DRAFT

Environmental Endowment and Conflict: The Case Of Diamonds in the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC).

Paper prepared by Anna Stabrawa,

Division of Early Warning & Assessment,
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
while at the Watson Institute for International Studies,
Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
under the UN Sabbatical Leave Programme

9 February 2003

Rich natural resource endowment can be a curse rather than a blessing for a developing country,
resulting in corruption and conflict over their exploitation and the realization of benefits, the
underdevelopment of the country and considerable suffering for the people concerned. This
paper aims to examine the role of environmental endowment in the form of diamonds in the
continuing conflict and underdevelopment of the Democratic Republic Of Congo, within the
context of that country’s historical heritage and foreign intervention, and examine the solutions
currently proposed.

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 Environmental Endowment and Conflict: the Case of Diamonds in the Democratic
Republic of Congo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
1.1 The Nature of Diamond Production
1.2 The International Diamond Industry
1.3 Conflict or Blood Diamonds

2. Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

2.1 Conflict and Natural Resource Exploitation
2.2 Diamond Production in the Democratic Republic of Congo
2.3 Transit and End-user Issues

3. Towards a Solution
3.1 The Peace Process
3.2 Origins of the Conflict: Grievance or Greed?
3.3 Recommendations
3.4 Discussion

4. References

Appendices

1. Abbreviations
2. Chronology of Events in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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1. Introduction

Natural resources provide the basis not only for basic human needs and well-being but also for
economic and social development. The presence and orderly exploitation of economically
valuable resources such as minerals has provided the foundations for many countries to develop
(such as Australia, South Africa, USA and Botswana), but only if certain (pre-)conditions are
met such as well-developed political and commercial institutional infrastructure and systems,
political stability, democracy attractive international market prices and favorable trading
conditions.

The origin of the current woes of the war-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lie in its
bloody colonial past and its rich endowment of natural resources. As the private fifedom of
Leopold II of Belgium in the 19th century, years of terror broke down traditional communities
and created a long-lasting pattern of plunder which continued through the reign of President
Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997) to the present day. With the advent of the latest conflict in the
DRC, illegal exploitation of natural resources developed from mass-scale looting in the first 12
months of the conflict, into systematic and systemic exploitation (UN 2001). A country which
has the potential to be one of the wealthiest in Africa, is one of the poorest, ranking 152 on the
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2000) and 205th in the World Development Report (World
Bank, 2001)

1.1 The Nature of Diamond Production

Diamonds are either found in volcanic rock known as kimberlite, which requires mining and is
an expensive, capital-intensive operation, or in alluvial deposits when kimberlite disintegrates
and the diamonds are carried by river systems and deposited over wide areas including sea-beds.
About 74 percent of diamonds are mined from kimberlite formations (in Botwana, Australia,
South Africa, Namibia and Canada), where it is easy to control production under tight security.
The remaining 26 percent of global production comes from alluvial deposits, found mainly in
west and central Africa, Latin America and Asia. Alluvial diamond deposits are spread over
wide, frequently remote areas, often exploited by small-scale artisanal diggers using rudimentary
technologies. Such production conditions are extremely difficult to regulate, and therefore lead
to the problem of "conflict" or "blood" diamonds.

Diamonds are "..small pieces of carbon with no real intrinsic value" (Smillie et al. 2000). The
"value" stems from a historical rarity value combined with an intrinsic beauty, reinforced by a
cartel which regulated supply and price as supply increased, and perceived as a luxury product
associated with "love" through clever marketing.

Globally, production of diamonds has grown from about 300,000 carats in 1870 to 117 million
carats in 2001 (Diamond Registry 2002) although these figures may be underestimates due to
theft and smuggling. For example, as much as 85 percent of Sierra Leon’s diamond production
may have been stolen and smuggled in recent years (Smillie et al. 2000, pg 17). Top producers
of diamonds are Botswana (25,160,000 carats in 2001), Australia (23,800,000 carats in 2001)
and Russia (23,200,000 carats) (Diamond Registry, 2002). With about 18,200,000 carats in 2001,
or about 15 per cent of world production the DRC is the world's fourth largest producer of
diamonds.

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1.2 The International Diamond Industry

The international diamond trade has been described as “.secretive, iconoclastic, exploitative, and
…. still pretty medieval” (Smillie et al, 2000). For about 70 years, this industry was dominated
by one company, De Beers, which owns about 40 per cent of diamond mines, produces about 50
percent of the world's gem diamonds and controls most of the international diamond trade by
buying 70-80 percent of all diamonds produced. These diamonds are held as buffer-stocks to
stabilize global supply and more or less used to set the price of rough diamonds globally. The
company's Central Selling Organization (CSO), based in London, manages the buffer-stocks of
unpolished diamonds and manipulates both the global supply and demand for diamonds (Smillie
et al, 2000, Goreux, 2001).

