Sanctions

Research on comprehensive sanctions underlines that targeted leaders are able to create a rally- round-the-flag effect through the distribution of economic resources and strong ideological sentiment. Although the policy shift to targeted sanctions ought to fix this unintended effect, evidences show that targeted leaders are still able to successfully use the symbolism of sanctions to foster public support. Although the rally-round-the-flag effect of sanctions is often treated in the literature, little is known about the mechanism explaining such phenomenon. By using the sociological securitization theory and Benford and Snow’s frame analysis framework this thesis presents the securitization process as a non-positivistically defined causal mechanism explaining the relationship between the symbolism of sanctions and public support. This theoretical framework is applied to the case of European Union (EU) and United States of America’s (USA) targeted sanctions on the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The analysis shows that the ZANU-PF was able to mobilise public opinion by using the symbolism of sanctions as a threat to the sovereignty and the economy of Zimbabwe. The acceptance of this security claim by key domestic audiences and its embeddedness within the context enabled such causal relation. Hence, sanction-imposing actors should give great attention to the complex social processes taking place within specific targeted states and adapt their approaches accordingly.

In this article for Just Security, the authors explain how the EU institutions (European Commission and External Action Service) and the US are pressing forward with a package assembled by Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi, which not only continues their pursuit of electoral law and constitutional changes which would reinforce the power and unaccountability of Bosnia and Herzegovina's political elites, but also put huge swathes of BiH land up for natural asset stripping. In addition, genocide denial and war crimes glorification criminal sanctions imposed by High Representative Valentin Inzko would be on the chopping block. These moves reward allied politicians Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic, who have jointly driven the ongoing crisis in BiH.

The forum was the largest event on econom cs n the post-pandem c world. 13,500 part c pants from 141 countr es attended the forum. 43 m n sters from fore gn nat ons, 93 d plomats (84 of wh ch were top ambassadors) part c pated alongs de 9 Russ an Deputy Pr me M n sters and 6 M n sters. 5,000 of the total part c pants were the representat ves from both Russ an and fore gn compan es, wh le 1,500 of these were sen or execut ves. More than 1,000 med a outlets from a total of 46 countr es were present n the forum. Guest Country of the Forum: Qatar Th s year's guest country was Qatar (Ch na was the guest country of the forum n 2019, wh le the forum was suspended due to the pandem c n 2020). Therefore, the largest 06/19/2021 21.07.2021 The St. Petersburg Econom c Forum-Un ted World Internat onal https://un tedworld nt.com/19290-the-st-petersburg-econom c-forum/ 2/12 numbers of part c pants were from Qatar (around 400). These were followed by part c pants were from the Un ted States w th more than 200, wh le German v s tors ranked th rd w th more than 140, the UK fourth w th more than 110 and France f fth w th more than 100 part c pants. Turk sh Ambassador to Russ a, Mehmet Samsar has also attended the forum, wh le the Vatan Party was nv ted to take part n th s nternat onal forum as well. The Afr can cry for a vacc ne More than 190 separate events were held as parts of the forum, where 1,300 Russ an and fore gn guests have held speeches. The speakers of the open ng sess on were the Russ an F rst Deputy Pr me M n ster Andrey Belousov, Qatar M n ster of Commerce and Industry Al b n Ahmed Al Kuwar , and the Rwandan Pr me M n ster Édouard Ng rente. The Pres dent of the Democrat c Republ c of Congo Fél x Tsh seked , the Pres dent of the World Bank Group Dav d Malpass, and the member of the Commun st Party of V etnam Central Comm ttee Pol tburo and Head of the CVP's Econom c Comm ttee Tran Tuan Anh, have jo ned the open ng sess on v a a v deo conference.

The construction boom in Pyongyang, along with other indicators of improved economic performance such as food production and foreign trade, provide further evidence of the ineffectiveness of current economic sanctions. The North Korean economy appears to be beating sanctions thanks to Chinese aid and trade, as well as the reallocation of conventional defense spending to the civilian economy.

Durante el año 2020 la agenda global de desarrollo se alimentó de una
exponencial dinámica de cooperación internacional, que se acompañó de
distintos actos de competencia entre múltiples entes para enfrentar a la
COVID-19. Esta circunstancia distrajo esfuerzos dedicados a la atención
de la Agenda 2030 y sus ODS, los cuales se suman a las víctimas de la
pandemia.

While everyday high-level practices have become an important area of study in foreign policy research, the every day of every (wo)man has been overlooked both in theoretical and empirical conceptualizations. Building on feminist, sociological, and ethnographic research, this article argues that everyday foreign policy is an assemblage-a combination of physical and cultural practices that inhabit digital and bodily spaces. Following the feminist call to liberate international relations from the straitjacket of high politics, this article aims to contextualize foreign policy within daily practices of regular citizens, who enact foreign policy at home, at the supermarket, and online. In effect, everyday foreign policy is not just about discussing identity, it is also about embodying and literally eating it. This article focuses on the grassroots of foreign policy sanctions in Russia in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea.

