G.R. No.

144882 February 04, 2005

LUISA BRIONES-VASQUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF MARIA MENDOZA VDA. DE
OCAMPO, respondents.

The sole issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in refusing to grant petitioner’s motion for
clarificatory judgment.

It must be noted, as narrated above, that the Decision of the Court of Appeals had
already become final and executory at the time that the motion for clarificatory judgment
was filed. With regards to FINAL JUDGMENTS, this Court has pronounced that:

… nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification
is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course,
where the judgment is void.22

As a GENERAL RULE, therefore, final and executory judgments are immutable and
unalterable except under the three exceptions named above: a) clerical errors; b) nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and c) void judgments.

In the present case, petitioner claims the second exception, i.e., that her motion for
clarificatory judgment is for the purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc amendment of the
final and executory Decision of the Court of Appeals.

NUNC PRO TUNC JUDGMENTS have been defined and characterized by this Court in
the following manner:

The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a
former time which was not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to
make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action
which has been actually taken. It may be used to make the record speak the truth,
but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the
court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it
has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy
these errors or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper
judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to
construe what the judgment means, but only to enter of record such judgment as
had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of record as
rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc
presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not
furnish the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L., pp. 622-623.)

The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment
and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in
proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to
make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was,
not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought
to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply
nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been.
(Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.)

A NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY in practice is an entry made now of something which was
actually previously done, to have effect as of the former date. Its office is not to
supply omitted action by the court, but to supply an omission in the record of
action really had, but omitted through inadvertence or mistake. (Perkins vs.
Haywood, 31 N. E., 670, 672.)

It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after the term at which the
transaction occurred, even though the rights of third persons may be affected. But
entries nunc pro tunc will not be ordered except where this can be done without injustice
to either party, and as a nunc pro tunc order is to supply on the record something
which has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted action by the court . . . (15
C. J., pp. 972-973.)23

From the above characterization of a nunc pro tunc judgment it is clear that the
judgment petitioner sought through the motion for clarificatory judgment is outside its
scope. Petitioners did not allege that the Court of Appeals actually took judicial action
and that such action was not included in the Court of Appeals’ Decision by
inadvertence. A nunc pro tunc judgment cannot correct judicial error nor supply
nonaction by the court.24

Since the judgment sought through the motion for clarificatory judgment is not a nunc
pro tunc one, the general rule regarding final and executory decisions applies. In this
case, no motion for reconsideration having been filed after the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision on June 29, 1995 and an entry of judgment having been made on
July 17, 1996, the same became final and executory and, hence, is no longer
susceptible to amendment. It, therefore, follows that the Court of Appeals did not act
arbitrarily nor with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
issued the aforementioned Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for clarificatory
judgment and the Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, for purposes of guiding the parties in the execution of the aforesaid
Decision of the CA, without altering the same, the following should be noted:

The Court of Appeals pronounced in its Decision that the contract between the parties is
an equitable mortgage. Since the contract is characterized as a mortgage, the
provisions of the Civil Code governing mortgages apply. Article 2088 of the Civil Code
states:

The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or
dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

This Court has interpreted this provision in the following manner:

The essence of pacto commissorio, which is prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil
Code, is that ownership of the security will pass to the creditor by the mere default of
the debtor (Guerrero v. Yñigo, et al., 96 Phil. 37, 41-42; Puig v. Sellner, et al., 45 Phil.
286, 287 – 88) …25

… The only right of a mortgagee in case of non-payment of a debt secured by mortgage

would be to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property sold to satisfy
the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagor’s default does not operate to vest in the
mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is against
public policy, as enunciated by the Civil Code …26

Applying the principle of pactum commissorium specifically to equitable mortgages,

in Montevergin v. CA,27 the Court enunciated that the consolidation of ownership in the
person of the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of the mortgagor in equity to pay
the obligation, would amount to a pactum commissorium. The Court further articulated
that an action for consolidation of ownership is an inappropriate remedy on the part of
the mortgagee in equity. The only proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the
mortgage in equity. And if the mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the
mortgaged property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure sale.