The CSO purchases diamonds both from De Beers mines as well as from non-De Beers
producers, and sells the diamonds at ten annual “sights” (sales) to 160 “sightholders” designated
by the company. De Beers packages and prices a mixture of rough gem quality and industrial
diamonds into “parcels”, which the sightholders buy, sight unseen, and transport to other cities
for either cutting and polishing or for onward sale (Smillie et al, 2000).

However, De Beers' control of world supply and prices for unpolished diamonds and the
resulting price stability was costly and benefited other producers who operated outside of the De
Beers cartel. In recent years, De Beers has changed its business strategy, from one of aiming to
control world production and marketing of unpolished diamonds (horizontal integration) to one
of vertical integration from production in its kimberlite mines to transformation into jewelry and
marketing under the "De Beers" brand name, preferring to be known as "the Supplier of choice"
(Goreux, 2001).

Antwerp is the world center for rough diamonds and the principal market outside De Beers.
About 80 percent of rough diamonds and more than 50 percent of polished stones pass through
the city. Other major diamond centres are London, Lucerne, New York, Tel Aviv,
Johannesburg, Bombay and Dubai and stones often pass through more than one city before being
sold to a manufacturer (Goreux, 2001). The Diamond High Council (the Hoge Raad voor
Diamant (HRD)) is a non-profit organization and the official voice of the entire Belgian diamond
industry with the objective of strengthening Antwerp’s position as the world center for diamonds
(Smillie et al, 2000).

1.3 Conflict or Blood Diamonds

Conflict (or blood) diamonds, defined by the UN as stones mined in territories controlled by
rebels and used to finance conflict, were first seen in Angola in the early 1990s, followed by
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo later that decade. In the cases of Angola
and Sierra Leone, the UN Security Council imposed embargoes on imports of weapons into
those countries and on the export of diamonds, as well as the establishment of sanctions
committees (Goreux, 2001). No such sanctions have yet been imposed in the case of the
Democratic Republic of Congo.

The characteristics of alluvial diamonds make them highly desirable and ideal for rebel forces to
finance their activities and benefit financially. As already mentioned, the widespread nature of
deposits, often found in remote areas and exploited by poor unemployed artisanal producers
using basic equipment makes it difficult to regulate production. In addition, the small size but
high value of diamonds makes them very easy to transport and smuggle. Lastly, it extremely
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difficult to identify where diamonds originate from. These factors make it difficult to police the
trade in conflict diamonds.

A number of characteristics of the Belgian diamond industry facilitate the smuggling and illegal
marketing of diamonds such as conflict diamonds, and inhibit tracking their real source:

‰ Neither the Government of Belgium or the HRD have data estimating the quantity or
source of smuggled diamonds (i.e. those entering Belgium without being declared to
customs officials, and which are not licensed for import by the Ministry of Economic
Affairs and the HRD Diamond Office).
‰ Belgium has few active policies to control diamond smuggling.
‰ The HRD documents diamonds as originating from the last country of export, even if these
are non-diamond producing countries such as the UK.
‰ It is the HRD, the industry representative, which monitors diamond imports and exports for
the Belgian government.

Resulting anomalies due to these factors include substantial imports of diamonds documented as
originating from countries which have no diamond deposits such as Rwanda and Uganda, two
key players in the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict. Diamond exports from these two
countries have only occurred in the last few years, coinciding with their occupation of eastern
DRC (UN, 2001).

2. The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) has a complex and turbulent history. The
most recent conflict stems from 1994-95 when refugees from the civil conflict in neighboring
Rwanda spilled over into eastern Zaire. In 1996, fighting between the Zairian forces of Mobutu
Sese Seko and the rebel Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
(AFDL), led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and supported by Angola, Rwanda and Uganda, resulted
in the conquest of eastern Zaire. Laurent Kabila and the ADFL went on to consolidate power
over the whole of Zaire in 1997, Mobutu left the country for medical treatment, Kabila named
himself President and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Further conflict flared up in 1998 when Kabila tried to expel Rwandan troops that had remained
in the Democratic Republic of Congo after his victory. Rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda,
and some mutinous Congolese troops tried to overthrow the Kabila government, which was
supported by troops from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. At this time in 1998 the rebels took
control of much of the eastern Democratic Republic Of Congo. However in 1999, rifts emerged
between the rebels backed by Rwanda (the Rally for Congolese Democracy or RCD) and those
backed by Uganda (the Congolese Liberation Movement or MLC).

The six African countries involved in the war (Democratic Republic Of Congo, Angola,
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda) signed a ceasefire accord in 1999, followed by the
RCD and MLC. In 2000, the UN Security Council send a 5,500 strong UN force to monitor the
ceasefire (MONUC), but fighting continued between rebels and government forces as well as
between Rwandan and Ugandan forces. President Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his
bodyguard in January 2001, and succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila.