Trade embargoes that have been used to convince a change in the government policies of specific countries go back to 432 B.C. Athenian Empire. Pericles was the one who first imposed sanctions on Megara for land violation. However, the embargo did not work in favor of Pericles and the Peloponnesian war was triggered as a result of the sanctions. Sanctions have been used throughout history at specific times, especially in the 18th when England used this method against other states with the aim of political retaliation. Applying sanctions has become a global trend in the 20th century and increased rapidly since then. The US has been at the top of the list applying the maximum number of sanctions when compared to other states.

While the UN and other global institutions are in the limelight to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in war-ravaged Afghanistan, Pakistan also has a role to play. It ought to diplomatically urge rich Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia to lead this initiative. The Saudis, having strategic competition with Qatar, may find an opportunity to establish a meaningful presence in this part of Asia. Last but not the least, Pakistan ought to urge Russia and China to financially support the Afghans. Pakistan must prioritise bilateral and multilateral trade with Afghanistan. Both Kabul and Islamabad need to understand each other’s sensibilities. Finally, Pakistan needs to focus on the Central Asian states, which recently indicated their geo-economic interests in India, which is the largest market in the region after China. To help Afghanistan ameliorate its humanitarian crisis, there is no harm in engaging the Central Asian countries via Moscow or Beijing. Until Afghanistan’s neighbours come on board, structural issues will only linger.

This paper attempts to examine the quiddity of the sanctions placed on Iran by the United Nations, addressing their effectiveness, first of all. Having scrutinized the relevant Security Council Resolutions the researcher draws the conclusion that these sanctions could not be expected to be of a major outcome, if not a major impact, particularly in the long-term. The implementation of sanctions is obviously more costly and there is no guarantee that the required costs would be constantly and cooperatively paid by the senders so that the sanctions would achieve their objectives. The author holds that such punitive measures would rarely lead to fundamental changes in the political behavior of Tehran.

Is it possible to build a bulletproof economy in the era of globalization and economic warfares? Yes, it is; but sacrifices are needed.
This 300-page original work, written between Italy and Russia, with which I got my master's degree in Area and Global Studies for International Cooperation at the University of Turin, has only one aim: to help policy-makers of developing countries to face economic warfares and to turn life-threatening challenges into once-in-a-lifetime opportunities to growth and flourish.

Do export sanctions cause export deflection? Data on Iranian non-oil exporters between January 2006 and June 2011 shows that two-thirds of these exports were deflected to non-sanctioning countries after sanctions were imposed in 2008, and that at this time aggregate exports actually increased. Exporting firms reduced prices and increased quantities when exporting to a new destination, however, and suffered welfare losses as a result.

The article examines the actions taken by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) against the delegation of the Russian Federation in response to the crisis in Ukraine. In 2014 the Assembly decided to suspend some of the rights of the Russian delegation and menaced to annul the credentials of the delegation if an effective effort was not made on the part of Russia to sort out the situation and to reverse the annexation. The adoption of sanctions against the Russian delegation raised several legal issues related to the very existence of a sanctioning power of the CoE and in particular of the Assembly. The question is whether the powers to “penalize” the parliamentary delegation have been ex- ercised by PACE in conformity with the Statute. The Statute of the CoE does not attribute sanctioning powers to the Assembly in order to target the states which are in breach of Article 3 or international law more generally. This power falls firmly in the hands of the Committee of Ministers as a way to put pressure on, deter, and eventually punish a state which has seriously violated the core of the principles of the CoE system. PACE, in the exercise of its functions, may certainly contribute to activating procedures to monitor the activities of the member states, but the last word is in the hands of the Committee which may suspend the rights of representation of a state and request that the offending state withdraw from the Committee entirely. The Statute plainly does not attribute this power to PACE. In the absence of the jurisdiction of a Court to deal with the problems caused by the lack of harmonisation between the sanctions adopted by the Committee of Ministers and the ones introduced by the Parliamentary Assembly through some modifications of the Rules of Procedure, the recent call for a 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CoE by the Assembly in order to “preserve and further strengthen this unparalleled pan-European project currently threatened by divisions and a weakening of member States’ commitment” by “harmonis- ing[...] the rules governing participation, representation and responsibilities of member States in both statutory organs, while fully respecting the autonomy of these bodies” should be welcomed.

U.S. foreign policies are determined by a small group of elites making decisions with grave consequences for humanity, with little input from the U.S. public and even less consideration given to the opinions of non-U.S. citizens. What would a just U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America look like? We propose some guiding values for the formulation of a just policy, centered on the dual principles that each person should have input in a decision to the degree that they are impacted by it, and that the perpetrators of crimes owe reparations to their victims. We then outline some specific pieces of a different policy, including but not limited to U.S. respect for international law, and conclude by discussing elements of a long-term strategy for achieving those changes.

