Common Foreign and Security Policy

Once again the European Union (EU) foreign policy is characterized by a capability-expectations gap: the expectations towards the redesigned High Representative of the Union (HR) are high, with the hope of a single voice representative being able to shape and align the positions of the Member States and EU institutions. By contrast, the actual capabilities of the new post are limited, as it is confronted with the prerogatives of the European
Commission in the field of integrated aspects of external action, while the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains intergovernmental. Hence, reducing the capability-expectations gap is now mainly a matter of Member States’ political will to use the potential of institutional innovation.To that end, co-leadership of the HR with Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament is needed to provide new momentum to the common foreign policy project.This argument is developed using three cases that exemplify the dynamics in the new EU foreign policy architecture: the setup of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the immediate reaction to the crisis in Libya and strategic thinking.
Based on the findings, conditions and measures to overcome the capability-expectations gap are discussed.

Although cybersecurity as an unifi ed domain is still a recent fi eld of common policy for the EU, it is widely perceived as an area of growing importance for the global position and security of the Union. This development of EU's cybersecurity policy is taking place in the context of the broader efforts, namely Europe's ambition to increase its strategic autonomy. For the EU the main challenge remains how to achieve the coherent and holistic approach to cybersecurity, encompassing it's all dimensions – network and information security, cybercrime and cyber defence. New initiatives undertaken recently by Brussels try to address this problem. This article's aim is to contribute to the better understanding of the potential of the EU's cybersecurity policy to frame the future of European security and defence. The article describes the process of development of the cybersecurity policy of the EU in the XXI century. It provides a brief overview of the instruments and institutions of this policy. Then, the article discusses the EU's potential in cybersecurity fi eld. The fi nal part deals with the three dimensions of EU's strategic autonomy – political, operational and industrial and how they relate to cybersecurity.

In 2015, the release of a Regional Action Plan updating the EU Sahel Strategy triggered the progressive apparition of a new paradigm: regionalisation. Building on the implementation of a comprehensive approach in Sahel, this paradigm refocuses the EU action in peace and security matters on multi-level coherence, from the local to the regional level. However, this work identifies transnational threats such as trafficking and terrorism as clear limits of the EU regionalisation paradigm. As they trigger a need for intelligence sharing and for joint border management, they must be addressed directly by African ROs. From this perspective, supporting African Regional Organisations (ROs) appears to be an adequate manner for the EU to foster regional coherence beyond the limits of its own external action. This, however, requires to first identify the African initiatives most capable of fulfilling this role. This work suggests that the EU has two options: “traditional” African ROs, building on a pattern of regional integration, and “emerging” ones, building on a pattern of looser technical cooperation. It intends to analyse the evolution of the EU support to each one by conducing two case studies: ECOWAS and G5 Sahel will respectively illustrate the case of a traditional and of an emerging African RO.

Following reasoning will be applied. ECOWAS provides for a very institutionalised framework but its heterogeneous composition seriously lowers its implementation capacity. G5 Sahel, in turn, relies on a high political willingness and homogeneity, ensuring a rather effective technical cooperation. In these conditions, the EU can be expected to shift its long-lasting support to ECOWAS towards G5 Sahel. This analysis will show that the EU support does not take such a clear-cut direction. On the one hand, the tendency to diversify beneficiaries thanks to new RIP rules and to innovative instruments, such as the Africa trust fund, clearly marks the opening of a vigorous support to emerging ROs. However, the EU support to ECOWAS under EDF was steadily increased and refocused to foster the RO’s capacity of action and its inclusion in a continental security architecture. This work therefore concludes that, in a spirit of regional coherence, rather than shifting its support, the EU built on each RO’s added value. To foster complementarity between the two, it underpinned ECOWAS in exercising a regional political steering, and G5 Sahel in conducing a deeper technical cooperation.

This paper is the product of my work for my bachelor thesis in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Cagliari. Its aim is to analyse the role of the European Union as a conflict manager in the frozen conflicts involving the former Soviet Union, by examining the two recent cases of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2013). Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between the European Union and Russia, the role of mutual perceptions in shaping the actors' policies towards one another - with particular reference to NATO and EU's parallel enlargement - and the interplay between the EU institutions and individual member states. My argument is that the EU's credibility as a conflict manager is undermined by the difficulty in finding a consensus among all of its member states, and the fact that much of its action is indeed constrained by member states themselves and their individual preferences. In this connection, the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe is definitely a factor in explaining the EU's inconsistencies in its approach toward Russia.