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In 2002, the government of Joseph Kabila signed peace deals with Rwanda, which agreed to pull
its troops out of eastern Democratic Republic Of Congo, and the Democratic Republic Of Congo
agreed to disarm and arrest Hutu gunmen involved in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. A peace
accord with Uganda was also signed, under which Ugandan troops would also pull out of DRC.
Local rebel groups took advantage of the vacuum left by the Rwandan and Ugandan troop pull-
out in eastern DRC. In December 2002 a peace deal was signed between the Kabila government
and main rebel groups, whereby rebels and members of the political opposition were given
portfolios in an interim government (see also Chronology of Key Historic events in Appendix 2).

2.1 Conflict and Natural Resource Exploitation

This most recent phase of illegal exploitation of natural resources by foreigners started in about
1996, when the AFDL conquered eastern and south-eastern Zaire, backed by Angolan, Rwandan
and Ugandan soldiers. Laurent Kabila signed contracts with foreign companies and "new
businessmen" appeared in the eastern DRC who spoke only English, Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili
(UN 2001).

In July 2000 the UN Security Council appointed a Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
Panel issued its first report in April 2001, and a second updated report in October 2002. In its
first report, the Panel found two phases of illegal exploitation of mineral and forest resources:
mass-scale looting of stockpiles in conquered territories, followed by the systematic and
systemic exploitation using existing systems of controls established by Rwanda and Uganda.
Key actors included top army commanders and businessmen as well as government structures.
The Panel also found a link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the
continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UN, 2001).

The first report of the Panel found evidence that at least 3 of the countries involved in the
occupation of Democratic Republic Of Congo (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) were profiting
from the illegal exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds (see Boxes 1, 3 and 4.). The
illegal exploitation of natural resources by Ugandans and Rwandans differ. Ugandans, mainly
top army commanders, have been implicated in exploiting resources of the Democratic Republic
of Congo using their hold over collaborators and officials in rebel movements, with the
knowledge of the political establishment in Kampala. In the case of Rwanda, there seems to be a
“pyramidal and integrated structure coupled with the strict discipline of the group” resulting in
“more systemic, efficient and organized” exploitation of resources in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. There also appear to be “bridges” between Rwandan and RCD rebel structures,
indicating Rwandan involvement in decision making (UN, 2001).

Illegal exploitation of wealth in the occupied regions of DRC has become total, with the
occupying forces creating monopolies and fixing prices for both locally produce and the supply
of imported consumer and other goods (see Box 1). Some rebels have also been implicated in
the production and introduction of counterfeit Congolese francs into the local economy,
collecting taxes, and use of child labour (UN, 2001)

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Box 1: Diamond exploitation in the Rwanda-controlled area

"The diamond market was the prize Rwanda fought Uganda to have for its own. After the last
clash in Kisangani in June 2000, RPA worked through the RCD-Goma administration to funnel
all the diamonds in Kisangani though the (RPA) Congo Desk control. The technique was to
oblige all local diamond traders to sell to one principal comptoir holding exclusive export
rights."

"The controversial "conflict" diamonds from Kisangani are marketed by criminal networks.
Proceeds from these sales are laundered by the purchase of large quantities of household goods
in Dubai - sugar, soap, cloth and medicines - which are then imported to the Democratic
Republic of Congo and offered to local sellers at attractive prices. The Rwandan wholesalers use
the profits in Congolese francs to buy dollars and, to close the trade circuit, to purchase
diamonds."

This way of laundering the revenues from diamond sales has had the effect of undermining and ruining
local manufacturing, driving previously flourishing enterprises out of businesses and bringing the local
Kisangani economy under Rwanda's control.

Source: UN 2002, page 17

In its second report, the Panel looked at the Democratic Republic of Congo in three parts based
on the actors and "elite-networks" involved in the continued exploitation of natural resources,
namely the Government-controlled area, the Rwanda-controlled area and the Uganda-controlled
area (see Box 2 for characteristics of these elite networks). The Panel found that the original
conflict had degenerated into "overlapping microconflicts" over natural resources and associated
revenues, which have "..built up a self-financing war economy centred on mineral exploitation."
(UN, 2002).