The private respondents do not appear to have caused the foreclosure of the mortgage
much less have they purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Petitioner, therefore,
retains ownership of the subject property. The right of ownership necessarily includes
the right to possess, particularly where, as in this case, there appears to have been no
availment of the remedy of foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground of default or non-
payment of the obligation in question.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The parties are directed to
proceed upon the basis of the final Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 29,
1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 39025, that the contract in question was an equitable
mortgage and not a sale.
 G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND ROLANDO J. DEL

ROSARIO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES RICHARD Y. HUANG & CARMEN G.
HUANG, AND STEPHEN G. HUANG, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A JUDGMENT THAT LAPSES INTO FINALITY BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND

UNALTERABLE. IT CAN NEITHER BE MODIFIED NOR DISTURBED BY COURTS
IN ANY MANNER EVEN IF THE PURPOSE OF THE MODIFICATION IS TO
CORRECT PERCEIVED ERRORS OF FACT OR LAW. PARTIES CANNOT
CIRCUMVENT THIS PRINCIPLE BY ASSAILING THE EXECUTION OF THE
JUDGMENT. WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY CANNOT BE DONE
INDIRECTLY.

On June 22, 2007, this Court in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Spouses

Huang11 affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals.12 Mercury Drug and
Del Rosario moved for reconsideration and/or new trial arguing that Stephen

was not entitled to the entire monetary award because he had partially
recovered from his injuries.13 The Motion was denied with finality in the
Resolution dated August 8, 2007.14 Entry of judgment was made on October
3, 2007.15

On February 1, 2008, Stephen and his parents moved for the execution of
the judgment16 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati to which Mercury
Drug and Del Rosario filed an opposition.17

The Regional Trial Court granted the Motion for Execution in the
Order18 dated July 21, 2008.
On August 26, 2008, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved to quash the Writ
of Execution21 as it allegedly contravened the tenor of the judgment. They
also moved for the inhibition of Presiding Judge22 Gina M. Bibat-
Palamos.23 Pending the resolution of these motions, the sheriff began to
garnish Mercury Drug and Del Rosario's bank accounts.24 Mercury Drug and
Del Rosario filed an urgent motion to defer the implementation of the Writ of
Execution.25 All three (3) motions were denied by the Regional Trial
Court.26 Mercury Drug and Del Rosario then moved for reconsideration but
their motion was denied.27

As a result of the garnishment proceedings, Citibank N.A. issued in favor of

Richard Y. Huang a Manager's Check in the amount of
P40,434,062.00.28 Afterwards, Stephen and his parents filed a Satisfaction of
Judgment29 before the Regional Trial Court.

On December 18, 2008,30 Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed a Petition for
Certiorari31 before the Court of Appeals. They argued that the Regional Trial
Court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the execution of the
judgment despite clerical errors in the computation of life care cost and loss
of earning capacity.32

In its January 20, 2011 Decision,33 the Court of Appeals denied the Petition
for Certiorari holding that the Regional Trial Court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.34 The Court of Appeals found that "the perceived
error in the computation of the award and [its] correction" entailed
a substantial amendment of the judgment sought to be
enforced.35 Under the doctrine on immutability of judgments, courts
are precluded from altering or modifying a final and executory
judgment.36

Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved for reconsideration but their Motion
was denied in the Reso1ution37 dated July 6, 2011.

On September 1, 2011, Mercury Drug and Del Rosario (petitioners) filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari38 before this Court to which Stephen and his
parents (respondents) filed a Comment.39 Petitioners then filed a Rep1y40 on
September 25, 2013.41

In the Resolution42 dated December 11, 2013, this Court gave due course to
the Petition and required both parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda on March 14, 2014.43

Petitioners assert that the dispositive portion of the September 29, 2004
Decision and the corresponding Writ of Execution varied the tenor of the
judgment. They point out, in particular, that the amounts of life care cost
and loss of earning capacity reflected in the dispositive portion and the writ
of execution do not correspond to those stated in the body of the decision.44

According to petitioners, respondent Stephen is only entitled to a life care

cost of P7,102,640.00 instead of P23,461,062.00 based on his average
monthly expenses and his life expectancy.45 Petitioners also point out that
the award of P10,000,000.00 as loss of earning capacity is patently
excessive.46 Based on respondent Stephen's life expectancy, projected
monthly salary, and the time within which he could have obtained gainful
employment, the award of loss of earning capacity should only be
P5,040,000.00.47 Petitioners claim that there were clerical errors in the
computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity.48 However, at the
same time, they contend that the two (2) monetary awards were not
"supported in the body of the decision [or in] the records of the case."49

