Pakistan—India Relations

Irfan Waheed Usmani

Outline
•(1)Introduction
•(2)Historicizing Pakistan--India Relations: 1947—2019
•(3) The Present Phase of Relationship: The Course of Relations after Neerendra Modi’s re-election e Present
Phase of Relationship: The Course of Relations During Neerendra Modi’s re-election The Present Phase of
Relationship: The Course of Relations During Neerendra Modi’s re-election
•(3) The Irritants in Pakistan--India Relations
• (4) The Future Prognosis
•(5) The suggestions to improve the Relations
 (1)Introduction

• )Introduction

▪THE SURFACING OF NEW KINDS OF

TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
▪N.MODI’S RE COUNTRIES HAVE LED TO THE FURTHER
ELECTION TO THE DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS THE
▪THE OVERALL OFFICE OF PRIME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
COMMENTARY ON ▪THE EFFORTS OF PAKISTAN’S MINISTER IN THE ▪ EVEN THE ERUPTION/ UNFOLDING OF
THE TRAJECTORY GOVERNMENTS TO DEFUSE LOK SABHA POLLS IN THE COVID19 CRISIS THAT CONTINUES TO
OF INDIA TENSIONS AND THE MAY 2019 FURTHER THREATEN THE ENTIRE REGION OF
PAKISTANS UNCOMPROMISING/HAWKISH ENCOURAGED HIM SOUTH ASIA AND DEMAND JOINT AND COMMENTS ON
RELATIONS SINCE STANCE OF THE INDIAN TO TAKE HAWKISH CONCERTED EFFORTS COULD NOT THE FUTURE
N.MODI’S COMING GOVERNMENT: THE SPECIFIC STANCE →THE SOFTEN THE STANCE OF THE INDIAN TRAJECTORY OF
INTO POWER. EXAMPLES SPECIFIC EXAMPLES GOVERNMENT.   RELATIONS
General to general Specific to general
Then you have to add the other dimensions
(2)Historicizing Pakistan--India Relations

•(I) The Period of Hostility and War (1947—48)

•(II) The phase of Hawkish/Hard line Attitudes (1949—1959)
•(III) Slight/Marginal Improvement in relations in mid of Tensions (1960—63)
•(IV) The Drift towards another War (1963—65)
•(V) A very Brief period of Thaw (1966): The Tashkent Agreement and after
•(VI) The Phase of Rocky/ Stormy/ Strained Relationship (1966—71)
•(VII) The Signs of Improvement in the mid of new Change in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1972—1979)
•(VIII) Another Phase of Rocky/ Stormy Relationship in the mid of Afghan Crisis (1979—1988)
(2)Historicizing Pakistan--India Relations
•(IX) The Relations haunted by the spectre of Kashmir Conflict (1989—1992)
•(X) The phase of Oscillating /Uneasy relationship (1993—1999)
•(XI)The Kargil War/Episode and the Sharp Dip in Pakistan –India Relations (1999—2003)
•(XII) The Phase of Improvement/Harmonious Relations (2004—2007)
•(XIII) The Bombay Mayhem and its aftermath: The Sharp deterioration in Relations
(2008—2010)
•(XIV)The Relations Show Signs of Improvement (2011—2014)
• (XV) The Relations since Neerendra Modi’s assumption of power/ coming into Power:
2014 till the Present
(I) The Period
of Hostility and ▪context →How ▪examples ▪India’s bid to
War (1947— India reacted to ▪India Pakistan annex Kashmir
disputes: ▪Tribal invasion:
48) the creation of
Pakistan:
▪partition riots (October 1947)…
▪ delay in ▪ The First
construed it as a
distribution of Kashmir war
conspiracy/
assets (May 48—Jan
conspirational ▪ Pushunistan 1949)
creation… Issue ▪The inter
What did it try to ▪water dispute dominions canal
do? To undo water dispute
partition…. (brief
hints on next
column)
(II) The phase of Hawkish/Hard line Attitudes (1949—
1959)

The Disputes that continued to The Efforts the two countries International arbitration of
haunt/ embitter the relations made to diffuse tensions Kashmir
Kashmir: Liaqat Nehru Pact 1950 UN missions
Refugees: Resumption of trade The efforts made by British
Water: Commonwealth
The UN resolutions
   