Box 1: Characteristics of the "Elite" Networks involved in illegal natural resource exploitation in
the DRC

1. "The networks consist of a small core of political and military elites and business persons and, in the
case of the occupied areas, selected rebel leaders and administrators. Some members occupy key
positions in their respective Government or rebel groups.
2. Members of these networks cooperate to generate revenue and, in the case of Rwanda, institutional
financial gain.
3. The elite networks ensure the viability of their economic activities through control over the military
and other security forces that they use to intimidate, threaten or carry out selected acts of violence.
4. The networks monopolize production, commerce and fiscal functions.
5. The elite networks maintain the façade of rebel administrations in the occupied areas to generate
public revenues that they then divert into the networks, thereby depleting the public treasury.
6. The elite networks derive financial benefit through a variety of criminal activities including theft,
embezzlement and diversion of "public" funds, undervaluation of goods and assets, smuggling, false
invoicing, non-payment of taxes, kickbacks to public officials and bribery.
7. The elite networks form business companies or joint ventures that are fronts through which members
of the networks carry on their respective commercial activities.
8. The elite networks draw support for their economic activities through the networks and "services"
(air transport, illegal arms dealing and transactions involving natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of Congo) of organized or transnational criminal groups."

Source: UN 2002, pages 6 and 7.

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The UN Panel identified a number of strategies used to generate revenues for the different elite
networks through illegal exploitation of natural resources such as diamonds:

1. Asset stripping of state mining companies

2. Control of procurement and accounting
3. Organized theft (See Box 3)
4. Using a corporate façade as a cover for criminal activities
5. Requisitioning funds from pubic enterprises such as utilities and parastatals.

Box 3: Organized theft of diamonds in the Government-controlled area

"The state-owned Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) diamond company has been plundered by a
management that condones widespread theft by company insiders. Three theft-rings operate in the MIBA
compound known as the polygone. The first of these rings was organized and operated by 48
Zimbabwean soldiers who had been stationed at five different locations throughout the large mining site.
Zimbabwean military personnel allow groups of people to enter the polygone and dig for diamonds, and
in exchange receive compensation in the form of money and diamonds.

A second theft ring is operated by the Brigade Minière or provincial mining police, who are trained to
guard the mine. Previously sacked for theft, Brigade Minière Commander …… has returned in force. In
exchange for protection, the Commander receives sacks of diamond-rich gravel. However, the diamond-
diggers are often caught in exchanges of fire between the Brigade Minière and the Zimbabweans in their
efforts to control the diamond thefts.

These losses are probably modest compared to the losses from a third theft ring that involves high-level
MIBA managers and occurs inside the cleaning, sorting and classification operation facility. The thefts
include gem and near-gem production. About 50 per cent of all company revenues are generated by the 3
to 4 per cent of gem or near-gem production. The drop in revenues resulting from theft has been
estimated at about 25 per cent of total revenue, roughly US$25 million per annum. Under pressure from
its creditors, MIBA was obliged to engage the services of ………. a private security firm, which
determined that a criminal syndicate was operating inside the classification operation."

Source: UN 2002, page 11

2.2 Diamond Production in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The importance of the diamond sector in the economy of the Democratic Republic of Congo
should not be underestimated, it contributed 70.9 percent of the value of exports in 1999, valued
at US$520 million and the principal source of the country’s revenue (Daito and Lumbi, 2001).
The value of diamond production in 1999 was estimated at US$725 million, with an average
price of US$33 per carat, half the world average per carat because of the high proportion of
lower value industrial diamonds (Goreux, 2001).

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Table 1: Diamond production in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1995-2001

Year Millions of Carats

1995 17.0
1996 20.6
1997 22.2
1998 15.0
1999 21.1
2000 17.3
2001 18.2

Source: 1995-1998 Smillie et al, 2000, 1999-2001 Diamond Registry, 2002.

Diamond production in the Democratic Republic Of Congo is centred on the Provinces of Kasï
Orientale and Kasï Occidental both in the south of the country (see Map). Most diamond mining
is in government-controlled territory, with the only industrial mine operated by Société Minière
de Bakwanga (MIBA1) and widespread artisanal mining in the Kasai region. In government-held
areas the purchase of raw diamonds was nationalized and foreigners banned from diamond
producing areas. The monopoly on the purchase of raw diamonds is handled by a joint-venture
company (Goreux, 2001). Outside the government-controlled area, diamonds are found in
Kisangani, under Rwanda-control and in Buta and Isiro under Ugandan-control (see Boxes 1 and
4).

It has been estimated that between 2.8 and 3 million people lived directly and indirectly from
diamonds in the DRC, and the diamond industry used to provide substantial social and
infrastructural services in the areas where it is based. For example, MIBA managed two
hospitals, and financed a number of social projects such as primary and secondary schools
around Mbuji-Mayi (Daito and Lumbi, 2001). However, the continuing conflict and diversion of
funds from government and state companies has resulted in the disappearance of the public
sector, collapse of services such as clean water provision, unpaid salaries to soldiers and the
government sector, which has precipitated a collapse in the urban economies of Mbuji Mayi,
Kananga and to a lesser extent Lubumbashi (UN, 2002).