A progressive penalty system encompasses heavier or more far-reaching sanctions being imposed as one commits more offences. A progressive penalty system is often called a progressive fines system if it involves increasingly higher financial penalties (fines), but (other) recidivism schemes such as demerit points systems can also be seen as a progressive penalty systems. The Netherlands has no general demerit points system such as England, France and Germany have, but it does have a demerit points system for novice drivers, a demerit points system for alcohol offenders, a scheme for repeat-offenders and recidivism schemes for various other serious traffic violations. Research shows us that progressive sanctions in the form of demerit points systems have a positive road safety effect with a duration of up to 1.5 years. The road safety effect of progressive (financial) fines has not as such been investigated in Netherlands nor in other countries. Research shows that there is considerable public support for the introduction of a general demerit points system; the public support for a progressive fines system has not been investigated. Under the current Dutch legislation progressive fines system cannot be introduced for traffic violations that fall under the 'Administrative Law enforcement traffic regulations' (Wahv, also called 'Mulder Law') and are dealt with by the Central Fine Collection Agency (CJIB). What are progressive penalty systems? Progressive penalty systems in traffic impose sanctions (educational measures, fines, punishments) of increasing severity each time an offence is repeated (see Figure 1). In brief: the more offences, the heavier or more far-reaching the penalty for later offences. In the case of progressive penalties in the form of increasingly higher financial fines we generally speak of a progressive fines system. However, a progressive penalty system can also be in the form of a recidivism scheme or a demerit points system. In the latter system points are awarded for specific offences and an extra or a higher penalty is given when a certain number of points is reached. Figure 1. In a progressive penalty system the penalty becomes more severe as the offence is committed more frequently.

Boyko Marinkov and Biser Banchev (eds), Ukrainskata kriza I Balkanite [The Ukraine Crisis and the Balkans] (Paradigma, 2017), is a comprehensive effort to map out responses in the entire region, from Albania to Romania and Croatia to Turkey. It is hoped that the collective volume by the Balkan Studies Institute at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences will find its way to the English- language reader.
Dimitar Bechev “Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe”

Contents
The Ukrainian crisis - the regional view
Anatomy of the Ukrainian crisis
The Ukrainian crisis in the Ankara-Kiev-Moscow geopolitical triangle
Romania and the Ukrainian crisis: in search of a new strategic role
Keeping up with Brussels. The Bulgarian response to the Ukrainian crisis
Croatia and the Ukraine crisis
"Andonis Samaras may end up like Yanukovych, but Greece will not end up like Ukraine"
The European idea in the shadow of Kosovo and South Stream (Serbia and the Ukrainian crisis)
The Ukrainian crisis and the Republic of Macedonia
The similar positions of Albania and Kosovo on the Ukrainian crisis
Montenegro and the Ukrainian crisis
Annexes
Selected chronology of the Ukrainian crisis
Positions of the Balkan countries on specific cases related to the Ukrainian crisis

our governments ought to forbid citizens and corporations from buying goods from societies blighted by dictatorship. Leif Wenar has recently argued that we should stop buying natural resources from countries where governments are not accountable to citizens in even a minimal sense. 3 Thomas Pogge has argued that our willingness to trade no-questions-asked with dictatorships serves to protectand even incentivise the emergence ofbrutal regimes, and as such violates a negative duty not to harm the global poor. In at least some circumstances, we are morally obliged to break off tradeincluding cases where initially legitimate governments in vendor countries slide away from democracy. 4 Shmuel Nili has claimed that democracies should not trade with dictatorships at all, since doing so would be a hypocritical violation of our liberal and democratic commitments. 5

Aufgrund des völkerrechtlich nicht anerkannten Krim-Referendums führte
die EU 2014 Sanktionen gegen Russland ein. Auch die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit ist hiervon betroffen. In der Praxis kommt es immer öfter vor, dass Parteien mit Bezug zu Russland Schiedsstandorte in der EU meiden.

The article (p. 24 - p. 30) deals with the causes and effects of US sanctions towards Russian
fuel and energy sector. It goes back to Ronald Reagan times and the Siberia-to-Europe
Gas Pipeline project, which has been crumbed and harmed Europe and USSR economy.
The article covers different points of view in the United States and gives prognosis on
the outcome of today sanction crises in accordance with the current energy market
situation.
Keywords: sanctions, fuel and energy sector, Russia, USA, Siberia-to-Europe
Gas Pipeline project, Europe, oil, Ronald Reagan, "dual use" items, transnational
corporations

Does international law regulate the economic activities that sustain war? States have long guarded against international interference in their war economies. But today there is an increasing tendency to impose rules on the economic activity connected to war. Acting collectively or on their own, states have sought to sharpen the focus of multilateral sanctions, strangle terrorist finances, constrain the flows of small arms and light weapons, and exclude minerals mined in war zones from the supply chains of global commerce. A steady trickle of litigation has seen courts of different jurisdictions prosecute pillage and slavery in war and pursue business people and companies for committing or enabling crimes in situations of armed conflict.

