Clemency

This dissertation attempts to illuminate the enigma of the Seneca whom we see in Tacitus, "Seneca politicus", and his capacity at the Palace. The project thus evaluates the three most accessible sources for both how Nero would have viewed Seneca, and how Seneca presented himself to Nero—Nero’s childhood and education, 'Apocolocyntosis', and 'De clementia'. Assessment of these sources through Nobel Laureate Michael Spence's game-theoretical model of signaling and signal games forms a model of their relationship, which itself becomes the thesis of the dissertation. The thesis contends that, post accession, Seneca engaged Nero in a didactic relationship focusing on philosophy—or, rather, on his own insights into ethical decision-making and morality in interpersonal dealings. But the details surrounding this deduction nuance its interpretation. His presentation of philosophy to Nero smacks of practicality. It is opportunistic, utilizing the philosophically propaedeutic nature of Nero’s education; and his own contribution to the imperial intellect, "clementia", is not convincingly Stoic. Seneca wished to be trusted for his ability to offer advice on interpersonal dealings, and to form acute judgments about other people and their actions.

Approximately three decades ago, two of us, Terrell Carter and Kempis Songster, were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that this sentence, effectively an order to die in prison, represented a legal determination that we were irredeemable. In this Article, with insights from our coauthor and friend, human rights scholar Rachel López, we ask: What does it mean for the law to judge some human beings as incapable of redemption? Isn't the capacity for change core to the human condition, and shouldn't that be reflected in the law? This Article marries human rights law with our lived experience to argue that the capacity for redemption is an innate human characteristic. By documenting the dehumanizing effect of codified condemnation and the struggle for humanity after a person has been found irredeemable in a court of law, we seek to show why all humans should have a legal right to redemption-a right embedded in the Eighth Amendment through the latent concept of human dignity. The reading of the Eighth Amendment we call for would require a dramatic reimagination of the U.S. criminal legal system into one that elevates humanity, not deprives it. One that creates the opportunity for healing and human development, not denies it. One that facilitates the human capacity for redemption, not forbids it. One, in other words, that recognizes that change is always possible. Redeeming justice thus requires that legal systems not make unalterable decisions about a human being's capacity for change. At a bare minimum, this means that all sentences should be reviewable, with release possible after someone redeems herself. No person should be permanently deprived of her hope for freedom.

Regarding the operational specifics of death penalty policy, Professors Johnson and Zimring have argued that it is extreme left or right wing authoritarian states’ aversion to a limitation of their own powers that determines high rates of executions in countries such as Vietnam, Singapore, China and North Korea as opposed to other, less-punitive Asian nations which share similar cultural and religious characteristics.  For a regime like Vietnam’s, the swift carrying out of a death sentence, especially when performed in public, serves to highlight the state’s power over life and death and enhance political control over the domestic constituency.  At first glance then, little scope for the exercise of the clemency power as a form of lenient reprieve from the death sentence by the executive government appears possible under a repressive regime of this nature.

However, unlike China and Singapore, a notable feature of Vietnam’s death penalty practice since the Doi Moi reforms of 1986 has been the executive’s willingness to reprieve a large minority of prisoners sentenced to death through Presidential clemency, even though executions themselves have continued unabated.  What official and unofficial justifications have been given for grants of Presidential clemency in Vietnam, and relatedly, what structural and cultural factors explain the use of clemency in a noticeable proportion of death penalty cases?  These are the under-researched questions I provide plausible explanations for in this article, incorporating an empirical study of Vietnam’s death penalty clemency grants since the mid-1980s, interpreted through the lens of the relevant academic literature on clemency and pardon grants.