Box 4: Diamond exploitation in the Uganda-controlled area

In the area controlled by Uganda, diamond-rich are areas are found around Buta and Isiro, controlled by
the RCD-Nationale rebel group. The elite network in this area controls all elements of the diamond trade,
from local buying houses, through army protection, tax exemption, export and connections in Antwerp
under the aegis of a front company. Some of the individuals concerned have been implicated in activities
such as counterfeit currency and money laundering as well as diamond smuggling.

UN, 2002.

1
Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA) is 80% owned by the Government and 20% by SIBEKA, an filiale of
Société Générale de Belgique, which is now a part of Groupe Indosuez (Daito et Lumbi, 2001)
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2.3 Transit and end-user issues

The transport and marketing of illegally exploited natural resources such as diamonds is key to
continuation of their exploitation (see Box 5). There are 11 African states through which such
resources could pass, four of which are directly involved in the conflict (Burundi, Rwanda,
Uganda and Zimbabwe). Of these 11 countries, none of the seven which responded to a request
for information from the Panel had procedures or plans to investigate commodities from the
DRC transiting through their countries to identify conflict goods (UN, 2002)

Box 5: Diamonds and transit trade issues

"Reliable sources have told the Panel that gem diamonds from Mbuji Mayi in the Democratic Republic of
Congo account for much of the phenomenal increase in diamonds transiting through Dubai in recent
years. Exports from the United Arab Emirates to Antwerp increased to US$149.5 million in 2001 from
US$4.2 million in 1998 according to the Diamond High Council's statistics. The Panel has been told of
chartered flights direct from Mbuji Mayi to Dubai, and other routes via Dar es Salaam, on which illicit
diamond exports have been carried. Likewise, Dubai has become a transit point for coltan from the
Uganda-controlled area and a portion of diamonds originating from Kisangani in the Rwanda-controlled
area."

Source: UN 2002, page 26

Efforts at the marketing and consumer end of the commercial chain are key to controlling the
continuing exploitation of conflict resources from the DRC, and ending the conflict. While there
is concern in end-user countries that measures to do this must not interfere with legitimate trade
in primary products or impose excessive burdens on those countries, there are a number of
initiatives which should contribute towards halting or reducing such exploitation.

The Kimberly Process is an industry scheme to certify diamonds as "conflict-free" which entered
into force on 1 January 2003. Producer-countries such as the DRC will issue the certificates, but
the effectiveness of the scheme depends on all producer countries being members, and
independent monitoring of the conflict-free certificates, which is not currently part of the
scheme. Without proper policing of the new scheme, such certificates could become part of the
problem in a country such as the DRC with no proper government control, and the smuggling
and conflict would continue.

Other measures which exists in relation to business activities in some countries are the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the European Commission's Green Paper on Social
Responsibility and the United Nations Global Compact. Regional and intergovernmental
organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African
Union (AU), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the World Customs Organization and
the World Trade Organization might also have a role to play in transit and end-user matters.

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3. Towards a Solution

3.1 The Peace Process

A number of initiatives occurred in 2002 aimed at bringing peace to the Democratic Republic Of
Congo. In April the Kinshasa government signed a power-sharing deal with the Ugandan-backed
MLC rebels, under which the MLC leader Jean Pierre Bemba would be premier, but this deal
was rejected by the Rwandan-backed RCD rebels. President Kabila then signed peace deals with
the Presidents of Rwanda in July and Uganda in September, under which the two countries
agreed to withdraw their troops from the eastern Democratic Republic Of Congo. In September-
October these two countries said their troops had been withdrawn, but local militias took
advantage and filled the vacuum left by the departed Rwandan and Ugandan troops. UN-
sponsored talks began in South Africa on a power-sharing plan between the Kinshasa
government and the two main rebel groups (RCD and MLD). In December 2002, a peace deal
was signed in Pretoria, South Africa between the Kinshasa government and the main rebel
groups, under which rebels and members of the political opposition were given portfolios in an
interim government. There have however been outbreaks of fighting in early 2003.

3.2 Origins of the Conflict: Grievance or Greed?

Any lating solution to the civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo fuelled by the
illegal exploitation of diamonds and other natural resources must address the real causes of the
civil conflict itself. Therefore whether the conflict is based on real grievances or on greed
fueling the exploitation of natural resources, which in turn continues the conflict, is key to any
solution (see Box 6).

Box 6: Causes of Conflict: Grievance or Greed?

Civil conflict was far more common than international conflict in the second half of the 20th century. Political
science tends to explain conflict in terms of motive or grievance based resentments, hatred or inequalities, which
form the basis for such conflicts, whereas economic theory tends to regard conflict as an industry which generates
profits, in other words in terms of greed or opportunity to exploit economically valuable natural resources .

