Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University

MES Insights • Volume 9, Issue 1 February 2018

MES Notes

Israel’s Cognitive War This issue of Insights carries an

abrigded version of guest lectures
by Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Shlomo Brom Brig. Gen. (Ret) Shlomo Brom
presented on information operations
and the information environment for
Wars among states are becoming a rare the faculty, students, and staff at the
phenomenon all over the world in general and in the Marine Corps University in January
Middle East in particular. In the case of Israel, the 2018.
common engagement in violent conflicts is no longer
with other states, but rather with non-state or hybrid Information about MES events and
actors1 in an asymmetrical war. The objective of such publications is available on the MES
military encounters is not to achieve a classical website at: www.usmcu.edu/mes, or
military victory that will cause the surrender of the you can contact Adam Seitz at (703)
enemy or encourage the enemy to adopt a peaceful 432-5260 or adam.seitz@usmcu.edu.
settlement that will annul the causes of the conflict.
On one hand, the non-state adversaries, who are
weaker militarily, do not intend to achieve a classical
military victory. Instead, they pursue their political Also in this Issue
goals through terror and guerilla warfare that target
civilians with the purpose of using the people directly “MES Hosts Visitng Israeli
or indirectly to influence Israel’s policy makers. Scholar”........................................Pg. 4
On the other hand, Israel’s non-state adversaries,
who are ideologically motivated and in many cases
guided by radical Islamic ideologies, will not
surrender, and when they are defeated in direct MES at MCU Disclaimer
military encounters, they melt away and find refuge
in the supportive population. This allows them to shift The opinions and conclusions
to more clandestine terror activities and organize as expressed herein are those of the
a potent military force. Therefore, the purpose of the individual author and do not
Israeli military campaign—in addition to minimizing necessarily represent the views of
damage to its civilian population and armed forces either the Marine Corps University
and curbing their adversaries’ capabilities to cause or any other governmental agency.
future damage—is to influence the non-state actors’ Any references to this newsletter
perceptions and policies in a way that will make them should include the foregoing
limit their violent actions against Israel and eventually statement.
consider more peaceful ways to achieve their political
goals. In the last two decades, Israel was actually
quite successful in achieving these objectives. There were substantial periods of
practical cease fire between Israel and its bitterest non-state enemies, and there are
indications that some of them are considering less violent ways of engaging Israel.

1
A hybrid actor is a non-state actor that has some attributes of a state, e.g., state-like military capabilities
and control over territories.

Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes
 Both sides in these conflicts are interested in MES Notes (Cont.)
shaping the perceptions not only of their adversaries
but also of those in their domestic and regional 20 December 2017
environments and beyond, acknowledging that these Adam Seitz published “The Tribal-
perceptions will affect the attitudes of the different Military-Commercial Complex and
societies, policy makers, and political groups in these Challenges to Security Sector Reform
environments. At the end of an encounter, the in Yemen” in Addressing Security
general perception of which side was victorious and Sector Reform in Yemen, edited by
which was defeated is sometimes more important Marie-Christine Heinze (CARPO).
than the actual military results of the campaign.
4 January - 5 February 2018
Modern military thought recognizes that the Amin Tarzi taught the Marine Corps
objective of military operations is not only to inflict University (MCU) Command and Staff
direct material damage on the other party but also to College (CSC) elective “The State of
Israel in Context, 1948-2018”.
shape the adversary’s thinking in a way that will serve
one’s campaign goals. Complementing the kinetic 5 January 2018
effects with information operations is also not new; Amin Tarzi presented a lecture on
this strategy has been used since Biblical times. What Iranian Maritime Capabilites to the MCU
has changed in recent decades is the scope and Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS).
means of such operations, first because of the
evolution of the classical traditional media from print 16 January 2018
to radio and then to television, and then because of Amin Tarzi co-taught a class entitled
the information revolution that has allowed “Isreal’s Security and the Balance of
individuals to serve also as media channels by using Power in the Middle East” at the Marine
YouTube, chats, and other social media tools to Corps War College (MCWAR).
communicate to a global audience.
24 January 2018
Consequently, Israel is developing a theory, Amin Tarzi presented a lecture on Iran
doctrine, and practice of cognitive war, a form of to the Senior Enlisted Professional
warfare that combines kinetic operations aimed at Military Education (SEPME) course.
influencing the other side’s thinking with information
dominance and information operations aimed at 31 January - 1 February 2018
achieving realistic limited objectives in an asymmetric, Adam Seitz presented lectures on
limited conflict. The most important soft power Yemen at MCWAR.
elements in cognitive warfare are economic steps
aimed at decreasing the pressure for use of violence 5 February 2018
and diminishing the supportive constituency of the MES hosted General Robert Magnus
(USMC, Ret) as a guest lecturer for Dr.
adversary. Tarzi’s CSC elective “The State of Israel
in Context, 1948-2018”.
Israel’s engagement with the Gaza Strip can
serve as a good example of Israel’s engagement in 20 February 2018
cognitive war. The Gaza Strip is ruled and tightly Amin Tarzi taught a class entitled
controlled by the Hamas Movement, which is a “Islamic State - Present and Future
classical hybrid actor. It is a violent political movement Challenges” at MCWAR.
using terror and guerilla warfare in the fight against
Israel, but it also serves as the government of the 21 February 2018
Gaza Strip. It operates against the Israeli population MES hosted Dr. Steven Cook, Council
from Gaza population centers, enjoying their on Foreign Relations, for a lecture
coverage for disguise and protection. entitled “Sinai, Sisi, and Extremism:
Local and Regional Dynamics,” as part
The Israeli campaign against Hamas in the Gaza of the MES AY18 Lecture Series.
Strip has four target audiences: Hamas, the
Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli public, 26 February 2018
and the regional and international community. Israel Adam Seitz presented a lecture entitled
uses threats of retaliation to deter Hamas from “The Houthi Rebellion and The Yemen
attacking. The message to Hamas is that, if it attacks Quagmire” at the Daniel Morgan
Graduate School, Washington DC.

Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes
Israel, it will fail in causing any real damage and will pay a very high price. On the other
hand, if Hamas stops its attacks, Israel would accept Hamas’ de-facto rule of the Gaza
Strip and help provide necessary services to the population by allowing flow of goods,
electricity supply, and water as well as medical assistance, enabling normal life for Gazan
citizens. That message is communicated using information operations, to include public
statements made by senior political and security personalities and messages delivered
by third parties. These statements are reinforced by kinetic means such as missile and
rocket defense, destruction of tunnels that Hamas has built to penetrate Israel, and
retaliation for every attack coming from Gaza.
Influencing public opinion in the Gaza Strip is considered an indirect way of shaping
policy makers’ decisions. In this case, Israel is influencing public opinion by directly
accessing the Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza through telephone calls (based on an
accurate list of all phone numbers in the Strip), internet chats, and social networks to
deliver a clear and consistent message: Hamas is making your life miserable when it
allows attacks on Israel, and Israel is willing to make your life better if the attacks stop.
These kinds of cognitive operations are also needed to prevent the adversary’s
cognitive war against Israel from being successful, and, therefore, it is also necessary to
address the Israeli public. The message to the Israelis is that the state and the armed
forces are doing all they can and are going to extremes to ensure Israelis’ security and
prevent interference in their lives; however, it is impossible to guarantee 100% security.
That message is delivered through kinetic operations (e.g., successful interceptions of
rockets by rocket defense systems, destruction of offensive tunnels around Israel’s
border, and punishing retaliatory attacks) and through statements made by political and
military leaders, government spokesmen, and the media.
The last target audience is the regional and international community. Here the
message is that Hamas is not serving the interests of the Palestinians. Instead, it is using
innocent Palestinians to protect terrorists who attack innocent Israelis, threatening life and
property of both Palestinians and Israelis. Israel cannot allow terrorist attacks against its
citizens and is reacting accordingly, doing the utmost to distinguish between the terrorists
and the innocent civilians and to minimize collateral damage. Once again this message is
delivered through actual actions in the material realm and through verbal messages that
are released via diplomatic channels, public statements, the media, and social networks.
There are two major keys for the successful delivery of Israel’s message. First of all,
the messages to the different audiences should be consistent. In the current open and
transparent world, delivering a message to one audience while delivering a contradictory
message to another is a grave mistake that will backfire. Second, there is a need for
synchronization between actions in the material world and operations in the information
world, namely synchronization between what Israel says and does. When these two
principles are followed, there is a good chance of success in shaping perceptions and
affecting decisions of foes and friends.