ÖZET Günümüz dünyasında¸maddîdünyasında¸maddî imkânların çoğalmasına rağmen¸insanîrağmen¸insanî değerlerin azaldığı görülmektedir. Son yıllardaçinayet¸yıllardaçinayet¸şiddet¸yıllardaçinayet¸şiddet¸tecavüz¸yıllardaçinayet¸şiddet¸tecavüz¸hırsızlık suçlarının arttığını görüyoruz. Bütün bunlar bize¸"bize¸"Acaba insanlarda merhamet ve empati azalıyor mu?" sorusunu sordurmaktadır. Şiddet¸öfke¸saldırganlık¸haksızlık¸zulümŞiddet¸öfke¸Şiddet¸öfke¸saldırganlık¸Şiddet¸öfke¸saldırganlık¸haksızlık¸Şiddet¸öfke¸saldırganlık¸haksızlık¸zulüm gibi insanı yok eden davranışları engelleyecek¸ilişkilerimizinengelleyecek¸ilişkilerimizin temeline sevgi ve yardımlaşmayı koyacak duygulardan biri de merhamet duygusu ve olaylara ve insanlara empati ile bakmaktır. Merhamet¸insanıMerhamet¸insanı kendine ve kendinin dışındakilere iyilik ve yardım etmeye yönlendiren acıma duygusudur. Merhamet sıradan bir acıma duygusu değildir. Merhametten¸ bütün yaratılmışlara sevgi ve şefkatle yaklaşma¸onlarıyaklaşma¸onları kötülükten ve zulümden koruma ve kurtarma¸yardımkurtarma¸yardım etme¸bağıştaetme¸bağışta bulunma¸affetmebulunma¸affetme gibi güzel huy ve davranışlar ortaya çıkar. Merhamet insanın¸temelinsanın¸temel insanî duygularından biridir. Bu duyguya sahip olmayan bir insan her türlü felakete sebep olabilir. Bu durumda merhamet duygusunun¸insanlığıduygusunun¸insanlığı hatırlatan sıfatların önemlilerinden olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Rahmet ve şefkat duygusundan yoksun bulunan kalbin sahibi¸kaba¸katı¸acımasızsahibi¸kaba¸sahibi¸kaba¸katı¸sahibi¸kaba¸katı¸acımasız bir insan olur. Bu kötü vasıflardan ise zulüm ve adaletsizlik¸bunlardanadaletsizlik¸bunlardan da huzursuzluk doğar. Kendisi için istediğini başkası için de istemek ya da kendi için yapılmasını istemediğini başkasına da yapmamak İslam'ın en güzel ahlak ilkelerinden biridir. Bu davranışa günümüzde "empati" deniliyor. Empati kişiler arası iletişimin en vazgeçilmez unsurlarından biridir. Empati¸kişinin¸kendiniEmpati¸kişinin¸Empati¸kişinin¸kendini karşısındaki kişinin yerine koyarak¸onunkoyarak¸onun duygu ve düşüncelerini anlamaya çalışması ve anladığını karşı tarafa "Seni anlıyorum." mesajı hâlinde iletmesidir. Peygamber Efendimiz¸birEfendimiz¸bir hadis-i şerifte¸"şerifte¸"Sizden biri¸kendisibiri¸kendisi için sevdiğini kardeşi için de sevmedikçe gerçek imana eremez." buyurarak yıllar öncesinden empati çizgisini hayat 1 1 "Merhamet ve Empati Değerleri ve Peygamberimiz", Uluslararası Hz. Peygamber ve Gençlik Sorunları Çalıştayı, 05-06 Ekim 2019

