Ethics of Forgiveness, Mercy and Responding to Evil

Pur essendo generalmente valutate in termini moralmente positivi, alcune azioni e attitudini morali non sono considerate come strettamente dovute, né tantomeno esigibili: si tratta delle attitudini e delle azioni che rientrano nell’ambito, vasto e molteplice, dell’amore.
La tradizione morale ha coniato un termine tecnico per indicarle: “supererogatorio” (o “supererogazione”). Rispetto al minimo necessario di ciò che non può e non deve mancare – l’ambito di ciò che è appunto esigibile – il supererogatorio configura un “massimo”: va oltre ciò che è strettamente esigibile ed è dunque generalmente considerato eccedente la sfera e le competenze dell’etica. L’ambizione di queste pagine è di mostrare come questo massimo sia anch’esso in qualche modo “necessario” e come – al contempo – dal ripensamento di questo massimo derivi un nuovo sguardo sull’etica in generale e sul dovere in particolare. Quel massimo eccede una certa figura del dovere, ma non il dovere in sé: configura dunque, a tutti gli effetti, un fenomeno etico.

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The complication in a study of the Hebrew word hesed (חֶסד) is conveying an adequate
English understanding of the Hebrew concept. Language is never a one-for-one equivalency, but the practice of translation is one of discovering and conveying concepts into one’s own terms and language. In this case, the vessel of English terminology is too limited to relay hesed in one single word. The best understanding of hesed would come from a thorough knowledge of the Hebrew language and, with that, extensive time spent engaging in focused reading. It would only be by this method that one might be able to catch all the nuance of the word as it is used in various contexts and thus come to a comfortable understanding of its range of semantic domain. Despite this challenge, it is the purpose of this paper to introduce the reader to three helpful tools to come nearer to a robust understanding of hesed. To facilitate this, we will briefly examine the way in which it is employed in the context of divine usage, in the context of human usage, and then we will see the concept displayed in the reunion of Jacob and Esau in Genesis 32-33.

Plato's Crito and Sophocles' Antigone challenge the concept of justice as "benefitting friends and harming enemies": justice stems from anger and harms the soul. The Antigone first illustrates how violence results from people's actions when they see themselves as the agents of justice; second, it points to a possible reassessment of justice as benefitting all, regardless of what others do to you. In the Crito, Socrates shows how this new notion of justice, which is very similar to mercy, is consistent with the life of a good human being. RÉSUMÉ: Le Criton de Platon et l'Antigone de Sophocle mettent en question la notion de justice qu'on trouve dans le monde grec: "faire du bien à ses amis, faire du mal à des ennemis". Selon cette définition, la justice provient de la colère et fait du mal à l'âme. Antigone montre d'abord que la violence est le résultat des actions des gens quand ils se considèrent eux-mêmes comme les agents de la justice. En outre, cette pièce suggère une possible redéfinition de la justice, au sens de "faire du bien à tous, indépendamment de ce que les autres nous font". Dans le Criton, Socrate montre comment cette nouvelle notion de justice, très similaire à la pitié, est cohérente avec la vie de l'homme bon. Justice and revenge have a long relationship, and Sophocles' Antigone and Plato's Crito show how connected they were in the ancient Greek world. This cannot come as a surprise since the idea of revenge is deeply rooted in human culture. Even today, people are often troubled when they witness others who do not react angrily and do not desire revenge when

This article discusses the relationship between the teaching of Veritatis Splendor and the principle in Catholic social doctrine called the preferential option for the poor. The goal is to locate the common vocation to preferential love for the poor within the anthropological and moral horizon indicated by Blessed Pope John Paul II’s encyclical. And, in that light, to reflect upon the moral implications of Jesus’s invitation to the rich young man into the perfection of charity called mercy: “If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give the money to the poor . . . then come, follow me” (Mt 19:21).

Toward that end, the morality tale Deutsches Requiem by Jorge Luis Borges highlights for us an important gesture in Veritatis Splendor regarding the virtue mercy and vicious sloth (acedia): an inchoate thesis concerning themes addressed in Pope John Paul’s encyclical Dives in Misericordia (1980) and the apostolic exhortation Salvifici Doloris (1984). Throughout, St. Thomas Aquinas will help us specify key aspects of the option for the poor in relation to Veritatis Splendor and identify some of the important work that lies ahead.

