Multi-Modal 2020: Multi-Modal Argumentation 30 Years Later
MICHAEL A. GILBERT
Professor Emeritus
Philosophy Department
York University, ON
Canada
gilbert@yorku.ca
Abstract: My essay, “Multi-modal
argumentation” was published in the
journal, Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, in 1994. This information
appeared again in my book, Coalescent
argumentation in 1997. In the ensuing
twenty years, there have been many
changes in argumentation theory, and I
would like to take this opportunity to
examine my now middle-aged theory
in light of the developments in our
discipline. I will begin by relating how
a once keen intended lawyer and then
formal logician ended up in argumentation theory. (If you do not care to
read this bit of autobiography, skip to
Section 2).
Résumé: Mon essai « Multi-Modal
Argumentation » a été publié dans la
revue savante Philosophy of the Social
Sciences en 1994. Cette information
est
réapparue
dans
mon
livre, Coalescent
Argumentation en
1997. Au cours des 20 années qui ont
suivi, il y a eu de nombreux changements dans la théorie de l'argumentation, et j'aimerais profiter de cette
occasion pour examiner ma théorie
maintenant d'âge moyen à la lumière
des développements dans notre discipline. Je commencerai par raconter
comment un juriste passionné, puis
logicien formel, s'est retrouvé dans la
théorie de l'argumentation. (Si cette
information autobiographique ne vous
intéresse pas, passez à la section 2).
Keywords: context, emotion, multi-modal argumentation, kisceral, logical,
visceral
1. How I got here
When I was quite young, perhaps nine or ten years old, I remember being with my grandfather and several of his friends. Some
subject came up, and I jumped in with an argument. They all went
silent, and then one of them said, “This one’s going to be a lawyer!” And, so, my career path was chosen. For years I was certain
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I would become a lawyer, in fact, a lawyer specializing in labour
law. When I entered university, Hunter College in the Bronx, now
Lehman college, I chose political science as my major. All was
set, until....
In my second year I enrolled in Philosophy 100. This was a required course for those in the social science stream, but you were
not supposed to take it until your third year. But I was eager, and
took it in my sophomore year. My instructor was Nicolas Capaldi,
then a grad student at Columbia, lately Legendre-Soulé Chair in
Business Ethics at Loyola University, New Orleans. Well, that
began a love affair between me and philosophy. I switched my
major, but not yet my life plans. In fact, one day on the subway
while I was studying, a gentleman sitting next to me struck up a
conversation. It turned out he was the dean of NYU School of Law
and told me that he thought philosophy was the very best major for
“pre-law.” Thus, encouraged I continued on happily, until the day
I realised I wanted to be a philosopher more than a lawyer, a decision, in retrospect, I’ve never regretted.
While my studies were generally in the analytic tradition, I focused primarily on formal logic. Those were the days of great
interest in Lewis style modal logics, but I quickly tired of attempts
to reduce the axiom set of S4 or S5 for no discernible reason. I was
attracted to logic because I believed in the importance of reasoning, especially as an alternative to violence. So, creating S4.231
and arguing it was better than S4.230 left me cold. I began to study
and ponder on the paradoxes of implication, and that led me to
relevance logic. My Ph.D. thesis argued that relevance logic did
not really have anything to do with relevance, and so I was once
again at sea.
I had been teaching many “baby logic” and critical thinking
courses. Just before I left Waterloo with my Ph.D. I had proposed
to Conestoga College an adult-ed course entitled How to win an
argument. When I arrived at the University of Toronto, their
School of Continuing Studies embraced it. It was extremely popular, and I eventually wrote a book with the same title. And I began
thinking more and more about argument. Real argument.
At this time, I wrote a paper entitled, “Toward a theory of dispute.” It detailed a Socratic argument by counter-example tech-
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nique, but that was not the interesting part. That part had to do
with my distinguishing between the terms ‘argument’ and ‘dispute,’ with an argument being a set of premisses and a conclusion,
while a dispute was a process between people. This was, roughly,
1982 or 1983. I submitted the piece to the journal Philosophy of
the Social Sciences, whose editor, Ian Jarvie, said he had no idea
for a referee. I also had little idea but suggested the communication theorist Edwin Bettinghaus whose book I had read and admired. Bettinghaus responded that someone named Daniel
O’Keefe had published work distinguishing between argument1
and argument2 which was essentially my distinction between an
argument and dispute. I had been scooped!
