CHEMER B. Capra - OXAND 2017

CHEMER
Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management

- Civil engineering decision support
Bruno CAPRA
1
Page
Page11
Agenda
1. Risk concepts
2. Case study
3. Discussion
Page 2
Clients
ENERGY
Nuclear Oil & Gas Hydraulic
TRANSPORTS
Harbors Railway - Highway Urban structures
PORT AUTONOME DU HAVRE
Page 3
OXAND Services
Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management / Civil

engineering decision support
Risk management to support large project managers
Page 4
Oxand scope
 infrastructure, asset or project risk-based life

cycle management
Strategy Operation
new project study Project management
Feasibility Design Building Ageing Management

Basic design decisions ? ‘as built’ vs. ‘as designed’? Refurbishment ? Life cycle
Design specifications ?  construction gap studies Maintenance? extension ?
Communication with authorities? Surveillance?
Feasibility Management Plan Project management

Profitability ROI Organisation, responsabilities Indicators follow up and Final report
GO/NO GO Decision Objectives and performance reporting, alerts and
indicators recommandations
Page 5
OXAND services
Structure
Our strength:
Technical culture
&
Management vision
Materials
Laboratory Field
Page 6
Simulation: SIMEO TM technologies
Data management
Quantification Maintenance &
Risk identification (Ageing & strategies Decision making
Probabilities) Reporting
SIMEO - RISK SIMEO – CONSULTING SIMEO - MAINTENANCE

& MC2 Simulation de scénario de maintenance : scénario 1
Besoin total (somme des coûts d’actions de maintenance) 200 MFr.
Coût du scénario de maintenance simulé 10 MFr.
Voir Liste des actions du scénario simulé
Blessures Séquelles à Plusieurs 0 à 15 15 à 60 60 à 200 Plus de 200

IR Sécurité 1 mort IR Disponibilité
légères vie morts Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes
[1-5]
<1 an
ans
[5-20] [1-3]
ans ans
[20-100] [3-6]
ans ans
[100-1000] [6-20]
ans ans 10 MFr.
[1000-10000] [20-50]
ans ans 5%
Offre
>10000 ans >50 ans
0
Attentat
terroriste
Séisme Chute d'avion Surcoût Surcoût de Surcoût de Surcoût Gêne non Gêne Sentiment de Sentiment de
IR Durabilité IR Confort danger non danger
> 30 % 30 à 100% 100 à 300 % > 300% persistante persistante persistant persistant
Vapeur d'eau Pluie
interne
<1 an <1 an
Risque Résiduel
Fa 19
Fa 18 Fa 20
Fa 5
Fa 6
Neige [1-3] [1-3]
Fa 4
Flux d'air ans ans
Fa 7 Vent [3-6] [3-6]
Fa 23
ans ans
Température Fa 24
interne
Fa 3 CO2
[6-20] [6-20]
DAMPIERRE 4
Fa 8
ans ans
Fa 22 [20-50] [20-50] 95 %
gel-dégel Fa 9 Ensoleillement ans ans
Fa 2
Fa 1
Fa 10 >50 ans >50 ans
Eau du circuit de Humidité relative
ambiante
refroidissement
Fa 11
Fa 17
Fa 14 Température
Fa 16 ambiante
Fa 15
Poids propre
Nappe Sol de fondation

phréatique Crue
53
SIMEO - MANAGER
27
10
7
FE simulations 7
SIMEO - ERM Page 7
Examples of OXAND clients’ needs
Should I carry on maintaining my infrastructure or is it more

profitable to rebuilt it?
Can I go beyond design operational life-time, with which action

plan?
Should I improve and reinforce my infra or can I still operate like

this?
How to improve my infrastructure’s design for a sustainable

operation life?
 OXAND Asset Management Services…
…including some needs about aging management

Page 8
 infrastructure risk-based life
cycle management
Basic Design & Build Long Term Operation

Basic design decisions ?  Refurbishment ?
Design specifications ?  Maintenance?
Communication with authorities? Surveillance?
“new structure” “ageing structure”
Feasibility Design Building