Il contesto del Giubileo della misericordia offre l’occasione per una riflessione su questa tematica così centrale nell'attuale pontificato. Come scrive papa Francesco nella bolla di indizione, essa «è la parola che rivela il mistero della santissima Trinità», «l’atto ultimo e supremo con il quale Dio ci viene incontro», «la legge fondamentale che abita nel cuore di ogni persona quando guarda con occhi sinceri il fratello che incontra nel cammino della vita», «la via che unisce Dio e l’uomo, perché apre il cuore alla speranza di essere amati per sempre nonostante il limite del nostro peccato» (Misericordiae Vultus, 2). I due passi principali del
vangelo su tale argomento sono, come il santo padre ricorda, la parabola del figliol prodigo (Lc 15,11-32) e la quinta beatitudine (Mt 5,7): nel primo si rivela l’azione di Dio nei confronti dell’uomo, mentre nel secondo la misericordia è designata quale via di salvezza per l’anima. Alle origini della cristianità, il primo autore
che abbia commentato con più ampiezza la parabola di Lc 15,11-32 è stato Origene; invece, la quinta delle Omelie sulle beatitudini di Gregorio di Nissa costituisce la prima esegesi estesa e completa di Mt 5,7. Questo contributo intende operare un confronto tra le
letture dei due Padri e i concetti da esse implicati, in particolare la preesistenza dell’anima nel primo e la libertà della persona nel secondo.

Resumen: La misericordia es una realidad difícil de valorar. La historia de este concepto ilustra una ambigüedad de fondo que puede servir para desentrañar su consistencia y dar algunos pasos que orienten una investigación más honda de su significado en la vida de las personas y del cuerpo social. El presente artículo intenta presentar algunas intuiciones y objeciones que se han planteado a lo largo de la historia para poder identificar los principales temas a afrontar en un estudio filosófico del argumento.

The word “epiphany” derives from the ancient Greek and means “manifestation”. Something similar is described in the modern language of Systems Theory with the term “emergence”. I claim that when we focus on human communities and societies, and even on the behavior of individuals, “epiphany” may be more fitting in order to describe an “emergence” with the adequate emphasis on the aesthetical, transcendent and ethical aspects that are required.
In the course of history and also of everyday life, epiphanies of evil and epiphanies of right occur and recur, at times in alternation and at times simultaneously.
Both for what concerns evil and right, epiphanies are discontinuous changes but come out of processes.
For what concerns evil, I focus on some characteristics and on the long-term deadly effects of a “problem-based” state of mind. Molding the world in terms of problems and solutions is necessary and appropriate in limited and practical domains. The adopting of this attitude as a general state of mind, shaping our whole presence in the world, blurs and ultimately denies the reality of persons, putting in foreground a pretended “reality” made of problems and solutions.
For what concerns right, I focus on what I call “eleogenetic” practices. “Eleos” is a Greek word that means “mercy”. “Mercy” is often mistaken for a sickly-sweetish attitude of turning a blind eye. I claim instead that mercy is a way to know reality with more precision and beauty, since reality is first of all a reality of persons, with their expressions, activities, encounters and contacts. Eleogenetic practices allow us to develop this kind of knowledge of oneself, of others, and ultimately of the world.

Many exegetes are convinced that the oldest formulation of the logion on the imitatio Dei (cf. Matt 5:48 // Luke 6:36) is found in the third gospel and that Matthew replaced the call to be merciful with the ideal of evangelical perfection. In fact, Luke had more reasons to change the Matthean form of the saying than vice versa. The adjective τέλειος “perfect” (cf. Matt 5:48), when referring to a deity, could take on an ambiguous meaning, especially in an audience coming from a pagan background. For this reason, Luke preferred to substitute τέλειος with οἰκτίρμων “merciful”, thus avoiding any kind of misunderstanding. The original formulation of the logion is thus in Matthew, while in Luke we find a sort of cultural translation of it. This is one of the many cases in which Luke’s dependence on Matthew seems plausible.

Forgiveness is presented as a specific application of mercy. The focus is on the one who forgives, not on the one seeking forgiveness. The concept of forgiveness is traced from its theological origins to modern-day philosophies. Two psychological models of forgiveness are then described: A social cognitive developmental and a social processing model.

Every individual act of punishment, every exercise of a punishing act is also a decision to overcome
compassion. It is a deliberate waiving of mercy.

Mercy exists as a potential and lingers in the
link, the bond between the punisher and the punished.

But mercy as a concept has all but disappeared in the official sphere of criminal punishment.There is
an apparent disparity between the individual experience of punishment and the institutional or
systematic understanding of what punishment should achieve and how it should be performed.

What accounts for this remarkable divergence?

My hypothesis is that a major contribution can be found in a philosophical effort during the period
commonly known as the the Enlightenment which undertook to ban the irrational concept of mercy
from the domain of rational punishment.

I will argue that the Enlightenment did not trust mercy because its characteristics are ostensibly at odds
with several creeds the protagonists of the Age of Enlightenment held.