O’Keefe had made an excellent job of introducing the distinction, and I had to demur. But more than that I discovered the motherlode of work in argumentation theory, still in its infancy, and
mostly in the (then) Journal of the American Forensic Association. I
began researching and absorbing this material and becoming familiar with a whole new slew of scholars. At the same time, I took a
break for several years to write fiction. When I returned to philosophy, or now, argumentation theory, I had deeply changed my perspective. This was in no small part due to the influence of scholars
such as Daniel O’Keefe, Wayne Brockriede, Joseph W. Wenzel,
Scott Jacobs, and, most of all, Charles A. Willard among others.
However, I credit my detour in fiction writing for bringing me to the
realization that informal logic and critical thinking did not mirror
the ways in which people really argued. As a result, in 1988, I
presented a paper, “Multi-modal argumentation,” to the graduate
department at Toronto’s York University. The rest, as they say, is
history.
2. The modes
I will begin the remainder of this essay by reminding you of the
essential aspects of my theory, make some general comments, and
then review the several modes individually.
The theory of multi-modal argumentation holds that communication in general, and argumentation specifically, never occurs in
one single mode. By a ‘mode’ I mean, fuzzily, a means or way of
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communicating, a form of expression, or a style of imparting
information. Modes, then, are systems of messaging using culturally dependent signs, signals and methods intended to pass information from one subject to another. I never suggested that messages were exclusively in one mode or another, but rather that they
were all mixed and could only be examined separately for the
purposes of argumentative investigation. Moreover, I never argued
for the correctness of the four modes I chose and allowed that
other models might select three or five or other numbers of modes.
The four modes I did identify were the logical, the emotional,
the visceral, and the kisceral. The logical mode appears in virtually every argument in one way or another. It is the mode that assists
us in moving from a message to a conclusion in a reasoned and
patterned way. Some arguments are more logically derived than
others, especially those that Chaïm Perelman and Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca (1969) have called quasi-logical. Moreover, premises
within a logical argument will not, ipso facto, be themselves highly logical. The second mode is the emotional mode, and here I
have written that the key is that the emotions being expressed in or
by an argument are more important than the words being used for
that expression. Thus, we often disregard the words someone
utters because we are confident that the message is expressed in
the emotional package in which the words are located.
The third mode is the visceral and covers all aspects of a message or an argument that are physical or environmental. Here the
idea of environment is being used widely to include political and
social aspects of a context such as power relations, physical configurations, and such like. Visceral events can themselves be
premises in an argument and I have used a double square bracket
to indicate them. E.g., [[Robert touches Marcia’s hand]]. This is
important because an action can change the significance of the
words in a message, and, therefore, is part of the message. The
final mode I identified involved the area of communication that is
intuitive, mystical, religious, or revelatory. I call this mode the
kisceral deriving from the Japanese word ‘Ki’ meaning energy.
This is a mode that is often disdained by rationalists, though they
have difficulties dismissing it due to its widespread use (Gilbert
2010). It’s fairly clear, for example, that more of the human popu-
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lation believes in the existence of invisible entities than does not,
and even scholars who are otherwise highly rationalistic believe in
various sorts of deities.
My reasons for introducing the complication of multimodalities into argumentation theory has to do with my respect for
its importance. I believe that argumentation theory is a vital discipline that can be used to understand and hone the tools people
draw on to communicate with each other, embrace agreement and
avoid violence. In order to do this, it seems to me that we need to
examine those sorts of arguments that ordinary arguers actually
use. We cannot simply look at those argument forms we believe
arguers ought to use, but rather those which they do use. It is this
belief that led me to make so much trouble about the forms of
argument we study and to insist that we must go to the arguer
rather than have the arguer come to us.