Commissioning End of initial life time Life cycle
extension ?
 ‘as built’ vs. ‘as
designed’?
Page 9
OXAND Solutions
Diagnosis / Forecasting :
C = F*G
Risks= f(t) Performance = f(t) State = f(t)

Containment – Structural integrity Gap / Design
0m
1
195 m Formations
2
397 m
420 m 3
4 Melquart
762 m
5 Beglia
981 m
1031 m
6
Stakes: 7 Mahmoud
1418 m 8
Jetty availability
Ain Grab
1475 m
9 Kethtna
1744 m
Persons’ security 10 Cherahil B
2080 m
11
2240 m Cherahil A
12
2413 m
Simeo
Consulting
Actions plan
Page 10
OXAND Solutions
Actions plan :
Risks mapping Actions plan Optimized actions plan

Réduire les incertitudes sur la corrosion du radier
Mode de défaillance ou cause
Parade initiale maximal associé C_init Coût (K$) C_fin Gain Coût/gain
(1) Vérifier l’enrobage
Inspections Bajoyers W Effondrement des bajoyers de 13 75 7 18 4,2
en face inférieure du radier de (2) Inspection visuelle W
manière non destructive (3) Mesures des taux
(pachomètre)
des défauts signes de Inspections Terre-pleins T Effondrement des terre-pleins 11 75 5 12 6,3
corrosion des aciers de chlorures et des
6 mois (épaufrures…) profondeurs de de T
20 carbonatation par carottage (4) Caractérisation de
Inspections Terre-pleins et Effondrement des terre-pleins 12 100 6 15 6,7
Nombre de scénarii de défaillance
l’état de fissuration du
radier Fonds W de W
Scénario Remise en Inspections Bajoyers T Fuite importante de matériaux 9 30 3 4 7,5
15 cause des de T
I.1 prédictions?
Inspections Terre-pleins et Basculement des quais de DG 11 100 5 12 8,3
Scénario Fonds DG
IV.1 Coûts Ancienne
Directives entrée + application stratégie
Impact de navire sur portes 10 30 6 3 10,0
10 1 an Affiner les prédictions de corrosion
Scénario
II.2 Inspection des portes WNouvelle
Blocagestratégie
de porte de W avec 10 100 5 6 16,7
navire coincé
6 Si nécessaire,
Inspection jetée "pleine" Ouverture de la jetée 8 20 2 1 20,0
Étude de nocivité intégrant les désordres et
Travaux Balisage Arrêt de fonctionnement 11 300 6 8 37,5
3 écarts d’enrobage constaté dans une étude
Travaux de protection contre la corrosion (ex:
injection de fissures, étanchement…)
probabiliste
0 3 ans
0 Années
mineur faible moyen élevé critique
Owner assistance
90
80
Profondeur de carbonatation (mm)
70
60
50
40
30
Dans une fissure 0,3 mm
20
Dans une fissure de 0,5 mm
10
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Age (an)
Page 11
Agenda
1. OXAND presentation
2. OXAND services
3. Risk concepts
a) Context
b) Definition of a stake (or issue)
c) Definition of a risk
d) Definition of a consequence
4. Case study
5. Other references
Page 12
Context
Industrialised countries are at a hinge period:
Before:
• New infrastructure works;
• Society in full growth;
• Low damage: appropriate curative strategy;
• Maintenance budgets sized on recurrent costs.
Today, tomorrow:
• Levels of damage accelerate;
• Maintenance costs increase non-linearly, maintenance becomes a major part
of the engineers' work;
• Budgets are insufficient, Impossibility to renovate everything;
• Prioritise, rank, DEFEND.
Page 13
Importance of ageing
"Operation"
Risk,
costs "young age"
"Zero" risk
cannot exist!!
Exceptional or accidental
conditions Ageing
Earthquake Modification of
operation
time
Page 14
Origins of failures
- New failure modes associated