La riduzione ad una sola virtù "straordinaria" e la scelta della clementia appaiono in avvio quasi inevitabili, ma costringono Seneca in una duplice gabbia, quella encomiastica di una virtus esclusiva del principe e quella storica della tradizione tardorepubblicana e già imperiale della clementia principis. Il vizio d'origine, rimasto latente nel libro I, dato l 'intento parenetico ed encomiastico, il ricorso ad exempla storici e, come detto, l 'esplicito rifiuto di trattare le problematiche di ordine teoretico, emerge però nel libro II: a livello di tradizione filosofica, infatti, Seneca con difficoltà poteva trovare appigli per la sua sovraestimazione della clementia, poiché nelle fonti greche praotes ed epieikeia, che si ritiene le corrispondano, non si trovano affatto in posizione di predominio sulle altre virtù, il che comporta quindi un vero e proprio hysteron proteron assiologico nel De clementia. Non trovando appigli per esso nella tradizione e non potendo parlare della clementia ignorando le altre virtù o sovvertendo lo schema stoico Seneca è costretto verso la "fine" del libro II a recuperare 1'apparato argomentativo e lessicale tradizionale, a partire proprio dal termine sapiens, che, come molti commentatori hanno notato, si sostituisce a rex, a princeps o al Du-Stil. Anche il "qualcosa in più" in cui è fatta consistere la clementia e che dovrebbe distinguere il principe dagli altri ed innalzarlo al proprio fastigium, si stempera o nell'aequitas giuridica o nell'humanitas e rinnega quindi, di fatto, il carattere particolarissimo del monarca.
L’abilità retorica di Seneca è tale da mascherare comunque il difficile Itinerario della clementia e la saldatura oggettivamente ardua tra la componente tradizionale romana e quella stoica, grazie soprattutto alla cortina diversiva desunta dai Fiirstenspiegel, fatta di excursus e di richiami ad una serie di tematiche minori, tra cui ricordo ancora la divinizzazione, l'immagine dei rapporti tra sovrano e sudditi come anima e corpo dello stato (1, 3, 2- 4, 3), il topos del principe sopra le leggi che si comporta come se le dovesse rispettare (1, l, 4) e quello della "nobile schiavitù", che sono tutti indipendenti dalla clementia.

T. Alonge, "Le pardon d'Auguste et le calcul d'Octave dans le dénouement de Cinna", Tropics, 5, 2018, p. 217-230.
Online: http://tropics.univ-reunion.fr/accueil/numero-5/supplement-autour-du-programme-de-lagregation-de-lettres-2019/tristan-alonge-le-pardon-dauguste/

İslam tasavvufunda yaratılışın asıl sebebi, kişinin Yaratan"ını bulup varlığın hakikatine erişmesidir. Kişinin bu hakikate vakıf olabilmesi, zuhur eden idrake eşlik eden derin muhabbetle mümkündür. Kişi; kendisini yok edeni, yoktan var edeni idrak eder ve muhabbet deryasında mükerrem kılınır. Bundan ötürüdür ki tasavvuf geleneğinde su; hayat, marifet, safiyet, ilahi feyz, kâmil nefs manalarına tekabül eder.

Como he demostrado en mi tesis doctoral, el perdón ejerció un importante papel en las estrategias políticas y legitimadoras de los soberanos omeyas andalusíes. En esta ocasión, haré un repaso de la institución del amān por ser una de las manifestaciones de esta clemencia más habituales en las crónicas sobre el período omeya. Se ha demostrado que la narración de estos pactos supuso un espacio excepcional para los cronistas a la hora de presentar una imagen estereotipada del soberano clemente, basando la firma de acuerdos de paz en la naturaleza benevolente de los gobernantes, en vez de verlo como una posible necesidad de negociación o una muestra de debilidad. El relato sobre la defensa de Tudmir será una vez más objeto de análisis por ser un interesante ejemplo de recreación historiográfica de la sumisión de ciudades, volviendo a repasar los paralelismos que existen entre este relato y otros similares con un precedente oriental como la toma de Hayr, en Arabia.

On 16 March 2015, Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim’s petition for pardon from what he claims was a politically-motivated conviction for sodomising his male aid was rejected by Malaysia’s King, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. In Malaysia’s Federal jurisdiction, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong exercises the prerogative power to grant clemency or pardon on advice from a specially-constituted Pardons Board, consisting of up to five members.

In this article, I describe the way in which the Malaysian Pardons Boards operate, and propose a set of plausible hypotheses explaining why the rejection of Anwar’s application for pardon, submitted on his behalf by his wife and daughters, came as no surprise. Despite arguments in the Malaysian media being made in favour of the purported independence of the Pardons Board as a decision-making body and the pre-eminence of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong as the final decision maker on pardon, this article demonstrates argues that through its composition and procedures, the Federal Pardons Board that disposed of Anwar’s petition is open to the perception that it may be subject to significant political influence from the Barisan Nasional government in power in Malaysia.

Papers. This series aims to increase understanding of current legal issues arising in the legal systems of Asian countries. They can be downloaded without charge from http://law.unimelb.edu.au/centres/alc/research/publications/alc-briefing-paper-series Each of the 4 bilingual papers has its own system of referencing.