The issue, as I saw it, was that argumentation theory was focusing on the easy parts, the claim-reason-complexes (CRCs) that
were analyzable and that could be broken into easily digested bits
and be categorized and sorted without too much dissension. Yet,
our own lived experience of arguing with colleagues, friends and
family, demonstrates that arguing is not a linear process with
clearly defined edges and readily identifiable components. Our
lived experience entails, if anything, the exact opposite conclusion: real, every day, marketplace argumentation is frequently
chaotic, rambling, emotional, and rife with explicit and implicit
references to, and reliance on, the context, social milieu, personalities, and personal history of the argument and the arguers.
This is the point made by the late Charles A. Willard in 1989,
based on his work going back to the 1970s (Willard 1989). He
claimed that arguers use all tools at their disposal to persuade a
dispute partner, and also that all communications taking place in
an argument are part of it. In my work, I took these ideas to the
extreme, and included as parts of an argument the physical setting,
mannerisms used, and a multitude of other factors not normally
included in the analysis of an argument. I hope that now the purpose and importance of a multi-modal approach becomes clearer:
in order to investigate the role that all these aspects and factors
play in a complex communication it is necessary to examine them
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using more than the tools logic and even informal logic make
available. We need to analyze these aspects according to their
purpose, intended and actual, and their results, intended and actual.
This demands a very wide breadth. That is where the multi-modal
approach comes in. A multi-modal analysis allows us to examine a
situation from a variety of perspectives with each one adding more
information and insights.
The tools, multi-modal aside, that currently exist are very valuable and very important. The ability to diagram an argument,
investigate it for fallacies, apply a pragma-dialectic analysis, are
all vital tools for the argumentation analyst. Nonetheless, my sense
that the richness of communication was being missed by not applying these tools within the various modes, by not applying them
in a finer way, led me to believe that a great deal of importance
was lost to the analyst. By using these tools within the individual
modes, and by tailoring them to the use and value of the individual
modes, a great deal more can be captured (Gilbert 2004, 2005).
3. Some finer points
I want to emphasize several points that, while mentioned in my
work, should be stressed. The first involves the difficulty of separating the modes, and, more importantly, placing communications
in modes. By this I mean to refer to the process of determining that
some communication, action, message, or argument, is, say, in the
visceral mode rather than the emotional mode. The fact is, that
while there are paradigms of each mode, separability, and its
analogue categorizability, are never definite. Consider, for example, a grimace. A grimace can be used to demonstrate disapproval,
pain, discomfort, or other emotions. In itself, it is a visceral action,
a physical movement of the lips and face. In context it might
indicate something emotional, as when one grimaces at the
thought of going to the dentist or taking an exam. We cannot
know, and need not know, if a grimace is primarily a visceral or
emotional object, except when we are actually analyzing the role
one particular grimace-token plays in a particular argumentative
interaction.
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In this regard, it might have been better to have referred to the
modes as “aspects” as this might have emphasized the ability of an
occurrence to play many roles, and to be viewed in different ways.
The modes do not indicate really different things, but rather ways
of analyzing or dissecting things according to certain interesting
conceptions. A grimace, as it occurs in an encounter, simply is
what it is. The phenomenological experience of a grimace provides us with cues that can be played out in different ways depending largely on the balance of the context. We know from Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Paul Grice, to name but two philosophers, that
we cannot determine meaning outside of context. The phrase,
“That’s just great!” can indicate joy or bedevilment, just like,
“¡Perfecto, es todo necesitamos ahora!” Interestingly, an English
speaker might well understand the import of the Spanish declaration simply by virtue of the context, grimace, and tone. The
modes, rather than being tools for categorizing, are tools for understanding the meanings of a communication.
Whenever we do philosophy, communication theory or any sort
of abstract analysis, we necessarily take things apart, break them
up into bite-size analyzable bits. It is imperative, however, that we
do not mistake the analysis, the model, for the reality. We need to
look at the reality as if it were made up of bits and pieces, but we
must not forget that it is a heuristic, and that the reality is itself
dense and complete. If, to use an analogy, we mix several colours
together is a glass bowl, we end up with a new colour. We know
what colours we put in, but the result is still one colour, and it is
not possible to subsequently separate them out. The modes are like
the colours: we know that they are all in there, and we can discuss
their impact on the whole, but in doing so we are using constructs
and not reality. It is this that I would emphasize more and, perhaps, the term ‘aspects’ would add to that emphasis.