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Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes
MES Hosts Visiting Israeli Scholar
Middle East Studies (MES) hosted retired Israel Defense Forces Brigadier General
Shlomo Brom, currently a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security
Studies in Tel Aviv, from 16 through 19 January 2018. Brig. Gen. Brom’s visit was
sponsored by the Israel Institute. During his four days at the Marine Corps University
(MCU), Brig. Gen. Brom addressed five different educational forums at MCU. He co-taught
the Marine Corps War College’s course, “Israel Security and the Balance of Power in the
Middle East Class,” with Dr. Amin Tarzi and guest lectured for Dr. Tarzi’s Command and
Staff (CSC) elective, “The State of Israel in Context, 1948-2018,” and the CSC elective,
“Modern Political Warfare: Cyber and Information Operations,” speaking on Information
Operations in the Lebanon War. He also led a roundtable discussion with MCU’s
Commanding General and invited guests on “The 2006 Lebanon War–Information
Operations/Information Environment in a War with a Hybrid Adversary” and presented the
lecture, “Israel—Retaining an Island of Stability in Stormy Water” as part of the MES
Academic Year 2018 Lecture Series, “Navigating Geopolitical Competition and Internal
Wars in the Middle East and North Africa.”
As the United States and its allies continue to advance their strategic interests and
develop partnerships to effectively confront the multifaceted challenges posed by
revisionist powers (e.g., Russia), rogue regimes (e.g., Iran), and non-state actors, it is
imperative for policymakers, military planners, and practitioners to understand the
challenges our allies face when confronting these adversaries. Given the Marine Corps’
mission set and ongoing deployments to the region, it makes sense for Marine Corps
University to lead this research agenda and to provide opportunities that enhance
professional military education (PME), both in and beyond the classroom. Hosting a
visiting professor from Israel with strong practical information operations experience in
Israel’s complex security environment provided such an opportunity to inject further
innovation in, and further enhance, the overall PME programs at MCU.

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Brigadier General (ret.) Shlomo Brom, a senior research associate at the Institute
for National Security Studies, joined the Jaffee Center in 1998 after a long career in the
Israel Defense Forces (IDF). His most senior post in the IDF was director of the Strategic
Planning Division in the Planning Branch of the General Staff. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom
participated in peace negotiations with the Palestinians, Jordan, and Syria, and in Middle
Eastern regional security talks during the 1990s. He continued to be involved in Track 2
dialogues on these subjects after his retirement from the IDF. In 2000 he was named
deputy to the National Security Advisor, returning to JCSS at the end of his post. In 2005-
2006, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom was a member of the Meridor committee established by the
Minister of Defense to reexamine the security strategy and doctrine of the State of Israel.
His primary areas of research are Israeli-Palestinian relations and national security
doctrine. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom authored Israel and South Lebanon: In the Absence of a
Peace Treaty with Syria, and edited The Middle East Military Balance 1999-2000 and The
Middle East Military Balance 2001-2002. He is the editor of In the Aftermath of Operation
Pillar of Defense: The Gaza Strip, November 2012, co-editor (with Meir Elran) of The
Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives and (with Anat Kurz) the Strategic Survey
for Israel series.

Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University

Dr. Amin Tarzi • Director, MES • amin.tarzi@usmcu.edu
Mr. Adam C. Seitz • Senior Research Associate, MES • adam.seitz@usmcu.edu