonious debate in almost any There was a lot of killing in a small area when this volcanic
gathering. Colonel Fitzpatrick's treatment of the question is so pile was wrested from the stubborn Japs. When we at home ~
unbiased and so temperate, without resorting to hedging, that read about this campaign we wondered what there was on the
this book may well be used as a handbook by debaters on island worth the losses-until we began to hear about the
both sides of the question, even though the author believes in numbers of B-29s that were saved on the island or by search ~
universal military training. planes from it.
The author sticks pins in the bubbles of the more active The whole story of the fighting would take volumes, but this
proponents of the proposition as well as in those of its op- book (and it isn't such a little book, at that) makes a good
ponents. He believes in universal military training because it is start in explaining what the Marines met in the way of resist-
necessary for the protection of the United States in the event ance, and how they overcame it. The ~)ictures are more plentiful
of future wars, not because it will make our youth any better than is usual in a book of this sort, and they add much to the
mentally, physically, or mo~ He admits that the~12ny has final product. Iwo, as ictured, is a rather dismal ile of ash.
 BOOK REVIEWS 89

People Going Crazy COAST ARTILLERY RINGS

£RSIAN GULF COJ\li\IAND. By Joel Sayre. New York: Ladies' Miniatures Now Available!!
Random House, 1945. 140 Pages; Illustrated. $2.00 .
. Iran is hot; not hot like a \Vashington summer, nor like the
(21ifomia desert, but so hot that the heat kills the Hies in July.
~\ temperature of 189 has been recorded, and 120 in the shade
common. Add to this heat the fact that the country's only
l1Iilroadwas little more than a streak of soft iron, that the road
~stem was reminiscent of a General J\lotors testing track, and
~.at the natives had little idea of things mechanical. l\lud in
rtain seasons, Hies, stran.ge diseases, strange religious customs,

P d mountainous territory were a few more complications.

With all these works of man and Nature to contend with,
lthePersion Gulf Command forwarded untold tons of vital war
100ateriaisto the Russians-war materials which had much to do
\withthe turn in the tide of the Russians' part of the war. The
.\meriCansbuilt their own roads, docks, and plants; they patched
and fixed and restocked the railroad; they assembled a truck
/
(.relY five minutes with native labor; and they got the tonnage
through. There was no enemy to fight, but there was the heat
Due to difficulties in the supply of gold, the JOURNAL in
I and the boredo,m. Four and one-half million long tons of sup-
plieswent to Russia through Iran-Americans did it.
• Joel Sayre tells how they did it, in New Yorker style, which
the past has been forced to disappoint many who ordered
Coast Artillery rings. GOLD IS NOW AVAILABLE-we

I makesit very ~ood reading indeed.

don't know how long this will be true. If you want a Coast
Artillery ring, ORDER NO\X'! These rings are made to order,
. ~ ~ ~
they are of heavy construction, and are made by one of Amer-
ica's leading manufacturing jewelers. Your name is engraved
I Ambulance in the Desert free.

1 DREAM OF THE DAY. By Caleb l'vlilne. New

\ Longmans, Green & Co., 1945. 122 Pages. $2.00.
York: Order your rings NO\X' because:
\X'e do not know how long gold will be available.
{ These are the letters from a sensitive, young, and talented Shipments overseas are at purchaser's risk.
American Field Service driver to his mother. Milne drove for Six to eight weeks are required for manufacture.
the British and the' French in North Africa, and was killed
while serving with General Leclerc. Part travelogue, part per- 3:

sonal experience narrative, the book helps to explain some of

the thoughts of an intellectual pacifist. A Coast Artillery Ring with. Y 01/1'
.
...'J ;:e
if ~ 0
:I
~
~ ~ ~
Name Engraved is a Ready
Meam of Identification
. ...
::r

~
:;
!=
0
S!,-
For Truck-Busters ?
I ONYX SETTING 11
KEEP 'EM ROLLING: A DRIVER'S HANDBOOK. By Richard
Gordon McCloskey. \Vashington: Infantry Journal, 1945 . PRICE TAX TOTAL .
"~
~ ~
Q.

270 Pages; Illustrated; Index. 50~. $27.00 $5.40 $32.40 4

~
This new and enlarged edition of the now-familiar Keep PLAIN GOLD (CA Insignia Signet)
.
5'
Q.

0
c
'Em Rolling is the sixth to come from the presses. The author, ~
PRICE TAX TOTAL "-
who wrote the first editions when he was editor of Army
.\fotors, is an expert at putting over instruction in the form $27.00 $5.40 $32.40 ~
"-
of colloquial, everyday language. ~
t>

Ducks, motorcycles, camouHage, the care and feeding of Although the supply of stones for men's ~
winches, and other related subjects are added to the expected rings is almost exhausted, miniature Coast
~
Artillery Rings for ladies are available in
I information on driving and first-echelon maintenance.
The reviewer, who has been driving for twenty years, didn't a wide variety of stones: ruby, alexandrite,
..2
~
~
'I realize how little he knew about modern vehicles and their amethyst, white sapphire, golden sapphire,
operation and maintenance until he read this new edition. i'
garnet, aquamarine, zircon, and spinel.
Every driver, mechanic, motor sergeant, and motor transport ~
These stones are available in the miniature ~
~officershould have his personal copy of this breezy book. rings only. The price: $20.00, tax $4.00; ~
~ ~ ~ total $24.00. ..
"-
or

il!
~ Crash and Burn
..~
:L

,AIRPLANE CRASH FIRE FIGHTING MANUAL. Boston: Since tbese rings are made to order, it is ~
0

National Fire Protection Association, 1945. 96 Pages; Il- ;:

necessary to require cbeck or mOlley 5'
lustrated. $1.00. i
Fighting fire in crashed airplanes is no job for amateurs, and
order before work is begun. .
"
;:
eVen trained city firemen often have much to learn about this
90 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOUR0JAL
specialized task. It entails knowledge of aircraft structure
equipment, armament, airport management, and traffic patte
among other things. This pamphlet, meant for use as a I
by fire companies or crews which might have to cope with fir
Services Offered by the in crashed aircraft, is well illustrated.