At the beginning of this decade, the EU’s foreign and security policy was leaderless, while several crises put Europe under pressure. The economically strong Germany had to become Europe’s new political engine. The way in which Germany took up its new and unusual role and the implications that German leadership has for the EU’s foreign and security policy are analysed in this report.
Germany fulfilled the leadership role that it never applied for. It pushed for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and led the Russia sanctions policy of the West. Germany not only followed the French call for military assistance after the Paris attacks, but is also heavily engaged in diplomatic efforts to solve the Syrian conflict. Berlin is central to the development of broader EU policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. It is in the driver’s seat when it comes to relationships with key international actors, such as Russia, Turkey and the US.
Germany has become an unlikely and unusual foreign policy leader, which still differs in various aspects from traditional foreign policy powerhouses. It leads through institutions and diplomacy rather than military power. It seeks European solutions rather than national ones. However, the success and sustainability of Germany’s approach depends on securing Europe’s unity and resilience in the face of crises in the neighbourhood and the effects of globalization.

The UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) has presented innumerable challenges for both the leaving state and the EU. In these unchartered waters, the future of UK involvement in EU policies is very much in doubt. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has not been at the forefront of the debates about Brexit, despite the increasing focus on the EU’s global role, and the UK’s own vision of a ‘Global Britain’. The purpose of this article is to consider the past, present, and future role played by the UK in the CFSP since its inception in the Treaty on European Union. This necessitates consideration of how the CFSP might develop in the future and fulfil the goals of the recent Global Strategy. The article explores the UK’s constant opposition to greater integration in EU foreign policy and how it has purported to distance itself from the CFSP machinery. This can be contrasted with the UK’s apparent post-referendum enthusiasm for pursuing shared foreign policy goals. The future direction of the CFSP may not be affected to a significant degree by the UK’s departure. However, the CFSP will not necessarily become more integrated after Brexit. To achieve this, greater commitment will need to be shown by the EU27 to the aims of the CFSP, and other Member States will no longer be able to count on the UK as the lead voice of opposition or ‘brake’ on integration. If there is a continued desire for the UK to be involved in the CFSP, finding an acceptable model for cooperation is likely to prove a substantial, long-term challenge.

The cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations in the context of peacemaking and peacekeeping has been vital at all times. The UN peacekeeping efforts recognize the help from member countries and other regional and the example of the EU as organization best suits the needs of the UN. On the European side, it is important to develop the functionality of CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) that has led the EU to resume its association with the United Nations. Both the UN and EU are considered legitimate bodies and major peacekeeping organizations of international repute to resolve global issues. The cooperation of these two organizations has led them to be regarded as authentic institutions. Yet the process of cooperation within both sides has gone in an extremely inhibited environment. Both the UN and the EU have showed a determination to go ahead in strengthening their relationship and cooperation even though they have significant structural and theoretical differences in the organizations’ own plans, strategies, working, community measures and the limitation in the span of their collaboration in the peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-operations. Peacekeeping is more important for the UN than the EU because UN is purely a democratic and political institution whereas the first priority of EU is for establishing the European Community was to gain economic power. The UN strategy is stimulated by an open plan for all people of the world while the European approach is a combination of regional interest and political dialogue to control destabilizing situations. In this context both organizations have attained a considerable amount of cooperation and coordination in terms of growing information of relevant functioning and actions, institutionalized structure of collaboration and practical partnership. Most of times the EU plays its role as a civilian power but in some areas it helped the UN with armed forces.

Instability and conflict in Africa create a range of security problems for Europe. Rapidly increasing migration via the Mediterranean Sea, extremism and terrorism, as well as cross-border crime, all have implications for security in Europe, but are spill-over effects of instability outside Europe. The European Union has a considerable interest in a stable Africa, and also seems willing to assume a special responsibility for the continent.

This Clingendael report focuses on the European Union’s role as a security actor in Africa. It considers the use of all the policy instruments at the EU’s disposal. The authors concentrate mainly on the question how the integrated approach is evolving, and what consequences this has for the Common Security and Defence Policy.