4. The logical mode
I would like to turn now to the various modes and discuss them in
light of the further work I have done and some of the comments
that have been made. Of course, the pre-eminent mode, the
grandmother, is the logical mode. In fact, some rationalists believe
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that all communication is really logical communication in other
guises. That is not to say that every communication is straightforwardly logical, but rather that the way in which we make sense of
it is logical. So, we translate, if you will, in lightning speed so that
it just seems that the reasoning is non-logical when in reality it is
very logical. Miranda Fricker (1995, p. 183) responds to this sort
of approach when she is talking about intuition. Can we really
imagine, she asks, that the many things we do automatically or
quickly like hitting a tennis ball or recognizing a face are really
long drawn-out processes done quickly? That hardly makes sense.
Damasio (1994, p. 171) calls this the high reason view and argues
that it simply can’t work: the available alternatives when we make
choices are overwhelmingly vast, and it would take forever to sort
through them no matter how quickly we did it.
I do not want to spend a great deal of time here simply arguing
that the non-logical modes exist. I concede that we can just about
always create a story about a non-logical communication that
provides it a logical gloss, but I do not see what that proves. We
can give a mechanistic interpretation of, say, love and the sacrifices one makes for it, but such explanations are inevitably unsatisfactory. They fail to explain why some people fall in love and
others do not. They fail to explain altruism, why Jane might love
Jack but not his twin brother Alan, and other lovely anomalies.
Moreover, there is a difference between the cause of something
and the experience of it. Knowing that when I burn my hand, I
am just exciting a bunch of nerves to an extremely high level of
activity, does not make the pain any less.
I was very careful, back when I first introduced the idea of
modes, to choose the term ‘logical’ rather than the term ‘rational.’ This was done to emphasize that there is nothing irrational
about the non-logical modes, but rather, as I put it then, logic is
imperialistic and likes to seem in charge of everything, but that’s
just highlighting, if you will, its aggressive underpinnings. So, in
my world, saying of a communication that it is not logical is not
to denigrate it, but, rather, to point out that different tools need to
be used. Among the tools I have examined most closely are those
pertaining to the emotional mode.
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4. The emotional mode
There is a good case for saying that (virtually) every argument
contains at least a minimal emotional component if for no other
reason than one is moved from inertia to make an argument. The
stimulus that moves one from inertia is some degree of emotional
reaction, some sense of disagreement, some feeling that something
is wrong and that one cares enough to act. This does not mean that
every argument is, at heart, an emotional argument. Rather, it
means that emotion and whatever logical sense goes into an argument are inseparable. Even though the communication might be
quite logical, an emotional argument may still be present provided
the emotions expressed in the argument are more important than
the words and signals used to express them (Gilbert 1995, p. 8). In
other words, the message is in the emotions and not in the discursive component. A simple example is when, as above, the grimace
contradicts the statement. Someone grimacing and saying they are
not in pain will not be believed whereas someone smiling and not
exhibiting stress will be.
All this I take to be non-controversial, and I believe that anyone
involved in any form of communication studies, let alone argumentation theory, would not demur from such an inane conclusion.
I have provided specific maps for investigating emotional arguments in both the informal logic approach and the pragmadialectic theory, (Gilbert 2004, 2005). In these essays I show that
the multi-modal approach can be used without doing serious damage to the structure or intent of the respective theories. However,
these major theories have not embraced any alternative way of
including the analysis of emotion in argument. I believe this
demonstrates, more than anything else, that there still exists a
strong prejudice within argumentation theory against emotion as
an argument forming apparatus (Vide Godden 2003).
There have been, to be clear, a number of scholars who have
been examining the relationship between emotion and argument.