Coast Artillery Journal Restless \Vaters

LAKE ERIE. By Harlan Hatcher. New York: The Bob
Ot
r
Merrill Company, 1945. 396 Pages; Index; Illustrated. $3.)' I
In this fifth book of the American Lakes series, Haria .
BOOKS
Hatcher deals with Lake Erie. Of all the Great Lakes, Erie h,
The JOURNAL can obtain for you any unclassified had, probably, the most profound effect on the people who IiI'
book, on any subject, that is in print, subject to the limi- in the immediate area, and on the growth of the country as
tations due to wartime restrictions. Military books, whole. Handling astronomical tonnages of waterborne freig '\
technical books, fiction, biography, history-any type of bordered by rich farming lands and thriving cities, Lake En L
book you desire. Send cash with your order and receive combines the elements that have made America great. ~
discounts paid in dividend coupons, which may be used The early French explorers found the lake and founded so $.
of the cities, notably Detroit; the British took over as the pag' T
for full or partial payment of other books or magazines.
of history turned; and finally the Americans owned the SOUl
ern shore. The War of 1812 highlighted the importance
MAGAZINES Lake Erie. A ready but dangerous highway, the Lake ma
possible the commerce that in turn made possible Buffal
The JOURNAL will handle your subscriptions to all Cleveland, Erie, and Toledo, along with the once-impona
magazines, subject at present to various wartime restric- cities of Sandusky and Vermilion. Canals were promoted I
tions. \X'rite us for quotations, or to learn the avail- connect with the Lake; the terminal cities grew fast with th
ability of any particular publication. If cash accompanies increased trade.
your order you will receive discounts in book dividend Today huge freighters carry wheat and are, and lesser ite
coupons, which may be used to pay for books or other the length and breadth of the Lake. Shallow and tempestuou
magazines. Binders with name inscribed are available the roughness of the water and the narrowness of the channel
and seaways make the Lake a hazardous place for the sailo
for all popular publications.
and the ships, but the commerce continues. The breed of me!
who became the industrial giants of the last century, \\"
ENGRAVING founded and helped the lake cities to grow, still carry 0
The desire for one last trip before the ice sets in has c .
Calling cards, wedding invitations and announcements, many a ship and many a man, but the people of the lakes sti
informals, place cards, and other forms of engraving are take out the ships. Tragedies and losses are taken in stride.
needed sooner or later by everyone. The JOURNAL Combined with the background of great cities, huge unload-
can do the job for you more reasonably than most other ing docks and elevators, and the making and losing of mone~
sources-with the added advantages of (1) keeping we have stories of the Underground Railroad of slavery day.
your plate on file, and (2) a complete knowledge of Perry and the \Var of 1812, Jack Miner and his game refuge
military and social forms. A style and price sheet will Cadillac and La Salle, and Captain John Brown, Jr. .
The book is good history, illuminated by good writing.
be sent upon request.

COAST ARTILLERY RINGS Eaton in Africa

,
FIRST AMERICANS IN NORTH AFRICA. By Louis B
Available both in men's style and 10 ladies' miniature
\Vright and Julia H. MacLeod. Princeton: Princeton Uni
style. Send for a descriptive price list. Men's 10k Gold
versity Press, 1945. 206 Pages; Notes; Index; Illustrate
Ring, $32.40; Ladies' Miniature Ring, $24.00. These
$3.00.
prices include tax.
There have been fictionalized histories of the labors and ad
ventures of William Eaton in his struggles against the Barba.
THE OOZLEFINCH pirates, and there have been chapters in histories covering Ih
subject, but this book is a refreshing change from the previou
The patron bird of the Coast Artillery Corps. Good desk treatments. It is factual without being dry, presumably accurate
ornaments; something unusual for the whatnot shelf at and seemingly objective in its treatment of William Eaton.
home. A fine inexpensive gift. Single birds, $1.00; pair, The story of Eaton is fairly well known-as one of au
facing opposite, $1.7;. A history of the Oozlefinch is consuls in North Africa at the time the United States wa
sent with each purchase. paying tribute and losing Americans to slavery in Morocco
Tripoli, and Algeria, he fought to stiffen America's attitude
to make a show of force, or even to fight. That the poli0
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOUR JOURNAL'S SERVICES Eaton urged was adopted years later, and that it was pro\"
right by the savings in men and money (to say nothing of na-
tional prestige), was of little satisfaction to Eaton, who by tha
time was a poor and broken man.
 BOOK REVIEWS 91

£aton's march across the desert, as "General" of an army service people to obtain these jobs, and in some cases, the jobs
sixmarines, a company of Greek mercenaries, and a volatile are reserved for those with military service.
p of fickle Arabs, is probably the best known of his feats. This book presents a list of 500 government jobs, explains the
k of coordination with the Navy and his own State De- requirements, gives some hints as to the types of examinations.
rt01ent colleagues nullified the results of the march, but it and tells how to go about findino0 openinos0 and applvino• 0
for
, still one for the annals . t he vacancies. The Veterans' Preference angle is e;..:plained
• Our early dealings with the Barbary pirates is a shameful fully.
pter in American history; Eaton did his best to change our It will be a shock to many with a desire to enter oovernment
- 0
icies, and his best was very good indeed. \Vhen the Navy work that a large number of the jobs pay relatively low wages,
allv did take the matter in hand. the power of the pirates and that even moderate salary grades require education and
s broken for all times. experience that will eliminate many job-seekers.
The person who wants a gover~~ent job will save much
of of of
shoe leather and time bv} readino0 this book thorouohlv
b •
before
Patrick Henry he begins his search.

i ~ OF THUNDER. By Julia _1\11. H. Carson. ~~w York:

~ Longmans, Green & Co., 194). 240 Pages; BiblIography. Your Own Boss
J 52.50. HOW TO STAH.T YOUR O\VN BUSINESS. By Walter F.
J This fictionalized biography of Patrick Henry covers the im- Shaw .and E. \\T. Kay. New York: Ziff-Davis Publishing
rtant events in his brilliant career with sympathetic under- Company, 1945. 227 Pages; Index; Illustrated. $2.00.

f: tanding. It does not hide the fact that Henry had enemies as
. liellas friends, and that the courses he followed were not always
aronsidered in the best interests of his state and his country, al-
The most valuable contribution of the authors in this book
is the fact that they plant the idea, both directly and indi-
rectly, that without proper management and much work anr
houoho
his motives and sincerity• were never in doubt. The
business cannot last. There is more to opening a business than
; ugar-coating of fiction does not detract too much from the
renting a vacant store, buying some merchandise blindly, and
uthenticity of the biography.
using the cash recejpts for household expenses.
The book contains valuable information on how to choose
a business, how to choose a location, how to control stock in-
\'{lorking for Uncle Sam ventories, how to keep records, how to budget, how to advertise,
OVEH.Ni\lENT JOBS AND HOW TO GET THEM. how to create and keep good will, and hundreds of other
Edited by Sterling D. Spero. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott "hows" that will make or break a small retail business. Not the
Company, 1945. 325 Pages; Index. $2.95. least valuable item in the book is the reading list for further
study ai: the end of each chapter.
,',Iany soldiers, even those who moan the loudest about their
present "employment," will have learned to like working for
thegovernment. The sureness of the pay checks, the relatively
ireater security of tenure, and (in some cases at least) the
~imited sphere of activities will have their attractions. Polls of
elxlUt-to-be-discharged soldiers have indicated that a large BINDERS
roportion are interested in Civil Service jobs.
AT A NEW LOW PRICE
, Veterans' Preference rights will make it somewhat easier for
[ Field Manual Size 51/4" X 8% "
Technical'Manual Size 6 %" x 10 % II