"Zaczęłam była trzeci tom Nad Niemnem -zwierzała się Orzeszkowa Leopoldowi Meyetowi w liście z 10 maja 1887 r. -ale jak na złość w tej chwili całkiem niepotrzebnie wlazła mi w głowę nowela i z taką natarczywością napastowała, że napisać ją musiałam. Pisałam całe dwa tygodnie bardzo pilnie. Rzecz jest dość duża (prawie jak Romanowa), nosi nazwę W zimowy wieczór, stanowi obraz z chłopskiego życia [...]" 1 .

The Hebrew word, hesed, is not one with a singular or simple definition; it is a Hebrew concept that takes a comprehensive study to extract and better comprehend its full meaning, which is undertaken in this study. To aid our understanding of this concept, I first lay the groundwork for coming near an understanding of hesed by examining it in its divine context and usage, illuminating its covenantal, relational, and enduring nature. I then contrast this with an examination of hesed as used in its secular and human context and usage, noting that a universal understanding of its divine usage is impractical for all occurrences in scripture. By examining a few disparate usages of this word in different contexts, I show the unifying aspects of the two understandings (divine and human) in order to come to a more comprehensive and inclusive understanding of hesed. In order to illustrate the concept and to come nearer to a proper understanding of this concept, I then draw on the pericope of Jacob and Esau’s reunion, showing it to be a situation in which hesed is displayed in both divine and human contexts.

The term “Eleogenetics” derives from the union of two ancient Greek words: “eleos”,
that means “mercy”, and “genesis”, that means “origin” and “development”. Thus,
“Eleogenetics” consists in the study of the processes of creating and facilitating the
emergence, or better, the “epiphany” of Mercy2. The word “epiphany” too derives
from the ancient Greek and means “manifestation”. Something similar has been
described in the modern language of Systems Theory with the term “emergence”, but
when we focus on human communities and societies, and even on the behavior of
individuals, “epiphany” may be more fitting in order to describe an “emergence” with
adequate emphasis on the aesthetical, transcendent and ethical aspects that are
required.

Philosophers have grappled with clarifying both the nature and ethical status of acts of forgiveness.  Much discussion has been devoted to whether, say, acts of forgiveness can be performed by outside parties or whether such acts should be thought of as supererogatory rather than as moral requirements.  In what follows, I will explore questions pertaining to ‘radical’ acts of forgiveness as they relate to considerations of duties and justice.  Acts of forgiveness that tend to move us the most are often justified by appeals to self-duty.  I will survey recent examples and show a possible philosophical basis for understanding them in terms of self-duty.  This kind of basis has been virtually ignored by the vast philosophical literature on forgiveness.  I attempt to show both that considerations of self-duty can provide a secular basis for justifying radical acts of forgiveness and that problems associated with this kind of forgiveness and justice are not as serious as they are often taken to be.

Unless you are a hermit, practically every American knows that school-based violence is killing our school system and our students. If academics from Florida are right, this situation is only being made worse by school districts trying to hedge performance-based funding by suspending, expelling or otherwise causing low-performing and impoverished students to drop-out. This phenomenon is called the "Test-to-Prison Pipeline" theory.

Il termine "misericordia" è pressoché assente nel lessico filosofico dell’Occidente.
Sarebbe certo interessante comprendere le ragioni di questa assenza. Non è andata così per altre categorie della tradizione teologica: è certamente il caso della speranza, virtù teologale per eccellenza, entrata – sebbene in versione secolarizzata – nel lessico della modernità filosofica e politica con Hobbes e Spinoza, fino a divenire “principio” con Bloch.
Avanzo un’ipotesi: se i filosofi hanno tradizionalmente considerato la misericordia come estranea al loro dominio di competenza, è perché essa non è appunto facilmente dominabile. Perlomeno non lo è nel quadro di alcune alternative del pensiero divenute canoniche: alternative che la misericordia supera e frantuma. Si tratta delle alternative proprie a un dualismo che – da Platone in avanti – ha segnato il pensiero occidentale. Nell'articolo mi soffermo su alcune di esse: l’alternativa tra interiorità ed esteriorità, tra immanenza e trascendenza, tra necessità e possibilità (tra passato e futuro), tra politico e impolitico (tra pubblico e privato).

In the first part of the article, the author reflects on Malta and its European neighbours and their history of being providing a safe haven for strangers: this is a key part of Maltese and European identity that is often ignored or silenced in movements that reduce patriotism to mere ethnonationalism. In the second part, this notion of hospitality that can shape one's identity is linked to the biblical concept of "mercy" as excellence in living out justice. Finally, the author presents some of the rights and principles included in Catholic Social Thought on Migration and Asylum that he believes should shape the concrete decisions taken by Maltese and European policymakers.

What does the Bible actually say about forgiveness? The answer may surprise you. New Testament scholar and Huffington Post writer Maria Mayo challenges traditional Christian assumptions about forgiveness in her research. While not dismissing the idea of forgiveness or diminishing its importance, she takes issue with the current practice of forgiveness as an individual, psychological act.