These include, aside from myself, Douglas Walton, Aaron BenZe’ev, Christian Plantin, Christopher Tindale, Brant Burleson,
Sally Planalp, Harald Wohlrapp and Linda Carozza (Ben-Ze'ev
1995, Burleson and Planalp 2000, Plantin 1999, Tindale 2015,
Walton 1992, Wohlrapp 2006, Carozza 2007). Nonetheless, emo-
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tion is still an aside, as opposed to a factor that must be considered
in all circumstances. One reason for this is the mistaken belief that
discursive communication is considerably more precise and manageable than emotional communication. I have argued against this
(Gilbert 2002a) but the prejudice is deeply rooted even though the
truth is that we trust emotional communications more than their
linguistic components. Everyone who is married knows that when
one’s spouse says, “Do whatever you want; I don’t care,” it is the
emotion and not the words that contain the real message.
There is a reason for the avoidance of emotional messages that
goes to the heart of the issue: the fear of psychologism. As I use
the term here, I refer to the ascription to a subject of a position,
belief or attitude based on non-discursive information communicated by the emotion present in a message. Such an ascription is a
direct violation of the pragma-dialectic rule III: “An attack on a
standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has really been advanced by the protagonist” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1987,
p. 286). So, assuming that an interlocutor has expressed an emotional statement which she has not explicitly uttered, it may violate
this rule. On the other hand, the very next rule, IV, states: “A
person can be held to the premisses he leaves implicit” (p. 287). It
is possible that one could play with this tension provided one can
determine safe rules for identifying those situations when an emotional message can be considered implicit. For an attempt at such
an analysis see (Gilbert 2002b).
Informal logic similarly has a prejudice against the unexpressed
except insofar as it might be seen to apply to virtually deductively
entailed enthymematic consequences. Here the penalty is most
likely a charge of hasty conclusion or possibly ignoratio elenchi.
In any case, informal logic has a decided antipathy toward including emotional message components as integrated parts of argument. This is not to say that emotional components are ruled out of
court, but rather that they must be expressed quite explicitly in
ways that emotions are rarely presented. This is clearly demonstrated when arguments are diagrammed: there is simply no place
to put the emotional interpretation of a message that may, in fact,
straightforwardly contradict its discursive statement. In fact, the
ideal informal logic arguer is one that Barbara O’Keefe (1988)
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describes as utilizing the expressive method design logic, the least
flexible and most unsophisticated of the three she describes.
5. The visceral mode
The visceral mode covers a wide range of communicative factors
that, like emotion, are often considered peripheral or irrelevant.
Certainly, the visceral mode includes what is generally considered
non-verbal communication, but also further areas that go beyond
that category. To begin with, I would place some non-verbal communications in the emotional category rather than the visceral because their emotional content simply outweighs their physicality.
That is, the fact of the action or message’s being attached or connected to the body or context is not as important as the emotional
content it carries. This is analogous to discursive versus emotional
content: where when the latter outweighs the former, the message is
considered emotional. Secondly, there are visceral aspects of a
communication which I believe to be very important that would
only be considered non-verbal communication at a stretch. These
include power relations, argument style, social and cultural considerations such as class and gender, as well as other factors that influence an argument or can be used in an argument that would not
traditionally be considered non-verbal communication.
The standard approaches place a huge emphasis on the discursive, often to the point where if something is not discursive it is,
for all practical purposes, ruled out of court. How, I wonder, can
one remove the physical setting of an argument from the process
of the argument? How can we ignore the role, for example, of
uniforms? Of a judge’s robes? Or even the male professor’s ubiquitous tweed jacket? Oh, the traditionalist answers, but it is a
fallacy to take those things into account when evaluating an argument. But it is impossible not to take them into account when
having an argument (Gilbert 2002a). To mention but one area in
which such visceral considerations play an important role, consider gender in argument. Carole Edelsky and Deborah Tannen
(1993), for example, show that men take more speaking turns than
women in mixed gender meetings, and go so far as to suggest that
the traditional yakky female is likely one who talks as much as a
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man. Gender makes an enormous difference in the process of an
argument no matter how much we think it ought not (Gilbert
1994a), and I cannot shake the feeling that it is important that we
pay attention to what is before we focus only on what ought to be.
