Avsec 2023

नागर विमानन सुरक्षा ब्यूरो – भारत
BUREAU OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY – INDIA
AVIATION SECURITY BASIC COURSE

(AVSEC BASIC)
Trainee Reference Book-2022
This Restricted Document is
Published by
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)

Year of Issue: 2022
(Jaideep Prasad, IPS)

Director General,
BCAS, New Delhi.
Aviation Security Basic
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Module-1 Introduction to the Course
Module Objective
 To understand the course objective, structure and methodology

 To understand the Terminologies related to Aviation Security and Vital Installations
 Act and rules related to AVSEC
 To learn about the organisations involved in Aviation security and of the applicable
legislation followed for Civil Aviation
 Need for Security Awareness
Teaching Methods
 Slide Presentations
 Lectures by certified instructors
 Group discussions
 Demonstrations
 Role- playing and practical exercises
 Site visits to the Airport
 Tests and Homework
 Overnight reading Assignments
 Progress Tests
 Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
Course Objective:
After completion of this course, the trainees will be able to:

 Understand the nature of the threats to civil aviation;
 Understand civil aviation from an international, regional and national perspective
 Work in and move around an airport safely;
 Communicate and cooperate with other airport agencies;
 Carry out access control duties to control the movement of people and vehicles ;
 Guard and patrol airport operational facilities, vulnerable areas, and aircraft;
 Recognize ‘Prohibited Articles’ including weapons and explosive and incendiary devices;
 Understand the concepts of screening and searching passengers and baggage; and
AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

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 Respond to security incidents or airport emergencies.
Terminologies Related To AVSEC and Vital Installations at Airport
Terms that are defined in the I C A O A v i a t i o n S e c u r i t y M a n u a l (Doc

8973) and the Annexes are used in accordance with the meanings and
usages given therein. A wide variety of terms are in use throughout the
world to describe facilities, procedures and concepts for airport operations
and planning. As far as possible, the terms used in this document are those
which have the widest international use.
Accompanied hold baggage: Baggage which is accepted for carriage in the hold of an aircraft
and which is checked in by the passenger who is on board.
Acts of unlawful interference. These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety
of civil aviation, including but not limited to:
• unlawful seizure of aircraft
• destruction of an aircraft in service,
• hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
• forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical

facility,
• introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or
material intended for criminal purposes,
• use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or
serious damage to property or the environment,
• communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight
or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an
airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.
Aerodrome Entry Permit (AEP). The photo identity card, smart card or temporary permit issued
by the Director General, BCAS, Ministry of Civil Aviation or any person authorized by the Central
Government for entry into the aerodrome or part of an aerodrome. (Ref. rule 2(c) of The
Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011).
Aerodrome: Any definite or limited ground or water area intended to used, either wholly or in
part, for the landing or departure of aircraft, and includes all buildings, sheds, vessels, piers and
other structures thereon appertaining thereto.
Aerodrome Operator: A person, organization or enterprise responsible for operation and

management of an aerodrome
Aircraft: Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air
other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.

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Aircraft in flight: An aircraft from the moment when all its external doors are closed following
embarkation until the moment when such doors are opened for disembarkation.
Aircraft in service: An aircraft shall be considered to be “in service” from the beginning of the
pre-flight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight
until twenty-four hours after any landing and in the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be
deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft
and for persons and property on board.
Aircraft not in service: An aircraft that either is parked for a period of more than 12 hours or is
not under surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
Aircraft security check: An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may
have had access and an inspection of the hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious
objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.
Aircraft security search: A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for
the purpose of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices,
articles or substances.
Aircraft stand. A designated area on an apron intended to be used for parking an aircraft.
Airport. Any area in a Member State which is open for commercial aircraft operations
Airside: The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof,
access to which is controlled.
Appropriate authority for aviation security: The authority designated by a State within its
administration to be responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of
the national civil aviation security programme.
Apron: A defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of
loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.
Annexure 17 (to the Chicago convention): Annex 17 to the Convention with the title “Standards
and Recommended Practices — Security — Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against
Acts of Unlawful Interference”.
Aviation Security Group. A unit of specialized Government agency authorized by the Director
General, BCAS to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference and protection of
property at the aerodrome handling civil aviation. (also see rule 13 of the Aircraft (Security)
Rules, 2011)
Apron passenger vehicle. Any vehicle used to convey passengers between aircraft and
passenger buildings

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Background check: A check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including, where
legally permissible, any criminal history, as part of the assessment of an individual’s
suitability to implement a security control and/or for unescorted access to a security restricted
area.
Baggage: Personal property of passengers or crew carried on an aircraft by agreement with the
operator.
Baggage Breakup Area: The area where all the arrival passenger’s bags are delivered to them.
Baggage sorting area: Space in which departure baggage is sorted into flight loads. (The area is
also known as Baggage Makeup Area)
Baggage storage area: Space in which checked/hold baggage is stored pending transport to
aircraft and space in which mishandled baggage may be held until forwarded, claimed or
otherwise disposed of.
Behavior Detection Within an aviation security environment, the application of techniques

involving the recognition of behavioural characteristics, including but not limited to
physiological or gestural signs indicative of anomalous behaviour, to identify persons who may
pose a threat to civil aviation
Bomb alert: A status of alert put in place by competent authorities to activate an

intervention plan intended to counter the possible consequences arising from a communicated
threat, anonymous or otherwise, or arising from the discovery of a suspect device or other
suspect item on an aircraft, at an airport or in any civil aviation facilities.
Bomb threat: A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers,

whether true or false that the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, or any airport or
civil aviation facility or any person may be in danger from an explosive or other item or device.
Cabin baggage: Baggage intended for carriage in the cabin of an aircraft.
Cargo: Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or
mishandled baggage.
Cargo area. All the ground space and facilities provided for cargo handlings. It includes aprons,
cargo buildings and warehouses, vehicle parks and roads associated therewith.
Cargo building. A building through which cargo passes between air and ground transport and in
which processing facilities are located, or in which cargo is stored pending transfer to air or
ground transport
Catering stores: All items, other than catering supplies, associated with passenger in-flight
services, for example newspapers, magazines, headphones, audio and video tapes, pillows and
blankets, and amenity kits.
Catering supplies: Food, beverages, other dry stores and associated equipment used on board an

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aircraft. Note: Stores (Supplies).

a. For consumption - Goods, whether or not sold, intended for consumption by the
passengers and the crew on board an aircraft, and goods necessary for the operation
and maintenance of the aircraft, including fuel and lubricants.
b. To be taken away - Goods for sale to passengers and crew of an aircraft with a view to be
taken away on landing.
Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate

authority for aviation security that a person possesses the necessary competencies to
perform assigned functions to an acceptable level as defined by the appropriate authority
Check-in: The process of reporting to an aircraft operator for acceptance on a particular flight.
Co-mail: Abbreviation of aircraft operator company mail, shipped within the company’s
network of stations.
Co-mat: Abbreviation of aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the company’s
network of stations.
Contingency plan: A “proactive” plan to include measures and procedures addressing various
threat levels, risk assessments and the associated security measures to be implemented,
designed in order to anticipate as well as prepare all concerned parties having roles and
responsibilities in the event of an actual act of unlawful interference.
Convention. The convention relating to International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on the 7th
day of December, 1944
Corporate aviation: The non-commercial operation or use of aircraft by a company for the
carriage of passengers or goods as an aid to the conduct of company business, flown by a
professional pilot employed to fly the aircraft.
(Note that corporate aviation is a subset of general aviation.)
Courier service: An operation whereby shipments tendered by one or more shippers are
transported as the baggage of a courier passenger on board a scheduled aircraft operator
service under normal passenger hold baggage documentation.
Crew member: A person assigned by an operator to duty on an aircraft during a flight duty
period.
Crisis management: Contingency measures implemented in response to increased threat levels

as well as implementation of measures and procedures in response to the emergencies to
include acts of unlawful interference.
Dangerous goods: Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety,
property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the
Technical Instructions or which are classified according to those Instructions.

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Deportee: A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had
entered a State illegally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent
authorities to leave that State. Note. — The competent authorities may provide an escort for
such persons.
Diplomatic pouch (bag): A shipping container having diplomatic immunity from search or seizure
when accompanied by the required official documentation.
Direct transit area. A special area established in an international airport, approved by the public
authorities concerned and under their direct supervision or control, where passengers can stay
during transit or transfer without applying for entry to the State.
Disruptive passenger: A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on
board an aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and
thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft.
Emergency plan. A plan setting forth the procedures for coordinating the response of different
aerodrome agencies or services and of those agencies in the surrounding community that
could be of assistance in responding to an emergency.
Explosive Detection System (EDS). A technology system or combination of different

technologies which has the ability to detect, and so to indicate by means of an alarm, explosive
material contained in baggage or other articles, irrespective of the material from which the bag
is made.
Explosive Device Detection System (EDDS). A technology system or combination of different

technologies which has the ability to detect, and so to indicate by means of an alarm, an
explosive device by detecting one or more components of such a device contained in baggage
or other articles, irrespective of the material from which the bag or article is made.
Explosive substance. A solid or liquid substance (or a mixture of substances) which is in itself
capable, by chemical reaction, of producing gas at such a temperature and pressure and at
such a speed as to cause damage to the surroundings. Included are pyrotechnic substances
even when they do not evolve gases. A substance which is not itself an explosive but which can
form an explosive atmosphere of gas, vapour or dust is not included.
Express cargo. Goods other than mail and accompanied or baggage involuntarily or
inadvertently separated from passengers or crew which is required to be carried on priority
basis by an aircraft operator.
Facilitation. The efficient management of the necessary control process, with the objective of
expediting the clearance of persons or goods and preventing unnecessary operational delays.
Freight. See Cargo.
Gate-no Show: Passenger who has checked in (may have registered baggage), but not reported
for boarding.

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General aviation operation: An aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport
operation or an aerial work operation.
Hijacking (Acts of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft): Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (i)
Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises
control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or (ii) is an accomplice of a
person who performs or attempts to perform any such act, commits the offence of
hijacking that aircraft.
High-risk cargo or mail. Cargo or mail presented by an unknown entity or showing signs of
tampering shall be considered high risk if, in addition, it meets one of the following criteria:
a) specific intelligence indicates that the cargo or mail poses a threat to civil aviation; or
b) the cargo or mail shows anomalies that give rise to suspicion; or
c) the nature of the cargo or mail is such that baseline security measures alone are
unlikely to detect prohibited items that could endanger the aircraft.
Regardless of whether the cargo or mail comes from a known or unknown entity, a State’s
specific intelligence about a consignment may render it as high risk.
Human Factors principles. Principles which apply to design, certification, training, operations and
maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components
by proper consideration to human performance.
Human performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety,
security and efficiency of aeronautical operations
Identification cards: See Permits.

Inadmissible person: A person who is or will be refused admission to a State by its
authorities. Such persons normally have to be transported back to their State of departure, or
to any other State where the persons are admissible, by the aircraft operator on which they
arrived. (See appropriate Standards in Annex 9 — Facilitation, Chapter 5.)
Interline Baggage: The baggage of passengers subjected to transfer from the aircraft of one operator
to the aircraft of another operator in the course of their journey.
Interline Passenger: Passenger who is transferred between aircraft of different air carriers
during the course of his journey.
In-flight security officer: A person who is authorized by the government of the State of the
Operator and the government of the State of registration to be deployed on an aircraft with
the purpose of protecting that aircraft and its occupants against acts of unlawful
interference. This excludes persons employed to provide exclusive personal protection for
one or more specific people travelling on the aircraft, such as personal bodyguards.
In-flight supplies. All items intended to be taken on board an aircraft for use, consumption or
purchase by passengers or crew during the flight, which typically include catering and cleaning
stores and supplies.
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Integrated/consolidated cargo. A consignment of multiple packages which has been originated

by more than one person, each of whom has made an agreement for carriage by air with
another person other than a scheduled aircraft operator.
Interline baggage: Baggage of passengers subject to transfer from the aircraft of one
operator to the aircraft of another operator in the course of the passenger’s journey.
Isolation Bay: A designated parking bay at the airport far away from the main passenger
terminal, exclusively designed for the purpose of parking the affected aircraft in order to
handle contingencies and other threat situations. Also known as Isolated Aircraft Parking
Position (IAPP)
LAGs: Liquids, aerosols and gels, in any volume, for sale at airport outlets (excluding food and
beverages for consumption in the airport premises and not intended for carriage into the
aircraft passenger cabin) or on board aircraft during the day(s) of the journey, either in the
airside area or in a security-restricted area.
Landside: Those parts of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof that are
not airside, as identified by States and relevant entities in their security programmes.
Mail: Dispatches of correspondence and other items tendered by and intended for delivery
to postal services in accordance with the rules of the Universal Postal Union (UPU).
Mishandled baggage: Baggage involuntarily, or inadvertently, separated from passengers or

crew.
Movement area: That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing
of aircraft, consisting of the maneuvering area and the apron(s).
Non-restricted area: Areas of an airport to which the public have access or to which access is
otherwise unrestricted.
Off-airport processing facilities. A passenger or cargo transport link terminal at an urban

population centre at which processing facilities are provided.
Passenger area. All the ground space and facilities provided for passenger processing, including
aprons, passenger buildings, vehicle parks and roads.
Permits: A permit system consists of cards or other documentation issued to individual persons
employed on airports or who otherwise have need for authorized access to the airport, airside
or security restricted area. Its purpose is to identify the individual and facilitate access. Vehicle
permits are issued and used for similar purposes to allow vehicular access. Permits are
sometimes referred to as airport identity cards or passes.
Person with disabilities (with reduced mobility):Any person whose mobility is reduced due to a
physical incapacity (sensory or locomotor), an intellectual deficiency, age, illness or any other
cause of disability when using transport and whose situation needs special attention and
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the adaptation to the person’s needs of the services made available to all passengers.
Pier: A corridor at, above or below ground level to connect aircraft stands to a passenger
building
Pilot-in-command: The pilot designated by the operator, or in the case of general aviation, the
owner, as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight.
Prohibited Items. A list of items i.e. weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or
substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference with civil aviation
operations. Such list is established by the DG, BCAS based on a risk assessment
Regulated agent: An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with
an operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate
authority in respect of cargo, courier and express parcels or mail.
Restricted articles: Articles which are, in the specific context of aviation security, defined as
those articles, devices or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful
interference against civil aviation or which may endanger the safety of the aircraft and its
occupants, or installations and the public.
Sabotage: An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property,

endangering or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its
facilities.
Screening: The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify
and/or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances which
may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.
Security / Aviation Security: Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This
objective is achieved by a combination of measures and human and material resources.
Security audit. An in-depth compliance examination of all aspects of the implementation of the
national civil aviation security programme.
Security accident. An occurrence which results in death or grievous hurt to a person or major
damage to the property.
Security checks for LAGs and STEBs. Visual checks or security controls, performed by security
staff, for signs of interference, in particular tampering with seals, theft and the introduction of
potentially dangerous devices, articles or substances. The checks should be made at the first
point of entry on the airside and should be made on all supplies of LAGs and STEBs to establish
that they have been protected, that there is no evidence or suspicion of tampering, and that
the necessary documentation is in order.
Security clearance. Compliance with the security controls specified in the National Civil Aviation
Security Programme with regard to any aircraft, entity, person or object. It is a status granted
to individuals or entities allowing them access to classified information, access to restricted
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areas or to conduct business after completion of a background check.
Security control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous
devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference
can be prevented.
Security equipment: Devices of a specialized nature for use, individually or as part of a

system, in the prevention or detection of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation and its
facilities.
Security exercise. A full-scale security exercise is a simulated act of unlawful interference with
the objective of ensuring the adequacy of a contingency plan to cope with different types of
emergencies. A partial security exercise is a simulated act of unlawful interference with the
objective of ensuring the adequacy of the response to individual participating agencies and
components of the contingency plan, such as the communications system.
Security incident. An occurrence in relation to civil aviation security which takes place either
on the ground or in flight, which results in:
- in injury to a person, damage to property, fire and breakage;
- contravention or breach of security laws, regulations, national civil aviation security
programme and orders issued by the Central Government under the provisions of the
Aircraft Act, 1934.
Security inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant National Civil Aviation

Security Programme requirements by an aircraft operator, airport or other entity involved in
security.
Security investigation. An inquiry into any act or attempted act of unlawful interference
against civil aviation and/or any alleged or suspected instance of non-compliance with a
State’s National Civil Aviation Security Programme or other legal and/or regulatory
requirements pertaining to civil aviation security.
Security programme. Written measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation

against acts of unlawful interference.
Security restricted area. Those areas of the airside of an airport which are identified as priority
risk areas where in addition to access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas
will normally include, inter alia, all commercial aviation passenger departure areas between
the screening checkpoint and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up areas, including those
where aircraft are being brought into service and screened baggage and cargo are present,
cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and aircraft cleaning premises.
Security survey. An evaluation of security needs including the identification of vulnerabilities

which could be exploited to carry out an act of unlawful interference, and the
recommendation of corrective actions.

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Security tamper-evident bags (STEBs). Specially designed bags that should only be used for the
sale of LAGs by airport outlets or on board an aircraft.
Security test. A covert or overt trial of an aviation security measure which simulates an
attempt to commit an unlawful act.
Sensitive Aviation Security Information. Information that, if accessed by or disclosed to

unauthorized persons, could create or be used to exploit a vulnerability or facilitate an act of
unlawful interference against civil aviation.
Service panel. Aircraft external access point used for providing aircraft services including
water, lavatories and ground electrical outlets, and other service compartments that have
external clip-down panels.
Small arms. A general description applied to all hand-held firearms.
State of Registry. The State on whose register the aircraft is entered. (See also the definition in
Annex 6.)
State of the Operator. The State in which the operator’s principal place of business is located
or, if there is no such place of business, the operator’s permanent residence.
Sterile area. The area between any passenger inspection or screening checkpoint and aircraft,
into which access is strictly controlled (see also security restricted area.)
Stores (Supplies).
- For consumption - Goods, whether or not sold, intended for consumption by the
passengers and the crew on board an aircraft, and goods necessary for the operation and
maintenance of the aircraft, including fuel and lubricants.
- To be taken away - Goods for sale to passengers and crew of an aircraft with a view to be
taken away on landing.
Terminal: The main building or group of buildings where the processing of commercial
passengers and freight and the boarding of aircraft occurs.
Threat Image Projection (TIP). A software programme approved by the appropriate authority
that can be installed on certain X-ray equipment, which projects virtual images of threat
articles such as guns, knives, and improvised explosive devices within the X-ray image of a real
bag under examination or complete virtual images of bags containing threat articles, and
provides immediate feedback to the X-ray equipment operators of their ability to detect such
images.
Trace detection equipment. A technology system or combination of different technologies

which has the ability to detect very small amounts of explosive materials, and so to indicate, by
means of an alarm, any such materials contained in baggage or other articles subjected for
analysis.
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Transfer cargo and mail. Cargo and mail departing on an aircraft other than that on which it
arrived of the same operator.
Transfer passengers/baggage: Passengers/baggage making direct connections between two

different flights.
Transit cargo and mail. Cargo and mail departing on the same aircraft as that on which it
arrived.
Transit passengers/Baggage: Passengers/Baggage departing from an airport on the same flight as

that on which they arrived.
Travel document: A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or

organization which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel.
Unaccompanied baggage: Baggage that is transported as cargo and may or may not be
carried on the same aircraft with the person to whom it belongs.
Unclaimed baggage: Baggage that arrives at an airport and is not picked up or claimed by a
passenger.
Unidentified/Unattended baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag,

which is not picked up by or identified with a passenger.
Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures in order to increase their deterrent

effect and their efficiency, by applying them at irregular frequencies, different locations and/or
with varying means, in accordance with a defined framework.
Unruly passengers: Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment when the
aircraft door is closed prior to take-off to the moment when it is reopened after landing, an act
of:
• assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or
the safety of property or persons;
• assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the
performance of duties or which lessens the ability to perform duties;
• wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment, or attendant structures
and equipment such as to endanger good order and safety of the aircraft or its
occupants;
• communication of information which is known to be false, thereby endangering the
safety of an aircraft in flight;
• Disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
Vehicle Entry Permit. Vehicle permits issued and used to allow vehicular access to restricted
areas of the airports.

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Vital installation. Any facility on or connected with an aerodrome, which, if damaged or

destroyed, would seriously impair the functioning of the aerodrome.
Vulnerable point: Any facility on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or

destroyed, would seriously impair the functioning of the airport. Example ATC, Fuel storage
area etc

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ABBREVIATIONS
1. AAI - Airports Authority of India
2. AC – Aerodrome Committee
3. ACCR - Aerodrome Committee Control Room
4. ACI - Airport Council International
5. ADP – Airfield Driving Permit

6. AEP - Aerodrome Entry Permit
7. ASC - Airport Security Committee
8. ASG - Aviation Security Group
9. ASTI – Aviation Security Training Institute
10. ASTP - Aviation Security Training Package

11. ATS – Air Traffic Services
12. AWB – Air Way Bill
13. AVSEC – Aviation Security
14. BBA – Baggage Break-up Area
15. BCAS - Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
16. BDDS - Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad
17. BSA /BMA – Baggage Sorting Area/ Baggage Make-up Area
18. BTAC - Bomb Threat Assessment Committee
19. BTCP - Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
20. BTL - Baggage Tally List
21. BTRC- Bomb Threat Review Committee

22. BWAF - Bomb Warning Assessment Form
23. CASO - Chief Aerodrome Security Officer

24. CAT - Computer Aided Tomography
25. CBD:- Chemical and Biological Device.
26. CBRN – Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear weapon

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27. CBW- Chemical and Biological weapons
28. CC – Central Committee
29. CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
30. CCS – Cabinet Committee on Security
31. CISF - Central Industrial Security Force
32. CLIP- Caller Line Identification Procedure

33. CMG- Crisis Management Group
34. COE - Controller of Explosives
35. COSAH - Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijacking
36. CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force
37. CTCP – Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan
38. CTP – Combined Test Piece

39. CTX – Computed Tomography X-Ray
40. DAW – Directorate of Air Worthiness
41. DFMD - Door Frame Metal Detector
42. DGR – Dangerous Goods Regulation
43. DGCA - Directorate General of Civil Aviation
44. DIP- Diplomatic Mail
45. EDDS - Explosive Device Detection System
46. EDS - Explosive Detection System
47. ETD - Explosive Trace Detector
48. EPX - Enhanced Performance X-Ray
49. EVD - Explosive Vapour Detector

50. HDB - HIGH DENSITY BLINKING
51. HHMD – Hand Held Metal Detector
52. HUM - Human Remains

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53. IATA - International Air Transport Association

54. IAPP – Isolated Aircraft Parking Position
55. ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
56. IED - Improvised Explosive Device
57. IFSO – In-flight Security Officer

58. IMS – Ion Mobility Spectrometry
59. LAG – Liquids, Aerosols and Gels
60. LTPE - Low Temperature Plastic Explosive
61. LPR – License Plate Reader
62. MANPADS - Man Portable Air Defense System
63. MCA - Ministry of Civil Aviation
64. MHA - Ministry of Home Affairs

65. MRTD - Machine Readable Travel Document
66. MZDFMD - Multi Zone Door Frame Metal Detector
67. NCASTP - National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme
68. NCASQCP - National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme
69. NCASP - National Civil Aviation Security Programme

70. NDA- Non Disclosure agreement
71. NSG – National Security Guards
72. OTP – Operating Test Piece
73. PB-IED – Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device
74. PFNA- Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis

75. PIDS- Perimeter Intruder Detection System
76. PRM – Person with Reduced Mobility
77. PSc - Pseudo Colour
78. PSO – Personal Security Officer
79. PTSD – Post Trauma Stress Disorder
80. QRT – Quick Reaction Team

81. RCB- Resume Current Bag

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82. RDX -Research& Developed Explosive

83. REM- Roentgen Equivalent Man
84. SARP – Standards and Recommended Practices
85. SLPC – Secondary Ladder Point Checks
86. SOP – Standard Operating Procedure

87. STEB – Security Tampered Evident Bag
88. STP – Standardized Training Package
89. SPG – Special Protection Group
90. TCV - Threat Containment Vessel
91. TIP – Threat Image Projection

92. VB-IED – Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
93. VCS -Variable Color Stripping

94. VDU - Visual Display Unit
95. VPB- View Previous Bag
96. UVSS - Under Vehicle Search System
97. UVSM - Under Vehicle Search Mirror
98. XBIS – X-ray Baggage Inspection System
Aircraft Acts and Rules of 1934 & 1937
Aircraft Acts of 1934
It extends to the whole of India and applies also-

(a) To citizens of India wherever they may be;
(b) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be;
(c) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered outside India but for the time being in or over
India; and.
(d) To an aircraft operated by a person who is not a citizen of India but as his principal place of
business or permanent residence in India.

MODULE -2
Overview of
International/National Civil
Aviation Security
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AVSEC BASIC COURSE – MODULE 2
2022
Module 02
Overview of International/National Civil Aviation Security
Aviation Security. Combination of measures, human and material resources intended to

safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.
Primary objective of Aviation security
To assure the protection and safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public,
aircraft and facilities of an airport serving civil aviation, against acts of unlawful interference
perpetrated on the ground or in flight.
Basic Principles and Philosophy for Aviation Security

The primary objective of international civil aviation security is to assure the protection and
safeguarding of passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public and facilities of an
airport serving international civil aviation against “acts of unlawful interference perpetrated on
the ground or in flight.”
The basic principles and philosophy for aviation security are as follows:
• Civil aviation shall operate from a safe and secure environment free from unlawful
interference;
• States shall develop and implement such legislation and procedures as are necessary to
ensure the safe and secure environment;
• The security measures put in place shall be consistent with Standards and Recommended
Practices as promulgated by ICAO, and adequate to meet the threat; and
• States shall either prosecute or extradite any person(s) who unlawfully interfere with civil
aviation of any other State.
Threats to Civil Aviation
Introduction
It is the responsibility of Civil Aviation Security set up in India and International Civil Aviation
Security regime to assure protection and safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel, general
public, aircraft and facilities of airports against act of unlawful interference perpetrated on the
ground or in flight. This is carried out by combination of measures and marshalling of various
human and material resources on international, national and airport level.
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The aviation industry is still the most threatened one at present time and would remain so in
future. Airports and airlines are soft targets for terrorist attacks. Any sabotage / explosion at
airports or in aircraft shatter public confidence in the States machinery. Such acts have high
news-value and the terrorist group gains publicity with very low investment.
What is Threat?
It is defined as "the probability of an attack being attempted against a target within a specified
time frame”.
What is Vulnerability?
Vulnerability is those characteristics of a target which could be exploited in an attack.
What is Risk?
Risk is the probability that an attack will be attempted and will be successful
RISK = THREAT x VULNERABILITY
Nature of threats
The Traditional / conventional types of threat to civil aviation are as follows.
• Hijacking of aircraft
• Sabotage of aircraft
• Terrorist attack at airports (Terminal, Concourse, Check-in, Passenger and Baggage
search areas)
• Sabotage of airports
• Attacks against off-airport locations (crew accommodation, national carrier ticket
offices, cargo facilities, vital installations).
New and Emerging threats:
Few example of emerging threat are
• Suicide attack on ground facilities

• Misuse of aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction
• Misuse of nuclear and other radioactive substances.
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• Threat from biological weapons

• Threat from chemical and dangerous substances
• Air to air attack by aircraft or by missile
• Ground to air attack by missiles.
• Cyber terrorism
• Attack through electronic systems to misguide the air traffic communications to the
aircraft.
• Attack by magnetic systems.
Terrorism
What is Terrorism?
Terrorism is an act of placing someone in extreme fear. It is the unlawful use of violence against
the Public to intimidate a Government.
Types of Offenders
• Mentally challenged persons
• Persons seeking revenge – disgruntled ex-employees
• Terrorists, individuals and groups
• Criminals, individuals and groups
Factors contributing to terrorism:
• Religious factors
• Economic conditions of a country
• Natural disasters
• Political factors
• Social recognition
The supports needed by the terrorist organizations:
▪ Financial support
▪ Motivated manpower
▪ Support of Public
▪ Arms & Ammunition
▪ Media
▪ Training
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Who are the Terrorists?
• Terrorists are generally people who feel alienated from society and have a grievance
or regard themselves as victims of an injustice.
• Terrorists are devoted to their political or religious cause and do not regard their
violent actions as criminal.
• Terrorists are ruthless and show no fear, pity or remorse.
Characteristics of Terrorists
• Target specific individuals on an aircraft, such as Diplomats or VIPs

• Engender fear of flying in the general public and disrupt normal life; and
• Obtain the release of prisoners, perhaps from their own group
• They operate in small groups or complex networks
• They are usually well organized
• Have access to necessary resources such as money, technical expertise, weapons,
explosives and sometimes supported by governments or States; and
• Aims are political in nature
Characteristics of Criminals
Attacks on Civil Aviation by criminal groups or individuals are rare and their motivation is
• Monetary gain or
• Extortion
• Personal gains
• Difficult to classify
• Unpredictable
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HIJACKING)
What are the techniques used for hijacking?

In order to execute a hijack of an aircraft, the perpetrator must be able to coerce the pilot-
in-command. Therefore, it is necessary to:
• Smuggle weapons onto the aircraft (examples of how this has been done ranges from
concealment in toys to false prosthetics)
• Possible collusion with or bribery of airport or airline staff
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• Armed assault. This has been used on several occasions
The types of weapons used vary and may include pistols, automatic weapons, explosive
charges, knives, or flammable material.
SABOTAGE
Sabotage techniques
Most sabotage devices targeted against aircraft are either explosive or incendiary devices
and can even be a combination of the two.
The saboteur needs to have access to the aircraft to plant the device or place the device on
the aircraft using passenger baggage, air cargo, catering or other stores loaded onto the
aircraft prior to flight. The most common means of infiltrating sabotage devices in the past
have been:
• Infiltration of device into baggage;

• Collusion with airport or airline staff to place device on aircraft;
• Subterfuge, use of an unsuspecting dupe
Sabotage of airports
Certain critical areas of an airport are vital to the continued operation of an airport, namely:
• Runway;
• Passenger terminal buildings;
• Navigational aids;
• Electrical power supplies;
• Air Traffic Control communications;
• Aviation fuel storage;
• Rescue and fire-fighting services.
Any sabotage to the above facilities can seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
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Suicide bomber
While most successful saboteurs move away from the event of the device activation the
suicidal saboteur is ready to kill himself for the cause.
Whether a religious, political, or nationalistic fanatic, these individuals or groups present
a formidable threat to today’s security measures.
These offenders may endeavor to achieve sabotage by:

• Carrying the device on their person; or
• Providing the means to have a device boarded through their checked baggage
Why is aviation an attractive target?
• Instant publicity
• Aircraft possesses inherent mobility
• Different nationalities involved
• Aircraft can be easily taken in control
• Aircraft itself can be used as a missile
• Small amount of explosive is sufficient to cause huge damage
• Adverse impact on tourism thereby furthering the terrorist cause
• Excellent means of extortion
• Economic damage to the country
• Economic damage to the airline
• Carriers are seen as flag bearers
• Large number of people in a confined area
Where can the threats come from?

• Terrorist disguised as a passenger with the intent to hijack the plane
• A terrorist may infiltrate a piece of luggage containing an explosive device directly
onto the conveyor belt
• Using naïve passenger to infiltrate a bomb into their luggage
• Explosive device concealed at the check in area set to explode during the operations
• Direct attack
• Explosive device placed at the boarding gate area
• Passenger used after check-in
• Interline passengers and baggage
• Cargo/Courier infiltration
• Catering infiltration
• Airport employees
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• Terrorist disguised as an airport worker

• Explosive device or weapon left on board to be used on the second leg of the flight
Where can the Threats come from?
Historical Reviews of Past Incidents
1 First hijacking in the world The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February
21, 1931 in Lima, (Peru).
2 1969 Year of maximum Hijackings

First hijacking in India 30th Jan, 1971, Indian Airlines flight from Srinagar to
Jammu taken to Lahore.
3 Outcome Rule 8 A of Aircraft Rule 1937 was being implemented.

{superseded by Rule 21 of Aircraft(Security) Rules 2011}
Second hijacking in India Indian Airlines Aircraft hijacked on 10th Sep, 1976,
Mumbai to Delhi taken to Lahore.
4 Outcome Shri B.D. Pandey committee was formed in 1976
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18th Jan, 1978 Formation of DCAS as a cell under DGCA on the

recommendation of Shri B.D. Pandey Committee
2nd August, 1984 A Bomb Explosion at Chennai (Meenabakkam) airport.
5
Outcome Bomb Threat Contingency Plan was Implemented.
23rd Jun, 1985

• Sabotage of Air India aircraft Kanishka Tragedy
over Atlantic Ocean.
• Explosion at Narita airport (Japan) during transfer of
baggage to Air India aircraft.
6 Post Kanishka Tragedy Justice B.N Kirpal, Commission was setup. On 1st April
1987 BCAS was formed as a Regulatory Authority on
Civil Aviation Security under MCA.
Following security measures were introduced
• Identification of baggage-Mandatory
• Reconciliation of baggage was introduced
• Re-identification of registered baggage on interline
station by passenger.
• Checking of baggage manually even after X-ray screening
• Inspection of security arrangements of national air-
carriers at foreign stations by BCAS officers
7 3rd May 1986 Sabotage of Air Lanka aircraft at Colombo airport.

Explosives send through tea consignment in cargo. LTTE
rebels bombed Air Lanka plane at Colombo airport,
killing 16 people
2nd April 1986 Bombing of TWA 840. 04 passengers died while 117
survived. The bomb contained one pound of plastic
explosive. It is suspected it had been placed under the
8 seat cushion on a previous journey by a Lebanese
woman
Outcome Aircraft security check & security search were
improved.
17th April 1986 Attempted sabotage of El Al Israeli Airlines flight 016
from London Heathrow to Tel Aviv. Anne Murphy who
was used by her fiancé Nazer Hindawi of Abu Nidal
Group. She was caught only on the basis of profiling.
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9 Outcome Emphasis on Profiling.
29th Nov 1987 Korean Air Bombing resulted in death of 115 persons
on board aircraft. A bomb was planted inside an
overhead storage bin in the airplane’s passenger cabin
10 by North Korean agents.
Outcome Transit Security checks were given high importance.
21st Dec 1988 Pan Am 103 incident resulted in death of 259 persons
on board aircraft, as well as 11 persons on the ground
at Lockerbie (Scotland).
11
Outcome Marking of Plastic Explosive for the purpose of
detection. Golden principle adopted. No passenger no
baggage and all bomb threat calls to be taken
seriously. Procedure for carriage of mishandled
baggage was introduced.
12 24th Dec 1994 Air France aircraft seized at Algerian airport by four
persons dressed as airline staff - three hostages killed.
Aircraft flown to Marseilles (France) where four
hijackers killed.
13 Nov 1996 ET 961 Ethiopian Airlines was hijacked by asylum
seekers. Crashed in Comoros Island due to insufficient
fuel.
24th Dec 1999 Hijack of Indian Airlines (IC-814) operating from
Kathmandu (Nepal) to Delhi (India). Finally taken to
Kandahar (Afghanistan)
14
Outcome • Introduction of CISF as ASG in Feb 2000
• Secondary Ladder point checks (SLPC) introduced in
January 2000
• Introduction of Sky Marshals
• Modernization / up gradation of electronic detection
devices
• Preventing an Hijacked aircraft to take off from Indian
24 July 2001 Colombo
soil, once itAirport
lands (Bandaranaike Airport) attack by LTTE.
• Review of contingency plans
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Outcome • Raising of Perimeter wall to the prescribed height

15 • Access control system strengthened
• Security of parked aircraft at night
• Deployment of QRT
11th September 2001 Attack by Al Qaida using 04 Aircrafts as a weapon of
Mass destruction in USA.
16
Outcome • Strengthening of cockpit doors

• Locking of cockpit doors
• Implementation of strict pre-embarkation security
checks
• Deployment of sky marshals
• Ban on steel / metallic cutlery with sharp edges.
22nd December 2001 • Richard Reid (Shoe Bomber), a member of Al Qaeda,
boarded American Airlines from Paris to Miami.
Passenger was on Aerial suicide mission.
17
Outcome • Shoe Scanning through XBIS was introduced.
• Carriage of Lighters & Matchbox in the aircraft is
prohibited.
18 28th November 2002 Arkia Airlines (Israel) shot at by shoulder launched
surface-to-air missiles on departure from Mombasa,
Kenya.
August 2006 Heathrow Airport Attack: Attempt to blow up 11
aircraft with the liquid explosive ( TATP)
19
Outcome Restrictions on carriage of more than 100ml of liquid in
cabin baggage
30th June 2007 Glasgow Airport Attack. A dark green Jeep
Cherokee loaded with propane canisters was driven
cabin baggage
into the glass doors of the Glasgow International
20 Airport terminal and set ablaze.
A second bomb was later found in the car parking.
Outcome Focus on Landside security.
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25th December 2009 Northwest Airlines Flight 253 was attacked by a man
21 using a small explosive device hidden in his underwear,
causing only a small fire inside the plane, which is
extinguished by a flight attendant; the man was
subdued by passengers and crew; there were 3 injuries.
Outcome Introduction of Body Scanners
24th January 2011 Moscow Domodedovo International Airport bombing. A
Airport Attack passenger exploded himself in the Moscow airport,
22 International arrival hall, baggage claim area.
Outcome Random screening at the entry gate of the terminal
building. Strengthening
of security towards city side. Landside security was
recommendation.
08th June 2014 Jinnah International Airport (Karachi) was attacked by
10 militants armed with automatic weapons, a rocket
launcher, suicide vests and grenades carried out the
attack. 36 people were killed, including all 10 attackers,
and at least 18 were wounded.
23 Outcome Recommended Practices on landside security, security

awareness training. Proper implementation of security
measures aimed at preventing or minimizing the effect
of ramming vehicle attacks should be incorporated,
such as: physical barriers, for example bollards, crash-
rated planters, speed breakers and chicane to be
placed in curbside and other appropriate areas.
17th July 2014 A Malaysian Airline flight MH 17 flying over Ukraine

and Russia border was bought down by a Buck missile
fired by the militant. Aircraft crashed near Gabrovo in
24 the Donetsk region. Total Passenger 280, crew 15,
Total 295 Pax.
Outcome Annex 17 included provision on attacks against
MANPADs
25 22nd March 2016 Three coordinated nail bombings occurred
in Belgium two at Brussels Airport in Zaventem. Two
suicide bombers, carrying explosives in large suitcases,
attacked a departure hall.
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Avsec for Air Crew BCAS Training Division
Handout 2.1
Page 1 of 1
Module 02
Development of Counter Measures
What Is Unlawful Interference
An illegal interference with international civil aviation, “acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or
do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order and
discipline on board”. Available in the Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful
Interference (Doc 8973 — Restricted) is a comprehensive definition of unlawful interference. However, from
the crew’s perspective, the three major forms of unlawful interference are unruly passenger, hijacking and
bomb threat.
Development of Security Measures
To prevent attacks against civil aviation, it became necessary for the industry to develop security measures.
These security measures can be said to be either:
• Legislative: Legislative measures include the development by ICAO of legal instruments, such as the ICAO
Conventions relating to security.
• Technical: Technical measures are the development of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
contained in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention and the development of AVSEC Programmes at a
national, airport and airline level.
• Physical: Physical measures include preventive procedures, such as the screening of passengers and their
baggage and controlling the movement of people at an airport, protection of aircraft, catering, stores,
cargo, etc.
The Security Measures include the following:
• Baseline security measures

