Ethical Theory

In this paper we make an argument for limiting veterinary expenditure on companion animals. The argument combines two principles: the obligation to give and the selfconsciousness requirement. In line with the former, we ought to give money to organisations helping to alleviate preventable suffering and death in developing countries; the latter states that it is only intrinsically wrong to kill an individual that is self-conscious. Combined, the two principles inform an argument along the following lines: rather than spending inordinate amounts of money on veterinary care when a companion animal is sick or injured, it is better to give the money to an aid organisation and painlessly kill the animal.

Different definitions of bioethics in American and Italian literature are reported. It is argued that they refer to three different conceptions of the epistemological status of bioethics: the first conceives of it as an application of moral principles to biomedical problems, the second as a methodology for the working out of clinical judgement, the third as a broader and interdisciplinary public inquiry. It is suggested that each approach grasps a part of the truth, for each singles out one level of the bioethical work. Bioethics is in fact a complex, three-level form of knowledge. The misunderstanding of this complexity has led to some confusion and to conflicts of attribution among those who are concerned with it.

From the 5th edition of Beauchamp and Childress' Principles of Biomedical Ethics, the problem of common morality has been given a more prominent role and emphasis. With the publication of the 6th and latest edition, the authors not only attempt to ground their theory in common morality, but there is also an increased tendency to identify the former with the latter. While this stratagem may give the impression of a more robust, and hence stable, foundation for their theoretical construct, we fear that it comes with a cost, namely the need to keep any theory in medical ethics open to, and thereby aware of, the challenges arising from biomedical research and clinical practice, as well as healthcare systems. By too readily identifying the moral life of common morality with rule-following behaviour, Beauchamp and Childress may even be wrong about the nature of common morality as such, thereby founding their, by now, classic theory on quicksand instead of solid rock.

The maxim ''parents should do what is in the best interests of their child'' seems like an unassailable truth, and yet, as I argue here, there are serious problems with it when it is taken seriously. One problem concerns the sort of demands such a principle places on parents; the other concerns its larger social implications when conceived as part of a national policy for the rearing of children. The theory of parenting that creates these problems I call ''optimizing parentalism.'' To avoid them, I define and defend a new and more morally appealing theory, ''satisficing parentalism.''

Evidence-based practice has become an important approach to social work practice. This paper highlights some of the ethical dilemmas which may be implicated by this approach, and encourages social workers and social work researchers to carefully consider these potential quandaries.

In medical ethics, principles have an important but frequently overextended role. The need for exact answers and moral formulae sometimes leads to the misuse of principles, such that they usurp the central place of persons and become ends in themselves. The Baby Jane Doe case is discussed as a prominent instance of both the proper uses and abuses of principles. A more fitting role for principles is described and illustrated, stressing the use of principles as tools of moral discernment and the time-laden character of moral judgments. Key words-medical ethics, principles, uncertainty, judgment "We're not just fighting for this baby but for the principle that every life is sacred [I]". C. EVERETT Koop "It should be clear by now that what is needed in neonatal decision-making is precise articulation of agreed-upon principles and improved procedures for applying them to individual cases [2]". GEORGE ANNA~

Inasmuch as unmitigated pain and suffering are often thought to rob human beings of their dignity, physicians and other care providers incur a special duty to relieve pain and suffering when they encounter it. When pain and suffering cannot be controlled it is sometimes thought that human dignity is compromised. Death, it is sometimes argued, would be preferred to a life without dignity. Reasoning such as this trades on certain preconceptions of the nature of pain and suffering, and of their relationships to dignity. The purpose of this paper is to lay bare these preconceptions. The duties to relieve pain and suffering are clearly matters of moral obligation, as is the duty to respond appropriately to the dignity of other persons. However, it is argued that our understanding of the phenomena of pain and suffering and their relationships to human dignity will be expanded when we explore the aesthetic dimensions of these various concepts. On the view presented here the life worth livi...