The future of the transatlantic relationship is rarely out of the headlines in Europe or North America. Despite the closeness, the relationship faces – as it has always done – new and familiar challenges.

This report offers views on the future of transatlantic relations from scholars who are at the start of their careers, with European and US perspectives on what the future holds in defence, economics, values, and relations with emerging powers.

AUTHORS:
Editor: Tim Oliver is Dahrendorf postdoctoral fellow at LSE IDEAS.
Philip Bednarczyk is Democratic professional staff on the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee responsible for the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats.
John Hemmings is an Adjunct Fellow at CSIS and Pacific Forum, CSIS and a doctoral candidate at LSE
Ben Jones is a PhD student at King’s College London and a former foreign affairs adviser to the British Liberal Democrats and MEP Assistant.
Jeff Lightfoot is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council.
Parke Nicholson is a Senior Research Associate at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies focusing on transatlantic relations and foreign policy.
Tereza Novotná is an FNRS Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Institute for European Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles.
Claire Sutherland is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Durham University.
Julia Teebken is a PhD student at the Environmental Policy Research Center and the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.
Andrew Whitworth is a doctoral candidate in political economy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC and Bologna, Italy.

This paper addresses the main changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon for the EU as a global actor. One of the main motivations for overhauling the basic setup of the European Union had been to make it a stronger, more visible and more assertive actor on the international scene. The EU Treaties, as they now stand after the Lisbon reform, contain a number of remarkable innovations in the area of external relations. These relate to the overall setup of the Union, its general external relations objectives, its expanded competences in that area, and – last but certainly not least – important institutional changes. From a Global Administrative Law (GAL) perspective, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is arguably the one most important development. As a sui generis organ that is neither legislative nor judicial in nature, it represents a novel kind of administrative body, which raises issues central to the field of global administrative law: How does the EEAS fit into the existing institutional structure of the EU? To which extent is it just a “salad bowl” of national diplomats and Commission and Council fonctionnaires, or is it rather cultivating an esprit de corps of its own? To whom will this sui generis diplomatic service be accountable? What legal and political powers does it have? Is there a sufficient degree of parliamentary oversight and judicial control?

This chapter addresses the changes and the implications they have had for the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and European foreign policy more generally. When talking about resilience and the integrated approach in North Africa, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, the discussion focused on counter-terrorism, border management and security sector reform. An autonomous EU working towards a more cooperative world is therefore a vision that includes but goes beyond security and defence. Power at the global level has been undergoing a profound structural transformation. The story of the global power shift is well known. The disenchantment from the European project took different forms over the last three years and went through dramatic ups and downs. The EUGS was released two days after the referendum in the UK, in which for the first time the majority of voters in a Member State indicated their will to exit the Union.

The EU foreign policy towards its southern neighbours in North Africa and Near East is pressured internally to deliver on security goals and normative values, while being challenged in the Mediterranean region.
Uprisings and instability brought forward during the Arab Spring, civil wars in the Middle East, massive migration and shared resources require European engagement towards its Arab and non-Arab Mediterranean neighbours, creating a loose framework composed by Member States’ diplomatic initiatives, bilateral and multilateral policies and international institutions. This mix tries to govern the relationship between the European Union and the Southern Neighbourhood, creating policy gaps, overlaps and potentially competing agendas.
Are the EU external policies towards the region consistent or clashing? Are the competing agendas of security, democracy and development, and diverging national interests detrimental to both the EU and the region? The handling of the Arab Spring and its aftermath is presented as a case study. The research question is analysed through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean. The ENP has been put into context historically with the Barcelona Process antecedent and horizontally, by analysing challenges and complementary policies, such as Common Foreign and Security Policy, migration and intergovernmental multilateral cooperation.

In the Rosneft judgment the ECJ proclaimed its jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings both to monitor the compliance with Article 40 TEU by CFSP acts and to review the legality of CFSP decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. If regarding the first element the judgment is peaceful, regarding the second is open to some criticism and moreover it has a more limited reach that one could think.

Fractious domestic debates, the fragmentation of regional politics and growing interstate competition all affect the capacity of the EU to forge a joined-up and sustainable foreign and security policy (EUFSP) in crises and conflicts. The problem is amplified by EUFSP governance structures, which have evolved irregularly, with a multiplicity of actors resorting to an increasingly diverse array of policy instruments when engaging with external players on multilateral, regional and bilateral levels. The potential for improved action depends on the capacity of EU institutions and member states to work within the multi-dimensional perimeter of the EUFSP governance system to create the conditions to mitigate the effects of intra-EU contestation, regional fragmentation and multipolar competition.