Recent quantitative research tried to explain the causes of recent civil conflicts by examining 78 civil conflicts over
the period 1960-99, and a number of explanatory variables associated with grievance and greed. This work suggests
that grievance has much less to do with most civil wars, rather it is the greed factor which is most strongly correlated
for a number of reasons. Whereas many rebels often portray themselves as fighting against genuine grievances,
contrary to popular perception, this economic analysis portrays them as more analogous to organized crime, banditry
or piracy, “Rebellion is large-scale predation of productive economic activities.”

In many ways the economic theory of conflict argues that the real motivation for conflict (grievance, greed or lust
for power) is not important, without the possibility to sustain that conflict. This study also argues that it is not
possible to tell the real motivation for rebellion from rebel discourse, and sometimes such discourse is contrary to
the rebels behavior, for example when rebel demands are met but they are not satisfied and make more demands.

The study identified the following risk factors as being associated with civil conflict include:
1. The export of primary commodities contributing a substantial share of GDP, with 26% primary commodity
dependence being the most dangerous level.
2. Geographical characteristics – a highly geographically dispersed population is harder for the government to
govern. The Democratic Republic of Congo, with 52 million people (22.5 persons per sq. km.) has a 50% risk
of conflict due to geographical characteristics alone.
3. Historical characteristics – the most important of these include a recent civil war, and the size of a country’s
diaspora. There is a 40% chance of further conflict immediately after the end of hostilities, which decreases by
about 1% for each year of peace. A large diaspora overseas also appears to increase the chance of conflict

12
 reoccurring and being sustained.
4. Economic opportunities, or lack of them, are associated with civil conflict, with key variables such as lack of
education, fast population growth and economic decline.
5. Ethnic and religious composition. The risk factor doubles where any one ethnic group constitutes between 45%
and 90% of the population, whereas ethnic and religious diversity appears to make a country safer.

Factors such as inequality of incomes or assets, or a lack of democratic rights were not found to affect the risk of
conflict. With the exception of ethnic dominance by one group over another, societies with diverse ethnic and
religious beliefs appear to be more stable and safer than homogenous societies, possibly because diversity makes
rebellion more difficult.

Collier argues that conflict is not caused by divisions, but rather it actively needs to create them, and “…that where
rebellions happen to be financially viable, wars will occur. As part of the process of war, the rebel organization
must generate group grievance for military effectiveness. The generation of group grievance politicizes the war.
Thus, the war produces the intense political conflict, not the intense political conflict the war.”. For example the
Democratic Republic Of Congo is a highly ethnically diverse society, but President Laurent Kabila used one
common characteristic, that they were all Bantu, to forge diverse ethnic groups into a common fighting group
against the Tutsis, who are not Bantu, manufacturing both the grievance and the group (Collier, 2000).

This statement and some of the findings of this work is supported by a study linking the civil war in Sierra Leone
with diamond exploitation “The point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in profitable
crime under the cover of warfare.” (Smillie et al, 2000).

These findings have important implications because of the environmental or natural resource dimension of many
conflict situations, in terms finding solutions to the real cause of the conflict.

Source: Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler, 2001.

3.3 Recommedations

In its second report, the Panel of Experts made a very comprehensive set of recommendations to
address and end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other neighboring Great
Lakes countries, covering immediate assistance (peace dividend), institutional reforms and
financial and technical measures to be considered in the case of non compliance (see Table 2).

Table 2: Recommendations for the DRC by the UN Panel of Experts

Broad Area Initiative Objective

Peace Quick-disbursement of aid for the DRC and To create jobs, rebuild
Dividend other Great Lakes countries involved in the infrastructure and improve
(initiatives for conflict, for reconstruction and rehabilitation conditions for the local
reconstruction population in areas such as
and sustainable education, health, water and
development) sanitation.
Regional economic integration and trade To reorient the regional trading
through a multilateral framework agreement system to post-conflict
imperatives, promote regional
economic integration, marginalize
criminal and military-driven trade
in favour of legitimate
commercial development that is
transparent and growth-oriented

