Courage

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-013-9249-8
https://doctorcroom.com/croom-2014a

PURPOSE The purpose of the study is to explore how gender norms emerge in romantic relationships among early adolescents (EAs) living in five poor urban areas. METHODS Data were collected as part of the Global Early Adolescent Study. The current research analyzed data from interviews with 30 EAs (aged 11-13 years) living in five poor urban sites: Baltimore, Cuenca, Edinburgh, Ghent, and Nairobi. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed in English using Atlas.ti, focusing on how EAs experience and perceive gender norms in romantic relationships. RESULTS Across the five sites, only a few respondents described having been in love, the majority of whom were boys. Findings indicate that stereotypical gender norms about romantic relationships prevail across these cultural settings, depicting boys as romantically/sexually active and dominant, and girls as innocent with less (romantic) agency. In spite of the similarities, Nairobi was unique in that respondents referred to ho...

Theorists have recently been exploring the prospects for a virtue-centred approach to aesthetics. Virtue aesthetics encourages a re-focusing of philosophical attention onto the aesthetic character traits of agents, in the same way that virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have encouraged us to focus on moral and intellectual traits. In this paper, I aim to contribute to the development of virtue aesthetics by discussing aesthetic courage, the aesthetic analogue of one of the most widely acknowledged moral virtues. In addition to proposing an account of the nature of this trait, I also argue that aesthetic courage is vital for any sort of aesthetically virtuous life. It is not possible to possess any aesthetic virtue without possessing aesthetic courage. It is important, therefore, for any future development of virtue aesthetics to acknowledge the central importance of aesthetic courage.

"'Democracy and Leadership: On Pragmatism and Virtue' presents a theory of leadership drawing on insights from Plato’s Republic, while abandoning his authoritarianism in favor of John Dewey’s democratic thought. The book continues the democratic turn for the study of leadership beyond the incorporation of democratic values into old-fashioned views about leading. The completed democratic turn leaves behind the traditional focus on a class of special people. Instead, leadership is understood as a process of judicious yet courageous guidance, infused with democratic values and open to all people.

The book proceeds in three parts, beginning with definitions and an understanding of the nature of leadership in general and of democratic leadership in particular. Then, Part II examines four challenges for a democratic theory of leadership. Finally, in Part III, the book tests the theory of democratic leadership in addressing problems of poverty, educational frustration, and racial divides, particularly aggravated in Mississippi.""

This study examines the relationship between behavioral courage and job performance, and explores the possible effects of organizational level and gender on this relationship. With a sample of managers from mid-to large-sized for-profit organizations in the United States, we found that behavioral courage was positively associated with job performance. Our results also revealed significant differences in supervisors' ratings of behavioral courage between employees at low and high organizational levels. The effects of behavioral courage on job performance did not vary by organizational level. In turn, the moderating effect of gender on the association between behavioral courage and job performance was supported. The study results provide important theoretical and practical implications in the fields of organizational behavior, leadership studies, and human resource development. Recommendations for future research are discussed.

ABTRACT: When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries to demar-cate his ideal of genuine courage from the paradigmatic examples of courageous actions derived from the Homeric epics. It remains questionable, though, whether Aristotle is truly earnest in his efforts to distance himself from Homer. It will be argued that Aristotle's attempt to associate with Homer the two forms of specious courage—courage of the citizen troops and spirit-caused courage—fails to provide sufficient criteria for the demarcation in question. All the essential elements of the Aristotelian account of courage, such as a voluntary choice, a noble goal, and a thumos-driven reaction guided by reason are exemplified by a number of Homeric characters as well. It is thus likely that the philosopher's account of courage largely incorporates the poetic tradition at a new level, rather than supersedes it.

In this chapter, DeYoung looks at the culturally and historically recognized virtue of courage. She specifically questions how we should think of all the pictures of courage and where we might look for Christlike examples of courage. To do this, DeYoung explores courage as it relates to fear and love and then delves into how courage can be a Christian practice.

In this age of technology, globalization, and rapid change, we are faced with new situations that raise the universal question of what it means to be human in the face of our existential anxiety - anxiety that is rooted in our being and cannot be removed. Theologian Paul Tillich surmised that the anxiety of meaninglessness and emptiness is most pressing in our current situation as exemplified by the earlier illustrations of searches for meaning and the unsatisfactory nature of traditional pathways. He concluded that a new courage-to-be arising from an absolute faith that includes and transcends a mystical and personal encounter with God is needed to address this new context.