Through a rigorous analysis of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, we  will see what competences  the European Union has in external action, as well as determining what institutions of the EU develop the most important role in this area.

With some 40 different types of restrictive measures in force, the European Union is undisputedly one of the major protagonists of today's sanction regimes. Measures such as selective trade embargos, asset freezes and travel bans have been adopted by the EU not only to implement Security Council mandated sanctions, but also in addition to (as with Iran and North Korea) or in the absence of UN action (as with Syria and Russia). Further, EU recent practice evidences that sanctions (Myanmar and Zimbabwe) have served the EU and its member states' own interests also with the view to promoting (the European construction of) values generally shared in international society. After outlining the legal discipline and the policy framework of EU restrictive measures, the present article analyses the legal issues emerging with respect to EU sanctions over the last four years. Among these, the 2017 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU in Rosneft, Brexit and its consequences on the implementation/adoption of sanctions by the United Kingdom, and recent developments concerning the legal position of candidate countries which refused to align with the EU sanction adopted in reaction to the Ukraine crisis, are the most important.

The investigation of European Union Member States’ international political consensus, regarding their approach towards the creation of a Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) throws light to the dynamic of this new constitution. This dynamic is directly related to Member States’ historical and political pluralism, and is being expressed through conceptual diversification regarding what security and defence means for each Member State. This conceptual diversification, with significant impact on political thought, during the centuries, had triggered tense-contradictions and on-going discussions among various schools of political thought. International Relations theories, since their introduction, constitute an important tool for the comprehension of states’ behaviour. As Ifestos argues, “an International Relations analysis is useful, beyond simple descriptions, it enhances the theoretical framework with comparative analysis of the key hypotheses under the prism of difference instances-examples” (Ifestos, 1999: 27). Whatsoever, it should be noted, that the case of CSDP is rather unique, as it also incorporates Member States’ political economy and technological-innovation different aspects. Thus, the initial vision of EU member states’ cooperation included economic and security benefits, for all implicating countries, in the view of recent-at-that-time WWII memories. This research examines CSDP through the Realist approach, mainly, due to the intergovernmental character of EU and due to Realism’s explanatory power. Grieco, argues that Realism’s explanatory power is important when it comes to national security affairs, and that this power is accepted “even by neoliberals” (Grieco, 1988).



Η διερεύνηση της διεθνούς πολιτικής συναίνεσης των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, ως προς την (από κοινού) προσέγγισή τους για τη δημιουργία Κοινής Πολιτικής Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας (ΚΠΑΑ) ρίχνει φως στη δυναμική αυτού εγχειρήματος. Η δυναμική αυτή συνδέεται άμεσα με τον ιστορικό και πολιτικό πλουραλισμό των κρατών μελών και εκφράζεται με εννοιολογική διαφοροποίηση όσον αφορά το τι σημαίνει ασφάλεια και άμυνα για κάθε κράτος μέλος. Αυτή η εννοιολογική διαφοροποίηση, με σημαντικές επιπτώσεις στην πολιτική σκέψη, κατά τη διάρκεια των δεκαετιών, είχε προκαλέσει έντονες αντιφάσεις και συνεχείς συζητήσεις μεταξύ διάφορων σχολών πολιτικής σκέψης. Οι θεωρίες Διεθνών Σχέσεων, από την εισαγωγή τους, αποτελούν σημαντικό εργαλείο για την κατανόηση της συμπεριφοράς των κρατών. Όπως υποστηρίζει ο Ήφαιστος, "μια ανάλυση των Διεθνών Σχέσεων είναι χρήσιμη, πέρα από τις απλές περιγραφές, μιας και ενισχύει το θεωρητικό πλαίσιο με συγκριτική ανάλυση των βασικών υποθέσεων υπό το πρίσμα των διαφορών-παραδείγματα" (Ifestos, 1999: 27). Η περίπτωση της ΚΠΑΑ είναι μάλλον μοναδική, καθώς ενσωματώνει διαφορετικές πτυχές τόσο της πολιτικής οικονομίας όσο και της τεχνολογικής καινοτομίας των κρατών μελών. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι το αρχικό όραμα της συνεργασίας των κρατών μελών της Ε.Ε. περιελάβανε οικονομικά οφέλη και οφέλη για την ασφάλεια, για όλες τις εμπλεκόμενες χώρες, με βάση τις πρόσφατες (τότε) μνήμες του Β' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου. Δεδομένου των ανωτέρω, η έρευνα αυτή εξετάζει την ΚΠΑΑ μέσω της Ρεαλιστικής προσέγγισης, κυρίως λόγω του διακυβερνητικού χαρακτήρα της Ε.Ε. και λόγω της ερμηνευτικής «δύναμης» του Ρεαλισμού. Ο Γκριέγκο, υποστηρίζει ότι η ερμηνευτική δύναμη του Ρεαλισμού είναι σημαντική όταν πρόκειται για υποθέσεις εθνικής ασφάλειας και ότι αυτή η «δύναμη» γίνεται δεκτή "ακόμη και από νεοφιλελεύθερους" (Grieco, 1988).