 (III)
Slight/Marginal
Improvement in ▪THE SIGNING OF ▪BHUTTO--SWARAN SINGH
relations in mid of INDUS BASIN TALKS
TREATY(1960) ▪THE GESTURES OF INDIAN
Tensions (1960—
GOVERNMENT
63)
(IV) The Drift
towards another
War (1964—
65) The The The India—Pak
situation Skirmishes Operation War
in Kashmir in Runn of Gibraltar: (September
/ The Kutch (July— 1965)
flaring up (1964) August)
of crisis in
Kashmir
Hazrat Bal
The Skirmishes in
Runn of Kutch The Rann of Kutch was first known to the
world when a dispute over the boundary arose
(1964) between Pakistan and India which led to
serious skirmish between the two neighbors.
Consequently, on British intervention, a
ceasefire was declared and an agreement was
singed on June 30, 1965.
Then the forces were withdrawn and the matter was laid before the three-
man tribunal appointed by the International Court of Justice (IJC) for
arbitration.
The international tribunal pronounced its verdict in 1968 delineating the
marshes Salt-marsh area that forms two shallow lakes (the Great Rann and
the Little Rann) in the wet season and is a salt-covered desert in the dry.
The tribunal awarded 90 per cent of the Rann of Kutch to India and 10 per
cent (about 800sq km) to Pakistan, the latter comprising almost all the
elevated area above water the year round.

he decision was accepted by both the parties, thus the territorial issue
was finally settled.
(V) A very Brief period of Thaw (1966): The
Tashkent Agreement and after
• Say few words on Tashkent Declaration
• The signing of Tashkent Declaration: January 1966
• Its underlying motives:
• Brief introduction
(VI) The Phase of
Rocky/ Stormy/
Strained ▪India began to ▪India ▪The ▪India’s ▪Indian
Relationship (1966 construct interventionairy deteriorating Hawkish invasion of
—71) Farkha barrage role in the East Political stance East
on Pakistan ▪India's Pakistan
situation in
Brahmaputra Indian support to military and the
Mukti Bahni East build-up outbreak
1968: Agartala Pakistan of 1971
Conspiracy Case war
▪the
Indian role
in the
secession
of East
Pakistan
 (VII) The Signs of Improvement in the mid of
new Change in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1972—
1979)

Bhutto’s Foreign policy ▪ Simla accord (1977—1979) ▪Irritants  

Bilateralism (1972) ▪Bajpai's visit to (I)Kashmir
Pakistan (1977) ▪(II)India’s Nuclear
▪1978: the visit of Programme: it denoted
Indian cricket team its nuclear bomb in
▪1979: the visit of 1974…
Pakistani cricket 1972 →Pakistan
team to India launched its nuclear
programme:
         
 (VIII) Another Phase of Rocky/ Stormy Relationship in
the mid of Afghan Crisis (1979—1988)

Afghan Khalistan Nuclear The assassination The issue of The Pakistan’s 1989 :
War issue rivalry of the Indian PM cross border Siachen president The
India Gandhi terrorism Dispute visit to rise of
1984 India to Kashmi
deescalate ri
the crisis : : uprisin
g
 (IX) The Relations haunted by the spectre of
Kashmir Conflict (1989—1992)
▪The ▪Involvement ▪1988: ▪Jag
rise/escalation of of Jehadi Military’s Mohan’s
insurgency in outfits: control Policies:
Kashmir (1989) 1990>>> over Pak’s
Kashmir
policy
(IX): the second slide
•▪Cumulative Impact →both countries reached to the brink of war
•Chari, P.I.Cheema and S.P.Cohem, The Crisis of 1990’s:
•I992 failure of efforts to resolve the Siachen dispute:
One can notice/identify two dominant trends
(X) The phase of Oscillating /Uneasy relationship (1993—1999)

1993—1996 1997—1999 Several factors that made relations

negatively skewed/ curved/ tilted
Mainly strained The relations move towards 1997: military’s frustration
improvement: regarding the future of Kashmir
dispute:
The nuclear detonations in 1998
enabled military to project Kashmir
as a nuclear flash point
The preparation of Operation Kargil
 Strobe ▪Track II ▪Bajpai's visit ▪Peoples-
Talbot’s Diplomac to Pak to-peoples
(II) diplomacy
1997
y Lahore
Declaration
diplomacy

Back channel
The phase of Oscillating Negotiations
/Uneasy relationship (1993
—1999): Positives on Kashmir:
(The
consideration
of the Chenab
Line Formula)
 (III) Irritants: (1993—1999)

