Michael Waibel
Michael Waibel is a Professor of International Law at the University of Vienna.
He studied law at the universities of Vienna, Paris II Pantheon-Assas and Harvard Law School, and economics at the London School of Economics. He worked at the European Central Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Previously, he taught for a decade at the University of Cambridge, und was from 2015-2019 co-deputy director of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law and Director of Studies at Jesus College. In 2010-2011 he was the Schmidheiny Visiting Assistant Professor in Law and Economics at the University of St. Gallen. In 2019, he was Nomura Visiting Professor of International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School.
The focus of his research is in international law, international economic law, and international dispute settlement. He received the Deák Prize of the American Society of International Law, the Book Prize of the European Society of International Law and a Leverhulme Prize for his research.
Supervisors: Professor August Reinisch
Address: Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom
He studied law at the universities of Vienna, Paris II Pantheon-Assas and Harvard Law School, and economics at the London School of Economics. He worked at the European Central Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Previously, he taught for a decade at the University of Cambridge, und was from 2015-2019 co-deputy director of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law and Director of Studies at Jesus College. In 2010-2011 he was the Schmidheiny Visiting Assistant Professor in Law and Economics at the University of St. Gallen. In 2019, he was Nomura Visiting Professor of International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School.
The focus of his research is in international law, international economic law, and international dispute settlement. He received the Deák Prize of the American Society of International Law, the Book Prize of the European Society of International Law and a Leverhulme Prize for his research.
Supervisors: Professor August Reinisch
Address: Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom
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Papers by Michael Waibel
The texts gathered in the present volume delve into these intricate alleys of inquiry. They offer evaluative criticism and serve as valuable contributions to our collective efforts to comprehend and navigate the profound shock of Brexit. Moreover, they present constructive and collaborative pathways forward for both the EU and the UK. They address a wide array of legal and political issues ranging from the structure and background of the withdrawal and cooperation agreements via political and legal repercussions for the EU internally, to the impact on free movement and establishment, dispute settlement, financial regulation and financial markets and, not least, constitutional problems involved.
We can group the actors in sovereign debt restructurings into three main categories
1. creditors, including creditor associations;
2. debtors, including their instrumentalities and financial and legal advisors; and
3. third parties (e.g., the IMF).
There is a degree of overlap between these categories. For example, many countries are both debtors and creditors; and the IMF may be both a creditor and a third party.
The texts gathered in the present volume delve into these intricate alleys of inquiry. They offer evaluative criticism and serve as valuable contributions to our collective efforts to comprehend and navigate the profound shock of Brexit. Moreover, they present constructive and collaborative pathways forward for both the EU and the UK. They address a wide array of legal and political issues ranging from the structure and background of the withdrawal and cooperation agreements via political and legal repercussions for the EU internally, to the impact on free movement and establishment, dispute settlement, financial regulation and financial markets and, not least, constitutional problems involved.
We can group the actors in sovereign debt restructurings into three main categories
1. creditors, including creditor associations;
2. debtors, including their instrumentalities and financial and legal advisors; and
3. third parties (e.g., the IMF).
There is a degree of overlap between these categories. For example, many countries are both debtors and creditors; and the IMF may be both a creditor and a third party.
Keywords: human rights; international trade law; inequality; labour and social rights; public health; trade sanctions.
Against this backdrop, this Chapter investigates the past, present, and future of safe assets in the EU. It is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews past borrowing programs and the safe assets these have produced. We show that the NGEU’s financing mechanism is not new; rather it is a scaled-up version of past EU borrowing programs. The Section also discusses the euro area’s two borrowing mechanism via separate supranational issuer: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Section 3 the zooms in on the legal aspects of EU safe assets, highlighting both commonalities and differences between the various debt issuance programs and analyzing the pertinent legal features of the debt instruments the EU has relied on. Section 4 concludes.
Keywords: sovereign debt; safe assets; European Monetary Union; euro area sovereign debt crisis; European Stability Mechanism; Next Generation EU program.
The first section compares competence for monetary policy with related areas, specifically economic policy, and closely connected thereto, education, health, labour and social policy. It also briefly discussed how the Eurozone crisis has affected the vertical balance of responsibilities between the EU and its member states in these areas. The second section examines the asymmetric allocation of competence for economic and monetary policy, and the fuzzy boundary between the two, through the prism of the two key Eurozone crisis cases before the CJEU, Pringle and Gauweiler. The third section examines why, contrary to first appearances, the EU does not at present have a genuine exclusive competence for monetary policy.