L`Harmattan - Paris ; 2013.

"commander le livre : info@europavarietas.org
sur le site de l`Harmattan : http://www.editions-harmattan.fr/index.asp?navig=catalogue&obj=livre&no=41212&razSqlClone=1

Ce deuxième ouvrage de l'auteur concernant la politique étrangère et de défense de l’Union européenne étudie l’évolution des missions et opérations de la PESD/PSDC en Afrique, dans le concert de la diplomatie européenne et l'activité des organisations internationales et des différents acteurs. L'approche régionale nous aide à comprendre la complexité des enjeux et des défis, la structure des conflits, et à analyser les interactions transfrontalières.
Les premières missions et opérations sont l’expression concrète de la volonté de l’Union d’agir. Agir pour promouvoir la paix et la stabilité, agir pour contribuer à la prévention et à la résolution de conflits. Mais, est-ce que les missions européennes strictement limitées dans l'espace et dans le temps sont capables de contribuer à la stabilisation en Afrique?
Le contient africain au cœur des intérêts des grandes puissances surtout à cause des matières premières stratégiques, le terrorisme international, la piraterie et de plus en plus pour la migration et la fuite des cerveaux. L’intérêt de l’Union européenne est garantir sa propre sécurité et ses besoins et qu’elle soit un partenaire fiable des pays et organisations africains. L’Afrique a besoin des aides et des subventions, plusieurs États sont incapables de garantir leur propre sécurité. La géopolitique en Afrique a une priorité absolue.
La question principale à laquelle l‘auteur cherche la réponse, c’est dans quelle mesure l’Union peut-elle devenir un acteur international. Comment l’Union peut-elle transformer sa puissance économique en une puissance politique dans le système international du XXIème siècle. Comment concevons nous la coopération entre les institutions de l’Union européenne et celles de l’Union africaine et de l'OTAN ?

Ancien visiting fellow de l’EUISS et de la Commission de Défense de l’Assemblée de l’UEO, András István Türke est docteur de Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle. Il a effectué sa thèse sur l’évolution de la défense européenne et travaille aujourd’hui comme consultant pour les questions internationales et de défense. Il est chercheur associé de plusieurs instituts de recherche en France en Hongrie et en Suisse.

256 p.

TABLES DES MATIERES

CHAPITRE I. Les enjeux et les défis européens en Afrique
/Néocolonisation ou nouvelles stratégies pour une présence en Afrique ?/

CHAPITRE II. Les missions de l’Union européenne en République Démocratique du Congo

CHAPITRE III. L’Union européenne et la crise du Darfour
/Les missions de l’Union européenne au Soudan, au Tchad et dans la République centrafricaine/

CHAPITRE IV. La réforme du secteur de sécurité en Guinée-Bissau

CHAPITRE V. L'Union européenne, la PSDC et la crise en Libye
/EUFOR Libye : « L'opération fantomisée de la légion invisible? »/

CHAPITRE VI. Somalia, East Africa and the EU: Geopolitics, drivers and “comprehensive” engagement
(András Hettyey)

Conclusion générale
Bibliographie

Europa Varietas Institute - http://www.europavarietas.org
András István Türke - http://andrasistvanturke.blogspot.ch"