In general terms, this can be described as a normal threat situation where, while there is no intelligence
to indicate that any air carrier or airport has been targeted for attack, there is always the possibility of
unlawful interference by groups and individuals about which there is no intelligence or from criminals,
the mentally disturbed, disaffected employees and the general public. At this level, baseline measures
need to be in place at all times to manage the possible risk.
• Enhanced threat measures

Intelligence indicates the probability (relatively high probability vs. that for Level One) that a particular
air carrier or air carriers and/or a particular airport or airports have been targeted for attack. At this
level, baseline security measures should be enhanced to manage the increased risk.
• Contingency planning for periods of extreme threat

Intelligence indicates that an air carrier and/or airport have been specifically targeted for attack. At this
level, baseline security measures should be further enhanced to manage the increased risk
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02nd April 2013 Trainee Reference Book
Handout 2.2
Page 1 of 3
Aviation Security Role Of Air Crew Members
Security Responsibilities and Awareness
It is the responsibility of everyone to be aware of the need to be alert and vigilant in order to assist in
preventing attacks against aviation. General security awareness applies to any business that has assets to be
protected from inside or outside interference
Security Responsibilities of Air Crew

• Cooperate with and assist security personnel in the implementation of the aircraft operator, airport and
national security programmes;
• Conduct security checks and searches of aircraft to detect weapons or explosive devices which may have
been placed on the aircraft;
• Ensure that passengers, staff, baggage, cargo, mail and all items carried on board an aircraft have been
subject to security control; and
• Respond to acts of unlawful interference or threats of such acts in accordance with the aircraft operator
security programme and prescribed aviation security procedures.
Avoid being Naïve:

Naïve means showing unaffected simplicity or lack of experience, judgment or information. The crew
members should not be naïve and can take precautions to being naïve with the following actions –
• Don’t accept packages from people you have not known for a long period of time.
• Never leave your baggage unattended
• Open and check your bags if you have left them in an hotel room, office, or with a porter
• When purchasing a product overseas, ensure it is wrapped in front of you.
• If you are given something by somebody or do leave your baggage unattended …….. Declare it
• Don’t check-in baggage for other people
• Don’t look after the baggage of strangers at airports
• Be aware of date rape
• Only have electrical items repaired by recognized retail outlets
• Only purchase goods at airports from recognized airport shops
• Don’t lend baggage or electrical items to people you have not known for a long time
• Don’t allow hotel staff to pack your baggage
Personal Security Awareness

Crew must ensure that the operator’s aviation security measures are implemented and that they set an
example by complying with the airline and airport security procedures. Crews should ensure that they:
• Do not leave crew baggage and personal items unattended.
• Do not accept items from any person for carriage on the aircraft.
• Protect items of uniform, identification cards and permits.
• Protect crew documents such as licenses and manuals; and
• Challenge unidentified people at all times who are near, or attempting to board an aircraft, or are within a
security restricted area
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Handout 2.2
Page 2 of 3
Stay Secure:
The Crew members while on duty or on layover have to go to various points viz Hotel, Airport, and Transport,
transiting or even socializing. The crew members must make sure that they are secure in all aspect and take
certain preventive measures or precautions to make themselves secure and safe.
Stay Secure At the Airport

• Lock your Luggage and keep it close by.
• Keep well away from unattended bags and do not use a mobile phone near them
• Where possible avoid long check-in queues, especially for higher risk airlines
• Don’t write your home address on the baggage label
Stay Secure in Transit

• Use approved taxis, avoid sharing
• Get your luggage out of the trunk before leaving
• Have the fare ready, separate from your wallet
Stay Secure at the Hotel

• Trust your Instincts
• Vary your routine when returning to your room
• Check for intruders, look for tampering
• Be discrete with your room number
• Watch out for hotel elevators
• Stay away from the window if you hear gun fire or bomb alarms
• Leave DO NOT DISTURB sign on door when out in the evening.
• Don’t take unexpected deliveries
Stay Safe Whilst Socializing

• Never leave your drink unattended
• Don’t draw attention to yourself
• Avoid sitting in outside cafes on the street
• Areas that attract lots of foreign customers can be easy targets.
• Don’t trust new acquaintances with sensitive information about yourself, your company or your
movements.
• Be aware of sexually transmitted diseases
• The sex industry poses a health risk and security risks to its punters
Crew Baggage:
Preventive measures include ensuring the protection of crew baggage:
• Whilst in transit from home/hotel/point of departure;
• By private/ public/ hotel and company transport.
• At airport/public areas/ banks/ restaurants/ toilets/ shops/ crew lounges.
• Within company or airport restricted areas such as crew reporting/ briefing/ meteorological offices/
transport pick-up/drop-off points; and within passenger lounges and gate areas.
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Handout 2.2
Page 3 of 3
Crew Uniform
Acts of unlawful interference have been assisted in the past using stolen uniforms. Therefore crew should:
• Not leave uniform items unattended or exposed in transport/public areas.
• Not lend uniforms for costume parties.
• When disposing of uniform components de-identify by removal of insignia, name bars, wings, stripes or
other identifying features.
• Report all losses / thefts immediately.
Identification Documents / Airport Permits

• Crew should set an example by always displaying their identification passes/permits and always wear and
display when in security restricted areas;
• Do not abuse use of ID / Permits when off-duty;
• Cooperate fully with security staff at control of entry points
• Produce ID/ permit when requested by police/ security/ airport officials.
Do not be afraid to challenge the identity and purpose of any unknown person around company property,
whether the crew is on or off duty.
Security is the responsibility of everyone and should be seen as an everyday component part of your job.
• Enhance your security
• Be ALERT
• Be OBSERVANT
• Act RESPONSIBLY
• Comply with the SECURITY PROCEDURES
- 35 -
12th June 2016 A man has set off a homemade explosive device at
Shanghai international airport, injuring four people as
well as himself at Pudong International Airport,
Shanghai. The man then took out a knife and stabbed
26 his own neck.
28th June 2016 The Atatürk Airport terrorist attack, consisting of
shootings and suicide bombings. Gunmen armed with
automatic weapons and explosive belts staged a
Outcome simultaneous
Landside attack
security at theainternational
became standard. terminal.
Aviation Security Countermeasures
National regulations on Aviation Security shall comply with the specifications made in the
international conventions and in ICAO's Annex 17.
For example, training programme, quality control programs, airport and airline security
programs can contribute to optimal aviation security on a national level.
The civil aviation industry has developed various countermeasures to counter the
threats.
These countermeasures can be categorized as:

• Legislative
• Technical
• Physical
Legislative Measures
International Conventions (Legal Instruments)

International Conventions are International legal Instruments by which Contracting States
affirm their intention to enforce the terms and provisions contained in these Conventions.
The Chicago Convention of 1944 on International Civil Aviation was instrumental in the
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formation of International Civil Aviation Organization on 4th April 1947. The organization
serves as a forum for cooperation in all fields of Civil Aviation among its 192 member states.
th
India became signatory to the Chicago Convention on 04 April 1947.
The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations and is responsible to promote safe
and orderly development of International Civil Aviation throughout the world. It sets standards
and regulations necessary for Aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as
for Aviation environmental protection.
ICAO has legislative powers by means of the SARPs provided by Annex 17. It also organizes
obligatory security audits at States worldwide. The ICAO Security Manual contains guidelines
on how to implement the SARPs as provided by Annex 17.
International Conventions
Chicago Convention1944
The Chicago Convention, officially called the Convention on

International Civil Aviation, was signed on 7 December 1944. In 1947
it led to the establishment of International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO).
The governments that signed this convention agreed on certain
principles and arrangements to allow a safe and orderly
development of International Civil Aviation. Furthermore, this
convention defines that international air transport services
should be established on the basis of equal opportunities.
This convention has 19 Annexes in total. The most important one concerning security issues
is Annex 17, containing a description of Standards and Recommended Practices that apply to
aviation security. Annex 17- Security, Safeguarding civil aviation against the act of unlawful
intervention.
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Tokyo Convention 1963
The Tokyo Convention was established in 1963. The official name of the convention is the
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. The Tokyo
convention only applies to offences that are committed on board an aircraft in flight.
This convention focuses on offences that jeopardize:
• The safety of the aircraft.

• The safety of the persons on board the aircraft.
• The good order on board the aircraft.
• The penal code of the State of registry of the aircraft.
This convention grants certain rights to the Pilot in Command (PIC), in order to ensure the
safety and order on board of his aircraft:
• Lawful commander of the aircraft
• Restrain passengers when they cause problems using reasonable measures.
• Allow the crew to ask assistance from other passengers to overpower unruly passengers.
• Disembark unruly passengers at the next port of call.
This convention also contains some obligations. The State of landing should:
• Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge.
• Allow the pilot in charge to disembark unruly passengers, disregarding the State's visa
or immigration requirements.
• Take delivery of unruly passengers.
• Take unruly passengers into police custody until the prosecution or extradition is
accomplished.
The Hague Convention 1970
The official name of the Hague Convention, established in 1970, is the

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This
convention made the unlawful seizure of an aircraft (hijacking) an
international offence.
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Contents of the Hague Convention
This convention obliges the States to:

• Make the unlawful seizure of an aircraft punishable by severe penalties.
• Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing and the
State of registry of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
• Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take
off to another destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
• Report every occurrence to ICAO.
The Montreal Convention 1971
The official name of the Montreal Convention, established in 1971, is the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The primary focus of this
convention was the sabotage of an aircraft.
This convention, established the term aircraft in service, A parked aircraft which is under
surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
Contents of the Montreal Convention
This convention defines the following offences:

• Violence against a person on the aircraft.
• Destroying or damaging the aircraft, thus endangering the safety of aircraft in flight.
• Placing on board a device likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
• Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities, likely to endanger the safety of aircraft
in service.
• Communicating false information, such as a bomb threat, likely to endanger the safety
of aircraft in flight.
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• Make attempts and accomplices to offences also punishable by severe penalties.

• Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing as the
State of registry of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
• Take all practical measures, like pre-board screening of passengers, in order to prevent
offences.
• Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take
off to another destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
• Report every occurrence to ICAO.
Protocol to the Montreal Convention 1988
The official name of this protocol, added to the Montreal

Convention in 1988, is the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation.
With this protocol, the definition of offences is broadened to all unlawful acts against a
person or an airport serving international civil aviation, causing or likely to cause:
• Injury or death at an airport
• The destruction or serious damage to the facilities of the airport
• The destruction or serious damage to an aircraft not in service located in that airport
• The disruption of the airport's services
This protocol was created following a series of attacks on international airports that
occurred after the creation of the Montreal Convention in 1971.
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The Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention 1991 (MEX CONVENTION)
The official name of the Marking of Plastic Explosives

Convention, established in Montreal in 1991, is the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection
Convention. This convention focuses on the detection of
explosives.
By 1990, a series of explosions on board an aircraft had a taken place, resulting in the loss of
uncountable liv es and the destruction of multiple aircrafts. These explosions were most
probably caused by bombs placed in checked baggage of passengers who finally did not board
the aircraft.
Contents of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention
This convention allows the use of existing vapour detection technology to detect
plastic explosives. Marking agents should be added to plastic explosives by the manufacturer.
• Prevent the production of unmarked explosives
• Prevent the movement of unmarked explosives through their territory
Beijing Protocol 2010

In 2010 in Beijing, the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was adopted. The Protocol makes amendments and additions to
the original convention.
The Beijing Protocol supplements the Hague Convention, 1970. The Protocol expands the
scope of The Hague Convention to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including
through modern technological means.
National Legislations
Enactment of Acts in India to implement International Legal Instruments:-
India is a signatory to all the above conventions. The terms and provisions of international
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conventions are given legal backup in India by virtue of following Acts:-
• The Aircraft Act 1934, Section 4 as amended from time-to-time

• The Tokyo Convention Act – 1975
• The Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 and its amendment in 1994 was repealed as new The
Anti-Hijacking Act 2016
• Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 Amended in
1994
Other National laws related to implementation and enforcement of National

Civil Aviation Security Programme and other related matters are as under:-
• The Aircraft Act, 1934
• The Aircraft Rules, 1937
• The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003
• The Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
• The Airport Authority of India Act. 1994
• The Explosive Act
• The Other Minor Acts connected with crimes against civil aviation and related matters.
• Orders and regulations
o Gazette Notifications, AVSEC Orders, AVSEC Circulars and Directions issued
by appropriate authority to implement ‘National Civil Aviation Security
Programme’.
o Airports Authority of India Regulations, 2000
The Aircraft Act, 1934 and it’s Amendment Act 2020

It extends to the whole of India and applies also-
(a) To citizens of India wherever they may be;
(b) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be;
(c) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered outside India but for the time being in or
over India; and
(d) to an aircraft operated by a person who is not a citizen of India but has his principal
place of business or permanent residence in India.
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Aircraft Acts (1934) and it’s Amendment Act 2020
The Central Government may constitute a body to be known as the Directorate

Section 4A
General of Civil Aviation
The Central Government may constitute a body to be known as the Bureau of

Section 4B
Civil Aviation Security
The Central Government may constitute a body to be known as the Aircraft

Section 4C
Accidents Investigation Bureau
Power of Central Government to make rules for Civil Aviation amendment

Section 5
added in “The Aircraft (Amendment) Act, 2020
Power to issue directions (DGCA or any other officer empowered by Central

Section 5A
Govt)
Penalty for failure to comply with directions issued under section 5 (2years
Section 10
imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 01 crore or both)
Penalty for failure to comply with directions issued under section 5A (2years
Section 11A
imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 01 crore or both)
The Aircraft Rules, 1937

The Aircraft Rules 1937, extends to the whole of India and apply also (unless the contrary
intention appears) -
(a) To, and to persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be, expect cases
falling under sub-rule(4);
(b) To, and to persons on, all aircraft for the time being in or over India
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Rule 8 Prohibition on carriage of arms, ammunition, explosives, military stores etc.
Prohibition on carriage of intoxicated person entering the aircraft (Operating

Rule 24
Crew)
Rule 24A Carriage of persons suffering from mental disorders or epilepsy in aircraft
Rule 24B Carriage of prisoners in aircraft
Rule 24C Carriage of animals, birds and reptiles in aircraft
Rule 25 Smoking in aircraft
Rule 27 Carriage of persons in unauthorized part of aircraft

Rule 90 Entry into Public Aerodromes
Inspection - (Empowers some of government officials authorized by Central

Rule 156 Government to enter aircraft for inspection, but are not exempted from
frisking/ searching)
Rule 159 Obstruction of Authorized Person
Rule 162 Penalties
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 17 Disembarkation of unruly passenger
Rule 21 Security Checks before embarkation
Rule 23 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods
Rule 26 Deployment of staff –For security Duties
Rule 27 Security Search of Aircraft
Rule 28 Access Control of Aircraft
Rule 29 Closing of Cockpit door
Rule 30 Deployment of In-flight Security Officer
Rule 31 Security control of Hold baggage.
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Rule 37 Security control for cargo and courier bags
Rule 40 Prohibition of certain goods (Cargo and Courier)
Technical Measures
Annex 17 Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention was adopted in 1974 by the

Council of ICAO. Its purpose is to safeguard International Civil Aviation
against acts of unlawful interference.
Annex 17 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that
apply to aviation security
STANDARD PRACTICE: -Specification necessary for the safety and regularity
of international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will conform in
accordance with the Chicago Convention. When they fail to do so, they are
required to inform ICAO about this. In Annex 17, standards always contain the
word shall.
Examples of standard practice:
• Pre-embarkation security checks of passengers, crew, ground
personnel
• Screening of hold baggage’s
• Background checks of personnel
• Each contracting state must have a written NCASP
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: Specification desirable for the interest of safety
and regulatory of international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will
endeavour to conform in accordance with the Chicago Convention. When a
state does not comply with a Recommended Practice, they are invited to
inform ICAO about this. In annex 17, recommended practices always contain
the word should.
Examples of recommended practice:
• SLPC
• Deployment of IFSO (Sky Marshals)
• Use of Body scanners
Contracting states must notify ICAO about every difference to a standard.

The Standards and Recommended Practices are adopted and incorporated as
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Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. There are 19

Annexure to the Chicago Convention.
Annex 17 deals with safe guarding civil Aviation against the act of unlawful
interference. The first edition of Annex 17 was being issued on 22nd March
1974. ICAO conducts Security Audit of each contacting state in order to review
the compliance of Annex-17.
Annex 17: Aviation Security.

Annex 18: The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.
Annex 19: Safety Management System.
ICAO Security Manual
The ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference, (Doc 8973) Restricted, is the principal guidance
document developed by ICAO to assist States in the implementation of the
technical specifications contained in Annex 17.
National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP)

Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written national civil
aviation security programme to safeguard civil aviation operations against acts
of unlawful interference, through regulations practices and procedures which
take into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights.
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National Civil Aviation Security Training programme (NCASTP)
Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure

the development and implementation of a National Training Programme for personnel of all
entities involved with or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the
National Civil Aviation Security Programme. This training programme shall be designed to
ensure the effectiveness of the national civil aviation security programme.
National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control programme (NCASQCP)
Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to develop,

implement and maintain a national civil aviation security quality control programme to
determine compliance with and validate the effectiveness of its national civil aviation security
programme.
Aerodrome Security Programme
Each Contracting State shall require each airport serving civil aviation to establish, implement
and maintain a written airport security programme appropriate to meet the requirements
of the national civil aviation security programme
Aircraft Operators Security Programme
Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air transport operators providing service
from that State have established, implemented and maintained a written operator security
programme that meets the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of
that State.
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Physical Countermeasures
• Anti-hijacking measures
• Anti-sabotage measures
• Anti-Terrorist measures
• Security of personnel
Anti-Hijacking measures
• 100% screening of passengers and their hand baggage.
• Secondary ladder point Check.
• Security of catering
• Locking/Strengthening of cockpit.
• Deployment of IFSO on flights.
• Revised Anti-Hijacking Contingency Plan.
• Conduct periodical mock up exercise.
• Introduction of CISF as ASG.
Anti-sabotage measures
• Screening of registered baggage.
• Identification/reconciliation of registered baggage.
• Supervision of registered baggage from check-in counter till loading into the aircraft by
airline staff.
• Anti-sabotage check at originating station and guarding of aircraft until take off.
• Security of catering.
• Screen/escorting of other items such as cargo, postal mail up to aircraft.
• Guarding of Aircraft
• Perimeter of standard height.
• Access control to Airport
• Anti-sabotage check at originating station and guarding of aircraft until take off.
Anti-Terrorist measures
• Guarding of aircraft and airport facilities.
• Apron/airport access control.
• Deployment of Quick reaction team (QRT).
• Perimeter wall of standard height.
• Perimeter lighting.
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• Perimeter road for Patrolling.

• Watch towers/ Patrolling-Foot or mobile.
• Police station in close proximity of airport.
• Efficient communication system.
Security of personnel
• Airport Entry Permit (AEP) issued after security vetting / Character & Antecedent
verification.
• Co-operate with APSU/ASG while frisking of all AEP holders before entry to airside.
• Display your AEP at airport to detect misuse.
• Never leave your baggage unattended at Airport.
• Never lend your uniform to anyone.
• Never accept a packed gift from anyone.
• If you accept than open, check & confirm it.
• Never discuss the confidential matters relating to AVSEC Rules with unauthorized
personnel.
• On the job supervision/surveillance
Key Responsibilities of States and Appropriate Authority
Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA)
Directorate General of Civil Aviation is an attached office of the

Ministry of Civil Aviation.
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is the regulatory body in
the field of Civil Aviation primarily dealing with safety issues. It is responsible for regulation of
air transport services to/from/within India and for enforcement of civil air regulations, air
safety and airworthiness standards. It also co-ordinates all regulatory functions with
International Civil Aviation Organization.
The headquarters are located in New Delhi with regional offices in the various parts of India.
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Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)
To meet the primary objective of the country the Government of India

has established a dedicated organization namely the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)
and is in existence since 01st April 1987. BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation
security in India. It is headed by Director General, Bureau of Civil Aviation (DG, BCAS) under the
Ministry of Civil Aviation for implementation of Annexure 17 to Chicago convention of
International civil aviation organization (ICAO). DG, BCAS is responsible for the development,
implementation, and maintenance of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme to
safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.
The Aircraft Security Rules 2011 provide legal structure and clearly defines the responsibilities
and methods of implementation.
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SET UP IN INDIA

History
The BCAS initially set up as Directorate of Civil Aviation Security (DCAS) on 18 Jan, 1978, as a
cell under the DGCA on the recommendation of the B D Pandey Committee, in the wake of the
hijacking of Indian airlines on the 10th Sept 1976.
The BCAS was organized into an independent organization on 01st April 1987 under the
Ministry of Civil Aviation on the recommendation of Justice Kirpal Commission formed to
investigate Kanishka tragedy.
BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation security in India. It is headed by an officer of
the rank of Director General of Police and is designated as Director General, Bureau of Civil
Aviation (DG, BCAS)
DG, BCAS is the appropriate authority for implementation of Annexure-17 to Chicago
convention of International Civil Aviation Organization.
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Organization chart of BCAS
Appropriate Authority-DG, BCAS
• Director General, Bureau of Security Civil Aviation (DG, BCAS) is the appropriate
authority
• DG, BCAS is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of
NCASP.
• DG, BCAS under powers conferred to him by Government of India through MCA
notification number 1797 dt. 03rd July 1997 under section 5A of aircraft act 1934 and
Aircarft (amendment) act 2020, has the authority to issue the AVSEC Orders and
Circulars.
Key Responsibilities of DG,BCAS
• Establish, Develop, implement, maintain, and review the NCASP, NCASTP, NCASQCP in
India in accordance with Annexure 17.
• Issue necessary directions on AVSEC.
• Respond immediately to meet any increased security threat.
• Allocate the responsibilities and ensure coordination amongst various agencies
responsible for implementation of the various aspects of the NCASP.
• Designate an authority at each aerodrome serving Civil Aviation who shall be responsible
for coordinating and implementation of security controls.
• Establish Aerodrome Security Committee (ASC) at each aerodrome serving civil aviation
for coordinating the implementation of security controls and procedures as specified in
the airport / aerodrome security programme.
• Arrange for security audit, test, survey, and inspection to be conducted on a regular basis.
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Key Responsibilities of BCAS
• Monitoring
• Training
• Planning
• Coordination
• Conducting surprise / dummy checks
• Advisory Role
• Technical Evaluation
Aviation Security Group (ASG)
CISF/ APSU has been entrusted with security of airports in India. They are termed as ASG.
In February 2000 CISF was deployed at Jaipur.
ASG is responsible for Anti Hijacking, Anti Sabotage and Anti-Terrorist measures
Unit’s or Components of ASG/APSU
• Intelligence and surveillance unit

• Anti-hijacking unit
• Support unit
• Protection unit
Roles:-
• Surveillance and Patrolling of Airport Terminal Areas

• Surveillance of arrival / departing passengers
• Pre-embarkation Security Checks of Passengers
• Access Control of airport.
• Security of Sterile Hold Area
• Prevent contamination of security cleared passengers
• Training.
• Handling of Contingencies.
Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS)

The ASG’s BDDS unit is responsible for the following functions
• Detection and disposal of Explosive Devices.

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• Attending bomb threat calls of aircraft and terminal buildings

• Handling of unclaimed and suspected baggage.
• Disposal / Demolition of confirm threat / IED.
• Store Explosive used in demolition of IEDs.
• Participate in the BTAC.
Role of Airport Operators:
The authority who provides infrastructure and facilities at airport is called airport operator. It
is their responsibility to provide a secure operating environment to airports as per norms
approved/prescribed by the appropriate authority.
The main roles of airport operators are:
• Issuance of vehicle permits & ADP for access of vehicles in operational areas
• Preparation of various Contingency Plans for the airport which is required to be
approved by Appropriate Authority.
• Provision & maintenance of Perimeter / fencing, Perimeter road, perimeter lighting,
apron, gates / entry points, security hold area, frisking points/booth, Provision of
Security Stamps, hand baggage checking counter, isolated parking bay, Cooling pit etc.
• Provision & maintenance of electronic equipment’s / devices like X-ray BIS, DFMD,
HHMD for passenger screening
• Sign boards for educating the passengers / airport employees
• Co-ordination in the event of any contingency at the airport.
• Inline Screening.(Wherever Applicable)
• All operational and administrative expenses of ASG/APSU
• Issuance of Temporary airport entry passes
Role of Airline Operators:

Airline / Aircraft Operator is responsible for anti-sabotage functions including security
screening of registered baggage passenger baggage reconciliation, checking catering, cargo
etc. They carry out these function based on their security programme.
The main role of airline / aircraft operator is:
• Security of Aircraft
• Aircraft Search (Pre-flight anti-sabotage Checks)
• Security of parked / idle aircraft.
• Screening of Registered Baggage
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• For security and surveillance in BMA and for accompanying the screened baggage up to
aircraft.
• Security in Baggage break-up area.
• Screening and escorting of screened cargo / unaccompanied baggage
• Secondary security checks.
• Surveillance in departure hall
• Security of catering items.
Scope of career in the field of Aviation Security:-

• Screening.
• Cyber Security.
• Profiling.
• Drone security.
• Aviation security training.
• Aviation security audits.
Foundation for a Person

• Career progression be linked with successful completion of the training programmes.
• Depending on and according to local organizational structure and career development
programmes.
Need for Security Awareness

• Security is everyone’s business
• Protect assets (people and property)
• Staying alert and vigilant to unusual or suspicious activities
• Comply with all security requirements.
Airline Assets
• Customers
• Staff
• Aircraft
• Other property and facilities
Everyday Question?
“What can be done to ensure that the aircraft, passengers and crew arrive safely at the final
destination?”
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Everyday Answer!
• Be alert
• Be vigilant
• Comply with security procedures
• Do not be afraid to challenge and positively identify any person (whether in uniform
or not) who is:
• Within a restricted area
• On board an aircraft
• Near an aircraft
Safeguard at all Times
• Items of uniform
• ID cards/permits
• Accountable documents
• Tickets / boarding cards
Safeguard station documentation
• Security manuals / directives,

• Briefing information sheets,
• Operational checklists and
• Crew Manifests
• Crew Baggage Labels
These items have been used to gain unlawful access and to provide information which has
resulted in cases of unlawful interference.
Security responsibilities
• Police and security staff
• Baggage handlers
• Inspection agencies staff
• Aircraft maintenance staff
• Tenants and concessionaries
• Aircraft equipment maintenance staff
• Cargo handlers
• Ramp services
• Fueling services
• Passenger agents
• Emergency services
• Passengers and Airport visitors
• Other airport staff
****END****
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नागर विमानन सुरक्षा ब्यूरो - भारत
MODULE -3
Working at Airport
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A Typical layout of an airport

Arrival / Departure Areas Passenger check-in and departure area
Passenger/baggage screening areas
Baggage make-up area Arrival Hall / Baggage Claim Area
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Airport Administration Building Operations Building
ATC Complex Fuel farms
Air Traffic Control Tower (ATC) Fuel storage area
Cargo Complex Cargo Hold
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Maintenance area Air Navigation Aids
Catering Establishment
Catering Establishment
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MODULE -4
ACCESS CONTROL -
PEOPLE and VEHICLES
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MODULE 04
ACCESS CONTROL PEOPLE AND VEHICLE
THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION
• Hijacking of aircraft on the ground or in flight or on the ground

• Sabotage of Aircraft
• Sabotage of Airports.
• Armed attacks on / off Airport facilities
Hijacking (Acts of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft): Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (i)
Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises
control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or (ii) is an accomplice of a person
who performs or attempts to perform any such act, commits the offence of hijacking that
aircraft.
Sabotage: An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of Aircraft or

property, endangering or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its
facilities.
Armed attacks on / off Airport facilities :- Terrorist attacks/ shootout outside the Terminal building or at off
airport locations and facilities affiliated with Civil Aviation.
Access Control Challenges
• Size of the airport and boundary

• Number of workers at an airport
• The requirement for people and vehicles to have legitimate access to controlled and security
restricted areas for operational purposes
• Airports are often 24-hour per day operations
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Purpose of Access Control
To control the movement of people and vehicles from landside (non-security restricted areas)
into airside (controlled and security restricted areas)
Responsibility of Access Control
The responsibility of controlling people and vehicle movement through gates from landside to airside
is of the ASG / APSU
Access Control Points
• Must be always manned they are open or in use, or otherwise locked or closed.
• All persons working at the airport must use the SRA access points when entering SRA, (includes
aircraft crew and airline employees).
• Access to Airside or Security Restricted Areas must be allowed only to those vehicles with a
clear operational requirement
• The admission of vehicles to Airside areas should be restricted for reasons of security
and safety and to avoid congestion on Aircraft movement areas
SRA Control Points
External Access Control Points
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Internal Access Control Points
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Access Control Point for Staff
Physical Barriers
Controlled by security guard using Equipment such as a turnstile for People and a drop-arm barrier for
vehicles
Tripod turnstile Drop Arm Barrier
Automated Access Control Systems (AACS)
• Coded card (with or without PIN)

• Proximity card (RF) (with or without PIN)
• Biometric Systems.
• Facial Recognition system.
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Access is required by
PEOPLE VEHICLE
Passenger Airport Operator
Airport Employees Airlines Operators
Airlines and Tenant Employees Police Department
Other Organizations like ASG/ Customs and Other Organizations like ASG/ Customs and
Immigration Immigration
Authorized Government Officials Authorized Government Officials
Diplomatic Representatives Authorized Government Officials
Emergency Services Catering Agencies
Visitors Cargo Agencies
Access Control- Passengers
• Require valid Ticket/ boarding card and Travel Identification documents

• Family and friends should NOT be allowed to accompany passengers into the Security
Restricted Area.
Valid document for entry into the aerodrome:

• Passport;
• Voter Photo Identity card issued by Election Commission of India;
• Aadhaar or m-Aadhaar issued by Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI);
• PAN Card issued by Income Tax Department;
• Driving License issued by RTO;
• Service Photo Identity Card issued by State/Central Government, Public Sector
Undertakings, local bodies or Public Limited Companies;
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• Student Photo Identity Cards issued by Government Institutions / Government recognized

Educational Institutions;
• Nationalized Bank Passbook with attested Photograph;
• Pension card / Pension documents having photograph of the passenger;
• Disability Photo ID Card/handicapped medical certificate issued by the respective
State/UT Governments/Administrations
Passenger identity checks at Counters
The purpose of identity checks at check-in is to establish that:
• the passport or identity document is genuine and valid.

• name on the booking matches the name on passport or ID document
• photograph in the passport or ID document matches with the passenger
• If doubt about a passenger's identity or the validity of documents presented, inform the
supervisor.
Arrangements around the check-in facilities
The purpose is to establish:

• Suspicious activities of persons and passengers shall be kept under surveillance by CCTV and
ASG surveillance staff
• The Aviation Security Group's armed personnel shall be deployed in the check-in area
• The airlines will conduct profiling of passengers prior to check-in process.
Access Control of Airport Employees- AEP
• Aerodrome Entry Permit” means the photo identity card, smart card or temporary permit
issued by the DG, BCAS authorized by the Central Government for entry into the
aerodrome or part of an aerodrome.
• If used in conjunction with an automated access control system, permits may be
equipped with electronic or other machine-readable codes to allow entry.
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Categories of AEP
• AEPs: for a period exceeding 30 days to a of maximum validity upto three years.
• TAEPs: will be for a period of minimum 1 day and maximum 30 days in a year from the date of
issue of first Temporary entry Permit (TAEP)
• Casual Labour: The contractor shall provide the list of casual labours along with their ID cards.
This list shall be treated as appointment letter.
• Visitor Admission Ticket Visitors will have access to the demarked visitor area of respective
airports for a period of four hours' duration.
• Transferable AEP: An AEP without photograph which may be issued to Embassies/ High
Commissions specifically recommended by MEA on the principle of reciprocity. This will be
valid only with the identity card of the holder issued by their concerned organization.
Pre-requisite of issuance of AEP
• Approval of Security Programme /Security Clearance of the entity

• Background Check of individuals.
• AVSEC Training, as prescribed in NCASTP.
TAEP
• All the above except background check. Under escort of a valid AEP holder of the
concerned entity.
AEP holder should:
• Always wear and display AEP in security restricted areas on outer most garment, above
waist level.
• Do not misuse AEP or permits when off duty.
• Cooperate with ASG security staff while frisking of all AEP holders before entry to airside.
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• Keep Positive Security attitude.

• Produce I.D. or permits when requested by BCAS, ASG and airport officials.
• Report lost and theft of AEP
• Surrender of AEP.
• All AEPs/TAEPs shall be handed over to the staff/casual labour at the beginning of the
shift by the supervisor/ custodian of permits.
• AEP/TAEP shall not be handed over to persons when they are not on shift.
• At the end of the shift all AEPs/TAEPs shall be collected back and kept in safe custody to
avoid misplacement/ misuse of any permit.
• Handing over/ taking over of AEPs/TAEPs shall be documented by entries in register.
Image of Biometric AEP
ACCESS CONTROL POINT AT AIRCRAFT
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Vehicle Access Point Location
• Vicinity of passenger terminal buildings

• Entrance to VIP/Cargo/Maintenance areas and GA.
• Entrance to ATC tower and operations building
• Vicinity of fuel storage areas
• Entrance to air navigation facilities
Vehicle Control
• Entry gates to remain closed

• Glass mirror or inverted mirror required for checks
• Appropriate screening equipment for checking of personnel
• Availability of communication equipment at gate
Access Control Point
• Carry out search of vehicles to detect prohibited articles.

• Apply Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for vehicles.
• Describe the procedures for dealing with irregularities or security incidents.
• Control point record book/log
• Control point Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Equipment for access control
The security personnel taking over duty at an access control point should always make sure of the
operational status of the access point by checking that all equipment at the control post is in
working order.
• Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.

• Communication system, such as radio, telephone
• Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors, explosive trace detection
• Search for vehicles, e.g., lights, angled mirrors
• Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) including stop lists
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Documents required for Vehicle entry to SRA
➢ Drivers
• Aerodrome Entry Pass/ Permit (BCAS)
• Airside Driving Permit
• Driving License
• Undergone a training programme on airport safety rules.
➢ Vehicle Permit
• Issued by Airport Operator
All motorized vehicles and equipment used on the airside in the vicinity of aircraft should be
“safety inspected” prior to the issue of an airside access permit. Permits for vehicles should contain
the following information:-
• Registered number of vehicle

• Name of organization
• Areas to which access allowed
• Period of validity
• Access control points to be used
• Authorized signature
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Examining Vehicle Permits
• Vehicle number on permit matches actual vehicle registration number

• Name of organization is correct and bona fide
• Permit is valid and not expired
• Permit valid for access point
• Authorizing signature correct / bona fide.
Airside Driving Permit (ADP)
Only Drivers having ADP are allowed to drive Vehicle in the Airside issued to the Staff by Airport operator.
Access Control Point Equipment
The security personnel taking over duty at an access control point should always make sure of the
operational status of the access point by checking that all equipment at the control post is in
working order.
• Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.

• Communication system, such as radio, telephone
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• Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors, explosive trace
detection
• Search for vehicles, e.g., lights, angled mirrors
• UVSS and UVSM
• Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) including stop lists
EQUIPMENT FOR ACCESS CONTROL
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Tyre Killer, Bollards, Boom Barrier
Tyre Killer, Bollards, Boom Barrier
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Vehicle Search
• Must have authority for search

• Search is for restricted articles (explosives and incendiary substances and/or devices and other
restricted articles, substances and devices)
• Not searching for contrabands or Narcotics.
(Weapons may be dismantled, and Explosive devices may be disguised or camouflaged.)
• Interior driver / passenger areas
• Trunk, boot or load carrying area
• Engine compartment
• Underside of the vehicle
• Roof
• External apertures
Access Control Point Log Entry
• Time control point was opened or handed over to a new shift

• The status of check point equipment
• Record of incidents at the control point
• An inventory of items and/or equipment kept at the control point for its operation
• Record visits to the control point by Supervisors
• Details of vehicle/ non-pass holders / visitors attempting to gain access at the control point
• Details of vehicles admitted; (depending on frequency and local SOP)
• Nature and brief of the incident
• Responding agencies etc.
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Suspicious Activities
• Unknown person trying to gain access as passenger/ staff.