Kashmir Blame Pakistan Arms Nuclear ▪Kargil

Conflict: game support to race: detonations: May conflict
1993—1996 Taliban Nuclear 1998
1999: Missile
 (XI)The Kargil War/Episode and the Sharp Dip in
Pakistan –India Relations (1999—2003)

▪Military ▪Attack on ▪2001 ▪2003 : ▪Till 2001

coup in Indian Brink The Afghanistan
Pakistan Parliament Agra also
of war
(13 summit remained an
December since and irritant.
2001) 2001 failure
 (XII) The Phase of Improvement/Harmonious Relations (2004—
2007)
▪The Saarc Summit 4-6 Jan 2004
▪ Renewed Sports links :

▪Resumption of air and railway service

▪ Nov 2003 agreed to cease fire along LoC and Siachen

▪7 Nov. 2005 the opening up of five bus Services

▪ 7 April 2005 Srinagar –Muzaffarabad Bus service

▪Musharraf visit

▪ 3 Oct the signing of two pacts

●a five-year agreement of giving advance notice of 72 hours before ballistic missile testing.
●a MoU to establish hotline b/w the costal guards
 

The Second World Punjab Conference

Visits of Chief ministers of Punjab :

●Five year extendable agreement to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons
●Flexibility in Pakistan in Kashmir : Pakistan proposed out-of-box solutions: examples Five Regions and seven nations

●the renewal of backchannel diplomacy

(XIII) The Bombay Mayhem and the Sharp
deterioration in Relations (2008—2010)
•26 /11 attacks :
•Causalities: 187;
•Disastrous impact on Pak—India relations :

• US role in deescalating tensions

(XIV)The Relations Show Signs of
Improvement (2011—2014)
▪Steps to improve Pak India Trade ▪Why India could not ▪MFN to India
relations by the PPP reciprocate the
government gestures→
Reason
The approaching Lok Most Efforts
Sabha polls: Favoured made by
2013; Nations the PML(N)
The defensive posture of Governmen
the ruling Congress t improve
Government: the
relations
after its
assumption
of power in
2013—
2014
 (XV) The Relations since Neerendra Modi’s assumption of power/
coming into Power: 2014—2019

▪Modi’s ▪The rise of ▪Pulwama ▪Indian Sur ▪blame ▪Afghanistan The provocative India s Uri
hawkish Hindutva …. attack( Feb: strikes on game another arena of Attacks:
statement of the bid to
stance 2019) Balakot India Pak rivalry Septemb
Indian foreign make
minister: Sushma SAARC er 2016
Swaraj dysfunct
ional as
a part of
its
campaig
n to
isolate
Pakistan
.
Pulwama Attack:
• On February 14, 2019, a terror attack was carried out in Pulwama in
Jammu and Kashmir by a suicide bomber resulting in the death of 40
CRPF personnel. The suicide bomber, identified as Jaish-e-
Mohammad's Adil Ahmed Dar, rammed his vehicle into a bus with the
CRPF convoy. 
 The Present Phase of Relationship: The Course of
Relations after Neerendra Modi’s re-election

The relations since N.Moodi’s re-election: reasons

India PM ‘s stance became further / emboldened in his hawkish stance
India’s move to annex Kashmir
The deteriorating situation along the LoC
The provocative gestures by the Indian Goverenmet: Modi’s statement on partition on 15 August:
The Indian withdrawal of the MFN status
(3) The Irritants in Pakistan--India Relations

• 3.1 Territorial Disputes

• 3.2 Water Disputes: Indian violation of IWT and Construction Dams/ water Disputes
• 3.3 The Issues that Fifth generation warfare has brought to the fore
•3.4 The construction of dam on river Kabul and Pakistan’s Concerns

:
•3.5 Afghan Conflict The divergent perception of the two countries as an irritant

•3.6 Issue of Cross border Terrorism and Blame game

•3.6.1 Indian alleged support to Bloch secessionists
•3.6.2 Pak’s alleged support to jehadi organizations
•3.7 Trade disputes
•3.8 India’s Hawkish stance/India’s bid to establish Hegemonic control in the region

•3.9 The Other Issues:

3.1 Territorial Disputes

Kashmir Siachen Sir

Creek
Kashmir

Post -5 August developments

How they have added new dimensions
to Kashmir crisis
Siachen
Sir Creek

96 KILOMETRES LONG TIDAL ESTUARY

SITUATED IN THE LOW-LYING MARSH REGIONS OF
RUNN OF KUTCH
1908
1914
THE TWO CONTRADICTORY PARAGRAPHS OF THE
VERDICT
3.2 Indian violation of IWT and Construction Dams