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has intensified its efforts to establish closer coordination between the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s security policies, i.e. between the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA) and foreign policy, based on the assumption that this serves the interests of all actors involved. More inward-looking actors, typically from the ministries of the interior and justice in individual Member States, believe that they can strengthen their internal problem-solving capacities if the EU uses its foreign policy instruments and capabilities in a targeted and focused way to improve internal security and to engage third countries in achieving its goals in the JHA domain. At the same time, JHA expertise and actors have become an indispensable resource for traditional foreign policy actors in terms of dealing with today’s security challenges and achieving the EU’s main foreign policy objectives, such as promoting the rule of law and preventing state failure.
This paper seeks to analyse the issue of coherence and complementarity between EU internal security policies and external relations/foreign policy, focusing on the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on existing political and institutional challenges. A key political challenge has been that the mainstreaming of internal security objectives in EU external relations, frequently driven by a security rationale that relegated human rights and civil liberties-related issues to secondary status, has risked undermining the stated normative principles of EU foreign policy-making. At an institutional level, the EU has had difficulties in living up to the expectations of its ambitious strategic papers, not least due to the tendencies of each Council formation (Justice and Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs Council) to protect its own turf.
The paper argues that the EU can address the institutional and political challenges by strengthening existing coordination mechanisms and fully exploiting the possibilities which the Lisbon Treaty offers. The European Parliament, now a legislative actor equal in standing with the Council in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), should become more engaged in the process of negotiating international agreements in the JHA field and the Council should no longer put its priorities on the back burner in relation to issues such as readmission of third-country nationals and data protection involving high stakes in the sphere of human rights and civil liberties. The problem of insufficient institutional cooperation between the Justice and Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs Councils can be tackled by, firstly, establishing a strong JHA expertise in the European External Action Service and, secondly, involving the JHA Council structures in a more comprehensive and systematic way in the planning and conduct of CSDP civilian crisis management missions and in CFSP thematic and geographical working groups. The paper concludes by underlining that the EU’s success in moving towards comprehensive coherence will also be determined by the political will and ability of internal and foreign policy actors to overcome their habit of thinking in different security mindsets and to develop a shared understanding of European security challenges.

The EU’s commitment to integrate and fine-tune security and development policies has been considerably complicated by three main obstacles: (1) the legal distinction between development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP; (2) the diffused institutional responsibility over the EU’s toolbox in these policy areas; and (3) the discord between the elusive interpretation of the security-development linkage and the rather rhetorical call to enhance coordination.The creation of the European External Action Service significantly alters the EU’s architecture in this regard by pooling together the EU’s scattered instruments and policy actors. In this manner, it offers opportunities to overcome the obstacle of diffused responsibility and operationalize the rhetorical coordination commitment. However, the legal divide between development cooperation and CFSP/CSDP has survived the Lisbon Treaty changes and may considerably complicate the day-to-day operation of the EU’s foreign service. Moreover, the EEAS fulfils only a supporting role and the extent to which its potential is turned into practice depends to a large degree on the constant and constructive cooperation with the EU’s traditional external actors.

In: Szakmai Szemle 2020/3 pp. 92-116.

Nicolas Sarkozy „hiperaktív” elnökségéhez képest az elnökséget átvevő, szürkébbnek, ugyanakkor konszenzuskeresőbbnek tartott François Hollande elnök külpolitikai ígéretei a mitterrand-i alapokhoz való visszatérést sugallták, koncepciózus, önálló(bb) diplomáciát eredményezve. Hollande egyrészt szakítást ígért a Sarkozy-féle politikával, megígérve az afganisztáni csapatkivonást és a NATO-tagság felülvizsgálatát. Másrészt úgy tűnhetett, hogy egyfajta versenyfutás kezdődött az Egyesült Államokkal, és a francia diplomácia azon igyekezett, hogyan tudna az amerikai törekvésekre „rálicitálni” például Irán, Szíria, Mali vagy az Iszlám Állam (Daech) kapcsán: Egyesek már-már a francia külpolitika „neokonzervatív fordulatáról” írtak. Általánosságban véve előre megállapítható, hogy visszatérés történt a klasszikus francia diplomáciai ügyvitelhez azzal a fontos „kilengéssel”, hogy a korábbiakhoz képest jelentősen megerősödött a hadügyminiszer szerepe az ország diplomáciája területén, a külpolitika militarizálódott. E militarizálódás hatása Afrikában és a Közel-Keleten markáns, kezdeményező szerepet jelentett, számos hadművelettel (még ha nem is minden tervezett művelet valósult meg) Európában viszont – a Sarkozy-korszakhoz képest – jóval szürkébb-gyengébb diplomáciai aktivitást fejtett ki a francia elnök. Jelen elemzés arra keresi a választ, hogy Hollande elnök közismert visszafogott, sokak által szürkének tartott karaktere – főként Laurent Fabius külügyminiszter karakterével kiegészülve – milyen hatást gyakorolt a francia külpolitika és világpolitikai jelenlét egészére. Az elemzés a válságzónákra való fókuszálás, valamint terjedelmi okok miatt nem foglalkozik a francia külpolitika fontos szegmensének számító Közel-Kelet térségének egészével, Kínával és Dél-Amerikával.