• Unknown person in vehicle trying to gain access to restricted area.
• Carrying parcel which was “suspect”
• Items that may be weapons or explosive devices should be treated as “suspicious”
Action when Prohibited or Suspicious Item Detected (Contents of Local SOP
• Remain calm and polite

• Do not alarm person/ vehicle driver.
• Do not allow the person/ vehicle to enter the airport.
• Do not try to restrain the person/driver or use physical force.
• Immediately notify supervisor.
Suspect Device
DO NOT TOUCH IT
DO NOT TOUCH IT
DO NOT TOUCH IT
Notify Supervisor
DO NOT OPEN
DO NOT UNWRAP
DO NOT SHAKE OR HANDLE
DO NOT TURN OR UNSCREW
DO NOT CUT STRINGS, ETC.
DO NOT LIFT OR REMOVE COVERS
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BDDS- Response
Permission of Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC
• Vehicle access up to the Tarmac Area of the Civil Airport in the country.
• On Grounds of Protocol
• On Grounds of Security
• On Medical Grounds
Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC on Ground of Protocol
• Speaker of Lok Sabha

• First Lady (Wife of President of India)
• Wife of Vice President of India
• Foreign Ambassador/ High Commissioner on the first arrival and final departure
Personal Vehicles without escort up to the Tarmac Area of the Civil Airports within their States / Union
Territories:
• Governors
• Lt. Governors of Union Territories
• Chief Ministers
• Governors and Chief Minister, Sikkim at Bagdogra airport in West Bengal
Other Dignitaries / Ministers from abroad
• AAI Vehicles
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Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC on Ground of Security
Personal Vehicles with escort during departures / arrivals at all airports in the country:
• President
• Vice President
• Prime Minister
• Visiting Heads of State
• Former President of India
• Former Prime Minister of India
• Chief Justice of India
Access of Vehicle up to TARMAC on Medical Ground

• DALAI LAMA
****END****
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MODULE -5
RECOGNITION OF EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES AND OTHER
RESTRICTED ARTICLES
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Restricted / Prohibited Article
“
or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation,
or which may endanger the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, or installations, or the public.”
Restricted articles are not allowed to be taken into security restricted areas and, if feasible,
prevented from entering public areas of an airport unless their carriage is authorized, and
adequate safety and security measures are in place. Additionally, restricted articles not allowed
be taken inside an aircraft cabin or placed in an aircraft hold without authorization.
For clarification and identification purposes, potential restricted articles are generically grouped as
follows:
A) Dangerous goods listed in Table 3-1 of Doc 9284:
i) prohibited for transport in accordance with Part 8. Unless proper measures are taken, Part 8
dangerous goods cannot be carried in passenger baggage but might be acceptable as cargo.
ii) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the cabin may be
restricted by a security ban.
iii) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the cabin may not be
permitted under aircraft operator policy; or
iv) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the cabin is not
permitted; and
B) Restricted articles:
That are not considered dangerous goods, but whose carriage is nonetheless prohibited in the
cabin and, for security reasons, are not transferable to hold baggage.
Restricted Articles
Some articles though prohibited from carriage in the cabin of an aircraft may be transported by
passengers in their hold baggage so long as the articles will not endanger the aircraft, are properly
packed, and are authorized for carriage by the airline operator concerned.
Persons tasked primarily with the detection of prohibited articles should also be aware that
there are certain articles or substances which are classified as “dangerous good ” by the ICAO
Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. (Doc 9284).
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Some of these articles and substances classified as prohibited articles will also fall under the
classification of dangerous goods. The exception given of a small number of permitted items,
dangerous goods must not be carried by passengers on their person or in their carry-on baggage or
hold baggage.
Any article not normally classified as Prohibited articles shall also be excluded from carriage by
passengers or any other person in the cabin of an aircraft or in hold baggage or carried into the
Security Prohibited Area of an airport based upon the threat assessment done by the Intelligence
bureau.
Handling of Prohibited Items
Many prohibited articles may be carried by the public legally but could be used to commit an act of
unlawful interference or would endanger the safety of the aircraft when carried in the aircraft
passenger cabin, may be transported as hold baggage if they do not endanger the safety of the
aircraft and are properly packed, sealed and authorized for carriage by Aircraft Operator. Such
items should be processed in one of the following ways:
• Placed in the passengers hold baggage unless the item would endanger the safety of the aircraft.
• Confiscated and subsequently properly disposed of or destroyed.
• Confiscated and kept in storage by the airport authorities or relevant aircraft operator for later
return to the passenger.
• Removed and once properly prepared and packaged, transported in the hold of the aircraft for
later return to the passenger at his ticketed destination.
Categories of Restricted Articles
1. Weapons
2. Dangerous Articles
3. Dangerous substances
4. Explosive
Category -1: Weapons
Weapons are articles designed to kill, injure, immobilize, or incapacitate a person.
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EXAMPLES OF WEAPONS
Handguns, flare guns, blow guns and darts, electric dart guns, rifles, shotguns pellet guns, spear
guns and dart, knives with blades over 10 cms, mace, tear gas shell, martial arts weapons, pepper
spray, blades or spiked finger rings and wrist bands, sword canes and umbrella swords etc.
Category 2: Dangerous articles
Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft.
Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft Starter pistols, toy guns, replica
of weapons, sharp pointed scissors and letter openers, chisels, ice picks, large Screwdrivers and
knitting needles, pocketknives with blades over 4cm but less than 10cms, etc.
Category 3: Dangerous Substances
Substances which are capable of posing hazard to the health of passengers and crew or the security
/ safety of aircraft or property.
• Flammable liquid fuel e.g., Petrol / gasoline, diesel, lighter fluid, alcohol, ethanol.
• Gas & gas containers e.g., Butane, propane, acetylene, oxygen - in large volume.
• Non safety matches
• Turpentine & paint thinner
• Acids and Alkalis e.g., spillab ‘ e ’ batteries
• Corrosive or Bleaching Substances - e.g., mercury, chlorine
• Radioactive material. - e.g., Medicinal, or commercial isotopes
• Poisons
• Infectious or biological hazardous material. - e.g., infected blood, bacteria, and viruses
• Material capable of spontaneous ignition or combustion.
• Fire extinguishers
Additional Items Prohibited for Flights assessed at Higher Risk:
A risk assessment made by individual member states may indicate that certain aircraft operations
are at higher risk of an act of unlawful interference being committed against them. In these
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circumstances individual member states may wish to include one or more of the following items
in the stat ’ list of Prohibited articles which may not be carried on the person and within cabin
or hold baggage as appropriate.
• Knitting needles
• Knives with blades less than 6 cm
• Metal cutlery
• Scissors with blades less than 6 cm
• Liquid Aerosol and Gels (LAG)- each item not exceeding 100ml, total 1litre allowed.
Category 4: Explosives
Material that causes a sudden, almost instantaneous, release of gas, heat, and pressure,
accompanied by loud noise when subjected to a certain amount of shock, pressure, or
temperature.
Most explosives manufactured are lawfully used. The armed forces use propellants to propel
bullets, shells and rockets and explosives to destroy a target. Pyrotechnic materials are used in
signaling, in safety devices such as car air bags, and for entertainment in the form of fireworks
and theatrical pyrotechnics.
Low explosives
For many years, black powder was the most common low explosive used throughout world. But
black powder or gun powder as it was commonly called, produced a large amount of smoke
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and was dangerous to use.
Pyrotechnic materials and propellants are often known as low explosives. The main distinction
between these materials and high explosives is in the way that they produce their effect.
Pyrotechnics and propellants, when initiated by heat, rapidly change from a small volume solid or
liquid to a large volume of hot gases. Pyrotechnic materials and propellants are easily bought
in the form of matches, fireworks or firearms propellants or can be improvised. They are therefore
commonly misused by terrorists in incendiaries and blast bombs. The “pipe bomb” is usually a length
of steel pipe with screw-on end caps, filled with a pyrotechnic material.
High explosives
As far as explosives detection is concerned, most modern high explosives fall into several groups:
• Nitroglycerin based explosives are often called “commercial explosives”. Trade or generic
names for Nitroglycerine explosives include “Dynamite”, “Gelignite”, “Blasting Gelatin”,
“Special ” and “Frangex”, and usually come as paper- wrapped sticks.
• TNT based. TNT (trinitrotoluene) is a hard, yellowish white solid that can easily be melted
and cast. For this reason, it has long been used to fill bombs and shells. TNT is sometimes
found as blocks and is often supplied in the form of flakes. Terrorists have sometimes
disguised TNT by casting it into any shape.
• Plastic explosives. Plastic explosives are usually mixtures of the powerful explosives RDX
(cyclonite or hexogen) or PETN (pentaerythritol tetra nitrate) with oil or grease, making a
puttylike material. Plastic explosives are easily molded into any shape and have many
military and industrial uses. They are commonly used by terrorists. It is well known that
a few hundred grammes of plastic explosives can destroy an airliner. “C4”, “PE4” and
“Semtex H” are well known plastic explosives.
• Fuel/oxidant mixtures. Fuel/oxidant mixtures comprise something that burns, such as oil,
and an oxygen-containing chemical which liberates oxygen quickly on heating, such as
ammonium nitrate. Mixtures of almost any fuel with any oxidant will produce either a
pyrotechnic or high explosive effect.
Most modern commercial explosives are fuel/oxidant mixtures. ANFO (ammonium nitrate and fuel
oil) and “Power gel” are examples.
Identification of explosive
S. No Explosive Color Physical Form
1 RDX White Crystal

line
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2 PETN White Crystal

line
3 Sheet Expl White Flexible
4 C–4 White Plastic/Putty like substances
5 TNT Pale Yellow Block (Brick Shaped)
Cartridge/plastic mass
6 PEK Yellow
7 Tetryl/CE Yellow Granular/Powder
8 Cordtex Chocolate / White / Orange Cord
9 LTPE Black Flexible/cartridge
10 Semtex Black/orange Slurry
11 Gun powder Black Granular
Pyrotechnic
S .No Explosive Color Physical Form
1 Safety Fuse Dirty black Yarn/jute bounded
Civil Explosives
1 Gelatin Yellow Stick
2 Dynamites Yellow Cartridge wrapped in paper
3 ANFO Greenish Slurry with white crystal of AN
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Components
An IED is the explosive device designed, fabricated, placed, and activated with an intention of
causing injury/death or to create panic and chaos amongst public or to cause intensive damage to
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property. IED’s could be of any size and shape.
IED could be manufactured in any innocuous objects such as Briefc a s e , Suitcase, Tiffin carrier,
Sweet packet, Gift item, Radio, Laptop computer, TV, VCR, Telephone, Cycle, Scooter, Car, Vehicle
etc. It may be operated electrically or mechanically and designed to explode while handling or
by use of any delay mechanism or remote control etc. Its components are:
1. Explosive material (main charge)
2. Detonator
3. Power source
4. Switch/ Mechanism
1. Explosive material
To attack the aviation industry the terrorist will prefer using high explosive as it is safe to
carry, small quantity is sufficient to cause a huge damage, it is also easy to conceal.
2. Detonator
There are various devices used for initiating explosives and connecting charges. These include
detonators, fuses, and shock tube. A detonator is a small cylinder containing an initiating explosive
and, usually, a “booster” charge of high explosive. It is used to initiate the detonation of high
explosives. In blasting and demolition, the detonator is normally stored separately from the high
explosives and inserted only when the charges are placed, and the area is evacuated.
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• Non-Electric detonators are open at one end. A fuse is inserted into the open end and the
spark from the fuse impinges on the initiating explosive and fires the detonator. The plain
detonator is sometimes used with percussion caps and other devices which can produce a
flame. This is half filled and half empty for inserting safety fuse.
• Electric detonators have wires emerging at one end. They are fired by passing an
electric current through the wires. In terrorist and criminal use, a battery together with an
improvised electrical delay circuit (timer and power unit) is commonly used to initiate the
detonator.
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3. Power Source Power sources of bomb could be from normal batteries such as 1.5V, pencil and
torch cells, 6V, 9V etc. There are flat batteries, which can be used for letter bombs. Latest
batteries manufactured in pure plastic containers, which are difficult to view in machine.
4. IED Initiating Mechanism or Switches used in an IED:

These are also known as Bomb Initiating Mechanism. It normally is based on four principles they
employ such as:
• ANTI HANDLING
• DELAYED
• AMBIENT CONDITION
• REMOTE CONTROL/ COMMAND
ANTI HANDLING
Anti-Handling Bombs when it is inadvertently removed, lifted, or opened it may explode.
Anti-handling switches may vary from a small micro switch to improvised switch such as cloth-peg or
loop made from normal electrical wire. It is otherwise called as “Victim operated switch”.
DELAYED
Delayed Bombs delay was achieved by normal clockwork mechanism like watch or timepiece.
Delay can also be used by chemicals cleverly concealed in ordinary objects and these chemicals
when meet Improvised explosives causes fire or explosion. Chemicals such as sulphuric acid, cupric
chloride, nitric acid slowly eats away the metal, the breaking of metallic wire will trigger the firing
mechanism.
AMBIENT CONDITION
The triggering mechanism is activated by environmental factors such as gas, smoke acoustic,
barometric, humidity, proximity, light, sound etc.
REMOTE CONTROL
Normal remote-control bombs are activated by transmission of electromagnetic waves.
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Type of Switches / Mechanism
Anti-Handling Delayed Ambient Condition Remote Control
Pressure Clock Work Proximity Radio control

Pressure release Electronic Gas/ smoke sensitive FM Transmission
Timer PTD Barometric/ humidity Command wire
Pull
Timer Thermal Infra-red beam
X-ray sensitive
Collapsing delay Laser.
Infrared sensitive
Circuit
Water Drip Metal sensitive Cell phone
Tension
Water Add Acoustic sensors Pager
Vibratory
Pyrotechnics Light / Dark sensitive
Lift Satellite Phones
EFFECTS OF EXPLOSION
a) Blast Effect
High pressure -Up to 40, 00,000 PSI.
Velocity of Detonation of TNT -25,000 KMPH.
b) Fragmentation
Speed of fragments may be up to 6000 KMPH.
c) Thermal
High Temperature of 3000 – 4000 0 C.
d) Translation
Bodies are lifted 30 to 60 feet above ground level and thrown 100 mts. away.
e) Concussion
In the air a vacuum or suction effect is created behind the moving blast wave.
f) Earth and water shock
Damage takes place miles away.
g) Secondary effects
Fire, damage to building, vehicles etc.
It is estimated that 50 PSI of pressure cause eardrum to rupture and 250 PSI of pressure applied on
lungs of a human being, can cause his death. The high pressure of 40 lakh pounds per square inch
(PSI) and high velocity of atmosphere moving at thousands of KMPH will cause death to anyone
situated in the blast zone. Therefore, we find many people are killed beyond recognition at the point
of detonation.
Places of Concealment of Explosives
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• On the person
• In cabin baggage
• In hold baggage
• In Cargo or Mail
• In vehicles
Methods of Concealment
Ways of concealment can be either Disguised, Dismantled & Camouflaged
• Explosives in Shaving Cream Tubes

• Liquid Explosives in Whisky or Wines Bottles
• Explosives in Birthday Cake
• Blasting Gelatin Embedded in Chocolate
• TNT Cast in Toy Shapes, Doll Head, animals, Wall Painting.
• IED in false Bottom of Baggage.
• Explosive Jacket.
• Preparation of Explosive from Local Material
• Detonator Hidden in Pen, Calculators and Shoe Sole.
******END**********
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MODULE -8
PROFILING AND BEHAVIOUR

DETECTION
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Profiling is described as a systematic observation to categorize each passenger by creating a short

biographical character sketch to study certain characteristic personal manner or attitude, to decide
whether the passenger is a threat to the airline or not.
Behaviour Detection Within an aviation security environment, the application of techniques involving
the recognition of behavioural characteristics, including but not limited to physiological or gestural signs
indicative of anomalous behaviour, to identify persons who may pose a threat to civil aviation.
Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures to increase their deterrent effect and their
efficiency, by applying them at irregular frequencies, different locations and/or with varying means, in
accordance with a defined framework.
Profiling is done to detect the following:
- A terrorist with intent to harm the airline.

- A terrorist with intent to cause damage to the terminal building, aircraft etc.
- Asylum seekers
- criminals
- Detection of fraudulent travel documents
- Traffickers of drugs, contraband, and Human Trafficking
Passenger Classification
Correct classification of passenger is the key element in security system. All passengers can be classified
as non-threatening and Threatening based on the suspicious sign in appearance and behavior displayed
by them.
Non- Threatening: - Are those passengers who does not pose any threat to the flight.
Threatening: - Are those passengers who have/ possess potential threat to the flight. These are the
passengers we need to keep a vigil on.
Threatening passengers are again of two types. The first type is that who does not know that they pose
a threat to the flight. While the other type of passenger are aware of this.
- UNAWARE
- AWARE
Unaware passenger:
- Naïve: - Who is unaware that his/ her baggage is in- filtered with explosives.
- Partly Naïve: - Who does not have any link with the terrorist organization but is not aware that he is
carrying explosives. Example, a passenger carrying an item on behalf of someone without checking the
contents. He knows that the package is not his but is totally unaware that the package given to him is an
IED.
- Framed terrorist: - Is one who has connection with a terrorist organization, is carrying materials for them,
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but is not aware what will be the consequences of carrying the same. Instead of the documents, his
organization has given him an IED to carry. He is being used by his own organization.
Aware passenger
- Terrorist/ Hijacker: - is one who will harm by creating unlawful interference and escapes from the
target to save his/ her own life. Example bombing of Kanishka, Pan Am etc.
- Suicidal Terrorist: - is one who is ready to sacrifice his own life while creating unlawful interference.
Example Suicide incident in Moscow airport.
All Passenger
Threatening Non-threatening
unaware aware safe to travel
Unaware
Naive Partly Naive Framed Terrorist
Aware
Terrorist/ Hijacker
Suicidal Terrorist
Five Steps for Profiling
1. The Interviewing processes.

2. Threat assessment.
3. Visual profile of potential terrorist.
4. Knowledge of the information in the accompanying documents of the traveler
5. Knowledge of the average traveler.
Profiling is carried out on
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• Passenger
- Business travelers
- Couples
- Traveling alone
- Traveling with Family
- Traveling with group
- Tourists
- Students
- Officials and VIPS
- Unaccompanied
- Pilgrimage
- Mourners
- Sick
- Prisoners
- Immigration deportees
• Baggage
- Carryon Baggage
- Hold Baggage
- Other items.
• Travel documents
- Passport (expired; forged; alterations; etc.)
- Visa,
- Ticket (last minute purchase; one way ticket; uneconomical routing; etc.)
- List of documents permitted for entry into Terminal.
Equipment or tools used for Profiling:
• X-BIS
• Explosive detectors
• Metal detectors
• Machine to check passport.
• Ultra-violet light
• Biometrics (Iris Scan; facial recognition; voice recognition; hand geometry; fingerprint)
Tools essential to the successful performance
a) Deviations from the norm. Any abnormality displayed either by the passenger, his travel
documents and/or his baggage.
b) Lessons from the Past. It is a known fact that terrorist use forged, altered or stolen passports and
tickets to hide their identity. The tickets are mostly purchased in the last minute and in cash.
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c) Suspicious Signs. Any deviation from the norm along with lessons of the past is good enough to
’ nce and behavior,
documentation and/or baggage. At times in case, we see a person in possession on a weapon, it
can be for a specific reason for acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, then it is termed
as critical sign and calls for the passenger to be handed over to the law enforcement.
d) Questioning Guidelines. Is used to confirm or resolve any suspicious sign observed during the
profiling process.
e) Positive Signs.
1. Diplomats have been through a strict security clearance process and are well known to the
Government, therefore, they are unlikely to carry out a terrorist act.
2. Designated VIPs or guests of the airline. These are well known to the airline and the public. They
’ hese people being involved in
a terrorist organization.
3. Direct employees of the Airlines who present a valid employee ID card and a valid ticket. All the
airline employees go through background checks to verify the possibility of being involved with a
terrorist organization prior to begin hired.
4. Military personnel and their families usually live in secure military compounds. They are more
security conscious, and it would be more difficult for ’ groups to have contact with them.
5. Frequent flyers are exposed to the airline security personnel, Immigration and Customs officials
very often. The Company has a lot of information about these people such as addresses, phone
numbers, etc.
6. A child under 12 years is unlikely to be involved with or used by a terrorist organization to carry
out an attack due to their maturity level and lack of experience.
7. Group traveling together. It would be difficult for a terrorist to infiltrate a group without raising
suspicion as they all have a common background, known to each other, ticket issued from the
same agent etc. Terrorists would not want to be part of a group because of the reservations and
information they would have to supply.
f. The Mandatory Baggage Control Questions (MBCQ).

1. Is it your baggage?
2. Did you pack it yourself?
3. Do you know the contents?
4. Was the bag in your custody throughout?
5. Are you carrying any electronic / electrical goods?
- If yes, since how long have you owned it?
- Did you lend it to someone in the recent past?
- Has it ever been repaired?
6. Did you accept any gift / packets etc. from any other person to be carried on their behalf?
7. Note: From now till the time, you board the aircraft, do not leave your hand baggage
unattended or accept any parcel from anyone.
The First step in Profiling starts with interview. When we see someone approaching us, we form a first
impression about the person by the way the person is behaving, just by observing their gestures. This
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process of recognition of behavioral characteristics and ascertaining whether a person in question is a

potential threat or not for Civil Aviation is Known as Behavior Detection. Such persons need to undergo
enhanced security screening.
It is not only the passenger who possess threat to aviation industry. Even the non-travelling public are
also a concern. Hence, we also need to consider informally interacting with non-passengers, which
involves interactive dialogue (including security interviews, casual conversation, and targeted
questioning) between trained staff and non-passengers to assess the legitimacy of the non- ’
presence and their activity.
Hence, Behaviour Detection is done of three categories of persons: -
1. Passengers
2. Non-traveling persons
3. Airport staff
Profiling depends on the effectiveness of the “Behaviour ” because most individual(s)

involved or in the process of doing illegal activities are unable to speak the truth and may present
fraudulent documents to mask their true intentions and identity. Its focus on the intention of individuals
instead of prohibited items carried by passengers, behavioural detection potentially allows for the
detection of unknown threats not currently addressed by other measures in aviation security like human
trafficking, smuggling etc.
Behaviour detection is a continuous process. A person may display any abnormal sign in his behavior
while:
a) Entering inside the terminal building.
b) While at screening point.
c) While waiting at the check-in counter queue.
d) While check-in.
e) While waiting at the queue at SHA.
f) At boarding gate.
g) While boarding.
h) Inside the aircraft.
The flexibility inherent in the deployment of security staff for behavioural detection at different locations
makes it an ideal tool when unpredictable security measures are intended to be implemented in various
locations of an airport.
A) At entry gates: - in case a person shows any abnormal sign, the ASG staff shall resolve anomalous
behaviour through targeted conversation with persons and/or through additional screening at the x-
ray machines so installed near the entry gates for the purpose.
B) Any other location: - staff shall resolve anomalous behaviour through targeted conversation with
persons and/or through additional screening at the nearest location.
If anomalous behaviour cannot be resolved, refer those persons to appropriate authorities such as your
supervisor, ASG or local law enforcement.
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Steps for Behavior detection

- Threat assessment
- Profile of your passenger
- Profile of potential terrorist
- Interviewing process
Passenger appearance and behavior – Suspicious signs (as mentioned below). The staff needs to ensure
all the signs displayed by the person is resolved.
A passenger who is a possible threat may be identified by the following suspicious signs:
• Sweating Shaky voice

• Nervousness Stammering
• No eye-contact. Deep sighs
• Fumbling ’ teeth
• Curiosity
• Gestures Undue interests in security procedures
• Face turns pale or white Contact with other passengers through signals.
• Shivering Cannot open his baggage.
• Biting lips First pax
• Biting nails Last pax
• Restless Inability to answer a question or reluctance.
SIGNS OF STRESS
- Late for flight

- Avoid eye contact with Security person.
- Yawning
- Excessive fidgeting
- Excessive perspiration
- Face pale from shaving (neck & face different color/ Fresh shaving after long time
- Facial Flushing (on neck & ear (pink &red)
- Faster eye blink rate (increases at stress point more)
- Increased breathing rate (faster/harder /Deeper & mouth opening)
- Adams Apple jump (audible gulp)
- Protruding Neck arteries
- Repetitive face touching
- Strong body odor
- Sweaty palms
- Trembling
- Whistling
SIGNS OF FEAR FACTOR
- Bag appears to be heavier and does not suit the passenger.

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- Bag heavier and requires more efforts (Lift/Carrying/Hold or move and suggest or will sag, hang
or stress
- Bulges in clothing
- Cold penetrating stare
- Pure hatred in the eyes towards security personals
- Looking at others traveling associates
- Exaggerated emotions (excessive Laughter or chatter/swings/shift to one another)
- Repetitive grooming
- Hesitation
- Identical dress or Luggage (not traveling together)
- Powerful Grip on bag
- Rigid posture (limited or restricted range of movement or hiding something on torso)
- It may be mentioned that we need to understand that all signs displayed by the passenger may
not be threating.
- Looking for security or ASG
- Unusual Interest on security
- Display arrogance (shows superior)
- Improper attire (does not match with geographical background)
- Widely opening staring eyes (white in eye very much visible)
Signs of DECEPTION
- Appear to be confused or disoriented.

- Pax. continued distracted.
- Appear to be in disguise.
- Pax. has taken observable steps to alter his/her appearance.
- Ask security related questions.
- Does not responds to authoritative commands.
- Maintain covert ties with others.
- Pax. Pats upper body with hand
It may be mentioned that we need to understand that all signs displayed by the person may not be
threatening.
A passenger may be displaying a sign of nervousness as he might be a first-time traveller or may not be
feeling well etc. Hence the staff needs to know that all signs displayed by a person may have a threatening
as well as a non-threatening reason.
Sign/ behavior Threatening reason Non-Threatening reason

Passenger or those The terrorist or drug smuggler or Fear of flying. Passenger may
accompanying passenger their accomplices may display be intoxicated or under the
display unusual nervousness this Sign as they know that they influence of drugs.
or fear. are doing something illegal and
do not want to get caught.
Passenger refuses to The terrorist/smuggler is trying Passenger considers the
cooperate with security staff. to pressure or intimidate the screening process to be an
security agent into bypassing invasion of their privacy.
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security procedures that might

reveal their identity and purpose.
Passenger maintains covert Large groups generate attention Secret love affair.
ties (secret contact) with therefore terrorists/drug
others. smugglers may split up to draw
less attention to them. If one of
the groups is caught during the
security check the other
members may still be able to
continue with the operation.
Coded signals, such as nodding,
may be used to signal the
progress of the mission.
Passenger rushes security staff The terrorist/drug smuggler is Passenger is late for the flight.
to complete procedures. trying to pressure the security Passenger may also want to
agent into overlooking details make business calls or shop
that may lead to their capture. for duty free items before the
flight.
Passenger displays exceptional In preparation for an attack or First time fliers who are
interest in security. movement of narcotics, the unfamiliar with airline
terrorist/drug smuggler will send security, or possibly
members of the organizations to passengers that are in the
check out the security operation security business themselves.
of an airline. This is designed to
ensure the success of an
operation.
Passenger arrives unusually The terrorist/drug smuggler is Passenger is genuinely late for
late for flight. trying to put pressure on the the flight or is hoping for a
security agent to overlook details last-minute upgrade.
that may lead to their capture.
Passenger insists on boarding a The terrorist has targeted a Passenger is travelling with
specific flight for no valid specific flight or needs to meet others or has an important
reason. with other members of the business meeting that they
operation at a specific time and cannot miss.
place.
Appearance and behavior not Experience has shown that when Company sponsored ticket.
consistent with price of ticket. planning an attack, the ideal
place for the terrorist to be is in
the front of the plane, as near the
cockpit as possible. Due to high
price, assures the passenger a
definite seat in case of
overbooking.
Passenger appears to be lying Maybe he is a partly naïve Asylum seeker.
or withholding information. passenger framed or a terrorist.
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Will accompany with 1 or more

signs.
Passenger possesses A terrorist. Definite Hijacker. Bonafide passenger with valid
prohibited items such as license
weapons, ammunition,
explosives etc.
Passenger wearing loose Terrorist planning a hijack. Hiding Maybe not feeling well. May
clothing or clothing weapons. be travelling to a colder place
that can conceal weapons or may be carrying excess
strapped up to body. baggage.
Passenger refuses to The terrorist/smuggler is trying Passenger considers the
cooperate with security staff. to pressure or intimidate the screening process to be an
security agent into bypassing invasion of their privacy.
security procedures that might
reveal their identity and purpose.
Action to be taken in case a suspicious behavior is detected:
• Keep surveillance on the passenger (preferable electronic)

• Inform Supervisor
• Ask questions.
Casual conversation- Interview
• Extended conversation, Voluntarily informal interview

• Resolving anomalies behavior exhibited by high-risk individuals.
• Observe, ask & listen (stress/fear/ deception)
• Ask non-threatening/non coercive question.
• Ask trip story (may be pleasure, business or personal/ originating/coming back)
• Additional casual conversation with Security Officer or ASG.
Purpose of Questioning
A person can be an innocent non- threatening passenger if has a logical reason for the sign. To eliminate
this, we need to ask question. Asking questions will identify signs that are truly suspicious. It is a process
of asking a passenger, questions to determine whether he potentially possess a threat to flight.
RESOLVE To find a logical, legitimate reason behind a suspicious sign which you can believe, therefore
the sign is no longer considered suspicious. The passenger is then classified as regular/ non-threatening
passenger.
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CONFIRM Unable to find a logical, legitimate reason behind a suspicious sign, therefore the sign is
considered truly suspicious. The passenger is then classified as selectee or threatening passenger and will
be subjected to enhanced security procedure.
Questioning Techniques
- Use open ended questions.

- Do not ask closed questions.
- Do not ask leading questions.
Building Rapport
- Co-operative
- Positive Interactions
- Ask non-threatening questions.
- Keep a neutral casual tone at the start.
- Listen actively and carefully.
- Practice self-awareness
Behaviour detection Security Officer should refrain from:
- Resolving any behavior.

- Asking for any ID or travel documents.
- Searching Personnel property
- Antagonizing questions.
- Persisting in engaging passenger (If he/she does not speak to you)
Points to remember:
Inconsistencies in behavior
• Are the persons action consistent with his words?
• Place the person’s action in context of the situation.
• Observe changes in behavior.
• ’ .
• Watch the person while posing question and his answers.
• Do not come to conclusion on a single sign / gesture.
He should then handover the passenger/ person in concern to his supervisor, who will then apply
additional security measures like checking of documents, screening of baggage etc. to confirm the
suspicion.
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Baggage (Check-in / Hand baggage and any item on person) – Suspicious signs
The baggage of a passenger who is a possible threat may also provide signs for suspicion. These may
be:
- Profile of passenger does not match to the type of baggage.

- Baggage not matching with profession declared.
- Baggage not matching with class of travel or duration of trip.
- Baggage contents are confusing – not matching travel requirements.
- Passenger not having the baggage keys or does not know how to open the baggage.
- Name on the baggage does not match with the name on the ticket.
- Passenger carrying weapons, explosives, prohibited articles & Dangerous goods.
It may be mentioned that we need to understand that all signs displayed by the person may
not be threatening.

Baggage and/or contents of Baggage being carried by a The passenger may have
baggage inconsistent with terrorist/drug smuggler is not borrowed the baggage.
’ always packed by the same
profession, ticket class or person completing the mission. It
description of contents. is therefore possible that the
person carrying the bag is not
familiar with its contents or
dressed in a manner consistent
with the cost of the actual
baggage.
Passenger claims not to have It is not his baggage, may be Might have forgotten the
baggage keys or does not belonging to terrorist or is code number or left the keys
know how to open baggage. carrying an IED. at home.
Name on Baggage does not Baggage belongs to third party May have borrowed a
match name on ticket or i.e., Terrorist baggage from someone.
passport. Maybe the bag belongs to
some family member.
Amount of baggage unusual to This sign indicates the possibility May be transferred or on
ticketed Itinerary. that the passenger is not carrying immigration visa.
his own baggage or is carrying no
baggage at all. His true intentions
Page 31 of 45
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and the purpose of journey is to

hijack.
Documents - Suspicious Signs
The travel documents of a passenger may also provide signs for suspicion. The signs may be:
- Last minute purchase of ticket

- One way ticket.
- Unusual / uneconomical routing of the ticketed
- Ticket appears to be corrected forged or stolen.
- Passport appears to be forged, altered or otherwise invalid.
- Name on the passport does not match with the name on ticket.
- Personal identification information does not match with that on Passport.
- Passenger not familiar with the details in travel documents
- Passenger originating from a suspicious country.
- Passenge ’ ionality does not match with his / her profile.
Action to be taken in case a suspicious passenger is detected: -
- Keep surveillance on the passenger (preferable electronic)

- Inform Supervisor
- Check baggage thoroughly.
- Ask questions.
- Verify documents.
- Inform ASG
- Frisk thoroughly
Remember if a person is displaying a suspicious sign, it does not mean that he is of potential threat.

Passenger unable to speak A terrorist/drug smuggler may Some countries recognize
language of country of have been given a stolen foreign several different national
passport. passport to hide their identity languages, and it is possible
but does not know how to speak that the passenger is from a
the national language associated region in the country that
with the document. speaks a dialect different to
the principal one.
Passenger unfamiliar with the A terrorist/drug smuggler may Imposter. Asylum seekers.
ticket and or passport have been given a stolen
information. passport to hide their identity.
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Ticket purchased within 24 A terrorist hiding his identity. Maybe traveling on business
hours of travel. Last minute tickets are most meeting planned at the last
expensive, hence will not be minute.
offloaded by airlines. Specific
target.
One way ticket On a specific mission. Maybe a student or traveling
on work permit.
Unusual routing of the ticketed Terrorist wants to hide his Long route tickets are
itinerary identity generally cheaper.
Name on the passport does Terrorist travelling on forged Typo error, name change
not matches with the name on documents. after marriage, middle name
ticket. not included or even in few
countries nick names are
commonly used. Ticket may
be booked by third party so
misspelt name.
A sign may either be resolved or confirmed with the help of interview process, document check and/or
baggage checks. If the sign is resolved, a person may be allowed to travel. However, if the sign is confirmed,
then the person must be made a Selectee and Selectee search procedure may be applied to.
Even if a passenger with positive sign displays any suspicious sign in behaviour, documentations or baggage,
the sign so displayed needs to be resolved first.
Selectee is a passenger when he / she displays at least one confirmed suspicious sign, indicating that he /
she is a threat to the Airline or the Airport in some way or other.
A thorough inspection of the contains of the baggage, screening of empty baggage and frisking of such
passengers would be done in a private screening area. At least 2 screeners of same gender would be
available to conduct such search. After the search is completed until the time the passenger boards the
aircraft, he shall be always in supervision of a security staff.
Characteristics of Profiler
- Alertness
- Awareness
- Experience
- Endurance
- Sufficient knowledge
- Flexible
- Good Interpersonal Skills
- Good Team Member and
- Quick decision maker.
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COURTESY AND BEHAVIOUR expected from the profiler.

Courtesy and Behaviour at the airport:
- Image of the organization

- Satisfied customer is the best goodwill promoter.
- High Profile personnel travel through airport
- Larger Media publicity
Personal Presentation:
- Good Appearance
- Posture / gesture while dealing with the passenger.
- Clothing – pressed, neat, and clean (good turnout)
- Facial expression / body language
- Good and effective communication skills.
- Conversation with passenger- Fresh breath, voice tone /voice modulation
- Right staff at right place at the right time.
DOS AND DONTS for staff
- Positive Attitude.
- Well conversation.
- Smiling face
- Honesty
- Cooperation with the passenger
’
- Do not chew, eat during dealing with passenger.

- Do not give wrong information.
- Do not relax during duty.
- Do not irritate on the behavior of pax.
- Do not lose temper.
Never ignore a bad security impression.
****END****
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MODULE -09
PROTECTION AND SEARCH OF

AIRCRAFT
Page 1 of 28
2022
Handout 5.1
Page 1 of 7
Module 05
Protection of Parked aircraft
General
The protection of aircraft is an important element within the protective measures and procedures necessary
for total airport protection.
Passengers cannot be considered as the only means of introducing weapons and explosives onto aircraft. An
aircraft, before coming into service at the beginning of each operating day, will need to be subjected to
security checks to ensure that it has not been exposed to an act of interference. It is dangerous to assume
that the security of an aircraft cannot be breached within the confines of an airport.
The operation and protection of an aircraft is generally accepted to be the responsibility of the airline owning
and operating the aircraft. The airport authorities are also responsible to protect the airport and facilities
from unlawful interference.
Threat Identification
Threat Items can be infiltrated into an Aircraft either by employees working at the airport or by passengers. A
wide variety of airport employees or organizations can have access into an aircraft they can be authorized or
unauthorized.
An airport / airline employee may be authorized to have access into an aircraft if he is a bonafide employee of
the organization and is required to access the aircraft to perform his job functions.
An airport employee needing access into an aircraft maybe from the following depts.:
• AAI Medical Team,
• ATC Official,
• Customs,
• Airport Security Unit / Aviation Security Group
• Catering,
• Staff from fuelling company,
• DGCA Officials
• BCAS Officials
- 61 -
Handout 5.2
Page 1 of 3
Aircraft Protection (Security Principle – Defense in depth)
Rings of Protection
Security principles for physical protection are a series of protective "in depth" rings which are known as "The
Rings of Protection".
The first line of defence in preventing unauthorized access to aircraft is by safeguarding the airside/ landside
boundary by physical means such as fencing.
Outer Protective Ring
It is established at the airside / landside boundary line and includes fencing, lighting, signs, alarm systems and
controlled doorways. These measures are designed to channel people and vehicles through controlled access
points provided in the outer ring.
Eg: Perimeter walls/Fence : 8’ + 1½’ barbed wire hung over ‘Y’ shaped angle
Perimeter Gates : For control of access into restricted areas
Static Posts : An elevated platform/ observation post which is constructed at

regular intervals round the perimeter wall and guarded rounded the
clock by armed guards
Lighting : Adequate lighting is required for areas which are dark / during night
Signs : Information of restricted areas etc.
Alarm Systems : In case of any intrusion
Middle Protective Ring
It is established at the exterior of buildings, terminals and other structures sited within an airport boundary
and include greater protection of doors, windows, roofs, skylights, etc.
For open areas, such as aircraft movement areas security is maintained by means of patrolling guarding and
surveillance.
The measures designed for the middle protective ring are more positive than at the outer ring and comprise
locks, bars, alarms, additional lighting and increased surveillance.
Eg. Perimeter Roads : Road around the perimeter inside the restricted area for mobile
patrols
Because there are difficulties in preventing unauthorized access to aircraft within the airport boundary,
measures need to be taken in the immediate proximity of parked aircraft to provide the third inner ring of
protection.
- 62 -
Handout 5.2
Page 2 of 3
Inner Protective Ring
For aviation purposes the inner ring can be considered to be buildings, areas, and aircraft, which require
maximum protection, by special means, such as guards and additional barriers.
Eg.Vital Installations : Areas such as ATC Tower, navigational facilities etc. which if damaged
or destroyed will seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
Security staff operating in the immediate proximity of parked aircraft or patrolling the apron / ramp area
provide yet another layer of protection.
Finally flight /cabin crew and airline staff actually working on board the aircraft provide another layer.
Responsibility for Aircraft Security
The basic responsibility for the security of aircraft rests with the aircraft operator.
During diversions, due to weather or mechanical, responsibility rests with the Captain as the Airline
representative. The Captain must make arrangements for securing the aircraft if no company ground
personnel are available. If local security personnel are not available crewmembers should be assigned security
duty.
Means of Protection
When aircraft is parked and unattended, precautions should be taken to prevent unauthorized access to the
aircraft. The process involves that:
(a) aircraft are parked in a well-lit area;
(b) all external doors locked;
(c) stairs and loading bridges removed; and
(d) Stairs and steps in vicinity of aircraft moved away and immobilized.
Because of the large number of access points on an aircraft which must remain open during its stay on the
ground, it is difficult to seal the aircraft entirely. Such access points include the following:
(a) undercarriage wells and wheel assembly;
(b) engine access panels;
(c) engine intakes; and
(d) Fuel intake panels.
When aircraft is under increased threat level:

(a) Higher Threat will require Greater Protection
(b) Stress that when a higher level of threat exists and additional protection is required, it will be necessary for
a specific person from the airline concerned to be in charge of the aircraft to coordinate all security
measures and ensure they are properly implemented.
(c) State that when a higher level of threat is known to exist the following additional precautions may be
required;
(d) Dedicated point guards posted in close proximity to each aircraft;
(e) Frequent irregularly timed security patrols on foot or by vehicles; canine reinforcement of guard capability;
Handout 5.2
Page 3 of 3
- 63 -
Aircraft Guard Duties
(a) Establish the integrity of the aircraft upon taking up duty;
(b) Search immediate area for suspect explosive devices
(c) Challenge all persons approaching the aircraft;
(d) Check the specific authorization of persons claiming a need to access the aircraft;
(e) Patrol and make visual inspection of aircraft at random intervals.
(f) Stress the importance of a communication system (radio/telephone) being required between guard and
security authority reaction force to summon assistance.
Response Action to Unauthorized attempt to board or actual unauthorized access to aircraft
• If possible detain the person concerned.