URANIUM AND
ATOMI~ POWER
Jack De Ment and H. C. Dake

1945 Edition $4.00

T here is a /Jell' world i/J the maki/Jg /JOll' that u'e ca/J harness
atomic pou'er. Here, in a practical, clearly-written volume,
are all the underlying principles and theories essential to a In order to reduce our inventory we are offering a
thorough understanding of atomic power and the atomic
bomb. In practice and theory, it is an exposition of the substantial reduction in the price-FIELD AND TECH-
uranium minerals, based on the chemistry of uranium, and NICALMANUALBINDERSare now $1.00. Individuals
including the possibilities of atomic power.
Atomic power has become a source of great interest and and organizations should order NOW, because this
concern to millions the world over. This presentation of
offer will not be continued after our stock is reduced.
information regarding atomic power and the physics of
uranium are in terms which the layman, as well as technical
men and physicists, can easily comprehend. This volume,
therefore, is of interest and value to anyone who would like
ro become acquainted with the newest concepts in atomic
$•.00
physics with a minimum of effort.
FOR A LIMITED TIME ONLY
92 ' THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Septem her-Oct
\X'ork for Veterans vanquished except in the cemeteries or in prison. Isabel
Palencia found haven in Mexico, where she still works a
500 POSTWAR JOBS FOR lvlEN, By Vocational Guidance
fights for the Republican cause.
Research, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co" 1945, 270
Pages; Index, $250, The internment in France of many of the Republicans, a
the wanderings and sufferings of the group as a whole ma'
Many soldiers, officers and enlisted men alike, have only a bitter reading. The book is part history, part biography.
vague idea, or no idea at all, of what they intend to do when
they leave the service, \ Vith millions being discharged in the f
next few months, it behooves the prospective civilian to do what
he can about finding profitable and congenial employment. How a Unit is Born
This book lists 500 jobs; under each one are listed the follow- "E" COMPANY. By Frank O'Rourke. New York: Simon an
ing subheads: Present Outlook, Job Description, Requirements, Schuster, 1945. 166 Pages. $2.00.
Advantages, Disadvantages, Earnings, Advancement Oppor- ..
tunities, and \Vhere to Apply, "E" Company was organized about ten days after pe~r
Harbor, went through the normal training (including the gr
f f "broomstick maneuvers"), and fought in Africa. This no\'
portrays very well the task of forming a fighting unit from a hun
Atrocities dred-odd assorted characters; the author does a fine job
THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN AGAIN, By Clark Kinnaird, delineating the personalities of many of the men, "key" an
New York: Howell, Soskin, 1945, 160 Pages; Illustrated, otherwise, from the CO to the phoney dice expert. This isn
$2.00. great literature, but it is a workmanlike, straightforward bit
Putting on record, in pictures and in text, the atrocities of writing that is a far cry from the Hollywood school of milita
glamor. '
our late enemies, this book is far from pleasant reading. Most
of the pictures and much of the text have been seen before, in f f
newspapers and other periodicals, but never in such a huge
dose as this. The apologists for the Germans, the Japs, and the Cartoons Again
Italian fascists might do well to avoid those who have read this STOP OR I'LL SCREAM. Edited by Gurney Williams. Ne\
book. ' York: Robert 1\11. McBride & Company, 1945. 159 Pag
f f $2.00.

Dark Days for Spain More than 300 cartoons from Collier's fill this book. The~
isn't a cartoon in the collection that is obscure 'in meaning
SMOULDERING FREEDOM. By Isabel de Palencia. New which does not mean that subtle humor is lacking- Chon Day'
York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1945. 247 Pages; pair of tykes, with one of them saying, "Let's go down to th
Notes; Index. $3.00. depot and yell 'Daddy' at the servicemen," gives you an idea
This is the story of the struggles and the exile of the Spanish There is a good representation from Virgil Partch; Foster Hum
Republicans, whose government was overthrown by Franco in freville's Alfred the Sailor bobs up on page after page; and
the late Spanish Civil \Var. The war was bitter and bloody, in Gardner Rea, Larry Reynolds, and the rest of the Collier':
the fashion of civil wars, and there was no place in Spain for th'e stable are here.

The standard edition of any book will be sent U11/essthe paper-bound Fighting Forces edition is specifically requestea
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL, - REMARKS, OTHER ITEMS
631 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Washington 4, D. C.
Please send the following books:

o I inclose remittance in the amount of $-------------

o Send bill to Battery Fund.
(For unit orden only.)

o Please charge to my account.

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(0A545)
 BOOKS
In the Present, Prepare for the Future
~f the book you want is not listed here. the Journal can get it for you.
~~ ,(Titles marked * for sale to members of the Armed Services only)
Military Training Rifles & MGs of the World's Armies Field Artillery, Bali, ~.OO
(Johnson) Seacoast Artillery (A complete textt-ook) .. 3.00
a hology for the Armed Services 3.00 Cloth edition ~.OO Battery Duties: A Checklist 2~
,
~ hology for the Returning Serviceman 2~ *Fighting Forcel edition 2~ Gas Warfare
njiIin Battle (Dollard) 2~ Rockets (Ley) 3.~0
Reading for the Soldier 1.00 A Manual of Military Small Arms (Smith) 2.00 Gas Warfare (Gen. Waitt)
bat Problems for Small Units 1.00 How to Shoot the U. S. Army Rifle 2~ Cloth edition 2.7~
I dence System of Teaching Drill 15 Ammunition (Johnson & Haven) *Fighting Foreel edition 2~
~7 tials of Infantry Training (with 100 tables) ~.oo Ordnance
Cloth edition 2.00 Gun Care and Repair (Chapel) 3.15 0 I F' ld G'd 3 I h 2.~0
Paper edition 1.~O The Book of the Springfield 4.00 f< nance Ie UI e, vo s., ea,
[ R & SOFM Combined 1.~O Firearms Investigation (Gen. Hatcher) 7.~0 Medical
ow to Use Your Eyes at Night 10 *The Gun (Forester) 2~ Doctors at War ~.oo
Infantry in Battle: Examples from War .. 3.00 History of Automatic Arms (Johnson & Burma Surgeon (Co\. Seagrave)
wdership for American Army Leaders Haven) ~.oo Cloth edition 3.00
I
(Gen. Munson) 2~ Machine Gunner's Handbook (Co\. *Fighting Foreel edition 2~
llap & Aerial Photo Reading Complete LOU Coates) ~o Handbook for Nurses' Aides (Orbison) 2.00
lew Infantry Drill Regulations Military & Sporting Rifle Shooting 4.~0 Medical Soldier's Handbook 1.00
Cloth edition , 7~ Story of Weapons & Tactics Military Medical Manual (complete text), 4.~0
,I Paper edition 30 (Wintringham) 2.2~ Military Preventive Medicine (Dunham) .. 3.2~

f.
ychology for the Fighting

e lot Con ro
Cloth edition
Fitghtlin(gc
0 .
uting & Patrolling
FlorWeel
00
Man

edd)ition
J
.2~
1.~O
i' .. l'=O~
The Tools of War (Newman)
Weapons for the Future (Johnson &
WhHtayven) S'h' . 'ld''K" .. "A'bo'. 't"
a ou ou now
Our Arms & Weapons (Major
u
\ ,

Hicks).
~.OO

2~
2.~0
What You Should Know About Wartime
Medicine (Darnall & Cooper)
Military Intelligence
Combat Intelligence (Gen. Schwien)
2.~0