Desde antes da Constituição de 88, tem sido uma prática constante os Presidentes da República editarem, ao final de cada ano, decretos de indulto com o objetivo de perdoar penas de pessoas condenadas pela justiça criminal. Nos últimos anos, diante do vertiginoso aumento da população encarcerada e da ineficácia de alternativas tradicionais para frear esse crescimento, o poder de perdão do Presidente tem sido alçado como um instrumento capaz de, ao menos, mitigar o ímpeto punitivo do Estado. O resultado desse movimento foi a produção de decretos com maior número de hipóteses de perdão e com requisitos menos restritivos para a sua concessão. Ocorre que pouco se sabe sobre a aplicação do indulto pelo Poder Judiciário, responsável pela sua concretização. Diante disso, este trabalho busca, a partir de uma pesquisa empírica baseada em 207 pedidos de perdão formulados ao Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo em favor de pessoas condenadas por tráfico de drogas, reconstruir o fluxo do processamento desses requerimentos e identificar os atores, os momentos, e os fatores institucionais que condicionam a implementação pelo Poder Judiciário da prerrogativa presidencial de extinguir penas. De modo geral, a pesquisa ilumina a capacidade de interferência do Chefe do Poder Executivo na execução penal e, ao mesmo tempo, ilustra o protagonismo dos juízes de 1ª instância na condução dessa intervenção.

Abingdon: Routledge, 2016. xiv + 203 pp. Hardcover: £90* In 1977, Israeli academic Leslie Sebba published two articles comparing constitutional arrangements for executive clemency the world over. 1 Despite some thematic coverage in comparative constitutional law or death penalty textbooks, 2 and several smaller-scale comparative studies, 3 Sebba's work remained the leading scholarship on executive clemency across national borders for almost 40 years. There are good reasons for the scarcity of academic literature on executive clemency (broadly defined as the executive branch reducing or abrogating lawfully-imposed punishment, without fully exonerating the prisoner 4 ), particularly in a comparative context. Clemency deliberations by executive decision-makers throughout the world are usually performed in secret, with public justification for the exercise of clemency rarely given. Accordingly, possible reasons behind death sentence commutations are rarely analysed in any systematic way. However, this does not make such research and less urgent. As Kobil observes, clemency and pardons now demand academic explanation to an even greater degree:

The emperor Justinian is not known today for his mercy, but during his reign he and his ministers led a concerted effort to present him as merciful. Historians like Procopius and John Malalas recorded numerous, specific examples of the emperor’s grand acts of clemency. The emperor and his legal ministers touted clemency in the Novels of Justinian. Courtiers such as Agapetus and Paul the Silentiary praised the virtue as well. The propaganda of mercy in the reign of Justinian drew on historical traditions from the earlier Roman Empire, the Hellenistic world, and Christian teaching.

The question of whether Diya constitutes a form of clemency or pardon is an important issue that has not yet been sufficiently addressed by scholars of Islamic Law, nor by scholars concerned with capital punishment. The few scholars and NGO reports that have addressed this issue to date have automatically assumed that Diya is a form of clemency as understood in secular legal systems. I challenge these assumptions. In this article I begin by first defining Diya, and then move on to a definition of clemency and pardons in death penalty cases in secular legal systems. By noting the conceptual similarities and differences between each of these concepts, I make clear whether or not Diya can properly be thought of as a form of clemency or pardon and if it can informed by the academic literature on clemency and pardon grants, or else whether a different theoretical paradigm (such as restorative justice, or victims’ rights) is needed in order to understand this feature of Islamic criminal justice. In the article I also clarify whether or not the practice of Diya in the absence of a separate provision for executive clemency will lead to a contravention of the ICCPR’s Article 6(4). Can the exercise of the power to 'pardon' be confined to the victim's relatives under international human rights law? If not, then several state parties to the ICCPR will be in breach of their binding obligations under the treaty.

Every individual act of punishment, every exercise of a punishing act is also a decision to overcome
compassion. It is a deliberate waiving of mercy.

Mercy exists as a potential and lingers in the
link, the bond between the punisher and the punished.