Assuming that there were no clerical errors, petitioners assert that

respondents cannot immediately collect the two (2) monetary awards in
full.50The amounts of life care cost and loss of earning capacity should be
paid in installments or "amortized over the probable lifetime of
Stephen."51Petitioners, citing Advincula v. Advincula52 and Canonizado v.
Benitez,53 argue that life care cost is similar to judicial
support.54 Hence, it should be paid monthly.55 Loss of earning
capacity should likewise be amortized since it is akin to a monthly
income.56

On the other hand, respondents assert that petitioners are prohibited from
questioning the propriety of the monetary awards under the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments.57 There are no clerical errors in the
computation of the two (2) monetary awards.58 Respondents contend that
the reduction of these amounts would amount to a substantial amendment
of a final and executory judgment.59

Respondents add that petitioners are estopped from raising the issues in the
present Petition because they have been considered and passed upon by this
Court.60 Lastly, respondents disagree that the two (2) monetary awards
should be paid on installment basis.61 The dispositive portion of the
judgment sought to be enforced is silent regarding the manner of
payment.62 Hence, Rule 39, Section 9(a) of the Rules of Court63 should
govern.64

This case presents the following issues for this Court's resolution:

First, whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the
doctrine of immutability of judgments. Subsumed in this issue is whether or
not a clerical error exists that would warrant the modification of the
dispositive portion of the judgment;65

Second, whether or not the Writ of Execution conforms to the judgment

sought to be enforced; and

Lastly, whether or not the monetary awards in dispute should be paid in

installments or in lump sum.66

The Petition is denied.

A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants

are entitled to the satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution.
On the other hand, courts are barred from modifying the rights and
obligations of the parties, which had been adjudicated upon. They have the
ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment.

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality

becomes immutable and unalterable.67 The primary consequence of this
principle is that the judgment may no longer be modified or amended by any
court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is
to correct perceived errors of law or fact.68 This principle known as the
doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter of sound public
policy,69 which rests upon the practical consideration that every litigation
must come to an end.70

The rationale behind the rule was further explained in Social Security
System v. Isip,71 thus:

The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-

fold purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2) to
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indefinite period of time.72
The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an ironclad
rule.73 It is subject to several exceptions, namely:
(1) [T]he correction of clerical errors;

(2) [T]he so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party;

(3) [V]oid judgments; and

(4) [W]henever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.74
I.A

Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may

result from inadvertence. These errors can be rectified without violating the
doctrine of immutability of judgment provided that the modification does not
affect the substance of the controversy.75

Clerical errors are best exemplified by typographical errors or arithmetic

miscalculations.76 They also include instances when words are
interchanged.77

Baguio v. Bandal78 was illustrative. The dispositive portion of the decision

ordered the defendants "to deliver the possession of Lot 1868 . . . to
[p]laintiffs."79 Upon motion, the trial court subsequently amended Lot 1868
to Lot 1898.80 This Court sustained the modification since it was patently
clear that the subject of the controversy was Lot 1898.81 The error
addressed by the lower court was "merely clerical and
typographical,"82 which did not affect the rights of the parties.

The same rule was applied in Filipino Legion Corporation v. Court of

Appeals.83 The dispositive portion of the decision was modified to reflect the
proper description of the documents upon which Filipino Legion Corporation
based its claim.84 This Court held that the modification simply cured an
ambiguity but did not operate to reduce the area adjudicated to the
corporation:85
It is this last-mentioned rule which respondent Court of Appeals applied
when it ordered the amendment of the disputed portion of its judgment in
CA-G.R. 9196-R, and We see no error in its action considering that all what
respondent Court did was to cure an ambiguity and rectify a mistake it had
inadvertently made when it referred to the tax declarations of real property
marked as Annexes C, D, and E, as Exhibits C, D, and E instead of Exhibits
F, G, and H, respectively. As indicated earlier, it is obvious that the appellate
Court was misguided by the markings "Annex C", "Annex D", "Annex E",
appearing respectively on the face of Exhibits F, G, and H, and these
letterings C, D and E were the ones the Court mistakenly used when it
described the exhibits in question in the dispositive portion of the decision.