- Design with ageing
- Construction errors - Sequence of events not
incorporated in the design
- Changes in operating
conditions
Page 15
Traditional approaches
Education:
• Mainly new constructions.
Practice:
– Initial reflex:
• Detailed inspections cost money;
• Problem = visible deterioration;
• Solution = restore to original condition, "the standard";
• Urgent?
• Budget?
• Hierarchise = trust the inspector's or the expert's judgement
when taking the decision.
Page 16
Traditional approaches
Inspection is important but not sufficient:
- adds elements from the past;

- reveals a modification and a change in what is visible;
 what are the thresholds?

 does it provide elements on residual strength, on imminent failure, on
future changes?
 Which procedure do I need from measurement to decision?
 what about the non-visible, places that are difficult to get at,
uncertainties?
Page 17
Difficulties inherent
in civil engineering constructions
Inherent difficulties:
• high costs,
• uniqueness of design,
• long life cycles, low recurrence of failures;
• high levels of uncertainty about some
components,
• complexity of mechanisms of ageing and
failure,
• threshold effects,
• major stake,
• etc.
Management of civil engineering constructions =

very complex task
Page 18
Definition of a stake
Exercise 1: identification of clients stakes
• Examples of stakes that may guide decisions ?
•Brainstorming:
•
Page 19
Definition of risk
Exercise 2: definition of risk

Participatory work (2)
• Define what a risk is?
•Brainstorming:
•
Page 20
Definition of risk
It is what threatens the

stakes.
Possibility of non-
achievement of
objectives due to
random disturbances or
uncertainties.
 Frequency ?
(probability)
Page 21
Definition of a consequence
Consequence:
• Loss of performance, impact of a threat on a stake
Examples:
• One lane of the motorway is closed for 6 hours;

• Operating end due to gap / standards or requirements;
• A car is destroyed following the fall of a lump of concrete;
• The roads are blocked with snow;
• Etc.
Page 22
Risk analysis
Risk = Probability x Consequences
-Health, Safety
1 overall approach -Availability
-Asset
-Environment
-Financial, economic
-Political
Page 23
Risk analysis
Risk = Probability x Consequences
- Rebuild the background events

- Detailed analysis of the causes
- Inventory of failure modes
- Exhaustivity
- Quantification
Page 24
What is risk management?
Risk management aims to reach or overtake the

objectives of a company while taking into account risks
and opportunities in a conscious way. Events, actions
and evolutions likely to prevent company from reaching
its objectives or allowing it to overtake them have to be
controlled and managed.
The main objective is to implement with success the

action plans of risk mitigation
Page 25
Risk management reference framework
ISO/IEC 31010:2009
Risk management-
Risk assessment techniques
Page 26
Identify
- Workshops (brainstorming)
- Experts’ opinions
- Functionnal analysis, PDA, FMEA
- Fault trees, events trees
Page 27
Risk Identification :
Space of risks
method
Impacts
Page 28
Estimate
- Experts’ judgements (qualitative indicators)

- PRA, FMECA (qualitative or quantitative)
- Fault trees, events trees (quantitative)
- Probabilist analysis, Markov models (quantitative)
- P&R methodologies
Page 29
Estimate
Probability ?
Severity ?
Criticality (Risk) !
Page 30
Qualitative methodologies
Description Level
Probability: Unlikely:
A
very rare.
Possible:
B
can be observed, feared.
Likely:
C
already observed, will probably occur.
Very likely:
D
expected to occur (almost certain).
Severity:
Performance Sustainability
Stakeholder satisfaction Planning Organizational Reputation Know-how
All criteria fulfilled in appropriate Technical questioning of the CO2 project

1: Minor Delay < 1 month No need for reorganization Slight impact
way. from CO2 project management
Not all criteria met, but Technical questioning from RWE Dea
Severity levels
Reorganization of part of a sub Reputation of RWE Dea affected

2: Medium workarounds or alternatives can Delay < 3 months (solutions to pilot issues exist within the
system on a short term
easily be found. project)
Some criteria can only be
Reorganization of one sub Reputation of RWE Dea affected Technical questioning from RWE Dea (no
3: Serious fulfilled with additional clients, Delay < 1 years
system on a long term solutions to pilot issues)
by partners or new solutions.
Cooperation/concensus cannot Reorganization of the whole Technical questioning from RWE AG

4: Critical Delay > 1 years Reputation of RWE AG affected
Page 31
be realized. CO2 project team and/or authorities
Evaluate
Probability
Probabilité
- Acceptable ? For who ?