This paper intends to explore how mystical, non-Christian spiritual practices embedded within a personal, Christian framework could impact the spiritual formation of a contemporary courage-to-be from Tillich’s concept of absolute faith. To do this, this project will explore the phenomenological and theological aspects of the narratives of two people who integrated non-Christian, mystical spiritual practices into their original Christian spiritual formation amid their own manifestations of existential anxiety: Dr. Ruben Habito and the practice of Zen Buddhist sitting meditation and John Coltrane’s Jazz improvisation. Both narratives contain each person’s formation through these spiritual practices along with a revelatory event - Buddhism’s kensho and Jazz’ Ultimate Flow state. Each narrative will be explored as conversation with theologian Paul Tillich’s theological concept of the courage-to-be arising from revelation in addressing existential anxiety. The implications of this conversation will be applied toward a theological construct of spiritual formation for United Theological Seminary and its students in the exploration of their own existential anxiety as it relates to their formation.

In light of these considerations, I will argue that a trans-religious engagement between each mystical spiritual practice and a Christian background is one effective way for an absolute faith to meet the existential anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness. This will have implications on the formation of seminary students.

本文首先從《論語》的“ 勇者不懼”到《老子》的“ 勇於不敢”，再到《墨辯》的“ 勇，以其敢於是也命之，不以其不敢於彼也害之”，梳理出一條先秦“勇”觀念史的發展線索。對《老子》“慈故能勇”的歷代詮釋包括儒家、道家與法家三種傾向，其中儒家傾向的詮釋高度體現了儒道的德性倫理學的會通。最後，老子的“慈故能勇”與孔子的“仁者必有勇”背後所蘊含的德性倫理學的理論框架不同：孔子的“仁”與其他德目的關係可以用德性本末論和德性偏全論來概括，
而老子的理論框架則是一種消極德性與積極德性相互轉化的動態的德性整全論。通過對照老子論德性的“大似不肖”與論道的“大曰逝、遠、反”，可將老子的德性整全論與其道論相匹配，理解爲一個融貫的系統。

TILL KINZEL Der Schmerz des Menschen in der Welt Überlegungen zu einem unvollständigen Dialog zwischen Ernst Jünger, C. S. Lewis und Josef Pieper Der Schmerz ist das, was den Menschen erst dann zum Problem wird, wenn er auftritt. Erst im Zustand des Schmerzes wird die Selbstverständlichkeit der Schmerzlosigkeit, die der gesunde Mensch empfindet und daher voraussetzt, aufgehoben. Nur die Schmerzlosigkeit läßt es möglich erscheinen, die Welt in gewissem Maße objektiv in sich aufzunehmen. Denn die Realität des Schmerzes scheint in einer Spannung zu stehen mit der Realität der Welt. Der Schmerz, der den Menschen bis in das Innerste seines Wesens erschüttert, zieht ihn auch aus der Welt zurück auf sich selbst. Denn im Schmerz denkt der Mensch nur an diesen Schmerz und damit an sich selbst als das Objekt des Schmerzes. Mit dem Schmerz ist der Mensch allein. So scheint es jedenfalls zunächst. Schauen wir also zu, wie sich die Philosophie zum Problem des Schmerzes stellt und wie sich dieses Problem mit der hier interessierenden Frage nach dem Menschenbild verbindet. Der Schmerz steht als Phänomen der Grenzerfahrung bemerkenswerterweise nicht im Zentrum anthropologischer Betrachtung, auch wenn es selbstverständlich eine lange philosophische Tradition der Auseinandersetzung damit gibt, bis hin zu der Leidensphilosophie eines Arthur Schopenhauer. 1 Das neueste Handbuch Anthropologie des Metzler-Verlages enthält keinen Eintrag oder Indexverweis auf das Phänomen des Schmerzes. Ebenso erwähnt das Handbuch Ethik desselben Verlages den Schmerz nicht eingehender, sondern nur gleichsam en passant. 2 Immerhin hat die sogenannte Historische Anthropologie, die sich emphatisch gegen die allgemeine Rede von dem Menschen und damit eigentlich gegen jede Anthropologie im eigentlichen Sinne wendet, das Phänomen in den Blick genommen, denn in der historischen Realität ist es unausweichlich, den Schmerz als einer Form des Leidens gewahr zu werden. Hans-Peter Dreitzel bietet in seinem ausführlichen Artikel in dem voluminösen Handbuch Vom Menschen eine Art Phänomenologie des Schmerzes. Schaut man jedoch in die dort abgedruckte Bibliographie des Artikels, stellt man mit einigem Erstaunen fest, daß weder Ernst Jünger noch C. S. Lewis, von Josef Pieper ganz zu schweigen, hier berücksichtigt werden. 3 Das ist ein doch immerhin überraschender Befund, wenn man um den erheblichen Tiefgang weiß, den die Betrachtungen der genannten Schriftsteller und Philosophen aufweisen. Um eben diese drei soll es aber im Folgenden gehen, unter der vorausgesetzten Vermutung, daß sich bei diesen Denkern und Schriftstellern Impulse zu einem Verständnis des Problems des Schmerzes finden, die bisher im philosophischen Denken noch nicht eingeholt worden sind. Ohne diesen Anspruch hier selbst einholen zu können, möchte ich wenigstens Prolegomena zu diesem Themenkreis vortragen, die sinnvollerweise nur zur weiteren Auseinandersetzung anregen