But mercy as a concept has all but disappeared in the official sphere of criminal punishment.There is
an apparent disparity between the individual experience of punishment and the institutional or
systematic understanding of what punishment should achieve and how it should be performed.

What accounts for this remarkable divergence?

My hypothesis is that a major contribution can be found in a philosophical effort during the period
commonly known as the the Enlightenment which undertook to ban the irrational concept of mercy
from the domain of rational punishment.

I will argue that the Enlightenment did not trust mercy because its characteristics are ostensibly at odds
with several creeds the protagonists of the Age of Enlightenment held.

The five contemporary practitioners of the death penalty in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam) have performed judicial executions on a regular basis between 1975 and 2013. Notwithstanding this similarity, the number of death sentences passed by courts that were subsequently reduced to a term of imprisonment through grants of clemency by the executive has varied remarkably between these jurisdictions. Some of these countries commuted the sentences of death row prisoners often (for example, the clemency 'rate' of 91-92 per cent witnessed in Thailand), others rarely (a clemency 'rate' of around 1 per cent in Singapore), and some at 'medium' rates. In this article, I employ the methodology of comparative criminal justice to explore the discrepancies and similarities in capital clemency practice between these five Southeast Asian jurisdictions. In doing so, I seek to identify the structural and cultural reasons why retentionist countries exercise clemency at vastly different 'rates' in finalised capital cases.

This article discusses victim engagement with the executive clemency process from a normative perspective. The authors’ aim is to explore the existing models of victim participation in clemency decision making in common law jurisdictions, in order to determine whether these possess any sound theoretical basis. The article brings together the academic literatures on victim participation and clemency functionality in order to ground the analysis. In brief, the authors' main finding is that victim involvement in clemency decision making can indeed be supported by the theoretical literature, albeit to a more limited extent than is currently practised in some common law jurisdictions. In light of the theoretical underpinnings of clemency in democratic societies and the literature on victim participation, the authors conclude by making several ‘best practice’ recommendations for future policy-making.

In questo articolo, dopo una breve presentazione della produzione latina di Da Ponte (cap. 2.), ci soffermiamo sul carme più lungo e concettualmente significativo, Il monarca non è più felice del suddito, di cui diamo testo critico e prima traduzione italiana in versi (cap. 3.) e un esteso commento (capp. 4. e 5.).

La riduzione ad una sola virtù "straordinaria" e la scelta della clementia appaiono in avvio quasi inevitabili, ma costringono Seneca in una duplice gabbia, quella encomiastica di una virtus esclusiva del principe e quella storica della tradizione tardorepubblicana e già imperiale della clementia principis. Il vizio d'origine, rimasto latente nel libro I, dato l 'intento parenetico ed encomiastico, il ricorso ad exempla storici e, come detto, l 'esplicito rifiuto di trattare le problematiche di ordine teoretico, emerge però nel libro II: a livello di tradizione filosofica, infatti, Seneca con difficoltà poteva trovare appigli per la sua sovraestimazione della clementia, poiché nelle fonti greche praotes ed epieikeia, che si ritiene le corrispondano, non si trovano affatto in posizione di predominio sulle altre virtù, il che comporta quindi un vero e proprio hysteron proteron assiologico nel De clementia. Non trovando appigli per esso nella tradizione e non pote...

All five contemporary practitioners of the death penalty in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)— Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam— have performed executions on a regular basis over the past few decades. NGO Amnesty International currently classifies each of these nations as death penalty 'retentionists'. However, notwithstanding a common willingness to execute, the number of death sentences passed by courts that are reduced to a term of imprisonment, or where the prisoner is released from custody altogether, through grants of clemency by the executive branch of government, varies remarkably among these neighbouring political allies.

Last Chance for Life: Clemency in Southeast Asian Death Penalty Cases explores the patterns which explain why some countries in the region award clemency far more often than do others in death penalty cases. Over the period under analysis from 1991 to 2016, the regional outliers were Thailand (with more than 95% of condemned prisoners receiving clemency after exhausting judicial appeals) and Singapore (with fewer than 1% of condemned prisoners receiving clemency). Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam fall at points in between these two extremes. What results is the first research monograph, anywhere in the world, to compare death penalty clemency across national borders using empirical methodology, the latter a systematic collection of clemency data in multiple jurisdictions using archival and 'elite' interview sources. Last Chance for Life is an authoritative resource for legal practitioners, criminal justice policy makers, scholars and activists throughout the ASEAN region and around the retentionist world.