The paper is an introduction to the doctoral dissertation in law (defended in December 2017, University of Oslo) which examines how international law regulates the economies that help sustain today’s wars. The dissertation focuses on the international legal norms that have arisen to regulate phenomena that arise at the nexus of commerce and conflict. Drawing on advances in our understanding of the social and economic dynamics in situations of irregular warfare, the dissertation discusses developments in international humanitarian law, international criminal law, international human rights law and the law of international peace and security. The dissertation maps the global regulatory system that has arisen to respond to the nexus of commerce and conflict and resolves a principal uncertainty for international lawyers, namely the nature of the problem to be regulated and the normative content of the applicable rules of international law.

Due to Western sanctions, Russian energy companies were banned from using Western advanced technology. This special report looks at Russian energy companies’ response to Western sanctions, their pivot to the Asia-Pacific and evaluates the import substitution programme.

An open letter signed by more than 200 Iranians living inside and outside Iran, asks E.U. officials to end their efforts in assisting the Iranian government, after Donald Trump imposed a second round of sanctions on Iran earlier this month. The letter, which was sent to the European Unionʼs headquarters, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ambassadors of various countries, and other individuals and organizations, is still gathering signatures.

When confronted with the introduction of new sanctions regulations, each potentially interested party, be it an individual or an organization, must adapt its behaviour. A commercial enterprise will pursue the goal of achieving sanctions compliance while limiting as much as possible disruption of its business operations.
This compromise proves often a difficult objective to reach.
The rigid operational constraints imposed by trade sanctions require special consideration because there is a lot at stake in our times. Even a single non-compliance incident can bring substantial damage to essential company values such as its reputation, its profitability and its relations with business partners.

This paper is organized in three parts.

In the first part (chapters 1 to 3), after a brief outline of the history of trade sanctions, the current status of trade sanctions relevant for the shipping industry will be presented. A particular attention is dedicated to the U.S. sanctions policy and its related actions. Sanctions regimes have of course several political and geographical dimensions, from the United Nations, through the European Union down to individual national programs. The decision of concentrating on U.S. sanctions regulations is motivated by the very prominent, far-reaching and sometimes aggressive behaviour of its enforcement agency, the Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (1).

In the second part (chapters from 4 to 6), the author will try to show how well does the business manage to be compliant with the regulatory frameworks described in the first part. Several major non-compliance incidents will be considered, highlighting the tangible and intangible damages suffered by the companies. Further on, the role of promotor of industry standards played by a state agency such as OFAC will be illustrated, together with some of the most challenging aspects of U.S. sanctions compliance. The paper will then illustrate common issues faced by the shipping company departments that are most directly involved in sanctions due diligence and the strategies adopted to minimize risk. To this aim, the author will make use of specific findings obtained during a recent internship at the Legal department of MSC Belgium NV.

In the third and final part (chapter 7), the author will indicate three opportunities of improvement that in her opinion could have a positive effect on sanctions compliance management: a better transposition of sanctions requirements in IMO regulations, a deeper integration of compliance mechanisms in business operations, further enhancements in data screening tools allowing more efficient controls on cargo.

(1) OFAC is a financial intelligence and enforcement agency of the U.S. Treasury Department, which, according to their website, has “a long history of dealing with sanctions, dating back prior to the War of 1812. […] OFAC itself was formally created in December 1950, following the entry of China into the Korean War, when President Truman declared a national emergency and blocked all Chinese and North Korean assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction.” (OFAC, 2019)