While bioethics as a field has concerned itself with methodological issues since the early years, there has been no systematic examination of how ethics is incorporated into research on the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications (ELSI) of the Human Genome Project. Yet ELSI research may bear a particular burden of investigating and substantiating its methods given public funding, an explicitly cross-disciplinary approach, and the perceived significance of adequate responsiveness to advances in genomics. We undertook a qualitative content analysis of a sample of ELSI publications appearing between 2003 and 2008 with the aim of better understanding the methods, aims, and approaches to ethics that ELSI researchers employ. We found that the aims of ethics within ELSI are largely prescriptive and address multiple groups. We also found that the bioethics methods used in the ELSI literature are both diverse between publications and multiple within publications, but are usually not themselves discussed or employed as suggested by bioethics method proponents. Ethics in ELSI is also sometimes undistinguished from related inquiries (such as social, legal, or political investigations).

Much has been written about the outsourcing phenomenon. Most authors have attempted to measure and/or minimize its effects or show that "in the long run" the benefits will outweigh the costs. Many authors have described the best way to manage the outsourcing process. But what is the morality of offshoring? What is its "rightness" or "wrongness?" Little analysis of the ethics of offshoring has been completed thus far. This paper develops a preliminary framework for analyzing the ethics of offshoring. The first section of this paper following this introduction discusses the meaning of the terms ethics, morality and fairness. The second section looks at data for

The investigation of the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying the moral mind is of paramount importance for understanding complex human behaviors, from altruism to antisocial acts. A new study on patients with prefrontal damage provides key insights on the neurobiology of moral judgment and raises new questions on the mechanisms by which reason and emotion contribute to moral cognition.

A L L M A R K P . ( 2 0 0 5 ) A L L M A R K P . ( 2 0 0 5 ) Journal of Advanced Nursing 51(6), 618-624 Can the study of ethics enhance nursing practice? Aim. The aim of this paper is to suggest that the study of ethics and ethical theories can enhance nursing practice. Discussion. Knowledge of ethical theories can be of practical use to nurses in at least three ways. First, it can help nurses uncover to what extent a problem is an ethical one. The questions faced in practice can be empirical, formal or philosophical. Very often, a practical decision requires us to tackle all three types. In the example of a 'Do not attempt resuscitation' order, deciding on whether such an order is appropriate requires us to answer empirical questions such as how likely any attempt is to achieve success. It also requires us to answer formal questions such as whether the law permits such an order in the present circumstance. Finally, it requires us to answer ethical/philosophical questions, such as how we should weigh up quality of life against quantity. Second, it can enable practitioners to develop skills and tools to tackle ethical/philosophical questions. In this paper I describe two such tools: Socratic questioning and Aristotelian dialectic. Third, it can help practitioners to develop the soundness of their ethical values and beliefs. All ethical reasoning requires us to use our values and beliefs, and attending to them enhances the quality of our reasoning. Conclusion. The study of ethics can enhance nursing practice.

Ethics of Animal Use by Peter Sandøe, Stine B. Christiansen is reviewed. Sande and Christiansen offer a helpful introductory book on ethics and animal use that is geared primarily toward teaching ethics in veterinary and animal science courses. Anyone in search of a readable and rounded introduction to the ethics of animal use would be well served in reading this book.