Eredeti hely :
https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/publikaciok.html#szsz2020-3

Avrupa Birliği (AB)’nin Ortak Güvenlik Politikası, özellikle operasyonel deneyimleri bakımından oldukça kurumsal ve politika değişikliğine tanık olmuş dinamik bir siyasa alanıdır. Birleşik Krallık'ın AB’den ayrılma kararının ardından, AB şu ana kadarki en büyük iç krizle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Birleşik Krallık’ın AB’den ayrılma süreci olarak bilinen Brexit sürecinin, AB'nin sonunun başlangıcına işaret eden, domino etkisi yaratabilecek nitelikte bir süreç olduğu getirilen yorumlar arasındadır. Ancak bir taraftan geriye kalan 27 üye devletin, Birliğin hayatta kalabilmesi için daha fazla birleştiği ve belirli politika alanlarında iş birliğini daha da güçlendirdiği takdirde siyasi arenada daha güçlü bir pozisyona geleceği düşünülmektedir.
Bu çalışma ile Brexit süreci güvenlik perspektifi açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Brexit’in gerçekleşmesinde rol oynayan Birleşik Krallık’ın Avrupa güvenlik mimarisindeki yeri tarihsel gelişim süreci itibariyle ele alınarak ulusal değer ya da çıkarlarının AB’ye karşı tutumu konusundaki etkisi incelenmiştir. Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri kapsamında geleneksel ve yeni güvenlik yaklaşımları açısından Birleşik Krallık ve AB’nin tutum ve davranışları irdelenerek günümüz güvenlik anlayışı bakımından açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır.
Brexit ile AB, acilen kendi kendini yenilemesi ve geniş kapsamlı reformlar sürecini başlatması gerektiğini anlamıştır. Özellikle AB’nin savunma konusundaki yeni çalışması olan Kalıcı Yapılandırılmış İş birliği (Permanent Structured Cooperation - PESCO) konusundaki atılımlar bu noktada önemlidir. Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OGSP)’nin geliştirilmesi konusunda istekli olan Fransa ve Almanya Birliğin bundan sonraki politikalarında belirleyici olacaktır. Bu süreç ile hem Birleşik Krallık’ın hem de AB’nin güvenlik ve savunma politikalarının nasıl şekilleneceği değerlendirilmeye çalışılmıştır.

The book is also available in print from Amazon Germany: http://www.amazon.de/dp/3737561915

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reform created the remodeled version of the High Representative of the Union as a potentially powerful agent to represent and coordinate Europe’s foreign policy. However, this book shows how and why the EU member states granted only limited discretion to the new foreign policy actor during the first years of the post’s existence. This study argues that the EU foreign policy chief is the constrained agent of Europe’s foreign policy. The book comprises an in-depth analysis of the history of the post of EU High Representative, the setting-up of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the tenure of Baroness Catherine Ashton as the first incumbent of the office, and of the 2013 review of the EEAS. The aim of the book is to reveal the conditions of discretion of the EU High Representative. With the use of a principal-agent (PA) approach, the book shows that conflicting preferences of the member states, tight control mechanisms, as well as inadequate cooperation with the European Commission limited the High Representative’s room for manoeuvre. It is suggested that the post of High Representative has the potential to emancipate from its status of a constrained agent over time, and to gain credibility as a foreign policy actor. The findings suggest that the PA approach can be developed further in the future in order to better explain limited discretion of agents in matters of foreign policy. Based on the findings, the study also puts forward a number of characteristics of a ‘constrained agent’.