In May 2015, in an effort to foster peace in the restive Papua and West Papua Provinces, Indonesian President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo granted clemency to five political prisoners, releasing them from sentences ranging from 20 years to life. The president also stated that there would be 'a follow-up granting clemency or amnesty to other [political prisoners] in other regions' (Jakarta Post, 10 May 2015). However, with up to 50 political prisoners still incarcerated in prisons around Indonesia (mostly Papuan and Moluccan separatists), Jokowi's selective release policy faces several legal and political obstacles. This article outlines the various options open to Jokowi in facilitating future political prisoner releases (including amnesty, clemency, remissions and conditional release), the advantages and disadvantages of each, before suggesting an acceptable way forward for all parties.

As states that use the death penalty liberally in a world that increasingly favours abolition, the Muslim-majority jurisdictions that are strict exponents of Islamic Law and the People's Republic of China share a crucial commonality: their frequent use of victim-perpetrator reconciliation agreements to remove convicted murderers from the threat of execution. In both cases, rather than a prisoner's last chance at escaping execution being recourse to executive clemency, victim-perpetrator reconciliation agreements fulfil largely the same purpose, together with providing means of compensating victims for economic loss, and enabling the state concerned to reduce execution numbers without formally limiting the death penalty's scope in law. Utilizing the functionalist approach of comparative law methodology, this article compares the thirteen death penalty retentionist nations that have incorporated Islamic Law principles into their positive criminal law with the People's Republic of China, as to the functions underpinning victim-perpetrator reconciliation agreements in death penalty cases.

Amb aquesta contribució em proposo examinar el desenvolupament ideològic de la concepció de la clementia entre Cèsar i Ciceró d'una banda i el De clementia senequià de l'altra. L'objectiu de l'estudi pot ser limitat, però tal vegada no mancat d'interès: es tracta de definir els inicis d'allò que al meu parer és una interpretació específicament romana de la teoria monàrquica. Per fer-ho, no seguiré tant l'evolució del terme clementia, un treball que ja han encarat, fins i tot recentment, estudiosos il·lustres 2 ; més aviat examinaré preliminarment el punt d'arribada prefixat d'aquest desenvolupament ideològic, és a dir la clementia del tractat homònim, per tal de poder establir si la virtut així anomenada per Sèneca es retroba del tot o almenys en part en els escriptors precedents, independentment de la presència del terme clementia.

Nearly every country in the world has a mechanism for executive clemency, which, though residual in most legal systems, serves as a vital due process safeguard and as an outlet for leniency in punishment. While the origins of clemency lie in the historical prerogative powers of once-absolute rulers, modern clemency laws and practices have evolved to be enormously varied. This volume brings comparative and empirical analysis to bear on executive clemency, building a sociological and political context around systematically-collected data on clemency laws, grants, and decision-making. Some jurisdictions have elaborate constitutional and legal structures for pardoning or commuting a sentence while virtually never doing so, while others have little formal process and yet grant clemency frequently. Using examples from Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the USA, this comparative analysis of the law and the practice of clemency sheds light on a frequently misunderstood executive power.

This book builds on existing academic scholarship and expands the limited geographical scope of prior research, which has tended to focus on North America, the UK, and Australia. It relays the latest state of knowledge on the topic and employs case studies, doctrinal legal analysis, historical research, and statements by clemency decision-making authorities, in explaining why clemency varies so considerably across global legal and political systems. In addition, it includes contributions encompassing international law, transitional justice, and innocence and wrongful convictions, as well as on jurisdictions that are historically under-researched.

The book will be of value to practitioners, academics, and students interested in the fields of human rights, criminal law, comparative criminal justice, and international relations.