2.00
~
-fate Defense Force Ma~~~i '(St~te' (;~a'rd~) 1.00 Air S d S-2 in Action (Co\. Thomas) Uo
s actics & Technique of Infantry, Bali, ... 3.00 • Forces tu Y What You Should Know About Spies &
~ aetics & Technique of Infantry, Advaneed ~.Oo Rockets and Jets (Zim) 3.00 Saboteurs (Irwin & Johnson) 2.~0
Survival: Land, Sea, Jungle, Arctic
Psyc h ology & Lea d ership ,'
C I ot h edIt/on 1.50
Motors & Drivers
Fighting Fo e edition .2~ Driver Training: Handbook for Instructors .2~
Psychology for the Armed Services 3 .00 Flight Crew Trainingrc 1Program •.......••
.2~ Keep 'em Rolling: Handbook for Drivers ... ~o
!"nf
Psychology A fork the(RReturning
I) Serviceman 2~ Mechanics Hand b ook 60 P reventlve
. '{' am t enance
"' 1 .00
il antry ttac s
. B I (D II d)
omme 3.00
2<
Of I t t
ns rumen s an
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mgs .. ,
2<
J Sports and G~es
\.ear matt e G 0 ar 9 8 2 J~ I ns t ru ct or .s M anua I 2<J -.un
,men cans V6. ermans, 1 17.1 Refueling the Airplane 2~ Scarne on Dice 2. ~O
~ TheBa~~::h .(~.t.. ?>~'~.~~e.r~~I.l~ 2.00
t~C:Ji~t:~O.~ ARttdi~udpe.... '1" : :: : : :: :: ::: : : :: 1:02(1~ Boxing: Skills & Techniques (Haislet) 1.2~
F' h' F d' . a 10 nnClp es Get Tough (Fairbairn) 1.00
Ig tin!!. oreel e ilion 2~ Hvdraulic Principles 1.00 Kill or Get Killed (Applegate) 2.00
Generals and Generalship (Gen. Wavell).!.Of E'. P' . I , .. ,. In Military Ski Manual (Harper) 2.00
,Infantry in Battle: Examples from War 3.00 Ra io Operating es
ndgme nnclp , 60 ~[d
1 0 ern
J u d 0 (Y er k ow ) 300
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~Leadership for U. S. Army Leaders , .
, (G M ) Mechanical Principles 60 Softball: How to Play It (Noren) 1.2~
lanag~~entUan:dnMO~~ie. (R'o~ihii~b~rg~~j: 2:~~ Use of Numbers 60 Sports as Taught & Played at West Point
h' . W (M' ) Flight Principles 60 (Co\. Baumer) , 2.00
sye latry m ar Ira 2.7~ Electrical Shop 040 Touch Football (Co\. Grombach) 1.2~
~sychology
h I fand hthe F'
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M Lor Stoc k Cler k 's M anual 1.00 W res tl'mg: Sk'lII s & T ec h mques
. (G a II ag h er ) 1 . 2~
J~
ci~:h~d~:~~~
::::::::::::::::::l:;~
syc 0 ~gy or Ig tlOg an Loading and Cruising 1.00 Volleyball: How to Play It (Laveaga) 1.2~
Weather Principles
Electrical Principles
1.00
1.2~
You MUcsl Bh FJ
ot e Itlon
(W AC Physical Training)
.
1.00

r Headquarters
Military Correspondence
& Administration
Checklist
Stock Clerk's Manual, Air Forces
2~
1.0(1
Celestial Navigation
Navigation Principles
Pilot's Technical Manual
So You're Going to Fly the Big Ones
1.00
1.7~
1.~O
Paper edition
Military Law
Occupation of Enemy Territory
~o

1.2~
H (W ) ~o Lawful Action of State Military Forces
/ andbook to AR & Admin. (Sczudlo) 2.~0 ynn .. 'd' .. f' 1. Paper edition 1.~O
How to Write a Military Letter (Klein) .. 1.2~ Roger Wileo: Ra io or Flyers 2.00 I h d" .
Administration of the Army (AG School). 10 The Air Future: Jobs Ahead in Aviation .. 2.7~ Cot e Itlon 3.00
. A' f C . H dbo k 2 <0 Military Justice for the Field Soldier (Co!.
The Army Clerk (AG School) 1.00 Ircra t onstructlOn an 0 ...••..... ~ W') (P . f . I . I
1 A' f '[ h (W II' & H'II) 17< tener reparatIOn or tna, tna,
"rmy Food & ~{essing (Mess Management) 2.~0 lrcra t "' at. a 109 I J d
The Army Personnel System (AG School) 10 Aircraft Navigation (Stewart & others) .. 2.00 and recor s) 1.00
<:0. Administration & Personnel Records . Basic Math, for Aviation (Ayres) 3.2~ Articles of War Annotated (Co!. Tillotson) 2.~0
Paper edition 1.~0 Basic Math. for Pilots & Crews 2.00 Cou(i:f'Iadtiab Practical ~uide I~McCarthY)
I Cloth ~dition : 2.00 Basic Physics for Pilots & Crews 1.6~
f
a y ourtroom an(ua D" 1.00
Company DutIes' A Checklist 2< Elements of Aeronautics (Pope & Ellis) 3.7~ Manual or Courts-Martial War ept.) .. 1.00
General & Speciai Staffs (AG S~h~~l)':::: :1~ Elements of Radio (Marcus) 4.00 Manual of Martial Law (Co\. Wiener)
Orders: Guide to Preparation (AGS) ~O Navigation for Mariners & Aviators ~.O(l (Military Control of Civilian Areas) .. 2.00
r SOP for Regimental Adjutant's Office ..
N aVlgatlOn (K' I d & S) 100 The Soldier and the Law (Co!. McComsey
10 lOgs an epger .
Travel: Guide to Regulations (AGS) 60 Primer of Celestial Navigation (Favill) .. 2.00 & Major Edwards) .. ; 2.00
Cavalry Military Thought
Weapons and Weapons Training Modern Reconnaissance. : 1.~0 Balance of Tomorrow (Strausz-Hupe) 3.~0
Coming Age of Rocket Power (Pendray).: 3.~0 Military Staff: History & Development 2.00
Ordnance Field Guide, 3 vols., each ..... 2.~0 Artillery Military Institutions (Vegetius) 1.00
Tanks and Armored Vehicles (Co\. leks). 4.7~ Coming Age of Rocket Power (Pendray) .. 3.~0 Frederick's Instruction to His Generals 1.00
OCkets and Jets (Zim) 3.00 Rockets (Ley) . 3.~0 Saxe's Reveries on the Art of War 1.00
94 THE COAST ARTILLEHY JOURNAL Septem ber-Oct

