DURBAN

~D T UNIVERSIT
TECHNOLOGY
Y OF

DEP ART MEN T OF APP LIED SCIE NCE S

ADV ANC ED DIPL OMA IN MAR INE ENG INEE RING

MAR INE SURVEYING

ASS IGNM ENT TWO
2023

TITU S NDANYENGWA NGO LOM WEN A

22382106

LECT URER : MR S.M BHEN GU

5th May 2023

Plagiarism declaration

I acknowledge and understand that plagiarism is wrong, and I understand that my assignment must
be accurately referenced. I have followed the rules and conventions concerning referencing,
citation, and the use of quotations.
This assignment is my own work. I acknowledge that copying someone else's assignment, or part of
it, is wrong, and that submitting identical work to others constitutes a form of plagiarism. I have not
allowed, nor will I in the future allow anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing it off as
their own work.
STUDENT
Name: Titus Ndanyengwa Ngolomwena

Signature: bd-~ ~
Date: 05 th May 2023

NB: IT SHALL BE NOTED THAT THE NAMES USED IN TIDS ASSIGNMENT,

PARTICU LARY THE SRUVEY REPORT, ARE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSE S ONLY.
 Table of contents
............. 2
lara tion ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ..................................................................
Plagiarism dec
...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... .............................................................. 4
General Questions ......
at
wal, what would you look at in dry dock? Wh
During the survey of the vessel for a class rene
irement for vessels as they get older? State the
certificates are renewed? State the different requ .. 4
lain why? ............................................................
type of defects you would expect to find and exp
............ 4
orsed............................................................
The documents/certificates to be renewed/end .... 5
requirem ent for vess els as they get olde r: ..............................................................................
The
...........................................................................
6
of defects exp ected plus reasons : ............
The type
s are look ed at dur ing the claim if the dam age is said to be damage to the AUXILIARY
What item
ERA TOR ENG INE ? Wh at pho tograph s are taken? What may be requested for testing
GEN .................................................................. 7
..................
pur pos es?......................................................
.......... 9
nari o und er revi ew ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ........................................................................
Sce
......................... 12
PAR ED REP OR T DET AIL S ...... ...... ..................................................................
PRE
...................... 13
VEY REP OR T- . ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ..................................................................
SUR
............ 14
odu ctio n: ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ........................................................................
Intr
...................... 15
AN ALY SIS ON TH E SUR VEY CO ND UC TED ................................................
1.0
............... 16
...................................... '. ........................ ......
2.0 INV EST IGA TIO N FIN DIN GS ............
................... 20
........... ..... .................................................
3.0 AN ALY SIS AN D COMMENTS...... T?
ENERATORS AND HO W WOULD DETECT THA
Would the vessel sail with TWO AUXIL 21
 General Questions
During the surver_ of the vessel for a class renewal, what would you look at in dry
dock? What certificates are renewed? State the different requirement for vessels as
they get older? State the type of defects you would expect to find and explain why?
When conducting a survey of a vessel for class renewal, the goal is to ensure that the vessel meets
the necessary safety and regulatory requirements to continue operating. This involves a thorough
inspection of the vessel's structure, machinery, systems, and equipment. During a survey, a surveyor
will typically examine the vessel's documentation and records to ensure that all required certificates,
licenses, and permits are up to date and valid. The surveyor will also review any recent maintenance
or repair work that has been done on the vessel.

In dry dock, the surveyor will inspect the vessel's hull, looking for any signs of corrosion or
damage. They may use ultrasonic testing or other methods to check the thickness of the hull plating
and ensure that it meets the required standards. The surveyor will also inspect the propeller, shaft,
and rudder, checking for any signs of damage or wear. Other areas of the vessel that may be
inspected during a survey include the engine room, electrical systems, navigation equipment, and
safety systems such as fire detection and suppression. The surveyor will also typically conduct a sea
trial to test the vessel's performance and handling characteristics.

Overall, the goal of a vessel survey for class renewal is to ensure that the vessel is safe and
seaworthy, and that it meets all of the necessary regulatory requirements to continue operating. The
surveyor will provide a detailed report of their findings, and any necessary repairs or maintenance
will need to be carried out before the vessel can be re-certified.