На мой взгляд, одной из причин противоправного посягательства на жизнь человека (приговоренного к смертной казни) может стать пробел в ст. 175 Уголовно-исполнительного кодекса Республики Беларусь (УИК), которая не предусматривает, что приговор к смертной казни, вступивший в законную силу, обращается к исполнению, в частности, после получения официального сообщения Комитета ООН по правам человека (КПЧ ООН) об отсутствии нарушений права на жизнь осужденного либо о неприемлемости поданной жалобы, в случае если таковой осужденный обращался в КПЧ ООН и последний направил просьбу Республики Беларусь не исполнять смертный приговор до окончания рассмотрения жалобы Комитетом.

В настоящий момент УИК предусматривает в качестве предпосылок исполнения вступившего в законную силу смертного приговора отклонение 1) жалоб, направленных в порядке надзора, и 2) ходатайства о помиловании. Обе предпосылки исполнения смертного приговора конкретизируют соответствующие нормы Конституции (ст. 84; ст.ст. 60 и 115).

В тоже время Конституция предусматривает также право каждого в соответствии с международно-правовым актами, ратифицированными Республикой Беларусь, обращаться в международные организации с целью защиты своих прав и свобод, если исчерпаны все имеющиеся внутригосударственные средства правовой защиты (ст. 61).

Очевидно, что казнь осужденного, обратившегося в КПЧ ООН с соответствующей жалобой, до окончания ее рассмотрения, лишает смысла ст. 61 Конституции, т.к. осужденный в любом случае не узнает результата, а положительный для него результат рассмотрения не вернет его к жизни. В результате ст. 61 Конституции превращается не просто в декоративную норму, но даже издевательскую (над правом и моралью).

Соответственно, выходом из сложившейся ситуации является дополнение ч. 1 ст. 175 УИК необходимостью дождаться от КПЧ ООН официального сообщения об отсутствии нарушений права на жизнь или неприемлемости поданной жалобы, как одной из обязательных предпосылок для обращения приговора к смертной казни к исполнению.

В качестве альтернативы можно предложить дополнение УИК нормой о моратории на исполнение смертного приговора на время подготовки и доставки жалобы в КПЧ ООН после получения официального сообщения об отклонении  жалоб, направленных в порядке надзора, и ходатайства о помиловании.

This article explores executive clemency in death penalty cases in China, Taiwan and Japan. All three neighbouring legal jurisdictions are notable for frequently passing death sentences and executing prisoners over the past several decades without the executive branch of government granting individualised pardon or commutation to any death row prisoner since at least 1975, if not earlier. This highly unusual feature of all three nations' death penalty practice suggests a policy puzzle. The authors' case study comparison of these three East Asian jurisdictions reveals two common explanatory features. First is the availability of alternative post-appellate procedures to mitigate punishment in cases undeserving of death, and to limit execution totals for policy reasons. Second is the inability of condemned clemency petitioners to directly access the ultimate clemency decision-maker, unlike in most death penalty retentionist jurisdictions. The authors conclude by making several policy recommendations on this basis.

Readers have condemned King Gaulo of Cárcel de amor because, presumably blinded by anger, he unjustly sentenced his daughter Laureola to death. Instead of the historical circumstances of late fifteenth-century Castile that, according to some critics, contextualize the events of the romance, I analyse the romance with respect to the legal notion of ira regia and the common wisdom regarding anger and administration of justice, which were disseminated in medieval sapiential and legal literature. Thus contextualized close reading exonerates King Gaulo of the charges of intemperance, cruelty and disregard for justice. The parallels between the sentimental and the legal plot of the romance show that King Gaulo and Laureola take turns to advocate strict or lenient administration of justice. The resulting dilemmas and events illustrate ironically the capricious rule of fortune over the concerted human efforts to control their affairs.