Acknowledgements. INTRODUCTION. I The Grounds of Ethics. 1.1 Aesthetics. 1.2 Agency. 1.3 Authority. 1.4 Autonomy. 1.5 Care. 1.6 Character. 1.7 Conscience. 1.8 Evolution. 1.9 Finitude. 1.10 Flourishing. 1.11 Harmony. 1.12 Interest. 1.13 Intuition. 1.14 Merit. 1.15 Natural Law. 1.16 Need. 1.17 Pain and pleasure. 1.18 Revelation. 1.19 Rights. 1.20 Sympathy. 1.21 Tradition and history. II Frameworks for Ethics. 2.1 Consequentialism. 2.2 Contractarianism. 2.3 Cultural critique. 2.4 Deontological ethics. 2.5 Discourse Ethics. 2.6 Divine command. 2.7 Egoism. 2.8 Hedonism. 2.9 Naturalism. 2.10 Particularism. 2.11 Perfectionism. 2.12 Pragmatism. 2.13 Rationalism. 2.14 Relativism. 2.15 Subjectivism. 2.16 Virtue ethics. III Central Concepts in Ethics. 3.1 Absolute/Relative. 3.2 Act/Rule. 3.3 Bad/evil. 3.4 Beneficence/non-maleficence. 3.5 Cause/reason. 3.6 Cognitivism/non-cognitivism. 3.7 Commission/omission. 3.8 Consent. 3.9 Facts/values. 3.10 The Golden Mean. 3.11 Honour/shame. 3.12 Individua...

Mindfulness is a burgeoning field of study and practice within mental health care and medicine. Yet ethical codes, and the philosophy of the therapist-client relationship, differ greatly between disciplines, and even more between those disciplines and mindfulness-based approaches. The potential for ethical dilemmas is therefore significant.

The book breaks new ground by taking a focused look at an ethics derived from contemporary clinical mindfulness practice itself. What does a secular ethics of mindfulness look like? Who is competent to work therapeutically with mindfulness, and how does one delimit areas and levels of competence? How do clinicians ethically understand the therapist-client relationship from the therapeutic position of mindfulness? And how do clinicians respond when the necessary restraints of their professional role and ethics code come into conflict with the mindfulness-based relationship and therapeutic position?

This book makes a vital contribution to the understanding of ethics as the cornerstone of mindfulness-based practice, and will be of interest to all those involved in delivering mindfulness-based interventions, including psychologists, counselors, spiritual directors, occupational therapists, physicians, nurses, and educators.

It is generally accepted that transgenesis can improve our knowledge of natural processes, but also leads to agricultural, industrial or socio-economical changes which could affect human society at large and which may, consequently, require regulation. It is often stated that developing countries are most likely to benefit from plant biotechnology and are at the same time most likely to be affected by the deployment of such new technologies. Therefore, ethical questions related to such biotechnology probably also need to be addressed. We first illustrate how consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories of ethics can be applied to the genetically modified organism debate, namely consequentialism, autonomy/consent ethics (i.e. self-determination of people regarding matters that may have an effect on these people) and virtue ethics (i.e. whether an action is in adequacy with ideal traits). We show that these approaches lead to highly conflicting views. We have then refocused on mo...

Samuel Scheffler has argued that people value tradition for its own sake because they view it as accumulated experience, and as playing an important role in forming their personal integrity, structuring their lives, and providing them with a sense of belonging. These reasons, according to Scheffler, are de facto justifications that people offer for choosing to act on purely traditional grounds. In this essay, I argue that these de facto reasons must be supplemented if they are to be seen as de jure rational grounds for valuing tradition for its own sake. Such a supplementation would open up the possibility of articulating a coherent theory of moderate cosmopolitanism.

I offer some reasons for the theory that, compared with human beings, non-human animals have some but lesser intrinsic value. On the basis of this theory, I ®rst argue that we do not know how to compare an animal's claim to be free from a more serious type of harm (e.g., death), and a human's claim to be free from some lesser type of harm (e.g., non-fatal morbidity). For we need to take account of these parties' intrinsic value, and their competing types of claim. Yet, there exists no known way for making such comparison, when a human's intrinsic value is higher than that of an animal, whereas the type of claim an animal has is morally weightier than the type of claim a human has. Second, I explain why utilitarianism is unhelpful in making such comparison. Third, in the case where some animals can be sacri®ced for saving a larger number of humans, it is crucial to ask whether animals have the right to life, and I argue that this question is more perplexing than we might think. My conclusion is that the various dif®culties mentioned above have a deeper source than we have so far acknowledged, and that this re¯ects that the moral reality is less tidy and more complex than many theories portray.