Art of War (Sun-Tzu) 1.00 We Cannot Escape History (Whitaker) The Six Weeks War (Draper) .
Still Time to Die' (Belden) 3.00 Cloth edition 2.75 Geography of the Peace (Spykman) .
The German Army (Rosinski) 3.00 *Fighting Forces edition 25 D Day: What Preceded & Followed .
Defense (General von Leeb) 1.00 The Time for Decision (Welles) 3.00 Global Warfare (Mowrer & Rajchman) .
The Framework of Battle (Col. Burr) 3.00 Geography of the Peace (Spykman) ._ 2.75 Report on the Army, 1939-43 (Gen.
Lifelines of Victory (Harris) 2.00 One World (Wendell Willkie) Marshall)
The Living Thoughts of C1ausewitz Cloth edition 2.00 Cloth edition 1.
*Fighting Forces edition 25 Paper edition 1.00 Fighting Forces edition .
MacArthur on War 3.00
Makers of Modern Strategy 3.75 Use of Air Power China. Burma. India
Maneuver in War (Gen. Willoughby) 3.00 Carrier War (Jensen) 2.50 Solution in Asia (Lattimore)
Masters of Mobile Warfare (Col. Colby). 2.00 Fighting Wings (Paust & Lancelot) 2.75 Cloth edition 2.
Napoleon and Modern War (Co1. Lanza). 1.00 Bombers Across (Wynn) 2.50 *Fighting Forces edition ::
The Nature of Modern Warfare Bombardment Aviation (Ayling) 2.00 Pilots Also Pray (Harmon) 2.
(Capt. Falls) 1.2 5 The British Navy's Air Arm 25 Still Time to Die (Belden) 3.
On War: Clausewitz Full Text 1.45 Combat Aviation (Ayling) 2.00 Report on India (Raman)
Principles of War '(Clausewitz Outline) .. 1.00 Douhet and Aerial Warfare (Co1. Sigaud) 1.75 Cloth edition 2.5
Roots of Strategy (Gen. Phillips) 3.00 Fighter Facts and Fallacies 1.25 *Fighting Forces edition .
Sergeant Terry Bull: His Ideas on War 25 Horizons Unlimited: History of Aviation .. 3.75 [he Making of Modern China (Lattimore)
Studies on War: From Military Affairs '" .25 War in the Air, 1939-41 (Garnett) 3.50 Cloth Edition 2.
Surprise in War (General Erfurth) 1.00 Winged Mars: The Luftwaffe 1870-1914. 2.00 *Fighting Forces edition .
Winged Warfare (Gens. Arnold & Eaker) 3.00 The Changing Far East (Johnstone) 2
Notebooks Burma Surgeon (Col. Seagrave)
Airborne Troops Cloth edition 3.
Army Officer's Notebook 1.00
Platoon Record Book 50 We Jumped to Fight (Raff) 2.50 *Fighting Forces edition .
Squad Record Book 25 He's in the Paratroops Now (Rathbone) .. 2.50 China Handbook, 1937-19-13 5.
Modern Battle (Co1. Thompson) 25 Introduction to India (Moraes & Stimson). 2.
Mathematics Paratroops: Airborne Tactics (Miksche) .. 2.50 Retreat with Stilwell (Belden) 3.
Slide Rule 50 They Shall Not Sleep (Stowe) 3.
Commandos &. Amphibious War Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo (Capt. Lawson)
Use of Numbers 60
Military Application of Math. (Hanson) .. 3.00 U. S. Marines on Iwo Jima Fighting Forces edition .
Mathematics Refresher (Hooper) 2.50 Cloth edition 3.00
Fighting Forces edition 25 The War in Europe
Mathematics for the Million (Hogben) 3.75
Betio Beachhead (U. S. Marines) 2.50 48,000,000 Tons to Eisenhower " 2.
Wartime Refresher in Fundamental Math .. 1.40
Amphibious Warfare (Adm. Keyes) 1.50 The Mightiest Army (Col. Detzer) .3
NavigatloZl Combined Operations:. Commando Raids .. 2.00 I Knew Your Soldier (Martin & Stevenson) .2
Dress Rehearsal: The Dieppe Raid 2.00 Still Time to Die (Belden) 3.
Of Instruments and Things 25 Guerrilla \Varfare (Yank Levy) 25 Brave Men (Ernie Pyle) 3.
Loading and Cruising 1.00 New Ways 'of War (Wintringham) 25 One Damn Thing After Another (Treanor) 2.
Weather Principles 1.00 Invasion (Wertenbaker) 2.'
Celestial Navigation 1.00 Mechanized Wmiare Grave Diggers of France (Pertinax) 6.
Navigation Principles 1.75 Tanks and Armored Vehicles (Co1. leks). 4.75 The Six Weeks \1{Tar, 1940 (Draper) 3.
Northern Routes 25 Armored Warfare: Lectures on FSR III ... 1.00 Engineers in Battle (Col. Thompson) 1.5
The Raft Book (Gatty) 3.25 The Army of the Future (Gen. DeGaulle) 2.00 Modern Battle (Col. Thompson) 2
Navigation for Mariners & Aviators 5.00 Blitzkrieg: Its History (Co!. Marshall) 2.00 Tank-Fighter Team, 19-10 (Gerard) 1
Navigation (Kingsland & Seager) 1.00 Guerrilla Warfare (Yank Levy) 25 War in the West (Battle of France, 1940) 2.
Primer of Celestial Navigation (Farrill) .. 2.00 Machine Warfare (Gen. J. F. C. Fuller)
Cloth edition 2.50 North African War
Radio * Fighting Forces edition 25 Artist at War (Biddle) 3.5
Radio Operating 60 Tank-Fighter Team: France 1940 (Gerard) .25 One Damn Thing After Another (Treanor) 2.
Radio Principles 1.00 Modern Battle (Co1. Thompson) 25 We Jumped to Fight (Raff) 2.5
Elements of Radio (Marcus) 4.00 War on Wheels: History of Mechanized Pipeline to Battle (Major Rainier)
Fundamentals of Electricity (Mott-Smith) .. 25 War 2.00 Cloth edition 2.5
Roger Wileo: Radio for Flyers 2.00 Fighting Forces edition 2
Naval Warfare Assignment to Nowhere: Battle for Tunisia 2.
Sciences Carrier War (Jensen) 2.50 The Battle is the Pay-Off (Ll. Col. Ingersoll)
Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (Smyth) Battle Report: Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea .. 3.50 Cloth edition 2.
Paper edition 1.25 Guide to Naval Strategy (Lt. Brodie) .... 2.75 Fightin!!, Forces edition .
Cloth edition 2.'0 East of Malta, West of Suez (Bartimeus) .. 2.50 Conquest of North Africa, 1939-42 _ .
Plant Life of Pacilic World (Merrill) The British Navy's Air Arm 25 The End in Africa (Moorehead) .
Cloth edition 3.50 America's Navy in World War II (Cant) Here is Your War (Ernie Pyle) .
*Fighting Forces edition 25 Cloth edition 3.75 Tunis Expedition: Americans in Battle
Reptiles of Pacilic World (Loveridge) *Fighting Forces edition 25
Cloth edition 3.00 Sea Power in the Machine Age (Lt. Brodie) 3.75 The Pacific War
*Fighting Forces dition 25 They Were Expendable: The PT Boats U. S~ Marines on 1wo Jima
Native Peoples of Pacilic World (Keesing) . Cloth edition 2.00 Cloth edition .
Cloth edItIon 3.00 Fi/!,hting Forces edition 25 Fighting Forces edition .
* Fighting Forces edition 25 Toward a New Order ot ~ea Power Betio Beachhead (U. S. Marines) 2.
Survival: Land, Sea, Jungle, Arctic (Sprout) " 3.75 Green Armor (White) ;.0
Cloth edition 1.50 What You Should Know About Modern Bridge to Victory: Attu (Handleman) 2.0
Fighting Forces edition 25 War (Pratt) 2.50
Animals of the Pacilic World CaPtureCl~t~tt~di~~nM~~ .~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~r~ 2'~
Cloth edition 3.00 War History &. Geopolitics Fighting Forces edition 2
*Fighting Forces edition 25 48,000,000 Tons to Eisenhower 2.00 Island Victory: Critique on Kwajalein
Fundamentals of Mechanics (Mott-Smith The Mightiest Army (Co1. Detzer) 35 Cloth edition 2.0
& Van de Water) 25 Selected Speeches & Statements of General Fighting Forces edition 2
Use of Numbers 60 Marshall Still Time to Die (Belden) ;.0
The Pacilic World Cloth edition 2.75 Tarawa (Sherrod) 2.01
Cloth edition 3.00 Fighting Forces edition , 25 Bataan: The Judgment Seat (Ind) 3.5
*Fighting Forces edition
The Raft Book (Gatty)
'0
3.25
The World at War: 1939-1945 25 c/o Postmaster (Cpl. St. George)
*The Fight at Pearl Harbor (Clark)
1.01
2
Great Soldiers of World War II
Science at War (Gray) 3.00 (DeWeerd) 3.75 Guadaleanal Diary (Tregaskis)
Cryptography: Science of Secret Writing .. 2.50 Europe: An Atlas of Human Geography Cloth edition 2.5
Fundamentals of Electricity (Mott-Smith) .. 25 (Rajchman) 2.00 Fighting Forces edition 2
Handbook of Elementary Physics (Lindsay) 2.25 Our Army at War (WD Photos) 3.00 I Saw the Fall of the Philippines (Romulo) ;.0
Secret & Urgent: Story of Codes & Ciphers 1.00 Invasion (Wertenbaker) 2.50 Men on Bataan (Hersey) 2.5
Wartime Refresher in Fundamental Math .. 1.40 Geopolitics (Strausz-Hupe) 2.75 They Were Expendable: The PT Boats I
War Aims
Human Nature and Enduring Peace 3.50
Grave Diggers of France (Pertinax)
Invasion Diary: Sicily and Italy (Tregaskis)
Atlas of Global Geography (Raisz)
6.00
2.75
3.50
Cloth edition
Fighting Forces edition
Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo (Capt. Lawson).
2.0~
'~
U. S. War Aims (Lippmann) 1.50 Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943 3.00 Fighting Forces edition ...........•
 BOOK LIST 95
The Enemy: Germany The Wacs (Shea) 2.50 Reptiles of Pacific World (Loveridge)
Time for Decision (Welles) 3.00 Weapons for the Future (Johnson & Cloth edition . 3.00
Nazi State (Ebenstein) Haven) 25 * Fighting Forces edition . .25
Cloth edition 2.75 West Point (Col. Baumer) 3.00 Wartime China (Stewart) . .25
*Fighting ForceI edition 2~ West Point Today (Banning) 2.~0 America's Job in the Pacific (Wallace) .. .25
tlbe Axis Grand
Strategy 3.~0 What You Should Know About Army Filipinos & their Country (Porter) . .25
German Army (Rosinski) 3.00 Ground Forces (Col. Greene) 2.50 Pacific Islands in \Var and Peace (Keesing) .25
- lin Diary (Shirer) 3.00 Korea Looks Ahead (Grajdanzev) . .25
Our Navy Native Peoples of Pacific World (Keesing)
~ 'tzkrieg: Armies on Wheels (Marshall) .2~
Carrier War (Jensen) 2.50 Cloth edition . 3.00
e German Soldier: His Training for War .2~
e Guilt of the German Army (Fried) .. 3.~0 Battle Report: Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea .. 3.~0 *Fighting Forces edition . .2~
ider's Second Army (Vagts) 1.00 Annapolis (Capt. Puleston) 3.00 The Pacific World
~t Train from Berlin (Smith) 2.7~ America's Navy in World War II (Cant) Cloth edition . 3.00
en Behind the War (Steel) 3.~0 Cloth edition 3.75 *Fighting ForceI edition . .~o
odem Battle (Col. Thompson) 2~ *Fighting Forces edition 25 Animals of the Pacific \XTorld
ttem of Conquest: German Plans 2.~0 This is the Navy (Cant) 25 Cloth edition . 3.00
e Cannot Escape History (Whitaker) The Navy's War (Pratt) 2.75 * Fighting ForceI edition . .25
\ Cloth edition 2.7~ The Book of the Navy 3.00 The Soviet Far East (Mandel) . 2.50
11I *F'tg h'tlng ForceI ed'tIIon
. Annapolis Today (Banning) 2.50 The Changing Far East (Johnstone) .25

