Political law case digest article 11 sec

CASE NO. 1186 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES KHAN JR VS OMBUDSMAN Facts: Private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala charged petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA 3019. In their complaint, private respondents accused petitioners, Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, of using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were shareholders. Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application of RA 3019. The Deputy Ombudsman denied petition. Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman raised the same issuesbut was again dismissed In this petition for certiorari, with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioners assail the orders dated July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996 of the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman, respectively. They claim that public respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the investigation of the case against them although they were officers of a private corporation and not "public officers." Issue: Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case Ruling: No. In accordance with article 13 section 2, Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although the government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman. Mainpoint: The Ombudsman can investigate only the officers of the government owned corporations with original charter. Pal, even when still owned by the government did not have original charter. CASE NO. 1187 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES OMBUDSMAN VS ESTANDARTE Facts: Ombudsman, petitioner found Heidi Estandarte, the school Principal, guilty of allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. Estandarte filed a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction with the CA. She alleged that the Ombudsman (Visayas) violated her right to due process when her request for a formal investigation was denied; that the DECS-Region VI has jurisdiction over the case; and that the Ombudsman (Visayas) failed to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, in which CA granted. The CA held that the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took over the case after it issued a memorandum considering the case closed and terminated and after jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special Investigating Committee. Such act violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that it is bereft of the authority to directly impose on the respondent the sanction of dismissal from service. It stresses that it has full and complete administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers. Issue: Whether or not the has exclusive jurisdiction over the case Ruling: No. The court do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it could assume jurisdiction over the administrative case after the DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction over the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner. Considering both court concerned do have jurisdiction over the cause of action of the parties herein against each other, the better rule is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the court which be in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced proceedings over the administrative case by constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to Section 9 of RA 4670. CASE NO. 1188 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES OMBUDSMAN VS LUCERO Facts: Petitioner Farida T. Lucero was appointed on November 18, 1999 as Clerk II of the Land Transportation Office, Regional Office No. VII, and was assigned at the Chief Finance Division in order to augment the personnel complement thereat. In a Memorandum dated November 18, 1999 which was issued by Regional Director Isabelo K. Apor, she was likewise directed to assist the Regional Cashier in collecting and receiving miscellaneous fees/revenues. On September 29, 2000, OIC-Regional Director Porferio I. Mendoza of LTO,Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City requested COA to conduct an audit in the Cash Section of the Operations Division of their office. After conducting audit, it is revealed Petitioner to have issued sixty-nine (69) altered miscellaneous receipts. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) rendered its Decision finding the Petitioner guilty of dishonesty and removal from the office. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman is empowered to order the removal of public officials or employees in administrative cases Ruling: Yes, the issue raised in this Court has already been resolved in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the Court declared that in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered not merely to recommend, but to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The Court stated that this was the manifest intent of the legislature: All the provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. CASE NO. 1189 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES OMBUDSMAN VS CA Facts: The Office of Ombudsman filed a petition for certiorari to impose its decision that was set aside by the CA, which is the penalty for dismissal from the service of Ma. Melly Jaud Magbanua (respondent). Respondent was the Local Treasury Operations Assistant of the City Treasurer’s Office in Bacolod City. On 27 February 1998, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination of respondent’s cash and account. The examination disclosed a shortage of ₱265,450. Upon demand, respondent failed to produce the missing amount. Respondent alleged that the shortage was due to the machinations and dishonest acts of Cash Clerk I Monina Baja. Respondent alleged that Baja, acting as Paymaster, received payroll funds for distribution to specific offices, in which Baja denied the allegation. The Office of Ombudsman ruled that respondent is guilty of gross neglect of duty and for violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, meted the penalty of dismissal from service. Issue: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative penalties on public officials or employees Ruling: Yes. In section 15, 21, and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 provide the functions and duties of the Ombudsman. (15) It stated that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government, (21) the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government, (25) the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal at the discretion of the Ombudsman. Therefore Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative penalties on public officials or employees. . CASE NO. 1190 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY VS PUNONG BARANGAY Facts: On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 61 of Local Government Code. Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint, Martinez was declared by the SB as in default. On 28 July 2005, the SB rendered its Decision imposing the penalty of removal from office. Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the SB is not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, the SB and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of decision of the SB. The trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Order of the SB removing Martinez from service is void.  