Se hace un análisis de la obra teatral sorprndendente de John Patrick Schalnley, llevada al cine bajo su dirección, para enriquecer el drama escénico, con su propio guión. Enfoco el artículo más desde la perspectiva del propio director, quien la llevaría al cine con actores de altísima calidad como Meryl Streep, Philip Seymour Hoffman , Amy Adams, Joseph Foster y Viola Davis, con un tema espeluznante.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Courage has seen an explosion of research in all branches of psychology, and the most popular measure is Norton and Weiss's the courage measure (CM). Despite widespread use, limited investigations into its psychometric properties and validity have been performed. To ensure the strength of findings drawn from the scale, the current study performs a theoretical, psychometric, and empirical analysis of the CM. The results demonstrate that the CM has theoretical concerns stemming from the operational definition of courage used during its creation, and may not actually measure courage. Also, the CM was shown to consist of two dimensions separated by regular and reverse coding. Next, the scale demonstrated slight concerns with method effects, and its construct validity was analyzed. Together, the results demonstrate that the CM would benefit from the removal of reverse coded items, and may actually gage persistence despite fear rather than courage.

What qualities do we need in order to be good philosophers? Wittgenstein insists that virtues of character – such as honesty, humility, courage, and strength – are more important for our philosophizing than the relevant intellectual talents and skills. These virtues are essential because doing good philosophy demands both knowing and overcoming the deep-seated desires and inclinations which lead us astray in our thinking, and achieving such self-knowledge and self-overcoming demands all of these virtues working in concert. In this paper I draw together many of Wittgenstein’s seemingly offhanded remarks on these issues in order to reconstruct his understanding of philosophy’s ‘difficulties of the will’ and the virtues needed to overcome them.

“Il giorno che l’Italia morì” è la storia di Sabatina e Silvano, dal 1943 al 2018. Tutta la storia di quei lunghi anni, che hanno formato e deformato l’Italia dal dopoguerra in poi. La storia è vista con gli occhi della malattia e del senso della morte durante gli ultimi mesi di vita dei due protagonisti. L’Italia vera, quella che è fisicamente e spiritualmente esistita, si contrappone alla visione di distacco progressivo dei due protagonisti da quella stessa Italia che hanno in realtà vissuto ma nella malattia e nel senso della morte imminente si offusca, sfoca, e scompare per lasciar posto a un grande Nulla insondabile. Nulla che proseguirà nel figlio Fabrizio spingendolo a cercare le ragioni di quel Nulla. A cercare quali narrazioni abbiano dominato (trasformandola) l’Italia in tutti quegli anni per portarla al Nulla degli ultimi mesi di vita di Sabatina e Silvano. Fabrizio è ultimo muto testimone e depositario della memoria del Nulla, di quelle due esistenze che come ospiti si congedano definitivamente dal mondo ormai indifferente alle loro esistenze. E’ un testo che si interroga su molte cose ma soprattutto su valori ormai usciti dal nostro vocabolario quotidiano, come il senso morale e il senso dell’onore, l'onestà, il morire per la patria e la libertà, il credere in valori (ideologie) che possono guidare la vita, giusti o sbagliati che siano, ma pur sempre valori che si contrappongono all’unico valore imperante: il denaro.