• Do not allow the person to have access to the aircraft or leave the area
• Do not allow further persons to board the aircraft until it is searched;
• Notify the security supervisor or control; and
• Ensure airline representative is notified.
Aircraft Intrusion
If there is evidence of intrusion at an aircraft a detailed search must be carried out. Such a search is a
specialized task conducted in accordance with the concerned airline’s specific security procedures, usually
using a security search check list.
Aircraft Security Search
A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose of discovering suspicious
objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.
Aircraft Security Check
An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had access and an inspection of the
hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices,
articles or substances
- 64 -
Handout 6.1
Page 1 of 3
Module 06
Aircraft Security Checks
Threat Identification
Threat Items can be infiltrated into an Aircraft either by employees working at the airport or by passengers. A
wide variety of airport employees or organizations can have access into an aircraft they can be authorized or
unauthorized.
An airport / airline employee may be authorized to have access into an aircraft if he is a bonafide employee of
the organization and is required to access the aircraft to perform his job functions.
An airline employee needing access into an aircraft maybe from the following depts.:
• Security,
• Engineering,
• In-flight,
• Customer service,
• Cabin Appearance,
• Cargo,
• Catering - External & Internal,
• Flight operations.
Aircraft Search
Why must an aircraft search be carried out?
There are legal and business reasons for carrying out aircraft searches.
Legal reason
International and national laws will apply. Sections of ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices
relating to the security of aircraft, give a direct bearing on the requirements of the aircraft operators
regarding the aviation security programme.
Sections of ICAO Annex 17, Standards and Recommended Practices relating to the security of aircraft, define
what contracting states must do.
Business Reasons
Establishing and implementing sound security measures also makes perfect business sense:
• Liability – demonstration of due diligence/duty of care;
• Market access – especially into the United States of America;
• Consumer confidence– especially in the wake of recent terrorist attacks;
• Cost avoidance – laws suits, loss of assets, etc.
- 65 -
Handout 6.2
Page 1 of 3
Extract from ICAO Security Manual (Doc 8973)
Appendix 19
Aircraft Security Search Checklist
The regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons should be conducted prior to
commencing each flight. A similar search will be required when an aircraft is suspected of being the target of
an act of unlawful interference. The difference between the two types is only in the degree and thoroughness
of search undertaken, and these will be dictated by the total circumstances applicable to each situation.
Aircraft operators should develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of aircraft in service and
include this checklist as part of the flight crew security kit. Use of such a checklist by ground crews will be
particularly helpful at locations where the only persons familiar with the particular type of aircraft or
configuration of aircraft are flight deck and cabin crew members.
Regular searches normally conducted prior to each flight are to be carried out while the aircraft is in the
normal gate or apron parking position. (Pre-flight Anti Sabotage Checks)
Aircraft searches should be carried out in good lighting conditions; this may require the use auxiliary power
units or the attachment of ground power lines to the aircraft. It will be necessary to impose and maintain
control of access to the aircraft before starting the search, which should be carried out with the minimum
number of persons on board.
To avoid duplication of effort the search of an aircraft should be conducted systematically by staff familiar
with the particular aircraft, provided with a checklist and assigned to specific areas of the aircraft. Attention
should be given to those areas to which passengers have had access, such as main cabins, galley areas and
toilets, but the search should also include the flight deck exterior of the aircraft and cargo holds.
Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented to the aircraft being searched. This is
necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the aircraft once it has been cleared. Control of access
must then be maintained until the aircraft doors are closed prior to push back.
Searchers should be briefed not to touch suspicious objects but to notify the search coordinator, mark the
location with a prominent object (but not touching the device) and withdraw from the immediate area to
await further instructions. When a suspect device is discovered the possibility of secondary devices should not
be discounted.
Hand-held communications are useful for coordination of the search and are often the only way of ensuring
appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for search and evacuation. However, once a suspect device has
been located those using hand-held communications should immediately move away and ensure that they
and anyone else in the area move outside the cordon as quickly as possible. Radios should not be used to
transmit within 25 m of a suspect device.
All entrance doors, hatches, inlet and exhaust ducts, service and access doors, etc., must be opened to allow
the necessary access to all areas to be inspected. However, a check must be made to ensure that all doors and
covers which were opened for inspection purposes are closed on conclusion of the search.
- 66 -
Handout 6.2
Page 2 of 3
It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect explosive devices as they can
be disguised in many ways. Trained & competent personnel who are familiar with the physical layout and the
normal contents of the aircraft should conduct the search of the aircraft.
When to search?
There are 4 instances when searches are usually conducted:
• Pre-flight;
• During en route transit stops;
• Post flight; and
• When the flight / aircraft is under increased threat.
Pre-flight Searches should be conducted under normal circumstances and also for emergency situations. As
no baggage can be loaded inside the aircraft without the respective passenger on board (NO PASSENGER – NO
BAGGAGE), similarly the aircraft cannot be declared sterile / secured without the search.
Pre-flight Aircraft Searches should be carried for all flights at:

• Originating Station
• Turn Around Station
• Transit Station
The search will involve a systematic inspection of the interior of the aircraft, including the passenger cabin
area, seats, overhead bins/ racks, toilets, galleys etc. The search will also involve an inspection of the exterior
of the aircraft, particularly the nose wheel area, wheel bay & aircraft Holds.
The pre-flight aircraft search will be carried out as under:
For Originating flights:

• Prior to the boarding of passengers and the loading of cargo, baggage and catering.
• Search can be carried out from the rear to the front of the aircraft or vice versa.
• The search should be carried out with a aircraft search checklist. This will avoid duplication of effort.
• The search can be carried out by more than one person / teams allocated with a specific areas for search.
Each team will carry the checklist.
• Each person / team member will sign on the checklist after completion of the search.
• After the search is completed, the aircraft should not be left unattended and strict access control should be
maintained.
For Turn Around Flights:

• After all the passengers have disembarked / deplaned.
• After Cleaners have carried out their duties and disembarked.
• After all Baggage, Cargo & Catering (if any) has been offloaded from the aircraft.
• Search can be carried out from the rear to the front of the aircraft or vice versa.
• The search should be carried out with a aircraft search checklist. This will avoid duplication of effort.
• The search can be carried out by more than one person / teams allocated with a specific areas for search.
Each team will carry the checklist.
- 67 -
Handout 6.2
Page 3 of 3
• Each person / team member will sign on the checklist after completion of the search.
maintained.
For Transit Flights:

• After all the passengers have disembarked / deplaned.
• After Cleaners have carried out their duties and disembarked.
• Ensure that passengers deplaning at transit station do not leave any item / baggage in the aircraft.
• The level of search to be carried out will depend upon the threat to the aircraft at the transit station and
the categorization of the airport.
• The search should be carried out with an aircraft search checklist.
maintained.
Who should carry out searches?
Cabin crew/or trained Security staff is usually responsible for searching the interior of the aircraft, including:
• Passenger cabins
• Seats
• Baggage storage lockers
• Lavatories/WC
• Galleys
• Other areas such as the baggage hold
Search teams should be briefed to look for unidentified objects or anything:

• that should not be there
• that cannot be accounted for
• that is out of place.
For an effective search:

• Searchers must be familiar with the aircraft type being searched.
• The searcher must be able to recognize an explosive or incendiary device.
• Search must be conducted using a checklist.
What equipment do you need?
Some tools are indispensable in conducting a search, these include:

• Checklists
• Search plan
• Flashlights (torches)
• Screwdriver
• Mirror and mirror extension.
Handout 6.3
Page 1 of 5
- 68 -
An Aircraft Security Search Checklist is a comprehensive document. Airlines have type-specific checklists
relevant to the aircraft they fly in their fleet. The Type-specific checklists in some cases provide aircraft floor
plans to aid in search.
Checklists ensure a thorough and efficient search and save time. It helps to avoid duplication or omission of
search tasks. Checklists should always be available on the aircraft, for searches when away from base or in the
air.
Extract from ICAO Security Manual (Doc 8973)

Appendix 19
Aircraft Interior
• Seats, including pouches, cushions and underside of seats
• Log book and flight manual stowage
• Crew oxygen mask stowage
• Entire floor, including area forward of rudder pedals and beneath all flight deck seats
• Ceiling, side and rear walls
• Life-jacket stowage
• Crew coatroom and luggage stowage area
• Table and drawer of third crew member’s position
• Area around rudder/brake pedals
• Inside first-aid kit
Forward entrance
• Stairway including underside
• Connection of stair to fuselage, as well as shelf at this point
• Escape chute stowage
• Cabin attendant seat, life-raft stowage and seat back
• Forward windscreen and storage unit, including compartments
• Oxygen mask compartment
• Ceiling and wall
• Fire extinguisher stowage
Companionway — flight deck

• Walls, ceiling and floor
• Coatroom
• Overhead baggage storage — entire area with baggage removed
• Compartments above baggage rack and coatroom
• Drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access
• Area above and along sidewall of stowage compartment, forward side of forward toilet
- 69 -
Handout 6.3
Page 2 of 5
Forward compartment
• Coatrooms and enclosed mask and vest stowages
• Flight attendants’ and passengers’ seats (including underside of seats)
• Passenger berth
• Ceiling, floor and walls
• Crew and passenger life vest stowages
• Portable oxygen stowage cupboard
• Seats (pouches and oxygen mask compartment)
• Table between rear lounge chairs and its compart ment
• Literature containers
Forward galley
• Remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already done
• Open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator
• Inspect containers removed from galley and bar
• Oxygen mask stowage (bar)
• Galley service door (tape stowage; hinge recess)
• Compartments above service doors
Forward toilets
• Remove soiled and waste material not already removed
• Remove containers under sinks, inspect contents and areas around sink
• Inspect towel compartment
• Tissue dispenser
• Toilet
• Mirror and compartments
• Door
• Oxygen mask stowage
• Access to drinking fountain
• Waste water receptacle
Main cabin
• Seats (pouches, oxygen mask stowage, cushions and underside of seats)
• Pillow racks, blankets and hand rail
• Floor — do not remove carpet unless presence of foreign object is suspected
• Side walls, including windows and curtains
• Bulkheads and foot recesses and oxygen mask stowage
• Ceiling
• Light recesses
• Compartments at aft end of each handrail
• Compartments behind rear cabin seats
• Stretcher equipment stowage above hat rack
• Demonstration life vest stowage
- 70 -
Handout 6.3
Page 3 of 5
• Emergency escape rope compartments

• Escape chute stowages
• Main door and recess with door closed
• Magazine racks
• Life raft stowages
• Life vest pouches
• Passenger berths
• Oxygen cabinet
• Cargo tie-down stowage
• Literature containers
• First-aid kit, only if unsealed
• Passenger oxygen service units — drop them down and inspect
• Oxygen and CO2 cylinder stowage drawers, forward sides of 1 and 3 galleys and aft toilets
• Over wing emergency exit release covers
• Aft entry door cabin attendant’s seat
• Drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access at floor
• Portable emergency exit lights — remove light and inspect
Centre galley and bar

• Remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already done
• Open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator
• Inspect all containers removed from the aircraft
• Glass stowage in bulkhead forward of bar
• First-aid kit in compartment aft side of aft unit — only if unsealed
• Compartment above service door
• Service door and recess
• Escape chute stowage’s
• Cabin attendants’ seats in aisle No. 2 galley
• Oxygen mask compartment in ceiling
• Portable emergency exit light, remove light and inspect
Rear galley area and bar

• Flight attendants’ seat
• Galley — remove all containers
• Open and inspect all compartments
• Compartments in front bulkhead
• Inspect containers removed from aircraft
• Diplomatic mail locker
• Galley service door hinge recess
• Escape slide stowages (each door)
• Aft entrance door hinge recess
• Life raft stowages
• Oxygen bottle ceiling stowage
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Handout 6.3
Page 4 of 5
Aft toilets
• Remove soiled and waste material
• Remove and inspect container under sink
• Inspect sink and area around sink
• Towel container
• Tissue dispenser
• Toilet seat and lid
• Mirror and compartments
• Flight attendants’ seat
• Door
• Access to drinking fountain
• Waste water receptacle
Aft wardrobes and coatrooms

• Remove coats and hand baggage
• Inspect entire area
• Sky cots and flight cradles
• First-aid kit, only if unsealed
• Life vest stowage
Aircraft Exterior
Fuselage (the areas behind/in the following doors and openings should be checked)
• Radom
• Ground pneumatic connector panel
• Cabin compressor air-inlets
• Cabin compressor access panels
• Doppler navigation antenna door
• Cabin compressor air-outlets
• Heat exchanger control access panels
• Heat exchanger outlet guide vanes
• Radio rack air-outlet
• Beacon-holder (beacon removed)
• Security locker and contents
• Flashlights (check batteries)
• Seals of first-aid kits for proper condition
• Seals of life raft panels for proper condition
• Accessory compartment door
• Auxiliary tank fuel sump doors
• Cabin pressure safety valves
• Aft waste water service panel
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Handout 6.3
Page 5 of 5
• Cabin pressure regulator valve
• Aft waste system service panels
• Access door to stabilizer-mechanism
• Tail cone access door
• Aft potable water service panel
• Aft cargo doors
• Forward cargo doors
• Forward potable water service panel
• Ground air conditioning connector door
• External power fuser door
• External power receptacle
Cabin compressor compartment

• Entire compartment, especially area of hollow spaces and cavities
Accessory compartment
• Entire compartment as well as all installations
Cargo compartments
• Forward cargo compartment, especially area underneath hinge snap-panel of cargo door floor covering
• Waste water tank compartment
• Flight-kit boxes
• Aft cargo compartment (especially area of cargo door hinge joints)
• Zone immediately behind aft cargo compartment
Landing gear wheel wells and gears

• Nose wheel well — area behind access and zip-fastener panels
• Entire main wheel wells and zone of wing roots LH + RH
• Gears, wheels — tires, rims, brakes and parts such as struts, drag-braces, beams, arms, actuators, frames
and trucks
Wings
• Trailing edge flap sections
• Snap-covers to fuel X-feed tube
• Snap-covers to fire-extinguisher bottles
• Pressure refuelling adapters
• Inspection snap-covers
• Fuel vent openings
Engines and pylons

• Engine air-intake, exhaust and fan-duct
• Engine oil and pneumatic heat exhanger air-inlet scoop
• Engine oil refill cover
• Engine heat exchanger air-outlet door
• Constant speed drive oil refill cover
• Open engine cowl doors and fan cascade vanes. Entire engine installation and all openings on the cowl
doors and pylons to be checked.
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Handout 6.4
Page 1 of 2
Post Search Reports

In all cases, a report should be prepared when a search is completed and provided to the pilot in command
and/or other company authority. Search reports should normally contain:
• Date of the search ;
• Flight number/ aircraft registration/ tail number;
• Time search started;
• Time search completed;
• A completed checklist. noting the areas searched
• Name and signature of team leader/ supervisor;
The supervisor should consolidate all checklists to ensure no part of the aircraft is missed from the search.
Only that part of the checklist that has actually been searched by the individual/team should be completed.
Searchers must never sign off on an area that they have not searched and they must always ensure the
recorded times are accurate. If you are called away to complete another task before the search is completed,
a note to this effect must be made on the checklist.
Suspect Items
Action to take on finding a suspect item If any object located during a search and cannot be positively
identified, it must be dealt with as a “suspect item”.
Discovery - Response Actions:-

• DO NOT TOUCH
• NOTIFY SUPERVISOR
• MARK AREA WHERE OBJECT IS LOCATED
• REMEMBER A DESCRIPTION OF THE OBJECT
• EVACUATE AIRCRAFT
Airport security should be notified immediately so that bomb disposal personnel can deal with it without
delay. Subject to bomb disposal personnel authority and commensurate with local emergency procedures, the
aircraft may be towed to a “safe area”. The aircraft should be evacuated and all persons should be kept at a
distance of at a minimum of 100 meters. Fire fighting personnel should be placed on standby Once declared
safe, the search should be resumed for secondary suspect items or explosive devices/ weapons
Action on Locating a 'Suspect' Item

If any object is located during an aircraft search and it cannot be positively identified, it must be dealt with as
a 'Suspect Item'. Action to be taken by the searcher:
• Do Not Touch
• Notify Supervisor
• Evacuate Aircraft
• Remember description of the Object / Item
• Mark area where object / item is located
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Handout 6.4
Page 2 of 2
Action to be taken by the Supervisor:

• Supervisor will inform Airport Manager (AAI) so that BDDS personnel are informed to deal with the
situation.
• Ensure the finder of the Suspect Item waits for the arrival of the bomb disposal team in order to provide
them with any useful information.
• BDDS will advice on movement of aircraft
• Fire Fighting Services will be on standby to deal with an explosion or fire until such time as the BDDS
declare the suspect item to be safe.
• If suspect item is declared safe search procedures should be completed to ensure that no secondary
sabotage device or substance is on the aircraft.
• In case of transit flight if a handbag remains unidentified. It will be removed from the aircraft and
necessary action for suspected article will be carried out.
Prior to offloading the handbag from the aircraft, it should be visually inspected for necessary security
cleared stamps
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Handout 7.1
Page 1 of 3
Module 07
Organization of Response to acts of unlawful Interference
Types of Emergencies and Crisis
The ICAO definition of emergency contained in the ICAO Airport Services Manual, Part 7 Airport Emergency
Planning, identifies sabotage, unlawful seizure and bomb threats as types of airport emergencies. The Acts of
Unlawful Interference will include the following:
• Unlawful seizure of aircraft,
• Destruction of an aircraft in service,
• Hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
• Forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility,
• Introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended
for criminal purposes,
• Use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to
property or the environment,
• communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the
ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a
civil aviation facility.
Crisis
In normal, everyday life, personal crises almost appear from nowhere and challenge our sense of what is
normal and well managed. A crisis is defined as “Decisive moment, time of danger or acute difficulty”.
Panic and confusion are normally associated with crises.
Characteristics of a Crisis
• Surprise
• Insufficient information when you need it most
• Events outpace response (real or perceived)
• Escalating flow of events
• Loss of control (real or perceived)
• Important interests at stake
• Intense scrutiny from the outside (media)
• Panic
• Development of siege mentality
• Disruption of regular decision-making process
• Affected decision-makers focus on short- term planning/decisions/actions.
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Handout 7.1
Page 2 of 3
Phases of Crisis Situation

In any given crisis situation, there are certain constantly changing levels of behaviour due to anxiety or
excitement on the part of the offender that can range from exhaustion to highly emotional, beyond which the
behaviour of the terrorist becomes uncontrollable.
Sequence of Events during an Hijack
Phase 1 Intimidation Phase

Phase 2 Custodial Phase
Phase 3 Resolution phase
Phases / Stages of A CRISIS
Crisis Situation Phase 1 - Intimidation Phase:
Hijackers will try to gain control and show who is in charge as quickly as possible. At the beginning of the
incident, the offender’s anxiety level is high. They are nervous, pumped-up and irritated.
Their excitation level rises to the hysterical stage quickly and they become very aggressive and border on the
uncontrollable.
As soon as the hijackers/terrorists feel that they have gained the initiative, and that the incident appears to be
progressing towards their objective, then this anxiety/excitation level decreases and their emotional graph
drops.
Handout 7.1
Page 3 of 3
- 77 -
Crisis Situation Phase 2 Custodial Phase:
The custodial phase is the period when passengers and crew are held captive. This phase is the longest phase
of any crisis situation and it is during this time that both the offenders and the authorities are trying to gain
and hold the initiative in order to direct the course or the outcome of the incident.
It is important from the point of view of the authorities to keep the emotional state of the offenders within
the stress stage because it has been shown from a study of past incidents that this makes the possibility of
successful psychological attrition relatively high.
If the stress becomes too emphatic, the emotional curve rises closer to the hysterical stage, at which time the
offenders behaviour verges on the uncontrollable.
If stress on the offender is reduced, the emotional curve drops below the agitated stage is reached in an
incident and attempts are made by the authorities to re-establish control by the introduction of new factors
and stipulations.
This is likely to raise the suspicion of the offenders who will become agitated and whose emotional state will
quickly rise to uncontrollable levels and possibly precipitate extreme action on the part of the offenders, that
is, the possible execution of hostages.
It therefore follows that the best course of action is to keep the offenders in a constant emotional state,
within the stress zone, eventually tiring them out mentally.
Crisis Situation Phase 3 - Resolution phase:
This is where psychological attrition or physical overpowering is achieved and the authorities realize their
objective and neutralize the offenders.
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Handout 7.2
Page 1 of 4
Crisis Management
Emergencies will arise regardless of the security measures incorporated into the airport or airline security
procedures. Since emergencies are bound to arise, they must be planned for although it is not known when,
where, how, or what will occur; and Since any portion of the airline or airport facilities may be subject to an
emergency situation, it is essential that the airline, crewmembers and authorities be prepared for an effective
response.
Lack of Emergency Response will lead to:

• Prolongation of the period of time when the airline or airport cannot resume normal operations
• No control over the situation by management (the control may then be under that of the perpetrators of
the act of unlawful interference);
• The situation escalates from an emergency situation to a crisis, and outside intervention required.
Principles of Effective Crisis Management
When considering the management of aviation security crises, the following basic principles are adopted:
• Containment;
• Isolation;
• Preparation; and
• Strategy.
Containment: The incident area must be contained in order to control access to the incident and prevent
unplanned movement from the incident site. It is necessary to create two controlled access barriers or
cordons.
These should be designated the inner cordon, which immediately surrounds the incident, and the outer
cordon, located at a greater distance from the incident.
The area between the inner cordon and the incident should be kept sterile and free of movement unless
sanctioned by the incident commanders.
The area between the inner and outer cordons should be reserved for essential personnel who are part of the
planned response.
Located on the Inner Cordon is the Forward Control Point (FCP), which is a command and control centre for
controlling movement through the Inner Cordon. Ideally, the Incident Control Centre (ICC) should be located
in the area between Inner and Outer cordons.
The outer cordon is designed to keep all non-essential personnel away from the incident.
Isolation: Once the incident site has been surrounded and secured then the process of isolating the hijackers/
terrorists should commence. The objective is to make the offenders totally dependent upon the authorities
thus creating a situation on in which negotiations can be carried out.
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Handout 7.2
Page 2 of 4
This can be done by restricting the communication equipment available, such as closing down telephone lines,
establishing interference to radio or television broadcast signals (if necessary), shutting off electrical, heating
or ventilation systems (if necessary).
Preparation: Advance preparation of all of the facilities that could possibly be required should be undertaken
previously and details included in the contingency/ emergency plans.
• Identification of remote areas for parking of hijacked aircraft;
• Closed circuit television (CCTV) coverage of such isolated areas;
• Preparation of potential sites for a Forward Control Point (FCP)
• Provision of communication systems (mobile/ portable/ hard-wiring)
• Establishment of an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)
• Identification of holding areas for specialist support units
Strategy: Each crisis is different and it is impossible to lay down clear strategies or hard and fast rules on how
to respond to each crisis, especially where hostages are involved.
When contemplating what strategy needs to be deployed to with the emergency or crisis the obvious main
need is to preserve human life additionally the responding authorities will need to consider international
reaction to their handling of the incident, cooperation and communication (or lack of) among involved States
and the options available to terminate the incident.
Predetermined strategy and planning for dealing with aviation security emergencies that are included in
airline contingency plans and airport emergency plans.
There are two basic alternatives:

• To secure the release of the hostages unharmed whilst conceding as little as possible to the hostage-takers
C known as hostage negotiation; or
• To attempt to rescue the hostages and neutralize the hostage-takers by offensive action namely an armed
intervention.
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Handout 7.3
Page 1 of 4
Command and Control
Command
Executive command
Executive command of the response to an act of unlawful interference occurring in India is responsibility of
the Central Committee with Director General, Civil Aviation as Chairman and COSCA / Addl. Commissioner,
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security as Convener.
Operational command
Operational command of the response to an act of unlawful interference is the responsibility of the
Chairman Aerodrome Committee. With relation to an act of unlawful interference concerning an aircraft
operational command of the response will be discharges by:-
(a) Air Traffic Control (AA), whilst the aircraft is airborne or taxing immediately after landing until the
aircraft comes to a halt, or from the time aircraft commences taxing prior to take off until the aircraft
leave airspace of India;
(b) Airport Security Unit, from the time the aircraft comes to a halt immediately after landing until the
incident is terminated or until the aircraft commences taxing immediately prior to take off.
Extract from Volume 5 Chapter 5 – Contingency Plans Doc 8973
Incident access and control
5.5.1 A controlled area should be established

covering the main incident area. Within the
controlled area, an inner cordon should be
established surrounding the actual incident with a
forward control point to control all access to the
inner cordon. The cordon is normally armed. The
purpose of the inner cordon is to isolate the
incident and prevent access to the incident by the
public or press and contain any breakout by the
perpetrators. Access to the inner cordon is
permitted only with the agreement of the
forward control point commander. In the case of
an act of unlawful seizure it is important that the
forward control point be mobile. An example
incident site is illustrated in Figure I below.
5.5.2 Plans must include traffic control around the airport and within the landside areas of the airport to allow
rapid access and egress of emergency vehicles and any other persons or agencies needed at the airport in
connection with the incident. A rendezvous point and staging area should be nominated outside the inner
cordon for all agencies that will be arriving at the incident. Emergency services such as fire and ambulance
crews should stand by at the rendezvous point outside the inner cordon to deal with the results an explosion
or fire.
Handout 7.3
Page 2 of 4
- 81 -
Incident access and control in India
(a) On receipt of information of an act of unlawful interference, it is the responsibility of ATC Officers on duty
at the airport to take further action as specified in the National Contingency Plan.
(b) On receipt of information of an act of unlawful interference occurring at an airport or affecting an aircraft
in flight, it is the responsibility of ATC officer on duty at that airport to activate the Aerodrome Committee
Control Room and take further action in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the Airport.
(c) All agencies with the responsibilities for the activation of Aerodrome Committee control room and Central
Committee Control Room are to ensure that these centers are regularly maintained and tested and that
all communication equipments installed therein are in good working order.
Functions of Crisis Management Centers
To deal with acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation the following Group/Committees shall be
established:-
a. Cabinet Committee on Security
b. Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)
c. Central Committee (CC)
d. Aerodrome Committee (AC)
Cabinet Committee on Security

Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is the apex body to decide the policy and take decisions on strategic
issues like response to hijacker’s demands involving national security, foreign policy, political implications,
strategy/approach to negotiations, forcible termination of the hijack etc. It will be advised by COSAH for this
purpose. Minister of Civil Aviation would also be included in the CCS for management of aircraft hijack
situations.
Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)

COSAH would comprise senior officials of Govt. to deliberate on the problems arising out of the contingency,
obtain necessary inputs from all Govt. agencies and Central Committee, brief and advise CCS about
developments and decisions to be taken, and communicate Govt. decisions/directions/guidance to the
Central Committee.
The composition of the COSAH is as under:

1) Cabinet Secretary Chairman
2) Addl. Secretary Cabinet Secretariat Conveyor
Functions
COSAH will meet immediately on receipt of intimation of aircraft hijack. However, in case of prolonged crisis
COSAH need not necessarily be in continuous session till the termination of the hijack, and may constitute a
Sub Group, which will be in session continuously. The composition of the Sub Group would be decided by
COSAH depending on the specific situation. For example, the Sub Group could be chaired by Foreign Secretary
in case an Indian registered hijacked aircraft lands at a foreign airport and by the Home Secretary in case
armed intervention for termination of the hijack looks likely (in case an Indian registered hijacked aircraft
lands at an Indian civil airport).
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Handout 7.3
Page 3 of 4
Central Committee (CC)

The Central Committee (CC) is the executive authority responsible for dealing with the contingency of
hijacking under the guidance of COSAH / CCS. It will meet in the Central Committee Control Room situated in
the new ATC building, near IGI Airport , New Delhi.
It shall guide the Aerodrome Committee for handling the situation on the ground including for negotiations
and/or forcible termination of hijack. The CC is empowered to deal with the situation in all respects and take
appropriate decisions on its own initiative except on major policy / strategic issues.
Constitution of the Central Committee

1) Director General Civil Aviation (DGCA) Chairman
2) Joint Secretary (In-Charge of Security) Member / Alternate Chairman
Ministry of Civil aviation
3) Commissioner of Security Civil Aviation (COSCA) Convener
The CC will maintain a panel of negotiators, psychiatrists and linguists so that they may be summoned to the
Control Room in case required.
The functions of the Central Committee would include the following:

(i) Keeping track of the situation and all developments, being in constant touch with all concerned agencies /
officials and taking timely decisions and action for handling the situation.
(ii) Providing inputs to COSAH on all developments.
(iii) Analysis and anticipation of developing situation, building possible scenarios and submission of strategic
options for consideration of COSAH / CCS.
(iv) Implementation of decisions of COSAH / CCS.
(v) Providing guidance and issuing necessary instructions to the Aerodrome Committee.
Aerodrome Committee (AC)

The Aerodrome Committee is established at every airport. In the event of an emergency, the concerned
Aerodrome Committee shall assemble at the airport without loss of time, not later than half an hour, in the
earmarked Control Room and will address the hijack situation in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the
concerned airport and directions of the Central Committee.
Constitution of the AC shall be as under:

1) Home Secretary of the State Chairman
2) Airport Director/ Dy. GM / Sr. Manager/ Convener
Incharge Airport, AAI / Airport Management
3) Representative from R&AW (on arrival) Convener
4) IG (Int)/ DIG (Int) Special Branch Member
5) Joint Director IB / Dy. Director IB (MHA)
6) A senior representative from Army
7) A senior representative from Air Force
8) A senior representative from Navy
(in case affected airport is Navy controlled)
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Handout 7.3
Page 4 of 4
9) Senior most officer of Airport Security Unit

(Commandant / Dy. Commandant / Asst. Commandant of CISF (ASG)
10) A senior most executive of the affected airline
11) Any other member as considered necessary Negotiators / Psychologist
12) Superintendent of Police of the area
Functions of Aerodrome Committee
The AC will provide for:

• Adequate Mobile Emergency Lights
• Fuel, Water, Food for crew and pax
• Positioning of Fire/Crash tenders Strategic points.
• Communication setup
– Forward post and control room.
• Forewarning Hospitals and arrangement of Ambulances.
• Barracks for commandos
• Security around the affected aircraft
• Negotiation team.(at initial stage)
Communication system
The Central Committee will be in constant touch with the Aerodrome Committee through the ATC. The
Aerodrome Committee would also remain in continuous communication with the CC through STD telephone,
direct speech circuit system, HF/ VHF etc.
- 84 -
Handout 7.4
Page 1 of 2
Role of Police, Airport and Airline Operators
All organizations, receiving information that indicates an act of unlawful interference about to be committed
or in progress or has been committed, will take such appropriate action as specified in the Contingency Plan.
The course of action to be taken will include dissemination of the message to all concerned in accordance
with the Contingency Plan, the assessment of the message and a plan of action amongst those concerned.
The organization receiving such information shall be responsible for gathering and recording of as much
information as on the message to allow an accurate assessment to be made of the incident.
Duties of ATC
• ATC Officers on duty at the airport will take action as specified in the National Contingency Plan.
• ATC officer on duty at that airport will activate the Aerodrome Committee Control Room and take further
action in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the Airport.
• Air Traffic Control centre will provide assistance to safeguard to the affected flight, if it enters or is in India
air space and wishes to land at any airfield in India. It will also take appropriate action to expedite the
conduct of all phases of the flight, including permission to land.
• On landing, the aircraft is to be directed to the designated isolated aircraft parking position and all further
action taken in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the airport.
Role of Police
• Control movement of traffic around the affected airport
• Maintain the outer cordon
Role of Airport Operators

• Prepare Contingency Plans for Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
• Earmark Isolated Area for the hijacked aircraft
• Operations Room for NSG
• Barrack / tent accommodation for Command Task Force
• Communication set-up between forward control post and aerodrome committee control room (EOC/ICC)
• Provision of Vehicles
• Maintain panel of doctors, negotiators, linguists, etc.
• Provide medical assistance to relatives of passengers & crew
• Briefing room for media
• Hostage Reception / Enquiry Center.
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Handout 7.4
Page 1 of 2
c) Role of Airline Operators
Role of the senior airline management representative, which could be initially the airline station manager, will
be to provide assistance to the national and incident CMTs, as and when required.
• Communicate about the hijack threat immediately to the concerned RDCOS BCAS and Commissioner of
Security (Civil Aviation) by telephone followed by detailed report by fax
• Install appropriate communication systems in aircraft
• On aircraft hijack the commander will communicate with Air Traffic Services(ATS) on
o Deviation of Flight
o Squawk appropriate transpoder code
o Description of hijackers
o Number of offenders and arms carried by them
o Demands made by the hijackers
• Open Information Centers at the airport to provide latest information about affected aircraft.
• Provide appropriate prescribed phrases in different languages on cards.
• Arrangements for providing temporary shelter / drinking water etc. to facilitate relatives of passengers &
crew at Origin & destination station
• Provide written report of Pilot-in-command to appropriate authority
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Handout 10.4
Page 3 of 3
Note 5: SELCAL PROCEDURES: No Selcal shall be originated by a ground station to an aircraft in known hijack
condition unless the pilot instructs the ground station or his appropriate company ground personnel that Selcal
may be used to contact the flight. This applies to all Communications Centres. With the deranged hijacker on
the flight deck, the light and bell alarms which accompany ground-originated Selcal tones could trigger the
individual (and nearly did so in one case) into violent action, with potentially disastrous results.
References: --Criminal Code of Canada -- ICAO Annex 17 -- FAA
Extract from the ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation (PANS) as presented in the Emergency Chapter of the
Jeppesen Manual. This extract depicts the transponder procedures to be used globally in the event of a hijack.
Unlawful Interference
General
An aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference shall endeavour to notify the appropriate ATS
unit of this fact, any significant circumstances associated therewith and any deviation from the current flight
plan necessitated by the circumstances, in order to enable the ATS unit to give priority to the aircraft and to
minimize conflict with other aircraft. (Annex 2, 3.7)
When an air traffic services unit knows or believes that an aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference,
no reference shall be made in ATS air-ground communications to the nature of the emergency unless it has
first been referred to in communications from the aircraft involved and it is certain that such reference will
not aggravate the situation (Annex 11, 5.6.2).
Transponder Operations - Unlawful Interference with Aircraft In-flight
Should an aircraft in flight be subjected to unlawful interference, the pilot-in command shall endeavour to set
the transponder to Mode A Code 7500 to give indication of the situation unless circumstances warrant the use
of Code 7700. (Doc 8168, Vol I, Part VIII, 1.5.1).
When a pilot has selected Mode A Code 7500 and is subsequently requested to confirm the code by ATC
he/she shall, according to circumstances, either confirm this or not reply at all (Doc 8168, Vol I, Part VIII,
1.5.2).
Note: The absence of a reply from the pilot will be taken by ATC as an indication that the use of Code 7500 is
not due to an inadvertent false code selection.
- 135 -
Handout 10.5
Page 1 of 2
Air Crew Do’s and Don’ts
Air Crew Do’s - Crew Behaviour
Self Control
• Do Carryout Regular Duties
• Do Eat when given the opportunity
• Do Exercise
• Do Work slowly
• Do Rest
• Do Protect yourself
• Do Communicate with external forces
• Do Consider effects of escape
Passenger Control
• Consider deterring intervention
• Consider encouraging intervention
• Keep passengers occupied
• Deal with passengers needs
• One class service
• Provide food and soft drink
• Ration food and water
• Issue personal cups, plates & cutlery
• Consider facilitating escape
• Provide encouragement
• You are still there for passengers safety
Hijacker Control
• Allow hijacker to establish rapport with chosen crew member
• Reduce hijackers anxiety
• Trained to cooperate
• Blame authorities for delays
• Encourage food and drink
• Request food and water, toilet servicing and air conditioning units
• Communicate personal details
• Secure release of elderly & children
Air Crew Don’ts

• Don’t Attempt to overpower the hijackers
• Don’t Antagonize
• Don’t Argue
• Don’t Belittle
• Don’t Threaten
• Don’t Make any move
• Do not suggest any course of action
• Don’t Provide liquor.
• Don’t Block Exits
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Handout 10.5
Page 2 of 2
Advantages of a Release
• Reduces bargaining power
• Provides up-to-date information to the authorities
• Humanitarian
• Fewer people to guard and serve
• Limits depletion of food and water
Information: Useful information needed about the hijackers

• Number of Hijackers
• Male / Female
• Nationality
• Language Spoken
• Weapon
• Safe Doors
• Dress Code
Information Required by Air Traffic Control

The flight crew will intimate the ATC as soon as possible the under mentioned details
• Routing & ETA
• Fuel Endurance
• Number of Passengers & Crew
• Condition of Passengers & Crew
• Number of Hijackers
• Weapons, Explosives & Incendiary Devices
Assault Phase
During the assault phase advise all the crew
• Get Down
• Protect Yourself
• Obey Commands
• Evacuate Aircraft When Told To
• Be Prepared To Be Treated As a Potential Hijacker
- 137 -
Handout 10.6
Page 1 of 3
Hostage Reaction to a Hijack
Human reaction to a hijack is thought to be a subconscious emotional response to the trauma of being a
hostage or innocent victim. The three common phases of reaction, shock, realization and self-preservation.
SHOCK PHASE
In this phase, the hostage is in a state of shock and refuses to accept that such a thing could happen to him. It
can only be a dream so the best thing to do is to go to sleep because he hopes that, like a dream, it will be all
over when he wakes up. This is said to include some aspects of reaction formation (denial that there is a
conflict) and disengagement (not wishing to know about it). This mental confusion may explain why so few
hostages in hijack incidents can remember what actually happened during the hijack: they make poor
witnesses during later debriefing.
REALIZATION PHASE
This phase is characterized by wishful thinking that the incident will be over soon and freedom regained. To
help pass the time, the hostage resorts to alternative activity that is preferable to taking note of what is going
on. Such activity has included counting the windows in the aircraft, or counting the other hostages, and is a
form of suppression of taking ones mind off a problem by concentrating on in-valid tasks.
SELF-PRESERVATION PHASE
The earlier defense mechanisms having failed, the hostage is driven to sit back and consider his predicament.
Starting by completely ignoring the hijackers, the hostage considers his own past-life and provided he regards
it as /not so bad, decides to hang on to it. This is a symptom of the individual acting purely in self interest, and
is followed by the go calling on other defense mechanisms.
However, these defense mechanisms are not invoked quite so automatically: it appears that the pros and
cons are examined more methodically, with considerable regard for previous experience. Two explanations of
what happens have been suggested, viz:
• Identification. The hostage first identifies with his parents – what would they have done in such
circumstances? The parents are unlikely to have been hijacked so no parallel exists. Lacking guidance from
the past, the hostage then identifies with the captor i.e. the hijacker, and tends to follow the captor’s
example. This type of identification is called introjections and involves acceptance of other people's norms,
even though they may be contrary to ones own standards of behaviour.
• Regression. Alternatively, the hostage can be considered as regressing to a very much earlier stage of ego
development - as far back as childhood when he was dependent on his mother to supply his every need.
The hostage is now dependent on the captor for everything, even his life: the captor is therefore the new
mother figure protecting the hostage from evil (in this case the police!)
Whichever explanation is preferred, the effect is the same, as both unite the captors and the hostages against
outsiders. However, to achieve sympathy for the captors, the hostages must have one important ingredient -
positive contact with the captors/hijackers. In the early stages of a hijack, only negative contact occurs
because the hijackers tend to be brutal and irrational in their dealings with the hostages.
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Handout 10.6
Page 2 of 2
As time passes, the hijackers become friendlier, even considerate, and tend to talk to and explain their actions
to the hostages: this is the essential positive contact which will do much to produce the sympathy in these
circumstances.
This sympathy can go to extremes, and is known as the Stockholm syndrome from a bank hold -up incident in
Stockholm where one of the hostages ended up marrying the criminal captor! Aircrews should be aware of
this characteristic of hijack behaviour: used intelligently, it can do much to alleviate the situation and preserve
the lives of both crew and passengers.
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Handout 10.7
Page 1 of 2
The Stockholm Syndrome
Many people were astonished to see, on a television news interview in September 1976, an airline Captain
befriending and defending the motives of a group of terrorists who had just killed a policeman and hijacked
his aircraft from America to France.
Irresponsible?
No, not really, he was just a victim of a human reaction known as the STOCKHOLM SYNDROME.
It was named after an infamous bank robbery in Stockholm on 23 August 1973.
At 10h15, the quiet early routine of the SVERIGES KREDITBANK was destroyed by the chatter of a submachine
gun. As clouds of plaster and glass settled around the 60 stunned occupants, a heavily armed, lone gunman
called out in English, The party has just begun. The party, was to continue for 131 hours, until 09h00 on 28
August, for four young bank employees who were held hostage by the bank robber/prison escapee named
OLSSON. Their jail was a carpeted bank vault which they came to share with another criminal named
OLOFSSON, who joined the group after OLSSON demanded his release from a local penitentiary.
This particular hostage situation gained notoriety because the electronic media exploited the fears of the
victims, as well as the sequence of events. Contrary to what had been expected, it was found that the victims
feared the police more than they feared the robbers. During a telephone call to the Prime Minister, one of the
hostages expressed a typical feeling of the group when she said; the robbers are protecting us from the
police.
After this incident, the hostages felt no hatred for their captors. In fact, they felt that the subjects had given
them their lives back and were emotionally indebted to them for their generosity. Even now they still visit
them in jail, and one of them is engaged to OLOFSSON.
The Phenomenon
The STOCKHOLM SYNDROME seems to be an automatic, unconscious, emotional response to the trauma of
becoming a victim. Though some victims may think it through, this is not a rational choice by a victim who
decides consciously that the most advantageous behaviour in this predicament is to befriend his captor.
Without delving deeply into the FREUDIAN theories of personality, it seems that the reaction develops from
three separate subconscious assessments that we might call regression to infancy, life threat from outside,
and life saving by the captor.
Regression to Infancy
As a baby or young infant, one has little or no freedom of movement, very limited means of communication
and is totally dependent on some adult, generally one’s mother, for food. Similarly, the hostage has little or
no freedom of movement, very limited means of communication and must rely on the captor for sustenance
during a long seige. It seems then that the hostage suffers a personality regression to his infancy and relates
his captor to his mother, depending on his captor for comfort when in his presence. This bond is actually
mutual experience which usually works to the hostage=s benefit. As the hostage becomes closer or better
known to the captor, the more difficult it is for the captor to execute his victim.
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Handout 10.7
Page 2 of 2
Life Threat from Outside

In a calm hostage situation, there seems little immediate threat to the hostage’s lives. However, as police
approach or otherwise intervene, so the danger to the hostage rises. Typically, the captor’s gun is held at the
hostage head if the police are near, but the gun is lowered as the police withdraw, so it is subconsciously
assessed that the threat is from the outside forces and not from the captor. This outside force causes the
hostages and captors to unite into one threatened group.
Life-saving by the Captor

When a captor frequently threatens the life of a hostage and then does not kill him, it is seen in the hostage’s
subconscious mind that the captor is actually giving life to the hostage. Gratitude develops by the hostage
towards his captor which, in extreme cases, can approach idol worship, equating this life-giver with a supreme
power. This is the part of the Stockholm Syndrome which can remain after the hostage=s release C sometimes
for many years. A classic example of this build-up of gratitude comes from one of the hijack victims of the
TWA flight 355.
After it was over and we were safe, I recognized that they had put me through hell and had caused my
parents and fiancé a great deal of trauma. Yet, I was alive. I was alive because they had let me live. You know
only a few people, if any, who hold your life in their hands and then give it back to you. After it was over and
we were safe, and they were in handcuffs, I walked over to them and kissed each one and said thank you for
giving me my life back. I know how foolish it sounds, but that is how I felt.
This was the hijacking, after which, as mentioned at the beginning, the Captain appeared on television
expressing sympathy for his hijackers as well as an understanding of their political cause. In addition, some of
the passengers began a defense fund for the captor’s legal costs.
Is it avoidable?
Yes. A strong-minded, self-disciplined adult in a hostage situation can remain apart from the emotional ties to
his captor without being outwardly aggressive or nonco-operative.
For example, a British Ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, was held captive for 244 days and so impressed his
captors with his dignity that they were forced to regularly change his guards for fear that he might convince
them that his cause was just and theirs wrong. Also, in America, Dr. Claude Fly was held for 208 days and
maintained his mental isolation from his captors by concentrating on writing and, in fact, wrote his 600-page
autobiography during his capture.
It is not suggested that we should all immediately write our memoirs should we be held in a hijack or other
hostage situation. One should, however, try to insulate oneself from the motives and personalities of the
captors without antagonism. At the same time, it is best to humanize oneself to the captor by letting him get
to know his hostage, thereby increasing one=s chance of survival.
After a hostage situation has ended, it is important that the victims rest and analyze their feelings before any
contact with the press. This is not only to avoid the embarrassment of being seen to side with the captor, but
also to increase the chance of successful criminal prosecution of the captor.
Trying to avoid the Stockholm syndrome is important for all hostage victims but especially important for crew
members of hijacked aircraft.
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Handout 10.8
Page 1 of 2
Post - Landing Procedures

Once the aircraft is on the ground, it is absolutely imperative that it remains on the ground. The flight crew
shall keep the door in lockdown. Since the flight crew cannot know with great certainty what is happening in
the cabin, lockdown should continue until absolutely certain from external personnel who have been visually
identified that the incident is really over.
• Once the aircraft is on ground, it must remain there.
• Lock - down must be maintained until clear confirmation that the incident is over.
• Make aircraft non-flyable.
• Decide if flight crew will evacuate.
• Once the aircraft is on ground, it must remain there.
Lock - down must be maintained until clear confirmation that the incident is over.
• Make aircraft non-flyable.
• Decide if flight crew will evacuate.
• Attempt to taxi aircraft to isolated parking bay.
• Attempt to have communications landline connected to aircraft.
• Advice status of emergency chutes to ground authorities.
• Ration food and water in case of protracted incident
• Establish good housekeeping practices throughout aircraft cabin area
• Off-load all alcoholic bar contents at first opportunity
Tactics of Ground Authorities

In all hijack incidents, the government of the country of landing will undoubtedly be the prime negotiator.
Other governments may be involved and play critical roles.
• Attempts to decide in delays means better survival chances.
• Delay tactics should not compromise aircraft worthiness.
• Portray the old, young and ill passengers as a burden and strive for early release.
• Delays may be considerable but are part of the negotiation process.
• Deadlines passed are positive steps to successful conclusion.
• Crew must be patient and realize that authorities have a big picture.
Ground Intervention
• When requested from crew or if situation is deemed desperate.
Crew must anticipate if situation deteriorates to extreme.