Le collège fantôme Une mesure de l'exclusion temporaire des collégiens Benjamin Moignard In Diversité, n°175, mars 2014 Un nouveau marché s'offre au champ de la médiation : celui de la prise en charge des élèves à la porte des établissements scolaires. Plus qu'une provocation forcément désuète, cet incipit renvoie aux enjeux liés à l'encadrement de certaines catégories d'élèves par des acteurs non scolaires, et pose la question de la recomposition des formes d'interventions éducatives sur des thèmes qui ne sont plus l'apanage de l'école. Plus précisément, la mobilisation nouvelle des acteurs locaux sur des problématiques en lien direct avec l'école fait courir le risque d'un affaiblissement de l'institution scolaire dans sa capacité à prévenir et à gérer un certain nombre des difficultés auquel elle est confrontée, tout en apportant des ressources et des compétences parfois précieuses, ou même indispensables, devant l'ampleur des problématiques posées. En milieu scolaire, la médiation peut être envisagée comme un « outil d'activation ou de réactivation de liens distendus entre l'élève et l'institution scolaire. Elle peut mobiliser dans ce but d'autres acteurs que les enseignants (des intervenants et des acteurs périscolaires par exemple, mais aussi les élèves eux--mêmes) ; quand elle s'appuie néanmoins sur l'expertise de l'enseignant, elle introduit un nouvel élément dans son activité et élargit son champ d'action par un déplacement d'une mission de transmission culturelle vers un rôle de conciliation, d'intégration sociale et de formation civique et politique » (Malet, 2010, p. 15). En d'autres termes, on pourrait considérer les usages de la médiation dans ses différents états comme un signe des changements structurels de l'école massifiée, confrontée au défi d'une transformation très relative de la forme scolaire qui s'adapte difficilement à l'hétérogénéité des publics (Pirone, Rayou, 2012). Le développement de la médiation est cohérent avec l'avènement de ce que Anne Barrère désigne comme un « nouvel âge de l'organisation scolaire », marqué par la démultiplication de dispositifs locaux à la fois dans et autour de l'école, qui consacrent la gestion de problématiques sociales et scolaires, lesquelles nécessitent des prises en charge spécifiques que le système scolaire traditionnel ne pourrait pas considérer pour de multiples raisons (Barrère, 2013). De fait, l'avènement d'un certain nombre de problèmes sociaux dans l'école depuis une trentaine d'années a ouvert la voie à une recomposition des formes de légitimation d'acteurs éducatifs non scolaires, qui sont désormais mobilisés pour prendre en charge des problématiques qui débordent la compétence ordinaire de l'école républicaine. C'est le cas par exemple de la gestion des élèves dits « perturbateurs », dont la seule présence en classe est régulièrement remise en cause . De nombreuses collectivités locales et territoriales se mobilisent désormais largement sur la prise en charge d'un certain nombre de problématiques scolaires. C'est le cas, par exemple, de l'encadrement des élèves temporairement exclus, alors que plusieurs communes et certains conseils généraux s'inquiètent du nombre d'élèves à la porte des établissements qui ne bénéficient pas d'encadrement éducatif particulier pendant la durée de leur exclusion. Aujourd'hui, aucune mesure précise du volume de ces exclusions n'est disponible. Ces sanctions sont pourtant des marqueurs significatifs de l'état de l'école et des difficultés que peuvent rencontrer les équipes sans toujours trouver de réponses internalisées, alors que l'on sait que la présence des élèves et la mobilisation des équipes auprès de ceux qui sont le plus en difficulté sont des conditions élémentaires d'apprentissage et de réussite . La gestion des comportements dits « perturbateurs » fournissent aussi l'occasion d'une structuration nouvelle du champ de la médiation autour d'une offre d'encadrement des élèves devenus un public à besoins particuliers, qui nécessite une prise en charge par des spécialistes de la resocialisation. Cette contribution présente

This paper reviews the use of the EU´s autonomous sanctions in its international relations. The underlying question focusses on the legal limits of EU law and International law to the capacity of the EU to adopt autonomous sanctions. First, the previous cases are examined, then the legal bases under EU law is discussed. Furthermore, the latest case law of the ECJ on autonomous sanctions in Rosneft and Bank Mellat reveals that the Council enjoys a broad discretion in designing sectoral embargoes. Subsequently, the framework of the law of responsibilities under ARISWA and ARIO is summarized. Moreover, the thesis also looks at sectoral embargoes under the IHL and the Geneva Conventions including the Additional Protocol. In the final chapter, a detailed analysis of the measures against Syria is presented and analyzed under the light of ARIO and ARISWA. In contrast to the countermeasures against Iran, the Oil Embargo against Syria is in full compliance with all procedural and substantive obligations arising from Chapter II of ARISWA.

This paper examines lessons from South Africa's cultural boycott under apartheid as a tool for social change. The boycott is often held up as a model for non-violent pressure to bring about change, including by the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign. In particular, the paper examines a shift initiated by the liberation movements from a blanket boycott – where no artists were allowed into or out of South Africa – to a selective boycott, where artists could travel with the express permission of the liberation movement. This paper explores a less savoury aspect of this shift in boycott tactics, where the African National Congress (ANC) and United Democratic Front (UDF) introduced political tests for which artists or artworks were allowed to travel, that these organizations then used to pursue a form of sectarian politics that undermined the unity of the oppressed. Underpinning these tests was an approach towards art and its relationship to politics that promoted art with propagandistic intent. The paper concludes by problematizing arguments that South Africa's boycott should be used as a model for cultural boycotts elsewhere.

Building EU foreign policy over the past twenty years has been one of the most challenging and difficult aspects of the process of integration and, despite the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the policy is still far from meeting the expectations of European citizens and the rest of the world. At the same time, the EU's role in international politics is being challenged both politically and economically. The rise of new powers, an increasingly fluid system of global governance, and the growing internationalisation of domestic politics and policies are all putting the EU under the spotlight to deliver.

