Aristotle on Friendship

ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP Onyenuru Okechukwu P pauloke24@gmail.com INTRODUCTION No man is an island! This is a common phrase used when people wish to emphasize the inevitability of living harmoniously in a community, of peaceful co-existence, or of “the other person”. The objects of moral philosophy are moral codes and principles guiding the behaviour of persons in a community. Why will there be a need for ethics if interaction is unnecessary, and so at the heart of Aristotle’s moral philosophy is his analysis on inter relationship which he calls “Friendship” in his Nicomachean Ethics. In this essay, we shall expose Aristotle’s concept of friendship, which will include the classes and levels of friendship. We shall also look at what he thinks about the “goodness” status of friendship and whether it is necessary for living a good life. Finally we shall explore other views on friendship, and the contemporary conception of it. WHAT IS FRIENDSHIP? In the eighth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tasks himself with addressing the issue of friendship. He uses the Greek word λ α to mean friendship between persons. The bond between persons in friendship is a result of something that is liked, whether it be the good or an apparent good. Whatever the case may be (good or apparent good),the choice is subject to the individual, for “it is thought that each man likes what is good for himself, and although the likeable is the good without qualification, each man likes what is good for himself”.1 1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VIII, 1155b, 24 1 The object of our likeness can be either inanimate or animate. In the case of the former, men do not refer to this as friendship because though one may like the object, the object does not return the likeness just as the thing is not wished any good by the one who likes.2 For instance one who likes beer wishes to be satisfied with the best lager, yet the beer is not wished any good, just as the beer lacks the capacity to like the consumer. Friendship is thus established between animates who have the capacity to return the likeness and wish themselves good for the sake of the other. For Aristotle, well-disposed friendship is one in which the other does not return the same wish given, and reciprocal friendship is established when it can be identified that both parties wish each other well in the same way.3 When can two persons then be said to be in friendship? He replies to this that “to be friends, then, two men should be well-disposed towards each other and wish each other good without being unaware of this….”4 This means that a person in friendship is disposed to liking the other intentionally, rather than spontaneously such as obtained in feelings and sensation geared towards satisfying the appetite5. Next he proceeds to analyze the species of friendship based on what it is that attract and binds one person to another. He identifies three kinds: 1) Friendship of Pleasure As the name goes, this friendship has its object of likeness in pleasure such as game, sexual and romantics. Two persons are friends of pleasure if they satisfy the pleasurable need of one another. One wishes the other good in as much as the thing shared is optimally supplied, but this goodwill is never extended for the sake of the other person.6 Friendship of pleasure seems to be 2 Ibid., 1155b, 28 Ibid., 1155b, 32 4 Ibid., 1156a, 3 5 Ibid., 1157b, 30 6 Ibid., 1156a, 15 3 2 passion driven for it occurs more in young persons who are quick to respond to impulses of passion and go after what is expedient. Although it is easy to come by in this class of humans (teenagers and youths), yet it is short-lived because the duration for a kind of passionate need is short and so when that phase expires, the friendship collapses.7 There is a kind of ease of bonding or making friend of this sort so it can be extended to so many persons at once in as much as both parties receive the same kind of pleasure and attain the same level of reciprocation of pleasure. 2) Friendship of Usefulness. There is enormous resemblance of this kind of friendship with that of pleasure but here, what is sought by both parties are useful material good, or what appears to be temporal goods. It may also be referred to as friendship of utility. It exists in virtue of an attribute, for a man is liked not in virtue of what he is but insofar as he gives some good….8 Friendship of utility is predominantly found in old persons who prefer to pursue that which is beneficial to them rather than what is pleasurable, because at this stage in life they have little or no drive for sensual pleasure.9 Also, old persons do not easily get along with people due to their redundancy in seeking pleasure, and no person will wish to spend time with an unhappy fellow. Therefore, they hardly get entangled with friendship of pleasure but readily hook-up with friends who can meet their material needs10 most done in order to compensate for losses in their youth. Business partners, trade associates and generally commercially minded persons (heads of state, ambassadors, monarch, CEO of companies) are those who readily engage in friendship of utility and it is the most short-lived since it brings the least happiness.11 7 Ibid., 1156a, 31-1156b, 5 Ibid., 1156a, 18 9 Ibid., 1156a, 25 10 Ibid., 1158a, 5-10 11 Ibid., 1158a, 20 8 3 3) Perfect Friendship. Aristotle emphasized more on this kind of friendship which he uses as a yardstick for all other kinds. He also calls it friendship without qualification; not in virtue of attribute; or of virtue. Perfect friendship is one that exists between men who are good and alike with respect to virtue.12 A good man is able to distinguish between the good and an apparent good, and so recognizes the good in the other person. He likes his virtuous friend because he sees him as a reflection of himself.13 Thus, just as he wishes himself good, he