- Responsabilities (Top management)
Gravité - Mitigation level (ALARP)
Severity
Page 32
Evaluate
Potential savings Watch out
Risks overcontrolled Risk control level

adapted to criticality
Survey
Not enough Risk
Risk control level control
adapted to criticality
Consider the couple control – criticality to be sure ressources

are well allocated
Page 33
Level of Risk control
Indicator: 1 2 3 4
(None) (Low) (Middle) (High)
Actions No Only few Preventive and All the actions
implemented mitigation preventive protective reasonably
action actions actions implementable
implemented implemented have been taken
Level of No transfer Part of the risk Risk partially Risk totally
transfer can be transfered transfered
transfered (insurance, sub-
contractor…)
Page 34
Treat
Prevention Protection
Page 35
Treat
Separation
- Duplication (spare part, …)

- Transfert (assurance)
- Abandon
Page 36
Agenda
1. OXAND presentation
2. OXAND services
3. Risk concepts
4. Case study
5. Other references
Page 37
Case study– harbor quay
• Harbor structure
• Equatorial climate
• Heavy traffic
• Age: 25 years
A : zone submergée C : zone d’aspersion

B : zone de marnage D : zone d’embrun
air + Cl-
embrun
Cl- D
embrun D
embrun
Cl-
aspersion C
embrun
marée B air + Cl-
Diffusion
H2O + Cl- Cl- C

A aspersion
H2O
Séchage Cl-
mer aspersion
H2O + Cl-
Dépôt Diffusion
Page 38
Ground
Page 39
EAST
Ground
sprays
WEST
Main winds
Page 40
400 m
South (Sea)
Zone 6 Zone 5 Zone 4

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
F
East
Ouest
E
Y
B
? ? ? ? ? M
PARTIE DEJA TRAITEE ?

? L
?
ZONE DEJA TRAITEE K
Nord (Terre) H

Cl- < 0,12%/béton
soit 0,8/ciment Cl- > 0,12%/béton démolition béton éclaté (relevé UDECTO-Mr GOUT)
Page 41
Which management strategy? What would you do?
Stake: rebuild-> 80 M€ + operation loss, what else ?
Initial solution considered:

•Inspection and characterization: more than1000 mesurements
(concrete cover, chloride ions, …)
•Décision: concrete cover replacement and steel treatment
•Tiem:12 months
Problems ! :
•Time underestimation
•Strong penalties
Solution 2 : structure reassessment-> main zones,

risk analysis and action plan
Page 42
1,6
1,4
Taux de chlorures totaux par rapport au poids
de ciment pour un dosage de 320 kg/m3 [%]
1,2
19 ans
1,0
51 ans
0,8 OXAND 0,85%~0,93%
26 ans
MCI 0,8%
0,6
0,4 UDECTO 0,4%

Chlorure en Zone 4 (% en ciment)
0,2 Chlorure en Zone 5,3 (% en ciment)
Chlorure en Zone 6,2 (% en ciment)
0,0 1,0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0,9
Age de Port d'Owendo (an)
0,8
0,7
75%
Probabilité (-)
0,6
• Interpretation of existing experimental 0,5

57%
data thanks to simulation 0,4
• Use of uncertainties, rebuild of past and 0,3
0,2
Prediction of futur behaviour 0,1 20%
Zone 4
Zone 5,3
Zone 6,2
0,0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Age de Port d'Owendo (an)
Page 43
400 m
Sud (Mer)
200 m
Eclatement : 55 ans
Zone 6 Eclatement : 32 ans
Zone 5 Eclatement : 25Zone
ans4
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
20% Perte : 93 ans
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 20% Perte : 63 ans
46 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 20% Perte : 54 ans
31 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
surveillance Réparation légère Réparation lourde E
Ouest
6 5 4
Est
Y
B
Eclatement : 55 ans Eclatement : 32 ans A
20% Perte : 93 ans 20% Perte : 63 ans