Το παρόν πόνημα επιχειρεί να αφουγκραστεί τον γεωπολιτικό απόηχο της διαδικασίας της οικονομικής επανένταξης του Ιράν στο Διεθνές Σύστημα. Δεδομένης της βαρύτητας της προαναφερθείσας μεταβατικής καταστάσεως, επιχειρείται μέσω ποιοτικών, ποσοτικών, αλλά και κοινωνικο- πολιτισμικών στοιχείων να καταλήξει τελικώς στο αν και με ποιο τρόπο πραγματοποιείται η οικονομική επανένταξη του Ιράν στο διεθνές οικονομικό σύστημα, μετά από τη χρόνια επιβολή οικονομικών κυρώσεων. Αναλυτικότερα, επιχειρείται η ανάλυση του ζητήματος μέσω της Συστημικής Γεωπολιτικής Αναλύσεως, εισαχθείσας από τον Καθηγητή Ι.Θ. Μάζη, Σύμφωνα με τον Καθηγητή Μάζη, «γεωπολιτική ανάλυση ενός γεωγραφικού Συστήματος ανισορρόπου κατανομής ισχύος καλείται η γεωγραφική εκείνη μέθοδος, η οποία μελετά, περιγράφει και προβλέπει τις συμπεριφορές και τις επιπτώσεις των σχέσεων των αντιτιθέμενων και διακριτών πολιτικών δράσεων ανακατανομής ισχύος και των ιδεολογικών μεταφυσικών που τις καλύπτουν, στο πλαίσιο των γεωγραφικών συμπλόκων που οι πολιτικές αυτές εφαρμόζονται» (Μάζης,2002). Κατά την Γεωπολιτική Ανάλυση μελετώνται τέσσερις πτυχές ασκήσεως της επιρροής ασκήσεως της ισχύος των εθνικοκρατικών δρώντων ή άλλης μορφής διεθνών δρώντων (νέων πόλων διεθνούς ισχύος). Οι πτυχές αυτές, ονομάζονται σύμφωνα με τον Καθηγητή Μάζη, «γεωπολιτικοί πυλώνες» και αυτοί είναι οι εξής: Άμυνα/ Ασφάλεια, Οικονομία, Πολιτική, Πολιτισμός/Θρησκεία. (Μάζης,2002).
Στο ανάγνωσμα της «Ισλαμικής Δημοκρατίας» εύλογα η πρώτη σκέψη είναι το θεοκρατικό καθεστώς. Η ανάληψη της εξουσίας από τον «κλήρο» επηρέασε την εικόνα του Ιράν τόσο στο εσωτερικό της χώρας όσο και στο εξωτερικό. Αυτό δε συνέβη μονάχα χάρη στην καινοφανή εδραίωση του θεοκρατικού καθεστώτος. Πριν το ιρανικό κοσμικό ημερολόγιο φθάσει στην τελευταία του σελίδα, έχει συμπληρώσει πολλές άλλες σελίδες με γεγονότα που ήταν καθοριστικά για την εξέλιξη προς το σημερινό Ιράν και για την πορεία ως την Ισλαμική Επανάσταση.
Προκειμένου να αναδειχθεί η αλληλουχία των γεγονότων ανάμεσα στο κοσμικό προεπαναστατικό και στο θεοκρατικό μετεπαναστατικό Ιράν, παρατίθεται σχετικό χρονολόγιο με τα πιο σημαντικά γεγονότα του 20ου και 21ου αιώνα, το οποίο παρουσιάζεται επισυναπτόμενο ως Παράρτημα Ι.
Στο Κεφάλαιο Πρώτο της εν λόγω εργασίας παρατίθεται αναλυτικά η φύση του σιιτικού σχίσματος, η έννοια του «ισλαμισμού» καθώς και η θέση του «κλήρου» στη διακυβέρνηση του μετεπαναστατικού Ιράν. Στο κεφάλαιο αυτό συμπεριλαμβάνεται συνέντευξη που παραχωρήθηκε από τον Καθηγητή Ισλαμικού Δικαίου, Κυριάκο Θ. Νικολάου –Πατραγά σχετικά με τον σιιτισμό και τη διακυβέρνηση στο Ιράν. Στη συνέχεια παρουσιάζεται η πορεία συγκερασμού σιιτισμού – ιρανικής ταυτότητας καθώς και λεπτομέρειες για την ενδότερη διάσπαση του σιιτικού Ισλάμ. Τέλος, το κεφάλαιο περιέχει πληροφορίες για το Σύνταγμα της Ισλαμικής Δημοκρατίας συνοδευόμενες από το μεταφρασμένο στα ελληνικά Προοίμιό του καθώς πληροφορίες και για τα θεσμικά και εκτελεστικά όργανα του Ιράν.