• Assault will be by doors, emergency exits and floor trap doors.
Actions on Ground Intervention

• Crew and passengers must follow instructions given by assaulting team.
• Lie on floor to remove themselves from line of fire.
• Wait for further instructions from AIT when rescue action subsides
• Expect to be treated as suspect until fully identified as non-hijacker
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Handout 10.8
Page 2 of 2
Post Incident Actions

Crews must, and passengers should, bear in mind that any information given to the media can be of great
value to perpetrators in future incidents.
• Interviewed by:
– Airport Authorities, Police, Explosive / CB specialists, State Officials, Company Officials.
• Follow company policy
• Do not talk about incident or threat with public or media.
• Incident Reports mandatory.

– Airlines to Appropriate Authorities of the State
– State Authorities to the ICAO
• Preliminary report
• Final report
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Handout 11.1
Page 1 of 1
Module 11
Hostage Negotiation
Terrorists take hostages with the intent of getting as much publicity as possible for their cause. These
incidents have usually been planned for months, and the hostage-takers have the physical and psychological
support of their fellow members. Usually the demands of the terrorists will go beyond the authority of local
police departments, requiring involvement of Federal officials. The likelihood of hostages being killed is very
high, since the terrorists will have discussed this possibility and may be prepared to die as “martyrs.” The key
to negotiating with terrorists is to convince the hostage-takers that their point has been well-made, their
demands have been heard, and killing the hostages would simply serve to discredit them in the eyes of the
public.
Why are Hostages Taken?

Hostages are taken for many reasons, not all of which are initially apparent - in political terrorism, the reasons
include showing the public that the government is not able to protect its own citizens. Also, taking hostages
virtually guarantees immediate media coverage, and after repeated hostage incidents, it is the hope of the
terrorists that the government may overreact and become excessively restrictive with its own citizens, thus
causing civil discontent and a grassroots movement to overthrow the government.
Law enforcement personnel are most likely to encounter hostage incidents that involve either criminal acts or
the mentally disturbed. If a hostage is taken in a criminal situation, it is usually because the criminal was
unable to complete the crime and escape before the police responded, making the taking of hostages a
spontaneous event. The criminal’s primary reason for taking hostages is to insure his own safety. Therefore,
the demands are invariably for safe passage and a means of escape in return for the hostages’ lives. It is also
very common for them to demand additional money.
A husband or wife may take a child hostage in a custody or domestic dispute. One person believes the other is
an unfit parent and should not have the child, and this is the only way he believes he can regain custody of the
child.
Finally, a mentally disturbed person may take hostages in order to right what he perceives to be a wrong. He
may believe that he has to take hostages in order to carry out some sacred mission or to prove that he can do
something important.
Whatever the initial reason for taking hostages, it is clear that the motive for holding the hostages may
change. For example, a criminal interrupted in the act of robbing a bank may initially demand a great deal of
money, but later reduce this demand to a guarantee of physical safety or clemency in court. Other hostage-
takers may initially demand an immediate change in a government policy or in a prison situation. These
demands may eventually change to an agreement for talks with appropriate officials about the conditions. No
matter what the initial reason for taking hostages, it is not uncommon for the hostage-taker, after some
period of time, to be willing to accept a lesser goal. Whenever a barricaded subject or a hostage situation
exists, there are two basic alternatives available to responding agencies:
• to secure the release of the hostages unharmed whilst conceding as little as possible (known as hostage
negotiation); or
• to attempt to rescue the hostages and neutralize the hostage-takers by offensive action - an assault by an
armed intervention team.
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Handout 11.2
Page 1 of 4
Hostage Negotiation
It is a process of verbal dialogue between the incident responding authorities and the hostage-takers as a
means of bargaining for the release of hostages
Objective of Hostage Negotiation

The basic objectives of hostage negotiation are:
• Resolution of the incident
• Wearing down of the hostage-takers; and
• Tactical negotiations
Command and Control

The most important of these elements, without which any response is doomed to failure, is the establishment
of a clear command structure that will allow decisions to be made at both the strategic (national policy) and
tactical (incident site) level, and a system of communication that will feed information to the decision-makers
and transmit these decisions to staff in the field charged with implementing them.
Executive command at the national policy level where overall strategy is decided upon to ensure that the
national interests and concerns of the State are being met.
Operational command at the scene of the crisis incident where tactical decisions are made within the
parameters of the overall strategy decided upon at the national level.
Operational command should be exercised at an incident control centre located between the inner and outer
cordons. The forward control point, which controls the inner cordon.
The term “incident commander” has been used several times and, however, it is necessary to touch upon the
subject of incident command from the conceptual point of view Most contemporary views of management in
a non-crisis situation are moving away from individual decision- makers to the point where managers are
facilitators who work as part of a team and facilitate that team’s ability to self-solve problems and manage
themselves. Whilst this is true to a certain extent in crisis situations, it has to be remembered that crises by
their very nature disrupt the regular decision-making process requiring a more dynamic and swifter
decision-making process Thus, in the management of crises, there is a need to designate an individual as the
principal decision-maker who will be advised and counselled by the crisis management team.
The Process of Negotiation
Priorities in a hostage incident include preservation of life, apprehension of the hostage-taker, and recovering
or protecting property.
If these alternatives are considered, always progress from the earlier response to the latter response because
it is virtually impossible to return to negotiating, for example, after an assault has taken place. Therefore, the
initial response may preclude the use of other responses later on.
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Handout 11.2
Page 2 of 4
Various aspects of hostage negotiation include:

• What kind of person takes hostages;
• What are common reasons for taking hostages;
• What behaviour can be expected from a hostage;
• The process of negotiation;
• Considerations in selecting a negotiator;
• The interactions between the negotiation team, the on scene commander, and the armed intervention
team; and
• How to use a clinical psychologist as a consultant for negotiation.
Hostage Negotiation Techniques
Establish a problem-solving climate by:

• Acknowledging existence of problem to perpetrator;
• Expressing desire to understand;
• Willingness to help solve problem; and
• Establishing climate of working together for solution.
Develop atmosphere where the goal is compromise, by:

• Having the negotiator communicate (give-and- take attitude);
• Showing willingness to bargain; and
• yielding on some issues, holding on others, bargaining for everything, avoid forcefulness or not make
threats;
Do not force confrontations by giving ultimatums, avoid soft bargaining the negotiator should not be too
concerned for perpetrator’s feelings; and
The negotiator does not need to feel he is liked or accepted by perpetrator.
Composition of Hostage Negotiation Team
Two five-man teams will work 12-hour shifts with a 30-minute handover period before and after each shift.
Each team will consist of:
a) Team Leader;
b) Negotiator;
c) Strategist;
d) Liaison Officer; and
e) Requirements Officer.
Team Leader
The team leader reports directly to the Incident Commander and supervises the hostage negotiation team.
The leader will elicit policy decisions from the Incident Commander, seek agreement on what is negotiable
and what is non-negotiable and other operational matters, monitor deadlines closely, anticipate demands and
needs, and explore alternative concessions.
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Handout 11.2
Page 3 of 4
Negotiator
The negotiator should normally be the only person with whom the hostage-takers speak. The negotiator is
represented as a middle person who cannot make decisions on major demands and who is reliant on “senior
officers” to consider such demands. They can, however, agree to minor demands, such as food, drink and
cigarettes, but will not deliver these without clearance from the Incident Commander.
Strategist
A strategist stays with the negotiator throughout the incident and discusses negotiation tactics with the
negotiator. If the negotiations are taking place some distance from the Incident Control Centre, a radio or
telephone link to the team leader is maintained constantly.
Liaison Officer
The hostage negotiation team liaison officer will remain with the negotiator at all times and assist in
maintaining the negotiator’s incident board. In the absence of the team leader, the liaison officer will be
available to advise the Incident Commander on matters pertaining to negotiations, and will also liaise with the
armed intervention team and the intelligence unit.
Requirement Officer
The requirement officer will liaise with other responding agencies and advise on the hostage negotiation
team’s needs. The requirement officer will liaise with the inner cordon concerning escorts, forewarning of
cordon movements, and will be responsible for stage managing the delivery of items to the stronghold.
Selecting A Negotiator
The negotiator should be a volunteer, usually an experienced law enforcement person in excellent mental and
physical health. He must be able to think clearly under stress.
Desirable personality traits for a negotiator include:

• He must possess emotional maturity. He should accept abuse, ridicule, and insulting statements without
responding emotionally. When those around him are anxious, frightened, or confused, he should be able to
maintain a clear head.
• He should be a good listener and have excellent interviewing skills.
• He should be a person who can easily establish credibility with others.
• He should have the ability to use logical arguments to convince others that his viewpoint is rational and
reasonable.
• He should be able to communicate with persons from the lowest to the highest socio-economic class.
• He should have “practical intelligence,” common sense, and be “street wise.”
• He should have the ability to cope with uncertainty and be willing to accept responsibility with no
authority.
• He should have total commitment to the negotiation approach.
• He should understand that if negotiations are not progressing and lives are in imminent danger, he will
have to assist in planning an assault to rescue the hostages.
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Handout 11.2
Page 4 of 4
Guidelines for Negotiation
Take your time when negotiating. The passage of time increases the likelihood hostages will be released
unharmed for the following reasons:
• Basic human needs for food, water, sleep, and the need to extricate from a stressful situation increase;
• Anxiety tends to be reduced;
• Most persons begin to think more rationally and less emotionally;
• The Stockholm Syndrome begins to form;
• Hostages have increased opportunity for escape;
• Intelligence gathered will permit better decision-making;

• Increased rapport and trust can develop between the negotiator and hostage-taker;
• The hostage-taker’s expectations and demands may be reduced; and
• The incident may simply fade. Some hostage-takers have simply allowed hostages to walk out with no
expectation of something in return.
Although there is no question that the passage of time can enhance the negotiation process, there are also
some negative effects.
Negotiators, armed intervention team members, and command post personnel may get tired and bored,
making mistakes possible. There may also be a loss of objectivity. Law enforcement personnel, in an effort to
end the incident, may be more willing to take a precipitous action that may be unnecessary, for example,
inadvertently creeping toward the subject or lessening caution in maintaining cover in perimeter control.
Pick the right time to establish contact. Give the hostage-taker time to calm down. Premature contact may
result in him feeling extreme stress, causing him to make unreasonable and threatening demands. If he is
given time to calm down and realistically assess the situation, the demands he makes may be more
reasonable.
Charter of Psychiatrist/Clinical Psychologist at a Counter Terrorist Incident
The psychiatrist/clinical psychologist will work with the hostage negotiation team leader. This specialist’s role
will be as follows:
a) To advise on the suspects’ personality types and mental states; and
b) To comment on proposed tactics, with particular emphasis on avoiding upsetting the suspects
unnecessarily.
c) To comment on the suspects’ likely priorities in their demands and on any evident psychological needs;
d) To chart the psychological progression of events;
e) To advise on:
i) Defusing any crisis; and
ii) Phase III strategy and tactics;
e) To provide emotional support to the negotiator and strategist; and
f) To advise the hostage negotiation team leader on the suitability of:
i) The current or proposed negotiator;
ii) Any potential intermediary.
Handout 11.3
Page 1 of 1
- 148 -
Armed Intervention Team
The armed intervention team (AIT) is necessary; to provide a tactical option to the Incident Commander for
the resolution of the incident or to respond should the situation deteriorate beyond acceptable levels.
The armed intervention team is required to provide the Incident Commander with an immediate action (IA)
plan that can be used when the situation deteriorates to unacceptable levels prior to the primary option being
ready.
The team leader will advise and assist the Incident Commander on the tactical options available to him and
formulate a plan, known as the primary option, to release the hostages by offensive action; and execute the
primary option or the immediate action on the direction of the Incident Commander in order to release the
hostages and resolve the incident.
Depending upon the circumstances, the tactical options available to the armed intervention team may include
the following:
• sniper action against the hostage-takers in their stronghold position (not normally a viable option if the
stronghold is an aircraft);
• assault action with sniper support on the stronghold;
• sniper action against the hostage-takers whilst they are moving from the stronghold; and
• Ambush of the hostage-takers en route between stronghold/vehicle/aircraft or upon arrival at a new

location.
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Handout 11.4
Page 1 of 1
Post Hijack Procedures
Hostage Reception
During the course of negotiation, arrangements may be concluded for the release of a number of hostages in
return for concessions from the authorities on demands made by the hostage-takers. Also, hostages will be
released following a successful armed intervention. This release and reception of hostages must be carefully
controlled to ensure that only genuine hostages are released.
Release & Reception
1. The following basic rules should always apply:

a) the hostage takers must always supply names and physical descriptions of all the hostages being
released;
b) the hostage takers must ensure that the hostages exit the stronghold via an agreed route, one by one
with their hands in the air;
c) on first contact, the receiving officer will ask the hostages to identify themselves;
d) With the exception of sick or injured hostages, all hostages will be subjected to a thorough body
search conducted in the prone position. As far as possible, searches should take place out of sight of
the stronghold;
e) sick or injured hostages will be quickly searched prior to being escorted for medical treatment;
f) after search clearance, the hostage will be escorted to the hostage reception centre via the agreed
route (usually through the forward control point); and
g) should a searching officer suspect that a hostage is not genuine, the individual will immediately be
handcuffed (in the prone position) and guarded pending the arrival of assistance.
Responsibilities
2. The commander of the field support group will be responsible for locating a suitable location for the
hostage reception centre and transport thereto if necessary. This will be large enough to
accommodate the hostages and the debriefing teams and will be within the outer cordon and
preferably near the incident control centre.
3. Security of the hostage reception centre will be the responsibility of the commander of the field
support group.
4. Actual hostage reception will be the responsibility of the inner cordon.
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MODULE -12
RESPONSE TO SECURITY
EMERGENCIES AND
CONTINGENCIES
Page 1 of 90
AVSEC BASIC COURSE-MODULE 12
2022
Handout 8.1
Page 1 of 4
Module 08
Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft on Ground
Bomb Threat
A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers, whether true or false that the
safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, or any airport or civil aviation facility or any person may be in
danger from an explosive or other item or device.
Characteristics of Bomb Threats
Experience has shown that bomb threats may be directed against:

• Aircraft on the ground or in the air;
• Airport installations, facilities and buildings; or navigation aids on or in the immediate vicinity the airports;
• Air cargo designated for shipment by air; or cargo installations, facilities and buildings.
Action by the Recipient of a Bomb Threat Telephone Call
Receipt of Bomb Threats

Telephoned bomb threats may be received by airports, airlines and cargo agents either directly from the
people issuing the threats or from intermediaries, for example, the media or press agencies. In either case,
recipients should try to obtain as much information as possible about the threat in order to facilitate
assessment of it and identification of the person issuing it.
To facilitate the collection of information, aircraft operators and airports should install tape recording facilities
on appropriate exchanges and/or telephones. Continuous loop equipment, which should be kept running
continuously, is preferable to conventional recording equipment which must be switched on when a recording
is to be made. When a bomb threat has been recorded, the tape should be retained as evidence.
Staff Instructions and Training

Staff such as telephone switchboard operators and airline ticket sales people who are likely to receive bomb
threat calls should be briefed on the action they should take before taking up their duties, and the responses
required from them should be incorporated into appropriate staff instructions.
They should be provided with checklists to facilitate their reactions. Supervisors should be similarly aware of
the response required and of the need to relay information about bomb threats to trained bomb threat
assessors.
Action by Recipient of a Bomb Threat

Any person receiving a bomb threat directly by telephone should:
• Listen carefully and make a note of the actual words used by the caller;
• Either take action to trace the call or alert a colleague in order that they may do so;
• Take such action as may be necessary to tape record the call, where this is not done automatically;
• Prolong the call to obtain as much information as possible;
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Handout 8.1
Page 2 of 4
• Ask the caller the following questions:
Asked first so that that an evacuation can be

WHERE is the bomb?
planned
So that a time factor is known for the
WHEN will it go off?
evacuation
To help in recognition of the device during a
WHAT does it look like?
search
WHO are you? To see if the caller is from a credible group
To build up a better picture of the incident and
WHY are you doing this? keep the caller on the line to assist in tracing
the call
Note 1. — The questions should be posed as open questions rather than as leading ones. For
example, ask, “Where exactly is the bomb?” rather than, “Is the bomb in the hold of the
aircraft?”
Note 2. — The order in which the questions are asked is important as the caller may hang up
before all the questions can be asked.
• If possible, test the credibility of the caller by making up a non-existent flight number, flight time or
location and asking the caller whether that is the one to which he or she is referring;
• Inform a supervisor who should inform the nominated bomb threat assessor, the police or security
services.
People receiving calls from intermediaries should:

• Ask for, and make written note of, the precise time at which the threat was issued and the exact words
used by the caller;
• Ask whether the intermediary obtained answers to any of the questions detailed above and about the
origin of the call and the caller’s identity.
The recipient of a written bomb threat should preserve the message and deliver it to the supervisor with
precise information about its discovery. Messages discovered in flight should be referred to the pilot-in-
command immediately.
Supervisors should interview the recipient of any call or message in order to complete the Bomb Threat
Report Form shown below and relay it without delay to the nominated bomb threat assessor.
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Handout 8.1
Page 3 of 4
SAMPLE BOMB THREAT REPORT FORM
Time: Date:
Name of person receiving threat message:
Message: (Caller’s exact words)
WHERE IS THE BOMB?
Terminal Fuel storage Cargo area Airline offices or Other

facility maintenance
area
Aircraft Flight number Departing Going to
Did the caller appear to be familiar with the aircraft or building when describing the location?
YES / NO
WHEN WILL IT EXPLODE?
Time : Day : Date :

In flight?: YES/NO If moved?: YES/NO Other :
WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?
Briefcase Shopping/carrier bag Suitcase

Box/parcel Other (describe)
WHO ARE YOU?
Name : Organization :
Where are you now?
WHY ARE YOU DOING THIS?
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Handout 8.1
Page 4 of 4
BACKGROUND DETAILS (Circle appropriate answer)
Origin of call
Internal (from within Public
Local Long distance
building) telephone/cellular/mobile
Attempt made to trace call? Yes/No

Caller’s identity
Sex: Approximate age: Language spoken:
Voice characteristics
Loud Soft High-pitched Deep
Raspy Pleasant Other
Speech
Fast Distinct Stuttering Slurred
Slow Distorted Nasal Other
Background noise
Noisy Quiet Trains Aircraft
Street traffic Voices Office machines Factory machines
Kitchen Party atmosphere Animals Music
Mixed (describe)
Accent
Local Not local Colloquial Regional Foreign
Manner
Angry Calm Irrational Rational
Coherent Incoherent Deliberate Emotional
Intoxicated Laughing Righteous Obscene
Other (describe)
Command of language
Excellent Good Fair Poor
COMPLETE FORM AND PASS TO NOMINATED BOMB THREAT ASSESSOR

DISCUSS THREAT CALL ONLY WITH BOMB THREAT ASSESSOROR POLICING AUTHORITIES.
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Handout 8.2
Page 1 of 3
Bomb Threat Assessment
A systematic procedure to assess bomb threats is necessary to ensure, as far as humanly possible, that
whenever there exists an actual bomb or other device the assessment leads to positive action and where the
threat is a hoax the assessment results in the minimum disruption to operations.
Such a procedure was devised by several States using a technique called “Positive Target Identification” (PTI).
The methodology was designed to lead a bomb assessor to a logical conclusion. PTI will assist in classifying the
threat as:
• Specific; or
• Non-specific;
The process of PTI is to use the specificity of the information contained in the threat to determine the
credence to be applied to the threat. The more information given by the caller (most threats are made
anonymously over the telephone; written threats are rare), the more likely the threat should be taken
seriously. Each threat must be assessed to determine its significance and the risk it represents so that
appropriate measures may be implemented.
Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
The salient features of a Bomb Threat Contingency Plan are:

• Designation of airport director as coordinator.
• Establishment of bomb threat control room.
• Evaluation of call by bomb threat assessment committee guided by BWAF.
• Questioning technique.
• Duties and responsibilities of various agencies at airport such as AAI, ASG / APSU, airlines, BDDS, DGCA,
customs and immigration.
• Search procedure.
• Evacuation of building under threat.
• Procedure to deal with unidentified / suspected baggage.
Bomb Threat Assessment on the Ground
Bomb threat assessment carries substantial responsibility. Bomb threat assessors should be appropriately
trained and available 24 hours a day. Each aircraft operator and airport should have at least one assessor on
duty or on call within the company at all times. Where a threat is received against an aircraft on the ground,
the targeted aircraft operator and the appropriate airport security services agency should agree on
assessment.
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Handout 8.2
Page 2 of 3
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC)
In India Bomb threat call is assessed by the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC). BTAC is a
recognized apex body at the airport empowered to evaluate every threat call and take appropriate action as
laid down as deemed necessary without reference to any higher outside agency.
The Bomb Threat Committee comprises of:
No Officials Agency Status

Airport Director or Director operations Airport Operator Coordinator.
1
or his representative
2 CASO or his representative ASG (CISF or State Police) Member
3 Security Manager / Station Manager Aircraft Operator Member
4 Watch Supervisory Officer (WSO) ATC Member
5 Airworthiness Officer DGCA Member
6 Representative of local police State Police Member
Officer I/C BDDS ASG/State Police/ NSG (where ever Member
7
located)
8 FRRO/Asst FRRO * Immigration Member
9 Deputy Commandant * Customs Member
COE or his representative BCAS Observer
10
(wherever located)
RDCOS or his representative BCAS Observer
11
(wherever located)
(Should be present in case threat relates to international terminal, international airlines or
*
import/export cargo terminal)
Aircraft operators may require pilots-in-command to refer bomb threats received on board aircraft in flight to
operations staff on the ground for assessment, or they may authorize the pilots-in-command to assess threats
themselves. Where pilots-in-command are authorized to assess bomb threats, they should be provided with
guidance from the police or State security services.
It is important that the bomb threat assessor obtain full details of the threat message — ideally in the form of
a completed Bomb Threat Report Form from the person who received it and by the fastest possible means.
The bomb threat assessor should assess the threat by working methodically through the Bomb Warning
Assessment Form (BWAF). Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF) is a guideline to the committee for
systematic and scientific evaluation of the Bomb Threat Call. It is designed to lead the assessor to a logical
assessment of the threat as GREEN (Hoax), AMBER (Non Specific) or RED (specific) Threat described below
with the actions required.
GREEN (Hoax) A warning, which may not identify a target Present countermeasures negate threat.
or a specific group of targets, or which No extra precautions necessary.
otherwise lacks credibility.
AMBER (Non A warning that can be related to one or This may involve danger and may require
Specific Threat) more targets but where there is doubt augmentation of countermeasures.
about its credibility or about the
effectiveness of existing countermeasures.
- 92 -
RED (Specific A specific warning where the threat is of a Likely to involve a danger to people,
Threat) nature which permits identification of a property or commercial activities and
specific target, or where the caller has therefore merits countermeasures.
positively identified himself or the
organization involved and is judged
credible.
Note.— Category RED warnings against Take all necessary countermeasures.
aircraft in flight should be notified
immediately to the pilot-in-command of the
aircraft and the destination or nominated
diversion airport
Although the procedure is largely dependent upon the provision of “Yes” or “No” answers to a series of
questions, the assessor must also take account of other factors that may bear upon the credibility of the
threat including, but not limited to, the following:
• The recent history of warnings and incidents for the airport and the main aircraft operators;
• The possible influence of current events such as:
o Industrial disputes concerning the aircraft operator of the flight concerned or airport;
o Disputes with neighbouring communities or environmental protest groups concerned with, for example,
airport expansion or development;
o Similar incidents having been recently reported in the media which may have prompted a hoax call;
o High-profile persons who may attract a threat at the airport or are passengers on the flight;
• Any reported incidents such as overbooked passengers, a passenger refused boarding, or disputes at
check-in or the gate involving friends or relatives;
• Anything particular or unique about the cargo being carried on the flight;
• Additional security measures that have been taken and the local police or security authority’s opinion of
the warning.
Deterring and Detecting Persons Responsible For Bomb Threats

Details of bomb threat incidents should be recorded by aircraft operators and airports and detailed in a report
which should be sent to the State’s civil aviation and security policy and regulatory section so that trends may
be considered, and to the appropriate police authority in order that the circumstances may be investigated.
When a person initiating a bomb threat is identified, that person should be prosecuted under the relevant
laws of the State; evidence of the cost and concern caused by the incident should be submitted for
consideration by the court, and convictions should be publicized to deter potential offenders.
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Handout 8.3
Page 1 of 2
Bomb Threat Response by Ground Authorities
Action after Positive Threat Assessment

In consultation with the police and other appropriate agencies, each aircraft operator and airport should
develop contingency plans to be implemented when bomb threats issued against it are assessed as RED or
AMBER to reduce the risks arising from such bomb threats.
Duties of Air-Carrier:
• Attend BTAC meeting.
• Stop Boarding of passengers if already boarded. Disembark all passengers and crew with all cabin
baggage. Escape slides should only be used in extreme emergencies;
• Be prepared to move the aircraft and GS equipment to a remote location such as the isolated parking
position in case BTAC decides to treat the call specific without loosing time;
• isolate and re-screen all passengers and their cabin baggage and hold them in a separate area until the
crew members, hold baggage, cargo and catering supplies have been inspected/screened, searched and
declared safe;
Duties of Air-Crew
• Stop boarding in-case boarding has already commenced
• Disembark passengers already boarded with their cabin baggage
• Send them to terminal building
• Make a final inspection of the cabin to ensure all pax have disembark & carry necessary shut down before
deplaning self.
• Do not touch, open or attempt to remove any unclaimed article / device, but report to the coordinator.
• Pre-embarkation check, comprising of 100% screening of hand baggage by ASG shall be implemented on
departing crew & pax.
• Post security checks Crew & Pax would wait in the boarding hall for announcements of boarding.
• Before boarding the aircraft, crew and pax are required to identify their registered baggage at the isolated
bay / BMA before proceeding for Secondary Security Checks & Boarding.
Action taken if the BTAC assess the call as Specific Threat Call
• Aircraft will be towed to the isolated bay.
• Senior Airline official from Security / Flight Crew / Engg / Catering / Cargo, Traffic, GSD etc. with sufficient
staff to be available to assist Anti-Sabotage check / search team.
• Aircraft will be searched by BDDS, dog squad, airline engineer & security, ASG, AWO and if required
assistance will be taken from crew.
• On receipt of clearance from the coordinator screened crew will be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Escorted crew would alight from bus at a safe distance of 100 mtrs from the aircraft.
• Crew should identify their hold baggage at the Isolated bay and proceed for Secondary Security Check
/100% hand baggage check by airline security before boarding the aircraft.
• Crew to give clearance for passenger boarding after necessary checks..
• On receipt of clearance from the crew, screened pax will be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Escorted pax will alight from bus at a safe distance of 100 mtrs from the aircraft.
• Pax are required to identify their hold baggage at the Isolated bay before proceeding for Secondary
Security Check & Boarding.
• Head Count to be taken
Handout 8.3
Page 2 of 2
- 94 -
Action to be taken if the BTAC assess the call as Non – Specific Call
• Aircraft to remain at parking bay
• Aircraft search would be carried out by AME & Airline security. Crew will assist if required
• Aircraft Security Search Check-list to be used for the Search
• On receipt of clearance from the coordinator screened crew to be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Crew to identify their hold baggage before proceeding for Secondary Security Check & Boarding.
• Crew to give clearance for passenger boarding after necessary checks.
• On receipt of clearance from the crew, screened pax will be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Pax to identify their hold baggage before proceeding for Secondary Security Check & Boarding.
• Head Count to be taken
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Handout 8.3
Page 1 of 1
Do’s & Don’ts for suspect item

Do’s
• Do evacuate men immediately to a safe distance.
• Open all windows & doors.
• Place sand bags around the suspected object.
• Inform bomb disposal squad.
• Inform fire brigade, hospital and ambulance.
• Do handle the package alone if you are duty bound to handle
Don’ts
• Do not touch or remove the object unless you are duty bound
• Do not open the package.
• Do not puncture package.
• Do not submerge packet into water.
• Do not accept identification marks on its face value. It could be a disguised bomb.
• Do not pass metallic object over the package.
• Do not direct flash light directly over the suspected object.
• Do not cut the strings or wire.
• Do not bring suspected device in security control room or police station.
• Always remove the men first and not the bomb from scene.
• Do not attempt to open the baggage by hand, always use remote entry technique.
• Don’t stereotype, the bomb being high explosive, it may be incendiaries.
• Don’t transport the suspected object through congested area.
• Do not permit re-entry of people until object is removed.
• Don’t be a dead hero
Countermeasures adopted for handling Bomb Threat Calls

• Installation of caller ID
• Wide publicity in local newspaper
• Prompt evaluation of call with help of BWAF
• Deployment of dog / BDDS in airports.
• Periodical mock up exercise
• Up gradation of EDS / EDDS.
• Installation of EVDS / ETDS
• CTX – machines (computer tomography x-ray)
• Training of employees
• A dedicated ASG (CISF) is inducted
• Centralized monitoring of CCTV by APSU/ASG, customs, immigration
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Handout 9.1
Page 1 of 4
Module 09
Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft in Air
Bomb Threat for Aircraft-in-flight
An aircraft is deemed to be in-flight when:

• It is taxing to takeoff point
• Aircraft lands back at departing station
• Scheduled arrival or diverted aircraft
Actions Before Take off / After Landing
On receiving notification of the bomb threat to an aircraft at the airport, the ATC - controller will immediately
notify the appropriate authority, the aircraft operator and the airport operator :-
(a) If the aircraft is on the ground

• Clearance will be denied for take-off until appropriate measures have been taken to establish that the
threat is false and continuance of the flight may be authorized, or until the aircraft and contents have
been searched and declared by a competent authority to be no longer under threat.
• After denying clearance, the control tower will clear affected taxiways and runways and direct the
aircraft to taxi or be towed to the isolated parking position.
• Rescue, fire fighting and security services shall be alerted in accordance with the airport emergency plan.
(b) For aircraft on bay

• Commander to immediately disembark passengers / crew with their hand baggage.
(c) For pushed back aircraft where Tow Tractor is still attached
• Commander to bring the aircraft to the same parking stand and disembark Passengers/crew with their
hand baggage.
(d) For pushed back aircraft when engine has started but taxiing has yet not commenced
• Commander to bring back the aircraft to the same parking stand on its own power and disembark
passengers/crew with their hand baggage.
(e) For aircraft, which has commenced taxiing

• Commander to continue taxing to the Isolation Bay.
(f) If the aircraft is airborne

• Aircraft will be cleared to land in accordance with established emergency procedures at the request of
the pilot-in-command.
- Decision on the action to be taken rest with the pilot-in-command.
• If the decision made is to continue the flight, then, for the duration of that flight, the aircraft should be
treated as suspect and appropriate separation arranged with contiguous ATS units to ensure that other
aircraft are not endangered.
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Handout 9.1
Page 2 of 4
(g) When the aircraft under bomb threat has departed before receipt of bomb threat call message
• Commander of aircraft will be informed regarding the bomb threat to the aircraft.
• BTAC decision would be passed on as soon as it is arrived at.
• Commander to either wait for BTAC decision, or return for landing or divert to nearest airport.
- He may continue to his scheduled destination without waiting for BTAC decision.
(h) Commander’s decision to be conveyed to the coordinator and also to the Area control/ATC units of
scheduled / diverted destination.
(i) Communicate decision of BTAC to Commander of affected aircraft as soon as it is received from the
coordinator.
(j) If the Commander, on hearing BTAC decision decides to land back or divert to nearest airport or continue
to his scheduled destination, inform commander’s decision to coordinator and affected ATC units
accordingly.
- In such a case, the affected aircraft will be treated as “suspect” and appropriate separation arranged
with air traffic service to ensure that other aircrafts are not endangered.
(k) If the commander of the aircraft decides to land back,