Issue: Whether or not the SB empowered to remove Martinez from service Ruling: No, The Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered. An elective local official may be removed from office of the proper court. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local official. Mainpoint: In Local Government Code, elective officials may be dismissed only by the proper court. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. CASE NO. 1191 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES PEREZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts:  Salvador Perez and Juanita Apostol Zapanta are Mayor and Treasurer of San Manuel, Pangasinan, respectively. They wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase of 1 computer unit costing P120,000 acquisition by personal canvass, violating Sec 362 and 267 of the Local Government Code. No public bidding occurred and no Committee award was constituted to approve the procurement. Salvador and Juanita gave Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or preference through manifest partiality, showing evident of bad faith and gross, inexcusable negligence, but this was not include in the original information, so it was recommended by the Special Prosecutor that the information be amended to show the manner of the commission of the offence, based on the Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original information. The amended information was admitted. The petitioners challenge this, saying it was the Sandiganbayan committed GAD in accepting the amended information, which had no approval from the Ombudsman, amounting to denial of due process. The SC granted the petition. Issue: Whether or not the Special has the authority to file information without approval of the Ombudsman Ruling: No. The Ombudsman’s margin notes order was to "study whether the accused, assuming arguendo that there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the seller of the subject computer” and “submit your recommendation soonest.”It is clear that the recommendation must be submitted to one who has authority to implement such recommendation. The Ombudsman has the power to file informations, as well as the power to delegate his powers. Office Order No. 40-05 delegates the disposition of administrative and criminal cases (filing informations) to the Deputy Ombudsman, but NOT the Special Prosecutor (which is included in the Office of the Ombudsman). All that is delegated to the Special Prosecutor is the discretional authority to review and modify the Deputy Ombudsman-authorized information, but without departing from the basic resolution. Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor are given the same rank and salary (RA 6770), but they do NOT have the same functions.  CASE NO. 1192 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES BUENCAMINO VS COA Facts: Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino, petitioner, is the incumbent mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan, while Constantino Pascual, private respondent, is the president of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, a company engaged in the mining of marble blocks. Private respondent filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, public respondent, an administrative complaint against petitioner for grave misconduct, abuse of authority and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. Office of the Ombudsman declared petitioner administratively liable for abuse of authority and suspended him from office for a period of six (6) months without pay. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA, a Petition for Review with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the appellate court issued a TRO but preliminary injunction was denied. He then filed a motion for reconsideration, but also denied. Hence, in an instant petition for certiorari, Petitioner alleged that denial of preliminary injunction, the CA gravely abused its discretion, the Decision of Ombudsman suspending him from office is not immediately executory; and that enforcement of decision from the service during the pendency of his appeal, the Office of the Ombudsman violated Section 27 of RA 6770, (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and the rulings of the Court in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, Lopez v. Court of Appeals, and Ombudsman v. Laja. Issue: Whether or not the Office of Ombudsman violated RA 6770 rulings of the court Ruling: No, Honorable Court emphatically declared that Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was already amended by Administrative Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the execution of the Ombudsman's decision pending appeal is now similar to Section 47 of the "Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" - that is, decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal. Considering that an appeal under Administrative Order No. 17, the amendatory rule, shall not stop the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from being executory, the court hold that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application for injunctive relief. It bears stressing at this point that Section 13(8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules CASE NO. 1193 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES MEDINA VS COA Facts: The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding herein petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The Resolution of the same court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The instant petition originated from the audit conducted by respondent Commission on Audit (COA) on the cash and accounts handled by petitioner in her official capacity as Municipal Treasurer of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite. The state auditors discovered a cash shortage. They thus directed petitioner to immediately restitute the shortage within 72 hours from receipt of the demand letter but petitioner allegedly failed to comply. The state auditors submitted a report to the Provincial Auditor's Office and recommended the relief of petitioner from her post as municipal treasurer and the filing of criminal charges against her. On the other hand, the provisions in the Administrative Code cited by petitioner in support of her theory that she is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. Issue: Whether or not the Medina, who has administrative complaint in Ombudsman, may appeal to the procedural rules under CSC Ruling: No. In particular, Section 48(2) and Section 48(3) are subsumed under Subtitle A of Title I, which pertains to the CSC and to the procedure of administrative cases filed before the CSC. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a different set of procedural rules govern. And rightly so, the Deputy Ombudsman applied the provisions of Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in ruling that the prerogative to elect a formal investigation pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner. CASE NO. 1194 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES VILLASENOR VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of 74 people. Villasenor and De Mesa are presently facing criminal charged for the crime of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They were also charged administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct and conduct before Sandiganbayan. In line with administrative case, they were preventively suspended for a period of 6 months. During the pendency of the criminal case, respondent special prosecutor Louella Mae Oco-Pesquera filed a motion for suspension pendente lite of petitioners. Petitioners opposed the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for 6 months relative to the administrative case. They posited that any preventive suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already absorbed by the preventive suspension in the administrative case because both the criminal and administrative cases were anchored on the same set of facts. Respondent court granted the prosecution's motion for suspension. It ordered the suspension of petitioners for a period of 90 days. Issue: WON the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the petitioners despite their 6 months preventive suspension Ruling: No. The Court finds no merit in the argument. Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. The public respondent did not abuse his discretion of regarding preventive suspension. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. In Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that such preventive suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it. This Preventive suspension will only last for 90 days, and may not exceed the maximum period of 90 days. CASE NO. 1195 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES OMBUDSMAN VS RODRIGUEZ Facts: On August 26, 2003, a complaint was received by the Ombudsman against Barangay Captain Rolson Rodriguez for the abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty. On September 1, 2003, a similar complaint was received by the Sangguniang Bayan of Binalbagan. Rodriguez was served with noticed of the complaint on Sept 8 by SB and Sept 10 by Ombudsman. He filed a motion to dismiss the Ombudsman case on the ground of forum shopping and motion of to dismiss the SB case alleging that it has no factual basis. The complainants subsequently withdraw the complaint with the SB to prioritized the Ombudsman case. Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and oppression.CA set aside such ruling for lack of jurisdiction. CA ruled that SB acquired primary jurisdiction over Rodriguez because it served the notice 2 days earlier than the Ombudsman which opts to take cognizance of the case and thus acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts with concurrent jurisdiction. Also, the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction of the case of Barangay Captain Rolson Rodriguez Ruling: Yes. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. Republic Act No. 8249, otherwise known as An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, limits the cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private respondent who, as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14 under Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. . CASE NO. 1196 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES OMB VS ESTENDARTE Facts: Ombudsman, petitioner found Heidi Estandarte, the school Principal, guilty of allegations of improprieties ranging from illegal handling of school funds, irregular financial transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. Estandarte filed a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction with the CA. She alleged that the Ombudsman (Visayas) violated her right to due process when her request for a formal investigation was denied; that the DECS-Region VI has jurisdiction over the case; and that the Ombudsman (Visayas) failed to act with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, in which CA granted. The CA held that the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took over the case after it issued a memorandum considering the case closed and terminated and after jurisdiction had already been vested in the Special Investigating Committee. Such act violates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that it is bereft of the authority to directly impose on the respondent the sanction of dismissal from service. It stresses that it has full and complete administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over public school teachers. Issue: Whether or not the has exclusive jurisdiction over the case Ruling: No. The court do not agree with petitioner’s contention that it could assume jurisdiction over the administrative case after the DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction over the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the complainants filed their formal complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and petitioner. Considering both court concerned do have jurisdiction over the cause of action of the parties herein against each other, the better rule is to allow the litigation to be tried and decided by the court which be in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Considering that the respondent is a public school teacher who is covered by the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has already commenced proceedings over the administrative case by constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670. CASE NO. 1197 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES SALVADOR VS MAPA Facts: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, through Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in dismissing the criminal complaint regarding the violation on Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Act against respondents, Mapa Jr et al, on ground of prescription, and the July 27, 1998 Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. To reiterate, the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Wilensky V. Fields, Fla, 267 So 2dl, 5, held that "an ex-post facto law is defined as a law which provides for infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which when it was committed, was innocent. Thus, the Ombudsman dismissed it. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has a jurisdiction to declare the law unconstitutional Ruling: No. In the case of Estarija v. Ranada, where the petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's decision, the court had occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and memorandum orders. The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto. . CASE NO. 1198 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES OMB VS MASING Facts: Respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the same school. Respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds.  Respondents contend that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them, but DECS has, through a committee to be constituted under "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers * (RA No. 4670 Sec 9)." However, the motion was denied. The Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty, CA reverse the decision. Respondent Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The charges were oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits, but CA reversed the decision again. Issue: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees Ruling: Yes. Ombudsman has jurisdiction to directly discipline public school teachers. The court reiterated the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where it emphasized that "the Ombudsman's order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, also held that: While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to "recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x" of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of RA 6770. . CASE NO. 1199 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES MEDINA VS COA Facts: The Court of Appeals' decision affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding herein petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The Resolution of the same court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The instant petition originated from the audit conducted by respondent Commission on Audit (COA) on the cash and accounts handled by petitioner in her official capacity as Municipal Treasurer of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite. The state auditors discovered a cash shortage. They thus directed petitioner to immediately restitute the shortage within 72 hours from receipt of the demand letter but petitioner allegedly failed to comply. The state auditors submitted a report to the Provincial Auditor's Office and recommended the relief of petitioner from her post as municipal treasurer and the filing of criminal charges against her. On the other hand, the provisions in the Administrative Code cited by petitioner in support of her theory that she is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. Issue: Whether or not the Medina, who has administrative complaint in Ombudsman, may appeal to the procedural rules under CSC Ruling: No. In particular, Section 48(2) and Section 48(3) are subsumed under Subtitle A of Title I, which pertains to the CSC and to the procedure of administrative cases filed before the CSC. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a different set of procedural rules govern. And rightly so, the Deputy Ombudsman applied the provisions of Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in ruling that the prerogative to elect a formal investigation pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner. CASE NO. 1200 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 POWERS; FUNCTIONS; DUTIES BORJA VS PEOPLE Facts: Petitioner Engr. Roger F. Borja, in his capacity as General Manager C of the San Pablo Water District, was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Borja filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment. Borja alleged that there is a pending civil case entitled Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 147402, which involves the issue of whether local water districts are private or government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). He argued that the issue is a prejudicial question, the resolution of which determines whether or not the criminal actions against him may proceed. If this Court resolves that local water districts are private corporations, the graft cases against him will not prosper since then he would not be a public officer covered by Rep. Act No. 3019. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the proceedings of the graft cases Ruling: No. the Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that the court had already rendered a decision on the Feliciano case, ruled therein that local water districts are not private corporations but GOCCs. Therefore, the criminal cases against Borja must proceed because he is a public officer covered by Rep. Act No. 3019. Borja’s contention of that a prejudicial question exist in his case is devoid of any legal basis, considering that it had been settled, long before the Feliciano case that Local water districts are GOCCs and not private corporations because their existence do not derived from the Corporation Code, but from Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, making the petitioner a public officer, therefore liable for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. CASE NO. 1223 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 JURISDICTION OVER CRIME Natividad VS Felix Facts: Petitioner, Municipal Mayor of Ramos, Tarlac, Arnulfo Natividad, was being investigated for the death of Severino Aquino. A subpoena was issued requiring him to submit a counter-affidavit. PNP filed another complaint on Circuit Trial Court of Gerona-Ramos Tarlac (MCTC Criminal Case No. 4923). The MCTC opined that there was probable cause to hold accused for murder, recommended bail of P250,000, the Provincial Prosecutor approved the filing of the information for murder but with no bail. After Petitioner submitted his counter affidavit, a resolution was issued by a panel of prosecutors holding that probable cause exists. They also attached an amended information charging additional defendants. Respondent judge admitted the amended information and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest without bail on petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner moved to remand his case for preliminary investigation with motion to quash warrant alleging that there was no preliminary investigation and contending that respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case because it was the Ombudsman and not the Provincial Prosecutor who had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. And, that the proper court which had jurisdiction over the case was the Sandiganbayan and not respondent judge. Issues: Whether or not the proper court which had jurisdiction over the case was the Sandiganbayan and not respondent judge Ruling: No. Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The two requirements must concur for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000. Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1486, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate. CASE NO. 1224 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 JURISDICTION OVER CRIME Lastimosa VS Vasquez Facts: Petitioner, Gloria G. Lastimosa, is the assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. She and the Provincial Prosecutor refused to file a criminal charge of attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrismo, thus, the Ombudsman filed an administrative complaint against them for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty refraining from prosecuting. The two were placed under preventive suspension. It was the contention of the petitioner that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case of mayor, thus, they cannot be forced to file the case against Ilustrismo. Issues: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the provincial prosecutor to assist in the case Ruling: Yes. In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to cal in prosecution for the assistance as provided in Se 21 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770).when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman, meaning, he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reerse and modify his decision. Petitioner cannot legally act,on her and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. CASE NO. 1225 ARTICLE 11 SEC 13 JURISDICTION OVER CRIME Presidential VS Desierto Facts: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 dismissing three complaints filed by petitioner docketed as OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645, and its Order of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing, motu proprio, the three complaints without first requiring respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and petitioner to file its reply thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that petitioner's evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman should have first required petitioner to clarify said evidence or to adduce additional evidence, in accordance with due process. Issues: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the case Ruling: No. Under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary investigation is proper. It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.