The documents/certificates to be renewed/endorsed

During the survey of a vessel for class renewal, several certificates may be renewed, depending on
the type and size of the vessel and the applicable regulations. Some of the most common certificates
that may be renewed during a class renewal survey include:

1. International Load Line Certificate: This cert· ~ by the vessel's flag state and
certifies that the vessel complie" _...... the International Convention on Load Lines. The
certificate confirms that the vessel's free-board and other structural features meet the
required standards to ensure safety at sea.

2. International Tonnage Certificate: This certificate is also issued by the vessel's flag state and
certifies the vessel's tonnage in accordance with the International Convention on Tonnage
Measurement of Ships. The certificate is required for the vessel to operate legally and may

impact port fees and other charges.

 3. Safety Equipment Certificate: This certificate confirms that the vessel's safety equipm
ent,
including lifeboats, rafts, and fire-fighting equipment, meets the relevant safety standard
s
and is in good working order.

4. Radio Certificate: This certificate confirms that the vessel's radio communication equipm
ent
meets the relevant international standards and is in good working order.

5. Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate: This certificate confirms that the vessel has
the
necessary equipment and procedures in place to prevent oil pollution and comply with
international regulations.

6. International Sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate: This certificate confirms that

the
vessel has the necessary equipment and procedures in place to prevent sewage pollution and
comply with international regulations.

The specific certificates that are renewed during a class renewal survey will depend on the
type and
size of the vessel, its intended operation, and the applicable regulations.

The requirement for vessels as they get older:

As a vessel gets older, the requirements for its class renewal survey may change based
on several
factors such as the vessel's age, type, size, operating conditions, and applicable regulations.
Some of
the different requirements that may apply to older vessels during a class renewal survey include:

1. Increased :frequency of surveys: As a vessel ages, it may be required to undergo

more
:frequent surveys to ensure that it remains in compliance with safety and regulato
ry
requirements.

2. More comprehensive inspections: Older vessels may require more thorough inspecti
ons to
assess the condition of the hull, machinery, systems
-_::.a-~L.~_~T'liimrrpirment. This may include more
detailed testing and such as the engines, boilers, and
electrical systems.

3. Upgrades and modifications: Older vessels may need to undergo upgrades and modific
ations
to meet changing safety and regulatory requirements. For example, the vessel may need
to
install new safety equipment or upgrade its navigational systems.

4. Documentation requirements: Older vessels may need to provide more extensiv

e
documentation to demonstrate compliance with safety and regulatory requirements.
This
 ates of
inc lud e rec ord s of pas t sur vey s, ma intenance and repair work, and certific
may
compliance.
t safety or
irem ent or scra ppi ng: In som e cas es, older vessels may no longer mee
5. Ret
vessel
tory req uire me nts and ma y nee d to be retired or scrapped. This may occur if the
regula
gers, or
lon ger eco nom ical ly via ble to ope rate , or if it poses a safety risk to crew, passen
is no
the environment.
gets older, and
all, is tha t the req uire me nts for clas s renewal surveys may change as a vessel
All in
ments to ensure
inv olv e mo re ext ens ive insp ecti ons , upgrades, and documentation require
may
ulatory standards.
continued compliance with safety and reg

s reasons:
The type of defects exp ect ed plu
be found,
vey of a ves sel for clas s ren ewa l, var ious types of defects can be expected to
During a sur
vessel. The types
can affe ct the safety, stru ctu ral inte grity, and regulatory compliance of the
which
ide ntif ied dur ing a clas s renewa l surv ey can vary depending on several
of defects that may be
age and typ e of the vessel, its operating conditions, and the applicable
factors, including the
ey
e of the com mo n typ es of def ects that may be found during a class renewal surv
regulations. Som
include:

stru ctu ral dam age: Corrosi on and structural damage can occur due to
I. Corrosion and
sea wat er, che mic als, and oth er env ironmental factors. This can weaken the hull
exposure to
sel's
er crit ical com pon ent s, incr easing the risk of failure and compromising the ves
and oth
structural integrity.
due to wear
chinery and equipment failures can occur
2. Machinery and equipment failures: Ma
ma inte nan ce, or imp rop er ope ration. This can affect the vessel's propulsion,
and tear, lack of
the risk of accidents and breakdowns.
navigation, and safety systems, increasing
can
and elec tron ic sys tem s failure s: Ele ctrical and electronic systems failures
3. Electrical
s
to issu es suc h as fau lty wir in~ ~Et eq[ Uate insulation, or component failures. Thi
occur due
ing the risk
affe ct the ves sel' s lig•-.....:....- ,
.c- com mu nication, and navigation systems, increas
can
of safety incidents.
ur due to
n-c om plia nce wit h reg ula tion s: No n-compliance with regulations can occ
4. No
g safety and
nt or failure to keep up with evolvin
changes in the regulatory environme
stan dar ds. Thi s can resu lt in the vessel being unable to operate legally or
environmental
being subject to fines and penalties.
Human error can contribute to a range of defects, including maintenance and repair errors,
operational mistakes, and non-compliance with safety procedures. This can increase the risk of
accidents and incidents and compromise the vessel's safety and regulatory compliance.

A class renewal survey is designed to identify any defects that may affect the safety, structural
integrity, or regulatory compliance of the vessel. Identifying and addressing these defects can help
to ensure the vessel remains seaworthy and compliant with applicable regulations.

What items are looked at during the claim if the damage is said to be damage to the
AUXILIARY GENERATOR ENGINE? What photographs are taken? What may be requested
for testing purposes?

When assessing a claim for damage to the auxiliary generator engine, several items are typically
examined to determine the cause and extent of the damage. The specific items that are looked at can
vary depending on the circumstances and the insurance company's protocols. However, here are
some common items that may be considered during the claim assessment:

1. Initial Incident Report: The claim process often begins with an initial incident report
provided by the vessel owner or operator. This report describes the details of the damage,
including the time, location, and circumstances surrounding the incident.

2. Visual Inspection: An on-site visual inspection of the auxiliary generator engine is typically
conducted. This involves examining the engine and its components for any visible signs of
damage, such as cracks, leaks, misalignment, or mechanical failures.

3. Documentation: Relevant documentation related to the auxiliary generator engine is

reviewed. This includes maintenance records, repair history, operating logs, and any
available technical specifications. These documents provide insights into the maintenance
practices, service intervals, and adherence to manufacturer's guidelines.

4. Failure Analysis: If necessary, a fai,,, ...,.__..-na ysis may be carried out to determine the root
cause of the damage. This can involve detailed examination of the failed components,
material analysis, and investigation into any potential design flaws, manufacturing defects,
or maintenance issues.

5. Operational Conditions: The operational conditions under which the auxiliary generator
engine was operating when the damage occurred are assessed. This includes evaluating
factors such as load profile, fuel quality, cooling system performance, and any abnormal
operating parameters. It helps determine if the damage resulted from normal wear and tear
or if external factors contributed to the failure.
 6. Maintenance Practices: The maintenance practices employed for the auxiliary generator
engine are evaluated. This involves reviewing the adherence to recommended service
schedules, use of genuine spare parts, and compliance with manufacturer's guidelines. Any
deviations from prescribed maintenance procedures may be considered in the claim
assessment.

7. Data Analysis: If available, operational data and diagnostics from the engine's monitoring
systems or logbooks may be analysed. This data can provide insights into the engine's
performance leading up to the damage event, helping assess if there were any anomalies or
trends that could have contributed to the damage.

By examining these items, the insurance company can assess the cause and extent of the damage to
the auxiliary generator engine, determine the validity of the claim, and make decisions regarding
coverage and reimbursement.

For assurance and evidence, photographs are taken to support the conclusions derived during the
survey. The following may be taken into consideration:

Overall Damage: Photographs of the auxiliary generator engine as a whole are taken to provide an
overview of the damage. This includes capturing images of the engine from different angles to show
the general condition and any visible signs of damage:

1. Close-Up Shots: Close-up photographs are taken to focus on specific areas of damage or
components. This includes capturing detailed shots of affected parts, such as pistons,
cylinder heads, valves, or fuel injection systems, to highlight any visible defects, fractures,
or signs of failure.

2. Broken or Damaged Components: Photographs are taken to document any broken or

damaged components within the auxiliary generator engine. This can involve capturing
images of cracked parts, leaked fluids, detached co ions, or any other visible signs of

mechanical failure.