- Coordinator to be informed
- Aircraft is cleared for landing on priority under established emergency procedures.
- Upon landing of the aircraft, the aircraft will be directed to isolation bay directly irrespective of fact
that BTAC has declared call as “Non Specific” or “Specific” or not able to take a decision due to
paucity of time.
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Handout 9.2
Page 1 of 1
Bomb Threat Assessment in the Air
Written bomb threats discovered on board aircraft in flight are likely to be spurious, but each one should be
considered on its merits in order to assess the risks involved. Where pilots-in-command are authorized to
assess threats, airlines should provide them with guidance to enable them to assess the risks and decide upon
a course of action. They should consider the following:
• The circumstances surrounding the threat to determine if it originated before the aircraft’s departure or
during the flight. The pilot -in-command should consider whether the threat could have been discovered
during the pre-flight search of the aircraft, or at an earlier stage in the flight. If the pilot-in-command
concludes that the author of the threat is on board and would be affected by an explosion, the threat is
likely to be a hoax;
• The precise wording of the threat, to determine whether it suggests there is a credible reason for the
threat having been given. A threat is most likely to be genuine if there is a reason for it, such as a desire to
avoid the casualties that would result from an explosion. It is likely that a person issuing such a threat will
seek to ensure that it gets through and that there is time to react to it. Where no clear reason for the
threat can be deduced, the threat is less likely to be genuine;
• Whether there is any person on board (e.g. a political figure or other well known person) who might
attract a threat;
• Whether there are passengers on board who might be responsible for a threat (e.g. a potentially disruptive
passenger, deportee or inadmissible, young people or rowdy passengers);
• Whether the airline’s operations centre can be contacted by radio to establish whether this is an isolated
incident or one of a series of similar events affecting the airline;
• If the pilot-in-command is not satisfied that the incident is a hoax, he or she should seek information
through the airline’s operations centre about the current threat to the airline’s interests at the airport of
departure, with a view to establishing whether there are credible motives for attacking the aircraft or
disrupting the flight and the quality of security measures at the airport of departure. Aircraft operators
should therefore develop procedures for making such information available to the pilot-in-command with
the least possible delay.
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Handout 9.3
Page 1 of 3
Aircraft in Flight
1. When a bomb threat is associated with an aircraft in flight, and once the threat has been assessed as
positive, the aircraft operator should contact the pilot-in-command, directly or through the air traffic
services unit, to provide information about the threat and device and about how to respond.
2. On receipt of the information, the pilot-in-command should require a discreet search of the aircraft by
crew members insofar as this is possible in flight and conducted in such a manner as to not cause
passengers to panic.
3. In those cases where the bomb threat assessment indicates that it is unlikely that there is a bomb on
board the aircraft, but where an aircraft operator or a pilot-in-command wishes to be prudent before
committing, for example, to an extended flight across water — the aircraft should be diverted to an
airfield at which it can land safely. Once it has landed, consideration should be given to taking the actions
described above for threats against an aircraft on the ground.
4. When the pilot-in-command has reasonable grounds for believing that there is a bomb on board the
aircraft, consideration should be given to the potential effects of an explosion on board the aircraft to
people on the ground, particularly within densely populated areas. Action as described in the following
guidelines should be taken:
• An aircraft emergency should be declared to the ATS unit stating the nature of the emergency, and the
aircraft should be diverted to the nearest civil or military airfield at which it can land safely. The route
to the nominated nearest suitable airfield should avoid densely populated areas.
• If the aircraft is required to make an approach to land over a densely populated area, it should be
permitted to land at that airfield in accordance with current emergency procedures. Its time in the air
should not be prolonged in order to divert to another airfield.
• If an immediate landing cannot be made, consideration should be given to seeking expert advice by
communicating on radio with the ATS unit or other ground station which should, in turn, provide a
landline link with the State’s explosive disposal experts. The possibility of radio communications
between aircraft and ATS units being monitored, with the attendant risk of compromise, should be
taken into account during transmissions. Consideration should be given to the use of on-board aircraft
telephone communications or digital cellular telephones.
• The pilot-in-command may also consider making discreet inquiries to establish whether any passenger
has bomb disposal (BD) or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise.
Only the initials for these skills should be used in order to reduce the likelihood of alarming other
passengers. Caution should be exercised about the skills any passengers may say they have and where
possible a check on their background should be initiated through the ATS unit or ground station with
which the aircraft is in communication.
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Handout 9.3
Page 2 of 3
5. In addition to the above guidelines, if a suspect explosive device is discovered on board an aircraft, the
pilot-in-command should direct that:
• The suspect object not be moved, touched or opened;
• Passengers should be moved as far away as possible, instructed to fasten their seat belts and keep
their heads below the tops of the seat backs;
• Portable oxygen, bottles of alcohol and first aid kits should be removed from the vicinity. Fire
extinguishers should be readily available.
6. If an immediate landing can be made, the item should be left in place, covered with polythene and then
packed around with pillows, blankets, coats and other blast absorbent materials. The item itself must be
kept dry (hence the polythene) but surrounding materials should be wet in order to reduce the risk of fire.
7. If an immediate landing cannot be made, the pilot-in-command should take expert advice from explosives
disposal experts as described above and consider moving the item, especially if its position poses a real
threat to the aircraft. Reference to the aircraft flying manuals should identify the type-specific least risk
bomb location. If this is a door, a stable platform of hard, blast-attenuating materials, such as cabin
baggage, upon which the suspect item can be placed, should be built to the centre of the door.
8. It is unlikely that an explosive device placed on an aircraft will be fitted with an anti-handling triggering
mechanism. Nevertheless, if the device is to be moved, the following actions should be taken:
• the suspect object should not be opened;
• a check should be made to ensure that it is free to move — i.e. that there is, for example, no thread
joining it to the aircraft structure which may indicate an anti-handling triggering mechanism;
• it should be moved gently and kept in the same attitude in which it was found;
• it should be placed, in the same attitude, in the prepared least risk bomb location and packed around
as described above and suitably restrained against movement during flight or during deceleration or
landing.
Note 1. — No procedures which involve disconnecting or cutting electrical circuits in the suspect items should
be attempted.
Note 2. — As a general rule, a suspect package or article should not be jettisoned from an aircraft in flight,
particularly through a dorso-lateral door, emergency exit or hatch. Tests have shown that such a course of
action will subject the object to severe buffeting by the airflow. This could cause an explosion in close proximity
to the fuselage, or engine(s) of the aircraft, resulting in a loss of control and possible consequential destruction
of the aircraft.
9. If no suspicious item is found and an immediate landing cannot be made, the pilot-in-command should
consider the following:
• Although a bomb threat may have been received and assessed as RED, aircraft should be flown as
normally as possible, striking a balance between the need for a rapid landing and the risk arising from
undue haste.
• An emergency should be declared and the aircraft should divert to the nearest suitable airfield. The
choice of airfield should take into account landing performance requirements, approach aids,
emergency facilities and the proximity of approach paths to densely populated areas.
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Handout 9.3
Page 3 of 3
• The ATS unit should be fully briefed on flight intentions so that the appropriate ground measures can
be initiated at the airfield of intended landing.
• The cabin crew should be briefed to be prepared for a possible emergency landing and prepare for
the possible use of crew oxygen/smoke masks.
• If operationally possible, the cabin differential pressure should be reduced to zero by descending the
aircraft to the cabin altitude. Do not raise the cabin altitude. Maintain this cabin altitude until the top
of descent. When the minimum safe altitude and range considerations permit, descend aircraft to
below 10 000 ft.
• All efforts should be taken to minimize aircraft manoeuvres and to try to avoid turbulence.
• Careful consideration should be given to the choice between flying fast to minimize airborne time and
flying slowly to minimize air loads and damage in the event of fuselage rupture. In most cases, the
turbulent air penetration speed will be a reasonable compromise.
• Consideration should be given to establishing the aircraft -landing configuration as soon as possible.
• Details of remote parking requirements and the immediate availability of passenger steps should be
requested from the airfield of landing. The airfield should be advised of the need to remove
passengers from the vicinity of the aircraft to at least 200 m in an upwind direction as quickly as
possible after landing.
10. When an aircraft lands following receipt of a bomb threat that has been assessed RED or AMBER,
provision should be made to disembark passengers and crew with a minimum of delay (with their cabin
baggage when circumstances permit). The necessary emergency services should be provided to preserve
life and prevent injury, and the aircraft should be parked where it will not hazard people or premises in
the event of an explosion. The actions for a bomb threat against an aircraft on the ground should then be
implemented.
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Handout 9.2
Page 1 of 3
Recommended In-Flight Emergency Safety Procedures for a Suspect Device On Board

Least Risk Bomb Location (LRBL) Procedures
1. Action: IF POSSIBLE, DESCEND, LAND, TAXI TO A REMOTE SITE AND EVACUATE THE AIRCRAFT
IMMEDIATELY.
Purpose: To get passengers and crew away from the hazard. If landing the aircraft and evacuating
passengers within 30 minutes is not possible, implement the following:
2. Action: CONTACT an air traffic control facility and your company operations office to request assistance
from an explosives specialist.
Purpose: To get expert advice directly from an Aviation Explosives Security Specialist (Bomb Technician).
Other countries may wish to implement local procedures.
3. Action: If possible, DESCEND to attain no more than a 1 pound-per-square-inch (PSI) pressure differential
while maintaining the existing cabin pressure as long as possible. It is extremely important that the cabin
pressure differential (? P) be reduced, even if the crew is unable to land immediately due to the distance
to a safe landing area (e.g., over the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans).
Purpose: To avoid strongly amplifying the effects of an explosion, preclude the activation of an altitude
sensitive device and to assist in evacuation of smoke.
4. Action: After considering the aircraft’s capabilities and the distance to the nearest suitable airport, SLOW
to approach speed if possible, and configure the aircraft for landing, restricting maneuvering to a
minimum. This may not be possible in all instances due to the distance to the nearest safe landing area.
Purpose: In the event of a detonation, the systems for lowering landing gear and other landing aids could
be damaged. Reducing approach speed and level flight may enhance aircraft survivability.
5. Action: Covertly CHECK for passengers for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise using only the
initials by announcing: Are there any EOD personnel on board?
Purpose: By using the initials, only persons familiar with EOD will be made aware of the problem.
WARNING: DO NOT OPEN or attempt to gain entry to the internal components of a closed or concealed
device. Any attempt may result in an explosion. Booby-trapped closed devices have been reported as having
been on board aircraft in the past.
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Handout 9.2
Page 2 of 3
DO NOT CUT OR DISCONNECT ANY WIRES
6. Action: KEEP all passengers seated with their seat belts fastened and seat backs and tray tables in their
full, upright positions, at least 4 rows from the suspect device.
Purpose: Distance from an explosion is one of the best protective measures for passenger safety. Placing
seat backs and tray tables in their full, upright positions will provide additional protection.
7. Action: SELECT the designated least risk bomb location (LRBL) for your aircraft from the Flight Operations
Manual.
Purpose: To prepare for moving the suspect item to the correct location on the aircraft.
8. Action: DISABLE all nonessential power to the areas in the vicinity of the LRBL.
Purpose: To reduce potential secondary fire ignition hazards.
9. Action: If the LRBL is a door, DISARM the escape slide and pin the inflation bottle if possible. DETACH the
slide from the door, and LAY it flat on the floor.
Purpose: To provide protection for the floor structure and aircraft systems beneath the floor.
10. Action: PREPARE the LRBL before moving the device. Construct a platform of baggage from the floor up to
the center of the LRBL site. Place at least 10 inches of wetted materials on top of this platform. Place a
single, thin sheet of plastic (e.g., trash bag) on top of the wetted materials.
Purpose: The escape slide and baggage will dissipate blast forces that could otherwise damage the floor
structure or critical systems beneath the floor and reduce or prevent fragments and fire in the cabin. The
wetted materials will also significantly reduce the chance of a cabin fire. Do not omit the plastic sheets, as
we do not want the suspect device to get wet and possibly short circuit an electronic timer.
11. Action: SLIDE a stiff, thin card, such as the emergency information card, underneath the device. If there is
no resistance under the device, leave the card in place.
Purpose: To check for an anti-lift switch.
NOTE: No anti-lift activated device has ever been reported on board an aircraft in flight.
CAUTION: In the unlikely event that the card cannot be slipped under the device, it may indicate that an
anti-lift switch is present and that the device cannot be moved.
NOTE: If the device cannot be moved to the LRBL, the best possible course of action may require you to
execute a modified LRBL packing procedure, keeping the device at its current location.
CONSULT with an Explosives Security Specialist to develop improvised procedures.
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Handout 9.2
Page 3 of 3
12. Action: If the device can be relocated, MOVE the device in the position found with the card in place to
the prepared LRBL. Stabilize it on top of the plastic sheet above the 10 inches of wetted materials and
centered against the inside surface of the structure at the identified LRBL site.
Purpose: To prevent detonation if an anti-lift switch is used in the suspect device.
NOTE: Though very sensitive vibratory-activated devices are not expected on board aircraft in flight, less
sensitive types requiring a 90-degree change in attitude have been encountered. Keeping the device in
the position found will reduce the chance of an accidental detonation.
13. Action: With the device against the inside surface of the cabin interior at the LRBL site (avoiding the
observation port when the LRBL is a door), PLACE an additional single thin sheet of plastic over the device.
Saturate soft blast-attenuating materials with water or any other nonflammable liquid.
Carefully pack at least 10 inches of material around and on top of the suspect device.
FILL the entire remaining area used as the LRBL with soft blast-attenuating materials up to the overhead
and out to the aisle. If the LRBL is on a tail cone, fill the tail cone with blast-attenuating materials forward
of the suspect device.
Purpose: To lessen the thermal effects, absorb energy, and assist in directing the blast, smoke, and
fragmentation outward.
14. Action: SECURE the LRBL stack in place using belts, ties, or other appropriate materials.
Purpose: To ensure the LRBL stack stays in place during the remainder of the flight.
15. Action: MOVE all passengers at least 4 rows of seats from the LRBL. In aircraft where the LRBL is under a
passenger cabin floor, ensure that seats above the LRBL are vacated as well. Seat backs and tray tables
throughout the cabin should be placed in their full, upright positions.
Purpose: Distance from an explosion is one of the best protective measures for passenger safety. Placing
seat backs and tray tables in their full, upright positions will provide additional protection.
16. Action: LAND and TAXI to a remote site, and EVACUATE the aircraft as soon as possible, avoiding exits on
the LRBL side of the aircraft and exits near the LRBL to the maximum degree possible. Be prepared to
provide the responding bomb squad with a description of the suspect device and a briefing on all actions
taken by the crew.
Purpose: To reduce passenger and crew exposure to the suspect device.
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Handout 9.3
Page 1 of 1
LEAST RISK BOMB LOCATIONS (LRBL)

AIRBUS INDUSTRIE:
All Models (Except A380) Right aft cabin door
BOEING AIRCRAFT:
B-707, B-720 (All Models) Left rear entry door
B-717 (All Models) Aft bottom of tail cone fairing
B-727-100 Right galley door
B-727-200 Right forward galley service door
B-737, B-747, B-757, B-767 (All Models) Right rear service door
B-777 (All Models) Right rear cabin door
DC-8 Right aft service/entry door
DC-9, MD-80, MD-90, MD-95 Aft bottom of tail cone fairing
DC-10 Right aft entry door
MD-11 Right aft entry door
BOMBARDIER AEROSPACE:
DHC-7 Right rear baggage door
DHC-8 Series 100/200 Left rear baggage door
DHC-8 Series 300 Left rear baggage door
DHC-8 Series 400 Right rear service door
CRJ-200 (CL-600-2B19) Right galley service door
CRJ–700 (CL-600-2C10) Right galley service door
CONVAIR:
CV-880, CV-990 Right rear service door
FOKKER:
F28, F70, F100 Right forward service door
LOCKHEED:
L-1011 (with lower galley) Lower galley service door
L-1011 (without lower galley) Right aft cargo door
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Handout 9.4
Page 1 of 3
Flight Crew Checklist for In-Flight Chemical / Biological Weapons
Situation
In Cabin But Inactivated In Cabin And Activated In Cargo Hold
• Don mask and goggles. • Don mask and goggles. • Don mask and goggles.
• Inform ATC and declare • Inform ATC and declare • Inform ATC and declare
emergency. emergency. emergency.
• Squawk 7700. • Squawk 7700. • Squawk 7700.
• Do not change altitude until • Turn off recirculation fans. • Turn off recirculation fans.
procedure directs.
• Turn off recirculation fans. • Raise cabin elevation to 10000 • Accomplish cargo smoke/fire
ft at fastest rate possible. checklist.
• Decrease cabin temperature. • Decrease cabin temperature. • Advise systems operational

control.
• Attempt to contain/wrap • Execute emergency descent • Maintain positive cabin

device. procedure. pressure until landing.
• Advise systems operational • Advise systems operational • Stop aircraft with surface wind
control. control. at 10/2 o’clock position.
• Initiate slow descent to • Upon landing, evacuate aircraft • Upon landing, evacuate aircraft
appropriate alternate via upwind side of airplane. via upwind side of airplane.
aerodrome.
• Quarantine passengers upwind • Quarantine passengers upwind • Quarantine passengers upwind

of aircraft until assistance of aircraft until assistance arrives of aircraft until assistance arrives.
arrives.
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Handout 9.4
Page 2 of 3
Cabin Crew Checklist for In-Flight Chemical/Biological Weapons
Identification
Any suspicious substance or package discovered on-board an aircraft must be considered hazardous until
proven otherwise. A substance or package not normally found on the aircraft and that meets certain criteria
should alert a crew member that precautions must be taken. A suspicious package may:
• have oily stains, discoloration or odour;
• Be unclaimed by anyone on board.
A suspicious substance may:

• be a white, tan or beige colored powder;
• Have the consistency and texture of talcum powder.
Crew Action
Discovery of a suspicious spilled substance — on the aircraft in flight

• DO NOT TRY TO CLEAN UP THE SUBSTANCE.
• Pilot-in-command must be advised. Ventilation should be turned down to minimum.
• Flight crew to consider going on oxygen.
• Consider directing passengers and cabin crew to go on oxygen.
• If contact has been made with the substance, immediately wash hands and forearms repeatedly.
• Don protective equipment — gloves and mask. (Special procedures for the donning of mask and removal of
mask and gloves.)
• Cover the substance immediately with anything suitable at hand, then create as many barrier layers as
possible between the agent and the cabin atmosphere by covering the item with multiple layers of plastic
trash bags, dry blankets, more plastic, wet blankets, then more dry blankets to minimize leakage and
spreading.
• Isolate the area. Do not allow anyone to approach the substance in a radius of 3 meters. (Move
passengers.)
• Have any individuals exposed to the substance wash their hands and forearms repeatedly.
• Stop all activities as much as possible around the substance to avoid disturbing the substance.
• Change clothing that may have been contaminated and place it in a sealed bag.
• Try to assess the extent of the contamination.
• Keep a list of all persons who may have had contact with the substance.
• Detailed description of the substance must be given to the pilot-in-command and the authorities.
Discovery of a suspicious package/envelope — on the aircraft in flight
• DO NOT SHAKE OR EMPTY CONTENTS OF ENVELOPE OR PACKAGE.

• Advise the pilot-in-command.
• Flight crew to consider going on oxygen.
• Don protective equipment — gloves and mask. (Special procedures for the donning and removal of mask
and gloves.) Cover all exposed skin.
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Handout 9.4
Page 3 of 3
• Isolate the area — move passengers and extra crew members away from the suspicious item.
• Do not move the item.
• Create as many barrier layers as possible between the agent and the cabin atmosphere by covering
the item with multiple layers of plastic trash bags, dry blankets, more plastic, wet blankets, then more
dry blankets to minimize leakage and spreading.
• Moistened paper towels provided to passengers as breathing filters MAY help in some circumstances.
• Consider directing passengers and cabin crew to go on oxygen.
• If contact has been made with the substance, immediately wash hands and forearms repeatedly.
• Ensure no one touches, moves or otherwise disturbs the item.
• List all people in the area when the suspicious item was recognized.
• Detailed description of item must be given to the pilot-in-command and the authorities.
The pilot-in-command in conjunction with the responsible cabin crew will assess the situation in order to take
further appropriate action.
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Module 12
Response to Security Emergencies and Contingencies

TYPES OF AIRPORT EMERGENCIES
Emergencies involving aircraft. These include:
• Incident’s involving-Aircraft on airport

• Incidents -Aircraft off airport
• Incident-Aircraft in flight
• Incident-Aircraft on ground
• Sabotage, including bomb threat.
• Unlawful seizure
Emergencies not involving aircraft. These include:
• Fire
• Sabotage, including bomb threat at airport
• Natural disaster
• Terrorist attack of ATC/terminal building
• Terrorist attack of airport
• Breakdown of runway
• Emergencies at airport(fire, collapse of airport building
Medical emergencies. These include:
• Collapsed person
• Sudden death
• Industrial accidents
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• Delivery of newborn
• Communicable disease alert
• Collective food poisoning.
Bomb Threat:
Bomb threat can be received to any aircraft which is on ground or in flight, at any
airport, vital installation, or any civil aviation facility like ATC, cargo facility,
navigational aid area or any person. The call received can be genuine, politically
motivated, hoax or malicious call to disturb safe operation of flight .Bomb threat
is also conveyed by any helpful person who informs concerned airline or airport
agencies regarding bomb threat, which he overheard or came to know, etc.
Bomb Threat Calls are made by
• Terrorist in order to check the efficiency of airport security.

• Mentally ill, practical jokers or those who want to play prank.
• Delayed passenger / Disgruntle passenger can give malicious bomb threat
call to civil aviation.
Whenever we receive a bomb threat call for any aircraft or any civil aviation
facility, there are four phases of handling that bomb threat
• Receipt
• Report
• Risk Assessment
• Response
Bomb Threat and its response Action in case of Bomb Threat Call:
Considering that the safety of lives / property under circumstances of a bomb

threat is directly linked to the prompt and appropriate decision of the BTAC, it
shall be the moral obligation on the part of senior most officials within each
agency to attend the BTAC whenever possible. However, also considering that
the senior most official within each agency may not be present at the airport
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round the clock due to the nature of official duty / routine work performed,
the next senior most official within such agency authorized as alternate
member of BTAC may attend the BTAC.
We often get b o m b t h r e a t calls at airport. Analysis of these calls reveals

that such calls are given by delayed passengers, those who has been denied
seats by airlines, drunken people, trickster, media crazy people, jilted lovers,
dismissed or suspended employees, love birds, competitors, politically motivated
people etc.
In case if you ask these callers about the details of bomb or reason for
bombing, their name, place or telephone number etc they will immediately put
the receiver down.
It is therefore suggested that telephone operators, Control room staff etc are to be
trained to ask following questions:-
• Where is the bomb?

• When will it go off?
• What does it look like?/ What type of device is used?
• Who are you?
• Why are you doing this?
Actions on Receiving a Bomb Threat Call
• Remain calm
• Ensure caller ID has registered calling number and note it down
• Switch on voice recording facility(if it is not automatic)
• Allow the caller to complete his conversation first without interruption.
• Note exact time of call
• Try to prolong call (if possible) to get maximum information.
• Ask open–ended questions instead of leading questions.
• Alert colleagues and supervisors who can also listen to conversation.
• Observe callers sex, voice, language, approx age, background noise etc.
• Note actual words and Record other details
• Inform all details to supervisor
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Supervisor to interview the receiver of threat call in order to complete the bomb
threat report form (BTRF) and relay the information without delay to the
respective BTAC coordinator of the affected airport for which the threat has
been received for.
Other information to be reported by the recipient of a Bomb Threat Call
• The background noise from where the call is been made

• Identification of gender
• Exact time of call
• Actual wording
• Approximate age
The response to the above questions and background details will help the
bomb threat assessment committee members to evaluate the call to “SPECIFIC”
or “NON SPECIFIC”
As per BCAS mandates all publicly advertised telephone number must have: -
a) Caller Line Identification Procedure (CLIP) facility.
b) BTRF
Actions to be taken by the Aircraft Operator.
On receipt of the threat call the air carrier will take immediate actions as under
a) Rush to attend the BTAC meeting after leaving instructions to next senior
official to: execute actions given as under
b) Where passengers have fully/partially boarded, quickly disembark such
passengers/ crew in an orderly manner with hand baggage and bring them
back to SHA through departure hall for further action.
c) Ask crew and ground staff on board / in cargo hold to look for and
report any unidentified article before they themselves finally disembark
due to bomb threat. (The crew and ground staff should be cautioned not to
touch, open or attempt to remove any unclaimed article/device but report
to the coordinator).
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d) Ask airline Engineers / staff to keep aircraft in ready to tow position for
removal to Isolation Bay/Area in case BTAC declares the threat call as
specific.
e) Identify passenger joining the check in Queue after receipt of bomb
threat call and refer such passengers to Airport Security for
inquiry/investigation.
f) Mobilize sufficient staff even if it is recess / relief time to ensure their
availability to empty aircraft holds and to layout all unloaded
baggage/stores for their anti-sabotage check as required under specific/
non-specific threat.
g) Actively participate in the evaluation of threat by BTAC and in deciding to
follow up actions.
h) Move to the aircraft under threat and get the tasks performed from the
staff as decided in the BTAC and in a coordinated manner with other
agencies.
Evaluation of Call
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC) shall be established at the

affected airport.
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC)
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee shall consist of the following officials with
respective status as mentioned against each: -
No Officials Agency Status
Airport Director or his

a Airport Operator Co-ordinator
representative
ASG (CISF or State

b CASO or his representative Member
Police)
Security Manager / Station

c Aircraft Operator Member
Manager of affected airlines
d Watch Supervisory Officer (WSO) ATC Member
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e Airworthiness Officer DGCA Member
f Representative of local police State Police Member
ASG (CISF\ State

g Officer I/C BDDS Member
Police)
h FRRO/Asst FRRO * Immigration Member
i Deputy Commandant * Customs Member
RD, BCAS or his representative

j BCAS Observer
(Wherever located)
* (Should be present in case threat relates to international terminal, international airlines or

import/export cargo terminal)
EVALUATION OF THREAT CALL

The BTAC uses the “Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF) as a guideline for
systematic and scientific evaluation of the Bomb Threat Call.
The procedure of building of an assessment system to lead the bomb warning

assessors to a logical conclusion to classify the threat is called as POSITIVE
TARGET IDENTIFICATION (PTI)
Accordingly the call is classified as under: -
SPECIFIC THREAT: A warning where the threat permits identification of a specific

target, or where the caller has positively identified himself or the organization
involved and is judged credible.
The BTAC evaluates the call based on the information given by the caller and threat
perception. The call is evaluated as “Specific”, if the information is of serious and
elaborate nature.
NON-SPECIFIC THREAT: A warning that can be related to one or more targets but
where there is doubt about its credibility or about the effectiveness of the existing
counter measures.
The call is evaluated as “Non-Specific”; if the call is of general nature such as there is
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a bomb in the evening flight ‘or’ flight going to Mumbai has a bomb.
Action in case of Specific Bomb Threat Call
• The aircraft will be shifted to isolated parking bay.

• ASG will cordon the aircraft from a safe distance of 50m and control
the movement of unauthorized people.
• Deploy airline security staff at ladder point to frisk/check belongings of all
authorized persons entering isolation bay / affected aircraft.
• Airline (GSD) will ensure sufficient loaders; bus trolleys are available for
speedy offloading.
• All registered baggage, cargo; unaccompanied baggage will be off loaded
and kept 100 meters away from aircraft. The registered baggage will be line
up properly for re-identification by passengers (with sufficient gap for dogs
to move around and for movement of passengers during re- identification)
unclaimed baggage to be opened / kept in cooling off pit by BDDS.
• Offload Catering items/ bonded stores and place them in the catering
vehicle. Catering vehicle to be parked 100 meters away from the aircraft and
searched.
• First aid kits and Engineering stores to be subjected to thorough search.
First aid kit may be opened and resealed by BDDS if doctors are not available for
resealing.
• Detail and ensure that senior airline officials from Security, Flight Crew,
Engineer, Catering Cargo, Commercial, GSD, etc. with sufficient staff are
available to assist anti sabotage check.
• Thorough search of aircraft will be conducted by BDDS, Airline Engineers,
Airline Security, ASG, Airworthiness Officer, etc. They work as a team and
conduct aircraft search with checklist.
• Prevent refueling of aircraft till completion of anti- sabotage check of
aircraft.
• Cargo, unaccompanied baggage, mail will not be reloaded unless it is X-
rayed or sniffed by dog. It will be kept in a protected area.
• Re- issue of fresh boarding cards and hand baggage tags to passengers
who have deplaned and brought back to departure hall.
• Crowding of too many employees and parking of vehicles near aircraft to be
avoided.
• Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 meters of a suspect device.
• Agencies carrying out search will sign a completion certificate, and which is
given to ATC by airline.
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• Rescreen passengers and their 100% hand baggage check by airport
security and hold crew/ passengers in security hold until clearance is received
from the coordinator from isolation bay.
• Deploy sufficient staff to cross check baggage tag numbers on hold
baggage, with counterfoils held with crew/ passengers and ensure proper and
uniform marking of identified hold baggage.
• Upon receiving clearance from coordinator at isolation bay, arrange to
escort crew in airline coaches to isolation bay. Ensure crew alights from bus at a
safe distance of 100 M and after identification of hold baggage, crew proceed
towards aircraft for secondary ladder point frisking /100% hand baggage check
by airline security before boarding the aircraft.
• Gets clearance for passenger boarding from the crew.
• Arrange to escort passengers in airline coaches (one coach at a time) to
isolation bay. Ensure passengers alight at a safe distance of 100 M and not
more than 10 passengers at a time should proceed with their baggage
coupons/boarding pass to identify their hold baggage.
• Upon identification of hold baggage, ensure that crew / passengers
proceed to aircraft under airline escort and do not loiter on airside.
• Secondary ladder point frisking /100% physical hand baggage check by
airline.
• Ensure that only identified hold baggage is reloaded in baggage
containers for loading into the aircraft.
• Ensure that hold baggage containers are not released for loading in
cargo hold until passengers / baggage reconciliation is done and head count of
passengers in aircraft matches with those checked in and number of boarding
card stubs collected at the ladder point.
• Make efforts to track the passenger of hold baggage which remain
unidentified from details of passenger on baggage tag and through
announcement inside aircraft.
• Note: Under no circumstance will unidentified baggage be taken inside the
aircraft for identification by the passenger or baggage loaded on aircraft with
verbal reconciliation arrived on board between the passengers and airline staff).
• Report details of baggage finally left unidentified, to the coordinator.
• Detail a security officer to accompany BDDS when unidentified baggage is
decided to be moved to explosive disposal area.
• Suspend loading of unaccompanied / rush tag baggage.
• Cargo, mail, courier, catering, bonded stores, medical / first aid boxes,
company stores etc., which is searched/checked/cleared by anti-sabotage check
team only will be loaded in the aircraft.
• If any of the above-mentioned stores cannot be searched / checked /
cleared the same will not be loaded on the aircraft. Such stores will be
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further subjected to 24 hrs cooling off in addition to a thorough
screening/physical check.
• Execute any additional security measure as directed by coordinator / BTAC.
• Arrange to get clearance certificate and get the same signed off by airline
engineer, airline security, ASG, airworthiness (DGCA), BDDS, coordinator and
hand over one copy of the same to coordinator for giving RT/telephone
clearance to ATC. Thereafter, hand over one copy each to ATC, BDDS and
other agencies for their record.
Action of Non-specific threat call to an aircraft
Action in case of Non-Specific Call by Coordinator
• Inform every agency and ask them to search their own area and report.
• Get confirmation from all about the search having been completed.
• Request BDDS and DGCA to stand-by near aircraft / building under threat until
search is over and clearance certificate is signed by all agencies.
By Air Carrier
• Alert staff at X - ray.
• Carry out inspection of aircraft.
• Look for suspected baggage.
• Increase physical inspection of registered baggage / mail / cargo.
• Proper baggage identification by passengers and crew.
• Ground engineering to carry out scheduled anti sabotage checks.
• Ensure proper Gate- no- show drill to be followed.
• Thoroughly screen air mail.
• Suspend airlift of unaccompanied baggage and rush tag baggage.
• Frisk staff / passengers at ladder point.
• Proper passenger baggage reconciliation.
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Search of Aircraft under non- specific Bomb Threat
• Airlines Security and Airlines e n g i n e e r s will carry out search of

aircraft under Non- S p e c i f i c Bomb Threat.
• Coordinator, Air carrier and ASG will ensure action as prescribed for their
individual agencies as per Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF).
• Airline will organize clearance certificate and obtain signatures of all
official agencies involved in search.
• Coordinator after ensuring that all officials/agencies have signed the
clearance certificate, will convey the clearance to ATC for release of aircraft.
• BDDS, fire tender and Ambulance must remain stand by near the aircraft
until clearance is conveyed to ATC by the coordinator.
Threat to terminal building
Action on specific threat to terminal building
• Coordinator will make continuous announcement on central PA system

and in different languages for evacuation of the terminal building.
• Announcement made should be deliberate and tactful to avoid panic
ex. “due to security reasons all passengers/staff are requested to evacuate
the terminal building and proceed to safe holding area.”
• All heads of airlines, agencies and departments should evacuate their
passengers/staff quietly to the pre designated safe assembly areas.
• Passengers who are not security checked will evacuate to city side.
• Passengers/staff in Security Hold will evacuate to airside.
• All heads of airlines, agencies and departments will ensure to hold back few
staff who are thoroughly familiar with their work area for subsequent search.
• All passengers/staff will carry their baggage/personal belongings with them.
• Staff will leave all doors and windows open.
• Coordinator will ensure to switch off central AC.
• Coordinator will ensure to open all Emergency doors.
• Unclaimed suspect article if spotted during search shall not be handled but
reported to BDDS.
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Action on non-specific threat to terminal building
• Evacuation of terminal building not required.

• All heads of airlines, agencies & departments should inform their staff of
the received bomb threat.
• Search of terminal building to be undertaken by airlines, agencies &
departments in their respective work areas.
• Search of common areas to be undertaken by coordinator through his care
takers, cleaners & watch, and ward staff.
• Upon locating an unclaimed article during search, the terminal building
will be evacuated as in the case of a specific area.
• Unclaimed article if located will not be handled but reported to BDDS.
The contents of the Bomb Threat contingency plan are as follows.
• Airport Director designated as coordinator.

• Establishment of Bomb Threat Control room
• Evaluation of call by Bomb Threat Assessment Committee guided by
Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF)
• Questioning Technique
• Duties and Responsibilities of various agencies bat airport such as AAI,
ASG, Airlines, BDDS, DGCA, Customs and Immigration.
• Search Procedure
• Evacuation of building under threat.
• Procedure to deal with unidentified / suspected baggage.
Bomb Threat Review Committee (BTRC)
To ensure installation / working of necessary infrastructure and smooth

implementation of bomb threat contingency plan each airport is required to
constitute a BTRC. The committee will meet once in three months.
Action to be taken on finding Suspect Explosive Device
All airports are required to have dedicated BDDS and dog squads. The BDDS should
be well equipped with necessary manpower and equipment to deal with any
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type of threat.
The four generic steps to be taken by BDDS on finding a suspicious item during a
search is as under:
• CONFIRM that the item found look like a suspicious item and needs
attention of security.
• CLEAR the area by evacuating all persons including search teams to a safe
distance of 100 meters.
• CORDON the area to prevent anyone gaining access to the suspect item.
• CONTROL the situation until specialized staff arrive and take command.
Counters measures for Bomb

Incidents at Airports
• Installation of caller ID (CLIP)
• Give wide publicity in local newspaper if caller is identified.
• Prompt evaluation of call with help of BWAF
• Training of employees
• Conduct periodicals mock up exercise
• Up gradation of EDS / EDDS.
• Centralized monitoring of CCTV by ASG, Customs, Immigration
• Installation of EVD / ETD
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Contingency plan to handle aircraft hijack situation
Contingencies related to unlawful seizure of aircraft:
For Hijacking / Forcible seizure of aircraft on ground, a contingency may arise

in one of the following forms: -
• An aircraft registered in India may be hijacked either within India or abroad
and may land in one of the airports in India or abroad.
• A foreign registered aircraft may be hijacked while in India and may land in
India or abroad.
• A foreign registered aircraft hijacked in some other country may land in India
or in one of the neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, China, Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan, Male and Sri Lanka, raising the
possibility of its take-off and likely landing in India.
Management Occurrences
To deal with acts of interference with Civil Aviation, the following Group/
Committee have been established:
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) Apex Body

Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH) Advisory Role
Central Committee (CC) Executive Authority/
Command
Aerodrome Committee (AC) - Operational Command
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Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)
The CCS is an apex body headed by the Prime Minister, which decides policies
and takes decisions on strategic issues like response to hijacker’s demands
involving national security, foreign policy, political implications, strategy /
approach to negotiations, forcible termination of hijack etc. Minister of Civil
Aviation would also be included in the CCS for management of aircraft hijack
situations.
Prime Minister : Chairman

Assembles at PMO Office
Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)
The COSAH is an advisory body, which deliberates on the problems arising out of
the contingency. It will brief and advise CCS about developments and decisions
to be taken, and communicate Govt. decisions / directions/ guidance to the CC.
Cabinet Secretary: Chairman

Addl. Secretary Cabinet Secretariat: Convener
Assembles at Cabinet Secretariat, Rashtrapati Bhawan
Central Committee (CC)
The CC is the executive authority responsible for dealing with the contingency of
hijacking, forcible seizure of the aircraft on ground or any other acts of unlawful
interference with civil aviation.
Director General, Civil Aviation (DGCA) – Chairman

DG, BCAS - Convener
Assembles at CCCR, ATC Building, IGI Airport New Delhi
The Central Committee shall manage the contingency situation till it is terminated.
It is empowered to deal with the situation in all respects and take appropriate
decisions on its own based on the guidelines of the COSAH.
It shall guide the Aerodrome Committee (AC) for handling the situation on ground
including negotiations with the hijackers /terrorists and /or forcible termination
of Hijack in the light of the policy guidelines laid- down by COSAH / CCS.
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Aerodrome Committee (AC)
The AC is established at every airport and shall be activated on the occurrence of

the emergency at the affected airport.
The composition of the AC depends upon the situation of the airport.

State Capital- Home Secretary of the state,
District headquarters- District Magistrate
Outside the district headquarters- District Collector
Defense controlled airports- Station Commander.
In all the above cases, Airport Director or his representative will be the Convener.
The AC of the affected airport shall meet at a place earmarked as Aerodrome

Committee Control Room (ACCR). It shall assemble immediately on receipt of
information of a contingency and take appropriate steps as described in the
functions of the AC. The control room of the AC should have a couple of
independent telephone lines, hotline to the Police Control Room / Police
Station and RT facility.
Members of Aerodrome Committee:
Home Secretary of the State/ District Magistrate/ Chairman

District Collector/ Station Commander
Airport Director or his representative Convener
Representative from R&AW (on arrival)
A senior most executive of the affected airline
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Contingency Plan – For Indian Registered Aircraft
The National Contingency Plan for various contingencies is prepared by the BCAS.
Each airport is required to develop the under mentioned contingency plans for
managing any acts of Unlawful Interference. The same is required to be
approved by the BCAS.
• Bomb Threat Contingency Plan

• Hijack Threat Contingency Plan
• Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan
The Airport Management will take the following actions for a hijacked aircraft:
On landing, the aircraft is to be directed to the designated isolated aircraft
parking position. Aircraft will not be allowed to take off unless its departure is
necessitated by the overriding duty to protect human life. The aircraft may be
immobilized by:
• Positioning of vehicles / fire tenders on runway

• Deflating tyres.
• Putting of lights of runway / taxi track
Aircraft Operators Responsibilities:
On receipt of threat Call the receiver will immediately inform his / her supervisor.
The Supervisor will in turn inform the Airport Director / Office / senior most
person of airport operator.
The following actions will be taken by the aircraft operator:
For Flights not yet boarded
• Interiors of pax cabin to be checked.

• 100% manual checks of hand baggage.
• 100% physical frisking of pax / crew.
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• Access control.
• Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft.
• Maintenance of Access Control Register.
• Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group.
For Flights in the process of boarding
• Pax to be deplaned with Hand baggage if already boarded and brought back
to the check-in counter via arrival hall under escort.
• Interiors of pax cabin to be checked.
• 100% manual checks of hand baggage
• 100% physical frisking of pax / crew
• Access control
• Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft
• Maintenance of access control register
• Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group
• Pax headcount to be taken.
• No need to offload baggage / cargo etc.
• Pax should not have access to registered baggage.
• Security measures to be supervised by senior most security staff.
For aircrafts in-flight

• Security measures to be reviewed.
• Set up Reception center.
• Documents related to flight to be sealed.
• Pax manifest at reception center.
• Assistance to be provided to the meeters and greeters.
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General Principles for Building and Area search
For searches to be effective they should be conducted systematically by staff

familiar with the area concerned. The main reason for this being that outside
personnel will be unlikely to know the layout of the aircraft or terminal building
and the various places in which a device could be concealed and therefore will not
so easily be able to spot anything which is out of place or unfamiliar. Search plans
should be prepared in advance and staff trained to use them. A search
Coordinator must be nominated to provide control of the search process and if
necessary, take the decision to evacuate.
Searches should be briefed on action to be initiated if suspicious object is found.
When a suspect device is discovered the possibility of secondary devices should
not be discounted.
The use of hand-held communications is useful for coordination of the search and is
often the only way of ensuring appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for
search and evacuation. However, once a suspect device has been located those
using hand-held communications should immediately move away and ensure
that they and anyone else in the area move outside the cordon as quickly as
possible. Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 meters of a suspect
device.
Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented in the area
being searched, this is necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the
area once it has been cleared.
Effective and systematic searching takes time, if the warning received indicated a
possible detonation time for the device which will prevent a thorough search
being conducted then the best and safest option is evacuation of all personnel
to a safe area and waiting for the arrival of specialist explosive disposal
personnel.
Sterile Holding Area concepts / Basic Screening plans:

• Decentralized, usually at the aircraft boarding gate.
• Semi-centralized, usually after the duty-free shop area
• Centralized, usually before the duty-free shop area
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Decentralized
Screening Points at Boarding Gates
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Concourse Pier 4
7 6 5 Screening
Points
Boarding Gates
Decentralized Screening: Screening of passengers is carried out immediately

before boarding at the boarding gate, jet-way or terminal door leading directly
to an aircraft or adjacent apron area. Passenger’s screening takes place when the
passenger boarding process begins.
• Requires screening point at each boarding gate.