~
2~
Command at Sea (Capt. Cope) 2.75
iIf The Enemy: Japan Naval Officer's Guide (Com. Ageton) 3.00 USSR
;~1'hrough.Japane~e. Eyes (Tolischus) Naval Reserve Guide 2.50 The Soviet Far East (Mandel) . 2.50
Cloth edtlton 2.00 The Navy Has Wings (Pratt) 2.75 The Red Army (Berchin & Ben.Horin) 3.00

t * Fighting ForceI edition 2~ Queen of the Flat-Tops: The Lexington 3.00 Russia (Sir Bernard Pares) new edition .. .25
'. S. Marines on Iwo Jima The Russian Army (Kerr)
! Cloth edition 3.00 Marine Corps Cloth edition . 2.7~
Fighting ForceI edition 2~ U. S. Marines on Iwo Jima
*Fighting Forces edition . .2~

i
RObinson Crusoe, USN (Clark) 2.7~ Cloth edition 3.00 United States
Betio Beachhead (U. S. Marines) 2.~0 Fighting Forces edition 2~
Ile)'te Calling (Lt. St. John) 2.00 Selected Speeches & Statements of General
Betio Beachhead (U. S. Marines) 2.50
Green Armor (White) 3.00 Marshall
Tarawa (Sherrod) 2.00
. Bridge to Victory: Attu (Handleman) 2.00 Guadalcanal Diary (Tregaskis)
Cloth edition . 2.7~
Japan & the Japanese (Editors of Fortune) .2~ Cloth edition 2.50
Fighting ForceI edition . .2~
U. S. War Aims (Lippmann) . 1.50
Fightin/!. Forces edition 25
ePtureC1~t1~t:di~~:{~~ .~~~ ~~~~~~~~r~ 2.00 Use of Presidential Power, 1789.1943 . 3.00
Marine Corps Reader 3.00
Ft/(htlng Forces edttton 2~ Report on Demobilization . 3.00
, Island Victory: Critique on Kwajalein Our Air Forces America in Arms (Gen. Palmer)
Cloth -edition 2.00 Cloth edition . 2.00
(See also Air Forces Study) Fighting ForceI edition . .25
Fighting Forces edition 2~
till Time to Die (Belden) 3.00 Air Gunner (Hulton & Rooney) 2.50 America's Foreign Policies . .25
,raveler from Tokyo (Morris) 2.7~ Fighting Wings (Paust & Lancelot) 2.75 Pocket History of the U. S.
~If en Years in Japan (Grew) 3.75 Air Forces Reader 3.75 (Nevins & Commager) . . 25
lOur Enemy Japan (Fleisher) 200,000 Flyers (Wiener) 2.75 Short History of American Democracy
, Bombers Across (Wynn) 2.50 (Hicks) . 5.50
Cloth edition 2.00
*Fighting Forces edition 2~ Official Guide to the AAF Under Cover: Quislings in the U. S . 1.49
In Peace Japan Breeds War (Eckstein) 2.~0 Cloth edition 2.~0 U. S. Foreign Policy (Walter Lippmann). UO
The Jap Soldier: Training for Conquest 25 Pocketbook edition 25 Weapons for the Future (Johnson &
Japan's Military Masters (Lory) So You're Going to Fly the Big Ones Haven) . .25
Cloth edition 2.50 (Wynn) ~. UO
How Our Army Grew Wings (Gens. South America
*Fighting Forces edilton 25
Men Behind the War (Steel) 3.50 Chandler & Lahm) 3.75 Our American Neighbors . 3.00
, With Japan's Leaders (Moore) 2.75 Winged Victory (A Play by Moss Hart) .. 2.00 Look at Latin America (Raushenbush) . .25