The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no

amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once
the latter had become final.86 (Emphasis in the original)
Clerical errors also contemplate inadvertent omissions that create ambiguity.
In Locsin v. Paredes and Hodges,87 the term "severally" was inserted in the
dispositive portion of the judgment.88 Although the modification changed the
import of the judgment's dispositive portion, the allegations in the complaint
and the conclusions of fact and law contained in the decision show that the
obligation was solidary.89 Hence, the dispositive portion of the judgment
should have stated that "the debt be paid severally[.]"90

Similarly, in Spouses Mahusay v. B.E. San Diego, Inc.,91 the lower court
amended its decision to include payment of "all penalties and interest due on
the unpaid amortizations" under the contracts to sell.92 The modification,
according to this Court) was not a substantial amendment of the
judgment,93 thus:
There was nothing substantial to vary, considering that the issues between
the parties were deemed resolved and laid to rest, It is unn1istakably clear
that petitioners do not deny the execution of the Contracts to Sell and, in
fact, admit their liability for the unpaid amortizations of the lots purchased. .
. There was a compelling reason for the CA to clarify its original Decision to
include the payment of all penalties and interest due on the unpaid
amortizations, as provided in the contracts. Considering that the validity of
the contracts was never put in question, and there is nothing on record to
suggest that the same may be contrary to law, morals, public order, or
public policy, there is nothing unlawful in the stipulation requiring the
payment of interest/penalty at the rate agreed upon in the contract of the
parties.94 (Citation omitted)
In determining whether there are clerical errors or ambiguities in the
dispositive portion of the judgment that should be rectified, courts should
refer primarily to "the court's findings of facts and conclusions of law as
expressed in the body of the decision."95 The parties' pleadings may also be
consulted if necessary.96

I.B

"Nunc pro tunc" is a Latin phrase that means "now for then."97 A
judgment nunc pro tunc is made to enter into the record an act previously
done by the court, which had been omitted either through inadvertence or
mistake.98 It neither operates to correct judicial errors nor to "supply omitted
action by the court."99 Its sole purpose is to make a present record of a
"judicial action which has been actually taken."100

The concept of nunc pro tunc judgments was sufficiently explained

in Lichauco v. Tan Pho,101 thus:
[A judgment nunc pro tunc] may be used to make the record speak the
truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have
spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should
have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it
has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the
entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a
judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgment
means, but only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly
rendered, but which had not been entered of record as rendered. In all cases
the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the
actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not
furnish the basis for such an entry.

....

If the court has omitted to make an order, which it might or ought to have
made, it cannot, at a subsequent term, be made nunc pro tunc. According to
some authorities, in all cases in which an entry nunc pro tunc is made, the
record should show the facts which authorize the entry, 'but other courts
hold that in entering an order nunc pro tunc the court is not confined to an
examination of the judges minutes, or written evidence, but may proceed on
any satisfactory evidence, including parol testimony. In the absence of a
statute or rule of court requiring it, the failure of the judge to sign the
journal entries or the record does not affect the force of the order grante[d].

....

The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new
judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one
placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously
rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial
action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment
which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however
erroneous the judgment may have been.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
The exercise of issuing nunc pro tunc orders or judgments is narrowly
confined to cases where there is a need to correct mistakes or omissions
arising from inadvertence so that the record reflects judicial action, which
had previously been taken. Furthermore, nunc pro tunc judgments or orders
can only be rendered if none of the parties will be prejudiced.103

Parties seeking the issuance of nunc pro tunc judgments or orders must
allege and prove that the court took a particular action and that the action
was omitted through inadvertence.104 On the other hand, courts must ensure
that the matters sought to be entered are supported by facts or data.105
This may be accomplished by referring to the records of the case. This
requirement was emphasized in Lichauco, thus:
[F]or the entry of a nunc pro tunc order, it is required that the record
present some visible data of the order which it is sought to be supplied by
said nunc pro tunc order, whether it is the data referring to the. whole of the
order or merely limited to such portion thereof, that the part lacking from
the record constitutes a necessary part, an inevitable and ordinary
consequence of the portion appearing in the record.106
Hence, courts cannot render a judgment of order nunc pro tunc in the
absence of data regarding the judicial act sought to be recorded.
In Lichauco, this Court invalidated the nunc pro tunc order issued by the trial
court because there was "no data, partial or integral, in the record regarding
the judicial act . . . in question."107 There was no visible data appearing in
the case records to establish that the trial court actually approved the lease
contract in dispute.108