Chenab Jhelum Indus

3.3 The Issues that Fifth generation warfare
has brought to the fore
• (I)The Role of RAW in Information Warfare in Pakatan
• (II)The Revelations of the EU Disinfolab : The Collaboration between
Srivastava Group and RAW
• (III)The Disinformation of ANI (Asian News Agency)
• (IV)India’s bid to get the intellectual Property Rights of Basmati
• (IV)Cyber Information warfare and the use of Nostalgia Narrative
• (VI) Use of Suicidal Bombers
• (VII) Propaganda
3.4 The construction of dam on river Kabul and
Pakistan’s Concerns

SHAHTOOT DAM Chahar 16 to 17 percent drop in

Asiab distinct of Kabul water flow.

146 million cubic meter of  

potable water to 2 million
Kabul residents.
•Elizabeth HESSAMI, “”Afghanistan’s rivers could be India’s next weapon against Pakistan” FOREIGN POLICY
13Nov 2018.

• WALEED MAJID YAR, “Afghanistan and Pakistan’s looming water conflict 15 DECEMBER 2018.
3.5 Afghan Conflict: The divergent
perception of the two countries as an irritant
Pakistan’s Concerns under Northern Alliance The Indian concerns under the first stint of the
Government (1994—1996) and later under Karzai Taliban Government(1996—2001) and under the
and Ghani Governments ( 2002—August 2021) recently established Government under Taliban
( since the fall of Kabul in the second week of August)
3.6 Issue of Cross border Terrorism and
Blame game
3.6.1 Indian alleged support to Bloch secessionists
3.6.2 Pak’s alleged support to jehadi organizations

BLA;
3.7 Trade disputes

The trade potential The volume of Pakistan India Trade Irritants

37—40 $ bn $250 million to $2.0 billion Issues of according MFN status
annually Negative Lists
Tariff and Non-Tarif barriers
The concerns of Pakistani
bourgeoisie/ industrialists
regarding Indian hegemony/
monopolization of trade
 3.8 India’s Hawkish stance/India’s bid to
establish Hegemonic control in the region

INDIA’S THE COLD THE POST-PULWAMA

MILITARY START DEVELOPMENTS
BUILD UP DOCTRINE
India’s Military Build Up
India’s Arm Indo—US Defence The Strategic Indo-Israelii Indian Nuclear
procurement collaboration and dimensions of Indo- Collaboration Doctrine
Strategic Russia relations
Partnership
The role the US has
assigned to India in
its South Asia and
China policies:
THE COLD START DOCTRINE(I)

•The Cold start Doctrine:

•31 JULY 2017 Economist
•Limited war strategy designed to seize Pakistani’ s territory
THE COLD START DOCTRINE(II)
• However, in January 2017, Chief of Army Staff General Bipin
Rawat for the first time publicly acknowledged the doctrine in an
interview: “The Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional
military operations.”
•  India’s limited war strategy under CSD calls for armored thrusts
into Pakistani territory supported by mechanized infantry
formations and air power within 48-72 hours at the outset of a
military confrontation with Islamabad. These Blitzkrieg-style
operations would heavily depend on close coordination between
the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force given the pivotal role
close air support and overwhelming conventional firepower
would play in such a campaign
It Limitations(III)
THE POST-PULWAMA
DEVELOPMENTS
India’s aggressive Indian aggressive Increasing
military build up designs frequency of
skirmishes along
Loc
3.9 The Other Issues:
3.9.1 India’s Growing tilt towards US and Pakistan’s 3.9.2 The growing cordiality in Sino—Pak Relations
concerns and India’s concerns
(4) The Future Prognosis