3. Wiring and Electrical Connections: If electrical issues are suspected as the cause of damage,
photographs may be taken of wiring and electrical connections within the engine. This
includes documenting any visible damage to wires, burnt connections, or signs of short
circuits.

4. Fluid Leaks or Spills: If there are fluid leaks or spills associated with the damage,
photographs may be taken to capture the extent and location of these issues. This can include
images of oil leaks, coolant spills, or any other visible fluid-related damage.
 5. Surrounding Environment: Photographs of the immediate surroundings of the auxiliary
generator engine may be taken to provide context and document any relevant factors. This
can include capturing images of the engine compartment, adjacent equipment, or
environmental conditions that may have contributed to the damage.

If the damage is claimed to be to the auxiliary generator engine of a ship, several tests may be
requested to determine the cause and extent of the damage. These may include:

l. Visual Inspection: A visual inspection of the engine can be carried out to determine the
location and extent of the damage. This may involve the use of endoscopes or borescopes to
inspect the internal components of the engine.

2. Non-Destructive Testing: Non-Destructive Testing (NOT) techniques such as ultrasonic

testing, magnetic particle inspection, and dye penetrant inspection can be used to detect any
cracks, fractures, or other damage to the engine.

3. Oil Analysis: An analysis of the oil in the engine can provide valuable information about the
condition 'o f the engine, including any contaminants or wear particles that may indicate
damage.

4. Vibration Analysis: Vibration analysis can be used to detect any abnormal vibrations or
resonances in the engine that may indicate damage.

5. Load Testing: Load te · g can be carried out to determine the engine's capacity to handle a
-:;,;,,,,-- - - - J any issues with the engine's performance under load.

The results of these tests can help to determine the extent of the damage, identify the root cause, and
determine the appropriate course of action to repair or replace the damaged engine.

Scenario under review

Before your visit to an above vessel, the owner informed you that the was a DAMA GE to
AUXILIARf GENERATOR #1 due to crank case explosion and the generator is out of commission.
What items are looked at during the claim if the damage is said to be damage to the AUXILIARY
GENERATOR ENGINE. What photographs are taken. What may be requested/or testing purposes?

A re ort on what documents are at is looked at and

Brief:
In the case of damage to t xiliary generator engine caused by a crankcase explosion, several
documents may be requested and reviewed during the claim assessment process. These documents
provide valuable information about the maintenance, operation, and condition of the engine. While
the specific documents required can vary based on the insurance company and circumstances, here
are some common documents that may be requested:
 ry generator engine are
I. Maintenance Records: The maintenance records of the auxilia
ies. This includes
examined to assess the regularity and adequacy of maintenance activit
tion, and parts
service logs, work orders, and reports of routine inspections, lubrica
replacement.

engine is reviewed to
2. Repair History: The repair history of the auxiliary generator
helps identify any
understand any previous repairs, modifications, or overhauls. This
ase explosion.
potential factors or previous issues that could have contributed to the crankc
ines, operating manuals,
3. Manufacturer's Guidelines and Manuals: The manufacturer's guidel
ine if the engine
and specifications for the auxiliary generator engine are examined to determ
from the guidelines
was being operated within recommended parameters. Any deviations
can indicate possible causes for the explosion.
engine are studied to
4. Operational Logs: The operational logs of the auxiliary generator
This includes fuel
understand the engine's performance leading up to the incident.
conditions or alarms
consumption, load profile, running hours, and any abnormal operating
recorded.
owner or operator,
5. Incident Report: An incident report is usually submitted by the vessel
ion. This report
detailing the time, location, and circumstances of the crankcase explos
company to initiate
provides initial information about the incident, allowing the insurance
the claim assessment process.

Regarding the possible cause of damage in _,..-,;,se of a crankcase explosion, several factors could
Tn ..

contribute to such an incident. So

ry generator engine
• Lack of Lubrication: Insufficient or inadequate lubrication of the auxilia
nents and eventual
can lead to increased friction and heat, causing stress on the compo
failure.