This paper examines the dynamics of hostile takeovers (HT's) as a form of corporate warfare. There are a number of compelling reasons for believing this to be an accurate approximation to corporate reality and therefore an appropriate analogy. In circumstances where it is all-too easy for either of the protagonists to act unethically (Berle and Means, The modern corporation and private property, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1991), there is an evident need for an appropriate template through which to analyse and evaluate the ethical dilemmas that HT's inevitably raise (Armour and Skeel, Georget Law J 95:1727, 2007)—whilst also, where possible, employing its prescriptions as a means of corporate conflict resolution. This paper evaluates just war theory (JWT) as one such template. In seeking a conceptually adaptable framework for analysing, interpreting and articulating antagonistic behaviour during a HT, it became apparent in the course of the research that JWT provided a potentially useful and viable template within which to pursue the above. The research questions centre not necessarily on whether this template could in some way be a substitute for statutory and regulatory constraints on unethical conduct but, rather, whether it might better inform all stakeholders of the importance of ethically informed restraint in the interest of the greater good.

This article discusses the relation between empirical and normative approaches in bioethics. The issue of dwarf tossing, while admittedly unusual, is chosen as a point of departure because it challenges the reader to look with fresh eyes upon several central bioethical themes, including human dignity, autonomy, and the protection of vulnerable people. After an overview of current approaches to the integration of empirical and normative ethics, we consider five ways that the empirical and normative can be brought together to speak to the problem of dwarf tossing: prescriptive applied ethics, theoretical ethics, critical applied ethics, particularist ethics and integrated empirical ethics. We defend a position of critical applied ethics that allows for a two-way relation between empirical and normative theories. Against efforts fully to integrate the normative and the empirical into one synthesis, we propose that the two should stand in tension and relation to one another. The approach we endorse acknowledges that a social practice can and should be judged both by the gathering of empirical data and by normative ethics. Critical applied ethics uses a five stage process that includes: (a) determination of the problem, (b) description of the problem, (c) empirical study of effects and alternatives, (d) normative weighing and (e) evaluation of the effects of a decision. In each stage, we explore the perspective from both the empirical (sociological) and the normative ethical point of view. We conclude by applying our five-stage critical applied ethics to the example of dwarf tossing.

The structure of studies of moral education is basically interdisciplinary; it includes moral philosophy, psychology, and educational research. This essay systematically analyses the structure of studies of moral educational from the vantage points of philosophy of science. Among the various theoretical frameworks in the field of philosophy of science, this essay mainly utilizes the perspectives of Lakatos’s research programme. In particular, this essay considers the relations and interactions between different fields, including moral philosophy, psychology, and educational research. Finally, the potential impacts of the new trends emerging from natural sciences that seem to be challenging to existing theoretical frameworks of moral education are examined using the vantage points of philosophy of science.

Whether conducted in a university or the healthcare field, research with human subjects gives rise to a multitude of ethical questions for healthcare professionals. While engaging in ongoing professional development on how to conduct research ethically, both clinicians and scientists need to expand their knowledge to provide answers to the following questions: Which ethical theories serve as a foundation for ethical principles in research ethics? What ethical principles should a researcher respect when conducting research with human subjects? What does it mean to conduct research ethically? What ethical dilemmas are encountered by a researcher in conducting research? This paper provides a review of ethical theories, and the ethical basis of guidelines developed and used to guide human subject research. Ethical behaviors and the personal responsibility of the researcher conducting research with human subjects are discussed along with the ethical considerations in research designs and methods.