extends this goodwill to his friend, not for the sake of what he will gain from the friendship, but for the sake of the wellbeing of his friend.14 Since that which is good is both useful and pleasurable, the good man is this to himself and also to his friend without qualification, and will receive similar good from his friend due to the goodness inherent in his friend.15 So the well-disposednesss of both friends is equal by virtue of their being good men. This places friendship of virtue on the top as it is a composite of utility, pleasure and more. Perfect friendship is the most stable for two reasons. First, what is liked in the other person is the virtue that lies within. Since virtue is stable, what is liked becomes stable and so does the friendship. Second, both parties are equally well-disposed to each other not by virtue of an attribute which is not stable.16 Firmness of this nature makes it difficult to inflict harm on this kind of friendship by slander, and even distance cannot dent it rather the exercise of friendly 12 Ibid., 1156b, 8 Ibid., 1170b, 5-8 14 Ibid., 1156b, 11 15 Ibid., 1156b, 20 16 Ibid., 1156b, 12-13 13 4 activities17. The rarity of perfect friendship is evident because of its high demand on virtue, and as only a few men exist who are virtuous, it becomes uncommon. It is a common saying that “a friend in need is a friend indeed”. υerfect friendship requires a test of time during which the usefulness and goodness of both parties are tested. Similarly, since pleasure has to do with enjoying each other’s company, getting along, and even living harmoniously together, familiarity is necessary for perfect friendship.18 EQUITY IN FRIENDSHIP In a couple of places, Aristotle emphasizes on equity in what is shared by friends. He identifies two distinct levels of equity19: 1. When friends receives the same kind of pleasure or utility from each other and wish the same thing for each other, it s called “equality in friendship”.20 Hence both parties receive from the other pleasure or benefit, which is the fuel of the friendship, and wishes the other good towards maximizing the endurance of what is gained not necessarily for the sake of the persons. Equality in friendship is primarily dependent upon quality of things exchanged and secondarily on merits borne by both parties. 2. “Equality in what is just” on the other hand is an equal possession of virtue, vice, social status etc. by both parties. This kind of equality is based primarily on merit and secondarily on quality. Therefore men standing in contrasting position of virtue, vice, social status, greatness etc. cannot expect to be friends. This is why according to Aristotle, friendship between a man and God is not plausible.21 17 Ibid., 1157a, 21-1157b, 11 Ibid., 1156b, 26 19 Ibid., 1158b, 30-1159a, 30 20 Ibid., 1158b, 2 21 Ibid., 1159a, 6 18 5 Thus equality of friendship is necessary for friendships of pleasure and utility, but in perfect friendship, what is required is equality in what is just which is not deficient in any way of equality of pleasure and utility shared. Is there also equality in certain relationships such as found in the family, community or nation? Aristotle is affirmative about this, but hinges it on a system of relationship. For him, the one who gives more in one aspect must be compensated with an excess in other things such as being liked better or given more affection.22 Thus the relationship between a father or mother and their children, or a king and his subject should take the form of a monarchial system; that between a father and mother should be Aristocratic; and between a siblings or equals should be democratic. He doesn’t forget to draw to our attention the fact that every friendship has laws guiding it, different laws apply to different kinds of friendship, for what is allowed or permissible to one may not be permissible to the other.23 In order for friendship to flourish, these laws must be respected by each party. THE GOOD OF FRIENDSHIP Does man need friendship? Is friendship a requirement for a fulfilled life? In the first few lines of his book, Aristotle explicitly states that “friendship is a virtue or something with virtue, and besides, it is most necessary to life for no man would choose to live without friends, though he were to have all the goods.”24 Being a virtue and something that is desired by all, it is a necessary good. In fact Aristotle calls friendship the greatest external good, and the essential constituent of a flourishing life.25 Since the end of all of man’s activity is happiness, and happiness is not an innate constituent of man, but an activity26, friendship is thus necessary for a happy life because 22 Ibid., 1158b, 24 Ibid., 1159b, 25-1160a, 5 24 Ibid., 1155a. 4-6 25 Ibid., 1169b, 8 26 Ibid., 1160b, 35 23 6 it entails engaging in useful and pleasant activities and also contemplating the good of the other person.27The good of friendship also includes provision of a companion with whom one can share both good and bad times.28 As it is towards one’s kind that one can display virtue, it is necessary that friendship exists in order to fulfill this human quest and to avoid living a solitary life. It may seem that evil or witty men should have no need for friendship, but this is false. Even though they prefer to choose the apparent good, it does not stop their longing for that which is good in itself. In this way they seek friendship too, however with one of their kind, so that as the friendship of between good men perfect their virtue, that between evil men perfect their vice.29 CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF FRIENDSHIP In Cooper’s commentary on Aristotle’s friendship, he identifies a kind of contradiction in his defining attribute of friendship. Aristotle says that “in speaking of a friend……. we say that we should wish the things that are good for his (the friends) sake”30 inferring that selfless goodwill is essential for friendship of all kinds. However, when a person in a pleasure or utility friendship extends a self-seeking or self-centered goodwill to his friend will this still be termed friendship? Cooper also questions Aristotle’s criteria for perfect friendship. By calling the parties in this kind this friendship “good men” (αγα ο ), it seems that only fully perfect persons – heroes of intellect and character- are open to having it. 31 Since one with this quality is quite difficult or even impossible to come by, it is doubtful if perfect friendship is not something of an idea rather a thing obtainable within human communities which consist of ordinary persons who are an admixture of both good and bad qualities. 