of the engine , resulting from factors like cooling system failure ,

• ase explosion
inadequate ven ation, or excessive load, can increase the risk of a crankc
fuel-air mixture, or
• Combustion Issues: Problems with the fuel injection system, improper
excessive pressure and
ignition issues can lead to abnormal combustion processes, creating
potentially causing an explosion.
, such as pistons,
• Component Failure: Failure of critical components within the engme
pressure,- leading to a
connecting rods, or bearings, can generate excessive heat, friction, and
crankcase explosion.
 • Maintenance Negligence: Inadequate mai
ntenance practices, failure to follow recomm
ended
service intervals, or using substandard
replacement parts can compromise the engi
ne's
integrity and contribute to a crankcase expl
osion.
Determining the specific cause of the cran
kcase explosion requires a thorough investiga
tion, which
may involve exp ert analysis, forensic exam
ination, and data interpretation. The examinat
ion of the
aforementioned documents, along with an
on-site inspection of the engine, helps establish
the cause
of the damage and evaluate the eligibility
for insurance coverage .

PREPARED REPORT DETAILS

Email: 22382106@dut41ife.ac.za
Address: Dun can Road 1, Por t of Cape
Town, Cape Town

q
J
Attention:
Our reference:
MV SS NUJOMA 05052023
Survey Rep ort No:
KLMC 0505023
Mar ine Surveyor:
TN Ngolomwena
Date Inst ruct ed:
051h May 2023
Date of Damage:
1st May 2023
Location:
Cape Town
Tim e:
05:00

'Typ e
Flag Nam ibia j
10
_J
 Port of Registry Liideritz
IMO Number 9761918
Gross Tonnage 7971
Net Tonnage 2391
Summer Draught 7.05m
Yard Kleven Verft shipbuilding group, Norway

Launched 12 August 2016

Delivered 16 June 2017
Classification Society ***DNV***

Owners Debmarine Namibia

Managers DeBeers Group

SURVEY REPORT
This survey was conducted at the request of DeBeers Group represented by Mr. Titus Ndanyengwa
th
Ngolomwena [Marine Surveyor of Cape Town Port Authority] on May 5 • 2023. Based on the
instructions, the following was conducted.

Assienment brief.
~ ' . . ..,·
Survey the cl · ed damage to MV SSN main engine units - to Atlantic 1 from Cape Town
on May I st, 2023 .
Verify the cause of Auxiliary Generator 1's black out, as Crank Case Explosion
Determine the extent of the damage
Analyze and determine the financial implication of the repair
Identify if the vessel can sail with two auxiliary generators only

KLMC Maritime Consultants conducted the s ey and have provided the report on an entirely
'without prejudice' and 'without liabili ' asis of KLMC Maritime Consultants or for any Party for
whom that we act. The damage to SSN Mining Vessel was surveyed in the presence of the
following representatives:

Franco Bezduirit Chief Officer

Bruce Van Maal Ship Superintendent
Sibonelo Bhengu Class Surveyor [DNV-GL]

11
p

'~ Ziqubu Boah . ··· unicorn Surveyor [AR Brin kand . -

Associates]

r Jeffrey Rhikotso · TNPA Surveyor [KLMC Maritime

Consultants] · · ·

,Titus Ngo lomw ena . KLMC Maritime Consultants

Edward Ngo roje . Ship Repairer ·.

Date of Survey ·. · May 05 1\ 2023 .

Port of Survey · Cape Town

I
1
Place of S~e y DeBeers Group Terminal, ·Duncan Road

· Time of Survey · . 09:36 · ·

( .

r Loc~tio~ of Survey on Board . Engine Room, Auxiliary Gen OI

t:· ---·~ - - ~ - :... . _• . - · ......... "'-"-' ~·~• _ ;___.

Introduction:
third engineer on board the Sam Nujoma MV
On May 15\ 2023, at approximately 05:00, the
tion of heat in the engine room. Whilst en route
(hereby referred to as SSN) noticed the accumula
n (South Africa) and when the vessel was some
between Atlantic I (Namibia) and port of Cape Tow
a
Liideritz registered vessel Sam Nujoma suffered
80 nautical miles Southwest of Oranjemund, the
to auxiliary generator one which ignited. There
crankcase explosion creating an oil mist external
ge and heat damage in the engine room was
were no personnel injuries although physical dama
also disabled. Ships staff conducted crankcase
significant. The vessel 's auxiliary generator 1 was
· us hot spots in the crankcase that could be
and scavenged space inspections. They found
the crowns of
expected to have initiated the ex · n, there were however cracks and oil found on

no 1 and 6 pistons.
oil
found to be a hole through to the piston cooling
Upon dismantling, the crack on no. 1 piston was
gh
een the combustion space and crankcase throu
space. This aliowed direct communication betw
source that initiated the explosion. The reason for
cooling oil passages and considered to be the heat
ction in material strength due to erosion from fuel
the crown failure was abnormal wear and a redu
to
mist ignition was failure of the flame arrestor
impingement. The reason for the external oil
~
function as designed/anticipated.