Air Warfare Against Germany Great Britain &: Dominions Mexico

( Cooperation for What? (U.S. & British Mexico: Making of a Nation (Herring) .. .25
I Air Gunner (Hulton & Rooney) 2.50
Commonwealth) 25
The Use of Air Power (Lt. Blunt) 1.00
Report on India (Raman)
Guide Books &: Atlases
Air Warfare Against Japan Cloth edition 2.50 Fishes & Shells of the Pacific World
*Figlwing Forces edition n (Nichols & Bartsch)
[ Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo Pacific Partner: Australia (Johnston) 2.50 Cloth edition . 3.00
Fighting Forces edition 25 The English People: Their History 3.00 * Fighting Forces edition . .25
Our Armed Forces Introducing Australia (Grattan) 3.00 Insects of Pacific World (Curran)
(Use of Introduction to India (Moraes & Stimson) 2.00 Cloth edition ............•..... 3.7~
Presidential Power, 1789-1943 3.00 New Zealand (Nash) 3.50 *Fighting Forces edition . .25
IReport on Demobilization 3.00 The Making of Modern Britain (Brebner & Plant Life of Pacific World (Merrill)
Short History of the Army & Navy (Pratt) .25 Nevins) .. ' ~ 2.50 Cloth edition . 3.50
Our Army
The Netherlands &: Dominions
*Fighting ForceI edition . .2~
48,000,000 Tons to Eisenhower 2.00 Reptiles of Pacific World (Loveridge)
TIle Mightiest Army (Col. Detzer) 35 The Netherlands (Landheer) 5.00 Cloth edition . 3.00
Selected Speeches & Statements of General *Fighting Forces edition . .25
I Marshall Near East Native Peoples of Pacific World (Keesing)
Cloth edition 2.7~ Balkan Background (Newman) 2.50 Cloth edition . 3.00
Fighting Forces edition 2~ East and West of Suez (Badeau) .25 *Fighting Forces edition . .25
Up Front (Sgt. Bill Mauldin) 3.00 Europe: An Atlas of Human Geography
Situation Normal (Miller) 2.00 Middle East (Rajchman) . 2.00
I Knew Your Soldier (Martin & Stevenson) .25 The Middle East (Ben.Horin) 3.00 Survival: Land, Sea, Jungle, Arctic
Brave Men (Ernie Pyle) 3.00 Cloth edition . 1.50
.Our Army at War (WO photos) 3.00 Far East Fighting ForceI edition . .25
America in Arms (Gen. Palmer) Fishes & Shells of the Pacific World The Pacific World
Cloth edition 2.00 (Nichols & Bartsch) Cloth edition . 3.00
Fighting Forces edition 25 Cloth edition , 3.00 *Fighting ForceI edition . .50
Handbook for Army Wives & Mothers 25 *Fightin'g Forces edition 2~ Animals of the Pacific World
History of the U. S. Army (Col. Ganoe) .. ~.oo Insects of Pacific World (Curran) Cloth edition . 3.00
The Officer's Guide 2.50 Cloth edition 3.75 *Fighting Forces edition . .25
Our Soldiers Speak: 1775.1918 3.~0 *Fighting Forces edition n Global War (Mowrer & Rajchman) . 1.00
Report on the Army (1939.43) (Gen. Plant Life of Pacific World (Merrill) Goode's School Atlas . 4.40
Marshall) Cloth edition 3.50 How to Live in the Tropics (Hunt) . 2.00
Cloth edition 1.~0 * Fighting Forces edition 25 Look at the World (Harrison) . 3.50
Fighting Forces edition 2~ Solution in Asia (Lattimore) A ,,"'ar Atlas for Americans (OWl)
The U. S. Army in War & Peace Cloth edition 2.00 Cloth edition . 2.~0
(Spaulding) 6.00 *Fighting Forces edition 25 Paper edition . 1.00
 96 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL September-Oc
Going Overseas Infantry Attacks (Rommel) . 3.00 As You Were: \'{Toollcott's Reader
Survival: Land, Sea, Jungle, Arctic AlIenby (Gen. Wavell) . 3.00 *Serviremen's edition .
Cloth edition 1.50 America in Arms: Our Military Policy . .25 At Ease: Brain Teasers (Leopold) :
Fighting Forces edition 25 Americans vs. Germans, 1917-18 . .25 A Book of \'{Tar Letters ,
So You're Going Overseas I (Barker) 25 Combat Intelligence (Gen. Schwien)
Great Soldiers of the First World \'{Tar
.
.
2.00 Infantry Journal Reader : i
The Raft Book (Gatty) 3.25 .25 Men at \'{Tar (Hemingway's Reader) j'
How to Abandon Ship (Richards & Banigan) How Our Army Grew \'{Tings (Generals Patriotic Anthology (of American
Cloth edition 1.00 Chandler & Lahm) . 3.75 Writings) 3
*Fighting Forces edition 25 Infantry in Battle: Examples from War .. 3.00 Pocket Book of War Humor '"
\1("'hat to do Aboard the Transport The Lost Battalion (Johnson & Pratt) . .25 A Soldier's Reader 2'
Cloth edition 1.50 Signposts of Experience. (Gen. Snow) . 2.75 The Stag's Hornbook (Soldier Poetry) '" 2
Fightin.~ Forces edition 25 Winged Mars: The Luftwaffe, 1870-1914. 2.50 Steinbeck's Anthology 2
*Thesaurus of Humor (8,000 Jokes) .
Biography & Experiences Military Histories
Lel.te Calling (Lt. St. John) 2.00 College Outline Series
Military Staff: History and Development 2.00
Robin~on Crusoe, USN (Clark) 2.75
War Through the Ages (Montross) . 5.00 Math for General Chemistry (Frey) /
McNair: Educator of an Army 2.00
The War of 1812 (Adams) . 3.00 Best Methods of Study (Smith & Littlefield) .6
Great Soldiers of World War II
Decisive Battles of the World (Creasy) .. 3.00 Spanish Grammar (Greenfield) 1.
(DeWeerd) 3.75
Masters of Mobile Warfare (Col. Colby) 2.00 German Grammar 1.
I Never Left Home (Bob Hope) 1.00
175 Battles, 490 B.C. to 1937 (Shaw) '" 2.00 French Grammar (du Mont) 1.
Woodrow Wilson (Johnson) 2.00
Warfare (Early Times to Frederick) . 3.00 Educational Psychology (revised) .
Captain Retread (Hough) 2.50
World's Military History (to 1918) . 3.00 Atlas of Human Anatomy Il
Allenby (Gen. Wavell) , 3.00
Americans vs. Germans, 1917-18 25 Insignia & Identi1ication Ancient, Medieval & Modern History '" I:.~
The Army Life (O'{TO Kahn) Ancient History .
Cloth edition 1.75 Identification: Insignia of All Armies . 2.00
Business Law I:..•.::
Fighting Forces edition 25 Insignia of the Services (Brown) . !.SO First Year College Physics .
Genghis Khan (Harold Lamb) 25 Military & Naval Recognition Book . 2.50 First Year College Chemistry .

i
Great Soldiers of the First World War 25 General American Government .
A Roving Commission (Winston Language Books General Forestry .
Churchill) 1.75 Elementary Chinese Reader and Grammar History of the Middle Ages .