Amb aquesta contribució em proposo examinar el desenvolupament ideològic de la concepció de la clementia entre Cèsar i Ciceró d'una banda i el De clementia senequià de l'altra. L'objectiu de l'estudi pot ser limitat, però tal vegada no mancat d'interès: es tracta de definir els inicis d'allò que al meu parer és una interpretació específicament romana de la teoria monàrquica 1. Per fer-ho, no seguiré tant l'evolució del terme clementia, un treball que ja han encarat, fins i tot recentment, estudiosos il•lustres 2 ; més aviat examinaré preliminarment el punt d'arribada prefixat d'aquest desenvolupament ideològic, és a dir la clementia del tractat homònim, per tal de poder establir si la virtut així anomenada per Sèneca es retroba del tot o almenys en part en els escriptors precedents, independentment de la presència del terme clementia. 1. El De clementia Allò que és específic de la concepció política del De clementia em sembla que es pot definir de la manera següent 3 :

Resumen: El mundo romano legó al período medieval diversos conceptos y perspectivas ideológicas que sirvieron como base para la construcción de la cultura política medieval. Dicha manifestación tuvo lugar a través de procesos de recepción creativos, que mostrarían la capacidad de las sociedades medievales para adaptar las realidades clásicas a las problemáticas que marcarían el ejercicio del poder en la Edad Media. Ejemplo de estos procesos es la recepción del título romano 'pater patriae' que, difundido en el ámbito romano en los momentos finales de la República y los iniciales del Imperio, alcanzará en la Corona de Castilla una difusión significativa durante el período bajomedieval, cuando servirá como fórmula para aludir al ejercicio de un poder clemente, benigno y misericordioso del monarca sobre sus súbditos, en correspondencia con la figura benéfica del padre en la sociedad medieval / Résumé: Le monde romain a légué à l’époque médiévale divers concepts et perspectives idéologiques qui ont constitué les fondements de la culture politique médiévale. L’élaboration de cette dernière s’est effectuée au moyen de processus créatifs de réception qui manifestent la capacité des sociétés médiévales à adapter les réalités classiques aux problématiques déterminant l’exercice du pouvoir au Moyen Âge. La réception du titre romain de pater patriae en représente un exemple. Diffusé dans le monde romain de la fin de la République et des débuts de l’Empire, il atteint son apogée dans la couronne de Castille à la fin de la période médiévale, où il sert de référence pour faire allusion à l’exercice d’un pouvoir clément, indulgent et miséricordieux du souverain sur ses sujets, en accord avec la figure bienveillante du père dans la société médiévale.

If the US were a Netflix saga, the current season would be the most captivating. After the storm and the acquittal of the ex-President in his second impeachment trial, President Biden pledges unity and healing, Republicans call for unity and even the Pope urges US reconciliation. Nonetheless, how healing and reconciliation are to be achieved remains an open issue. Some of these recent episodes have raised concerns and discussions among lawyers as well. From impeachment to pardon power, there are many relevant legal issues at stake. Behind them lies a major question: can law play a role in the reconciliation process?
In the first section, I will depart from the confined discussion around US presidential power of pardon, in order to affirm that clemency in general should have a structural role in our democracies and that lawyers should get involved in orienting its exercise. In the second section, I will raise some questions about a possible role of transitional justice in the US. In particular, after the major radical – and TWAIL – critiques to transitional justice, this could be the acid test: shall we dismiss transitional justice as an outdated  – or even neocolonial – political project of the 1990s or can it overcome its structural limits and become a tool to fight racism and social injustices even at the very heart of the Western World?
Link: http://opiniojuris.org/2021/02/16/i-beg-your-pardon-two-lessons-from-for-americas-worst-days/

Entre les deux thèses opposées, des détracteurs qui le représentent comme un homme irrésolu, lâche, et des partisans qui le considèrent comme un opposant caché du tyran, il me semble que notre enquête confirme une troisième voie, celle de voir en Cicéron « a centrist and a moderate », ou, mieux encore, celui qui est prêt à « s’adapter aux circonstances » (temporibus adsentiendum) pour le but souverain de l’utilitas rei publicae . Si le « piège de la clémence de César » (insidiosa clementia) de l’année 49 devint son « incroyable et quasi divine sagesse » (incredibilis sapientia ac paene diuina) de 46 (De Marcello 1), c’est bien parce que Cicéron ne voulait pas accomplir une entreprise d’adulation opportuniste, ni cacher son action d’opposant, mais bien exprimer sa profonde conviction que, faute de mieux, la politique « de la douceur » de César était la meilleure ou la moins mauvaise solution sub tyranno.