1.0 ANALX ONDUCJED

under licence by WATSILA Engines in Italy, it has

The main engine is a B&W 8 UEC 75 LLII built
23,535 kW at 84rpm. Cylinders are numbered by
a bore of75 0mm , stroke of28 00m m and develops
unit number one counting up towards the drive end,
the normal marine method of the free end being
end. The main engine has a crankcase oil mist
it rotates anticlockwise when looking on the free

12,
 QMI hich lmk. . n if the
monitoring sys tem man ufa ctur ed bY w s mto a main engine slowdown functio
A fi room and pum p
l
measured oil mis t exc eed s a pre-set eveI. 1xed CO 2 system protects the engine
•
d c. m is located within the
room in add itio n to man ual dampers an 1an remote stops. The control roo
·
t II ·· e though the machinery space
engine roo m and has mea ns of a ccess no norma y req um ng passag
itself.
general conversation
arations made by crew members andfrom
Common factors arising from witness decl
during the investigation follow.
(272,386 tonnes) of
ves sel was full awa y on pas sage carrying a mining tool in excess
1.1. The
ine room
881011 . Nor mal nav igat iona l wat ches were being maintained and the eng
Caterpillar X01
on.
was operating in an unmanned conditi
ine room followed by
two detonations were heard in the eng
1.2. Just after 03 :45hrs local time,
n system were in an
on of the gen eral alar m, num erou s zones of the engine room fire detectio
acti vati
d.
alarm condition, the system then faile
t to their
ded to mus ter at thei r fire stat ions , the second and fourth engineers, wen
1.3. Cre w pro cee
ke in the
trol roo m and wer e able to adv ise the master of the presence of thick smo
station in the con t.
roo m thro ugh a dam age d win dow ) but with a low level of associated hea
engine room (and con trol
engineer also voiced
indicated to the master and the second
Suspicion of a crankcase explosion was
unted for, which muster reports later did.
his concerns that all personnel be acco
proceed into the engine
were instructed by the master, not to
1.4. The second and fourth engineers
tilation fans had tripped
m but to wai t in the con trol room if the atmosphere allowed it. The ven
roo
the bridge and
mai n eng ine whi ch had gon e into automatic slowdown was stopped from
and the
vessel lost speed.
allowed to run down to standstill as the
e starting to
ies arri ved in the con trol room , by which time the diesel alternators wer
1.5. Fire part
choked turbocharger air
through air starvation, caused by soot
give high exhaust temperature alarms
engine
ef enginee o had by now taken command in the
filters. Permission was given by the chi
power and
for the thir d eng inee r to cha n Ilters in order to maintain the vessels
room),
lighting for firefighting purposes.
fires still burning in the
to the chi ef engineer there were no
1.6. The second engineer confirmed
to clear the smoke.
er to re-start the exhaust ventilation fans
engine room and the Chi ef gave the ord
made a lot of noise.
ove rloa d pro tect ion requ ired to be re-set and on start-up, No.3 exhaust fan
Fan
exhaust fan continued to extract smoke.
It was immediately stopped again, No.4
ssed by
was mai ntai ned , and the full exte nt of the incident was subsequently asse
1. 7. A fire watch
rity issues.
uded personnel and vessel safety/integ
the master and chi ef engineer which incl
( 2-0 INVESTIGATION FINDINGS
bl k
2.1 . The engine room was smoke/soot ac ened on the starboard side, deck plates around the
. d . . .
cylinder head area were distorted and d•Is1O ged from their ongmal location, thennoplastic diffusers
.
on fluorescent light fittings had me1ted sufficiently to flow easily under gravity and their own
arent in a number of locations.
weight , physical contact damage was app

Bulkhead above turbofhargers

Bo lto, 1 plate s slbd. s,c1e

pipework, lagging and

re side of the engine, on walkways,
2.2. Soot was deposited over the enti
tly deposited) existed
es. Shadow areas (where soot was ligh
fittings facing the crankcase relief valv
the relief valves and
es and . : ' frames in line of sight from
on the ship's side in way of deep fram
. - .. - - . .. . ...