Το Κεφάλαιο Δεύτερο της εργασίας πραγματεύεται στο σύνολό του την ανάλυση των συνιστωσών που οδήγησαν την Τεχεράνη στον οικονομικό απομονωτισμό. Αναλυτικότερα στο κεφάλαιο παρατίθενται πληροφορίες για την αρχή της κατασκευής του ιρανικού πυρηνικού προγράμματος υπό τον Σάχη και για το πώς αυτό συνδυαστικά με τη διπλωματική κρίση ανάμεσα στις ΗΠΑ και το Ιράν του Khomeini (1979) οδήγησε σε μια σειρά οικονομικών κυρώσεων επιβαλλόμενων από τις ΗΠΑ, το Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας των Ηνωμένων Εθνών και την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (εντεύθεν ΕΕ), οι οποίες έπληξαν σε βάθος την ιρανική οικονομία. Στη συνέχεια δίνονται βασικά σημεία της επίσημης έκθεσης της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας, ενώ η ίδια παρουσιάζεται αυτούσια ως Παράτημα ΙΙ. Κατόπιν, δίνονται βασικά σημεία του Κοινού Ολοκληρωμένου Σχεδίου Δράσης (εντεύθεν JCPOA), το οποίο υπεγράφη ανάμεσα στα πέντε μόνιμα μέλη του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας των Ηνωμένων Εθνών συν την Γερμανία και το Ιράν. Η Συμφωνία είχε ως σκοπό το πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα του Ιράν να εξυπηρετεί μόνον ειρηνικούς σκοπούς, με ανταλλαγή την ολική άρση των οικονομικών κυρώσεων που είχαν μέχρι τότε επιβληθεί στη χώρα σχετικά με το ζήτημα. Στο κεφάλαιο συμπεριλαμβάνεται η εισαγωγή και το κομμάτι του JCPOA που αναφέρεται στο ενδεχόμενο επιβολής εκ νέου κυρώσεων, όλα ανασυρόμενα από το «Ενημερωτικό σημείωμα για την άρση των κυρώσεων της ΕΕ δυνάμει του ΚΟΣΔ». Στη συνέχεια, γίνεται προσπάθεια σφυγμομέτρησης σχετικά με την επίδραση και την απόδοση του JCPOA, μέσω επίσημων οικονομικών εκθέσεων διεθνών οικονομικών οργανισμών αλλά και αναλυτών, ενώ αργότερα παρουσιάζονται ως παρελκόμενο της δυνατότητας άρσης των επιβληθεισών κυρώσεων οι σχέσεις της ιρανικής οικονομίας με το σύστημα SWIFT. Μετέπειτα παρατίθεται αναλυτικά το «Δόγμα Obama» με άξονα τη διαπραγματευτική στρατηγική προς το πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα της Τεχεράνης καθώς και η στάση που έχει κρατήσει μέχρι τώρα η Κυβέρνηση του Donald J. Trump απέναντι στη Συμφωνία και στο Ιράν εν γένει. Τέλος, παρουσιάζονται οικονομικές συμφωνίες που έχει συνάψει το Ιράν με τις ΗΠΑ, την ΕΕ, τη Ρωσία και την Κίνα μετά την υπογραφή του JCPOA. Το κεφάλαιο κλείνει με τα συμπεράσματα που διεξάγονται μετά την επιμέρους ανάλυση των προαναφερθέντων.
Στο Κεφάλαιο Τρίτο μετά την αποκωδικοποίηση του τίτλου του θέματος, έχοντας προσδιορίσει τα όρια του Γεωγραφικού Συμπλόκου και έχοντας ορίσει τον ακριβή προς μελέτη Χώρο, αφού επιχειρούμε να ορίσουμε τον γεωπολιτικό παράγοντα και να ολοκληρώσουμε τον προσδιορισμό της συστημικής δομής και της εσωτερικής διάρθρωσης των γεωπολιτικών χώρων σε υποσυστήματα και υπερ-σύστημα. Στη συνέχεια, προχωράμε στην εξαγωγή συμπερασμάτων μέσω της Συστημικής Γεωπολιτικής Αναλύσεως, η οποία σύμφωνα με τον Ι.Θ. Μάζη, είναι «η γεωγραφική αναλυτική μέθοδος που μελετά, προβλέπει και περιγράφει την ανακατανομή της ισχύος στον πλανήτη». Σε αυτό το σημείο πρέπει να διασαφηνιστεί ότι η εργασία δεν προβλέπεται να ασχοληθεί με άλλες χώρες της περιοχής (λ.χ. Τουρκία, Αίγυπτος, Ισραήλ ή γενικώς με μεσανατολικά κράτη), καθώς σχεδιάζεται να δοθεί έμφαση στις σχέσεις του Ιράν με τους μεγάλους δρώντες του Διεθνούς Συστήματος. Επιπρόσθετα επιχειρείται η εξαγωγή συμπερασμάτων για τα αναλυόμενα υποσυστήματα και υπερ-σύστημα μέσω πρόσθετων πληροφοριών, οι οποίες στοχεύουν στην ανάδειξη της συνισταμένης της Ισχύος που αποκτά η Ισλαμική Δημοκρατία του Ιράν μετά την άρση των κυρώσεων που συντελέστηκε με την υπογραφή της «Ενδιάμεσης Συνθήκης της Γενεύης» (Geneva Interim Agreement) ή αλλιώς του «Κοινού Σχεδίου Δράσης» (Joint Plan of Action) τον Νοέμβριο του 2013, αργότερα γνωστή και ως P5+1+. Τέλος, ακολουθεί η εξαγωγή Γενικών Συμπερασμάτων μαζί με τον τελικό Επίλογο. Θέμα της παρούσας εργασίας είναι «Η Οικονομική Επανένταξη του Ιράν στο Διεθνές Σύστημα: Μια Γεωπολιτική Ανάλυση».