The same standard was applied in Maramba v. Lozano,109 where a party

sought the issuance of a nunc pro tunc order to strike out the name of a
deceased defendant in the judgment's dispositive portion.110 This Court
rejected the prayer and underscored that nunc pro tunc orders can only be
issued when there is evidence that the judicial act in question was previously
made.111

I.C

The doctrine of immutability of judgment is premised upon the existence of a

final and executory judgment. It is, therefore, inapplicable where the
judgment never attains finality, as in the case of void judgments.

Void judgments produce "no legal [or] binding effect."112 Hence, they are
deemed non-existent.113 They may result from the "lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter" or a lack of jurisdiction over the person of either of the
parties.114 They may also arise if they were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.115

In Gomez v. Concepcion,116 this Court explained the nature and the effects of
void judgments, thus:
A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. B[y] it no rights are divested.
From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon, it [is] equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All
acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.117
A void judgment never acquires the status of a final and executory
judgment.118 Parties may, therefore, challenge them without running afoul of
the doctrine of immutability of judgment. A direct attack may be brought
either through a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.119 A void judgment may also be challenged collaterally "by assailing
its validity in another action where it is invoked."120

In Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation,121 this Court held that a judgment

or order that was issued in excess of jurisdiction has no legal effect and
"cannot likewise be perpetuated by a simple reference to the principle of
immutability of final judgment."122

I.D

The happening of a supervening event is likewise a ground to set aside or

amend a final and executory judgment.

This exception was explained in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals,123 thus:
One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is
the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new
circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.124 (Citation omitted)
Parties must establish two (2) conditions in order to properly invoke the
exception on supervening events. First, the fact constituting the supervening
event must have transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory. It should not have existed prior to the finality of the
judgment.125 Second, it must be shown that the supervening event "affects
or changes the substance of the judgment and renders its execution
inequitable."126

In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Manuel Abella,127 a civil

case for quieting of title was considered as a supervening event that
rendered a previous case for forcible entry unenforceable through
execution.128 This Court held that the judgment in the case for quieting of
title is a "new circumstance which developed after the finality of the
judgment in the forcible entry [case] . . . [which] conclusively resolved the
issue of ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of
possession[.]" The execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case
would, therefore, be unjust and inequitable to the respondents "who had
been conclusively declared the owners and rightful possessors of the
disputed land."129

Bani Rural Bank. Inc. v. De Guzman130 is another instance where the

exception was applied. The development of strained relations between the
employer and the employee was considered as a supervening event that
rendered the execution of the judgment, ordering the reinstatement of the
employee, impossible.131

On the other hand, the exception was found to be inapplicable in Javier v.

Court of Appeals.132 The parties in Javier sought to bar the enforcement of
an alias writ of execution. They anchored their argument on a deed of sale
that purportedly revoked a previous one.133 In determining whether the case
fell under the exception, this Court declared that:
The supervening event which would justify the suspension or nullification of
the execution of a final and executory judgment refers to facts and events
transpiring after the judgment or order had become executory. These
circumstances affect or change the substance of the judgment and render its
execution inequitable.

....

In the present cases, the execution or existence of the alleged deed of sale
of 4 March 1975 cannot be considered a supervening event that will alter the
finality and the executory nature of the decisions in question. The records
show that Luz Javier filed the complaint for rescission of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of 8 March 1972 on 5 August 1976. All throughout the
proceedings from the lower court to the appellate courts in 1976 (specifically
during the lifetime of Luz Javier, who died on 9 June 1980), to this Court in
1987, Ursula and the legal heirs remained silent about the existence of the
alleged deed of sale of 4 March 1975.134 (Citations omitted)
Aside from these well-known exceptions, several cases have also been
excluded from the application of the doctrine of immutability of judgment in
the interest of substantial justice. The exception sometimes applied when a
party's liberty is involved or when there are special and compelling
circumstances.135 For instance, judgments of conviction that have attained
finality were modified to correct an erroneous penalty previously imposed.136