• Passengers screened immediately before boarding.
• Staff/equipment must be available to handle optimum passenger load in limited
time.
• Screening point manned only when screening is in progress.
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Semi-centralized
Screening Points at Holding Areas
Screening
Points
1 2 3 Mobile
Lounge
Concourse Pier
4
7 6 5
Boarding Gates
Holding area
Semi-Centralized: Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to an area

designed to hold all passengers for a particular flight. This holding area is
secured (i.e. made “sterile”) by means of walls or suitable barriers, together with
controlled access points. The holding area may also be a vehicle designed to carry
passengers to a distant aircraft. Screening takes place as passengers arrive at the
holding area and passengers remain within the holding area until the boarding
begins.
Centralized
Screening Point at Concourse
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Pier 4
7 6 5
Screening
Point Boarding Gates
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Centralized: Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to a concourse
containing several gates, with no specific relationship to a particular flight.
Screening can therefore take place a considerable time before a particular flight is
due to depart Passenger remain in the concourse area until a short time before
their flight commences.
PHYSICAL SEARCH OF A HOLDING AREA FOR PROHIBITED ITEMS
Initiation of a Search
The coordinator can initiate a search by:

• Sending a message to the search teams over a public address system. It
should be coded to avoid unnecessary disruption and alarm to the public.
• Use of personal radios, or mobile/cell phones; or
• A telephone cascade system: the coordinator rings, say, three members, who in
turn each ring a further three members and so on until all the teams have been alerted.
What searchers should look for?

It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect
explosive devices as they can be disguised in many ways.
Searchers should be briefed to

• Look for unidentified objects or anything:
 That should not be there.
 That cannot be accounted for
 That is out of place.
• Do NOT TOUCH suspicious objects.
• Notify the Search Coordinator of progress of search and discovery of any
suspicious objects.
• Mark the location of suspicious object with a prominent object (but not
touching the device)
• Withdraw from the immediate area and await further instructions.
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Guidance for Searching Terminal Buildings
Search Plans
It is vital to have search plans prepared in advance, and staff trained in them. The
objective is to make sure that the whole terminal building is checked as quickly and
effectively as possible.
Search plans must be always readily available, architect’s drawings, checked for accuracy
and appropriately adapted, are suitable for this purpose. Sufficient spare copies
should be available for use during search operations. Searchers and the Coordinator
can then eliminate sections from the plan as they are declared clear.
Search procedure /technique: -
There are three types of search procedure/technique. Before searching an area,

searcher first should divide the area into three level.
Search Sectors
• The first step in preparing a search plan is to divide the terminal building into
Sectors. The building may already be segregated into various zones and therefore it
may be convenient make these the sectors. Each sector must be of manageable size for
the number of searchers nominated to it. Use 02 searcher per room or an area of 250
Sq.ft. Remember that effective and systematic searching takes time.
The sector may be one large room - such as a check-in area, concourse, baggage reclaim
area, or perhaps several small airline operations offices in an office suite. It is most
important that cloakrooms, stairs, corridors, and lifts are included in the search plans
and also car parks and other areas outside the building.
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Search Teams
Search teams should be formed from staff nominated to search those areas with
which they are most familiar. Numbers required will depend upon the size of the
search task. Reserves should be appointed in case of absence. Staff should be
trained and rehearsed.
Search Priorities
Those areas which are to be used as evacuation assembly areas, together with those
areas where the greatest number of the public or staff are likely to be vulnerable,
should be searched first. Consider also, as a priority, those public areas to which
the perpetrator may have had easy access such as restrooms, elevators, stairways,
and hallways. Those areas to which access is normally controlled may be searched
last. Do not overlook car parks, the outside area of the terminal building and the
perimeter.
How to Search
The conduct of searches will depend on local circumstances and local knowledge. The
overriding principle is that they should be conducted in a systematic and thorough
manner so that no part is left unchecked. The searchers need to practice, to get a
feel for the logical progression through their area (whether it be in a terminal
building, baggage reclaim area or administrative or operations office suite) and the
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length of time it will take.
The method outlined in this typical example is of a Room Search in a sector, it should be
adapted to reflect the peculiarities of the actual area being searched.
Example Room Search

• A search should begin at the entrance to the room.
• Each searcher or team should first stand still and look around the room.
• They should note the contents of the room and make a quick assessment of those
areas that will need special attention.
• They should look for any unusual lights (including small light sources knows as
Light Emitting Diodes which are often used in the arming circuits of improvised
explosive devices).
• They should also listen carefully for any unusual noises - particularly ticking or
whirring sounds.
If anything, unusual is seen, the searcher or team should alert the Coordinator who will
decide whether to evacuate the building.
If nothing unusual is seen, the search should begin.
The search should be conducted methodically, moving in one direction around the area
to be searched. It should be carried out in three sweeps.
• The first sweep:

- Around the edges of the room,
- Walls from top to bottom and the floor area immediately beneath the wall.
- Look inside fireplaces,
- Behind curtains and window blinds,
- Behind and beside furniture around the edges of the room.
- The sweep should finish at the doorway where it began.
• The second sweep:
- Furniture and the floor.
- Furniture should not be removed but drawers should be opened and searched.
- Gaps in and under furniture should be explored.
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- If the floor covering shows signs of recent disturbance, it should be lifted.
• The third sweep:
- Cover the ceiling,
- Light Fixtures
- Removable panels
- Areas in which objects might be concealed.
- Start at one corner and systematically search the whole surface.
After the search has been completed, and if nothing has been found, the coordinator
should be informed immediately so that the sector can be marked ‘CLEAR’ on the
search plans.
Searching should continue until the whole area has been cleared. Do not forget that
secondary devices are not unknown.
If a suspicious object is found, follow the golden rules:

• DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE THE OBJECT.
• If possible, leave a distinctive marker near (not touching) the object.
• Move away from the device to a designated control point, leaving lights on.
• Inform search team leader or Coordinator.
• The coordinator should implement the evacuation plan.
• Stay at the control point and draw an accurate plan of the location of the
suspicious package or device for the assistance of the police and explosive disposal
experts.
• The person finding the object should be immediately available for interview by
the police or security services.
• Do not use more searcher than necessary.
• Use 02 searcher per room or an area of 250 Sq.fts
• Mark the area after searched.
• Do not assume that only one device is planted.
• Do not trust anything and do not assume the face value of objects.
If the item detected is a weapon:
• Immediately safeguard the item; and
• Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).
If the item located is an explosive device or object that appears to be an explosive
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device:
• Do not touch the object.
• Mark the location; and
• Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).
Record the following details in screening point log when an item is found.
• Location of holding area.
• Time and date searched and by whom.
• Result of Search
• Details of item(s) detected.
• Action taken on finding the item(s)/object(s)
• Name of person who found it.
• Time and date of notification
• Action taken for safeguarding/disposal of item(s)/object(s)
Maintaining Sterility Of SHA
• Ensuring doors and entry points to the holding area are physically protected by
locks and windows barred.
• Observing operational holding area and keeping surveillance.
• Search of Sterile holding area using different levels of search.
• Effective screening of passenger and baggage.
• Screening authorized personnel such as airport and airline personnel entering the
holding area
• Inspection/screening of goods and supplies taken into the holding areas
• Strict access control of security hold area.
****END****
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MODULE -13
CARRIAGE OF ARMS AND
AMMUNITION
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Module 13
Procedure for Carriage of Arms and ammunition
On person or in hand baggage:
• PSO’s of VVIP’s
Can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition
should be kept separately.
• SPG’s when accompanying SPG Protectee
Can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition
should be kept separately.
• Sky Marshals
Can carry weapon on board aircraft. They should possess the Weapon Authorization Card
(WAC) issued by BCAS and ID card issued by NSG. They travel as per scheduled given by BCAS
and issued with all airport AEP. They need to undergo Breath Analysis test conducted by
respective airline medical department at the originating station.
Weapon allowed in registered baggage:
• PSO’s of VIP’s
Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and duty
slip/movement order authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on
bonafide duty traveling by air.
• Dignitaries of high risk category
Can carry authorized weapon and ammunition in registered baggage.
• Any person on bonafide duty

Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and travel order
authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty traveling
by air.
• Bonafide passenger holding valid license
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As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm (revolver/pistol/shot gun) and/ or 50
cartridges are allowed to be carried by a passenger in his/her hold baggage.
Passenger has to declare carriage of weapon to the airline and fill up a Weapon Declaration
Form.
The airline station manager authorizes the carriage of weapon.
The passengers license will be checked for expiry date, area of jurisdiction, weapon number,
make and model number, number of cartridges allowed etc.
The weapon and ammunition is stowed in area inaccessible to the passengers and crew
members during the flight. In case of an aircraft that does not have separate cargo holds the
airline should inform passengers that the weapons cannot be allowed for carriage in
registered baggage of passenger. However, if the weapon and ammunition is required to be
carried necessary arrangements for a securely locked, tamper proof container for keeping
registered baggage containing weapon / ammunition shall be made by the aircraft operator.
VVIPs like President, Vice President, Prime Minister and SPG protectees:
The Personal Security Officers shall carry their weapons and ammunition on their person or
in their hand baggage in fully unloaded condition.
SPG Personnel are hereby permitted to carry One Pistol with 60 cartridges: and one Sub
Machine Gun/ Assault Rifle with 150 cartridges.
Chief Aerodrome Security Officer of Aviation Security Group (ASG)/ In-charge Airport
Security Unit shall check the Identity Card and Duty Slip/ Movement Order of the PSOs of
VVIP/ SPG protectees and shall ensure their genuineness.
In Flight Security Officers (IFSOs):
To provide adequate security coverage to aircrafts registered in India and engaged in civil
aviation operations to and from all civil airports in India, permission has been granted by the
Central Government to IFSO while on duty in such aircraft, for carriage of weapons and
ammunition on board such an aircraft.
The I F S O shall be in possession of their Identity Cards and authorization, issued by Director
General, BCAS from time to time, for carriage of weapons and ammunition on board an
aircraft.
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PSO(s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category:
Whenever allowed by the government of India to accompany such a VIP/ dignitary during
his/ her journey by air or any person on bonafide duty with weapon and ammunition while
travelling by air shall carry the authorized weapons and ammunition in his/ her registered
baggage only in the manner specified below:
The Personal Security Officers or the persons on duty mentioned in para above shall carry
with them their valid Identity Cards and Duty Slips / Movement Orders authorizing them to
carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty travelling by air and shall
produce the same to the Airport / Airlines Security Officers/ Manager.
In the case of regular passengers, the Station Manager/ Airport Managers of all airlines are
authorized to allow carriage of only one licensed revolver or pistol or shotgun and fifty
cartridges belonging to a bonafide passenger. In case, a passenger is having more than one
weapon and /or 50 cartridges, the passenger must have written approval from DGCA.
The following conditions shall be strictly followed for carriage of weapons and ammunition
in the Registered Baggage by a bonafide passenger, PSOs or VIPs or any dignitary or high risk
category or any person who has been allowed to carry his weapon and ammunition on duty
while travelling by air. Henceforth such categories of persons have been referred to as
passengers:-
o Such a passenger shall declare the carriage of his/ her authorized/ licensed weapon and
ammunition to the concerned air carrier in writing on the prescribed form to be provided by
the airlines operator before security check of his / her Registered Baggage. Original copy of
such declaration shall be retained at the Boarding Station, second copy shall be kept in the
flight’s file and third copy shall be given to the passenger.
o Prior to acceptance of weapon and ammunition from a bonafide passenger having valid
license or authorization issued by the competent authority as mentioned above, the
concerned airlines operator shall ensure that the carriage of weapons and ammunition in
Registered Baggage of such a passenger is allowed only when an authorized and duly
qualified person of the airlines has determined that the weapon is not loaded.
o The Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall verify all the
relevant documents to ensure that the weapon(s) and ammunition is / are licensed /
authorized in the name of the passenger concerned and shall ensure that only authorized
number(s) of weapon and ammunition are allowed in the Registered Baggage.
o The weapons and ammunition shall be stowed in an area that is inaccessible to any
person including air crew while the aircraft is in flight and shall not be carried in the cockpit
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or retained by a member of the crew. Therefore, the weapons and ammunition shall be
carried only in the Registered Baggage of the passenger and such baggage shall be stored in
a securely locked, tamper-proof container which shall be located in the baggage
compartment of aircraft or in aircraft having separate cargo holds so as not accessible to
passengers.
o In case an aircraft does not have separate cargo / baggage hold for safe and secure
storage of a securely locked, tamper-proof container for keeping passengers Registered
Baggage containing their authorized weapons and ammunitions, concerned airlines shall be
responsible to inform their passengers not to carry arms and ammunition with them as the
same shall not be allowed to be carried in the Registered Baggage in such an aircraft.
However, if weapons/ ammunition are required to be carried in such an aircraft which does
not have cargo / baggage hold, necessary arrangements for a securely locked, tamperproof
container for keeping Registered Baggage containing authorized weapons /
ammunition shall be made by the aircraft owner /airlines operator. The Registered Baggage
shall be handed over to the concerned person/ passenger at destination in the arrival hall
only.
Carriage of licensed firearm and / or ammunition by a sportsperson while

traveling by air.
As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm and/ or 50 cartridges are allowed to be
carried by a passenger in his/ her hold baggage. If a sportsperson is traveling by air in
domestic sectors to participate in some shooting event within India for which he/ she is
required to carry more than one licensed firearms and/ or more than 50 cartridges, such
sportsperson may be allowed by the concerned aircraft operator to carry the required
number of licensed firearms and/ or ammunition in his hold baggage subject to the
following conditions: -
The sportsperson must declare orally or in writing about carriage of the firearms and/ or
ammunition and will produce the following documents at the security check point of hold
baggage for inspection by the screener of concerned aircraft operator:
o Valid license/ authorization of fire arms and ammunition;

o Evidence of identity which can be established by a photo identity card issued by a
government agency or the sponsoring sports club.
o Bonafide for carriage of arms and ammunitions based on a written document issued by
the president or secretary of the sports club sponsoring him/ her for the shooting event.
The fire-arm must be unloaded.
The fire-arm must be carried in a hard-sided container.
The container must be locked.
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Transported ammunition must be securely packed in fiber (such as cardboard), wood or

metal boxes or other packaging specially designed to carry small amounts of ammunition.
Fire -arm magazines/clips do not satisfy the packaging requirement unless they provide a
complete and secure enclosure of the ammunition.
The ammunition may also be in the same hard sided case as the firearm, as long as it is
properly packed as described above.
Black powder and percussion caps used with black powder type firearms are not
permitted neither in cabin nor hold baggage.
Authorization for carriage of firearms and ammunition by the sports persons in an aircraft
shall be obtained from DGCA in accordance with provisions of The Aircraft (Carriage of
Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
Procedure for dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or ammunition are
detected during screening of a passenger or his baggage.
The following procedure shall be followed for dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or
ammunition are detected during screening of a passenger or his baggage.
There may be following possibilities regarding carriage of arms and ammunition together or
separately:
Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the registered baggage of a passenger at the
time of X-ray screening and the passenger has failed to declare the same to the Airlines
Security staff.
Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on the person of a
passenger at the time of frisking / x-ray screening of hand baggage in the Security Restricted
Area (SRA) or at the ladder point.
Course of Action:
Authorized arms and/ or ammunition are allowed to be carried only in the hold of an
aircraft.
Even if the arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on person with
valid license/ authorization, the carriage of the same shall be allowed in the hold baggage
only and the following course of action shall be followed by the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/
Airline operator/ Airport operator (wherever ILBS installed) as the case may be, shall deal
with the situations as mentioned in paras above:
If the passenger is having a valid license with him, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline
Operator/ Airport operator security staff, as the case may be, shall examine the weapon.
physically to see that it is unloaded and packed as per the prescribed norms, obtain
declaration from the passenger as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous
Goods) Rules 2003 and thereafter allow him to proceed for check-in etc. There is no need to
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detain the passenger. However, a complaint shall be made about the incident to the
Director General, DGCA for necessary action at their end. Local police shall also be informed.
If the passenger does not have a valid arms license with him at that time but claims to
possess the same, he cannot be allowed to proceed. The passenger shall be detained and
handed over to local police for necessary legal action in this regard.
If the passenger claims that he is a serving Police/ Defence Services/ Central Armed
Forces personnel and is entitled to carry his service arms and ammunition, the ASG (CISF/
State Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security staff shall confirm his identity
through a
valid photo identity card issued by the Department/ Ministry concerned and movement
order/ authority slip. If his identity and bona fides are beyond doubt, the ASG (CISF/ State
Police)/ Airline operator/ Airport operator security staff can obtain necessary declaration
from him as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003 and
thereafter allow him to proceed for check-in etc. There is no need to detain the passenger.
However, a complaint shall be made about the incident to the Director General, DGCA for
necessary action at their end under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
Local police shall also be informed and a copy of such complaint shall also be forwarded to
the controlling authority of such person.
In case the passenger neither has a valid arms license with him nor claims to possess the
same, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security staff shall
hand him over to the local police along with the arms and ammunition with a complaint
about the incident for taking necessary legal action under the Arms Act 1959 and Aircraft
Act 1934 and the rules framed there under.
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Handout 12.1
Page 1 of 2
Module 12
Persons Traveling Under Special / Legal Status
Person authorized to carry weapons, fire arms on board.
Carriage of arms and ammunition, explosives or explosive device or any other dangerous goods on board a
aircraft is regulated as per the provision of Aircraft (Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003 subject to exemption of this
ordered by the Appropriate Authority.
Airline operators are permitted to transport weapons in areas which are not accessible to passengers and
crew during flight subject to prior approval in writing from Appropriate Authority. For the licensed weapons
within India, no additional permission is needed.
The Commissioner may -

(i) authorize a person to carry dummy weapon, explosive, explosive device or any other dummy prohibited
item in the hold/ cabin baggage of an aircraft for the purpose of testing the efficacy of the aviation
security measures; and
(ii) Permit a person to carry weapon in his cabin baggage or on person in the flight if it is so required for the
purpose of performing duty by such person as Personal Security Officer of a dignitary, sky marshal or in-
flight security guard.
The following Personnel are authorized to carry Arms & Ammunition on board the aircraft in the passenger
cabin:
1. Personal Security Officers of VVIPs & SPG Protectees
(a) Permission has been granted by the Central Government to Personal Security Officers of VVIPs like
President, Vice President, Prime Minister and SPG protectees, for carriage of authorized weapons and
ammunitions on board an aircraft while traveling with these VVIPs / protectees by air.
(b) The above Personal Security Officers can carry their weapons and ammunition on their person or in
their hand baggage in fully unloaded condition ie. weapon and ammunition shall be kept separately.
2. Sky Marshals
(a) In order to provide adequate security coverage to aircrafts registered in India and engaged in civil
aviation operations to and from all civil airports in India, permission has been granted by the Central
Government to Sky Marshals, while on duty in such aircraft, for carriage of weapons and ammunition on
board such an aircraft.
(b) The Sky Marshals shall be in possession of their Identity Cards and authorization, issued by
Commissioner of Security (CA) from time to time, for carriage of weapons and ammunition on board an
aircraft.
(c) Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall ensure that the pilot-in-command is
notified as to the number of armed persons and their seat allocation on board the aircraft.
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Handout 12.1
Page 2 of 2
3. PSO (s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category
a. PSO (s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category whenever allowed by the government of India to
accompany such a VIP / dignitary during his /her journey by air or any person on bonafide duty with
weapon and ammunition while travelling by air shall carry the authorized weapons and ammunition in
his/ her registered baggage only.
b. The Personal Security Officers or the persons on duty mentioned above shall carry with them their
valid Identity Cards and Duty Slips / Movement Orders authorizing them to carry specific weapons and
ammunition while on bonafide duty travelling by air and shall produce the same to the Airport /
Airlines Security Officers/ Manager
4. Regular Passengers
a. In the case of regular passengers the Station Manager / Airport Managers of all airlines are authorized
to allow carriage of only one licenced revolver or pistol or shotgun and fifty cartridges belonging to a
bonafide passenger.
At foreign airports, where Indian carriers operate, the discretion to permit the carriage of personal weapon
and ammunition in the Registered Baggage will vest with the Airport Manager of the concerned airlines in
consultation with the Airlines Security Officer if available.
In all such cases, the passenger shall carry valid documents and also subject to the provision that such carriage
do not violate the local / national laws, rules and regulations.
The above instructions shall be subject to any further restrictions applicable in countries of transit and
destination.
The person responsible for security function at that station is responsible to ensure the weapon/s are in
unloaded condition.
He will also ensure that the weapon/s is loaded in proper secure container and stored into such area of
aircraft which is not accessible to any passenger from passenger cabin. Aircraft operator will not carry any
weapon till such facility is not provided on board of the aircraft.
Any passenger is authorized to carry only one weapon and fifty cartridges on board of aircraft.
Carriage of Kirpan
As Kirpan hold religious sentiments in India, BCAS had allowed carriage of Kirpan in passenger cabin on person
under certain restriction. The restrictions are as follow:
• The Sikh passenger is allowed to carry Kirpan in Indian in passenger cabin.
• The total size of Kirpan should not be greater than 9 inch. And the blade
size should not be more than 6 inch.
• The Kirpan will be allowed on domestic routes only. Even on the domestic
leg of any International flight the Kirpan will not be allowed.
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Handout 12.2
Page 1 of 4
Carriage Passengers of Special Category
Due to local laws and regulation aircraft operators are obliged to carry certain passengers of Special
Categories who can be potential disruptive passenger on board of aircraft. The passengers of Special
Categories can be:
• Inadmissible passengers
• Deportees
• Persons being extradited
• Refugees and asylum seekers
Inadmissible passengers
A passenger who is refused admission to a State by the authorities of that State, or who is refused onward
carriage by a State authority at a point of transfer (e.g. due to lack of visa, expired passport etc)
Deportees
A deportee is a person who has legally been admitted to a country by its authorities or who had entered a
country legally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the authorities to be removed from that
country.
Persons being extradited
This is the category of persons traveling under special status who are subject to an extradition order.
Refugees and Asylum seekers
When Refugees and Asylum seekers do not meet the necessary criteria to remain in a country, the
immigration authority of the State will order them to leave.
As when such passengers are carried by any aircraft operator the risk perception of the said flight goes higher
than normal passenger flight as these passengers can be disruptive passenger on board of aircraft. Before any
aircraft operator carrying such passenger on board of any aircraft the aircraft operator has to assess the risk in
such movement.
To assess the risk, the aircraft operator will collect all the relevant information regarding such passenger from
immigration authority of the state. The aircraft operator will collect information regarding:
• A major objection on the part of the individual to be returned to another country
• The mental or physical state
• Nature of any criminal act already committed by the individual
• Individual is wanted by the police of any other State
• Individual personally objects to carriage by air
After assessing risk in such movement the aircraft operator will carry such passenger either with escort or
without escort.
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Handout 12.2
Page 2 of 4
Procedure to carry passenger of special category without escort
When the aircraft operator is carrying such passenger without escort, then safety of the passenger and
aircraft is responsibility of the aircraft operator. To ensure safety of passenger and crew the aircraft operator
will ensure:
• Thorough check of individual baggage
• No public disclosure of movement
• Travel formalities properly completed
• Any special requirements should be made available
• Any special requirements should be made available
Procedure to carry passenger of special category with escort
When the aircraft operator is carrying such passenger without escort, then safety of the passenger is
responsibility of the escort. To ensure safety of passenger the escort will ensure:
• Be in plain clothes
• Not be in possession of firearms or weapons
• Be trained in appropriate restraint devices (to be concealed to the public)
• Ensure that the individual and baggage is thoroughly checked
• Keep the captain informed of any incident during the flight
• Ensure no alcohol is served
• Be in possession of the escorted person’s personal property including passport, travel documents and
ticket
• Be in possession of the deportation/removal order
• Supervise the taking of medication
• No permit the deportee to disembark at transit stops
Persons in custody and under Administrative Control
Prior permission from Appropriate Authority will be obtained for transporting prisoners or persons under
administrative control or deportees with escort in the commercial flights and the conditions laid down in such
permission will be followed strictly by air operators, who will be informed of such approval in time.
Notification Requirement
Commissioner shall notify in due time the appropriate aircraft operator and pilot-in-command when
passengers are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings.
Such passengers include persons in the custody of law enforcement personnel, mentally disturbed persons
under escort, deportees and inadmissible persons.
When a person is obliged to travel because he or she is deemed to be inadmissible or the subject of a
deportation order, Commissioner shall inform authorities in transit and destination States of the identity of
the person, the reason for transporting that person, and an evaluation of any threat posed by that person.
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Handout 12.2
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Carriage of Prisoners in aircraft Ref Circular No. 42/ 2005 dated 24.10.2005
(i) No aircraft operator shall allow a prisoner and escorting officers as passengers unless prior permission
is obtained from the BCAS by the concerned policing authority who is responsible for transportation
of such prisoner with escorts by air.
(ii) The policing authority requiring transportation of a prisoner by air shall send their request in writing
to the Commissioner / Regional Dy. Commissioner of Security (CA), BCAS at least 7 (seven) days in
advance.
(iii) The policing authority responsible for carriage of a prisoner by air shall indicate classification of such
prisoner as dangerous or otherwise in their application addressed to the commissioner or Regional
Dy Commissioner of Security (CA), BCAS.
(iv) No more than one prisoner, classified as dangerous, shall be allowed on any one flight.
(v) Minimum 02 (two) escorts of the Policing authority shall be required for one prisoner who is classified
as dangerous by the policing authority.
(vi) Policing authority officers or other authorized persons should notify a responsible representative of
the operator well before the date it is proposed to transport a prisoner, or as soon as practicable in an
emergency, the identity of the person being escorted, the flight on which transportation has been
arranged, and whether or not the escorted person is considered dangerous.
(vii) Escorting officers should be apprised, by a responsible representative of the aircraft operator, of the
potential danger to the safe operation of the aircraft should they take any action during an act of
unlawful interference without direction from the pilot-in-command.
(viii) Escorting officers shall ensure that a prisoner does not carry contraband, weapons, matches or other
potentially dangerous items.
(ix) Escorts shall be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event they determine
that restraint is necessary. Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be shackled to any part
of the aircraft, including seats, tables etc.
(x) Escorts shall not carry arms, mace, teargas or similar incapacitating gas generating devices or any
dangerous goods / prohibited items specified by the BCAS on board the aircraft. Weapon and
ammunition if any may be allowed in registered baggage as per instructions in force.
(xi) Escorts shall adequately identify themselves to security personnel policing authority officers on duty
at the security check points and flight attendants. Their presence on board and seat assignment shall
be transmitted by the flight attendants to the pilot-in-command who should acknowledge receipt of
this information.
(xii) Any other security personnel and passengers authorized to carry firearms on board the aircraft should
be made aware of the transportation of a prisoner and escorts and their location.
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Handout 12.2
Page 4 of 4
(xiii) A prisoner along with escorts should be boarded before all other passengers and disembarked after
all other passengers have left the Aircraft.
(xiv) They should be seated as far as to the rear of the passenger cabin as is possible but not in a lounge
area or next to / directly across from an exit.
(xv) They should only be seated in a row for two or more seats and at least one escort should sit between
the escorted person and any aisle.
(xvi) They should be accompanied at all times and kept under surveillance, including visits to the lavatory.
(xvii) No intoxicating beverage shall be served to escorts or prisoner while on board the aircraft.
(xviii) Prisoner may be served food at the discretion of escorts but should not be provided with metal
utensils or a knife.
(xix) Aircraft operator should not accept a prisoner and escort(s) as passengers unless concurrence has
been obtained in advance from the BCAS (GOI) and other operators that may be involved en route
and at the intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance notification must be given to
operator so that prior agreements can be obtained.
(xx) The airline operator shall inform the pilot-in-command of the aircraft in which such person shall be
escorted about the presence of such person in the flight.
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Handout 12.3
Page 1 of 1
Exemption from pre-embarkation security checks:
VVIPs / VIPs and their accompanying spouse are exempted from pre-embarkation security checks at all civil
airports in the country as per BCAS AVSEC Circular No. 06/2008 dated 04th September 2008
1. President
2. Vice President
3. Prime Minister
4. Governors of States
5. Former Presidents
6. Former Vice-President
7. Chief Justice of India,
8. Speaker of Lok Sabha
9. Union Ministers of Cabinet rank
10. Chief Ministers of States
11. Deputy Chief Ministers of States
12. Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission
13. Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha
14. Holders of Bharat Ratna Decoration
15. Ambassadors of foreign countries, Charge D’ Affairs and High commissioners and their spouses
16. Judges of Supreme Court
17. Chief Election Commissioner
18. Comptroller & Auditor General of India
19. Deputy Chairman Rajya Sabha & Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha
20. Minister of State of the Union Council of Ministers
21. Attorney General of India
22. Cabinet Secretary
23. Lt. Governors of Union Territories
24. Chiefs of staffs holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank
25. Chief Justices of the High Courts
26. Chief Ministers of Union Territories
27. Deputy Chief Ministers of Union Territories
28. Visiting Foreign dignitaries of the same status as at Sl. Nos. 1 to 4,7,8,9 above
29. His Holiness the Dalai Lama
30. SPG Protectees
31. Shri Robert Vadra, while traveling with SPG Protectees.
Spouse of the president of India is exempted from pre-embarkation security checks at all civil airports even
when he/she is not accompanying the president.
Former Prime Ministers of India are also exempted from pre-embarkation checks at all civil airport in
country.
Except the categories specified above, all other categories of passengers, traveling by air through the civilian
airports in the country, are to be subjected to pre-embarkation security checks without making any exception
in any particular case.
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- 158 -
MODULE -15
EMERGING THREATS TO CIVIL
AVIATION
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After the attack of 9/11, using civil aircraft as a weapon and using dangerous materials to
attack aircraft or other targets on the ground was treated as an offence. The illegal transport
of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons is also criminalized. The Beijing Protocol
supplements the Hague Convention, 1970. The Protocol expands the scope of The Hague
Convention to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including through modern
technological means.
The following are the new emerging threats to Civil Aviation: -
A. Landside attacks and its mitigation measures

B. CBRN
C. Insider Threat and its mitigation measures
D. Cyber Threat and its mitigation measures
E. Drone Attacks
A. Landside attacks and its mitigation measures
Security in the landside area is difficult to monitor and control due to public accessibility and
the limitations of implementing security measures. There are many obstacles to overcome
while keeping focused on terminal design, passenger throughput and the generation of
revenues from sources like retail operations. When considering basic requirements for
airport security, all landside area operations remain as vulnerable targets and yet basic
tenants of physical security are applicable. Improved technologies and prudent use of
CCTV have been considered for airport security in coordination with airport law enforcement,
airport operations and the cooperation of tenants.
The physical security measures and the operational security measures described in this
chapter shall be implemented to protect the landside, public areas of the airport.
The development and implementation of appropriate security measures shall be based on a
security risk assessment process carried out by the relevant authorities and/ or entities, in
collaboration with national and local authorities and the airport operator, to detect, deter
and mitigate the risk in landside areas.
Landside security measures should be adapted to the airport environment by States and
relevant entities and implemented by the relevant local entities in accordance with national
requirements. These measures should be commensurate to the threat and risk and should
be described in the Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan (CTCP).
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Random Screening of passenger and baggage at entry gates based on behaviour detection and
risk assessment.
A coordinated approach - The Appropriate Authority, in coordination with all stakeholders

including law enforcement agencies (e.g., police, port authority and border control), aircraft
operators, security service providers, local public transport and retail representatives shall
include all concerned stakeholders when developing and implementing landside security
measures.
Landside mitigation measures — key elements
Attacks on landside may be carried out on public areas of an airport where attackers may not
need to defeat the security measures normally in place prior to entering security
restricted areas. Potential modes of attack may include, but are not limited to, the following:
a) Person – Borne IED (PBIED) and MANPADS.
b) IED placed inside or near airport key points (non – suicide attack).
c) Armed assault at a public area of an airport.
d) Vehicle – Borne IED (VBIED) attacks and terminal ram-raiding; and
e) An attack by means of chemical, biological and/ or radiological agents.
Landside security arrangements:
It is necessary to ensure that security measures are established for landside areas to mitigate
the risk of and to prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in coordination with
relevant departments and agencies; and in accordance with risk assessments carried out
by the relevant authorities or entities. The following aspects will be implemented by airport
operator, ASG (CISF/ State Police), State/ UT administration and other entities concerned: -
a) The identification of landside/ airside barriers.
b) CTCP, the mock drill frequencies, participation, and appropriate responsibilities of
all concerned for coordination of landside security measures between relevant
departments, agencies.
c) Airport – level training programme to impart required security training for securing
landside areas.
d) Provision of physical security measures like check points/ barriers on the access road
to airport terminal and Bullet resistant equipment.
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e) CCTV surveillance on the landside areas – coverage and recording system.

f) Security arrangements in the funnel area, particularly landing and take – off points.
g) Appropriate security measures for landside areas to mitigate the risk and to
prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in accordance with risk assessments
carried out by the relevant authorities.
Surveillance and patrols of the public areas of the terminal:
Securing the public area from terrorist attack to provide safe and secure environment at
the airport is of paramount importance to ensure safety and security of public, passengers,
employees, and materials. The following tasks shall be carried by the concerned entities
at the airport for the purpose: -
1. Regular patrols of public areas by airport security, police (overt and covert) and/or
other law enforcement agencies, as a means of deterrence and detection.
2. Explosive Detection Dogs Squad for effective detection of explosives on both the
Airside and landside.
3. A component of CISF/ local police personnel shall be deployed for patrolling on the
cityside.
4. Deployment of armed patrols on the city side of the terminals.
5. Deployment of QRT to strengthen protection level and to react in the event of any
contingency.
6. QRT Vehicles shall be provided for the QRT of ASG duly equipped with VHF sets.
7. Sufficient RT Sets shall be provided to the QRT/ sentries at Morchas and pickets for
effective communication.
8. Patrolling in the parking lots.
9. Only authorized vehicles allowed parking after vehicle checks.
10. Parking area will be secured by patrolling and barrier checking.
11. CCTV and vehicle check system installed at the entrance lane to Parking.
12. Bollards & Tyre killers have been provided at all the roads leading to terminals.
13. The vehicles cleared from the road outside Terminals by local Traffic Police &
assisted by the ASG patrolling parties.
Possible mitigating measures - Landside security measures should be proportionate to the

risk while remaining operationally sustainable in the long run-in order to ensure a reasonable
balance between aviation security, safety and operational requirements, and passenger
facilitation.
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Ground procedures to Mitigate risk of Missiles attach:

Missiles are easily transportable and can be operated from any open area, including the flat
roof of a building. Consequently, landing, and to a greater extent, take-off paths, which are
frequently over open terrain, are the areas from which attacks are likely to be launched.
Contingency plans should therefore include:
1. A requirement for detailed surveys of probable launch sites to be conducted from time
to time and for similar inspections to be carried out immediately prior to landing or
take-off.
2. Surveillance of probable launch sites by irregularly scheduled security patrols.
3. Prior identification of high-risk flights for which special procedures will be required
on take-off and landing; and
4. Clearance of areas from which attacks may be launched to eliminate places of
concealment for launch sites.
Arrangements to mitigate the risk of vehicles being used to crash into the terminal building with
improvised explosive devices.
i. Manned vehicle inspection stations to control access in and around the airport
terminal during elevated threat levels are necessary at the airport to provide a
location at a safe distance in which to inspect vehicles that are approaching the airport
terminal on the access roadway. In some instances, vehicle inspection stations are
also necessary at vehicle parking locations if they are located within the proximity
to the terminal building. Consideration has been given to including the following
features at vehicle inspection stations:
ii. Turnstiles roll gates, or vehicular crash barriers that will stop or impede “gate crashing”.
A sheltered checkpoint station has been provided on each vehicle gate to permit
maximum visibility over the immediate area of the gate and to provide easy access
for the guard to carry out inspecting duties.
iii. Sufficient space has been provided to direct a person or vehicle to one side for
further inspection without blocking access for those following. Sufficient space has
also been provided for emergency vehicles and other authorized vehicles to by-pass
the vehicle inspection stations.
iv. Communications, including emergency and duress alarms, between any sheltered
security checkpoint station and the airport security services office, as well as a
duress alarm by which emergency assistance may be summoned shall be provided
at the vehicle entry points on the landside.
v. Vehicle check system with License Plate Reader (LPR) have been installed on the
approach road to the terminals.
vi. Armed personnel at alighting and boarding point shall be deployed by ASG.
vii. Crash Rated bollards have been installed on the approach road to the airport
terminals.
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Arrangements to protect and police the passenger drop-off and pick-up areas and terminal
frontages to prevent vehicles being left unattended.
i. Roads to the terminal shall allow for un-congested flow during peak hours to ensure
law enforcement personnel can effectively monitor and move vehicles.
ii. Drop off and loading zones have been set as far away from the terminal as practical
to minimize the blast effects of a vehicle bomb. The use of moving sidewalks or
access to luggage carts to help Passengers Bridge the gap shall be essential.
iii. Emergency Vehicle (Fire and Police) Parking / staging areas near the terminal,
potential inspection areas, and congested areas have been provided.
iv. During periods of heightened security, it shall be ensured that vehicles cannot gain
access to the terminal by bypassing inspection area. It will also be ensured to evaluate
the ability of the potential to “jump curbs”, travel across open landscaping, or drive
the wrong way down a road.
v. To minimize traffic to the terminal, alternative routes to non-terminal- b a s e d
operations, such as access to the Air Cargo operations, Rental Car agencies, hotels,
etc. have been provided. Clear signage and sufficient dedicated driving lanes to permit
drivers unfamiliar with the airport to find their destinations quickly and easily.
vi. During periods of heightened security, exit points with alternate routes have been
provided to enable customers to choose other options or means to access the
terminal (such as buses or pedestrian). This will help in de-congestion and inspection
requirements. The security arrangement is vested with ASG.
vii. CISF will ensure that No vehicle shall be left unattended at any point of time in front
of the terminal building. Immediately after drop-off and pick-up the vehicle shall be
removed from the frontage zone of the terminal.
viii. It shall be the responsibility of CISF and local police to protect the passenger drop-
off and pick-up areas and terminal frontages to prevent vehicles being left unattended
which can be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.
ix. NAKAS on approach road of the airport terminals shall be established for checking
of vehicles at these points.
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Procedures for the protection of tickets, boarding passes, baggage tags and other documents
The following procedures shall be followed:
i. Responsibility of checking of travel documents and establishing the bonafide of

passengers, their baggage and cargo consignment to be transported by air rests with
the aircraft operator.
ii. Documentation: Tickets presented by passengers shall be examined to confirm they
are genuine, in date and appropriate to the intended flight and destination. Where
there are doubts about the validity of any document produced by a passenger,
check-in is to be discontinued until the matter has been resolved satisfactorily.
iii. Passenger identity checks: Each passenger’s passport or identity document shall be
examined at check-in for normal security procedures, for immigration obligations
and for the prevention of fraud. The purpose of identity checks at check-in is to:
a) Establish the passport or identity document is genuine and that its period
of validity covers the period of the intended journey.
b) Confirm that the name on the booking matches the name on passport or
ID document.
c) Match the photograph in the passport or ID document with the passenger
and establish that any necessary visa is present (instructions on the checking
of visas are issued separately)
d) When there is any doubt about a passenger's identity or the validity of
documents presented, check-in is to be discontinued until the doubt has
been cleared.
Arrangements around the check-in facilities to protect passengers on flights deemed to be of

higher risk: -
a) Suspicious activities of persons and passengers shall be kept under surveillance by
CCTV and CISF surveillance staff and prompt action shall be taken to check such
activities to prevent any unlawful interference at the airport.
b) The Aviation Security Group's armed personnel shall be deployed in the check-in area
to keep an eye on the movement of passengers and staff in that area and react to a
situation.
c) The airlines will conduct profiling of passengers prior to check in and any suspicion
will be reported to ASG personnel.
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Security awareness public announcements ( e.g., warning passengers not to leave articles
unattended).
For Public
a) Passengers and public awareness is very essential for effective implementation of
civil aviation security in the country. Therefore, frequent public announcement and
display of security signage shall be done by the airport operator concerned.
b) The passengers shall be advised not to leave the baggage unattended and not to
touch any unidentified object. If any unidentified object is observed by the
passengers, employees, workers at the airport, they shall report the same to the nearest
ASG personnel.
c) Signage about Police Post and Control Room details shall be displayed conspicuously on
the city side of the terminals of the airport and same is established by the Airport
Operator.
For Staff:
As Airport staff is the eyes and ears of security department, security awareness training is
provided to all Non-Security Staff for recognizing suspicious behavior and reporting the
concern immediately. They must be made aware that Security is everyone’s responsibility. If
they see something, they must inform immediately.
B. CBRN
CBRN is an acronym for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosives.
The weapons classified under this acronym all can create extremely hazardous conditions
that can lead to mass casualties and disrupt society completely as it has toxic and hazardous
chemical agents. CBRN events are commonly comprised of deliberate or aggressive acts, with
the malicious intent of inciting fear or causing grave harm to humans and the environment.
The characteristics of CBRN weapons are found below.
• Chemical Threats: Chemical threats consist of weapons that utilize a hazardous

chemical that is designed to cause intentional death or harm through its toxic
properties. The four different types of chemical agents include choking agents,
blister agents, blood agents, and nerve agents. This chemical threat has a direct
effect on many human organs and systems including the respiratory system, lungs,
heart, and skin. Symptoms that can occur upon exposure to a chemical agent
includes watery eyes, itching, coughing, difficulty swallowing, difficulty breathing,
chest pain, dizziness, nausea, and potentially death.
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• Biological Threats: A biological weapon, also called germ weapon, is any number of
disease-producing agents such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, toxins, and other
biological agents, that can be used as a weapon against humans. Lethal biological
weapons can cause mass deaths upon humans and have been responsible for
more deaths than from those employed by combat. There are five different
categories of biological agents including bacteria, rickettsia, viruses, fungi, and
toxins. The symptoms a human may experience from a biological threat can range
depending on the different category of biological agent.
• Radiological Threats: Radiological threats are weapons that disperse radioactive
agents to inflict injury or cause contamination and damage. A commonly used
radiological threat is the dirty bomb, which utilizes a conventional explosion to
disperse radioactive contaminants into an environment. The effects of radiological
threats upon the health of an individual can vary depending on the intensity,
duration, and type of radiation. Symptoms from this classification of warfare can
include nausea, vomiting, fatigue, fever, diarrhea, infection, bleeding,
gastrointestinal symptoms, and even death.
• Nuclear Threats: Nuclear weapons are devices designed to release energy in an
explosive manner because of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or a combination of
the two. This classification of weapon can lead to extreme danger to human health.
• Explosive Threats: An explosive weapon generally uses high explosives to project a
blast and fragmentation from the point of detonation. Explosive weapons can lead
to mass casualties in the affected area.
What is a CBRN Attack?