? ? ? ? ? M
PARTIE DEJA TRAITEE ?
surveillance Réparation légère

?
?
L
ZONE DEJA TRAITEE K
1 2 3 J
Nord (Terre)
H

Cl- < 0,12%/béton
soit 0,8/ciment Cl- > 0,12%/béton démolition béton éclaté (relevé UDECTO-Mr GOUT)
Gains : unavailability period respected, maintenance schedule

Page 44
Concrete ageing model
Corrosion of concrete structures

(from material to structural effects)
When will we reach the

limit of service ability?
How much time do we

have?
What about uncertainty

in the remaining service
life?
Page 45
Limit states? End of incubation period, x% of steel loss?

Needs for models able to describe the evolution of degradation vs
time for service-life estimation
Page 46
Durability and reliability approaches:
SIMEO® Consulting 2.0
Durability of concrete: carbonation, chloride

penetration, corrosion, leaching,…
Evolution of degradated structures elements

with time
DETERMINISTIC ET PROBABILISTIC
APPROACHES
Page 47
Models:
Carbonation: diffusion process
x   . f ( HR).k ( Rc 28). t
Compressive strength
Carbonation depth
Relative humidity
Exposition factor to Physical parameters

CO2  Valorization of
• Chloride penetration: modified Fick’s law existing data
   x   1
c( x, t )  cini  (csurface  cini ).1  erf   
   2  ..D .t   M cl
 Cl  
Diffusion coefficient
Chloride concentration
at depth x and time t
Matrix and [Cl]

interactions
Page 48
Numerical simulations
SIMEO Consulting
Data:
• Concrete: 30 MPa
• Cement: CEM I 300 kg/m3
• Porosity: 15%
• DCl=10-12 m2/s
• RH=80%
• T=25°C
• Cl surface=20 g/l
• Conc. Cover= 30 mm
(Chloride and carbonation)
Page 50
Chlorides profile
Convection area in a RC
structure submitted to hydrous
and chloride transferts
Page 51
Results
Free chloride vs time at rebar surface Chloride profile after 50 years
Corrosion current vs time
Limit state: end of incubation period
Service life: 23 years
Page 52
Uncertainties
Probability density
Stress function of R(t) and S(t)
R(t): mean value of resistance
S(t): mean value of sollicitation
R(t)
fR(t1)
fR(t2)
S(t)
fS(t2)
fS(t1)
Joint density function fR,S(t)
Time
t1 tk t2 tm
Designed Mean life-time
life-time S(tm)= R(tm) Page 53
Concrete ageing
model
Probabilistic simulations
Concrete cover: DCl:

Lognormal law Normal law
(30 mm, CV=15%) (10-12 m2/s, CV=10%)
Page 54
Concrete ageing model Concrete ageing
model
Deterministic approach
Results:
P(ICl > 0)
Vs. time
Acceptable prob. of fail.: 5%, 10%, 30% ?
Related SL: 13, 15, 20 years
Page 55
Risk management and maintenance
optimization of nuclear reactor cooling piping
system
Revue technique du 11
décembre 2006
Page 56
Seaside Nuclear Power Plants
Nuclear Power Plants NPP, using seawater for their nuclear reactor
cooling piping systems
Page 57
Seaside NPP : piping system
Cooling piping
system using
seawater
SEA SEA
 Some NPP use reinforced concrete pipes