•;. . .

Snado,i area ,n way of wet> frame

!:ihado·,. area in v,ay o• deep frame

at floor plate level,

On the port side of the engine room (the opposite side to the relief doors)
2.3.
had deformed wit t but not to the degree suffered on the
some of the fluorescent light diffusers
.
ection d sha d been buckled slightly
starboard side. Two of the crankcase insp
aces were checked but
ins ction, bearings and running surf
2.4. Ships staff performed a crankcase
bearing white
ediately obv ious was 1sco vered, a very small amount of 'squeezed'
nothing imm

H-
 I

metal was found on top of the oil sump near no 8 main b . b

Engi ne mon it . . • earmg, ut not enough to raise suspicion of
a hot spot. •
· hi
orme0, systems indicated no bearin g gh temperature alarms initiated before
.
or a fter the even t and disco loura f on mtem .
. ion al surfaces was negligible to non-existent.
2.5. External sign s were that all eig . h oard
. t crankcase explosion relief valves (located on the starb
.
side of the engine) had lifted , nos · 2 , 5 and 6 were found to have mcorrectly seated after closing
. Ad . .
under pressure from their ret um sprm gs. d1tionally, two of the sealing rubber 'o' rings had
become dislodged from their seats.

. 2, 4, 5, 6 was seen to be very dry and had a

2.6. Flame arrestor mesh fitted to the relief valves No
g lifting/operation, of these, no.5 exhibited
whitish ash on the side exposed to the er case durin

Fk:111L .-1•11:'5-to· n ....:•st1 no 5 u11,I ''IJ'.(; J :t, J1._•1:(1:..,t

ly in
2. 7. Fixed steel deck plating at cyl ·r head level was dislodged, distorted or lifted, particular
space around the engine is restricted, many
way of the turbochargers an air coolers where the clear
threads.
securing screws had been sheared or stripped of their
0Pc k p l ;1hng b)' turborh..ir gt>:l'S

1 i;;
2.8. Signifi cant soot and smoke d
amage on the starboard hi .
ducts was apparent. s ps side, plates, walkways, pipes and

2.9. The contro l room door . .

wire reinforced glass w bl hr
shards of glass b as own t ough into the control room where
ecame embedded in ad .
l · t d Th ~acent woodwork. The workshop door was buckled and de-
amma e . e spare gear store door was buckl~ ~e~ ~
~ ugh its frame and blown off its hinges.
2 · 1O. Engine room ventilation
tly deformed, dislodged or collapsed and
. ,: 1 1

Colla p se« l v e ntil •·it ion du e li ng

e of a hot spot in
2.11. During the investigation, a further crankcase inspection failed to find evidenc
the crankcase sufficient to initiate an explosion.
brushes were free
2.12. The shaft earthing device was found an and in an operational condition,
to move within their holders.
found to be cracked and holed which penetrated to the oil cooling
crankcase via the
space thereby allowing direct communication of the combustion space with the
cooling oil passages and would indicate a probable initiation site.

No 6 piston v1e1\Cd ,~ situ.crack from 12 o clo o\

. !'JO. 1 piston crovvn thro u gh s c a v enge o o rt 2 o clock pc, ,t1c,n at ecge of 011 puddle
.~ (hole d piston outlined ,n ye llow) '

i.
\
rj

1~
j
 ~:It: -- . i ; sto·1 ~·OM ~e 1 'C 1u:Jd for ~caie
He, •; uer1~\rdt re tc cccl1ng cil sp"ce

2 -14 -Following dismantling, carbonised oil sludge was found to be coating the interior of the piston
crowns.
2.15 • From historical records, it was determined that the engine performance monitoring system was
not fully functional prior to the incident, this may have provided useful diagnostic information to
developing problems with the combustion process.
2.16. Fuel valves removed from the engine following the incident were found in some instances to
have a static opening pressure 20-30 bar lower than design (314 bar), one had blocked atomiser
holes and carbon deposits were evident on the tips of others, spares tested before replacement were
also found to be wrongly adjusted so a full set of spares was overhauled for complete change-out on
the engine. Piston crowns exhibited "elephant skin" surface breakdown, an indicator of fuel

impingement.
2.17. This particular engine has no means of manually taking a closed power indicator card as it is
not possible to input crankshaft/timing cam position relative to the piston (and thus developed
pressure relative to timing). Pressure transducers together with crankshaft position transducers do
this electronically where the results are fed into the centralised computer system as a means of
performance monitoring and comparison with design nru:~frt€.
1