The book offers the first comprehensive account of the debate on true courage as it was raging in ancient Greece, from the times when the immensely influential Homeric epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were composed, to the writings of the equally influential philosopher, Aristotle. The many voices that contribute to this debate will include poets, authors of ancient dramas and comedies, historians and philosophers. The book traces the origin of the earliest ideal of a courageous hero in the writings of Homer (8th century BCE), and faithfully records its transformations in later authors, ranging from a complete denial of the Homeric standard of courage (as, for instance, in comedies of Aristophanes and Dialogues of Plato) to the strong revisionist tendencies of Aristotle, who seeks to restore true courage to its traditional place as an exclusively martial, male virtue.

This essay does two things. First, it provides a framework for understanding Brecht within analytic philosophy by demonstrating how his use of his adaptation's Fabel positions him within philosophical discourse. Second, it provides a case study of Brecht's adapted story, " Socrates Wounded " using that framework. This case study examines the story in relation to Plato's accounts of Socrates fighting at the battle of Delium with specific attention to the theme of courage. It finds that while both agree that courage is found in the wisdom to do the morally just action, they disagree on the nature of that wisdom and on what acts can be considered morally justified. It also finds that while both authors insist on a moral imperative to act courageously, the respective imperatives have different roots and that the two thinkers disagree as to whether or not one must be steadfast in order to be brave.

Risk aversion, courage and sacrifice during the "war" against coronavirus
Courage, cowardice and cowering?
Honouring the risk takers?
Misrepresentation of the scope of the crisis?
Collateral damage and tolerable fatalities in warfare -- from the perspective of authorities

High rates of desertion and surrender during the battles in North Africa in the summer of 1942
were a major factor in Eighth Army’s poor combat performance. At the time, some suggested
that these problems were symptomatic of a lack of courage or even of cowardice. There are two
broad strands to the conceptualization of courage and cowardice. One focuses on the willingness
of the person to fight; the other puts emphasis on how actions express an individual’s ability to
cope with fear. Whichever conceptualization is used, high morale motivates the soldier to fight
and shields the ordinary recruit from his fear, preventing it from overcoming him in battle. Where
morale fails, the soldier is left demotivated and burdened with his terror and, therefore, and is,
therefore prone to desertion or surrender. Because it is extremely difficult to maintain morale
at a continuously high level in an environment governed by chance and managed by humans, all soldiers can find themselves in situations where their actions may be judged as cowardly. Alternatively, if they are properly motivated to fight and prepared by the state and military to deal with the unavoidable fear of combat, all soldiers can be labelled courageous. Accordingly, emotive terms should be avoided when attempting to describe rationally explainable outcomes. The undoubtedly negative connotations attached to cowardice in battle and the positive ones attached to courage are, therefore, arguably unhelpful in understanding Eighth Army’s performance in the summer of 1942 and the human dimension in warfare more generally.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Although long-established military virtues, such as honor, courage and loyalty, are what most armed forces today still use as guiding principles in an effort to enhance the moral behavior of soldiers, much depends on whether the military virtues adhered to by these militaries suit a particular mission or military operation. Clearly, the beneficiaries of these military virtues are the soldiers themselves, fellow-soldiers, and military organizations, yet there is little that regulates the behavior of soldiers towards civilian populations. As a result, troops trained for combat in today's missions sometimes experience difficulty in adjusting to the less aggressive ways of working needed to win the hearts and minds of local populations after major combat is over. It can be argued that today's missions call for virtues that are more inclusive than the traditional ones, which are mainly about enhancing military effectiveness, but a convincing case can be made that a lot can already be won by interpreting these traditional virtues in different ways.

This volume offers an integrated approach to the main traditional virtues, exploring their possible relevance and proposing new ways of interpretation that are more in line with the military tasks of the 21st century.

Тема мужества и военно-вирильной доблести далека от чистого академизма, и самая, по видимости, мирная политическая и социальная повестка может неожиданно актуализировать ее. Уже в платоновском «Лахесе» ставится вопрос о том, нужно ли мужество только в бою. В статье обсуждается вопрос, является ли гражданское мужество идеалом Сократа / Платона, или же они предусматривают какую-то специфически философскую добродетель, близкую по типу мужеству, но превосходящую ее (kallion).
The topic of the military and/or masculine virtue is not purely academic, and even the most (apparently) peaceful social and political agenda can suddenly render it quite urgent. It becomes evident as early as in Plato’s Laches inquiring whether
one needs courage only in battle. The article discusses the question whether civic courage was Socrates’s / Plato’s ideal or they meant some specific philosophical virtue comparable with and yet superior to courage (kallion).
Ключевые слова: Сократ, Платон, диалог «Лахес», мужество, добродетель / доблесть, архаичные (традиционные) ценности, гражданское мужество, философское мужество.
Key words: Socrates, Plato, the dialogue “Laches”, courage, virtue, archaic (traditional) values, civic courage, philosophical courage.