Page 58
Cooling piping system : description
A B
 2 lines (A and B)
redundant system
both have to be operational
Page 59
Concrete pipes : description
 Made of concrete pipes with internal steel core cylinder
Internal concrete Reinforcement

layer Global piping system here
concerned :  10 km
Straight pipes:  90% of

total length
External
Cylindrical steel sheet concrete
(2 mm) layer
Page 60
Context
Cooling piping system = Strategic equipment
• Reactor in service
Heat generation
• Reactor stopped
Cooling pipes must be

operational
Strict operation constraints : intervention only possible during

unit shutdowns
 Planned outages : DV / every 10 years / last : 3 months

PV / every 3 years / last : 1 month
Page 61
Operational feedback
Signs of deterioration due to ageing (cracks, rust, seepages)

leading to punctual replacements of pipe elements (3m)
Investigations on replaced pipe

elements results: After removal
Corrosion of the steel sheet:
(1) local steel sheet thickness
losses or even holes in steel
sheet
(2) start of a generalized corrosion
affecting the whole internal
surface of the steel sheet
Page 62
Problematic
Should I carry on maintaining my infrastructure or is it more

profitable to rebuilt it?
Page 63
Risk management approach: What are the owner’s
stakes in this case?
Owner’s stakes:
• Safety: Enable the cooling of the reactor
• Availability of the two lines (redondant system)
• Determine optimum intervention dates for maintenance to minimize

unit shutdowns (Availability) and Costs
Page 64
What are the main risks and their causes?
Recommended method:
• Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
1
Functional
analysis
Functions of Stakes
the system (issues)
2
Risk inventory
System failure modes
Causes Impacts
Page 65
Fonction Failure Mode Cause Impact
Page 66
Problematic through risk analysis
Causes Manifestation Maintenance actions? Unwanted Global

Survey? Event Consequence
Localized
corrosion Holes,
seepages
local
phenomenon :
only concerning
some pipes
punctually
Local pipe Cooling source
break loss
Generalized
internal Steel sheet
corrosion residual
thickness
Global
phenomenon :
concerning whole
circuit
Page 67
Risk management: decision-making process
10-years visit (VD)

Plant unit shutdown
Year N-2 Year N Year N+3 Year N+10
Punctual curative maintenance ?

Investigations?
Feedback? DECISION Intermediate
works at PV?
Heavy works
at DV ?
DECISION PROCESS DECISION-BASED ACTION
Page 68
Operational feedback
During the 10 years after initial priming, steel perforations

have never caused a tightness loss : no seepage has been
observed
After 10 years of use, one steel perforation on average

has been recorded per production unit and per year
After 20 years, removed and inspected pipes may present

some signs of internal generalized corrosion
Page 69
1st cause of degradation : Pitting
-> How to handle it?
Pitting:
- determination of the critical hole size acceptable under
worst mechanical loading (Scorr)
- feedback on maximal hole size detected through
seepages / sweatings (Sseep)
 Sseep << Scorr ( 400 cm2)
Conclusion / recommendation :
- perforations can always be detected before reaching
critical size
- the defect can be punctually repaired by setting a pipe
reinforcement when unit is in service
 CURATIVE TREATMENT
Page 70
Finite Elements Simulations
FE Meshes
Pipe
Concrete
Reinforcement
Steel sheet
Deformed mesh Principal stresses
Determination of Scorr
Page 71
2d cause of degradation : Generalized corrosion
How to handle it?
Generalized corrosion:
- critical thickness reduction acceptable under worst
mechanical loading = 60% of initial thickness
- corrosion model prediction (simulation tools):
 system acceptable until 2020 (conservative), before
whole replacement
Conclusion/ recommendation:
- span life expansion
Uncertainties, how to control the evolution ?
- use of a dedicated monitoring (OXAND’s patent)
- updating with data fields
 PREVENTIVE TREATMENT
Page 72
Monitoring process
Corrosion de l’âme Mesures continues Outils d’aide àdes

Traitement la Outils d’aide à la
Ageing pipes Targeted continuous Datadonnées
treatment Decision-making
tôle ciblées décision
-> corrosion measurements indicators
5_1(-T)
43.010
43.000
42.990
42.980
Dilatations (mm)
42.970 NPP owning reinforced

42.960
42.950
5_1(-T) concrete system monitored
42.940
42.930
42.920
42.910
20-sept- 25-sept- 30-sept- 05-oct-05 10-oct-05 15-oct-05 20-oct-05 25-oct-05
05 05 05
Page 73
Strategy:
Monitoring Maintenance Unwanted Global