Judgments may also be modified or amended to supply operational matters

that are deemed necessary to carry out the decision into effect.137

I.E

In the present case, petitioners assert that the case falls under the first
exception: that clerical errors attended the computation of the amounts
awarded as life care cost and loss of earning capacity.138 The resolution of
the present petition would, therefore, require a comparison between the
dispositive portion and the body of the judgment.
The dispositive portion of the September 29, 2004 Decision provided:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding defendants Mercury Drug
Corporation, Inc. and Rolando del Rosario, jointly and severally liable to pay
plaintiffs Spouses Richard Y. Huang and Carmen G. Huang, and Stephen
Huang the following amounts:

1. Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy[-]Three Thousand Pesos

(P2,973,000.00) actual damages;

2. As compensatory damages:
a. Twenty[-]Three Million Four Hundred Sixty[-]One Thousand, and
Sixty-Two Pesos (P23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen;

b. Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as and for lost or impaired

earning capacity of Stephen;

3. Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as moral damages;

4. Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

5. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorney[']s fees and litigation

expense.

The defendants' counterclaim is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.139
On the other hand, the pertinent portion of this decision stated:
Drs. Renato Sibayan, Eduardo Jamora, Evelyn Dy and Teresita Sanchez
testified regarding the massive injuries suffered by plaintiff Stephen and
expenses that plaintiff will continue to incur. (TSN, July 5, 1999; TSN April
26, 1999, TSN, April 19, 1999; and TSN, March 26, 1999).

Although Stephen survived the accident, the doctors are unanimous in

saying that Stephen needs continuous rehabilitation for the rest of his life.
Dr. Sibayan's prognosis with regard to Stephen's future recovery is nil, or
zero. The best thing that can be done for Stephen is for the latter to
maintain some kind of rehabilitation program with the aim of preventing
complications, particularly bed sores, infection of the bladder, inability to
move. There are no dedicated and specific centers in the Philippines with
spinal cord injury rehabilitation program. Notwithstanding the presentation
by plaintiffs of the rehabilitation programs which the plaintiff Stephen may
avail of at Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, New Jersey, USA, together
with the estimated expenses which may be incurred by plaintiffs, (Exhibits Y,
Z-3), this Court deems it proper not to include the said amount because as
far as the records are concerned, the enrollment of Stephen thereat
remained a plan. The plaintiffs Spouses Richard and Carmen Huang merely
contemplated the sending of their son, Stephen to Kessler Institute.

Accordingly, the defendants must not only pay for the actual expenses
incurred by plaintiffs for the hospitalization and medical treatment of
Stephen, they must also pay plaintiffs for the natural and probable expenses
which the plaintiffs will in the future likely incur as a result of the injuries he
suffered. In 1997[,] Stephen[']s average monthly expense was P21,500.00
and for 1998 it was for P16,280.00 more or less, (TSN, p. 11, January 11,
1999). It is expected that he will continue to incur these expenses for the
rest of his life. The chance of Stephen regaining his normal ability to walk
and perform the most basic body movements is remote. Thus, he shall be
dependent financially and physically on the care, assistance, and support of
his family throughout his life. Based on the actuarial computation of the
remaining years that Stephen is expected to live, the life care cost will
amount to P23,461,062.00 more or less. Plaintiffs must be compensated
(Exhibits ZZ, ZZ-4 to ZZ-6).

Also part of the damages sustained by plaintiffs is the loss or in the least,
impairment of Stephen's earning capacity. The massive injury Stephen
sustained disabled him from engaging in those pursuits and occupations for
which, in the absence of said injury, he would have qualified. To determine
how much to be awarded for decreased earning capacity, the health of the
injured party, and his mental and physical ability to maintain himself before
the injury as compared with his condition in this respect afterwards have to
be considered. The rule necessarily permits an inquiry into the capacity of
plaintiff prior to the injury, including his physical condition, and his ability to
labor or follow his usual vocation, his age, his state of health, and his
probable life expectancy. The plaintiff's ability and disposition to labor or his
business or professional habits may also be taken into consideration . . .