There can be little doubt, at least in the Western world, that autonomy is the ruling principle in contemporary bioethics. In spite of its 'triumph' however, the dominance of the utilitarian concept of autonomy is being increasingly questioned. In this paper, I explore the nature of autonomy, how it came to displace the Hippocratic tradition in medicine and how different concepts of autonomy have evolved. I argue that the reduction of autonomy to 'the exercise of personal choice' in medicine has led to a 'tyranny of autonomy' which can be inimical to ethical medical practice rather than conducive to it. I take the case of Kerrie Wooltorton as an illustration of how misplaced adherence to respect for patient autonomy can lead to tragic consequences. An analysis of autonomy based on the work of Rachel Haliburton is described and applied to the role of autonomy in a recent bioethical debatethat arising from Savulescu's proposal that conscientious objection by health-care professionals should not be permitted in the NHS. In conclusion, I suggest Kukla's concept of conscientious autonomy as one promising pathway to circumvent both the limitations and adverse effects of the dominance of current (mis)understandings of autonomy in biomedical ethics. keywords autonomy, conscientious objection, Kant, Mill, Wooltorton In the British Medical Journal in 2003, Professor Ruth Macklin famously suggested that 'dignity is a useless concept' in medical ethics, being nothing other than a 'vague restatement of other more precise, notions… to invoke the concept of dignity without clarifying its meaning is to use a mere slogan' (Macklin 2003, p.1419). Macklin goes on to suggest that 'autonomy' is one word that could be substituted for 'dignity'. Over a decade later, I would suggest that far from being a more precise term than dignity, autonomy itself and certainly by itself, is arguably an equally useless concept in medical ethics and here explain some of my reasons for recently coming to this conclusion.

This chapter has two main objectives; on one hand, reflect on how different theories of development (liberal capitalist, marxist, post-colonial and post-development, liberal egalitarian and radical humanism approaches) have understood education and what brings to this reflection the perspective of development ethics. The second objective is to position ourselves in a particular perspective, the capability approach for human development enriched by elements of other theories of development, and use it to analyze a particular case in South Africa, in the city of Bloemfontein.

Points out how religion is power; power will be used by others--even the non-religious; when things go awry, then, religion is then blamed, often by the same ones who have exploited its power. This calls for critical and wary analysis of the rhetorical use of religion as a pawn, followed by its being blamed as a scapegoat.  Published in The Destructive Power of Religion; Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, edited by J. Harold Ellens (4 volumes, Westport/London: Praeger Publishers, 2004), Vol. 2, 265-83.

ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO MORAL THEORY, FIFTH EDITION provides a comprehensive yet clear introduction to the main traditions in ethical thought, including virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. Additionally, the book presents a conceptual framework of ethical pluralism to help readers understand the relationship among various theories. Lawrence Hinman, one of the most respected and accomplished professionals in ethics and philosophy education today, presents a text that gives readers plentiful opportunities to explore ethical theory and their own responses to them, using fascinating features such as the "Ethical Inventory" sections that appear at the beginning and the end of the text. End-of-chapter discussion questions, and the use of current issues and movies help students retain what they've learn and truly comprehend the subject matter

A number of Christian theologians and philosophers have been critical of overly moralizing approaches to the doctrine of sin, but nearly all Christian thinkers maintain that moral fault is necessary or sufficient for sin to obtain. Call this the “Moral Consensus.” I begin by clarifying the relevance of impurities to the biblical cataloguing of sins. I then present four extensional problems for the Moral Consensus on sin, based on the biblical catalogue of sins: (1) moral over-demandingness, (2) agential unfairness, (3) moral repugnance, and (4) moral atrocity. Next, I survey several partial solutions to these problems, suggested by the recent philosophical literature. Then I evaluate two largely unexplored solutions: (a) genuine sin dilemmas and (b) defeasible sinfulness. I argue that (a) creates more problems than it solves and that, while (b) is well-motivated and solves or eases each of the above problems, (b) leaves many biblical ordinances about sin morally misleading, creating (5) a pedagogical problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that (5) places hefty explanatory burdens on those who would appeal to (b) to resolve the four extensional problems discussed in this paper. So Christian thinkers may need to consider a more radical separation of sin and moral fault.

