Déficience Intellectuelle

Improving the sexual lives of people with disabilities (PWDs) and people with an intellectual disability (ID) requires not only changes in the service organizations and professional practices, but it is primarily based on an ongoing dialogue between stakeholders, including first and foremost, people with ID. Under the ''International Education Program for Democratic Citizenship'' by, for and with individuals with a mental, intellectual or physical disability, the issue of sexual rights has emerged as one of the major challenges empowering people with ID. Although several stakeholders have contributed to the emergence of a new emancipatory paradigm, based on the recognition and exercise of rights of people with disabilities, it is essential that PWDs and people with ID be heard and participate in the cultural, ethical, political, organizational or professional ongoing changes because the recognition of sexual rights is part of the political universe of citizenship and civic engagement. From words to political action through social changes, people with intellectual disabilities still have a long way to go and society has to consider major changes, so they can individually and collectively exercise all their rights.

Dans ce mémoire, je cherche à déterminer pourquoi les animaux non humains ne sont pas considérés comme étant autonomes dans les théories libérales contemporaines. Pour ce faire, j’analyse deux conceptions traditionnelles de l’autonomie, soit l’autonomie en tant qu’agentivité morale et l’autonomie hiérarchique (en tant que capacité à agir selon ses désirs de second ordre), et je soutiens que ces deux conceptions ne réussissent pas à bien justifier le respect des choix personnels même chez les agents humains. J’avance que ces deux conceptions de l’autonomie mènent à des conclusions perfectionnistes et paternalistes à certains égards, ce qui est pourtant contraire à leur fonction. J’analyse ensuite quelques versions alternatives de l’autonomie qui ne reposent pas sur la possession de facultés morales ou rationnelles, avant de proposer une nouvelle conception de l’autonomie qui pourrait répondre aux problèmes soulevés et potentiellement reconnaître l’autonomie des animaux non humains.

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In this M.A. research, I try to understand why nonhuman animals are not considered autonomous in the contemporary liberal theories. To do this, I analyze two main conceptions of autonomy, autonomy as moral agency and hierarchical autonomy (as the capacity to act according to second-order desires), and I argue that these conceptions both fail to justify the respect of personal choices even for human agents. I suggest that these two conceptions of autonomy lead to perfectionist and paternalist conclusions, although this is inconsistent with their function. I then review a few alternative versions of autonomy that do not rely on possessing moral or rational faculties, before sketching a new conception of autonomy that could answer the different issues raised during this research and potentially recognize the autonomy of nonhuman animals.