At the time of [the] accident, Stephen is a bright young man of 17, fourth
year high school, a member of his school's varsity basketball team. He
passed the entrance examination of the University of the Philippines, De La
Salle University, and the University of Asia and the Pacific. In the actuarial
study presented by plaintiff's witness, Aida Josef, she projected that
Stephen's life expectancy is only up to age 48.37 or more or less 20 years
after the accident. Had Stephen not met the accident, he would have
continued his studies, finished his course in time, embarked on a banking
career, initially earned a monthly income of at least P15,000.[00], gotten
married, raised children, and become a productive member of society. Based
on her actuarial study, Ms. Josef opined that due to serious physical injuries
which caused him to be paraplegic for life, Stephen lost the opportunity to
do all [of] the above. Stephen stood to suffer loss of his earning capacity in
the total amount of P41,982,764.00 from year 2003 to year 2004 (Exhibit[s]
YY, ZZ and XX with submarkings). However, considering the speculation
involved, this Court places the loss or impairment of Stephen's earning
capacity to a conservative amount of Ten Million Pesos, for which he must be
compensated.140 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, there are no clerical errors or ambiguities regarding the
computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity awarded to
respondent Stephen. The amounts indicated in the dispositive portion of the
judgment faithfully correspond to the findings of fact and conclusions of the
trial court.

The trial court deemed it adequate and proper to award P23,461,062.00 as

life care cost and P10,000,000.00 as loss of earning capacity based on the
evidence presented during trial. In awarding life care cost, the trial court did
not limit itself to respondent Stephen's actual expenses in 1997 and 1998
and his projected life expectancy.141 The trial court also considered the
testimonies of respondent Stephen's doctors regarding his future medical
expenses.142 On the award of loss of earning capacity, the trial court did not
likewise limit itself to respondent Stephen's projected initial monthly salary
and life expectancy. It considered other equally important factors such as
respondent Stephen's capacity prior to the injury, fhysical conditions,
disposition to labor, and his professional habits.143

These findings and conclusions were even affirmed by this Court in Mercury
Drug Corporation,144 thus:
Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. The doctors who
attended to respondent Stephen are one in their prognosis that his chances
of walking again and performing basic body functions are nil. For the rest of
his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further
complications such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal
failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other
spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the
care and support of his family. We thus affirm the award of P23,461,062.00
for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang, based on his average
monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years that
he is expected to live; and the conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, as
reduced by the trial court, for the loss or impairment of his earning capacity,
considering his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his
mental and physical condition before the accident. He was only seventeen
years old, nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in fourth year
high school, and a member of the school varsity basketball team. He was
also class president and editor-in-chief of the school annual. He had shown
very good leadership qualities. He was looking forward to his college life,
having just passed the entrance examinations of the University of the
Philippines, De La Salle University, and the University of Asia and the Pacific.
The University of Sto. Tomas even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic
scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending the basketball
try-outs. Without doubt, he was an exceptional student. He excelled both in
his academics and extracurricular undertakings. He is intelligent and
motivated, a go-getter, as testified by Francisco Lopez, respondent Stephen
Huang's godfather and a bank executive. Had the accident not happened, he
had a rosy future ahead of him. He wanted to embark on a banking career,
get married and raise children. Taking into account his outstanding abilities,
he would have enjoyed a successful professional career in banking. But, as
Mr. Lopez stated, it is highly unlikely for someone like respondent to ever
secure a job in a bank. To his knowledge, no bank has ever hired a person
suffering with the kind of disability as Stephen Huang's.145 (Citations
omitted)
There being no clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion or
body of the judgment, the amounts awarded as life care cost and loss of
earning capacity stand. There is no reason to disturb the trial court's findings
and conclusions on the matter.

This Court notes that the amendments sought by petitioners affect the very
substance of the controversy. While it appears on the surface of the Petition
that they merely seek the clarification of the judgment, a careful review of
petitioners' assertions and arguments reveal their true intention of appealing
the merits of the case. This cannot be done without violating the doctrine on
immutability of judgments. A correction pertaining to the substance of the
controversy is not a clerical error.