This is a unique opportunity for early career researchers to join The Alan Turing Institute. The Alan Turing Institute (ATI) is the UK’s new national institute for data science, established to bring together world-leading expertise to provide leadership in the emerging field of data science. The Institute has been founded by the universities of Cambridge, Edinburgh, Oxford, UCL and Warwick and the EPSRC.

This is a targeted call, by which we intend to recruit researchers in subjects currently underrepresented by our fellowship cohort. Fellowships are available for 3 years with the potential for an additional 2 years of support following interim review. Fellows will pursue research based at the Institute hub in the British Library, London. Fellowships will be awarded to individual candidates and fellows will be employed by a joint venture partner university (Cambridge, Edinburgh, Oxford, UCL or Warwick).

This paper reads Roger Simon’s concept of “transactional memory” in relationship to D.W. Winnicott’s theory of the “transitional space” to examine the emotional dimensions of making historical significance. Drawing on a personal memory ofarchival study with Simon, I suggest that his attention to the ethical qualities of remembrance at the same time offers a theoryof remembrance as a work of creative play that sets into motion the painful and hopeful process of working through the anguish ofloss.

The paper addresses O'Neill's view that her version of Kant's Categorical Imperative, namely, the requirement of followability (RF), marks the supreme principle of reason; it takes issue with her claim that RF commits us to Kantian constructivism in practical philosophy. The paper distinguishes between two readings of RF: on a weak reading, RF ranges over all (practical) reasoning but does not commit to constructivism, and on a strong version RF commits to constructivism but fails to meet its own test, and so is self-defeating. The paper argues that RF, if understood strongly, depends for its reasonableness on reasons that cannot coherently be required to meet RF, so that RF cannot be the supreme principle of reason. The paper considers several responses to this problem in order to suggest that RF depends for its reasonableness on perfectionist considerations.

her approach between ethical frameworks that appeal to the preferences of individuals and those that are 'platonic'-that posit objectives independent of desires and choices. However, her reluctance to appeal to preferences is so great-even considered preferences are likely to be distorted, she believes-that her position is hard to distinguish from platonism, with all the problems that this entails. She criticises procedural approaches to social ethics for building into the presuppositions of the procedure assumptions about the capabilities and relationships of participants. But her approach is at least as a priori.

Systematic research in the field of practical knowledge is a recent phenomenon. In this paper, the approaches which have been developed in the main centres of research into practical knowledge in Norway and Sweden are compared with an emphasis on their potential for the study of ethics. The focus on narratives and reflection based on the researcher's own professional experience which is the distingushing feature of the Centre for Practical Knowledge at the University of Nordland is seen as a very promising addition to the traditional repertory of ethical studies.

В книге Достоевского ``Братья Карамазовы'' Великий Инквизитор объяснял по каким законам развиваются цивилизации. Почему в некоторых случаях возникают ситуации, когда эти законы нарушаются? Как кумир учения может стать его первым врагом. Что можно добавить к вопросам ``страшного и умного духа''?

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski believes that a comprehensive moral theory can be constructed by identifying moral exemplars and by investigating (to put it very roughly) what it is that makes them tick. We identify moral exemplars by direct reference to persons we admire "upon reflection." Moral exemplars are persons like that. Two emotions will play a central role in this type of moral theory: admiration, and its opposite, contempt. Zagzebski's theory proceeds by rough analogy with a physical theory that identifies instances of water and then goes on to investigate the physical make-up of the natural kind, water. But an even better comparison, as she says, is to a community of linguistic users which identifies various instances of tigers, say, and then goes on to investigate the (possibly evolving) referent of the species-term "tiger." Zagzebski provides an engaging, illuminating, and deeply human discussion of how the details of this exemplarist approach, with its investigation into the psychological make up of moral exemplars, might be developed.

The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the available options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, displays a sadly illiberal form of prejudice. The paper finds and criticizes such a distortion in Jesse Prinz's recent discussion of the "Normativity Challenge" to Aristotelian virtue ethics, thus highlighting a common tendency that we can helpfully move beyond.