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit) is not only a source of political and legal upheaval in Europe but will also prompt a recalibration of transatlantic treaty relations. This Article argues that it is a gross oversimplification to
conceive of the latter as sets of old and new bilateral relationships. Instead, Brexit affects many existing and interdependent triangular relationships that the United States maintains with the EU and its Member States, which are conditioned also by the foreign relations laws of these polities. Perhaps counterintuitively, recalibration in
the “high politics” area of security and defense will be easier than in the “low politics” of trade and regulation. In elaborating on these arguments, this Article delves into three levels of complexity: First, the empirical challenge of determining the treaties in force between the EU and United States and by which the UK will cease to be covered; second, the transatlantic implications of available alternative models to EU membership for the UK; and third, the way forward in ensuring continuity and bringing about future agreements and cooperation in the EU-UK-U.S. triangle, seeing that the EU itself is a moving target due to ongoing reform efforts.

Europe’s “Strategic Compass” proposes a number of initiatives to enable the EU to act in the security and defence domain and confront the many challenges impacting European interests. The document, prepared by the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the responsibility of Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative and Vice President of the Commission, will be debated by defence and foreign ministers over the next few months and subsequently adopted as an official strategy statement sometime during the French Presidency of the European Council next year.

The European Union's restrictive measures or sanctions may be provided against one or more countries, international organizations, natural or legal persons (such as terrorists and terrorist group). In practice most used restrictive measures are the financial restrictions as asset freeze on of individuals or companies, assets bans and travel bans on individuals. But the ultimate objective of a sanction is determined in accordance with the individual situation or situation. The restrictive measures (Article 215 of Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) are part of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and judicial review is available under Article 275 TFEU, which prescribes that the Court has jurisdiction in reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union. This paper will analyse the legal aspects of restrictive measures and the legal nature of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) jurisdiction in this field. Second part of the paper will analyse how the European Union (EU) imposes sanctions and embargos among the member states (example Croatia) and how these measures impose to the non-State countries (example R. Macedonia).

The EU has shown considerable consensus and resolve in responding to the war in Ukraine. There surely have been differences between the member states, but this has not prevented the EU to put together ambitious sanctions packages and keeping a strong degree of unity. Moreover, the war has put many Eurosceptics on the defensive. The split between Poland and Hungary leaves Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán further isolated. French President Emmanuel Macron has scored points against his Eurosceptic and nationalist opponent, Marine Le Pen, for her connections with the Kremlin and for previously accepting Russian loans. The question is, of course, how long this new-found unity in the EU will last, but for the moment the war in Ukraine is concentrating minds.

[Português]

  A partir de uma abordagem histórica da chamada Era Espacial desde seu marco inicial, o lançamento do primeiro satélite artificial do mundo Sputnik 1 pela União Soviética, e das relações políticas entre Brasil e China, o presente trabalho procura discutir de maneira breve e teórica o atual programa de cooperação bilateral CBERS (China-Brasil Earth Resources Satellite, ou Satélite Sino-Brasileiro de Recursos Terrestres) e sua relevância para o desenvolvimento científico-tecnológico dos dois Estados. Este estudo visa, acima de tudo, reafirmar a importância do projeto, citado mundialmente como exemplo de cooperação Sul-Sul, no aperfeiçoamento da capacidade de produção de satélites e processamento de dados dos institutos especializados brasileiros e chineses, assim como realçar a necessidade de maiores investimentos nesse setor estratégico frente às presentes dificuldades, não apenas no programa CBERS, mas também em outros possíveis empreendimentos bi ou multilaterais, dentro e fora do âmbito do BRICS.


[English]

  From a historical approach of the so called Space Era since its initial milestone, the launch of the world’s first artificial satellite Sputnik 1 by the USSR, and from the political relations between Brazil and China, this paper seeks to discuss in a brief and theoretical manner the ongoing bilateral cooperation program CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) and its relevance to the scientific and technological development of both States. This study seeks above all to reaffirm the importance of this project, cited worldwide as an example of South-South cooperation, to the improvement of the Brazilian and Chinese satellite production and data processing capabilities, highlighting the importance of greater investment in this strategic sector, not only in CBERS but in other possible bi or multilateral joint ventures too, inside or outside the scope of BRICS.