Authority and categorization, whether by race, gender, culture, or
any other means play an overweening role in the process of argumentation and we ignore it at our peril. The dearth of women in
philosophy, for example, is laid by some (Rooney 2010) at the feet
of the style of argumentation used in philosophy, and especially its
reliance on the argument-as-war metaphor. What does it mean,
then, to state that such factors are irrelevant to the analysis of an
argument? It means that we are removing the argument from its
context, examining it en abstracto, as a CRC, a claim-reasoncomplex, something that exists independent of its users, its hearers, its senders, or persons, and, I believe, there is no such thing.
Having said that, let me give an appreciation to every model that is
a tool in the argumentation theorist’s toolbox. There is nothing
wrong with taking a piece of an argument and using it to demonstrate the kind of connectivity that occurs in argumentation, or to
show that different parts of an argument support each other in
identifiable ways. Whether the process is one involving formal
logic, informal logic, an argument map, or a pragma-dialectic
speech act analysis, it is very valuable—so long as the analysis is
not confused with the argument.
What I am doing by including the visceral mode as a form that
must be investigated is making room for all the factors mentioned
above as well as many others to be examined. Once we understand
a mode, how it works, what its dynamics are, how it can be used
both properly and improperly, then we might be able to create
some valuable normative correlates that will be useful. And this is
why argumentation theory must be a discipline in its own right,
rather than an area cobbled together from bits and pieces of other,
more established areas. A ship builder will employ carpenters,
electricians, all sorts of engineers, glaziers, and so on, but it is the
art of creating a ship that must hold it all together so that the finished project is functional, beautiful, practical and buildable.
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6. The kisceral mode
Recently I have been thinking about the role of kisceral arguments
(Gilbert 2010). The kisceral mode includes argument forms and
data that are involved with intuition, the mystical, hunches, the
religious, mysterious, and generally, non-sensory knowledge and
forms of persuasion. As I regularly point out, more of the human
population believes in the existence of invisible being such as
gods, ghosts, spirits and so on than does not. Moreover, many of
these people believe they have communion with such entities
and/or insight into their nature and being. As puzzling as I find
this, it is nonetheless the case, and even many highly educated
persons maintain such beliefs. One need only look at the scholarly
journals that abound in theology and religious studies to see the
truth of this. The difficulty with the kisceral mode is twofold. The
first issue reflects the strong sense of certainty, of surety, that
many people have concerning some non-sensory belief, while the
second centres on the inability of such beliefs to be subject to
falsification. These two problems are closely related and intertwined.
Surety is at the core of intuition insofar as it puts these beliefs
and arguments apart from other, more empirical beliefs. In fact, we
often feel more strongly and believe more fervently in a select
number of our non-sensory beliefs than we do in our collection of
facts. I believe with a great deal of certainty, for example, that if
one were to write out an integer with as many places as hairs on
the head of the readers of this article there would still be one higher. I can’t prove this, yet I believe it with certainty. This is truly
bizarre: here I am a highly rational person holding firmly to an
unfalsifiable belief that claims that there exists an infinity of invisible objects. It gets worse. Not only do I hold such beliefs, but I
also hold that many others who hold different falsifiable beliefs
with just as much evidence as I have and believe them just as
fervently as I believe my beliefs, are wrong.
My friend Kathy believes that everything that happens to you
happens because you want it to happen. You may not know that
you want it to happen, but you must because otherwise it wouldn’t
happen. This includes everything from winning the lottery to
having cancer. The analyticity and circularity of her position does
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not faze her in the least, any more than the definitional quality of
there being no highest integer perturbs me. Yet it strikes me that
she is wrong and is not justified in holding her belief while I do
have such justification. Here we might say: my belief is fact, yours
is theory, and hers is mysticism. In other words, I know what I am
talking about, but she doesn’t. Nonetheless, both beliefs are unfalsifiable, and both are held with a great deal of certainty, perhaps
hers more than mine, but mine is pretty solid as well.