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Institutional Capacity-building for State institutions to To enable a legitimate transitional
Reforms retrain and professionalize the entire national government to control the
security apparatus, including military and country's borders and natural
intellignece, law enforcement and regulatory resources without foreign
bodies such as customs, revenue authority, intervention
immigration and natural resources agencies.
Promoting legitimate and accountable civil Transition to a legitimate civilian
administrations in the eastern DRC through a administration capable of
comprehensive economic and social development providing security and law-
programme enforcement.
Good governance in the DRC and its To ensure that the Kinshasa
compliance with peace agreements linked to government adheres to the peace
disbursement of development assistance. agreement signed with Rwanda
and Uganda, as well as its
commitments to democratization
and to curbing the illegal
exploitation of its natural
resources.
Reform of natural resource sectors (mining and To establish the validity of
forestry) including review of all concessions and economic and financial
contracts signed during both wars. agreements.
For the rehabilitation of the
mining and forestry sectors and
sustainable revenue generation.
Financial and Governments of the countries where individuals, To investigate and prosecute
technical companies and financial institutions involved in illegal traffickers.
measures (in illegal activities are based have the power to
case of non- regulate and sanction through national legislation.
compliance Reducing Official Development Assistance. To promote peace and good
with Aid disbursements to Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda governance
agreements and Zimbabwe could be made conditional on their
and compliance with the peace process and
continuation of verification of measures taken to halt illegal and
illicit and illicit exploitation of resources.
illegal Restrictions on business enterprises and To stop these enterprises or
exploitation of individuals through travel bans, freezing of individuals from contributing
natural personal assets, barring companies or individuals revenues to the elite networks,
resources) accessing banking facilities, funding or engaging and thereby contributing to the
in commercial activities. ongoing conflict and human
rights abuses.
Adherence of businesses to the OECD To reduce demand for conflict
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises goods and promote socially
responsible business practices.
Regional organizations have many important To promote post-conflict peace-
roles to play such as regional integration through building and co-operation.
the East African Community, re-establishing
historical and legal trading patterns, improving
customs and trade monitoring mechanisms, and
improving air-traffic control mechanisms in the
Great Lakes region.

14
 Monitoring commodity trade from conflict areas The resulting data could be the
could be done using specialized industry basis of policing trade in
organizations such as the Tantalum Niobium commodities from conflict areas.
International Study Centre, the International
Coffee Federation, and the International Gold
Council together with UNCTAD.
Implementing the Kimberly Process, agreed to Aims to certify diamonds as
by the main diamond producing and consuming "conflict-free" by the producing-
countries, requires universal participation and country government.
internal controls from extraction to exportation to
be effective.
Protecting timber and forestry products To halt illegal logging and certify
through the work of intergovernmental and non- timber as "conflict-free".
governmental organizations at regional and
international levels.
Halting trade in endangered species by To control and ultimately
supporting implementation of the Lusaka eliminate loss of biodiversity.
Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement
Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild
Fauna and Flora.
Monitoring A Monitoring Process should be established. To monitor progress in
implementing all the
recommendations made, and
halting illegal and illicit activities,
including non-compliance, as
well as the humanitarian impacts.

3.4 Discussion

This paper has attempted to a brief but comprehensive overview of the complex conflict situation
in the DRC, without being able to go into great detail. What seems clear is that, regardless of the
origins of the conflict in this country, its continuation is based on greed fuelled by the
opportunity to illegally exploit the country's vast natural resource endowment, resulting in
immense human suffering of the local population. The numerous parties involved, have evolved
from crude looting to sophisticated, multi-faceted and deeply entrenched networks of
exploitation and control over the resources and the associated populations.

A peace agreement is in place, and although the scale of conflict has declined since the
withdrawal of foreign troops in 2002, there are still many rebel militias and signs that this fragile
peace may not hold. In addition, the peace deal does not address some of the key economic
issues behind the conflict, and has no timetable for demobilization of armed groups and their
integration into the army and police force; key pre-requisites for ending the armed conflict.

A comprehensive package of recommendations has been made to re-establish government

authority and control over the country and its endowment of valuable natural resources for the
benefit of the population of the DRC, but little or no progress has been made in implementation.
Any solution to the conflict must be comprehensive and all-embracing, involving the agreement
and participation of all the parties involved both within the country, the Great Lakes sub-region
and all neighboring countries involved in some way. But the solution also needs to actively
target the commercial aspects of the conflict, which work to sustain it. This means along the
whole chain from producer to consumer.
15
In the case of diamonds the Kimberly Process of certification has been launched to certify
diamonds as "conflict-free". However, this scheme has its flaws and will only succeed if it has
universal membership by producers, and an independent monitoring programme. Without these
two elements, it is open to abuse, particularly where there is a lack of governance and oversight.
In addition, the international diamond industry itself lacks transparency in the way it operates,
which facilitates the illegal marketing of conflict diamonds. It is too early pass judgement on the
Kimberly Process, but without addressing the highlighted shortcomings in the process as well as
reform and greater transparency within the international diamond industry it is less likely to
succeed.

One area that has not been addressed in the search for a solution to the situation in the DRC is
that of the use of traditional structures and institutions in relation to the restoration of governance
and the management of local resources. Although it seems that such traditional structures were
badly affected by the waves of violence and exploitation associated with the DRC's historical
past, once sustained peace is achieved this area should be explored further to encourage
sustainable exploitation of resources by and for the local population.