2. I 8. This particular engine has no I ca exhaust temperature thermometers, reliance having to be

placed on thermocouples fitted to the engine or an emitted infrared electronic thermometer, to

obtain these readings.

2. 19. During the investigation, calibrations showed No. l and No.6 piston crowns to be out of
tolerance for further use, whereas in dry dock less than eight months previously, calibrations had

tf
shown they were within wear tolerance for a further service period of 8,000 -10,000 running hours
(approximately 11 - 14 months continuous service).
No. I exhaust valve was also measured with the maximum allowed wear (12mm) and was
recommended for exchange and reconditioning.

3.0 ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

3.1. The findings are consistent with primary and secondary crankcase explosions which resulted in
a flash fire external to the engine. The path of this was outwards and upwards from the crankcase
overpressure relief valves which is in direct contradiction to normal design parameters (and indeed
the installation on board the engine) which is supposed to deflect down and away from the engine.
3.2. The rapid expansion of gases and resulting temperature rise of the flash fire created
considerable subsequent damage.
3.3. The crankcase relief valves did not appear to perform as designed to prevent a secondary
explosion. The doors did however relieve excess pressure from the crankcase preventing further
damage to the engine itself. It was observed that three valves had not re-seated correctly and that the
o-ring seals had been displaced, this would allow air back into the crankcase to give the conditions
needed for a secondary explosion.
3.4. The flame arrestors failed to prevent expelled oily mist ignition and therefore did not perform
as designed.
3.5. The crankcas ,,,,,...•... ~. monitor was found inoperable, the attending service engineer advised
this to be a result of overpressure caused by the explosion(s), a crankcase high mist alarm·occurred
in the five second per~od between the first abnormality indication - ME governor minor fault and
the ME cylinder no. I outlet high temp and would tend to support the theory that the damage
occurred as a result of the explosion. Due to the short timespan between first indication and
explosion, it would be doubtful if the monitor could have slowed the engine quickly enough to
prevent an explosion.
 3.6. The shaft earthing device fi
/ h Id b ffi . . was ound to be clean, with freely moving brushes and therefore
s ou e e ective m operation .
. . to reduce electric potential build-up on the propeller shaft and
possible static discharge inside the erankcase.
3. 7. Engine performance m . .
omtonng systems form an important part of the safety of the engine
should failure occur prio ·ty h . '
' n s ould be given to determine the reason and restore correct function
with minimum delay, trend s may prov1"de advance warning of underlying problems. Good watch-

keeping practice monitors various systems using all individuals' senses, unfortunately the lack of
local reading equipment would hinder this process.

Would the vessel sail with TWO A UXJLIARY GENERATORS AND HOW WOULD DETECT THAT?
Yes, a vessel can sail with two auxiliary generators even if one of them is commissioned out or not
in service. Auxiliary generators are typically installed on ships to provide electrical power for
various onboard systems and equipment. Ships usually have multiple generators for redundancy and
to ensure continuous power supply in case of maintenance or failure of any individual generator.

If one auxiliary generator is commissioned out, meaning it is taken out of service for maintenance,
repairs, or other reasons, the remaining operational generator(s) can still provide sufficient power to
meet the vessel's electrical requirements. The operational generator(s) would need to compensate
for the loss of the commissioned generator by supplying the additional power needed.

However, it's worth noting that operating with reduced generator capacity may limit the vessel's
ability to handle peak power demands or may require more careful load management to ensure
power distribution remains stable. Therefore, the vessel's operations and power consumption may
need to be adjusted accordingly until the commis · ned generator is back in service.

In any case, the decisjon to sail with one commissioned-out generator would depend on the specific
circumstances, the vessel's power requirements, safety considerations, and the regulations or
guidelines set by the ship's operators or regulatory bodies.