When philosophers talk about kisceral arguments they typically
worry about such things as axioms and foundational normative
principles (DePaul and Ramsey 1997). One ultimate difficulty for
those who would like to dismiss intuitional arguments, is that the
grounds for doing so typically rely on intuition (Sosa 2006). One
way of thinking about kisceral arguments is to consider the discovery/justification distinction. We tell our introductory students
that the process of discovery is different than the presentation of
justification. Yet in many kisceral arguments this is not the case;
in those cases, the experience of discovery is the same as the
justification. The mystic whose acolyte proceeds along certain
specified steps may be following the only form of justification
available, just as the intuitionist mathematicians saw the process of
proof creation, the actual construction of a mathematical object, as
essential to its justification. Are there facts we cannot comprehend
if we do not have certain experiences? Can a male never understand a mother’s love because he has never experienced pregnancy? Am I an atheist because I have never had a revelation or a
mystical experience? In most cases I reject these ideas for what I
consider are good reasons. I believe, for example, that there is
likely no major difference between the love of an adoptive mother
compared to a biological one, and once exceptions begin to accrue,
it’s only a matter of time before they become overwhelming.
The problem is that my belief, even if supported by evidence
from social psychology, ultimately rests on an intuition as well.
This means that the role of argumentation theory is to find the
means for separating and evaluating different beliefs according to
criteria that can be accepted by the partners and agreed upon as
legitimate grounds for distinguishing between acceptable and
unacceptable beliefs. This, of course, has both object level and
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Multi-Modal 2020 501
meta level applications. The object level may have identifiable
rules and procedures as Western philosophy does with logic and
its less formal siblings, or if not carefully laid out there are likely
precedents and traditions. On the meta level matters are more
complex because it is there that we will find differences in basic
means of establishing beliefs and truths. A Papal edict, for example, does not carry weight with a non-Catholic, while for a member of the faith it is a sign of absolute truth. In these cases, kisceral
arguments carry great weight, and the question of whether or not
we can separate those we like and those we do not becomes much
more tenuous. Still, the job is there to be done.
7. Context
It will have been noticed in my presentation that I have not distinguished between arguments as objects and arguments as processes,
or, to use Daniel O’Keefe’s (1977) language, argument1 and argument2. I have avoided this distinction because, on the one hand,
the multi-modal framework cuts across it, and on the other, the
distinction itself is not terribly useful aside from providing some
paradigmatic exemplars. The real problem with the argument1 and
argument2 distinction lies in the complexity and necessity of context in understanding arguments. The identification and isolation
of a typical argument1 requires that we understand enough of the
context to be able to remove it and inspect it, and yet, unless we
are examining something created for a critical thinking class, it is
impossible to understand it in isolation from that context. Moreover, if we allow that anything that influences an argument is part
of it, then the context is part of it and, thereby, an argument2. We
end up with a sort of Heisenberg principle of argumentation: to
remove a part of an argument from its context is to thereby, ipso
facto, change it. This is not to say that we cannot study something
in isolation, but rather that when we do so we are missing a great
deal of important information.
I believe it is obvious that the notion of context is important,
and many authors and theories pay lip service to this. Examples
are often preceded by short paragraphs that describe the general
background, for example, of a letter to the editor. But this is noth-
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502 Gilbert
ing. Compare this to the analysis that might accompany the discovery of an archeological relic where the surrounding area, adjacent soil, general location, historical knowledge of the area, flora
and fauna will all be examined to learn more about the object.
Context can demonstrate a great deal as when we examine a political situation and the arguments presented for it. Claudio Duran’s
2006 analysis of the Chilean press (Duran 2006), takes enormous
amounts of local, social and historical information into account.
Moreover, a rich account naturally examines the several modes as
a means to understanding an object and its processes. If our archeological find was a tool, was it decorated? Did it appear cared for?
Important to its owner? Part of a set? These are emotional questions. Was it made from local materials? What tools were used to
make this one? These are visceral questions. Did it have a spiritual
aspect? Were there designs appealing to gods or demons? These
are kisceral aspects. Just as with other endeavours, understanding
arguments requires a knowledge of the context, and the ways in
which the message was communicated, intended and used. This, in
turn, can be ably assisted by a multi-modal analysis.