Cause Threats Manifestation actions Event Consequence
Visual
Localized inspection Reinforcement
Holes, Service criteria:
corrosion
seepages hole size
local Potential Local (observable seepages
phenomenon : measurements replacement conservative)
only concerning
some pipes
Seism, overpressure
punctually Curative management

Local pipe Cooling source
bursting loss
Generalized Removal
internal + expertise Service criteria:
Steel sheet
corrosion Complete thickness
residual
replacement
thickness reduction (<60%)
Permanent of circuits
Global
phenomenon : monitoring
concerning whole
circuit
Preventive management
Page 74
Risk management:
decision-making process
10-years visit (VD)

Plant unit shutdown
Year N-2 Year N Year N+5 Year N+10
MONITORING
LIFESPAN
?
REPAIRS / PIPE
REMOVAL
PROLONGATION
Not
OK
Can we wait another 10 years before
carrying out heavy works??? INITIATION OF
REPLACEMENTS
DECISION PROCESS DECISION-BASED ACTION
Page 75
Owner’s benefits
Owner now holds decision support indicators and

service criteria to defend its maintenance strategy;
Owner decided to postpone the replacement of a cooling

piping system to the next Decennial Visit, with
recommended strategy;
Saved expenses : 12 M€
Page 76
Conclusion
Risk-based management allows an optimized

maintenance of structures considering
various stakes
Thank
It is a powerful you for
and dynamic your
methodology
involving numerous actors
attention
But nevertheless, sometimes…
77 INSAS, 25/01/08
Page 77

CHEMER B. Capra - OXAND 2017

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

CHEMER B. Capra - OXAND 2017

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

CHEMER B. Capra - OXAND 2017

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

CHEMER

Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management

Nuclear Oil & Gas Hydraulic

Harbors Railway - Highway Urban structures

PORT AUTONOME DU HAVRE

Risk-based life-cycle infrastructure management / Civil

Risk management to support large project managers

 infrastructure, asset or project risk-based life

new project study Project management

Feasibility Design Building Ageing Management

Feasibility Management Plan Project management

SIMEO - RISK SIMEO – CONSULTING SIMEO - MAINTENANCE

Blessures Séquelles à Plusieurs 0 à 15 15 à 60 60 à 200 Plus de 200

Nappe Sol de fondation

Should I carry on maintaining my infrastructure or is it more

Can I go beyond design operational life-time, with which action

Should I improve and reinforce my infra or can I still operate like

How to improve my infrastructure’s design for a sustainable

 OXAND Asset Management Services…

…including some needs about aging management

Basic Design & Build Long Term Operation

“new structure” “ageing structure”

Feasibility Design Building

Risks= f(t) Performance = f(t) State = f(t)

Persons’ security 10 Cherahil B

Risks mapping Actions plan Optimized actions plan

Industrialised countries are at a hinge period:

- New failure modes associated

Inspection is important but not sufficient:

- adds elements from the past;

 what are the thresholds?

Management of civil engineering constructions =

Exercise 1: identification of clients stakes

• Examples of stakes that may guide decisions ?

Exercise 2: definition of risk

• Define what a risk is?

It is what threatens the

• Loss of performance, impact of a threat on a stake

• One lane of the motorway is closed for 6 hours;

Risk = Probability x Consequences

Risk = Probability x Consequences

- Rebuild the background events

Risk management aims to reach or overtake the

The main objective is to implement with success the

- Experts’ judgements (qualitative indicators)

Stakeholder satisfaction Planning Organizational Reputation Know-how

All criteria fulfilled in appropriate Technical questioning of the CO2 project

Reorganization of part of a sub Reputation of RWE Dea affected

Cooperation/concensus cannot Reorganization of the whole Technical questioning from RWE AG

- Acceptable ? For who ?

Potential savings Watch out

Risks overcontrolled Risk control level

Consider the couple control – criticality to be sure ressources

- Duplication (spare part, …)

A : zone submergée C : zone d’aspersion

H2O + Cl- Cl- C

Zone 6 Zone 5 Zone 4

PARTIE DEJA TRAITEE ?

ZONE DEJA TRAITEE K

Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3