CBRN attacks can happen either accidentally or intentionally – but no matter the
circumstance the effects are bound to be grave. An accidental CBRN attack is typically caused
by human error, natural, or technological reasons. This can include spills, accidental releases,
or leakages that cause the incident to occur. When an accident occurs with these weapons it
is usually referred to as DG or a HAZMAT accident.
Whereas intentional CBRN incidents involve criminal acts, maliciously motivated poisoning of
an individual, or a terrorist attack or act. An intentional CBRN attack can leave great
devastation after deployment, with a calculated plan to harm a large area with many
individuals present when the attack occurs. These weapons are usually described as ‘low
probability, high risk’, because of the relatively low risk of a CBRN attack occurring but the
high threat risk to public health upon an attack taking place in the environment.
The Risk of a Chemical Attack
The severity of an attack is dependent upon several different factors, particularly the toxicity
of the chemical and its concentration when it reaches people. The release of a chemical agent
or a chemical attack in an enclosed space (such as a subway, airport, or an office space) could
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deliver lethal doses, high enough to severely hurt or kill a large group of people. In
comparison, when a chemical attack is deployed in an open area, a toxic chemical cloud, or
plume, would become less concentrated as it spreads and would have to be released in a
large quantity to produce significant casualties.
Immediate health impacts can start to effect humans upon exposure to a chemical agent that
has been deployed during a chemical attack. Symptoms from exposure to toxic chemicals will
start to appear quickly, sometimes a couple hours or even a couple minutes following
exposure. The health risks alone from a chemical attack solidify the strength and devastation
that a chemical attack can wreak over an environment.
CBRN Terrorism
Terrorism or terrorist attacks that involve the use of CBRN materials pose a very real and
dangerous threat to public health and safety. Terroristic threats utilizing CBRN weapons can
also impact national security, economic, and political stability on a global level. When these
types of weapons are deployed in an act of terrorism, the complete destruction could be
insurmountable – leading to unrepairable effects on the human population and environment.
Preventing the risks of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons has
been a priority for a long period of time. The main used devices for terrorist attacks include
chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.
What are Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Devices?

CBR (Chemical, Biological, and Radiological) devices are without a doubt dangerous threat to
public health and safety. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological devices produce airborne
hazardous contaminants that can be in the form of gases, vapors, or aerosols. These types of
airborne contaminants can be very dangerous as they enter the body rapidly and impact
health within hours or even minutes after exposure.
To Mitigate the threat from Radiation, VMS and LMS have been installed at Indian Airports.
Implementation of dedicated, continuous nuclear and radiological monitoring systems for

identifying and tracking nuclear materials out of regulatory control is associated with high
operational burdens. Although video and images from cameras are helpful in assessing
threats, the raw, unstructured data require time-intensive human interaction to extract the
relevant actionable information for adjudicating a threat. A solution to this is to automatically
combine spatiotemporal information from radiological sensors and cameras with video and
data analytics within a computing platform such as a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), to
produce structured, annotated video information that allows security staff to adjudicate
potential threats rapidly. The purpose of the proposed work is to exploit video/data analytics
and camera control solutions of VMSs to support the detection, identification, and tracking
of nuclear/radiological objects moving within the monitored environment, as well as to
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generate actionable information about the object that is carrying/conveying the threat
materials.
The LMS (Limb Monitor Scanner) system is installed at the gas infrastructure facilities and
determines lowest gas concentrations at up to 1093 yards (1 km). If a leak is detected along
the scanning laser path, the system records this fact, gas concentration at the leak, leak
coordinates and time. System behavior at the time of leak detection can also
be programmed — record data and continue scanning, send a message to the duty control
panel, or stop scanning and turn on the alarm.
C. Insider Threat and its mitigation measures
Although fatal hijackings and attacks on aircraft have been occurring since long 9/11 sparked
the international community into launching new aviation security, procedures, regulations,
and operations. There are political, economic, and social implications that act as motives of
terrorism. Some terrorists claim that acts of violence are the better alternative to other forms
of political protesting and promotion. Some join terrorist groups for financial reasons, such
as providing for their families. Other people join terrorist groups because they are otherwise
outcasts and lack a place in society.
The insider is rising as one of the key threats to the aviation industry in relation to terrorism.
Motives for malicious and intentional insider activity can be political, economic, social,
cultural, and personal. Malicious insiders seeking revenge, sabotage, or espionage, and
intentional insiders seeking a self-benefiting profit are aware that their access to materials,
systems, networks, and infrastructure is valuable to terrorists. They can provide terrorists
with access to information about a company or significant building that would aid in an attack,
such as the layout of an airport. Terrorists can also recruit insiders to act on their behalf or
attempt to become the insider to carry out an attack by gaining authorized access to facilities,
systems, and data.
To define the Insider Threat more clearly, we first need to understand what constitutes an
‘insider’ within an aviation context. Essentially in an airport environment, an insider is an
individual who exploits their knowledge or access to their airport, airline, or organization’s
assets, for unauthorized purposes. So, the insider could be virtually anyone, including an
employee, contractor, consultant, or anyone else who has legitimate access to their
organization’s information or assets. This problem is especially difficult to manage when you
consider the interdependencies and wealth of information that moves around an airport.
Insider threat One or more individuals with access, and/or insider knowledge that allows them
to exploit vulnerabilities of the transportation domain.
Insider threat is the risk posed by workers with inside access and knowledge to exploit
vulnerabilities in the Civil aviation systems.
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Why are insiders so dangerous?

The danger presented by an aviation insider is that they already understand the external
security of airports and aviation assets and will be able to exploit their knowledge of these
security measures. Many aviation insiders potentially also have access to the most critical and
sensitive parts of an airport. They are already in a position of trust and might hold an access
card to an airport’s airside, for example. Given this enhanced level of access, they are more
likely to be able to identify vulnerabilities and target the weakest areas within their airport.
Insiders pose a great risk to security and safety of the aviation industry by challenging security
countermeasures, exploiting potential vulnerabilities and increasing their knowledge of
security procedures for nefarious purposes.
Potential Insider Threats within the Aviation Industry include a wide variety of individuals
involved with the aircraft and passengers, including, but not limited to, the following
categories:
– Airline employees
– Concession and restaurant employees
– Cleaning and catering crews
– Construction and maintenance crews
– Law enforcement, military and/or security personnel
– Taxi, cab, shuttle bus and/or other transportation specialists
– Current and/or former employees
– Current and/or former contract government employees
– Air Traffic Controllers
– Ground Handling Agency staff
What is the intent behind an Insiders act?

Historically, the insider threat is a malicious insider or group who seeks to do harm; however,
it is important to remember that the insider threat can be unintentional as well. Personality,
behavioral, and lifestyle indicators may alert us to the malicious insider; however, the
unwitting or complacent insider could go undetected by peers and supervisors.
• Malicious: Insider seeks to aid or conduct an act that is malicious and intentional in
nature to cause damage
• Complacent : Insider takes a lenient/relaxed approach to policies, procedures, and
potential security risks
• Unwitting : Insider is not aware of security policies, procedures and protocols which
expose the organizations/agency to external risks.
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Types of Insider Threats
The insider threat to the aviation sector spans across all realms of the threat vector to include
cyber, criminal, and terrorism. Some of the more notable examples of aviation insider threat
across the globe include terrorism/sabotage, security compromise, and physical property
theft.
Terrorism Use of insider access to facilitate an act of violence as a

means of disruption or coercion for political purposes.
Espionage Use of insider access to obtain sensitive information for

exploitation.
Security Compromise Use of insider access to facilitate and circumvent security
controls.
Sabotage Use of insider access to destroy equipment or materials.
Physical Property Theft Use of insider access to steal material items.

Information/Intellectual Use of insider access to steal information or intellectual
Property Theft property.
Workplace Violence Use insider access to conduct violence in the workplace.
What motivates an insider?
The motives of an insider can be varied and can include gaining financial advantage through
low-level or organized crime activities. They can be issue-driven (e.g., environmentalist
groups), terrorism focused, or an individual may become an insider simply because they are
disgruntled or unhappy with the way they have been treated by their organization. However,
the motivation may also be due to a combination of the above factors. Motivation is a
complex issue, as two employees may be faced with an identical situation, while only one
may decide to act against the interests of their organization. The following factors motivates
and Insider threat: -
– Financial Gain- Some insider threat activity has been motivated by greed or financial
need.
– Anger/Revenge- Insider threat activity has been conducted by employees who were
disgruntled to the point of wanting to retaliate against the organization.
– Problems at work- Some insider threats have been individuals who felt a lack of
recognition at work, has disagreements with co-workers or managers and were
dissatisfied with the job, or upset by a pending layoff.
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– Divided loyalty- Insider threat activity has also been conducted by individuals who
have pledged allegiance to another person or company or to a country besides India.
– Blackmail/Extortion- Blackmail is when a person is easily manipulated due to fear of
sensitive information getting out such as gambling, fraud, or illicit relationships.
– Extortion is when a person is coerced through force or threat.
– Destructive Behaviour- On occasions individual threat activity was related to an
individual’s problems with substance abuse.
– Adventure/Thrill Seeker- A person who wants more excitement in life and who in
intrigued by covert or sneaky activity is probably motivated by fame. He or she
generally has an inflated ego.
– Radicalization- The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent
extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups.”
– Family Problems- In the past, there also have been incidents when a person who was
experiencing the stress of family or marital conflicts, or separation from loved ones
became involved in insider threat activity.
MITIGATING INSIDERS’ THREAT: Proposed Solution
The advantage of someone working at an airport possessing sufficient knowledge of routine

security systems may be significantly reduced if unpredictable measures are in place like
random screening of staff, Surprise check of AEP.
Security measures also contribute towards mitigating the risk associated with the insider
threat, and include background checks, selection procedures, security awareness training for
airport identification holders and training of staff implementing other security controls, as
well as perimeter security, access controls, surveillance, aircraft security and quality control.
In all cases, screening and other security controls carried out in a random and unpredictable
manner should achieve outcomes to combat the insider threat.
• Proactive approach to reporting suspicious activities.
• Pre‐employment background checks: Comprehensive background check of all
personnel selected for hiring/ employment at the airport should be carried out by
the relevant State’s security agencies base on the risk assessment.
• The policy should focus on preventing the recruitment of a person who is not able to
provide a background check which is compliant with the operator’s requirements.
• Criminal records, detailed review of employment history, travel history, correct
identification etc. can provide a reasonable picture of a potential employee.
Operators should have a process to ensure that all new entrant staff complete the
requirements of the vetting process prior to employment. These measures may be
varied depending on the level of risk that is posed by the person’s role and the access
to the operator’s sensitive areas.
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• Spot and Stop measures: Operators should consider what measures exist to identify an
insider at the earliest stage and to stop or deter him.
SPOT measures: measures aim to identify behaviour or activities of concern, and to identify
any changing or suspicious behaviour patterns that might help to detect a potential insider.
STOP measures: should aim to prevent or deter an insider from exploiting or intending to
exploit their role for unauthorized purposes.
Due to changing circumstances in their lives, every person may potentially become vulnerable
to being an insider, and if so, their attitudes or behaviour are significantly affected.
Such circumstances range from stressful personal crises to deliberate targeting and
recruitment by malicious third parties. Circumstances leading to vulnerability might be
subtle and difficult to recognize.
However, the reality would suggest that most such circumstances are caused by financial
difficulty, undue pressure from peers and family, perceptions of unfairness at work, or other
inducement or coercion from third parties.
Governance: Within the insider threat policy the operator should consider identifying a
summary of the roles and responsibilities of relevant departments.
D. Cyber Threat and its mitigation measures
Cyber Threat can be defined as the possibility of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a
computer network or system.
In Aviation Industry it has been categorized as new and emerging threat.
What is Cyber Security?
Cyber security is the practice of protecting systems, networks, and programs from
digital attacks. These attacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying
sensitive information, extorting money from users or interrupting normal business
process.
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Why Aviation Information & Communication Technology System needs to be protected?
1) Rapid growth of civil aviation and significant use of data and use of new technologies.
2) Manual processes are shifting to more efficient automated processes.
3) Paperless and environment friendly approach
4) Huge number of stakeholders
5) Cyber-attack can endanger the safety of an aircraft.
6) Hackers, cyber criminals, “hacktivists” and terrorists are focused on malicious intent,
theft of information, profit, and disruption.
GOI is implementing Digital experience for Air Travelers through “DigiYatra” Platform. The
'DigiYatra' is a digital processing of passengers at the airports. Passengers will be
automatically processed based on facial recognition system at check points like; Entry point
check, Entry into Security Check, Aircraft Boarding, additionally this will also facilitate self-Bag
Drop and Check-in, using facial recognition to identify pax and data recall. Digi Yatra will
facilitate paperless travel and avoid identity check at multiple points.
Governance and responsibilities:

States, governments, Airport Operator, and relevant entities should work collaboratively
towards the development of an effective and coordinated framework for civil aviation
stakeholders working at the airport to address the challenges of cyber threats and increase
the resilience of the global aviation system to cyber threats that may jeopardize the safety
of civil aviation operation at the airport.
The confidentiality, integrity and availability of all Information and Technology systems of
the airport shall be maintained.
Each entity involved in Civil Aviation is responsible for keeping the industry safe from Cyber
Threat:
1. Access control and alarm monitoring system.
2. Departure control systems
3. Passenger and baggage reconciliation system
4. Screening system and/or explosive detection system
5. Regulated agent and/or known consignor.
6. Air Traffic Management systems
7. Reservation and passenger check-in system
8. CCTV surveillance systems
9. Security Command, control, and dispatch system
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Identification of critical information

DG, BCAS shall define criteria for identification of critical information systems. An information
system is critical when it contains or uses sensitive or privacy data and/or assets; or its
operation is indispensable for the safe and secure operation and availability of aviation
activities. The identification of critical systems should be conducted through classification of
all data and/or assets according to a predefined data policy or classification, and the
development of a business impact analysis on the criticality for each of the individual system.
Airport Operator, ATS, aircraft operators, communications service providers, ground
handling agents, maintenance, repair and overhaul service providers, and Security service
providers should identify additional critical data and information systems software and
hardware used in their operation, which may include, but are not limited to:
a) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation safety perspective, such as:
i) Air traffic management systems,
ii) Departure control systems,
iii) Communication, navigation, and other safety-critical systems of an aircraft,
iv) Aircraft command, control, and dispatch systems,
b) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation security perspective, such as:
i) Regulated agent and/or known consignor databases,
ii) Access control and alarm monitoring systems,
iii) Closed-circuit television surveillance systems,
iv) Passenger and baggage reconciliation systems; and
v) Screening systems and/or explosive detection systems, whether
networked or operating in a stand-alone configuration,
c) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation facilitation perspective, such as:
i) Aircraft operator reservation and passenger check-in systems,
ii) Flight information display systems,
iii) Baggage handling and monitoring systems; and
iv) Border crossing and customs systems.
Each stakeholder working in aviation industry needs to identify critical information vital to
their operations and the consequences of its being misused.
Risk Assessment
When applying security considerations in airport design, it will be necessary to conduct an
airport threat and risk assessment. The Airport Operator shall be responsible to ensure
threat and risk assessments of a particular airport and shall approach the Director General,
BCAS well in time.
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Factors to be considered: -
a. Threat assessment and risk management

b. Extent of Airport Operation
c. Frequency and volume of aircraft operations
d. Volume of cargo and mail or catering operations
e. Likelihood of an act of unlawful interference
f. Outcome of previous monitoring activities
g. Finding of internal quality control measures
h. New and emerging needs
Protection of critical information
The objectives of these measures should be, at a minimum, to:

a) protect the systems and data against unauthorized access, modification, and use,
b) prevent lack of availability and integrity due to flaws in software compilation and/or
misuse of configurations; and
c) prevent tampering with the systems and their data.
Protection of data against
• Data Breach: - A data breach is the intentional or unintentional release of secure or

private/confidential information to an untrusted environment.
• Hacking: - Hacking refers to a variety of techniques that are used to compromise or
gain access to a digital system. This can be a computer, mobile phone or tablet, or
an entire network.
• Cyber Incidents: - Cyber incident means actions taken using computer networks that
result in a compromise or an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information
system and/or the information residing therein.
• Cyber-attacks: - In computers and computer networks an attack is any attempt to
expose, alter, disable, destroy, steal, or gain unauthorized access to or make
unauthorized use of an asset.
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Most common Cybersecurity threats:

1) MALWARE: - is sending a code with malicious intents which may seals the data or
destroys the computer. It can be done by 3 ways.
a) Virus – Virus when enters a computer system/software can clean files or infect
files. Virus attaches itself to an existing executable program. It can spread very
fast. It may enter the system by sampling downloading a file.
b) Trogan- a program that appears desirable but contains something harmful. It
may be a legitimate software that can be tampered with.
c) Worms it is a code which infects one computer and can spread to the entire
network (network interface). It targets the operating system vulnerabilities.
2) PHISHING: - the fraudulent practice of sending emails purporting to be from

reputable companies to induce individuals to reveal personal information, such
as passwords and credit card numbers. The moment you furnish your details,
they will steal the data. Messages look authentic however, the email received
will not be from not a very reliable source (the e-mail ID would be fictitious, not
a company ID).
3) PASSWORD ATTACKS: - the hackers will try to enter the system by cracking the
password of the computer. They will repeatedly try to check the passwords
stored in the computer algorithm, by applying combinations. There are 3 ways
of password attacks.
a) Brute force attack: - In case the name list of employees is available to the
hacktivists, they will have combination of name and numbers like ABC123.
b) Dictionary attacks possibilities: - using short and easy words used in
dictionary as passwords.
c) Keylogger attacks: - they will try all the keys which the user has used during
a day on the keyboard to crack the password.
4) DISTRUBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE (DDoS) ATTACK: - When you hear about a website
being “brought down by hackers,” it generally means it has become a victim of a
DDoS attack. In short, this means that hackers have attempted to make a website
or computer unavailable by flooding or crashing the website with too much traffic.
5) MAN-IN THE-MIDDLE: - if using non-Encrypted files/links and pirated software/

videos a person in the middle can have access to the flow of information between
2 parties/entities without their knowing. Example. When 2 persons are talking on
the phone a third person picks up the parallel line and listens to your conversation.
This 3rd person is the man-in the -middle he can impersonate your information/data
to the best of his advantage.
6) THREATS BY DOWNLOADS: - when you download any app or files from a

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compromising website a malicious code can be downloaded in the background to

your device. Unintentional download of virus or malicious software in your
computer. Same is the case when you use external device like pen drive unknown
virus can be transferred without knowing.
7) MALVERT ICING: - advertisement may look like authentic but has been placed by
criminals. These advertisements have small code when you click on them, you
would be redirected to some criminal server and the codes connect to the server
of the company system and get the sensitive information.
8) ROGUE SOFTWARE: Scareware, Ransomware: - makes to believe that there is virus in

your system and make to pay you ransom money to release the data. The sender would
make use of various temptations to ensure that you download an app or file like giving
free vacation or trial versions of software. The moment you click a POP-UP warning will
show stating that your computer is infected and to clean/remove the virus by clicking
on the programme. The Scareware Software will then either steal your data or corrupt
your files and even stop you from sending any data/file.
Mitigation measures Response: Planning and Readiness
To overcome the threat from cyber-attacks, all stakeholders should ensure that the software
computer installed are ISO certified. There is a proper supply chain for purchase and
installation of software and hardware. Apart from having a proper selection, recruitment,
background check policy to prevent possibility of any data leakage, all companies must also
ensure that the critical sensitive is shared with only people in leadership on need -to- know
basis. All employees must be informed: -
a) Avoid clicking on links and attachments sent by unknown source or person.
b) Stay away from pirated software. Install only original and authenticated software/
hardware.
c) Report such emails to your company.
d) Only use Encrypted wireless point, security of connection https to be used. If not
on https website, your credentials can be stollen.
e) No use of external drive
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All entities must have strict IT Policies which must include the following: -
a) deployment of Firewalls: - will help such emails or attachments from reaching the
server of the company.
b) Frequent software security updates. Install only original and authenticated
software/ hardware only.
c) To have Controlled advertisements have advertisement blocker installed. Any
advertisement of free lottery or trips should not be opened.
d) Updated firewall.
e) Install trusted antivirus software and spyware software which can prevent such
mails, threats from entering your systems.
f) Regular software updates, online monitoring, monitoring of data flow to identify
any unusual or threatening spikes traffic before it becomes a problem/ bigger
threat.
g) Only HTTPS websites to be given permission into the company’s server to keep
away the Spam mails.
h) Password Protection Policy: -
i. Avoid using your name, Date of birth. etc.
ii. Short and easy words used in dictionary should be avoided.
iii. Multifactor authentication is must.
iv. Update regularly.
v. Use words not in dictionary.
vi. Combination of Alpha numeric and character
vii. Password Protection: -
1. NEVER SHARE YOUR PASSWORD WITH ANYONE
2. Do not leave your computer in unlocked condition unattended.
3. If going away from computer, please lock it so that no one can
use it and steal any information.
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Reporting
Any act or breach in the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
critical information and communications technology systems and data used for civil aviation
purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation shall be
immediately reported to the DG, BCAS by the concerned entity.
E. Drone Attacks
Drone” means an unmanned aircraft. Authorized “Unmanned Aircraft System Operator” means a
person authorized to engage in or offering to engage in operation of an unmanned aircraft system
under The Unmanned Aircraft System Rules, 2021.
Each UAS shall be equipped with the following–
• Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver(s) for horizontal and vertical position fixing ;
• Autonomous Flight Termination System or Return To Home (RTH) option;
• Geo-fencing capability;
• Flashing anti-collision strobe lights;
• Flight controller with Flight data logging capability;
• No Permission – No Takeoff (NPNT) compliant;
• Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) transponder
• Reliable Command and Control Link;
• Real-time tracking system;
• Barometric equipment with capability for remote sub-scale setting;
• Detect and Avoid capability;
• Manufacturer Serial Number;
• Fire resistant identification plate for engraving the UIN;
• Two-way communication system; and
• 360 degrees collision avoidance system.
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Flying Restrictions
No unmanned aircraft shall fly in a restricted area unless specifically permitted by the Director General.
No unmanned aircraft, except Nano unmanned aircraft, shall be flown by a person who is not a
licensed remote pilot.
No Unmanned Aircraft belonging to small, or medium or large class shall be permitted to fly in
enclosed premises.
No unmanned aircraft shall be flown

(a) Within 5 kilometers from the perimeter of international airports at Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai,
Kolkata, Bengaluru and Hyderabad.
(b) Within 3 kilometers from the perimeter of any civil, private or defense airports, other than those
mentioned in clause(a);
(c) Above the Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS) or Procedures for Air Navigation Services
(g) Within 3 kilometer from perimeter of military installations/ facilities/ where military activities/
exercises are being carried out unless clearance is obtained from the local military installation/facility;
(h) Within 5-kilometer radius from Vijay Chowk in Delhi. However, this is subject to any additional
conditions/ restrictions imposed by local law enforcement agencies/ authorities in view of the security.
(i) Within 2 kilometer from perimeter of strategic locations/ vital installations notified by Ministry of
Home Affairs unless clearance is obtained from Ministry of Home Affairs;
Counter Drone System
The composition of Counter Drone System
1. Primary Drone Detection Radar;

2. Radio Frequency (RF) Detector and Direction Finder;
3. Electro Optical (EO) and Infra-Red (IR) Sensor;
4. Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and RF Jammer;
5. Hard-kill options such as Laser and Fire Control locking system (FCS); and
6. Command & Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence management
systems
BCAS Policy
• Drones are not allowed in hand baggage of the passengers.

• Drones are allowed in the registered baggage without the batteries.
****END****
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Handout RESTRICTED
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Module-16 Escorting People and Consignment
Module Objective
 Escort disruptive / inadmissible / deportees in the restricted areas of an airport

 Escort consignments over a predetermined route.
 Maintain radio communication with security control centre
 Apply contingency plans for emergencies involving disruptive/inadmissible/
deportees and consignments under escort.
 Primary reason for escorting typical categories of people requiring escort.
Teaching Methods
 Slide Presentations
 Lectures by certified instructors
 Group discussions
 Demonstrations
 Role- playing and practical exercises
 Overnight reading Assignments
 Progress Tests
 Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
International Legislations
Annex 17
Standard 4.7.1 Each Contracting State shall develop requirements for
air carriers for the carriage of potentially disruptive
passengers who are obliged to travel because they have
been the subject of judicial or administrative
proceedings.
Standard 4.7.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the aircraft
operator and the pilot-in-command are informed when
passengers are obliged to travel because they have been
the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings, in
order that appropriate security controls can be applied.

Handout RESTRICTED
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National Legislation
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011,

Rule 17 Procedures of disembarkation of unruly passengers.
NCASP
7.6 Persons in custody and under Administrative Control
Aviation Security Order / Circular

Order 08/2011 Instructions to handle potentially disruptive passengers.
Circular 42/2005 Instructions for carriage of prisoners / person under judicial

custody / administrative control.
Typical categories of people requiring escort:
 Authorized visitors
 Deportees and inadmissible passenger
 Medical patients and accompanying personnel
 Persons in custody
 VIPs.
The primary responsibility for the movement of people is that of the agency as mentioned below.
Deportee Immigrations
Inadmissible pax Concerned Airlines

Persons in Judicial/ Law enforcement Officer
Administrative custody ( State Police)
Medical Pax Airline
VVIP / VIPs Personal Security officers & Special
Cell of State Police
Disruptive / Unruly Passenger
POLICY FOR UNRULY PASSENGER

Handout RESTRICTED
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Unruly passengers – Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment
when the aircraft door is closed prior to take-off to the moment when it is reopened after
landing ,an act of :
 Assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or

the safety of property or persons;
 Assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the performance
of duties or which lessens the ability to perform duties;
 Wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment ,or attendant structures
and equipment such as to endanger good order and safely of the aircraft or its occupants;
 Communication of information which is known to be false, there endangering the safely
of an aircraft in flight;
 Disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
Who is considered as a disruptive and unruly passenger?
The passenger who creates or has the potential to create disturbance either on board the
aircraft or on ground and in the process could endanger the safety of the aircraft, fellow
passengers, crew members, airline staff or property thereby hampering the operations.
Although such incidents are small as compared to number passengers we carry, it must be
recognized that some of these disruptive and unruly passengers have the potential to
jeopardize the safety and security of our operations.
Besides other factors, the following are the main causes for a passenger becoming unruly,
 Excessive drinking
 Nicotine starvation due to smoking restriction
 Resentment of authority.
 Unreasonable high expectations
 Flying phobia and
 Travelling in crowded environment for extended time.
Passenger Disturbance Threat Level:
Level 1 : UNRULY / VERBAL ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR

Level 2 : PHYSICALLY ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR
Level 3 : LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR AND ATTEMPTED or ACTUAL BREACH OF
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT DOOR.
Unruly passengers are the concern of airline staff involved in one of the many activities of a
flight operation. It begins at check-in and ends at the arrival of a flight at the destination.
It is therefore necessary to have a coherent policy and procedures for all services involved,
be it on ground and in the air.

Handout RESTRICTED
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Procedure on ground:
 Staff should at all the times be observant during check-in/lounge/boarding of any

unusual passenger behaviour, if noticed the same should be promptly brought to the
notice of the immediate supervisor.
 If the station manager/Duty manager considers him unfit to fly and safety risk he/she
should be denied boarding.
 Also offload the baggage of said passenger.
Procedure in air:
 Verbal warning to be given to the passenger by senior crew member.

 A w r i t t e n warning letter s i g n e d by the commander to be issued to the unruly
passenger by the senior crew member.
If passenger becomes too violent to be controlled, a restraint should be used on the
passenger until the passenger is handed over to the Law Enforcement Authorities on
landing into the next station of arrival.
Persons in Judicial/ Administrative custody- Carriage of Prisoners
The following general guidance material refers to persons in lawful custody i.e. persons
under arrest or convicted criminals under escort.
Procedure:
 No aircraft operator shall allow a prisoner and escorting officers as passengers unless prior
permission is obtained from the BCAS by the concerned policing authority that is
responsible for transportation of such prisoner with escorts by air.
 The policing authority requiring transportation of a prisoner by air shall send their request in
writing to the DG,BCAS at least 7(seven) days in advance.

Handout RESTRICTED
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 The policing authority responsible for carriage of a prisoner by air shall indicate
classification of such prisoner as dangerous or otherwise in their application addressed to
BCAS.
 A prisoner should not be transported on board an aircraft unless escorted by one or
more policing authority officers.
 Policing authority officers or other authorized persons should notify a responsible
representative of the operator well before the date it is proposed to transport a prisoner or
as soon as practicable in an emergency, the identity of the person being escorted, the
flight on which transportation has been arranged, and whether or not the escorted person
is considered dangerous.
 Escorting officers shall ensure that a prisoner does not carry contraband, weapons,
matches or other potentially dangerous items.
 Escorts shall be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event they
determine that restraint is necessary .Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be
shackled to any part of the aircraft, including seats, tables etc.
 Escorts shall not carry arms, mace, teargas or similar incapacitating gas generating
devices or any dangerous goods /prohibited items specified by the BCAS on board the
aircraft. Weapon and ammunition if any may be allowed in registered baggage as per
instructions in force.
 Escorts shall adequately identify themselves to security personnel, security check
points, flight attendants and pilot in command.
 Any other security personnel and passengers authorized to carry firearms on board the
aircraft should be made aware of the transportation of a prisoner and escorts and their
location.
 A prisoner along with escorts should be boarded before all other passengers and
disembarked after all other passengers have left the aircraft.
 They should be seated as far as to the rear of the passenger cabin as is possible but not
in a lounge area or next to /directly across from an exit.
 They should only be seated in a row for two or more seats and at least one escort should
sit between the escorted person and any aisle.
 They should be accompanied at all times and kept under surveillance including visits to the
lavatory.
 No intoxicating beverage shall be served to escorts or prisoner while on board the aircraft.
 Prisoner may be served food at the discretion of escorts by should not be provided with
metal utensils or a knife.
 Aircraft operator should not accept a prisoner and escort(s) as passengers unless
concurrence has been obtained in advance from the BCAS and other operators that may be

Handout RESTRICTED
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involved en route and at the intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance
notification must be given to operator so that prior agreements can be obtained.
Dangerous Prisoners
At least two escorts should be required for each prisoner considered dangerous by the
escorting agency or in the judgment of a responsible representative of the operator. Not
more than one such prisoner and escorts should be carried on any one flight.
Persons suffering from mental illness
A person suffering from mental illness that is deemed to be a threat to the safety of a
flight may be accepted for transportation if accompanied by an attendant physically capable
of coping with untoward actions by that person during the flight and skilled in administering
sedatives as required and authorized by an appropriate doctor. If a mentally disturb person
requires sedation prior to departure each portion of the flight should last no longer than
the effective duration of the sedative administered. The aircraft operator, on the advice of
representatives of the operators medical and security staffs, as appropriate, should be
permitted to deny boarding to such a person.
Deportees
A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had entered a
State illegally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent authorities to
leave that State.
Each request for transportation should be evaluated and the operators consulted to
determine if the person is threat to the safety of the flight or if additional measures such as
escorts are necessary.
The administrative and financial arrangements for removal of such persons are the
responsibility of the government ordering the deportation.
The primary responsibility of escorting a deportee is of immigration Law Enforcement
Agency of the deporting country
Refusal Room: A separate refusal room for the purpose shall be earmarked by the Airport
Operator in consultation with the immigration authorities at each international airport.
Whenever there is a passenger in the guard room it will be guarded by CISF to ensure that the
passenger does not escape from custody and is deported out of India.
The following instruction shall be implemented by all concerned:-

1. The entire infrastructure for the refusal room will be provided by the Airport Operator. The
design of the Refusal Room will be sent to BCAS by Airport Operator for security vetting.
2. Necessary facilities in the Refusal Room will be provided by the concerned Airport Operator.
3. Guarding of the Refusal Room is the responsibility of CISF for which a guard of one Head
Constable and 04 Constables will be provided.
4. Food and other facilities to the INAD will be provided by the concerned airlines.
Handout RESTRICTED
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5. No charges will be levied for the Refusal Room on the Bureau of Immigration.
Inadmissible persons (sometimes referred to as “refusals’’).
A passenger who is refused admission to a State by the authorities of that State, or who is
refused onward carriage by a State authority at a point of transfer (e.g. due to lack of visa,
expired passport etc).
Typical consignments requiring security escort
 Valuable cargo and mail

 Diplomatic Bags / Mail
 Dangerous goods
 Vulnerable cargo during high threat situations
 Registered baggage
 Catering.
PRIMARY responsibility for movement of consignment will be that of the airline or agency
involved. SECURITY is responsible to assist airline/police/other agency for the safe movement
of the consignment.
Procedure for Escorting Consignment:-
Responsible agency for escorting of consignment should ensure that:

• The movement is planned in advance
• The consignment and escort proceed along a pre-determined route

• The route is varied from consignment to consignment
Register Baggage / Accompanied Baggage

Personal Property of passengers or crew for which the sole custody is taken by the aircraft
operator & claim tagged is issued.
Categories of baggage required escort
 Bags Containing Arms / Ammunition

 Bags Containing High value items
 Baggage of VVIP ’s
Any baggage which has weapon in it will be escorted in restricted area.

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नागर विमानन सुरक्षा ब्यूरो – भारत

BUREAU OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY – INDIA

AVIATION SECURITY BASIC COURSE

Trainee Reference Book-2022

This Restricted Document is

Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)

(Jaideep Prasad, IPS)

Module-1 Introduction to the Course

 To understand the course objective, structure and methodology

After completion of this course, the trainees will be able to:

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

 Respond to security incidents or airport emergencies.

Terminologies Related To AVSEC and Vital Installations at Airport

Terms that are defined in the I C A O A v i a t i o n S e c u r i t y M a n u a l (Doc

• forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical

Aerodrome Operator: A person, organization or enterprise responsible for operation and

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Behavior Detection Within an aviation security environment, the application of techniques

Bomb alert: A status of alert put in place by competent authorities to activate an

Bomb threat: A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers,

Cabin baggage: Baggage intended for carriage in the cabin of an aircraft.

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aircraft. Note: Stores (Supplies).

Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate

Crisis management: Contingency measures implemented in response to increased threat levels

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Explosive Detection System (EDS). A technology system or combination of different

Explosive Device Detection System (EDDS). A technology system or combination of different

Freight. See Cargo.

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Identification cards: See Permits.

Integrated/consolidated cargo. A consignment of multiple packages which has been originated

Mishandled baggage: Baggage involuntarily, or inadvertently, separated from passengers or

Off-airport processing facilities. A passenger or cargo transport link terminal at an urban

Sabotage: An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property,

areas or to conduct business after completion of a background check.

Security equipment: Devices of a specialized nature for use, individually or as part of a

Security inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant National Civil Aviation

Security programme. Written measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation

Security survey. An evaluation of security needs including the identification of vulnerabilities

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Sensitive Aviation Security Information. Information that, if accessed by or disclosed to

Small arms. A general description applied to all hand-held firearms.

Trace detection equipment. A technology system or combination of different technologies

Transfer passengers/baggage: Passengers/baggage making direct connections between two

Transit passengers/Baggage: Passengers/Baggage departing from an airport on the same flight as

Travel document: A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or

Unidentified/Unattended baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag,

Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures in order to increase their deterrent

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Vital installation. Any facility on or connected with an aerodrome, which, if damaged or

Vulnerable point: Any facility on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or

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1. AAI - Airports Authority of India

3. ACCR - Aerodrome Committee Control Room

4. ACI - Airport Council International

5. ADP – Airfield Driving Permit

7. ASC - Airport Security Committee