Furthermore, petitioners have previously raised their arguments in different

fora, particularly in their Petition for Review before the Court of
Appeals146 and in their Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial147 before
this Court. Their arguments have been reviewed and passed upon twice.

Nevertheless, even if we were to indulge petitioners, their arguments

deserve scant consideration. Petitioners insist that the computation of life
care cost should be limited to respondent Stephen's average monthly
expenses in 1997 and 1998 and his projected life expectancy.148 They also
insist that the computation of loss of earning capacity should be limited to
respondent Stephen's estimated initial salary and his projected life
expectancy.149
To limit the computation of life care cost and loss of earning capacity strictly
to these variables glosses over other equally important economic factors that
the trial court has pn,:lbably considered. Inflation, which is generally defined
as the increase in the price of goods and services over time,150 is a
significant economic factor. Petitioners failed to consider that the cost of
goods and services back then would not be the same as today. Petitioners
also glossed over the possibility that respondent Stephen might eventually
be promoted within the banking industry. This may lead to an increased
basic salary and the grant of additional benefits on top of hefty bonuses that
are usually given to top-notch or high-ranking bank officers. Furthermore,
petitioners overlook the health complications that may arise from spinal cord
injuries. While it may be true that respondent is able to function as a
productive member of society today, this cannot operate as a justification to
reduce the monetary award granted to him. Reducing the monetary award
granted to respondent Stephen penalizes his recovery.

II

Another effect of a final and executory judgment is that winning litigants are
entitled to the satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution.

A writ of execution must substantially conform to the judgment sought to be

enforced.151 A writ of execution that exceeds the tenor of the judgment is
patently void and should be struck down.152 Upon a finding of its invalidity,
the case may be remanded to the lower court for the issuance of the proper
writ.153

In this case, the Writ of Execution154 issued by the Regional Trial Court
neither varied nor departed from the terms of the judgment in any manner.
It was faithful to what the trial court decreed, thus:
You are commanded to demand from MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and
ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO at #7 Mercury Avenue, Libis, Quezon City and C.
Valle Street, Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, respectively, the judgment obligors, the
immediate payment in full of the sums of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SEVENTY[-]THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P2,973,000.00), Philippine Currency,
as actual damages; TWENTY[-]THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY[-
-]ONE THOUSAND, AND SIXTY[-]TWO PESOS (P23,461,062.00) for life care
cost of Stephen; TEN MILLION PESOS (P10,000,000.00) as and for lost or
impaired earning capacity of Stephen; ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00)
as moral damages; TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as attorney's fees and
litigation expense, together with your lawful fees for service of this
execution, which SPOUSES RICHARD Y. HUANG & CARMEN G. HUANG and
STEPHEN G. HUANG, the judgment obligees, recovered in this case against
said judgment obligors, and to tender the same to said judgment obligees
and return this writ, with the lawful fees, to this Court within thirty (30) days
from the date of receipt hereof with your proceedings indorsed thereon.155
III

The case not falling within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of
immutability of judgments, it becomes the court's ministerial duty to issue a
writ of execution, which must "conform to that ordained or decreed in the
dispositive part of the decision."156 The manner of execution of a judgment
cannot depend upon the choice or discretion of a party.157

In this case, the judgment did not indicate, in any manner, that the amounts
of life care cost and loss of earning capacity should be paid in installments or
amortized. There is nothing in the decision that would substantiate
petitioners' assertion that life care cost and loss of earning capacity were
awarded as judicial support.

The cases petitioners relied upon to support their arguments are

inapplicable. Advincula158 and Canonizado159 are judgments for support
arising from family relations. In the present case, the two (2) monetary
awards were given as the "natural and probable expenses" that respondents
would likely incur for rehabilitation and continued treatment.160 Although the
court stated that respondent Stephen would be "dependent financially and
physically on the care, assistance, and support of his family throughout his
life[,]"161 this should not be construed to mean that the monetary awards
were given as judicial support. They were awarded as damages arising from
quasi-delict.

In the absence of any directive in the body or in the dispositive portion of

the decision that the judgment award should be amortized or paid in periodic
installments, the manner of its execution shall be subject to the Rules of
Court. The manner of execution of judgments for money is specifically
governed by Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision

dated January 20, 2011 and Resolution dated July 6, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals inCA-GR. SP No. 106647 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.