• Near/ Immediate
• Distant
Near/ Immediate
• Trust Deficit
• The unresolved/ the non-resolution of territorial and water disputes
• Indian bid to establish hegemonic control in the region
• Pakistan’s India-centric Policy
• The dominance of hawks in the establishments of both the countries
• The unresolved issue of terrorism/ the issue of cross border terrorism and
resultant blame-game
• The ineffectiveness of SAARC
• Differences over Afghanistan: The clash of interests in Afghanistan
• The hawkish Press
Distant: Hope for improvement but it would
be contingent upon a number of factors
• Both the countries may learn lesson from history/ experiences
• The compulsions of WTO and Globalization
• Challenges of chronic poverty and backwardness
• The desire of US and the other world powers to maintain peace in
South Asia
• The Presence of Nuclear Deterrence
• The incentives of peaceful engagement
• The expanding role of civil societies: what is the prerequisite
Trust Deficit
The unresolved/ the non-resolution of territorial and water disputes
Indian bid to establish hegemonic control in the region
Pakistan’s India-centric Policy
The dominance of hawks in the
establishments of both the countries
The unresolved issue of terrorism/ the issue of cross border terrorism
and resultant blame-game
The ineffectiveness of SAARC
Differences over Afghanistan: The clash of
interests in Afghanistan
The hawkish Press
Distant: Hope for improvement but it would
be contingent upon a number of factors
• Both the countries may learn lesson from history/ experiences
• The compulsions of WTO and Globalization
• Challenges of chronic poverty and backwardness
• The desire of US and the other world powers to maintain peace in
South Asia
• The Presence of Nuclear Deterrence
• The incentives of peaceful engagement
• The expanding role of civil societies: what is the prerequisite
Both the countries may learn lesson from
history/ experiences
The compulsions of WTO and Globalization
Challenges of chronic poverty and
backwardness
The desire of US and the other world powers to maintain peace in
South Asia
The Presence of Nuclear Deterrence
The Presence of Nuclear Deterrence
The incentives of peaceful engagement
The expanding role of civil societies: what is
the prerequisite
(5) The suggestions to improve the Relations

• Let the peace process continue

• Both the countries should respect each other sensitivities
• Both the countries should put premium on peace
• They need to resolve the issue of cross-border terrorism: dimensions/ suggestions
• Amending the charter of SAARC
• Making SAARC effective vibrant
• The expeditious implementation of the FTA
• What behooves upon India and Pakistan?/ what India and Pakistan should do?
• The responsible role of media
• Helpful insights from the other articles
Let the peace process continue
Both the countries should respect each other sensitivities

Pakistan’s sensitivities India’s sensitivities

(I) India’s hegemonic designs (I) Pakistan's India-cenrtic policy
(II) The rise of Hindutva (II) Pakistan’s support to Jehadi organization
(III) India’s military build up: (III) Pakistan’s backing of Taliban in Afghanistan
(IV) Indian role in Afghanistan (IV) The dominance of military over decision making
(V) India’s China-centric policy
(VI) Indian support to secessionist elements in
Pakistan
(VII) India’s involvement in subversive e activities in
Pakistan
(VIII) Indo—Israeli nexus
Both the countries should put premium on
peace
• They should not allow the peace process to fall prey to whims and
desires of hawkish elements
They need to resolve the issue of cross-border
terrorism: dimensions/ suggestions ( the three levels)
(I) The establishment of fact- (II) Intelligence sharing (III) Making the framework of anti-
finding/ truth commission through terrorism cooperation under
SAARC to ascertain the real causes SAARC more vibrant
The countries should move beyond The framework is available under
ascertaining the causes rather they (I) 2004;(II) 2006,and;(III)
should demonstrate/show the extradition treaty
requisite will to address the issue
Amending the charter of SAARC

• To allow the discussion of contentious issue on the platform

Making SAARC effective vibrant
• We should take cue from the examples of successful regionalisms..
The expeditious implementation of the FTA
What behooves upon India and Pakistan?/ what India and Pakistan
should do?

The Indian responsibility What Pakistan should do?

India needs to display more flexible stance. It should Pakistan on the other hand, needs to change a lot
play the role of a benign neighbor. internally. It should resolve the issue of extremism on
long-term basis.
The responsible role of media

Comments on We need to Need to make Himal Impassioned

negative role of orientate the forums/ platforms appeal…
media and its anchorpersons in like SAFMA more
impact on India— the subjects of vibrant
Pak relations conflict-resolution
and conflict
management
Helpful insights from the other articles
(I) Riaz Mohammed (II) Zamir Akram, (III) Riaz
Khan Can Pakistan – “Talks with India: a Mohammad khan,
India ties be reality check” , The “the tragedy of
normal? Dawn 14 ET, 30 March 2021 India—Pakistan
August 2017 disputes”, Dawn 29
March 2020.
Summing
Comments on the (II) The dilemma (III) The present (IV) Brief hints of
overall trajectory of with India –Pakistan hurdles Suggestions to
India—Pakistan relations improve relations
relations