16
4. References

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, 2001. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Research Paper
dated 21 October 2001 from The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence project. World
Bank. Viewed on 14 April 2002, available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm

Collier, Paul, 2000. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy. Paper
dated 15 June 2000 from The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence project. World
Bank. Viewed on 14 April 2002, available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.htm

Daito, Amuri Tobakombee and Pierre Lumbi, 2001. La Gestion des Ressources Minières en
RDC. 1. Le Diamant. Observatoire Gouvernance-Transparance (O.G.T.), Kinshasa, RDC.
Mars, 2001.

Goreux, Louis 2001. Conflict Diamonds. Arica Region Working Paper Series Number 13.
March 2001. The World Bank, Washington, USA.

Smillie, Ian, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Haleton, 2000. The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone,
Diamonds and Human Security. Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000. Viewed on 24 April
2002, available on: http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org/hsdp/index.html

UN, 2001. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. United Nations Security Council.
S/2001/357. 12 April 2001. United Nations, New York.

UN, 2002. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo. United Nations Security
Council. S/2002/1146. 16 October 2002. United Nations, New York.

UNDP, 2000. Human Development Report 2000. United Nations Development Programme,
New York, USA

World Bank, 2001. World Development Report 2001. World Bank, Wahshington, USA.

17
 Appendix 1

Abbreviations

AFDL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, led by Laurent-
Désiré Kabila

AU African Union

CSO Central Selling Organisation

HRD The Diamond High Council (the Hoge Raad voor Diamant)

MIBA Société Minière de Bakwanga

MLC Congolese Liberation Movement, headed by Jean-Pierre Bemba.

MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

RCD Rassamblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally of Congolese Democracy)

RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army

SADC Southern African Development Community

UPDF Ugandan People's Defence Forces

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

18
 Appendix 2

Chronology of Key Historic events in the Democratic Republic Of Congo2

19th century King Leopold II of Belgium colonises the Congo basin in the 1870s. European
powers recognise Leopols's claim to this area at the Conference of Berlin (1884-
85). Belgians conquer Katanga (1881-82) and then Eastern Congo (1892-94)

1960 Belgian Congo granted independence from Belgium, Patrice Lumumba is elected
Prime Minister, and Joseph Kasavumbu President of the renamed Democratic
Republic of Congo

1965 Lieutenant General Mobutu, Commander in Chief of the Army, seized power and
declared himself President

1970 President Mobutu Sese Seko renamed the Democratic Republic Of Congo the
Republic of Zaire

1994-95 Refugee crisis due to war in neighbouring Rwanda changed sub-regional

population dynamics and created a security situation along the border between
Zaire and Rwanda

1996 Tensions from neighboring Rwanda spilled over to eastern Zaire. War between
Zairian forces and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Congo-Zaire (AFDL), led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and supported by Angola,
Rwanda and Uganda, resulted in the conquest of eastern Zaire.

1996 Illegal exploitation of resources by foreigners aided by the Congolese army began
with the first “war of liberation” as the AFDL conquered eastern and south-
eastern Zaire, backed by Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers.

May 1997 Peace talks between Mobutu and Kabila failed, Mobutu left the country and
Laurent Désiré Kabila named himself President, consolidating power around
himself and the AFDL. Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Aug. 1998 President Kabila tried to expel Rwandan troops that had remained in the
Democratic Republic Of Congo after his victory. Fighting broke out between the
Congolese army and Rwandan and Ugandan troops, in northern, western and
eastern parts of the Democratic Republic Of Congo. Congolese were assisted by
Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean, Sudanese and Chadian troops CHECK.
The Congolese army mutinied, and the mutiny in Kivu Province turned into a
drive to overthrow the government. Opposing the Kabila government were the
Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), Rwanda and Uganda, while the
Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) emerged later. Defending the
Kabila government were the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR)/Interahamwe
militia, Angola, Namibia, Chad, Zimbabwe and the Congolese army (FAC).

2
Compiled from UN Report, Background Notes: DRC, US Department of State, January 2000, and BBC 2002..
19
January 2001 President Laurent Désiré Kabila was assassinated, and his son Joseph Kabila
became President.

April 2002 Talks aimed at bringing an end to the Democratic Republic Of Congo’s 4 year old
war fail, apparently blocked by the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese
Democracy (RCD-Goma)

July 2002 Peace accord signed between Presidents of DRC and Rwanda, Rwandan troops to
leave DRC, and DRC agrees to disarm and arrest Rwandan Hutu gunmen
implicated in the 1994 genocide.

Sept. 2002 Peace accord signed between Presidents of DRC and Uganda, and Ugandan
troops to leave DRC.

Sept/Oct Ugandan and Rwandan forces withdraw from eastern DRC.

2002

Dec. 2002 Peace deal signed in Pretoria, South Africa, between the government in Kinshasa
and the main rebel groups (RCD and MLC). Rebels and members of the political
opposition are given portfolios in an interim government.

20