i
See Here, Private Hargrove 25 (Chen) 2.25 1\!ew History of the World Since 1914 '" l
Signposts of Experience, 1917-19 Spanish Dictionary for the Soldier (Henius) .50 History of Latin America 1.2>
(Gen. Snow) 2.75 The Loom of Language (Bodmer) 3.75 History of the U. S. to 1865 :~
Army Talk (Soldier Language) 2.00 History of the U. S. Since 1865 7
Early American Wars Blitz French (Nicot) 75 History of England
American Campaigns: 1690-1899,2 ,'ols. .. 8.00 Blitz German (Brandl) 75 History of Europe, 1500.1848 7
Patriot Battles, 1775-1782 (Col. Azoy) 25 Civil & Military German (Pfeffer) 2.50 History of Europe, 18IS to 1944 /
Soldiers in the Philippines, 1898.1902 25 Current Spanish (Martinez) 1.00 Latin America in Maps 1.2\
The War of 1812 (Henry Adams) 3.00 Easy Malay Words & Phrases (Mendlesen) 1.00 Organic Chemistry (revised) U
Short History of the Army & Navy (Pratt) .25 Elementary Japanese (Col. Sullivan) Survey of Journalism 1.
The Civil War Cloth edition 2.50 Topical Survey of American History 1.'?9
*Fighting Forces edition 1.00 Everyday Law Guide ,
Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943 ... 3.00
Abraham Lincoln & the Fifth Column Enf;lish for the Armed Forces 1.50
Cloth edition 3.75 French Dictionary for the Soldier (Henius) .50 AMERICAN TECHNICAL SOClETYl
FightinJ!. Forces edition 25 German Dictionary for the Soldier (Henius) .50 BOOKS
American Campaigns: 1690-1899,2 vols. .. 8.00 How to Say it in Spanish 75
Conflict: The Civil War (Milton) Italian Dictionary for the Soldier (Henius) .50 Aviation
Cloth edition 3.50 Italian Sentence Book for the Soldier .25 Aircraft Sheet Metal Work 3.7~
*Fighting Forces edition 25 Modern Military Dictionary (Col. Garber Ai.rcraft Sh.ee~ Metal. Blueprint Reading .. 2.
Lee's Lieutenants (Freeman) 3 vols., each 5.00 & Col. Bond) 2.50 Plight-AViatIOn EngInes '.' 3.1-
Our Soldiers Speak: 1775.1918 3.50 Speech for the Military 1.20 Flight-First Principles 2JC
Reveille in Washington (Leech) 3.50 Flight-Construction and Maintenance .. 2,51
Short History of the Army & Navy (Pratt) .25 Personal AHairs Flight-Meteorology, Aircraft Instruments
With Sherman to the Sea 2.25 So You're Going Overseas (Capt. Barker) .25 & Navigation 3.2
Report on Demobilization 3.00 Fundamentals of Machines 2.lXl
The First W orId War Handbook for Army Wives & Mothers. '" .25
Woodrow \'{Tilson (Johnson) 2.00 Air Conditioning and Building Trades
[he Army Wife (Shea) 2.50
Woodrow Wilson & the Lost Peace (Bailey) 3.00 The Fourth Horseman: Legal Provisions . 1.00 Air Conditioning Design and Construction
Official History of 1st Division 1.50 of Ducts 2.5\
Official History.of 2d Division 1.50 For Returning Servicemen Air Conditioning-Furnace & Unit Heaters 3.0<
Official History of 3d Division 1.50 Air Conditioning-Heating and Ventilating 4.0(
Psychology for the Returning Serviceman .25
Official History of 4th Division 1.50 Building Trades Blueprint Reading-
Veteran's Rights & Benefits (Erana &
Official History of 5th Division 1.25 Parts 1 & 2 4.0~
Symons) . 1.00
Official History of 7th Division 75 Building Insulation 3JC
Report on Demobilization (Mock) . 3.00
Official History of 26th Division 1.25 Carpentry 2.0~
The Fourth Horseman: Legal Provisions . 1.00
Official History of 27th Division 1.00 How to Design nnd Install Plumbing 3.D
Official History of 28th Division 1.50 Reference Books How to Estimate for the Building Trades 4.7l
Official History of 29th Division 75 Sheet Metal Work 2.5(
Official History of 30th Division 1.00 Tanks and Armored Vehicles (Col. leks). 4.75 How to Plan a House 4.5(
Official History of 32d Division 1.25 The World at War: 1939-1945 . .25 How to Remodel a House 4.7l
Official History of 33d Division 1.25 Handbook to AR (Sczudlo) . 2.50 Painting and Decorating I.5~
Official History of 35th Division 75 The Raft Book (Gatty) . 3.25 Stair Building 2.D
Official History of 36th Division 75 Identification (Insignia of all Armies) . 2.00 Steam and Hot Water Fitting 2.O
Official History of 37th Division 75 InJex to Army Regulations . .65 Steel Construction 3.50
Official History of 42d Division 1.50 Militarv & Naval Recognition Book . 2.50 Steel Square I.:'
Official History of 77th Division 1.50 U. S. Government Manual . 1.00
Official History of 78th Division 75 Business and Management
Official History of 79th Division 75 Anthologies. Readers. Hwnor
Fundamental Business Law 3.O
Officiil History of 80th Division 1.25 Cartoons for Fighters . .25 Bookkeeping for Personal and Business Use 2.2l
Official History of 81st Division 75 Male Call (Milton Caniff) . 1.00 Effective Retail Selling 2.25
Official History of 82d Division 1.00 Up Front (Sgt. Bill Mauldin) . 3.00 How to Write Business Letters - 2.00
Official History of 89th Division 1.00 The Best from Yank . 3.50 How to Train Shop Workers I.t
Official History of 90th Division 1.00 Air Forces Reader . 3.75 Production Management 3.J;
Official History of 91st Division 1.00 The Marine Corps Reader . 3.00
Official History of 92d Division 75 The Second Navy Reader . 3.75 Drawing. Drafting and Designing
Official History of 93d Division 1.00 A Treasury of American Folklore . 3.00 Freehand and Prospective Drawing 1.5D
Captain Retread (Hough) 2.50 Freedom Speaks (Poelry & Prose) Mechanical Drawing 2.00~
Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943 3.00 Cloth edition . 2.00 Machine Design 3.
Report on Demobilization 3.00 *Fighting Forces edition . .25 Tool Design 4.
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 48~OOO~OOO TONS
to
EISENHOWER
By LIEUTENANT COLONEL RANDOLPH LEIGH
The inspiring story of the greatest logistical job ever accomplished in the history of war-
fare. Never before had armies struck by land and air with such sustained speed. Never
before had the striking power and velocity of combat forces been so completely depend-
ent on the ability of supply troops to cope with unprecedented burdens. The logistical
experts of past wars would have deemed the task impossible. The fight was won because
the men who braved the fire were supported by men who dared to move mountains. Con-
tains much formerly secret information.
After the forward fighters of ground and air came the soldiers of the Services of Sup-
ply. Members of the port battalions-men on the docks, unloading ships-railway men
-truck drivers .... Men piling ammunition in lonely forests-moving masses of supplies
through bleak warehouses Men in repair shops and maintenance depots-men han-
dling clothing and tentage Skilled surgeons and nurses, tending the wounded ....
Thousands of men doing their duty wherever they happened to be, in defiance of danger
and exhaustion.

With 32 Pages of Pictures, 20 Charts

$2.00
»»»»»»»»»»»»»»X««««««««««««<«<
ATOMIC ENERGY
for
MILITARY PURPOSES
By H. D. SMYTH
Consultant, Manhattan Engineer District
(Prepared at the Request of Major General L. R. Groves, U. S. Army)

From the Foreword by General Groves ...

"The story of the development of the atomic bomb by the combined efforts of many
groups in the United States is a fascinating but highly technical account of an enormous
enterprise. Obviously military security prevents this story from being told in full at this
time. However, there is no reason why the administrative history of the Atomic Bomb
project and the basic scientific knowledge on which the several developments were based
should not be available now to the general public. To this end Professor Smyth's account is
presented.
"All pertinent scientific information which can be released to the public at this time with-
out violating the needs of national security is contained in this volume .... "

Paper $1.25 - Cloth $2.50