8. Viva Mexico
One very interesting factor that has come to the fore in the 20 or so
years since I began promulgating multi-modal argumentation has
been just where and where not it has, if you will, caught on. It has
not been a major success in argumentation theory as performed in
Canada, the United States, or Holland; three places where argumentation theory has definitely taken hold (though this does seem
to be gradually changing). These are all countries where the logical mode and the critical-logical model are dominant. While certainly eschewing formal logic as a model for marketplace argumentation, its replacement, informal logic or pragma-dialectics, is
also quite structured and linear. Most importantly, it is productorientated. Arguments are artifacts that are viewed and examined
in isolation from context and situation. The arguer is irrelevant to
the analysis of the dispute on pain of fallacy, i.e., argumentum ad
hominem. The self-same argument given in dramatically different
circumstances by very different interlocutors and audiences with
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Multi-Modal 2020 503
very different goals and backgrounds would be assessed in the
very same way.
It is similar to the role of propositions in philosophy of language. The sentence, ‘The cat is on the mat,’ we are told is the
same proposition as the sentence, “That damn cat is on my grandmother’s hand-made mat again!” I find this ludicrous. If you find
it true, then so much the worse for the idea of proposition, a concept I have not understood in fifty years of philosophy. We do not
communicate via propositions, but with messages, and messages
contain a wealth of information not carried in words. Arguments
are much the same: an argument is a series of messages centred on
an avowed disagreement. Everything that touches on the comprehension and interpretation of those messages is part of the argument. This includes the relevant emotions, physical location,
personalities of the arguer and audience, gender of the arguer and
audience, actions of the participants, and even possibly the weather. To say that informal logic and pragma-dialectics do not make
room for such factors is an understatement.
Multi-modal argumentation as well as coalescent argumentation
have been well received in other places. One, in particular, is
Mexico. At a conference at Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo
Leon, I learned that a number of graduate students were writing
dissertations focused on my work. This was also true at the Universidad Autónoma de Nayarit and the Universidad de Guadalajara. In addition, a number of younger scholars in Europe, including
Spain, are also finding the work appealing. My recent book, Arguing with People, has been translated in Spanish by Fernando Leal
of the Universidad de Guadalajara, and is now available (Gilbert
2017). This is being sold at a nominal cost (MP$200) to make it
maximally available. In addition, I have spoken at many universities in Mexico, and expect to visit more. I put forward a totally unevidenced theory that there is a factor of cultural attractiveness
involved. Clearly, my work appeals to the Latin soul, a soul that
typically embraces emotion and, yes, the mystical. This openness
means that not everything is assumed to be straightforward, orderly and following a set pattern. My approach to argument views it
as a social interaction where anything can and does happen. Understanding an argument does not, to me, mean identifying its
© Michael A. Gilbert. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2022), pp. 487–506.
504 Gilbert
premisses and conclusions; it goes beyond the logical, formal or
informal, relations between the parts of “the argument.” The indeterminacy of translation itself precludes the identification of such
allegedly precise components, as anyone who has argued with
students following a translation quiz can attest.
To understand an argument we must, as Willard said, “get our
hands dirty.” We have to know the actors, what they are feeling,
what their goals are, their motivations, values, relationships and
shared beliefs, not to mention coded language. Of course, applying
informal logic precepts can be valuable, but not as a way of understanding what the argument is about or whether it is a good or bad
one. For that, much more information is needed. So, cultures
which are not restrictive in their means of expression and give
license to emotional, physical, and kisceral arguments as well as
the logical, are cultures in which my work can thrive.
I have, in the preceding, tried to present both an amplification
and defence of multi-modal argumentation. I believe, as do some
others, that it can be a useful and powerful tool for investigating
the structure, meaning, and reliability of arguments. We must
never forget, in examining the models that make theorizing possible, that the models are but mere shadows of the reality.
Acknowledgements
Research and writing of this paper was originally supported by
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Grant 4102008-1999.
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