27 Ibid., 1170a, 1-5 Ibid., 11.71a, 3 29 Ibid., 1172a, 11-16 30 Ibid., 1155b, 31 31 J. M Cooper. Aristotle on Friendship In Essay on Aristotle’s Ethics, Ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (California: University of California Press Ltd., 1980), p. 304 28 7 Cooper proposes a different approach to interpreting the three kinds of friendship. For him, friends of all three sorts genuinely show a disintegrated goodwill towards one another. They differ merely in the condition under which that goodwill is displayed. In friendship of utility and pleasure, the friends show this selfless goodwill towards each other only on the condition that the benefit of the union remains. Greatness for the other can be sought without prejudice to the conditions.32 Another critique is that of his use of an all-encompassing word. In Greek, there are four words employed for the purpose of describing human relationships: αγαπ (between a deity and man), επο (between two passionate lovers), λα (dispassionate virtuos love between persons), and ο γ (affection felt by parents towards their children). But Aristotle makes use of the fourth, philia, in describing all sorts of relationships including family, passionate lovers, voluntary associations, political societies, business partnership. It seems that his main interest is to establish the binding force between persons in relationships.33 Finally, there is an aspect of the “other self” that Aristotle never fully articulates. Part of the beauties of friendship is not only that one shares in the joys and pains of the other, but that one can fully understand his friend and be in synchrony with his/her psychology. This is called empathy, a cognitive experience which involve stepping into another’s shoes. Adam Smith sees it as feeling another’s pain or anguish through an act of imagination, to trading places in fancy.34 David Hume uses the word sympathy to mean the same thing, which for him is a kind of vicarious arousal, a congruent feeling that allows access into the mind. Thus a person is on the same “footing” or “page “with his friend. Aristotle seems to be narrow-minded by encapsulating friendship in gain. 32 Ibid., p. 305 Ibid., p 301-302 34 Adams Smith. The Theory of Moral Sentiments”. (New York: Prome Thesus Books, 2006), p.4 33 8 CONTEMPORARY OUTLOOK OF FRIENDSHIP The modern man that emerged after the enlightenment is one that has traded traditional communities for modern ones. This exchange has led to decadence in his morality and decay in human values especially friendship which was one of the strongest pillars of traditional communities. Modern man is so engrossed with making fortunes that time and occasion of making real friends is so meager. This quest for undue greatness has reduced the level of trust and inter-dependence, a disposition necessary for friendship. From a classical utilitarian view flavoured with an egoistic attitude, people go into friendship such as marriage not for love but for what that union will benefit them, members of their families or friends. Young persons go into relationships for the sexual pleasures and other material benefits they will get rather than wishing for a happy life, a life of virtue. This has led to premarital pregnancy, unplanned married life, divorces and unavoidably unhappy life. The prevalent philosophy proposed by Kant has reduced friendship to duty that must be performed rather than a good which everyone is supposed to strive for. For instance, friend is helped not out of love, sympathy or empathy, but merely out of duty. The good of friendship is here lost. Finally, with the invention of social network, one would think that people will be brought ever closer, but internet globalization has not achieved this objective. People have made virtual friends with fake identities which has cost many their goods and even their life. This is not to say that it has not been beneficial to some, but the fact remains that people parade false identities on the internet, casting a slur on the value system of modern man. CONCLUSION Aristotle has given us an “eagle’s view” of the nature of friendship. Friendship is an essential good for every man whether good and bad. He identifies three kinds of friendship based on their 9 condition of likeness yet emphasizes on perfect friendship as one which everyone should strive to obtain. However, as man is a dynamic being, he could not have hoped to exhaust everything on this topic. From the point man began to see himself more in relation to nature and less in relation to God and his fellow man he gradually began to lose the basics and even the spirit of friendship. Quest for knowing nature has resulted in a decline in knowing the self. It is doubtful if pristine friendship or friendship for improvement of virtue and sustenance of a harmonious society can ever be practiced today. 10 BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle, Nichomechian Ethics. Transl. by Hippocrates G. A. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gerson. Iowa: Peripatetic Press, 1982. Cooper, J. M. “Aristotle on Friendship” In Essay on Aristotle’s Ethics, Ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty. California: University of California Press Ltd., 1980. Cooper, J. 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