This paper examines the concept of courage within medieval ethics and uses the Battle of Agincourt as a case-study for how medieval writers discussed this virtue. It shows how courage was defined as the virtuous mean between the vices of cowardice on the one hand and of foolhardiness on the other. Giles of Rome's Aristotelian discussion of courage sets out seven kinds of fortitude and argues that true courage is when men choose of their own free will to fight for the common good.

Courage  has  been  linked  to  important  workplace  outcomes,  but  little  is  known  about  the  antecedents  of  courage.  To  identify  possible  methods  to  develop  a  more  courageous  workforce,  the current article provides initial evidence regarding the antecedents of behavioral social courage from  five  broad  categories:  personality,  job  characteristics,  leadership,  culture,  and  demographic  characteristics.  Three  exploratory  studies  show  that  certain  antecedents  from  these  categories  have a significant relationship with behavioral social courage, including grit, proactive personality (personality),  social  support  (job  characteristics),  empowering  leadership  (leadership),  power  distance  (culture),  and  age  (demographics).  Perceived  courage  benefits  and  risks  did  not  mediate  the  effect  of  most  antecedents  on  behavioral  social  courage.  These  results  suggest  that  certain  antecedents  may  influence  behavioral  social  courage,  but  the  mediators  of  these  relationships  remain unknown. Further implications and directions for future research are discussed.

This paper analyzes Aristotle's discussion of courage, the first and paradigmatic virtue in his account of moral virtue, as the perfection of human beings' natures as both political and rational. It identifies unrecognized complexities in his definition of courage as "a mean with respect to fear and confidence," in his subtle analysis of citizen courage, and especially in what he reveals to be the conflict-riddled reasons people find courage noble and good. While working to moderate the excessive fieriness of traditional heroism and to render citizens' courage more sober and moderate, Aristotle shows why political courage can in fact never be made perfectly rational, pointing to a key limit to human rationality altogether.

Hoje em dia, devido a muitas mudanças políticas, económicas e culturais na Europa e no mundo inteiro, as noções da identidade, das fronteiras e de culturas nacionais tornaram-se muito permeáveis e flexíveis e dá-se cada vez mais importância a uma perspectiva comparatista de olhar para o Outro e por isso a literatura comparada desempenha um papel cada vez maior no diálogo intercultural e contribui para um melhor conhecimento e aproximação entre os diversos povos.
Este é um dos motivos que nos levaram a desenvolvermos vários trabalhos de investigação na área da literatura popular comparada, incluindo as nossas dissertações de Mestrado e Doutoramento. Para os efeitos desta leitura crítica escolhemos justamente “As postas do peixe”,  porque este conto tem as suas variantes mesmo dentro da própria cultura portuguesa, e aparece também numa versão sérvia e provavelmente em outras literaturas. Nas versões portuguesas esta narrativa pode encontrar-se também sob os títulos “A torre de Babilónia”  e “A torre da Má Hora”. Nas últimas duas criações literárias trata-se não propriamente do mesmo conto com “retoques” que lhe aportam as diferenças, mas do aproveitamento de alguns motivos e elementos. O denominador comum das três torres é o seu nome, que implica um presságio, a “morte” e a “má hora” nos títulos dos contos têm praticamente o mesmo significado, enquanto “Babilónia” apenas pelo nome faz lembrar a bíblica torre de Babel, cuja construção provocou a ira divina e por isso Deus decidiu confundir as línguas dos homens para não se entenderem. Porém, a própria história nada tem a ver nem com a soberba humana, nem com as línguas, nem com o motivo bíblico e pode pressupor-se que a palavra “Babilónia” neste contexto foi usada apenas para rimar com a maldição popular “quem lá vai nunca de lá torna”.
Palavras chave: Conto Português "As Postas do Peixe", Conto sérvio: "As três enguias", motivos semelhantes, coragem, amor fraternal