The military escalation in the Ukraine came as an unexpected tragedy. To the end of assessing the consequences of the Ukrainian conflict on the Russian economy, this paper distinguishes four different processes: the structural downturn of the Russian economy prior to the events in Ukraine ; the initial impact - i.e. apart from the sanctions - of the degradation of the situation in Ukraine ; the role of sanctions ; and the consequences of the one year embargo on several products imported from the European Union, Canada, Australia and the United States.

Over the past years, the European Union has faced a number of cybersecurity challenges that range from
cyberattacks to the critical infrastructure to cases of ransomware. In order to face these security challenges, the EU has
developed all the necessary strategies and policies, including the launch of the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox in 2017. This toolbox
includes among others, the policy instrument of cyber sanctions (Council Decision 2019/796 and Council Regulation
2019/797). The purpose of this paper is to review the EU’s cyber sanctions regime. In order to do that, we will apply key
questions that have arisen in the sanctions literature and apply them in the case of the EU. In particular, we will examine the
technical, political and judicial parameters, which involve the implementations of cyber sanctions. Issues like the reliable
attribution of cyberattacks, the clarifications of relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the level of
cooperation with the private sector and the scale and type of cyber sanctions are only some of the factors that will determine
the success of the cyber sanctions regime. Having established a clear theoretical framework on the implementation of cyber
sanctions, we will briefly review the empirical evidence, which involves the sanctions package that the EU announced on 17
May 2019 and the amending version published on 30 July 2020, against various entities and individuals. The end goal is to
reach a conclusion on whether cyber sanctions are of symbolic nature, or can be considered as an effective policy instrument
for the EU. This paper highlights the uses and limits of the EU cyber sanctions regime, which is a rather recent development
and therefore under developed in the relevant literature.

This report -the product of a multidisciplinary, international team of sanctions specialists -seeks to contribute to the debate on Russia sanctions (and their renewal) at a crucial time. It does so through exploring four key questions: (i) what impact have sanctions had to date and how effective have they been; (ii) what evidence is 6 there that some EU countries and sectors are being hit harder than others; (iii) how could measures be adjusted to improve chances of success, and (iv) what are the most likely scenarios for sanctions on Russia in the months/ years to come? The report makes use of a rigorous methodological framework developed by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium, and also draws on analysis of trade statistics, detailed consultation of the specialist literature, interviews with officials involved in sanctions implementation and scenario-building.

Russia's new foreign policy pays particular attention to the reconquest of the African space. Motivated by the desire to be considered as a global power, Russia engages in Africa aiming to challenge Western hegemony. Thus, her offensive in Central Africa draws as much from the Soviet heritage as from a philosophy of power based on the control of geopolitical pivots. The good geopolitical analysis of the territories realized by Russia allows her to maximize benefits despite the modesty of her capabilities. Then, she can use, alternatively, multilateralism and bilateral cooperation as tools of conquest. However, important structural weaknesses undermine the Russian's power politics. The absence of consistent geopolitical capacities and the counteroffensive of the traditional powers, including France, represent major threats to the African ambitions of Russia.

Validity, efficacy and coerciveness are all central concepts in legal theory. Every major legal theoretician has somehow touched upon in each of these concepts. However, their meaning and interrelationship remain problematic. Some of these problems originate from the adopted definitions of these concepts, some others from the ambiguous tone of legal philosophers. This article can be viewed as an effort to reconcile these three concepts and rediscover their central position in legal theory. In this regard, the article examines the work of three important positivists, each leading a different understanding of positivism: Austin, Kelsen and Hart. The article reaches the conclusion that the concepts of efficacy and validity are intertwined as the efficacy of the legal system has always been conceived of as the precondition for its validity. On the other hand, an individual norm's efficacy should have no effect on its validity. The connection of sanctions as the tool of coerciveness to these two concepts depends on the adopted definition of sanction. There are two understandings of sanctions: Normative and factual. In case the normative understanding or definition is adopted, sanction and coerciveness have very little to do with either validity or efficacy. If sanction is considered to be a factual "evil", however, its effect on the system's efficacy and validity increases.

В работе исследуются основные подходы к определению юридической ответственности в современном избирательном процессе России и ее виды.

The paper examines the main approaches to the definition of legal responsibility in the modern electoral process in Russia, and its types.

Note: Downloadable document is in Russian.